
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Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics

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
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Jews in Cochin (Malabar).

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Rector of St. Saviour's, Bridge of Allan; Hon. Canon of the Cathedral of the Holy Spirit, Cumbrae; Examiner in Comparative Religion and Philosophy of Religion, Victoria University, Manchester; Bell Lecturer, Edinburgh Theological College; author of *Comparative Theology, Religion: its Origin and Forms, The Childhood of Fiction, The Religion of the Ancient Celts.*

Hymns (Celtic), **Incense, Invisibility, Landmarks and Boundaries.**

MACDONELL (ARTHUR ANTHONY), M.A. (Oxon.), Ph.D. (Leipzig).
Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford; Fellow of Balliol College; Fellow of the British Academy; Fellow of the Royal Danish Academy; Keeper of the Indian Institute, Oxford.

Hymns (Vedic), **Indian Buddhism.**

MCDOUGALL (WILLIAM), M.A., M.B., F.R.S.
Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford; author of *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908), *Body and Mind* (1911).

Hypnotism.

MCGIFFERT (ARTHUR CUSHMAN), Ph.D., D.D.
Washburn Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary, New York; author of *A History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age, Martin Luther: the Man and His Work.*

Immanence.

MACGREGOR (DAVID HUTCHISON), M.A. (Edin. and Camb.).
Professor of Political Economy in the University of Leeds; sometime Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

Laissez-Faire.

MCINTYRE (JAMES LEWIS), M.A. (Edin. and Oxon.), D.Sc. (Edin.).
Anderson Lecturer in Comparative Psychology to the University of Aberdeen; Lecturer in Psychology, Logic, and Ethics to the Aberdeen Provincial Committee for the Training of Teachers; formerly Examiner in Philosophy to the University of Edinburgh; author of *Giordano Bruno* (1903).

Imagination, Intelligence.

MACKENZIE (DONALD), M.A.
Minister of the United Free Church at Oban; Assistant Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen, 1906–1909.

Libertarianism and Necessitarianism.

MACKENZIE (JOHN STUART), LL.D., Litt.D.
Professor of Logic and Philosophy in University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire; author of *A Manual of Ethics, Outlines of Metaphysics, Lectures on Humanism.*

Infinity.

MACKENZIE (WILLIAM DOUGLAS), M.A., D.D., LL.D.
President of the Hartford Seminary Foundation, Riley Professor of Christian Theology in the Hartford Theological Seminary; author of *The Ethics of Gambling, Christianity and the Progress of Man, The Final Faith.*

Jesus Christ.

MACKINTOSH (HUGH ROSS), M.A., D.Phil. (Edin.), D.D. (Edin.).
Professor of Systematic Theology in New College, Edinburgh; author of *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* (1912).

Implicit Faith.

MACLAGAN (P. J.), M.A., D.Phil.
Of the English Presbyterian Mission, Swatow.

Incarnation (Chinese).

MACLEAN (ARTHUR JOHN), D.D. (Camb.), Hon. D.D. (Glas.).
Bishop of Moray, Ross, and Caithness; author of *Dictionary of Vernacular Syriac*; editor of *East Syrian Liturgies.*

Hymns (Syriac Christian), **Intercession** (Liturgical), **Invocation** (Liturgical), **Laity, Law** (Christian, Anglican).

MACLEAN (JAMES HAIR), M.A., B.D.
Of the United Free Church of Scotland Mission, Conjeeveram.

Kanchipuram.

MACPHERSON (JOHN), M.D., F.R.C.P.E.
Commissioner in Lunacy for Scotland.

Hysteria, Insanity.

MACRITCHIE (DAVID), F.S.A. (Scot. and Ireland).
Member of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland; President of the St. Andrew Society, Edinburgh; author of *Ancient and Modern Britons; The Ainos; Fians, Fairies and Picts; Scottish Gypsies under the Stewarts*, and other works.

Images and Idols (Lapps and Samoyeds).

MARGOLIOUTH (DAVID SAMUEL), M.A., D.Litt.
Fellow of New College, and Laudian Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford; author of *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam, Mohammedanism*; editor of many Arabic works.

Hymns (Ethiopic Christian, Muslim), **Ibadis, Kalam, Khawarij.**

MARGOLIOUTH (GEORGE), M.A. (Cantab.).
Member of the Board of Studies in Theology at the University of London; formerly Senior Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books and MSS in the British Museum, and Examiner in Hebrew and Aramaic in the University of London.

Hymns (Hebrew and Jewish, Samaritan and Karaite).

MARR (HAMILTON CLELLAND), M.D., C.M., F.R.F.P.S. (Glas.).
H.M. Commissioner of Control for Scotland; formerly Medical Superintendent of Glasgow District Asylum, Lenzie; MacIntosh Lecturer on Insanity, St. Mungo's College, Glasgow.

Hypochondria, Illegitimacy.

MELLONE (S. H.), M.A. (Lond.), D.Sc. (Edin.).
Principal of the Unitarian Home Missionary College, Manchester; Lecturer in the History of Christian Doctrine in the University of Manchester; Examiner in Psychology in the University of Edinburgh; author of *Studies in Philosophical Criticism, Leaders of Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century.*
Immortality.

MENZIES (ALLAN), M.A., D.D.
Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of St. Andrews; author of *The Earliest Gospel*; editor of the *Review of Theology and Philosophy.*
Law (Biblical, New Testament).

MITCHELL (ANTHONY), D.D.
Bishop of Aberdeen and Orkney; formerly Principal and Pantonian Professor of Theology in the Theological College of the Episcopal Church in Scotland.
Laud.

MODI (SHAMS-UL-ULMA JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI), B.A., Hon. Ph.D. (Heidelberg).
Fellow of the University of Bombay; Dipl. Litteris et Artibus (Sweden); Officier d'Académie, France; Officier de l'Instruction Publique, France; President of the Anthropological Society of Bombay; Vice-President of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Initiation (Parsi).

MORGAN (CONWY LLOYD), D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S.
Professor of Psychology and Ethics in the University of Bristol; author of *Introduction to Comparative Psychology, Instinct and Experience.*
Instinct, Laughter.

MORRISON (JOHN), M.A., D.D.
Formerly Principal of the Church of Scotland College, Calcutta.
Kalighat.

MOULTON (JAMES HOPE), M.A. (Cantab.), D.Lit. (Lond.), D.D. (Edin.), D.C.L. (Durham), D.Theol. (Berlin).
Sometime Fellow of King's College, Cambridge; Greenwood Professor of Hellenistic Greek and Indo-European Philology in the University of Manchester; Tutor in Didsbury Wesleyan College; author of *Grammar of New Testament Greek* (3rd ed. 1908), *Religion and Religions* (1913), *Early Zoroastrianism* (Hibbert Lectures), 1914.
Iranians.

MUNRO (ROBERT), M.A., M.D., LL.D. (Edin. and St. Andrews).
Founder of the Munro Lectureship on Anthropology and Pre-historic Archæology; past President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association; author of *Ancient Scottish Lake-Dwellings, The Lake-Dwellings of Europe, Palæolithic Man and Terramara Settlements in Europe, Prehistoric Britain.*
Lake-Dwellings.

MURRAY (JOHN CLARK), LL.D. (Glas.), F.R.S.C.
Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal; author of *A Handbook of Psychology, A Handbook of Christian Ethics.*
Idleness, Ignorance.

MURRAY (ROBERT HENRY), M.A., Litt.D.
Minor Canon, St. Patrick's Cathedral, Dublin; Lecturer in History at Alexandra College, Dublin; author of *Revolutionary Ireland and its Settlements*; editor of *The Journal of John Stevens.*
Hypocrisy.

NAKAJIMA (TAMAKICHI).
Professor of Civil Law in the Imperial University, Kyoto.
Law (Japanese).

NICHOLSON (REYNOLD ALLEYNE), M.A., Litt.D., LL.D.
Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge; sometime Fellow of Trinity College; author of *A Literary History of the Arabs* (1907), *The Tarjuman al-Ashwaq* of Ibn al-Arabi, with translation and commentary (1911).
Jalal al-Din Rumi.

NIESE (BENEDIKT), Ph.D.
Late Professor of Ancient History in the University of Halle; editor of the Works of Josephus.
Josephus.

NIVEN (WILLIAM DICKIE), M.A.
Minister of the United Free Church at Blairgowrie; Co-examiner in Mental Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen.
Ideal.

NORTHCOTE (STAFFORD HARRY).
Viscount St. Cyres; author of *François Fénelon* (1901), *Pascal* (1909).
Jansenism.

OTTLEY (ROBERT LAURENCE), D.D.
Regius Professor of Pastoral Theology, and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford; author of *The Doctrine of the Incarnation* (1895), *Aspects of the Old Testament* (1897), *The Religion of Israel* (1905), and other works.
Innocence.

PATON (LEWIS BAYLES), Ph.D., D.D.
Nettleton Professor of Old Testament Exegesis and Criticism, and Instructor in Assyrian, in Hartford Theological Seminary; formerly Director of the American School of Archæology in Jerusalem; author of *The Early History of Syria and Palestine*, 'Esther' in the *International Critical Commentary, Jerusalem in Bible Times, The Early Religion of Israel.*
Ishtar.

PEARSON (A. C.), M.A.
Sometime Scholar of Christ's College, Cambridge; editor of *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, Euripides' *Helena, Heraclidæ*, and *Phœnissæ.*
King (Greek and Roman).

PERLES (FELIX), Ph.D.
Rabbi at Königsberg.
Law (Jewish).

PHILLPOTTS (BERTHA SURTEES), M.A. (Dublin).
Lady Carlisle Research Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford; Fellow of the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries (Copenhagen); formerly Librarian of Girton College, Cambridge; author of *Kindred and Clan: A Study in the Sociology of the Teutonic Races* (1913).
Inheritance (Teutonic).

PINCHES (THEOPHILUS GOLDRIDGE), LL.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.
Lecturer in Assyrian at University College, London, and at the Institute of Archæology, Liverpool; Hon. Member of the Société Asiatique.

Hymns (Babylonian).

POPE (ROBERT MARTIN), M.A. (Camb. and Manchester).
Author of *Cathemerinon of Prudentius.*

Kindness, Liberty (Christian).

POUSSIN (LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE), Docteur en philosophie et lettres (Liège), en langues orientales (Louvain).
Professeur de sanscrit à l'université de Gand; Correspondant de l'Académie royale de Belgique; Co-Directeur du *Muséon*; Membre de la R.A.S. et de la Société asiatique.

Identity (Buddhist), **Incarnation** (Buddhist), **Jivanmukta, Karma.**

POZNAŃSKI (SAMUEL), Ph.D. (Heidelberg).
Rabbiner und Prediger in Warschau (Polen).

Karaites.

RIVERS (W. H. R.), M.A., M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Lecturer in the Physiology of the Senses in the University of Cambridge; Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association in 1911; author of *The Todas.*

Kin, Kinship.

ROBERTSON (Sir GEORGE SCOTT), K.C.S.I., D.C.L., M.P.
Formerly British Agent at Gilgit; author of *The Kafirs of the Hindu-Kush and Chitral, The Story of a Minor Siege*, and other works.

Kafiristan.

ROSE (H. A.), I.C.S.
Superintendent of Ethnography, Panjab, India.

Jat.

SCHRADER (OTTO), Dr. phil. et jur. h.c.
Ordentlicher Professor für vergleichende Sprachforschung an der Universität zu Breslau; author of *Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan Peoples.*

King (Teutonic and Litu-Slavic), **Law** (Teutonic and Slavic).

SCOTT (WILLIAM ROBERT), M.A., D.Phil., Litt.D.
Lecturer in Political Economy in the University of St. Andrews; Vice-President of the Economic History Section of the International Historical Congress, 1912; author of *Francis Hutcheson: his Life, Teaching, and Position in the History of Philosophy* (1900).

Industrialism, Insurance.

SEATON (MARY ETHEL).
Mediæval and Modern Language Tripos, Class I., 1909 and 1910; Lecturer at Girton College, Cambridge.

Images and Idols (Teutonic and Slavic).

SELL (EDWARD), B.D., D.D., M.R.A.S.
Fellow of the University of Madras; Hon. Canon of St. George's Cathedral, Madras; Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, Madras; author of *The Faith of Islam, The Historical Development of the Qur'ān, The Life of Muḥammad, The Religious Orders of Islam.*

Images and Idols (Muslim), **Inspiration** (Muslim), **Islam.**

SHOREY (PAUL), Ph.D., LL.D., Litt.D.
Professor and Head of the Department of Greek in the University of Chicago; Roosevelt Professor at the University of Berlin, 1913; Member of the American Institute of Art and Letters.

Isocrates.

SHOWERMAN (GRANT), Ph.D.
Professor of Latin in the University of Wisconsin; Fellow in the American School of Classical Studies at Rome, 1898–1900; author of *The Great Mother of the Gods* (Dissertation), 1901, *With the Professor*, 1910; translator of Ovid's *Heroides* and *Amores* (Loeb Classical Library), 1914.

Isis.

SIEG (EMIL), Dr. Phil.
Ordentlicher Professor des Sanskrit und der vergleichenden indogermanischen Sprachwissenschaft in Kiel.

Itihasa.

SIMPSON (JAMES GILLILAND), D.D.
Canon and Precentor of St. Paul's; **Examining** Chaplain to the Bishop of Argyll and the Isles.

Irving and the Catholic Apostolic Church, Justification.

SMITH (HENRY PRESERVED), D.D.
Librarian of the Union Theological Seminary, New York; formerly Professor of Old Testament Literature and the History of Religion in the Meadville Theological School, Pennsylvania.

Inheritance (Hebrew).

SMITH (VINCENT ARTHUR), M.A.
Of the Indian Civil Service (retired); author of *Asoka* in 'Rulers of India,' *Early History of India, A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon.*

Jalandhara, Kaniska, Kapilavastu, Kusinagara.

SÖDERBLOM (NATHAN), D.D. (Paris), Hon. D.D. (Geneva, Christiania, St. Andrews).
Élève diplômé de l'École des Hautes Études; Archbishop of Upsala; Prochancellor of the University of Upsala; formerly Professor in the University of Upsala and in the University of Leipzig.

Incarnation (Introductory, Parsi).

SPEIGHT (HAROLD EDWIN BALME), M.A.
Junior Minister of Essex Church, Kensington; formerly Assistant Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Aberdeen; sometime Fellow of Manchester College, Oxford.

Lessing.

STARBUCK (EDWIN DILLER), Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy in the State University of Iowa; author of *The Psychology of Religion.*

Intuitionalism.

STAWELL (FLORENCE MELIAN).
Certificated Student of Newnham College, Cambridge (Classical Tripos, 1892, Part I. Class I. Div. I.); sometime Lecturer in Classics at Newnham College.

Ionic Philosophy.

STOCK (ST. GEORGE), M.A. (Oxford).
Lecturer on Greek in the University of Birmingham; author of *English Thought for English Thinkers.*

Incarnation (Greek and Roman).

STOKES (GEORGE J.), M.A. (Trinity College, Dublin).
Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Philosophy and Jurisprudence in University College, Cork, National University of Ireland.
Intellect.

STRAHAN (JAMES), M.A.
Edinburgh; Cunningham Lecturer; author of *Hebrew Ideals, The Book of Job, The Captivity and Pastoral Epistles.*
Inspiration (Protestant Doctrine).

TAKAKUSU (JYUN), M.A., D.Litt. (Oxford), Dr. Phil. (Leipzig).
Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Tokyo.
Initiation (Buddhist), **Kwan-yin.**

TASKER (JOHN G.), D.D.
Principal and Professor of Church History and Apologetics in the Wesleyan College, Handsworth, Birmingham.
Intercession.

TAYLOR (ALFRED EDWARD), M.A. (Oxon.), D.Litt. (St. Andrews).
Professor of Moral Philosophy in the United College of SS. Salvator and Leonard, St. Andrews; late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford; Fellow of the British Academy; author of *The Problem of Conduct* (1901), *Elements of Metaphysics* (1903), *Varia Socratica* (1911).
Identity.

THURSTON (HERBERT), B.A., S.J.
Joint-Editor of the Westminster Library for Priests and Students; author of *Life of St. Hugh of Lincoln, The Holy Year of Jubilee, The Stations of the Cross.*
Jesuits.

TRITTON (A. S.), M.A. (Lond. and Oxon.).
Assistant to the Professor of Hebrew and Semitic Languages in the University of Edinburgh.
King (Semitic).

TROELTSCH (ERNST), Dr. theol., phil. jur.
Professor der Theologie an der Universität zu Heidelberg; Geheimer Kirchenrat.
Idealism, Kant.

TURMEL (JOSEPH).
Prêtre; ancien Professeur de Théologie au Séminaire de Rennes; auteur de *Histoire de la théologie positive, Histoire du dogme de la Papauté des origines à la fin du quatrième siècle.*
Immaculate Conception.

TURNER (RALPH LILLEY), M.A.
Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge; Professor of English Literature in Queen's College, Benares.
Karma-marga.

VACANDARD (ELPHÈGE), Docteur en Théologie.
Aumônier du Lycée Corneille, Rouen; Chanoine de la Cathédrale; Lauréat de l'Académie Française; Officier de l'Instruction publique.
Inquisition.

VINOGRADOFF (PAUL), D.C.L. (Oxford and Durham), LL.D. (Cambridge, Liverpool, Calcutta, and Harvard), Dr. Hist. (Moscow), Dr. juris (Berlin), F.B.A.
Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford; Fellow of the Academies in St. Petersburg, Copenhagen, and Christiania; Corresponding Member of the Academy in Berlin.
Law (Greek).

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., LL.D., F.L.S., M.R.A.S., Lt.-Colonel I.M.S.
Formerly Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; author of *The Buddhism of Tibet, Tribes of the Brahmaputra Valley, Lhasa and its Mysteries.*
Images and Idols (Tibetan), **Incarnation** (Tibetan), **Initiation** (Tibetan), **Jewel** (Buddhist), **Lamaism.**

WATT (HENRY J.), M.A., (Aberd.), Ph.D. (Würz.), D.Phil. (Aberd.).
Lecturer on Psychology in the University of Glasgow; author of *The Economy and Training of Memory* (1909), *Psychology* (1913).
Illusion.

WATT (WELLSTOOD ALEXANDER), M.A., LL.B., D.Phil.
Author of *An Outline of Legal Philosophy, The Theory of Contract in its Social Light, A Study of Social Morality.*
Internationality.

WEBB (CLEMENT CHARLES JULIAN), M.A. (Oxon.).
Tutor of St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford; sometime Wilde Lecturer in Natural and Comparative Religion in the University of Oxford; editor of John of Salisbury's *Policraticus.*
Idea.

WELCH (ADAM CLEGHORN), D.D., Theol.D.
Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in New College, Oxford; author of *The Religion of Israel under the Kingdom.*
Investiture Controversy.

WIEDEMANN (Alfred), Dr. Phil. et Litt. h.c. (Louvain), Litt.D. h.c. (Dublin).
Ordentlicher Honorar-Professor der altorientalischen Geschichte und Aegyptologie an der Universität zu Bonn.
Incarnation (Egyptian).

WINTERNITZ (MORIZ), Ph.D.
Professor of Sanskrit and Ethnology in the German University of Prague.
Jataka.

WISSOWA (GEORG), Dr. jur. et phil.
Ordentlicher Professor an der Universität zu Halle; Geheimer Regierungsrat.
Indigitamenta, Invocation (Roman), **Law** (Roman).

WOODHOUSE (WILLIAM J.), M.A.
Professor of Greek in the University of Sydney, New South Wales.
Inheritance (Greek, Roman), **Keres.**

WU (CHAO-CHU), LL.B.
Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of International Law and Roman Law in the University of Peking.
Law (Chinese).

CROSS-REFERENCES

In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

Topic.	Probable Title of Article.
Hypostasis	Person of Christ.
Ibn Arabi	Muhiyy'ddin ibn Arabi.
Ibn Malik	Malik ibn Anas.
Idiocy	Degeneration, Development (Mental).
Ilahis	Akbar.
Imitation	Development (Mental).
Immorality	Ethics and Morality.
Independents	Congregationalism.
Indo-Europeans	Aryan Religion.
Indults	Bulls and Briefs.
Inebriety	Drunkenness.
Infanticide	Abandonment, Children, Human Sacrifice.
Invisibles	Sects (Christian).
Iowan Indians	Siouans.
Isaac ben Yakub al-Isfahani	Messiahs (Pseudo).
Ismailians	Carmatians.
Jacob Frank	Messiahs (Pseudo).
Januarius (Saint)	Miracles (Modern).
Jezreelites	Sects (Christian).
Jieng	Dinka.
Jihad	Law (Muhammadan).
Jilani	'Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani.
Judah	Israel.
Jumpers	Sects (Christian).
Kah-gyur, Kanjur	Lamaism.
Kamchatkans	Siberia.
Kanarese	Dravidians (North India).
Kharijites	Khawarij.
Khliktsi	Men of God.
Khusrau, Nasir ibn	Nasir ibn Khusrau.
Kickapoos	Algonquins (Prairie Tribes).
Kubera	Brahmanism.
Kukis	Lushais.
Lamb	Sacrifice, Symbols.
Last Day	Eschatology.
Latitudinarianism	Cambridge Platonists.
Lent	Fasting (Christian), Festivals and Fasts (Christian).
Leopard	Animals.
Levellers	Sects (Christian).
Lhasa	Tibet.
Liberality	Charity, Hospitality.

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. General

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
Ak. = Akkadian.
Alex. = Alexandrian.
Amer. = American.
Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
Apocr. = Apocrypha.
Aq. = Aquila.
Arab. = Arabic.
Aram. = Aramaic.
Arm. = Armenian.
Ary. = Aryan.
As. = Asiatic.
Assyr. = Assyrian.
AT = Altes Testament.
AV = Authorized Version.
AVm = Authorized Version margin.
A.Y. = Anno Yazdagird (A.D. 639).
Bab. = Babylonian.
c. = *circa*, about.
Can. = Canaanite.
cf. = compare.
ct. = contrast.
D = Deuteronomist.
E = Elohist.
edd. = editions or editors.
Egyp. = Egyptian.
Eng. = English.
Eth. = Ethiopic.
EV = English Version.
f. = and following verse or page: as Ac 10^{34} f.
ff. = and following verses or pages: as Mt 11^{28} ff.
Fr. = French.
Germ. = German.
Gr. = Greek.
H = Law of Holiness.
Heb. = Hebrew.
Hel. = Hellenistic.
Hex. = Hexateuch.
Himy. = Himyaritic.
Ir. = Irish.
Iran. = Iranian.
Isr. = Israelite.
J = Jahwist.
J" = Jehovah.
Jerus. = Jerusalem.
Jos. = Josephus.
LXX = Septuagint.
Min. = Minæan.
MSS = Manuscripts.
MT = Massoretic Text.
n. = note.
NT = New Testament.
Onk. = Onkelos.
OT = Old Testament.
P = Priestly Narrative.
Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
Pent. = Pentateuch.
Pers. = Persian.
Phil. = Philistine.
Phœn. = Phœnician.
Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
R = Redactor.
Rom. = Roman.
RV = Revised Version.
RVm = Revised Version margin.
Sab. = Sabæan.
Sam. = Samaritan.
Sem. = Semitic.
Sept. = Septuagint.
Sin. = Sinaitic.
Skr. = Sanskrit.
Symm. = Symmachus.
Syr. = Syriac.
t. (following a number) = times.
Talm. = Talmud.
Targ. = Targum.
Theod. = Theodotion.
TR = Textus Receptus.
tr. = translated or translation.
VSS = Versions.
Vulg. = Vulgate.
WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. Books of the Bible

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.
Ex = Exodus.
Lv = Leviticus.
Nu = Numbers.
Dt = Deuteronomy.
Jos = Joshua.
Jg = Judges.
Ru = Ruth.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.
Ezr = Ezra.
Neh = Nehemiah.
Est = Esther.
Job.
Ps = Psalms.
Pr = Proverbs.
Ec = Ecclesiastes.
Ca = Canticles.
Is = Isaiah.
Jer = Jeremiah.
La = Lamentations.
Ezk = Ezekiel.
Dn = Daniel.
Hos = Hosea.
Jl = Joel.
Am = Amos.
Ob = Obadiah.
Jon = Jonah.
Mic = Micah.
Nah = Nahum.
Hab = Habakkuk.
Zeph = Zephaniah.
Hag = Haggai.
Zec = Zechariah.
Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.
To = Tobit.
Jth = Judith.
Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.
Wis = Wisdom.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.
Bar = Baruch.
Three = Song of the Three Children.
Sus = Susanna.
Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.
Mk = Mark.
Lk = Luke.
Jn = John.
Ac = Acts.
Ro = Romans.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.
Gal = Galatians.
Eph = Ephesians.
Ph = Philippians.
Col = Colossians.
1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Tit = Titus.
Philem = Philemon.
He = Hebrews.
Ja = James.
1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Jude.
Rev = Revelation.

III. For the Literature

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

Baethgen = *Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
Baldwin = *Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901-1905.
Barth = *Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 ([2]1894).
Benzinger = *Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
Brockelmann = *Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols. 1897-1902.
Bruns-Sachau = *Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.
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Perrot-Chipiez = *Hist. de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, 1881 ff.
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Wilkinson = *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
Zunz = *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*[2], 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

AA = Archiv für Anthropologie.
AAOJ = American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
ABAW = Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
AE = Archiv für Ethnographie.
AEG = Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
AGG = Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
AGPh = Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
AHR = American Historical Review.
AHT = Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
AJPh = American Journal of Philosophy.
AJPs = American Journal of Psychology.
AJRPE = American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
AJSL = American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
AJTh = American Journal of Theology.
AMG = Annales du Musée Guimet.
APES = American Palestine Exploration Society.
APF = Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
AR = Anthropological Review.
ARW = Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
AS = Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
ASG = Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
ASoc = L'Année Sociologique.
ASWI = Archæological Survey of W. India.
AZ = Allgemeine Zeitung.
BAG = Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
BASS = Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
BCH = Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
BE = Bureau of Ethnology.
BG = Bombay Gazetteer.
BJ = Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
BL = Bampton Lectures.
BLE = Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
BOR = Bab. and Oriental Record.
BS = Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.
BSAA = Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
BSAL = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
BSAP = Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
BSG = Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
BTS = Buddhist Text Society.
BW = Biblical World.
BZ = Biblische Zeitschrift.

CAIBL = Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CE = Catholic Encyclopædia.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CI = Census of India.
CIA = Corpus Inscrip. Atticarum.
CIE = Corpus Inscrip. Etruscarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscrip. Græcarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscrip. Latinarum.
CIS = Corpus Inscrip. Semiticarum.
COT = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR = Contemporary Review.
CeR = Celtic Review.
ClR = Classical Review.
CQR = Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL = Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dict. of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG = Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB = Dict. of National Biography.
DPhP = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi = Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr = Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM = Egyp. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
EI = Encyclopædia of Islām.
ERE = The present work.
Exp = Expositor.
ExpT = Expository Times.
FHG = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLR = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archéologique.
GB = Golden Bough (Frazer).
GGA = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIrP = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV = Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes.
GVI = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HAI = Handbook of American Indians.
HDB = Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE = Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJP = History of the Jewish People.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICO = International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR = Indian Census Report.
IG = Inscrip. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA = Inscrip. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI = Imperial Gazetteer of India² (1885); new edition (1908–1909).
IJE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAFL = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JASBe = Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD = Journal des Débats.
JDTh = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS = Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ = Jenäer Litteraturzeitung.
JPh = Journal of Philology.
JPTh = Jahrbücher f. protest. Theologie.
JPTS = Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAI = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBo = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASC = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.
JRASK = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.
JRGS = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JThSt = Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*² = Die Keilinschriften und das AT (Schrader), 1883.
*KAT*³ = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding [really a totally distinct work], 1903.
KB or *KIB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1889 ff.
KGF = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCBl = Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh = Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSSt = Leipziger sem. Studien.
M = Mélusine.
MAIBL = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniæ Historica (Pertz).
MGJV = Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ = Monatschrift f. Geschichte u. Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MVG = Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC = Nuovo Bulletino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC = Nineteenth Century.
NHWB = Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED = Oxford English Dictionary (Murray).
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC = Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.
PASB = Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.
PB = Polychrome Bible (English).

PBE = Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.
PC = Primitive Culture (Tylor).
PEFM = Palestine Exploration Fund Memoirs.
PEFSt = Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement.
PG = Patrologia Græca (Migne).
PJB = Preussische Jahrbücher.
PL = Patrologia Latina (Migne).
PNQ = Punjab Notes and Queries.
PR = Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).
PRE^3 = Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).
PRR = Presbyterian and Reformed Review.
PRS = Proceedings of the Royal Society.
PRSE = Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
PSBA = Proceedings of the Soc. of Biblical Archæology.
PTS = Pâli Text Society.
RA = Revue Archéologique.
RAnth = Revue d'Anthropologie.
RAS = Royal Asiatic Society.
RAssyr = Revue d'Assyriologie.
RB = Revue Biblique.
RBEW = Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).
RC = Revue Critique.
RCel = Revue Celtique.
RCh = Revue Chrétienne.
RDM = Revue des Deux Mondes.
RE = Realencyclopädie.
REG = Revue des Études Grecques.
REg = Revue Égyptologique.
REJ = Revue des Études Juives.
REth = Revue d'Ethnographie.
RHLR = Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses.
RHR = Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.
RN = Revue Numismatique.
RP = Records of the Past.
RPh = Revue Philosophique.
RQ = Römische Quartalschrift.
RS = Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.
RSA = Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.
RSI = Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.
RTAP = Recueil de Travaux rélatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.
RTP = Revue des traditions populaires.
RThPh = Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.
RTr = Recueil de Travaux.
RWB = Realwörterbuch.
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
SBB = Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
SBE = Sacred Books of the East.
SBOT = Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
SDB = Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
SK = Studien u. Kritiken.
SMA = Sitzungsberichte der Münchener Akademie.
SSGW = Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
SWAW = Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
TAPA = Transactions of American Philological Association.
TASJ = Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
TC = Tribes and Castes.
TES = Transactions of Ethnological Society.
ThLZ = Theologische Litteraturzeitung.
ThT = Theol. Tijdschrift.
TRHS = Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
TRSE = Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
TS = Texts and Studies.
TSBA = Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archæology.
TU = Texte u. Untersuchungen.
WAI = Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
WZKM = Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZA = Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
ZÄ = Zeitschrift für ägyp. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
ZATW = Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
ZCK = Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
ZCP = Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
ZDA = Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
ZDPV = Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
ZE = Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZKF = Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
ZKG = Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
ZKT = Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
ZKWL = Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft u. kirchl. Leben.
ZM = Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
ZNTW = Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft.
ZPhP = Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
ZTK = Zeitschrift für Theologie u. Kirche.
ZVK = Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
ZVRW = Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZWT = Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*^{2}, *LOT*^{6}, etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

H

HYMNS.

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HYMNS (Babylonian).—In the extensive literature of Assyria and Babylonia a considerable number of hymns are found, most of them in the old Sumerian language, and generally accompanied by renderings into Semitic Babylonian. Several examples of this class of literature, however, are known to us only in the Semitic idiom, and do not seem to have been based on any Sumerian original. These compositions are generally in praise of the gods, and are such as might be expected from a nation so appreciative of the benefits showered down upon them from on high as the Babylonians. Hymns to heroes are exceedingly rare, unless those addressed to Merodach, Tammuz, and other deities who are stated to have been originally kings may be regarded as poems of that nature.

Though the Sumero-Babylonian hymns are addressed to various deities, it cannot be said that they vary greatly. They sing the gods' praises, extol their might, and descant on the glories of their temples. They also speak of the gods' mercies, their places in Nature with regard to man, and the benefits which they conferred on the world as the Babylonians knew it. The wording is often well-chosen and even elegant, whether the idiom is Sumerian or Semitic.

The poetical form is somewhat monotonous, variety in these compositions, whether Sumerian or Semitic, having apparently not been aimed at. This is probably due to the fact that most of them were composed by the priests, with whom all religious forms originated, and who copied the style of older compositions.

Naturally many theories concerning the nature of primitive Sumerian poetry are possible, but in all probability it was the root-syllable, or the principal root-syllable, which was accentuated, the others being passed over lightly. The lines are generally divided into two parts by the cæsura, indicated by a space so arranged that the text seems to be written in two columns. The Sumero-Babylonian hymns are often of considerable length, but among the shorter compositions of this nature may be cited the hymn to the setting sun, from the temple-library at Borsippa—a gem in its way:

'Šamaš in the midst of heaven, at thy setting
May the bolt of the limpid heavens speak thee greeting;
May the door of heaven bless thee;
May Mišarum, thy beloved minister, direct thee.
At É-babbar, the seat of thy lordship, thy supremacy shall shine forth.
May Aa, thy beloved spouse, joyfully receive thee;
May thy heart take rest;
May the feast of thy divinity be set for thee.
Leader, hero Šamaš, may there be praise to thee;
Lord of E-babbar, may the course of thy path be straight;
Make straight thy road—go the direct road to thy resting-place.
Thou art the country's judge, the director of its decisions.'

The above being part of a series (the next was a hymn to the Sun-god on his rising), the composition deals only with the satisfaction and peace that the god experienced when, after fulfilling his task in the sky, he was greeted by his home and his spouse, and, having been refreshed, thought over all that he had seen on his course above the earth, the decisions of whose tribunals he directed. The first four lines are alternately of 11 and 15 syllables, while the 5th and 6th contain 18 each. At this

point are again four short lines (10–12 syllables), followed by two long ones (18–19 syllables). Evidently this regularity of form is intentional.

The Sun-god was one of the deities whose influence the Babylonians could appreciate, hence the tone of the above composition addressed to him. Enlil, the older Bel, however, was a divine personage whose ways were more inscrutable, and in some of the compositions addressed to him there is noticeable a tone of reproach. This is exhibited by the text beginning *Ame umašana šegibbi nebgin* (G. Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylon. Hymnen*, Berlin, 1896, p. 130 ff.)—a composition in dialect, where the god is called Mullil:

'The fold of the lord bitterly laments;
The fold, the fold of the lord, bitterly (laments).
O lord of the lands, honoured one, lord of the lands;
O lord of the lands, heart-remote, whose word is faithful;
He does not turn—with regard to his command he does not turn—
The honoured one, Mullil, changeth not his utterance.'

Troubling the waters, he caught the fish, he snared the birds, he sent 'the son of the plain' up to the mountain, and he sent 'the son of the mountain' down to the plain, etc.:

'O lord of the land, heart-remote Mullil, how long will thine heart not be appeased?
Father Mullil, who regardest, how long will thine eye not pity?
Thou who coverest thine head with a garment, how long?
Who sinkest thy chin (lit. 'neck') to thy bosom, how long?[1]
Who closest thine heart like a reed, how long?
Honoured one, who placest thy fingers in thine ears, how long?'

A kind of litany closes this long and interesting enumeration of 'the older Bel's' inattention to the world created under his auspices. It contains much hidden teaching of the Babylonian priesthood.

Before the rise of Merodach, the worship of Enlil was probably more favoured in Babylonia than that of almost any other god except Ea, and the importance of Nippur, which was originally his city (before the adoption of Ninip as patron), always maintained Enlil's supremacy. This is shown by the descriptive hymn published in *PSBA*, March 1911, p. 85 ff. After describing the district wherein the temple of Enlil and his spouse Ninlil lay, the text continues as follows:

'The god fixing the fate of (? everything)
Causeth Enlil to be taken to the reception-hall.
Enlil, may the sodomite (?) go forth from the city;
Nu-namnir,[2] may the sodomite (?) go forth from the city—
O Enlil, for the fate which thou hast decided;
O Nu-namnir, for the fate which thou hast decided.
Enlil cometh, Ninlil descendeth—
Nu-namnir cometh—the king.
Enlil calleth to the man of the great gate:
"Man of the great gate, man of the lock—
Man of the bolt, man of the holy lock—
Thy lady Ninlil cometh!
If (anyone) ask thee for my name,
Thou shalt not reveal to him my place."
Enlil calleth to the man of the great gate:
"Man of the great gate, man of the lock—
Man of the bolt, man of the holy lock—
Thy lady Ninlil cometh—
The handmaid who is so bright, so shining!
Let none woo her, let none kiss her—
Ninlil so bright, so shining!"

Enlil, the bright, the fair, will pronounce the decision.'

In contradistinction to the 'heart-remote Enlil' or 'older Bel' is his younger representative, Bel-Merodach, 'the merciful one,' who, later, took Enlil's place. The hymns to Merodach are naturally, from the attributes of that deity, among the most interesting:

'The merciful one among the gods,
The merciful one who loveth to vivify the dead—
Merodach, king of heaven and earth,
King of Babylon, lord of E-sagila,[3]
King of E-zida, lord of E-mah-tila,
Heaven and earth are thine;
Even as heaven and earth are thine,
The incantation of life is thine,
The philtre of life is thine,
Mu-azaga-gú-abzu[1] is thine,
Mankind, the people of the black head;
The living creatures, as many as there are, which bear a name in the land;
The four regions, as many as there are;
The Nun-galene, which are the host of heaven and earth, as many as there are,
To thee do they (turn) their ear.'

More popular than other deities of the Bab. pantheon were in all probability Tammuz and Ištar, whose worship goes back to the fourth millennium B.C. Hymns to them are generally composed in dialectic Sumerian, and are, therefore, of comparatively late date. As examples of Semitic Babylonian hymns to these deities will be found farther on, an extract from the exceedingly well-preserved bilingual hymn to Ištar, excavated by George Smith, is given here:

'The light of heaven, which dawneth like fire in the land, art thou.
Goddess in the earth, in thy fixed abode;
She who, like the earth, stately advanceth, art thou.
As for thee, a path of righteousness blesseth thee.'

The goddess then answers:

'Twin sister of the sun, the adornment of the heavens,
To produce the omens I exist—in perfection I exist;
To produce the omens for my father Sin I exist—in perfection I exist;
To produce the omens for my brother the Sun I exist—in perfection I exist,' etc.

Though daughter of Anu, the god of the heavens, Ištar is here called daughter of Sin or Nannar, the Moon-god, probably because, like the moon, the planet shows phases. She was regarded as the sun's sister because she accompanied him on his course, sometimes at his rising, at other times at his setting.

One of the gods of war and also god of pestilence—Nergal, patron-deity of Cuthah—was worshipped as one of the sons of Enlil, the great divinity who, as the author of the story of the Flood informs us, desired to destroy mankind to prevent them from increasing too quickly on the earth. Notwithstanding Nergal's unsparing nature, hymns were addressed to him, and he was glorified therein with every confidence that harm would not overtake the Babylonians at his hands, but would befall their enemies:

'Let me glorify the hero of the gods, the powerful, the brilliant one, the son of Enlil;
Urra (*i.e.* Nergal) let me glorify, the hero of the gods, the powerful, the brilliant one, the son of Enlil;
The beloved of Enlil, the supreme leader, the avenger of his father;
The offspring of the Lady of the gods, the great queen, the son of the king, who trusts in his might;
The clever one of the gods, the sublime oracle-priest, the great hero, the trust of Enlil.'

He is, after this, addressed as the one who overcomes evil devils and fates, the evil and powerful foe, subduing the evil gods, and loving the saving of life. Bêl-rêmanni, who seems to be mentioned as the composer of the hymn, asks for the god's favour upon the city of Marad, where the god was worshipped; and for the saving of his own life, which was threatened by some hostile fate. Another noteworthy Sumerian hymn addressed to Nergal is in the form of verses chanted by the priest, and repeated by the people, as follows:

Priest: 'His bright image (?) overshadoweth the demons right and left.'
People: 'His bright image,' etc.
Priest: 'The long arm whose blow (*i.e.* disease and pestilence) is invisible, the evil one with his arm [he smiteth].'
People: 'Nergal, the long arm,' etc.

This text, which is very mutilated, was of considerable length when complete, and is important not only on account of its form and the words used, but also because of the light which it sheds upon the Babylonian conceptions of this deity.

Another Sumerian hymn (*WAI* iv. pl. 26, no. 8, and 27, no. 3), regarded as being in the form of a

[1] Cf. 1 K 18[37].
[2] Probably another name (or title) of Enlil.
[3] The temple of Bel there.

[1] 'The holy incantation, the word (from) the Abyss,' so called because communicated to Merodach by Ea, king of the Abyss and lord of wisdom

dialogue, differs widely from the above. To what god it is addressed, however, is uncertain:

Priest: 'In [affliction] of heart, in evil weeping, in sighing he sits;
In bitter crying, affliction of heart,
In evil weeping, in evil sighing,
He moans like a dove, in anguish night and day.
To his merciful god he lows like a wild cow—
Bitter sighing he constantly makes.
To his god in supplication he has bowed down his face;
He weeps, crying out without ceasing.'
Penitent: 'I will tell my deed—my unspeakable deed!
I will repeat my word—my unspeakable word!'
(These lines are repeated, after which the text is broken away.)

From the other inscriptions of a similar kind, it would seem that the gods of Babylonia loved to hear the confessions of their worshippers, which, composed in poetical form, were regarded as having weight with them to the penitent's advantage (cf. also art. CONFESSION [Assyr.-Bab.], vol. iii. pp. 825–827).

The above extracts show the nature of the Sumero-Babylonian hymns, composed, apparently, in that ancient idiom, and generally, on the tablets which have preserved them to us, provided with a Semitic (Assyro-Babylonian) translation. Those composed in the Semitic Babylonian (Assyrian) idiom only were modelled, to a certain extent, upon the Sumerian hymns, but, naturally, as the language is a widely differing one, the poetical form departs from that of the old writers of Sumer. The personal and prepositional infixes of the Sumerian verb, and the use of post-positions instead of prepositions, account for such differences as are noticeable.

As far as can be judged, the diction of Semitic Babylonian poetry is more regular, and, therefore, has an appearance of greater dignity. Each half-verse has four principal accents, as a rule, though this is by no means without exceptions. The following will give an idea of the nature of the Semitic compositions:

'Thou, Ištar, whose spouse is Tammuz,
Daughter of Sin, the heroine traversing the land,
She who loveth reproduction, she who loveth all men art thou.
I have given to thee thy great gift—
A *vulva* of lapis-lazuli, a *multi* of gold, the adornment of thy divinity.
To Tammuz, thy spouse, take my pledge—
May Tammuz, thy spouse, take away mine indisposition.'

After this the suppliant addressed Tammuz himself:

'Tammuz, the lord, shepherd of Anu, son of Êa art thou;
Spouse of Ištar the bride, ruler of the land;
Clothed with the scarf (?), bearing the staff;
Producer of all things, lord of the fold;
Eater of pure (food), the ashcake;[1]
Drinker of water from the sacred skins,' etc.

In certain of the Semitic compositions a similarity with the Hebrew psalms has been pointed out. The following is from a tablet of this nature:

'God, my lord, maker of my name;
Keeper of my life,[2] causing my seed[3] to be:
My angry[4] god, may thine heart be appeased;
My wrathful goddess, be at peace with me.
Who knoweth, my god, thy seat?
Thine holy dwelling-place, thine abode, have I never seen.[5]
. . . . . .
As for ill-luck (?), let (it) pass from me—
Let me be preserved with thee.
Allot to me then the lot of life;
Let my days be long—grant (me) life.'[6]

Among the most noteworthy texts of the nature of hymns may be mentioned also those which accompanied the new-year ceremonies in honour of Merodach. The lines are couplets, the first of each being dialectic Sumerian, and the other Semitic Babylonian. Though the second is regarded as a translation of the first, this is only exceptionally the case. One of the couplets reads:

'Celestial king of men, celestial king who bestoweth;
Lord of kings, bestower of gifts,'

and every other line at most merely reflects the sense of that preceding.

Among the royal hymns are compositions containing the names of Nebuchadrezzar I. of Babylon (about 1200 B.C.), Sargon of Assyria, Esarhaddon, and Aššurbanipal. The name of the last occurs in a dialectic bilingual psalm. A hymn containing the name of Nebuchadrezzar is an acrostic upon the name of the god Nebo.

LITERATURE.—Further examples will be found in A. H. Sayce, *Origin and Growth of Religion* (Hibbert Lectures, 1887), London, 1891, p. 149 ff.; H. Radau, *Sumerian Hymns and Prayers to the God Nin-ip* (= *Bab. Exp. of the University of Pennsylvania*, vol. xxix. pt. 1), Philadelphia, 1911; *PSBA*, 1906, pp. 203 ff., 270 ff.; 1908, pp. 53 ff., 77 ff.; 1909, pp. 37, 57 ff.; 1911, p. 77 ff.; and the works mentioned in art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS, vol. ii. p. 319, section (*d*).

T. G. PINCHES.

HYMNS (Buddhist).—The word 'hymn' is ambiguous. It has been defined as a 'song of praise,' a 'religious ode,' a 'sacred lyric,' a 'poem in stanzas written to be sung in congregational service.' In the last of these various senses the Buddhists, who have neither churches nor chapels, neither congregations nor services, have consequently no hymns. In the other senses there are quite a number of hymns scattered throughout the longer prose books in the canon; and in the supplementary *Nikāya* we have twelve anthologies, mostly short, of religious poems of different kinds. These are collected in the anthologies either according to subject (as in the *Vimāna* and *Peta Vatthus*) or according to the kind of composition (as in the *Udānas* and the *Iti-vuttakas*).

An example or two will make this clear. In the *Sutta Nipāta*, undoubtedly containing some of the very oldest of these hymns, we have seventy-one lyrics of an average length of sixteen stanzas each. These are arranged in five cantos (each of which existed as a separate booklet before they were brought together in one book),[1] and in them the arrangement and order of the lyrics have little or no reference to the subjects of which the lyrics treat. Quite the opposite form of arrangement is found in the well-known *Dhammapada*, where all the verses are arranged according to subjects—such as Earnestness, Thought, Wisdom, Foolishness, the Path, Craving, Happiness, and so on. The title means 'Verselets of the Norm'—that is, of the *Dhamma*. This word is often rendered 'religion'; but the idea is not the same, and the word 'religion' is not found outside the European languages. More than half of these 'Verselets of the Norm' have been traced back to the extant canonical books.[2] The rest were verses current in the community at the time of the rise of Buddhism; and some of them may even be pre-Buddhistic, belonging to the stock of moral sayings handed down in verse among the general body of Indians interested in such questions. This will, however, always remain doubtful, as no verse has as yet been traced in pre-Buddhistic literature. We can only say for certain that quite a number of the verses are reproduced, in either identical or closely similar words, in the various sectarian books of later speculation. We cannot be sure that these verses were not first composed among the Buddhists.

The fact is (though it has not been noticed anywhere in the voluminous literature on the *Dhammapada*) that the 'Verselets of the Norm' deal for the most part with the lower morality of the unconverted man—that is, with the ethics more or less common to all the higher religions. This may explain the great vogue that this anthology

[1] So Zimmern; a cake baked in the ashes is apparently intended.
[2] Cf. Ps 66[9].
[3] Ps 89[29].
[4] Ps 7[11].
[5] Cf. Job 11[7 8][29].
[6] Ps 21[4].

[1] See, on the growth of the *Sutta Nipāta*, Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*[2], London, 1903, pp. 177–180. The Pāli work has been translated by V. Fausböll (*SBE*, vol. x.[2] [1898]), and a second edition of the text by D. Anderson appears in the *PTS* for 1913.
[2] For the details see Rhys Davids, *JRAS*, 1900, p. 559 ff.

has had in Europe.[1] Most of its verses were easily understood. They had none of the strangeness and difficulty of those dealing with the ethics of the Path. So also in India. When the Buddhists began to write in Sanskrit, they imitated the *Dhammapada*, changing the title, however, omitting the difficult verses, and adding others. This new anthology, the *Udānavarga*, became very popular, was current in different recensions, and was translated into both Chinese and Tibetan.[2]

The fate of the *Sutta Nipāta* has been exactly the opposite. It is concerned mostly with the higher ethics of the Path, and in both form and matter its hymns come much nearer to Christian hymns than do the 'Verselets of the Norm.' But it is scarcely read in Europe except by Pāli philologists, and except for three ballads which it contains. In India it did not survive the decline of Pāli, and it has not been translated into Tibetan or Chinese.[3]

In early times in N. India such hymns or verses were intoned or chanted either for edification or for propaganda. In the 7th cent. of our era I-Tsing gives an interesting account of the manner in which, in his day, the Sanskrit hymns then current were used as processionals, either round a monument to some religious leader or through the halls of the great Buddhist monastery at Nālandā.[4]

The *bhikkhus* in Ceylon now chant certain of the above-mentioned Pāli hymns in a kind of visitation of the sick—a ceremony called *Paritta*, instituted as a protest against the charms used by those of the peasantry who are still pagans at heart.[5] It is not known when or under what authority this custom was introduced, or to what extent it has been adopted.

LITERATURE.—M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der indischen Litteratur*, Leipzig, 1905 ff., ii. 60-134, gives a detailed account, with examples of all the early Buddhist anthologies. An earlier account is in Rhys Davids, *Buddhism: its Hist. and Lit.*, London, 1896.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

HYMNS (Celtic).—Apart from scanty notices in classical authors, documentary information regarding the continental Celts is lacking, and we have no relics of their sacred chants or poetic invocations or hymns. Cæsar writes that those who went for instruction to the Druids 'are said to learn there a great number of verses' (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14); and there can be little doubt that many, if not all, of these were of a religious or magical character—runes, poetic invocations and incantations, and hymns. The prayers which accompanied sacrificial rites or were used in invocations and the like were perhaps couched in formulæ of verse like the Roman *carmina*. This is certain so far as the battle-chants are concerned. These, as well as the loud war-cries, are referred to by several writers, and are called *cantus*, or ᾠδὴ ἀπειλητική. These ritual battle-chants were accompanied by a dance, as well as by the waving of weapons and shields, and by measured noises—the clashing of the weapons, etc. (cf. Livy, xxi. 28, xxxviii. 17; Dio Cassius, lxii. 12; Appian, *Celtica*, 8). In single combats, warriors chanted or declaimed as they advanced on their opponent (Sil. Ital. iv. 278-280, Livy, vii.). After a victory an exultant chant was sung (Livy, x. 26. 11, *ovantes moris sui carmine*; cf. xxiii. 24). These warrior-chants were composed by bards, and doubtless included both invocations of the war-gods and the recital of ancestral deeds; and they may have been a kind of spell ensuring the help of the gods. Chants were likewise sung by the 'priestesses' of Sena for the purpose of raising storms (Mela, iii. 6).

Such hymns were used also by the Irish Celts (cf. CELTS, vol. iii. p. 298[b]). A curious archaic chant, preserved in the *Book of Leinster*, is said to have been sung by Amairgen, the poet of the Milesians, as they approached Ireland, and by its means the magical dangers raised against them were overcome. It is an invocation of Nature or of the natural scenery and products of Ireland, and was evidently a ritual chant used in times of danger. The following represents the translation given by H. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*Cours de litt. celt.*, Paris, 1883-1902, ii. 250; *Book of Leinster*, 12, 2; cf. the gloss on these lines cited by E. O'Curry, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, London, 1873, ii. 190):

'I invoke the land of Ireland!
Shining, shining sea!
Fertile, fertile hill!
Wooded valley!
Abundant river, abundant in waters!
Fish-abounding lake!
Fish-abounding sea!
Fertile earth!
Irruption of fish!
Fish there!
Bird under wave!
Great fish!
Irruption of fish!
Fish-abounding sea!'

Such archaic formulæ, unrhymed and alliterative, which have parallels in savage ritual, may have been in common use. There is a similar one in the words spoken after the destruction of Da Derga's hostel, by MacCecht on his finding water. He bathes in it and sings (*RCel* xxii. [1901] 400):

'Cold fountain,
Surface of strand,
. . . . . .
Sea of lake,
Water of Gara; stream of river;
High spring well; cold fountain.'

At a still later period there is a trace of hymn-invocations in Highland folk-custom in Lewis. A man waded knee-deep into the sea and poured out an offering of ale or gruel into the waters, chanting:

'O god of the sea,
Put weed in the drawing wave
To enrich the ground,
To shower on us food.'

Those on shore took up the strain in chorus, their voices mingling with the noise of the waves (A. Carmichael, *Carmina Gadelica*, Edinburgh, 1900, i. 163; cf. M. Martin, *Descr. of the W. Isles of Scotland*[2], London, 1716, p. 28). In Ireland, the Scottish Highlands, and Brittany many charms still survive and are sung or chanted in connexion with magical rites, usually for healing, or as invocations for a variety of purposes. In these, names of the Persons of the Trinity, the Virgin, and the saints have taken the place of those of older divinities (for these see CHARMS AND AMULETS [Celtic] and reff. there given). Scanty as these data are, they prove sufficiently that the pagan Celts must have had a large number of hymns, chants, and the like in common use.

LITERATURE.—C. Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903; J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

HYMNS (Chinese).—It must be premised that idolatry is not social in its service in the way in which Christianity is. The worshippers do not gather together in a congregation to hymn the praises of the gods, nor is singing employed by those who go into the temples to present their solitary petitions and prostrate themselves before the images.

In ancestor-worship there is an approach to a united service, but it is confined to the family or

[1] The translations into European languages are specified by M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der ind. Litteratur*, ii. 63.

[2] Sylvain Levy, in *JA*, 1913, has compared in detail one chapter of this with the corresponding chapter of the *Dhammapada*.

[3] That is as a whole; see Anesaki, in *JPTS*, 1900, p. 50.

[4] I-Tsing, *Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, pp. 152-167.

[5] See R. C. Childers, *Pali-Eng. Dictionary*, London, 1872-75, *s.v.*

clan, and the use in such worship of an ode or hymn of praise is not entirely unknown. The *Shi King* (or *Book of Poetry*) contains among odes and folk-songs some hymns or sacred songs of filial piety, which were in use in ancient times in the worship of ancestors. The following is one used at one of the services and addressed to the progenitor from whom the kings of the Chow dynasty (1122-249 B.C.) traced their origin:

'O, thou accomplished great Hâu-chi,
To thee alone 'twas given
To be, by what we owe to thee,
The correlate of Heaven.

On all who dwell within our land
Grain-food didst thou bestow:
'Tis to thy wonder-working hand
This gracious boon we owe.

God had the wheat and barley meant
To nourish all mankind.
None would have fathomed his intent
But for thy guiding mind.

Man's social duties thou didst show
To every tribe and state:
From thee the social virtues flow,
That stamp our land "The Great."'[1]

A hymn in honour of his ancestors was sung before the Emperor of China when he performed ancestor-worship. It was divided into three parts, and was begun when His majesty stood before the table or altar on which were placed the representations of his ancestors. The second part was sung while he performed the kow-tow; and, after the offerings had all been made, the third part followed, during which the spirits of the ancestors were supposed to return to heaven. The hymn was accompanied by music of a slow and solemn nature, played on a number of instruments. The solemnity and pomp of the occasion were increased by grave men who postured, and by their motions and attitudes expressed the feelings which the Emperor should evince at such a time, while the singers also expressed in the words of the hymn the sentiments that should actuate him. The first stanza of the second part was as follows:

'To you I owe my all, as I willingly confess.
Your body is the source of this body I possess.
The breath I breathe it comes from you,
From you the strength to dare and do.
When my deep gratitude I wish to make appear
And prompted by high duty devoutly I draw nigh,
I rejoice, Paternal Spirit, that you are present here,
Descending to greet me from your glorious home on high.'[2]

In the worship of Confucius—a State-worship performed at stated times by high officials of government—a stanza adulatory of the Sage was chanted by a chorus:

'Confucius! Confucius!
Great indeed art thou, O Confucius.
Before thee
None like unto thee;
After thee
None equal to thee.
Confucius! Confucius!
Great indeed art thou, O Confucius.'[3]

Hymns also are used in the worship of Heaven and Earth. In the Taoist canon there are several hymn-books containing hymns of aspiration and of repentance, and hymns to the 'Three Pure Ones,' as well as to other deities, such as 'The Dipper,' or 'Charles's Wain,' and certain other constellations and stars.[4] In the Buddhist books used in worship there are also stanzas which are chanted with the rest of the ritual employed in the services. In both Taoist and Buddhist tracts short hymns of praise to deities are to be found.

[1] J. Legge, *Religions of China*, London, 1880, p. 90; see also 'Shi King,' in Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861-72, iv. i 7, iv. ii. 7 iv. iii. 2.
[2] *Chinese Recorder*, xv. (Shanghai, 1884) 61-64, and J. J. M. Amiot, 'Mémoire sur la musique des Chinois,' in *Mémoires sur les Chinois*, vi. (Paris, 1779) 1 ff.
[3] G. G. Alexander, *Confucius, the Great Teacher*, London, 1890, p. 297.
[4] L. Wieger, *Le Canon taoïste*, Paris, 1911, pp. 73, 159-160, 168, 191.

The old rural processions in Greece and Rome, which were mixed with religious ideas, had a counterpart in the China of Confucius, and the Sage countenanced them.[1] These ceremonies of *No*, as they were called, were somewhat of the nature of a play, and the processions were composed of singers. The performers at the present day sing as they go round. The name now is *Yang ko*, 'raising a song,' and a Buddhist priest in modern times forms one of the number.[2]

The celebrated Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, in his account of funerals at the city of Kinsay (the modern Hang Chow), says that the mourners follow the corpse to the sound of music 'and singing hymns to their idols,' and that

'the instruments which they have caused to be played at his funeral and the idol hymns that have been chaunted shall also be produced again to welcome him in the next world; and that the idols themselves will come to do him honour.'[3]

LITERATURE.—This is cited in the footnotes.

J. DYER BALL.

HYMNS (Greek Christian).—The vast accumulation of Christian hymns in the Greek language falls, in respect of form, into three sections differing widely in magnitude and importance. Thus we have (1) the prose hymns of Christian antiquity; (2) Christian hymns in the ancient quantitative metres; and (3) the new rhythmical compositions of Byzantine hymnody, the metre of which depends upon the enumeration of syllables and the stress accent.

1. **Prose hymns.**—The first praise-book of Greek-speaking Christians was the Psalter in the LXX version. This was at an early period supplemented by an appendix containing other Biblical passages, nine of which, already brought together in the *Codex Alexandrinus*, form the group of so-called *Songs*, viz. (i.) and (ii.) the Songs of Moses (Ex 15^{1-19} and Dt 32^{1-43}); (iii.) that of Hannah (1 S 2^{1-10}); (iv.) Habakkuk (Hab 3); (v.) Isaiah (Is 26^{9-20}); (vi.) Jonah (Jon 2^{3-10}); (vii.) and (viii.) the Three Holy Children (Dn 3^{26-90} and 3^{57-88} LXX [=Three $3-34$. $35-61$]); and (ix.) Mary and Zechariah (Lk 1^{46-55}. $68-79$). Here we should note that the mode of rendering these Biblical lyrics was of decisive importance for the development of Greek hymnody in the centuries to follow: they were recited by a single person, while the congregation, or, as representing it, the choir, simply responded at the end of every verse with a short refrain, the *hypopsalma*. Such *hypopsalmata* (a list of which, as used in Constantinople in the early Middle Ages, is still extant [*DACL* i. 3031 ff.; cf. 2467 f.]) may be said to constitute the simplest form of Christian prose hymnody in the Greek language.

Even in the 1st cent., however, we can trace the production of new Christian hymns, for which the Greek text of the 'Psalms of David' served as a model; and, as that text has no regular metrical structure, the imitations likewise were composed in prose form. Now and then we hear the echoes of such 'psalms and spiritual songs' in the Epistles of Paul and the Apocalypse (see Eph 5^{14}, 1 Ti 1^{15} 3^{16} $6^{15f.}$, 2 Ti 2^{11-13}, Tit 3^{4-7}, Ja 1^{17} [Julian, *Dict. of Hymnol.*[2], London, 1907, p. 458[b]]); and in the 2nd cent. we find a non-Christian writer, Pliny the Younger (*Ep.* x. 97), speaking of the 'carmen' in which—as an essential element of their worship—the Christians of Bithynia glorified 'Christ as their God secum invicem,' i.e. probably, in some kind of antiphonal song. The statement of the heathen writer strikingly recalls 'the psalms and hymns written by the brethren from the beginning,' which, on the testimony of a work against Artemon, quoted by Eusebius (*HE* v. xxviii. 5) as by an unknown writer of the early part of the 3rd cent.,

[1] Legge, *Chinese Classics*, i. 97.
[2] J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, London, 1880, p. 269 f.
[3] Marco Polo, ed. H. Yule[2], London, 1874, ii. 174 f.

praised 'Christ the Word of God, calling Him God.' The hymn which was composed by Athenogenes, who suffered martyrdom in the reign of Septimius Severus (193–211), and to which St. Basil appealed (*de Spir. Sanc.* 29) in support of the Deity of the Holy Spirit, was probably one of those primitive prose hymns. An early Christian hymnal of this kind—the 'Odes of Solomon'—fragments of which had long been known in a Coptic translation, has been recently re-discovered, almost complete, in a Syriac version. But whether the Gr. text upon which the two versions undoubtedly rest was the original or was itself a translation from Hebrew; whether these spirited lyrics are, as a whole, of Christian origin, or simply a Christian redaction of a Jewish original; whether they are Gnostic or Montanistic productions or hymns of the Catholic Church—these questions are still in dispute, and may perhaps never find a definite answer. It may at all events be taken as a fact that a type of religious poetry designed to compete with the OT Psalter was zealously cultivated in Gnostic circles. Certain pieces in the Apocryphal Acts of Thomas and Acts of John give us an idea of the nature of such heretical compositions, although in the case of those in the Acts of Thomas the Syriac text is probably the original.

The favour enjoyed by such non-Biblical pieces among heretics naturally led the Church to make a stand against them and their use in Divine service. Thus Paul of Samosata, writing not later than A.D. 260–270, sought to justify the suppression of certain 'psalms' in praise of Christ, to which he objected on the ground that they were of quite recent origin (Eus. *HE* VII. xxx. 10). Nevertheless, the Church of the 4th cent. still held in high regard various prose hymns which were undoubtedly a legacy from the pre-Constantinian period, and at least two of these maintain to the present day an important place in the worship of the Greek Church. (*a*) The evening hymn sung at the close of vespers, the Φῶς Ἱλαρόν, is attested *c.* 375 by St. Basil (*loc. cit.*) as a universally known part of Evening Prayer, the origin of which was altogether unknown. (*b*) The corresponding morning hymn, the Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις, Θεῷ, called 'the Great Doxology'—an extended form of the original on which the Western 'Gloria in excelsis' is based—occurs in the group of hymns appended to the *Codex Alexandrinus*, and also in a more archaic redaction at the end of bk. vii. of the *Apostolic Constitutions*. In the former place is found another evening hymn and a hymn-like grace before meat. Moreover, the Gr. original of a short hymn to which the Rule of St. Benedict (ed. Woelfflin, Leipzig, 1895, p. 25. 20) gives a place in the monastic Morning Office of the Western Church is, at least, not of later origin than these. A relatively early origin must be assigned likewise to another prose text having the essential features of a hymn, viz. the 'Prologue,' which in the consecration of water at the Feast of Epiphany precedes the consecration prayer proper, and is a glorification of the day upon which Jesus was baptized in the Jordan, akin to the Easter 'Exultet' of the Roman liturgy. Of this there are, besides the Greek, a Slavic and a remarkably interesting Armenian version. Certain Gnostic features still adhering to it show that its composition was long prior to the days of St. Sophronius of Jerusalem († 638), to whom it is ascribed, apparently without MS authority, in the printed edd. of the Gr. Euchologion.

2. Hymns in classical metres.—Besides the prose hymns connected with the Gr. version of the OT, we find also, from the 2nd cent., a Græco-Christian hymnody employing the ancient poetic forms. It is in accordance with the general position of Gnosticism in the religious sphere that it took the lead here, and guided the development along fresh lines.

We are unable to say whether the 'psalms' or 'odes' of Basilides and a psalm-book of Marcion or the Marcionites attested by the Fragmentum Muratorianum belonged to the prose or the metrical type. But a hymn of the Naassenes and a specimen of the psalms of Valentinus, inserted by Hippolytus in his *Philosophoumena* (v. 10, vi. 32), both exhibit logaœdic anapæsts, and thus, in spite of a certain irregularity of treatment, show indubitably that here the Gnostic hymnology studiously followed the traditional forms of ancient lyrical composition.

In the sphere of Catholic Christianity the new style appears in the hymn to Christ with which Clement of Alexandria closes his *Pædagogus*. Apart from its introductory lines, which are of very doubtful authenticity, this hymn is manifestly composed in anapæsts, and, as compared with the Gnostic survivals, exhibits an even more rigid adherence to the laws of classical metre, while its contents do not seem to preclude the possibility that compositions of the kind were actually used in the service of the Alexandrian churches about the beginning of the 3rd century. The further stages of a development which doubtless begins at this point are certainly very obscure.

The list of the works of Hippolytus inscribed upon his statue in the Lateran makes mention of 'Odes.' We hear of an Egyptian bishop named Nepos as a prolific writer of psalms about the middle of the 3rd cent. (Dionysius of Alexandria, *ap.* Eusebius, *HE* VII. xxiv. 4), and of Hierakas, a rigorously dualistic ascetic, likewise an Egyptian (*c.* 300), who wrote 'psalms of a new kind' (Epiphanius, *adv. Hær.* lxvii. 3 [*PG* xlii. 176]); and we may assume that all these writers worked upon the lines of the development in question, although the historical data are not sufficient to substantiate the hypothesis.

To the hymn of Clement, however, is closely allied in a formal way a fragment preserved in a papyrus of the Amherst Collection; this also is in anapæstic metre, and dates probably from the 3rd rather than the 4th century. It has been described as a versified ethical catechism of early Christendom, although it might quite as fitly be regarded as a hymn forming part of the liturgy of initiation, and addressed to the newly baptized. By reason of the formal characteristics which differentiate it from Clement's hymn to Christ, it is of great interest in the development of Greek hymnody.

Its anapæsts, *e.g.*, are constructed with as much regard to accent as to quantity, and it thus marks the transition from the older metres of quantity to the newer metres of accent; while its verses are linked together by the thrice-repeated artifice of the alphabetical acrostic, which was to form so prominent a feature in the rhythmical hymns of the Church.

This artifice is also the connecting medium between the strophes of a hymn- likewise in anapæstic measure—which purports to be sung by a soul entering after death into the enjoyment of eternal bliss, and the conclusion of which is found in a Berlin papyrus. Above all, the acrostic forms the connective between the strophes of the 'psalm' of the virgins with which St. Methodius of Olympus († *c.* 311) concludes his *Symposion*. The latter is perhaps not entirely unrelated to the ancient *Parthenia* of Alcman and Pindar. But in the expansive freedom of its iambic rhythms it conforms not less closely to the accentual style of rhythmical verse than does the anapæstic text of the Amherst papyrus, and in the *ephymnion* repeated after each strophe there appears for the first time another feature which came to be of great importance for that kind of composition. We may, therefore, regard this production, which was in the first instance purely literary, as the representative of really vital elements in contemporary liturgy.

An altogether different type appears in the archaic Græco-Christian lyrics of the subsequent part of the 4th and the beginning of the 5th century. While it is explicitly said of the heresiarch Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea from A.D. 361, that he sought to win acceptance for his doctrines by composing short metrical lyrics intended for the use not only of the community in public worship, but also of individuals in their hours of work or recreation (Soc. *HE* iii. 16), yet in general this type of lyric took a course which from the outset diverged widely from the sphere of congregational worship. This is true not only of the lost 'Odes' in which the younger Apollinaris (rather than his father) tried to emulate the art of Pindar, and of the

extant hexameter paraphrase of the Psalms which bears his name; it holds good equally of the hymn-like poems which are found in the rich and varied literary heritage of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, by far the most eminent representative of this school († 389 or 390). As altogether subjective expressions of personal piety, these compositions of Gregory, which in their learned perfection of form are closely akin to the Hellenistic poetry of the Ptolemaic period, cannot possibly be regarded as liturgical prayers uttered by a Christian assembly. Of the ten extant 'hymns' in the Doric dialect composed by the Neo-Platonic philosopher Synesius, who became bishop of Cyrene in 406 or 409, not more than five in all (nos. 5 and 7–10) belong to the Christian period of their author, and these, no less than the poems of Gregory, exhibit an individualistic spirit and a technical structure incompatible with their liturgical use.

In the Byzantine period the classical metres sometimes employed in hymnody as in other kinds of poetry came to be reduced in effect to two, viz. the Anacreontic strophe and iambic trimeter. Hymns to saints are first found among the Anacreontics of St. Sophronius, in which the artistic devices and forms of the new rhythmical poetry appear in the linking together of the regular strophes by the alphabetical acrostic and the introduction of a stanza with a different metrical structure after every four strophes. As regards the poems which in their general style may be compared with the hymns of the Western writer Prudentius, there is, again, good reason to doubt whether they were ever actually used in the liturgy. Such liturgical use, on the other hand, is clearly implied by the note indicating the ecclesiastical tone to which the Anacreontic penitential hymn of a certain Syncellus Elias was to be sung, and here, too, the strophes are connected by the alphabetical acrostic. The iambic trimeter was used by Georgius Pisides, deacon in the Church of St. Sophia in Constantinople in the reign of Heraclius (610–641), in an Easter hymn of 129 verses; though it is certain that this work never held a place in the liturgy. As regards a truly liturgical type of composition in rhythmical verse, we find that St. John of Damascus (cf. below, 3 (5)) employed the ancient dramatic metre in his three canons —for Christmas, Epiphany, and Pentecost, respectively—in which the initial letters of the iambic verses form an acrostic of two elegiac distichs. It is true that this artifice produced no imitations worthy of note, and it was left for a much later writer, Manuel Philes, in the first half of the 14th cent., to commit the barbarism of recasting in quantitative iambic trimeters one of the noblest examples of accentual sacred song in the early period, the hymn *Akathistos* (cf. below, 3 (2)).

3. Rhythmical hymnody.—The earliest examples of Græco-Christian sacred poetry in a metrical form based upon the stress accent alone are found in two of the poems of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, where they appear strangely out of keeping with their surroundings. One of them at least, an evening song addressed to Christ, is of the nature of a hymn. The fact which conditioned the development of the new type of hymnography was that Greek had in ever greater measure lost the quantitative distinction of its vowels. The development was prepared for by the artistic prose of the rhetoricians, and was in an equal degree influenced by the example of Christian Semitic poetry, which was accentual from the outset. Besides the abandonment of quantitative metre, there were two artistic devices which had an important influence upon the new *genre*, viz. rhyme and the acrostic. The purely rhetorical use of rhyme emanated unquestionably from Greek prose, which in the hands of Christian preachers made use of it with increasing frequency, while the employment of the acrostic was based essentially on Semitic models, though, as has already been noted, an occasional use of this artifice can be traced in the earlier poetic composition. Whether and to what extent, in addition to the influence of the ancient literary prose, that of ancient quantitative metre made itself felt in the extraordinarily copious and artistic forms assumed by the new rhythmical poetry must be left an open question.

(1) The simplest type of rhythmical hymnody—a type to which the two merely tentative pieces in the poems of St. Gregory of Nazianzus form a direct link of transition—is found in a class of hymns with lines of equal length, to which attention has been paid only in recent times. Of a group of primitive compositions of this type one example, found in a papyrus of the 6th or 7th cent., has permanently maintained a regular place in the 'Great Apodeipnon,' the solemn compline for Lent in the Greek rite. The other components of the group must also have been actually intended for a place in the liturgy. One of them is a special form of Evensong for the twofold festival of the Birth and Baptism of Christ, still celebrated together on the 6th of January (cf. artt. CHRISTMAS, EPIPHANY). Another begins with what are in reality the opening words of a hymn after communion, of which a piece in the *Antiphonary of Bangor* (ed. F. E. Warren, London, 1893–95, i. 32 *v*, *Ad communicare*, 'Corpus domini accipimus') may be a Latin translation. All these were probably composed in the 5th century.

To the same period belongs a song in adoration of the Cross on Good Friday which is found only in MS liturgies of the Italian Basilians. Its two-line strophes, which already indicate the beginnings of a less simple metrical structure, are connected by means of the alphabetical acrostic, which it has in common with several other kindred poems (on the Mother of God, for Christmas, for the festival of the Presentation in the Temple).

This form was resorted to at an early period in Greek imitations of the poetic meditations of St. Ephraim. Subsequently it was used only exceptionally and in unpretentious compositions of a wholly personal character; as, *e.g.*, in a *ὕμνος ἐκ προσώπου Βασιλείου τοῦ δεσπότου* by Photius († 891), and in a penitential hymn of the Emperor Leo VI. (886–912)—compositions in strophes, which exhibit alphabetical acrostics, and the accentual metre of which seeks to imitate the quantitative Anacreontic.

(2) Dependence upon the Semitic poetry of Syria, of which St. Ephraim († 373) was the chief representative in Nisibis and Edessa, appears in the principal form of ancient Byzantine hymnody, viz. the *kontakion*. Here the Eastern Aramaic class of *sôgîthâ* was of fundamental importance, though this, again, in its characteristic features can be fully understood only as a product of Hellenistic influence. Its fructifying effects upon the work of Greek hymn-writers, according to a recent theory, were to a great extent mediated by Greek preachers. The use of the (originally alphabetical) acrostic, an introductory stanza of a different metrical structure, the refrain, or *ephymnion*, sung by a choir, which, breaking in upon the solo parts, bound together the *proœmion* or *kukulion* and the ordinary strophes, or *oikoi* ('houses'), and a highly dramatic treatment of the subject—such were the features borrowed from Syrian hymnody. The rhetorical splendour of the diction, and an artistic structure of line and stanza which was intimately related to the melody and did not need to fear comparison with the most elaborate metrical examples of ancient choral lyric poetry, were contributions of the Greek genius. Of Greek origin likewise were those forms of the acrostic which, instead of being alphabetical, give the name of the writer, or the theme, or the liturgical purpose of the piece—forms which, it is true, are found also in the *Carmina Nisibena* of Ephraim.

If the *Virgins' Psalm* of Methodius may be regarded as a transitional form between the hymns imitative of ancient models and the *kontakion*, there are other two early compositions which show how the new mode was related to the prose hymn. These are (*a*) a purely prose hymn which is found, almost intact, in a 6th cent. papyrus in the John Rylands Library, and which in its alphabetical acrostic and its short *ephymnion* (*Κύριε, δόξα σοι*) exhibits two essential features of the *kontakion*; and (*b*) a complete *kontakion* for Good Friday, which, however, surrenders the prose form for accentual metre only in the *ephymnion*, and which, like a related poem for Palm Sunday, is known thus far only in the Italo-Greek liturgy. The Good Friday *kontakion* is of interest also as regards its theme, being the earliest example of a lamentation supposed to be spoken by the suffering Saviour, after the style of the Western *improperia*.

The new species of poetic composition is first met with in its full maturity in a series of hymns and fragments of hymns which, like the earliest

examples just specified, are anonymous. The oldest instance is probably a *kontakion* on the first man, showing simple four-line strophes and the alphabetical acrostic. A lamentation of Adam for the loss of Paradise, as also a *kontakion* (dating from before 553) on the 'holy fathers' of the earliest councils, and a fragment of another on Elijah and the widow of Zarephath, deserve mention as compositions of singular vigour and beauty. If Cyriacus, the writer of a hymn on the raising of Lazarus, could with confidence be identified with the Palestinian ascetic of the same name who, on the testimony of his biographer, Cyril of Scythopolis (*AS*, Sept. viii. [1865] 151), acted as choirmaster (*κανονάρχης*) in the Laura of St. Chariton for thirty-one years (from 488), we should have to regard him as the earliest writer of *kontakia* known to us by name. But the unrivalled master in this kind of composition was Romanus, the deacon, who in the centuries following was revered as a saint and distinguished by the epithet of 'the Melodist.'

Romanus, born at Emesa of Jewish parents, removed from Beirût, where he had laboured in the Church of the Resurrection, to Constantinople in the reign of the Emperor Anastasius (491–518), probably towards its close, and filled the magnificent churches of Justinian's day with the music of his hymns. His sacred poems, according to a notice that is probably legendary, numbered nearly one thousand. Some eighty pieces bearing his name have survived, though with a legacy of authentic productions of undeniable merit tradition has mingled much that is spurious and inferior. The poets Dometius and Anastasius may be regarded as nearly contemporary with Romanus. Of the anonymous compositions of his time the most outstanding is the festal hymn for the second dedication of the Hagia Sophia of Justinian (562).

In this first and golden age of Byzantine hymnody, however, as in later times, it was not customary to create a new form of strophe and a corresponding melody for each fresh composition. On the contrary, the metre and melody of older pieces were frequently adopted. The typical strophe used as the pattern either of the *kukulion* or of the *oikoi* of a later song was called its *heirmos* ('series').

The heirmos reproduced in the *oikoi* of the so-called hymn *Akathistos* had already been used by Romanus, and the nucleus of that hymn must therefore have been composed as early as the 6th cent., and probably in the first third of it. Tradition assigns the highly esteemed Song in honour of Mary variously to Romanus himself and to a considerably later writer, Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople († 638), while Georgius Pisides and even as late a writer as Photius have also been credited with its authorship.

Originally a *kontakion* on the Annunciation, this production of the 6th cent. seems to have been subsequently transformed by the addition of a new *kukulion* into a song of thanksgiving addressed to the Most Blessed Virgin by the city of Constantinople for deliverance in the stress of war, and in all probability the change was made at the time when the city was threatened by the Avars in 626. It was at that period also that twelve of its twenty-four strophes were furnished with doxologies beginning with the word *χαῖρε*—ascriptions which form a signal contrast to the short *ephymnion* of a simple Alleluia at the end of the other twelve, and give a peculiar stamp to the whole.

In its enlarged form the hymn *Akathistos* was occasionally imitated, as in a lyric on St. Sabas the Younger by a melodist named Orestes, and in others on the Falling Asleep of the Most Holy Mother of God and on the Holy Cross by unknown authors. Even in later centuries, indeed, certain writers added not a little to the store of *kontakia* in the Greek Church. Writers whose compositions belong in the main to another and a later poetic type, such as Theodorus Studites and Joseph the Hymnographer (cf. below, (5)), cultivated also the older form. But in genuine poetic qualities the productions of the later period, destitute as they are, above all, of dramatic power, are far inferior to those of the 6th century. Then from the 10th cent. the *kontakion* itself lost the place which it had hitherto held in the liturgy.

The book known as the *Tropologion*, in which the hymns of this class were collected, fell more and more into oblivion. Only a few strophes of the older hymns, and at length—apart from the *kukulion*—generally but one, retained a permanent place in the daily office, and the poems composed for this office under the names of *kontakion* and *oikos* (or *oikoi*) were mere imitations of such mutilated survivals. The *kontakion* of Romanus for Christmas, however, continued to be sung annually on the 25th of December, even at the Emperor's festive board, until the downfall of the Eastern Empire. The *Akathistos* still forms the nucleus of a festival office dedicated to the Mother of God on the Saturday of the fifth week in Lent, and for the popular religious sentiment of the Orthodox East it takes the place filled conjointly by the Litany of Loreto, the rosary, and the *Te Deum* in the Roman Catholic West. Finally, the impressive funeral *kontakion* of Anastasius—though in a much mutilated form—is used to the present day in the office for the burial of priests.

(3) As compared with the *kontakion*, which in the zenith of its vogue appears to have been called also the *tropos*, the term *troparion*, a diminutive of the latter word, signified a shorter form of what was essentially the same thing: it was a single strophe constructed generally of accented lines of various kinds, the part performed by the precentor being, at least originally, supplemented by an *ephymnion* sung by the congregation or the choir.

We learn the nature of this species of sacred song in its earliest form from the *troparia* with which St. Auxentius, a prominent representative of Greek monachism, enriched public worship in Bithynia and Constantinople in the first half of the 5th cent., and specimens of which have been preserved by his contemporary biographer Georgius (*PG* cxiv. 1412). They are artless pieces, composed of a few short lines of lyrical rhythmical prose, in which genuine piety finds homely though effective expression. Anthimus, a pupil of Auxentius, once a court official, latterly a deacon and presbyter of the Church, and Timocles, his contemporary, who are said to have flourished *c.* 457, are named as the leading representatives of what was probably a more artistic type of *troparion*, although nothing survives that can be definitely ascribed to them.

The rich development which this form of liturgical poetry likewise speedily attained, more especially on the native soil of the *kontakion*, *i.e.* in Greek-speaking Syria, can still be seen in the so-called *Octoëchos* of Severus of Antioch—a complete hymn-book, the groundwork of which was laid by that celebrated exponent of Monophysitism in the years 512–518. This invaluable liturgical monument, lost in the original, is preserved in the revised form which Jacob of Edessa re-constructed in 675 from the older Syriac translation executed by a bishop of Edessa named Paul.

Its component pieces, 366 in number, are, without exception, lyrics of a single strophe, and in their general structure are all to be classed as *troparia*, although they exhibit a special and characteristic feature in the fact that by far the larger number of them were meant to be sung in connexion with a verse from the Psalms. Many of them already show an affinity, in manifold forms of expression, with the numerous *troparia* found in the later liturgical books of the Greek rite. On the other hand, a group of its texts, meant for use in the celebration of the Eucharist and called *prosphorikoi*, bear, in virtue of their archaic style, a close resemblance to the *troparia* of Auxentius.

Besides Severus, two contributors of special importance are John bar Aphtônyâ († 538), and John surnamed Psaltes, both archimandrites in the monastery of Qen-nešrê on the Euphrates. A *terminus ad quem* even for the latest poems in the original collection is found in the date of Paul's translation, which may be assigned to 619–629. A number of very short pieces seem to be of even earlier date than those of Severus. Two of the lyrics in this Syriac hymn-book are definitely called 'Alexandrian.'

In point of fact the ancient Greek liturgy of Egypt also must have had its own stock of *troparia*. To that must be assigned, first of all, the residue of hymns for the Feast of Epiphany found in a papyrus of the Archduke Rainer's Collection—lyrics which some, probably overshooting the mark, would trace back to the first half of the 4th, if not even to the 3rd century. Besides ostraka and various papyrus fragments, the Egyptian Monophysite Church has preserved further materials of great value in this connexion. Thus *troparia*, definitely so designated in their original Greek and in a Saidic translation, are furnished by fragments of the earlier MS liturgies of the Coptic rite. The almost indescribable state of neglect in which the Greek text of these fragments has been left points to the lapse of a considerable interval between the date of their composition and that of the surviving transcripts. Nevertheless, a *terminus ad quem* is indicated by the fact that several of them are based

on the *Trisagion* in its distinctively Monophysite expansion. These Egyptian texts may, therefore, be regarded as of contemporary origin with those of the hymn-book of Severus.

The rapidity with which the entire public worship of the Greek Orthodox Church came to be permeated by the *troparion* is shown by a very interesting account which two monks named Johannes and Sophronius have given of a visit paid by them to Mt. Sinai, probably towards the close of the 6th cent. (Pitra, *Juris eccl. Græc. hist. et mon.* i. 2205). Here they found an anchorite, Nilus by name, living in complete seclusion from the world, and adhering to a form of Church daily prayer which on principle he kept clear of the new-fangled embellishments of liturgical poetry.

With his uncompromising devotion to antiquity, the writers contrast what, in its conjunction of *troparia* with the essentially Biblical elements of the Sunday Office, was for them 'the rule of the Catholic and Apostolic Church.' According to that rule, they say, the *Κύριε ἐκέκραξα*, *i.e.* Pss 140. 141. 129 and 116 in vespers, and a selection from the nine Biblical songs, viz. the 7th, 8th, and, from the 9th, Lk $1^{46\text{-}55}$ (the 'Magnificat' of the West), as also Pss 148-150, called the *Αἶνοι*, in matins, were associated with a series of *troparia*. Each of the three parts into which the psalmody of matins preceding the rendering of the odes was divided was followed by a hymn of the same class, called a *kathisma*, and in the rendering of the odes a corresponding piece, called a *mesodion*, marked a pause after the 3rd and 6th odes. In vespers, finally, a *troparion* was conjoined with the evening hymn *Φῶς ἱλαρόν*, and in matins, another, specially commemorative of the Resurrection, was combined with the Great Doxology.

We shall meet with not a few of such elements of a poetic character in the final form of the Greek Office, and we may, therefore, safely assume that many of the compositions performing a like service in that office date from the 6th century. Although we have not the necessary external evidence from which to draw definite conclusions regarding such ancient works, yet tradition furnishes the date of certain very old *troparia* which hold to this day an honoured place in the Eucharistic liturgy of the Greek Church. We are told that the Emperor Justinian himself (527-565) was the author of the Christologically important *troparion* entitled *Ὁ μονογενὴς Υἱός*, which comes shortly before the Scripture lessons. In the reign of his successor, Justin II. (565-578), the 'Cherubic Hymn' which accompanies the procession known as the 'Great Entrance' was inserted in the Byzantine Mass; while other two pieces, the *Τοῦ δείπνου σου τοῦ μυστικοῦ* and the *Σιγησάτω πᾶσα σὰρξ βροτεία*, which are substituted for that hymn on Maundy Thursday and Easter Even respectively, are probably not of later origin. The introduction of a *troparion* to be sung after Communion (*Πληρωθήτω τὸ στόμα ἡμῶν*) is assigned to the year 624, and of another (*Νῦν αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν*), which takes the place of the Cherubic Hymn in the Mass of the Pre-sanctified, to 645.

(4) The early Antiochene *troparia* of Severus's hymn-book, perhaps because they are essentially connected with verses from the Psalms, are assigned to a distinct class, the *antiphon* (Syr. *ma'nîthâ*). On the testimony of the Western pilgrim Etheria, or Eucheria (*Peregrinatio*, xxiv. 5, xxvii., xxix., xxxi. 5, xxxv., xxxvii., xl., xliii. 5, xlvii.), lyrics bearing that title, together with 'hymns' and 'psalms,' had already won an important place in the worship of the churches in Jerusalem towards the close of the 4th century. In the Greek liturgy of the following period a hymn formed of a Biblical passage and a *hypopsalma* rendered between the verses by two different choirs alternately was regarded as 'antiphonal.' Here it was customary at first to render whole psalms in this way; later, with increasing frequency, a few verses only were sung. The *hypopsalma*, again, in extending beyond the narrower limits of the formulæ originally employed, developed first of all into a somewhat longer prose formula, as found, *e.g.*, in the three antiphons at the beginning of the Eucharistic liturgy. Afterwards, however, it became the practice to introduce a real *troparion*, of which either the whole or the concluding part was repeated between the verses of the Biblical passage; characteristic examples of the latter method are retained to the present day in the vespers for Christmas and Epiphany. This unvarying repetition of a single *troparion*, however, was at length superseded by a whole series of such pieces, each of which was sung but once by either of the choirs, and thus, when these *troparia* were welded into an integral whole either by an acrostic or by an *ephymnion* common to all, there arose a distinct artistic type of antiphon.

It may be assumed that the use of this form of choral art was not altogether infrequent at an earlier stage of liturgical development. An extant example is furnished by the third of the fifteen so-called antiphons of Good Friday, which an unreliable tradition ascribes to St. Cyril of Alexandria. Generally, however, what we find here in the early period is a combination of verses of psalms with *troparia* which have no definite inner link of connexion, and at the present day even the verses of psalms formerly so employed have disappeared, so that only the name of the antiphon now survives.

The name 'antiphon' came also to be associated with the so-called *anabathmoi*, which had a recognized place in the matins of Sundays and important feast days, as also in the office of burial. The *anabathmoi* are two series of poetical paraphrases of the beginning and middle of the Psalms of Degrees (119-130 and 132) in two *troparia*, to which was attached, as a sequel to the Lesser Doxology (*Δόξα Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ*, *κ.τ.λ.*), a third *troparion* in praise of the Holy Spirit. It must be taken for granted that these very ancient forms likewise were originally intended to be used in an antiphonal rendering of the psalms in question.

Finally, special significance seems at one time to have attached to an antiphonal rendering of Ps 118. That psalm, sung antiphonally in combination with a *hypopsalma* of very short formulæ, has remained a regular feature of the burial service. In similar manner the *stichera* (see below, (6)), called from their opening words *Αἱ ἀγγελικαί*, which come before us as the work of Romanus, and which, divided into short groups, are used at the present day in the matins for the 20th-24th, 28th, and 30th of December for quite a different purpose—forming a peerless festal hymn on the Redeemer's birth in the stable at Bethlehem—must originally have been the poetic investment of an effective three-fold antiphon constructed with the aid of the same psalm. On the other hand, a lyric in its own way not less magnificent, though doubtless of much later date, is now combined with Ps 118 in a peculiar antiphonal rendering for the matins of Easter Even.

These are the so-called *enkomia*—comprising a markedly poetical lament at the Saviour's bier—which, surviving in various recensions, and bearing the names of various writers, as, *e.g.*, Germanus, Michael Files, an archimandrite called Ignatius, and a patriarch called Arsenius, perhaps go no further back than the 12th or 13th century. Similar *enkomia* were composed at a later date in honour of the Mother of God and John the Baptist, and—at least in the local form of worship prevalent in Jerusalem—a funeral hymn upon the former, an imitation of the *enkomia* of Easter Even, has permanently retained a place of importance as a special feature in the matins of the 15th of August.

(5) The essential feature of the antiphon, *i.e.* the organic combination of *troparia* with a Biblical passage, appears also in the structure of the *canon*, which was the leading form of hymnody from the 8th cent., and which from the 10th cent. superseded the older *kontakion* in the liturgy. The canon, to speak more precisely, is a mode in which the singing of *troparia* is combined with all the Biblical songs recited in matins, the short and unvarying *hypopsalma* of an earlier day giving place to poetical strophes of considerable length and of the same metrical structure. The consistent application of this principle led necessarily to the composition of very long poems in nine parts, in each of which the number of strophes formed upon a particular model strophe as a *heirmos* corresponds to the number of verses in the associated Biblical song. A composition essentially of this kind is actually found in the so-called 'Great Canon,' a penitential poem of two hundred and fifty *troparia*,

which, notwithstanding its rhetorical embellishment and its wearisome diffuseness, is of a most impressive character, and is now recited annually on the Thursday of the fifth week in Lent, in exactly the same way as the hymn *Akathistos* two days later.

Its author was Andreas, archbishop of Crete († 740), a native of Damascus, who, trained in the clerical circles of Palestine, became in his youth secretary to the patriarch of Jerusalem, and then lived in Constantinople for a considerable time previous to his promotion to the archbishopric. He was a prolific writer, and in the tradition of the Eastern Church is actually regarded as the inventor of the new poetic form, to which was applied the name of 'Canon,' hitherto given to the whole morning office, or to its most important part, viz. the nine Biblical songs.

Certain other compositions of Andreas, as, *e.g.*, the canon on the Myrophori, sung on the second Sunday after Easter, and one of 180 *troparia* on Simeon and Anna, approximate in length to the Great Canon. But, in general, the practical necessity of limiting the duration of public worship soon led to the practice of attaching not more than three or four poetical strophes to each Biblical song. The same requirement led here, as in other parts of the office, gradually to the entire omission of what was originally the cardinal feature, *i.e.* the Biblical passages, or to their being restricted to a few verses. Thus the essential nine sections of the poetic canon—to which the term 'odes' was henceforth specially applied—actually came to take the place of the very elements with which they were once intended to be combined. A further departure from the earliest order is seen in the regular omission of the second ode of the lyrical group, the reason being that the second Biblical song had been previously left out of the actual recitation—from a superstitious dread, it was said, of uttering the imprecatory threats contained in it. Then, besides complete canons, *diodia*, *triodia*, and *tetraodia* were composed to be sung with groups of two, three, and four Biblical passages respectively. Of special importance are the *triodia* and *tetraodia* of the Lenten season, which owe their existence to the circumstance that during Lent one of the Biblical songs, i.–v., was recited on week-days from Monday to Friday, and nos. vi. and vii. on Saturday, these being followed each day by nos. viii. and ix. The term *heirmos*, conformably to what was noted in the case of the *kontakion*, denotes here the model strophe which was in most cases borrowed from an older canon, and with which the *troparia* of each ode had to conform both in metre and in melody.

The entire mass of compositions which follow the norm introduced by Andreas of Crete comprises two strata differing in date and place of origin. The earlier stratum had its origin in the ancient Byzantine form of worship found in Jerusalem, and embraces the lyrics of Passion Week, and of the chief festivals of the Christian Year, and the morning canons of the so-called *Octoëchos*, which contains the ordinary Sunday offices arranged for the eight ecclesiastical tones. The birthplace of this group was the Laura of St. Sabas in the Kedron Valley, where, in the first half of the 8th cent., its standard forms took shape in the hands of St. John of Damascus († *ante* 754) and his adoptive brother Cosmas, surnamed the Hagiopolite, who was consecrated bishop of Maiuma, near Gaza, in 743. The later stratum was deposited in Constantinople, where the Stadion monastery, as a centre of sacred poetry, attained an eminence corresponding to that of the Laura of St. Sabas. It was, above all, three of the most prominent residents of that monastery—Theodorus the Studite († 820), his younger brother Joseph, subsequently archbishop of Thessalonica, and Theophanes, surnamed Graptus, promoted to be metropolitan of Nicæa in 842—who, during the Iconoclastic conflicts of the 9th cent., completed the work of their Palestine forerunners in composing canons for Lent, for numerous Saints' Days, and for the festal offices arranged for the eight ecclesiastical tones in the so-called *Paraklitiks*. John of Damascus and Cosmas the Hagiopolite had been pupils of a Sicilian named Cosmas, who is also said to have been a writer of poetry, and was ransomed from slavery among the Arabs by the father of the former; and afterwards another Joseph, a Sicilian, like his fellow-countryman Methodius of Syracus, developed his talent as a hymnographer in the capital of the Eastern Empire alongside of the three just mentioned. The poets Georgius of Nicomedia, Metrophanes, and Theodorus of Smyrna, with other hymnographers of the Studion—as, *e.g.*, Antonius, Arsenius, Basilius, Gabriel, and Nicolaus—were all natives of the East.

In the hands of these and of later writers the artistic type of the canon, once it had become completely independent of the nine Biblical songs, came to occupy an essentially different position in the liturgy as a whole, being now employed in the most diverse parts of it. Thus, in the midnight office, on each of eight successive Sundays, the psalms were superseded by one of the eight canons on the Most Holy Trinity, two of which at least were the work of Metrophanes. A canon occupies a central position in the various forms of the burial office, in the administration of Extreme Unction, and in the Frocking of Monks. When the land suffered from drought or earthquake, or was threatened with war or pestilence, the canon was the official form of Church prayer, and it was likewise used at the sick-bed and the death-bed. Of two canons thus employed, the one is worthy of note as the work of Andreas and the other as being connected with the Western form of prayer called the *commendatio animæ*, and with the sepulchral paintings of ancient Christian art. In confession and in preparation for Communion a canon was used for private devotion, and for a like purpose one on the Guardian Angels, composed about the middle of the 11th cent. by Johannes Mauropus, bishop of Euchaïta, was frequently employed. The 'small' and the 'large' *παρακλητικοὶ κανόνες* on the Mother of God—the former probably by a monk named Theosterictus, the latter by the Emperor Theodorus Ducas Lascaris (1254–58)—form the nuclei respectively of two votive offices of the Virgin.

In real poetic merit, not only such productions of a relatively late period, but even the canons of the 8th and 9th centuries, are far inferior to the classical creations of the writers of *kontakia*, though we cannot ignore the high achievement of works like the celebrated Easter canon of John of Damascus, or the Christmas canon of Cosmas. As regards its form, the canon borrowed from the *kontakion* the frequent device of linking its strophes together by the acrostic, which in some cases was, as before, simply alphabetical, and in others—where it was used to indicate the substance or purpose of the poem, often naming the author as well—was wont to take the form of a hexameter or an iambic trimeter. The solitary attempt to apply the laws of classical metre to the composition of canons was noted above (2).

(6) In the final form of the Greek liturgy the canon is the central feature in what is called the *akoluthia* ('sequence') of a particular liturgical day or festival—a term which corresponds in a manner to the Western *officium*. But, besides the canon, numerous other compositions belonging to various classes of rhythmic poetry occur as more or less regular elements in every *akoluthia*. To say nothing of *kontakion*, *oikos*, and *anabathmoi*, we may recognize here, generally without difficulty, the types of *troparia* which, on the testimony of the monks Johannes and Sophronius (see above under 3 (3)), found a place in public worship during the latter half of the 6th century. Thus the ancient *troparion* to the Φῶς Ἱλαρόν seems to survive in the *apolytikion*, the closing *troparion* of vespers.

The *kathismata* formerly sung in matins after the three portions from the Psalms have also been retained—or, at least, two of them, as, on Sundays, instead of the third, a shorter strophe of rhythmical poetry called the *hypakoë* leads to the *anabathmoi*. Of the two *mesodia*, the first, now also called the *kathisma*, interrupts the continuity of the canon after the third ode, just as at an earlier period it interrupted the series of Biblical songs at a corresponding point, while the second was superseded by *kontakion* and *oikos*. The *megalynaria* sung in connexion with the ninth ode of the canon at the chief festivals of Christ and the Mother of God recall the *troparia* formerly associated with the 'Magnificat' (Lk 146-55).

Next to the canon, the most important elements in an *akoluthia* are the *stichera*, which almost always occur in groups. They derive their name from the fact that they are combined with verses of Biblical passages (*στίχοι*) usually taken from the Psalms. The *stichera* to the Κύριε ἐκέκραξα of vespers and to the *ainoi* are manifestly identical with the *troparia* which in the 6th cent. were attached to these Scripture passages; and the present usage of reciting in matins, not the whole of Pss 148–150, but only a few verses, in connexion with the appropriate *stichera* is merely a later abbreviation. Another class of *stichera*,

however, which are rendered towards the close of vespers, just before the canon, in the hours of prime, tierce, sext, and nones, in general, and, in particular, in the so-called 'great hours' of Good Friday and of the vigils of Christmas and Epiphany, as well as in the most diverse parts of the liturgy outside the regular Daily Office, were meant from the first only to be inserted between two *stichoi* separated by the Lesser Doxology, and appear to have some affinity with the ancient Antiochene antiphons of Severus's hymn-book. A third class of *troparia*, which now have no connexion with any Biblical passages, were in all likelihood originally rendered in a similar way.

On their purely formal side the *stichera* fall into three groups. Those which in metre and melody are not in any way related to the rest are called *idiomela*, and are generally of considerable length. Those which serve as the metrical, and therefore also the musical, patterns of others are *automela*. Those, again, which in the form of their strophes follow the pattern of particular *automela*, and are set to their tunes, are *prosomoia*.

There are several other distinct forms of the *troparion*, but all of minor importance. Thus in matins the 'hymns to the Trinity' (*ὕμνοι τριαδικοί*), composed according to the eight ecclesiastical tones, are sung regularly at the beginning, and the *exapostellaria* after the canon; the *eulogetaria*, devoted to prayers for the dead or to the praise of the Resurrection, are used especially on Saturdays and Sundays, and the *photagogika*, which hail the light of the dawning day, in Lent. In the Eucharistic liturgy of Sunday, in the nocturn of Good Friday, and in the burial office, the singing of the so-called *makarismoi* is interwoven with the text of Mt 5^{3-12}. A *troparion* in praise of the Mother of God, called a *theotokion*, is conjoined with the single odes of each canon and with all other forms of *troparion*; and here the strophes specially devoted to her maternal sympathy with the sufferings of her Son are called *staurotheotokia*. Of less frequent occurrence are the so-called *triadika* and *nekrosima*, expressing respectively a doxology to the Trinity and a prayer for the dead.

The vast mass of texts exhibiting these various kinds of *troparia* in the MSS and printed editions of the liturgical books was, of course, a slow and gradual growth. The texts themselves are for the most part anonymous. Not a few of them were the work of writers who have already been mentioned as authors of canons. Among other writers whose names are found, the most prominent is a certain Anatolius, who should not be confounded with his namesake, the patriarch of Constantinople in the 5th century. Like Anatolius, Sergius, a Hagiopolite, Stephen sometimes called a Hagiopolite, sometimes a Sabbaite, and probably also Andreas Pyrrhus belong to the older Palestinian school of rhythmical composition; the characteristics of this school appear also in a few *idiomela* by St. Sophronius, whose work is generally on such radically different lines. It is not easy to say whether, or to what extent, certain extant compositions bearing the name of Johannes 'the Monk' are the work of a writer not to be identified either with John of Damascus or John of Mauropus. In Constantinople, St. Germanus the patriarch († 740) and the nun Casia or Icasia, a woman of undeniable and peculiar gifts, who flourished in the reigns of Theophilus (829–842) and Michael III. (842–867), won repute in historically traceable compositions, especially in the class of *idiomela*. A series of morning hymns on Sundays attached to the eleven Resurrection gospels of their matins were composed by the Emperor Leo VI. (886–911), and the series of corresponding *exapostellaria* by his son Constantius VII. Porphyrogenitus (912–959). These fall below mediocrity, while the *apolytika*, *kathismata*, and *stichera* of an earlier age surpass the contemporary canons in sheer poetic qualities.

In Byzantium and the East, hymnography as an active and living development virtually came to an end in the 11th cent., with the codification of the definitive liturgical books of the Greek rite, viz. the *Octoëchos* and the *Parakletike*, and, above all, the *Triodion*, the *Pentekostarion*, and the *Menaia*, which contain the choral texts respectively for Lent and Passion Week, for the period between Easter and Pentecost, and for the fixed feasts of the Christian year. Only in the Italo-Greek West was there about the same time a noteworthy revival of rhythmical hymnody. The art was assiduously cultivated in the famous and still surviving Basilian Abbey of Grottaferrata, near Rome, till well into the 12th century. The founders of the abbey, St. Nilus the younger († 1004), and his successors, Paulus and Bartholomæus, were the heads of a school to which Arsenius, Germanus, Joseph, Procopius, and others belonged. Within the Greek Orthodox Church itself, moreover, whole *akoluthiæ* and single lyrics were incorporated in the liturgical books at a still later date. Mention may be made of Nicephorus Xanthopulus and the Patriarch Philotheus († 1379) in the 14th, and Nicolaus Malaxus in the 16th cent., as authors of such later elements of the liturgy.

LITERATURE.—i. *TEXTS.*—An excellent selection of examples of all the various types will be found in W. Christ and M. Paranikas, *Anthologia Græca carminum Christianorum*, Leipzig, 1871, which contains a complete critical edition of the hymns of Synesius, and is the most convenient authority for the Nazsene hymn, the *Parthenion* of Methodius, the hymn at the end of the *Pædagogus*, the ancient prose-hymns for morning and evening, and the compositions of Syncellus Elias, the Emperor Leo, and Photius; J. R. Harris, *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon published from the Syriac Version*[2], revised and enlarged, Cambridge, 1911; Apollinaris's metrical paraphrases of the Pss., in *PG* xxxiii. 1313–1538, and in a critical ed. by A. Ludwich, *Apollinarii Metaphrasis psalmorum*, Leipzig, 1912; the poems of St. Gregory of Nazianzus according to the Benedictine ed., *PG* xxxvii.–xxxviii., and his iambic poems in a Syriac version, ed. J. Bollig and H. Gismondi, *S. Gregorii Theologi liber carminum iambicorum, versio Syriaca antiquissima*, Beirût, 1895–96; the *Anacreontics* of Sophronius, in *PG* lxxxvii. 3733–3838, based on A. Mai, *Spicilegium Romanum*, iv., Rome, 1840; another hymn, lacking in *PG*, ed. L. Ehrhard, *S. Sophronii anacreonticorum carmen xiv.*, Strassburg, 1887; the Easter hymn of Georgius Pisides, in Migne, *PG* xcii. 1373–1384. P. Maas, *Frühbyzantin. Kirchenpoesie*, i. 'Anonyme Hymnen des v.–vi. Jahrh.,' Bonn, 1910, gives a critical ed. of equilinear hymns and of the oldest anonymous *kontakia*. The papyrus hymn on the Birth of Christ is given in A. S. Hunt, *Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester*, i. (London, 1911) 13 ff., while the hymn of the Amherst Papyri can now be most conveniently consulted in C. Wessely, 'Les plus anciens Monuments du christianisme, écrits sur papyrus,' in *Patrologia Orientalis*, iv. iii. [1907] 95–210, no. 28, and the fragment of the Berlin Papyrus, in C. Schmidt and W. Schubart, *Altchristl. Texte*, Berlin, 1910, p. 125 f. The rich store of ancient *kontakia* was first drawn upon by J. B. Pitra, *Analecta sacra spicilegio Solesmensi parata*, i., Paris, 1876; the Russ. ed. of a Moscow Κοντακάριον by the archimandrite Amfilochij, 2 vols., Moscow, 1878, is too defective to be of any service; other *kontakia*, especially those of Romanus, or ascribed to him, and modern critical edd. of single pieces: J. B. Pitra, *Sanctus Romanus veterum melodorum princeps; Cantica sacra ex codd. MSS monasterii S. Joannis in insula Patmo primum in lucem ed.*, Rome, 1888; K. Krumbacher, 'Der heilige Georg in der griechischen Überlieferung,' ed. posthumously by A. Ehrhard in *ABAW*, philos.-philol. u. histor. Klasse, xxv. iii. [1911] 84–102; and P. Maas, 'Kontakion auf den heil. Theodoros unter dem Namen des Romanos,' in *Oriens Christianus*, new ser., ii. [1912] 48–63. A complete critical ed. of the hymns of Romanus was prepared by Krumbacher, and will be published by Maas. The *kontakion* on the dedication of the Hagia Sophia was ed. by (S. Gassisl), 'Un antichissimo "Kontakion" inedito,' in *Roma e l'Oriente*, i. [1911] 165–187; the *troparia* of Auxentius, in Pitra, *Analecta sacra*, i. xxiii. f. The *editio princeps* of Severus's hymn-book: E. W. Brooks, 'James of Edessa: The Hymns of Severus of Antioch and Others,' in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vi. 1, vii. 5. There is as yet no collection of the ancient Egyptian *troparia* scattered through edd. of Greek papyri and catalogues of Coptic MSS, but T. Schermann, *Ägyp. Abendmahlsliturgien des ersten Jahrtausends in ihrer Überlieferung*, Paderborn, 1912, pp. 211–230, may be consulted. The liturgical books of the Greek rite for use in the Greek Orthodox Church were formerly printed for the most part in Venice, latterly also in Athens. A text critically collated with the older MSS, and, on the whole, the best, is that of the Roman edd. prepared for the use of the Uniat Greeks, Τριῴδιον, 1879; Πεντηκοστάριον, 1884; Παρακλητικὴ ἤτοι Ὀκτώηχος ἢ μεγάλη, 1885; Μηναῖα τοῦ ὅλου ἐνιαυτοῦ, 6 vols., 1885–1902; canons of John of Damascus and Cosmas respectively, in *PG* xcvi. 817–856 and xcviii. 459–524.

ii. *GENERAL WORKS.*—The *Prolegomena* of Christ and Paranikas, and of Pitra, *Analecta sacra*, i., are of paramount importance; based on them and on the textual material furnished by them are: H. Stevenson, 'L'Hymnographie de l'église grecque,' in *Revue des questions historiques*, xl. [1870] 482–543, and L. Jacobi, 'Zur Gesch. des griech. Kirchenliedes,' in *ZKG* v. [1882] 177–250; E. Bouvy, *Poètes et mélodes: Étude sur les origines du rythme tonique dans l'hymnographie de l'église grecque*, Nimes, 1886; K. Krumbacher, *Gesch. der byzantin. Litt. von Justinian bis zum Ende des oström. Reiches*[2], Munich, 1897, pp. 656–705, 'Die byzantin. Kirchendichtung'; in the 3rd ed., which is in preparation, this section will be edited by P. Maas; also F. Cabrol, *L'Hymnographie de l'église grecque*, Angers, 1893; O. Bardenhewer, *Patrologie*[3], Freiburg im Br., 1910, pp. 485–492; H. Jordan, *Gesch. der altchr. Lit.*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 455–470; and, above all, the excellent art. of L. Petit, 'Antiphone dans la liturgie grecque,' in F. Cabrol's

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A. BAUMSTARK.

HYMNS (Syriac Christian).—Our knowledge of the hymnody of the Syriac-speaking Churches has been greatly increased during the last 25 years by the publication of much literature in that language which formerly existed only in MSS, and in particular of many of the East Syrian or Nestorian service-books in Syriac, with English translations. But much still remains to be done, and until a similar work is effected for the West Syrian, or Monophysite (Jacobite), service-books, some considerable gaps in our knowledge will remain.

1. Early history of Syriac hymnody.—The earliest known writer of Syriac hymns was Bardaiṣān (Bardesanes), whose book of 150 hymns after the number of the Psalter was in the hands of Ephraim the Syrian (see below). Bardaiṣān was born at Edessa (Syr. Ur hāi), the capital of Osrhoëne, A.D. 155 (for the date, see *DCB* i. 250), and was deemed by his successors to be heretical (for his doctrines see Eusebius, *HE* iv. 30). Sozomen (*HE* iii. 16) tells us that his son Harmonius was learned in Greek erudition, and

> 'was the first to subdue his native language [Syriac] to metres and musical laws; the verses he delivered to the choirs, and even now the Syrians frequently sing, not the precise copies by Harmonius, but the same melodies.' As these verses were somewhat infected with Bardaiṣān's heresy, 'Ephraim . . . applied himself to the understanding of the metres of Harmonius, and composed similar poems in accordance with the doctrines of the Church. . . . From that period the Syrians sang the odes of Ephraim according to the law of the ode established by Harmonius' (cf. Theodoret, *HE* iv. 26).

From these statements of Sozomen it has been deduced that the hymns ascribed by Ephraim to Bardaiṣān were really written by Harmonius, or at least that father and son worked together. It is clear, if Sozomen is to be trusted, that the Syrians derived their methods of hymnody from the Greek Christians in the first instance; and we know from Eusebius that the latter used sacred poetry at an early date. That historian speaks (*HE* v. 28) of the 'many psalms and hymns, written by the faithful brethren *from the beginning*,' celebrating 'Christ the Word of God, speaking of Him as Divine (*θεολογοῦντες*).' There is no indication *here* that these hymns were sung in church; but there is such an indication in Pliny's famous letter to Trajan (*Ep.* 96):

> 'They affirmed . . . that they were accustomed on a fixed day to assemble before dawn and to sing antiphonally a hymn to Christ as to a god.'

In Eusebius (*HE* vii. 24), Dionysius of Alexandria († 265) is quoted as praising the schismatic Nepos, an Egyptian bishop early in the 3rd cent., for his 'extensive psalmody,' and saying that his compositions still delighted many of the brethren. Probably Antioch led the way in the use of hymns in church. Socrates (*HE* vi. 8) ascribes the origin of singing antiphonal hymns to Ignatius the martyr, who 'saw a vision of angels hymning the Holy Trinity in alternate chants.'

The most famous hymn-writer of the Syriac-speaking Christians was Ephraim (c. A.D. 308-375), a native of Mesopotamia. He is always represented as a deacon, and his words 'Christ gave me the talent of the priesthood' (*Op. Syr.* iii. 467 D; *DCB* ii. 138) are not really against this, for the Syriac *kāhnūthā* ('priesthood') includes all ranks of the ministry (A. J. Maclean and W. H. Browne, *Catholicos of the East*, London, 1892, p. 185); so the E. Syr. *Sūnhādhūs* (Book of Canon Law), vi. 1. In addition to his numerous other works, he composed metrical homilies and other religious poems, including commentaries in metre on Holy Scripture; and he also wrote a large number of hymns for liturgical purposes, many of which are still sung (see below, § 4 (*a*)). He made use of hymnody to spread orthodox doctrine, just as Bardaiṣān and Harmonius had used it, and as the Arians did, to spread their erroneous teaching (for the latter, see Socrates, *HE* vi. 8, where we read that they went about Constantinople at night chanting antiphonal hymns to support their heresy, while the Catholics imitated their example). Ephraim seems to have done much to promote and improve ecclesiastical music, and his compositions became extremely popular (for an account of his writings see R. Payne Smith, in *DCB* ii. 137). His metres are irregular, and, as is the case with all the earlier Syriac poetry (see below, 3), his lines do not rhyme. There is no good reason to suppose that he ever wrote in Greek; his extant works in that language are doubtless translations. A very interesting and newly published Syriac metrical homily by him on Bardaiṣān may be seen, with English translation, in *JThSt* v. [1904] 546 ff.

After the separation of Nestorian and Monophysite Syrians, the most famous Syriac hymn-writer was the Nestorian Narsai (Narses), known as the 'Harp of the Spirit' (*kinārā d'rūkhā*), who, after spending 20 years at the great school of Edessa, left it A.D. 457 to preside over the scarcely less celebrated school at Nisibis; he died A.D. 502. His metrical compositions include 360 homilies; of these 47 have been published in Syriac by A. Mingana (Mosul, 1905), together with 10 short poems (*sōghyāthā*); and four of these homilies, dealing with the Liturgy and the Baptismal Office, have been translated into English by R. H. Connolly, with illuminative Introduction and Notes ('The Liturgical Homilies of Narsai,' *TS* viii. 1, Cambridge, 1909). These homilies, however, were not meant for church use, and for the hymns by this writer used in the services reference must be made to the East Syrian office books (see below, § 4 (*a*)). Narsai's favourite metre was the six-syllable line (see E. A. W. Budge's ed. of Thomas of Marga's *Book of Governors*, London, 1893, ii. 300 n.), but hymns by him in other metres are found.

Of other early Syriac hymn-writers may be mentioned Isaac of Antioch, a native of Amidh (Diarbekr), who was an Orthodox priest at Antioch c. A.D. 450, and a disciple of Zenobius, who himself had learnt from Ephraim (*DCB* iii. 295); and Jacob, bishop of Baṭnān (Batnae) in Srūgh (Sarug), a district of Osrhoëne, in the 5th cent. († A.D. 521 or 522). Two volumes of the *Homilies* of the latter have been published by Bedjan (Paris, 1905-06), and some account of them may be seen in *JThSt*

viii. [1906–07] 581 (R. H. Connolly). It has been disputed whether he was Monophysite or Orthodox (see E. Renaudot, *Lit. Orient. Collectio*, Frankfort, 1847, ii. 366 f., and *DCB* iii. 327). He ordinarily wrote in twelve-syllable lines. A third well-known hymn-writer was Balai (Balaeus), who wrote in quinquesyllabic metre (Connolly, 'Narsai,' p. ix; *DCB* iii. 296[a]), which he seems to have invented. He was a disciple of Ephraim, and a chorepiscopus (R. Payne Smith, *Thesaur. Syr.*, Oxford, 1897–1901, i. 534).

The plan of writing homilies and expositions in metre continued for a long time. We find one by Thomas, bishop of Marga, inserted in his *Book of Governors*, a long biographical composition of 415 stanzas in the twelve-syllable metre (9th cent.; Budge, i. 172, ii. 345). Thomas afterwards became metropolitan of Beth Garmai (east of the Tigris).

2. Syriac hymns and poems translated from Greek.—We have seen that the Greeks gave the Syrians the incentive to compose religious poetry. The Syrians also used many hymns translated from Greek. Of these the earliest example, probably, is to be found in the *Odes of Solomon*, poems in Syriac (some also in Coptic), which have been lately recovered. J. H. Bernard (in *JThSt* xii. [1910–11] 1 ff., and in his ed. 'The Odes of Solomon,' *TS* viii. 3, Cambridge, 1912) suggests that they are a collection of Christian hymns 'packed with allusions to baptism, and comparable to Ephraim's Hymns on the Epiphany' (*JThSt* xii. 29), though perhaps his theory of their object and contents goes too far. He dates them c. A.D. 150–200; R. H. Connolly (*JThSt* xiv. [1912–13] 311) possibly a little later; J. Rendel Harris, the first editor (*Odes and Psalms of Solomon*, Cambridge, 1909), a little earlier; E. A. Abbott (*Light on the Gospel from an ancient Poet*, Cambridge, 1912) thinks that they were written by a Jewish Christian in the 1st cent.; Harnack considers them to be a Jewish work with Christian interpolations—against this see Connolly in *JThSt* xiii. [1911–12] 298. That the *Odes* were used in public worship in the 4th cent. is made probable by a reference to them in the *Testament of our Lord*, which we know only by a Syriac translation made by Jacob, bishop of Edessa, in the 7th cent. († A.D. 708 or 710). This Church Order has a direction (i. 26): 'Let them sing psalms and four hymns of praise (*tishbkhāthā*, see below, § 4 (*a*)), one by Moses, and of Solomon, and of the other prophets.' The present writer accepts Bernard's correction (*JThSt* xii. 31) of his own suggestion in the English edition of the *Testament* (Edinburgh, 1902) that the Song of Songs is meant, and adopts his view that the *Odes* are here referred to. Now, though it has been suggested by Abbott (*Light on the Gospel*, and *JThSt* xiv. 441) that Syriac, or some Semitic dialect, is the original of the *Odes*, yet the argument by Connolly (*JThSt* xiv. 315 f., 530 ff.), that our Syriac text is translated from the Greek, appears to be very strong (see also *JThSt* xv. [1913–14] 44 ff.). If it be sound, we have here a good example of the use by Syriac-speaking Christians of Greek hymns.

Another example is the Syriac version of the Greek hymns of Severus, Monophysite patriarch of Antioch (A.D. 512–519), made by Paul, bishop of Edessa (A.D. 510–526; see *DCB* iv. 259), and revised by Jacob (see above). The Syriac has been edited by E. W. Brooks in *Patrologia Orientalis*, vii. 5 (Paris, 1912).

3. Rhymed poetry.—The metrical compositions hitherto mentioned are not rhymed, but about the 12th cent. the Syrians learnt from the Arabs the art of rhyming. A. Mingana states (Connolly, 'Narsai,' p. xiii) that after A.D. 1150 all the poetry had this characteristic; and Connolly (p. xxxviii f.) gives from Cardakhi (see in Literature) a list of 9 or 10 writers of the 13th cent. who wrote in rhymed verse. Of these the most famous were the Monophysite Bar-hebraeus, and the Nestorian Audīshū[1] ('Abhdīshō', Ebedjesus) the bibliographer, Khāmīs (West Syr. Khamīs), and George Wardā. From Warda and Khāmis, hymn-writers of great repute, have been named two East Syrian service-books, containing 'propers' for festivals, etc., several of them probably having been written by these authors.

These later writers are distinguished by an extremely artificial style, and by a profusion of Greek words and strange forms. For examples of their compositions reference may be made to the anthems at the Blessing of the Months, sung at Evening Service on the first day of every month except February (A. J. Maclean, *East Syrian Daily Offices*,[2] p. 230). The stanzas attributed to Mār Abraham of Slūkh (Seleucia) on the Tigris contain the following: Ahīyāh = אהיה, Tī'ūn = *θεόν*, Aghūstūs = Augustus, the reigning king, and Tī'ūlūgh = *θεολόγος*, the reigning patriarch (these stanzas rhyme in *-tā*). In the anthems given on p. 231 ff. each line of a stanza ends in *-tā*, *-nā*, *-ān*, *-thā*, *-rā*, *-zā*, *-ākh*; while the last four stanzas are non-rhyming. The authors of these rhyming stanzas are of the 13th cent. or later. A good example of the style of these later writers may also be seen in the highly artificial prayers said before the psalms in the East Syrian Morning Office on festivals, composed by Mār Eliyā (Elijah), Catholicos, surnamed Abūkhalīm (J. S. Assemani, *Bibl. Orient.*, Rome, 1719–28, III. i. 289); they are given in an English translation in Conybeare-Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum*,[3] Oxford, 1905, pp. 377–379. They are taken from the book called *Abūkhalīm* after Eliyā; they abound in foreign words to such an extent as to make them quite unintelligible to the Syrian. The famous Audishū (see above) was a great composer of hymns of praise (*tishbkhāthā*) and anthems (Payne Smith, *Thes. Syr.* ii. 4028; Assemani, III. i. 708), but his style is greatly disfigured by its artificiality.

4. Hymnody in the present service-books.—In what follows the East Syrian service-books are those principally dealt with. They were largely re-modelled and systematized by Ishuyaw III. (Ishō'yahbh, Jesujabus, lit. 'Jesus gave'), who was the Nestorian Catholicos from A.D. 647 to 658. Till his time there was no system of hymns, and probably he borrowed ideas from the Byzantine churches when he visited Antioch and other Greek cities. He revised the *Khūdhrā* (lit. 'Cycle'), or book of 'propers' throughout the year, and introduced much hymnody into it. For some account of this Catholicos see Thomas of Marga, bk. ii. § 11; Budge gives some of his Epistles in Syriac in his edition of Thomas (ii. 132–147), and relates what is known of his life (i. pp. lxxxiv–xcvii). In addition to his work on the *Khūdhrā*, Ishuyaw remodelled the baptismal rite.

The hymns in the East Syrian books are of different kinds, and may now be considered in order.

(*a*) The *Hymn of praise*, Syr. *tishbūkhtā* (pl. *tishbkhāthā*), lit. 'praise.' This word, which is used in the Peshiṭta of the hymns in Ex 15[1], Dt 31[19. 30] etc., and of the Song of Songs (*tishbkhath tishbkhāthā*) is used also in the service-books, both

[1] In this article the more common names are given in their Western form, as George, Ephraim; others are given as pronounced by the East Syrians, with the exact transliteration of the Syriac added if necessary, and with their Westernized forms. In the pronunciation *au* = *ō*; *ai* = French *é* (usually); *kh* and *gh* are hard and soft gutturals; *aw* final is halfway between *ow* (as in 'cow') and *ō*; *dh* and *th* represent the two sounds of *th* in English. Consonants in words derived from the Pa'el conjugation, etc., are not doubled in pronunciation.

[2] Hereafter cited as *ESDO*. [3] Hereafter cited as *RA*.

East and West Syrian, of prose hymns like the 'Gloria in excelsis' (called by the West Syrians the 'hymn of praise of the night') and of the 'Song of the Three Children' (called by the East Syrians the 'hymn of praise of the company of Ananias'). The ordinary 'hymn of praise,' however, is a metrical composition consisting of a number of stanzas sung alternately by the two choirs (which are called respectively 'the former' and 'the latter'), and usually of two lines each, though occasionally of four or more. Rarely these hymns of praise are acrostic, beginning with the letters of the alphabet (*ESDO*, 231, 233), or with the letters of a name, as Ishū Mshīkhā ('Jesus Christ') or Shimshā-sahrā ('sun and moon') or the like (*ESDO*, 167, 230).

The East Syrian service-books frequently (but not always) ascribe these hymns of praise to definite authors. The following, among others, are mentioned: Ephraim and Narsai (above, § 1); Shmūn (Shim'ōn) Barsabā'ē (Simeon Barsaboë), Catholicos in the 4th cent.; Awā (Abhā, Abbas), Catholicos in the 6th cent.; Thomas of Ur-hāi (Edessa), contemporary and friend of Awā; Bāwai (Bābhai, Babaeus: W. Syr. Babai) the Great, Ablot of Mount Izlā early in the 7th cent. (see Budge, *op. cit.* ii. 46), Bāwai of Nisibis (8th cent.; Budge, *ib.*; he was famous for his beautiful voice); George, Monophysite metropolitan of Nisibis (7th cent.; see *DCB* ii. 642, Assemani, III. i. 456); 'Abraham, Doctor' or 'Abraham of Izla,' *i.e.* Abraham of Kashkar, the reviver of monasticism in the 6th cent., the head of the monastery of Mount Izlā near Nisibis (Budge, ii. 37); Abimelech (date?); Abraham of Nithpar, whose life was written by Saurishū Rūstām (Sabhrishō' Rōstām, Sabarjesus Rostam), a disciple of Narsai (Thomas of Marga, bk. i. § 32, bk. ii. § 17; see also Budge, ii. 108 n.); John of Bēth Rabān (6th cent.), founder of a monastery in Dāsin, a district on the Great Zab south of the modern Qūchānis, the seat of the present Nestorian Catholicos Mar Shimun (Budge, ii. 67, 301; *DCB* iii. 405); Saurishū, Catholicos *c.* A.D. 600; Barsauma (Barsumas) of Nisibis (5th cent.); Khnāna of Kh'dhayaw (Kh'dhayabh, Adiabene), a district east of the Tigris, between the two Zabs (Assemani, III. i. 81). The ascriptions are in some cases doubtful, and the scribe himself sometimes hesitates, and gives two names as alternatives.

(*b*) The *Madrāshā* (lit. 'commentary,' Payne Smith, *Thes. Syr.* i. 956; pl. *Madrāshē*), said to be a 'doctrinal hymn.' This is a less common form of hymn. It consists of an antiphon (*'ūnāyā*) and two or more verses (*batē*: these two names are used by the West Syrians also). The antiphon is said first, and the two choirs then sing the verses in turn. There is a daily Madrāshā at Compline (which is uncommon as a daily service, but is used, combined with Evensong, on saints' days and in Lent; it is, however, used by the more religious as a private devotion; see Maclean-Browne, *Catholicos of the East*, p. 234); two Madrāshē are said at the Night Service on Feasts of our Lord; one is said on Sundays, on saints' days, and on week days in Lent. A Madrāshā is sometimes called a 'station' (Syr. *istatyūnā*).

(*c*) The *Anthem* ('*ūnīthā*, pl. '*ūnyāthā*; this word sometimes denotes a stanza of an anthem) is at once the most characteristic and the most common form of East Syrian hymnody. It consists of a number of stanzas; each stanza is prefaced by a clause from the Psalms (occasionally from other books of the Bible) said in monotone; then the metrical stanza is sung to a chant. The Anthem usually ends with a stanza prefaced by 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost,' and often with another prefaced by 'For ever and ever, Amen,' sometimes with a third prefaced by 'Let all the people say Amen' (Ps 106[48]). The length of the stanzas varies greatly; but they are usually short, consisting of 2, 4, or 6 lines; the lines are often of 4 feet (spondees or dactyls), sometimes of 3½ or of 5 feet or more. Under the heading of the 'Gloria' and of 'Let all the people' there are frequently grouped several stanzas, and these are sometimes elaborate and probably late compositions; they often commemorate the East Syrian martyrs and other worthies (see, *e.g.*, *ESDO*, 134 ff., where several other groups of stanzas are added after the 'Gloria').

As this form of hymnody is unknown in the West, it may be useful to give a specimen, taken from the Ferial Evening Service of First Tuesday (*ESDO*, 24):

Our help is in the name of the Lord (Ps 124[8]). Our help is from God: who by means of His mercies chastiseth us all: for He is the giver of our life: The hope of the salvation of our souls shall never more be cut off: but let us cry and say: Keep us, O my Lord, in thy compassion and have mercy upon us.

And our helper in times of trouble (Ps 46[1]). Our help, etc. (*repeat*).

Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. O Christ, who didst reconcile at thy coming all creation with Him who sent thee: pity thy Church saved by thy blood: and bring to an end within it strifeful divisions: which allow the devil to enter: to the wonderful dispensation of thy manhood: and raise up in it priests to preach the sound faith.

In the Anthems some of the stanzas inserted before the 'Gloria Patri' are often called 'Of prayer' (see, *e.g.*, *ESDO*, 145, 195); but the meaning of this heading is not clear. Some are 'occasional' stanzas, as 'for a journey' or 'for rain' (p. 149). The Anthems at the Night Service, especially on Festivals of our Lord, are extremely long; the translation of those appointed for the Epiphany takes 84 octavo pages of small print in *RA*; but the daily Anthems are only of from 3 to 6 stanzas. The 'Martyrs' Anthems' in praise of the heroes of the past, which are sung twice daily on ferias except in Lent (according to the rubric, they are appointed for Sundays also), are somewhat longer. They are a great feature of the services. The martyrs are called architects, the beams of a building, combatants (*āghānīstē*, *ἀγωνισταί*), merchants buying the pearl, precious stones, etc. In almost every one of these Martyrs' Anthems the following are mentioned: St. George, the famous martyr under Diocletian (*DCB* ii. 645 f.); St. Cyriac, the boy-martyr in the same persecution, and Julitta, his mother (T. Ruinart, *Acta Sincera Martyrum*[2], Amsterdam, 1713, p. 477); St. Pithyūn, 'who opposed the magi' and was martyred by Adhūr-prazd'gard (for a detailed account see the anthem in *ESDO*, 139); St. Sergius, martyr in Syria under Maximian or Maximin (*DCB* iv. 616: sometimes his companion, St. Bacchus, is mentioned, for whom see *DCB* i. 236); and the sons of Shmūnī (the seven martyrs of 2 Mac 7), and Elī'āzar (Eleazar) their teacher (4 Mac 5 ff.): their names are given (*ESDO* 111) as Gadai, Maqwai (Maqbhai, Maccabæus), Tarsai, Khyūrūn (Khibhrōn, Hebron), Khyūṣūn (Khibhṣōn), Bākūs (Bacchus), Yūnādāw (Yōnādabh, Jonadab). [In the Latin paraphrase of 4 Mac 8 ff., published by Erasmus (the *Rule of Reason*), the names are given as Maccabæus, Aber, Machar, Judas, Achas, Areth, Jacob; and the mother's name is Salamona (W. R. Churton, *Uncanonical and Apocryphal Scriptures*, London, 1884, p. 579 ff.).]

Anthems are used at each of the four daily services (Evening, Night, Morning, and Compline —for the last, see above, (*b*)) and also in the Eucharistic Liturgy, in the baptismal service, and in large numbers in the occasional offices such as marriages and funerals. Many of the anthems at the burial of the dead are of great beauty, and are highly dramatic. Those used at the Eucharist

are: the 'Anthem of the Sanctuary,' sung after the psalmody at the beginning of the service; the 'Anthem of the Gospel,' sung after the Gospel is read; the 'Anthem of the Mysteries,' sung after an unnamed and fixed offertory anthem; an Anthem at the Fraction; and the '[Anthem] of the Bema,' sung by the choir in the nave during the communion of the people, which is unlike other anthems, and more nearly resembles a Madrāshā, consisting of an antiphon and verses (for that sung on Ascension Day see F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*,[1] Oxford, 1896, i. 298; for that sung on the Epiphany see *RA*, 388).

While 'Anthems' are most highly developed in the East Syrian books, somewhat similar compositions are found in Greek (see *LEW*, 354, where three parts of a prayer are 'farsed' with the clauses of the 'Gloria Patri'; the prayer, however, is not metrical). Much nearer to the East Syrian anthem is the West Syrian *sedrō* (E. Syr. *sidrā*, lit. 'order'), though it is not so highly developed (for specimens see *LEW*, 71, 74, 80, 108). The *sedrō* begins with a *prūmiōn*, or antiphon (*προοίμιον*), and this is followed by stanzas. The psalm-clauses, however, have in some cases dropped out; the best example is that on p. 108, which retains not only the clauses of the 'Gloria,' but also Ps 36[9b]. Payne Smith (*Thes. Syr.* ii. 2534) says that a *sedrō* is so called because it is arranged in order, and often is acrostic, or rhymes.

The authorship of the Anthems is seldom mentioned in the East Syrian service-books, but the Martyrs' Anthems are said in some MSS of the *Qdhām-ū-wāthar* (lit. 'Before and After')—the book of the daily offices less the 'propers' of the season, etc., named after the two choirs who sing the services—to have all been composed by Mār Mārūthā (Maruthas), metropolitan of Miparqat (Maipheracti), a city on the Tigris between Mosul and Baghdad, otherwise known as Takrit (Tagrit) or Martyropolis. Mārūthā became metropolitan A.D. 640, or, as some say, A.D. 624; for his life, by his successor, Mār Dinkhā, see *Patrologia Orientalis*, iii. 1 (ed. F. Nau, Paris, 1912). G. T. Stokes, in *DCB* iii. 859, appears to confuse him with one or two earlier namesakes. The Sunday Martyrs' Anthems differ in style from the week-day ones, and seem to be of a later date (*ESDO*, 173). A few names of authors are given in the service-books to particular parts of other Anthems, especially to certain long and elaborate groups of stanzas added, in some cases, at the end. In the MSS translated in *ESDO* and *RA* these are: Khakīm of Bēth Qāshā (lit. 'house of the presbyter'), Shimshā Ṣaidnāyā, Audishū the bibliographer (13th cent.; see above), Shmūn, metropolitan of Amīdh (Diarbekr), Abraham of Slūkh (Seleucia on the Tigris), and Gabriel. The Anthem of the last-named is dated in the MSS '1910 of the Greeks,' *i.e.* A.D. 1599 (*ESDO*, 231). It would seem that, when an author's name is given to an Anthem, the composition is comparatively late. Some of the Anthems in *RA* are said in the MSS to have been derived from the *Wardā* (above, § 3), and the *Gazā* (lit. 'treasury'), a large volume containing propers for Festivals of our Lord, etc.

(*d*) The *Tūrgāmā* (lit. 'interpretation') is an expository hymn sung in the Liturgy. An invariable *tūrgāmā* is sung before the Epistle ('Apostle,' *i.e.* St. Paul), and a variable one before the Gospel (*LEW*, 257, 259).

(*e*) The *Canon* (Syr. *qānūnā*=*κανών*) is a hymn, metrical or non-metrical, consisting of verses 'farsed' with a psalm or other composition (for other meanings of this word see *ESDO*, 292); it is another great feature of the East Syrian services. A conspicuous example is the Canon 'Terrible art thou,' sung on Feasts of our Lord (*LEW*, 297), which runs thus:

'Terrible art thou, O God most high, out of thine holy place, world without end. Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place,'

and is sung between several clauses proper to the particular festival. A very elaborate Canon occurs in the Third Mōtwā (*Mautbhā*, a series of anthems sung sitting, Gr. *κάθισμα*) at the Night Service on Epiphany (*RA*, 365). The stanzas farse the clauses of Dt 32[21b-43], and are remarkable as including four unique verses in an old Persian dialect, in metre of lines of 8 syllables. D. S. Margoliouth judges them to belong to a dialect of Christians in Persia before the Muhammadan Conquest (*JRAS*, Oct. 1903, and *RA*, 367 n.). Another instance of a Canon is the *Lākhū mārā* (lit. 'Thee, Lord'), named from its first words, and sung at almost all the services:

'Thee, Lord of all, we confess: thee, Jesus Christ, we glorify: for thou art the Quickener of our bodies, and thou art the Saviour of our souls.'

This is used as a farsing of a psalm-clause with 'Gloria Patri' (see *ESDO*, 3, 104, etc.; *LEW*, 249). Yet another instance is the 'Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy upon us,' which is farsed with the 'Gloria Patri' (*ESDO*, 10; *LEW*, 250). These two compositions, however, are not called 'Canons' in the service-books. It may be added that 'farsing' is a favourite practice of the East Syrians; the psalms, and even the Lord's Prayer, are farsed (for the last see *LEW*, 252; *ESDO*, 1 f.).

LITERATURE.—As the subject is so little known, it may be desirable to name certain East Syrian service-books where specimens of the hymns described above may be found. The following two service-books, published in Syriac by the Archbishop of Canterbury's Mission in London and at Urmi in Persia, may be mentioned out of several similar works: *Takhsa* (lit. 'Order,' *τάξις*), the Missal (1890); *Qdham-ū-wathar*, the book of daily offices (1892), for which see above, 4 (c). These contain the services as used by the Nestorians. The services as modified for the 'Uniat Chaldæans' may be seen in the *Breviarium Chaldaicum*, Paris, 1886. For Eng. tr. of the services see A. J. Maclean, *East Syrian Daily Offices*, London, 1894; F. C. Conybeare and A. J. Maclean, *Rituale Armenorum and the East Syrian Epiphany Rites*, Oxford, 1905; F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, i. do. 1896 (contains one Liturgy, with the 'propers' for the Ascension); *Liturgy of Adai and Mari*, London, 1893 (contains three Liturgies and the baptismal service).

Besides the works mentioned in the course of the art., reference may be made to Gabriel Cardakhi, *Liber Thesauri de Arte Poetica Syrorum*, Rome, 1875 (an anthology of poems of different dates); G. Bickell, *S. Ephraemi Syri Carmina Nisibena*, Leipzig, 1866; J. Julian, *Dictionary of Hymnology*[2], London, 1907, art. 'Syriac Hymnody.' A few Syriac hymns have been rendered in English verse by R. M. Moorsom *Renderings of Church Hymns*, London, 1901, and by others.

A. J. MACLEAN.

HYMNS (Ethiopic Christian).—Hymns enter largely into the services of the Abyssinian Church, and in catalogues of Ethiopic MSS the names of certain hymn-books are usually found, viz. the *Degwa*, the *Egziabher nages* ('The Lord is king'), the *Me'rāf* ('Chapter'), and the *Mawāshĕt* ('Responses'). Like other hymns, they are dedicated to particular persons, and intended for special occasions; a complete hymn-book is one which contains hymns for every solemnity in the year. A specimen of a Response or Antiphon is given by A. Dillmann in his *Chrestomathia Æthiopica* (Leipzig, 1866, § 10); it consists mainly of Scripture texts, chanted by the minister, and partly repeated by the choir; their response is called *Melṭān*. Although it bears the title *Wāzēm* ('Hymn'), which resembles the Arabic *wazn* ('metre'), it bears no trace of rhythm or rhyme. Other hymns exhibit rhyme similar to that used in Arabic versification; *i.e.* a series of lines all terminate in the same consonant or consonant and vowel: but, whereas in Arabic this rhyme pervades the poem, in Ethiopic it pervades the strophe, which is ordinarily of five lines (see examples in

[1] Hereafter cited as *LEW*.

E. A. W. Budge, *Miracles of the Virgin Mary*, London, 1900); sometimes, however, it is only of three. The lines of a strophe do not appear to correspond exactly in other respects, and at times vary considerably in length and sequence of syllables. The chanting is of three styles: *Geez* (or *Zêmâ*), *'Ezel*, and *Arârâi*, said to be suited respectively to holy days, fasts, and feasts; of these names the second appears to be identical with the Arabic *Ghazal*, 'love songs,' but the others are obscure. The *Degwa* is supposed to be the composition of one Yârêd of the 8th cent.; but this ascription is probably valueless. The matter contained in these hymns does not differ from the contents of analogous compositions in other branches of Christianity.

LITERATURE.—Catalogues of Ethiopic MSS, especially A. Dillmann, *Cat. codd. MSS æthiop. Bibliothecæ Bodleianæ*, Oxford, 1848; W. Wright, *Cat. of the Ethiop. MSS in the Brit. Mus.*, London, 1877; H. Zotenberg, *Cat. des MSS orient. de la bibliothèque nat.* iii., Paris, 1877.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

HYMNS (Latin Christian).—I. *EARLY CHRISTIAN HYMNS.*—The language of the Western liturgies was originally Greek, not Latin, and the numerous Greek expressions in the present Roman liturgy remind us of this original dependence. Greek, moreover, was the written language of the early Fathers and ecclesiastical writers till Tertullian, so that it is not surprising to find that no original and independent Latin hymns were composed before the 4th cent. after Christ.

Isidore of Seville designates **Hilary of Poitiers** as the first hymn-composer of the Latin-speaking West,[1] and, according to Jerome,[2] he composed a whole book of hymns, but had apparently no decisive success.[3] The reason of his failure was that he made no attempt to condescend to the uncultivated Gallic populace, but tried to raise them to his own level.

Regarding the hymns of Hilary there was no certain information until quite recently. The *Liber hymnorum* of which Jerome spoke was lost, and the other compositions which circulated under his name in anthologies and literary histories either could not be proved authentic or were associated with his name only through an error which has found its way from Daniel's *Thesaurus hymnologicus* into countless works.[4] In 1884, G. F. Gamurrini discovered fragments of the missing *Liber hymnorum* in the public library of Arezzo, and published them in 1887 in the *Bibliotcca dell' academia storico-giuridica*, vol. iv., under the title, 'S. Hilarii Tractatus de Mysteriis et Hymni et S. Silviæ Aquitanæ Peregrinatio ad loca sancta.' Unfortunately, the hymn-book is in a mutilated condition; it contains only three hymns, which are all incomplete, two being defective at the beginning, and one at the end; two of them are acrostics, or alphabet-hymns. In spite of this mutilation, the hymns are of priceless value to us, for they help us to estimate the oldest Latin hymns, and the poetical attempts of the great Gallic Church Father. Their contents—especially those of the first hymn, which deals with the doctrine of the Trinity and the consubstantiality of the Son—are not very clear, and have no popular characteristic. They are metrical in form, but show no artistic taste; and great liberties have been taken with the metre.[5]

Although Hilary was the first Western writer to compose hymns in Latin, **Ambrose** may be rightly called the Father of Latin hymn-composition, and, indirectly, of all Church hymnody and popular song.[1] There is far more evidence of the activity of Ambrose as a hymn-writer than in the case of Hilary. Many testimonies from Christian antiquity, among which his own takes the first rank, assure us of his poetical activity as well as of his striking success.[2] Augustine, his younger contemporary, has preserved quotations from the hymns of Ambrose; we have his good authority for four of them, viz. 'Æterne rerum conditor,' 'Deus, creator omnium,' 'Jam surgit hora tertia,' and 'Intende qui regis Israel.' If, by means of these four hymns, which are undoubtedly genuine, we examine the characteristics of Ambrose's style of thought and poetical expression in language and metre, we may be able to prove his authorship of a series of other hymns in the collection of the Church of Milan.[3]

The first fact that strikes us in connexion with the success of Ambrose is that his influence as a hymn-writer was as strong as it was lasting. Both Augustine and Ambrose himself describe the inspiriting and even fascinating effect which these hymns exercised when they first appeared. They were songs for the people and the congregation in the fullest sense of the term, being thoroughly popular in contents, form, and melody. Of course, the population of an imperial seat of residence like Milan stood at a higher level of culture than the people of a Gallic provincial town like the Poitiers of Hilary, and those who could follow the sermons of Ambrose with intelligence and affection would also appreciate his hymns, and sing them with enthusiasm.

The hymns of Ambrose spread rapidly over the West, and became popular everywhere. The ancient Latin hymns were also folk-songs, and they continued to be so as long as Latin remained a living tongue. When it became a dead language of liturgy, the sphere of influence of these hymns naturally became narrowed; instead of being the property of a whole people, they became, as poetry of the Church and cloister, the possession of a privileged class. But, later on, a popular form of poetry was evolved from this poetry, which continued to exist, and even flourish luxuriantly, in a dead language—an evolution which took place not in one, but in many languages; and thus we have the surprising phenomenon of a popular form of composition passing through an artistic stage to return again to the popular level. In this sense, also, Ambrose is the father of our popular ecclesiastical hymns; even to-day some of his poems and melodies are sung by the people. It is impossible now to discover the stages through which the popular hymn of Ambrose passed in its development into the clerical and monastic hymn of the Middle Ages, or the time when the transformation was completed. The want of liturgical records, and especially of MS hymns, reduces us almost entirely to the expedient of combining fragments—an untrustworthy method when the data are so scanty and uncertain. With the exception of a few MSS, such as *Vaticanus Reg. 11* and the *Antiphonary of Bangor* (ed. F. E. Warren, London, 1893–95), which, however, belong to quite a different environment and a different kind of composition, we have hardly any hymn-collections before the 10th century. In all of them the transforma-

[1] *de Eccl. off.* i. 6. [2] *De Vir. illust.* 100.
[3] *Com. in Gal.* iii., pref.
[4] Cf. *Analecta hymnica*, xxvii. [1897] 49 f.
[5] For other questions connected with Hilary's hymns see the detailed account in *Anal. hymn.* i. [1907] 3 f.

[1] See G. M. Dreves, *Aurelius Ambrosius, 'der Vater des Kirchengesanges,'* Freiburg im Br., 1893.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 4, 28.
[3] This is the aim of Dreves's *Aurelius Ambrosius*. Following the example of L. Biraghi (*Inni sinceri e carmi di S. Ambrogio*, Milan, 1862), he proves fourteen hymns to be undoubtedly authentic, and four others to be probably composed by Ambrose (see *Aur. Amb.*, pp. 127–140, and *Anal. hymn.* i. 11–21). Dreves is also the first to attempt to ascertain by the same critical method the melodies which we are justified in regarding as originating from Ambrose (*Aur. Amb.* p. 129 ff.). His statements on both points have not been contradicted or disproved.

tion is complete; and they also show another change — the hymn governed by quantity and metre has evolved one governed by rules of accent. The single certain fact in this long period we derive from the monastic rules of Benedict, and of Aurelian and Cæsarius of Arles, which show us a small number of hymns as existent in the 6th cent., and the Latin hymn almost completely transformed into the monastic hymn.[1]

Contemporary with Ambrose, although his hymns appeared later, **Prudentius**[2] introduced a new kind of religious poetry; the non-liturgical hymn appeared and developed alongside of the liturgical; to the poetry expressing official and public congregational devotion was added the poetry of personal and domestic edification.

Besides his greater works (he wrote in all over ten thousand verses), which are mostly didactic and polemic, Aurelius Prudentius Clemens composed two works of mixed lyric and epic content, the *Cathemerinon* and *Peristephanon*, which have given his name a leading place in the history of hymnology. The first is a collection of hymns for the different hours of prayer in the day and the festivals of the year; the second consists of a series of poetical narratives celebrating the sufferings, conflicts, and victories of various martyrs, especially those belonging to Spain. These compositions belong to epic rather than to hymnic verse, but some of them were adopted into popular use as hymns.

Prudentius presents a striking contrast to his immediate predecessor Ambrose, writing as he did from an entirely different point of view, and only for private reading. Among the early Christian hymn-writers, Ambrose may be called the Classic and Prudentius the Romantic. While Ambrose everywhere betrays the genuine Roman character, with its sustained dignity and strenuous self-control, in the poems of the hot-blooded Spaniard there is a sparkle and glow, a thrill and enthusiasm unknown to the ancient Roman poets. The contrast between the liturgist and the poet is also obvious in the external form chosen by the two writers. While the hymns of Ambrose invariably consist of eight stanzas—a number which remained the rule till far into the Middle Ages—those of Prudentius are much longer. All the hymns of Ambrose are composed in the iambic dimeter—a metre whose simplicity was specially adapted to meet the requirements of congregational singing, and in which the majority of Latin hymns have been composed down to the present day; on the other hand, Prudentius takes pleasure in imitating and, if possible, surpassing, the rich variety of metres in Horace; so that, even in poetical form, self-limitation marks the one, and self-expansion the other, of the two protagonists of ancient Christian poetry.

As regards the influence of both writers on the hymn-composition which they originated, we may say that Ambrose has exercised a more powerful influence on the form, and Prudentius on the subject-matter, of sacred poetry, and that in later hymnody the one acted more as a restraint, and the other as a stimulus; the influence of Ambrose has been the more permanent, and that of Prudentius the more extensive, as he did not confine himself within the narrow limits of liturgical hymn-composition. Further, the influence of Prudentius on posterity was as great as that of a conspicuous poet has ever been, because, like the poets of classical antiquity generally, he became the common property of all nations who shared the intellectual wealth bequeathed by ancient Rome.

[1] Cf. C. Blume, *Der Cursus Sancti Benedicti Nursini*, Leipzig, 1908.

[2] *PL* lix.-lx.

In comparison with these two masters of ancient Christian hymnody, the other Christian hymn-writers belonging to this period fall into the background. We possess numerous inscriptional poems of Pope **Damasus** († 384), which are distinguished by elegance of expression and artistic polish.[1] The hymns attributed to him, however (one in praise of Agatha, and a hymn commemorating St. Andrew, which has long been in liturgical use), apparently do not belong to him; the former is probably of Mozarabic, and the latter of Gallo-Frankish, origin. **Augustine** († 430) also touches the province of hymnology in so far as he composed a 'rhythm' against the sect of the Donatists, each strophe beginning in alphabetical order from *a* to *v*. He himself calls it 'Psalmus contra partem Donati: liber unus.'[2] It was intended for popular singing, in order to make the common people better acquainted with the distinctive teaching of the two parties, and had a refrain (*hypopsalma*). Although the form is lyrical, the contents are so pronouncedly didactic that the poem can hardly be counted among sacred lyrics; but it is of the highest importance for the history of rhythmic Latin poetry because of its indisputable authenticity. Pontius Meropius Anicius **Paulinus**, bishop of Nola in Campania († 431), composed a whole 'book of hymns.'[3] Either this refers to the *Carmina Natalitia* on St. Felix or the book has been lost. Among the extant poems of Paulinus, all that can be called hymns are the 'Prayer' (*Carm.* iv.) and three paraphrases of Ps 7-9.[4] **Cælius Sedulius**, who flourished about the middle of the 5th cent., has left two poems besides his great 'Carmen Paschale.' These he himself intended to be hymns, although the first is really a combination of didactic and lyrical poetry; and the second, the famous 'A solis ortus cardine,' is a poem in iambic dimeters, the initial letters of whose strophes form an acrostic. This hymn was used in the Mozarabic liturgy, where it was divided into six sections for the Festivals of the Annunciation, of the Virgin Mary, the Birth of Christ, the Epiphany, Innocents' Day, the Feast of Lazarus, and Maundy Thursday; it is also used in the Roman liturgy, but in a condensed form. Some verses from the 'Carmen Paschale' have a place in the Roman missal, in the Introit of the votive Mass of the Virgin.[5] Pope **Gelasius** († 496) also composed hymns in the manner of Ambrose.[6] Unfortunately his hymnary is lost, and we cannot authenticate any single hymn as his literary property.

II. *MEROVINGIAN HYMNS.* — Between early Christian and mediæval hymn-composition there are two transitional periods—the time of the Merovingians, which shows a further development from metre to rhythm, and the Carlovingian period, which is a time of artistic renaissance, and which also inaugurates a completely new epoch. **Ennodius**, bishop of Pavia († 521), like Gelasius, belongs in time to the Merovingian period, although in his whole character and tone of thought he is a product of the former early Christian age. We possess a complete hymnary written by him containing twelve hymns, most of which have survived only in a single Brussels MS.[7] Ennodius was obviously roused to poetical activity by the example of Ambrose, and at any rate wrote his hymns as archdeacon of Milan for the use of the Church there. His hymns, with the exception of the eighth, are in the same measure as those of Ambrose. He always divides them into eight

[1] *PL* xiii. 375 ff.; ed. M. Ihm, *Antholog. Lat. supplementa*, i. [Leipzig, 1895].

[2] *Retract.* i. 20. [3] Gennadius, *de Script. eccl.* 48.

[4] *Anal. hymn.* l. 47 ff.; *PL* lxi. 439 f., 449 462.

[5] *Ib.* l. 63 ff. The poems of Sedulius are to be found most conveniently in *PL* xix. 549 ff.

[6] Gennadius, 94. [7] *PL* lxiii. 326-334.

stanzas, and chooses only subjects that had not already been treated in verse by Ambrose. The Church of Milan, however, did not respond to his desire; his hymns were not adopted in her liturgy, and only three of them can be traced in other liturgies. Ennodius is one of the poets on whom, as a rule, literary historians pour out the vials of their wrath. His hymns hardly deserve the censure generally heaped on them; in spite of being modelled on those of Ambrose, they are not entirely devoid of originality, and, notwithstanding their obscurity of style, they do not lack a certain inspiration.[1] We must mention here Pope **Gregory the Great** († 604)—not as a hymn-writer, but as a supposed hymn-writer. Just as all the reforming energy of this Pope with regard to the Liturgy lies in obscurity, so nothing is known about his poetical activity. All that we read about hymns which he is said to have composed is either the product of private supposition (such as that of Mone) or derived from Jodocus Clichtoveus, who, in his *Elucidatorium ecclesiasticum* (Basel, 1517), was the first to assign a few hymns to Gregory, without any reason. During the whole mediæval period, down to the time of Gregory himself, almost absolute silence prevails on the subject.[2]

The greatest and most conspicuous figure of this period is Venantius Honorius Clementianus **Fortunatus**, who was made bishop of Poitiers in 599. His poetry, with the exception of the four books of his *Life of St. Martin*, is 'occasional poetry' in the strictest sense of the term. According to Paulus Diaconus,[3] he also composed numerous hymns for the various Church festivals, but these have not been handed down. In his eleven books of 'miscellaneous poems'[4] there are three hymns on the Holy Cross and an 'occasional poem' on Easter, which, in an abbreviated form, was used as a processional hymn. Besides these there are other three hymns ascribed to Fortunatus: the baptismal hymn, 'Tibi laus, perennis auctor' (called 'Versus Fortunati presbyteri' in an 8th cent. office-book from Poitiers preserved in the 'Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal' in Paris), the Christmas hymn 'Agnoscat omne sæculum,' and the beautiful hymn in praise of Mary, 'Quem terra, pontus, æthera.'[5] In spite of neglect of artistic form, the hymns of Fortunatus belong to the acknowledged pearls of Christian literature. Hymns like the 'Pange lingua' and the 'Vexilla regis' have never been surpassed, and will remain immortal. They had a great influence on both text and music of later hymns.[6]

Among the contemporaries of Fortunatus we may mention **Eugenius of Toledo** († 658), who bestowed special care on Church-hymnody, and revised the Church office-books; but, as no ecclesiastical hymns have come down under his name, we cannot ascertain his probable share in the hymn-composition of the Mozarabic liturgists.[7] After Venantius Fortunatus the most conspicuous poet of the period is the **Venerable Bede** († 735). In the last chapter of his *Ecclesiastical History of England*, in which he inserted a synopsis of his original works, he says that he had also composed 'a book of hymns in various verse-measures and rhythms.' We have to lament the loss of this book as a whole; but eleven hymns have been handed down to us under Bede's name by Georgius Cassander in his *Hymni Ecclesiastici* (Cologne, 1556), regarding the genuineness of which there has been much controversy.[1] Besides these hymns we have an abecedary hymn on St. Edilthrida in the *Ecclesiastical History* (iv. 20), and two Psalm-paraphrases preserved in various MSS. Bede's hymns are of unmistakable sobriety, corresponding with the whole character of their author. They did not circulate widely, however, and exercised no lasting influence on later Latin hymn-writing; only a few of them occur in liturgical MSS. The hymn on St. Edilthrida was imitated in a large series of Anglo-Saxon and Irish hymns, *e.g.* those of Wulstan of Winchester (cf., further, below, p. 20[b]).[2]

We may mention here a double series of hymns, which began in the Merovingian period, and have a decidedly national character, which is strikingly evident in the national form of writing: the ancient Irish and the Gothic or Mozarabic hymn collections. The ancient Irish Latin hymns are discussed in art. HYMNS (Irish Christian). More important than these, however, are the hymns collected in the Mozarabic Liturgy. This Liturgy, which differs very little from the Roman, was first entitled 'Old Spanish,' then, with the dominion of the Goths, 'Gothic,' and, finally, after the conquest of Spain by the Arabs (A.D. 711) 'Mozarabic,' *i.e.* the Liturgy of Christians living among Arabs. Isidore of Seville seems to have done for this Liturgy what Gregory the Great did for the Roman, but the facts of the case are equally uncertain. The hymns, numbering about 200, which can still be collected out of old Mozarabic breviaries, are by no means the product of one period; on the contrary, there are some in the classical metre of the early Christian period, some which show the gradual transition from metrical to rhythmic composition, and some displaying all the linguistic barbarism of the 10th century. The Mozarabic Liturgy is much richer in hymns than the Roman. It has a whole series of hymns for special occasions, such as the consecration of a bishop, a bishop's birthday, a coronation, a king's birthday, marriages, etc.

With the disuse of the Mozarabic Liturgy this mass of lyrical poetry became obsolete, and found its way from the Church into the libraries and archives.[3]

III. *THE CARLOVINGIAN RENAISSANCE.*—The empire of the Carlovingians, with its Cæsaropapism often resembling that of Byzantium, marks a new epoch for Latin hymnology. During this period two tendencies appear which afterwards run parallel through the whole of the Middle Ages, viz. the artistic reproduction of the old and the obsolete, and the preparation of the new and original. Charlemagne was not only a warrior but a patron of art, and under his rule artistic Latin poetry received a new impetus which has been called the 'Carlovingian Renaissance.' The central focus of these efforts was the 'palace-school' of Charlemagne, with which the most famous learned men of the time were connected. It must be admitted that, considering their numbers and their poetical activity, the authors belonging to the learned circle of the palace and its 'school' composed few hymns—no doubt because the introduction of the Roman Liturgy into the whole empire of the Franks checked the impulse towards hymn-composition. Still, the majority of them made small contributions towards the treasury of Church hymnody.

The most important was **Paul the Deacon** († 799),

[1] *Anal. hymn.* l. 61 ff.
[2] Cf. Dreves, 'Haben wir Gregor den Grossen als Hymnendichter anzusehen?' *Tübinger Quartalschrift*, 1907, pp. 548-562. C. Blume, in an art. in the *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach* (lxxiv. [Freiburg im B., 1908] 269 ff.), has ventured to reclaim Gregory for sacred hymnody, but he seems scarcely satisfied with his own arguments.
[3] *de Gest. Longobard.* ii. 13.
[4] *PL* lxxxviii. 63 ff.
[5] Cf. Dreves, *Hymnologische Studien zu Venantius Fortunatus und Rabanus Maurus*, Munich, 1908, pp. 1-51.
[6] *Anal. hymn.* l. 70 ff. [7] *Ib.* l. 89 ff.

[1] See *Anal. hymn.* l. 96 ff. [2] *Ib.*
[3] See *ib.* xxvii. for Cienfuegos's attempt to resuscitate it. The Liturgy is found most conveniently in *PL* lxxxvi.

who from 782 to 786 stayed at the Court of Charlemagne. Besides a hymn on the miracle-worker, Benedict of Nursia, in his *History of the Lombards* (i. 26), we have the immortal poem on John the Baptist.[1] **Paulinus II.**, patriarch of Aquileia († 802), was a more productive composer. His best known and most popular hymn was that on the Apostles Peter and Paul, beginning 'Felix per omnes festum mundi cardines.'[2] **Alcuin** († 804), a central figure in this group and one of the most prolific hymn-writers, is represented by only two hymns—one on Vedastus and an evening hymn.[3] Legend says that **Theodulf**, bishop of Orleans († 821), from his prison-window greeted the Palm Sunday procession in Angers, in which King Louis the Pious took part, with the improvised hymn 'Gloria, laus, et honor,' fragments of which are still in use in the Roman Liturgy. The only other extant hymns of Theodulph are those for 'The Salutation of the King,' *In Adventu Regis*.[4] In this circle of poets we may also include **Florus**, the deacon of the Lyons Church, and **Sedulius Scottus** († *c.* 874), the scholar of Liège. We have some hymns by Florus (fl. middle of 9th cent.) composed in elegiac verse, and some free translations of psalms in heroic metre (one Psalm-paraphrase is written in iambic dimeter).[5] The poems of Sedulius Scottus belonging to the rank of hymns are very few.[6]

Besides this group of poets of the early Carlovingian period, there is another in the later period—the 'Singers' school' of St. Gall.[7] The two groups are connected by Rabanus Maurus, who was a pupil of Alcuin, and Walafrid Strabo, who came from St. Gall to Rabanus at Fulda, and later on became abbot of Reichenau. Walafrid, the younger of the two, is the better and more artistic poet, Rabanus the more productive and influential. The poems of **Rabanus** († 856), especially his hymns, are known chiefly from the ed. of C. Brower (Mainz, 1617), who took them from a MS which probably belonged to the Fulda monastery. A small portion of this MS is preserved in the monastic library at Einsiedeln.[8] In his hymns Rabanus is more original and inspired than in his other works. The immortal 'Veni Creator Spiritus' is assigned to him by a Breslau MS now in London.[9] **Walafrid**, nicknamed Strabo or Strabus ('the cross-eyed'), abbot of Reichenau († 849), seems to have composed a 'Book of Hymns' (*sacrorum hymnorum librum unum* [J. Pitseus]), but it has been lost. Only a few hymns of Walafrid are known—a Christmas hymn, a hymn on Gallus, well known in Germany in the Middle Ages, hymns on Mammes, Januarius, Sergius, and Bacchus, and poems to welcome the Emperor.[10] Another pupil of Rabanus—the monk **Gottschalk** of **Orbais** († 869)—composed hymns, or, rather, spiritual songs. Two of them are specially interesting because of their original rhythms.[11]

The 'School of St. Gall,' to which we now pass, produced two classes of writers—the first class being an offshoot of the Carlovingian Renaissance, cultivating the liturgical hymn in classical metre and developing the processional hymn, and the second (especially Notker and Tutilo) introducing an entirely new art of sequences and tropes.

(1) In the former class **Ratpert** († after 884) was an active writer, although all that remains of his liturgical writings is a short litany for Sunday processions, composed partly in elegiac, partly in heroic, verse, beginning 'Ardua Spes mundi,' a communion hymn 'Laudes, Omnipotens, ferimus tibi, dona colentes,' a processional hymn for the festival of St. Gall, and a song to welcome the Queen.[1] **Waldrammus** (wrongly entitled 'deacon' by Ekkehart IV.) composed a processional, 'Sancte Pater, juva nos,' two hymns to welcome the King, and a sequence for the Church-dedication festival.[2] A contemporary and brother-poet of his is the younger **Hartmann**, abbot of St. Gall († 925), of whose compositions we possess a hymn to be sung before the Gospel (really a precursor of the 'Conductus' which came into use later), a hymn and a processional for the festival of the Holy Innocents, a metrical litany for Sunday processions, hymns to welcome the King, and hymns for the procession bearing the remains of St. Magnus.[3] Others in this class are **Notker Physicus** († 975), who wrote hymns on the Virgin Mary and St. Othmar,[4] and **Ekkehart the Deacon** († 973), the author of some sequences.

(2) **Notker the Stammerer** (Balbulus; † 912) stands at the head of the second class. He introduced rhythmical sequences into the Church liturgy, freed hymn-composition from the trammels of early Christian art, and thus inaugurated the rhythmical composition of the Middle Ages, which afterwards developed so luxuriantly. In Notker's time there was no proper musical notation. Melodies had to be memorized; and the notation in use was merely an aid to memory for the singer, marking the groups of notes and the general rise and fall of the melody, but not the exact intervals between the notes. It was very difficult to remember passages in which a long sequence of notes (sometimes occupying several lines and called 'melismæ' and 'jubilations') had to be sung on a single syllable of a word, as, *e.g.*, in the Alleluia at the end of the Gradual. Notker had often wondered how this difficulty could be obviated. When the monastery of Jumièges in Northern France was destroyed by the Normans, one of the monks came to St. Gall. In the choir-books which he brought with him Notker saw that there were words fitted into the long sequences of notes—a syllable for every note; and he determined to attempt something similar. Under the wordless 'melismæ' he introduced words of his own composition, so that each note was sung to a single syllable; and he composed two lines of words for each musical phrase (*clausula*), which, if we may infer earlier custom from later, were rendered by choirs of men and boys alternately. After Notker had overcome the first difficulties with the help of his teachers Iso and Marcellus, he composed sequences for nearly all the festivals of the ecclesiastical year, divided them into two books, wrote a preface, and dedicated them to Bishop Liutward of Vercelli, the patron of his monastery. Notker's collection of sequences, which held its ground in Germany till the time of the Council of Trent—and some of it even later—exists in numerous MSS, in many of which, however, there is a mixture of later additions, *e.g.* sequences of Ekkehart and others. In contents, form, and manner of musical phrasing Notker's sequences are entirely original—a liturgi-

[1] From the opening words of this hymn, 'Ut queant laxis resonare fibris,' Guido of Arezzo borrowed the tonic 'Ut, re, mi' notation. For the hymns see *PL* xcv. 472-474, 1597 f.; cf. also E. Dümmler, 'Zu den Gedichten des Paulus Diaconus,' in *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft fur ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde*, xvii. [1891] 397-401, and *Anal. hymn.* l. 117 ff.

[2] *Anal. hymn.* l. 126 ff.; *PL* xcix. 479-504.

[3] *Ib.* l. 152 ff; *PL* ci. 681 f., 726 f.

[4] *Ib.* l. 160 ff.

[5] *Ib.* l. 210 ff.; *PL* lxi. 1083-1087.

[6] *Ib.* l. 229 ff.; *PL* ciii. 293 ff.

[7] A. Schubriger, *Die Sängerschule St. Gallens*, Einsiedeln, 1858.

[8] On the genuineness of the poems assigned to Rabanus by Brower, see Dreves, *Hymnologische Studien zu Venantius Fortunatus und Rabanus Maurus*, pp. 55-136.

[9] *Anal. hymn.* l. 180 ff.; for the hymns see also *PL* cxii. 1649 ff.

[10] *Ib.* l. 167 ff.

[11] *Ib.* l. 219 ff.

[1] *Anal. hymn.* l. 237 ff.; *PL* lxxxvii. 39 41, 46.

[2] *Ib.* l. 244 ff.

[3] *Ib.* l. 250 ff.; *PL* lxxxvii. 29-35, 451, 47.

[4] *PL* lxxxvii. 45-50.

cal, poetical, and musical innovation—as the hymns of Ambrose had been, and their circulation and influence find no parallel except in the case of the great Milanese. As with Ambrose's hymns, Rome alone showed little appreciation for the Teutonic innovation of Notker—a circumstance which afterwards, at the Council of Trent, proved momentous for sequence-composition. Besides his sequences Notker composed a series of hymns on St. Stephen.[1]

Next to Notker the Stammerer, **Tutilo** († 898) is the most influential member of the St. Gall school; for he ranks as the first writer of 'tropes' (*i.e.* additions in prose or verse to an already existing liturgical text).

These insertions were afterwards more frequent in Missals or Graduals than in Breviaries or Antiphonaries. In the former we find them in the 'Kyrie,' 'Gloria,' 'Sanctus,' 'Agnus Dei,' and in the Epistles (*Epîtres farcis*) as well as in other fixed or changing parts of the Mass (Introit, Gradual, Offertory, Communion); in the latter, as a rule, only in some of the Responses.

Only a few tropes composed by Tutilo remain, and these are mostly in prose, and therefore interesting to liturgists, not hymnologists. As regards hymn-writing Tutilo is important, not on account of what he composed, but for what he inaugurated and suggested: the composition of tropes, introduced in German territory and cultivated to a moderate extent in Germany, spread into France, Italy, and England, where it attained a much fuller development.

The 'School of Saint Amand' (*Schola Elnonensis*) also flourished during this period. **Milo** († 872) was one of its most celebrated teachers and a prolific poet, but none of his hymns have been preserved. The most distinguished, however, was **Hucbald** († 930), one of the first composers of harmony. He discovered the *organum*, or *ars organizandi*, *i.e.* the art of accompanying a melody in perfect fifths; and his name is also connected with the introduction of the metrical or rhymed office (*Historia rhythmica*), *i.e.* a daily liturgical prayer-office, comprising the seven canonical hours, in which the hymns and everything else sung, except the Psalms and lessons, are composed in metre, rhythm, and rhyme. Besides hymns on St. Theodoric of Rheims and St. Cyricus of Nevers, he composed rhymed offices on St. Rictrude of Marchiennes and others. At any rate, the district of St. Omer, St. Amand, and Liège may be rightly regarded as the birthplace of this kind of composition.[2]

IV. *The Early Mediæval Period.*—When treating of the school of St. Gall as a whole, we have already touched on the early mediæval period (10th and 11th centuries). The 10th cent. takes up the task—interrupted and postponed by the Carlovingian Renaissance—of liberating the Latin hymn from ancient metrical laws and of bringing it under the government of rhythm. During the process, which is tedious and confusing, the hymns which appear are neither metrical nor rhythmical; they have neither accent nor metre—in fact, the composers seem simply to have followed the principle of counting syllables. Rhyme appears in a desultory manner in the Carlovingian period, in Rabanus and Gottschalk, but throughout the 10th cent. it remains weak and imperfect. It was not till the 11th cent. that both accent and rhyme reached the pitch of perfection which they maintained in the 12th and 13th centuries. At the same time the art of writing sequences, begun by Notker, continued to be cultivated, although it never again attained Notker's depth of thought and mysticism. In the 11th cent. sequences appeared in France which, re-constructing Notker's prose tropes in poetic form, and his syllable-counted cadences in rhythms and strophes, introduced a new type of sequence. They constitute—to borrow a figure from architecture—the transition-style, in which Romanesque forms are mixed with Gothic elements. During this period, as throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, metre holds its ground, but, like rhythm, it is re-modelled and re-moulded in the disguise of the most variable and purely ornamental forms.[1]

One of the most famous hymn-writers of this period is the Anglo-Saxon **Wulstan**, precentor of St. Swithin in Winchester. We have several abecedaries composed by him in elegiac measure on local saints of Winchester—Athelwold, Birin, and Swithin. They are modelled on Bede's hymn on Edilthrida, and have been revised by Ordericus Vitalis.[2] The monastery of the reformed Benedictine order at Clugny, which at this time influenced not only France but all the Christian kingdoms of the West, is represented in hymn-composition by the two most celebrated abbots that it possessed—**Odo**, the best musician of his time († 943), and **Odilo** († 1048). Only a few fragments of their hymns remain. Odo celebrated St. Martin of Tours;[3] Odilo panegyrized St. Majolus, abbot of Clugny, and the empress St. Adelheid, consort of Otto the Great.[4] The German poet-pope **Leo IX.**, a count of Egisheim († 1054), is closely connected with the Clugny group. Besides two hymns he composed a rhythmical office in honour of Gregory the Great.[5]

More famous than all these, however, as theologian, schoolman, and poet, is **Fulbert of Chartres** († 1028). The comparatively few poems of his which are extant are composed in the most varied metres and rhythms. The more widely-circulated of his writings were the sequence 'Sonent regi nato,' the Epiphany hymn 'Nuntium vobis fero de supernis' in France, and the Easter Song 'Chorus novæ Jerusalem' throughout Christendom.[6] Other French hymn-writers of this period are **Adhémar of Chabannes**, a monk of Angoulême († 1034), who panegyrizes in hymns the patron of his monastery, St. Eparchius;[7] **Eusebius Bruno**, bishop of Angers († 1081), who composed a number of rhythmical religious poems, of which one on St. Stephen became the common property of the mediæval Church;[8] and **Anselm**, archbishop of Canterbury († 1109), the composer of some pious prayers. It is to be regretted that we cannot give more substantial proof and a more detailed description of Anselm's activity as a hymn-writer.[9] In a MS of the poems of Eusebius Bruno there is a poem of **Berengar of Tours** († 1088), 'Juste Judex Jesu Christe.'[10]

In Italy, besides pope Leo IX. just mentioned, there are two conspicuous poets, who in other respects differ as widely as two writers can—**Peter Damiani** († 1072) and **Alfanus of Salerno** († 1085). One writes in mediæval rhythms; the other might be designated as a herald of humanism.

Peter Damiani belongs to the prolific hymn-writers of the Middle Ages. As regards artistic form, his poetry can hardly bear comparison with

[1] The legend of the origin of the 'Media vita in morte sumus,' which attained such celebrity, is the invention of a later time. Notker's hymns are conveniently edited in *PL* cxxxi. 1005–1026, lxxxvii. 58–92.

[2] The rhymed offices of the Middle Ages, as far as they are known, will be found in *Anal. hymn.* v. [1889], xiii. [1892], xvii. [1894], xviii. [1894], xxiv.–xxvi. [1896-97], xxviii. [1898], xlv.*a* [1902].

[1] Cf. the countless varieties of Leonine verse with its elaborations and artificialities, the 'versus caudati' and 'bi-caudati,' 'crucifieri' and 'cruciati,' etc. (*Anal. hymn.* v. 12 ff.).

[2] *Anal. hymn.* xlviii. [1905] 0 ff.; see also C. Blume, 'Wolstan von Winchester und Vital von St. Evroul, Dichter der drei Lobgesänge auf die heil. Athelwold, Birin, und Swithun,' *SWAW* cxlvi. [1903] p. iii.

[3] *PL* cxxxviii. 513–516.

[4] *Anal. hymn.* l. 264 ff., 297 ff.; *PL* cxlii. 961–964, 991 f., 1035 ff.

[5] *Ib.* l. 302 ff.

[6] *Ib.* l. 280 ff.; *PL* cxli. 339–352.

[7] *Ib.* xlviii. 109 ff. [8] *Ib.* xlviii. 79. [9] *Ib.* xlviii. 94 ff.

[10] Mone, *Lat. Hymnen des Mittelalters*, i. 359.

the more polished and elaborated compositions of the succeeding age; but under its bald exterior with the feeble assonantal rhymes are hidden a genuine poetic genius, and a warmth of feeling which at times bursts into a volcanic blaze. In the ordinary hymn-forms he celebrates the Virgin and the local saints of his native place, Ravenna, and depicts the joys of heaven and the terrors of the Judgment. His poem on the joys of Paradise, beginning 'Ad perennis vitae fontem,' has actually been honoured by being wrongly assigned to the 6th cent. or to St. Augustine himself.[1] **Alfanus of Salerno** composed a series of 21 liturgical hymns, a metrical office, and a number of religious lyrics.[2] With one exception all his poems are in classical metre, and are, for his age, remarkably pure in expression and form.

Germany also produced several important hymn-writers. **Heribert of Eichstätt** († 1042), a count of Rothenburg, composed a series of liturgical hymns, some of which, *e.g.* his hymn on the Holy Cross, and a poem on St. Lawrence, found a general circulation in Germany. In other hymns he celebrates the local patron saints of Eichstätt—Willibald and Walpurgis.[3] **Bern of Reichenau** (Berno Augiensis; † 1048) was a musician as well as a poet, and he certainly wrote more than the few hymns and sequences known to us as his. **Othlo,** monk of St. Emmeran in Regensburg († 1072), deserves mention as the composer of a series of prayers in stiff hexameters and stanzas.[4] There were two writers of greater influence than these, however—**Heriman the Lame** (Hermannus Contractus) of Reichenau († 1054), one of the most celebrated men of his time, and **Gottschalk of Limburg** († 1098), the most distinguished composer, after Notker, of sequences in Germany. **Heriman** was a popular teacher and a prolific as well as celebrated writer. Besides his chief work, his *Chronicon Augiense* (the first universal history of the Middle Ages), he composed mathematical, astronomical, and musical works. Very few of his liturgical writings have come down to us under his name. The sequences which we know to be his are marked by a mysticism going far beyond that of Notker, and by the trick of inserting Greek words in the Latin text. The one most free from the latter mannerism is the most celebrated and widely used of Heriman's sequences, 'Ave praeclara maris stella,'[5] which also shows the writer's preference for long cadences in contrast to the much shorter ones of Notker. Besides this we have an office in honour of St. Afra composed mostly in prose, and (probably) the beautiful antiphons still used in the services of the Church, 'Alma Redemptoris Mater' and 'Salve Regina.'[6] As a composer of sequences, **Gottschalk of Limburg** far surpassed Heriman. With the exception of Notker of St. Gall there is no composer of sequences during this period when rhymeless rhythms were in vogue from whose hand we have a greater number of 'proses' than Gottschalk. He writes in a very peculiar style. He is especially fond of the figures known as 'enumeratio,' 'polyptoton,' and 'annominatio.' He shares with Heriman the preference for long cadences, and, without imitating him, resembles him very closely in his manner of conceiving and presenting a subject.[7]

[1] *Anal. hymn.* xlviii. 29 ff.; *PL* cxlv. 861–864, 930 ff.

[2] The list of his hymns will be found in *Anal. hymn.* l. 330, the text, *ib.* xxii. [1895], on the pages referred to in l. 330; his religious poems of a non-liturgical character are collected in *ib.* l. 330–338. This ed. corrects the numerous faults of the earlier ones, since all the original MSS were freshly collated. For a convenient, though less critical, ed. see *PL* cxlvii. 1219 ff.

[3] *Anal. hymn.* l. 290 ff.; *PL* cxli. 1360–1374.

[4] *Ib.* l. 320 ff.

[5] On the question of the authorship of this sequence see *Anal. hymn.* l. 309.

[6] *Anal. hymn.* l. 308 ff.

[7] *Ib.* l. 339 ff.; Dreves, 'Godescalcus Lintpurgensis,' in *Hymnolog. Beitr.* i. [1897]; *PL* cxli. 1323–1334.

Mention must be made of one more contemporary composer, **Wipo,** a Burgundian, Court-chaplain to the Emperors Conrad II. and Henry III., and, according to a marginal note on an Einsiedeln MS, author of the famous Easter sequence, still in use, 'Victimae paschali laudes.' This sequence is of special interest because it is a classical example of those transitional sequences in which the old forms initiated by Notker are adorned with rhymes and re-cast in a rhythmical mould.

V. *THE MIDDLE AGES.*—We now reach the acme of mediæval culture, the period of Early and High Gothic, in which poetic composition keeps abreast of the sciences and arts, and not least in the form of religious Latin poetry. There are more writers of reputation; the forms of composition show a richer variety; the rhythms are more correct, the language more tuneful, and the rhymes purer. Good writers of the 12th and 13th centuries obey the rule that the masculine (iambic) rhyme must be two-syllabled.

The writers of this period may be arranged into several groups. The first group is formed round **Hildebert of Lavardin** and the second round **Abelard.** The whole mass of liturgical composition, however, culminates in **Adam of St. Victor.** Another group is dominated by **Philippe de Grève.** Finally, there are several less celebrated writers.

(1) The chief members of the first group are **Marbod,** bishop of Rennes († 1123), **Baudri** (Baldericus), abbot of Bourgueil and bishop of Dol († 1130), and **Reginald,** monk of Saint Augustine's, Canterbury († 1109). All these writers have two characteristics in common: they cultivate classical and metrical poetry, although Marbod and Reginald also write Leonine or rhymed hexameters; and in their poems they incline towards worldly or religious-epical or didactic poetry. **Marbod** wrote a series of hymns and prayers (the latter partly in metre and partly in rhythm).[1] Of **Baudri's** compositions only a few hymns on St. Samson of Dol remain.[2] The form which he prefers is that of the poetic epistle, and the collection of his letters is of great importance from the point of view of the historical student. **Reginald of Canterbury,** in the last book of his chief work, the *Life of St. Malchus,* has collected a series of hymns addressed to God, to Christ, to the Holy Spirit, etc., all of which he puts in the mouth of his hero. These hymns show unmistakably a feeling for poetic form and a certain energy of sentiment which secure for their author an honourable place in the great throng of mediæval writers.[3]

Hildebert himself († 1133), archbishop of Tours, belongs to the most careful cultivators of form among the mediæval poets. Some of his verses were actually included by modern philologists in the anthology of Latin classical authors, and were taken for genuine productions of antiquity, till Hauréau drew attention to the mistake. It is unfortunate that there are no liturgical compositions of Hildebert known. But, even if Hildebert had given us nothing but the single *Oratio devotissima ad Tres Personas SS. Trinitatis,* 'Alpha et Ω magne Deus,' this one poem would give him a claim to be reckoned with the greatest hymn-writers of all ages and tongues.[4]

(2) Of an 'Abelardian' group we cannot, strictly speaking, say anything from the literary-historical point of view, since Abelard does not belong to any one school or tendency; but, considering the fact that the two men who most deeply and permanently affected his life—Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter the Venerable—were both engaged in hymn-

[1] Cf. *Anal. hymn.* l. 388 ff.; *PL* clxxi. 1647 ff.

[2] *Ib.* xviii. 252 f. [3] *Ib.* l. 370 ff.

[4] *Ib.* l. 408 ff.; *PL* clxxi. 1411–1414; cf. also B. Hauréau, *Les Mélanges poétiques d'Hildebert de Lavardin,* Paris, 1882.

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composition, it is perhaps justifiable to bring them together in a group. **Bernard of Clairvaux** († 1153) composed only a few hymns on the saints Victor and Malachias,[1] which are not very remarkable in contents or form. All the other works ascribed to him in the mediæval period have been proved by B. Hauréau[2] not to be his. The well-known 'Jubilus' of the Name of Jesus, in which two-syllabled masculine rhyme is employed throughout, is certainly not his. It is probably not earlier than the 13th century.

A larger number of liturgical hymns and sequences and extra-liturgical rhymed prayers have come down to us from the hand of **Peter the Venerable**, abbot of Clugny († 1156). His compositions are more numerous and of a higher quality than Abelard's, displaying variety and polish of form. His melodies are also preserved.[3]

Peter Abelard († 1142) surpasses both Bernard and Peter the Venerable as a hymn-writer. He is one of the few mediæval poets who composed a whole hymnary. It is very copious in contents, and has come down to our time almost complete. The first book contains the ferial hymns, the second the hymns for the festivals of our Lord, the third for the feasts of the saints. These hymns are not so rounded and complete as the hymns of later writers, and their contents sometimes suggest the philosopher rather than the poet; but their imperfections are due to the fact that the hymnary was not composed gradually in hours of inspiration, but had to be executed all at once. Still, as a whole, it is a remarkable piece of work, not only because of the new forms which Abelard introduces into hymn-composition, but also on account of the beauty of the contents. It is unfortunate that the two original MSS, which mutually supplement each other—the older Brussels codex and the more recent and fuller one at Chaumont-sur-Marne—do not record the melodies of the hymnary, since Abelard enjoyed a wide reputation as a melodist.[4]

(3) The writings of **Adam of St. Victor** († 1192) stand at the head of liturgical composition of the Latin speaking Middle Ages indeed, of all Christian lyric poetry. He is unquestionably one of the greatest poets who ever mastered the Latin tongue. His poetical works were edited four times during the 19th cent., three times by Léon Gautier (who deserves to be called his discoverer; Paris, 1858, 1881, 1894), and once by Eugène Misset and Pierre Aubry (do. 1900), whose edition gives the melodies of the sequences.[5] In the contents of his writings —*e.g.* his sequence on the Holy Trinity, 'Profitemur unitatem,' which in theological scholastic knowledge surpasses even the 'Lauda Sion' of Thomas Aquinas—in the euphony of his language, and in the incomparable grace with which he wears all the shackles of rhythm and rhyme imposed upon him, Adam of St. Victor is equally great.

(4) In the 13th cent. we come upon a group of poets who may be called the 'hymn-writers of the Mendicant orders,' although the central figure of the group is a personage who during his life belonged to the most strenuous opponents of the Mendicants —the chancellor, Philippe de Grève. In this group we find **Thomas Aquinas** († 1274), the singer of the Sacrament of the Altar, and the author of the justly-celebrated 'Lauda Sion,' the 'Pange lingua,' and the 'Adoro Te';[1] **Johannes Fidanza, surnamed Bonaventura** († 1274), a theologian and poet like Aquinas, author of the 'Tree of Life,' an office celebrating the Passion of Our Lord, and of the beautiful Passion-hymn 'Recordare sanctæ crucis';[2] **John Peckham** (Johannes Pechamus), a pupil of Bonaventura, subsequently archbishop of Canterbury († 1292), who composed the lovely nightingale-song 'Philomela prævia,' a rhymed office celebrating the Holy Trinity, which displays deep thought and warm feeling with the most elaborate rhythmical expression, and some widely celebrated hymns in honour of the Virgin, etc.;[3] **Julian of Speier** (Julianus Teutonicus; † 1278), the author of rhymed offices in honour of St. Francis of Assisi and Antony of Padua, remarkable for both contents and form;[4] **Constantinus Medici**, archbishop of Orvieto († 1257), the author of an equally elaborate office in honour of St. Dominic;[5] and **Thomas of Celano** († after 1250), the author of some sequences and probably of the immortal sequence on the Last Day, the 'Dies Iræ,' so often translated and set to music.

This was originally composed for private devotion and ended with the words, 'Gere curam mei finis.' In the 13th cent. it was sometimes adopted as a sequence in the Mass-books of the Franciscan Orders, and for that purpose the six last lines (which are not consistent with the rest either in contents or in form) were appended to it. It was not till towards the end of the 15th cent. that the 'Dies Iræ' was used more frequently as a sequence. By that time it had been forgotten that a Mass without an 'Alleluia,' such as the Mass for the dead, ought to have no sequence.

All those writers, to whom a large number of less importance might be added, are surpassed by a man who until recently has not received the recognition and honour which he enjoyed among his contemporaries—the chancellor of the Church of Paris, **Philippe de Grève** (Philippus de Grevia; † 1236). From his hand we have a *Summa Theologica* (unfortunately still unprinted) and three collections of sermons—for feast-days, on the Psalms, and on the Gospels appointed for Sundays. These sermons are still for the most part unpublished. In spite of his zealous and deep theological studies, Philippe de Grève found time for copious poetical activity. His chief poem was the 'Cantio,' a sacred song intended for vocal performance. Although extra-liturgical in contents and origin, it found its way into the liturgy and pervaded it, while it also prepared the way for the sacred popular song in the vernacular. We have a whole series of such songs composed by him on subjects ranging from hymns to the Virgin, of a child-like simplicity and devotion, to verses of keen wit and satire. He also wrote some hymns properly so called; and there are few hymns in the great treasury of the mediæval Church with which his hymn on Mary Magdalene will not bear comparison. Henri d'Andeli, in his poetical panegyric of Philippe de Grève, called him the most valiant and wisest 'qui fut en la crestiente.'[6]

(5) We have still to mention a series of writers belonging to this period who produced some fine religious lyrics: the 'doctor universalis,' **Alanus of Lille** († *c.* 1203), on account of his *Anticlaudianus*, ranks among the most famous and widely read poets of the Middle Ages; **Alexander Neckam** (latinized as Nequam), abbot of Cirencester († 1217), also one of the most skilled artists in verse of his time, composed fine hymns to the Virgin and in

[1] *Anal. hymn.* xix. [1895] 189 ff.; *P.L.* clxxxiii. 775 f., 779, clxxxii. 1117 *f.*

[2] *Des Poèmes latins attribués à saint Bernard*, Paris, 1890; for a convenient ed. see *P.L.* clxxxiv. 1307 ff.

[3] *Anal. hymn.* xlviii. 233 ff.; *P.L.* clxxxix. 1012-1022.

[4] *Ib.* l. 141 ff.; *P.L.* clxxviii. 1775 ff.

[5] A fifth edition (by M. Legrain, Bruges, 1899) appeared in Belgium 'in usum scolarum,' which attempts the praiseworthy, although probably unattainable, task of making this master of a new form of Latin composition known to young students; cf. also *P.L.* cxcvi. 1423-1534; Eng. tr. (with original text) by D. S. Wrangham, 3 vols., London, 1881.

[1] *Anal. hymn.* l. 583 ff.

[2] At the end of the 15th cent., when canonized by the Franciscan pope Sixtus IV., he was credited, like Bernard of Clairvaux, with a series of ascetic poems which he did not compose.

[3] *Anal. hymn.* l. 592 ff.

[4] *Ib.* v. 126 ff., 175 ff.; cf. also J. E. Weis, *Julian von Speier*, Munich, 1900, and *Julian's von Speier Chorale zu den Reimofficien des Franziscus- und Antoniusfestes*, do. 1901; H. Felder, *Die liturg. Reimofficien auf die heil. Franciscus und Antonius, gedichtet und componiert durch Julian von Speyer*, Freiburg, 1901.

[5] *Ib.* xxv. [1897] 239 ff.

[6] *Ib.* l. 523 ff.

honour of Mary Magdalene;[1] **John Hoveden** († 1275), Court-chaplain of Queen Eleanor of England, mother of Edward III., composed a series of mediocre religious lyrics, and a narrative lyric poem on the life and sufferings of Christ entitled *Philomela*, which is of conspicuous excellence; **Guy de Basoches** (Guido de Bazochis), precentor of Chalons-sur-Marne († 1203), in his collection of correspondence, which is important for the literary history of the period, has interwoven numerous hymns and religious poems;[2] **Adam de la Bassée** (Adamus de Basseia), canon of Saint Pierre de Lille († 1258), composed songs of the most varied kinds to suit existing liturgical or popular melodies;[3] and **Orrigo Scaccabarozzi** († 1293), the archpresbyter of Milan, wrote several liturgical hymns, rhymed offices, and Masses, which, however, are not remarkable either for contents or for form.[4]

We must specially mention two female writers: **St. Hildegard**, the abbess of Rupertsberg in Bingen († 1179), and **Herradis of Landsberg**, abbess of Hohenburg or Odilienberg in Alsace. **Hildegard**, the great seeress of the 12th cent., also composed hymns and sequences, or, rather, rough drafts of hymns and sequences, which are corrected by another hand. In the Wiesbaden MS (the only one in which they occur) these rough drafts are set to music—whether by Hildegard or some one else we do not know.[5] The compositions of **Herradis of Landsberg** († 1167) are of a different kind. She enriched the library of her convent with a MS which is equally interesting for the history of art and the history of literature. The 'Hortus deliciarum,' as it was called, seems to have been a kind of theological Encyclopædia, and was illustrated by interesting miniatures which are quite famous. On 23rd August 1870 the MS was destroyed by fire. This 'Pleasure-garden' of Herradis also contained a series of poems ascribed to the anthologist.[6] Whether these are her composition or not, she certainly wrote poetry, and so far mastered the Latin tongue as to be able to clothe sentiments of simple piety in an unadorned and pleasing garb.

We must here merely mention the fact that a number of hymns had been appearing anonymously during these early centuries, and, in fact, these far exceed in numbers the compositions whose authors are known.

VI. *THE LATER MIDDLE AGES.*—In the 14th and 15th centuries Latin hymn-writing slowly but steadily declined from the high level which it attained in the 12th and 13th centuries. There were more writers interested in the further development of the art, but they do not rouse our admiration. And the great stream of anonymous poetry increased. Some works of first-rate quality appeared, but the gradual falling-off continued. The *form* of hymn-writing seems to have undergone the most rapid eclipse in France, where it had reached its most perfect development. Word-accentuation, which constitutes the basis of rhythmical composition, did not even with Abelard attain the perfection to which Adam of St. Victor brought it, and in Philippe de Grève's work it perceptibly declined. The process of deterioration went on rapidly until hymn-writing was again reduced to the system of syllable-counting from which it had begun to emerge in the 10th century. In England, and perhaps more gradually in Germany, the same deterioration took place; in Italy it had never reached the perfection which it attained in France.

This period begins with **Jacopone da Todi** († 1306), the Franciscan poet, who composed many celebrated Italian religious poems. He is commonly regarded as the author of the world-renowned 'Stabat Mater,' the most beautiful mediæval elegy in honour of the Virgin. Like the 'Dies Iræ,' the 'Stabat Mater' was originally a hymn for private devotion; but it occurs in many of the 15th cent. books of prayer, and before the end of the century it found its way into the Liturgy. Cardinal **Jacobus de Stephanescis** († 1343) displayed activity as a liturgical writer and as a composer. Among acknowledged compositions of his are hymns on St. George, antiphons in honour of pope Cœlestin V. (Petrus Morrone), and a few other liturgical and extra-liturgical pieces.[1] Another cardinal, **Guillermus da Mandagoto** († 1321), more famous as a lawyer than as a poet, composed sequences which his nephew (of the same name) included in the Missal of Usez, and thus handed down to posterity. Faultless in form, these poems are greatly lacking in the glow of inspiration.[2] These writers are succeeded by two Austrian poets, the Cistercian **Christan of Lilienfeld** († before 1332) and the Carthusian **Konrad of Gaming** (Gemmicensis; † 1360), who is also called Konrad of Heimburg, after his birthplace. From the pen of the former we have a great number of hymns and sequences, offices and prayers in rhyme, which are all remarkable for their carefully-cultivated form and their tone of deep piety. His rhymed prayers are short; they nearly all contain five stanzas, each beginning with the word 'Ave.'[3] **Konrad of Gaming** has left liturgical compositions, chiefly hymns in honour of the Virgin and the saints. They are, as a rule, rather long, but reveal a child-like and touching piety.[4] Konrad of Gaming was more widely read in Germany than his model, Christan of Lilienfeld, whose poems are preserved almost exclusively in the MSS of his monastery. There were other imitators of Christan of Lilienfeld besides Konrad, *e.g.* the Carthusian **Albert of Prague** (first half of 14th cent.), who compiled a book of devotion entitled *Scala Cœli*, in which there is a series of his own compositions. They are inferior in style, and of wearisome prolixity.[5] The prolific writer, **Ulrich Stöcklin of Rottach**, abbot of Wessobrunn († 1443), shows skilful manipulation of the forms, but suffers from the same weakness of barren verbiage. He followed the lines marked out by Christan and Konrad, and may therefore be mentioned here, although he properly belongs to the next century.[6]

Turning from this group of South German writers to the North, we find in the 14th cent. a small group of Scandinavian hymn-writers of some importance. The oldest of them is **Brynolphus** I., bishop of Scara († 1317), the author of a rhymed office on St. Helena of Skövde, with the hymns belonging to it, and probably also of a rhymed office in honour of St. Nikolaus of Linköping.[7] To **Birger Gregorsen** (Birgerus Gregorii; † 1383), bishop of Upsala, we owe rhymed offices in honour of St. Birgitta and St. Botuidus, with accompanying hymns.[8] The hymns of both these writers are distinguished by carefully modelled poetic forms, showing French influence. A third northern writer, **Petrus Olavi**, attendant of St. Birgitta and confessor in Vadstena († 1378), seems more careless regarding cadence and rhyme. He arranged the choral office of the nuns of the order of St. Birgitta, and composed a whole series of new hymns for it.[9]

In the first half of the 14th cent. there flourished in France **Guillaume de Deguilleville** (Guillermus de Deguilevilla; † after 1358), prior of Chaalis,

[1] *Anal. hymn.* l. 624 ff. [2] *Ib.* xlviii. 317 ff.
[3] *Ib.* xli.*a* [1903].
[4] The first complete ed. of the poems of Konrad is in *Anal. hymn.* iii. [1888] 1–102.
[5] *Ib.* iii. 105 ff. [6] *Ib.* vi. [1889], xxxvii. [1902].
[7] *Ib.* xxvi. 90 ff. [8] *Ib.* xxv. 166 ff., 179 ff.
[9] *Ib.* xlviii. 410 ff.

[1] *Anal. hymn.* xlviii. 262 ff. [2] *Ib.* l. 507 ff.
[3] *Ib.* xlviii. 298 ff. [4] *Ib.* xiv.*b* [1893] and l. 617 ff.
[5] *Ib.* l. 483 ff.
[6] In *ZKT* xxiii. [1902] 632 ff. the present writer has shown that this is incorrect.

known through his epic-didactic poems in his mother-tongue, 'Pèlerinage de la vie humaine,' 'Pèlerinage de l'âme,' 'Pèlerinage Jésu-Christ.' He has also left several very long Latin poems, in which is noticeable a vanishing of the word-accentuation.[1] Along with him should be mentioned the Englishman **Gualterus Wiburnus**, a Franciscan poet († after 1367), who composed several hymns in honour of the Virgin, in carefully-handled forms.[2] At the end of the 14th cent. lived two poets who are closely connected through the Feast of the Visitation of Our Lady, which was just then beginning to be observed—Cardinal **Adam Easton**, also called 'Adam Anglicus' († 1397), and **Johann of Jenstein**, archbishop of Prague († 1400). An illuminated edition of Jenstein's works, which he himself revised, appeared in Rome. This is the present *Codex Vaticanus*, 1122. It also contains the ecclesiastical compositions of Jenstein—sequences, tropes, rhymed offices, hymns, and rhymed prayers, which are very unequal in contents and form, his worst being the hymns on St. Wenzel.[3] Jenstein was the first to introduce the observance of the festival of the Visitation of the Virgin into his Archiepiscopal see, and urged Urban VI. to introduce it into the whole Church. Urban VI. was prevented by death from carrying out the suggestion; but his successor, Boniface IX., in 1389 issued the bull commanding the observance of the festival. The office composed by Jenstein, however, was not adopted into the Roman breviary, for that honour was reserved for a rhymed office composed by Cardinal Adam Easton. It begins with the words, 'Accedunt laudes virginis,' and exhibits an acrostic on his name, which, however, has fallen into disorder.[4] This office was handled severely, and not altogether justly, by the Humanist Jakob Wimpheling in his *Castigationes locorum in cantiicis ecclesiasticis et divinis officiis depravatorum* (1500). The festival of the Visitation of the Virgin caused great activity on the part of poets. There are no fewer than ten different rhymed offices in honour of it. One of them, used by the Dominican order,[5] and beginning, 'Collaetentur corda fidelium,' was composed by **Raimund of Capua** († 1399), confessor and biographer of St. Catherine of Siena. Another Dominican, **Martialis Auribelli** († 1473), wrote acrostic hymns in honour of Saint Vincent Ferrer.

We have already entered the 15th century. Among the writers in the earlier part of it is the unfortunate fanatic **Johann Hus** († 1415). Only a few of his hymns remain, composed partly in Czech and partly in Latin. The most widely celebrated was his 'Jesu Christe, nostra salus,' which shows his name woven into an acrostic, and which is still occasionally sung. With the name of Hus we may connect the host of anonymous Bohemian poets who zealously cultivated a special kind of Church hymn, the so-called 'cantiones.' Next to France, no country has so delighted in this form of vocal music as Bohemia. Their form—doubled stanzas, and a concluding song to follow, sometimes similarly doubled—is often very artistic; their rhythm and rhymes, however, show every sign of decadence.

A figure whose fame belongs to universal history marks the end of the 15th cent.—that of **Thomas à Kempis** († 1471). He wrote a number of hymns and rhymed prayers. Some of the prayers seem to have been provided with melodies, most of them not for public but for private use. The compositions of the famous mystic are not of great poetic value.[6] Somewhat younger than à Kempis, and following in his track as a mystic and poet, is **Johannes Mauburnus** († 1503), abbot of Livry. Most of his works are still unprinted. Those which we know to be his are found in his *Rosetum exercitiorum spiritualium* (first printed, 1491).[1] With these two mystics we may associate a third, **Henricus Pistor**, canon of St. Victor in Paris. Jodocus Clichtoveus has preserved in his *Elucidatorium ecclesiasticum* a fine sequence of his composed for the festival of St. John the Baptist. One of the most prolific theological authors of this period is **Dionysius of Rickel**, known also as 'Dionysius Carthusianus' († 1471). He has been given the cognomen, 'Doctor Ecstaticus,' although, as a matter of fact, his character appears to have been the prosaic one of compiler. He also composed some Latin rhythms. There are extant long poems on God and the Holy Trinity, or, rather, rhymed dissertations and reflexions which are wearisome from their prolixity. They are known only from the author's *Opera Minora*, Cologne, 1532. A few other religious poets of this period deserve mention. **Matthäus Ronto**, a monk of the Olivetan convent at Siena († 1442), wrote some hymns which are preserved in a MS of the Wilhering monastery.[2]

Hieronymus de Werdea (as he was called in the convent, though christened John), prior of Monsen († 1475), wrote religious poems (which never take the form of liturgical composition) celebrating Christ and the Virgin, Saints Benedict, Florian, George, etc. Considering the period in which he wrote, their form is well managed, but there is no genuine poetical inspiration in them. We may also mention **Wynandus de Stega**, priest at Bacharach, who has left hymns and sequences in honour of St. Werner. A Vatican MS has preserved two other poems of his, one in a German adaptation. At the close of the century stands the Franciscan **Johannes Tisserand**, who founded an order of Magdalens in Paris in 1493. A Paris MS has handed down some of his poems, whose form reminds us of those of Guillaume de Deguilleville. He composed the Acts of Bernhard de Corbio and the five martyrs of Morocco, and possibly also the rhymed office which exists in honour of these martyrs.

Summary.—It would be easy to add to the foregoing list of hymn-writers, but the purpose of this article has been rather to indicate only the principal figures and most significant tendencies at work. We have seen that all through the Middle Ages metrical as well as rhythmical poetry was cultivated, while poetry modelled on that of ancient Rome was never entirely extinct. But towards the end of the mediæval period the character of this poetry changed; and the so-called humanistic poetry, the product of the Renaissance of classical learning, appeared. It is distinguished from the metrical poetry of the Middle Ages, not only by greater purity of language and poetical form, but also by greater dependence on the common models—a dependence which is sometimes repellent. This kind of composition first appeared in Italy in the beginning of the 14th cent., but soon passed over into Germany. At first it was only rarely in the form of religious poetry or hymns, but later it became quite an important branch of religious lyric poetry. As this humanistic poetry seldom found its way into liturgical use, for the exigencies of which the period of rhythmical poetry had made ample provision, we have here disregarded it. It was a new art, alien and hostile to the Middle Ages. Although mediæval composition in its offshoots reaches far past the Council of Trent, while the beginning of humanistic poetry goes far back into the departing mediæval period, we may designate the Council of Trent as the dividing line between

1 *Anal. hymn.* xlviii. 321 ff.
2 *Ib.* xlviii. 421 ff.
3 *Ib.* xxiv. 94 ff.
4 *Ib.* l. 630 ff.
5 *Ib.* xxvi. 89 ff.
6 *Ib.* xlviii. 457 ff.

1 Cf. *Anal. hymn.* l. 515 ff.
2 *Ib.* xlviii. 456 ff.

the intellectual world of the Middle Ages and a more modern period. This line, at any rate, separates the freely developing liturgical composition of the mediæval period from that of the post-Tridentine period, which was executed to order. When the Roman rite obtained exclusive validity, the very conditions of existence were withdrawn from liturgical composition. It had to come to an end because there was no more scope for it in the liturgy; and the liturgy itself was looked upon as something finished and complete. Provision was made for the few necessities of the kind by a Roman Congregation, which gave a commission for hymn-writing, but could not supply poetic inspiration. On one occasion, however, a national Church, a Gallican, burst from these fetters and created liturgies and liturgical poems, although only one poet, **J. B. Santeul**, deserves mention. Even in the Gallican poems there is no pulse of genuine liturgical life; they were commissioned work; it is a matter of indifference whether the authority who commissioned them resided in Rome, Paris, or Lyons; they were manufactured, not a natural growth, and only furnish another proof that what has been extinguished cannot be called back to life by an arbitrary decree. And, since history is always the representation of life, we may without exaggeration affirm that the history of the liturgy in general and of liturgical poetry in particular closes with the Council of Trent.

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HYMNS (Irish Christian).—Like all the hymns of the Middle Ages, the religious poems of Christian Ireland fall into two groups: (1) those directly intended for use in liturgical worship, and (2) those written for purposes not originally connected with the offices of the Church, such as hymns in praise of special saints, or verses composed as charms against disease or pestilence, or as safeguards in moments of danger. Many of these personal poems seem afterwards to have been used in the Church services, although they were not written expressly for this purpose. Of the first group all are in Latin; of the second group some are in Latin and some in Irish.

1. **Liturgical hymns.**—The use of hymns in the offices of the Church seems to have been a very ancient custom in Ireland. In Adamnan's *Vita S. Columbæ*, a *hymnorum liber septimaniorum sanctæ Columbæ manu descriptus*, apparently a book of hymns for use on each of the days of the week, is mentioned (ii. 9), and we learn from one of the prefaces to St. Columba's hymn, 'Altus Prosator' (*Ir. Lib. Hymn.* ii. 24), that Gregory sent a gift to St. Columba of the *Hymns of the Week*. We find also that, on the morning of the death of the Saint (9 June 597), hymns were sung in the monastic offices at Iona; *hymnis matutinalibus terminatis* is the phrase used by Adamnan (iii. 23). These slight indications point to the use of hymns in the offices of the Church as early as the 6th century. That they were so used in times not far removed from this at least is certain. The *Antiphonary of Bangor* dates from the end of the 7th cent., and twelve hymns used in the Church offices are given in it. Again, in the directions given in the liturgical fragment found at the end of the 9th cent. copy of the Gospels called the *Book of St. Mulling*, portions of three (possibly four) well-known Irish hymns are directed to be sung, with certain supplementary stanzas, in the course of a short office which seems to have been designed as a service of intercession against the yellow plague, a pestilence which decimated Ireland at frequent intervals during the 7th and following centuries. An office practically identical with this is appointed in the tract entitled *The Second Vision of Adamnan* (*Leabhar Breac*, p. 258ᵇ f.) for special days of fasting and prayer; also on the first three leaves of the 10th cent. (?) Greek Psalter at Basel (A. vii. 3), which contains some Latin pieces and directions for what appears to be a monastic office in Irish handwriting, three Irish hymns are found.

In the largest existing collection of Irish and Latin hymns, that known as the *Irish Liber Hymnorum*, of which two MSS, slightly differing from each other in contents, exist—one now in the Franciscan Library, Merchant's Quay, Dublin, which belonged to the Library of Father John Colgan at Louvain in the 17th cent.; the other in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin (classed E. 4. 2), a MS of the 11th cent.—the material does not appear to be arranged in any order of service. It contains in the main body of the collection 17 hymns and poems in Latin and 9 in Irish, also the 'Te Deum,' 'Benedictus,' 'Magnificat,' 'Gloria in excelsis,' an abridgment of the Psalter, etc.; and among the extra matter added at a later time in the Franciscan MS are found two other Latin hymns and the 'Lorica' of Gildas, with the 'Benedicite,' the 'Quicunque vult,' etc.

From the manner in which the material is thrown together and the elaborate prefaces in Irish with which it is accompanied, it would appear that this is a miscellany of religious pieces rather than an actual choir book. The editors suggest that it may have been compiled at a time when the older Celtic services were giving place to the use in England, in order to preserve all those pieces which were most cherished in the memories of the monks, as connected with a system of worship which was being superseded by a new and less national order of religious service.

Several of the poems contained in the *Liber Hymnorum* are ascribed to saints of the 6th and 7th centuries. Besides the 'Lorica,' or hymn of protection, ascribed to St. Patrick himself, there are hymns by St. Sechnall (Secundinus), a contemporary and disciple of St. Patrick, by St. Columba (†597), by St. Ultan (†656), by St. Broccan (†650), by St. Cummian Fada ('the Tall') (†661-2), and by other saints of the 7th and 8th centuries. That many of these hymns are of great antiquity is shown by the use in them of pre-Hieronymian texts in both the OT and NT quotations and allusions, such as are found in Sechnall's 'Audite omnes' in honour of St. Patrick, and in St. Columba's 'Altus Prosator.' The surprise of St. Patrick, expressed in the Preface, at the use by St. Sechnall of the word 'maximus' in the phrase 'maximus namque in regno cælorum' is also interesting, as this is the reading of St. Cyprian and of the Rushworth Gospels, the Vulgate (Mt 5¹⁹) having 'magnus.' It shows that the hymn preserved a reading already almost forgotten at the time of the composition of the Irish prefaces, which are probably in all cases later than the hymns

themselves, and that the author of the preface was perplexed at the use of a word unfamiliar to him. The ascription of the 'Lorica' to St. Patrick († 461), and of the hymn 'Audite omnes' to his contemporary St. Sechnall, is confirmed by their rude Latinity and by the use of uncouth grammatical forms in the former, as well as by the structure of both poems. The 'Lorica' is not in metre, and, though constructed with a sense of proportion, it shows no knowledge of either Irish or classic forms of verse. It contains allusions to pagan practices, and is evidently the direct descendant of the native pagan rune or charm. The hymn of St. Sechnall is unrhymed, and quantity and elision are completely ignored; nor does it show acquaintance with the Irish poetic rules of composition, which required a certain fixed number of lines and syllables, besides alliteration, rhyme, and assonance. It would seem that these poems were composed before the native poetic metres had reached perfection, and this is in accordance with their early legendary origin. In St. Columba's great poem, the 'Altus Prosator,' we are carried a step forward, for some more definite effort at structural conformity is shown; each line is closed by a word of three or more syllables, with a rhyming sound in the last syllable and a careful choice of concurrent vowels. This hymn recounts in an alphabetical poem of 24 stanzas of six lines each, addressed to the Trinity, the creation and fall of the angels, the creation and fall of man, the foundations of the earth and the under world, and the second coming of Christ and final judgment. It shows curious affinities with the *Book of Enoch* and may be compared with the *Saltair-na-Rann*, the longest Irish mediæval poem on any religious subject, which contains sections treating of the same questions of cosmogony and speculations on the system and fate of the universe. It is found in many MSS among works ascribed to Prosper of Aquitaine (403–465); in three cases or more it follows on the work *de Vita contemplativa*, now known not to be a genuine work of Prosper's. But its subject and character, its barbarous Latinity, and its use of words found only in a few pieces which have Celtic origins (see below, § 3), as well as its use of an O. Lat. text similar to that in early use in Ireland, tend to confirm the traditional ascription of the hymn to St. Columba. The inclusion of a long portion of this poem in a hymn by Rabanus Maurus, archbishop of Mainz (786–856), and its appearance among the works of Prosper, testify to its popularity. It is said in the preface to have been written in Hi (Iona) and sent as a gift to Pope Gregory, who 'found no fault with it except the scantiness in it of praise of the Trinity *per se*, though the Persons were praised through their creatures.' This reproof reaching St. Columba, he wrote the hymn 'In te Christe' to amend this lack in the former composition.

A gradual approach to a more perfect form of verse-structure according to native Irish ideals is seen in the hymn of St. Cummian 'the Tall,' 'Celebra Juda,' which has a rich end-rhyme or harmony of two or more syllables, with a careful correspondence in the vowel sounds and occasional alliteration and internal rhyme. In the later hymns by St. Colman mac Murchon in praise of St. Michael, and in St. Cuchuimne's hymn to the Virgin, written about the middle of the 8th cent. (at a time when we know from the fragments of non-liturgical verse that remain to us that Irish poetry was approaching its highest perfection), we find this verse-system developed with the richest and noblest effect. The prosody of the classical language is replaced by accent and rhyme, and the technical skill of such lines as this, with its rich trisyllabic rhymes, its alliterations, correspondences, and harmonies, could not easily be surpassed:

æterna possint præstare	regis regni aulia
ut possideam cum Christo	paradisi gaudia

(Hymn of St. Colman († 731)),

or again:

cántemús in ómni die	cóncinéntes várié
cónclamántes Déo dignum	hymnum sánctæ Máriæ

(Hymn of St. Cuchuimne († 746)).

The only hymn in the *Ir. Lib. Hymn.* not by Irish saints is that ascribed to St. Hilary of Poitiers, 'Hymnum dicat turba fratrum,' a classic unrhymed poem which is praised by Bede (*de Arte met.* 23 [*PL* xc. 173]), but without naming any author. It is not accepted as Hilary's by Daniel or Dreves; the latter considers that only the three hymns found in the Gamurrini MS in Arezzo are genuine works of Hilary. Yet there is much more solid ground for accepting it as his than there is for receiving the seven hymns printed under Hilary's name by Daniel and accepted by D. S. Wrangham in Julian's *Dict. of Hymnology*[2] (London, 1907, p. 522), the authorities for which are very late. The 'Hymnum dicat' is expressly ascribed to Hilary in the *Antiphonary of Bangor*, 7th cent., in two ancient codices of St. Gall (codd. 567 and 577) of the 8th and 9th centuries, and in the two MS copies of the *Ir. Lib. Hymn.*; it is also so named by Hincmar, archbishop of Rheims († 882), twice (*de Una et non Trina Deitate*, i. and xii. [*PL* cxxv. 486, 566]); it forms part of the offices in the *Book of St. Mulling*, in the *Second Vision of Adamnan*, and in the *Book of Cerne* – the last a document which shows signs of having been formed under Irish influences; in the *Second Vision of Adamnan*, as in 'de Arreis,' an old Irish tract (for which see *RCel* xv. [1894] 285–298, it is directed to be repeated as a charm or penitential exercise, and the value attached to its recitation is shown by the story of the three clerics (W. Stokes, *Lives of the Saints from the Book of Lismore*, Oxford, 1888, pp. viii, ix). It would appear from the *Rule* of St. Ailbe of Emly († 542 [?]), and from its place in the *Book of Cerne*, that it was sung in the early morning; but one of the prefaces suggests another purpose. It says *sic nobis convenit canere post prandium*, and the St. Gall MS no. 567 directs its recitation *omni tempore*. The last eight lines seem to be an addition by an Irish writer. Among the additamenta copied into the *Liber Hymnorum* at a later date are the well-known 'Christe qui lux es et dies,' and a hymn in praise of SS. Peter and Paul, 'Christi Patris in dextera'; the latter poem is not found elsewhere, and it is probably a native composition. Among the hymns in Irish, the poem in praise of St. Brigid, variously ascribed to St. Columba and to St. Ultan († 656), beginning *Brigit bé bithmaith* – 'Brigid, ever-good woman'—is the most perfect, and shows a complete mastery of the difficult technical laws which governed Irish verse.

In the *Antiphonary of Bangor* are found twelve Latin hymns, ten of them placed close together in the first section of the book, and two at the end, but probably sung at intervals during the offices, for we find the musical rubric 'Post Hymnum' attached to four of the Collects. Besides these hymns proper, there is a whole series of rhyming Collects for the day and night hours (nos. 17–26), and similar Collects are found elsewhere interspersed among the prayers and antiphons. Of the twelve hymns, two, the 'Hymnum dicat' of St. Hilary and St. Sechnall's hymn in praise of St. Patrick, 'Audite omnes,' are found in the *Ir. Lib. Hymn.* and elsewhere. Three (nos. 14, 95, 129) are personal to the monastery of Bangor (Co. Down), from which the service book originally emanated; they celebrate the praises of this important foundation and of its first abbots. It con-

tains also a hymn in praise of a St. Camelac, of whom very little is known. Of the remaining six hymns, one, 'Mediae noctis tempus est' (no. 10), is well-known and is given both here and in the *Mozarabic Breviary* (see *PL* lxxxvi. 932 f.) for 'medium noctis.' It is cited in the *Rule* (xi. 69) of Cæsarius of Arles († 542; *AS*, Jan. ii. 18) for use at the first nocturn and by the Codex Rhenoviensis (9th cent.) for use at nocturns on Sunday. Daniel (i. 46, iv. 26) thinks that it is an Ambrosian hymn, and that it is distinct from the hymn 'Jesu defensor omnium' with which it has often been printed. It does not seem to be of Irish origin. The remaining five hymns are not found elsewhere, and nos. 3, 8, 9 are almost undoubtedly Irish. Nos. 11, 12 do not show sufficient indications to pronounce upon their origin, but they are found in no other copy, which argues in favour of their local origin. The hymn of the Apostles (no. 3) was very popular in Ireland and is mentioned with St. Sechnall's hymn 'Audite omnes,' St. Colman's hymn to St. Michael, 'In Trinitate spes,' and the 'Hymnum dicat' of Hilary as among the penitential hymns recommended in *The Second Vision of Adamnan* (*c.* 1096). It consists of 42 stanzas beginning 'Precamur Patrem,' and was probably an Eastertide or Sunday hymn. Daniel thinks, and J. D. Chambers (in Julian, p. 642) agrees with him, that it bears evidence of having been translated from a Greek original.

The beautiful hymn, 'Sancti venite, Christi corpus sumite' (no. 8), is entitled *Hymnus quando communicant sacerdotes*, and was sung during the communion of the priests who formed part of the monastic body. Hence Daniel's argument (i. no. 160, iv. 109) that the administration of the sacrament in both kinds to the laity is implied in such lines as 'Hoc sacramento corporis et sanguinis' falls to the ground so far as this hymn is concerned. Tradition says that, when Patrick and Sechnall were passing a church, they heard this hymn chanted within by a choir of angels at the offering. It is still used in the offices of the Western Church, and is familiar in Neale's translation, 'Draw nigh and take the Body of the Lord.' The hymn 'Ignis Creator igneus' (no. 9), entitled *Hymnus quando cereus benedicitur*, seems to have been sung at the daily lighting of lamps at the 'Hora Vespertina' or else at the annual festival of the benediction of the Paschal candle on Easter even. The custom of lighting a Paschal fire was very ancient in Ireland, and Duchesne thinks that it spread from there to other countries (*Christian Worship*[4], London, 1912, p. 250 f.). The hymn to martyrs, 'Sacratissimi martyres summi Dei' (no. 11), is rhythmic rather than metrical. No. 12, 'Spiritus divinae lucis gloriae,' is for use at matins on Sunday. Its origin is unknown.

It is to be remarked how common was the use of alphabetical hymns in the Irish Church. Nos. 1, 2, 14, 25, and 28 of the hymns in the *Ir. Lib. Hymn.* are alphabetical hymns, and nos. 13, 14, 15, and 129 in the *Antiphonary of Bangor*. In some instances, as in no. 14, the hymn to St. Comgall, abbot and founder of Bangor monastery, the whole poem is a *tour de force*; almost every line in the stanzas of 8 or 10 lines each begins and ends with the same letter or syllable. The hymn of Cælius Sedulius, 'A solis ortus cardine,' is also alphabetical, and there are other examples. Among the Latin poems of St Columbanus (b. 543) and Sedulius Scottus († after 874) are several on religious subjects. Dreves includes seven hymns by Sedulius in his collection, three of them being Paschal hymns (*Anal. Hymn.* l. [Leipzig, 1907] 229). Others will be found interspersed in the *Liber de Rectoribus Christianis* of Sedulius.

A number of Irish hymns which found their way abroad about the 11th cent. are studied by C. Blume in *Der Cursus S. Bened. Nurs.* (Leipzig, 1908).

2. Hymns used as charms.—A large number of the Irish hymns were composed as charms, the recitation of them being supposed to ward off famine, disease, fire, or pestilence, or they were used to safeguard a traveller on going a journey. Such are the 'Noli Pater' of St. Columba, the 'Loricas' of St. Patrick and St. Columba, the hymn of St. Colman mac Ui Cluasaigh (*Sén Dé*), the hymn of St. Cuchuimne, 'Cantemus in omni die,' the hymn of St. Colman mac Murchon, 'In Trinitate spes mea,' and many others. The recitation of such hymns was supposed not only to confer protection on the author, but to be a safeguard against similar perils to all who recited them afterwards, besides in most cases securing heaven to those who kept up the practice regularly (see prefaces to these hymns in *Ir. Lib. Hymn.*). In several instances, where the hymn was long or difficult to remember, the same benefits were obtained by reciting the last three stanzas only. For instances of this practice see the office in the *Book of St. Mulling*, in which the last three stanzas of the hymns 'Audite omnes,' 'Celebra Juda,' and 'Hymnum dicat' only are given. In one instance, 'Christus in nostra,' only the last three stanzas of what seems to have been a long alphabetical poem have survived either in the *Ir. Lib. Hymn.* or in the office in the Basel MS (A. vii. 3), where also it is found. A similar custom is the recitation of 365 verses gathered from the Psalms, which was held to be equivalent to that of the whole Psalter.

3. Loricas.—Among these charm-hymns, the *Loricas* or *Loricæ*, 'Hymns of the Breast-plate,' which were composed as a protection against danger or disease, form a group by themselves, showing special peculiarities. Ten of these are known, but they are, doubtless, only examples of a common form of religious invocation. They usually fall into two or three parts, the first invoking the power of the Trinity and of the angels and heavenly hosts, the second enumerating at great length and with extraordinary minuteness the members of the body which might be subject to injury, with often a third part detailing the dangers to which the body is exposed, as in St. Patrick's 'Lorica.' A common feature of all these charm-hymns is the repetition of the same phrases and invocations, often at great length and with slight variations.

The following are the most important of these Loricas: (1) The *Lorica of St. Patrick* is of early date, though it is not found in Muirchu's Life of the saint. It was traditionally composed as a protection when the saint and his companions were in flight before the king of Tara, and is said to have rendered them invisible. It is uncouth in language; but in spirit and structure, as in religious fervour, it is by far the finest of all the charm-hymns.

(2) More pagan and very fatalistic in tone is an ancient and rude *Lorica of St. Columba*, in which God is addressed as 'King of the White Sun' and Christ as 'My Druid.' It is said to have been composed as a protection when the saint was journeying to Donegal after the Battle of Culdremhne.

(3) The authorship of the long *Lorica of Gildas* (called also the *Lorica of Lathacen*, *Loding*, or *Lodgen*) is uncertain. In the oldest document which contains it—the *Book of Nunnaminster* (Harl. MS 2965 ff. 38[8]–40; 8th cent.)—it is said that 'Lodgen appointed this Lorica in the year of danger, and that the virtue of it is great if it be chanted three times a day.' The Darmstadt MS printed by Mone, now at Cologne (no. 2106, end of 8th cent.), has at the end, 'Explicit hymnus quem Lathacan Scotigena fecit,' and the *Book of Cerne* (9th cent.) says in its preface, 'Lodgen sang this Lorica three times a day.' The copy in the *Leabhar Breac* (fol. 111[b]) is more explicit. It has 'Gillus hanc loricam fecit ad demones expellendos eos adversaverunt illi . . .

Lai[d]cend mac Búith bannaig venit ab eo in Insolam Hiberniam, transtulit et portauit super altare sancti Patricii episcopi sanos nos facere, amen.' The Laidcend, son of Buith the Blessed, of the *Leabhar Breac* MS, is evidently the same as the Lathacan Scotigena of the Cologne MS. He was a monk of Clonfert-Mulloe in Ossory, and died 12th Jan. 660. Taking it for granted that Gillus is identical with Gildas the historian, a saint well-known in Ireland, who is so called in the Irish *Ann. of Tighernach*, the *Ann. of Ulster*, and elsewhere, it seems likely that the 'Lorica' was brought into Ireland at a later date by Lodgen, and appointed by him for use in 'the year of danger' or plague as a charm against the disease. If it was frequently used by him, as the *Book of Cerne* states, and placed by him on the altar of Armagh, it might easily be thought to be his own composition. Hugh Williams (*Cym. Record Series*, no. 3 [1901], 304–313) considers that the hymn is later than the time of Gildas, but that it belonged to the S.W. British group in which the name of Gildas was pre-eminent. Zimmer (*Nennius Vind.*, App. 291–342) also ascribes its origin to the S.W. British monasteries, but places it early in the 6th century.

The great interest attaching to this 'Lorica' arises from the number of peculiarities of language that it contains, some of the forms being found elsewhere only in the *Folium Luxemburgense*, a fragment containing an abstract of rare and difficult words from a continuous Latin text with portions of an enlarged recension of the tract *Hisperica famina* (first published by A. Mai in vol. v. of his *Classici Auctores* [Rome, 1828–38], pp. 479–500, from *Cod. Vat. Reg.* lxxxi. ; cf. also Migne, *PL* xc. 1187–96).

(4) The same pompous and artificial Latin, interspersed with Greek and Hebrew, is found in the *Lorica of Leyden*, a fragment strongly resembling the *Lorica of Gildas* in its detailed list of the parts of the body as well as in the obscurity of its word forms (V. H. Friedel, *ZCP* ii. [1898] 64).

It will be seen that the two prominent features of all these charm-hymns are (*a*) a tendency to repetition of words and phrases, and (*b*) the use of uncommon words and forms. These peculiarities occur in a greater or less degree in the two remaining 'Loricas' hitherto published, the *Lorica of Mugron*, successor of Columcille († 980) (K. Meyer, *Hibernica Minora*, Oxford, 1894, pp. 42–44, from MS Rawl. B. 512), and a 'Lorica,' classed 23. E. 16, p. 237, in the Royal Irish Academy (partly translated by E. Gwynn, in *Ir. Lib. Hymn.* ii. 210; text printed by K. Meyer, *Archiv für celt. Lexikographie*, iii. [1907] 6 f., from MS 23. N. 10, p. 19, Royal Ir. Acad., and by A. O'Kellehor, in *Eriu*, iv. [1910] 236, with translation). The 'Altus Prosator' of St. Columbe shows similar peculiarities of language, while redundancies of expression are a common feature in prayers, confessions, etc., produced under Irish influences (for examples see *Book of Cerne*, nos. 17, 15, 18, 54, 7 ; *Ir. Lib. Hymn.* ii. 211–212, 213–215).

To any one familiar with the ancient pagan charms or incantations universal among the peasantry of Europe, and in common use among the Gaelic peoples, it will at once be clear that these 'Loricas,' repeated as incantations against evil, come down in direct descent from earlier pagan models. In many cases, as in the *Lorica of St. Patrick*, the Christian tone and sentiment may have been added to an existing pagan charm. Such charms and runes are still found in the Western Highlands and in Ireland, and a glance at some of those collected in A. Carmichael's *Carmina Gadelica* (Edinburgh, 1900), or in Hyde's *Religious Songs of Connacht* (London, 1906), will show that their form is precisely that of the 'Lorica' of St. Patrick or of Mugron. Incantations were taught and practised as a regular part of their profession by the bards down to the 14th–15th cent. or later, and the fragments of incantations on the same model found in the St. Gall MSS show that they were also used in the monasteries. The pagan charms were Christianized in tone but their forms remained unchanged (see, further, HYMNS [Celtic] above, p. 4). It is also to be remarked that all charms contain large numbers of words that have become so corrupted by constant oral repetition that they remain as mere meaningless sounds ; they are simply spell-words essential to the charm. Is it not probable that some of the uncouth forms found in the ancient 'Loricas' of Ireland may be explained in this way?

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ELEANOR HULL.

HYMNS (Modern Christian).—The rise of modern hymnody may be regarded as synchronous with the rise of Protestantism, and in the earliest hymns is mirrored the antithesis between the old faith and the new.

1. German hymns.- The earliest hymns of the Reformation were those of the Bohemian Brethren, of which a collection of 89 was printed at Prague in 1501, and another, of about 400, in 1505 ; but these were so effectually suppressed that only one imperfect copy of the former is known to exist, and none of the latter. For practical purposes the history of modern hymnody begins with the publication, in 1524, at Erfurt and Wittenberg respectively, of two small books of German hymns, in each of which about three-fourths of the contents were from the pen of Luther. Altogether, Luther's hymns and sacred songs number 38 ; of these 11 are wholly or partly translated from the Latin, 4 are revised from pre-Reformation hymns, 6 are metrical psalms, 6 paraphrases of other portions of Holy Scripture, and 11 original. At least 24 are still in more or less common use.

The hymnody of Protestant Germany is the richest in Christendom, and by 1820 it was known to include more than 80,000 hymns of varying merit. The great majority of the authors were members of the Lutheran Church, whereas the hymn-writers of the 'Reformed,' or Calvinistic, Church were comparatively few, and their effusions were generally more suited to private devotion than to public worship. This is due to a belief, strongly held by Zwingli and Calvin, and generally accepted by their adherents, that the Biblical Psalms furnish a complete manual of praise for public worship, and the only one divinely sanctioned. As a result of this belief, more than 130 German Metrical Psalters, more or less complete,

are known to exist, and seven-eighths of them were composed by members of the Reformed Church.

The great German hymn-writers may be conveniently arranged in seven successive periods, each of which has its own distinctive character.

(1) The first group consists of Luther and his contemporaries, from about 1517 to 1560. Their hymns are neither didactic nor retrospective, but natural, cordial, and fearless, at once popular and churchly. As long as the German language endures men will sing Luther's pathetic 'Aus tiefer Noth,' his child-like 'Von Himmel hoch da komm ich her,' and his immortal 'Ein feste Burg.' With him must be associated Michael Weisse (1480–1534), who translated many of the Bohemian Brethren's hymns into German, but who is perhaps best remembered for his funeral hymn 'Nun lasst uns den Leib begraben,' Paulus Speratus (1484–1551), Nicholaus Hermann († 1561), Paul Eber (1511–69), Johann Zwick, of the Reformed Church (1496–1542), and Hans Sachs, the cobbler-bard of Nüremberg (1494–1576).

(2) The second period, 1560–1618, is one of transition towards the subjective style of later times. There are occasional references to personal circumstances, and didactic matter is sometimes introduced. Many worthless compositions of this age have come down to us, and the best authors were too prolific. Among these may be named Bartholomäus Ringwalt (1532–98), Johann Michael Altenburg (1584–1640), and, above all, Philipp Nicolai (1556–1608).

(3) The third period is that of the Thirty Years' War, 1618–48. The Psalms now become the model and type; prominence is given to personal matters; brevity and terseness give place to enlargement of thought. From this estimate one hymn must be excluded, the 'Nun danket alle Gott' of Martin Rinckart (1586–1649), which is almost the only one of his voluminous writings which has escaped oblivion, and which has become the national doxology of Germany. Martin Opitz (1597–1639) was a literary man of no very decided principles; but he greatly influenced German hymnody by his literary style, and as a reformer of German prosody. This influence operated chiefly on writers of what is called the Silesian School. Of these the foremost place belongs to Johann Heermann (1585–1647), the author of 400 hymns, including 'Herr Jesu Christ, du wahres Licht,' and 'Herzliebster Jesu, was hast du verbrochen?' Johann Rist (1607–67) was also a prolific writer. Others of the school are Josua Stegmann (1588–1632), Paul Flemming (1609–40), Matthäus Apelles von Löwenstern (1594–1648), and Johann Matthäus Meyfart (1590–1642). To the contemporary school of Königsberg belong Simon Dach (1605–59), Georg Weissel (1590–1635), Heinrich Alberti (1604–51), and others.

(4) The fourth period reaches from the peace of Westphalia to the outbreak of the Pietistic controversy, 1648–90. Hymns of this period assume more and more of a subjective character, the objective features tending to disappear, while hymns relating to various circumstances and events in life—as suffering, consolation, death, the family, etc.—become more numerous. There is often a tendency to excessive length, a common fault of meditative verse. The chief singer of this generation—in the judgment of many, the greatest of all German hymnists—is Paulus Gerhardt (1607–76). Foremost among his 120 hymns is the incomparable 'O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden,' and not far behind it comes the ever popular 'Befiehl du deine Wege.' To the same school belong Ernst C. Homburg (1605–81), Johann Franck (1618–77), Georg Neumark (1621–81), and Johann Georg Albinus (1624–79).

Contemporary with these is a group of poets whose hymns are, in general tone, mystic and contemplative. Foremost among them is Johann Scheffler (1624–77), who, becoming a convert to the Roman Communion in 1653, assumed the name of Angelus Silesius. Many of his hymns, written both before and after his transition, display a marvellous sweetness, in strange contrast with the bitterness of his controversial writings, *e.g.* 'Ich will dich lieben, meine Stärke,' 'Liebe, die du mich zum Bilde,' etc. With him may be associated Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1636–89), Michael Franck, Sigismund von Birken, Christoph Wegleiter, and others of less note; and in the Reformed Church Joachim Neander (1650–80).

(5) The fifth period is that of Pietism, about 1690–1750. The hymnists of these two generations are far too numerous to be particularly specified, but they may be classified in five groups. (i.) The contemporaries of Spener, pervaded by a healthy and sincere piety. Spener himself wrote few hymns of any value, and those produced by the rest of the group are noticeable for quality rather than for quantity. We may mention Adam Drese (1620–1701), Johann Jakob Schütz (1640–90), Cyriacus Günther (1649–1704), Samuel Rodigast (1649–1708), Laurentius Laurenti (1660–1722), and Gottfried Arnold (1666–1714).

(ii.) The older school of Halle. Their hymns are of a scriptural, practical, and devotional tendency, and are mostly for individual edification and for the closet, rather than for the church. Most worthy of notice are Wolfgang Christoph Dessler (1660–1722), the author of more than 100 hymns, of which the best known are 'Mein Jesu dem die Seraphinen' and 'Ich lass dich nicht, du musst mein Jesus bleiben,' Johann Anastasius Freylinghausen (1670–1739), Johann Heinrich Schröder (1667–99), Bartholomäus Crasselius (1667–1724), and Johann Joseph Winckler (1670–1722).

(iii.) To these succeeded a younger school, representing the decline of Pietism into sentimentalism and trivialities. The better writers of this school are Johann Jakob Rambach (1693–1735), Johann Ludwig Conrad Allendorf (1693–1773), Carl Heinrich von Bogatzky (1690–1774), and Leopold F. F. Lehr (1709–44).

(iv.) Side by side with these is a group of poets devoted to strict Lutheran orthodoxy, and therefore unsympathetic towards Pietism. Three of these composed, among them, nearly 2000 hymns, many of which, though not of the highest order of merit, are of great and permanent value. Salomo Franck (1659–1725) is best remembered by his hymn for Easter even, 'So ruhest du, O meine Ruh'; Erdmann Neumeister (1671–1756) was the author of many cantatas for use in church, and re-modelled a number of older hymns; Benjamin Schmolck (1672–1737) was the most prolific of the school.

(v.) The school which is represented in theology by Bengel and Crusius, mediating between Pietism and orthodoxy, claims a few sacred poets. The chief of these are Johann Mentzer (1658–1734), Johann Andreas Rothe (1688–1758), P. F. Hiller (1699–1769), and C. C. L. von Pfeil (1712–84).

Two distinguished hymnists of the period appear to stand apart from all these various groups. Gerhard Tersteegen (1697–1769), brought up in the Reformed Church, but from early manhood a mystic and a separatist, has more in common with Scheffler than with any other poet. His numerous hymns were long restricted to a limited circle, but during the last 70 years have been represented in most German hymn-books, Lutheran as well as Reformed. 'Gott ist gegenwärtig' is the most popular; but 'Siegesfürste, Ehrenkönig,'

'Gott rufet noch,' and others are of sterling value.

Nicholaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700–60), patron and afterwards bishop of the Moravian Brethren, wrote upwards of 2000 hymns of almost every possible degree of merit, but even at the lowest displaying deep personal devotion to Christ. His extraordinary aptitude for improvising led to the production of a huge mass of rhyme, of which sincere piety is the only redeeming feature. The use of his hymns is almost restricted to the Moravian Church; but 'Jesu, geh voran' and 'Christi Blut und Gerechtigkeit' are hymns that Christendom will not willingly let die; and a few centos, translated into various languages, are current.

(6) The sixth period, from about 1750 to 1830, is that of the 'Enlightenment' (*q.v.*), whose effect on hymnody was for the time disastrous, especially in the dilution of the church hymn-books and sacred poetry in general. During its earlier years the orthodox tradition was worthily maintained by Christian Fürchtegott Gellert (1715-69), who in 1757 published 54 hymns characterized by rational piety and good taste, but generally individual rather than churchly. Many of them are still in use, the most popular being 'Jesus lebt, mit ihm auch ich.' Friedrich G. Klopstock (1724–1803) produced in 1758 modernized re-casts of 29 earlier German hymns, apparently without any doctrinal motive. Of his original pieces, mostly emotional and subjective, by far the best is the triumphant funeral song 'Auferstehn, ja, auferstehn wirst du.' Modernizing of standard hymns, without doctrinal purpose and with undesirable results, was undertaken by Johann Andreas Cramer (1723–88) and Johann Adolf Schlegel (1721–93). The one spiritual singer who stands conspicuous in this dreary time is Johann Caspar Lavater (1741–1801). Of his 700 hymns the best known is 'Jesus Christus, wachs in mir.' Georg F. P. von Hardenberg, commonly called Novalis, was a religious poet rather than a hymn-writer. 1160?

(7) A seventh period, one of Evangelical revival, may be dated from the publication by Christian Karl Josias Bunsen in 1833 of his *Versuch eines allgemeinen evangelischen Gesang- und Gebetbuchs*, containing 934 hymns, followed in 1837 by the *Evangelischer Liederschatz* of Albert Knapp, with 3590. Bunsen endeavoured to restore, as nearly as possible, the original text of each hymn; Knapp, unfortunately, was less scrupulous; but from that time the colourless hymn-books of the preceding age gradually disappeared; and those now in use usually contain the best productions of evangelical singers from the Reformation downward. It would be impossible to pass in review the original compositions of the last three generations. Five names are specially worthy of mention: Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769–1860), Christian F. H. Sachse (1785–1860), Johann Wilhelm Meinhold (1797–1851), Albert Knapp (1798–1864), and Carl J. P. Spitta (1801–59), of whose *Psalter und Harfe* 55 editions were printed in as many years.

2. Dutch hymns.—Even in the 15th cent. a number of macaronic hymns, partly Latin and partly Dutch, and generally of a Hussite character, were current in the Netherlands. A collection of these was printed at Kempen in 1550. The Reformation in these regions was of so strongly Calvinistic a type, however, that several synods forbade the singing of any hymns except those found in Holy Scripture. A collection of metrical Psalms, with music, was printed at Antwerp in 1539; and two complete metrical Dutch Psalters appeared in 1566. To another Psalter, published in 1580, were added metrical versions of other Scripture canticles, together with the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, and the 'Gloria in excelsis.' Altogether between 30 and 40 Dutch Psalters appeared before 1773, in which year the Synod of South Holland issued an authorized version, which is still commonly used in the Dutch Reformed Church.

The Dutch Lutherans, in 1615, published at Utrecht a collection of 58 hymns translated from the German. The suppression of these was attempted by the Synod of Dort (1619); but a few years later local synods authorized their use on festival occasions. In 1659, Willem Sluiter published a volume entitled *Psalmen, Gezangen en geestelijke Liederen*, which, together with a posthumous volume of hymns by the same author, was long in popular use for domestic worship. The first religious bodies in Holland to authorize the use of hymns in public worship, however, were dissenters from the Dutch Reformed Establishment. The Anabaptists published an Appendix to the Psalter in 1713; a hymnal for a separatist congregation, compiled by Jacob Groenewegen in 1750, ran through several editions; and a large volume of Mennonite hymns appeared in the latter half of the 18th century. It was not till 1805 that the first authorized hymn-book of the Dutch Reformed Church was offered to the public. It contained 192 hymns, of which a large proportion were translations. An Appendix, which had been nearly 20 years in preparation, was authorized in 1866. This hymn-book and appendix are still in common use both in Holland and in South Africa; and nearly all other Dutch hymnals have borrowed largely from them.

Of the older Dutch Lutheran hymns almost half were appropriate only to festivals. It was not till 1826 that the Lutheran Synod of Holland published its own hymn-book, containing 376 hymns, of which 150 were from the older Lutheran books, and 162 were new compositions. Some serious omissions were supplied in an Appendix 24 years later. The other most important Dutch hymn-books are the modern Baptist hymnal, a volume of translations from the Latin by R. B. Janson (1860), and a volume of revival hymns, translated from English and American originals. Very few Dutch hymns are original compositions; according to the best authority, the whole number does not much exceed 3000, of which at least two-thirds are translations.

3. Scandinavian hymns.—The Reformation in the Scandinavian countries was, to a greater extent than elsewhere, the work of the rulers rather than of the people. The national Churches of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway were thoroughly Erastian. These facts had some influence, if not on the composition of church songs, at least on their publication and use in public worship.

The father of **Swedish** hymnody was Lars Petersen, archbishop of Upsala († 1573), who, in addition to original pieces, made many translations from Latin and German hymns. His brother, Olaf Petersen, also has some repute as a hymn-writer. They were assisted in their poetical work by two other brothers, Lars and Peter Andersen. These, in 1536, published *Swenske songor eller wisor nw pa nytt prentade, forokade, och under en annan skick än tilförenna vtsatte* ('Swedish Songs or Hymns, now newly printed, enlarged, and published in a different shape from the former'; what that former book was we are not informed). Two kings of Sweden—Erik XIV. († 1577) and Gustavus Adolphus (slain at Lützen, 1632)—contributed to the national hymnody; the latter, shortly before his death, wrote the renowned battle-song, 'Förfäras ej, du lilla hop.'

The number of Swedish hymn-writers is not great. Of the 15 who wrote within the 17th and 18th centuries the greatest was Johan Olaf Wallin

(1779–1830). In 1819 he published *Den svenska Psalmboken af Konungen gillad och stadfästad* ('The Swedish Hymn-book, approved and confirmed by the King'), which is still in common use throughout the country. To it he contributed about 150 original hymns, besides translations and revisions.

In 1529 there was published at Rostock, in the **Danish** language, *Een ny Handbog, med Psalmer oc aandelige Lofsange, vdragne aff then hellige Schrifft* ('A new Handbook, with Psalms and Spiritual Songs of Praise derived from Holy Writ'). This contained translations from the Latin, German, and Swedish, and some originals. Its principal author was Claus Martensön Töndebinder (1500–76); and it was the hymnary of the Danish and Norwegian Lutherans for more than a century. In 1683, Thomas Kingo, bishop of Funen, whose *Aandelige Sjunge-chor* ('Spiritual Choral-Songs') had attracted attention, was commissioned to prepare a new hymn-book for the churches in both countries. The first part appeared in 1689; it contained many of Kingo's own compositions, and was greatly admired by some, while others, of the Pietistic school, unfairly denounced it as rationalistic. The controversy was so violent that the completion of the book was entrusted to a committee, who, however, worked on Kingo's lines, and included many of his hymns. The resultant *Forordnede ny Kirke-Psalme-Bog* ('Authorized New Church Hymn-book'), in its complete form, appeared in 1699. Several attempts were made to supplant it by collections on Pietistic lines. Especially notable was a *Ny Salmebog* ('New Hymn-book') edited in 1740 by Eric Pontoppidan. This contained a large number of hymns, both original and translated, by Hans Adolf Brorson, bishop of Ribe, whose views were decidedly Pietistic. Another attempt in the same direction was made by N. H. Balle, bishop of Seeland, who in 1797 produced a revision of Kingo's book under the title *Evangelisk-Kristelig Salmebog* ('Evangelical Christian Hymn-book'). The attempt failed, however, because of the feebleness of the verse; and more than half a century passed before any real improvement was effected. This at length was brought about, mainly through the influence of Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig (1783–1872). This eminent scholar, true poet, and fervent evangelist waged war for many years against the prevailing Rationalism and Erastianism of the national Church, and suffered accordingly. While under ecclesiastical suspension he wrote and compiled *Sang-Værk til den danske Kirke* ('Song-Work for the Danish Church'). His moral influence at length prevailed so far that his worth was appreciated, and steps were taken to prepare a new *Salmebogen til Kirke-og Hus-Andagt* ('Hymn-book for Church and House Worship'). This was sanctioned for general use in 1853, having been edited by the poet Bernhard Severin Ingemann (1789–1862). It was based on the old book of Kingo, but contained many hymns by Brorson, Grundtvig, and Ingemann.

Iceland is closely bound to Denmark by political relations. For a long time the only hymn-book in use there was the *Graduale* or *Messu-saungs bók* ('Mass-Song-Book'), consisting of translations into Old Norse of a few of the earlier hymns of Martensön's collection. The last edition is dated 1773. Since then local translations of the Danish books have been in use. In 1861, Thordersen of Reykjavik issued *Nýr viðbætir við hina evangelisku Sálmabók* ('New Contributions to the Evangelical Psalm-book'), much on the lines of the Danish book of 1855.

Norway, until 1814, had been politically united with Denmark; and Danish hymn-books, or revisions of such books in modernized language, have been in common use—the churches allowing themselves considerable freedom. The books now most in use are *Kirke-Salme-Bogen* ('The Church Hymn-book'), edited on the basis of older books by Magnus B. Landstad, and authorized in 1869; and *Christelige Psalmer til Husandagt og Skolebrug* ('Christian Hymns for Domestic Worship and for Use in Schools'), published in 1851 by Johan Nikolai Frantzen.

A very large proportion of the Scandinavian hymns are translated from German Lutheran authors. The older hymns are generally doctrinal or invocative; those of later date are rather subjective, expressing personal sentiments, hopes, and fears. As to the characteristics of individual singers, it is commonly said that 'Kingo is the poet of Easter, Brorson of Christmas, and Grundtvig of Whitsuntide.'

4. French hymns.—The earliest known French hymn-book was printed in 1527. It was entitled *Hymnes communs de l'année*, and consisted of translations of Latin hymns by Nicolas Mauroy. In 1533 appeared the *Miroir d'une ame pecheresse*, by Marguerite de Valois, to which were appended metrical versions, by Clément Marot, of the Creed, Lord's Prayer, Ave Maria, Grace before Meals, etc. Between this date and 1597 nine small books of Huguenot Songs were published, containing hymns, carols, ballads, and paraphrases of Scripture. Meanwhile, in 1542, Marot published his 50 metrical Psalms, which, being sung to ballad tunes, became widely fashionable. In hope of supplanting these, Guy de la Boderie, a Roman Catholic, published *Hymnes ecclésiastiques* in 1578, also *Cantiques spirituels*, consisting of translations from Prudentius, Petrarch, and Vidas, and some paraphrases of Scripture songs. Before the end of the century, several other volumes of devout songs were produced by Huguenot writers, such as Nicolas Denisot, Charles de Navières, Etienne de Maizon Fleur; but none of them were designed for public worship. The Reformed Church in France, as in Germany and elsewhere, limited its church-song to Biblical Psalms and Canticles. Various writers, therefore, sought to supply what was lacking in Marot's work; and in 1550 a complete Psalter was published in Paris, consisting of Marot's versions, with others by Gilles d'Aurigny, Robert Brincel, 'C. R.,' and 'Cl. B.' This was generally supplanted by *Les Pseaumes mis en rime françoise par Clément Marot et Théodore de Bèze*, 1562. Of this at least 24 editions were printed within the year, at Paris, Caen, Lyons, Geneva, and other places. Until the early years of the 18th cent. this Psalter alone was used in the public worship of the Reformed Church; and beyond the bounds of that community its influence has been far wider than that of any other metrical Psalter.

The Lutheran Church in France, besides using the Psalter, made free use of translations of the best German hymns. *Pseaumes, hymnes et cantiques . . . mis en rime français selon la rime et mélodies allemands*[8], Frankfort, 1612, contains 63 hymns or paraphrases. Successive enlargements or developments of this book appeared under various titles in the 17th and 18th centuries, that of 1739 having 381 pieces. The rigidity of the Reformed Church also gave way in 1705, when Benedict Pictet published *Cinquante-quatre cantiques sacrez pour les principales solemnitez*. Twelve of these were authorized for use in public worship, and became an appendix to the Psalter throughout the Reformed Church. Some of them are among the finest hymns in the French language.

The French Roman Catholic hymnists of the 17th cent. are not numerous. *La Philomèle séraphique*, by Jean l'Evangéliste, 1632, consisted of hymns of

a mystical type, set to secular tunes. It was regarded as a Jansenist book, and was not designed for use in church. Pierre Corneille versified parts of the *Imitatio Christi*, thus producing a few hymns still current. Racine also wrote, in 1689, two hymns which are still in use. A few hymns of a soberly quietistic strain were written by the illustrious Fénelon, and a large number by Madame Guyon (1648–1717); but few, if any, of these have come into common use. A number of hymns by Abbé Pellegrin were published in 1706–15, and set to lively secular tunes; some of them are still in use. A meritorious collection of hymns was made for the Seminary of St. Sulpice in 1765. The *Recueil de cantiques, traduits de l'allemand*, 1743, was a Moravian hymn-book of 75 pieces. In successive editions the number was raised to 576 in 1778, of which about 370 are translations from the German, the rest being French originals.

Probably the greatest of French hymn-writers is H. A. César Malan (1787–1864), pastor at Geneva, champion of Evangelicalism, and the founder of modern French Reformed hymnody. He is said to have written about a thousand hymns; and, though many are weak and full of literary faults, others are of great value. A large number are still in use, and some of them are found in every French Protestant hymn-book. Of contemporary and later writers of the same school may be named Ami Bost, Merle d'Aubigné, Henri Lutteroth, Alexandre Vinet, and Adolphe Monod.

Modern French hymn-books are very numerous, and suited to every phase of Protestant Christianity. The first French Methodist hymn-book was issued in England about 1813, for the benefit of French prisoners of war; it contained many translations of English hymns. Another, for use in the Channel Isles, appeared about 1818, and in an enlarged edition in 1828; it was frequently reprinted, until replaced by a better book in 1868. In 1831, or earlier, appeared *Cantiques chrétiens à l'usage des assemblées religieuses*, which reached a 14th edition in 1881. The Reformed Church has overcome its aversion to 'human compositions,' and since 1787 has sanctioned several good hymn-books. The Walloon Collection (1803) contained 133 hymns; a good collection published at Frankfort in 1849 contained 289; and the *Nouveau Livre de cantiques*, edited by E. Bersier, Paris, 1879, has 217. At least six French Lutheran hymn-books were published in several editions during the 19th cent. at Paris, Montbéliard, Strassburg, and Nancy; and a French Moravian hymn-book, in 1880, contained 700 pieces, mostly translations from the German. Several modern books of the revivalist type have had wide circulation, especially those published in connexion with the Protestant Mission called 'L'Œuvre MacAll.' The most noteworthy of these is *Cantiques populaires*, which with its supplement contains upwards of 60 translations of English and American 'revival hymns.'

An undenominational hymn-book, with music, appeared at Paris in 1834, under the title of *Chants chrétiens*, edited by Henri Lutteroth. Its aim was to collect the best hymns of the older poets, as Racine, Corneille, Pictet, etc., together with others of recent date. It was much modified in successive editions, assuming its final shape, with 200 hymns, in 1857. Its influence has been wide and beneficial, bringing into common use numerous hymns of great merit. Its chief blemish is that it is too didactic—an unusual fault in French hymnody, which is, for the most part, intensely subjective. French hymns rarely or never have the strength of good German or English poetry; but the best of them have much sweetness and tenderness, while some are highly picturesque, and others of delightful simplicity.

This seems a fitting place to mention a group of French Roman Catholic poets of the 17th and early 18th centuries, who wrote in Latin, and whose hymns are to be found in the Paris Breviary of 1726 and other Gallican Breviaries. The foremost of them in merit is Charles Coffin (1676–1749); next must be ranked Jean Baptiste de Santeuil (1630–97) and his elder brother Claude (1628–84); with these are honourably associated Guillaume de la Brunetière († 1702), Nicolas le Tourneux (1640–86), S. Besnault, and several of lesser note. Their hymns, especially those of Coffin, are of a high standard of excellence.

5. Italian hymns.—The religious revival initiated by St. Francis of Assisi in the 13th cent. called forth a number of religious songs in the Veronese and Umbrian dialects, some of which were sung by the Flagellants in their processions. Towards the end of the century Jacopone da Todi (to whom is usually attributed the 'Stabat Mater dolorosa') wrote many vernacular songs extolling the divine love, which, though never used in the regular church services, were much sung during the two following centuries by members of the religious orders. Towards the middle of the 15th cent. G. Savonarola wrote 'Hymns of Praise and Contemplation,' which, however, were not suited for use in public worship. Two of his contemporaries, Maffei Belcari and Girolamo Benevieni, wrote hymns which were widely known and used. The spiritual poems of Vittoria Colonna (1490–1547) were highly esteemed, but there is no evidence that they were ever used in public worship.

From this time till late in the 17th cent. no religious poet of eminence arose in Italy. But in 1688, Matteo Coferati, a priest of Florence, edited a collection of about 330 hymns, under the title *Corona di sacre canzoni, o laude spirituali di piu divoti autori*. The authors' names are not stated. This is the earliest known Italian hymn-book.

Bernardo Adimari, a priest of the Oratory of San Filippo Neri, was the author of 212 hymns, published at Florence in 1703. These were accompanied by tunes in four parts; and there is evidence that at this time it was common in many places to sing hymns antiphonally, or one verse by the choir and another by the people. The next prolific hymn-writer was Alfonso Maria de Liguori (1696–1787). His verses were designed for popular use. Some are devotional, some ascetic, and some mystical; they abound in utterances of intense devotion, but are for the most part too warm and passionate for English taste. Liguori has often been credited with the authorship of the best known of all Italian hymns, 'Viva, viva Jesu'; but the ascription is very doubtful. The well-known poets Metastasio and Manzoni wrote hymns which have been included in church collections; and several recent Roman Catholic poets of less note might also be mentioned. Among the principal Protestant hymn-writers of the 19th cent. are Gabriele Rossetti, his kinsman, T. Pietrocola Rossetti, C. Mapei, G. Niccolini, and Michele di Pretoro. An Englishman, Thomas W. S. Jones, who lived many years in Italy, is also the author of more than 140 hymns in the Italian language. At least 10 Protestant Italian hymn-books, some of considerable bulk, have been published since the Italian Revolution, at Florence, Naples, Rome, Trieste, and Casella. Some of these contain numerous translations of English and American hymns. In Italy the Roman Catholic Church does not favour the singing of hymns in the vernacular in public worship; nevertheless, in extra-liturgical services such hymns are used with some freedom.

6. English hymns.—Popular tradition has constantly associated hymn-singing with the Lollards. But, although a number of devout songs are pre-

served in MSS of the 14th and 15th centuries, some of them of no little merit, they are all—except a few carols—too intensely personal to have been used in public worship. The earliest printed English hymns are probably those in Marshall's Primer of 1535 and the Sarum Primer of 1538. These are translations from the Latin, and their versification is of the rudest.

The first English hymn-book, properly so called, is the *Goostly Psalmes and Spirituall Songes* of Miles Coverdale, 1539. It contains 41 pieces, all but 5 of them translations or imitations from the German—17 being from Luther. There are versions of 13 Psalms, the 'Magnificat,' 'Nunc dimittis,' 'Gloria in excelsis,' the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments. Efforts were made to suppress this book, but in 1545 Henry VIII. authorized a new Primer, which contained 8 hymns, smoother in versification than the former primers. In this Cranmer is believed to have had a hand, and it was his desire that English versions of the old Church hymns should have a place in the projected new service-books. It is thought that the influence of Calvin and Bucer had to do with the abandonment of this project.

During the interval between the death of Henry and the accession of Elizabeth the 'old version' of the Psalms was gradually compiled, the chief contributors being Thomas Sternhold, John Hopkins, Thomas Norton, William Kethe, and William Whittingham. To several successive editions a few hymns were prefixed or appended; the complete edition of 1562 has 23, including 'The Lamentation of a Sinner' and the earliest known non-Roman Communion hymn in the English language, 'The Lord be thanked for His Gifts.' The next really important hymnological publication is the *Gude and Godlie Ballatis*, which bears the same relation to the Reformation in Scotland as Coverdale's *Goostly Psalmes* does to that in England. The principal, but not the only, authors were the brothers John and Robert Wedderburne, clergymen of Dundee, who became exiles on account of their Protestant principles. The earliest editions have entirely perished, and their date is matter of conjecture; the oldest known perfect copy was printed at Edinburgh in 1578, with the title *Ane Compendious Buik of godlie Psalmes and spirituall Sangis*. It contains 116 pieces, all in the Scottish dialect. There are 22 metrical Psalms, 8 Scripture paraphrases, the Creed, 34 hymns, 8 graces, and 43 ballads, some devotional and some satirical. More than a fourth of the whole is translated from the German, and a few pieces are borrowed or adapted from Coverdale. Several of the devotional ballads are remarkable for their beauty and tenderness, while the satirical pieces, some of them coarse as well as humorous, attack the Roman Catholic clergy with considerable vigour.

It may seem surprising that, of about 130 English writers of religious verse in the latter half of the 16th cent., scarcely any contributed to the worship-song of the Church. The explanation lies in the fact that—largely, no doubt, through the Calvinistic influence brought to bear upon the formative period of the English Book of Common Prayer—only the scantiest scope was allowed for hymns in public worship, an injunction of the first year of Elizabeth granting merely that 'in the beginning or in the end of the Common Prayer, either at morning or evening, there may be sung an hymn, or such like song, to the praise of Almighty God.' It was not until the revision of 1661–62 that the insertion, after the third collect at morning and evening prayer, of the rubric for the anthem opened the way, even though slowly taken, to a true hymnody. In modern times a few Elizabethan hymns have come into common use, *e.g.*, the earliest original English morning hymn, 'You that have spent the quiet night,' by George Gascoigne, and the delightful 'Hierusalem, my happie home,' of which the author, 'F. B. P.,' has not been satisfactorily identified.

Between the death of Elizabeth and the outbreak of the Civil War the conditions were much the same; and the sacred poets of the day, such as John Donne, George Herbert, and Phineas Fletcher, for the most part offered no contributions to public worship, though a few of their devout lyrics have found a place in modern hymn-books. A few attempts were made to supplant the Sternhold and Hopkins Psalter, but with little success. The very meritorious version of George Sandys failed to win the public ear; that of William, Earl of Stirling, though put forth in the name of King James, had no better success; and the faithful but intolerably harsh version of Henry Ainsworth found favour only with the Separatists.

To this period, however, belongs the first really great English hymn-writer, George Wither (1588–1667). His poetical works, sacred and secular, are numerous. His noble version of the Psalms has been undeservedly neglected. His *Hymns and Songs of the Church* was printed in 1623, with 'the particular approbation both of the king and of convocation,' but the intrigues of the Stationers' Company frustrated the intentions of the king and clergy, and practically suppressed the book. It contained all the OT and NT Canticles, the Song of Songs, the Lamentations, versions of the Lord's Prayer and 'Veni Creator,' and 44 original hymns for various ecclesiastical seasons and special occasions. In 1641, Wither published *Hallelujah, or Britain's Second Remembrancer*, with a dedication to the Parliament, his sympathies being at that time on the popular side. The book contained 233 hymns, classified as occasional, temporary, and personal; 42 of them are taken from the former book, often with alterations which are not always improvements.

The Sternhold and Hopkins Psalter had become unacceptable to the Puritans, not because of its rugged versification, but because it was not, in their opinion, sufficiently close to the original. They conceived the impossible idea of a literal translation from the Hebrew in an English metre that could be sung. Between 1640 and the end of the century there were at least half-a-dozen attempts to realize this fancy—among them the curious *Bay Psalm-Book* of the Puritan Colonists in New England (1640). When the Long Parliament undertook to remodel the Church of England on Puritanical lines, part of the scheme was to provide a metrical Psalter for general use throughout England and Scotland. The work was assigned to a committee, who, by conflating two versions by Francis Rous and William Barton respectively, produced what is known as 'The Scots Version'—it being approved by the Scottish General Assembly in 1649. With all its faults—and they are neither few nor small—it has endeared itself to the hearts of the Scottish people, and will not be supplanted for generations yet to come. The wonderful 23rd Psalm in this version is probably the most perfect metrical Psalm in Christendom.

Between the fall of the Monarchy and the Revolution several poets produced lyrics which, though not designed for use in public worship, were utilized by later compilers of hymn books. Such were Henry Vaughan, Richard Crashaw, and John Quarles. There were also at least three genuine hymnists—William Barton, whose work has been unaccountably neglected, Samuel Crossman, and John Mason, whose best productions are still deservedly popular. Mention must also be

made of two rhymesters, whose verses are unmitigated doggerel, but who did excellent work as pioneers. Abraham Cheare, a Baptist minister of Plymouth, who died in prison in 1668, is the first known English author of hymns for children. Benjamin Keach, also a Baptist, had been set in the pillory for seeking to propagate his opinions through the press. His *Spiritual Melody* (1691) is poor; but by it, and by a couple of vigorous pamphlets, he practically broke down the prejudice which until then existed among Baptists against singing in public worship.

In 1692 was printed the first edition, unauthorized and incorrect, of Bishop Thomas Ken's *Morning and Evening Hymns*. At first written for the scholars of Winchester School, they have won an abiding place in the esteem of all English-speaking Christendom. Ken's other hymns, for the festivals of the Church, were a posthumous publication, and have been little regarded.

At the time of the Revolution the Psalms of Sternhold and Hopkins, already archaic, were still almost exclusively used in the Anglican Church; the well-meant attempts of W. King, John Patrick, John Denham, and others had totally failed to supplant them; and the noble versions of Sandys and Wither had apparently been forgotten. About 1698 a New Version, by Nahum Tate and Nicholas Brady, was put forth under royal patronage, and soon became immensely popular. Its one merit is that, smooth and unimpassioned, it suited the literary taste of the day. For 150 years it held the field against all rivals; at present about half-a-dozen psalms of the 'New Version' continue in use, the most popular being the 34th and the 67th.

In the Church of Scotland, on the re-establishment of Presbyterianism after the Revolution, the General Assembly considered the question of an authorized appendix to the Scottish Psalms. Patrick Simson of Renfrew had published, at Edinburgh, six books of *Spiritual Songs or Holy Poems*, consisting of versified paraphrases of all the poetical parts of Scripture except the Psalter. The work is of considerable merit, the rendering being fairly close, without that rigidity which marked the Scottish and New England Psalms. In 1695, Simson being Moderator, the Assembly appointed a Commission to revise the Scripture Songs; but the business was delayed year after year, and in the end nothing was done, so that the Scottish Psalms continued in exclusive use for about 50 years longer.

Among English Nonconformists the manuals of Church Song chiefly in use were the Scottish Psalms, a revision of the New England Psalter, and, occasionally, Barton's. During the last decade of the century several ministers—Robert Fleming, Joseph Boyse, Thomas Shepherd, Richard Davis, and Joseph Stennett—produced hymns for the use of their own congregations, some of which found wider, though very limited, acceptance. Nearly all these hymns are personal rather than congregational; and most of them are mere Calvinistic theology in rhyme. The first selection of hymns for Nonconformist worship of which we have found any trace was published in 1694 under the title *A Collection of Divine Hymns upon several Occasions.* To this seven authors contributed, among whom were Richard Baxter, John Mason, and Thomas Shepherd. The next selection, Matthew Henry's *Family Hymns* (1695), consisted entirely of centos from various metrical versions of the Psalms.

In 1695 a young Nonconformist student commented on the unsatisfactory character of the rhymes in use at the Meeting-house in Southampton, and was challenged to produce something better. The next Sunday the spirited paraphrase 'Behold the Glories of the Lamb Amidst His Father's throne' was 'lined out,' to the delight of the worshippers. The young man was Isaac Watts, in after years renowned as pastor, philosopher, and poet. In 1707 he published *Hymns and Spiritual Songs, in Three Books*, containing 222 pieces, which in the second edition (1709) were increased to 360. These were followed in 1715 by *Divine and Moral Songs for the Use of Children*; and in 1719 by *The Psalms of David imitated in the Language of the New Testament.* Other publications in verse followed; and Watts's various works contain at least 750 hymns, of which nearly 200 are still in common use. Before his death, in 1748, fifteen or sixteen editions of his hymns had been circulated; and for more than 100 years their use, with or without a supplement, was all but universal among Congregationalists and Baptists. His meditative hymns are not usually superior to those of Crossman, Ken, and Mason; but in hymns of praise fitted for united utterance he has no superior and few equals. His theology is in the main Puritan, without the Puritan rigidity and intolerance.

Watts was the first who could be deemed the founder of a distinct school of English hymn-writers. Among his followers may be reckoned, in addition to a multitude of inferior rhymers, Simon Browne (1680–1732), Philip Doddridge (1702–51), Anne Steele (1716–78), Thomas Gibbons (1720–85), Samuel Stennett (1727–95), and Samuel Medley (1738–99).

The influence of Watts extended into Scotland. In the hymns of John Willison († 1750), and in the *Scripture Songs* of Ralph Erskine († 1752), he is plagiarized almost wholesale. In the *Translations and Paraphrases* prepared by a committee of the General Assembly in 1745, of 45 paraphrases 18 were by Watts. In the *Paraphrases* of 1781, of 67 pieces 19 are based on Watts and 4 on Doddridge, but all more or less altered. By far the most successful of these alterations is the fine paraphrase—transmuted from one of Watts's feeblest hymns—'How bright those glorious spirits shine.'

Of writers more or less contemporary with Watts, but outside the sphere of his influence, the following deserve mention: John Dryden († 1701), who is believed to have translated from the Latin most of the hymns which appear in the Roman Catholic Primer of 1706; Nahum Tate († 1715), already mentioned, the chief author of those hymns and alternative versions which appeared as a supplement to the 'New Version' in 1703; Joseph Addison († 1719); Samuel Wesley the elder († 1735); and Joseph Hart († 1768), most of whose hymns are strongly Calvinistic.

We come next to the greatest of all English hymn-writers, Charles Wesley (1707–80), the poet of the Methodist revival. The exact number of his hymns is doubtful, because of an arrangement with his brother John (1703–91) that in works for which they were jointly responsible their respective parts should not be distinguished. The poetical publications of the two brothers number 62 distinct issues, ranging from single leaflets to stout volumes, 9 of which include pieces by other authors. On the lowest estimate these works contain 4395 hymns by the Wesleys. Of these 100, including all those translated from the German, are certainly the work of John, while of 325 the authorship is uncertain; so that 3970 pieces at least may be ascribed to Charles. His general tone is strongly Arminian. At least 500 of Charles Wesley's hymns are in use in the Methodist Churches, and a large proportion of them are equally valued in other communions.

The unapproachable greatness of Charles Wesley seems to have had a repressive influence on hymn-writing in Methodist circles; not more than three or four of his Methodist contemporaries left anything of value; and even the most gifted of these, Thomas Olivers, is chiefly remembered by one great hymn, 'The God of Abraham praise.'

A totally different school is represented by a succession of writers who seem to have derived their inspiration from the Moravian Brethren. The German Moravian hymns are too often characterized by a kind of spiritualized sensuousness, and the same feature is found, in a mitigated form, in many English hymns of the same denomination. John Gambold (1711–71), sometime vicar of Stanton Harcourt, and afterwards Moravian bishop, edited the great hymn-book of 1754, containing 1155

Hymns of the Children of God in all Ages, which, expurgated and revised, furnished most of the material of Moravian hymn-books till quite recent times. Its influence is evident in the hymns of John Cennick (1718–55), of James Allen (1734–1804), of Walter Shirley (1725–86), and of Jonathan Evans (1749–1809). Some characteristics of this school are also found in the poems of Augustus Montague Toplady (1740–78) ('Rock of Ages, cleft for me'); but they are modified by his militant Calvinism.

Yet another school, that of moderate Calvinism, is represented by the *Olney Hymns*, first published in 1779, the joint work of William Cowper (1731–1800) and John Newton (1725–1807). The romance of Newton's adventurous youth, and the pathetic story of Cowper's intermittent insanity, are well known; the effect of each on their respective contributions is easily traceable. The features common to both resemble those of J. Mason; Cowper is remarkable for his tenderness, and occasionally for expressions or thoughts that seem suggestive of Moravian sources; Newton is sometimes gloomy, and sometimes descends to mere doggerel, but at his best he exhibits a strength and joyousness to which his colleague is a stranger. His hymns number 280, of which 50 or 60 are still in use; Cowper produced 68 (besides his translations from the French of Madame Guyon), of which nearly half have a place in modern hymn-books. To the Olney school may be referred Thomas Haweis (1732–1820), John Fawcett (1740–1817), John Ryland (1753–1825), and many others of less note.

A few writers of the 18th cent., who cannot be classed with any particular school, are remembered as the authors of single hymns; while the rest of their works, sometimes voluminous, are all but forgotten. Such are Robert Seagrave (1693–1750) ('Rise, my Soul, and stretch thy wings'); James Fanch (1704–67) ('Beyond the glittering starry skies'); John Bakewell (1721–1819) ('Hail, Thou once despised Jesus'); Edward Perronet (1726–92) ('All hail the power of Jesus' name'); and Robert Robinson (1735–90) ('Come, Thou Fount of every blessing').

Two small sects which originated in Scotland about the middle of the 18th cent. yielded hymns of some literary interest. Among the *Christian Songs* of the Glasites, or Sandemanians (1749), are several especially designed for secular tunes; and this idea was still more vigorously carried out by John Barclay (1734–98), the leader of the Bereans. Some of Barclay's hymns, set to familiar Jacobite and other Scottish tunes, possess real beauty. Similar adaptations occur in *A Collection of Spiritual Songs*, published in 1791 by John Geddes, a Roman Catholic clergyman. Here, too, may be mentioned the *Christian Hymns, Poems, and Sacred Songs* of James Relly, the Universalist (1720–78), published in 1777; these display a good deal of rugged vigour.

It seems fitting to notice also some of the more important selections of hymns that appeared in the 18th century. The first of any note offered to the Church of England seems to have been the *Collection of Psalms and Hymns*, 70 in number, published by John Wesley at Charlestown in 1737. This excited little interest, and was not reprinted. More important was George Whitefield's *Collection of Hymns for Social Worship* (1753). The hymns were mostly from Watts and Wesley, often freely altered; and, though compiled by an Anglican clergyman, were chiefly used in 'Tabernacles' and Meeting-houses for Nonconformist or undenominational worship. This collection passed through many editions, the 25th being dated 1781. Martin Madan's *Collection of Psalms and Hymns* (1760) had a great influence on subsequent developments of hymnody, chiefly through his very skilful alterations and corrections. Other collections were those of Dyer (1767), R. Conyers (1767), Richard de Courcy (1775), and Toplady (1775). All these editors were Anglican clergymen of the Evangelical type, and the tone of their books was distinctly Calvinistic. So were the various collections used in the Countess of Huntingdon's chapels from 1764 till 1780, when they were displaced by her own *Select Collection*. A strong Evangelical Arminianism, on the other hand, pervaded the selections edited by John Wesley, from 1741 onward till the production, in 1780, of his *Collection of Hymns for the Use of the People called Methodists*. A mild type of Calvinism characterized the selections compiled by Congregationalists, usually as supplements to Watts's *Psalms and Hymns*. The earliest of these was that of Thomas Gibbons (1769), which was followed by Rowland Hill's (1783), George Burder's (1784; 28th ed. 1829), William Jay's (1797), and a considerable number of local publications. Rather more pronounced was the Calvinism of the Particular Baptist selections of J. Ash and C. Evans (1769), and John Rippon (1787), while the General Baptist Hymn-book (1771) and Dan Taylor's (1793) were just as distinctively Arminian. Two Scottish Baptist books also deserve notice: the collection made by Sir William Sinclair of Keiss (1751) and *A Collection of Christian Songs and Hymns* (Glasgow, 1786).

The growth first of Arianism and then of Socinianism in the English Presbyterian Churches necessitated a special provision for worship. This was usually made by eliminating from the hymns of orthodox writers every allusion to the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement. The earliest selection made on this principle was printed in London in 1757, and at least 10 such books appeared at various places before the close of the century; one of them, by William Enfield (Warrington, 1778), professed to be 'unmixed with the disputed doctrines of any sect.' Most of these books contain little that could not be sung by a pious Jew or Muhammadan.

The earlier years of the 19th cent. were barren of new or striking hymns; but before long there burst forth such a flood of sacred melody as England had never heard before. It is quite impossible to review, within any reasonable limits, the English and Scottish hymnists of the century, of whom more than 550 are enumerated between 1800 and 1890. A few points may be briefly noted.

(1) The large number of women writers who produced not merely sentimental verses, but genuine hymns of lasting worth. Prominent among them are Cecil Frances Alexander (1823–95) ('The golden gates lift up their heads'), Sarah Flower Adams (1805–48) ('Nearer, my God, to Thee'), Charlotte Elliot (1789–1871) ('Just as I am, without one plea'), Frances Ridley Havergal (1836–79) ('Take my life, and let it be'), Adelaide Anne Procter (1825–64) ('The way is long and dreary'), and Anna Letitia Waring (1820–1912) ('My heart is resting, O my God'). Others have displayed remarkable skill as translators, especially from the German, as Jane Borthwick (1813–97), Frances Elizabeth Cox (1812–97), Sarah Findlater (1823–86), and Catherine Winkworth (1829–78). Others, again, are unrivalled in adapting themselves to the capacities of children, *e.g.* Cecil Frances Alexander ('There is a green hill far away'), Jane E. Leeson (1807–82) ('Saviour, teach me day by day'), and Jemima Luke (1813–1906) ('I think when I read that sweet story of old').

(2) The appearance, for the first time, of really good hymns for children, child thought in child language. Isaac Watts had led the way, but for two generations he had no followers. Even

Charles Wesley's efforts in this direction were far from being a complete success; his famous 'Gentle Jesus, meek and mild,' needs explaining to make it intelligible to children. But Jane Taylor (1783-1824) and her sister, Ann Gilbert (1782-1866), understood child nature; and, though sometimes entangled in theology, their songs for children usually excelled those of Watts as far as his did the efforts of Abraham Cheare. The path they opened up was worthily followed not only by C. F. Alexander and Jemima Luke, but by E. Paxton Hood, W. W. How, Annie Matheson, Albert Midlane, Hugh Stowell, and many more.

(3) The naturalizing, by satisfactory translations, of the best Latin, Greek, and German hymns. The last named have found most favour in the Evangelical section of the Anglican Church, and among the Free Churches. Some of the most capable translators have already been indicated; others are mentioned in the literature at the end of the article. Attention was drawn to the rich stores of Latin hymnody in connexion with the Oxford Movement between the years 1830 and 1840. Naturally the chief, though not the only, translators of the Breviary and other mediæval hymns were men of the High Church school, such as J. D. Chambers (1805-93), John Chandler (1806-76), W. J. Copeland (1804-85), R. F. Littledale (1833-90), and, above all, John Mason Neale (1818-66). With these may be associated a few Roman Catholics, especially Edward Caswall (1814-78). The foremost translator of the late Latin hymns of the Gallican Breviaries was Isaac Williams (1802-65). These hymns first found acceptance in High Church circles; but the best of them are now in common use in almost all Christian communions. The Greek hymns were first urged on public attention by J. M. Neale, and his versions are still most in favour; but many others have been effectively translated by John Brownlie.

(4) The enormous output of mission and revival hymns, mostly subjective or hortatory, and many of them set to the tunes of popular songs. These became common in connexion with the great religious revival of 1858, and were augmented about 1873 by hymns of American origin. Some of them were valuable, but many were sentimental and, when judged by strict canons, not always in the best of taste. It must be owned, however, that songs of this class, used by Evangelistic bodies like the Salvation Army, have often availed to call forth genuine religious emotions in persons of the most degraded type.

The hymn-books of the 19th cent. are literally innumerable. No fewer than 160 were compiled for use in the Anglican Church alone between 1800 and 1860, to which in the next 30 years 90 more were added. The use of many was merely local, while others are fairly representative of distinct schools of thought within the Church. Of the collections in use prior to 1860 by far the greatest number represented the Evangelical school; and it is estimated that these were used in nearly three-fourths of the English parish churches. The most popular books of this class were William Mercer's *Church Psalter and Hymn Book* (1854), Charles B. Snepp's *Songs of Grace and Glory* (strongly Calvinistic, 1872), and Edward H. Bickersteth's *Hymnal Companion* (1870, revised 1876). Of the moderate High Church type was *Hymns Ancient and Modern* (1861, revised 1875; appendix 1889; another revision 1904), which has become the most popular of all English hymn-books. To the same school belong William Cooke and Benjamin Webb's *The Hymnary* (1872), and *Church Hymns* (1871, revised 1903). To the advanced High Church party belong *The Hymnal Noted* (1852), with its many supplements, James Skinner's *Daily Service Hymnal* (1863), R. F. Littledale's *People's Hymnal* (1867), C. F. Hernaman's *Altar Hymnal* (1884), and the *English Hymnal* (1906). Recently a few books of the Broad Church type have appeared, but they are not extensively used. Of hymn-books compiled for the use of the various Nonconformist Churches during the century, a list of at least 250 is before us, not including innumerable selections designed for Sunday schools, or the multitudinous 'undenominational' books, large and small, compiled in the interests of revival, missions, temperance, or merely as publishers' speculations. But the tendency has long been towards concentration; the local collections have generally gone out of use, and all the great denominations have their authorized or characteristic hymn-books, by which most of the others are being gradually supplanted.

It remains to indicate a few of the most distinguished hymnists of the 19th cent., not heretofore mentioned, according to their ecclesiastical associations. Two of them can scarcely be regarded as belonging to any special communion: Thomas Kelly (1769-1854) and James Montgomery (1771-1854), who between them produced nearly 1200 hymns, of which no fewer than 160 are still in common use. To the Anglican Church belonged Reginald Heber (1783-1826), bishop of Calcutta, John Keble (1792-1866), author of the *Christian Year*, Henry Francis Lyte (1793-1847), Christopher Wordsworth (1807-85), bishop of Lincoln, John S. B. Monsell (1811-75), William Walsham How (1823-97), bishop of Wakefield, Godfrey Thring (1823-1903), John Ellerton (1826-93), and F. T. Palgrave (1824-97). Among Roman Catholics, John Henry Newman (1801-90) and F. W. Faber (1814-63) stand pre-eminent. To the Presbyterian Churches belong Horatius Bonar (1808-89), John Ross Macduff (1818-95), James Drummond Burns (1823-64), and Anne Ross Cousin (1823-1906). Among the Methodists but few hymn-writers are conspicuous: Benjamin Gough (1805-77), W. M. Punshon (1824-81), Mark Guy Pearse (b. 1842), and Thomas B. Stephenson (1839-1912) deserve mention. To the Congregational Churches belong W. B. Collyer (1782-1854), Josiah Conder (1789-1855), George Rawson (1807-89), Thomas Toke Lynch (1818-71), Edwin Paxton Hood (1820-85), and Thomas Hornblower Gill (1819-1906). Among Baptists we note, of the exclusive Calvinist school, John Kent (1766-1843), William Gadsby (1773-1844), and Joseph Irons (1785-1852); of the modern liberal school, W. Poole Balfern (1818-87), Dawson Burns (1822-1900), T. Goadby (1829-89), Marianne Hearn (1834-1909), and J. M. Wigner (1844-1911). Of Unitarians, at least fifty have written hymns of merit; the best known are Anna Letitia Barbauld (1743-1825), John Bowring (1792-1872), J. Johns (1801-47), William Gaskell (1805-84), and James Martineau (1805-1900). Swedenborgian hymn-writers of note are Joseph Proud (1745-1826), Manoah Sibly (1757-1840), and F. M. Hodson (c. 1819). Among the Plymouth Brethren we observe Edward Denny (1796-1889), J. N. Darby (1800-82), J. G. Deck (1802-8x), and S. P. Tregelles (1813-75). Bernard Barton (1784-1849) stands conspicuous in the Society of Friends; while of the Irvingites, Edward W. Eddis and Ellen Eddis deserve fuller recognition than they have yet received.

7. **American hymns.**—The celebrated *Bay Psalm-Book* of 1640 was the first English book printed in America. The 3rd edition, about 1650, revised and augmented by a number of Scripture hymns, was reprinted about 70 times, and continued in almost exclusive use in New England for about a hundred years. In 1757 a revision by Thomas Prince failed to gain public favour; but about that time Tate and Brady's New Version began to be known; and this, together with Watts's *Psalms* and *Hymns*, gradually superseded the older book. It is doubtful whether a single original hymn of American origin had been printed in America before the date last mentioned. Certainly the first American hymnist of whose work any part is still in use was Samuel Davies (1723-61), whose 16 hymns, including the noble 'Great God of wonders, all Thy ways,' were printed posthumously in England. Scarcely any collections of hymns were published in America before the War of Independence; probably the earliest was an appendix of 27 hymns, annexed to Tate and Brady's Psalms, issued by the Episcopal Church in 1789. The Reformed Dutch Church also published a collection of Psalms and Hymns in 1789. A Methodist *Pocket Hymn Book*, which was not approved by Wesley, certainly appeared before 1790; and a Baptist collection was printed at Newport, R.I., not later

than that year. Two Universalist collections were published in 1792; Lutheran and Unitarian collections in 1795; the first Congregational selection of any merit is dated 1799; and no Presbyterian selection was authorized until 1828. It is a noticeable fact that in all these books, and in most of those which followed, by far the greater number of the hymns were by English authors. In 18 of the most extensively used hymn-books of the Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist, Baptist, Congregational, and Reformed Churches, published between 1826 and 1880, less than 14 per cent of the hymns are of American origin.

Until the great religious revival which commenced in America about 1858, and extended over a large part of English-speaking Christendom, very few hymns of American authors were included in English collections. Since that time, however, many have gained great popularity, especially hymns embodying the Gospel call, hymns of aspiration, and such as relate to the future life. A common fault of American hymns is a too great tendency towards sentimentalism; and many of them seem to owe their popularity to the light jingling tunes to which they are wedded.

8. Welsh hymns.—There is some evidence of the use, in the Early British Church, of hymns in the native language; but no specimens remain, and by the time when Protestantism arose the Welsh had apparently lost the gift of composing hymns. Early in the 17th cent. the celebrated Vicar of Llandovery, Rees Prichard, published a volume of religious poems, largely didactic, entitled *Canwyll y Cymry* ('The Welshman's Candle'), portions of which were commonly sung as hymns. It became immensely popular, was many times reprinted, and its influence is not yet extinct. In 1621 Archdeacon Edmund Prys produced his metrical version of the Psalms, which is still in use, though partially supplanted by the more modern version of William Morris. Skill in poetical composition is so widely diffused among Welsh-speaking people that the number of hymn-writers is very great, while the paucity of family names makes them somewhat difficult to distinguish. Two poets of the 17th cent., Rowland Vaughan (*c.* 1629–58) and Elis Wyn (1670–1734), are held in honourable remembrance, each by a single hymn. As early as 1703 a collection of sacramental hymns was published by Thomas Baddy, a dissenting minister. A few years later a collection was issued by the celebrated educationalist, Griffith Jones of Llanddowror (1683–1761), but it is not certain whether it included any of his own compositions.

The great outflow of Welsh sacred song began with the religious revival initiated by the early Calvinistic Methodists, in whose ranks are enrolled the greatest of all Welsh hymnists, William Williams of Pantycelyn (1717–91), his contemporary David Williams, Morgan Rhys († 1776), and Ann Griffiths (1776–1805). Outside that circle we find the names of David Jones of Caio, who in 1753 translated into Welsh Watts's *Psalms*, and afterwards his *Divine Songs*. He was a Congregationalist, as was Ioan Thomas of Rhaiadr (fl. 1776–86), many of whose hymns are still in use. The great hymn-writer among the Unitarians was Edward Williams, renowned as an antiquary under the name of Iolo Morganwg (1745–1826). The first Baptist hymn-book in Wales was compiled by Joseph Harris, called 'Gomer,' in 1821; it contained many of his originals.

The most striking characteristics of Welsh hymnody are depth of emotion and abundant use of metaphor—every kind of natural object being enlisted for the illustration of things spiritual. The hymns are for the most part intensely subjective.

9. Missions.—Since the year 1800, agents of the various missionary societies have produced hymns in upwards of a hundred and twenty languages and dialects, of which more than half had never previously been reduced to writing. Some of these are in native, some in English, metres, and, as might be expected, a large proportion of them are translations from English or German originals.

[10. Cumanic and other early vernacular hymns.—In a Latin-Persian-Cumanic glossary of 1303 (ed. G. Kuun, *Codex Cumanicus*, Budapest, 1880) are a few hymns in Cumanic, the language of a hybrid Turkish tribe then occupying Moldavia and the neighbouring districts. The majority of these hymns are translated from the Latin; *e.g.* there is a rendering of the 'Vexilla regis.' One hymn, however, Eucharistic in character, is thus far believed to be an original composition (cf. W. Bang, 'Beiträge zur Erklärung des koman. Marienhymnus,' in *GGN*, 1910, pp. 61–78, and 'Ueber einen koman. Kommunionshymnus,' in *Bull. Ac. roy. de Belge* [classe des lettres], 1910, p. 230).

It is by no means impossible that a considerable body of early vernacular hymnody was composed in various languages, only to disappear. Thus, the Observantine Minorite Ladislaus (*c.* 1440–1505) is recorded by his biographer, Vincentius Morawski, writing in 1633, to have composed many hymns, Psalters, etc., some of which were in Latin, but others in Lithuanian ('Vita,' I. ix. 59, in *AS*, May, i. [1866] 579). All trace of these Lithuanian productions has vanished.—Louis H. Gray.]

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T. G. CRIPPEN.

HYMNS (Egyptian).—The religious literature of ancient Egypt is fairly prolific in the department of hymnology, and a considerable amount of religious poetry has been preserved and translated; but, on the whole, it cannot be said that the quality is on the same level with the quantity. To a great extent the hymns which have survived bear the stamp, not of a genuine personal religious feeling on the part of the writer, as in the case of our own best hymns, but of a purely official and stereotyped attitude towards the divinities whose praises are celebrated. Religion in Egypt, as we know it, was far too much of a business of cast-iron ritual to leave much room for any natural outpouring of thoughts and feelings of devotion and affection. If there were such outpourings, they were probably not on account of the great gods, whose position was infinitely removed from that of the ordinary worshipper, but rather of some of the minor deities, whom, as we know, the common people of Egypt took to their hearts in preference to the distant and unsympathetic figures of the great triads and enneads. Such effusions were not at all likely to survive in any quantity in comparison with the stilted official odes which had the sanction of the priesthood, were multiplied in an infinity of copies, and were continually used for ritual purposes.

In the time of the New Empire, however, there are traces of a feeling of impatience with the stereotyped formulæ of the official religion, and one or two of the hymns which have survived from this period give us what is otherwise very unusual—the expression of a personal and living interest in religion. Thus, from a hieratic papyrus of this period we have the following:

'Amen-Ra, I love thee and enfold thee in my heart . . .
I do not follow anxiety in my heart; what Amen-Ra saith cometh to pass.'

To the same period also belongs a hymn which gives us one of the very few evidences that the devout Egyptian ever realized his own sinfulness: 'Chastise me not,' says a writer whose poem is preserved in the Anastasi Papyrus, 'according to my many sins.' A hymn to Thoth from the Sallier Papyrus presents us with a view of the inward and secret nature of true religion totally alien to the beliefs of the upholders of the great religious cults of the nation, who emphatically seem to have thought that they would be heard for their much speaking:

'O thou sweet spring for the thirsty in the desert; it is closed for those who speak there, it is open for those who keep silence there. When the silent man cometh, he findeth the spring.'

Such natural expressions of love, confidence, and inward intercourse with God are, however, quite exceptional in Egyptian hymnology. Taking the ordinary run of the hymns to the great gods, we find a constant repetition of the same cycle of ideas in practically the same phrases—a repetition which becomes wearisome, and gives a very poor idea of the extent to which any genuine devotional feeling can have entered into Egyptian religion. Erman's opinion (*Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 389 f.) is amply justified:

'There seems to be no question of devotional feelings on the part of the singer; in fact, the greater part consists of stereotyped phrases, which could be adapted to any of the mighty gods, and could also be used in adoration of the king.'

In fact, the average Egyptian hymn seems to have been constructed on a certain definite recipe. It was essential that the writer should say that the two countries (Upper and Lower Egypt) together show honour to the god, that his fear is in all lands, that he has subdued his enemies and received the dignity of his father, that he is praised by the great cycle of the gods, that all creatures are full of delight at his coming and adore his beauty, and so forth. All this belonged to any of the gods. In order to make the effusion a characteristic hymn to Ra or Amen, there were added the name of the god in question, and perhaps one or two allusions to the myths associated with him and to the particular temple or temples which he most affected; the result was a standard hymn which had this advantage, that with a few alterations it would do equally well for Ptah or Osiris.

Thus we have the following from 'A Hymn to Ra when he riseth' (Papyrus of Nekht):

'Homage to thee, O thou glorious being, thou who art dowered with all sovereignty. . . . The regions of the north and south come to thee with homage, and send forth acclamations at thy rising in the horizon of heaven. . . . The goddess Nut doeth homage unto thee, and the goddess Maat embraceth thee at all times. . . . The company of the gods rejoiceth at thy coming, the earth is glad when it beholdeth thy rays.'

Ani (Papyrus of Ani) can find nothing more original to say of the same deity:

'Homage to thee, O thou who hast come as Khepera, the creator of the gods. . . . Thy mother Nut doeth an act of homage unto thee with both her hands. The land of Manu receiveth thee with satisfaction, and the goddess Maat embraceth thee both at morn and eve.'

Osiris fares no better than Ra at the hands of his devout worshipper:

'Glory be to Osiris Unnefer, the great god within Abydos, King of eternity, lord of the everlasting. . . . Eldest son of the womb of Nut, lord of the crowns of the north and south, lord of the lofty white crown. As prince of gods and of men he hath received the crook and the whip and the dignity of his divine father. Thou art crowned lord of Busiris and ruler in Abydos.'

The great bulk of Egyptian hymn literature consists of poems in praise of one or other of the three great gods, Ra, Amen, and Osiris.

1. **Hymns to Ra.**—A certain amount of real religious feeling was apparently awakened in the Egyptian mind by the contemplation of the rising and setting of the life-giving sun, and this was transferred to the Sun-god, though its expression is often very stilted.

'Homage to thee,' says an interesting hymn in the Papyrus of Hu-nefer, 'O thou who art Ra when thou risest and Tum when thou settest! Thou risest, thou risest, thou shinest, thou shinest, thou who art crowned king of the gods. . . . Thou didst create the earth, thou didst fashion man, thou didst make the watery abyss of the sky, thou didst form the Nile, thou didst create the deep, and thou dost give light unto all that therein is. . . . Thou art unknown, and no tongue is worthy to declare thy likeness: only thou thyself. . . . Millions of years have gone over the world, I cannot tell the number of those through which thou hast passed. Thou didst pass over and travel through spaces requiring millions and hundreds of thousands of years; thou passest through them in peace, and thou steerest thy way across the watery abyss to the place which thou lovest. This thou doest in one little moment of time, and then thou dost sink down, and dost make an end of the hours.'

Thus Ra is here adored as the Creator, the Ineffable, and the Eternal, and in this hymn, at least, there is a distinct vein of genuine poetical feeling in the description of the Sun-god's swift journey over space. But even in such hymns the constant reiteration of the creation formula and the endless repetition of the solar journey in the morning and evening boats become very tiresome.

One of the most important of the Ra hymns is that series which is sometimes called the 'Litany of Ra.' It exists in the form of a long text sculptured at the entrances of the royal tombs in the Valley of the Kings at Thebes. Its importance lies, not in its poetical merits, which are very small indeed, but in the fact that throughout the hymn Ra is successively identified with 75 various gods or cosmic elements. They are all forms of the god, who, as primordial deity, embraces all, and from whom emanate all the other gods, who are only his manifestations.

'Homage to thee, Ra, supreme power, he who descends into the sphere of Amentet, his form is that of Tum. Homage to

thee, Ra, supreme power, he who sends forth the plants in their season, his form is that of Seb. Homage to thee, Ra, supreme power, the great one who rules what is in the Nun, his form is that of Nut,' . . . and so on.

2. Hymns to Amen.—Next in importance to the Ra hymns come those addressed to Amen. Of these perhaps the best is that found in a hieratic papyrus (no. 17, Boulaq). It contains, of course, the usual formulæ, which belonged to Amen, as they belonged to Ra, to Osiris, or to any of the great gods, and were mere matter of habit, so many lines to be filled according to the usual recipe,

'Chief of all the gods, lord of truth, father of the gods, creator of beasts, maker of men, lord of existences, creator of fruitful things, maker of herbs, feeder of cattle,'

and it expressly identifies Amen, not only with Ra, but with Tum, Min, and Khepera. Yet it contains also here and there traces of that realization of divine power in the sustenance of living things which always, as Erman has observed (*Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 391), brings reality, and something of beauty and freshness, into the arid desert of Egyptian hymn-writing.

'He it is who makes pasture for the herds and fruit trees for man; who creates that whereby fish live in the river and the birds under the heavens; who gives breath to them who are in the egg and feeds the son of the worm; he creates that whereby the gnat lives, and also the worms and fleas; he creates that which is needed by the mice in their holes, and that which feeds the birds upon all trees.'

The verses, with their minute description of the divine care for the smallest creatures, suggest a far-off anticipation of Coleridge's

'He prayeth best who loveth best
All things both great and small,
For the dear God who loveth us
He made and loveth all.'

At the same time the writer has a sense, somewhat unusual, of moral quality in his god. To him, Amen is a god

'listening to the poor who is in distress, gentle of heart when one cries unto him, deliverer of the timid man from the violent, judging the poor, the poor and the oppressed, Lord of wisdom, whose precepts are wise, Lord of mercy most loving, at whose coming men live.'

The pantheistic tendency of Egyptian religious thought is clearly seen in the late hymn found in the inscription of Darius at the Oasis of el-Khargeh. The hymn is specifically addressed to Amen; but we find that the god is completely identified with the other great gods of Egypt:

'He is Ra, who exists by himself.' 'It is Amen who dwells in all things, the revered god who was from the beginning. . . . He is Ptah, the greatest of the gods.' 'Thy august ram dwells in Tattu' identifies him with Osiris. 'Shu, Tefnut, Mut, and Khons are thy forms, dwelling in thy shrine under the types of the god Khem.' 'We cannot,' says Naville (*The Old Egyp. Faith*, p. 149), 'sum up more clearly the Egyptian doctrine than in the following phrase: "Thy throne is reared in every place thou desirest, and, when thou willest it, thou dost multiply thy names."'

3. Hymns to Osiris.—Of all Egyptian hymns, those addressed to Osiris are perhaps the most disappointing. Here, if anywhere, we should have expected to find the evidence of sincere religious feeling. For the cult of Osiris was not only the most popular and long-enduring of Egyptian cults, but was so precisely because of the human elements in the life of Osiris, the sympathy which these created between him and his worshippers, and the ethical character of many of the beliefs regarding him. If any personal relationship existed between an Egyptian worshipper and any of the great gods, it is to be looked for in the Osiris cult. Yet, when we turn to the Osirian hymns, we find, almost more than anywhere else, only the multiplication of bombastic and meaningless epithets.

'Praise to thee, Osiris, son of Nut, who wearest the horns, and dost lean upon a high pillar; to whom the crown was given, and joy before the nine gods. . . . Great in power in Rosetta, a lord of might in Ehnas, a lord of strength in Tenent. Great of appearance in Abydos . . . before whom the great ones of might feared; before whom the great ones rose up upon their mats. . . . To whom Upper and Lower Egypt come bowing down, because his fear is so great and his might so powerful.' 'Beyond this,' says Erman (*Egyp. Rel.* p. 48), 'this priestly poet could find nothing to say of this most human of all the gods.'

A certain amount of human feeling does, however, enter into the funeral hymn known as the 'Lamentations of Isis and Nephthys,' in which these goddesses are supposed to bewail the deceased Osiris:

'Come to thy house, come to thy house, O god On! . . . O beautiful youth, come to thy house that thou mayest see me. I am thy sister whom thou lovest; thou shalt not abandon me. . . . Come to her who loves thee, Unnefer, thou blessed one. Come to thy sister, come to thy wife, thy wife, thou whose heart is still. . . . I call to thee and weep so that it is heard even in heaven, but thou dost not hear my voice; and yet I am thy sister, whom thou lovedst upon earth. Thou lovedst none beside me, my brother, my brother!'

This is both genuine and touching; but, as it was the typical funeral lamentation, it is permissible to believe that these qualities are due, not to the worship of the god, but to the human loss which was actually bewailed.

4. Hymn to Hapi.—Besides the hymns addressed to the great gods, there are others, such as the well-known hymn to Hapi, the Nile-god, in which the formulæ have a little more of life and reality behind them. The worshipper was here addressing a god who was a necessity of his daily life, and there could scarcely fail to be an element of sincerity in his approach to such a deity.

'The flowing stream, laden with blessing, is a visible sacred being, and when the Egyptian treats of the real, and describes the things he daily sees, his art always succeeds the best' (Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 391).

The following extracts are from Maspero's translation of the 'Hymn to the Nile' (from the 2nd Sallier and the 7th Anastasi Papyrus):

'Hail to thee, Hapi, who appearest in the land, and comest to give life to Egypt; thou who dost hide thy coming in darkness. . . . Creator of corn, maker of barley. . . . Do his fingers cease from their labours, then are all the millions of beings in misery; doth he wane in heaven, then the gods themselves and all men perish; the cattle are driven mad, and all the world, both great and small, are in torment. But if, on the contrary, the prayers of men are heard at his rising, then the earth shouts for joy, then are all bellies joyful, each back is shaken with laughter, and every tooth grindeth. . . . Stones are not sculptured for him . . . he is unseen, no tribute is paid unto him, and no offerings are brought unto him; nevertheless the generations of thy children rejoice in thee, for thou dost rule as king . . . by whom the tears are washed from every eye!'

5. Royal hymns.—Among all the gods there was probably none who was so real to the ancient Egyptian as the one whom he called 'the good god,' in contradistinction from 'the great gods'—the reigning Pharaoh. It was the duty of all loyal subjects to offer adoration to him, and even the answers of the courtiers to the questions of their sovereign had to be prefaced with a short hymn of praise in which all the stock attributes of divinity were piled upon the king. Two of these royal hymns stand out above others, and are important enough to require notice, though their poetical merit is not very great. The first is that addressed to Senusert III. (Usertsen) of the XIIth dynasty. It is remarkable for its exact strophic structure, and for the illustration which it gives of the fact that at so early a period the Egyptian literary art was already bound, not to say strangled, by hard and fast rules.

'Twice great is the King of his city, above a million arms; as for other rulers of men, they are but common folk.
Twice great is the King of his city; he is as it were a dyke, damming the stream in its water flood.
Twice great is the King of his city; he is as it were a cool lodge, letting men repose unto full daylight.
Twice great is the King of his city; he is as it were a bulwark, with walls built of the sharp stones of Kusem.'

The hymn runs thus, with carefully balanced lines, through six long strophes, in which the king is compared to all sorts of good and gracious influences.

The second hymn was inspired by the warlike prowess of Tahutmes III. of the XVIIIth dynasty. After an introduction in praise of Tahutmes, the poet makes the god Amen guide his son the king round the whole circuit of the world, giving it all

into his power. Occasionally in this long geographical excursion there are passages of vigour and fancy which show that the fierce energy of the old king had awakened the imagination of his subjects.

'I have come, giving thee to smite down those who are in their marshes.
The lands of Mitanni tremble under fear of thee;
I have made them see thy Majesty as a crocodile;
Lord of fear in the water, unapproachable.
I have come, giving thee to smite the Libyans,
The isles of the Utentiu belong to the might of thy prowess;
I have made them see thy Majesty as a fierce-eyed lion,
While thou makest them corpses in their valleys.
I have come, giving thee to smite those who are nigh thy border,
Thou hast smitten the Sand-dwellers as living captives;
I have made them see thy Majesty as a southern jackal,
Swift-footed, stealthy-going, who roves the Two Lands.'

By far the most significant relics of Egyptian hymnology, however, are the two hymns addressed to the Aten, or life-giving power of the solar disk by the King Amenhotep IV., better known as Akhenaten, of the XVIIIth dynasty. The longer of these has been frequently translated, and it stands alone in its simple realism, its vivid depiction of the benefits received from the Aten, and its conception of a universal deity to whom all nations are alike dear:

Thou restest in the western horizon of heaven,
And the land is in darkness like the dead . . .
Every lion cometh forth from his den,
And all the serpents then bite;
The night shines with its lights,
The land lies in silence;
For he who made them is in his horizon.
The land brightens, for thou risest in the horizon,
Shining as the Aten in the day;
The darkness flies, for thou givest thy beams;
Both lands are rejoicing every day.
Men awake, and stand upon their feet,
For thou liftest them up;
They bathe their limbs, they clothe themselves,
They lift their hands in adoration of thy rising,
Throughout the land they do their labours . . .
The ships go forth, both north and south,
For every way opens at thy rising;
The fishes in the river swim up to greet thee;
Thy beams are within the depth of the great sea.'

Then passing to the universality of his deity:

'In the hills from Syria to Kush, and the plain of Egypt,
Thou givest to every one his place, thou framest their lives,
To every one his belongings, reckoning his length of days.
Aten of the day, revered of every distant land, thou makest their life,
Thou placest a Nile in heaven that it may rain upon them . . .
Oh, lord of eternity, the Nile in heaven is for the strange people,
And all wild beasts that go upon their feet.
The Nile that cometh from below the earth is for the land of Egypt,
That it may nourish every field. . . .
Thou makest the far-off heaven, that thou mayest rise in it,
That thou mayest see all that thou madest when thou wast alone.
. . . Thou art in my heart, there is none who knoweth thee excepting thy son Nefer-Kheperu-ra-ua-en-ra.
Thou causest that he should have understanding, in thy ways and in thy might' (Griffith, in Petrie's *Hist. of Egypt*, ii. 215 f.).

While there is perhaps nothing absolutely original in the hymn except the acknowledgment of a universal and spiritual god to whom all men are dear, yet even the familiar motives are handled with such freshness and vigour as to make Akhenaten's hymn a welcome oasis in the dry and thirsty land of Egyptian hymnology. The misfortune is that it stands practically alone.

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HYMNS (Greek and Roman).—**I. GREEK.**—The term ὕμνος (first found in Hom. *Od.* viii. 429, and Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 657), of unknown and probably (like ἔλεγος, παιάν, διθύραμβος, etc.) non-Greek derivation,[1] was applied to poems addressed to the gods, as ἐγκώμιον was used to denote eulogies of human beings. In its widest sense it included such species as dithyrambs, pæans, nomes, threni, etc.; but, according to the definition of the grammarians, it was appropriated to narratives of or addresses to divine personages, without dancing and without music, other than that of the cithara (Proclus, *Chrestomathia*, p. 244, *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 320 A 12, Bekker: ἐκάλουν δὲ καθόλου πάντα τὰ εἰς τοὺς ὑπερτέρους [ὑπηρέτας MS] γραφόμενα ὕμνους· διὸ καὶ τὸ προσόδιον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ προειρημένα φαίνονται ἀντιδιαστέλλοντες τῷ ὕμνῳ ὡς εἶδη πρὸς γένος . . . ὁ δὲ κύριος ὕμνος πρὸς κιθάραν ἤδετο ἑστώτων; cf. also Plato, *Legg.* 700 B, 801 B, *Ion*, 534 C; Aristotle, *Poet.* 1448*b* 27). It will be convenient to distinguish Greek hymns according to their metre, since the character of the hymn varied materially with the metrical form.

1. Hexameter hymns.—These originally constituted a kind of department of epos, and were in the hands of its executants, the rhapsodes. They were of different dimensions: some, such as the greater Homeric hymns (see below), were as long as a book of the *Odyssey*; others consisted of a few lines. The latter were known as προοίμια and were used by rhapsodes as a preface to their recitation (Pindar, *Nem.* ii. 1–3, who says that the usual invocation was of Zeus).[2] The word, however, was applied to the longer hymns also, as, for instance, by Thucydides, iii. 104, to the Homeric hymn to Apollo. The lay of Demodocus upon the loves of Ares and Aphrodite (*Od.* viii. 266–366) appears to be an imitation of a hymn of the first class; the first ten lines of Hesiod's *Works and Days* are the earliest specimen of the second. In the same poem (654 ff.) Hesiod says that he won a three-legged pot with ears at the wake of Amphidamas at Chalcis with a hymn; and a quotation from an unknown Hesiodic poem (fr. 265, Rzach) represents Hesiod and Homer competing at Delos with 'new hymns' to Apollo. Another hymn which we can refer to an early period is the προσόδιον written by Eumelus of Corinth (8th cent.) for a Messenian pilgrimage to Delos. Two Doric hexameters are quoted from it by Pausanias, IV. xxxiii. 2.

Hymns began with a formula of invocation—usually to the Muses: Μοῦσαι . . . δεῦτε Δι' ἐννέπετε (Hes. *Works and Days*, 1 f.); Ἑρμῆν ὕμνει, Μοῦσα, Διὸς καὶ Μαίάδος υἱόν (*Hym. Homer. in Herm.* 1); ἀμφί μοι Ἑρμείαο φίλον γόνον ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα (*Hym. Homer. in Pan.* 1) (the last opening was so frequent in the dithyramb as to give rise to a verb ἀμφιανακτίζειν [Suid. *s.v.*])—and ended with one of farewell and transition to another theme (ἀλλά, ἄναξ, μάλα χαῖρε [Zenobius, v. 99]; νῦν δὲ θεοὶ μάκαρες τῶν ἑαθλῶν ἄφθονοι ἔστε [Ælius Dionysius, *ap.* Eustath. 360]; καὶ σὺ μὲν οὕτω χαῖρε, Διὸς καὶ Λητοῦς υἱέ· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ σεῖο καὶ ἄλλης μνήσομ' ἀοιδῆς [*Hym. Homer. in Apoll.* 545 f.]).[3]

The extant hexameter hymns may now be considered.

(*a*) *Homeric hymns.*—This name is applied to a collection of 33 poems handed down usually together with the hymns of Callimachus and Proclus and similar poetical literature (ed. A. Baumeister, Leipzig, 1860; A. Gemoll, do. 1877; E. Abel, do.

[1] It is possible, however, that ὕμνος has arisen from *ὔδμος, and is connected with ὕδω, ὑδέω, 'to tell of, celebrate'; cf. Brugmann, *Gr. Gramm*[4], Munich, 1913, p. 89, and the lit. there cited.

[2] This statement is confirmed by the hymnal language of Theocritus, xvii. 1; Aratus, 1.

[3] Imitations of these formulæ are frequent in literature: Theocr. i. 132, ii. 14, xv. 142, xvii. 135; Ion of Chios, i. 15; Nonnus, xix. 174, 192; inscr. *ap.* Plut. *Vit. Aem. Paul.* 16.

1886; A. Goodwin, Oxford, 1893; T. W. Allen and E. E. Sikes, London, 1904; Allen, do. 1912). The antiquity of the collection as such is limited by the neo-Orphic character of the eighth hymn (to Ares), and cannot at earliest be fixed much before the Christian era.

The first five hymns in the collection were on a large scale, and of them a short account may be given. The hymn to Dionysus (i.) is a fragment, but that to Demeter (ii.) is of considerable poetical value. It narrates the rape of Persephone by Pluto; the wanderings of Demeter in search of her daughter; her reception, disguised as an old woman, in the house of Celeus at Eleusis; and her intention of making the child Demophon immortal. Frustrated in this by the child's mother, Metanira, she reveals herself, orders the foundation of a temple at Eleusis, and causes the fruits of the earth to cease. Zeus eventually commands that Persephone return to the upper world, although she must pass a third of each year in the under world. The crops once more come up, and to the Eleusinians are revealed the rites of Demeter's worship upon which depends happiness in another world. The date of this hymn turns almost entirely on an argument *ex silentio*. The doctrine of the after happiness of the initiate (ver. 480 ff.) is otherwise not found before Pindar, and there is no definite evidence by which to date its first appearance. Further, the hymn makes very large omissions; in fact, it ignores the whole of the mystery proper, as it was practised, nor does it mention one prominent personage, Iacchus, or the obscene part of the Baubo-story. As this was clearly intentional, just as was the dignified and epic tone of the story, no definite date can be inferred from it. Of more importance is the absence of any allusion to Athens, which, it is generally believed, had absorbed Eleusis by 600 B.C. This, together with the lofty style of the poem, leads us to date it not much later than 700 B.C. Subsequently, at a date unknown, it was excerpted and adapted to assist a prose narrative of the story in its fuller and Orphic form (cf. papyrus ed. W. Schubart and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Berliner Klassikertexte*, v. [Berlin, 1907] 7 ff.). Tradition is silent regarding the authorship of the hymn.

The hymn to Apollo (iii.) is unique in that it was ascribed in antiquity to Cynæthus of Chios, a rhapsode (Hippostratus, *FHG* iv. 433), who 'was the first to recite the Homeric poems in Syracuse in the 69th Olympiad.' The date has been recognized to be wrong on the ground that, firstly, it contradicts the other statement in the passage, since it is incredible that Homer should first have reached Sicily in 504 B.C. in the age of Epicharmus; and, secondly, from an argument *ex silentio* derived from the poem itself, which alludes neither to the Pythian games (instituted 586 B.C.) nor to the burning of the temple of Trophonius and Agamedes (548 B.C.). This is decisive against Ol. 69, and Cynæthus may revert to his natural date among the Homeric and Peloponnesian rhapsodes of the 8th century.[1]

The hymn begins with the birth of Apollo. Leto, seeking a place in which to bring forth her son, wandered in vain round the coasts of the Ægean, from Crete to Athos, from Pelion to Cnidus; only barren Delos received her. Here Apollo was born, and the island burst into flowers of gold. So it is beloved by Apollo more than any other place, and there the Ionians gather with their wives and children and ships and possessions, for boxing, dancing, and singing. Here is the marvel of the Delian singing-women, who imitate the words and the music of all men, and here the sweetest of singers, a blind man who lives in Chios. Besides Delos, Apollo inhabits Lycia, Mæonia, and Pytho, as well as Olympus, the home of Zeus. Brides hath he too, but the poet will tell how he set up the first oracle in the earth. To accomplish this, he left Olympus and set foot in Pieria; thence, passing the Ænianes, the Perrhæbi, and Iolcus, he reached Cenæum in Eubœa. The Lelantine plain displeased him, so he crossed the Euripus and travelled [along the later Sacred Way] by Thebes and Onchestus, Haliartus, and the city of the Phlegyæ to Crisa. There, with the help of Trophonius and Agamedes, he built his temple, and shot a great snake which wasted men and sheep, from whose rotting (πύθειν) the place was called Πυθώ, and the god Πύθιος. He still required ministers, and them he brought by sea from Minoan Knossos in Crete—meeting their ship in the guise of a dolphin (δελφίς)—and there he established them to pray to him as δελφίνιος, and to maintain themselves upon the sheep that should be sacrificed by the tribes of men. But, in case of idle word, or deed, or insolence, other men should rule them.

It has long been recognized that this hymn consists of two parts, the Delian and the Delphic. The character of the two is different: the former is brilliant, and deals with the Ionians and the poet at least as much as with Apollo; the second is impersonal, and contains a number of essential details, local and historical. Moreover, the lines constituting the junction of the two parts (179–206) are not natural in the context, and the opening of the second hymn is unusual (207–214). If, then, Cynæthus wrote the first part, another author must be sought for the second, and probably in Bœotia, since the interest is entirely continental, and the events take place on the Pilgrims' Way from Mycalessus to Pytho. It is usually supposed, but without definite evidence, that the two parts were put together at a later period; yet it is quite as likely that Cynæthus composed the first part as a preface to the second, which was already existent, and joined them together without much ado. The Hesiodic *Scutum* is an ancient document of similarly composite character. The whole hymn, like the others, is distinguished by its omissions: the Delian portion mentions none of the sights and sacred places of Delos, which were well known at least as early as the 6th cent. (Theognis, 5 ff.); this is probably a proof of its antiquity, as is the cheerful description of the Ionians, and the allusion to Mæonia (*i.e.* Lydia) and Lycia as seats of Apolline worship. This outlook has been recognized to date from a time before the Lydian monarchy had begun to threaten Ionian independence, *i.e.* from the 8th century. Another important omission is that of Apolline worship in the north, and the story of the Hyperboreans (*q.v.*), which was sung by Olen (see below (*c*) (1)). It is uncertain what interpretation is to be put upon this fact. The Delphic portion equally omits most of the features of the oracle, especially the Pythia (see A. P. Oppé, *JHS* xxiv. [1904] 214 ff.), and its allusion to the pre-Apolline worship at Pytho (300 ff.) is superficial and vague. The hymn to Hermes (iv.) is equally eclectic, and describes only the following features of the god's functions and history: his birth of Maia at Cyllene in Arcadia; the invention of the lyre four days afterwards; the theft of Apollo's cattle at Pieria; the invention of fire (produced by the friction of sticks); the slaughter, dismemberment, and roasting of two kine, and the portioning of the cooked parts into twelve, of which Hermes did not taste; Apollo's search and discovery of the cattle; the terms struck between these two gods—Apollo received the lyre, and Hermes, besides retaining the care of cattle, also received the *caduceus* ('rod of wealth'); and the witchcraft of the three σεμναί or Θριαί. The story, therefore, is very simple, although reference is incidentally made to most of Hermes' functions. The hymn is more ætiological than the others. On the other hand, it has a peculiar raciness; Hesiod is parodied (36), and the indifference of the Olympians towards mankind is roundly asserted (577 f.). The date of the hymn may be obtained by considering the geographical state of the legend; the cows are driven from Pieria (in an earlier form of the tale this had probably been Percia in S. Thessaly) to the Alphean Pylus; later authors substituted the Messenian Pylus. The Alphean or Nestorian Pylus appears to have been sacked towards the end of the 7th cent. in consequence of the events narrated by Herodotus, iv. 145, and Mimnermus, fr. 9, and it rapidly became forgotten. Hence its mention here appears to make the document not later than the end of the 7th cent., for in Stesichorus, fr. 44, of the same period, we find mention of the adjacent Alphean Samos or Samicum, which was soon also to vanish from memory. Some slight linguistic peculiarities (Allen Sikes, p. 133) perhaps point to a Bœotian or Euboean origin. The same story of the invention of the lyre and the theft of the cattle is told in the newly discovered satyr-play, the Ἰχνευταί of Sophocles (*Oxyr. Pap.* ix. [1912]), but the influence of the hymn is not apparent.

The hymn to Aphrodite (v.) is a straightforward account of one episode in the goddess's life, telling how, in revenge for her influence over the whole universe, Zeus inspired her with a passion for the Trojan prince Anchises, who begat on her a child, Æneas, whose stock should rule over Troy for ever (196 f.). The poetical merits of the hymn are very high. Its date and place are uncertain, but the theme, the prophecy, and the detail that the Trojans and Phrygians speak different languages (113 ff.; cf. P. Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Gesch. der griech. Sprache*, Gottingen, 1896, p. 182), as well as one or two verbal usages, point to a colonist, doubtless a Homeric, author.

A word must be said upon the evidence of the presence or absence of the digamma in these hymns, since it affords a legitimate criterion for their relative age. The result of the calculations (Flach, *Bezzenberger's Beitrage*, ii. [1878] 143; Allen-Sikes, p. lxxi) is (1) Pythian or Delphic part of the hymn to Apollo, (2) Aphrodite, (3) Delian part of the hymn to Apollo, (4) Demeter, and (5) Hermes. It should also be added that the style of their composition is a continuation of the Homeric manner: it is dignified and anthropomorphic. Although ritual ἀπόρρητα are alluded to (as in Demeter), and the origin of rites is explained (as in Hermes), the details are not given. There is, therefore, the same apparent absence of magic and primitive symbolism as in Homer. This is in striking contrast to the Orphic literature (see below).

The remaining hymns may be briefly dismissed. They appear to be all invocations or προοίμια, and are insignificant except that to Dionysus (vii.) and that to Pan (xix.). Their age is uncertain, but they contain no trace of Alexandrian style or, except in Ares (viii.), of eastern doctrine. It is doubtful if any, except viii., can be brought below 500 B.C.

(*b*) *Callimachus of Alexandria.*—This poet († *c.* 240 B.C.) has left six hymns, handed down in the same MSS as the Homeric, which, until the recent recovery of fragments of the *Hecale* and the *Aetia*, were all the writings of Callimachus that had directly survived. The hymns (ed. O. Schneider, Leipzig, 1870; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff[2], Berlin, 1897) are to Zeus, Apollo, Artemis, Delos, on the Bath of Pallas, and to Demeter. The Λουτρὰ Παλλάδος is in elegiacs, and this and the hymn to Demeter are in Doric. As might be supposed from Callimachus's reputation, these hymns have superior

[1] His antiquity is assumed by Philodemus, who mentions him together with Orpheus (*Herculanensium voluminum quæ supersunt*, Naples, 1793–1855, vi. 156, col. 7; cf. Gomperz, *SWAW* cxxiii. [1890]).

literary quality, but they are quite unepic and frankly modern, and, like the Alexandrian epics in general, find their interest in ætiology.

(*c*) *Orphic hymns.*—These poems (ed. G. Hermann, Leipzig, 1908; E. Abel, do. 1885), 88 in number, have nothing save the name in common with the older Orphic hymns and poems. They are of mystic signification and no literary value. According to A. Dieterich (*de hymnis Orphicis*, Marburg, 1891, p. 24), they are of different dates; the extremes are, on the one hand, the allegorizing doctrines of the Stoics; on the other, the magical inscriptions (A.D. 100–150) in which the hymns are quoted (see also Petersen, *Philologus*, xxvii. [1868] 385–431).

(*d*) *Hymns of Proclus.*—This philosopher, the head of the Academy († A.D. 485), composed, amongst his many other works, 8 hymns of a Neo-Platonic character (ed. A. Ludwich, Königsberg, 1895). Like the Orphic hymns, they are contained, for the most part, in the same MSS as the Homeric hymns. Their literary value is not great.

(*e*) *Lost hexameter hymns.*—Among hexameter hymns which are no longer extant the following deserve mention:

(1) Olen of Lycia wrote hymns to Eileithyia, Hera, and Achaia, which were in use at Delos. According to Pausanias (IX. xxvii. 2), he was the oldest of hymn-writers. His name Ὦλήν, which is not Greek, confirms their Lycian origin, and Lycia is the most probable source of the Apolline worship. It is remarkable, therefore, that Herodotus (iv. 35) quotes him for the northern extension of Apolline influence, viz. the legend of the Hyperborean tribute, which, as we have seen, is passed over in the Homeric hymn. As Suidas calls Olen ἐποποιός, we may infer that his hymns were in hexameters.

(2) Pamphos (Πάμφως), whom Pausanias (IX. xxvii. 2) puts between Olen and Orpheus, wrote hymns for the Athenian sacral family of the Lycomidæ, who had the hereditary function of performing worship to Demeter at Phlya in Attica. He wrote about Demeter, and perhaps also on other divinities. Two hexameters (on Zeus) are quoted in Philostratus, *Heroicus*, 693.

(3) The quotations of the hymns and hymnal poems which go under the name of Orpheus are collected by E. Abel, *Orphica*, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 224–251 (see also Dieterich, *de Hymnis Orphicis*; H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[2], Berlin, 1906–10, pp. 473–482). According to Clem. Alex. (*Strom.* i. 21), the greater part of the Orphic corpus was composed by various hands in the 6th cent. B.C., although both the hymns and the poems were universally believed to be older than Homer. These hymns, like those of Pamphos, were written for the Lycomidæ for temple-worship at Phlya, and were used also at Eleusis. They were more devotional and less literary than the Homeric (Pausanias, IX. xxx. 12), short and few in number (*ib.*), and appeared incredible and grotesque to the uninitiate (Menander, *de Encom.* v. 41). The poem dealing with the rape of Persephone (fr. 209 ff.) illustrates this criticism, and, compared with the Homeric hymn to Demeter, shows the difference between the Orphic and the Homeric treatment of myth.

(4) Very similar to the Orphic hymns were those of Musæus (Paus. X. vii. 2), which were in use also at Phlya and Eleusis. Plato (*Rep.* 364 E) mentions Musæus and Orpheus together. There are no quotations. On Musæus in general, see Kinkel, *Ep. gr. fr.*, Leipzig, 1877, p. 218 ff.; Diels[2], 482–488.

Other hexameter hymns hardly require mention. Socrates wrote one in prison to the Delphic god (*Phædo*, 60 D); a beautiful imitation (to Adonis) is inserted into Theocritus's 15th Idyll; and the existence of many short ritual hymns in the classical period is inferred from imitations in drama by Adami, *Jahrb. f. klass. Philol.*, 1901, p. 213 ff.

2. **Melic hymns.**—The pæan is as old as the *Iliad* (i. 473, xxii. 391); the Δηλιάδες also (Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 607) and the Cretan ministers of Delphi (*Hym. Homer. in Apoll.* 518) sang a pæan; and, if we took the word ὕμνος to cover the pæan, nome, dithyramb, and θρῆνος, a long list of titles would have to be given. When we adopt the somewhat arbitrary ancient restriction of meaning (see p. 40[a]), we find the following among poets who wrote hymns: Alcæus, Alcman, Anacreon, Castorio, Lasus, Simonides (all in T. Bergk, *Poetæ lyr. Gr.*[5], Leipzig, 1882, iii.), Pindar, and Bacchylides, as well as Ion of Chios (*ib.* ii. 251, with a kind of elegiac hymn to Dionysus) and Aristotle (to Arete, *ib.* 360, of uncertain classification). All these, however, have perished, so far as direct tradition is concerned. A certain number of hymns or similar compositions have been preserved on stone; among these are Isyllus's poem on Asclepius (*IG Pel. Ins.* i. 950) of about 300 B.C., of unusual literary merit (see von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Isyllos von Epidauros*, Berlin, 1886); three hymns discovered by the French at Delphi (*BCH* xvii. [1894] 651, xviii. [1895] 71, xix. [1896] 393) by Aristonous, Cleochares, and Philodamus; a hymn sung by the Cretan Curetes (*BSA* xv. [1908–09] 347, with commentary by Bosanquet and Murray); a hymn to Asclepius (*CIA* III. i. 171 [3rd cent. A.D.]). See in general the article 'Hymnus' by S. Reinach in Daremberg-Saglio, *Lex. des ant. gr. et rom.*, Paris, 1896 ff., p. 337.

II. *LATIN.*—Hymns play a very small part in Latin literature. The *axamenta*, hymns of the Salic priests of Mars, unintelligible even to the priests (Quintilian, I. vi. 40), exist only in a few quotations (see Teuffel-Schwabe, *Gesch. der röm. Lit.*[5], Leipzig, 1890, § 64). The hymns of the Fratres Arvales, however, are preserved in inscriptions first dug up in 1570 in the Vigna Ceccarelli, near Magliana, on the road from Rome to Porto. They are edited in *CIL* vi. (1886) 2023 ff., and by Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* (Berlin, 1874). In literature proper we may point to Catullus's 34th poem ('Dianæ sumus in fide') and his invocation of Venus (xxxvi. 11–16), and Horace's *Carmen sæculare*.

LITERATURE.—Besides the sources mentioned in the article reference may be made to the usual Histories of literature, *e.g.* G. Bernhardy, *Grundriss der griech. Literaturgesch.*, Halle, 1876, i. 301 ff.; K. Sittl, *Gesch. der griech. Lit.*, Munich, 1884, pp. 15 ff., 193 ff.

T. W. ALLEN.

HYMNS (Hebrew and Jewish).—It will for the present purpose be best to adhere to the boundary line between Hebraism and Judaism provided by the destruction of the Temple by the Romans, A.D. 70, and the consequent substitution of synagogue worship for that of the Jerusalem sanctuary by the Jewish leaders assembled at Jamnia. We shall thus have to consider (1) the hymns embodied in the OT and the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical writings, which stand in some degree of relation to the Hebrew Canon, and (2) the hymns found in the Jewish liturgy and other literary sources belonging to Synagogue times.

1. **Hymns of the OT and Hebrew writings related to it.**—The ancient Hebrews were endowed with a high degree of poetical sensitiveness which often showed itself in quick lyrical utterance reflecting the inward emotion with wonderful truth and vividness; and, as the select and most refined spirits among them were also pre-eminently gifted with religious feeling and intuition, it was only natural that their lyrical faculty should have often exercised itself in strains of sacred song. Such song, moreover, though in each case naturally

issuing from an individual spirit, generally expressed the feeling and thought of the national or tribal circle to which the poet belonged; for the sense of communal oneness, which is to the present day a marked characteristic of the Jewish diaspora, was probably stronger among the ancient Hebrews than among any of the nations surrounding them, and the religious poet, as a rule, gave genuine utterance to the emotions which at the moment swayed the community to which he belonged, or were supposed to have swayed it in the historical period which his song was intended to celebrate.

The three outstanding national songs of victory indited by some of the most gifted poets of the race are the Song of Deborah (Jg 5), which critics generally admit to be the earliest source for the history of the events which it celebrates; the Song at the Red Sea (Ex 15), which, though apparently composed in the time of the monarchy, may embody a nucleus from very ancient times; and the Song of Victory contained in 2 S 22 and Ps 18, supposed by some critics to be in part a genuine product of the Davidic age. The sense of Jahweh's might and of gratitude to Him for victories vouchsafed is a dominant note in all the three songs, but in power and intenseness of expression the Song of Deborah stands unequalled. 'With might steppest thou onward, O my soul' (v.[21]) fitly expresses the spirit of exultation which pervades the whole poem.

The outstanding antithesis to these strains of triumph is the Book of Lamentations, or *Threni*, which is traditionally ascribed to the prophet Jeremiah, and for the most part undoubtedly reflects the mournful attitude of the community in the early years of the Exile. In the highly finished five elegies comprised in the collection, Israel is seen heartbroken and weeping with bent head in the presence of Jahweh, who has allowed judgment in its fullest measure to fall on the sinful nation. The book thus consists of five dirges of a type akin to 'Dies Iræ,' written, not in the dread contemplation of future judgment, but in actual sight of the havoc wrought by the 'wrath' of the offended Judge whom the nation, in a flood of tears, nevertheless implores to allow His love and pity to reassume its ancient sway.

Striking instances of lyrical utterance occasioned by special situations, real or supposed, in the life of individuals, but affecting the community by reason of the great significance to it of the persons concerned, are the triumphal hymn of Hannah (1 S 2[1-10]), the Thanksgiving of Hezekiah (Is 38[10-20]), and what may be called the Psalm of Jonah (Jon 2[2-10]). The literary prophets, with their souls wrapt in the contemplation of things supra-mundane and hidden from ordinary sight in the counsel of the Eternal, also naturally break out at times in longer or shorter hymnal strains in the midst of scathing admonition or description of happiness to come (so, *e.g.*, Is 9[1ff.] 12. 44[23], Jer 14[7ff.] 16[19], and note particularly Hab 3); and the controversies of the Book of Job regarding the justice, power, and providence of God are as naturally apt to lead to occasional outbursts of hymn-like utterance (so, *e.g.*, 25. 26[5ff.]).

Apart, however, from the pieces named and others of a similar nature to be found in different parts of the Hebrew Canon, the Book of Psalms is the great hymnal treasury of the ancient Hebrew Ecclesia, or Church, embodying the typical expression of all possible religious moods, and ranging historically from David and the Davidic age down to the re-awakening of the national and religious life in the time of the Maccabees. Besides the compositions which were primarily communal in character (as, *e.g.*, Pss 33. 47. 50. 66. 106. 113–115), many Psalms appear to have been originally lyrics of individuals; but personal experience of whatever kind—whether of penitence, exaltation, prayer for help, or even of violent resentment of oppression and thirst for vengeance—is there, so far as it was considered to represent a true aspect of Israel's relation to Jahweh and the world, fully owned and echoed by the community at large, so that the original 'I' of the poet has everywhere become the symbol of the great communal self, of which he was, in truth, the genuine mouth-piece, uttering individually the religious emotions of the great body to which he belonged.[1]

The titles most in use to denote a hymnal composition are *shîr*, *shîrâ*, *mizmôr*, *t'hillâ*, and *t'fillâ*. The first three terms point, in one way or another, to the rhythmical and musical character of the pieces concerned; *t'hillâ* denotes a hymn of praise; and *t'fillâ*, which primarily means 'prayer' or 'supplication,' sometimes bears the general sense of liturgical composition (see particularly Ps 90). 'Lamentations' or 'Threni' translates the term *Kînôth*, though not so styled in the Hebrew Canon, the Synagogue name of the Book being אֵיכָה ('How!'), which is the first word of the first chapter.[2]

Regarding the question of rhythm, a subject which has been much discussed of late (for reference to summaries see Literature at the end), one can say that there is now a sufficiently general consensus of opinion in favour of the view that it is the accentual beat which mainly, if not exclusively, counts in Hebrew versification, the intervening number of syllables having (within limits, of course) no determining effect on the poetical structure. The 'parallelismus membrorum,' though 'not a constant phenomenon of Hebrew poetry' (G. B. Gray, 'Isaiah i.–xxvii.,' in *ICC* [1912], p. lxi), is yet almost everywhere as striking a characteristic in hymnal pieces as in gnomic composition. The only special kind of rhythm so far definitely established in OT poetry is the elegiac or *kînâ* form (first pointed out by K. Budde), in which the second hemistich of a line is shorter than the first, the mourner being supposed to break off his plaint in a sob.[3]

The proposition, however, that this rhythmic form had its origin in the ancient lament for the dead performed by women mourners (see, *e.g.*, *HDB* iv. 5) is so far incapable of verification, and it is, moreover, true that 'it can no longer be maintained that the rhythm is *peculiar* to elegy, though it may be said to be characteristic of it' (Gray, *op. cit.* p. lxiii, note).

The question of strophical arrangement in Hebrew hymns and OT poetry in general has also been much discussed in recent times (for a summary see *HDB* iv. 7f.). A decisive factor in favour of, at any rate, occasional strophic structure is the refrain that is sometimes found (see, *e.g.*, Pss 42. 99); and there is, besides, a strong auxiliary argument for fairly frequent strophic arrangement in the undoubted fact that music, both vocal

[1] The question of the individual element in the Psalms has often been discussed in recent times. But we have something very similar in Modern English hymnal collections. Toplady's 'Rock of Ages, cleft for *me*,' and Newman's 'Lead, Kindly Light . . . lead Thou *me* on,' for instance, were primarily utterances of personal religious emotions, but they at the same time express the genuine cry of all Christian believers, that is to say, of the whole community or Church. A striking modern instance of the patriotic emotion of an individual poet becoming truly national in character is that of Theodor Körner, who died while fighting for the liberation of Germany. In the Psalter the national and religious spirit is one and indivisible, so that the hymn-writer is one and the same with the politician and nationalist.

[2] For terms that are used more or less rarely the reader is referred to the Introductions and Commentaries on the Psalms.

[3] Cf. the classic elegiac metre, in which the pentameter alternates with the hexameter.

and instrumental, regularly accompanied the recital of hymns (besides the headings of Psalms, which are by themselves quite conclusive, see 1 Ch $25^{5.7}$, 2 Ch 7^{6}), for the musical tune is naturally either repeated with the successive longer units of the poetical composition, or else changes its character at the beginning of a part meant to express a different strain of poetical emotion. Congregational responses at certain intervals, for which there is some evidence (see Ps $106^{1.47}$), would seem to lead to a similar conclusion. A composition like Ps 136, in which the second hemistich is throughout the antiphonal response to the first, has, of course, no bearing on the question of strophical arrangement.

The poetical compositions embodied in the Apocrypha stand on a lower level, both with regard to inspiration (using this term in its widest sense) and to their bearing on the national life; yet they do in some limited, and partly sectarian, manner continue on lines similar to the hymnal pieces contained in the Canon.

The Song of the Three Children[1] (the *Benedicite*) has a grand liturgical effect, notwithstanding the deliberate artificial attempt to enlist every part of creation in the great symphony of praise. Among other notable examples are the Prayer of Manasses, portions of Baruch, 2 Mac 1^{24-29}, Wis 9. The praise of Famous Men in Ecclesiasticus (44–50) is in reality also of the nature of a hymn, all praise being finally ascribed to the God whom the famous men served. Specially noteworthy are the 16 lines which in the Hebrew Cairo text are inserted between vv. 12 and 13 of ch. 51, and of which the first 14 are modelled on the antiphonal strains of Ps 136. It is a disputed point, however, whether these verses formed part of the original composition of Ben Sira.

The most notable hymnal section of the *pseudepigraphical writings* connected with the OT is the collection of 18 pieces belonging to the time of Pompey's invasion of Palestine, which are known as the Psalms of Solomon;[2] but shorter or longer hymn-like strains are also found in the fourth Book of Ezra and the Book of Enoch. The Greek hexameters of the *Sibylline Oracles*, iii., of which the greater part is also Hebraic in spirit, follow the prophetical writings with regard to the presence of an occasional hymnal strain.

Apart from the Psalms of Solomon, which have their root in important national events, the poetical portions of these writings are, as may be expected, as much removed from actuality as the prose frameworks in which they appear; yet they sound a genuine note of the religious idealism by which the *Pseudepigrapha*—largely sectarian in origin—were called into existence.

2. Hymns of the Synagogue.—After the destruction of the Temple by the Romans, Judaism definitely succeeded the ancient Hebraism. The bulk of the Hebrew people could not see their way to adopt the form of Christian adoration which, in the minds of its true devotees, was expressive of the most real inwardness of the religious life. The Jews, therefore, clung to their own ceremonial and devotional forms, which, indeed, enshrined a peculiar inwardness of their own, and it is this special Judaic religious inwardness that was perpetuated and developed—very often in beautiful language of true devotion—in a long series of hymnal compositions, which have become more or less closely attached to the general framework of the daily and festival prayers. The great model in the earlier stages of this liturgical development was naturally the Psalter, which, as in the Temple services, was itself largely drawn upon for purposes of synagogal and individual devotions, and which to the present day provides the ritual with some important constituent elements (so particularly the *Hallel* in the festival services and the series of Psalms in the earlier portions of the daily prayers). The liturgy, moreover, in its general idea as well as in its prevailing form, is a systematic elaboration of the *Bĕrākhā*, or Benediction, which is in its simpler form well represented in the OT (see Gn 24^{27}, 1 K 1^{48}, Ps 28^{6}, Neh 9^{5}), but in the specifically Jewish period gradually developed into a system of prayers and doxologies, to some parts of which the lyrico-religious genius of the race could not but give a high poetical form.

Among the finest and most important of the poetical Benedictions which thus came into existence are the pieces which precede and follow the recitation of the שמע ('Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord,' etc.) in both the morning and evening services, the former having two Benedictions before and one after the *Shĕma'*, and the latter two before and two after this central confession of the Divine Unity (see Mishna *Bĕrākhōth*, i. 4).[1] Among the other pieces whose existence in early times is attested by Talmudical references are the famous *Nishmath* ('The breath of all things living') in the Sabbath and festival prayers, and several compositions in litany form; and the elaborate Benediction at the end of a meal, to which much importance has always been attached, also exhibits a decidedly poetical tone in some of its parts.

Among the various compositions belonging to the time of the *Geonim*, which followed the Talmudical period, are the famous *Bārūkh Shĕāmer* of the morning service, and the equally famous *Ên K'lōhēnū*, which stands in the modern Ashkenazi ritual at the end of the Sabbath service, but is recited every day by the members of the Spanish and Portuguese congregations scattered in different parts of the world. The Aramaic[2] *Yĕķūm Purķān*, inserted in the Sabbath services, which also belongs to this period, may be classed as an interesting and characteristic congregational supplication in poetical prose.

The earliest synagogal hymn-writer known by name is Jose ben Jose, who appears to have lived in the 6th or 7th cent., and among whose compositions is an *'Abōdā* (on this term see below, p. 45[b]) which is still used in Piedmont and other places. His pieces exhibit no rhyme, whereas Yannai, as well as his famous pupil and successor El'azar ben Jacob Ḳalir, adds the use of rhyme to the acrostic and other earlier marks of poetic form. Ḳalir opens a new and most prolific epoch in the history of synagogal hymnology. On his date and birthplace widely conflicting views have been held, but Zunz, who is the highest authority on questions of this kind, places him in the latter half of the 10th cent.,[3] and names southern Italy as the place of his nativity. He composed no fewer than 200 pieces, scattered over divers portions of the Ashkenazi and Italian forms of the *Maḥzōr*, as used at the present day. His subject-matter is derived mainly from Talmudic and Midrashic sources.

[1] The question as to whether Hebrew or Greek was the original medium of composition for this and the other pieces named is not important in the connexion, the spirit pervading them being in all cases Hebraic, though no doubt influenced by Hellenistic tendencies.

[2] It has also been maintained by some that the so-called *Odes of Solomon*, of which J. Rendel Harris discovered a Syriac rendering, were also originally Hebraic; but this opinion is not likely to gain many adherents.

[1] Zunz (*Gottesdienstliche Vortrage*[2], p. 382 *f.*) considers that in their present form these pieces show later additions; but the rhyme of some parts, on which he largely relies, may be accidental.

[2] On the *Ḳaddish*, which is also Aramaic, see vol. I. p. 459 f.

[3] So in *Gottesd. Vortrage*[2], pp. 376 and 395; in *Literaturgeschichte*, p. 31, however, the first half of the 9th cent. is regarded as the earliest possible date.

His language is very often obscure and to the ear of the Hebrew purist strange and even uncouth, but his synagogal inspiration is of so high an order that the impression which he made on his contemporaries has—notwithstanding much influential opposition—continued its sway down to the present time.

An impetus to an entirely different style of liturgical poetry was given by Sa'adya Gaon (891–941), whose original home was Egypt, but who spent the most active part of his life as head of the Academy of Sura in Mesopotamia. He cannot be said to have been the founder of a liturgical school in the same sense as Ḳalir. His poetical compositions are not very numerous, nor was he strong as a poet, his genius enabling him rather to shine as philosopher, commentator, and controversialist; but, on the other hand, he brought to his task the best literary and scientific refinement of his age and surroundings, and he was in this way able, among his greater successes, to give an important fresh direction to liturgical efforts, which later on developed into the finest poetical achievements of mediæval Jewry. Acquainted as he was with the pure classical themes and forms of Arabic literature, he naturally aimed at similar purity of language in his Hebrew compositions; and the subject-matter of his devotional pieces rested for the same reason on philosophic contemplation rather than on Talmud and Midrash. His strophic system is elaborate, and he also uses rhyme besides the alphabetical acrostic.

Thus arose two distinct schools of liturgical composition, Ḳalir representing the more exclusive Jewish spirit of nationalism which found its chief nourishment in Talmudism, and Sa'adya paving the way in the direction of general human culture and the philosophico-scientific aspect of religion; and so deep-rooted as well as far-reaching were these two tendencies that each in its turn became the starting-point of one of the two main divisions of the Jewish liturgy, the Romano-Germanic order of festival services belonging, in the main, to the school founded by Ḳalir, whilst the Hispano-Arabian liturgy has been built up by the great poets who worked on in the spirit of Sa'adya.

No wonder, therefore, that the names of the leading writers of the last-named school, such as Solomon ibn Gabirol[1] (fl. 1050), in whom the Spanish school reached its most classical development, Moses ben Ezra (11th to 12th cent.), Yehuda ha-Levi († about 1140), and Abraham ibn Ezra († 1167) sound more familiar to the cultured Europe of the present day than the, in their own way, also highly distinguished names of men like Meshullam ben Kalonymos of Lucca (10th cent.), Gershon ben Yehuda (fl. first half of 11th cent.), Solomon Yiṣḥāḳī († 1105), and his son-in-law Samuel ben Meir.

It was, however,—on account of the general bond uniting all synagogal communities into one great organization,—inevitable that the poetical compositions of each school should exercise an influence on the other. The Jewish liturgical writers of each country were, moreover, naturally to some extent affected by the surroundings amidst which they worked; nor could individual poets help importing into their compositions their own intellectual, doctrinal, or emotional peculiarities. Among the later (post-classical) writers of sacred poetry who thus, for one reason or another, become entitled to particular mention in even a brief historical survey of the subject are Abraham of Beziers (13th cent.), his son Yed'aya (entitled hap-Penīnī), Yehuda Ḥarizi († before 1235), Moses Rieti (fl. first half of 15th cent.), Israel Nagara (16th cent.), Isaac Loria the Kabbalist (1534–1572), and the Yemenite Shalom ben Joseph Shabbezi (17th cent.). The most prolific authors of short hymnal compositions among those just named were Israel Nagara and Shalom Shabbezi, though of the former only a few penetrated into the liturgy; and of the other apparently none.

Among the most important terms used since early times in connexion with synagogal liturgical poetry are (besides *Payṭān* and *Piyyūṭ*, respectively denoting 'poet' and 'poetical piece of devotion,' the significant part of both words coming no doubt from the Greek ποιητής): (1) *Ḳᵉrōbā*, which is sometimes used in the general sense of liturgical poetry (the word denoting 'coming near' in prayer), but in the plural usually bears the more restricted meaning of pieces accompanying the Prayer of Eighteen, or, rather, its festival representative; (2) *Yōṣᵉrōth, i.e.* Piyyūṭīm accompanying the benediction *Yōṣēr Ōr* ('Creator of the Light'), but sometimes also used in a more general sense; (3) *Sᵉliḥōth*, or penitential pieces; (4) *Ḳīnōth*, or elegies; (5) *'Abōdā*, a species of elaborate composition for the Day of Atonement descriptive of the Temple Service as solemnized on that day, the account being based on the Mishna *Yōmā*; (6) *Azhārōth*, embodying the Pentateuchal commandments; (7) *Hoshaʻnoth*, i.e. pieces with a Hosannah refrain, used on *Hoshaʻna Rabba* (the 7th day of the feast of Tabernacles); and (8) *Widdui*, or confession of sins. The entire collection of the festival services is entitled *Maḥzōr, i.e.* '(annual) cycle.'

The introduction of rhyme into liturgical poetry prior to the time of Ḳalir has already been referred to. With regard to the use of acrostics, it is important to mention that, besides the very frequent employment of the alphabetical device, the authors of Piyyūṭīm were very much in the habit of marking their compositions with acrostics of their own names, the motive underlying this practice probably being, not vanity, but the desire of linking their own personalities with their sacred compositions. In the case of Ḳalir it has been shown (see Zunz, *Gottesdienstliche Vorträge*[2], p. 398 f.) that he also often achieved this object by means of *Gematria*, i.e. by the equation of the numerical value of his name with that of a sentence in the poem. Of special interest is the form of metre which has been employed in Hebrew hymns—and, indeed, Hebrew poetry in general—from the time of Solomon ibn Gabirol onwards. The measure rests neither on the quantity of the syllables nor on the accent, but on the difference between a simple syllable (*tᵉnūʻah*) and a syllable beginning with a moving *shᵉwa* (called *yāthēd*, i.e. 'tent-pin' or 'nail'). The simple syllable is in modern editions of Hebrew verse marked –, irrespective of quantity in the usual sense of the term, and the *yāthed* is marked ⏑. Seventeen different forms of verse founded on this principle are generally counted, but it will here suffice to give examples of two only, represented by the opening hemistichs of the well-known hymns respectively beginning *Ádōn 'Ōlam* and *Yigdāl*:

1. Ádōn | 'Ōlām | ăshĕr | mālākh. | [1]
2. Yigdāl | Élō | hīm Ḥăi | wᵉyish | tāhbāḥ.

In the first case the line is described as consisting of a *yāthēd* and two *tᵉnūʻōth*, followed by another *yāthēd* and two *tᵉnūʻōth*; in the second case the scansion is two *tᵉnūʻōth*, a *yāthēd*, and two *tᵉnūʻōth*, followed by another *yāthēd* and two *tᵉnūʻōth*.

Among the most popular pieces attached to the daily services are *Ádon 'Olam* and *Yigdal* (just referred to), and *Lᵉkhā Dōdī*. The first-named poem, which was probably not composed before the end of the 13th cent., lays special stress on the

[1] Latinized as Avicebron, and widely known under that name as the author of *Fons Vitæ* (מקור חיים).

[1] The poet has, however, allowed himself considerable licence in this piece.

Divine Unity, and was in this way probably meant to enforce the Jewish side of a polemical religious topic. The *Yigdal*, written in Italy by Daniel ben Yehûda Dayyân in the early part of the 14th cent., embodies in brief poetic form the thirteen articles of faith formulated by Moses Maimonides in the 12th century. The *Lekhâ Dôdî*, composed by Solomon Ben Moses al-Kâbiṣ (16th cent.), is a fine poetical greeting of the 'Bride of the Sabbath' recited at its entrance in the Friday evening service.[1] Of considerable popularity are also the *Habdâlôth*, *i.e.* poetical pieces recited in the home at the close of the Sabbath, some of which embody legends of the prophet Elijah. Solomon ibn Gabirol's great philosophico-religious poem entitled *Kether Malkûth* deserves special mention; it may be described as a great Hymn of Adoration and Penitence, though only attached, and that loosely, to some of the rituals.

The number of Piyyûṭîm of various kinds for fasts and festivals, and more particularly for the New Year's Feast and the Day of Atonement, is so large that much space would be occupied by even a careful selection. But it should be remarked in conclusion that the note of sadness that is so very prominent in the recital of the nation's manifold sufferings and its deep penitence, as well as the strain of joy in other parts of the liturgy, is very often of so intensely lyrical a character that musical expression becomes almost a necessity, and it is for this purpose mainly that the profession of *Ḥazzânîm*, or Synagogue Cantors, came into existence in early times, and has remained an institution down to the present day.

LITERATURE.—On the Psalms and hymnal compositions in other Books of the OT, see the Biblical Introductions and Commentaries. Summaries of the different theories regarding metre in OT poetry will be found in the artt. 'Poetry (Hebrew),' in *HDB* iv. 3 ff. (K. Budde), and 'Poetry,' in *JE* x. 93 ff. (E. König), as well as 'Poetical Literature,' in *EBi* iii. col. 3793 ff. (B. Duhm). For a general survey of the more primitive period the reader should be referred to *The Early Poetry of Israel in its Physical and Social Origins*, by G. A. Smith (Schweich Lectures, 1910; published London, 1912). Until quite recently the best edition of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha was that of E. Kautzsch (Tubingen, 1900); but there is now R. H. Charles's edition (Oxford, 1913), in which fuller information will be found on points connected with the present article; specially to be mentioned among editions of separate parts is R. H. Charles's *Book of Enoch*[2], Oxford, 1912, in which special attention is given to the rhythmic form of some parts.

The great authority on Synagogal poetry is Leopold Zunz, *Die synagogale Poesie des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1855, *Die Ritus des synagogalen Gottesdienstes*, do. 1859, *Literaturgeschichte der synagogalen Poesie*, do. 1865, also parts of *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*, Berlin, 1832, [2] Frankfort, 1892. Consult also M. Sachs, *Religiöse Poesie der Juden in Spanien*, Berlin, 1845; Franz Delitzsch, *Zur Geschichte der jüdischen Poesie*, Leipzig, 1836; the article 'Piyyuṭ,' in *JE* x. 65 ff. (besides "Abôdah' and the artt. on individual liturgical writers [of varying merit, however] in the same Encyclopedia); 'Liturgische Poesie,' in Hamburger, Supplementband ii. (a very serviceable summary of the entire subject). Among Catalogues of MSS giving lists of hymns may be mentioned A. Neubauer, *Catalogue of the Hebrew MSS in the Bodleian Library*, Oxford, 1886, cols. 218–418, and the present writer's *Catalogue of the Hebrew and Samaritan MSS in the British Museum*, ii. [1905] 197–487.

Among the very numerous editions of the Daily Prayers and the *Maḥzôr* are the *Prayer Book* of Amram Gaon, Warsaw, 1865; *Maḥzôr Vitry* (compiled about 1210; published Berlin, 1893); *'Abôdath Yisrael* (ed. Seligman Baer, Rödelheim, 1868 [the best edition with a Hebrew Commentary]); 'The Authorized Daily Prayer-Book' (with a tr. by S. Singer, London; often reprinted); the Sephardic *Forms of Prayer* (with D. A. de Sola's tr., London, originally published 1836–38; revised by M. Gaster, 1901–06); *Services of the Synagogue; a New Edition of the Festival Prayers with an Eng. Tr. in Prose and Verse*, London, 1904–09.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

HYMNS (Japanese).—Before the introduction of Buddhism, the hymn was not an integral part of the liturgy of Japanese religion. The religious dance (*kagura*)[2] seems to be of a pre-historic origin, and it was performed with musical accompaniments, both instrumental and vocal. The songs chanted on these occasions were called the *kagura-uta*, but the extant ones are not so old as the dance itself; the collection dates from the 9th cent., and their style and language point to their composition at that age.

It was Buddhism that introduced hymns to Japan, or gave them an important rôle in the religious performances. In the first period of Buddhism in Japan they were sung in Sanskrit or Chinese, and were called *gâthâ* (Jap. *ge* or *kada*), which were later adapted to Japanese and gave rise to a new style of poem composition, called *ima-yô*, or 'modern style.' It consisted of a strophe of 48 syllables, namely in four feet, each of which contained 12 syllables. The *kagura-uta* were mostly the regular Japanese verses of 31 syllables, and these were gradually superseded by the *ima-yô*, especially since the 11th century. These hymns were sung after the melody of the Indian *gâthâ*, and the art was carefully cultivated in Buddhist colleges and monasteries, according to the theories and traditions of the Indian *śabda-vidyâ* (Jap. *shômyô*, 'theories of language and music'). A collection of these hymns (along with some secular poems) dating from the middle of the 12th cent.[1] is handed down to us, and they show a great extension of the *ima-yô* hymns. The themes are either Shinto benediction and felicitation for worldly prosperity, or they are taken from Buddhist legends and praises of Buddha. Thus, parallel with the distinction in style, these hymns show a division of labour between Shinto deities, who care for the earthly good, and Buddhist deities, who guide men to the other shore of bliss. Here we shall cite some examples:

'What a pity, we cannot see Buddha face to face,
Though he is everywhere at any time;
Yet, as in a vision, he appears to us
In the calm morning hour, when there is no human bustling.

'A mere illusion it was that we saw dispersed
The smoke (of cremation) arising from the Sâla grove (of Kuśinagara);
The Lord Śâkya never died (in reality),
But He is preaching the truths eternally on Vulture Peak.'[2]

'The Deity of Mikasa Hill,
Whom we worship and pray now,
He is surely looking upon us;
So long as he blesses us,
Sure is the prosperity of our Lord,
Who rules the lands under heaven.'[3]

These hymns, both Buddhist and Shinto, were not only chanted in front of a sanctuary as a part of the liturgy, but were sung on various occasions, at banquets and musical evenings, in sitting rooms, and on streets. The intention in doing so was not profane, but it was meant to dedicate daily life and even amusement to the praise and glory of the deities. Yet the secularization led to the degradation of the sacred poems; and this circumstance gave rise, on the other hand, to particularly religious hymns, mostly composed by pious monks, in contrast to the composition of the *ima-yô* by court nobles.

We distinguish two categories in these pious or pietist hymns, the one called *wa-san* and the other *go-eika*. The *wa-san* means Japanese *gâthâs*; they consist of 48 syllables and differ little from the *ima-yô* in style and themes. Yet there was a certain difference of melody, and the *wa-san* were chanted only at religious performances. The oldest *wa-san*

[1] Compare particularly the designation 'Princess Sabbath' in vogue among the Falashas (see J. Halévy, *Te'ezâza Sanbat*, Paris, 1902).

[2] Aston's explanation (*Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 238) of the Chinese signs for *kagura* as meaning 'God-pleasure' is misleading; they mean 'divine music.'

[1] *Ryôjin Hishô* ('A Precious Collection of Chanting Pieces'), compiled by the monk-Emperor Go-Shirakawa, contained 10 fasciculi; but only one of them was recently discovered and edited by N. Sasaki.

[2] The contrast between the earthly life of Buddha and his true immortal life, the idea taken from ch. xv. of the *Lotus of the True Law*.

[3] A 31 syllable poem; the deity of Mikasa is the famous Kasuga, the ancestral deity of the clan Fujiwara.

are ascribed to Kūya (901–972) and Genshin (942–1017), the famous pioneers of Amita-Buddhism. Though the authenticity of this tradition is not well established, the rise of this category of hymns seems most probably to date from the last part of the 10th century. These pioneers were followed by many composers, and the *wa-san* were almost exclusively dedicated to Amita, the redeemer in the western paradise, Sukhāvatī.[1] The best known and most popular *wa-san* are ascribed to Shinran (1173–1262), the founder of the Shinshū, the largest of Buddhist sects in Japan up to this day. The following are three specimens from Shinran's *wa-san*:

'Beings so numerous as dusts and fine sands, who are in the worlds in the ten directions,
They are all embraced by Amita's grace and never forsaken,
Only if they invoke his name;
Our Lord is, therefore, called Amita, the Infinite.'

'Without end is the dreary ocean of births and deaths,
Immersed in it are we since eternity;
We can in no way be carried across (to the other shore)
But by being loaded on the ship of Amita's vow to save all.'

'Lo! There a torch illumines the ever-dark night of illusion!
Never regret yourself that the eyes of wisdom are troubled.
There is here a ship on the ocean of births and deaths,
No need of groaning over the heavy sins and obstacles.'

Nearly four hundred of Shinran's hymns make up a collection—the largest in the hymnology of Japanese Buddhism; and they are chanted and sung in many temples and families, so that the name *wa-san* has almost been monopolized by them.[2]

The second category, the *go-eiki*, consists of the poems composed by deities. It owes its rise to the practice of pilgrimages to various sanctuaries scattered over the country. The mountaineering practice of syncretic Buddhists was very old in its origin, but it was limited to the priest class belonging to regular orders. Towards the end of the 10th cent. the example of an ex-Emperor, who became a pilgrim, was followed by many nobles and common people. During the centuries of civil wars which lasted from the 14th to the 16th, the practice became universal. The disgraced nobles and defeated warriors, the men who had lost dear ones, and those whose properties had been ravaged derived their consolation from their devotion to deities, and especially from the itineraries made from sanctuary to sanctuary. The most popular of these places of pilgrimage were the thirty-three Kwannon (Skr. Avalokiteśvara, the god or goddess of mercy) in the central provinces, the eighty-eight temples dedicated to Kōbō Daishi,[3] the sixty-six places for the recitation of the *Hokke-kyō* (*Lotus of the True Law*), etc. The pilgrims go their way and prostrate themselves before the shrine, chanting the hymn ascribed to the deity of each shrine. Most of these hymns are simple in idea, saying that the deity appeared on the spot because he loved the place and wished to attract the people to the place and to his worship, and the like. They are also crude in rhetoric, and represent the poetic genius of the uncultured people in the ages of wars. Yet many of these are quite popular even at the present day, and they are chanted at meetings in private houses.[4]

Since the 17th cent., Buddhist hymnology has made hardly any progress (Shinto hymns almost in disuse since the 14th). Changes or development in melody were left to the various branches of secular music (which owe their origin to religious music), and the hymn retains its archaic simplicity, with some minor deviations according to sects. A feature of Japanese hymns (both Buddhist and Shinto) is that they are not always sung by all the worshippers but often by the priests alone. Another characteristic is the absence of refrain. In the case of the Shinshū hymns, Amita's name is repeatedly chanted, in the place of a refrain, between two strophes of the hymns.

[1] Later on, some *wa-san* were composed in praise of various other Buddhas and saints.

[2] Many of the Buddhist sects in Japan do not use hymns, but recite their sacred texts and litanies.

[3] A popular saint who lived in the 9th century.

[4] One group of these hymns is dedicated to Jizō (Skr. Kṣitigarbha), revered as the patron deity of children, especially dead; and they are sung in mournful tones in the houses of the common people where a child has died.

LITERATURE.—The only literature bearing on the subject has been mentioned in the article. M. ANESAKI.

HYMNS (Muslim).—Music and verse have no place in the ordinary worship of the Muslims, so that it might be difficult to find in Islamic literature anything precisely analogous to the Christian hymn. The Qur'ān is hostile to the poets, and the Prophet was at first careful to dissociate himself from them; he 'had not been taught versification' (Qur. xxxvi. 69), and seems never to have had any appreciation of it, though towards the end of his career he employed a court-poet, and allowed poetical eulogies on himself to be recited. Still it is asserted that his troops inspired themselves on the field with war-songs, which, owing to the religious character of their cause, might be called hymns; and the songs of triumph which celebrated the early victories of Islām seem to deserve the same name; an example is to be found in the verses of the poet 'Alī celebrating the victory of the Muslims over the apostates of Bahrain (Aghānī, xiv. 49).

In the early poetry the verses had ordinarily little more than an artificial connexion with each other, so that the same poem might contain edifying and unedifying matter; but, with the settlement of the Arabian State and the consequent development of study, the departments of poetry came to be separated, and two which bear some analogy to hymns are encomia of the Prophet and his Companions, and the subject called *zuhd*, *i.e.* 'contempt of the world.' The composition of the former sort began, as has been seen, in the Prophet's lifetime, and has ever since been popular. Perhaps the most celebrated poem of the kind is the *Burdah* of Sharaf al-dīn Muḥammad b. Sa'īd al-Būṣīrī († A.D. 1295), in 170 lines. Miraculous powers are supposed to be attached to this work, which has been frequently interpreted and translated. An example of a poem in praise of the Companions is that by the inventor of the *maqāmah*, Badī' al-zamān al-Hamadhanī († A.D. 1008; see Yāqūt, *Dict. of Learned Men*, ed. Margoliouth, London, 1907 ff., i. 114–116). The Shī'ah naturally have poems in praise of 'Alī, Fāṭima, and their family; an author of celebrity in this line was 'Alī b. 'Abdallah al-Nāshī' († A.D. 976), one of whose laments on Ḥusain was chanted by a professional mourner in a mosque (Yaqut, v. 240).

The beginnings of ascetic poetry are found very early; the author who is usually regarded as the best representative of this department is Abu'l-'Atāhiyah († A.D. 826, 827, or 829). His *dīwān* (published at the Roman Catholic Press, Beirut, 1886) is mainly devotional and introspective; and, were the odes rendered into European verse, their content would be found to resemble that of many a hymn-book.

The use of music for the purpose of stirring religious emotions scarcely goes back to the time of Muḥammad, but appears to have commenced early in Islām; 'Aṭā b. Abī Rabaḥ († A.D. 734) is said to have introduced the practice at Mecca during the days of the pilgrimage month called *tashrīq*; he kept two singing-women to perform on these occasions (*Qūt al-qulūb* of Abū Ṭalib al-Makkī, Cairo, 1310, ii. 62), and the custom was maintained in the Ḥijāz. Probably the verses

sung by these women were erotic; but the Ṣūfīs habitually address the Divine Being in the terms of the erotic passion, and it is often difficult to tell whether a poet is allegorizing or not. The erotic poems of Ibn al-Mu'allim († A.D. 1196) were committed to memory by the dervishes of the Rifā'ī order, who sang them at their religious concerts, for the purpose of exciting their souls to a state of rapture (Ibn Khallikān, tr. de Slane, London, 1842–71, iii. 169). These appear to have been primarily erotic; but those of Ibn al-Fārid († A.D. 1238), probably the most affecting in the Arabic language, seem to have been primarily religious.

The propriety of employing music and erotic odes for this purpose was naturally questioned by the orthodox, and some authorities condemn it unhesitatingly. Those who approve of it are inclined to confine it to persons who have attained a high stage of holiness, and in whom the music can wake only sublime thoughts, or with whom it serves as an aid to fasting (*Qūt al-qulūb*, ii. 61). The influence of music on the mind and its effect on persons of different spiritual attainment are discussed by Ṣūfī writers with great subtlety, *e.g.* in the *Kashf al-Maḥjūb* (tr. Nicholson, London, 1911, pp. 397–413). It seems clear that there need be nothing essentially religious about either the verses or the tunes which can be employed devotionally; and the enemies of the Ṣūfīs taunt them with singing frivolous songs in the mosques and even in the great sanctuary of Mecca (*al-'Alam al-Shāmikh*, by Sālih b. Mahdī al-Muqbilī [† 1696], Cairo, 1328, p. 380). Naturally the legal systems which forbid all music could be quoted in condemnation of these performances.

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

HYMNS (Samaritan and Karaite).—The hymnal compositions of the Samaritans and the Karaites, though in each case decidedly particularist in spirit, are, nevertheless, properly comprehended in the wider Israelitish family of devotional verse.

1. **Samaritan hymns.**—Out of the great mass of valuable details that have resulted from A. E. Cowley's investigation (see Literature at the end), it becomes evident that the data bearing on the composition of the Samaritan liturgy, which consists of Pentateuchal lections alternating with poetical and prose compositions, appear to justify the assignment of special significance to the following three periods, each marking a fresh departure in liturgical development: (1) the 4th cent. A.D., when Aramaic was the language used; (2) the 10th and 11th centuries, when Aramaic had ceased to be the vernacular, but was still used in liturgy, though it had become artificial and mixed with Hebraisms; and (3) the 14th cent. and after, when Hebrew, mixed with Aramaisms, had become the liturgical language.

The names of great composers of hymns in the 4th cent. are Marqah and Amram Darah, the latter being possibly identical with Amram b. Sered, the father of Marqah; and the leading synagogal reformer, in conjunction with whom both of them worked, was Baba the Great, a contemporary of the high priest Nethanael, who died A.D. 332. Marqah's son Nanah also wrote some devotional poetry. The collection of their poems (Marqah's pieces being referred to in the texts under his name, and Darah's work being known as the *Durran*) constituted, together with the lections from the Pentateuch and a number of prose pieces, the original form of the liturgical canon which later acquired the title of *Defter* (دفتر = διφθέρα), its earliest known representative being the British Museum MS Oriental 5034, the greater part of which was written in A.D. 1258.

The dates of the leading writers of the 10th and subsequent centuries cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, be fixed with much certainty; but Cowley, whilst fully appreciating the confused character of the references found in the chronicles and elsewhere, considers that the style of the compositions assigned to al-Dustān suggests a date in the 11th cent., that Abu'l-Ḥasan of Tyre also belongs to some part of the 11th cent., and that Ab Gelugah and Ṭabiah b. דרתה flourished in the early part of the 12th century. Firmer ground is reached in the allocation of dates in the third period. The founder of the new school of writers was apparently the high priest Pinḥas (1308–63), and the talent and zeal shown by him remained hereditary in his family for some generations. Of his two sons, Eleazar and Abisha, the former, who left only a small number of liturgical pieces, succeeded to the office of high priest, whilst to the latter, who enjoyed a great reputation as a writer, seventeen pieces can be assigned with certainty, and seven others with a high degree of probability. Pinḥas, the son of Abisha, who succeeded his uncle Eleazar in the high priesthood, and died in 1442, was also a liturgical writer.

There is, on the other hand, considerable uncertainty regarding the date of the liturgist Pinḥas b. Ithamar, who was high priest at Damascus. Cowley is inclined to accept A.H. 793 (A.D. 1391) as the beginning of his term of office, but he acknowledges that the possibility of his having flourished about a century later is not excluded. There is also some uncertainty about the dates of several other hymn-writers connected with Damascus (*e.g.*, Abraham חיתרי, probably about the middle of the 15th cent.; Seth Aaron b. Isaac, probably about the same date). Of the hymn-writers of later times, chiefly belonging to the Levitical,[1] the Danfi, and the Marḥib families, only a few representative names can be mentioned in this place. A prolific writer of the first-named family was Ṭabiah (or Ghazzāl) b. Isaac († 1787), and among the latest hymn-writers of the same stock was Pinḥas b. Isaac († 1898). The Danfi names which most frequently occur are Murjān and Muslim (= משלמה), and the latest member of the Marḥib family to write liturgical compositions was Abraham b. Ishmael, who was living in 1828.

For a list of the services (which, as may be expected, follow *mutatis mutandis* the order of the Jewish liturgy) and the manner in which the poetical pieces are distributed in them, see Cowley's edition of the Samaritan liturgy, which includes an 'Index of First Lines' of the pieces published in the work (Introd. pp. lxxiii–xcv).[2]

'With regard to *metre* in the poetical compositions,' writes Cowley, 'no certainty is possible, since pronunciation varied at different periods and we know little about it at any time.' He, however, agrees that some pieces seem to be metrical, though the majority exhibit only 'some sort of rhythm.' The alphabetical acrostic has been very usual since the time of Marqah, and the acrostic giving the author's name, which is found once in Marqah (piece beginning מרה ראלהותה דילך הי רבותה), is very usual in later pieces. Rhyme, which is used by neither Marqah nor Darah, becomes very common in the later periods, when it is not infrequently (in the long hymns) employed up to a high

[1] The high-priestly family of Aaronic descent died out in 1623–24; from that date onward the office descended to members of the family of Uzziel, a younger son of Kohath.

[2] The services in praise of the prophet Moses, as exemplified by the British Museum MS Additional 19,021 (Arabic; composed in 1537 by the Shaikh Ismā'īl ibn Badr ibn Abu'l-'Izz ibn Rumaih), should be added to the list embodied in Cowley's edition. It should also be noted that the Samaritan order appears to betray at some points conscious imitation of the Jewish liturgy (so, *e.g.*, the frequently occurring forms of ישתבח).

degree of tediousness, a long row of lines ending in the same rhyme.

2. Karaite hymns.—At the foundation of Karaism, about A.D. 750, the traditional liturgy of the Jews was, as a part of Talmudical legalism, discarded by the sectaries, and the Pentateuch, the Psalter, and other parts of the OT were henceforth to constitute the only sources from which, besides lections, prayers and devotional songs were to be drawn. The totally unimaginative and stationary attitude which Anan enjoined on his followers could not, however, be maintained for very long; and, just as the abandonment of Talmudical hermeneutics and general Halakhah led to the gradual development of an almost equally involved system of Karaite legal hermeneutics, so also in the course of time, the Rabbinic liturgy was replaced by a Karaite ritual running on parallel lines with the Rabbanite services. As, moreover, the Karaite leaders possessed the sense of logical consistency in a much higher degree than the poetic faculty, they for the most part not only found it necessary to imitate the hymnal models of the Rabbanites, but even could not help admitting Rabbanite compositions into their liturgical collections (as by Solomon ibn Gabirol and Yehudah hal-Levi).

The most prominent among Karaite liturgical authors was Moses Dar'i, who was also successful as a writer of secular poems. He is believed in Karaite circles to have flourished about the middle of the 9th cent., and it is, accordingly, claimed that Solomon ibn Gabirol, Moses ibn Ezra, Yehudah hal-Levi, and other Rabbanite poets worked on models provided by Dar'i. Investigations—principally by Steinschneider and Geiger—have, however, shown that the position must be reversed, Dar'i having in reality been the borrower from the Rabbanite poets referred to, so that the end of the 12th cent. is the earliest date that can be assigned to him.

The greatest name connected with the development of the Karaite liturgy is that of Aaron b. Joseph (called Aaron the Elder to distinguish him from Aaron b. Elijah of Nicomedia), who flourished at Constantinople (though born in Sulchat in the Crimea) in the second half of the 13th and beginning of the 14th cent., and who is often affectionately referred to at the head of his poetical compositions in the printed Karaite Service Books as הרב ז"ל ('the Master, may his memory be for a blessing'). The impression made by Aaron b. Joseph's personality and work (which includes a series of poetical pieces for the pericopes of the Pentateuch as liturgically recited throughout the year) was, indeed, so great that his redaction of the liturgy remained, under somewhat varied forms, the norm of the Karaite services down to the present day. Traces of other rituals, in some cases actually exhibiting different sets of liturgical poems, and in other cases also having no doubt contained pieces by other authors, are, however, not lacking. Joseph b. Mordecai Troki, writing to his countryman Elijah Bashiatsi (both of them having belonged to the Byzantine body of Karaites) towards the end of the 15th cent., states that there were at that time three different rituals in the hands of the Karaites: (1) by one of the early liturgists (א' מהקדמונים), (2) by Aaron b. Joseph, just mentioned, and (3) by Joseph, the father of the same Aaron (see Neubauer, *Aus der Petersburger Bibliothek*, Leipzig, 1866, pp. 58, 140). More definite evidence of the existence of different rituals is afforded by the British Museum MSS Or. 2531 (dated A.D. 1700), 2530 (16th–17th cent.), and Or. 2532 (written about A.D. 1700), the first representing the ritual of Damascus, and the last two that of Jerusalem (for full descriptions, with lists of pieces, see Margoliouth, *Cat. of the Heb. and Samar. MSS in the Brit. Mus.* ii. nos. 725–727).

Among the other noted Karaite authors who—for the most part in addition to works of larger compass—composed liturgical poems are Aaron b. Elijah of Nicomedia (14th cent., already referred to), Israel b. Samuel Rôfè (early 14th cent.), Samuel al-Maghribi (*i.e.* of North Africa; in this case, Cairo; early 15th cent.), Elijah Bashiatsi (already referred to), Caleb Efendopolo (latter half of 15th cent., first at Adrianople, then Constantinople), Yehudah b. Elijah Gibbôr (author of מגחת יהודה, consisting of a series of poems on the pericopes of the Pentateuch; beginning of 16th cent.), Daniel b. Moses Pêrôz (living at Damascus in the latter part of the 17th cent., where he also composed an introductory treatise on the Damascus ritual), Isaac b. Shalom (end of the 18th cent.), and another writer of the same name (presumably resident in the Crimea, now the only important part of Karaite settlements), who edited the Karaite Service Book printed at Vienna in 1854. In the Museum MSS referred to the name Samuel סני very frequently appears as the author of hymns, and other names (such as משלם = Muslim or Meshullam, and Mansur) occurring there also await further investigation. Among the topics dealt with are the praises of Moses, Aaron, Samuel, and Elijah. In the hymns occurring in the MSS, Hebrew is sometimes intermixed with Arabic, and occasionally Arabic only is employed. It furthermore remains to say that the order of the Karaite services corresponds (again, of course, *mutatis mutandis*) to the Jewish Synagogue services, and that in point of metre, rhyme, acrostics (both alphabetical and of authors' names), etc., the Karaite liturgical poems run on parallel lines with the Rabbanite *Piyyûṭim*.

LITERATURE.—I. *SAMARITAN.*—The most important work to consult is *The Samaritan Liturgy*, ed. A. E. Cowley, Oxford, 1910, on which the section dealing with Samaritan hymns has been based. Other works (or articles) are: W. Gesenius, *Carmina Samaritana e codicibus Londinensibus et Gothanis*, Leipzig, 1824; M. Heidenheim, *Die samaritanische Liturgie*, Leipzig, 1885 (= *Bibliotheca Samaritana*, ii.), and a number of liturgical pieces in different parts of *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für englisch-theol. Forschung und Kritik*, 1861-71; A. J. Merx, 'Carmina Samaritana e codice Gothano,' in *Atti della reale academia dei Lincei*, Rome, 1887; L. Rappoport, *La Liturgie samaritaine: office du soir des fêtes*, etc., Paris, 1900; G. Margoliouth, 'An Ancient MS of the Samaritan Liturgy' [i.e. the Brit. Mus. MS Or. 5034, referred to in the article], in *ZDMG* li. [1897] 499; J. A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans*, Philadelphia, 1907, where also a number of further details on this literature will be found (bibliography, pp. 322–346).

ii. *KARAITE.*—The two principal editions of the Liturgy (both representing forms of Aaron b. Joseph's redaction) are סדר תפלות המקראים, Vienna, 1854, and תפלות כמנהג המקראים, Odessa and Wilna, 1868–72. Complete lists of hymns found in the Brit. Mus. Karaite liturgical MSS are given in G. Margoliouth, *Cat. of the Heb. and Samar. MSS in the Brit. Mus.*, London, 1905ff., ii. 450–487. Lists of hymns in the comparatively few Karaite liturgical MSS in Berlin are given in M. Steinschneider's *Hebr. Handschr.* ii. [Berlin, 1897] no. 198; *Aus der Petersburger Bibliothek*, by A. Neubauer, has been referred to in the body of the art., and scattered information on liturgical topics will be found in the works named in the bibliogra. by appended to **A. de Harkavy's art.** 'Karaites,' in *JE* vii. [1904] 438.

G. MARGOLIOUTH.

HYMNS (Vedic).—1. Importance.—The body of literature comprising the Vedic hymns claims a very high place in the history of civilization; for it supplies the investigator not only of Indian but of Aryan life with his most ancient data. The language in which they are composed furnishes the student of comparative philology with his oldest and most abundant material. From the information contained in them can be constructed a fairly detailed description of the social and political conditions of the earliest Aryan inhabitants of India. In them we find the sources of Aryan mythology and religion: here alone can be traced the process of personification by which gods were evolved from natural phenomena, and the stages by which polytheism was transformed into the pantheism that for far more than two thousand years has domi-

nated the thought of the Hindus. In them can be discerned the foundations of the indigenous Aryan religions of India—Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism: the first the faith of four-fifths of the Indians of to-day, the last a world religion that has profoundly influenced the civilization of the Farther East. Without a knowledge of them these later religions cannot be understood any more than the NT without the OT.

2. Definition.—Owing to the somewhat different sense attaching to the word in other literatures, it is necessary to define the term 'hymn' as applied to the Vedas. Here it means a ritual poem consisting, on the higher side of religion, in praises of the gods, and generally accompanying the sacrifice offered to them; or, on its lower side, in spells or charms directed against hostile powers, and accompanying some domestic practice of a magical character. Hymns of the former type, in which praise of one or more of the gods associated with prayers for all sorts of worldly goods is the chief feature, are collected in the Rigveda, the oldest of the four Vedas. Hymns of the latter type constitute the main contents of the latest of the four, the Atharvaveda. The use of the term 'hymn' is also extended so as to include a certain number of poems, philosophical or even quite secular in character, that have found their way into the canonical form of both these Vedas. These two collections alone consist of hymns.

The other two Vedas are formed of disconnected verses or spells employed solely for application to special ritual purposes. The Sāmaveda contains hardly any independent matter, all its verses (except 75) being borrowed from the Rigveda and used exclusively in the ritual of the Soma sacrifice. These verses are strung together without any internal connexion, being significant only as applicable to a particular rite when they are chanted in the various melodies collected in certain songbooks. The Yajurveda consists solely of ritual formulas (about one-half being in prose), which, unlike the verses of the Sāmaveda, are successively applicable to the whole sacrificial ceremonial. About one-half of its metrical portion is borrowed from the Rigveda, the remaining three-fourths of its contents being original. Owing to the compelling force which, by the time of this Veda, the sacrifice was regarded as possessing, its formulas virtually belong to the sphere of witchcraft: they are sacrificial spells, not differing fundamentally from the domestic spells of the Atharvaveda.

3. Chronology.—According to the native traditional authorities, the Vedas were the creation of Brahmā, and were only revealed to or, as they express it, seen by various seers (*ṛṣis*). Scientific investigation, however, has shown from internal evidence that not only the four Vedas but parts of the same Veda differ in age, and that they were composed by seers who belonged to various families, and who often refer to the skill with which they have endeavoured to fashion a new hymn to win the favour of the gods. But, although the relative ages of the various Vedas are known, we have nothing in the nature of exact chronology in regard to them. All that we can say is that the lower limit of the period covered by them must necessarily be fixed at several centuries before 500 B.C., the approximate date of the spread of Buddhism on India. For Buddhism presupposes the existence not only of the Vedas themselves, but of the intervening theological and theosophical literature if the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads (see VEDIC RELIGION, **2**, *b*, *c*). Since that literature is extensive and betrays a considerable development of ideas within its limits, it cannot be assumed to have begun later than about 800 B.C. Again, the evidence of their language, their religious ideas, and their geographical data proves that the Vedas vary greatly in age. Thus we find that, between the time when the earliest and the latest Vedic hymns were composed, the Aryan invaders had spread right across Northern India from Eastern Kabulistan to the delta of the Ganges. Similar evidence indicates the existence of successive chronological strata within each Veda. To allow for all this gradual development it is necessary to postulate a period of some centuries, decidedly longer, for example, than that between Homeric and classical Greek. Hence the age of the Vedic hymns cannot be assumed to begin later than about the 13th cent. B.C. In the opinion of the present writer, which practically agrees with the earlier moderate estimate of Max Müller in his *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, five hundred years are amply sufficient to account for the gradual changes, linguistic, religious, social, and political, that this hymn literature reveals. We have only to reflect on the vast transformation wrought on the continent of America by the lapse of only four centuries since the European immigration began. H. Jacobi, however, and an Indian scholar, B. G. Tilak, in 1893 independently arrived at the conclusion, on astronomical grounds, that the period of Vedic culture goes back to a far higher antiquity. The latter claims for some Vedic texts the immensely remote date of 6000 B.C., while, according to the former, the hymns of the Rigveda must at any rate be earlier than 3000 B.C. This is not the place to discuss the complicated arguments on which these results are based. Suffice it to say that such distinguished authorities as Whitney, Oldenberg, and Thibaut all refuse to accept these deductions, which are founded on the assumption that the early Indians possessed an exact astronomical knowledge of the sun's (not the moon's) course in relation to the lunar mansions, such as there is no evidence, or even probability, that they actually possessed. The astronomical calculations are not in doubt; it is the validity of the assumptions and inferences which constitute the starting-point of those calculations that is in the highest degree questionable. The possibility of extreme antiquity seems to be disproved by the relationship of the earliest literature of the Avesta (*q.v.*), estimated to date from the 6th cent. B.C., to the Vedic hymns. That relationship is linguistically (to say nothing of religious ideas and practices) already so close that, if the language of the Avesta were known to us at a stage earlier by six or seven centuries, it could hardly differ at all from that of the Vedic hymns. It therefore seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Indians cannot have separated from the Iranians much earlier than about 1300 B.C. By Jacobi's hypothesis the Indians had already separated from them before 4500 B.C. From this it follows that both the Indian and the Iranian language remained practically unchanged for the truly vast period of over 3000 years, whereas in a similar period the Vedic language has undergone the immense changes represented by the present condition of the modern vernaculars of India. The present writer's view does not seem to be invalidated by Hugo Winckler's discovery, in 1907, of the names of the Indian deities Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra, Nāsatya (in the form of *mi-it-ra*, *uru-w-na*, *in-da-ra*, and *na-ša-at-ti-ia*), in an inscription dating from 1400 B.C., at Boghaz-keui in Asia Minor. The phonetic form of these names quite well admits of their being assigned to the Indo-Iranian period, when the Indians and Persians were still one people. The date of the inscription would allow two centuries for the separation of the Indians, their migration to India, and the commencement of Vedic hymn literature in the north-west of Hindustan.

4. Growth of the hymn collections.—When the Indo-Aryans entered India by the passes of the Hindu-Kush, they brought with them a religion in which various powers of Nature were personified and worshipped as gods, of whom a few, such as Dyaús (=Zeús), go back to the Indo-European period, and several others, such as Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra, to the Indo-Iranian period. A comparison of Veda and Avesta shows that they also brought with them the cult of fire and of Soma, and were acquainted with the art of composing religious lyrics in several metres. The object with which most of these ancient hymns were composed was to win the favour of the gods by praises accompanying the oblation of melted butter in the fire and the offering of the juice of the Soma plant on a litter of grass. Doubtless many hymns of this character composed in the earliest period of the Aryan invasion have been lost. Those which have survived were composed almost exclusively by singers of the hereditary priestly class. They were handed down in different families by memory, not by writing, which cannot have been introduced into India before 800 B.C. at the earliest. These family groups of hymns were by gradual stages brought together till, with successive additions, they assumed the earliest complete form of the Rigveda, from which the later Vedas, when they came into being, borrowed a considerable part of their matter. The different Vedas were then handed down by a separate tradition till they were edited in their final form called *Saṁhitā*, with which the second period of their textual history begins, and in which they have come down to us. The constitution of the Saṁhitā text of the Rigveda must have taken place at the end of the period of the Brāhmaṇas or about 600 B.C., but before the appendages to those works, called Upaniṣads (see VEDIC RELIGION, **2**, *c*), came into being. The editors of the Saṁhitā did not alter the diction of the text already in existence, but merely applied to it certain later euphonic rules, by which, in particular, vowels are contracted or changed to semi-vowels in such a way as to obscure the metre. On the completion of this work extraordinary precautions were taken to preserve intact the sacred text fixed in this manner. The first step was the constitution, by a grammarian named Śākalya, of the *Pada*, or 'word' text, in which all the words of the Saṁhitā are separated and given in their original form as unaffected by the rules of euphonic combination, and all compounds are analyzed. This text, which practically constitutes the earliest commentary on the Rigveda, was followed by others of a more complex character devised to prevent the possibility of any change or loss in the sacred collection of hymns. The result of all these safeguards is that the text of the Rigveda has been handed down for 2500 years practically unmodified, with a fidelity elsewhere unparalleled. There is evidence showing that even in the earlier period of the text the hymns of the Rigveda were preserved with such care that, if the Saṁhitā text is pronounced with due regard to metre, it represents the hymns almost in the very form in which they proceeded from the lips of their composers. The Saṁhitās of the other Vedas were also provided with Pada texts and other safeguards, but the tradition in their case has been a good deal less trustworthy than that of the Rigveda.

5. Language and metre.—The language in which the Rigveda (and to a less extent the other Vedas) is composed represents the oldest stage of the classical Sanskrit stereotyped by the grammarian Pāṇini (*c.* 300 B.C.), differing from the latter about as much as Homeric from Attic Greek. It is much richer in grammatical forms. Thus it possesses a subjunctive in frequent use and some twelve forms of the infinitive. The former has entirely died out in Sanskrit, while of the latter only a single form survives. The language of the Vedic hymns also differs from Sanskrit in its accent, which is marked in all the Saṁhitās, and, like that of the ancient Greeks, is of a musical nature, depending essentially on the pitch of the voice, not the stress. This accent was, some time after the beginning of our era, exchanged in Sanskrit, as in later Greek, for a stress accent.

All the hymns of the Rigveda are metrical. They consist of stanzas mostly of four verses or lines, but also of three and sometimes five. The line, called *pāda* ('a fourth'), forms the metrical unit, consisting generally of eight, eleven, or twelve syllables. A stanza is usually composed of lines of the same kind; but a few of the rarer forms of stanza consist of a combination of different lines. The metres are about fifteen in number, but of these only seven are at all common. Three of them, the *triṣṭubh* (four lines of eleven syllables), the *gāyatrī* (three of eight), and the *jagatī* (four of twelve), are by far the most frequent, accounting for two-thirds of the total number of the stanzas in the Rigveda. The metres of the Vedic hymns, compared with those of Sanskrit, of which they are largely the foundation, are somewhat elastic and irregular: only the rhythm of the last four or five syllables in the line is fixed, while that of the first part is not subject to any fixed rule. They occupy a position midway between the metres of the Indo-Iranian period, in which (according to the evidence of the Avesta) the metrical principle was the number of syllables only, and those of Sanskrit, in which (excepting the epic stanza called *śloka*) the quantity of every single syllable in the line is determined. Generally a Vedic hymn consists of stanzas in the same metre: a typical variation of this rule is to mark the conclusion of the hymn by a stanza in a different metre. A certain number of hymns are strophic in their construction. The strophes in them consist either of three stanzas in the same simple metre, usually *gāyatrī*, or of the combination of two stanzas in different mixed metres. The latter strophic type is found chiefly in the eighth book of the Rigveda and is called *prugātha*.

6. Extent and divisions of the Rigveda.—The Rigveda consists of 1017 or (counting eleven that are recognized as a later addition) 1028 hymns, containing altogether about 10,600 stanzas. The average length of a hymn is thus rather more than ten stanzas. The shortest hymn consists of only one stanza and the longest of fifty eight. The Saṁhitā text, if printed continuously like prose and in Roman characters, would fill an octavo volume of about 600 pages of 33 lines each. The Rigveda is divided into parts in two ways. The one division is a purely mechanical one into *aṣṭakas*, or 'eighths,' of about equal length, each of these consisting of eight *adhyāyas*, or 'lessons,' each of which is subdivided into *vargas*, or 'groups,' of five or six stanzas. The other division is into ten *maṇḍalas*, or 'books' (literally 'cycles'), and *sūktas*, or 'hymns.' The latter system is a historical one, throwing light on the manner in which the collection arose. It is, therefore, the division invariably followed by Western scholars at the present day in dealing with or quoting the hymns of the Rigveda.

7. Arrangement.—Of the ten books, six (ii. to vii.) are homogeneous. The hymns contained in each of them were, according to native tradition, composed ('seen') by singers of the same family, which handed them down as its own collection. This tradition is supported by the internal evidence of the seers' names mentioned in the hymns and of

the refrains occurring in those books. Hence they are generally designated the 'family books.' The principle of arrangement which prevails in them is uniform, each of them being divided in the same way into groups addressed to different deities. Books i., viii., and x. are not the composition of families, and the groups of which they consist are the productions of different individual seers. Book ix. is peculiar in that all its hymns are addressed to one deity, Soma, while their arrangement is in no way connected with their authors, for the groups within it are constituted by identity of metre. In the family books the first group is always addressed to Agni, the second to Indra, and those that follow to less important deities. The arrangement of the hymns within these deity groups is in the diminishing order of the number of stanzas. Thus in bk. ii. the Agni group of ten hymns begins with one containing 16 stanzas, the last having only six. The first hymn of the Indra group here has 21 stanzas, the last only four. The entire group of family books, again, is arranged according to the ascending number of the hymns they contain, if later additions are allowed for. Thus the second book has 43 hymns, the third 62, the sixth 75, and the seventh 104. The homogeneousness of these books renders it probable that they formed the nucleus of the Rigveda, which grew to its final extent by later successive accretions. The first of these additions seems to have been the second part of bk. i., which, as formed of nine groups, each by a different author, came to be collected and prefixed to the family collections, following the latter as their pattern in their internal arrangement. The eighth resembles the family books, inasmuch as it is composed for the most part by members of one family, the Kāṇvas. But it differs from them in other respects. Thus it does not begin with a group of hymns addressed to Agni; and it is peculiar in the predominance of the strophic *pragātha* metre. The fact that it contains fewer hymns than bk. vii. indicates that it was not included in the collection of family books; but its somewhat analogous character caused it to be the first to be added at the end of that collection. The hymns forming the first part of bk. i. (1–50) have various points in common with those contained in bk. viii.; more than half of them seem to have been composed by seers of the Kāṇva family; the strophic metre affected by that family reappears in them; and many similar or identical passages are found in the two collections. The present state of research does not enable us to decide the chronological priority of the two collections or to explain why they were divided. The fact, however, remains that they were added at the beginning and the end of an older collection.

The addition of bk. ix. was the direct result of the formation of the first eight into a unit. This book consists entirely of hymns addressed to Soma and recited while the pressed juice of the plant was 'clarifying' (*pavamāna*). Their composers were seers belonging to the same families as those of bks. ii.–vii., as is shown, among other evidence, by the occurrence of refrains peculiar to those families. The hymns to Soma Pavamāna have all been extracted from the family books (in which no Soma hymn of any kind occurs), as well as from bks. i. and viii. (which contain only one and two hymns respectively to Soma in his general character), being gathered into one book as the hymns proper to the Udgātṛ, or chanting priest (while the rest belonged to the sphere of the Hotṛ, or reciting priest), and added at the end of bks. i.–viii. There is no ground for supposing that these Soma hymns were of later date than the others. On the contrary, the presumption is that the hymns belonging to the Soma ritual, which goes back to the Indo-Iranian period, date from early Vedic times. It has not as yet been possible to detect differences of chronology in this book. As to its internal arrangement the order of its first 60 hymns depends on the number of their stanzas, which decreases from 10 to 4. In the remaining 54, some of which are very long (one having as many as 58 stanzas), this principle is not observed. The two parts also differ in regard to metre; for, while the first 60 hymns are composed (except 4 stanzas) in *gāyatrī*, nearly all the rest consist of groups in other metres: thus 68–86 form a *jagatī*, 87–97 a *triṣṭubh* group.

Book x. was added last of all. It is undoubtedly, as its language and contents show, of later origin than the rest of the Rigveda. Its composers were evidently acquainted with the older books. Not only the position that it occupies at the end of the whole collection, but the fact that the number of its hymns (191) is made up to that of bk. i., is an indication of its supplementary nature. It consists of hymns by a large number of seers of different families, the names of some of which occur in other books. But the traditional names of the authors of a great many of these hymns are very doubtful. Though this book is in general more modern than the rest, it contains some hymns as old, and at least as poetical, as the average of those in other books. Such hymns perhaps found their way into this supplementary collection because they had for some reason been previously overlooked. As a whole, the tenth book approximates in language and general character to the Atharvaveda, with which it is also closely associated. For of about 1350 stanzas from the Rigveda incorporated in the Atharvaveda more than 40 per cent are taken from bk. x. Here, in contrast with the other books, we find earlier grammatical forms and words growing obsolete, while indulgence in abstract ideas and philosophical speculation, as well as the introduction of matter connected with witchcraft, such as is characteristic of the Atharvaveda, has much increased.

8. Subject-matter.—The great bulk of the hymns of the Rigveda consist of *invocations* of various deities. Their contents are, therefore, largely mythological, and furnish the main source of our knowledge of Vedic religion (*q.v.*). The gods to whom most hymns are addressed are Agni (about 200), Indra (over 250), and Soma (over 100), who thus between them claim considerably more than one-half of the whole Rigveda.

Only a few hymns (not exceeding 30) are not intended for the worship of gods or deified objects. About a dozen of these, almost restricted to bk. x., are concerned with *magical practices*, the proper sphere of the Atharvaveda. Two such (ii. 42, 43) deal with augury; two others are directed against poisonous vermin (i. 191) and the disease called *yakṣma* (x. 163); two (x. 58; 60, 7–12) consist of incantations for the preservation of life; one (v. 55) is a charm to induce sleep; two (x. 183; 162) are spells for procuring offspring or for warding off a demon destructive of children; one (x. 166) is directed against enemies, another (x. 145) against rival wives; one (x. 159) is a song of triumph over rivals; another (vii. 103) a panegyric of frogs as magical bringers of rain.

Some 20 others are more or less *secular poems*, concerned with social customs, moral questions, riddles, and cosmogonic speculations. Several of these are especially important as throwing light on the earliest thought and civilization of India, though much information of this character may be gathered from incidental references scattered through the rest of the collection. One of the most noteworthy is the long wedding hymn (x. 85) connected with the marriage ceremonial, though containing a large admixture of mythological

matter. There are also in bk. x. five hymns (14–18) dealing with funeral rites. Four of them, however, are addressed to deities concerned with the life beyond the grave. The last, being quite secular in tone, supplies more information than any of the rest about the funeral usages of early Vedic India (see DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Hindu]).

Besides several mythological *dialogues* in which the speakers are divine beings (iv. 62; x. 51, 52; 86; 108), there are two in which one or both agents are human. One is a somewhat obscure colloquy (x. 95) between a mortal lover Purūravas and a celestial nymph, who is on the point of forsaking him. The other (x. 10) is a dialogue between the twins Yama and Yamī, the ancestors of the human race. This group of hymns has a special literary interest as precursors of the dramatic poetry of a later age.

Among the secular hymns of the Rigveda are to be included the *dānastutis* ('praises of gifts'), which are represented by one complete hymn (i. 126) and appendages of 3–5 stanzas to over 30 others. They are poems of a *semi-historical* character, being panegyrics on liberal patrons in whose behalf the singers composed their hymns to accompany the sacrifice. They furnish incidental genealogical information about the seers and their employers, as well as about the names and habitat of the Vedic tribes. They are late in date, belonging chiefly to bks. i. and x., and to supplementary hymns of bk. viii.

Four of the secular hymns are of a *didactic* type. One of them (x. 34) is a remarkable poem, being the lament of a gambler who, unable to resist the fascination of the dice, deplores the ruin he has brought on himself and his family. The other three, describing the various ways in which men follow gain (ix. 112) and praising wise speech (x. 71) or the value of good deeds (x. 117), are the forerunners of the sententious poetry which was so assiduously cultivated in post-Vedic Sanskrit literature.

Two of the hymns of the Rigveda consist of *riddles*. One of them (viii. 29) in ten stanzas describes various gods by their characteristic marks, leaving it to the hearer to guess who in each case is meant. A far more elaborate collection of riddles is a long hymn (i. 164) consisting of 52 stanzas. These propound, in mystical and symbolic language, a number of enigmas, many of them connected with the sun. Thus the wheel of order with 12 spokes, revolving round the heavens and containing within it in couples 720 sons, means the year with its 12 months and 360 days.

Lastly, there are six or seven *cosmogonic hymns* containing speculations regarding the origin of the world in connexion with a Creator (called by different names) as distinct from any of the ordinary gods. Only one of them (x. 129), however, treats the subject in a purely philosophic spirit, as an evolutionary process from the non-existent (*a-sat*) to the existent (*sat*), and thus forms the starting-point of Indian philosophy.

From the *geographical data* furnished by the Rigveda, especially the numerous rivers mentioned there, we are justified in concluding that at the time when these hymns were composed the Aryan tribes were in occupation of the territory drained by the Indus river system lying between 35° and 28° northern latitude and 70° and 78° eastern longitude, and corresponding roughly to the North-west Frontier Province and the Panjāb of to-day. This conclusion is borne out by the references to the flora and fauna of the country in which they were settled.

From the *historical data* of the hymns we further learn that the Aryans were still engaged in warfare with the original inhabitants. Many victories over these foes are recorded, and once 1000 of them are said to have been bound and 30,000 slain with the aid of Indra. That the Aryans were still bent on conquest is to be inferred from the mention of rivers as barriers to their progress. Though split up into numerous tribes, they were conscious of religious and racial unity, for they contrasted the aborigines, whom they called Dasyus or Dāsas, with themselves, designating them as non-sacrificers and unbelievers, and calling them 'black skins' and the 'Dāsa colour' as opposed to the 'Aryan colour.' This racial contrast appears to have been the starting-point of the later system of caste (*q.v.*), the Sanskrit name of which (*varṇa*) means 'colour.' The enslaved Dāsas became the Śūdras, the fourth or lowest caste, first mentioned in one of the very latest hymns (x. 90) of the Rigveda.

The names of many of the Vedic tribes are mentioned. There was no political cohesion among them, for, though they sometimes formed coalitions, they were constantly at war with one another. A coalition of several tribes is referred to as taking part in the 'battle of the ten kings,' when Aryans fought against each other on the banks of the Parusnī river (now Ravi).

The hymns also furnish material for a fairly detailed account of the *social conditions* of those early days. Thus we find that the family was the foundation of society with the father as its head, and that women held a freer and more honoured position than in later times. Mention is made of various crimes, of which robbery, chiefly in the form of cattle-lifting, seems to have been the commonest. Indebtedness was known, mainly as a result of gambling, and reference is made to the clearing off of debt by instalments. Various details are given about clothing and personal adornment. Thus we see that it was usual to wear an upper and lower garment, which were made of sheep's wool and were often decorated. Bracelets, anklets, necklets, and earrings were used as ornaments. Hair is mentioned as worn in different ways. Men usually grew beards, but occasionally shaved. The usual food consisted of milk, clarified butter, grain, vegetables, and fruit. Meat was eaten only on ceremonial occasions, when animals were sacrificed. The commonest kind was apparently beef, since bulls were the chief offerings to the gods. But the sanctity of the cow which prevailed, having in fact come down from the Indo-Iranian period, gradually grew in strength till in later times beef in general came to be absolutely forbidden, and has remained so among the Hindus down to the present day. Two kinds of spirituous liquor were made: *soma* was restricted to religious ceremonies or festivals, while *sura*, made from some kind of grain, was that in ordinary use.

That one of the main *occupations* of the invading Aryan was warfare is only natural. He fought either on foot or from a chariot; but, as far as can be seen, not on horseback, as in later times. The usual weapons were bows and arrows, but spears and axes were also employed. Cattle-breeding seems to have been the chief means of livelihood: cows are the most prominent objects of desire in the prayers to the gods. But tillage was also practised to some extent. Fields were furrowed with a plough drawn by bulls. Corn was cut with a sickle, and then threshed out and winnowed. The mention of channels excavated for water seems to indicate that irrigation was not unknown. Wild animals were trapped and snared, or hunted with bows and arrows, sometimes with the aid of dogs. Navigation in boats (doubtless of a very primitive

type) propelled by paddles seems to have been employed mainly for the purpose of crossing rivers. Fishing hardly seems to have been practised, probably because the rivers of Kabulistan and of the Panjāb were in those days, as they are now, poor in fish. Trade was known only in the form of barter, the cow representing the standard by which the value of commodities was estimated.

The primitiveness of life in those days enabled every man to supply most of his own wants. But it is clear that certain trades and crafts already existed, though doubtless in a rudimentary stage. One of them was the combined occupation of the carpenter and the wheelwright, who, since the construction of chariots and carts required special skill, must have been much in demand. Skill in the composition of hymns is often compared by the singers of the Rigveda with the deftness of the wheelwright. Mention is also made of the smith who smelted ore in a forge, and made kettles and other vessels of metal. The tanner, too, is spoken of as preparing the skins of animals. Women practised plaiting mats of grass or reeds, sewing, and especially weaving, but whether they as yet ever did so professionally is not clear.

Among active *amusements* chariot-racing was the favourite one, as might have been expected in a warlike and conquering population. The social recreation most practised was playing with dice, which were four in number. Dancing was also indulged in, chiefly by women. The people were fond of music, playing on the drum (*dundubhi*), the flute (*vāṇa*), and the lute (*vīṇā*). The lute has from those early days been the favourite musical instrument of the Indian. Singing also is often mentioned. This art, at least as applied to religious purposes, must have advanced beyond a rudimentary stage by the time the Sāmaveda was compiled, for the melodies in which it was chanted were numerous, and are already often referred to by their special names in the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads.

9. **Literary merit.**—The diction of the hymns of the Rigveda is, on the whole, simple and natural. The moderate use of compounds, which are practically restricted to two members, contrasts strikingly with their frequency and inordinate length in classical Sanskrit. Considering their great antiquity, the hymns are composed with a remarkable degree of metrical skill and command of language. But, as they were produced by a sacerdotal class and were generally intended to accompany a ceremonial that was no longer primitive, their poetry is often impaired by constant sacrificial allusions. This is especially apparent in the hymns addressed to the two ritual deities Agni and Soma, where the thought, otherwise artless and direct, becomes affected by conceits and obscured by mysticism. This tendency was probably aggravated by the necessity of ringing the changes on a limited range of ideas throughout a large number of hymns, comprising nearly one-third of the whole collection. Here we already meet, in its earliest form, that partiality for subtle and difficult modes of expression which prevails in post-Vedic literature, and which one of the Brāhmaṇas already indicates by observing that 'the gods love the obscure.' In spite of such defects, the Rigveda contains much genuine poetry. Since the gods addressed are, for the most part, personifications of natural phenomena, and their connexion with those phenomena is still felt, the praises addressed to them give rise to much beautiful and even noble imagery. It is, however, only to be expected that the literary merit of so large a body of poetry should vary considerably. Some hymns accordingly consist of commonplace and mechanical verse, while others attain a high level of poetic excellence. The average degree of literary skill is in fact remarkably high. This is perhaps partly due to the fact that these early singers felt the necessity of producing a hymn composed with the highest art in order to please the gods. A poet often says, generally in the last stanza, that he has praised the deity according to his knowledge or ability, that his hymn is like a well-wrought car, a well-woven garment, or a bride adorned for her lover.

The hymns in which literary merit is most conspicuous may be briefly indicated. The group of some twenty addressed to Uṣas, goddess of Dawn, is the most poetical in the Rigveda. It will probably be admitted by all who read them, even if only in a good translation, that their beauty is quite equal, if not superior, to that of the descriptive religious lyrics of any other literature. Some of the hymns to Indra (esp. i. 32) show much graphic power in their account of the conflict of that god with Vṛtra, the demon of drought; those to the Maruts, or storm-gods, often depict with much striking imagery the phenomena of thunder and lightning, and the mighty onset of the wind. One hymn to Parjanya (v. 83) paints the devastating effects of the rainstorm with great vividness. The hymns addressed to Varuṇa, the most ethical of the Vedic gods, describe the various aspects of his sway as moral ruler of the world, in an exalted strain of poetry. Several of the mythological dialogues already referred to set forth the situation with much beauty of language. Such are the dialogue between Indra's messenger, Saramā, and the demons who have stolen the cows (x. 108), and that between the primeval twins, Yama and Yamī (x. 10). The gambler's lament (x. 34) is the finest specimen of pathetic poetry in the Rigveda. Ideas connected with death are treated in language of impressive and solemn beauty in one of the funeral hymns (x. 18). Among the cosmogonic hymns one in particular (x. 129) is an example of how profound philosophic speculation can be clothed in poetry of a high order.

10. **Interpretation.**—In dealing with the hymns of the Rigveda, the important question arises, to what extent are we able to understand their real sense, considering that they have come down to us as an isolated relic from the remotest period of Indian literature? The reply, stated generally, is that as the result of the labours of scholars the meaning of a considerable proportion of the Rigveda is clear, but of the remainder many hymns, and a great many single stanzas or passages, are still obscure or unintelligible, as a comparison of different translations suffices to show. This was already the case in the time of Yāska, the author of the *Nirukta*, the oldest extant commentary on parts of the Rigveda (c. 500 B.C.); for he quotes one of his predecessors as declaring the Vedic hymns to be obscure, unmeaning, and mutually contradictory. Detailed critical research has already done much to reduce the number of passages the sense of which is questionable. It cannot be doubted, however, that an irreducible minimum of unintelligible matter will always remain, simply because no evidence survives of the particular circumstances that could enable us to understand the allusions made. Much progress is still to be expected from patient and minute research guided by the method of interpretation now generally accepted. In the earlier period of Vedic studies, commencing in the middle of the 19th cent., the traditional method, which follows the great commentary of Sāyaṇa (14th cent.) and is represented by the translation of the Rigveda begun by H. H. Wilson in 1850, was considered adequate. But now the critical method initiated by Rudolf von Roth, the founder of Vedic philology, is, with some modifications, that which has been adopted

by practically all Western scholars. Roth proved that, though the native commentators were invaluable guides in explaining the theological and ritual texts of the Brāhmaṇas and Sūtras, with the atmosphere of which they were familiar, they did not possess a continuous tradition from the time of the Vedic hymns. They could not in fact possess any such tradition, for interpretation began only when the meaning of the hymns had become obscure. That the gap between the poets and interpreters even earlier than Yāska must have been considerable is shown by his predecessor's opinion quoted above. That Yāska's own interpretations are often merely conjectural appears from his frequently giving two or more alternative meanings for a word. Yet he must have had more and better means of ascertaining the sense of various obscure words than Sāyaṇa, who lived nearly 2000 years later. Sāyaṇa's interpretations, however, sometimes differ from those of Yāska. Hence either Yāska is wrong or Sāyaṇa does not follow the tradition. Again, Sāyaṇa often gives several inconsistent explanations of a word in interpreting single passages or commenting on different passages. In short, it is clear from a careful examination of their explanations that neither Yāska nor Sāyaṇa possessed any certain knowledge about a large number of different words in the Rigveda. Hence their interpretations can be treated as decisive only if they are borne out by probability, by the context, or by parallel passages. For the traditional method Roth therefore substituted the critical method of interpreting the difficult parts of the Rigveda from internal evidence by the minute comparison of all passages parallel in form and matter, while taking into consideration context, grammar, and etymology, without ignoring the help supplied by the historical study of the Vedic language in its connexion with Sanskrit or the outside evidence derived from the Avesta and from comparative philology. In the application of his method, Roth attached too much weight to etymological considerations, while he undervalued the evidence of native tradition. Pischel and Geldner, on the other hand, in emphasizing the purely Indian character of the Vedic hymns, connect the interpretation of them too closely with the literature of the post-Vedic period and the much more advanced civilization which is described therein. There is good reason to hope, from the results already achieved, that a steady adherence to the critical method, by admitting all available evidence, including that of ethnology, and by avoiding the excesses just indicated, will eventually clear up a large proportion of the obscurities and difficulties that still baffle the translator of the Vedic hymns.

11. **The Atharvaveda.**—The Atharvaveda, regarded as a whole, deals with the lower side of religion as represented by witchcraft, the word itself meaning the 'lore of the Atharvans or magicians.' The oldest designation by which this Veda is known in Indian literature is *Atharvāṅgirasaḥ*, 'the Atharvans and Angirases,' the names of two classes of pre-historic fire-priests, referring respectively to the two kinds of spells, the propitious and the hostile, that form the main content of the collection. Very different from the world of the Rigveda is the sphere to which we are now introduced. There we have moved among the beneficent gods of the bright heavens. Here we are confronted with the dark hostile powers that the sorcerer seeks to win over by flattery or to drive away by imprecations. The priest and the magician, though originally one and the same, had from the beginning of the Vedic period been separated, the functions of the former being concerned with the gods, those of the latter with the uncanny world of demons. The ceremonial, moreover, to which the spells of the Atharvaveda apply is that of domestic rites or of such as are connected with the person of the king. It has nothing to do with the great sacrificial ceremonial of the three other Vedas which, in the works of the Brāhmaṇa and the Sūtra period, are constantly characterized as the *trayī vidyā*, or 'the threefold sacred lore.' A long time accordingly elapsed, after its hymns had assumed the form of a collection, before it attained to canonical recognition as the fourth Veda. The Saṁhitā text, in the shape in which it has come down to us, undoubtedly came into being later than that of the Rigveda, for internal evidence of different kinds shows that a good many of its hymns belong to a more recent period than any in that collection. It probably dates from after the completion of the Brāhmaṇas of the Rigveda, which do not mention it, while it is referred to in two of the Brāhmaṇas of the Yajurveda. Its original contents had already been Brāhmanized by the addition of many hymns which are of a theosophic character, or contain references to the sacrificial ceremonial, or were composed directly in the interests of Brāhman priests. But it was probably not till it had been superficially connected with the great sacrificial ceremonial by the addition of bk. xx., which, excepting twelve hymns, is borrowed unchanged from the Rigveda, that the Atharvaveda came to be acknowledged as a canonical work. It appears to have gained that position by the second cent. B.C., when it is referred to in this sense by the *Mahābhāṣya*, the 'great Commentary' on Pāṇini's grammar.

Probably the composition of the Atharvaveda, like that of the Rigveda, extended over a period of several centuries, which, however, is not to be regarded as a period subsequent to that of the Rigveda. While some of its hymns are later than any in the Rigveda, and the Brāhmanized additions are contemporaneous with the late portions of the Rigveda, many of the characteristic hymns forming the nucleus of the collection may be considered just as old as the earliest in the Rigveda. There is, indeed, a probability that some of its spells go back in their original form to a very early prehistoric age, being cognate in form and matter to ancient spells preserved in other Indo-European languages.

The *language* of the Atharvaveda, considered grammatically, is later than that of the Rigveda, but earlier than that of the Brāhmaṇas. Lexically it is noteworthy for the many popular words that appear in it. This is doubtless due to its material having been current among the people and not the priestly class. Another peculiarity of this Veda is the introduction among its hymns of a considerable amount of prose like that of the Brahmaṇas. The whole of one bk. (xv.) and the greater part of another (xvi.) are composed in prose, while six others (viii.–xiii.) contain prose passages of some length. The *metre* in which the great bulk of the Atharvaveda is written does not essentially differ from that of the Rigveda. But two points in regard to it are to be noted. One is the extreme metrical licence that appears in its hymns: it is so great that the irregular verses probably outnumber the regular ones. The other is the predominance of the *anuṣṭubh* metre, which in the Rigveda comes only fourth in order of frequency.

The Atharvaveda consists of 20 *kāṇḍas*, or books, containing 731 hymns. The number of stanzas in a hymn ranges from one to eighty-nine, their total being about 6000. Leaving out of the calculation what is borrowed direct without alteration from the Rigveda, the Atharvaveda has 5038 stanzas, or about one-half as many as the older Veda. Internal evidence shows that this collection also under-

went a process of growth by successive additions till it assumed the form in which it has come down to us. It is clear that the first eighteen books had been combined before the last two were added. That older collection consists of three main divisions, in the first two of which, bks. i.–vii. and viii.–xii., the hymns are arranged according to the number of stanzas they contain, while the guiding principle in the third, xii.–xviii., is unity of subject-matter in each book. The first group comprises short hymns (none exceeding eighteen stanzas), the second long hymns with more than twenty stanzas, the subjects in both being miscellaneous.

There can be little doubt that the first six books of the first group formed the nucleus of the Atharvaveda, their hymns consisting of its characteristic matter, charms and spells exclusively in metrical form. These six books are arranged primarily according to the amount of text they contain in an ascending scale, the first having 153 stanzas, the sixth 454. This principle is supplemented by the arrangement of these books according to the normal number of stanzas contained in their hymns, also in an ascending scale. Thus bk. i. contains hymns of 4, ii. of 5, iii. of 6, iv. of 7, v. of 8 stanzas. Book vi. contains hymns of only 3 stanzas, occupying this position because the secondary principle here is subordinated to the primary one of amount of text. Book vii. is to be regarded as a supplement to this group. This is indicated by the fact that it infringes both principles that govern the arrangement of the preceding books, being both much shorter than bk. vi. and consisting of hymns which have normally one stanza only, and which can, therefore, hardly be accounted hymns at all.

In the second main division, bks. viii.–xii., the hymns are arranged according to decades, each of the first four containing ten hymns of 20 to 50 stanzas, while bk. xii. has five of more than 50 stanzas. This group further differs from the first in two special points. As contrasted with the mainly popular matter of that group it is clearly of hieratic origin, its sphere of thought being that of the Brāhman priesthood. It also contrasts with the first group in form, each of its books containing an extensive passage of prose like that of the Brāhmaṇas.

The third main division, xiii.–xviii., distributes its hymns among its six books according to their subject-matter. Thus xiv. deals with the wedding ceremonial, and xviii. with burial rites, both borrowing most of their stanzas from bk. x. of the Rigveda, and thus not being specifically Atharvan in character. Bks. xiii. and xvii. consist of hymns addressed to the sun, in the character of Rohita, or the Ruddy one, in the former, and as identified with Indra and Viṣṇu in the latter. The whole of xv. and most of xvi. consists of prose resembling that of the Brāhmaṇas. The former treats mystically of the *vrātya*, probably meaning the religious mendicant; but it is hard to say exactly what unity of subject-matter connects the hymns of the latter.

Some time after these main divisions had been formed into a collection of eighteen books, the nineteenth was added to it as a supplement. That this was the case is proved by a considerable amount of cumulative evidence. The most striking is that the 23rd hymn of this book supplies a sort of table of contents to the eighteen preceding books, and presupposes their existence practically in their present arrangement. It is also to be noted that the corrupt state in which the text of this book has been handed down is in marked contrast with that of the earlier collection. Last of all was added bk. xx., which consists almost entirely of extracts from the Rigveda taken over unchanged (while the material borrowed from the Rigveda at an earlier stage had undergone considerable modification), and is in no way related to the rest of the Atharvaveda. This supplement was appended simply in order to bring the Veda of spells into connexion with the sacrificial Soma ceremonial of the Brāhman priesthood. It is a significant fact that two of the most important auxiliary works belonging to the Atharvaveda and dating from the latest period of Vedic literature, its Prātiśākhya and its Kauśika Sūtra, ignore bks. xix. and xx.

It now remains to give a brief survey of the various *contents* of the Atharvaveda. A large number of its hostile spells are intended as remedies, together with the use of different herbs, against a number of diseases, ailments, and injuries, such as fever, jaundice, scrofula, leprosy, dropsy, cough, baldness, ophthalmia, impotence, poisoning, snake-bite, wounds, and fractures (cf. DISEASE AND MEDICINE [Vedic]). These incantations are addressed to the diseases personified as demons, or to whole classes of demons supposed to cause them. This Veda, supplemented by its Kauśika Sūtra, is thus our earliest source for the history of Indian medicine. Allied to the remedial spells are the charms which invoke or praise healing plants, the purifying waters, and fire, the most potent dispeller of demons. Among the auspicious spells are many prayers for protection from the various forms of death and disease, and for long life, often expressed in the form of a desire to live 'a hundred autumns.' Others are charms for the prosperity of flocks and the produce of the fields, or for luck in undertakings, especially in gambling. Another group aims at the attainment of harmony and concord or of success in the assembly. A large class is concerned with wedlock and love. Several of these are of a pacific character, being charms for the obtainment of a husband or bride, blessings on a newly married couple, prayers for children or a happy wedded life. More numerous, however, is the hostile type, such as imprecations against rivals or incantations to compel the love of an unwilling person. A considerable group of hymns concerns the person of the king. They consist of spells to be employed at the royal inauguration or intended to secure for him the attainment of power, fame, and especially victory in battle. There are, again, a few hymns consisting of spells for the expiation of sins or moral transgressions, such as the non-payment of debts. Finally, there remain three or four classes of hymns which, being alien to the true Atharvan spirit, date from a late period in the growth of this collection. One of these comprises the hymns composed in the interest of Brāhmans. Though the later literature frequently refers to witchcraft and sorcerers in a hostile spirit, their use is even sanctioned when employed by Brāhmans against others. In these hymns the inviolability of the person and property of Brāhmans is emphasized, while imprecations are hurled against their oppressors. They also contain exaggerated panegyrics of the sacrificial fee (*dakṣiṇā*), the liberal bestowal of which is pronounced to be the height of piety. In this group, prayers of a less interested nature, as for wisdom and theological knowledge, are rare. Sacrificial hymns and spells, besides those borrowed wholesale from the Rigveda in bk. xx., occasionally appear in other parts of the Atharvaveda. The group of cosmogonic and theosophical hymns doubtless constitute the latest additions to this collection. Their speculations and terminology indicate a development of philosophy corresponding to that which appears in the Upaniṣads. They are not to be regarded as forming a connecting link between the philosophy of the Rigveda and

that of the Upaniṣads. They are mystical productions not of genuine seekers after truth, but of sorcerers who utilize the philosophical notions current in their day mainly to subserve their practical purposes. Among the hymns of this class may be mentioned those in which the sun appears as a cosmogonic principle (xiii.; xi. 5), and those in which personifications of Prāṇa, or Breath (xi. 4), Kāma, or Desire (ix. 2), Kāla, or Time (xix. 53–54), and even Uchchhiṣṭa, or 'Remnant' of the sacrifice (xi. 7), are deified as the Supreme Being.

The *literary merit* of the Atharvaveda is, as may be expected from its contents, much lower than that of the Rigveda. But a few of its hymns, besides many isolated verses scattered throughout the collection, furnish specimens of true poetry. Such is the long hymn (xii. 1) in which the Earth is invoked as the supporter of all living things and the bestower of all blessings. Another (iv. 16), though concluding with two verses essentially Atharvan in character, exalts the omniscience of Varuṇa in language unsurpassed by any hymn addressed to that deity in the Rigveda.

The geographical data found in the Atharvaveda indicate that its composers lived in a region much farther east than the home of the singers of the Rigveda. Certain tribes of the north-west are referred to as remote, while the country of the Magadhas (Bihar) and that of the Aṅgas (Bengal) are mentioned as known. By the time this Veda was completed the Aryan migration appears, therefore, to have extended as far as the Delta of the Ganges. It is noteworthy that the Atharvaveda seems never to have penetrated to South India, and that it is practically unknown there at the present day.

The Atharvaveda and the Rigveda combined enable us to understand fully the character and spirit of the oldest poetry of the Aryan Indians. The information we derive from the former supplements in a remarkable manner what we know from the latter about the religious and social conditions of the times, especially the more intimate side of domestic life, the regulated form of which is presented by the Gṛhya Sūtras, or manuals of domestic ritual, belonging to the latest stratum of Vedic literature (*c.* 500–200 B.C.). Between them these two Vedas furnish a body of material which is of incstimable value, not only for the early history of India in its various aspects, but for the study of the development of human institutions in general.

12. Though the two liturgical Vedas cannot be said to consist of hymns, it is perhaps advisable to describe as briefly as possible their form, their arrangement, their contents, and their relation to the other Saṁhitās. The **Sāmaveda** consists of 1549 stanzas chanted in various melodies, called *sāman*, to accompany the Soma ritual. Its stanzas are nearly all borrowed from the Rigveda, chiefly from bks. viii. and ix. The 75 stanzas not derived from the Rigveda are to be found in other Saṁhitās or in ritual works. Its stanzas are mostly composed in the *gāyatrī* metre or in the so-called *pragātha* strophe, both of which metrical forms were originally meant to be sung (their names being derived from *gā*, 'to sing'). It is divided into two parts. The first consists of 585 single stanzas arranged in decades, the first group of which is addressed to Agni, the second to Indra, the great Soma drinker, and the third to Soma. The second part, containing 400 chants, is arranged on a different principle. It consists throughout of small groups of stanzas, closely connected and generally three in number, which follow the order of the main sacrifices. Internal evidence shows that the second book is secondary in character as well as later in date. As regards the age of the Sāmaveda, it is at least certain that the divisions of the first book are known to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. There is also some ground for believing that as a collection the Sāmaveda is older at any rate than two of the recensions of the Yajurveda, the Taittirīya and the Vājasaneyi Saṁhitās. The two parts of this Veda supply only the words. The melodies of the chants were doubtless long handed down by vocal tradition only. They were later collected in *gānas*, or 'song-books,' which indicated in musical notation the manner in which the words were to be sung. These tunes received special names in very ancient times, two of them, the *Bṛhat* and the *Rathantara*, being even mentioned in the Rigveda. There are indications that the oldest of them may have been of popular origin and connected with the rites of pre-Brāhmanical sorcerers. Thus the second part of the Sāmavidhāna Brāhmaṇa, a ritual work belonging to the Sāmaveda, is a manual of witchcraft which prescribes the employment of various *sāmans* for purposes of sorcery. The injunction of the Brāhmanical law-books, that the recitation of the Rigveda and the Yajurveda must cease on the sound of a *sāman* being heard, is perhaps a reminiscence of such early use.

Thus, though the contents of the Sāmaveda are worthless from a literary point of view, they are of some value for the history of sacrifice and witchcraft, and decidedly important for that of Indian music.

13. **The Yajurveda** is the prayer book of 'sacrificial formulas' (*yajus*), from which it receives its name, and which are in prose. These form about one-half of its matter and are original. The remainder is metrical, consisting of stanzas (*ṛchas*), about one-half of which are original, while the other half are borrowed from the Rigveda. The latter are taken over singly or in groups for application to a particular ceremony, but a few entire hymns, such as the *puruṣasūkta*, 'Hymn of Man' (x. 90), have found their way into this collection. In the characteristic prose formulas and prayers of the Yajurveda, the gods are not always invoked or prayed to, but various sacrificial implements or rites are brought into connexion with them. Thus the priest, in offering an oblation, says, 'Thou art the body of Soma, thee (I offer) to Viṣṇu'; or, in taking hold of some utensil, he exclaims, 'At the stimulation of god Savitṛ I grasp thee with the arms of the Aśvins, with the hands of Pūṣan.' The object of most of these formulas is not to worship the gods, but to force them to fulfil the desires of the sacrificer. Many of them are in fact nothing else than spells in prose. Among them imprecations like those of the Atharvaveda are also to be met with. Here, too, we find the beginnings of that form of prayer which seeks to influence a god by the repetition of his various names, and which was greatly developed in later times. This is represented by the *Śatarudriya*, or enumeration of the hundred names of the god Rudra. A similar tendency appears in the frequent employment of sacred but unintelligible exclamations, especially the syllable *om*, which, having originally been a particle of assent, is somewhat analogous to the Hebrew 'Amen.' Thus prayer in the Yajurveda shows deterioration as compared with the Rigveda and a proclivity to revert from the domain of religion to that of witchcraft.

The language and the metre of the prose formulas and of the original verses of the Yajurveda agree on the whole with those of the Rigveda, but represent a distinctly later stage. The internal evidence of the subject-matter points in a similar direction. It shows that the country in which the Yajurveda was composed lay much farther east

than that of the Rigveda, having as its centre the tract between the two small rivers Sarasvatī (Sarsuti) and Dṛṣadvatī (Chautang), somewhat to the west of the Jumna. The organization of society also appears at a more advanced stage than in the Rigveda, the caste system in particular having grown up and been consolidated in the interval.

The Yajurveda has come down to us in six recensions. Four of these form a closely connected group, called the Black Yajurveda, the texts of which are often identical word for word. They agree in mixing up, to some extent, explanatory matter with their sacrificial formulas and stanzas. The two other recensions, which are very closely allied, form the so-called White Yajurveda. This contains the prose and verse formulas to be recited at the sacrifice only, the explanatory matter being collected in a Brāhmaṇa. It is divided into 40 chapters, in which several chronological strata may be distinguished. It appears to have originally consisted of the first eighteen alone, for this is the only portion explained word for word in the Brāhmaṇa and recurring in the Taittirīya recension of the Black Yajurveda. To them were then added the next seven chapters. These 25 chapters together form the older part of this recension and contain the prayers for the most important great sacrifices, which comprise food offerings on the one hand and Soma offerings on the other, both being associated with the cult of fire. The remaining fifteen chapters are evidently of a supplementary character. The fortieth, being an Upaniṣad, was added last of all. Even the original part of this recension must have assumed shape at a later date than any of the recensions of the Black Yajurveda, because the separation and distribution of its matter are more systematic than in the latter.

Though the Yajurveda can scarcely be said to display any literary merit, it is important and even interesting to the student of the history of religions, especially with reference to the significance of prayer.

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A. A. MACDONELL.

HYPERBOREANS.—A people who, in Greek legend, were fabled to live in the extreme north, beyond (*ὑπέρ*) the north wind (*Βορέας*), and hence to enjoy a warm climate which continually gave them sunshine and abundance. They were imagined to exist without war, and free from all natural ills; but they were not supposed to be immortal, the life of each Hyperborean being 1000 years in duration. They are mentioned in poems attributed to Homer and to Hesiod, and are described by Pindar and Herodotus. Æschylus (*Choeph.* 373) alludes to their proverbial felicity. Later writers, like Strabo, accept them (on the authority of Pindar, Simonides, etc.) as having at least a legendary existence. They were thought to be worshippers of Apollo, and especially to have sent maidens to Delos for the service of that god. Herodotus (iv. 36) says: 'If Hyperboreans exist, then there must also be Hypernotians' (who live as far to the south as the Hyperboreans live to the north), and seems sceptical as to the real existence of the people, though he narrates the legend of the maidens coming to Delos (iv. 33-35). Pindar (*Pyth.* x. 29-34) says that it is impossible for men to mount to heaven or reach by sea or land the Hyperboreans, 'with whom Perseus once feasted, as they were sacrificing asses to the god' (Apollo). He depicts them as a joyous, music-loving race, to whom disease and old age never came.

The etymology of the name is not certain, but *bor* is probably the same as Skr. *gir*, 'mountain'; and *hyper-borean* may at first have meant (as Otto Schroeder thinks) 'above the mountains' (in heaven); that is, it may have been an appellation of celestials. But, from a comparison of similar myths, it seems more probable that, while 'over the mountains' is the literal meaning of the word, the locality thus indicated had, as is usually understood, the sense 'across' rather than 'above' the mountains. For the Hyperborean myth is not unique. It has a parallel in the Hindu fable of the 'Northern (*uttara*) Kurus,' who live for '10,000 and 1000' years in a land of bliss beyond the northern mountains—a land of perpetual bloom, where the food is the 'milk of the milk-tree, resembling ambrosia' (see art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Hindu]). These Hindu Hyperboreans also are ever free from illness. Megasthenes, in the 4th cent. B.C., made the Greeks acquainted with them (*FHG* ii. 424), and the parallel with the native Greek myth is noticed by Strabo (p. 711). In Hindu tradition, Mount Meru is also supposed to be in the north, and is described as the abode of bliss. The Persians, too, had a form of the legend in the myth of Yima's paradise (see art. BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Persian]), a garden of delight having imperishable food, where people live 'without age or

death,' although this paradise seems to be combined out of various elements, and may originally have referred to a happy realm of the blest hereafter.

The tradition of a northern home, which succeeding generations would conceive of as an abode of greater and greater felicity, is not incompatible with the geographical origins of the Indo-Europeans, who entered Greece and India from a northern land; and it is possible that the myth of the Hyperboreans has in it some germ of historical truth, especially as there is other evidence in the Vedic age of the northern origin of the people holding this tradition. The same myth, however, is found among some of the tribes of North America—of course, set in an appropriate frame; and this fact has led to the more or less fanciful interpretation of the story as a tradition belonging to the whole human race, and commemorating descent from the arctic zone, the garden of Yima and Mount Meru being the North Pole. Such a hypothesis is too ill supported to meet with general approval, and much of the literary evidence adduced in its support is unconvincing.

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HYPNOTISM.—Hypnotism is the name now generally given to the study of, and the practice of inducing, a peculiar abnormal state of mind which in some respects is allied to sleep (hence the name, from ὕπνος, 'sleep'). The modern practice of hypnotism has been developed from the practice of 'magnetic' or sympathetic healing, which enjoyed a great vogue in Europe and especially in Paris in the latter half of the 18th cent., owing chiefly to the labours of F. A. Mesmer (whence the term 'mesmerism,' still in popular use). Until the middle of the 19th cent. almost all practitioners of 'mesmerism' followed Mesmer in attributing the effects they produced in their patients to the passage from the operator to the patient of some subtle physical influence or fluid, generally called 'animal magnetism.' The adoption by the mesmerists of this unverifiable conjecture largely accounts for, and to some extent perhaps justifies, the extreme scepticism and hostility with which the arts of the mesmerists were regarded by the great bulk of the medical profession until almost the close of the 19th century.

To a French physician, Alexandre Bertrand, belongs the honour of having first pointed out (*Traité du somnambulisme*, Paris, 1823) that the therapeutic and other effects attributed to 'animal magnetism' are (in so far as they are genuine, and not, as in the early days so many were, errors due to fraud or to malobservation) to be regarded as in the main produced through the mind of the patient working upon the organism, as effects of expectation induced in the mind of the patient by suggestions given directly or indirectly by the operator, these effects being generally favoured and intensified by a peculiar mental and bodily condition of the patient induced by the mesmeric procedures. Bertrand's great discovery remained, however, almost unheeded by the medical world; and twenty years later James Braid, a surgeon of Manchester (*Neurypnology*, London, 1843), arrived independently at the same conclusions, and by his successful application of hypnotic measures in his practice secured for them, under the name of 'Braidism,' a certain consideration even in medical circles. But it was not until the truth was discovered and published independently for the third time in 1884 by H. Bernheim, Professor of Medicine at Nancy, that it began to gain general acceptance in the scientific world and (under the name of 'hypnotism,' which Braid had suggested) to be applied by medical men in all parts of Europe without serious risk of loss of their professional reputations. In the last decade of the 19th cent. it became generally recognized that hypnotism was a legitimate method of medical practice, extremely useful in many cases of nervous and functional disorder.

When Bernheim published his work (*De la Suggestion*, Paris, 1884), he took the view that the therapeutic effects he recorded were secured by creating in the mind of the patient the expectation of the disappearance of symptoms; and the process of inducing such expectation, which generally took the form of confident affirmation on the part of the physician, he called 'suggestion.' He recognized that such 'suggestions' operate more powerfully if the patient to whom they are directed is first brought into a drowsy or half-sleeping state. But he did not recognize that this state, so favourable to the operation of suggestion, differs essentially from a normal state of drowsiness. On the other hand, Charcot, the celebrated physician who extensively applied the hypnotic methods in the Salpêtrière Hospital at Paris (in the eighties), taught that the hypnotic state is a peculiar and abnormal condition which can be induced only in persons suffering from certain nervous deficiencies. These two views of the hypnotic state were opposed to one another in a lively controversy prolonged through many years. It is now generally recognized that the truth is to be found by adopting the middle way. Hypnosis (as the hypnotic state is now generally called) is a peculiar state of mind, involving some abnormal condition of the nervous system, as Charcot maintained; but this condition is one which can be temporarily induced by a skilful hypnotist in the great majority of normal and perfectly healthy persons. The most constant, perhaps the only constant, feature or symptom of hypnosis is the increased suggestibility of the subject; for, although in most cases, especially in cases of deep hypnosis, the subject presents the appearance of drowsy passivity or even profound sleep, this is not always the case; and in this respect much depends upon the methods used for the induction of hypnosis and the general handling of the case by the operator.

In a typical condition of hypnosis of moderate depth, the subject appears completely plastic in the hands of the operator. He remains unresponsive to, and apparently unaffected by, all persons and things of his environment, except the operator and those things or persons to which the latter may direct his attention. But, in relation to the operator, his mind and senses seem to be peculiarly alert and responsive; and he obeys implicitly the slightest indications of the operator's wishes or expectations. This responsive obedience, however, which is the essence of the abnormal 'suggestibility' of the subject, is not a voluntary obedience; it differs from the most abject voluntary obedience in two important respects. First, the hypnotized subject may, and sometimes does, exert his will to resist the suggestions of the operator; and, though such exertion may be attended with more or less success according to the depth of the hypnosis, the degree of training of the subject, and the extent of the personal influence established by the operator, the measure of its success is very much less than in the normal condition, or the effort required for success is much greater. Secondly, the subject's obedience to, or acceptance of, suggestions is much more complete, unhesitat

ing, and uncritical, than in the normal state. He accepts with conviction suggestions so improbable and against all common experience that in his normal state he could not accept them or believe in them even though he should endeavour to do so. For example, he may be told that he cannot lift his hand from his knee, and forthwith he finds himself unable to perform this simple action. And in a similar way he may be prevented from performing any other movement or be made to execute any 'suggested' movement. In such cases it seems that the essential condition of the effectiveness of the 'suggestion' is that the notion suggested to the subject shall be accepted by him with complete conviction, and shall prevail firmly in his mind without being subjected to the criticism or opposition of other notions. There is good reason to believe that, if any person in a normal condition could be induced to accept any such suggestion with complete conviction, the notion thus established in his mind would be just as effective in controlling his movements as is the suggestion made during hypnosis; for we occasionally observe instances of such control of movement by an idea suggested under peculiarly favourable conditions to a person in a normal state. And not only control of bodily movement, but many others of the phenomena of hypnotism, notably the induction of hallucinations and delusions of all sorts, and the abnormally increased influence of the mind over organic functions such as sleep, the action of the bowels, and the circulation of the blood, may plausibly be brought under the same type of explanation.

According, then, to one view widely prevalent among the more orthodox psychologists and practitioners of hypnotism, hypnosis is essentially a condition in which the suggestibility (the tendency to accept any proposition imparted) normal to all minds is temporarily increased owing to some peculiar condition of the patient's brain induced by the process of hypnotizing him; and this condition of the brain is held to be one of 'relative dissociation,' *i.e.* one in which the interplay of the systems of neurons (the anatomical elements of which the brain is composed) is rendered less free and lively than it normally is, so that, any one system being excited, it works out its effects in an untrammelled and thorough manner.

But there is a class of hypnotic phenomena which does not easily lend itself to interpretation of this simple type; in various ways the subject's behaviour may seem to express two independent but simultaneous streams of mental activity, and this peculiar condition seems in many cases to be prolonged beyond the period of hypnosis into the fully waking state. It is, in fact, in the influence of commands or suggestions given during hypnosis, but designed to take effect after the termination of that period (post-hypnotic suggestions), that the dual stream of mental activity is most clearly revealed. For the waking subject may be quite unable to recall to consciousness any incident of the period of hypnosis or the nature of any suggestions made to him during that period, and yet he may carry out such suggestions with minute accuracy; and these post-hypnotic suggestions thus carried out by the waking subject, without conscious recollection of the instructions given, may be such that their execution implies complex intellectual activities. For example, the subject may be instructed to perform some simple action after the lapse of a given number of minutes; and in some cases the number of minutes so named may be so large that the accurate determination of the appointed moment may necessitate either continuous counting of the passage of the minutes throughout hours, days, or even weeks, or the carrying out of complicated arithmetical operations which seem to be beyond the normal powers of the subject. Such post-hypnotic executions of suggestions are typical of a large class of phenomena which seem to render necessary the notion of subconscious or co-conscious mental activity.

Some of the exponents of the hypothesis of neural dissociation attempt to apply it to the explanation of the facts of this order also. Others, notably Pierre Janet, attempt a rather different line of explanation. They argue that, while truly productive mental process is always fully conscious and involves the activity of a centre of synthetic mental energy, the subconscious processes are always of the nature of semi-mechanical or automatic repetitions of processes previously achieved by true mental activity.

To many students of hypnotism it seems that both these attempts at explanation are wholly inadequate. It may be admitted that neural dissociation of various degrees is characteristic of the hypnotic state, while yet it is recognized that this hypothesis affords but a partial interpretation of a part of the facts. By those who take this view it is urged that, according to both these theories, hypnotic and subconscious mental processes must be of a relatively low grade of efficiency (and many of them, no doubt, answer to this description); yet in some cases, it is pointed out, they far surpass in intellectual level or in range of control over bodily functions the normal mental processes of the subject; and it is insisted that these features of hypnotic process must be considered in relation to a wealth of facts which have been recorded in the course of modern studies of hysteria, spontaneous trance, mediumship, genius, religious conversion and ecstasy, and other unusual mental states and processes in which the bounds of normal mental activity seem to be transcended.

When hypnosis is thus regarded in relation to the larger field of manifestations of obscure but wide-ranging powers of the mind, hypnotism appears as a means of experimental investigation capable of greatly extending and deepening our conception of human personality; and it is from this point of view that many of the most effective students have pursued it, and that many interesting speculations have been made for the purpose of rendering the facts in some degree intelligible. Such speculations are, in the main, of two types. On the one hand, the psychical constitution of man is regarded as indefinitely richer and more complex than is revealed by the course of our normal mental life, as comprising potentialities or faculties which normally find no expression owing to the limitations imposed by our bodily organization, and which find only partial and very incomplete expression in the super-normal phenomena of the abnormal states of which hypnosis is the experimental type. Of speculations of this group, the conception of the 'subliminal self' put forward by F. W. H. Myers (*Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*, London, 1903) is the boldest and most elaborated.

Speculations of the other type (best represented by William James in *A Pluralistic Universe*, London, 1909, and other writings) attempt to account for the super-normal phenomena by conceiving human individuality as relative only and as conditioned by the nature of the bodily organization. Each human mind or personality is conceived as but a fragmentary and temporary expression of some larger psychical whole; and it is sought to explain the super-normal phenomena by assuming that they are rendered possible by some temporary relaxation or breaking down of the conditions by which the isolation of the individual mind is commonly maintained, so that for the time being it may share in

the larger life of the whole, of which it is in reality a part, and may draw psychical or spiritual energy from the common store more freely than is possible in normal conditions.

That some such far-reaching hypothesis would be needed for the explanation of the facts is indisputable, if any large part of the mass of supernormal phenomena reported by careful and credible observers should be finally established—telepathy, clairvoyance, expression of knowledge possessed only by deceased persons, and so forth. Those who attempt to explain all the facts of hypnosis in terms of the hypothesis of the division or dissociation of the normal mind generally ignore or repudiate the alleged super-normal phenomena as the products of fraud or error. The decision as to the type of theory which must eventually gain general acceptance for the explanation of hypnosis thus depends upon disputed questions of fact in that obscure and difficult province of investigation in which the Society for Psychical Research has now for a generation been actively engaged.

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W. McDOUGALL.

HYPOCHONDRIA.—In the literature and practice of medicine, hypochondria is regarded as one of the many forms of mental affection embraced under the term 'melancholia.' Any uneasiness or disease of the regions on either side of the abdomen beneath the cartilages of the false ribs, of the hypochondriacal regions in short, was, from the earliest times, associated with those feelings of profound depression and sense of ill-being which constitute the basis of the affection. This is well illustrated in the old Folio frontispiece of *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, where Hypochondriacus is depicted leaning on his arm:

> 'Winde in his side doth him much harm
> And troubles him full sore, God knows,
> Much pain he hath and many woes.'

Underlying all signs of hypochondria are functional disorders, less frequently organic disease, of any portion of the intestinal tract from the stomach downward or of the larger secretory glands in the abdomen, especially the liver and the sexual organs, or a combination of these conditions. Consequent on deranged chemical processes initiated by the abnormal functioning of the abdominal organs and the absorption of poisonous products thus elaborated into the blood system, all parts of the body may be functionally disturbed, and more particularly those organs and tissues which are predisposed. There is a consensus of opinion that hypochondria is induced by poisons arising from the deranged chemical processes above mentioned (metabolic origin); but recent researches suggest that the virus in the blood may be due to the presence of micro-organisms, which find a footing in the disordered walls of the intestinal tract; cases of hypochondria have been recorded in which the mental affection has disappeared with the elimination of such organisms under appropriate treatment (microbic origin).

Sense impressions received by way of the several intestinal and abdominal organs do not intrude on the mind in healthy states save as vague, and not clearly distinguishable, pleasurable emotions. Where disordered or diseased functioning occurs, the affective or emotional elements of mind are of a more or less painful nature. Further, where there is an insane or neurotic inheritance, such as is commonly found in hypochondria, varied manifestations of this malady are excited by worry, shock, or mental stress and strain of any kind.

Hypochondria is more prevalent in men than in women, and is usually met with in middle age; it is rarely seen in persons under thirty. It is preceded, as a rule, by dyspeptic and anæmic conditions, is insidious in its origin, and develops slowly. The attack may be slight, and take the form of mild depression. In such circumstances it does not interfere with one's occupation, and ends in recovery after a few weeks or months of proper attention. In many cases, especially where there is a hereditary taint, the disease develops and may pass the limits of sanity. Here the disturbed general sensations already referred to force themselves on the attention, gradually arrest it, and occupy the whole mental domain. The affected person becomes fearful and anxious. There is marked mental inhibition and particularly of will power. The sensations perceived are much exaggerated; thus excessively painful spots are pointed out, shooting pains are complained of, and loud lamentations are made of loss of power or want of sensation in various parts of the body. The trouble grows worse until the hypochondriac thinks of nothing but his many ailments, and believes he is the subject of some frightful malady. He seeks relief in all sorts of remedies, and consults all kinds of persons in the hope of finding help. He is constantly searching his excretions for signs of serious disease; he reads medical and quack literature in order to diagnose his condition. Any mild disorder he has, or change in his appearance, is magnified into a grave malady; spots on his skin are signs of syphilis; vague pains and throbbing in the head tell him that his brain is dissolving or breaking up. He points to well nourished limbs and says they are wasted or dead. He believes he is the source of infectious disease, and recounts all his ailments in endless variety. The sensations arising from the disordered or diseased organs of the body are falsely interpreted, and are, therefore, to be classed as illusions. These illusions constitute prominent symptoms of hypochondria, and the most striking examples of the serious effects of illusion are seen in this connexion. The misinterpretations thus referred to pass insensibly into false conceptions and judgments. Hallucinations, *i.e.* the experience of sensations, when the terminal sensory organs are not excited, are not common. When they do occur, they are generally auditory and incidental (see, further, art. HALLUCINATION).

A lady known to the writer, when labouring under hypochondria in an advanced stage, believed that an egg, which she had partaken of, had developed into a chicken. She heard the chirp of this chicken for some days coming from the region of the epigastrium. As the chicken grew the chirp was no longer heard, and the beliefs changed into ideas based on the illusion that a fowl was located somewhere in the intestine, and that, whenever food was taken, this bird picked it up. The sensations of the act of picking were graphically described. The gnawing pains of an ulcer, subsequently discovered in this patient, accounted for the sensations and the beliefs experienced, as they disappeared with the surgical treatment of the ulcer.

The mental pain felt by the hypochondriac is more apparent than real. He may look the picture of grief when detailing his distresses, but, unlike the true melancholic, he can for the moment be diverted from his troubles to talk rationally and act brightly. Defective will power and loss of memory are associated with hypochondria. The memory defect is due to the concentration of the mind on the bodily troubles. All other thoughts for the time are excluded, and so the experience of recent events not obtruding on his limited mental outlook is lost.

Hypochondria is not easily confused with other mental affections. Though it differs in degree only from true melancholia, which is more concerned with morbid thoughts than morbid sensations, there are obvious differences: the hypochondriac is restless, always seeking for sympathy and the ear of one to whom he may detail his sorrows; the

melancholic generally keeps to one place and one attitude, and does not dwell on his mental state unless under pressure. The frequency of suicidal attempts, which are generally openly made, is to be explained by the desire of the hypochondriacal to elicit sympathy and not from any impulse to self-destruction, though it has to be noted that in a few cases such attempts may be accidentally successful. The suicidal attempts of the melancholic are generally deliberate and secretive.

The condition known as 'psychasthenia' has been confounded with hypochondria. In this disease, there are irrepressible thoughts, fears, and impulses, and an absence of those morbid sensations which are the central theme of hypochondria. Hypochondriacal symptoms not infrequently arise in the course of many forms of mental disease; they are generally of a temporary nature, and due to the same causes as are at the basis of the real affection.

With appropriate treatment, hypochondria is eminently recoverable. The main lines of treatment are rest, alteratives, tonics, milk and farinaceous foods, and, above all, cheerful surroundings and skilful nursing.

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HYPOCRISY.—Primitive man was so much a member of the society to which he belonged that he was unable to conceive of any existence apart from it. It was all-important to him that there should be a body with power to regulate his habits. What he wanted most urgently was to be disciplined, and early society undertook this task with a will. What he got was a comprehensive rule binding men together, making their conduct in similar matters the same, moulding them, as it were, into a common pattern. The rules evolved covered the whole field of life as completely as a modern bureaucrat could desire. There was no room left for individuality, for conduct in every respect must conform to the common type. Primitive man, too, was most anxious to comply perfectly with the rules laid down for him; he was afraid of the wrath of the gods incurred by any departure from them. The element of fear bulked largely among the motives controlling his life. Like ourselves, from this point of view, he hated trouble, and chose—though he was barely conscious that he made a choice—the line of least resistance. In tropical Africa the country is covered by a network of narrow footpaths, made by the natives. These paths seldom run straight, and their flexuosities witness to small obstacles, here a stone and there a shrub, which the feet of those who first marked the path avoided. To-day one may perceive no obstacle. The prairie which the path crosses may be smooth and open, yet every traveller follows the windings, because it is less trouble to keep one's feet in the path already marked than it is to take a more direct route for oneself. The latter process requires thought and attention; the former does not. Primitive man instinctively felt this, and discouraged all independence of judgment. He was most desirous of creating what Bagehot called 'a cake of custom' to bind all his actions into a whole that would commend itself to his community. Consequently, hypocrisy was an idea outside his line of action, for he wanted to conform.

This intense eagerness to conform can easily be seen in such arrested civilizations as those of the East. The hardening of the cake of custom became too much for India, and men were so stereotyped by this hardening that they were unable to break through it. There is a tendency in descendants to differ from their progenitor, but the Indian discouraged variation from the original type. Among successful peoples the differers dissembled at first, until they became strong enough to soften the cake of custom, though they pretended to themselves that they had changed nothing.

This course, however, was the exception, not the rule; for the propensity of man to imitate what is before him is one of the strongest parts of his nature. In early times it was a case of 'that which hath been is that which shall be; and that which hath been done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun' (Ec 1[9]). This extreme propensity to imitation forms one great reason of the amazing sameness which every observer notices among savage nations. No barbarian can bear to see one of his nation deviate from the old barbarous customs and usages of his tribe. All the tribe would inevitabiy expect a punishment from the gods if any one of them refrained from what was old or began what was new (cf., further, art. CUSTOM). Comparative sociology at once reveals a substantial uniformity of genesis. The habitual existence of chieftainship, the establishment of chiefly authority by war, the rise everywhere of the medicine-man and the priest—these are evident in all early organizations. It is true the old order changes—leaving some room for dissemblers—yielding place to the new, but the new does not wholly consist of positive additions to the old; much of it is merely the old very slightly modified, very slightly displaced, and very superficially re-combined. 'If you want,' remarked Swift, 'to gain the reputation of a sensible man, you should be of the opinion of the person with whom for the time being you are conversing.' It is obvious, then, that all primitive men were profoundly sensible. When Lord Melbourne declared that he would adhere to the Church of England *because* it was the religion of his fathers, he was acting upon one of the most deeply rooted maxims of his ancestors.

Conduct in the olden days was never individualistic; it was always corporative. To early man all his acts were tribal, for all the acts of the tribe involved him in their consequences. Hypocrisy to him was abhorrent, for he could not bear any divergence from the observed ritual. When the street statues of Hermes were mutilated, all the Athenians felt afraid; they thought that they would be ruined because one of their corporate body had mutilated the image of a god. The mind of the citizen had been so permeated by the ideas of the day that they were part and parcel of its mental furniture. His brain, not merely his actions, was so cut and marked as to conform to the orthodox type. His habits, his superstitions, and his prejudices were absolutely those of his fellow-tribesmen. In the Fiji Islands, for example, a chief was one day going over a mountain path followed by many of his people, when he happened to stumble and fall. All his followers, save one, also stumbled and fell. Immediately they beat the defaulter, asking him whether he considered himself better than the chief.

The Greeks and the Romans possessed the seed of adaptiveness, and were, therefore, able to free themselves from the cake of custom. This freedom, however, made possible the existence of the hypocrite, and Æschylus (*Agam.* 788 ff.) analyzes the traits in his character:

πολλοὶ δὲ βροτῶν τὰ δοκεῖν εἶναι
πρωτίουσι δίκην παραβάντες.
τῷ δυσπραγοῦντι δ' ἀπιστενάχειν
πᾶς τις ἕτοιμος· δῆγμα δὲ λύπης
οὐδὲν ἐφ' ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται·
καὶ ξυγχαίρουσιν ὁμοιοτρεπεῖς
ἀγέλαστα πρόσωπα βιαζόμενοι.
ὅστις δ' ἀγαθὸς προβατογνώμων,
οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν ὄμματα φωτὸς,
τὰ δοκοῦντ' εὔφρονος ἐκ διανοίας
ὑδαρεῖ σαίνειν φιλότητι.

The *Iliad* (ix. 312 f.) speaks even more plainly:

ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν,
ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ.

With this passage may be compared *Od.* xviii. 282 f., and Theognis, *Eleg.* 87. So far has the Greek travelled from the old conception that Plato lays down in the *Republic* (iii. 394) that our guardians ought not to be imitators, and that the productions of the imitative arts are bastard and illegitimate (x. 603 ff., *Laws*, xi. 915 f.).

During the last two centuries of the Roman Republic the presence of superstition and scepticism is very noticeable. With the unreality of Roman literature was combined the unreality of education. The teacher often selected questions of casuistry for discussion by the pupil. Such discussions inevitably developed the tendency of the age to affectation and lack of reality. To this Lucian and Seneca, Statius and Vellcius bear witness. In the pages of the first writer we meet the sham philosopher, speaking loudly of virtue while his cloak covers all the vices of dog and ape. Cicero (*de Nat. Deor.* ii. 28. 70, iii. 17. 43, *de Div.* i. 3. 6), Seneca (frag. 39), Panætius, Polybius (vi. 56), Quintus Scævola, and Varro (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, vi. 4) regarded religion as the device of statesmen to control the masses by mystery and terror. It had become impossible for these men to believe in the old faith, yet the people had to continue to take part in a gross materialistic worship. According to Gibbon, all religions were regarded by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the statesman as equally useful. Cicero quotes a dictum of a Pontifex Maximus that there was one religion of the poet, another of the philosopher, and another of the statesman.

Stoicism maintained the idea of a 'double truth'—one truth for the intellectual classes and one for the common people, the climax being reached in the phrase, 'It is expedient for the state to be deceived in matters of religion' (*expedit igitur falli in religione civitatem*). Thinkers in the community adopted this attitude towards religion in the last cent. B.C. It is too much to say that they were hypocrites, but the outcome of their thought was hypocritical. Sulla used religion for State purposes, and with him it became merely another department of political activity. In Cicero's time old women had ceased to tremble at the fables about the infernal regions (*de Nat. Deor.* ii. 2–5). Even boys, according to Juvenal, disbelieved in the world of spirits (*Sat.* ii. 149–152). Cicero was an augur, yet he quotes with approval Cato's saying that he wondered how one augur could meet another without laughing. On the whole, however, the people still retained their faith in the old gods, which the educated had lost. The latter, in spite of their disbelief, attended carefully to the details of ritual. In their case creed and practice were utterly divorced, and the effects of this divorce on the moral character can easily be imagined. In commenting upon the life of Seneca, Macaulay remarks:

'The business of a philosopher was to declaim in praise of poverty with two millions sterling out at usury; to meditate epigrammatic conceits about the evils of luxury, in gardens which moved the envy of sovereigns; to rant about liberty, while fawning on the insolent and pampered freedmen of a tyrant; to celebrate the divine beauty of virtue with the same pen which had just before written a defence of the murder of mother by a son' (*Essays*, pop. ed., London, 1870, p. 393).

Just as many a sturdy beggar in the Middle Ages donned the cowl of a begging friar, many an idle vagabond and profligate called himself a Stoic, and brought discredit upon the name. (See Tacitus, *Ann.* xvi. 32, for Egnatius, a hypocrite of this order; A. Grant, *Ethics of Aristotle*, London, 1866, i. 281; J. B. Lightfoot, *Ep. to Philippians*[4], London, 1878, p. 284, note 5.)

The latter-day philosophies of Greece proved to the Roman that the foundations of his religion were baseless, yet its existence was indispensable for the preservation of the State. This conflict between private belief and public conduct can be seen, for example, in Ennius. He wrote treatises, embodying advanced sceptical doctrines, and he also wrote patriotic poems in which the whole cycle of Roman gods was exhibited and most reverently treated. From Augustine's *de Civ. Dei* (iv. 27) we learn that Quintus Scævola develops the 'double truth' of Ennius into the familiar triple one—the religion of poets, of philosophers, and of statesmen. The writing of Scævola and Varro came too late, for Sulla's control of religion by the State had killed it.

Contemporary with the classical possessors of 'double truth' and 'triple truth' were the Pharisees, the people often taken as typical hypocrites. Their hypocrisy was a consequence of their past history, for, in the catastrophe of the Exile, Ezra perceived the danger of associating with the neighbouring peoples. The policy of splendid isolation was that best fitted to save Israel: it must 'observe to do all that is written in this book of the Torah,' that is, what is contained in the five books of Moses. The importance of the Torah forms the central point in the outstanding reformation of Ezra. Henceforward the Jew felt, as he had never felt before, that he had a guide laying down a detailed code of conduct; it was an honest attempt to guard the religious life of the family from the corruption of intercourse with strangers. The strict Jew became the *Pharisee*, 'the separate one.' As his strictness increased, he explored the Torah more thoroughly, and came to see that by analogy its precepts applied to cases not originally contemplated. The Scribes, the *Sôphĕrîm*, interpreted the Divine teaching so widely that many traditions came into being; the *Responsa Prudentium*, the 'answers of the learned in law,' furnishes a parallel case from Roman law. The *Sôphĕrîm* worked out rules applying to particular cases, much after the fashion of the Jesuits. Their system inculcated deliberation in judgment, which is the key to the casuistry of the Talmud. Moreover, the Scribe and the Jesuit equally urged that this deliberation proceeded from the desire to do justice to every possible aspect of the question at issue.

Under the princes of the Maccabæan house there was a steady tendency towards a stricter enforcement of the Torah. The Pharisees (*Pĕrûshîm*, 'separated') frowned upon the worldliness of the rest of the nation, and formed themselves into distinct societies pledged to observe certain rules in the matter of meat, drink, and clothing, according as the Torah or traditions derived from it allowed or forbade these points. The rules of right conduct, the Hălākhāh, increased so much in scope that they practically covered all the actions of a man's life. It is plain that the Hălākhôth imposed upon the many what only the few could obey, and the result was hypocrisy, and formalism became prevalent. The tithing of mint, anise, and cummin was performed, while the motive of these actions was not sufficiently scrutinized. Jesus, then, was obliged to speak plainly in the long speech contained in Mt 28, when He said: 'Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!' In their case the letter had killed the spirit. They had played

a noble part in Jewish life, but their hypocrisy (cf. the seven classes of Pharisees, of whom five are hypocritical or foolish, *Soṭah* 22*b*) had destroyed their usefulness. They had been truly patriotic, truly scrupulous, but their social ritual forced them to become unscrupulous. It is the degeneration of the best which makes the worst, and the sincere observer of the Torah in the days of Ezra left for his successors in the days of Christ the most insincere of men.

Most men want their lives regulated for them, and what the *Sôphĕrîm* had done before the Christian era the Christian Church undertook to carry on. Cases of conscience had rules formulated for them, and in the writings of Thomas Aquinas we find an elaborate code of morality. In the *Summa Theologica*, ii. 2, the question of hypocrisy receives careful treatment.

Qu. cxi. art. i. asks, 'Is all simulation sinful?' Simulation, we learn, is properly a lie enacted in certain signs, consisting of outward actions; and it makes no difference whether one lies in word or in action. Hence, as all lying is sinful, so also is all dissimulation. As one lies in word when he signifies that which is not, but not when he is silent over what is—which is sometimes lawful; so it is simulation when by outward signs, consisting of action or things, any one signifies that which is not, but not when one omits to signify that which is; hence without any simulation a person may conceal his own sin.

Art. ii.: 'Is hypocrisy the same as dissimulation?' Augustine says: 'As actors (*hypocritæ*, ὑποκριταί) pretend to other characters than their own, and act the part of that which they are not; so in the churches and in all human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not, is a hypocrite or actor; for he pretends to be just without rendering himself such.' So, then, hypocrisy is simulation, not, however, any and every simulation, but only that by which a person pretends to a character not his own, as when a sinner pretends to the character of a just man. The habit or garment of holiness, religious or clerical, signifies a state wherein one is bound to works of perfection. And, therefore, when one takes the holy habit intending to betake himself to a state of perfection, if afterwards he falls by weakness, he is not a pretender or hypocrite, because he is not bound to declare his sin by laying the holy habit aside. But if he were to take the holy habit in order to figure as a just man, he would be a hypocrite and pretender.

Art. iv.: 'Is hypocrisy a mortal sin?' There are two things in hypocrisy, the want of holiness and the state of possessing it. If, therefore, by a hypocrite we are to understand one whose intention is carried to both these points, so that he cares not to have holiness but only to appear holy—as the word is usually taken in Holy Scripture—in that understanding it is clearly a mortal sin; for no one is totally deprived of holiness otherwise than by mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite is meant one who intends to counterfeit the holiness which mortal sin makes him fall short of, then though he is in mortal sin, still the mere prudence on his part is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes only venial. To tell when it is venial and when mortal, we must observe the end in view. If that end be inconsistent with the love of God and of one's neighbour, it will be a mortal sin, as when one pretends to holiness in order to dissemble false doctrine, or to gain some ecclesiastical dignity of which he is unworthy, or any other temporal goods, placing his last end in them. But if the end intended be not inconsistent with charity, it will be a venial sin, as when one finds pleasure and satisfaction in the mere assumption of a character that does not belong to him: of such a one it is said that 'there is more vanity than malice in him.'

This analysis is noteworthy because it is the presentation that dominated mediæval life, and in the *Summa Theologica* Latin Christianity received a definitive form, covering all the transactions of life. The separation between law and custom, thought and action, lies at the very root of all forms of hypocrisy, and literature bears witness to this divorce of creed and life.

The poem *Piers the Plowman* exposes the corruption of the times, while Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* does not overlook the ecclesiastical courts. In *The Scourge of Villanie*, Marston analyzes the most offensive forms of the hypocrisy of the sensualist. The Reformers devote much attention to this particular vice. Bradford describes a hypocritical profession of the Gospel (*Sermons*, Cambridge, 1848, p. 430 f.). Ridley shows that hypocrisy is a double evil (*Works*, do. 1841, p. 60). Bacon points out its prevalence (*Early Writings*, do. 1843, p. 40), analyzes it (*Prayers*, do. 1844, p. 610; cf. Bullinger, *Decades*, v. [do. 1852] 11 f.), exposes the dislike of God's word (*Catechism*, do. 1844, p. 468), the liability to fall away in time of persecution (*Prayers*, 283), and the vainglory of its prayer (*Early Writings*, 130). Bullinger compares hypocrites to chaff and rotten members (*Decades*, v. 12–13). Latimer emphasizes the difficulty in knowing them (*Remains*, Cambridge, 1845, p. 62), dwells on their salutation and conduct (*Sermons*, do. 1844, p. 289) and their desire to sell their works, their 'opera supererogationis' (*ib.* 482; *Remains*, 200). John Woolton notes their observance of rites and ceremonies (*The Christian Manual*, Cambridge, 1851, p. 45). William Tindale observes that they extol their own works above the law of God (*Expositions*, do. 1849, p. 127), notes their alms, prayers, and fastings (*ib.* 78), their desire to be praised of men (*Doctrinal Treatises*, do. 1848, p. 73), their outward abstention from sin (*ib.* 80), their impurity in heart (*Expositions*, 26, *Doctrinal Treatises*, 496), their faith (*Expositions*, 11, 130), their judgment of others (*ib.* 112), that they have the world on their side (*Doctrinal Treatises*, 133), that they must be rebuked (*Expositions*, 44), and their wisdom must be turned to foolishness (*Doctrinal Treatises*, 134).

A perusal of the works of the Reformers proves how conscious they were of the relaxation of moral discipline in the 16th century. Moreover, when persecution overawes, it transforms a man into a hypocrite. The weak bent to the intolerant policy of the time by the use of the weapons of intrigue and falsehood, and both then and ever since escape has frequently been sought from censure—whether ecclesiastical or social—by a feigned compliance which is the mark of hypocrisy.

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HYSTERIA.—Hysteria (*ὑστέρα*, 'the womb') is a psychical, or at any rate a functional, nervous disease, which is so much more frequent in women that its consideration as regards the male sex may for the present be omitted. The chief clinical feature of the disease, which, however, is not manifested by the majority of the subjects of the affection, is the hysterical fit; the other symptoms are either preliminary or subsequent to the fit, or they occur as isolated symptoms with a tendency to culminate in the fit. The fit may succeed a period of great excitement, or it may come on spontaneously, but it never occurs suddenly, as is the case in epilepsy; and it usually takes place when other people are present. Consciousness is never entirely lost, as may be ascertained by touching the conjunctivæ, when a protective spasm of the eyelids will at once occur. The eyeballs are always turned up, so that the pupils are concealed under the upper eyelids. The hands are clenched, and the thumbs inverted. There is usually clonic spasm of the muscles, and the patient struggles and throws herself about. She may moan or cry and breathe stertorously, but there is no biting of the tongue or bloody froth about the mouth, as in the epileptic fit. The paroxysm generally terminates with crying, laughing, sighing, or yawning, and is followed by a feeling of exhaustion. Various mental, motor, and sensory symptoms appear in hysterical subjects, subsequent to the fit, associated with it, or independent of it.

1. **Mental symptoms.**—The subjects of hysteria are neuropathic, and a hereditary tendency to insanity or the neuroses is usually present in their family history. They manifest prominently those symptoms of instability which are described by modern writers as mental degeneracy. Chief among these are a want of intellectual vigour, excitability, ostentation, vanity, deficient self-reliance, and a craving for sympathy and notoriety. The subjects are extremely susceptible to suggestion by stronger wills than their own, and exhibit

a feeble resistance to various instinctive promptings or temptations to which they may be subjected. At the same time, they are by no means deficient in intelligence, and the ingenuity they display in attracting attention to their supposed maladies, or in simulating diseases, is often phenomenal. Upon such a psychical basis it is easy to see that the diseased mental symptoms may assume many and diverse forms. Some of the patients are depressed and moody; others gay, excited, and reckless in their conduct. Many of them are restless, irritable, impatient, and difficult to manage or to live with. The morbid ambition of others leads them to such means of attaining notoriety as prolonged fasting, the invention of improbable tales of assault upon themselves—usually of an indecent nature—or the simulation of various forms of obscure diseases, of which paralysis of motion is the principal.

2. **Motor symptoms.**—It is a mistake, however, to suppose that true hysterical paralysis is a simulated affection. This paralysis is distinguished from ordinary organic forms in so far as sensation in the paralyzed limb is never abolished, and the nutrition of the affected part is not impaired. In hysterical hemiplegia the face and tongue are rarely implicated, while in hysterical paraplegia the two lower limbs are usually unequally paralyzed.

3. **Sensory symptoms.**—The principal sensory disturbance is a condition of hyperæsthesia, or over-sensitiveness, which involves both the special senses and the general sensibility of the patient. Slight sounds, bright lights, or a small degree of cutaneous pressure produce undue and exaggerated effects upon the nervous system. Neuralgic pains in various parts of the body are often complained of. One of the most common symptoms is the *globus hystericus*, described as a choking feeling or a constriction in the throat or chest, as if a ball were passing up or down the cavity. Anæsthesia of different parts of the body, sometimes involving one whole side, is not an unusual symptom in advanced cases. The patient may be unaware of the presence of the symptom, and the anæsthesia may be either complete or partial. Generally speaking, in hemianæsthesia the condition is permanent, but fluctuates in degree from time to time. Charcot attached great importance to tenderness of the ovary, usually the left, in hysteria. The ovarian hyperæsthesia is indicated by pain in the lower part of the abdomen, corresponding in site to the position of the affected ovary. This pain may be so extremely acute that the slightest touch on the part is dreaded, while in other patients firm pressure is required to elicit it. Firm pressure has usually a decisive effect in checking the advent of the hysterical fit. In other cases it tends to bring out certain sensations which are known as the *aura hysterica*, prominent among which is the *globus hystericus* already referred to. The hyperæsthetic ovary is usually upon the same side of the body as is affected by the various sensory and motor disturbances which have been mentioned.

4. It is necessary to refer briefly to three phenomena which are associated with hysteria. These are: (1) catalepsy, (2) trance, and (3) ecstasy. These three phenomena are so intimately associated with one another that the one may merge into the other in the same subject. In *catalepsy* there is a condition of stupor, accompanied or not with loss of consciousness, and followed or not by a recollection of what took place during the condition. The will to move is in abeyance, and the muscles are rigid. When a limb is moved passively by an observer, it remains in any position in which it may be placed. In the state of *trance* the patient lies as if dead—some persons have even been 'laid out' as dead in this state; the skin assumes a deathly paleness; and the functions of respiration and circulation are so attenuated as to be almost imperceptible. In the *ecstatic state* the patient becomes so vividly hallucinated that complete scenes which she is able to describe fluently pass in sequence before the mental vision. The nature of the 'visions' changes according as the mental condition of the patient varies emotionally from grave to gay. The ecstatic state is accompanied by posturing and gesturing of an exaggerated character, which not infrequently terminate in dancing movements such as are practised by certain religious communities.

5. Estimated by its universal diffusion over the world and by the frequent references to it in the writings of travellers, lay and medical, hysteria must be the most common of all the neuroses. In the very oldest Brāhmanical writings, which precede the Christian era by thousands of years, mention is made of it among the diseases of the nervous system (J. Jolly, *Medicin* [*GIAP* iii. 10 (1901)], p. 119). The origin of the word, derived from the writings of the Greek physicians, is also very ancient. Coming down to comparatively modern times, we find it constantly referred to in the writings of travellers. Judging from the comparative frequency of these references, we can form the opinion that 'one of the principal seats of the malady is the group of countries in the Arctic latitudes of the Eastern Hemisphere, including Iceland, the Faröe Islands, Lapland, and the parts of European and Asiatic Russia in the extreme north. From the last of these we have information of the truly endemic prevalence of hysteria among the women of the Samojeds . . . and of the Jakutes and other Siberian tribes, as well as among the inhabitants of Kamschatka . . . thus hysteria is unusually common among the women of the Baltic Provinces, and among those of Viatka, Simbrisk, Samara and the Kirghiz Steppes' (A. Hirsch, *Geog. and Hist. Pathol.*, Eng. tr., London, 1883-86, iii. 519). Among the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula a peculiar manifestation of the disease, known as *latah*, is very common, of which an excellent description has been given by Ellis (*Journ. of Mental Science*, 1897, p. 32).

6. When we turn from endemic to epidemic hysteria, a wide and difficult field of inquiry presents itself. As hysteria is a hereditary disease, it must be latent in otherwise apparently normal populations to an enormous extent. This latent potentiality may suddenly become active, under the influence of any powerful excitant, moral or spiritual, acting on a people. It is generally believed that these powerful emotional excitants sharply delimit the neuropathic from the normal elements in a population. The history of religious hysterical epidemics is inextricably associated with the history of the human race, so far as we know it, and can be traced, through the records of the Asiatics and other Eastern races, down to the accounts of the Mad Mullahs of our own day. In Europe, during the Christian era, the most remarkable instance of it was the 'dancing mania' of the Middle Ages. An account of it given by Raynald, as it was witnessed at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1374, is as follows:

> 'They formed circles hand in hand, and appearing to have lost all control over their senses, continued dancing, regardless of the bystanders, for hours together, until at length they fell to the ground in a state of exhaustion. . . . While dancing they neither saw nor heard, being insensible to external impressions through the senses, but were haunted by visions, their fancies conjuring up spirits whose names they shrieked out. . . . Where the disease was completely developed, the attack commenced with epileptic convulsions. . . . They foamed at the mouth, and suddenly springing up began their dance amidst strange contortions' (quoted from J. F. C. Hecker, *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*, Eng. tr., London, 1844, p. 87).

Those interested in this peculiar form of psycho-

pathology will find a very full description of it in J. F. C. Hecker's *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*. That such epidemics are not necessarily associated with religious fervour alone is seen from the similar outbreaks of hysterical excitement which occurred in Paris during the Revolution and after the close of the Franco-German war. In Madagascar, in the year 1864, an epidemic of hysteria occurred among girls and young married women between fifteen and twenty-five years of age. The occasion of the outbreak, which began at one point and spread gradually over almost the whole island, was the profound sensation caused among the people by the violent death of the king, and the consequent changes in the form of religion and laws. The morbid phenomena were almost identical with those of the dancing mania of the Middle Ages (Hirsch, *loc. cit.* p. 529). See also art. DEGENERATION.

From the above facts and many others that might be cited, it appears probable that in every population there is a certain amount of hysteria; that it varies in amount in different communities or races; and that in predisposed individuals the disease varies in intensity—from those subjects who without known cause present the pronounced clinical symptoms of convulsion, hallucination, mental aberration, or disease-mimicry, up to those who only under extreme excitement manifest perversions of feeling and conduct of a pathological nature.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities cited in the article, and the standard works on Medicine and Pathology, see P. Sollier, *Genèse et nature de l'hystérie*, Paris, 1897; P. Janet, *État mental des hystériques*, do. 1893, and *Les Névroses*, 1898; R. Lee, *Treatise on Hysteria*, London, 1871; Legrand du Saulle, *Les Hystériques*[2], Paris, 1891; A. Moll, *Das nervöse Weib*[2], Berlin, 1898; A. T. Schofield, *Functional Nerve Diseases*, London, 1908; F. C. Skey, *Hysteria*, do. 1867; P. Mantegazza, *Estasi umane*, Milan, 1887.

JOHN MACPHERSON.

I

IBĀḌIS.—The Ibāḍīs were a Muslim sect, a branch of the Khawārij (*q.v.*). They were called after 'Abdallah b. Ibāḍ, who figures in the *Chronicle* of Ṭabarī (ii. 517) in the year 65, as separating himself from the Khārijite leader, Nāfi' b. Al-Azraq (founder of the Azāriqah), and taking a more lenient view of the treatment to be accorded to the unorthodox than Nāfi', but less lenient than that of 'Abdallah b. Ṣaffār, founder of the Ṣufriyya. The chronicles otherwise say little about him, and indeed confuse him with other personages; but, in an Ibāḍite treatise excerpted by E. Sachau (*Mittheil. des Seminars für orient. Sprachen*, ii. [Berlin, 1899] 47–83), two letters purporting to have been written by him to the Umayyad Khalīf 'Abd al-Malik are preserved, and his birth and death are said to have taken place in the reigns of Mu'awiya (A.D. 661–680) and 'Abd al-Malik (685–705) respectively. These letters are homiletic in character, and contain little that is definite respecting the special doctrines of Ibn Ibāḍ, though insisting on the political programme of the Khārijites, who were responsible for the assassination of Othman, and afterwards for that of 'Ali. There is probably little reason for supposing them to be genuine, and analogous forgeries are common. Ibn Ibāḍ appears to have devised a new interpretation for the word *kafir*, 'denier,' which ordinarily means 'unbeliever,' but may also signify 'ungrateful'; according to him, a Muslim who committed a capital offence might be described as a *kāfir* in the latter sense; and the consequence to be deduced was that the goods of Muslims might not be appropriated as spoil, though their lives might be taken. This doctrine, which is sketched by Ṭabarī (*loc. cit.*), is afterwards said to be characteristic of the Ibāḍīs by writers on sects ('Abd al-Qāhir [† A.H. 429], in *al-Farq bain al-Firaq*, Cairo, 1910, p. 82; 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī [† A.H. 561], in *al-Ghunyah*, Cairo, 1288 A.H., i. 76. 19).

By the end of the Umayyad period the views of Ibn Ibāḍ appear to have found numerous adherents, since the Ibāḍī 'Abdallah b. Yaḥyā, who headed an insurrection in A.H. 130, found support in Baṣra, Ḥaḍramaut, and Yemen. A detailed account of this revolt is given in the *Aghānī* (1st ed., Būlāq, 1285, xx. 97–114); and perhaps the most authentic documents which we possess about the tenets of the sect are the sermons which in that narrative are ascribed to the heads of the rebellion, which was shortly crushed by the Umayyad forces, after the Ibāḍīs had enjoyed brief supremacy in both Mecca and Medina. Early in the Abbasid period they gained ground in Africa, where in A.D. 758 they founded Sijilmasa, and held Qairawan from 758–762. They became prominent again between A.D. 942 and 947, but were defeated by the Fatimids, and the survivors took refuge in Jebel Nefusa, where they were to be found in the time of Ibn Ḥauqal († A.H. 366), and where the community still survives. From Africa they spread to Spain, where in the time of the author last quoted they were represented in Castille, and an author of the 5th cent. A.H. (Ibn Ḥazm) speaks of the Ibāḍīs in that country rejecting meat slaughtered by Jews or Christians. In the somewhat earlier treatise by 'Abd al-Qāhir they are divided into four subsects, called Ḥafṣiyyah, Ḥarithiyya, Yazidiyya, and 'Believers in pious acts not done for God's sake'; they differed on a variety of subjects, but all agreed on the interpretation of the word *kāfir* given above, with the consequences deduced.

From an early time they appear to have been dominant in Oman, where their religion is still official. There they were found by Ibn Baṭuṭa in the 14th cent.; he observes that at midday on Friday they have a prayer of four inclinations, and something like a *khuṭba* ('sermon'). They ask God's favour for the first two khalifs, but say nothing of the third or fourth, and indeed speak of the last as 'the man,' whereas they call the assassin at whose hand he fell 'the faithful servant' (ed. and tr. Defrémery and Sanguinetti, Paris, 1853–59, ii. 228). J. R. Wellsted (*Travels in Arabia*, London, 1838, i. 332) claims to be, after Sale, the first European to give any account of their tenets; he appears to have employed an account drawn up by a contemporary dervish, which he imperfectly understood; the statement that the Ibāḍīs deny that the Deity will be *seen* in the next world (as the Sunnis think) is, however, confirmed by Sachau's treatise. The account of W. G. Palgrave (*Travels*, London, 1865, ii. 366) is even less accurate than Wellsted's. Other places, besides Jebel Nefusa, where Ibāḍī communities continue to exist are the island Jerba, and the Cercle Laghouat in Algeria, where the M'zab profess this doctrine. L. Rinn (*Marabouts et Khouan*, Algiers, 1884, p. 143) states

that this settlement dates from about A.H. 400, and that those who started it had originally dwelt south of Vargla at Kerima, Sedrata, and Jebel Ibad. These Algerian Ibāḍīs, who in 1884 numbered about 49,000, are, according to this author, more like an ascetic sect than a political community. He speaks very highly of their honesty, morality, and devoutness. Their organization resembles in many respects that of the Sūfī confraternities. The most accurate account hitherto published in Arabic is that excerpted, as stated above, by Sachau from a treatise called *Kashf al-Ghummah*, which is only one specimen of a large Ibāḍī literature, little known in Europe. The treatise is evidently late, and appears to be modelled on the manuals in use among the larger Muslim communities; and the differences between the Ibāḍī doctrine and the Sunnī do not appear to be very numerous; moreover, the author, in his polemic against the Sunnī doctors, seriously misrepresents them. Like the Sunnīs, the Ibāḍīs believe in predestination; they define 'faith' as 'word and deed,' and declare that repentance is only for unintentional offences. The bulk of their polemic is directed against views which are associated with the Shī'ah, the Murjis, and the Mu'tazils.

Owing to the French annexation of the M'zab confederation in 1882, the legal system of the community has been studied by French scholars, and a manual of M'zabite legislation was drawn up by E. Zeys (Algiers, 1886). This is based on a work called the *Nīl* by the Shaikh 'Abdal-'Azīz, of the second half of the 18th century. A further list of Ibāḍite works is enumerated by A. Imbert, *Le Droit abadhite chez les Musulmans de Zanzibar et de l'Afrique orientale* (Algiers, 1903); the earliest of these is called *Bāyan al-Shar'* ('Explanation of the Code'), in more than 70 volumes, composed by Muḥammad b. Sulaimān († A.H. 508), while the most authoritative is of about the year 1840 A.D., called *Qāmūs al-Shari'a* ('Ocean of the Law'), in more than 90 volumes. Imbert gives some account of the peculiar features of the system in the matter of inheritance, based on a monograph by Sachau ('Muhammedanisches Erbrecht,' in *SBAW*, 1894, p. viii).

LITERATURE.—To the authorities quoted above add I. Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910; E. Mercier, *Histoire de l'Afrique septentrionale*, Paris, 1888–90.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

IBN EZRA.—1. Ibn Ezra, Abraham ben Meir (Aben Ezra, Avenares), Jewish philosopher, poet, grammarian, and exegete, and one of the most widely-known Jewish scholars of the Middle Ages, was born in Toledo, Spain, during the last decade of the 11th cent., and died *c.* 1167. The first part of his life was spent in his native country, which he seems to have left in the year 1140. From that year until his death he was a continuous wanderer, his way leading him to Egypt and through Northern Africa, Italy, and Southern France, and to England. His place of death is variously given: some authorities contend for Rome, others for Calahorra on the frontier of Navarre. Ibn Ezra was a prolific writer; his roaming life did not prevent him from composing works upon a variety of subjects. His style is always precise—sometimes so precise as to be slightly unintelligible, especially in his commentaries; and at times hurried—owing to the circumstances of his life.

As a poet, Ibn Ezra is a worthy representative of the Hispano-Jewish Hebrew poetry, which was modelled upon that of the Arabs. While not possessing the simplicity and naturalness of its greatest representative, Jehudah Halevi (*q.v.*), he excels him in the depth of his feeling and in the pungency of his wit. Fully 150 of his religious poems—lyric, didactic, and historical—have found their way into the prayer-book of the Synagogue. His *Diwān*, or collected poetical works, comprises about 260 different pieces, and contains many that are of a purely worldly character. He often plays with numerical relations, as he was much interested in mathematics. As is the fashion in Oriental literature, he clothed a variety of subjects in poetic garb. Not only did he intersperse short poems in the introductions to his various commentaries on parts of the Bible, but he versified treatises on religion, on calendar-rules, and on chess.

His *Diwān* has been published by Jacob Egers, *Diwān des Abraham ibn Esra*, Berlin, 1886; and his collected poetical works by David Kahana, *Kōbeẓ ḥokmat ha-Ka'ba'*, 2 vols., Warsaw, 1894; and with German tr. by David Rosin, *Reime und Gedichte des Abraham ibn Esra*, Breslau, 1885–1894. Cf. K. Albrecht, 'Studien zu den Dichtungen Abrahams ben Ezra,' *ZDMG* lvii. [1903] 421–473.

In philosophy, Ibn Ezra shows distinct traces of Neo-Platonic and Pythagorean influences. His Neo-Platonic ideas he seems to have adopted from his earlier contemporary Solomon Ibn Gabirol (*q.v.*); the Pythagorean from the writings of the Arabic 'Brethren of Purity.' According to Ibn Ezra, the whole universe is made up of substance and form—with the exception of God, who is substance alone; though substance is defined as that of which being can be predicated. God is further described as the power out of which comes that which is felt and thought. He is incorporeal and spiritual, 'knowing in a sense very different to the knowledge of man, since He is at one and the same time the Knower and the thing known.' But God knows only general ideas—the immutable and permanent species, not the individuals that go to make up the species. When we attribute wisdom, goodness, and righteousness to Him, we are describing His actions only, not His essence. When we speak of God's creative act, we refer only to the sublunar world; the rest of creation—heavenly bodies, angels, spheres, and stars—have neither beginning nor end. He is thus opposed to what became the official theological doctrine of Judaism, the *creatio ex nihilo*. God determines the species, to which He gives the power to fashion the individual. The sublunar world is created through the instrumentality of the angels. In fact, God acts upon the world through the angels, and through certain human beings who have not entirely lost the character of angels prophets, pious ones, and the righteous. He also uses as intermediaries the heavenly bodies, which, by their conjunction, work good or evil upon mankind. But, in order to save his religious conceptions, Ibn Ezra holds that God can overpower the workings of the heavenly bodies; and that this interference depends upon the moral condition of the subject affected, thus making free will possible. It is accomplished through the angels. Ibn Ezra does not rationalize the wonders in the Bible, though he warns against exaggerating their importance. The universe is composed of the Highest world (angels), the Middle world (sun, moon, and stars), and the Lowest world of Nature (made up of the four elements and the three kingdoms). With the exception of his *'Aruggat ha-Bōsem* and *Pardēs ha-Mezimmāh*, written in rhymed prose, Ibn Ezra has left no work of a peculiarly philosophic character. His ideas are scattered throughout his other writings.

See Rosin, in *Monatsschrift für Gesch. und Wissensch. des Judenthums*, xliii. [1898], xliii. [1899]; Hamburger, *Real-Encyclopädie des Judentums*, iii., vi.

Two theologico-religious works of Ibn Ezra deserve mention. The first is the allegory *Ḥai ben Mēḳiṣ*, a rhymed prose description of the Supreme Being, composed upon the lines of Avicenna's *Ḥai ibn Yaḳẓān*, and to be classed with Ibn Gabirol's *Keter Malkūt* (best text in Egers' ed. of the *Diwān*). The second is his *Yesōd Mōrā*

(ed. and tr. by M. Creiznach, Leipzig, 1840), a pamphlet written in England, in which he treats of the study of the Law and of the nature of the divine commandments. But Ibn Ezra not only gives semasiological explanations; he tries to find the ethical foundations for the various commandments.

As a grammarian, Ibn Ezra was the first of the Spanish school to write in Hebrew, though his method of treatment and his terminology are still wholly dependent upon his Arabic prototypes. His wish was to popularize the Arabic system among the Jews and to make them acquainted with the works of his noted predecessor, Judah Hayyūj. His largest work on grammar is his *Sefer Ṣaḥōt*, written in 1145. To this must be added a number of smaller treatises: *Yesōd Dikdūk*, *Sāfāh Berūrāh*, *Yesōd Mispār*, *Sefer ha-Shēm*, *Sefer Yēther*, and a popular treatise entitled *Mōznayim*, a sort of terminological dictionary of Hebrew lexicography. Most of these works are poor and hurried in their arrangement, and written probably merely as text-books.

See W. Bacher, 'Die hebräische Sprachwissenschaft,' in J. Winter and A. Wünsche, *Die jüdische Litteratur*, ii. [1892–95] 184.

Ibn Ezra is best known as a commentator of the Bible. His commentaries were always popular among the Jews, being usually printed together with the glosses of Rashi. He wrote commentaries upon the following books: Pentateuch, Isaiah, Twelve Minor Prophets, Psalms, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Kohelet, Esther, and Daniel; and a second commentary to Exodus, Canticles, Esther, and Daniel. As a commentator Ibn Ezra opens up a new era among his compatriots because of his judicious aloofness to the claims of tradition when they cannot be substantiated by the plain meaning of the text. In the introduction to his commentary on the Pentateuch he discourses upon the methods hitherto employed in explaining the Biblical text: the digressive, the anti-traditional, the allegoric, and the Midrashic. All of these he rejects in favour of his own method, which he characterizes as a combination based on tradition and free research. In this manner a scientific sanity pervades his comments, which causes him to reject the theory of the verbal inspiration of the text, to lay minor stress upon the miracles, and, exegetically, to oppose any insistence upon the difference between *scriptio plena* and *scriptio defecta* as indicating a difference of meaning. Whenever he himself departs from this level, it is either with the object of finding a deeper and more philosophical meaning or of indulging in astrological speculations, to which he was much given. Free research, however, leads him to take up positions on certain questions which, though on a line with currents which were not strangers to the Synagogue (see Gottheil, 'Some Early Jewish Bible Criticism,' *JBL* xxiii. [1904] 1–12), would have rendered him an object of suspicion, had he not at times veiled his real meaning, at times given his reader a choice of explanations by adding such expressions as 'the reader will adopt the opinion which recommends itself most to his judgment,' or 'he who understands the difficulty should keep silence.' Thus, because he does not believe that the writers of the Bible anticipated history, he holds that the latter part of Samuel was written by some one other than the prophet; and that the second part of Isaiah was not written by the author of the first part. His influence upon Spinoza's theories in this respect (*Tract. Theol.-Pol.* viii.) is evident.

See M. Joël, *Spinoza's theol.-pol. Traktat*, Breslau, 1870, p. 64; and, in general, Bacher, in Winter and Wünsche, *Die jüdische Litteratur*, ii. 289 ff.

In addition, Ibn Ezra wrote a number of works on mathematical subjects, e.g. *Sefer ha-Mispār* and *Yesōd Mispār* on arithmetic; *Sefer ha-'Ibbūr* on the calendar; and *Kelē ha-Neḥōshet* on the astrolab, as well as a treatise on chronology.

Despite his tendency to rationalism, Ibn Ezra was a child of his times, and, as mentioned above, was much interested in astrology. As many as eight small treatises on this subject have come from his pen.

See M. Steinschneider, 'Abraham ibn Ezra . . . zur Gesch. der mathem. Wissensch. im xiii. Jahrhundert,' in *Abhandl. zur Gesch. der Mathematik*, Leipzig, 1880, pp. 57–128.

LITERATURE.—M. Friedländer, *Essays on the Writings of Ibn Ezra*, London, 1876; N. Krochmal, *Mōreh Nebūkē ha-Zeman*, Lemberg, 1851, ch. xvii.; H. Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Leipzig, 1861, vi. note 8; W. Bacher, *Abraham ibn Ez.a als Grammatiker*, Strassburg, 1882, also in *JE* vi. 520–524.

2. Ibn Ezra, Moses ben Jacob, Jewish poet and philosopher; contemporary and relative of his greater namesake Abraham ibn Ezra; born in Granada *c.* 1071, died *c.* 1138. He was a most fruitful writer of religious poetry, which is all characterized by gravity and a touch of pessimism. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the 220 such poems ascribed to him the greater part are to be found in the rituals for the solemn festival of New Year and the Day of Atonement. Of his secular poems, which do not possess the wit and sparkle of Abraham ibn Ezra, a large number (300) are found in his *Diwān*, which is still unpublished. He is also the author of a remarkable poem, variously styled *Tarshīsh* and *'Anāḳ*, containing some 1210 verses and written in the style of the Arabic *tajnīs*, in which the lines of each strophe end in words similarly written and pronounced, but differing in meaning (homonyms). Ibn Ezra intended by this *tour de force* to show the possibilities of the Hebrew language in the working out of such literary conceits. The poem is divided into ten chapters, in which the *tajnīs*-rhymes are arranged alphabetically. The first chapter is occupied with the praise of some great man, who is supposed to have been the learned astronomer Abraham bar Ḥiyyah of Barcelona.

Even in his secular pieces, Moses ibn Ezra preserves his seriousness; but so varied is his use of the Hebrew language that his compositions are often preferred to those of Jehudah Halevi and Abraham ibn Ezra.

The *Tarshīsh* has been inadequately edited by David Günzburg for the society Meḳiṣē Nirdāmim, Berlin, 1886. See, however, T. Lewenstein, *Prolegomena zu Moses ibn Ezra's Buch der Tajnis*, Halle, 1893.

The most important work that has come down to us from Moses ibn Ezra is his *Kitāb al-Muḥāḍarah*, written in Arabic. It is the only work of its kind written by a Hebrew scholar, and contains a detailed treatise on Hebrew prosody, a history of Hebrew poetry, and a mirror of the history of the Jews of his time. It is evidently fashioned closely upon the model of the Arabic *Adab* books.

Only a portion of it has been edited by P. K. Kokovtzov, in *Vostočnyja Zamětki*, St. Petersburg, 1895 (pp. 193–220); but a general account of its contents has been given by M. Schreiner in *REJ* xxi. [1890] 98–117, and xxii. [1891] 62–81, 230–249.

Moses ibn Ezra also wrote a philosophical work under the title *'Arugat ha-Bōsem*. Only fragments of this composition have been published, so that it is impossible to understand the system to which he adhered. He cites a number of Greek philosophers, al-Farabi, and, of Jews, Saadia Gaon and Ibn Gabirol. It is evident that this work must be of inferior importance, as it has left little trace in the literature of the time.

A few selections have been published by L. Dukes in the Hebrew periodical *Ziyyōn*, ii. [1842] 117 ff.

LITERATURE.—L. Dukes, *Moses ben Esra aus Granada*, Altona, 1839; L. Zunz, *Literaturgeschichte der synagogalen Poesie*, Berlin, 1865, p. 202; M. Sachs, *Die religiöse Poesie der Juden in Spanien*, do. 1845, p. 276.

RICHARD GOTTHEIL.

IBN GABIROL.—Solomon ibn Gabirol (Gabriel) enjoyed two distinct reputations. To the Synagogue he was known as a hymnologist, to the Church as a philosopher. It was S. Munk who, first in a periodical in 1846 and later in his *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris, 1857-59), proved the identity of Ibn Gabirol with Avencebrol or Avicebron. This name seems to have arisen by successive corruptions of Ibn Gabirol into Aven-gebrol, Avicebrol, and the other forms familiar from quotations in the mediæval Scholastics. E. Renan (*Averroès*, Paris, 1852, p. 76) describes Munk's discovery as an 'eminent service to the history of philosophy.' For the curious implications of the identification, compare the remarks of Ueberweg-Heinze, *Gesch. der Philos.* (Berlin, 1898) ii. 296.

Ibn Gabirol was a Spanish Jew, who passed the years 1040-50 in Malaga (M. Steinschneider, *Die heb. Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1893, § 219). It is commonly supposed that he was born about 1020 and died about 1070. Some authorities fix his death in the year 1058. The picture drawn of his personal life by H. Graetz may be found in the latter's *History of the Jews* (Eng. tr., London, 1891-92), vol. iii. ch. ix. There are no materials for a more definite narrative. Of his literary activities, however, we are better informed. Many of his Hebrew poems have been preserved in the Synagogue liturgy. Among these may be particularly cited his *Royal Crown*, which has been more than once rendered into German, and is to be found fully in English prose in the Prayer-Book of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews (ed. M. Gaster, *Day of Atonement*, Oxford, 1904, p. 47), and in part in English verse in Alice Lucas's *Jewish Year* (London, 1898), p. 140. It is an interesting fact that Ibn Gabirol, famous philosophically as a Platonist, should in this poem, the masterpiece of the neo-Hebraic muse, have gone for inspiration to Aristotle's short treatise 'On the World.' Gabirol's text is Aristotle's saying: 'What the pilot is in a ship, the driver in a chariot, the coryphæus in a choir, the general in an army, the lawyer in a city—that is God in the world' (*de Mundo*, ch. vi.). Where Gabirol differs from Aristotle is not merely in the moral optimism of his outlook, but in the mystical fervour of his inward gaze. There is, moreover, a charm of 'youthful freshness' in his verse, a quality which led to the erroneous belief that the poet died young. Many others of Gabirol's poems are found in the 'Spanish' liturgy; a short invocation of his, translated by Mrs. R. N. Salaman, is now included in the 'German' service-book (see *Authorized Hebrew Prayer-Book*, annotated ed., London, 1913, p. ccxlvi). Gabirol also wrote didactic hymns, such as his *Azhārōth* (*Exhortations*)—poetical summaries of the Biblical Laws, for recitation on Pentecost. Another long poem of his is termed *'Anāq*; this is a linguistic treatise. Others of his poems previously unknown have been recently published. Ibn Gabirol, like other mediæval Hebrew authors, wrote secular as well as religious poems; several of his epistles have come down to us. His command of a pure Hebrew style is as remarkable as is the elevation of his thought. He stands very high among post-Biblical writers of Hebrew.

Besides his poetical works, Ibn Gabirol composed ethical and metaphysical treatises, some of them of minor importance. A full account of these may be found in the work of Steinschneider cited above. One popular collection of moral maxims, the *Choice of Pearls*, is attributed to Ibn Gabirol, though authorities are divided as to the correctness of this ascription. The book was translated into English by B. H. Asher (London, 1859). More authentic is the *Improvement of the Moral Qualities*, written in Saragossa about the year 1045 (ed. S. S. Wise, in Arabic and English, New York, 1901).

'In two respects the "Ethics" (by which abbreviation the work may be cited) is highly original. In the first place, as compared with Saadia, his predecessor, and Bahya and Maimonides, his successors, Gabirol took a new stand, in so far as he set out to systematise the principles of ethics independently of religious belief or dogma. Further, his treatise is original in its emphasis on the physio-psychological aspect of ethics, Gabirol's fundamental thesis being the correlation and interdependence of the physical and the psychical in respect of ethical conduct' (*JE* vi. 529). This thought, indeed, permeates the philosophy of our author.

By far the most important of Ibn Gabirol's philosophical treatises was the Arabic work of which the original is lost, but which is known in Hebrew as *Mqōr Hayyim* and in Latin by the equivalent title *Fons Vitæ*. The fullest edition of the Latin is by C. Baeumker, *Avencebrolis Fons Vitæ* (Münster, 1895). Mysticism naturally attaches itself to Platonism; hence the *Fons Vitæ*, being Platonic in spirit, easily influenced the Jewish Qabbalā, especially in its theory of emanations. On the other hand, it did not affect the progress of Jewish scholastic theology, partly because the latter assumed an Aristotelian guise, and partly because the *Fons Vitæ*, though it essentially is an attempt to harmonize the Jewish monotheism with Platonism, is based on extra-Biblical foundations. The *Fons Vitæ* is, however, frequently quoted by Christian scholastics. Albertus Magnus cites its author as an Arab (Ueberweg-Heinze, 266). Duns Scotus, whose hostility to the Jews is notorious, had no suspicion that the author whom he so admired was himself a Jew. Of Duns Scotus the historian just cited (p. 291) says that 'many Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas penetrated into his thought by the channel of the *Fons Vitæ*.'

Holding that every created substance, whether spiritual or bodily, possesses matter as well as form (a position contested by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas), Duns Scotus asserted: 'ego autem ad positionem Avicembronis redeo.' He agrees with Ibn Gabirol in holding 'quod unica sit materia' (p. 290). Platonic realism and its underlying hypostatization of ideas have obvious relations with Ibn Gabirol's *materia universalis*, though, unlike Spinoza, Ibn Gabirol does not identify God with the *materia universalis*. On the contrary, he absolutely excludes God from any such category. The theory of the identity of substance running through the universe of spirit and body is a hypothesis of far-reaching import, and interest in Ibn Gabirol has been revived in recent times because of the new turn which has been given to mystical and monistic conceptions.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited in the course of the article, the following may be added, out of the extensive literature on the subject: M. Sachs, *Die rel. Poesie der Juden in Spanien*, Berlin, 1845, pp. 3-40, 213-248; G. Karpeles, *Gesch. der jüd. Lit.*, do. 1886, pp. 465-483; W. Bacher, *Bibelexegese der jüd. Religionsphilosophen des Mittelalt.*, Strassburg, 1892, p. 45; J. Winter and A. Wünsche, *Die jüd. Litt.*, ii. (Trier, 1894) 723, iii. (1896) 28, 109; D. Kaufmann, *Stud. über Salomon ibn Gabirol*, Budapest, 1899; D. Neumark, *Gesch. der jüd. Philos. des Mittelalt.*, i. (Berlin, 1907) 157, 500, 524, 555.

I. ABRAHAMS.

IBN HANBAL.—Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, the founder of the Ḥanbalite school, was born in the month of Rabī' the first, A.H. 164 (A.D. Nov. 780) in Baghdād. His lineage was of pure Arabic stock, from the great tribe of Bakr ibn Wā'il. Ḥanbal was the name of Aḥmad's grandfather. His father, Muḥammad, died when Aḥmad was still in infancy. Rarely the *imām* is called Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥanbal. When 15 years of age, he began the study of tradition and other Muslim sciences. To acquire a full knowledge of the holy texts, he visited Mecca and Medina, Yemen, Syria, Mesopotamia, Kufa, and Basra, and studied under Sufyān ibn 'Uyaina, Abū Yūsuf, al-Shāfi'ī, and many other famous teachers of those days. During this time he often lived in penury and suffering. Yet, when still a youth, he was held in reverence as an authority in matters

of Muslim tradition. Al-Shāfi'ī too seems to have had a great respect and affection for Ibn Ḥanbal. It is told that, when al-Shāfi'ī went at last to Egypt, he said: 'I do not leave behind any one greater as a *faqīh* or more pious and learned than Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.'

After this period of travelling, Aḥmad continued to reside in Baghdād. Soon he was regarded as one of the greatest teachers of tradition and *fiqh*. During his whole career he was a great defender of orthodoxy. In his personal life he was very scrupulous in his adherence to the ritual observances. It is said that he was wont to pray every day 300 *rak'a's* at least (every prayer consists of a certain number of *rak'a's*). It was his custom at night, after the last prayer of the day, to sleep only for a short time, and then to arise and offer prayers of supererogation until the morning. He recited the whole Qur'ān once every seven days. His needs were so extremely few that his life might seem a continuous fast. His demeanour was that of a man abstracted from the common concerns of life.

Aḥmad's maintenance of the integrity of orthodox faith, during the inquisition (*miḥna*) ordered by the Khalīf al-Ma'mūn and his successors, is looked upon as one of his greatest merits by his Muslim biographers. Al-Ma'mūn had adopted in the year A.H. 212 (A.D. 827) the doctrine of the Mu'tazilites, that the Qur'ān was *created*. The Khalīf made this tenet obligatory upon his subjects, and sent letters to all the provinces, ordering that his governors should cite the *qāḍīs* and learned men and demand of them a clear answer as to Allāh's *creation* of the Qur'ān. Those who would not yield, as the test was applied, were frightened by threats and tortures. But Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal remained firm in the orthodox faith that the Qur'ān was Allāh's *uncreated* word. He was cast for some time into prison, in chains, but refused to assent to the Khalīf's doctrine. In the year A.H. 219 he was scourged in the palace of the Khalīf Mu'taṣim, Ma'mūn's successor. Finally, as the crowd outside became moved with anger and was preparing to attack the palace, the Khalīf ordered the suspension of the punishment, and soon after set Aḥmad free.

After the scourging Ibn Ḥanbal was let alone. It may be that the Government feared a popular outbreak if any further action was taken against the holy man. In the year A.H. 234 (A.D. 848) the Khalīf al-Mutawakkil stopped the application of the test by public proclamation. When Aḥmad was asked by this Khalīf to undertake the teaching of al-Mu'tazz, his favourite son, in the palace at Surramanra, he excused himself, fearing that the Khalīf was going to make him an attaché to the court.

As a *faqīh* and a traditionist, Ibn Ḥanbal bore a great reputation among his own and the following generations. He was a man of great influence among the people, and the leading representative of the strictest orthodox party in those days. He died on the 12th of Rabī' the first, A.H. 241 (A.D. 31 July 855), at the age of 77 years. When the news of his death became known, there was general grief over the city of Baghdād and even in distant countries. It is told that many thousands were present at his funeral.

In regard to Ibn Ḥanbal's works we know very little. Only one book, the *Musnad*, his great work, is well known. It is a compilation containing about 30,000 or 40,000 traditions relating to the *sunnah* of the Prophet. According to Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, only the traditions in it were a reliable basis for argument in *fiqh* and other Muslim sciences, whilst the traditions omitted therein were not at all to be regarded as a sound basis. The *Musnad* is not arranged with any reference to the subjects of the traditions it includes, but only according to the earliest authorities of the cited traditions. The work has always had a great reputation in Muslim circles; it has been used by many traditionists, but its immense size and the inconvenient method of its arrangement prevented it from becoming a popular book. A printed edition was issued at Cairo in 1896.

After the death of Ibn Ḥanbal, his pupils and admirers continued to form the so-called *Ḥanbalite madhhab*, one of the four Muslim schools of *fiqh*, which still exist at the present day. The Ḥanbalites have always distinguished themselves by their aversion to liberal theories in matters of faith, and their enmity against the Muslim rationalists and freethinkers (see, further, art. SECTS [Muslim]).

LITERATURE.—Walter M. Patton, *Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna: a Biography of the Imām, including an Account of the Moḥammedan Inquisition called the Miḥna*, Leyden, 1897; I. Goldziher, 'Anzeige von Patton's Ahmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Miḥna,' in *ZDMG* lii. [1898] 155–160, 'Zur Gesch. der hanbalit. Bewegungen,' *ib.* lxii. [1908] 1–28, 'Neue Materialien zur Litt. des Ueberlieferungswesens bei den Muhammedanern,' *ib.* l. [1896] 465–505, and art. 'Aḥmed b. Muḥammed b. Ḥanbal,' in *EI* i. [1913] 188–190; C. Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litt.*, Weimar and Berlin, 1897–1902, i. 181–183.

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

IBN ḤAZM.—Ibn Ḥazm (Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad), a celebrated theologian and *bel esprit* of Muslim Andalusia, was born A.H. 384 (A.D. 994) in a suburb of Cordova, the Umayyad capital. He belonged to a Spanish family of converts (*muwallad*; cf. *ZDMG* liii. [1899] 602 ff.) hailing originally from Niebla. His great-grandfather, Ḥazm by name, had renounced the Christianity in which he was born, and embraced Islām; but the family subsequently denied their Christian descent, and fabricated for themselves a Persian origin, claiming to be descended from a Persian who had been emancipated (*maulā*) by Yazīd, the brother of Mu'awiya, the first of the Umayyad Khalīfs, and to be the protégés of that family. Aḥmad, the father of Ibn Ḥazm, had served as vizīr under the 'Āmirids (al-Manṣūr ibn Abī 'Āmir, and his son al-Muẓaffar), and Ibn Ḥazm himself held the office for a short time under the Khalīfs 'Abdalraḥmān IV. (al-Murtaḍā) and 'Abdalraḥmān V. (al-Mustaẓhir), taking part in the wars forced upon the tottering Umayyad Khalīfate by the insurgent Berbers under the claimant 'Alī b. Ḥammūd. He was for a time a captive among the Berbers. After the fall of Mustaẓhir (A.D. 1024), he was thrown into prison by Muḥammad II. (al-Mustakfī), the next occupant of the throne. On regaining his liberty, he withdrew entirely from the political arena, and lived a rather solitary life on his ancestral estate near Niebla, devoting himself to the literary and scientific pursuits which at length made him one of the most prominent figures in Andalusian Islām. He died there A.H. 456 (A.D. 1063).

His literary work was of a varied character. His son, Abū Rāfi', estimates that he was the author of some 400 compositions, consisting in the aggregate of 80,000 pages, and there is no doubt that he was a most prolific writer. He was a tasteful poet, and his love poems are often quoted. He also composed a belletristic monograph on love, entitled *Ṭauq al-ḥamāma fi-l-ulfa wal-ullāf* ('the dove's neck-ring on sociality and the sociable'), still extant in a single MS (in Leyden), an edition of which is being prepared for publication by a Russian scholar. From this work a charming love-experience of its author has been translated by Dozy. Ibn Ḥazm contributed also to historical study. A short treatise of a historical character, *Nuqaṭ al-'arūs fī tawārīkh al-khulafā*, was recently edited from the sole surviving MS (in Munich), and published with a Spanish transla-

tion ('Regalos de la novia sobre los anales de los califas') in the *Revista del Centro de Estudios Historicos de Granada y su Reino* (i. [1911] 160–180, 236–248), by C. F. Seybold. Of more importance in this field is Ibn Ḥazm's great work entitled *Jamharat al-ansāb* (in Maqrīzī, *Kitāb itti'āẓ al-ḥunafā* ['History of the Fatimids'], ed. H. Bunz, Leipzig, 1909, p. 8, l. 4 –the title appears as *Kitāb al-jamāhīr fi ansāb al-mashāhīr*), treating of the genealogy of the Arab and Berber tribes, with special reference to the branches of the former in the Maghrib. This work, a section of which has been published in India by S. Khudā Bukhsh, was highly prized by Ibn Khaldūn ('Ibn Ḥazm is the *imām* of genealogists and learned men'; 'trustworthy, he has no equal'), and was often used by him (*Histoire des Berbères*, ed. de Slane, Algiers, A.D. 1847–51, i. 106 f., 147, ii. 2, and *passim*).[1]

But the bulk of Ibn Ḥazm's literary work is devoted to theology. Even a treatise on Logic —now lost—he is said to have brought into the theological sphere, thus disregarding the position assigned to the former by Aristotle. Voluminous works on the *fiqh*, the *ḥadīth*, the dogmatics, and other elements of Islām are ascribed to him; but, for a reason to be mentioned presently, the greater number have perished. He was at the outset an adherent of the Shāfi'ite school, but, following in the wake of Dāwūd b. 'Alī (*q.v.*), the founder of the Ẓāhirīyya school, abandoned it for the latter. Just as, in a general sense, he vindicates the rejection of the non-traditional sources for the deduction of the Laws in a special work (*Ibṭāl al-qiyās*) first made known by the present writer, so, in particular, he develops his Ẓāhirite polemic against the dominant schools (*madhāhib*) in the special chapters of his work *al-Muḥallā*, which deals with the religious law, while in various works in systematic theology he exhibits the Ẓāhirite method in its broadest application. In one direction, however, he advanced beyond the normal position of the Ẓahirite school; for, whereas they had hitherto limited the scope of their principle to the science of law (*fiqh*), and had regarded the province of dogmatic theology as indifferent, Ibn Ḥazm applied their method to the latter as well. In controverting, on the one hand, the Ash'arite theology, which in his day represented the orthodox conception of the faith, and, on the other, the dogmatics of the Mu'tazilites, he interprets theology in the light of the Ẓāhirite school, and from that standpoint assails all other views. He develops his criticism in his best known work, the *Kitāb al-fiṣal fi-l-milal wal-ahwā wal-niḥal*—a title usually abbreviated to *Kitāb al-milal wal-niḥal*—of which a printed edition is now available (4 vols., Cairo, A.H. 1317–21; on the MSS cf. *ZDMG* lxvi. [1912] 166).

In this treatise he first of all gives, for polemical purposes, an account of non-Muhammadan religions and their doctrines, and then a critique of the doctrinal divisions of Islām. The first part of the work is devoted mainly to Judaism and Christianity, and to criticism of the OT and NT and the inconsistencies and absurdities therein, his design being to confirm a view already expressed in the Qur'ān and elaborated with increasing distinctness in later Islām, viz. that the alleged documents of revelation in the hands of Jews and Christians cannot possibly be the sacred writings given by God. He deals also with later religious writings of Judaism and Christianity, and, in particular, he submits the Talmud to severe criticism. This side of his work would never of itself have aroused the animosity of other theologians, but it was a very different matter with the bitter and merciless spirit in which, alike in the work before us and in his writings on the *fiqh*, he speaks of the most eminent authorities in Muslim jurisprudence and dogmatics.

In his theological writings his tone is immoderate, fanatical, and unsparing, and he shows not the slightest respect for authority or for the great personalities of the past who stood high in the general esteem. His character for severity became a proverb in literary circles: *Saif al-Ḥajjāj waqalam Ibn Ḥazm* ('The sword of Ḥajjaj and the pen of Ibn Ḥazm'). The result was that he lost all favour with the theologians; his books were banned, and left unstudied (cf. Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shafi'iyya*, Cairo, A.H. 1324, iv. 78), and were seldom quoted. This explains why most of his works are lost, and why some are extant only in rare MSS. Under the Abbadid ruler al-Mu'tamid, indeed, his books were publicly burned in Seville—a proceeding upon which Ibn Ḥazm commented in an epigram charged with supreme disdain:

'Though you burn the paper, you cannot burn what the paper contains, for it is laid up in my breast;
It goes with me whithersoever my camel betakes himself; it stops where I stop, and will be buried with me in my grave;
Let me alone with your burning of parchment and paper, and speak rather about science, so that the people may learn which of us knows anything;
If not, go to school again. How many secrets has God beyond the things you aspire to!'

In his increasing isolation he was shunned even by students. Of the few pupils who availed themselves of his oral teaching the best known is Muḥammad b. Abī Naṣr al-Ḥumaidī († A.H. 488 [A.D. 1095]), who speaks in laudatory terms of his learning, and his moral and religious character.

Amongst his polemical works may also be included a still extant satirical poem of 137 couplets in which he holds up Christianity and its institutions to derision by way of a rejoinder to a Byzantine writer who had assailed Islam and the Khalifate in verse. A complete text of this poem appears in Subkī (*op. cit.* ii. 184–189). Ibn Ḥazm never speaks of Judaism or Christianity except in fierce and virulent language.

Of his theological writings, besides the polemical work above referred to, his treatise on Abrogation in the Qur'ān (*Kitāb al-nāsikh wal-mansūkh*) has been published (Cairo, A.H. 1297, in connexion with an edition of the Jalālain Commentary; also at the Khairīya Press, A.H. 1308). An ethical work, *Kitāb al-akhlāq wal siyar fi mudāwāt al-nufūs* ('On the healing of souls')—a series of maxims relating to morals and the conduct of life, arranged in chapters—has also appeared in print (ed. Muḥmasānī, Cairo, 1905). This tractate, in which the *Imitatio Muhammedis* is set forth as the ideal of the ethical life (cf. I. Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, p. 30), is of importance as affording a vivid impression of the author's personal character, and reveals very candidly his qualities and defects. He refers in it to the arrogance which ruled him for a time, but from which he was delivered by self-discipline. His intolerance, his propensity to bitter criticism of his fellow-men, and his ill-humour he ascribes to an enlargement of the spleen resulting from an illness (p. 77). This work is the tranquil outcome of the mature experience to which he constantly appeals. He complains here of the inconstancy of friends; after long years of intimacy his own best friend had deserted him (p. 40). But in spite of all he is able to say:

'Everything has its advantages: I myself have derived great benefit from the attacks of the ignorant. They have stirred up my spirit, quickened my feeling, stimulated my thought, and fostered my activity. They were the cause of my composing large works which I should never have written unless they had disturbed my peace and fanned the spark hidden within me' (p. 52).

Of his sons, besides the Abū Rāfi' mentioned above, we hear also of an Abū Usāma Ya'qūb as the transmitter of one of his father's works (*Nuqaṭ al-'arūs*; cf. Ibn al-'Abbār, *Mu'jam* [*Bibl. arab. hispana*, iv.], p. 29, line 2 from foot).

[1] A quotation will be found in Nawawi, *Tahdhib*, ed. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1842–47, p. 376, line 4 from foot.

LITERATURE.—Sources for the life of Ibn Ḥazm: C. Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litt.* i. (Weimar, 1898) 400; R. P. A. Dozy, *Hist. des Musulmans d'Espagne*, Leyden, 1861, iii. 341 ff. (*Gesch. der Mauren in Spanien*, Leipzig, 1874, ii. 210 ff.); the Arabic periodical *al-Muqtabas*, i. (A.H. 1324) 39 ff., ii. (A.H. 1325)

313 ff. For his work on the sects: I. Friedländer, in the *Nöldeke-Festschrift*, Giessen, 1906, pp. 267–277; the same writer has edited and translated the chapter on the Shi'ite sects in *JAOS* xxviii.–xxix. (1908–09). On his criticism of Judaism and [illegible]; I. Goldziher, 'Muhammedanische Polemik gegen Ahl al-Kitab,' in *ZDMG* xxxii. [1878] 365; M. Schreiner, *ib.* xlii. [1888] 612, xlviii. [1894] 39; his polemic against the Talmud was published by Goldziher, in Kobak, *Zeitschr. für Gesch. des Judentums*, viii. [1872] 70–104; his dogmatic system with references to his works is set forth in Goldziher, *Die Zâhiriten, ihr Lehrsystem und ihre Gesch.*, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 115–170.

I. GOLDZIHER.

IBN TAIMĪYA.—Ibn Taimīya (Taḳī al-dīn Abu-l-'Abbās Aḥmad b. 'Abdalḥalīm), the most eminent Muslim theologian of the 13th–14th centuries, was the scion of a Syrian family of scholars, and was born A.H. 661 (A.D. 1263) in Ḥarrān, near Damascus, a locality where a rigidly puritanical conception of religion had prevailed from early times (Dhahabī, *Tadhkirat al-ḥuffāẓ*, Ḥaidarābād, n.d., ii. 48, line 3 from foot), and where the Ḥanbalite school was strongly represented. The family of Ibn Taimīya belonged to that school. As a public exponent of its tenets in Damascus he succeeded his father in A.H. 681 (A.D. 1282), and in a short time his lectures and writings, in which he assumed a position of decided antagonism to the dominant tendencies of Muslim orthodoxy, made a great stir and aroused vehement opposition. He rejected the unthinking and slavish adherence to a particular school of religious law (*taḳlīd*), and in the discussion of that subject he called upon his fellow-Muslims to fall back upon the old traditional sources. It is true that he went further than the Ẓāhirites (see art. DĀWŪD B. 'ALĪ), with whose principles he closely agrees, in the range which he assigned to arguments from analogy (*ḳiyās*). Alike in the sphere of theology and in that of religious usage, he relentlessly assailed the innovations (*bida'*) which had found their way into the religious life, and, above all, he fought strenuously against the spiritualistic interpretation of the anthropomorphic passages in the Ḳur'ān and the *ḥadīth*, against the Ash'arite method of dogmatics, and against the mysticism of the Ṣūfīs (*q.v.*). In the cultus, again, he declared war upon the worship of saints and tombs which had crept into Islām, and he even objected to the practices of invoking the Prophet and making pilgrimages to his tomb. He differed from the acknowledged schools of jurisprudence with reference to the law of divorce. It is of special importance to note his opposition to the abuses which brought in their train the practice of *taḥlīl*, viz. that a man should not re-marry a woman from whom he had been definitely divorced, unless she had meanwhile consummated a valid marriage with another and been divorced from him. In his writings he is a zealous adversary of Greek philosophy, Judaism, and Christianity. By way of inciting the Muslims against them, he pointed to the Mongol invasion which had just swept over Syria, asserting that the visitation was in part due to the laxity of his co-religionists. He issued a *fatwā* demanding that the Jewish synagogues in Cairo should be destroyed, and urging his people not to allow the chapels of other faiths to exist in their midst (ed. M. Schreiner, in *REJ* xxxi. [1895] 214 ff.). In his criticisms he did not spare the most widely accepted authorities of Islām, not even the first Khalīfs. But the special object of his antagonism was al-Ghazālī, whom he disliked both as an Ash'arite and as a mystic, and whose knowledge of the sources of theological science he greatly disparaged. His opposition to the Muslim *consensus* (*ijmā'*)—a theological growth of centuries—brought upon him a series of prosecutions, and from A.H. 705 (A.D. 1305) till his death he was repeatedly imprisoned both in Damascus and in Cairo. He died in prison on 22nd Dhulqa'da 728 (29th September 1328).

Though a stringent interdict was laid upon the acceptance of his doctrines, he was not left without champions. Even after his death, pamphlets were written on the question whether he was to be regarded as a *kāfir* ('unbeliever') or as a genuine representative of orthodoxy. The tradition of his teaching was continued by his faithful pupil Shamsaddin Ibn Ḳayyim al-Jauziya († A.H. 751 [A.D. 1350]) in numerous works. At a much later period his views enjoyed a furtive revival in smaller circles, and the most striking historical result of his teaching is the fact that in the 18th cent. the founder of the powerful Wahhābi (*q.v.*) movement in central Arabia derived his initiative from the writings of Ibn Taimīya (cf. Goldziher, *ZDMG* lii. [1898] 156). His name is the shibboleth of the Wahhābite theologians in their controversy with the orthodox, who in turn take as their watchword the name of Ghazālī.

As regards the influence of Ibn Taimīya at the present day, it should be noted that the party championed by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā in his periodical *al-Manār* (now in its 16th year)—a party which rejects the *taḳlīd* of the four orthodox schools, appeals to the *ḥadīth*, and is opposed to the worship of saints and the superstitious practices associated therewith—draws its constant inspiration from the writings of Ibn Taimīya and Ibn Ḳayyim al-Jauziya. It is perhaps due to this wide-spread acceptance of Ibn Taimīya's views that within little more than a decade so many of the hitherto much neglected works of the great Ḥanbalite theologian have been issued in printed form in Cairo and Ḥaidarābād.

Ibn Taimīya displayed a vast literary fertility in books, tractates, epistles, and *fatwās*. The list of his works given in Brockelmann's *Gesch. der arab. Litt.* ii. 103–105 is by no means exhaustive, and, in particular, attention should be drawn to a series of treatises (*majmū'at al-rasā'il al-kubrā*), published in 2 vols. at Cairo, A.H. 1322.

LITERATURE.—I. Goldziher, *Die Zâhiriten, ihr Lehrsystem und ihre Gesch.*, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 188–193, and in *ZDMG* lxii. [1908] 25 f.; M. Schreiner, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der theolog. Bewegungen im Islam*, Leipzig, 1899 (= *ZDMG* liii. [1898] 540–563, liii. [1899] 51–61), with a bibliography of the controversial writings for and against Ibn Taimīya; C. Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litt.*, ii. (Berlin, 1902) 103. I. GOLDZIHER.

IBN ṬUFAIL.—Ibn Ṭufail (Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn 'Abd-al-malik ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭufail al-Ḳaisī), referred to by the Christian Scholastics as Abubacer, was born, probably at the beginning of the 12th cent. A.D., in the little Andalusian town of Guadix (Wādī Ash), and died in the royal city of Morocco in 1185. Besides the name Abū Bakr he also bore that of Abū Ja'far (as in the MS of the British Museum tr. by Pococke), from the name of another of his sons. Our information regarding his life is but meagre, and what we are told is by no means always reliable. It is certain, however, that he was possessed of the learning and culture of his day, that he composed verses, and that he was actively engaged in medicine and politics. Thus we read that he was the physician and vizīr of Khalīf Abū Ya'ḳūb Yūsuf (1163–84), with whom he lived on terms of friendship. He performed a special service to Muhammadan philosophy by introducing Ibn Rushd (Averroes) to that prince, and encouraging him to write a commentary on Aristotle. This event has been generally assigned to the year 1154, but L. Gauthier brings it down to 1169.

We possess no scientific work from the hand of Ibn Ṭufail. His claim of being able to improve the Ptolemaic system is probably to be interpreted merely as expressing his conviction that he must adhere as closely as possible to Aristotle rather than to Ptolemy.

His only surviving work—a work that secures for its author a niche in the temple of universal literature—is a philosophical allegory entitled *Ḥayy ibn Yaḳẓān*. In the introduction to that book he indicates his position in Muslim philosophy. He professes to be an adherent of the philosophy of enlightenment (*ishrāḳ*, 'illumination'). This is not the crude pantheism current in India and Persia, but a speculative mysticism of a Neo-Platonic type. Having laid the foundations in the observation of Nature and in rational

thought, he aspires to ascend to the highest—*i.e.* to the state of ecstasy, in which the soul experiences what the eye has never seen, the ear never heard, and the heart of man never imagined. Just because such a spiritual process cannot be described easily, or even described at all, in words, it must be presented allegorically. The persons in his allegory, so far as their names are concerned, are borrowed from the mystical treatises of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). But 'Salāmān' and 'Asāl' are in all probability derived from the field of Hellenistic-Jewish legend, while 'Hayy' recalls the first syllable of 'Gāyōmart,' a mythical king of Persia. Many features of Ibn Ṭufail's work are of legendary origin, but the arrangement is doubtless his own. The theme proposed was a practical question in Western Islām at the time, just as it had been in the East at an earlier day. The problem was, in fact, the relation of the individual to society, or, to state it more precisely, the relation between the philosophical reflexion and intuition of the individual and the traditional belief of the multitude.

The author seeks to portray as clearly as possible three distinct types: (1) the philosopher, who by natural endowment and his own reflexion and self-abnegation is fitted to receive enlightenment from above—one, that is to say, who rises step by step to a mystic unity with higher spirits, and ultimately with the Divine Being Himself ('Hayy'); (2) the man of traditional beliefs ('Salāmān'); and (3) the speculative theologian, who interprets the figurative language of revelation, as given in the Qur'ān, in a spiritual sense ('Asāl'=Ibn Sīnā's 'Absal'). The last-mentioned, accordingly, stands for the allegorical method of interpreting the sacred writings—a legacy of Alexandrian thought—which had been far more widely assimilated in Islām than philosophy in the stricter sense as represented by Hayy.

The thread of the narrative is as follows: Hayy ibn Yaqẓān ('The Living, son of the Awake') is, when a mere child, cast upon an uninhabited island below the equator—or, according to another legend, comes into being there by spontaneous generation. He is suckled by a gazelle, and grows up among animals, the language of which he learns, and from which, after trying the leaves of trees, he obtains his first primitive clothing. This is the starting-point of his development, which completes itself in 7×7 years. He has an intense desire to learn. The gazelle that suckled him dies, and shortly afterwards he begins to dismember it, continuing till he comes to the conclusion that the heart is the central bodily organ, the seat of the principle of life. Having discovered how to produce fire, and having found a relish in roasted flesh, he proceeds to dissect various other animals, either dead or alive. Then, just as he studied the animals of his island, even taming a number of them, so he investigates its plants and minerals, its atmospheric phenomena, and, in a word, the whole philosophy of Nature. He is struck by the multiplicity of phenomena, and he endeavours to find unity in all—the unity of the organism, that of the species and the genus, and at length the all-pervading unity of the world. From his study of physical Nature, in every part of which he traces the distinction between matter and psychical or spiritual form, and, accordingly, an ever-recurring birth and decay, he infers the existence of a pure and invariable Form as the cause of all that is, and in this way he comes to know the Deity from His works. The existence of the Divine Spirit he infers also from the fact that space must necessarily be conceived as finite.

Thus far he has recognized the Creator of the world only as the most perfect spiritual being. He now proceeds to study his own spirit as the medium through which he has obtained that knowledge. He perceives that he belongs to a realm above the animal kingdom, and that he is akin to the spirits who control the celestial spheres. It is only as regards his body that he is of the earth; his soul or spirit (*ruḥ*) is indubitably of a celestial nature, and the highest that is in him—that by which he has come to recognize the Supreme Being—must surely be akin to that Being. These reflexions furnish him with the law for his future conduct (cf. the exercises of Buddhist monks and of whirling dervishes). He restricts his physical wants to what is absolutely necessary. By preference he eats ripe fruits and vegetables, and only in case of necessity resorts to animal food, while he fasts as often and as long as possible. He resolves that no species of animate beings shall become extinct on his account. He aims at scrupulous cleanliness, and in his movements, as, *e.g.*, his walks around the beach of his island, copies those of the heavenly bodies. By these means he is gradually enabled to raise his true Self above the heavens and the earth, and so to reach the Divine Spirit; and at this stage, in place of his earlier logical proofs of God's existence, he enjoys the *visio beatifica* and the *unio mystica*. He has now transcended the mathematico-logical categories of unity, plurality, etc. So far as the world still exists for him, he regards it only as a reflexion of the Divine light.

Hayy has often enjoyed the raptures of ecstasy, when at length his solitude is interrupted. Upon a neighbouring island live a people who, though adherents of the Muslim faith, are given to sensuous pleasures. A friend of Salāmān, the ruler of this island—an individual named Asāl—desiring to devote himself to study and self-denial, sets out for Hayy's island, which he supposes to be uninhabited. Here, then, he meets with Hayy, and, when the latter has at length acquired human language, the two become convinced that the religion of the one, in its rational interpretation, and the philosophy of the other are essentially the same. With a view to proclaiming this pure version of the truth to the credulous multitude, Hayy proceeds to the adjacent island, accompanied by Asāl. But their design miscarries; and the two friends have ultimately to admit that Muḥammad had acted wisely in giving the truth to the people under a veil of symbolical language. They, therefore, go back to the uninhabited island, in order that they may further give themselves to a life consecrated to God.

The greater portion of Ibn Ṭufail's book is devoted to the course of Hayy's education, and it is not to be wondered at that those who first translated the work, and gave an account of the author's philosophy, were mainly concerned with the person of Hayy. But the central theme of the allegory, as has been indicated, is the relation between religion and philosophy, and the principle that philosophy is one with religion properly understood. This has been specially emphasized by Gauthier, though perhaps somewhat one-sidedly. It is certainly quite obvious that in several passages Ibn Ṭufail is on Hayy's side: the eyes of Asāl are opened to the profoundest mysteries of the Spirit, not by the direct revelation of the Qur'ān, but by Hayy's philosophy of enlightenment; and at all events the work permits the inference that man may attain to supreme salvation by the inner light alone, and without the aid of prophetic revelation. This point of view was enough of itself to render the book objectionable to the Christian theologians of the Middle Ages, while, in particular, the monopsychitism of its author was stigmatized by Albertus Magnus as 'error omnino absurdus et pessimus' (*de Nat. et Orig. An.* ii. 4), and as a thing 'omnino deliramento simile' (*de An.* III. i. 7).

The *Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān* had at first but few readers. The Neo-Platonists of the Renaissance seem not to have known it, else they would have found it acceptable, inasmuch as they taught that there were rays of the one Divine truth in all religions and philosophies. Certain points of connexion between *Hayy* and *El Criticón*, a work by the Spanish author Baltasar Gracián published in 1650–53—links recently pointed out by Menéndez y Pelayo—have not yet been satisfactorily explained.

LITERATURE.—i. *TRANSLATIONS OF HAYY IBN YAQẒĀN.*—The Arabic text with a Lat. tr. by E. Pococke, Jr., and an introduction by his father, was published at Oxford in 1671, and reprinted in 1700. The first Eng. tr. (1674; from the Lat.) was the work of George Keith, who, as a Quaker, probably set a higher value upon the 'inner light' than upon the letter of a revelation. A second Eng. tr. (also from the Lat.), by George Ashwell, appeared in 1686. In 1708, Simon Ockley, the orientalist, published a new English version from the original, and this was recently re-issued with few alterations by E. A. van Dyck, 'for the use of his pupils' (Cairo, 1905). Of Dutch translators probably the first was J. Bouwmeester, a friend of Spinoza, whose rendering (Amsterdam, 1672) was executed from the Lat. of Pococke, and this work was re-published at Amsterdam in 1701, while in the same year another issue, collated with the original Arabic and furnished with notes by the oriental scholar H. Reland, a professor in Utrecht, was published at Rotterdam. The earliest Germ. tr., by J. G. Pritius (Frankfort, 1726), was based upon the English of Ockley; that of J. G. Eichhorn (Berlin, 1783) is more independent. French and Spanish trr. have appeared only in recent times (*see* below).

Pococke's designation of the work, 'Philosophus Autodidactus,' appears on the title-page of most of the trr., even the Spanish of 1900. Reland (1701) has 'De natuurlijke Wijsgeer' ('The Natural Philosopher'), and Eichhorn, 'Der Naturmensch' ('The Natural Man'). In the 19th cent. Hayy was often compared with Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, but to us it is surely rather the contrast than the resemblance that suggests itself: Crusoe is the pattern of the practical man, while Hayy is the ideal of the reflective and mystical mode of life. Since 1882 the original has been frequently issued in the East—in Cairo and Constantinople—and has thus been brought within the range of active European study.

ii. *DISCUSSIONS*, etc.—A. Merx, 'Eine mittelalterliche Kritik der Offenbarung,' in *Die protestantische Kirchenzeitung für d. evang. Deutschland*, 22nd July–12th August 1885; T. J. de Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam*, London, 1903, pp. 181–187; *El Filósofo autodidacto de Abentufail: Novela psicológica traducida . . . del arabe por D. Francisco Pons Boigues, con un prólogo de Menéndez y Pelayo* (=*Colección de Estudios*

Arabes. v.), Saragossa, 1900; Léon Gauthier, *Ḥayy Ben Yaqdhân: Roman philosophique d'Ibn Thofaïl, texte arabe . . . et traduction franç.*, Algiers, 1900, and *Ibn Thofaïl: sa vie, ses œuvres* (=*Publ. de l'École des Lettres d'Alger, Bulletin de Corresp. Afric.* xiii.), Paris, 1909 (with bibliography).

T. J. DE BOER.

IBN TŪMART.—Ibn Tūmart was a famous Muslim reformer of Morocco, surnamed 'the *Mahdī* of the Almohads.' According to Ibn Khaldūn, his name was *Amghar*, Berber for 'the chief.' The names of his ancestors were also Berber. The date of his birth is unknown; but it must have taken place between A.H. 470 and 480. He was born in a village of Sūs called Ijli en Warghān. His family were Iserghins, a section of the Hintata, one of the chief tribes of the Atlas. Ibn Khaldūn says that they were celebrated for their piety, and that Ibn Tūmart seemed eager to learn, and frequented the mosques, where he burned so many candles that he received the surname *Aserfu* (Berber), 'the fire-brand.' It was probably the thirst for knowledge that drove him to the East.

At this time the Almoravid dynasty, which ruled in the Maghrib and a part of Spain, was declining, and corruption of morals had followed close on conquest. One of the strictest Muslim sects, that of Mālik ibn Anas, was in power; it confined its attention to the study of *furū'*, manuals which had usurped the place of the Qur'ān and the *ḥadīths*. Ghazālī had strongly opposed its doctrines in the East in a chapter of his *Iḥyā 'ulūm al-dīn*—the *Kitāb al 'Ilm*, which called forth the hatred of the lawyers (*faqīh*), such as the *qādī* 'Iyād, and even Ash'arites like al-Ṭurṭūshī, who did not admit independent minds into their sects. His works were burned by order of the Almoravid amirs. Further, the grossest anthropomorphism (*tajsīm*) was prevalent; the allegorical expressions of the Qur'ān were taken literally; and God was given a corporeal form.

Ibn Tūmart started his travels in Spain, and it was undoubtedly there that he began to modify his ideas under the influence of the writings of Ibn Ḥazm (*q.v.*). He then went to the East, but the chronology of his travels is not certain. If, contrary to the opinion of al-Marrākushī, it was during his first stay in Alexandria that he imbibed the doctrines of Abu Bakr and Ṭurṭūshī, the latter—a believer in the Ash'arite teaching, although opposed to Ghazālī—must have imparted it to his pupil. He afterwards made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and studied at Baghdād and perhaps at Damascus. There he became imbued with the ideas of Ghazālī. Later writers say that it was under Ghazālī's influence that Ibn Tūmart decided to reform the beliefs of his country; but the two men never met.

These years of travel and study had transformed the Maghrībine *ṭālib*. If his plan was not yet fixed in all its details, he had at least thought of it. On the vessel in which he sailed he preached to the crew and the passengers, who, in obedience to his words, set themselves to read the Qur'ān and to pray. Thoroughly inspired with Ash'arite doctrines, he continued his preaching in Tripoli, in Mahadia, where the ruling sultan, Yaḥyā ibn Tamim, showed him great regard after hearing him state his case, at Monastir and at Bougie. There he played the part of moral reformer without restraint, making liberal application of an early maxim:

'Whoever among you sees anything reprehensible must change it with his hand; if he cannot, he must do it with his tongue; if that is impossible, he must do it with his heart. This is the minimum of religion.'

The Ḥammadite sovereign was annoyed at this impeachment of his authority; the people themselves rose up, and Ibn Tūmart fled to the Beni Uriagol, a neighbouring Berber tribe, who took him under their protection. There he met[1] the man who was to continue his work, 'Abd al-Mu'min, a poor *ṭālib* of Tajira, to the north of Nedroma, who, like himself, went to the East to study. Legend, which ascribes to Ibn Tūmart a knowledge of the qabbālā, which he learned in the East, claims that he recognized, from certain signs in this young man, the person for whom he was looking, just as Ghazālī had recognized the future reformer in him. All that we know is that he had an interview with 'Abd al-Mu'min, that he questioned him minutely, and that he ended by making him decide to give up his travels in the East in order to follow him. He then returned to the Maghrīb by way of Warsenis and Tlemsen, out of which he was driven by the governor; and then he passed through Fez and Miknāsa, where the people received his remonstrances with blows. At last he arrived at Morocco, where he asserted more than ever his rôle of uncompromising reformer of morals and doctrines. The Lemtuna women, like the Tuaregs and Kabyle of the present day, did not veil their faces. On this account Ibn Tūmart insulted them, and even assaulted Sura, the sister of the Almoravid amir 'Alī. 'Alī himself was not free from his insults. He rebuked him even in the mosque. 'Alī, who was more patient and tolerant than the reformer, did not punish him as he deserved; he merely summoned a conference at which Ibn Tūmart had to argue with Almoravid lawyers. They discussed such points as: Are the ways of knowledge limited or not? The principles of the true and the false are four in number: knowledge, ignorance, doubt, and supposition. He had no difficulty in defeating them, although among them there was a Spaniard as intellectual and as intolerant as himself—Mālik ibn Wuhaib, who advised 'Alī to put him to death, but in vain. The amir spared him, and Ibn Tūmart fled to Aghmāt, where he took part in further discussions, and thence to Agnilin, where he inaugurated his apostleship in a methodical way. At first he posed simply as the reformer of morals in so far as they were contrary to the Qur'ān and tradition; then, when he had obtained a certain influence over his followers, he went on to preach his own doctrines, inveighing violently against the dynasty 'that followed false doctrines,' and pronounced as 'infidel' any who transgressed his teaching: it was a preaching of holy war, not only with pagans and polytheists, but also with other Muslims. He chose ten companions, 'Abd al-Mu'min among them, and, after preparing their minds by a description of the characteristics of the Mahdī, he made them recognize him as such, and composed a genealogy for himself which made him a descendant of 'Alī ibn Abū Ṭālib. His doctrine was not pure Ash'arism; it was mixed with Shī'ism. The historians mention tricks of jugglery and perfidy to which he resorted in order to justify his claims. He rallied round him all the Hergha and a large section of the Maṣmūda, who had always been hostile to the Lemtuna (Almoravids), so much so that Yūsuf (ibn Tashfīn) had founded Marrākesh in order to keep them at a safe distance. He had written various treatises for them in Berber—a language which he spoke very well.[2] One of them, the *Tauḥīd*, is preserved in an Arabic version, published at Algiers in 1903. He completed the organization of his followers, whom he divided

[1] According to the *Rauḍ al-Qirṭās*, this meeting took place at Tajira, the birthplace of 'Abd al-Mu'min.

[2] The Berbers knew so little Arabic that, in order to teach the uneducated Maṣmūda the *Fātiḥa* (first *sūra* of the Qur'ān), he named each of them by a word of this *sūra*: the first was called *al-Ḥamdu lillāh* ('praise to God'); the second, *Rabbi* ('lord'); the third, *al-'Ālamīn* ('of the worlds'). By asking them to repeat their names in order, he succeeded in teaching them to recite the *sūra*.

into categories: the first was composed of the ten who had been the first to recognize him; they were called the *jumā'a* ('community'). The second was made up of fifty faithful ones; these he sometimes called 'believers' (*mū'minūn*) and sometimes 'unitarians' (*mu'aḥḥidūn*, from which comes the name 'Almohads'). His authority, however, was not recognized all over, as was shown particularly by the inhabitants of Tīnmāl (or Tīnmelel). He entered this town by strategy, massacred 15,000 men, took the women as slaves, divided the land and houses among his followers, and built a fortress. He converted the neighbouring tribes with their consent or by force, and in A.H. 517 he sent an army against the Almoravids under the leadership of 'Abd al-Mu'min. It sustained a terrible defeat, and the Mahdī found himself blockaded in Tinmāl. Some of his followers suggested surrender. Ibn Tūmart had recourse to charlatanry with the complicity of Abū 'Abd Allāh al-Wansharisī, whom he had brought from Warsenis; and, having regained his prestige, he massacred those of whom he was not sure. Ibn al-Athīr gives the evidently exaggerated number of 70,000 men as that of those thus slain. The cause of the Almohads revived as the power of the Almoravids weakened in Spain and Africa, and, when the Mahdī died in 524 (522 according to others), 'Abd al-Mu'min, whom he had chosen as his successor, was ready to re-commence the struggle. His tomb is in Tīnmāl, but his name and his history are completely forgotten.

LITERATURE.—Arabic authors: Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rikh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, vol. x., Leyden, 1864, no. 8, pp. 400–407; 'Abd al-Wāhid al-Marrakushī, *Kitāb al-Mu'jib*, ed. R. P. A. Dozy, do. 1847, pp. 128–139; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayat al-A'yān*, 2 vols., Būlaq, 1299 A.H., ii. 48–53; *Ḥulal al-Mawshya* (anon.), Tunis, 1329 A.H., pp. 76–88; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 7 vols., Būlaq, 1284 A.H., vi. 225–229; Ibn Abī Zar', *Rauḍ al-Qirṭās*, ed. Tornberg, 2 vols., Upsala, 1843–46, i. 110–119; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Raqm al-ḥulal*, Tunis, 1316 A.H., pp. 56–58; Al-Zarkashī, *Ta'rikh al-daulatain*, do. 1289 A.H., pp. 1–5; Ibn Abī Dīnār, *Al-Munis fī akhbār Ifriyyah*, do. 1289, pp. 107–109; As-Salawī, *Kitāb al-Istiqṣa*, 4 vols., Cairo, 1312 A.H., i. 130–139; *Le Livre de Mohammed ibn Toumert*, ed. J. D. Luciani, Algiers, 1903.

Western authors: I. Goldziher, 'Materialien zur Kenntniss der Almohadenbewegung,' *ZDMG* xli. [1887] 30–140; the Introd. to *Livre de Mohammed ibn Tounert*, pp. 1–102; cf. also R. P. A. Dozy, *Essai sur l'hist. de l'islamisme*, Leyden, 1879, pp. 368–377; A. Müller, *Der Islam*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1885–87, ii. 640–644; C. Brockelmann, *Gesch. der arab. Litt.*, 2 vols., Weimar and Berlin, 1898–1902, i. 400–402; A. Bel, *Les Almoravides et les Almohades*, Oran, 1910, pp. 9–16. RENÉ BASSET.

IBSEN.—Henrik Ibsen (dramatist and poet) was born at Skien, in southern Norway, on 20th March 1828, the eldest son of Knud Ibsen, a substantial merchant. Scottish, German, and Danish strains preponderated over Norwegian in his ancestry. While Henrik was still a child, his father failed in business, and the family removed from his first home, a stately house in the market-place, to a humble suburban dwelling. His schooling was brief, and distinguished chiefly by a bent for art. This could not be indulged, and he was apprenticed at fifteen to an apothecary at Grimstad, a place still smaller and more remote. Here he spent seven years (1843–50), his time of storm and stress. The revolution of 1848–49 quickened his instinct of revolt and wakened his lyric power. He wrote fiery appeals on behalf of struggling Hungary and Denmark. He chose a Roman revolutionary for the hero of his first drama. *Catiline* (1850) excited no attention whatever; but its importance is great. Ibsen re-published it in 1875, with a preface in which he points out that it foreshadows the standing theme of his later drama —'the conflict of will and power.' And he is already a dramatist; in spite of his revolutionary sympathies, he has not idealized his hero; his Catiline is a tragically mixed character, who owes his ruin more to his own inner corruption than to the power of his foes.

A few months before its publication, Ibsen, having completed his apprenticeship, had come to Christiania. Here a second piece, *A Viking's Barrow* (*Kjæmpehöjen*), was acted with some success. He lived precariously by journalism, editing, with two friends, a short-lived periodical. In Nov. 1851 an appointment as stage-poet of the theatre at Bergen cut short these desultory activities, and decided his career. In accordance with the terms of his contract, he spent some months of 1852 in the study of stage arrangements at Copenhagen and Dresden. The five following years at Bergen brought him a practical training in stage technique of the utmost value to him. Besides staging numerous plays by other men, he produced four new pieces of his own—in particular *Dame Inger at Östraat* and *The Feast at Solhaug*. Enthusiasm for the national past was in the air at Bergen, and Ibsen did not escape it. But his mind was utterly unhistorical; history, even the national history, attracted him only as a source of dramatic or psychological problems, and these he was soon to find were furnished in greater abundance by contemporary society. Even when he drew upon history he re-shaped it freely to his needs. The historical Dame Inger was a spirited and high-handed, but not a tragic, figure; Ibsen involves her in a harrowing conflict between ambition and motherly love, which ends in her involuntary murder of the son for whom she has dared and endured. The *Feast at Solhaug* (1855) was the first result of his study of the sagas of Iceland. Something of their tragic grandeur is already reflected in the heroine Margit. But the lyrical form of the dialogue echoes the Norwegian ballads, and the temper of the play has a romantic buoyancy which Ibsen never again recovered. Two other new pieces were written and performed at Bergen—*St. John's Night* and *Olaf Liljekrans*, both based upon Norwegian legend. Both remained till recently unprinted.

In the summer of 1857, his contract at Bergen having terminated, Ibsen accepted a similar post at the Norwegian theatre in Christiania. A few months later he brought a wife to his new home, Susannah Daae Thoresen of Bergen.

The theatre had been recently established expressly to combat the dominant Danish taste by promoting a national Norwegian drama. With *The Vikings at Helgoland* (1857), Norway definitely acquired an original and very noble drama of her own. But the resources of the Norwegian theatre were unequal to staging it, and the older theatres both at Christiania and at Copenhagen rejected it with scorn. Danish poets like Oehlenschläger had dramatized the heroic saga in elegant iambics, and with a persistent effort to assuage and refine. Ibsen kept the rude strength of persons and situations, and the sinewy unadorned prose of their speech. Hjördis, the passionate wronged woman, who slays in deliberate vengeance the man she loves, is a tragic creation worthy of her prototypes in myth and saga, Brynhild and Gudrun.

The rejection of *The Vikings*, which was not played anywhere before 1861, increased Ibsen's estrangement from Christiania society. Conservative in politics, orthodox in religion, and devoted to Danish ideals of culture, the official and mercantile circles of the capital offered a stolid resistance to the young and needy idealists of the Nationalist cause. Björnson, four years Ibsen's junior, a born orator, and already the author of *Synnöve Solbakken* (1857), stood above the taciturn Ibsen both in persuasive potency and in popular repute. And Ibsen's next drama was a satiric comedy which ridiculed well-to-do society at its

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most sensitive point, and turned its apathy into furious indignation. *Love's Comedy* (1862) is, on the surface, an amusing exposure of the foibles incident to conventional courtship and marriage; a plea for the subjection of these relations to calm good sense, undistracted by sentiment and romance. But this attack upon 'romance' was inspired by a conception of love romantic in the extreme. Love's 'comedy' concerned only the shallow sentiment which society called by that name. The plight of genuine love in marriage could only, in Ibsen's eyes, be tragic: the routine of married life, the cares of household and children, vulgarized, he thought, the passion of souls. Falk, the young poet who preaches this doctrine, is at once ardent and shallow enough to make it, in his own case, plausible. The heroine, Svanhild, one of Ibsen's loveliest and most pathetic creations, gives him her heart, and they are on the point of adopting the conventional solution when the representative of calm good sense, an elderly merchant, intervenes, poses the young lovers with their own forgotten principles, and offers his own hand to Svanhild, who sadly accepts it. The play is written with abounding wit in ringing rhymes, and is now popular on all Scandinavian stages; but its imperfect technique and impossible ethics have hindered its vogue elsewhere. *Love's Comedy* is, however, important as Ibsen's first essay in the modern 'social' drama. A second saga-drama followed. The *Pretenders to the Crown* was written in a few weeks of the summer of 1863. Like *Dame Inger*, it is built upon Norwegian history, but is at once less unhistorical and more Ibsenian. The two figures, whose prolonged duel for the throne of Norway we watch, are admirably imagined and drawn: Hakon, the born ruler, clear-sighted and strong-willed; Skule, paralyzed by his own doubts. In Skule, Ibsen's own still hesitant faith in his powers may be reflected; but it is Hakon, not Skule, who is suggested by the clear structure and powerful build of this striking play.

Early in 1864 Ibsen's affairs reached a crisis. His outward circumstances, always precarious, had been seriously embarrassed by the failure, in 1862, of the Norwegian theatre. A small appointment as 'æsthetic adviser' at the Christiania theatre barely afforded a livelihood. His inner estrangement from society grew more bitter and intense. Some measure of it is given by the terrible stanzas of *On the Fells* (1860), an autobiographic confession shot through with the passion of Faust and the cynicism of Mephistopheles. The outbreak of the Dano-Prussian war in the spring of 1864 added a new and more definite provocation. Norway and Sweden declined, as in 1849, to support their Danish brothers; and the poet, who as a young man had then striven vainly to rouse them, felt their abstention yet more bitterly now. Some enthusiastic students went to the front as volunteers, but the government remained neutral; and service in the Norwegian army remained, as Ibsen intimated in his mocking verses, *The Ground of Faith*, one of the safest of callings. He sought to leave the country, and applied for a travelling pension, such as had recently been granted to Björnson. But *Love's Comedy* was too recent, and the favour was refused. In April 1864, Ibsen left Christiania for the south. Off Düppel he heard the Prussian guns; at Berlin he saw the Danish trophies, and the first idea of a great retributive poem upon his unfaithful fellow-countrymen flashed into his mind. It was the germ of *Brand*. In May he settled in Rome. The project at first made little progress. *Brand* was originally planned as a narrative poem, but the few cantos executed are laboured, and they were finally thrown aside and lost sight of. Thirty years later the Danish collector Pontoppidan discovered the MS in an antiquarian shop at Rome; it was published at Copenhagen in 1907. Meanwhile Ibsen, better inspired, had reverted to the dramatic form in which he was a master, and to a swift, flexible, ringing verse; he now wrote with fire, and in three months of the summer of 1865 completed the colossal poem. Brand, the prophet of 'All or Nothing,' hero and fanatic, is a great tragic figure, sublimely, but not quite consistently, conceived; and the drama itself is something less and something more, and greater, than the invective against Norway which it set out to be. Types of her prevailing weaknesses—of compromise, sentimentality, fainthcartedness—are drawn with brilliant and incisive touch; peasants and artists, officials and clergy, come under the satirist's stroke; but the final upshot is in the spirit of Agnes the devoted wife rather than of Brand, of love rather than uncompromising will. *Brand* has *longueurs*, but in its greatest moments, such as the close of the fourth act, it reaches a tragic intensity unsurpassed in the literature of the century. Contrary to the expectation of both author and publisher, it was received throughout the Scandinavian world with rapturous applause; its fierce invectives counted for nothing with readers who recognized that the poet who lashed his country passionately loved it, or who saw in it, above all, a thrilling religious romance. With *Brand*, Ibsen's Scandinavian fame begins.

A yet greater work was immediately to follow. In *Peer Gynt* (1866), Ibsen found a totally new way of saying essentially the same things. The hero, instead of being the prophetic assailant of Norwegian failings, is their embodiment. The sombre tone and Hebraic intensity of *Brand* are replaced by an action of immense scope and many-coloured diversity. Peer, a romantic egoist, living only to 'fulfil himself,' finds at the close of a career of self-indulgence that he has no self to fulfil. From the Nemesis pronounced by Ibsen upon fragmentary and purposeless lives he is saved, apparently, by the devotion of Solveig, in whose faith and love his 'self' has lived—a beautiful incoherence which betrays the persistence of the romantic heart in Ibsen himself. In wealth of poetry, sometimes, as in Ase's death-scene, of the most daring originality, *Peer Gynt* marks the highest reach of modern Scandinavian literature. Even more than in *Brand* the poetry overshadowed the polemical animus which had inspired its inception.

But in Ibsen himself the polemical animus was still vigorous. The desire to give it more direct and searching expression contributed to shape *The League of Youth* (1869), the first of the prose comedies of modern society. It was written at Dresden, whither he had moved from Rome in the previous year. The Liberal party, which was the main support of Norwegian separatism, is here brought with scathing realism upon the stage. The temper of the piece is as far removed from poetry as the form. Ibsen compared it to the Dresden 'beer and sausages,' after the Roman 'wine' of *Peer Gynt*. The play provoked a storm of obloquy, to which Ibsen retorted in the verses *At Port Said*. A vaster work, meantime, was approaching completion. *Cæsar and Galilean*, published in 1873, had been planned in 1864, and occupied much of the intervening years. The spell of classical antiquity, which inspired Julian's overthrow of Christianity, Ibsen himself, living at Rome, did not escape, and Julian is drawn with unmistakable sympathy. But Ibsen profoundly understood the futility of his enterprise, and portrayed his failure with an emphasis which procured for the drama the plaudits of the orthodox. Julian's character, however, is not perfectly maintained; in the Second

Part he is too far degraded to rouse genuine tragic pity. Ibsen, for the first and last time, appears not completely master of his material. In both the contending forces, Hellenism and Christianity, he saw the seed of failure, and looked forward, like Heine, to the coming of a 'Third Kingdom,' superseding and surpassing both.

The passage containing this prophecy is deeply interesting; but Ibsen never reverted to it. It suggests a belief in the permanence of some form of political or religious community, which events were rapidly sapping in his mind. His fervid championship of Scandinavian brotherhood, of a union of the Northern States, had for years held in check his native individualism. He had allied himself with the Norwegian conservatives, and, not without astute arrangement on their part, had received flattering attentions and distinctions from the Swedish king, as an illustrious pillar of the Union. He was thus drawn into a false position. To political and ecclesiastical institutions as such he had at no time attached value. He had derided them in the persons of the Mayor and the Dean in *Brand*. His letters of the early seventies express a yet more radical antagonism. 'The State must go!' he wrote to Brandes in the crisis of the fate of France, 1871; 'all religion will fall!' The pillars of society, he was convinced, were rotten; and the hope of humanity lay in a revolution which would alone make possible the free development of the individual. That such a revolution was imminent in Europe Ibsen for at least twenty years (1864–84) believed. One who thought thus could not long remain in alliance with the conservatives; in 1877, Ibsen cut himself loose with the drama significantly called *The Pillars of Society*. 'It may pass in some sort as an antithesis to *The League of Youth*,' he wrote to his publisher shortly before its appearance. The satire is now aimed, not at the democratic agitators, but at the men of social standing and prestige, the magnates of finance and business; and it is aimed with more conviction and more passion. In technical mastery and psychological force the *Pillars* falls short of Ibsen's finest work; but the impact of the sharp tonic of truth, in the person of Lona Hessel, upon the fabric of an imposing but hollow respectability is represented with extraordinary verve. The conservatives deeply resented this unexpected blow. One yet more searching followed. *A Doll's House* (1879) probed the roots not merely of social status, but of the family itself. That women were to count with men as individuals, and to share men's claim to self-development, was now first made clear. In marriage this claim seemed to be all but universally ignored. Ibsen's ideal for women had hitherto been the selfless devotion of an Agnes or a Solveig to husband or lover. Even the emancipated Lona shatters the 'Pillars' only that she may vindicate her brother. Nora is the first to discover that she herself has a personality, and a duty towards it, which as the wife of Helmer she cannot fulfil. The play, a capital stage piece, called forth a storm of protest, which made its author's name for the first time widely known in Europe. The weightiest criticism took the form of the inquiry: 'What then of the children?' Ibsen replied in the terrible drama *Ghosts* (1881), a work far greater in technical mastery, as well as in intellectual reach, than any of its predecessors. In laying bare the horrible possibilities of inheritance, Ibsen discovered a new source of tragic terror and pity, analogous to the antique destiny, but indefeasibly real; he also struck a courageous blow for the cause of womanhood. But *Ghosts* only redoubled the scandal of *A Doll's House*. Ibsen, provoked by what he took to be a general conspiracy to ignore ugly facts, retorted the next year with *An Enemy of the People* (1882), an incisive and brilliant satire, in which patricians and democrats fare equally ill, and Ibsen's individualism culminates in the ringing declaration that 'the strongest man is he who stands alone.'

With this challenging cry, however, the polemical phase of Ibsen's drama closes. In his eight remaining plays the temper of revolution is constantly present as a subject, but it no longer altogether reflects his own; on the contrary, he probes its weaknesses as remorselessly as those of conservatism and orthodoxy; and his attitude is now that of the inscrutable doubter who puts searching questions everywhere and answers none. To find answers, as he said, was not his business. *The Wild Duck* (1884), a masterpiece of construction, is a wonderful study of the disasters wrought by the blundering idealist; Gregers Werle is a diminutive Stockmann, Hjalmar Ekdal a mean and shabby Peer Gynt. *Rosmersholm* (1886), perhaps the greatest of the prose dramas, paints the guilty passion of an emancipated woman, and her purification by love and in death. No other modern play is informed with so deep a sense that sin may be forgiven, but must be atoned for, as this masterpiece of the 'immoral' Ibsen. Here, too, the mysterious suggestions of folklore, so abundant in *Brand* and *Peer Gynt*, so severely banished from the revolutionary prose dramas, once more recur. The 'white horses of Rosmersholm' gleam eerily in the background, foreboding the fateful issue; and *The Lady from the Sea* (1888) is a study of such revolt as Nora's, inspired by no doctrine of self-development, but by the spell of the sea. Contrary, too, to Ibsen's wont hitherto, the spell is finally mastered; Eline is reconciled to her husband. In *Hedda Gabler* (1890), even more than in *The Wild Duck*, he is occupied with the meaner and baser types of emancipated character; Hedda is a pitiful parody of romantic revolt drawn with merciless power. *The Master-Builder* (1892), which shows a growing use of symbolism, portrays emancipation in a form at once more fascinating and more dangerous; his old theme of rivalry between youth and maturity is resumed but in other terms. Solness succumbs to no young men's revolt but to the too stimulating homage of a girl. *Little Eyolf* (1894) and *John Gabriel Borkman* (1896) painted other tragic issues with diminishing power. Finally, in 1900, *When We Dead Awaken*, little more than an eccentric parody of an Ibsenian play, closed the great series. In 1901, Ibsen suffered a nervous collapse, from which he never recovered. On the 23rd of May 1906 he died. He was buried with national honours.

The fierce controversies once provoked by Ibsen's name have long subsided, even in England, where they survived longest. It is premature to determine the final rank of his work; but there can be no doubt that it will count among the most potent and original literary forces of the 19th century. One of the last descendants of the Revolution, near of kin to the poets of Young Germany, above all to Heine, he added to their ardent individualism and to their brilliant imagination artistic conscience, method, and will. Drama was for him from the first a means of expressing his own impassioned apprehension of the dissonances of modern society; but he fashioned the instrument to his purpose with deliberate and calculated precision. In mastery of dramatic resource, in knowledge of the stage, he has no superior; but his technique, without disdaining tradition, was shaped essentially by the need of presenting with the utmost cogency and clearness what he had to say. This meant, however, a wholesale rejection of stage conventions, stage situations, and stage

talk; a return to fearless realism, especially in dialogue. It meant also a re-discovery of some long disused but potent ways in drama—the concentrated or inverted tragic plot, as in *Oedipus Tyrannus*, and *Rosmersholm*, the stress of an irresistible fate, rooted in past events, as in the *Oresteia*, and *Ghosts*. His subject always concerned the forces which disturb or shatter social cohesion; but his normal sympathy with these forces was at no time unqualified; he exposed the corruption of a Catiline, the fanaticism of a Brand; he angered both political parties, and perplexed his warmest partisans by an ironical impartiality which spared the failings of neither side. To see the truth under many aspects, 'to see life thoroughly and see it whole,' in the great Sophoclean way, was less signally his gift; and the drift of his thinking is accordingly not towards any kind of harmony, but to the statement of fundamental problems about life which cannot be resolved and must not be escaped. With all this, Ibsen was fundamentally a poet. His few but enthralling lyrics, and his magnificent verse dramas, amaze the reader of his colourless prose by their splendour of imagination, their metrical brilliance, and the romantic intensity with which they render the passion of love. It was one of the secrets of his dramatic achievement that the white heat of poetry was in him united, as it has rarely been, with logical rigour and precision, and inflexible self-control. He gave the drama not merely an original technique, but immensely heightened intellectual and ethical significance. Since 1870 the influence of his work has told powerfully upon the scope and status of the drama throughout civilized Europe.

LITERATURE.—Collected editions of Ibsen's works, with introductions to the several plays, are now accessible (1) in the original, ed. Halfdan Kohl, and others, Copenhagen, 1898; (2) in German, ed. G. Brandes, and others, Berlin, 1899 ff.; (3) in English, ed. W. Archer and C. H. Herford, London, 1906. The best study of his life and work, as yet untranslated, is R. Woerner, *Henrik Ibsen*, Munich, 1900. Halvorsen's bibliography, included in the Norwegian edition of the Works, is invaluable. The first drafts of the plays are collected in *Efterladte Skrifter*, 3 vols., Christiania, 1909. Ibsen's *Letters* were published in 1904, Eng. tr., Christiania, 1905. Many of the lyrics have been excellently translated by F. Garrett, London, 1912. Other studies are: Brandes, *Essays*, Copenhagen, 1868 ff.; E. Gosse, *Ibsen*, London, 1907; G. Bernard Shaw, *Quintessence of Ibsenism*, do. 1892; R. E. Roberts, *Ibsen*, do. 1912. The literature of Ibsenian commentary and exposition, esp. in German, is already immeasurable. Much of it is catalogued in the appendix to Woerner's *Life* mentioned above. C. H. HERFORD.

ICELAND.—See TEUTONS.

ICONOCLASM. -Iconoclasm is the name of a movement against the worship of holy pictures in the Eastern Church, in the 8th and 9th centuries, which was repeated on a smaller scale in the Frankish kingdom.

1. **Origin.**—The source of Iconoclasm is much discussed. Just before the Roman Emperors began to persecute image-worshippers, their rivals, the Khalifs at Damascus, had started a similar campaign among their Christian subjects (Yazid I., 680-683; Yazid II., 720-724). The Iconoclast movement in the Empire was warmly approved by the Muslims; yet it is unlikely that it should have been caused solely, or even chiefly, by the influence of the great enemy of the Christian Emperors. Undoubtedly in the 8th cent. the worship of images in the East had arrived at an extreme point. When we read of people who chose, not a living man but some special icon (*εἰκών*), to be the godfather of their child, and who ground an image to powder, mixed this with water, and drank it as a magic medicine,[1] it is not difficult to understand that a reaction would come. Moreover, long before the Iconoclast troubles began there were parties in the East which objected to the prevalent cult of holy images.[1] The Paulicians, thinking all matter bad, rejected material pictures. In the early 8th cent. several Orthodox bishops (Constantine of Nakolia, Theodosios of Ephesus, and Thomas of Klaudiopolis) had already preached against images and relics. A Jacobite bishop, Xenaias of Hierapolis, was a forerunner of the Iconoclasts; and, when this party succeeded in getting the ear of the Emperor, the Iconoclast persecution began.

2. **The first Iconoclast persecution.**—Iconoclasm throughout was a government movement; the chief secondary issue all the time—indeed, from some points of view, the main issue—was the right of the Emperor to legislate for the Church. On the other hand, the monks were always defenders of images. The Isaurian dynasty of Emperors were the Iconoclasts of the first period, and the first of this dynasty, Leo III. (A.D. 716-741), began the campaign. As soon as he had made himself Emperor, he developed a policy of strengthening the Empire by enforcing uniformity and centralizing the power.[2] He persecuted Jews and Paulicians cruelly. Then he was persuaded by the party opposed to images that they were the main obstacle against the conversion of Jews and Muslims. There was also a certain rationalizing tendency in this dynasty which helps to explain his attitude. Constantine of Nakolia and his party persuaded the Emperor that the worship of images was the great hindrance to the unity of the Empire, that it caused superstition and divisions, and that it was forbidden by the first commandment (in the Byzantine numbering). Seeing the coming trouble, John of Synnada wrote to warn the Patriarch of Constantinople of Constantine's views; and the Patriarch, Germanos I. (A.D. 715-730), wrote a treatise in favour of images, addressed to Thomas of Klaudiopolis.[3] But the Emperor, having now made up his mind to forbid image-worship, began to enforce their destruction ruthlessly. In 725 he published an edict declaring that image-worship is idolatry, and commanding all icons in the churches to be destroyed. The soldiers began to carry out his order, and there were disturbances throughout the Empire.[4] Germanos protested against the edict and appealed to the Pope (Gregory II., A.D. 715-731) in 728,[5] whereupon the Emperor declared him a traitor, deposed him, and set up an Iconoclast, Anastasios, in his place (730). Leo had already written to the Pope, commanding him to accept the new edict, destroy his images, and summon a general council to forbid their use. In 727 Gregory answered by a long defence of images; he also blamed the Emperor's interference in Church matters, denied the need of a council, and demanded that Leo should cease his policy in this matter.[6] A correspondence between the Emperor and the Pope followed in which each maintained his position, Leo claiming the right to legislate for the Church, on the strength of being both *βασιλεὺς καὶ ἱερεύς*.[7] Meanwhile the persecution of image-worshippers raged in the East. The government was specially fierce against the monks, as being the chief defenders of images. Monasteries were destroyed, monks banished, tortured, and put to death. The Iconoclast movement took the further lines of rejecting

[1] So the letter of Michael II. to Louis the Pious (Mansi, xiv. 417-422). On the cult of icons in the Byzantine Church just before Iconoclasm see E. Marin, *Les Moines de Constantinople*, Paris, 1897, ch. iv. pp. 312-325.

[1] One of the earliest forerunners of Iconoclasm was Serenus of Marseilles, to whom Pope Gregory I. (590-604) wrote a severe letter (*Ep.* ix. 105 [*PL* lxxvii. 1027]).

[2] For Leo III.'s policy in general see Bury, *Hist. of the later Roman Empire*, vi. ch. ii.

[3] Harduin, iv. 245-262.

[4] See Gregory II.'s first letter to the Emperor (Mansi, xii. 959 ff.).

[5] Harduin, iv. 233 ff. [6] Mansi, xii. 959 ff.

[7] Jaffé, *Regesta*, nos. 2180-2182.

and destroying relics, and denying the intercession of saints. These two further points, though not necessarily involved by Iconoclasm, became generally identified with it. At this time St. John Damascene, safe from the Emperor's anger at the Khalîf's court, wrote his famous defences of icons.[1] In the West, too, the people rose against the Emperor's Edict. In 727 there was a revolt in Greece against the Iconoclast Emperor, and a certain Kosmas was set up as anti-Emperor, ostensibly to protect the images. It was easily put down; then followed a second and severer law against image-worshippers. In 731 Pope Gregory II. was succeeded by Gregory III. (731–741), and the new Pope at once held a synod of 93 bishops at Rome, who excommunicated all who defiled or destroyed pictures of Christ or the saints.[2] The legate sent to Constantinople with a copy of this decree was stopped and imprisoned in Sicily. The Emperor then sent a fleet to Italy to punish the Pope; but it was wrecked by a storm on the way. He confiscated all the property of the Holy See on which he could lay his hands (in Sicily and Southern Italy), and affected to withdraw Illyricum from the Roman Patriarchate and to join it to that of Constantinople. To make the Byzantine Patriarchate coterminous with what was left of his Empire was part of his general centralizing policy. He continued an active persecution of all image-worshippers till his death in 741. His son, Constantine V. (Kopronymos, 741–775), was an even fiercer Iconoclast than his father. At Leo's death there had been another rebellion when Artabasdos, who had married Leo's daughter, set himself up as Emperor and restorer of the icons. The intruded Patriarch, Anastasios, veered round (in the usual Byzantine way) under Artabasdos, restored the images, and excommunicated Constantine. The rebellion was soon suppressed. Artabasdos was blinded and imprisoned; Anastasios was blinded, publicly flogged, forced to return to Iconoclasm, and then reinstated as Patriarch. In 753, Constantine summoned a great synod, which was to be ecumenical and to forbid image-worship for ever. Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem refused to send legates. About 340 bishops attended. The see of Constantinople was vacant by the death of Anastasios (who did not long survive his mishandling), and Theodosios of Ephesus and Pastillas of Perge presided. This synod carried out the Emperor's wishes exactly, and declared all images idols forbidden by Ex $20^{4ff.}$, Dt 5^{8}, Ro 1^{23-25} etc. Pictures of Christ must be either Nestorian or Monophysite, since it is impossible to represent His Divinity; the only lawful representation of our Lord is the holy Eucharist. It is blasphemous to represent by dead matter those who live with Christ. Image-worshippers are idolaters; Leo and Constantine are the glory of the Orthodox faith, our rescuers from idolatry. With regard to three great defenders of images, already dead (Germanos of Constantinople, John Damascene, and a monk George of Cyprus), the synod declares that 'the Trinity has destroyed these three.' An Iconoclast, Constantine II. (754–766),[3] was elected to the vacant see of Constantinople, and the government at once published the decrees of this synod, demanding that all bishops in the Empire should sign the acts and destroy images in their dioceses. Instead of pictures of saints the churches were now decorated with those of flowers, fruit, and birds. The Paulicians were well treated, but the monks were tortured and put to death. A great number of the martyrs of the Iconoclast persecution come from this time. Relics were thrown into the sea. Then the Emperor, seeing in monasticism the mainstay of image-worship, made a great effort to abolish it altogether. The monastic habit was forbidden, monasteries were turned into barracks, and the Patriarch was made to denounce his former state as a monk in his own Church. It is noticeable that the army especially became fiercely Iconoclast. Constantine died in 775. His son Leo IV. (775–780), though he did not repeal the laws, was milder in enforcing them. He tolerated monks and, at least in the first part of his reign, carried out a policy of conciliation. Towards the end of his life, however, he renewed the active persecution of his father. But his wife Irene was always a devoted image-worshipper, and kept icons secretly in her apartments.

[1] Three apologies 'Against those who destroy holy images' (*PG* xciv. 1231–1420).

[2] Mansi, xii. 269 ff.

[3] The acts of the Iconoclast synod of 753 are contained in those of Nicæa II., Mansi, xiii. 205–363.

3. The first reaction.—As soon as Leo IV. died (Sept. 780), a complete reaction set in. His son, Constantine VI. (780–797), was only nine years old, and the Empress Irene became regent for him. As soon as her fear of the army allowed, she set about to repeal the Iconoclast laws. All this time Iconoclasm had prevailed only within the territory over which the Emperor actually ruled. Outside the Empire, under the Muslims and in the West, image-worship went on as before; indeed, in the West especially, there was much angry feeling against the Iconoclast Emperors. Irene first deposed the Patriarch of Constantinople (Paul IV., 780–784, naturally a partisan of the late government), and a pronounced image-worshipper, Tarasios (784–806, an uncle or cousin of Photios),[1] was appointed to succeed him. Then the Empress renewed relations with Rome. She sent an embassy to the Pope (Adrian I., 772–795) begging him to come himself or to send legates to a synod which should undo the work of the former one.[2] Adrian in answer sent two letters, one for the Empress and one for the Patriarch.

He is not pleased with Tarasios' succession to the Patriarchate, but praises his orthodoxy about the images. He repeats arguments in favour of these, insists on his own authority, and demands the restitution of Illyricum to his Patriarchate.[3] As legates he sends an Archpriest Peter and Abbot Peter of St. Sabbas near Rome. The other Patriarchs were then too much harassed by the Muslims to be able to send legates. However, the monks of Egypt and Syria send deputies, who seem in some sort to have been accepted as representing their Patriarchs too.

So the synod was opened by Tarasios in the church of the Apostles at Constantinople in August 786, but it was at once dispersed by the soldiers. Irene then disbanded these and replaced them by others, and for greater safety the synod reassembled at Nicæa in Bithynia (where the first General Council had been held). Here it was opened in the summer of 787. This is the council counted by Orthodox and Catholics as the seventh General Council (Nicæa II.). About 300 bishops attended. The Roman legates signed first and were named first in all lists of members; but Tarasios conducted the proceedings, apparently because of the usual difficulty of language. The synod declared the lawful use of icons, and defended this by texts showing that there were images in the Temple (Ex 25^{18-22}, Nu 7^{89}, Ezk $41^{18f.}$, He 9^{5}) and by quotations from the Fathers. In the 5th session an icon was set up in the hall of the synod. The former council (of 753) was declared to be not ecumenical, since neither the Pope nor any of the other Patriarchs was represented at it, and its arguments were refuted one by one. The 7th session drew up the symbol (*ὅρος*) of Nicæa II., in which, after the usual renewed condemnation of old heresies, it is declared that the holy icons are to receive veneration (or worship, *προσκύνησις*), not adoration (*λατρεία*). The honour paid to them is only relative (*σχετική*),

[1] *Vita Tarasii*, ed. J. A. Heikel, Helsingfors, 1889.

[2] Mansi, xii. 984-986.

[3] Jaffé, *Reg.*, nos. 2448 and 2449; Mansi, xii. 1073 ff.

and is given for the sake of their prototypes. There is nothing new in this. It is what the defenders of image-worship had said throughout the controversy. The synod then anathematizes the chief Iconoclasts, and, in opposition to the phrase of the other council, declares that 'the Trinity has made these three (Germanos, John Damascene, and George of Cyprus) glorious.' Twenty-two Canons were drawn up, of which the third forbids the civil government to appoint bishops.[1] Copies of the acts were sent to the Pope, who approved them and had them translated into Latin. Then the images were restored in all the churches, and the first Iconoclast movement was at an end, although there remained a strong Iconoclast party, especially in the army.

4. The second Iconoclast movement.—Twenty-seven years later Iconoclasm broke out again. This time it is easily explicable, for the Iconoclast party, which had not ceased to exist, again got the power. After Nicæa II. the Empire was singularly unfortunate. The image-worshipping Emperors were defeated by the Muslims and Bulgars, and the soldiers looked back with regret to the glorious reign of Constantine V. Michael I. (811–813) was defeated by the Bulgars and forced to resign, while in his place the army set up Leo V. (the Armenian, 813–820), whom they persuaded that all the troubles of the Empire came from image-worship. The new Emperor invited the Patriarch of Constantinople, Nikephoros I. (806–815), to re-open the question of the icons; but he refused, saying that it was already settled by a general council. In spite of this the old laws against images were renewed, and the work of breaking images in the churches began again. In the year 815 Nikephoros[2] was deposed by a synod of bishops in obedience to the Emperor's orders, and an Iconoclast, Theodotos I. (815–821), was made Patriarch in his stead. Nikephoros was banished, and the new Patriarch immediately summoned a synod which undid the work of Nicæa II. and renewed the acts of 753.[3] The persecution of image-worshippers broke out again, more fiercely than ever. Bishops, monks, clergy, and laymen who would not accept the Iconoclast laws were banished, tortured, or killed. The great champion of the images at this time was St. Theodore, abbot of the Studion monastery,[4] who, with the image-worshippers generally, appealed to the Pope (Paschal I., 817–824). Paschal wrote to the Emperor, protesting against his renewal of the old heresy, but without effect.[5] He also welcomed the exiled monks at Rome, and gave them a monastery. In 820 Leo V. was murdered, and Michael II. (the Stammerer, 820–829) was made Emperor. He continued the same policy, and the persecution went on as before. In 842 Theophilos (829–842), who had succeeded Michael II., died. The story of the former Iconoclast movement is repeated in this one with curious exactness. Theophilos left a son three years old (Michael III. the Drunkard, 842–867), and again the Empress, Theodora, became regent for her son. At once she put an end to Iconoclasm. She deposed the Patriarch (John VII., 832–842) and put an image-worshipper (Methodios I., 842–846) in his place. She opened the prisons and let out the image-worshippers. In 842 a synod renewed the decrees of Nicæa II., approved John VII.'s deposition, and excommunicated all Iconoclasts. On the first Sunday of Lent (19th Feb. 842) the images were taken in triumph in a great procession, and were restored to the churches. That is the end of the story in the East. Iconoclasm disappeared; the holy icons have ever since been honoured by the Orthodox Church; the decrees of Nicæa II. have not again been disputed, and the memory of the restoration of the images is still kept every year (Feast of Orthodoxy, first Sunday of Lent).

5. Iconoclasm in the West.—At the end of the 8th cent. there was a slight echo of the great Iconoclast movement in the Frankish kingdom, caused by two misunderstandings. First, the Frankish bishops misunderstood what had been decreed at Nicæa II., and knew its acts only through a grossly inaccurate version.

For instance, in the 3rd session of the council a bishop had declared: 'I receive the holy and venerable images, but I give that worship which is real adoration (*κατὰ λατρείαν*) only to the consubstantial and life-giving Trinity.' This phrase had been translated: 'I receive the holy and venerable images with the adoration which I give to the consubstantial and life-giving Trinity.' The Franks misunderstood the word 'worship' (*προσκύνησις*) too. It is abundantly clear from the acts of the council, indeed from the whole controversy in the East, that this means reverence, a relative honour, for the sake only of the prototype (such is the explanation given by all the defenders of image-worship, St. John Damascene, St. Theodore, etc.). But in Latin *προσκύνησις* was translated *adoratio*, and the Franks thought it meant what we generally mean by 'adoration.'

Further, they were not used to, and did not understand, Byzantine etiquette. The Byzantines prostrated themselves before the Emperor, incensed him, and kissed his feet; they even gave these marks of respect to his portraits. So it was natural that they should do the same to portraits of the saints. Really all such forms have no absolute nor inherent meaning. They mean just what the custom of the time and place makes them mean. But the Franks, unused to such ceremonies, interpreted them according to their more reserved custom, and thought them idolatrous. Lastly, there was already the dislike of the Greeks and deep distrust of all that they did (the Franks were just about to break with the Eastern Empire altogether and to set up their own king as rival Emperor). Yet it should be noticed that these Frankish bishops never meant to take the side of the Eastern Iconoclasts. If they for a time condemned the second Council of Nicæa, they also condemned the Iconoclast Council of 753.

Already, in 767, Constantine V. had tried to gain the Frankish bishops for his views, but without success. A synod at Gentilly sent a declaration to the Pope (Paul I., 757–767) which quite satisfied him;[1] but, when Adrian I. (772–795) sent the acts of Nicæa II. (wrongly translated) to Gaul, the bishops sent back a refutation of them (790) in 85 chapters (790). This answer, expanded later, is the famous *Capitulare de imaginibus*, or *Libri carolini*.[2] In it the bishops admit that images and relics should be kept in churches and treated with due respect; but God only can receive adoration. The images are to have *opportuna veneratio*, not *adoratio*. Except for the misunderstood use of the word *adoratio* (*προσκύνησις*), this is exactly what Nicæa II. had declared. In 794 they held a synod at Frankfurt in the presence of two papal legates, who seem to have done nothing to clear up the misunderstanding. This synod formally condemns Nicæa II., while showing plainly that the bishops do not understand what has there been decreed. They report it as a synod held by the Greeks at Constantinople (they do not even know where Nicæa II. sat), in which the 'Greeks' had declared that the same service and adoration are to be given to images as to the holy Trinity; and, accordingly, the Franks at Frankfurt, not sorry to

[1] The acts of Nicæa II. in Mansi, xii. and xiii.
[2] His writings against Iconoclasm in *PG* c. 201–850; *Vita Nicephori Patr.*, by the deacon Ignatius (ed. C. de Boor, Leipzig, 1880).
[3] Mansi, xiv. 185 ff., 417.
[4] His life, by a contemporary monk, in *PG* xcix. 113 ff.; his works, *ib.*; A. Gardner, *Theodore of Studium*, London, 1905.
[5] J. B. Pitra, *Spic. Solesm.*, Paris, 1852–58, ii. p. xl ff.

[1] Hefele-Leclercq, *Hist. des conciles*, iii. 726.
[2] *Ib.* 1061–1091; in *PL* xcviii. 999–1248. The authenticity of the *Libri carolini*, once disputed, is now admitted.

be able to condemn 'Greeks,' declare that they 'despise and condemn that synod.'[1] They sent their acts to Rome with a petition that the Pope would confirm them, which, of course, he refused to do. He had already written a long explanation of the acts of Nicæa II.; but this did not arrive in Gaul till after the synod of Frankfurt. There matters rested for a time. When the second Iconoclast persecution had broken out, Michael II. wrote to Louis the Pious demanding that the Greek image-worshipping monks who had fled to the West should be handed over to Byzantine justice, and also arguing at length against the images.[2] Louis then begged the Pope (Eugene II., 824–827) to receive from the Frankish bishops a collection of texts from the Fathers bearing on the subject, and to prepare this document they met in Paris in 825, where they again attempted a middle way, but leant decidedly towards Iconoclasm. The treatise was sent to Rome with every possible expression of respect, as useful material for consideration in the crisis. Nothing is known about the result of this document, except that it made no change in the attitude of the Holy See. Then gradually the Frankish misunderstanding was cleared up, and the movement in the West died out. Pope John VIII. (872–882) sent a more accurate translation of the acts of Nicæa II., which helped to allay the suspicion of the Franks.

There are a few later isolated cases of opposition to the veneration of images in the West. In 824 Claudius of Turin destroyed all pictures, crosses, and relics in his diocese; for which action he was reprimanded by a number of other bishops and by a Frankish abbot, Theodemir. He was condemned by a local synod. Agobard of Lyons at the same time shared Claudius's views; but Walafrid Strabo and Hincmar of Rheims defended the attitude of Nicæa II., and so explained it that we hear little more of Frankish Iconoclasm. Still, as late as the 11th cent., Jocceline of Bordeaux was severely reprimanded by Pope Alexander II. for Iconoclastic ideas.

6. The cult of images.—Both the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches accept the decrees of Nicæa II., with their distinction between σχετικὴ προσκύνησις and λατρεία. But there is a practical difference in their application. The Orthodox have innumerable pictures, and even bas-reliefs, which they treat with great reverence. But they have no solid statues, and are very much disposed to regard these as idols. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, sees no difference in principle between a solid statue and a flat picture. Except the Nestorians, all the other Eastern Churches agree with the Orthodox in this matter. They, too, have pictures, but no statues, though some of them (notably the Armenians) are more reserved in their forms of reverence towards pictures, and sometimes blame the Orthodox in this matter. The Nestorians now have no pictures of any kind, only a plain cross, to which they pay the greatest reverence. They alone among the Eastern Churches make a principle of not venerating images, although there is evidence that formerly they had them, according to the usual Eastern custom.

LITERATURE.—C. J. Hefele, *Histoire des conciles*, French tr. by H. Leclercq, vols. iii.-iv. (Paris, 1909), contains a complete account of Iconoclasm with the acts of all the councils, and copious bibliography. The acts are in Mansi, xii. and xiii.; **Natalis Alexander**, 'de Iconoclastarum hæresi,' in F. Zaccaria, *Thesaurus Theologicus*, Venice, 1762, iv. 64–83; L. Maimbor *Histoire de l'hérésie des iconoclastes*, 2 vols., Paris, 1683; F. [illegible] *um ihre Eigenart und ihre Freiheit*, Gotha, 1890 (the best short history); L. Bréhier, *La Querelle des images*, Paris, 1905; J. B. Bury, *A History of the later Roman Empire*, London, 1889, ii. 428–438.

ADRIAN FORTESCUE.

IDEA.—This word has been used by philosophers to denote (*a*) eternal natures or essences, the objects of true and abiding knowledge; (*b*) such natures considered as contents of a Divine mind, and archetypes of the things which we perceive with our senses; (*c*) the contents, or some of the contents, of the human mind or consciousness. The present article will be devoted to tracing the historical origin and connexion of these several usages.

1. In Greek philosophy.—The importance of the word in the vocabulary of philosophy is due to *Plato*, and its earlier history concerns us mainly as illustrating his usage. Both ἰδέα and the kindred term εἶδος, from whose history its own is, down to the time of Aristotle, inseparable, are derived from the root of ἰδεῖν, 'to see,' and originally had the sense of 'look,' 'looks,' 'outward appearance.' Already in Homer (*Od.* xvii. 454) εἶδος is used for 'beauty.' The primary sense of 'appearance' passes easily into that of 'form' or 'kind,' and in such passages as Thucydides, ii. 50 (τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου), the reference is plainly not so much to outward appearance as to true structure or essential nature; and this meaning seems to have established itself in scientific circles before the time of Plato. A. E. Taylor has recently contended (*Varia Socratica*, Oxford, 1911, p. 178 ff.) that it is independent of the meaning 'kind,' and is derived from a Pythagorean use of the word for geometrical figures, conceived as the ultimate elements of reality (cf. Plato, *Tim.* 53 C) and then extended to such elements (στοιχεῖα), however conceived. The evidence seems insufficient to support this conclusion (see C. M. Gillespie, in *Classical Quarterly*, July 1912).

We learn from the *Iatrica* of Meno (see J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], London, 1908, p. 235 n.) that Plato's contemporary, Philistion, called Empedocles' four elements ἰδέαι; but this may only have meant 'kinds of body.' The fact that Democritus called his atoms ἰδέαι or εἴδη (Sext. Emp. *Math.* vii. 137; Plut. *adv. Colot.* 1111*a*; see Burnet, p. 388 n.) is explicable by his view that the atoms differed from each other only in shape (Aristotle, *Met.* A 4, 985[b] 13, *de Gen. et Corr.* i. 2, 315[b] 7). On the early history of the word see C. A. Brandis, *Gesch. der gr. und röm. Phil.*, Berlin, 1835, pp. 242, 299, 307; H. Diels, *Elementum*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 16; Burnet, *op. cit.*, p. 354, and the refl. under εἶδος, ἰδέα, in the Index; Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, p. 178 ff.; Constantin Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen über Platon*, Munich, 1910, p. 228 ff.

The full examination of Plato's doctrine of Ideas and of the questions how far it was original, how far the common inheritance of the Socratic circle (see Burnet, p. 354 ff.), and what changes it underwent at different periods of his life, lies beyond the scope of this article, which will confine itself to a general description of his usage, especially in relation to the later history of the word. Aristotle (*Met.* A 6, 987[a] 29 ff.) tells that Plato, when young, learned from Cratylus the doctrine of Heraclitus, that everything sensible or corporeal (and to such things alone Heraclitus referred, according to Arist. *Met.* M 4, 1078[b] 14) was involved in a process of perpetual flux or change; and that Plato, who perceived the deadly consequence of this doctrine for knowledge, sought a way of escape suggested to him by his intercourse with Socrates, who, in dealing with attempts to show the purely conventional nature of such notions as those of justice, courage, and the like, had attempted, by defining these terms, to reach fixed objects of moral approval. For the very statement that what was just under *these* circumstances is unjust under *those* becomes meaningless unless what is meant by 'just' is the same in both cases. Plato, by extending this principle beyond the ethical sphere, reached his doctrine of Ideas—permanent

[1] Mansi, xiii. 861; Pertz, *Mon. Germ. hist.* iii.
[2] Hefele-Leclercq, iv. 43–49.

realities or natures corresponding to general terms. Such permanent natures are not objects of *sense*; they are apprehended by *understanding*. Others, *e.g.* Democritus, had thought that such truly existent natures, εἴδη or ἰδέαι, must underlie the shows of the world; but it was definitely realized by Plato (and, it would seem, first by him) that they must be *incorporeal*.

Aristotle, by giving this account in close connexion with a treatment of the theory, usual with him, as a modification of the Pythagorean doctrine that Numbers are the ultimate realities, suggests that the Pythagorean influence on Plato was not independent of the Socratic; and there are other indications (collected and insisted upon, not without exaggeration, in Taylor's *Varia Socratica*) that Socrates stood in closer connexion with Pythagorean circles than has always, despite Plato's *Phædo*, been recognized.

Aristotle's account brings out clearly the fact that Plato's ideas are *objects of thought* (νοητά): they are not 'concepts' or 'thoughts in the mind' (νοήματα). The latter explanation is actually put by Plato (*Parm.* 132 B) into the mouth of the youthful Socrates, only to be dismissed by Parmenides with the pertinent inquiry whether there could be a thought which was a thought of nothing (νόημα οὐδενός). Plato must not be regarded as one who, at first a 'conceptualist,' went on to 'substantiate' or 'hypostatize' concepts. Such a gratuitous proceeding could not be regarded as an important contribution to philosophy (see Lotze, *Log.*, Leipzig, 1874, iii. 2, § 313 ff., Eng. tr., Oxford, 1888, ii. 200 ff.). We should rather approach his theory by considering that, while we should readily admit that we might be mistaken about the motive of an act we *thought* just, or the beauty of a face which affection predisposed us to love, or which had been injured since we last saw it, we could not claim even to have an opinion about them, did we not *know* what justice or beauty is. So, too, a judgment that two visible lines are equal to one another can never express more than an opinion; but, if we did not know what equality is, no such judgment could have any meaning at all. One could not doubt what was just in a hard case, or correct a wrong definition of justice on the production of a case not in accordance with it, except in virtue of a knowledge of the nature of justice. This nature or Idea is no corporeal being perceptible by the senses, but something more lasting, better known, and more properly to be called real than anything which is so perceptible. It is no notion in my mind; I have a notion or knowledge of it, but for that very reason it is distinct from the notion or knowledge which I have of it. We may legitimately ask how this Idea is related to particular instances of it, or to the sensible phenomena which exhibit it, or to the mind which apprehends it; but in all such questions we are talking and thinking of it as something real, permanent, known; and, whatever it be, it is certainly neither a body nor a mode of consciousness; if it is less plain that it is not a spirit, it is certainly not plain that it is so.

Aristotle held that Plato was wrong in asserting that this Idea was χωριστόν, separable and separate from the particulars which might be said to 'copy' it or 'partake of' it. The former metaphor Aristotle (*Met.* A 6, 987[b] 11) ascribes to the Pythagoreans, the latter to Plato. The difficulties of both are exhibited by Plato himself (*Parm.* 130 E ff.). But Aristotle did not hold that it should have been described as a 'thought in our minds.' Such thoughts are not the individual substances of which we think; and 'conceptualism' is at least as open as Platonism to the charge of χωρισμός, the separation of the universal from the particulars. What Aristotle denied was the Platonic view that science required the assumption of 'separate' Ideas (*Post. Anal.* i. 11, 77[a] 5 ff.), whereas it only required the possibility of universal predication. What Plato called an Idea Aristotle called a καθόλου, or universal, an expression not used by Plato (but see *Meno*, 77 A) and implying the Aristotelian criticism. The ἀρχὴ ἐπιστήμης is for Aristotle 'one beside the many' (ἓν παρὰ τὰ πολλά) like Plato's Idea (*Post. Anal.* ii. 100[a] 7), but *as thus separated from the particulars* it is in the mind only. Any other separation is not necessary for science, and involves insuperable difficulties. Aristotle, then, did not take Plato for a conceptualist who 'substantiated concepts,' but for a realist who placed the essence of individual substances outside of them, and supposed that in predicating universally of them we were asserting another substance beside them, which possessed their common predicates without their distinct individualities. This had led to denial that the individual substances were substances at all, because they were not this additional substance. Hence Plato's εἴδη or ἰδέαι to which Aristotle said good-bye (τὰ εἴδη χαιρέτω [*Post. Anal.* i. 83[a] 33]) were mere idle sounds (περιττώματα); but Aristotle himself held to εἴδη otherwise conceived. For Aristotle every individual had its own εἶδος (*Met.* Λ 5, 1071[a] 29); thus the soul of every animal is the εἶδος of its body (*Met.* Z 10, 1035[b] 16). In perishable beings a perpetual succession of individuals of the same kind realizes as near an approach to immortality as is possible to them. Of all such individuals the same things which belong to the essence of each can be predicated in common; hence εἶδος may be used, not only of the individual's 'form,' but of that of the group of beings of whom the same essential predicates hold, the *infima species* (ἄτομον εἶδος). Where one individual is (like a planet) eternal, there is no multiplicity of individuals of that kind. Eventually 'form' has come to be the usual rendering of εἶδος in the sense of the essential or fundamental characteristics of a substance; 'species' in that of a group of substances, whose essential characteristics are not to be distinguished. But this differentiation has been only gradual. Cicero preferred *forma* as a rendering of εἶδος, because it could be declined throughout, while *species* must borrow the gen. and dat. pl. of *forma* (*Top.* vii. § 30); but he gives *species* as the Latin equivalent of ἰδέα (*Acad. Post.* i. 8, § 30, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 24, § 58).

We have so far not distinguished the use of ἰδέα from that of εἶδος; but a preference for ἰδέα in certain contexts may be noted even in Plato. See L. Campbell's note in Jowett and Campbell, *Republic*, Oxford, 1894, ii. 294 ff. 'Ιδέα is the more picturesque term, and signifies 'form' rather than 'kind' or 'class.' Cf. P. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 21; Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 325 ff. In consequence of the fact that Aristotle rarely used ἰδέα in its philosophical sense except when referring to Plato, while εἶδος is used by him no less when expounding his own views, Idea has become the recognized name for the Platonic Form; and, even when it has come to be used in very un-Platonic fashion, its Platonic associations have constantly led either to a misinterpretation of Platonic Ideas, because so-called, or to such a modification of the word's non-Platonic meaning as will bring it into closer accordance with Platonic usage.

In the *Euthyphro* (the earliest Platonic dialogue in which the word occurs) the ἰδέα of holiness is to be used as a παράδειγμα (6 D, E). This is important in view both of the subsequent employment of this expression by Plato himself (*e.g. Rep.* v. 472 C, ix. 592 B, *Parm.* 132 D) and of the fact that it is as eternal patterns of phenomenal things that the Ideas were retained in the mediæval tradition of Platonism.

For passages illustrating the Platonic usage, see G. A. F. Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum*, Leipzig, 1835-38 (until superseded by Burnet's), Ritter's very full essay (vi.) in his *Neue Untersuchungen*, and Campbell's discussion of terminology in Jowett and Campbell, *Republic*, vol. ii. As Campbell shows, the transition to specially Platonic use is well marked in *Parm.* 131 E, 132 A, and the frequent combination μία ἰδέα is deserving of notice.

On the question whether to all or only to some general terms there correspond Ideas, see *Parm.* 130, where the young

Socrates' hesitation to allow Ideas of mean things is treated as a mark of philosophical immaturity. On the relation of the particulars to the Ideas see *Parm.* 131 ff. It cannot be explained in terms of a different relation, such as *μίμησις* or *μέθεξις*, yet the doctrine of Ideas must not be given up, else even so indispensable a notion as Unity, which also involves puzzles, must also be given up. The attempt to describe the relation as *μίμησις* is presupposed in the criticism embodied in the argument called *τρίτος ἄνθρωπος*, invented (see Alex. Aphrod. on Arist. *Met.* 990b 15) by the sophist Polyxenus, often referred to or used by Aristotle (*e.g.*, *Met.* A 9, 990b 17, where cf. Alex. *ad loc.*), and answered in principle by Plato, *Rep.* x. 597 C.

In *Rep.* vi. 508 A ff. the *ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is the supreme principle of the being of the other Ideas, and of the knowledge whose object these are, *οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος*. This account greatly influenced later, especially Neo-Platonic, speculation. In Aristotle's *Met.* we learn of a doctrine of Ideas which are also numbers, which is not expounded in the *Dialogues*. See, for Aristotle's criticism of Plato's ideas, esp. *Met.* A 9; but it is to be found in all parts of his works.

The essential features of the Platonic Idea are that it is (1) an *object of thought*, not a *thought* (*νοητόν*, not *νόημα*); (2) an object of *thought* or knowledge, not of *sense* (*νοητόν*, not *αἰσθητόν*). Plato's philosophy is not Idealism in the sense of a doctrine which resolves the phenomenal world into facts of human consciousness. Lotze's explanation (*Log.* iii. 2) of the *οὐσία* of the Ideas as 'validity' (*Geltung*) or Natorp's description of them as 'laws' (*Gesetze*) may be useful, if not understood as making them mere attributes of something else, considered in abstraction from their substances; but J. A. Stewart's expression 'points of view' (*Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, Oxford, 1909; see esp. p. 4) so plainly makes them ways of apprehending, not realities apprehended, that its use is fundamentally incompatible with the account given above.

Aristotle's abandonment of the word to Plato determined its subsequent history, although instances of its use which involve no reference to Plato's doctrine are to be found in many later writers, and even in the Middle Ages (see Du Cange, *s.v.*).

Among the problems about the Ideas bequeathed by Plato to his successors historically the most important was that of their relation to the Divine mind. A doctrine of a personal God in the Christian sense forming no part of Plato's theology, he himself freely varied his language to suit his context. God 'makes' Ideas (*Rep.* x. 597 B), 'contemplates' them (*Phædr.* 247 D, E), 'uses them as models' in creation (*Tim.* 39 E). Such expressions are mythical or imaginative. More philosophically important is the line of thought illustrated by *Soph.* 249 A, *Phileb.* 28 D. The Ideas cannot be of inferior nature to the soul which finds its chief good in knowing them; they must themselves possess life and thought. Again, as the material elements of our bodies are derived and replenished from the vaster masses of like nature in the great world, so must our souls be derived from the 'royal soul and royal reason' in the nature of Zeus, wherein dwells the wisdom to which the order in the world is due. The relation of the Ideas to this world-soul (for which see also *Phædr.* 245 ff., *Tim.* 34 ff., *Laws*, x. 892 ff.) is a genuine problem for Platonism, but there is nothing to suggest that in order to solve it Plato would have surrendered the objectivity of the Ideas. Rather they inform it and our souls, which are parts of it, 'as a light to enlighten and a guide to govern' (Berkeley, *Siris*, § 335 [*Works*, ed. Fraser, Oxford, 1871, ii. 496]). It was their indwelling of the soul as the *τόπος εἰδῶν* (Aristotle, *de An.* 429a 27) that proved to Platonists that it was immortal.

Though Aristotle rejected Plato's Ideas, his speculations influenced the development of thought respecting them, which led to the view of them as Divine thoughts. While no idealist in the later sense, he held that the Divine mind cannot be (like ours) in a position of dependence upon its object; still less can it exercise itself in knowledge of what is inferior to itself: thus its object must be what itself is, and its activity *νόησις νοήσεως* (*Met.* Λ 9, 1074b 34).

After an interval of five centuries *Plotinus* stands in the direct line of succession from Plato and Aristotle. While in sense-perception the perception conforms itself to an object other than itself, *νοῦς*, or understanding, can have no alien object external to itself. Its object must exist in it, but such an immanence in *νοῦς*, just because *νοῦς* is higher than anything but the One or the Good which transcends (like Plato's *ἰδέα τἀγαθοῦ*) the distinction between subject and object, is a higher kind of existence than the independence which the objects of inferior faculties enjoy over against the apprehending faculties. The intelligible natures of all things, which, of course, are no other than the Platonic Ideas, thus form the content of the eternal *νοῦς*, which is the 'second person' of Plotinus's Trinity (the One, the *νοῦς*, and the World-Soul); see *Enn.* v. ix. 8. Here we reach the interpretation of the Ideas as Divine thoughts which became traditional in the Middle Ages; but the *νοῦς* of Plotinus is not what we should call a 'personal' God.

2. In mediæval philosophy.—A further step is taken under the influence of Christianity, which seriously conceives God as 'personal.' A passage of *Augustine* (*de Div. qu. 83*, xlvi.) became in the Middle Ages the *locus classicus* on Ideas, and is quoted as such by Albertus Magnus (*Sum. Theol.* I. xiii. qu. 55. 2, § 2), Alexander of Hales (*Sum. Theol.* i. qu. 23. 2, § 4), Thomas Aquinas (*Sum. Theol.* i. qu. 15, art. 1; cf. *in I. Sent.* dis. 36. qu. 2. art. 1, *de Veritate*, art. 3, 'de Ideis'), Bonaventura (*in I. Sent.* dis. 35, *Comp. Theol.* i. 25, *Sum. Theol.* qu. 11, art. 1), and Duns Scotus (*Op. Oxon.*, *in I. Sent.* dis. 35, art. 1). Augustine could reconcile his earlier conviction that we must suppose Ideas as eternal and immutable patterns of phenomenal things with his Christian belief in one eternal Being, the Creator of all others, only by supposing the Ideas to be internal to God's essence and to participate in its eternity and unchangeableness. The world is in time, which (according to Plato, *Tim.* 38 B) began along with it; its existence is throughout dependent on the Divine will; but its eternal pattern, the world of Ideas, is an integral part of the Divine nature. Augustine assists himself by the analogy of the designs in an artist's mind. This illustration had already appeared in Philo (who as a Jew was also accustomed to regard God as personal). See *de Opificio Mundi*, §§ 16, 25, pp. 4, 5 (the Divine Logos, as one with the world of Ideas, the *κόσμος νοητός*, is called by Philo *ἰδέα τῶν ἰδέων*; the phrase, however which occurs in Origen, *c. Cels.* vi. 64—is bracketed by Cohn). The same metaphor of an artist's designs had been used by Seneca (*Ep.* 58, § 19) in exposition of Plato; and we may compare with it a passage (in which, however, the word *ἰδέα* does not occur) in the *Introd. Arithm.* of the 1st cent. mathematician Nicomachus of Gerasa in Palestine (i. 6). The *Placita Philosophorum* (i. 882 D [Diels, *Dox. Gr.*, Berlin, 1879, p. 309]) already assert that Plato held the Ideas to exist *ἐν τοῖς νοήμασι καὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ τούτεστι τοῦ νοῦ*. The use of such language was encouraged by the new stress which Christianity laid on the thought of Divine personality. Hence the importance of Augustine's adoption of the analogy with the artist's designs. In the earlier period of Western mediæval thought Augustine's influence was paramount, and to the same still powerful influence it was due that even after the triumph of Aristotelianism in the 12th and 13th centuries the Platonic Ideas, as interpreted by Augustine, retained their place in the

philosophical tradition beside the Aristotelian Forms.

In the 12th cent. we meet with an explicit *Platonism* which regards the Ideas as eternal patterns; *e.g.*, in Bernard of Chartres (John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, ii. 17, where the author traces the history of the doctrine of Ideas, and, it may be noted, speaks of εἶδος as standing to ἰδέα in the relation of *exemplum* to *exemplar*). We find other examples in the *Megacosmus et Microcosmus* of Bernard Silvester (sometimes identified with his probably older namesake of Chartres) and in the *Anticlaudianus* of Alan of Lille. This Platonism depends not only on Plato's *Timæus* (the only accessible dialogue) and Augustine, but on such writers as Boethius, Macrobius, and Marcianus Capella. After the triumph of Aristotle the acceptance of Ideas was still, as we have seen, general. It was a subject of controversy whether they were Ideas of individual things (Thomas Aquinas) or of universals only; whether they were practical or only speculative (Henry of Ghent); whether they were in God's essential nature as *rationes cognoscendi* or only in His intelligence as objects of His knowledge (Ockam). The answers given to such questions depended, of course, on the general philosophical and theological position of the thinker concerned.

3. Transition from the mediæval to the modern use.—We have now to trace the process by which a word hitherto associated with eternal natures and archetypal Divine designs came to be commonly employed for the thoughts and even imaginations of human beings. The Stoics (perhaps carrying on a Cynic tradition; see E. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, Eng. tr., London, 1868, p. 254) interpreted the Platonic Ideas as mere concepts (ἐννοήματα) or even as images of sensible things (*Plac. Phil.* 882 E, Stob. i. 12, p. 332 H; Diels, *Dox. Gr.* pp. 309, 472). Great as in certain directions was the influence of Stoicism (esp. through Cicero, Seneca, and Boethius) on mediæval thought, it is doubtful whether this interpretation of the Ideas affected the fortunes of the word before the Renaissance, when a general revolt against Aristotelianism brought into favour a word free from Aristotelian associations, while at the same time attention was drawn to the Stoic logic as the chief ancient rival of the Aristotelian. Thus the habit gradually crept in of using *idea* where the originally equivalent *species* had been commonly employed in the sense of *νοητὸν εἶδος, αἰσθητὸν εἶδος* (*species intelligibilis, species sensibilis*) of Aristotle's *de Anima*. We find Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) passing from the Divine Idea to the *idea quæ est in mente nostra, quæ est species* (*de Incantationibus*, Basel, 1567, p. 36). *Melanchthon* identified *idea* with the *actus intelligendi*, which is best described as the formation of an image (*de Anima*, Lyons, 1555, p. 187), and characteristically attempted to reconcile Plato and Aristotle by interpreting Plato's Ideas as *imagines in mente* ('Erot. Dial.', in *Corp. Reform.* Halle, 1834–60, xiii. 520), or (in an exposition of the *Ethics*) as *communes notiones*. In the latter interpretation he was taken to task by J. C. Scaliger (*de Subtil.*, Frankfort, 1576, vi. 4) on the ground that *notiones* are accidents, whereas Plato held the Ideas to be substances, but was defended by Goclenius (*in Exercit. J. C. S. de Subtil.*, Marburg, 1599, p. 98), whose *Lexicon Philosophicum* (Frankfort, 1613), *s.v.* 'Idea,' is worth consulting.

The 16th cent. physician *Fracastorius* (*de Intellectione*, i. [*Opera*, Venice, 1574, p. 129 A, 130 A]) uses *idea* as equivalent to *universale*, and the so-called Spagyric school of medical writers affected the use of the word, from which their master Paracelsus formed a number of technical derivatives (see B. Castellus, *Lex. Med. Renov.*, Nüremberg, 1682, pp. 705, 706). The Paracelsian terminology was the source of *Jacob Boehme's*, to whom the word 'idea,' when he heard it from his friend and biographer von Frankenberg, 'proved vastly agreeable,' suggesting to him 'a beautiful, heavenly, chaste virgin' such as is Sophia or Wisdom in his theosophical system (*Memoirs of Life*, etc., tr. F. Okely, Northampton, 1780, p. 16).

Outside the Schools the tendency at this period to give the word a wide extension of meaning may be illustrated from *Shakespeare*. Here the general sense of 'pattern' or 'model,' itself directly descended from that current in mediæval philosophy (cf. Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* i. 4, § 1, ed. Oxford, 1874, p. 212, of the Lord's Prayer: 'the perfect Idea of that which we are to pray for'), passes into that sense of the 'idealizing' memory in *Much Ado*, IV. i. 226 ('the Idea of her life'), and into that of a true copy of the pattern in *Rich. III.*, III. vii. 13 ('the right Idea of your father'), while 'ideas' appear in *Love's Labour's Lost*, IV. ii. 69, along with 'forms, figures, shapes, objects, apprehensions' among the furniture of 'a foolish, extravagant spirit.'

4. In modern philosophy before Kant.—In the technical language of philosophy the substitution of *idea* for *species* served to some extent to conceal the fact that the difficulties of the old theory of 'representative species' passed unsolved into a later psychology (cf. Reid, 'Human Mind,' ii. § 6, in *Works*, ed. Hamilton, ii. 140; H. W. B. Joseph, in *Mind*, Oct. 1910). These difficulties are traceable to Aristotle's statements in *de Anima*, ii. 12, iii. 2, about the reception by the perceiving soul of the form of the object without the matter, which easily lent themselves to a quasi-materialistic interpretation, and in any case tended to make the immediate object of perception and ultimately of conception also an image or representation within the mind of the real thing without. This substitution becomes generally current through its adoption by *Hobbes* and *Descartes*. In his *Hist. Animæ Humanæ* (Paris, 1636), David Buchanan frequently uses *idea* as the equivalent of *species* for the immediate objects (*objecta interna*) of human consciousness. There is no evidence that he enjoyed personal intercourse with Descartes, but the facts of his life do not exclude the possibility; his *clara et liquida idea* (p. 339) reminds us of the Frenchman's 'clear and distinct' perceptions. With Hobbes *idea* is synonymous with *phantasma* and signifies an 'appearance which remains in the brain from the impression of external bodies upon the organs of the senses.' Such appearances, if they represent external bodies where they are not, are properly 'idols,' false 'ideas.'[1] How the false idea or idol is to be distinguished from the true Hobbes leaves obscure; but it is clear that 'idea' and 'idol' alike are something in the brain or mind. Thus we have different 'ideas' of the same thing in succession when what we first saw at a distance to be some material object we see on coming nearer to be a living thing, and on coming yet nearer to be a human being.

An instructive controversy arose between Descartes and Hobbes over their use of the word 'idea.' Descartes had spoken freely in his *Meditations* of the 'idea' of God; Hobbes objected that he had no such 'idea.' He did not mean that there is nothing to suggest to us the existence of a God; but that we have no image in our minds of a being such as the admirable order of the world leads us to suppose exists. Descartes admitted this, but said that by 'ideas' he did not mean 'images of material things in the corporeal phantasy,' but always 'anything of which the mind is directly aware'; so that, when we perceive ourselves to be, *e.g.*, willing or afraid, he would call the volition or the fear 'ideas.' He adds: 'I have made use of this name because philosophers have long been accustomed to use it to signify the forms of the perceptions of the divine mind, although we do not suppose any *phantasia* (sensible imagination) in God.' Thus the historical associations of the word with the Divine thoughts recommended it to Des-

[1] Bacon had already contrasted *humanæ mentis idola* with *divinæ mentis ideæ* as *abstractiones ad placitum* with *vera signacula Creatoris* (*Nov. Org.* i. §§ 23, 124).

cartes as a very general expression for the immediate or direct object of consciousness, which would not commit him to a materialistic theory of the nature of consciousness. He was naturally, therefore, displeased by Hobbes's assumption that its proper meaning was that of an 'image in the corporeal phantasy.' Hobbes appealed to etymology; and so went back behind the associations which recommended the word to Descartes, who indeed had himself in *Med. II.*, before Hobbes's criticisms had raised the question, observed that, although volitions, fears, and judgments are all *cogitationes*, yet that kind of *cogitationes* to which alone the word 'idea' properly refers are those which are *tanquam rerum imagines*. This use of 'idea' it is difficult to distinguish from that found in Hobbes (see Hobbes, *Lev.* i. 11, iii. 34, iv. 45 *t.*, *de Corp.* i. 1, § 3, 2, § 14, 5, § 9; Descartes, *Med.*, Obj. iii. 5. For Descartes's use see refl. collected in Veitch's note to his tr. of *Meth.*, *Med.*, etc., Edinburgh, 1880, p. 276 ff.).

Thus the word came into common philosophical use tainted with an ambiguity as carrying with it at once an association with a materialistic theory of experience and an association with one (the Cartesian) which insisted on the impossibility of any such theory. But in both Hobbes and Descartes it was associated with the view that the immediate object of knowledge is something in the mind—a view which admits of different developments according to the different views entertained of the nature of the mind. Notwithstanding the ambiguity, *Gassendi* (1592–1655), the friend of both Hobbes and Descartes, proposes to use it in the widest sense as less open to ambiguity than other equivalent words, such as *species*, *notio*, etc. (*Inst. Log.* pt. i. [*Opera*, Lyons, 1658, i. 92]). *Cudworth* (1617–83) speaks of 'sensible ideas' (*Int. Syst.*, London, 1678, i. §§ 5, 39), but does not limit the word to these; against Hobbes he recognizes an 'idea of God' (iv. § 1). *Huet* (1630–1721) regards Descartes as restoring the Stoic usage (*Cens. Phil. Cartes.*, ch. ii. § 7, ed. Paris, 1694, p. 48). *Malebranche* (1638–1715), like his contemporary Locke, uses *idée* for 'objet immédiat de notre esprit' (*Rech. de la vérité*, iii. 2, ch. i., ed. Paris, 1700, i. 386); but his doctrine (based on the Cartesian emphasis on the disparateness between mind and matter) that the immediate objects of our perception are not bodies, but rather the Divine archetypes of bodies, reverts in a way to the mediæval use of the word. *Fénelon* (1651–1715) follows Malebranche: the ideas which constitute the human reason are universal, necessary, eternal, immutable, in fact they are God revealed in our souls so far as the limitations of our nature allow (*De l'Exist. de Dieu*, ii. 4 [*Œuvres*, ed. Paris, 1787, ii. 228 ff.]). For the use (or uses) made of the word by *Spinoza* (1632–77) the reader must be referred to Spinoza himself (see esp. *Eth.* ii. def. 3, 4, prop. 48, 49) and his commentators (esp. H. Joachim, *Study of Spinoza*, Oxford, 1901). As the spiritual or psychical correlate of an extended thing or body, a man's mind is described as the 'idea' of his body.

Locke (1632–1704) and *Leibniz* (1646–1718) both make ideas 'the immediate objects of the understanding in the widest sense' (Locke, *Ess.* i. 1, § 8; Leibniz, *Nouv. Ess.* ii. 1, § 1 [ed. Erdmann, Berlin, 1840, p. 222]). Locke held, against Descartes, that they are never 'innate,' but always derived from experience or from reflexion upon experience. For Leibniz all ideas are innate; if distinct, they represent God; if obscure, the world. Thus for both Locke and Leibniz they *represent* objects from which they are themselves distinct. With *Berkeley* (1685–1753) ideas, though conceived, after Locke, as the immediate objects of conception, represent no objects beyond themselves. They are themselves the only objects; of everything, except spirits or minds (of which we are said to have not 'ideas' but 'notions'), the *esse* is *percipi*; thus the object of perception is called an idea rather than a thing, because things are 'generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind' and also to include 'spirits' (*Princ. of Human Knowledge*, i. § 39 [*Works*, ed. Fraser, Oxford, 1871, i. 175]). Out of this very un-Platonic theory of ideas a more Platonic one is developed by Berkeley in the much later *Siris*. Among the 'ideas' of Locke and Berkeley, *Hume* (1711–76) distinguished direct perceptions as 'impressions,' while the name 'ideas' is confined to reproductions of these which are known as such by their inferior 'liveliness.' This has become, on the whole, the tradition of later English philosophy (see Spencer, *Princ. of Psychology*, London, 1872, pt. vii. ch. 16 [vol. ii. p. 454 ff.]; cf. Baldwin, *DPhP*, *s.v.* 'Idea'). Hume's contemporary *Johnson*, who in his *Dictionary* defines 'idea' as 'mental image,' branded (erroneously) as 'modern cant' the use of it for a notion or opinion of which there can be no such image (Boswell, *Life*, ed. Oxford, 1826, iii. 176).

5. In modern philosophy since Kant.—This use of 'idea' as primarily denoting a sensation reproduced in memory or imagination passed with the English empirical philosophy to which it belonged to the French free-thinkers of the 18th cent., among whom *Condillac* (1715–80) uses *idée* for a sensation remembered and related to an external object, except in the case of a sensation of touch, where the sensation by itself is an *idée* because directly relating itself to such an object (*Extr. rais. du traité des sensations* [*Œuvres*, Paris, 1798, iii. 39 ff.]); and, similarly, *Holbach* (1728–89) uses the term for the image of an object which causes a sensation or perception (*Syst. de la nature*, Paris, 1821, i. 133). Not altogether dissimilar is the account of 'idea' given by *Wolff* (1679–1754), in *Psych. Emp.*, Frankfort, 1732, § 48, as a mental representation in relation to the represented object. This use of 'idea,' however, was not to prevail in Germany. *Kant* (1724–1804) set himself (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, *Transc. Dial.* i. 1 [*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1867, iii. 256 ff.]) to restore the word from a deplorable degradation, in which it could be used for 'the representation of the colour red' to its original Platonic use of a 'conception transcending the possibility of experience.' Of such conceptions, which Reason inevitably forms, but which cannot be verified in experience, he recognized three: the soul, the world, and God. To Kant, that we necessarily think a thing to be so and so by no means implies that it is so in itself; but to *Hegel* (1770–1831), who does not thus divorce thought from reality, such a conception, transcending but implied in our experience in space, in time, as Kant called an Idea is no mere speculative problem or at most a postulate of action; it is the ultimate unity, in the light of which alone whatever is real is seen as it truly is, and that because it is only what it is as a stage in the eternal process wherein the Idea unrolls, as it were, before itself the riches of its own nature (see *Log.* §§ 213, 236 [*Werke*, Berlin, 1843, vi. 385, 408]). As the Platonic Ideas constitute in Philo the content of the supreme Idea, the Divine mind or Logos, so in Hegel the one Idea breaks itself up into a system of definite Ideas; and similarly for *Schelling* (1775–1854) the Ideas are the living Universals in the Divine mind (*Vorles. über die Meth. der akad. Stud.* xi. [*Werke*, Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61, v. 317]), or, as it is put elsewhere (*Syst. der Philos.* § 33 [*ib.* vi. 183]), the essences of things as grounded in God's eternity.

If divested of the theistic language, this use of Idea approximates to *Schopenhauer's* (1788–1860) (see *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Leipzig, 1873, § 25). An Idea is a 'definite and fixed grade of the objectification of the Will so far as it is thing-in-itself and therefore has no multiplicity.' These grades are related to individual things as their eternal forms or prototypes. Such Ideas are the forces of Nature (gravity, electricity, etc.), life, the various organic species, the chief types of

humanity. This Schopenhauer holds to be in agreement with Plato's true meaning, while Kant's three Ideas of the Reason have nothing in common with Plato's except a transcendence of experience which they share with the merest chimeras. The Idea, thus conceived, Schopenhauer holds to be the object which the fine arts aim at representing (it is to be observed that Kant also recognized æsthetic Ideas, *Kritik der Urth.* i. §§ 17, 49, 57 [*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1867, v. 238, 324, 353]). Such a view gives to art a higher rank in the scale of values than is assigned to it by Plato, who, although sometimes describing the apprehension of the Ideas in language suggestive of æsthetic contemplation, regards the productions of the artist as an imitation not of the Ideas, but only of the sensible copies thereof (*Rep.* x. 596).

Following Kant, who had taught that the Ideas, which were mere problems for the Speculative Reason, became postulates for the Practical, sufficient grounds for action though unverifiable in experience—thus we can, and indeed are bound to, act as though free, yet a speculative proof of freedom is impossible—*Herbart* (1776–1841) speaks of *practical* Ideas (Freedom, Perfection, etc.) springing from judgments of value (*Kurze Encyc. der Phil.* § 47 [*Werke*, Leipzig, 1850, ii. 79]). A similar usage is found in *Wundt*.

6. Ambiguity of the word 'Idea.'—Some of the ambiguities which have beset the word 'idea' are merely verbal, and may be removed by careful definition. Such is that arising from the application of the word at once to eternal principles which underlie appearances and are discovered by the exercise of reason, and also to varying modes or states of a finite consciousness. Less easily kept apart are the sense of 'mental image' and the sense of 'concept'; but the distinction between the words *Vorstellung* and *Begriff* (in recent philosophical English represented by 'concept') has to a large extent saved German writers from this equivocation. But less easily eradicable is the ambiguity which the word 'idea' inherited from the word 'species' when, in the 17th cent., it took its place in the philosophical vocabulary. Used now for an activity of the mind apprehending an object (cf. the phrase 'I have no idea' = 'I do not know,' or the occasional use for 'the faculty of apprehension,' as in the well-known line in Thomson's *Seasons*, 'to teach the young idea how to shoot' ['Spring,' 1152]), now for the object immediately apprehended (even where, as in Berkeley, this is not treated as representative of anything beyond itself), it inevitably comes to suggest a *tertium quid* internal to the mind as compared with the external object it is supposed to represent, yet not the mental process or activity of apprehending, but its immediate object. The assumption of such a *tertium quid* is rendered plausible by the difficulties due to a comparison between the experiences which different individuals, or the same individual at different times, claim to have of one and the same object. Even justice seems to be done to all of these if each be considered as an apprehension of a different 'idea' of the same thing, which is itself in no case the direct object of the experience. This may seem to be supported by the fact that we can seldom, if ever, think without imagery—a fact expressed by Aristotle in the saying, *οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή* (*de Anima*, iii. 7, 431ª 17), 'the soul never thinks without an image'—even when, as in the instance of a chiliagon or of the Roman Empire, any image that may present itself is plainly not that of which we are thinking. In thinking, however, of a sensible thing not actually present to the senses, but remembered, it is easy to confuse the image with the object, to talk as though *it* were the object of our thought, as though *it* were what we remembered (and yet, as it is here in our imagination *now*, it is clearly not *it*, but what it represents, that we remember); and, lastly, as though, even in perceiving an object actually present to the senses, it were such an image, and not the object, that is before us. This is a way of speaking which, when used of others, comes naturally enough, because we do not share their perceptions, but picture to ourselves what we take them to be perceiving, forgetting that this is not what *they* perceive, but only a picture of it in *our* imagination.

The assumption of such a *tertium quid* between the apprehending mind and its object appears to be confirmed by the existence of hallucinations and of dreams, where what seems, as presented in consciousness, to be indistinguishable from a real object is afterwards judged not to have been such. This suggests that, both when a real object is present and when it is not, what we actually perceive is not this object, but a 'mental image,' which may or may not be representative of a real original. But this assumption only transfers the difficulty; it is no more easy to understand how, on the hypothesis that our immediate object is always such an 'idea,' we can become aware at all of an external object represented by some of them and not by others (cf. Berkeley, *Princ. of Human Knowledge*, § 8), than how in any case we sometimes come to think we perceive external bodies when we do not. These disadvantages of so ambiguous a word as 'idea' (which are not removed by substituting, with J. Ward, 'presentation'—a literal rendering of the *Vorstellung* of Herbart and Wundt) make it a hindrance rather than a help in discussing the nature of our experience prior to any such reflective discrimination between the respective shares of subject and object as must appear in any account which can be given of it. It is significant of the realization of this by English psychologists that W. McDougall avoids its use on the ground that most who have so named features distinguished in the stream of consciousness have tended to 'reify' them, preferring to use the word 'feelings,' which describes them as features of our behaviour rather than as objects of our apprehension (see *Psychology, a Study of Behaviour*, London, 1912, p. 50); and that in Loveday and Green's *Introd. to Psych.* (Oxford, 1912) the word 'idea' and its scarcely less misleading synonyms do not occur at all.

LITERATURE.—For further information as to the history of the word 'idea,' see W. Hamilton, *Discussions*, London, 1852, p. 70, *Works of Thomas Reid*, Edinburgh, 1872, p. 925 ff.; R. Eucken, *Geschichte der philos. Terminologie*, Leipzig, 1879, pp. 199–201; R. Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philos. Begriffe und Ausdrücke*, Berlin, 1899, *s.v.* 'Idee,' i., to all of which this article is much indebted.

C. C. J. WEBB.

IDEAL.—1. Use of the term.—The term 'ideal' is perhaps one of the vaguest in common use. In popular usage it signifies sometimes what is excellent of its kind, *e.g.* 'we had ideal weather'; sometimes what would be perfect if it could be attained, but as a matter of fact is utterly unattainable, as when we speak of the 'ideal' State; sometimes what is regarded as unworthy of serious attention as being purely fanciful and oblivious of the facts of the case. With the last two usages in mind, Hegel speaks of

> 'the popular fancy that ideals are nothing but chimeras, and the very different fancy that ideals are something far too excellent to possess reality, or something far too feeble to procure it for themselves' (W. Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, Oxford, 1874, p. 8).

From philosophical language, too, there comes an ambiguity, for the adjective 'ideal' may correspond to either of the two nouns, 'idea' and 'ideal'; and in the former case, corresponding to 'idea,' in the

sense in which the English psychological philosophers from Locke to Hume made the term current, 'ideal' is apt to be interpreted as in contradistinction to what is actual. The 'ideal' and the 'real' are distinguished, and the distinction becomes an opposition, and the tendency is intensified to think of what is ideal in any sense as non-existent and permanently so—something that is 'all in the air.' Further, this notion of ideals derives strength from consideration of the ideals of the artist. His ideals, the types of beauty which he depicts, are commonly taken to be representations of a beauty which never and nowhere existed, nor can be found.

> 'The light that never was, on sea or land,
> The consecration, and the Poet's dream'
> (Wordsworth, *Peels Castle*).

Turning from popular usage to writers on psychology and ethics, one's impression that 'ideal' is a word of vague import is strengthened. Some have no use for the word at all. Some introduce it casually in the course of discussions without any explanation. Some use it as synonymous with 'end.' Some draw a careful distinction between ideal and end, and, having drawn it, seem to ignore it. Various writers deal with various aspects or characteristics of the ideal; few think it necessary to define the term or give a connected treatment of the topic. It is difficult to understand why 'ideal' should not be handled with something of the care which, *e.g.*, 'motive,' 'intention,' and 'desire' receive.

2. **Definition.**—An ideal in general may be defined as a conception of what, if attained, would fully satisfy; of what is perfect of its kind, and, in consequence, is the pattern to be copied, and the standard by which actual achievement is to be judged. The ideal is the standard of value, and the actual has worth in so far as it embodies the ideal. (For a general discussion of ideals and their significance, see EPISTEMOLOGY, § 20 f., in vol. v. p. 352 ff.).

The moral ideal is what we are now concerned with; and a moral ideal is a conception of what, if attained, would completely satisfy man as a moral being. It stands, as what *ought to be*, over against what *is* in character and conduct, and constitutes a standard by reference to which character and conduct are estimated. The ideal is not synonymous with the end. It is a product of constructive imagination in which the end is envisaged as attained, embodied, and expressed. Individuals who agree in their way of defining the end may differ widely enough in their ideals. The ideals of a hedonist, for instance, may be high or low. On the other hand, it seems quite erroneous to say, as has sometimes been said, that difference of conception of the ideal determines the difference between various schools of ethical speculation. For men who differ profoundly as moral philosophers do not necessarily differ widely as moral individuals. They may approve, condemn, seek after, and avoid the same things; their ideals, therefore, are not dissimilar. It will appear below that difference of ideal—the kind of difference in view in the statement which we are considering—marks, not school from school of ethical theory, but stage from stage of moral progress.

To entertain ideals is part of man's nature. It is given with his power of retrospect, forecast, and choice. All men have an ideal of some kind, for all rational beings distinguish what *is* and what *should be*. The moral ideal can be only formally defined as a conception of man with his powers at the best, using them for the best. It cannot be concretely defined. For man is a developing being, and does not know what his powers at the best may be. And conceptions of 'for the best' may differ, and do differ. Further, a particular individual may find that, in constructing his ideal, the peculiarity of his circumstances requires that there is a conflict of some kind between 'at the best' and 'for the best.' It is a serious question for some, *e.g.*, whether, in view of all their circumstances and obligations, they are justified or not in taking a University course, or entering a career for which they are fitted, but which requires an expensive training which will mean hard sacrifice for others. Hence it is that 'ideals are relative to the lives that entertain them' (W. James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*, London, 1899, p. 292). An ideal, however, is not conceived to be something purely or essentially individualistic. He who holds it is not impressed with the relativity of it, but with its universality. It is not something which he alone should seek after; it is what he conceives all should follow.

There is an infinite variety of ideals as held by different individuals. They may be low or high, sordid or sublime; they may be limited by the seen and temporal, or stretch forward to the unseen and eternal; they may be so worth striving after, and the individual so thwarted and baffled in pursuit of them, that an argument for immortality may be founded thereon. Whatever its nature, the ideal is that which inspires, directs, and gives coherence to the moral life. (For an excellent discussion of the meaning of ideals, see Leslie Stephen, *The Science of Ethics*, p. 74 ff.)

3. **The forming of ideals.**—As character is partly an endowment, partly an achievement, so ideals are partly imposed upon the individual, partly chosen by him. A child develops towards moral individuality by obeying authority which it did not itself constitute. When it awakens to moral consciousness, its standards of judgment are already so far fixed for it. It has been following an ideal chosen by others, set before it, and imposed upon it. And obviously the imposed ideal may determine in varying degree the deliberately chosen ideal. The ideal in many cases never differs appreciably from the ideal found in the home or the community. Many are never aware of any break or contrast between what they are ordered or expected to obey and what they freely choose to obey. Such freedom to choose, indeed, is only dimly, if at all, realized; or, if realized, may be regarded only as a temptation to be combated. In communities, however, where individual freedom is safeguarded and esteemed, and where there is a wide range of choice of life-work open, the necessary choice of some definite life-work, which brings a multitude of varied possibilities before the individual, contributes to his becoming keenly conscious of his power of choosing an ideal of what his life, character, and achievement are to be.

The psychology and the whole process of such choice, such 'setting up' of an ideal, are very obscure. Factors enter into it due to temperament, previous training, and all sorts of 'personal equation,' which make analysis in any particular case very difficult and generalization impossible. Our earliest ideals glow with colour and romance, and, literally enough, baffle description. There is something great and splendid that we wish to attain, but what more definitely it is we cannot say. We hear the wind rise 'roaring seaward' and feel we must go, but whither and wherefore we are not clear. We are inclined to think of our ideal as something absolutely new, unheard of till we discovered it (cf. W. James, *Talks*, p. 292; J. Royce, *Studies*, New York, 1898, p. 80). The truth in this exaggerated view of ourselves and our ideals is that there is an element of uniqueness in every personality. With the lapse of time the ideal

loses in colour but gains in clearness. It comes down from the skies to common earth. While it remains something personal, peculiarly our own, we lay more stress on its universal character. (On the contrast between the 'idealism' of youth and the 'realism' of maturer years, see H. Lotze, *Microcosmos*, Eng. tr.[4], Edinburgh, 1899, ii. 305 ff.)

4. Is the ideal realized?—To this question the answer is Yes and No. (*a*) On the one hand, we must hold that the ideal is attainable and is realized. An ideal which is absolutely and inherently unattainable cannot be an ideal; for, as we have said, the ideal is our conception of what should be, and, as Kant says, 'an ought implies a can.' If a thing cannot be, there is no sense in saying it should be. And, unless we are prepared to deny that men ever act rightly, or that there is such a thing as moral progress, we must hold that the ideal is realized. 'The moral ideal may be said to be realized every time we truly act' (J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*[4], p. 29). We know, too, that multitudes find their ideal realized in some individual; their effort is to try to be like him. What would *he* think of this? is their standard of judging. (*b*) On the other hand, most men are constrained to admit that the ideal is never attained by them. Strive as they like, it remains ahead of their accomplishment. The fact is that man is a developing moral being, and that moral progress means, not only that in achievement the individual is ever coming nearer an ideal, but that the ideal itself is progressing. Like character, the ideal is only relatively fixed and permanent. If, as we have said, the ideal gives coherence to the moral life, it must obviously have stability of a kind. But we have to think of a stability in progress—a mobile equilibrium. As we progress in the moral life, the ideal unfolds and expands.

'Every achievement of good deepens and quickens our sense of the inexhaustible value contained in every right act. With achievement, our conception of the possible goods of life increases, and we find ourselves called to live upon a still deeper and more thoughtful plane. An ideal is not some remote all-exhaustive goal, a fixed *summum bonum*' (Dewey-Tufts, *Ethics*, p. 421 f.).

Hence it is that what at any moment in the moral life we picture to ourselves as the *best* turns out to be only a *better*. As in achievement we approach what we regarded as the best, we gain a conception of something still more excellent.

Hence the statement 'ideals are realizable' is true; it means that moral progress is possible. The statement 'the ideal is not realizable' is also true, as meaning that we can assign no limit to moral progress. To say that there is an absolute ideal, an absolute best, is to say that such limit can be fixed, that there will come a time when no further moral progress can take place. (For full discussion of the points dealt with briefly in this paragraph, and of the problems which emerge, see T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, bk. iii.; S. Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress*, bk. iii.)

5. Change of ideal.—Apart, however, from the change of ideal which proceeds in every life gradually and imperceptibly, probably the majority are familiar with a change of another kind, when the cleavage between old and new is distinctly marked, and the connexion seems to be only one of sharpest contrast. There are times when one can say, 'The old things are passed away; behold, they are become new' (2 Co 5^{17}), when one feels oneself to be a new creature looking out upon a new world. This may come about under a manifold variety of circumstances in which little, if any, general rule may be discerned. It may happen that needs of our nature of which we were not previously conscious suddenly make themselves felt, so that what formerly satisfied is no longer adequate. Needs which were weak or suppressed may become relatively stronger. Or we may find that what we thought would satisfy proves in experience unable to do so. It may happen that our call to, and assumption of, fresh responsibilities give a new vision of what life and character ought to be. We see that the old ways are unworthy, that the old habits must be broken, that our standards must be raised, and our whole scheme and view of life revised, as Henry v. found when he assumed the dignity of kingship. A new bond of friendship or love may mean a similar new vision. Or the change may be, and often is, concomitant with a religious experience; 'if any man is in Christ, he is a new creature' (2 Co 5^{17}).

In some cases the phenomenon admits of explanation; in others, especially when religious elements enter, it is too recondite; obscure factors are involved of which the individual himself can give no clear account, and the case defies psychological analysis. We cannot explain our tastes, our likes, and aversions; it is a cold-blooded sort of love if one can explain why he prefers one person before others. And of that change of ideal which means a revolution in the moral life, and comes, or seems to come, suddenly, an adequate explanation is seldom possible. 'The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but knowest not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit' (Jn 3^{8}).

When a new vision of the ideal comes to us, it may affect us in a variety of ways. We may feel at once a peace and satisfaction like that of the merchant who has long been searching for the goodly pearl, and, having found it, sells all that he has and buys it; we may yield to its attraction and inspiration. More often, especially when we not merely get a new conception of the ideal, but see the ideal realized or approximated in an actual life or deed, we may experience a sort of despair; we may feel overpowered with a sense of the contrast between what we are and what we now see we ought to be (on this topic generally, and the value of self-abasement, see Iverach, *The Other Side of Greatness*, serm. i.). Or we may for a time be involved in a conflict of ideals, undecided as to how the moral life is to be directed, and, like Paul, 'kick against the pricks' (Ac 9^{5}).

While moral progress is often marked by the positive appearance of a new ideal, it is also frequently marked mainly or entirely, *negatively*, by the failure of the old ideal any longer to satisfy us. Sometimes we see more or less clearly what the new 'better' is, sometimes we have nothing but a sense that what we used to regard as best is not good, and that a 'better' there must be, though we cannot yet say what it is. We have to grope our way, 'moving about in worlds not realized' (Wordsworth, *Intimations of Immortality*).

6. The teaching of ideals.—It may be said to be the duty of every moral being to unfold and commend an ideal to those who are morally undeveloped, or are searching for an ideal, and to propose something better to those who are plainly following a low ideal. In various aspects of it, this is the special task of preachers, teachers, and parents (see art. EDUCATION, MORAL, vol. v. p. 216 ff.). We may note some of the most important principles which must be kept in mind in this connexion. Regarding the kind of ideal that should be commended for imitation, some remarks by L. T. Hobhouse are worth noting:

'It is just worth noticing, as we pass, that ideals are interesting or vapid according as the element of construction or abstraction preponderates in them. Types in which differences are left out, in which you try to get down to the pure thing, free from all incrustation of other elements, are nauseating in proportion as their delineation is successful. This kind of "idealism" gives us the heroes and heroines who live to utter

moral platitudes, and spoil whole chapters of good writing. It inspires the morality which tries to make all life a study of what you ought not to do. The constructive idealism, on the other hand, finds dissatisfaction always in incompleteness, and finds completeness only in the many-sided character and the varied life' (*The Theory of Knowledge*, p. 211).

It is very important that the ideal exhibited should be positive, and not negative. Otherwise a boy will get the impression that a good boy is one who does none of the things that an average boy wants to do, and at any age one will conceive of virtue as an anæmic thing, and goodness as essentially some form of abstinence. Further, the aim must be to make the ideal concrete, not abstract, to show flesh and blood examples, not merely to lay down precepts, to point to lives or deeds in which the ideal has been approximately embodied, to show that, as actual occurrences prove, virtue is not incapable of attainment. (On this topic see S. M. Bligh, *The Direction of Desire*.)

7. **The unrealized ideal.**—We have seen that the ideal is unrealized and unrealizable in the sense that it is a mobile thing which constantly keeps ahead of us in our moral progress. It ever appears as 'a better beyond the best.' But, apart from this, every one who is in earnest in moral endeavour knows that the ideal is not realized in another sense—in the sense, namely, that in his conduct he comes short more or less, and usually more rather than less, of what he purposed. Taking the moral life at any moment, and the ideal as it is then presented to us, and striven after, there is often a wide gulf between what *was to be* and what *is*. This may be due to our fault or to our misfortune. We may find, like Paul, that the good we would we do not; and the evil that we would not, that we do (Ro 7^{19}). Or in ignorance we may adopt a wrong means of realizing our ideal. Or we may find that circumstances are in conspiracy against us, and forbid the realization of our purposes, that we are handicapped, thwarted, baulked by the *force majeure* of practical facts which we cannot circumvent or surmount. Besides, we must take account of our general inability to give adequate or appropriate expression to the deepest things of the spirit. Take the case of emotion. We can only stammer brokenly, and to an unsympathetic or uninterested ear ludicrously, about our love. We search in vain for an adequate mode of expressing contempt or hate. In an excess of joy we are moved to tears, and a smile may be all the expression we can give to heart-breaking disappointment or despair. So with the ideal which in our highest moments may be revealed to us. Unutterable thoughts, inexpressible aspirations may come to us; we feel, we know, that they are the most valuable of our possessions, though neither in word nor in deed can we fully reveal them. They are among the truest riches of our nature though we cannot exhibit them:

> 'Thoughts hardly to be packed
> Into a narrow act,
> Fancies that broke through language and escaped;
> All I could never be,
> All, men ignored in me,
> This, I was worth to God'
>
> (Browning, *Rabbi Ben Ezra*).

The familiar words of Kant respecting the good will may be applied to the ideal:

> 'Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of rtune, or the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly na' it should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, . . . its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from its value' (T. K. Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*[3], London, 1883, p. 10).

A lover of paradox might well say that a man's real worth depends on what he fails in. 'Thou didst well that it was in thine heart' (2 Ch 6^{8}). The ideal in some cases is doubly ideal; it is a conception not of what *would* but of what *should* satisfy. The individual does not feel the needs which it would meet, but in some sense he acknowledges that he ought to feel them, or at least that they ought to be felt generally. An audience the individuals of which are immoral, or even criminal, will hiss the villain of melodrama, and applaud the triumph of long-suffering virtue. One who makes no attempt to realize high ideals in his own conduct may be very exacting in demanding them of others, or very earnest in commending them to others. Ideals which are not realized in conduct may thus still be determinant of character; though ineffective to shape conduct, they do have a share in making the individual what he is. Further, ideals which he never seeks to realize as a private individual may none the less mould his conduct in various ways as a member of society. They may determine his contribution to public opinion, his attitude on public questions, his vote at elections, his discharge of public duty. If he be a parent, they may prescribe the rules he lays down for his children. The moral standard of his home may be very different from that of his office, and both very different from the standard he acts up to when he feels himself free for the time from his usual social obligations. We may regard such a man as we please, but we cannot say that the ideals he never seeks to realize are altogether valueless, either for himself or for society. Conduct is at the best but an imperfect expression and revelation of an individual's ideals, and, similarly, institutions and customs are imperfect embodiments of the ideals, the moral worth, and the moral standpoint of a community (see art. GOOD AND EVIL, vol. vi. p. 318 ff.). This has been so well said by Julia Wedgwood that we may close the subject with a quotation from her work:

> 'That which gives life its keynote is, not what men think good, but what they think best. True, this is not the part of belief which is embodied in conduct: the ordinary man tries to avoid only what is obviously wrong; the best of men does not always make us aware that he is striving after what is right. We do not see people growing into the resemblance of what they admire; it is much if we can see them growing into the unlikeness of that which they condemn. But the dominant influence of life lies ever in the unrealized. While all that we discern is the negative aspect of a man's ideal, that ideal itself lives by admiration which never clothes itself in word or deed. In seeing what he avoids we judge only the least important part of his standard; it is that which he never strives to realize in his own person which makes him what he is. The average secular man of to-day is a different being because Christendom has hallowed the precept to give the cloak to him who asks the coat; it would be easier to argue that this claim for what most would regard as an impossible virtue has been injurious than that it has been impotent. Christianity has moulded character, where we should vainly seek to discern that it had influenced conduct. Not the criminal code, but the counsel of perfection shows us what a nation is becoming; and he who casts on any set of duties the shadow of the second best, so far as he is successful, does more to influence the moral ideal than he who succeeds in passing a new law' (*The Moral Ideal*, p. 373 f.).

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IDEALISM.—1. **The term.**—'Idealism' is a term of very varied application. As 'personal idealism' it may denote a view of human life in which all utilitarian and eudæmonistic considerations are subordinated to duty or to objective ideals of culture, and in which the mind asserts its superiority in the face of all determinism and materialism. This is the type of idealism the attainment and vindication of which find imposing and even classical expression in Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*.

Again, the term may be applied generally to philosophical and religious systems, to views of the universe and poetic creations, in which the world is represented as being dominated by spiritual ends of a moral, religious, or æsthetic character. An idealism of this kind is found in all the great national religions, in the most diverse philosophical systems, and in poems such as Dante's *Divina Commedia* and Goethe's *Faust*; its antitheses are sceptical relativism and hopeless pessimism. But these rather general applications of the word have no place in a scientific terminology, and have not much significance even in the inexact speech of everyday life, as everything turns upon the particular ethical, religious, or æsthetic sense in which the nature of the ideal and its authority over personality are conceived. As a technical term, idealism concerns us only as denoting a distinct type of metaphysical thought, and in that sense alone will it be dealt with here.

2. The fundamental position of idealism.—In order to determine the philosophical import of the term 'idealism,' it will be necessary to fix the place which the corresponding theory occupies among the various fundamental philosophical positions. These fundamental positions may be combined in the several systems of philosophy, but they always remain separate and distinct as regards their starting-points. No one single or solely possible point of origin can be ascribed to philosophical reflexion. On the contrary, the data of experience form from the outset the subject of various problems, the very variety of which renders anything like a real monism impossible. Thus we have, first of all, the question as to the ultimate reality given in experience; secondly, the question as to what the thinker expects to attain by a logical elaboration of the given; and, finally, the question regarding the attitude to be assumed to the facts of becoming and change, and therefore also to the existence of ends and values, in the data of experience. These three questions, even if the answers to them can be harmonized and combined, cannot, as has been said, be reduced to one another. To begin with the last: we note that from this question arise the systems of pantheistic changelessness on the one hand, and of pluralistic change on the other, the two sides of the antithesis being exemplified by the Eleatics and Heraclitus respectively. In the second question originate, on the one hand, the systems which by logical elaboration of the given find a more specific and certain reality behind or above the manifold of experience—as, indeed, the basis and explanation of it; and, on the other hand, the systems which seek merely to explain psychologically the formation of the concepts actually applied in experience, and thus to regulate such application. These systems are respectively the dogmatic *a priori* theories of which Platonism is the type, and the empirical pragmatic theories represented by the Sophists. The first question, again, gives rise, on the one hand, to the systems which regard material reality as the primary element of experience, and find in it the explanation of consciousness; and, on the other, to the systems which begin with the individual consciousness, and pass thence to the trans-subjective reality: they are respectively the realistic systems represented by materialism and by a naturalistic pantheism of the Spinozistic type, and the idealistic systems framed by Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley, and Hume.

Now the place of 'idealism' among philosophical conceptions lies within the confines of the last of these antitheses. It denotes the metaphysical theory which, as regards the primary and most certain datum of experience, takes its stand upon consciousness and its contents. In its most uncompromising and self-consistent form idealism is solipsism, and finds its initial and most difficult problem in the question regarding the trans-subjective reality of knowledge, or the separation of the merely subjective element from elements which are super-subjective and universally valid. This problem, which had been touched upon by the Greek Sophists and Sceptics, by Augustine and the mediæval Nominalists, became the real crux of Descartes and Malebranche, of Locke and Berkeley, and it is impressively expounded by Fichte in his *Bestimmung des Menschen*. This idealism is often called 'Phenomenalism'—a designation which implies that consciousness and its content of phenomena must form the starting-point of all philosophical reflexion, that the entire range of physical and psychical reality is given as a mere phenomenon to a consciousness which carries the whole within itself. Whether the phenomena thus immanent in consciousness have correlatives of an objective character, and what such correlatives may be, are questions left entirely unanswered. Of late it has become common to speak of this view as 'Immanence'—a term signifying that all reality is comprised in consciousness as sensation, perception, and idea. All these, however, are neither more nor less than metaphysical idealism in the only technical sense that we can ascribe to the term. Hence, to put the matter shortly, idealism implies that the relation of subject and object is one of the essential starting-points of philosophy, and in its view of that relation it lays down the decisive principle that objects can exist only for a subject, and that the subject which carries the objects within itself is the higher category, and as such must determine the process of philosophical thought.

3. Various developments of the idealistic principle.—As thus understood, idealism is simply one of the essential starting-points of philosophical thought. But in its further development as a system it may assume a vast variety of forms. It really implies a method, not a school of opinions and beliefs with a definitely fixed result, or, at most, it involves such a result only in so far as it is opposed to materialism, according to which consciousness has its source in material reality, and arises from it in certain conditions, as was maintained by the ancient materialists and their successors, as well as by the naturalistic monists and agnostics, who often approximate very closely to them; and, of course, it similarly opposes every kind of objectivism which would derive personal consciousness and its contents from some such supposed primordial datum as God, nature, the All, or cosmic law, as was done by Neo-Platonism and the ecclesiastical philosophy, by Spinoza and his modern followers. So far, it is true, idealism means something more than a mere method; it signifies a mode of thought whose subject-matter is fixed and defined from the standpoint of consciousness and the ego. Even so, however, the most varied lines of systematic development lie open to it.

(*a*) *Various attempts to reach trans-subjective reality from the idealistic standpoint.*—Thus we may, with Descartes and Malebranche, begin with the idea of God as a fact of consciousness, pass thence to the objective world, and then from that position explain consciousness, or the ego. Or we may, with Locke, assert merely the probable existence of objective correlatives to the contents of consciousness, and upon that probability construct a system that differs but little from objectivism. With Berkeley, we may attribute our experience of phenomena to the divine will, and thus attain to a theological theism, or, with Hume, Comte, and the Pragmatists, we may hold the

relation of subject and object to be inexplicable and inscrutable, and so content ourselves with what can be based upon the laws of phenomena. Some, with Schelling and Hegel, deduce from experience the identity of subject and object, and with this identity as a basis elucidate the being and evolution of all things. Others, again, with Leibniz, Herbart, and Lotze, derive from the facts of consciousness a pluralistic reality corresponding thereto; while some, finally, with Schopenhauer, deduce from the individual consciousness the theory that it subsists in the unconscious, from which subject and object severally arise, only to fall back again into the unconscious. There is thus an extraordinary variety in the systems evolved from the fundamental position of idealism. Some of these approximate to materialism, or else to objectivism; some do not pass beyond the subject; while some propound an objective reality corresponding to it. But in virtue of their common starting-point they are all rigidly opposed to pure materialism or pure objectivism.

(*b*) *Idealism combined with epistemological theories.*—Further specialized forms of the idealistic theory present themselves, however, when this metaphysical starting-point is combined with conclusions developed from the epistemological starting-point. Here we meet with the great main divisions of idealism related to the second source of philosophical reflexion (as noted in § 2 above), viz. empirical-nominalistic and *a priori* realistic idealism—a distinction which, as represented by the Greek Sophists and Sceptics on the one hand, and by Plato on the other, differentiates idealistic systems to the present day.

i. Nominalistic idealism culminates in Berkeley's Phenomenalism, in Hume, in Pragmatism, in James's Voluntarism, and in the entire psychological philosophy of modern times. It emphatically affirms that not only the facts of mind but also the facts of nature are phenomena of consciousness. Here consciousness becomes simply the stage on which the facts exhibit their movements. The associations and dissociations which take place according to the laws of nature and the psychological laws of social life are the material of which our so-called knowledge—and, therefore, also our philosophy—is built. Here philosophy explains the genesis of the conceptual world as a process of moulding the contents of experience, or consciousness, and distinguishes between the elements that pertain to a trans-subjective world and those that pertain to the ego, and it ascribes to both groups of conceptions a power of continuous self-direction and of progressive self-adaptation to the ends of practical life. What these ends really are is a question that cannot be decided from the standpoint under consideration; it belongs to the ethico-teleological series of problems (see (*c*) below). But, if we bring the modern doctrine of biological evolution within the epistemological circle of problems, then the theory of empirical idealism resolves itself into the doctrine of the continuous adjustments, inheritances, and selections according to which the contents of consciousness group themselves conceptually with reference to the ideal ends realizing themselves therein. We have here, in fact, a psychological relativism having the idealistic method as its pre-condition, but it entirely avoids the metaphysical endeavour to reach absolute reality, and abstains even from a metaphysical interpretation of its own starting-point. At the same time, however, it lends to the systems which it embraces an anti-materialistic bent that does justice to the mystery of existence and of spirit. The idea of the great mystery which Comte recognizes in his 'Idée de l'humanité,' Spencer in his 'Unknowable,' and Simmel in his hypothesis of a relativistischer Pantheismus' emanates from the idealistic starting-point.

ii. The idealism directed by an *a priori* and realistic epistemology, *i.e.* Platonism in its various forms, proceeds in a directly opposite way. From the psychical data of consciousness and the psychologically explicable laws of association it distinguishes a specific inner capacity of forming concepts. This function cannot be explained by, or derived from, anything else, but, on the contrary, is itself the necessary condition of all explanation and derivation. It is a spontaneous and creative faculty of spirit or reason, and is independent of the soul as such, of its contents and their interaction under the operation of psychological laws. This independence finds expression in the attributes 'a priori' and 'autonomous,' which imply that the faculty does not originate in experience, but that, on the other hand, experience is spiritually permeated and so rendered intelligible by it. Thus *a priori* idealism does not merely differentiate between the bare elements of consciousness and their associative combinations, but also distinguishes from the latter the conceptual faculty, which follows its own logical laws. As valid, self-consistent, and necessary knowledge results only from an elaboration of the data of consciousness in conformity with these laws, it is the conceptual faculty that transforms the chaos of mental phenomena into a reality systematized and apprehended by means of concepts. True reality is generated only by a process of thought governed by autonomous *a priori* principles. Hence this type of idealism is also designated realism—the knowledge of the veritably real by means of concepts. Such an idealism, by reason of its epistemology, stands at the opposite pole from nominalist-empirical idealism. But in this very circumstance lie the peculiar difficulties of the position, viz. (1) the dependence of all conceptual activity upon experience, and the observed variability of the views advanced—facts ever in conflict with the apriority and autonomy maintained by the theory; (2) the very idea of a reality which is attained by means of concepts—an idea which led Plato to hypostatize the concepts as absolute entities, and has led others to regard them as the laws by which the divine mind acts; (3) the question as to how far the entire manifold of consciousness can be rationalized by concepts, and whether the process does not leave a residuum of non-rational elements—a doubt which has re-asserted itself in fresh forms from Plato to Schelling and Schopenhauer; and, finally, (4) the difference between the purely theoretical general concepts, on the one hand, and, on the other, the practical ideals or values whose inherent *a priori* necessity coincided, in Plato's view, with the cognate necessity of theoretical knowledge, but whose genuinely practical and theoretically inexplicable character could not permanently remain unrecognized. Thus, while the subsuming of idealism under the *a priori* epistemology corresponds to the true import of knowledge and of the conception of truth—since, of course, every sceptical and relativistic theory must likewise find its warrant in autonomous and logical evidence—yet this idealism, in setting up a reality which is apprehended only through concepts, and stands higher than the reality of immediate experience, involves all the difficulties of rationalism. The idealism which is interpreted on nominalistic-empirical principles lies closer to reality, and does more justice to the changes that occur in the separate sciences and their presuppositions, but precisely on that account it surrenders the idea of truth, and falls into scepticism and sophistic relativism.

(*c*) *Idealism combined with teleological theories.*—

Idealism assumes definite forms of yet another type, and encounters fresh problems, when it is brought into relation with the third main philosophical position (cf. § 2 above), *i.e.* that from which arises the antithesis of pluralism and monism, of change and immutability. In itself idealism is not exclusively bound up with either of the alternatives, but may take both directions. It contains elements which may lead to the one as well as to the other. But, once it becomes involved in the two antitheses, it manifests a very different character in each.

i. Thus, when it proceeds from the individual consciousness, it encounters at the very outset the fact of a variety of consciousnesses. The joint action of these and the dialectic of their common discovery of the concepts are here held to be the necessary conditions of a kingdom of knowledge. From this point, then, idealism becomes pluralistic; and, moreover, when the question is raised as to the possibility and probability of an extra-human consciousness, idealism must, on the higher plane, admit the existence of a plurality of intellectual realms, and, on the lower, must regard it as probable that the sub-human, and perhaps even the inorganic, world is endowed with a spiritual life. Now, as such pluralism involves the idea of movement and reciprocal influence, consciousness —conceived as a subjective activity seeking to reduce its contents to clearness and order—contains also the impulse to strive and advance towards self-comprehension and self-organization. Then, as ethical and practical values are at length recognized in this striving and developing subjective principle, there arises the ideal of personality and of a kingdom of individual minds. This form of idealism finds typical representatives in Augustine, Nicolas Cusanus, and Leibniz. Further, this multitude of spirits must, of course, remain united in their common starting-point—in consciousness in general. But this in turn brings us naturally to an absolute relativism, as in Heraclitus; or to a pan-psychism, as in Averroes; or to that unreconciled opposition between the cosmic consciousness and finite personal spirits which is characteristic, above all, of European idealistic thought.

ii. At this point, however, we touch upon the other factor of the antithesis—that which presses towards monism and changelessness. The consciousness that forms the starting-point here is not the casual finite consciousness at all, the latter being indeed simply its representative. The individual consciousness represents consciousness in general, inasmuch as it is a quintessence of the simplest metaphysical conditions. Here 'being' means being for a consciousness: *esse est percipi*. Then, as consciousness in its individual aspect cannot perform this function except on the absurd supposition of solipsism, and as, moreover, the individual consciousness has its genesis and its decay, its own 'being' can exist only for and in an *absolute* consciousness. In this way the individual person, like all else, becomes an element in the divine mind. Here then we find ourselves within the sphere of monism—the monism of consciousness. If, however, we begin with the absolute consciousness, it is difficult to find a place for becoming and movement, as these can be predicated only of particular, finitive, and relative things. Hence, either the absolute consciousness is interpreted anthropomorphically, *i.e.* as a being who creates, imparts, and directs the movement of things, or else movement is altogether denied, and the finite consciousness becomes a mere illusory appearance of the absolute consciousness. With the surrender of plurality and movement, in fact, the ego and consciousness themselves disappear, and become the unconscious. From the mysticism of Brāhmanism to Schopenhauer runs a quite intelligible line of development, which Western thought, under the influence of Christianity, has been able to avoid only by tracing the human personality in some way to the Deity, and so lapsing into the well-known antinomies in the idea of God.

We thus see that the bare adoption of metaphysical idealism does not carry us very far. Idealism acquires definite character only by being combined with the tendencies of thought which are definitely moulded by actual decisions regarding the other two philosophical starting-points. To exalt the mind, or consciousness, above all its contents is doubtless an important step, but it in no way determines the fundamental character of philosophical thought. The vital question is how the mind as thus exalted above its phenomena is itself regarded as to its own nature and the direction of its activity. But this, as we have seen, brings us face to face with a vast variety of alternatives, and with antinomies of the most formidable kind.

4. **Transcendental idealism.**—The recognition of these innumerable complications and paralogisms led to that unique form of idealism which is known as Transcendental or Critical Idealism—the doctrine of Kant. That doctrine concerns us here only in so far as it is idealistic, and has furnished modern thought with a new weapon against materialism and semi-materialism. The character of this idealism finds its clearest expression in the distinction which Kant drew between his own views and the empirico-nominalistic idealism of Hume, as well as that of Berkeley—certainly no less empirical, but corrected and supplemented by a metaphysical theology. Kant's doctrine is idealism of the type evolved from the first starting-point. It is a metaphysic from the standpoint of consciousness as embracing all experience, in so far as that standpoint itself implies a metaphysical position. But this idealism is distinguished from Hume's by the fact that it is developed and explained, not by the empirical-nominalistic, but by a rationalistic-aprioristic, method, and from Berkeley's by the fact that it does not simply accept the facts of consciousness as given psychologically, and then graft upon these the metaphysical element, but transforms them by a critical and rational procedure into real knowledge, and at the same time will have nothing to do with a metaphysical procedure that would transcend the rational order of the phenomena themselves. Here we have the grounds of the two leading characteristics of the Kantian philosophy, viz. (1) the rational *a priori* transformation of the facts of consciousness into real knowledge by the *a priori* forms of reason; and (2) the limitation of the validity of this transformation to the actual data of experience, and the tracing of all contradictions and antinomies to an illegitimate application of the categories to a reality beyond experience. Experience itself, in its intuitions of time and space, in its synthesis of phenomena by means of the categories, and in the unity which it presupposes, becomes real only in virtue of the *a priori* forms of reason already operative within it. But these forms are to be applied only to the experiential material of the human consciousness; for, if they are applied to what lies beyond, they inevitably become involved in all the paralogisms of traditional metaphysics. Adhesion to the fundamental idealistic position; the expansion of this position into the intra-experiential rationalism of a logically necessary systematization, and a practically necessary valuation, of the contents of experience or consciousness; a demonstration of the fact that a metaphysic which seeks to transcend experience necessarily results in antinomies; the vindication of ethico-religious con-

victions by a practical postulate on the basis of the moral reason; and, finally, the reconciliation of the metaphysical postulate of moral freedom with the theoretical-rational system of an ordered totality of experience by the doctrine of the purely phenomenal character of the latter—these are the leading features of the Kantian idealism. It is, accordingly, a philosophical fabric *sui generis*, and, in fact, could not come into existence at all until the several starting-points of philosophy had been adequately developed, and until, in particular, the idealistic principle had been fully wrought out. Still, it is essentially idealism—idealism within the sphere of consciousness as embracing all experience, and in it the individual consciousness represents consciousness in general. But it does not sanction any advance beyond the idea of representation, or any reaching forth towards what is represented. The rational articulation and valuation of the contents of consciousness—that and that alone is its aim. How consciousness itself comes into being, how it is related to what transcends it, how the theory comes to embrace a plurality of consciousnesses and the possibility of their mutual intercourse—these are for it unanswerable questions. The metaphysical range of Kant's idealism does not pass beyond the fundamental thesis of a system within the limits of conscious experience.

The nature and deduction of the principles by means of which the contents of consciousness are reduced to order and valued need not concern us here. But it is necessary to point out that the Kantian system is also a form of *personal* idealism, *i.e.* that in its recognition of ethical ends and imperatives, and its corresponding conception of the All, it rests upon practical judgments and postulates which lie wholly outside its metaphysical idealism as such, and are admittedly drawn from interests of a non-logical character. Hence it is possible, by divesting the system of its practical aspect, to interpret it in a decidedly naturalistic way. In point of fact, however, Kant himself, by thus expanding his system, has burdened it with a dualism which brings in its train all the old antinomies and perplexities of philosophical thought.

Whatever significance is to be ascribed to the Kantian idealism, it at all events broke away from the practice—inherited from Greek philosophy—of simply identifying theoretical and metaphysical with personal and ethical idealism, and of extending the consistency of the former to the latter. Theoretical procedure and practical procedure, logical articulation and ethical judgment, natural law and moral imperative, though both members of each pair have a common idealistic foundation, are rigorously differentiated by Kant. While necessity and validity are predicated of either side, yet they are not of the same type in both, and are in each case demonstrated on different grounds. The personal idealism of the ethical, religious, and æsthetic sphere must, accordingly, be clearly distinguished from the metaphysical idealism that ranks consciousness above all its phenomena, nor is it to be identified with the logical and theoretical articulation of these phenomena. Thus a fresh source of philosophical principles is recognized and set apart, while at the same time further perplexities are added to philosophical reflexion. The manner in which Kant ultimately at once distinguished and combined the antagonistic elements by his dual conception of the world, viz. a phenomenal, empirical, and logical, on the one hand, and a noumenal, intelligible, and personal on the other, is obviously unsatisfactory, as human experience exhibits, and, for a true interpretation, demands, not the mere juxtaposition, but the actual fusion, of the two aspects. This explains why Kant's subjective idealism of logically ordered experience and moral freedom soon fell back again into an objective idealism, *i.e.* a theory which derives reality from the absolute or divine consciousness.

5. German idealism.—The objective idealism evolved from the Kantian system is usually called 'German Idealism'—a term covering the movement of speculation from Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to Schopenhauer and Herbart, of the last of whom, again, such thinkers as Lotze, Fechner, and Wundt, notwithstanding the independent character of their contributions, may be regarded as the legitimate successors. But this type of idealism has spread far beyond the confines of Germany. In France it is more or less independently represented by Cousin, Renouvier, and Maine de Biran; in Britain by Coleridge, T. H. Green, Hutchison Stirling, the Cairds, and the Seths. It thus forms one of the outstanding phases of modern philosophy. It is impossible to deal here with the movement in detail. Suffice it to emphasize its most vital feature, viz. that in all cases its starting-point is the individual consciousness, and that, as this is treated as representing consciousness in general, it forms the bridge by which thought advances to the conception of the divine universal consciousness or the divine universal will—the internally organized process of the former, or the active movements of the latter, being then the source of the world of subjective consciousness, which, in turn, will merge in the universal consciousness or universal will. Of the utmost importance in this connexion, accordingly, are the several interpretations of the idea of God which is disengaged by analysis from the subjective consciousness—as being, in fact, its necessary foundation and pre-condition. Thus we have theistic, pantheistic, or pessimistic interpretations, corresponding to the various leading conceptions of the subjective consciousness. This form of idealism is, in reality, a revived Platonism or Neo-Platonism, except in so far as, on the lines of Descartes and Kant, the idealistic factor depends upon the principle of a philosophy of consciousness, and all laws and values are regarded as respectively but the processes and ends of the absolute consciousness which is deduced from that principle, whereas in the older systems named their idealistic character rests, not upon any central element abstracted by analysis from consciousness, but upon the hypostatization of the general concepts readily evolved from it. This expansion of the central idea of Kant—a position which was of set purpose narrowly circumscribed—brings back, of course, all the antinomies and perplexities which in his conscious and studied agnosticism he had so ingeniously got rid of.

6. 19th cent. development.—The remarkable advance of physical science and the concrete study of sociological development which mark the 19th cent. brought about the collapse of this idealistic metaphysics in the grand style, and thus gave materialism once more an open field and a position of far-reaching influence. But a part of still greater moment was played at this juncture by semi-materialism or positivism, which declared the problem of subject and object to be insoluble and of no consequence, and recognized the phenomenal order of nature as of no less decisive import for the mind than an order metaphysically deduced. Our whole task, it was held, is to adjust ourselves to the laws actually operative in the world, in life, and in society as a means of the fullest possible self-expression and of the utilitarian organization of society. The determinative factor is in all circumstances the law of physical and psychical phenomena; the mind has no creative power of its own, but has only a capacity of adaptation by means of which, in its differentiations and integra-

tions, it may maintain and further the existence of human beings. To that existence itself no independent spiritual content is ascribed; there is nothing beyond the adaptation of an empty capacity for existence. Here the mind is not derived from matter,—and so far an idealistic element is retained,—but it is divested of all specific and spontaneous content, and receives everything from the surrounding world. Hence the relation between subject and object, and thus also the problem of idealism itself, together with all the fundamental views which serve to determine its development, may, as being insoluble and of no practical utility, be relegated to the sphere of the unknowable. This positivism, it is true, was challenged by a revival of the Kantian idealism——in the form of Neo-Kantianism, in which, however, Kant's ethics, his doctrine of freedom, and his philosophy of religion were for the most part set aside. Strong opposition came also from the nominalist-empirical idealism which, in the hands of G. Simmel, produced a type of thought as definitely idealistic as it was relativistic.

But the modern or German idealism, as a philosophy based on consciousness, met with a very severe and powerful criticism from the side of modern psychology, with its experimental investigation of consciousness. This psychology demolished the conception of the ego, the soul, and the unity of consciousness, and thus made it difficult to deal with and make use of the individual consciousness as the representative of consciousness in general. Still more effective were the investigations regarding the relation of supraliminal consciousness to subliminal consciousness (or the unconscious). Consciousness now became a mere series of isolated movements associated by contiguity—a mere fortuitous intensification of the subconscious. It is in the latter that the real continuity of consciousness lies, and in it likewise subsist the most important movements and forms, of which only a few ever come into the light of clear consciousness. This being so, supraliminal consciousness cannot be regarded as the primordial metaphysical datum, or as representative of the universe, or of reality in general. It should be remarked, however, that the subconscious, in which Schopenhauer and E. v. Hartmann find the principle of the cosmos, is itself no immediate datum of thought—no ultimate reality of experience.

But, as a matter of fact, these psychological theories of consciousness merely shift, and do not subvert, the foundation of idealism. Even the Kantian idealism—like the earlier Leibnizian theory of *petites perceptions*—took as its basis an unconscious or pre-conscious activity of reason, and his entire system was based upon the development of the occurrences due to that activity into the consciousness of principles, and upon the self-reflexion of reason which it rendered possible. Hence we should probably distinguish between a critico-transcendental conception and the psychological conception of consciousness. The latter alone need be taken into account by the idealistic philosophy, and for that conception the distinction between the psychologically subconscious and the psychologically conscious fusion of subject and object does not really matter; in fact, that fusion and the preponderance of the subject over its contents are thought of here as only relative, as more or less complete. But, even if the foundation of the philosophy of consciousness is thus maintained and recognized, its development therefrom is confronted with new problems. Account must be taken from the outset of the distinction between the two grades of consciousness, and consciousness in the ordinary sense must be regarded as in itself inadequate, and as capable of being supplemented by elements and ideas which emanate from the subconscious. Above all, the higher concept, which embraces both ordinary consciousness and subconsciousness, becomes something which lies beyond the possibility of experience, and the true conception of reality is detached from experience and thought in quite a different way from Kant's method in the doctrine of the antinomies. To enable us to grasp that conception, in fact, we must fall back upon an imaginative and poetic intuition of the feeling of life and reality—a feeling the object of which cannot be demonstrated in experience or grounded in thought. Idealism thus becomes intuitive, as in the most recent school, viz. that of Bergson—a school whose influence is steadily increasing—and the conclusions drawn from that fundamental position conform less and less to the idea of a homogeneous and complete system.

7. **The significance of idealism for religion.**—Having thus surveyed the development of the idealistic conception of things, we are now in a position to determine its significance for the verification and valuation of the constitutive ideas of the Christian religion. Here, however, we must always bear in mind that idealism is concerned with only one of the fundamental problems of philosophy, and that, whatever its contributions to religious thought may be, it does not thereby solve the problems associated with the other main starting-points of philosophical reflexion. Thus it in no way furnishes a solution of the questions arising from the antithesis of an empirical-relative *versus* a rational-absolute epistemology, or from that of pluralism *versus* monism, for these questions lie outside its range. Nor, again, does it decide anything with reference to practical and personal idealism, inasmuch as the question regarding the import of ideas and values is not solved simply by ranking consciousness above all its contents. What is of importance in personal idealism is rather the question as to the practical ends which we must recognize in the mind—ends that always have a spontaneous character and are not to be established by formal reasoning; here, in point of fact, the decisive factor is the personal, individual will.

Still, even with due recognition of all these reservations, idealism is of immense significance for religion. It invalidates all materialism and semi-materialism. It maintains that consciousness cannot be derived from matter, but that, on the contrary, matter exists only for consciousness—that its *esse* is *percipi*. Nor does this imply that matter is simply given in consciousness, for in that case it would be of no consequence whether we started from the one or from the other. But in the fundamental relation between the two, according to idealism, consciousness is the formative and regulative principle—that which contains in itself meaning and life, and is, therefore, pre-eminent, and intelligible to itself. Idealism asserts the mind's supremacy over the real. But the conviction that mind cannot be explained by matter, and that it is the formative principle of the real, is a fundamental scientific postulate of religious life and thought, and is recognized as such wherever religious thought is consciously directed upon its possibility and its rights. It is true that the idealistic theory cannot in itself determine the direction in which the mind's supremacy will assert itself, or the ends and values which that supremacy involves. Idealism regards the mind merely as a formal principle, the materials of which are given, and the ends of which are revealed to the will in the process of spiritual development. What particular ends the mind will choose are determined

in part by the solutions of the other two groups of philosophical problems, and, above all, are drawn from the supreme convictions of the mind itself. No more than any other form of philosophy can idealism by itself develop into religion; it must ever be supplemented by independent elements of religious life, and from these receive a concrete determination. But in so far as mind and the supremacy of mind form the metaphysical precondition of religious belief, idealism is to that extent of the utmost significance for religious life and thought.

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E. TROELTSCH.

IDENTITY.—1. General (logical Law of Identity).—Any discussion of the problems connected with Identity must necessarily start from a clear understanding of what is meant by Identity as a concept of pure logic, and what is the precise sense of the so-called logical Law of Identity. This is the more needful since Hegel at least professes to reject the Law of Identity, and since some of the most eminent of our modern philosophers have, in consequence, been led to minimize the significance of the formula, though they have usually stopped short of actually denying it.

There are several ways of defining sameness or identity as a notion in pure logic, but all of them are logically equivalent (on the meaning of 'equivalence' a few words will have to be said further on). Thus, in a logic which, like that of Boole and Peano, is founded on the notions of class, member of a class, and the relations of inclusion in and exclusion from a class, we may conceivably begin by defining the identity of individuals, and proceed to consider identity between classes as derivative, or we may first define the identity of class with class and then deduce an expression for individual identity. Taking the first course, we may say that, if x and y are *terms* (*i.e.* determinate individual objects of thought represented in language by singular names or denoting phrases), x and y are the *same* term when *every* assertion which is true of x is also true of y, and every assertion which is false if made of x is also false when made of y; or, to put it in other language, if x and y are *not* to be the same, there must always be at least one assertion which is true of the one but false of the other. Now, this definition of identity will also hold good if x and y are not individuals but classes. For classes are identical only when they comprise precisely the same members, and in that case it is clear that whatever can be truly asserted of class x, and nothing else, may be truly asserted of class y.[1]

Or, again, we may reach an equivalent result by first defining identity as a relation between classes; thus, the class x is identical with the class y when, and only when, every member of x is a member of y and every member of y a member of x. Bearing in mind that for every individual term there is always at least one class of which the term in question is the *only* member (as, *e.g.*, 'Thomas Hobbes is the only member of the class "author of *Leviathan*,"' 2 the only member of the class 'even prime number,' and so on), we get the result that, if x and y are both classes of one member, *the* one member of x is the same term as *the* one member of y. This obviously reduces to our previous formula for the identity of individuals. For, if a be 'the x,' and there is a proposition which is true of 'the x' but not of 'the y,' such as 'the x is a w,' it must be true that 'a is a w,' but false that 'the y is a w,' contrary to our previous deduction from the definition of identity between classes.

When we say of anything that it is 'the same' or is 'identical,' our statement is manifestly incomplete, and, as it stands, without significance, unless we say what it is the same *with*. Identity is thus clearly a relation of some kind. Further, it is a symmetrical relation, *i.e.* it is its own converse, since, if a is the same as b, b is always the same as a. Also, the relation is transitive, *i.e.* it is always true that, if a is the same as b and b the same as c, a is the same as c.[1] Again, identity, like self-love, self-support, suicide, is a self-relative, since everything is always 'the same as' itself, or, to put it more technically, the same term which is antecedent, or first term, in the relation may always be sequent, or last term. It is this that is expressed in the abstract formula known as the Law of Identity, $a = a$ (for some remarks on the meaning of the symbol = in this formula, see immediately below). It should be noted that the formula of itself does *not* state that the asserted identity excludes the co-existence of difference or variety, and that the attacks which have been directed against it on this ground thus arise from misapprehension of its precise purport. Thus, if for a we substitute 'the crosser of the Rubicon,' the formula in no way denies that the person who crossed the Rubicon is the same person who was killed by Brutus and Cassius; all that it denies is that the person who crossed the Rubicon can be identical with a person who never crossed the Rubicon, or who did not cross it in the circumstances described in the proposition. This consideration of itself largely invalidates the Hegelian attack on the principle. There is, however, a further peculiarity about the relation of identity which is not taken into account by the formula, but has now to be mentioned, and does afford more plausible grounds for raising metaphysical difficulties. Self-relatives in general are relations which may subsist between a term and itself, but may also subsist between one term and another. Thus, a suicide is one who kills himself, but the relation of killer to killed may, and most often does, hold between distinct persons; a man may govern or love himself, but he may also love or govern other persons. But absolute self-sameness, or identity, can subsist only between a term and itself. If a and b are numerically distinct terms, then it is never absolutely true that a and b are identical—a point which is perhaps most clearly brought out when we consider such relations as those studied in pure mathematics, where, *e.g.*, it is fundamental that a point or an integer is *never* identical with any point or integer which is not itself. And, as we shall see directly, the same consideration that a thing is never identical with anything but itself is really of no less moment in the study of human moral and social relations.

Summing up, then, we may say that identity is a relation which is symmetrical, transitive, and self-relative, and that in its strictest logical sense it is the *only* relation which can exist only between a term and itself. We have now to consider some of the objections which have been urged against admitting the reality of such a relation. But per-

[1] If, *e.g.*, there is a certain term m which belongs to x but not to y, there is a proposition, viz. 'x contains m,' which, as it stands, is true, but would be false if y were substituted for x.

[1] In the case where a, b, c are geometrical magnitudes, this formula becomes the familiar 'first axiom' of Euclid, 'things which are equal to (*i.e.* have the same magnitude with) the same thing are equal to one another.'

haps it will be well first to say a word about one or two possible misapprehensions which arise from the ambiguity of the commonly adopted symbol = to express this relation.

It must be remembered that the symbols which represent relations and operations are, in the first instance, arbitrary. Such signs as =, +, ×, ÷ of themselves tell us nothing of the relations or operations for which they stand. The person who first introduces them is at liberty to put what sense he pleases upon them, provided only that the sense intended is made perfectly clear and that the same symbol retains, so long as no notice to the contrary is given, the same precise sense. It follows, further, that there is no objection to the employment of an already familiar symbol in an extended or otherwise modified sense, provided two conditions are observed: the relation or operation for which the symbol is henceforth to stand must have certain formal logical characteristics in common with that for which it had been formerly used; the same symbol must not be used for relations and operations which bear no analogy at all with one another. And it ought to be clearly indicated exactly how far the analogy between the old sense and the new extends, what formal characteristics are common to the two cases. Thus, in arithmetic, if the symbol × has first been 'defined' for the domain of natural integers, and 'multiplication' of one natural integer by another has thus received an unambiguous sense, we have no right to use the same symbol × or the word 'multiplication' to denote an operation with rational fractions, or with 'algebraic' or 'real' numbers in general, without first fixing its sense by re-defining the word or the symbol for the new domain in which it is henceforth to be employed. It follows that, taken apart from its definition for a given domain, a symbol of relation or operation is usually ambiguous, and some at least of the criticisms which have been passed on the formal expression of the Law of Identity seem to be mere consequences of the ambiguity of the symbol =. It has been said, in support of the view that the relation = has no meaning unless it relates two distinct terms, that the whole point of such expressions as $x+7=10$, or $(a+b)^2=a^2+2ab+b^2$, would be destroyed if the sides of the 'equation' were not different expressions. It must be replied that in the first case, where we are dealing with a genuine 'equation,' the symbol = does not denote logical identity at all, but *equality*, *i.e.* identity of magnitude. The symbol x here stands for a number, as yet supposed to be unknown, but such that, when it is discovered, the sum of it and 7 is equal to 10. If we replace x by the only value which satisfies the equation, viz. 3, the statement $3+7=10$ becomes a strict identity. Its meaning is that *the* self-same number which results from the operation of adding 7 to 3 is *the* number which results from adding 1 to 9. The two operations are distinct; but, since each integer occurs only once in the series of natural numbers, the result of the operation is identical in the strictest sense, and it is of the result that we mean to speak. There is only one 10 in the whole universe of thought, and it is this unique object 10 about which we are making an assertion. If there could be two different numbers 10, one of which resulted from the addition of 1 to 9 and the other from the addition of 7 to 3, arithmetic would be impossible. Thus, if we take $3+7=9+1$ as a statement about the *results* of two different operations, we are asserting the identity of a term—10—with itself; if we take it, as we are also at liberty to do, as a statement about two *operations* of addition, the symbol = no longer denotes identity but equivalence (*i.e.* the operations of adding 1 to 9 and of adding 7 to 3 are not identical, but they yield a result which is identical). So in an algebraical formula, like that given above, which contains no 'variable,' though it is often convenient to speak of the formula as an 'identity,' or to say that the two sides of the expression are 'identically equal,' what is really stated is an equivalence. The meaning is not that the operation of multiplying $(a+b)$ by itself is the same as that of multiplying a by itself, b by itself, and 2, a, b by one another, and then adding the results, but that the two processes yield a final *result* which is identical.

It may still be urged that, at any rate when we make significant judgments of identity, there is always an assertion of difference included in our statements. (For an able statement of the view, here criticized, that *two terms* are required for the relation of identity, see particularly Varisco, *Conoscr te Stesso*, p. 147, note.) Thus, it may be said that, even in the 'identities' of which we have just been speaking, by our own admission what we assert is that different operations determine one and the same result, and that, apart from the difference of the operations, it would not be worth while to assert the identity of the result. Who, for instance, would be the wiser for knowing that 10=10, or, to take Hegel's example, that 'a plant is—a plant'? And it may even be urged, as by Bradley, that the so-called Law of Identity $a=a$ is not a judgment or proposition at all, since every significant proposition is a synthesis of different elements. Yet neither criticism seems to go to the root of the matter. It is not true to say that 10=10 (the symbol = being here taken as meaning 'is identical with') is an unmeaning or otiose assertion. For it means that the number 10 is unique in the series of natural integers, so that, *e.g.*, in counting, when one has once passed 10 he will never come back to it, or, to use other words, that the series of integers is non-recurrent. If we do not usually think it necessary to mention this peculiarity of the series of integers, that is merely because of its familiarity; in a logical study of the properties of number the peculiarity is a highly important one, and the proof of it a highly elaborate affair. Hence it is not strictly true to say that, whenever we assert identity, we simultaneously assert or, at any rate, imply difference as well, though this is, no doubt, most commonly the case. And reflexion will show that, where we assert 'identity in difference,' there is always an assertion of absolute self-sameness involved. Thus, if we say 'the wall-paper in Mr. X's study has exactly the same shade as that in Mr. Y's dining-room,' we do state a difference; the papers are not the same papers, and the walls which they cover are not the same walls. But the shade of colour of the one paper is numerically one and the same with that of the other. There are not two colour-shades, but one. Or, if an actor in a stage recognition-scene exclaims, 'That person is my long-lost son,' it is implied, of course, that the long-lost son has changed in many ways, but there is something of which absolute identity is asserted; he is numerically one and the same person. If personal identity were the fiction that Hume asserted it to be, such a statement as 'This is my long-lost son' would always be false. Hence, wherever a statement of identity in diversity is made, it will be found to include as part of its meaning an assertion of the form $a=a$. This is not to deny that physical things change or that organisms grow; it is merely to state that, unless the change or growth is a process within something permanently self-identical, the very statements '*This* changes,' '*This* grows,' cannot be true.

With respect to the statement that an expression of the form $a=a$, if it means what it says, is no genuine judgment, one may say that the matter is partly one of arbitrary definition. If, in Bradley's fashion, a judgment is defined in such a way as to make the presence of distinct terms part of the definition, then, of course, with such a definition, no affirmation in which there is only one term will be a judgment *according to this definition*. But this obvious consideration does not dispose of the question whether there may not be true and significant statements which fall outside the limits of this definition. Thus 10 = 10, according to what has just been maintained, is significant and true, since it disposes of the conceivably possible view that the number-series may be recurrent; but it would not be a judgment according to Bradley's definition. And certainly the abstract schema of all such propositions, the formula $a=a$, cannot be an actual judgment, for the simple reason that a has here no determinate signification, but is merely a blank form standing equally well for any actual term, but not itself a term at all. And, where there is not even one term, there clearly can be no judgment. But this criticism has of itself no more direct bearing on the Law of Identity than upon any other pure logical schema of possible judgments, such as, *e.g.*, 'All x's are y's.' As the present writer understands it, none of the so-called formal laws of thought claims to be more than a rule or formula according to which true propositions can be made, and in violation of which no true proposition can be made. The real function of the Law of Identity is thus simply to assert that every object of thought has a definite character. Simi-

larly the Law of Contradiction (which, it may be incidentally observed, is not the Law of Identity disguised in a negative form, but a wholly independent law) adds that no object of thought can at once have and not have a given determinate character, while the Law of Excluded Middle further adds that, if the given character is fully determinate, any given object of thought must either have it or not have it. The effect of the three taken together as postulates of thought is to ensure that the logical universe of discourse shall contain only determinate and distinct objects of thought, or, in other words, that its members, whatever they may be, shall possess a definite and recognizable individuality. Since each of the three 'laws' is required to guarantee this result, it seems impossible either to deny the logical value of the Law of Identity, or, in Hegelian fashion, to maintain that an actual thing is only identical with itself *because* it is also different from itself, and *vice versa*. Indeed, we have seen that, in the case of such objects as the natural numbers, there seems to be a self-identity which excludes all difference whatsoever. To revert to our example, $9+1=10=3+7$, there is undoubtedly a difference between $9+1$ and $3+7$, but it is a difference not in the result of the operations, the number 10, but merely in the methods by which it is obtained. What is identical here, the result, has no element of difference within it; and what is different, the two operations, is not identical, but merely equivalent. So, when we say that two different men, *A* and *B*, see the same sun, the whole situation exhibits identity in difference; but the identity belongs to one thing, the object seen, and is absolute down to the utmost particular; the difference to something else, the processes by which the perception of the object is effected in the case of *A* and of *B* respectively. So more generally, if it is said of *A* and *B* that they are 'the same and not the same,' meaning, *e.g.*, that their formal structure is the same but their material different, it is clear that identity is asserted about one constituent element of *A* and *B*, and difference about quite other constituent elements. The common formal structure, *e.g.*, in respect of which *A* and *B* are pronounced the same, is strictly and numerically one and the same with itself, and it is precisely this that is expressed in the affirmative part of the statement.

2. Application.—It is no part of the business of logic to formulate criteria of identity, or to say when any particular assertion of identity is correct. Still it may well fall within the logician's province to utter a warning against one or two popular fallacies, which might, if unnoticed, prevent the recognition of identity where it exists. The chief of these prejudices is perhaps the inveterate tendency to assume that identity, wherever it is asserted, means the presence of an identical material constituent or constituents in a complex. This, of course, need not be the case; the point of identity in a given case may lie entirely in the formal structure of the complex, as when a melody is said to be the same, though it has been transposed into a different key. Or we may mean to assert identity of formal structure together with identity of some, but not all, of the material constituents. In such cases it may be impossible to say with certainty how many of the material constituents of a complex must remain the same in order that our assertion may be regarded as true. This is illustrated by the old question whether the pair of stockings which had been darned so often that no part of the original silk remained were still the same or a new pair. The point is that, in a case like this, we mean in ordinary life to assert something more than the formal or structural identity of the pair of stockings; we feel that the identity of the stockings is not preserved unless at least some part of the material has remained all through the processes of mending; but we have no fixed standard by which to determine how much of the material must be preserved, and thus the question admits of no determinate answer. What we may learn from it is that in any concrete case the question of identity cannot be answered unless the exact respect is specified in which identity is sought. It is possible to have, for instance, absolute identity of material constituents without identity of formal structure, or, again, complete identity of formal structure without any identity whatsoever of material constituents. This shows us that the Law of Identity is in no way affected by the fact that change is real, since either the material constituents of a complex or its formal element may change without affecting the other element. Hence, if a person is, in any given context, specially interested in the one aspect, he may correctly assert identity, though there may have been considerable change in the other. We also see that the identity which co-exists with change is not well described as a permanent substratum. Where what we mean to assert is identity of form or structure, the use of a word like substratum, which inevitably suggests a material factor in a complex, is wholly misleading. In general we may say that, owing to the fact that in concrete cases we usually mean to assert an identity which is neither wholly formal nor wholly material, the question whether something is still 'what it was' or has become 'something different' cannot be satisfactorily answered except with reference to the end we have in view in raising it. To take a trivial instance—the fact that every material constituent of one's body may be different from any of what were its material constituents ten years ago is irrelevant to an 'identification' in the police-court.

So far we have been in the main considering the case of complexes which on their material side have been treated as mere aggregates capable of receiving a structural determination from without; and we have seen that, with respect to them, there appears to be always a certain degree of arbitrariness involved in deciding the question how far they can be modified without losing their identity. (For some general remarks applicable to the case in hand, see Varisco's observations on the arbitrary element in scientific formulæ [*Conoscí te Stesso*, pp. 118–120].) The case of wholes which are not mere aggregates, and whose formal character consists not in a structure imposed from without, but in internal development along definite lines and towards a definite end, requires some further consideration. In what does the identity of a living organism or, again, of a personal self consist? In the case of the organism, which is constantly renewing itself by getting rid of superfluous material constituents and building up fresh elements to take their place, it is plain that identity does not depend on the retention of any material constituent throughout the whole of the organism's life. If we interpreted rigidly the Aristotelian formula, 'presence of the *same* form in the *same* matter,' it would clearly not be a correct account of the identity of any living organism. What seems to be of primary importance is formal identity as shown not in unchanging retention of one and the same structure, but in the continuous development of structure through successive phases according to a definite law of growth. We do *not* mean by this merely a law of growth common to all the members of a class or species, but a law or principle of structural development which in its full determinateness is unique and peculiar to this one organism. (It is true that, *e.g.*, one oak grows on lines which are much the same for all oaks; but there are

always individual differences: no one oak is a mere replica of any other, and no mere general formula applicable to all oaks alike is an exhaustive statement of the living law of development or 'form' of this special oak.) From the continuity of development presupposed in such a formal identity, it seems to follow at once that identity would be destroyed if there could be an instantaneous change of all the material constituents of the organism. There would be no sense in speaking of a structure in which all the material constituents were simultaneously replaced as a growth or development. It would be in the strictest sense a new creation. Finally, a word or two may be said about personal identity. Does it reside solely in the soul or mind, or does it involve identity of the physical organism? In actual practice, of course, life does not present us with cases in which personal identity is found apart from such an identity of the organism as has just been spoken of. But we can at least imagine such a possibility.

Suppose, for example, that the Pythagorean doctrines were true, and that the soul of a man could become associated with the body of a parrot. If it were possible for the supposed parrot to convince us that it retained the psychical character which we had previously known as that of a friend, it is difficult to see how we could refuse to believe that we were dealing, not indeed with the same *man*, but with the same *person*. We should, *e.g.*, be morally bound to treat the parrot, not as a mere parrot, but as having the same moral claims and rights as our friend. And we should hardly regard the belief in personal immortality as capable of refutation by the mere consideration that there can be no identity of organism between an embodied and a disembodied spirit.

And, again, though many theologians would maintain that complete immortality involves a 'resurrection of the body,' it is hard to see in what sense they can maintain that the 'glorified' body is the same organism as the 'corruptible' body. Personal identity would thus seem to be essentially psychical and, in its concept (whatever the full concrete facts may be), independent of bodily identity. Once more, as in the case of the organism, it is important to understand that personal identity is, primarily, identity of form. It does not require the permanent and unchanged persistence of any special material content, such as a group of sensations or thoughts or feelings, throughout the course of personal existence. It is no more required, in order that a man may be the same person as he was twenty years ago, that some mental 'contents' should have persisted unchanged during the twenty years, than the sameness of his body requires that some of its particles should still be the same as twenty years ago. What is required is that the succession of changes in mental and moral character should be linked together as a continuous development according to a law of growth which in its concrete fullness is characteristic of the person in question and of no other being in the universe. A man's present experience is *his* experience, because it fits on to *his* past experiences as it does not fit on to any other series of individual experiences. It is thus an abuse of language, which may easily lead to the gravest confusion of thought, to speak of personal identity as involving anything in the nature of an unchanging psychical 'substratum.'

The confusion appears in the crudest form in the difficulties raised by Hume about personal identity. His difficulty is real only if we assume that personal identity means the permanent persistence of some identifiable mental 'state' or group of states. If this is conceded, it is, of course, easy to show that we have no evidence for the existence of any such permanent 'impressions' or 'ideas.' Even Bradley's suggested minimum of a persisting core of cœnæsthesia is something in which it is very hard to believe. The difficulty vanishes when it is seen that personal identity is primarily identity of form, not of content or matter. The same mistaken demand for identity of content as a basis of personal identity seems to lie at the bottom of the contemporary tendency to exalt the 'subliminal' self into a principle for the explanation of all psychological difficulties. It is, of course, a fact capable of establishment by careful observation, even if it were not already presupposed in the conception of the mind as a thing that grows and develops, that mental 'states' do not arise and vanish instantaneously; they have a period of 'marginal' existence which may exist both before and after their occupation of the 'centre' of attentive consciousness. But the doctrine of the 'subliminal' self extends this conception of the 'margin' surrounding the 'focus' of consciousness beyond the limits within which its validity can be submitted to experimental tests. The 'subliminal' is thought of as a region in which mental contents of all kinds still persist as actual, though unconscious, when they have disappeared from even the 'margin' of consciousness, and from which they can be evoked again in the processes of recall. As a symbol for the truth that the actual condition of consciousness may be largely determined by experiences which are no longer present to consciousness, there can be no objection to the use of such a notion; but when the attempt is made to regard the symbol as an explanation—for instance, to explain recollection by the supposed persistence of a percept or idea 'below the threshold,' or to convert a mental tendency into an actual conjunction of 'subliminal' states—and, most of all, when personal identity is supposed to rest upon such an actually unchanging body of 'subliminal' mental contents, it should be clear that we are dealing with the Humian fallacy in a new dress. An identity which is really one of form and law is being illegitimately converted into one of material constituents. If we are right in holding that personal identity requires no notion of an unchanging 'substrate,' the theories which may be formed of the character of the supposed 'subliminal' self will have no bearing upon the problem of identity. In fact, the very problem to be solved, in what the identity of a person consists, obviously breaks out again when we ask what is meant by the unity and self-identity of the supposed 'subliminal' personality itself.

Without introducing any reference to the 'subliminal,' we may simply state the facts of which it appears to give a mythological account thus. Since personal identity would appear to depend on the unique linking up of past with present mental states in virtue of a formal law or principle of mental development, it seems to involve as a consequence at least the possibility of a recall in memory of whatever experiences have belonged to a self. That we in all probability forget most of our experiences so completely that they are never recalled, at least in the life that we know, is no objection to such a view. For it may well be that they are not recalled simply because further experience does not provide us with the appropriate cues. From abnormal cases, such as those of persons who have survived the very near approach of death and have recorded their experiences, it would seem unsafe to assert of any experience that it has certainly passed beyond all possibility of recollection. On the other hand, it is hard to see how the kind of continuity in mental development without which there would be no meaning in speaking of certain past experiences as mine, and not those of another person, could be preserved if all possibility of their actual recovery were precluded. Such totally lost experiences would not be 'linked up' with any personality at all, and, if they could be supposed to exist, would seem to have become ownerless. But an owner-

less experience is surely a contradiction in terms. On the contrary, if there is such a continuity in personal development that there is always a real dependence of the later phases of a personality upon the earlier—a dependence which is different in kind from the dependence of one man's personality on that of another—this would seem to be of itself enough to guarantee the possibility that any experience which has been that of a given individual may be, when the cue for it arrives, reinstated in the form of memory. Hence it seems, to the present writer at least, that memory is essential to personal identity, and that there is ultimately no sense, *e.g.*, in speculations which represent the same person as passing through a succession of lives in each of which he is absolutely precluded from all possible memory of the events of those which have gone before. If all links of memory are destroyed at death (or at re-birth), on what ground do we pronounce a given man *A* to be a reincarnation of another man *B* rather than an entirely new creation?

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IDENTITY (Buddhist).—**1.** We find the notion of identity principally in material objects which preserve the same aspect for a long time, and which may be moved in space without change of form. The Buddhists have carried the doctrine of non-identity so far that they have come to deny movement. According to them, when a body seems to move, it is really being continually renewed, and is, so to speak, re-born of itself—re-born each moment in a different spot. Such is the opinion of the orthodox (Skr. *Abhidharmas*). The Vātsīputrīyas, who are heretics, believe that a gesture is a movement, whereas, according to the orthodox opinion, gesture is but a new disposition of a body, which is no longer the same body as it was before. Yet, like all Buddhists, the Vātsīputrīyas admit—basing their faith on Scripture and experience—that a flame is always being renewed, and that it never remains for one moment identical with itself. The flame of the lamp in the third watch of the night is the continuation of the flame in the first watch; these two flames form a series (*santati*): the first is the cause (*hetu*) of the second, for they have both the same nature; the wick and the oil are not causes, but only coefficients (*pratyaya*). This series may be developed in space while it lasts: when there is a prairie fire, the flame of the Northern extremity of the prairie stands in the same relation to the flame of the Southern extremity as the bird arriving in the South to the bird which has come from the North. But we may follow the problem still more closely. It may quite well be the case that flame, sound, and thought are essentially 'momentary,' 'perishing from moment to moment,' and yet that certain objects and the atoms originally constituting all objects remain identical. Certain things remain in existence as long as there is no cause to destroy them.[1]

If things (*saṁskṛta*)[2] are momentary, then they perish of themselves, without any cause. It is denied that the flame dies because it is blown out, or that sound dies because a hand is laid on the bell. The cause which is in opposition to the existence of the flame does not destroy the flame; for how can we destroy what exists, or how can we destroy what does not exist? This cause prevents the new flame from springing up to replace the present one; it interrupts the series of the flame by paralyzing the forces which made it last. From all evidence, it is the same with wood.

'Are we to think that wood perishes by contact with flame?—Yes, for we no longer see the wood when it is burnt, and no reasoning is worth the evidence of our senses.—No. It is a matter of reasoning; for, even if we no longer see the wood, that may be the outcome of the fact that it perishes of itself and ceases to be renewed. The non-existence of the wood, which, you say, is caused by the fire, is a pure nothingness, a non-entity: and non-entity cannot be an effect and cannot be caused. Besides, if destruction, the non-existence which succeeds existence, had sometimes a cause, it would always, like birth, have a cause. And you willingly admit that flame, sound, and thought are momentary by nature' (*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, iv. 2).

If things perish without cause, from their very nature—as objects thrown into the air fall—they must perish in the very moment of birth, and they cannot exist beyond the moment in which they actually receive being; they perish in the spot where they are born, and they cannot pass from one place to another.

'If destruction, being without cause, does not take place at the very birth of the thing, it will not take place later, for the thing remains what it is.' But, one may say, the thing changes, it ripens, it grows older. What grows older and what changes is a 'series,' for the notion of change is by its very terms contradictory. 'That the same thing should become other than it is, is absurd; that the thing should remain the same, and its characters become different, is absurd.'[3]

There is much discussion over the example of water which disappears by ebullition. The fire prevents the atoms of water, which disappear every moment, from procreating new atoms of water: 'thus the mass of water is reduced more and more, until it entirely disappears, and finally does not exist in its series, or in its being.'[4]

2. The point of view of the Dignāga school (5th cent. [?]) is too well known to require more than brief mention here.[5] By existence is meant the capacity for producing an effect (*arthakriyākāritva*). Now, a permanent thing is inactive. Does it possess, at the moment when it is accomplishing its present act, the power to accomplish its past and future acts? If so, then it will certainly accomplish them at once, for it is not usual that anything capable of an act should postpone it. If

[1] The old school believes that things are *anitya*, 'non-eternal,' 'fragile'; but it does not say that they are all *kṣaṇika*, 'momentary,' 'instantaneous.' Buddha says: 'It is evident that this body lasts one year . . . a hundred years, and even more. But that which is called mind, intellect, consciousness, keeps up an incessant round by day and by night of perishing as one thing and springing up as another' (*Saṁyutta*, ii. 95).

[2] *Saṁskṛta* = 'what is composed, caused.' The *saṁskṛta* alone exists. The 'non-caused,' be it 'space' or *nirvāṇa*, is but a name.

[3] Vasubandhu (3rd–4th cent. A.D. [?]) in *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, iv. 2, fol. 180 of *Tanjur, Mdo*, vol. lxiii. (India Office Library copy).

[4] *Ib.*

[5] See *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, Calcutta, 1858, tr. A. E. Gough, London, 1882, p. 16; tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin, in *Muséon*, new ser., i. [1902] 64.

not, it will never accomplish them, just as a stone, which is at the present moment incapable of producing a bud, will never produce one. It may be said that the permanent thing produces such and such an effect by reason of the co-operation of additional factors. If these factors remain exterior, then it is they that are active. If they give some new capacity to the permanent thing, then our point is proved: the primitive being, who lacked this capacity, has perished; a new being has been born who possesses this capacity. It is very difficult to attribute to a non-momentary thing, to a thing which is permanent and identical with itself, a successive activity. That which produces no effect—space or *nirvāṇa*—is not a thing, since it is incapable of action or reaction, and incapable of being caused.

3. If we consider in a series (*santati*) two moments which are very close, the one 'cause' and the other 'effect,' we shall have no difficulty in persuading ourselves that they are neither identical nor different. The philosophy of Nāgārjuna (1st cent. A.D. [?]), arguing from the fact that the relations of cause and effect are 'inexpressible,' gives its opinion in favour of the relative character of the idea of causality; there is, in absolute truth, no cause and effect. A more moderate or less critical philosophy admits a certain identity in the series. Every atom of water, according to it, is fluidity; every atom of fire, heat.

With regard to the most interesting of all series, the mental or intellectual series which constitutes our pseudo-individuality, our substantial and permanent pseudo-ego,[1] the *Milindapañha* remarks that the murderer deserves to be punished, although he is, at the time of punishment, no longer the same being who committed the crime; just as the marriageable woman belongs to the man to whom she has been promised as a little girl.[2] Thus the series which constitutes our soul is divided into an infinite number of existences (*nikāyasabhāga, janman*), each one of which is prepared to make retribution for a certain lot of actions (see art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Buddhist]). In each of these existences the soul really remains identical with itself: its acts, with the exception of the very gravest, will not be requited till a future existence. There is no reason for surprise over the fact that it makes retribution (*vipāka*) for its past acts, or that it is disposed either to good or to evil by reason of the 'issuing' (*niṣyanda*) of its past acts, although there is nothing permanent in itself. It is a parallel with the flower which receives the counter-blow from the substances on which the seed has fed.

The Sautrāntikas believe that acts bring about a certain modification in the series, *i.e.* in the soul—a spiritual modification, if we may call it so, from which retribution springs. The school of Abhidharma believes that the act creates a subtle matter (*avijñapti*), which develops in an uninterrupted series, forming part of the series of the human being, just as the series of thoughts or the series of gross elements does. So the past is perpetuated in the future; and the being, although developing, yet remains to a certain extent similar to itself.

[1] H. Taine (*De l'Intelligence*[3], Paris, 1879, pref. p. 9): 'There is nothing real in the ego, except the train of its events.'

[2] *Milinda*, ii. ii. 1, ed. V. Trenckner, Lond. and Edinb., 1880, p. 40; Rhys Davids, 'Questions of King Milinda,' in *SBE* xxxv. [1890] 63: 'The king said: "He who is born, Nāgasena, does he remain the same or become another?" "Neither the same nor another." "Give me an illustration." "Now what do you think, O king? You were once a baby, a tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back. Was that the same as you who are now grown up?" "No. That child was one, I am another." "If you are not that child, it will follow that you have had neither mother nor father, nor learning nor teacher . . ."' (cf. H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, pp. 148–152).

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the notes. See also H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*[6], Stuttgart, 1914, Eng. tr., London, 1882; P. Oltramare, *Hist. des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, i. [Paris, 1906] 197; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, do. 1909, p. 178.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

IDLENESS.—The essential idea of the word 'idle' seems to be *empty* or *unoccupied*. This idea may be applied vaguely to what is void of any content, unsubstantial, trivial, useless, fruitless. More definitely it may refer to time that is not filled with *occupations*. In English the latter is the more prominent meaning; in the German *eitel*, the former. Probably the German usage keeps nearer to the original meaning of the word, and the prominent English meaning is derivative; but it is this meaning that gives definite import to idleness as descriptive of a condition in the moral life of men.

In this sense idleness presents an aspect that is not necessarily unfavourable, but is at times even favourable, to morality and happiness. It offers an agreeable relief from the irksomeness which is occasionally attendant on nearly all the occupations of life. This *dolce far niente* has found a delightful expression in Thomson's *Castle of Indolence*, and Tennyson's *Lotos-Eaters*. It is in the spirit of these poems that W. Morris speaks of himself in *The Earthly Paradise* as 'the *idle* singer of an empty day,' and Johnson entitled one of his well-known series of papers *The Idler*. But in its higher purport idleness is commonly denoted by 'leisure'; it means such relief from the occupations that are necessary for physical existence as leaves time and energy for the higher interests of life. In a practical shape this idea of idleness has found embodiment in the holidays or festivals of all races. Of these the highest type is the Hebrew Sabbath. But the Greek mind embodied the idea of the Sabbath in its own way. The name for an institution designed to cultivate the higher life—the name from which our 'school' is derived—is the common Greek word for 'leisure,' σχολή. In his blunter fashion the Roman called a school *ludus*, 'play' or 'sport.' Both of the great races of the ancient pagan world thus saw, like the Hebrews, that the culture of a higher life becomes possible only when men have secured a certain relaxation from the serious labour for physical existence—such relaxation as appears comparatively like playful exercise. As Gray puts it, life must 'leave us leisure to be good' (*Hymn to Adversity*, 20).

But this is not the most prominent feature in the moral aspect of idleness. The truth is that in this higher aspect idleness is conceived as idleness only in a relative sense of the term. The idle man enjoys relief from one class of occupations only that he may be free to occupy himself with others.

> 'How various his employments whom the world
> Calls idle, and who justly, in return,
> Esteems that busy world an idler too!'
> (Cowper, *Task*, iii. 352–354).

Accordingly idleness, as such, is never viewed by the moralist in a favourable light. Even Thomson, though the praise of industry in his second canto is a very palpable failure to neutralize the drowsy spell of the first, has yet to describe indolence as 'a most enchanting wizard, . . . than whom a fiend more fell is nowhere found' (canto i. 2). The ethical literature of the world is therefore full of warnings against the evils to which moral character is exposed by a life of idleness. These evils corrupt both spheres of the moral life, that of personal character and that of social relations.

1. *Personal character is injured in various ways by an idle life.*—(1) Even if morality be interpreted in the spirit of a narrow egoistic hedonism, recognizing no worth or aim beyond personal pleasure, it is clear that that aim itself is defeated by idleness. What-

ever theory of pleasure and pain may be adopted, it is self-evident that they are but emotional products of the activities that make up life. Pleasure, therefore, can be obtained only by a sufficient degree of occupation to create an interest in life. The pleasure of ease itself is enjoyable only as a relief from the fatigue of work. If the interest of life is not sustained by adequate employment, there is apt to grow up an emotional condition of life-weariness—tedium or *ennui*—which may become so intolerable as to drive its victim, if not to suicide, at least into some escape from idleness by means of laborious sports or feverish excitements like gambling.

(2) But not only is activity necessary to enjoyment; it is necessary also to maintain our energies in vigour. Bodily organs become atrophied from lack of exercise, and all the powers of life become enervated if not constantly employed. Consequently a general enfeeblement of character is the inevitable result of idleness.

(3) Probably, however, the malign aspect of idleness, which is mainly emphasized by the moralists, is that vacuity which leaves the unoccupied mind open to any seductive influences of evil. We have seen that sheer idleness becomes intolerable by eliminating all interest from life, leaving nothing to make life worth living. The craving for relief in some direction becomes irresistible; and, if it is not found in useful occupations, it will be sought in occupations that are frivolous, if not positively pernicious. This is such an obvious teaching of common experience that it has found embodiment in many a familiar proverb, as well as in the homely lessons of popular moral and religious literature.

2. But the larger aspect of idleness, as of ethical problems in general, is that which bears upon *social relations*. By its very nature idleness connects itself with the economics of society, and it draws its significance for social morality from a familiar commonplace of economical science with regard to the production of wealth. All those commodities—the necessaries and comforts and luxuries of life—which constitute wealth are producible only by labour expended on raw material furnished by nature. Every human being, therefore, who lives in unproductive idleness, who is merely a consumer without being a producer of wealth, requires others to labour not only for their own subsistence, but also for his. This fact forms the foundation of that sturdy moral sentiment to which St. Paul gives expression, that, if a man will not work, he has no right to the means of subsistence (2 Th 3^{10}). In this sentiment St. Paul represents a peculiar feature in the moral ideal of the Hebrews. For they stand almost alone among the nations of the ancient world in their appreciation of the moral value of industrial labour. On this subject there is nothing in all literature more noble than the utterances of some of their Rabbis (some are quoted in E. Deutsch's essay on the Talmud, published in the volume of his *Literary Remains*, London, 1874, p. 5).

Among other races social sentiment with regard to industrial labour took a very different course. The ideal of uncivilized tribes is well known. It is often illustrated by Herodotus's description of the Thracians (v. 6): 'To be idle is accounted the most honourable thing, and to be a tiller of the ground the most dishonourable. To live by war and plunder is of all things the most glorious.' This ideal was undoubtedly confirmed by slavery. The origin of this institution is generally regarded as indicating an advance upon a more savage practice, by which captives in war were ruthlessly slaughtered, if not also eaten, to gratify hunger, or revenge, or some horrid superstition. Instead of this, captives came to be adopted by their victors, and forced to undertake those peaceful, steady labours which are out of harmony with the bodily and mental habits of a warlike race. The result was that such labours came to be viewed as appropriate occupations only for persons of an inferior rank in society; and, as slavery was perpetuated in all the later and higher civilizations, the prejudice against industrial labour became deeply engrained in the moral sentiment of the ruling classes everywhere (see W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Rationalism*[3], London, 1877, ch. vi. *ad init.*; see also his *Hist. of European Morals*[3], do. 1869, i. 277; the fullest exposition of the varied influence of slavery upon the free classes will be found in H. Wallon, *Hist. de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité*[2], Paris, 1879, especially bk. i. ch. xii., and bk. ii. ch. ix.).

The great pagan races of the ancient world in general regarded most forms of industrial labour as incompatible with the highest morality, and more particularly with the moral character of a free citizen. It is not indeed to be understood that the great States encouraged idleness. On the contrary, in some the law required every citizen to show that he had some honest means of living, and failure to do so was punishable by death (Herod. ii. 177). According to Herodotus, this law was imposed upon Athens by Solon's legislation; but, though Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, London, 1846–56, ch. xi.) rightly judges this to be improbable, it may be taken as implying that the great reformer did provide some measure to protect the State against idle vagrants. Herodotus, however, himself indicates the sweeping qualifications by which such condemnations of idleness are to be interpreted. For he takes care to inform us that, among the nations with whom his researches had made him acquainted, barbarian as well as Greek, the prejudice against trades (τέχναι) was almost universal, those persons being held in highest rank (γενναῖοι) who kept themselves aloof from such occupations, and especially those who devoted themselves entirely to war (ii. 166, 167). The truth is that the ancient States were in their whole sentiment military, not industrial, societies. The strength of their prejudice against trade, as Herodotus observes (*loc. cit.*), went at times so far as to prohibit their citizens from engaging in trade; *i.e.* tradesmen were not allowed the full rank and rights of freemen. This remarkable prohibition is taken by Montesquieu (*L'Esprit des lois*, Geneva, 1748, iv. 7) to illustrate the prevalent conviction of ancient legislators, that the trading spirit is incompatible with the moral character necessary for civil freedom. It was for this reason that ancient thinkers sometimes justified the institution of slavery as being the only means by which industrial labour could be carried on in a free State. It is, moreover, significant that the moral treatises of ancient paganism, being designed to expound the moral life of freemen, not only ignore the industrial virtues, but, when they do touch upon trade, are in general opposed to the recognition of it as a legitimate sphere of life for the virtuous man. The only great teacher among the Greeks who had surmounted this prejudice was **Socrates** (Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, i. 2, ii. 7. 8, iii. 9); and his wholesome teaching on the subject throws a light, which has seldom been appreciated, on his personal character and influence. We seem to catch an echo of his teaching in that of his great disciple. For **Plato** recognizes the fact that trade cannot be harmful in its essential nature, as it is indispensable to society. He admits, therefore, that, if it were conducted in accordance with reason, it would be an honourable employment. But, as he holds this to be impossible for human nature, he would exclude the trader from the rank of freemen (*Laws*, xi. 918). **Aristotle** is unwilling to go even so far as his master in his concession to trade.

While holding that the best democracy is that of an agricultural country, and next that of a pastoral, he declares democratic government by a town population to be far inferior, because 'there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics, or traders, or labourers' (*Politics*, vi. 4. 12, vii. 9. 3-4). The latest utterances of Greek philosophy carry the same sentiment to an extreme. Two extraordinary illustrations are furnished in **Plutarch's** *Pericles* and **Lucian's** *Somnium*. Both of these authors speak with contempt of sculpture, even in the hands of Phidias and Praxiteles, as merely a manual occupation. In such employments, says Plutarch, *op. cit.*, *ad init.*, 'though we are charmed with the work, we often despise the workman, as we are pleased with perfumes and purple, while dyers and perfumers appear to us in the light of mean mechanics.'

It thus appears that the prejudice against manual labour continued down to the beginning of the Roman Empire. **Cicero**, in fact, during the last days of the Republic, had struck the keynote of Roman sentiment on the subject. After dismissing nearly every kind of productive industry, except agriculture, as 'sordid,' he turns to commerce; and the utmost length he is willing to go is a grudging admission that, if it is conducted on a large scale—if it is 'magna et copiosa, multa undique apportans, multisque sine vanitate (cheating) impartiens'—then it is not to be severely condemned—'non est admodum vituperanda' (*de Officiis*, i. 42[151]). Such a state of sentiment accounts for the vast number of Roman citizens who were content to live the parasitic life of clients, or even to accept a daily dole of bread from the Government rather than take up any industrial occupation. Even the learned professions, with the exception of law, suffered social degradation from the same cause, and were left to men of lower rank, mostly slaves or freedmen (Cicero, *loc. cit.*). Apparently it was this cause also that prevented a freeman or any of his family from cultivating music professionally. In this connexion Aristotle's discussion on the place of music in education is curious. While recommending that the young should be trained in music, he insists that the practice of it should be abandoned in maturer years, and must never be undertaken for gain. 'Professional performers,' he says, 'we call vulgar (*βαναύσους*), and no freeman would play or sing unless he were intoxicated or making fun' (*Politics*, viii. 5. 8). It is evidently owing to the same sentiment that **Juvenal** is shocked at a man of consular rank driving his own chariot. The satirist finds in the incident a proof of the degrading innovations that were invading society, and he cannot palliate the degradation even on the ground of its having occurred by night, for still 'the moon and the stars were witnesses'—'sed luna videt, sed sidera testes | Intendunt oculos' (*Sat.* viii. 144-152).

It is evident, therefore, that, when Christianity began to spread over the pagan Empire, it had to encounter a deeply-rooted prejudice that encouraged idleness so far as most forms of industrial labour are concerned. It is true that Christianity brought with it the more wholesome sentiment of the Hebrews. It is also true that in the young Christian community industrial labour was elevated to the loftiest dignity by the example of the Master (Mk 6^{3}). And it is true still further that it would be difficult to overestimate the far-reaching influence on industrial life of the fact that the slave took equal rank with his owner in relation to their common Master (1 Co 12^{13}, Col 3^{11}). But the conversion of the Empire did not mean that pagan sentiment died out altogether. On the contrary, new tendencies growing up in Christendom itself created some additional forces hostile to the industrial life of the world. One of these was the happy prominence given in the Christian ideal to the gentler virtues, and especially to charity. There is evidence, indeed, that at first careful precautions were taken to avoid the abuse of this expansion of moral and religious life. The best proof of this is the fact that some of the official titles in the Church seem to have been adopted originally to designate those officers who were appointed to administer the Church's charitable funds (G. Uhlhorn, *Chr. Charity in the Anc. Church*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1883, bk. ii. ch. iv.; E. Hatch, *The Organization of the Early Chr. Churches*, London, 1881, especially Lect. ii.). But, notwithstanding all precautions, there is ample evidence to show that unfortunately the charity of the Church was often misdirected to the encouragement of idle beggary (Uhlhorn, *op. cit.* bk. ii. ch. v.; a glimpse of this abuse is afforded by Lucian's *de Morte Peregr.*, even if it be but a fictitious story of contemporary life). This unfortunate effect was aggravated by the development of the simple conception of almsgiving as a sacrifice into the theological dogma of its efficacy as an atonement for sin, and still more by that strange perversion of moral sentiment which elevated mendicancy into a peculiar grace of religious life. Under these influences it is no wonder that the aristocratic prejudice of the ancient pagans against labour was carried over into the aristocracies of mediæval Europe. In fact, it was apparently intensified in the transmission. In many countries a nobleman or gentleman lost all the privileges of his rank by engaging in trade (H. Hallam, *Middle Ages*[9], London, 1846-48, i. 191).

It will thus be seen that practically through all the ages and nearly all the races of men there has been an ideal of social rank strongly hostile to industrial activity, strongly favourable to industrial idleness. This inheritance has come down to the modern world, and infects even its most advanced industrial communities. It is still an object of ambition among many of the most energetic industrial workers to attain rank in the leisure class of their community; and all the usages of such a class are based on the principle of avoiding everything that has the appearance of industrial labour—the principle of flaunting conspicuously the fact that they are living in unproductive idleness (T. B. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, New York, 1898; cf., by way of antithesis, his *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, do. 1904). There is obviously but one cure for this condition of things; and that is a revolution in the ideal of social rank, such as was foreshadowed in the memorable address: 'Ye know that in other communities the rulers are those who lord it over them, and the nobles those who exercise authority. Not so shall it be among you; but whoever will become a noble among you shall be a servant, and whoever will be your prince shall be the slave of all. For the Son of Man also came not to be served, but to serve and to give his life a ransom for many' (Mk 10^{42-45}).

In the love of idleness extremes meet. Besides the idle rich who live upon accumulated wealth, there is in every community a vast horde of idlers who have no such wealth, but whose habits render steady labour so irksome that they prefer subsistence by beggary or theft. Not only is this class an object of serious concern to moral and religious reformers, but its maintenance and its control impose such a burden upon the industrial labourers of the world as to form a perplexing problem for the statesman.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the works referred to above.

J. CLARK MURRAY.

IDOLATRY.—See IMAGES AND IDOLS.

IGNORANCE.—Ignorance has a bearing on the ultimate problems of philosophy (see art. AGNOIOLOGY); but it has an important significance in moral and religious life as well. This significance, as might be anticipated, has been but gradually evolved. In the moral and jural condition of primitive society there are many facts which prove that ignorance regarding the nature or injurious tendencies of an action is not recognized, at least not unequivocally recognized, as freeing the agent from responsibility for the injury done. This early confusion of the moral consciousness was evidently connected with the peculiar jural organization of primitive tribes. It is now a commonplace of historical science that society did not originate by previously isolated individuals combining. On the contrary, society is historically prior to the individual. Its primitive unit is not the individual, but some community—a family or clan—in which the individual is born and brought up. The moral life, therefore, is at first associated with the community rather than with the individual. The moral responsibilities of the individual are absorbed in those of his family or clan. The whole family or clan is held responsible for the misdeed of any member, nor is the misdeed fastened specially on the offender personally even when he is well known. In such a condition of society any individual may find himself involved in responsibility for an action of which he was entirely ignorant; and consequently ignorance is not felt to be of essential importance in determining whether or how far any one can be called to account for an action. All this is abundantly illustrated in societies at the tribal stage of development. It was a striking feature of the aboriginal tribes of North America at the time of their discovery, and it may be traced still in the conduct of the surviving tribes with which the Governments of Canada and the United States are called to deal. An elaborate and interesting illustration of this phase of moral consciousness is given by F. Parkman in his *Jesuits in N. America*[10], Boston, 1876, pp. 354–360. More familiar illustrations are furnished by the clans of the Scottish Highlands prior to the collapse of the clan-system after the disaster of Culloden. It is but a logical corollary from this moral and jural condition that criminal jurisprudence in its primitive crudeness often involves the whole family or kindred of the offender in the punishment of his offence. A well-known example of this, bringing it down even into a later civilization, is the story of Haman in the Book of Esther. War has continued this barbarous confusion of moral ideas to a much later period. Even in the wars of Christendom down to a very recent date it remained the custom to plunder and even butcher indiscriminately not only the combatants, but also the unoffending civilian population of a conquered town or an invaded country.

The tribal organization, with its limited moral ideas and sentiments, has not always vanished at once on the welding of tribes into a nation. Among the ancient Hebrews tribal distinctions remain clearly marked long after the attainment of a larger nationality. Among the Hellenes the old tribal alliances and tribal feuds continued to the very last to complicate and fetter all nobler political aspirations, so that they never succeeded in establishing any unity of national life. In actual history, therefore, the morality of the great nation is still narrowed and hampered by the moral ideas of tribal life. In the States of the ancient world generally the individual finds his chief, if not his sole, moral value in being a citizen. Man exists for the State, not the State for man. It is true that with the loss of political freedom individuals in the ancient States took to personal culture as the supreme object of life; and this explains the vigorous vitality which for generations was imparted to the ancient schools of philosophy, to the Academics and Peripatetics, the Stoics and Epicureans, and even the Sceptics. But the absolute worth of the individual finds distinct recognition for the first time in the teaching of Christianity that it can profit a man nothing, though he gain a whole world, if he himself be lost (Mt 16^{26} ||). Still, the significance of this teaching did not make itself felt at once in the reorganization of society after the conversion of the Roman Empire. The old ideas of social organization continued to dominate the minds of men and modified the whole mediæval interpretation of Christianity itself. Under that interpretation the individual lost his direct religious responsibility and entered into relation with God only as a member of the religious community, the Church. The great revolution of the 16th cent. was a new assertion of the independent worth of the individual, and that not in his religious life alone, but in all his relations, social, economical, and political as well (this is illustrated by many interesting facts in the monograph by E. Belfort Bax on *German Society at the Close of the Middle Ages*, London, 1894).

But, if the narrow ideas of a tribal society continue to cramp the larger life of nations, on the other hand the ideas of a more spiritual morality begin to purify the moral life even of rude communities. Then the import of ignorance for moral responsibility comes to receive more or less explicit recognition. Thus among the Hebrews, while the tribal custom of blood-revenge is still recognized in law, there is an explicit distinction drawn between the deliberate murderer and the man who happens to slay another 'ignorantly' (Dt 19^4), 'unawares and unwittingly' (Jos 20^3; cf. Nu 35). For the latter, the law makes the equitable provision of cities of refuge where he can find protection from the avenging kinsmen of the person slain. Moreover, Deuteronomy (24^{16}) explicitly abolishes the custom of punishing a whole family for the misdeed of a single member, limiting the penalty to the actual transgressor. This enactment is given as the ground in law why the children of the murderers of king Joash were not put to death (2 K $14^{5.6}$). On this point, of course, the prophets represented the higher morality, and it finds eloquent expression in a singularly noble passage of Ezekiel (18^{19-32}; cf. the more brief but pithy expression in Jer $31^{29.30}$).

Athenian law had followed a similar course to that of the Hebrews. At an early period it had drawn a distinction between *φόνος ἑκούσιος* and *φόνος ἀκούσιος* (Smith's *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant., s.v.* 'Phonos'), recognizing the fact that actions done in ignorance do not belong to the same moral category as those done in full knowledge. It is true that some of the old Hellenic myths, like that of Oedipus, point to a state of moral confusion which does not discriminate between an unwitting transgression of law and an intentional wrong; yet the handling of these myths by the great dramatists of the 6th cent. B.C. indicates in general a complete emancipation from the perplexed morality of the myths themselves. In fact, the two great tragedies of Sophocles on the Oedipean myth, especially the *Oedipus in Colonus*, might be interpreted as taking for their leading motive the vindication of an unfortunate transgressor on the plea of ignorance (see esp. lines 262–270, 546–547, 957–988).

While the import of ignorance in relation to moral responsibility was being brought into clearer light by the great dramatists of Greece, it received at the same time a more explicit recognition by the philosophic teachers. This was specially the case with **Socrates**. The one definite doctrine which can with certainty be ascribed to him seems

to give an exaggerated value to knowledge and ignorance in the moral life. This is the doctrine that in its essence virtue *is* knowledge, and vice ignorance (Xen. *Mem.* iii. 9, iv. 2; cf. Plato's *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Meno*, and numerous references in other dialogues). In later ethical systems of the Stoical type there has been generally and logically a tendency to the same view. The view is criticized by Aristotle on the ground that virtue is not a single act of knowledge or of any other kind, but a habit (*q.v.*) trained by repeated action. The Socratic doctrine undoubtedly fails to recognize sufficiently the fact that virtue implies something to be *done*, not merely something to be *known*. But, as Aristotle himself points out (*Eth. Nic.* vi. 13. 3), though all virtue is not knowledge, there can be no virtue without knowledge (φρόνησις). That is to say, in order to do what is right a man must know what is right; and therefore knowledge is an indispensable factor of virtue. A very fair plea may also be made for the contention that at the critical moment in a vicious action the agent is so blinded by passion that he does not really know what he is doing. To this extent also Aristotle recognizes a certain truth in the Socratic doctrine (*Eth. Nic.* vii. 3. 14).

But the truth implied in the doctrine is not the whole truth. The doctrine overlooks at least two other truths: (1) that knowledge does not necessarily involve will to do what is known; (2) that ignorance is not always or wholly involuntary.

(1) Socrates assumed that, as virtue is knowledge, and vice ignorance, a man needs only to have his ignorance removed—to learn what virtue requires—in order to become virtuous. That would imply that the doing follows with certainty the knowing of what is right. Now it may be admitted that a scientific psychology does not allow us to regard knowledge and feeling and will as absolutely dissociated in actual life. Not only is there an element of will in all knowledge, but without knowledge will becomes merely the blind impulse of emotion. The power of will is thus so intimately dependent on knowledge that to common thought they appear at times identical. We say, in Bacon's phrase, that 'knowledge is power'; in many a popular phrase in different languages the knowledge how to do a thing is spoken of as equivalent to being able to do it; and etymology seems to identify in origin *ken* and *can*, *kennen* and *können*. Yet, while every allowance may be made for these significant facts, a scientific psychology also obliges us to admit that at times one of the aspects of mental life—knowledge or feeling or will—may so predominate as to make the others practically negligible quantities. There is often a cool inert contemplation of bare fact without any response from the emotions or the will. There are even morbid conditions of mind, in which the patient has a perfectly clear idea of what it would be wise for him to do or not to do, while his will is so enfeebled that he has no power of constraint in the one case or restraint in the other. The pathology of mind furnishes strange illustrations of this practical dissociation of intelligence and will. (T. Ribot, in his *Les Maladies de la volonté*, Paris, 1883, gives a detailed exposition of the subject; H. Maudsley also treats it in *Body and Will*, London, 1883, pt. iii., 'Will in its Pathological Relations.')

These morbid phenomena exhibit in an exaggerated form that disintegration of mental unity which in less injurious forms is a common characteristic of imperfect mental action in general. For the healthiest mental life is that in which intellect and emotion and will harmoniously cooperate. Moral and religious teachers therefore have found it necessary to distinguish that mental state which represents merely an intellectual activity from that knowledge or faith which carries the whole mental nature with it, involving the assent of the affections and the will as well as of the intellect. But all this implies that virtue cannot be identified with knowledge, nor vice with ignorance, in the ordinary sense of these terms.

(2) But there is another invalid assumption in the doctrine of Socrates. It is not true that a man may not be willingly ignorant. Knowledge is not a state of passive reception; it always implies active effort, even if it be only the effort of attention. Consequently, as a man cannot do his duty if he does not know what his duty is, he is bound to put forth the voluntary effort required to obtain a knowledge of his duty. If he does not make the necessary effort, then he is to be blamed not merely for having done wrong, but for the ignorance that led to his wrong-doing. Such ignorance may relate either to particular facts or to general principles.

(*a*) To discern what is right in particular cases, the facts must be known. But the agent may fail to learn the facts because he makes no effort to know them, possibly even because he makes some effort *not* to know them. In such cases his is properly said to be *wilful ignorance*; and, if it is pleaded as an excuse, the plea must be met with the reply that he ought to have known better.

(*b*) Often moral ignorance extends to general principles. In the moral life of men there is no fact more familiar than the experience that conscience is kept clear by a consistent course of virtuous conduct, while it is darkened by persistent indulgence in vice. Men may come to prefer moral darkness to moral enlightenment because their deeds are evil (cf. Jn 3^{19}). As this darkening of moral intelligence is a natural penalty resulting from habitual disregard of its teaching, the condition has been described in old religious language as *judicial blindness*. Such moral ignorance, so far from being an excuse for sin, may be its most heinous aggravation. In an extreme form it may become that fixed habit of resisting the enlightenment of the Divine Spirit—that 'sin against the Holy Ghost' (Mt $12^{31f.}$ ||)—which by its very nature cannot be forgiven.

But ignorance is often involuntary. Not only individuals, but whole races and classes of men are placed at times in such circumstances that it is practically impossible for them even to conceive any lofty ideal of morality. In particular cases, also, the most cultured moral intelligence may be unavoidably ignorant of facts necessary to a correct judgment; and consequently it is not an infrequent reflexion of good men that they would have acted differently if at the time of action they had known better. Under such conditions ignorance is, in the technical language of the old moralists, spoken of as *invincible*; and it forms a valid apology for faulty conduct. The same principle of justice demands further that all moral judgments on the conduct of men must be modified by a regard for the opportunities of enlightenment which they have enjoyed. This principle is made peculiarly explicit in the teaching of Christ (see esp. Lk $12^{47.\,48}$, Mt 11^{20-24}). Cf. INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE.

The problem of the moral import of ignorance is thus seen to be by no means simple. The external circumstances and the internal motives of moral action are so complicated that human judgment practically breaks down in attempting to determine how far in individual cases ignorance is a just plea. It remains, of course, one of the sustaining assurances of religious faith that in the final account all the complications of every man's life will be truly and justly appreciated by an Omniscient Intelligence. But the perplexity arising from these com-

plications has naturally opened a wide field for casuistical ingenuity. Unfortunately the science of casuistry, which might be made a valuable discipline for the enlightenment of moral intelligence, has commonly shown a tendency not to err on the side of moral safety, but rather to try to find how near action may go to the brink of the precipice of sin without actually slipping over into the abyss. But, fortunately, jurisprudence takes a healthier attitude; and in the problems connected with the moral import of ignorance probably the jurists will be found more helpful even to the moralist than any of the casuists. It is true that the juridical point of view differs from the moral. Still it is based upon it; and, as jurisprudence demands specific statement of the conditions under which an action is done, it can hardly fail to impart some of its own definiteness to the moral aspect of the action as well. In regard to our present problem, jurisprudence is in general governed by the maxim that 'ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris, quod quisque scire tenetur, neminem excusat.' It is specially in medical jurisprudence that the problems of moral ignorance take their most interesting and important shape. For the largest section of this science is that which deals with insanity in its relation to responsibility, and the old legal definitions of insanity generally made moral ignorance its test. It was a common judicial decision that, unless a person was at the time ignorant of the moral quality of the action for which he was called to account, he should be held legally responsible (Maudsley, *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, pp. 88-98). Obviously this involves the assumption, which has been shown to be involved also in the Socratic doctrine of virtue, that the knowledge of what is right implies will-power to do it, and that the knowledge of what is wrong implies will-power to refrain from doing it. But this assumption has been shown to be upset by psychology, especially in its analysis of morbid phenomena. It is now, therefore, acknowledged that mere ignorance of wrong-doing is not a sufficient criterion of insanity. Nervous or cerebral disease may generate an impulse which the patient knows to be wrong, but which is so irresistible that he cannot in justice be held responsible for yielding to its power.

There is another class of actions arising from ignorance, on which the moralist may receive some guidance from the more specific definitions of the jurist. These are the actions coming under the general category of *mala praxis*—the malpractice of men in their professions or trades. In all the occupations of life, injury may be inflicted by the ignorance of practitioners or by that *negligence* which, as etymology indicates, is a peculiar form of ignorance, a temporary lapse of intelligence. In cases of this kind, while allowance must be made for a certain amount of ignorance or negligence as 'invincible,' yet justice also demands that every man shall show reasonable diligence in mastering and applying the knowledge which he professes in his occupation. But the complications of modern professional and industrial life run this general principle of justice into an infinitude of details, for which the legislation of all countries has been obliged to make elaborately minute provisions.

It may be added that a peculiar modern phase of semi-professional life raises a curious question of moral ignorance. There seems to be good ground for believing that in their abnormal condition 'mediums' indulge at times in trickery or deceit, although in their normal consciousness they are not aware of what they have done. It is therefore a valid question, how far such persons are justified in allowing themselves to lapse into a condition in which they lose intelligent self-control, and become capable of doing unwittingly actions which in their normal state they know to be wrong.

LITERATURE.—On the doctrine of Socrates, the original sources of information in the works of Xenophon and Plato have been given above. Reference has also been made to Aristotle's critique, and it may be added that the whole of the first three chapters in the seventh book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* are of interest in this connexion. The casuistry of moral ignorance is discussed at length in J. P. Gury, *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis*, Paris, 1850, which is illustrated by its companion volume of *Casus Conscientiæ*, do. 1863. In this work Tractatus i., *de Actibus Humanis*, has a section (cap. ii. art. iii. §1) *de Ignorantia*, and Tractatus ii., *de Conscientia*, also bears on the subject. These passages should, of course, be read in the light of the illustrative cases of conscience. On the relation of ignorance to legal responsibility the maxim quoted above finds a discussion of some interest to the moralist in *A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classified and Illustrated*, by H. Broom (pp. 205-227, 7th ed., London, 1900). On the connexion of insanity with responsibility, moral as well as legal, valuable aid will be found in any of the great works on medical jurisprudence. H. Maudsley's *Responsibility in Mental Disease*, London, 1874, has been already referred to, and with it may be mentioned his *Pathology of Mind*[2], do. 1895, which devotes nine out of its eleven chapters to insanity. It must always be remembered, however, that Maudsley's psychological and ethical views are deeply moulded by an extreme determinism. In *The Juridical Review* for March, June, and September, 1904, the present aspect of the problem of insanity is discussed from both the medical and the legal points of view in a series of articles, by J. B. Tuke and C. R. A. Howden, conjointly, on 'The Relation of the Insanities to Criminal Responsibility and Civil Capacity.' On the moral aspect of malpractice there is a discussion in W. Whewell's *Elements of Morality*[4], Cambridge, 1864, art. 114. Responsibility for negligence is the subject of a vast juridical literature, but it is mostly an exposition of special provisions in local legislation. In T. Beven's elaborate work, *Negligence in Law*[2] (1st ed. *Principles of Negligence*), London, 1895, bk. i. may be referred to as dealing with the 'constitutive principles of the law. F. Pollock's *The Law of Torts*[7], London, 1904, devotes two chapters to negligence. Browning's *Sludge the Medium* is an attempt at psychological and ethical analysis of a peculiarly subtle condition of mind, but it cannot be accepted as based on a fair study of facts. Of real psychological and ethical value, however, is the discussion of the same mental condition in F. Podmore's *Modern Spiritualism*, London, 1902, ii. 315-328.

J. CLARK MURRAY.

ILLEGITIMACY.—The subject of illegitimacy, in general, presents a number of complex problems which demand the close attention of the sociologist. No single explanation can account for isolated cases, still less can it be used as a reason for the wide variations in the rates of illegitimacy in civilized communities. Differences of religion, of mental range, of social conditions and aptitudes, of race, and of the marriage laws of the different countries, must all be taken into consideration. The importance of the subject, so far as it concerns Great Britain, is shown in the fact that 48,517 illegitimate births were registered in the British Isles during the year 1910. As the most recent statistics available are those for Great Britain and Ireland, a detailed examination of the prevalence of illegitimacy in the several parts of the United Kingdom will throw light on some of the problems before mentioned. Taking the countries in the order of an ascending scale of frequency of illegitimacy, and estimating the percentage of illegitimate births to the total number of births, unless where otherwise stated, the percentage for Ireland is 2·8, for England 4·3, for Wales 5·4, and for Scotland 7·29.

The percentage of illegitimacy in Ireland varies in the four provinces from 0·7 in Connaught to 3·7 in Ulster. The latter province is the only one which has been above the mean for Ireland (2·8) during the quinquennium period 1906 to 1910. Of the counties of Ulster, the two with the highest percentages are Antrim (5·6) and Down (4·6), the two with the lowest percentages are Donegal (2·0) and Cavan (1·1). In Antrim, the district of Ballymoney had 7·7 per cent of illegitimacy, and that of Ballymena 7·3 per cent; in Down the district of Newtownards had 5·5 per cent of illegitimacy, and Banbridge 5·2 per cent. The percentages of illegitimacy in the cities of Dublin and Belfast were 2·5

and 3·3 respectively. An analysis of those varying ratios in the different parts and districts of Ireland points to the prevalence of illegitimacy in large market towns subserving agricultural districts, and the populous rural and maritime districts of North East Ulster—a condition of affairs quite different from that obtaining in England, Wales, and Scotland, where illegitimacy is most common in thinly populated rural districts. At first sight racial differences may appear to account for the distinction referred to. In the eastern half of Ulster the majority of the inhabitants are of Scottish descent, while in Connaught the race is almost wholly Celtic. Illegitimacy is, however, as common, if not more so, among the Celtic population of Scotland as among the Teutonic, and commoner in Celtic Wales than in Teutonic England. Probably the explanation, so far as Ireland is concerned, is to be found in the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, which has a wholesome effect in preventing illegitimacy.

Of the ten districts into which England is divided, those which are under the mean rate of illegitimacy (4·3 per cent) are the South Midland (3·7 per cent) and West Midland (3·9 per cent), and those which are over it are the North Midland (4·9 per cent), North Western (4·5 per cent), Yorkshire (4·5 per cent), and Northern (5·5 per cent). Eight counties form the South Midland district, and in four of these (Middlesex, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, and Northamptonshire) illegitimacy is on a relatively low scale; in the remaining four the percentages are: Bedfordshire 4·4, Cambridge 5·1, Huntingdon 5·6, and Oxford 5·7. In the Thame district of Oxfordshire, which comprises Lewknor and Thame, the high percentage of 8·2 is attained. This rate is higher than that obtaining in the highest of all the districts, the Northern, and exceeds by 2·9 per cent that of the County of Westmorland, which is the county with the largest amount of illegitimacy in the Northern district. In London there is 4·0 per cent of illegitimacy. It will be noted that illegitimacy is more prevalent in the rural and agricultural districts of England, and especially where those districts are not thickly populated. The relatively low rates in London and large towns are undoubtedly helped by the steady influx of well-doing and enterprising young people from country districts; the same cause adversely affects the country districts. In this connexion, however, it may be pointed out that illegitimacy and immorality are not synonymous terms. In large cities, sexual immorality is prevalent, and opportunities for its practice are more abundant and less exposed to the force of public opinion than in the country. In large cities, moreover, illegal means to prevent the fulfilment of pregnancy are not uncommonly used, and can be resorted to with less risk of detection, injury, and punishment. On the other hand, the system of cohabitation, especially in the poorer districts of large cities, is a source of illegitimacy; and such a mode of life is not necessarily associated with continuous immorality.

Wales affords, in contrast to Ireland, the example of a Celtic race with the presence of a large amount of illegitimacy in its midst. The average percentage for the whole of Wales is 5·4, or 1·3 per cent higher than that of England and 2·6 per cent above that of Ireland. In the country districts of Wales, the highest levels are reached in Anglesey (8·7 per cent), Radnor (7·5 per cent) and Montgomery (7·5 per cent). The most thickly peopled county, Glamorgan, has the low percentage of 2·8. When subdivisions of counties are taken into consideration, Bala, an inland rural district of Merioneth, gives the high rate of 13·1; and Anglesey, a maritime-rural district, has 11 per cent of illegitimacy. The same remarks which were made on England with respect to the prevalence of a high rate of illegitimacy in a rural and thinly scattered populace apply to Wales, and, as the sequel will show, to Scotland, with this proviso regarding the last two countries, that the proximity of a maritime population to such rural districts tends to an increase of illegitimacy. In Wales, as in Scotland, peculiar social customs, concurred in by tradition, are not uncommon in country districts during courtship, and these exercise an influence on the amount of illegitimacy.

Of the four countries, Scotland has the highest percentage of illegitimacy, namely 7·29. The percentage varies from 14·51 in Banffshire to 4·49 in Dumbarton. All the Scottish counties, towns, and cities have an average illegitimacy rate above the English mean of 4·3 per cent. In the principal towns, there is a variation from a maximum of 9·79 in Edinburgh to a minimum of 3·96—the percentage found in Govan and Coatbridge. It is worthy of notice in passing that Govan and Coatbridge are two large industrial centres, whose population consists of the working classes. The average percentage for the principal towns in Scotland is 7·35. Large towns have 5·74 per cent of illegitimacy; small towns 6·63 per cent; mainland rural districts 7·24 per cent; and insular rural 6·14. The Eastern districts, with a more fertile soil and better adapted for agricultural purposes than the Western, show a greater prevalence of illegitimacy than the Western. The Northern and Southern districts have the high rates of 8·7 and 11·85 per cent respectively. When a comparison of county districts is made, three have an unusually high percentage of illegitimacy —Banff 14·51, Elgin 14·27, and Wigtown 13·41. These three counties are mainly agricultural, with a large admixture of seafaring population. More than one-fourth (5951) of the male population of Banffshire are engaged in agricultural pursuits, and more than one-fifth (4183) are fishermen or seafaring men. Almost similar conditions to those prevailing in Banff with respect to the occupation of the population are to be found in Elgin and Wigtown. On the other hand, in counties with the lowest number of illegitimate children, such as Dumbarton (4·49 per cent), the populace is to a large extent occupied in shipbuilding, foundries, engineering, and calico-printing works. The housing of farm servants of both sexes in bothies—a custom peculiar to Scotland—is regarded as a fruitful source of illegitimacy, especially in those districts where the rate is high.

The decline in the birth rate of the majority of civilized countries throughout the world has been very marked. If the quinquennium 1901–1905 is compared with that twenty years earlier, the fall in the birth rates in Switzerland, in Ireland, and in Spain has been about 3 per cent; it reached 14 per cent in France and Italy; 16 per cent in Servia, England, Wales, and Hungary; 25 per cent in the Australian Commonwealth; and 27 per cent in New Zealand. Except in the cases of the German Empire, Sweden, France, Belgium, and the Australian Commonwealth, the decrease in the number of illegitimate births is greater than the corresponding fall in the general birth rate. This marked decrease in the majority of European and other civilized countries has been almost continuous during 20 years. With the exception of Sweden and France, where there has been an increase of 7·5 and 8·5 per cent respectively, it has varied within wide limits. Thus it has been 3·1 per cent in Spain, 39·7 per cent in England, 37·4 per cent in Scotland, and 13·6 per cent in Ireland. The proportion of illegitimate births per 1000 unmarried and widowed women between the ages of 15 and 45 years of age and for the years 1900–1902 reached

its highest points in Austria and the German Empire; the numbers in those two countries were 40·1 and 27·4 respectively. Calculated on the same basis, the smallest number of illegitimate births took place in the Netherlands and Ireland, where the numbers were 6·8 and 3·8 respectively.

Countries (arranged in order of rates in 1900–1902).	Proportion of illegitimate births per 1000 unmarried and widowed women aged 15 to 45 years.
Austria	40·1
German Empire	27·4
Sweden	24·3
Denmark	24·2
Prussia	23·7
Italy	19·4
France	19·1
Belgium	17·8
Norway	17·2
Spain	15·5
Scotland	13·4
Australian Commonwealth	13·2
Switzerland	9·8
New Zealand	8·9
England and Wales	8·5
The Netherlands	6·8
Ireland	3·8

The causes underlying the almost universal decline in the amount of illegitimacy are difficult to determine. Beneficent legislation, social activities, a more elevated moral tone, and extended practice of the Christian religion are undoubtedly at their root. In the discussion of illegitimacy throughout the British Isles, reference has already been made to the influence of race, religion, and some social surroundings and conditions. It now remains to refer to these more fully and add other factors which exert a modifying power.

There are differences in laws relating to illegitimacy which have a restraining influence or the reverse on its prevalence. By the law of Scotland and in accordance with the laws of most of the Continental countries, an illegitimate child is fully legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents. Such laws were intended to benefit the child by removing its dishonour and disgrace; but a subsequent marriage does not always take place, and a woman is often led into immoral courses by the promise of marriage, which the man either refuses or never intended to fulfil. In Scotland at any rate, this state of the law, combined with a common custom among the lower classes in country districts and fishing villages, whereby marriage does not take place until the woman is with child, is mainly responsible for the high position it takes with respect to illegitimacy. This conclusion is justified when the effect of the existing state of the law in other portions of the British Isles is considered. By English common law, an illegitimate child cannot be legitimated, though the civil and canon laws legitimate children whose parents subsequently marry.

A factor that cannot be disregarded in the production of illegitimacy is the state of the law towards the fathers and mothers of such children. In Scotland, the mother has legal custody of the child until the age of 10 years, and the father is legally bound to contribute from 2s. 6d. to 3s. weekly towards the aliment of the child; in England, the putative father may be summoned and compelled to make a proper allowance not exceeding 5s. per week. Here also the maintenance of the child devolves on the mother, who is bound to maintain the child as part of her family so long as she remains unmarried, or until the child is 16 years of age or gains a settlement in its own right, or, being a female, is married. Thus a man is penalized for having an illegitimate child to the extent of, at most, a meagre pittance of 5s. per week, and is often allowed to go scot free, either from fear on the part of the mother to sue for aliment, lest such action might spoil the prospects of a future marriage, or by the facilities afforded of escaping his obligations by emigration to another country. Even when all the legal obligations are undertaken by the parents, an illegitimate child is expected to earn its own living and take care of itself at the early age of 16. Social legislation tending to guard child life from immorality, and providing for the better care and training of such children, ought to embrace more suitable provision for the illegitimate child as well as sounder measures for combating illegitimacy. Already the Children's Act in this country has had a beneficent effect in these directions, and it is much needed when the mortality of illegitimate children is compared with that of legitimate. It cannot be doubted that the illegitimate starts life less fitted physically for the battle than the legitimate. The deaths from all varieties of disease are greater among illegitimate children under one year than among legitimate children of the same age. With reference to statistics applicable to England and Wales for 1910, the proportion of deaths among illegitimate infants to 1000 illegitimate births, and among legitimate infants to 1000 legitimate births is seen in the following table to be greater for the illegitimate in all varieties of disease, and with respect to diarrhœal and tubercular diseases more than double the deaths from similar causes among legitimate infants.

Mortality of illegitimate as compared with legitimate for England and Wales under one year of age, 1910.

Cause of death.	Both sexes.	
	Illegitimate.	Legitimate.
1. Common infectious diseases	8·92	7·16
2. Diarrhœal diseases	26·34	12·05
3. Wasting diseases	75·29	39·02
4. Tubercular diseases	7·86	3·74
5. Miscellaneous diseases	76·43	39·67

As in Great Britain, so it is elsewhere. In several European countries, new legislative measures have been adopted or are in the course of being promulgated which will have a material effect on the existing amount of illegitimacy. In Germany, where the illegitimacy rate ranks next to the highest amount, that shown by Austria (see Table i.), the laws which allow the father of an illegitimate child to be freed from his responsibilities by a small monetary payment have been widened in their scope so that such a father, in addition to monetary aliment, is now required to provide training for his child such as will fit it to earn its own living in after life. Further, if the child should be physically or mentally unfit to earn its own livelihood after the statutory age limit of 16 years, the father must then support it all his life. The governing principles of recent legislation, both in Germany and in Austria, are for the betterment of the illegitimate child. It is generally recognized that neither the mother nor the father is the most suitable guardian for an illegitimate child: such parents make the interests of the child subservient to their own, and in general they have not the moral strength to retrieve the honourable position which they have lost by giving the same attention and care to the child which it would receive had it been born in lawful wedlock. On these grounds an official guardian—the *Vormund*—is appointed to enforce the laws. In Germany the mother may be—though she seldom is—appointed guardian. In Austria, it is illegal for the mother to be appointed to this position. The reasons given for forbidding the mother to be *Vormund* are those already mentioned, in addition to the fear that she might not like to displease the father by putting into force the laws protecting the child, and this might lead to the child's being neglected. Again, the *Vormund* must be some person other than the father of the illegitimate child, or the father's relatives, or any one who may have an

interest in saving expense to the father. In the performance of his or her duties, the guardian is assisted by voluntary agencies—such agencies as the Vigilance Societies of Britain. The guardian appointed by law is usually the president of one of these societies, and among the duties which are required to be performed are the proper direction of aliment so as to educate and train the child to be self-supporting, and the legitimation of the child by inducing the father to marry the mother. In Austria about one-half, 45·4 per cent, of the illegitimate children have become legitimated in this way through the influence of the *Vormund* and his voluntary helpers.

In France, where the lot of the illegitimate has been made extremely hard by the existence of article 340 of the civil code containing the well-known clause, 'La recherche de la paternité est interdite,' an Act to remove the hardships and amend the existing law has been announced. There are many points in this Act which find general acceptance throughout France; and, should it become law, it will tend to diminish illegitimacy and confer benefit on such as are illegitimate. By a process at law a mother may establish legal responsibility on the father for his child if the action is brought within two years of its birth. Such an action may also be brought by the Court which, according to the Law of July 1907, acts in the capacity of the *conseil de famille*.

One source of illegitimacy has not been referred to, but is worthy of special prominence—that which occurs as the result of the seduction of feeble- or defective-minded women. Legislative action is at present under consideration in Great Britain, which, if successful, will prevent or at least minimize such occurrences in the future, either by placing the feeble-minded woman under strict guardianship or by visiting with severe punishment those who thus take advantage of her. The clauses referred to have the following purposes: (1) feeble-minded persons who are in receipt of poor relief at the time of giving birth to an illegitimate child, or who are with child, may be dealt with and placed under special care; (2) any person having carnal knowledge of a feeble-minded person who is under the provisions of the Mental Deficiency Act is guilty of a misdemeanour. Legislation such as has been described is being undertaken in many countries other than those referred to, but on similar lines to those to which reference has already been made. There is good reason to believe from experience that it will not only reduce still further the general prevalence of illegitimacy, but also, where the latter occurs, will remove or alleviate the disgrace that clings to the illegitimate throughout life.

LITERATURE.—The statistical information and the tables for Great Britain and Ireland are taken from the Annual Reports for 1910 of the Registrars-General of the several countries. The Report of the Registrar-General of England and Wales for 1910 contains much valuable information relating to foreign countries. See also Reports by the Presidents of Statistical Departments or Bureaus of European countries, Reports of the Registrars-General of the British Colonies, and Reports of the Chief Statistician for Vital Statistics, Bureau of the Census U.S.A. Cf. C. Smith Rossle, 'The Love Child in Germany and Austria,' *Eng. Rev.*, June 1912; O. Spann, *Die Lage und das Schicksal der unehelichen Kinder*, Leipzig, 1909; A. Keller and H. Reicher, *Die Fürsorge für uneheliche Kinder*, Vienna, 1909; F. Janisch, *Die öffentliche Schutzfürsorge für die unehelichen Kinder*, do. 1906; Memoranda on 'A Social Evil in Glasgow,' by J. R. Motion and J. Lindsay, Glasgow, 1911; Acts of Parliament and Bills before Parliament such as 'The Children Act' (1908), 'Criminal Law Amendment Act' (1912), and 'Mental Deficiency Bill' (1912-13).

HAMILTON MARR.

ILLUMINATION. — See ENCYCLOPÆDISTS, ENLIGHTENMENT.

ILLUSION.—By the common usage of psychology the name 'illusion' is now reserved for certain special anomalies of sense, which do not necessarily involve any process of cognition in the strict sense of the term.

For the most part our senses provide us with a well ordered and steadily integrated system. This is most probably based upon the various series of differences that are known as the attributes of sensation. States also occur that are dependent upon variations in these attributes, and that presumably are founded upon them or consist of them. These are known as 'forms' (*Gestalten*) or modes, and usually constitute variable series. Examples are found in the series of distances of increasing length in any of the three dimensions—in the line of sight, or vertically or horizontally perpendicular thereto—in the series of motions of increasing speed, in the series of surfaces of increasing area, in the series of positions 'round the head' of auditory space, and so on. These series become correlated with one another in the sensory experience of ourselves, and presumably of all other creatures in proportion to their complexity and development. In these higher developments at least the order of the system is manifest. No one fails to respond coherently, by action or by thought, to the integration of apparent size with distance from the point of observation. To uniocular vision the apparent surface of an object varies inversely with the square of the distance. In normal binocular vision this rule holds good without modification only from beyond a certain distance from the eye. For nearer distances, within which differences of optical position (convergence, divergence) are effectively distinct, the apparent surface tends to retain one and the same size. We do not notice differences in the apparent size of equally tall persons seated around a drawing-room or moving about in it. But a photograph shows us how their projections on our retinæ must differ. And, if we seat them in a row and look along it, we can easily see these differences. For we then destroy the integrative process which usually guides us at near distances, and base our perception solely upon such differences as are conveyed by the size of the retinal impressions, which alone guide us at great distances. Thus in various circumstances various integrative processes, based upon a manifold of simpler sensory data, guide us, or rather our cognition. From their own point of view, however, our sensory processes are simply harmonious and systematic. If I am startled by the sound of a motor horn, I can usually locate it in a position in the horizontal plane round my head with considerable accuracy. If my head and eyes are impelled to turn towards this point, its source, they will turn rapidly and accurately. If the motor horn is a familiar one, I shall also have some 'idea' (I shall experience some mode) of the distance of the motor from me, even before I see it. And, when I see it, this auditory distance will be confirmed by the visual distance at which it will appear, and that again by its apparent size. In a sense there is, of course, no confirmatory process here at all, for that strikes beyond the senses into cognition, anticipatory belief, and judgment of coherence. It is rather merely the fact that all the more complex and usual sensory processes are adjusted to one another, integrated and correlated in a systematic way. It is also true that, if sense is stripped of cognition, it can never be illusory, in so far as illusory is taken to include a reference to the realities of the external world. For, stripped of cognition and the memory which it involves, sense can refer only to sense, both being actually present and given, linked to one another by integrative processes. A reference to a permanent object means at least a reference to the contents and implications of experiences that

are not actually present. Nevertheless, every cognition of the outer world implies and involves such an integration of sense as will make it possible. And sense must be systematic for systematic knowledge to be possible by means of it.

In the major part of the complex integrations of sense, then, the combining factors and their references and attachments to one another are patent and manifest. An illusion, on the contrary, is a 'departure' from these generally prevailing schemes of sense by reason of the operation of 'hidden' factors—factors which do not themselves fall within any of the main integrative schemes of sense. As their effects, however, appear in sense and within a common integration, they get wrongly attributed to the operation of that process which in the course of ordinary integration would bring them about. Thus arises a primitive kind of error, which has much interest for epistemology, just because it is so primitive. It provides a case of natural or unavoidable error, which is, none the less, erroneous and misleading. This peculiarity gives special importance to the study of illusions, and raises them far above the triviality which any practical considerations would attach to their study.

Thus in the case of retinal irradiation whereby a bright surface looks larger than a dark surface of the same real size, the untutored mind will act and think as if the bright surface were really larger. Such a mind is guided by the habitual integration of distance from the eye and apparent size of surface, according to which two surfaces of the same apparent size and at the same apparent distance should be of the same real size, *i.e.* should give the same results by the method of visual superposition through the medium of, say, a foot-rule. The hidden cause of this illusion is sought on the retina, where its presence is hardly verifiable, because there is no psychical difference between the two cases which might account for the effect. Similarly the red letters of a coloured lamp sign appear farther away than the green or blue ones, because the cause—a mere matter of the difference of refraction of coloured lights, and hence of retinal 'disparity'—is hidden (cf. the red and blue patterns on many rugs). We soon discover the illusion in this case when we see that the frame of the sign or the glass upon which the letters stand is flat. Still it is to be noted that we discover this only in virtue of the correlations of sense with which it disagrees.

In the illusions of reversible perspective there is no retinal distortion. The cube that appears solid, though merely drawn upon a flat surface, makes identical impressions upon both eyes. This is proved by the fact that the paper upon which the cube is drawn still appears flat, that the illusion holds also for uniocular observation, and that the illusory solid changes its aspect from moment to moment, all the then far points now appearing to be near and *vice versa*. If there is thus no change in the outer or in the retinal impressions to account for the apparent solidity and its reversal, the cause of these will lie in some more central physiological factor or in a purely psychical factor. Thus fatigue is said to determine at which moment the reversal shall happen, when the psychical determinations given by change of fixation and by thinking of one or other form of the solid have been excluded. Under certain circumstances, *e.g.* momentary exposure, supporting indices, suppression of background, etc., the illusion can be greatly increased. The cube will appear to be 'really' solid. Here, of course, we have succeeded in excluding only the integrations of sense which in ordinary circumstances make the illusion obvious, viz. that we see the object looked at—paper and drawing of cube upon it—as if it were at once flat and solid. The hidden cause of this illusion probably lies in the nature of stereoscopy as a purely psychical process. Possibly a primitive form of integrative recall operates here. It is not surprising that the cause of the illusions of reversible perspective, whether it be found in the process of redintegrative memory or not, should be hidden; for the fusion that characterizes stereoscopy almost entirely obscures any psychical integrative factors it may contain. We are not usually aware of the double images that all vision involves, but only of their integrative result.

The other illusions of sense still await definite classification. Much research has been done on them, but the discovery of their causes is perplexingly difficult. A familiar example and one of the most pronounced is the Müller-Lyer illusion, in which the lengths of two equal horizontal lines are distorted by the addition to their ends of two arrow-heads, pointing, in the one outwards (<⟶>), in the other inwards (>⟵<). The former line seems much shorter. The amount of the illusion has been measured under various circumstances. Anything that tends to let the compared horizontal lines become prominent reduces, or destroys, the illusion. Certain primitive people are not subject to the illusion; their synthetic visual capacity is probably low. If an analytic habit of vision is practised, the illusion can likewise be suppressed. But the synthetic attitude is the usual one in ourselves; for the illusion appears even when the exposure is momentary. If a regular series of Müller-Lyer figures is prepared in which the arrow-head lines revolve harmoniously about the two end points of the horizontal line, and if this series is shown in the stroboscope (projection by the cinematograph would be the equivalent of this), the illusion will show its presence most emphatically, for the horizontal line will appear to shorten and lengthen, and the end points will appear to move up and down. Many theories of this and other similar illusions have been given, but most of these—especially such as involve a reference to the physiology of the retina or of the optical muscles—have been shown to be untenable. The final explanation, however, is not even yet quite clear. Though we are told to compare the lengths of the horizontal lines, we seem to be compelled by the hidden cause of the illusion to compare the spaces enclosed by the two figures instead, and to refer the result of this comparison to the comparison which we were instructed and endeavoured to make. Of course, it is easy to learn that it is the end lines which are ultimately responsible for the illusion; but it requires very little insight into psychological science to discern that this most patent factor is insufficient to account for the illusion. There is nothing in the side lines which should alter lengths or spaces. The cause must lie hidden in psychical processes, built upon the skeleton of lines given in the figure, but not patent in it; for the illusion just consists in the difference between the size of the line as a mere line and the size of the line as an element in a complex of lines and spaces.

Much remains to be discovered before we can fully explain the illusions. Apart from the discovery of special facts, the greatest contribution towards their solution will probably be made by the progress of general psychological theory regarding the interconnexions of sensory states of different complexity.

In the illusions of perception proper, we have to deal with the redintegrative completion of a sensory presentation that forms a part of two or more of the perceptual complexes of an individual.

Thus a shadowy form seen at the roadside on a dark night might be the outline of a bush, a brigand, or a beast. One would suffer from illusion if one took it for anything but the harmless shrub. But the mistakes one makes have clear though hidden motives. What is seen and heard and felt and known all suggest the ordinary wayside objects, but the fears that more or less assail us all in the dark help us to see what we dread. To children, who instinctively dread the darkness, the terrors of the way to bed up the dark stair through the unlit halls are very real indeed. We need not appeal to special 'traumata' for an explanation of the origin of these fears. Children naturally fear darkness, strangers, and animals separately; and these fears are sufficiently similar to be able to induce one another where that is possible. Of course, many a child knows that there is really nothing to fear in the unlit home, but revived images combine so readily with the data of perception of the same sense which evokes them that they are at once referred to the usual cause of the latter. Their own cause thus becomes hidden. In the illusions of suggestion we also see the operation of hidden causes which, of course, may be either emotional or merely associative and cognitive, or both.

In general, then, true illusions all owe their being to the fact that incidental integrative and fusional coherences of (broadly) simultaneous experiences may obscure or usurp to themselves the references which parts of these experiences possess and would otherwise plainly reveal. True illusions are, therefore, all of psychical origin. There is no sense or purpose in speaking of the disparity between the psychical and the material as being illusory. For the same reason, illusions caused by the anomalous distortion of impressions by the sense-organ hardly deserve the name. They enjoy it only in virtue of the fact that the anomaly which they represent exists both on the material and on the psychical side.

LITERATURE.—For a very broad treatment of illusion as equivalent to error, see James Sully, *Illusions*, London, 1881. For an introduction to the experimental investigation of the illusions, see any good text-book of experimental psychology, *e.g.* C. S. Myers, *A Text-book of Experimental Psychology*[2], Cambridge, 1911, ch. xxii., or E. B. Titchener, *Experimental Psychology*, New York, 1905, i. 151–170, and ii. 303–328, where numerous references to the experimental literature will be found.

HENRY J. WATT.

IMAGES AND IDOLS.

General and Primitive (G. D'ALVIELLA), p. 110.
Ægean (H. R. HALL), p. 116.
Babylonian (L. W. KING), p. 117.
Buddhist (A. S. GEDEN), p. 119.
Celtic (J. L. GERIG), p. 127.
Chinese (J. DYER BALL), p. 130.
Christian.—See ICONOCLASM, IMAGES AND IDOLS (General and Primitive), WORSHIP (Christian).
Egyptian (J. BAIKIE), p. 131.
Greek and Roman (P. GARDNER), p. 133.
Hebrew and Canaanite (ADOLPHE LODS), p. 138.
Indian (W. CROOKE), p. 142.
Japanese and Korean (T. HARADA), p. 146.
Lapp and Samoyed (D. MACRITCHIE), p. 148.
Muslim (E. SELL), p. 150.
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Teutonic and Slavic (M. E. SEATON), p. 155.
Tibetan (L. A. WADDELL), p. 159.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (General and Primitive).—There is a theory that certain species of animals have the instinct of proportion and even a feeling for art, as shown by the habitations which they make for themselves, the way in which they ornament them, the influence of the plumage or the song of the male on the female, etc.; but it must be admitted that man alone possesses the gift of making images, *i.e.* of creating figured representations of beings and objects for a utilitarian or sentimental purpose. This kind of representation implies not only that man reasons about his ocular impressions, but also that he claims the power of exteriorizing them accurately and even of reproducing them after they have disappeared from his vision.

I. *CLASSIFICATION.*—Images having a religious value may be divided into three classes: (1) purely representative images, (2) magical images, and (3) idols.

1. **Purely representative images.**—This class includes drawn, carved, sculptured, or painted images of a purely commemorative, instructive, or edifying nature, *i.e.* whose only aim is to reproduce the features of a real or ideal person, the shape of a well-known object, an episode taken from history or legend, the appearance of a sacred spot, or the celebration of a rite. Every one likes to have near him whatever reminds him of the beings whom he loves or worships—especially their image; this feeling alone would suffice to explain the frequency of figures representing either persons who have played an important part in worship, such as priests, reformers, miracle-workers, scholars, theologians, and martyrs, or the superhuman beings to whom the worship is rendered. J. B. de Rossi,[1] analyzing the different kinds of images found in the catacombs of Rome, makes a classification which might be applied to the figured representations of religions in general: (1) hieratic portraits, (2) ideographical symbols, (3) allegorical paintings illustrating parables, (4) historical scenes drawn from OT and NT, (5) scenes taken from the history of the Church, and (6) reproductions of ritualistic ceremonies.

The maker of an image may either content himself with imitating an accepted type or seek inspiration for the treatment of his subject in the character and rôle ascribed to his model by tradition. As a matter of fact, the resemblance to the original person and the accuracy with which scenes are represented are secondary points; all that is necessary is that people should believe in their accuracy or convention sanction them. It is a short step from this to purely allegorical images—representations of abstractions or ideal beings, such as Faith, Hope, Charity, Virtue and Vice, Religion, in forms borrowed from life. Even God Himself has been treated in this way. A. N. Didron, a famous 19th cent. archæologist, wrote a volume on the iconographical history of God.[1] As an antithesis to this we might mention the copious iconography of the Devil published by Paul Carus.[2]

The image may be realistic, but interpreted in such a way that it becomes a pure symbol—*e.g.*, among Christian images, the lamb and the dove; in Buddhism, the wheel and the lotus-flower; among the Egyptians, the *crux ansata*, the winged globe, etc. Some of these symbols are so clear as to require no comment: the representation of the moon by a crescent, of the sun by a disk or a rayed face, the scales of Justice, the bandage over the eyes of Love, the aureoled hand coming forth from

[1] *Aperçu général sur les catacombes*, Paris, 1867, p. 17.

[1] *Iconographie chrétienne, histoire de Dieu*, Paris, 1844.
[2] *History of the Devil from the earliest Times*, Chicago, 1900.

a cloud and brandishing a weapon; others are so complex that they become rebuses or hieroglyphs, the origin of which it is not always easy to trace—*e.g.*, the fish, which in Greek (*ἰχθύς*) gives the anagram of Christ.

These remarks are still more applicable to the representation of religious groups and scenes. Every great historical religion except Judaism and Islām has attempted to express its legends and myths in images. These representations may have only a commemorative or explanatory intention; but we must remember that certain religions use them especially for the purpose of education and edification.

'All the pictures that we see in the Church tell us as plainly as if the image spoke the story of Christ's coming down among us, the miracles of His Mother, or the struggles and exploits of the saints, so that we may imitate their wonderful and ineffable actions.'[1]

No religion can rival Christianity in the multiplicity of its images. In some large churches, such as the French cathedrals of Paris, Chartres, Reims, and Amiens, there are as many as two, three, or four thousand statues; and in the cathedrals of Chartres, Bourges, and Le Mans, three, four, or five thousand figures on stained-glass.[2] Although quite a number of these are merely figures of unimportant personages, nevertheless we have here what has been called a whole Bible for the use of the unlettered. Next to Christianity comes Buddhism, which has covered India, Ceylon, and the Malay Archipelago with its bas-reliefs, and flooded Tibet, China, and Japan with its painted images; in this it has been imitated by the other religions of the Far East, including Hinduism. It is superfluous to mention here the service rendered to art by the mythological compositions of Greco-Roman sculpture. Of less importance from an æsthetic point of view, but none the less interesting, are the bas-reliefs and paintings of Egypt, and the sculptures of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. It may be said that the region where religious images are found forms a belt on the surface of the globe which includes the Northern hemisphere from Japan to Mexico, while in the Southern hemisphere there are only some rudiments of art.

The desire to be permanently in touch with venerated objects led man to set up his own image in places where everything evoked the memory of his Divine patrons; hence the effigies of private persons which were so frequent in the sanctuaries of pagan antiquity. In the Oriental monarchies, the right to a place in the sanctuary was almost entirely confined to the images of the Pharaohs, the Patesi, and the Great kings; even the most favoured citizens never aspired beyond having their features reproduced on a stele or in a statue placed near their tomb. In Greece, the privilege of figuring in the temples was accorded to the images of the most illustrious citizens or of private individuals who were rich enough to present a generous donation along with their effigy. The sanctuary chosen for this purpose was generally the one belonging to the god who had watched over the professional occupation of the donor, or to the god whom he specially worshipped.[3] The two aims of having the gods near oneself and being near them were frequently combined by placing religious images on objects of everyday use—jewels, pendants, whorls, clothing, weapons and tools, vases, lamps, seals, and coins, the discovery and interpretation of which have contributed so much to our knowledge of the principal ancient religions. For a still closer combination the faithful engraved the portrait or the symbol of the god on their very bodies. Tatuing has enabled man to assume this Divine uniform, and examples are found all over the world, from the Australian savage who paints on his breast the image of his totem to the Breton or Italian sailor who has the image of the Madonna or of the Sacred Heart figured on his arm. It is now admitted that everywhere the tatuing of the uncivilized has a religious or magical significance.

[1] John of Damascus, *adv. Constantinum Cabalinum Orat.* 7 (*PG* xcv. 324).
[2] Didron, *Histoire de Dieu*, Paris, 1843, Introd. p. 1.
[3] E. Courbaud, in Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Image.'

2. **Magical images, *i.e.* images having magical properties.**—Recent ethnology has thrown light on the close connexion which primitive intelligences establish between a being or object and its figured reproductions. This is an application of the laws of similarity and contiguity, in which J. G. Frazer has found two of the chief sources of magic belief. Primitive man believed that, by tracing an image, he was producing the reality, and that, when he acted on the image, he was also acting on the thing itself. From the quaternary age onwards we find, on fragments of stone and bone, and also on the walls of caves, sculptured, carved, or painted images, representing animals of the period. Salomon Reinach[1] reproduces more than 1200 of these figures, and points out that they nearly all represent species of animals which formed the food of the people of the time, and therefore the people would naturally desire to favour their multiplication—mammoths, reindeer, horses, goats, etc.

As a result of observations made in our own day among the savages of Australia, it has been proved that among the magical proceedings for promoting the development of species which provide clans with their totem and their food there is a certain worship of the *churingas*, *i.e.* blocks of stone or pieces of wood on which there has previously been traced the schematic image of the totem and which are placed underground in sacred places. In other places, these same figures are painted on rocks, and become the centre of ceremonies for furthering the multiplication of the totem.[2] Another hunting people, the Bushmen of S. Africa, painted on the walls of their caves very good likenesses of the animals that they hunted or carried off from their neighbours, the Kafirs.[3] Finally, similar paintings have been observed on the rocks of California and North Africa.[4]

Even among the figured representations of prehistoric times, however, we find some images of harmful and undesirable animals; but these exceptions may also have a magical import. Thus the negro of West Africa cuts out figurines representing crocodiles, tigers, or serpents. Attempts have been made to explain these images by totemism, but it is simpler to account for them thus: the negro thinks that, possessing the copy, he will be able to compel the original to go away or even destroy it altogether.

The Kaitish of Australia believe that the rainbow prevents the rain from falling or makes it stop prematurely. They therefore draw a rainbow on a shield, which they hide far from the encampment, thinking that they will prevent the phenomenon by making its image invisible.[5] The natives of Malaysia use as preservatives bamboo stalks carved with representations of the scorpions and centipedes which infest the country; but they set the remedy and the scourge side by side by also carving on the bamboo the image of the pheasant which devours this vermin. Among the Burmese, the natives of the Shan States use the capsule of a plant called *martinga* as a snake-charm because it roughly resembles the head of a venomous snake with its two fangs.[6] All these are applications of the principle that like acts on like, evokes it, or produces it. Emile

[1] *Répertoire de l'art quaternaire*, Paris, 1913, and 'L'Art et la magie' in *L'Anthropologie*, 1903, p. 257.
[2] For the various applications of the process in Australia and among other savages, see *ERE* i. 821–823, 'Note on the use of Painting in Primitive Religions.'
[3] E. Cartailhac and H. Breuil, *La Caverne d'Altamira*, Berlin, 1906; cf. C. H. Tongue, *Bushman Paintings*, Oxford, 1909; A. Schweiger, 'Neuentdeckte Buschmannmalereien in der Cape-Provinz' in *Anthropos*, viii. (1913) 652–669, 1010–1025.
[4] J. Déchelette, *Manuel d'archéologie préhistorique*, i. (Paris, 1908).
[5] Spencer-Gillen[1], p. 294 f.
[6] H. Balfour, *Evolution of Decorative Art*, London, 1893, p. 83.

Durkheim has even extended this formula thus: 'Anything that affects an object affects also whatever has any relation of proximity or solidarity to that object.'[1]

As a general rule, the portrait of an object is supposed to give its possessor control over the original. This is the belief of savages, who usually refuse to be photographed or sketched, and who in nearly all countries make use of this kind of spell to work evil on their enemies. The oldest cases of such sorcery which have come down to us are perhaps the figured representations discovered on the walls of the grotto of Niaux (Ariège), where we find bisons riddled with barbed arrows. We have here, combined with the solidarity of the image, the idea that the realization of an event may be brought about by simply sketching it. According to the practice of the Middle Ages, when one wanted to wound, paralyze, or kill an enemy, it was sufficient to make a figurine more or less like him, have it blessed by a priest on some pretext or other, and then prick it with a needle in the heart or wherever it was desired to harm the original. Similar spells were in use among the Chaldæans, Egyptians, Hindus, Greeks, and Romans. They are also found among most uncivilized peoples who employ the arts of black magic.

The same idea of artificial solidarity is found in *ex-votos*, where imitations of legs, arms, other organs, and even of whole bodies are placed near sacred images by believers who have been granted, or are praying for, the cure of certain ills: in the one case the donor hopes that, on account of this proximity, the gods will act on the injured member through the medium of its image; in the other, the desired effect having been obtained, he expresses his thanks to the deity by offering up the organ, of which the deity has already in a sense taken possession by expelling the malady. These same images, which abounded in the temples of Æsculapius and other gods of healing,[2] are found on the continent of Europe, without any modification of material or form, even in the smallest chapels of Roman Catholic rural districts. Often the possession of the image is sufficient to ward off illness and all kinds of calamities. Each image has its special charm: some guard against fever, others against plague, others against lightning, the perils of the sea, the enemy's shot, and so on; there are even some which show where lost objects may be found, as, *e.g.*, certain of the Congo fetishes. Some have still wider scope, as talismans for appeasing fate and mastering destiny.

Central Africa is the promised land of fetishism (*q.v.*); yet the negro, according to a statement made by Albert Réville, which seems to be well founded,[3] distinguishes clearly between fetishes, which he believes to be inhabited by a spirit, and amulets, which he wears about his person, but does not worship, even when they reproduce the form of a living being. Schoolcraft also speaks of domestic idols in human or animal form found in the huts of the American Indians, but they were more of the nature of talismans, for they were not worshipped in any way.[4] We may place in the same category the *zemis* of the Antilles, *i.e.* figurines made of wood, stone, or bone, representing fish, turtles, lizards, serpents, and even men.[5] These were so numerous at the time of the discovery of the Antilles that the Benedictine monks who came in the train of Columbus boasted of having destroyed single-handed more than 170,000 of them at Hayti. To the same class perhaps belonged the *teraphim* of Laban, which Rachel concealed in the camel's furniture (Gn $31^{19\text{-}34}$); and the statuettes which abound in ancient tombs from Ægean times to the end of paganism.

Large statues are as highly prized by communities for their magical services as small ones are by individuals and families. The desire to possess them frequently gave rise to armed contests, which took place as often between the cities of antiquity as between the towns of the Middle Ages; the desire was not so much to have the monopoly of paying homage to the divinity or the saint as to gain possession of a talisman of repute. This is proved by the bad usage which the images sometimes received, either to punish the original for having refused a demand, or to compel him to fulfil it. It is not only in the Congo that nails are hammered into the sacred image to command its attention.

In a church in Louvain there was until quite recently an old statue of Christ, the red velvet robe of which used to bristle with pins. Now worshippers stick their pins into two cushions placed at the feet of the image, over which is the inscription in French and in Flemish: 'Please do not stick pins into the robe.' This practice, however, may be explained in another way; it may be a case of getting rid of an illness by nailing it into the image, or sometimes of passing it on by hanging on the image linen which has been in contact with the injured member. Frazer, following Mannhardt, gives sufficient evidence in his *Golden Bough* of cases of folk-lore, where agricultural populations, having manufactured an image or a mannikin representing the spirit of the last harvest and sometimes the spirit of death, destroy, burn, or drown it, after having loaded it with the sins or calamities which they desire to get rid of periodically.

Just as the copy procures the services of the original, it may replace it on every occasion; the offering of the image instead of the reality thus becomes both an attenuation and an extension of sacrifice. Thus the Chinese offer to the divinity clothes, houses, furniture, sumptuous repasts, and even considerable sums, without growing any poorer, for these offerings are simply paper images. The Egyptians painted on the walls of the tombs offerings intended to maintain indefinitely the posthumous existence of the deceased, or depicted experiences that they would like him to be able to continue or repeat; they even added figurines representing his wife, slaves, and workmen, so that in the life beyond the grave he might have all the co-operation that he enjoyed on earth. It seems now to be admitted that this was also in many cases the aim of the bas-reliefs and paintings decorating the tombs of Etruria and ancient Greece.

3. Idols, *i.e.* conscious and animated images.—The talisman, the fetish, and the idol form an ascending scale. The talisman is a material object endowed with marvellous properties, either because of its nature or of some magical operation it has gone through, or because it is invested with supernatural properties by some external Power. The fetish is a talisman in which resides the spirit that gives it its power. The idol is a fetish representing the supposed form of the spirit dwelling inside it.

Idols are formed in various ways. (1) *By the natural association of natural objects with the human features which they resemble, e.g.* the rocks resembling human beings worshipped by Negroes, Fijians, Chippewas, Lapps, and, indeed, by all peoples inhabiting hilly countries—not to speak of other similar *ludi naturæ*. (2) *By forgetfulness or ignorance of the significance originally attached to an image.* This, however, is an exceptional occurrence. In most cases, it is only a question of the transfer of an image from one cult to another. Sometimes an attempt is made to explain the image by creating personages and even inventing myths for the occasion. Clermont Ganneau has called this by the apt name of 'ocular or optic mythology,'[1]

[1] *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912, p. 508.
[2] Cf. the art. 'Donarium,' by Homolle, in Daremberg-Saglio.
[3] *Religions des peuples non-civilisés*, i. 97.
[4] H. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1851-57, v. 169.
[5] Cf. J. W. Fewkes, *25 RBEW* (1907), pp. 42, 53-59.

[1] *Mythologie iconographique*, Paris, 1878.

and he gives several examples of it: the child Horus, who becomes among the Greeks the god of silence, because he holds his finger to his lips; a Pharaoh sacrificing three barbarians, which forms the prototype of Cacus slaying the three-bodied Geryon, etc. Examples of legends which originated in misunderstood images are no less frequent in mediæval Christianity. It has often been asserted that the stories of cephalophorous saints (*i.e.* saints who are pictured with their heads in their hands) had their origin in the figured representation of their decapitation. The martyrs and saints recognized by naive and perhaps interested parties in the bas-reliefs of pagan sarcophagi are too numerous to be quoted.[1] (3) *By simply manufacturing an image representing a superhuman being.* The artist, choosing his subject either according to his own taste or in obedience to orders, may conform to tradition; but it is the popular voice alone that ratifies and sanctions his work. Sometimes the idol is an ancient fetish of wood or stone which has been carved so as to give it the appearance of a human being; at other times it is a statue whose reputation for supernatural power is due to the fetish enclosed in it, as, *e.g.*, the statue of the *Magna Mater Idæa* in Rome. (4) *By the supposed command of the divinity whom the image represents.* In the Antilles, the tree in which a spirit dwelt revealed to the sorcerer how to set about manufacturing a statue with its wood. In the public square of Corinth there were two statues of Dionysus which were held in great veneration; according to Pausanias (II. ii. 7), they were cut out of the wood of a tree which the Corinthians, in compliance with the command of an oracle, had worshipped under the name of Dionysus. In France, Italy, Spain, and the East there are frequent examples of images of the Virgin which are said not to have been made by the hand of man. We might mention in passing the Buddhist legend that the portrait of Maitreya, the future Buddha, was drawn by an artist temporarily transported into the special division of Paradise where Maitreya was awaiting the moment to descend on earth.[2] Among the Greeks the same reputation was enjoyed by many of the most venerated statues, including the palladium in the Acropolis at Athens, representing the protective goddess of the city. (5) *By means of some magical operation.* Among the Negroes of the West Coast there are regular shops for fetishes and idols, kept by sorcerers. The purchaser makes his choice, and it is only then that the sorcerer causes the spirit to descend into the idol. Among the New Zealanders, the priest makes the souls of the dead pass into statues which he shakes up and down as if he were rousing a sleeping man; if the operation is unsuccessful, the soul may pass into the body of the officiating priest, who then falls into convulsions. In Finland a kind of doll, or *para*, made out of a stick and some rags, is carried nine times round a church to the words, 'Live, Para'; the *para* then begins to live, or, rather, a spirit comes and dwells in it.[3] Towards the end of classic paganism, the operation was more complex, but its nature remained the same. According to Augustine (*de Civ. Dei*, viii. 23), Hermes Trismegistus speaks of it in the following terms:

'To unite, therefore, by a certain art those invisible spirits to visible and material things, so as to make, as it were, animated bodies, dedicated and given up to those spirits who inhabit them—this, he says, is to make gods, adding that men have received this great and wonderful power.'

The last upholders of paganism met the taunts of the Christians with the reply that they did not worship the bronze, gold, or silver of the statues, but the divinities that had passed into them on consecration (Arnobius, *adv. Gent.* v. 17, 19).

Nevertheless, an explanation is needed as to how this unlimited multiplication of the person of the divinity, and the belief in his actual presence in each of these images, could be reconciled with the unity of his personality. Here, we must remember, we are in the domain of things sacred, where a lack of logic is overlooked, or, rather, a particular logic is admitted which applies the principle of contradiction in a different way from that of ordinary logic. According to a rudimentary idea, a superhuman individuality may be doubled or multiplied *ad infinitum*, and yet remain an unbroken whole in its original type and in each of its manifestations.

II. *HISTORY.*—A favourite theory among 18th century theologians and philosophers was that idolatry was a degeneration. Man was supposed to have begun with a very high and pure idea of the divinity. Then, desiring to have a material picture of his deity, he represented him by the noblest and most elevated thing that he knew—his own image. Gradually he came to regard these symbolical images as real portraits, and ended by treating them as divine individualities. As early as the time of the author of Wisdom (14[18-20]) it was held that idols were originally the images of deceased ancestors; and Herbert Spencer has revived this idea.[1] It is not difficult to show, however, that history, pre-historic archæology, and ethnology are agreed in giving an entirely different explanation of the origin and evolution of idolatry. Undoubtedly there may be found in more than one religion periods of decadence in which idols, which had been more or less outgrown, re-appear in the worship. Thus, Buddhism, which had shaken the very foundations of idolatry, judging from the quasi-philosophical doctrine of its founder, re-installed the ancient idols of Hinduism and even of Tantrism, merely surrounding them with a new mythology created specially for them. But these are cases of infiltration or retrogression, not of logical and spontaneous development.

Strictly speaking, idolatry is neither a general nor a primitive fact. It was entirely unknown in India in Vedic times. We have to come far down in the history of China and Japan to find any traces of its development. It was not practised by the nomadic tribes of the Semites. Among the Jews it appeared only in exceptional cases (*e.g.*, the Golden Calf and the Brazen Serpent). Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 21) and Tacitus (*Germ.* ix.–x.) assert that there were neither temples nor images among the Teutons. In Rome, according to Varro (Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, iv. 31) the Romans lived 170 years without representing their gods by images. Even among the Greeks we find scarcely any traces of idolatry in the time of the Pelasgi. The question is whether this absence of idols is due to the fact that these peoples had too spiritualized a conception of their gods to give them material forms. It will be sufficient answer to note that idolatry is equally unknown to most of the peoples who are to-day still on the lowest rungs of the social ladder—Bushmen, Hottentots, Fuegians, Eskimos, Akkas, etc., who are at the first stages of intellectual and religious development. This seems to have been the mental condition of the future civilized races at the period of which we have just spoken.[2] Even

[1] P. Saintyves (pseudonym for E. Nourry), *Les Saints, successeurs des dieux*, Paris, 1907.

[2] A. Foucher, *Iconographie bouddhique*, Paris, 1899, p. 118.

[3] M. A. Castren, *Finnische Mythologie*, St. Petersburg, 1853, i. 106.

[1] *Sociology*, London, 1885, pt. vi. § 585.


[2] For the period of cults without images see (*a*) among the Greeks, Farnell, *CGS*, 1896-1909, *Index*, *s.v.* 'Aniconic worship'; (*b*) among the Romans, W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, pp. 146, 264; G. Wissowa, *Rel. und Kultus der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912, pp. 32, 56; (*c*) among the Hindus, H. Barth, *The Religions of India*, London, 1882, pp. 61, 128, 259; (*d*) among the Semites, W. Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], London, 1894, p. 207 ff.; (*e*) among

among the nations where idolatry has been pushed to the furthest extreme, *e.g.* the Egyptians, Chaldæans, Greeks, and Hindus, it came into being only with their progress in the arts of civilization. In the case of the aborigines of the New World, while idolatry flourished in the civilized States of Mexico, Peru, and Central America, it was encountered but rarely among the savages of the two American continents. Lafitau recognized this fact as early as the 17th cent.: 'We may say in general that the majority of savage peoples have no idols.'[1] In Japan, idolatry was equally unknown before the spread of Buddhism. Even to-day, 'broadly speaking, Shinto has no idols.' With a few exceptions, 'the pictures of the gods sold at Shinto shrines in the present day are owing to Chinese or Buddhist influence.' But, as the same author shows, this is simply due to the arrest of development which made itself felt, more than a thousand years ago, in the ritual as well as in the theology of the old national religion of Japan.

'This absence of idols from Shinto is not owing, as in Judaism and Islam, to a reaction against the evils caused by the use of anthropomorphic pictures and images, but to the low artistic development of the Japanese nation before the awakening impulse was received from China. It indicated weakness rather than strength.'[2]

We may conclude, then, that idolatry is but a step in religious evolution, and that it even represents a comparative advance. From the time of its first appearance onwards, man appeals to art—however rudimentary the attempt may be—to aid him in giving material shape to his religious ideal. Several authors maintain, with every appearance of reason, that the plastic arts originated in the service of religious or magical ideas (see ART, vol. i. pp. 817–827). The oldest images that have been discovered are the sculptures and paintings mentioned above, which go back to the reindeer period, in the second half of the quaternary age. For a long time before that, man had probably imitated the attitudes and movements of the animals he wished to capture or cause to multiply. Then it suddenly dawned upon him that approximate images of them existed in certain fragments of stone, bone, or wood, or in some seed or shell. In his magical operations he may already have used objects which to his infantile imagination seemed like living beings, and for this purpose he naturally employed the natural or chance products most favourable to his illusion. He would then try to increase the resemblance by clumsily touching up the object. Examples of this have been found in the primitive sculpture of various entirely different peoples. The next step would be to carve, or directly manufacture with the help of suitable materials, the image which he wished to possess and utilize. The fig. represents an object, now in the Oxford Museum, which was used as a charm by seal-hunters in the Queen Charlotte Islands. It is simply a pebble roughly resembling a seal, but sufficiently like it for the natives to have tried to increase the resemblance by scratching in the eye, mouth, and nostrils.[3]

It was probably a similar idea that inspired the first figured representations of the superhuman personalities whom man desired to have within reach so as to make them more accessible to his evocations and sorceries as well as to his prayers and homage. Whatever opinion one may have of the origins of religion, it must be admitted that at a certain period man began to experience the need for representing in concrete and personal form the mysterious forces which he conceived of as being, on the one hand, embodied in certain natural or artificial objects, and, on the other, situated at the very source of the phenomena of nature. The first images which seem to have been the object of real worship occur long after the quaternary age. These are the rudely sculptured female figures in the caves of Marne, in France, found side by side with the representation of an axe, just as in the pre-Mycenæan pictures discovered in Crete.[4] As a matter of fact, statues of women have been found belonging to the reindeer age, with the abdomen, breast, and hips exaggerated out of all proportion; but these very probably represent pregnant women—a magical means of ensuring the increase of a tribe. At any rate, it is certain that man began at a given moment to make his fetishes in the form of the spirit which he believed to dwell inside each one.



Seal-hunters' charm.

Examples of the transition from fetish to idol may be found among the most widely differing peoples. The first step seems to have been the worship of upright stakes or more or less conical stones, found among the aborigines of India, the tribes of the Upper Nile, the Ostiaks of Siberia, and some small tribes of Oceania and North and South America—not to speak of the ancient populations of Western Europe. Elsewhere the natives set themselves to manufacture a kind of doll. The idols of some of the Siberian tribes consist of skins stuffed with grass. The Crees of the United States worship bundles of sticks topped with a head made of rags. The Brazilian sorcerers make idols out of calabashes which they set on a stick and bore with a hole to represent the mouth. In the Society Islands, fragments of columns dressed in native costume are worshipped. In the Fiji Islands, the natives decorate conical stones with a girdle and assign a sex to them. In the Deccan, the head at the top of the cippus is represented by a round mark painted red. Among the Indians of Virginia, a head was carved at the top of the stave, as is seen in a curious illustration in Lafitau's work. The head once formed, the rest must have followed rapidly. Arms and legs still joined to the body were sketched, and then finally these were separated off to give them the necessary appearance of life and action.

These facts are nearly all given in Lord Avebury's *The Origin of Civilization*, so it is not a little surprising to find, even in the seventh and last edition (London, 1912, p. 284), the following assertion:

'Fetichism is an attack on Deity, Idolatry is an act of submission to Him, rude, no doubt, yet humble. Hence Fetichism and Idolatry are not only different, but opposite; so that the one cannot be directly developed out of the other.'

As a matter of fact, fetishism is a direct antecedent of idolatry, and is everywhere co-existent with it. The fetish and the idol are both conceived of as the body of a spirit; they are used for the same purposes and employed under the same conditions, except that idolatry lays more stress on the anthropomorphic, or rather zoomorphic, conception of the divinity, and so lends itself to a more accentuated development of the cult. There exist, on the one hand, domestic idols, and, on the other, tribal or village fetishes. There are even fetishes that fill a still higher rôle, *e.g.* the black stone of Pessinus, which represents the Mother of the Gods in the Palatine temple. No occurrence is found of an intermediary state between fetishism and idolatry; on the contrary, the history of art makes it clear that idolatry is the direct and immediate outcome of fetishism. Nowhere is this continuity more evident than in Greece, from the thirty stones of Pharæ, which in

[1] *Mœurs des sauvages américains*, Paris, 1723, i. 161.

[2] W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, pp. 71–73; see also M. Revon, *Le Shintoïsme*, Paris, 1905, p. 227.

[3] Given in H. Balfour's *Evolution of Decorative Art*, fig. 31.

[4] Déchelette, *Archéologie préhistorique*, i. 585 ff.

the Chinese, A. Réville, *La Religion chinoise*, Paris, 1889, p. 133; (*f*) among the Japanese, W. G. Aston, *Shinto, the Way of the Gods*, London, 1905, p. 71 ff.

the time of Pausanias (VII. xxii. 3) were regarded as the most ancient images of gods, down to the masterpieces of Phidias and Praxiteles.[1]

Among the first idols, representations of animals or monsters predominate, as is still the case with the uncivilized peoples of to-day. All that can be maintained with certainty is that the tendency to invest supernatural beings with human shape increases with the growing conception of their personality as a type of ennobled manhood. At the same time the animals which originally represented these beings did not entirely disappear from iconography; they became the companions or slaves of the divinities whom they used to embody, as, *e.g.*, the owl of Athene, the eagle of Zeus, the hind of Artemis, the dolphin of Poseidon, and the dove of Aphrodite. In other cases, the bestial or repugnant forms have been left to evil spirits, the enemies of gods and men; examples of this are too numerous to be mentioned here. A third combination has perhaps helped to give rise to composite figures, sometimes with a human head on an animal's body, sometimes with an animal's head on a human body. The Egyptian pantheon is formed almost entirely of these curious figures, and they are found in nearly all ancient and modern forms of polytheism. Peoples such as the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Chinese, who had left barbarism far behind, undoubtedly believed in the actual existence of such monsters. Their written traditions testify to this belief, and traces of it are found even among French authors of the Middle Ages.

We must remember, however, that, when the sculptor in ancient times represented Janus as a god with three faces, to mark his faculty for seeing the present, the past, and the future all at one time, he was probably as fully conscious of making a pure allegory as the sculptor who in Christian times symbolized the Trinity by a three-headed being. It is questionable whether the Greeks, or before them the Phœnicians, when reproducing the image of a spirit with two pairs of wings, the one raised and the other lowered, really aimed at representing perpetual movement and not at simply reproducing superhuman beings who for the Assyrians had an actual existence. Again, it is a moot point whether, when the Buddhists assigned to their future Buddha, Avalokiteśvara (*q.v.*), an infinite number of arms, it was really, as they say, so that he might the better save all his creatures, or whether it is not rather an express imitation of the numerous pairs of arms attributed to the Hindu Śiva.

We must, however, take into consideration another factor, viz. the possibility of the fusion of two types. There is a law in symbolism which holds good for all kinds of images. When two signs or two plastic types in any given neighbourhood express the same or similar beliefs, they are inclined to amalgamate, if not to unite, and form an intermediary type. An attempt has been made by the present writer[2] to show how symbolic images differing as much as the wheel, the winged globe, the rose or the lotus, the conical stone, the *crux ansata*, or 'key of life,' the cuneiform star, the sacred plant, and even the human outline, have changed their forms and passed into each other, making composite types, in the different features of which the various originals may be recognized. These phenomena of plastic hybridization are rarer in the case of the representation of living creatures, but even here some examples are found. Bancroft, referring to the totems in use among the Indians of North-West America, says:

'When the descendant of the "hawk" carries off a wife from the "salmon" tribe, a totem representing a fish with a hawk's head for a time keeps alive the occurrence, and finally becomes the deity.'[1]

This emblem is just as odd as the hawk-man who represented Horus among the Egyptians.

We have also to reckon with religious types which continue to exist after the disappearance of the worship to which they originally belonged. In present-day iconography, we may still find representations of subjects which originated among the sculptures of ancient Chaldæa, five or six thousand years ago, and which have come down to us through two or three intermediary religions and still retain at least a symbolic value. Such, *e.g.*, is the sacred tree between two monsters facing each other, which has passed, on the one hand, to India, Persia, China, and Japan, and, on the other, to Greece, Rome, and the Christian countries of the West, where sculptors used it in cathedrals to represent the tree of the Garden of Eden. The transmission of images does not necessarily imply the transmission of the beliefs to which they were originally attached. When in a new religion it is desired to represent personages or traditions which have not yet been expressed in plastic art, the artists naturally treat the subject on the principles of the only art within their reach. In the catacombs, Christians did not scruple to use the image of Orpheus taming the wild animals with his lyre, to symbolize Christ teaching men. Psyche being teased by Cupid came to represent the soul guarded by an angel. The ram-bearing Hermes, who originally figured in the sculptures of Asia Minor as a priest bearing the sacrificial lamb, furnished the essentially Christian type of the Good Shepherd, and we know from the sculptures of Gandhāra that this subject passed into Buddhist India about the same time.[3] The first representations of the Heavenly Father as an old man seated in a *cathedra* were inspired by certain statues of Juppiter; it is even possible that their prototype may be found among the Assyrian images of seated divinities which occur among the rock sculptures of Malthai.

Again, we have to reckon with the deformations which in the long run always appear in the reproduction of images. It is somewhat difficult to recognize in the classic type of the thunderbolt two tridents soldered together at the base. Joachim Menant[2] has shown that the Greek Sagittarius has its prototype in the winged bull of Assyrian palaces, which became among the Persians the image of the mythical bull Gayomart, half transformed into an archer; and, by a series of easily discernible modifications, the bust of Apollo has become the simple *epsilon* found on coins. Among the paddle carvings exhibited in 1872 at the British Association for the Advancement of Science, there was a crouching human figure and next to it a crescent placed on the point of an arrow. No one who did not possess the whole series of intermediary figures could possibly have imagined that the latter was the outcome of the former.[4] Inversely, there are examples of the transformation of a linear image into a human figure. The sacred *baetyl* which figures on the coins of Byblos reappears, modified in form through contact with the Egyptian *crux ansata*, in certain representations of Astarte and Tanit which depict these goddesses in a conical form with their elbows close to their sides and their forearms outstretched.[5]

It must be borne in mind that a religion, more

[1] Cf. M. Collignon, *Mythologie figurée de la Grèce antique*, Paris, n.d., pp. 11–17.

[2] In *The Migration of Symbols*, London, 1894, chs. v. and vi.

[1] *NR* iii. 37.

[2] A. Grunwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, Eng. tr., London, 1901, fig. 44.

[3] *Pierres gravées de la Haute Asie*, Paris, 1883, p. 191.

[4] For other examples of the same kind see H. Balfour, *Evolution of Decorative Art*, p. 33 ff.

[5] Cf. *RHR* xx. (1889) 142.

especially when it has just superseded another, has often to tolerate the worship of images and even of sanctuaries belonging to former cults. When it is unable to destroy them, it finds that it is more advantageous to appropriate them. By adopting the *labarum*, Constantine wittingly chose an emblem which could be accepted both by the worshippers of Christ and by the worshippers of the Sun. Even to-day, Leroy-Beaulieu[1] speaks of an old Buriat idol, preserved in the Monastery of Posolsk on Lake Baikal, which has been transformed by the monks into a statue of Saint Nicholas, and is worshipped by pagans and Christians alike. The Buddhists are still less scrupulous about appropriating the images of the religions which they have succeeded in suppressing by their propaganda: the solar wheel becomes the wheel of the Law; the feet of Visnu are transformed into the feet of Buddha. When the Buddhists gained possession of the sanctuary erected at Bharhut by tree- and serpent-worshippers, they simply appropriated the bas-reliefs for their own religion by attaching to each scene an inscription giving it a Buddhist interpretation.[2] The followers of Hinduism acted in the same way when they had succeeded in expelling Buddhism from India.

It is sometimes rather difficult to judge whether the image of a superhuman being should be classed as an idol or as a magical or purely commemorative representation. Even the people who use them are not always clear on this point. When the priests of Hierapolis explained to Lucian (*de Dea Syria*, 34) that they had not placed the Sun and the Moon among the images of the gods in their temple, because men could see and worship them directly, it is possible that, at least to the priests, divine images were merely representational signs. But, when the Tyrians, besieged by Alexander, chained up the statue of Baal Melkart to keep the god from escaping to the enemy's side (Curtius, IV. iii. 21 f.), it is evident that they considered and treated it as an idol. The same idea recurs in Sparta, where, according to Pausanias (III. xv. 5), the statue of Ares was chained up to prevent its escaping.[3]

Speaking generally, we may include in the category of idols all images that open or close their eyes, gesticulate, utter oracles, move of their own free will, or converse with their worshippers. On the other hand, it would be an exaggeration to maintain that every image worshipped or even venerated is necessarily an idol. Nothing is more natural than to set up in a conspicuous place the images of the beings loved or esteemed, and to take as a personal insult outrages perpetrated on them. Later, the image is regarded as an intermediary in all dealings with its original, and it is invested with the supernatural faculties attributed to the original. This tendency is co-existent with the mental state, mentioned above, which confuses the copy with the original and leads to investing the images with a personality of their own. In the time of Pericles, Stilpo was banished from Athens for having maintained that Phidias's statue of Pallas Athene was not the goddess herself (Diog. Laert. II. xii. 5). In Buddhist iconography, Gautama's entry into Nirvāna was represented at first only by an empty throne or by footprints. Gradually his image was introduced, and it finally ended by working innumerable miracles and becoming a regular object of worship. In order to escape from these superstitions certain monotheistic religions, such as Judaism and Islām, have entirely forbidden representations of the human figure or even of any animate being.

[1] *La Religion dans l'empire des Tsars*, Paris, 1889, p. 113.
[2] A. Cunningham, *The Stûpa of Bharhut*, London, 1879.
[3] For other instances see J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, iii. 336 f.

LITERATURE.—E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[4], London, 1903; J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*[3], do. 1911 ff.; A. Réville, *Religions des peuples non-civilisés*, Paris, 1883; A. C. Haddon, *Evolution in Art*, London, 1895; A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, do. 1887; Yrjö Hirn, *The Origins of Art*, do. 1900; M. Hoernes, *Urgesch. der bild. Kunst in Europa*, Vienna, 1898; Goblet d'Alviella, *The Migration of Symbols*, London, 1894; G. Ferrero, *Les Lois psychologiques du symbolisme*, Paris, 1895; G. Perrot and C. Chipiez, *Histoire de l'art dans l'antiquité*, do. 1881–1911; H. Leclercq, *Manuel d'archéologie chrétienne*, do. 1907.

GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Ægean).—It was thought a few years ago that Ægean religion was aniconic, that the Mycenæans envisaged their deities in no form, human or other, and that with a sublime simplicity they confined their worship to trees or stone monoliths in which the divine spirit was supposed to take its residence, or placed in sacred spots a single stone seat, an empty throne, for the god to sit on, unseen by his worshippers. This view, however, always seemed rather improbable to some observers, who were convinced that, the phenomena of religion being pretty much the same in every country and all over the world, the Ægeans would eventually be proved to have been by no means so lofty in their ideas as the 'aniconic' view would imply. This has come to pass, and we now know that the Ægeans made idols and venerated them as did every other people of their time. Whether D. G. Hogarth is right or not in claiming (*ERE* i. 143[a], 147[a], *EB*[11] i. 247[a]) that the Ægeans worshipped only two deities, the Mother Rhea and the son Zeus, or whether we should rather say that these were the two primary objects of worship, it is at least probable that the 'Dual Monotheism' which he postulates was accompanied by the veneration of spirits of wood and water, sky, sea, and land, as in every other country of the world. In later Greek religion there is many a trace of these pre-Hellenic worships; and, though we may say that Artemis, Diktynna, or Britomartis of Crete is but another form of Rhea, yet we may doubt whether the worshippers themselves thought so. They surely would have considered that they were venerating different goddesses. And in the representations of deities which we have on seal-rings, etc., we no doubt see different forms of the goddess. We have representations, too, of demons, like the Thueris-headed water-carriers, no doubt deities of streams, who must be regarded as, if not gods, at any rate supernatural beings worthy of worship and distinct from the two primary deities.[1]

We have not, however, many representations of other gods than Rhea and Zeus, although we may yet find them. The few images of the gods that have been found in the Cretan and other excavations are almost exclusively female, and represent different forms of the great goddess, who is usually associated with the snake, no doubt to mark her chthonic character. The faience images of her, or of various different forms of her (or of different but closely-related goddesses), found at Knossos (*ERE* i. 143[a]) are well known. One figure has on its head a spotted cat curled up. This is a curious attribute of the goddess, and may perhaps connect with Egypt (are we to see by connexion also the panther of later Greek iconography?).

The ruder figures of the goddess found at Knossos and Gournia, with their accompaniment of votive clay trumpets, are well known. They are contemporary with the equally rude 'owl-headed' figures from Mycenæ, also representing a goddess.

[1] Primary Rhea and Zeus certainly were; one only doubts if they were the sole objects of worship. Such monotheism is, after all, an artificial development of human religion: the natural man is polytheistic and idol-making. Monotheism is a product of high spirituality. We have no proof that the Ægeans were at all a spiritual people: it is highly probable that they were nothing of the sort; and, if Egyptians and Hittites worshipped gods, it is probable that Ægeans did so too.

The young god, Zeus-Velchanos, has not yet been found represented in the round, but we have hints of his appearance. On a fresco at Tiryns he stands, a warrior, upright, holding spear in hand, and guarded by a great 8-shaped shield. On a ring from Mycenæ and on a sarcophagus from Palaikastro he descends to earth with long hair flying behind him in the wind. He is a true Minoan in appearance.

Some of the demons look like strange dog-headed insects, perhaps locusts. Certainly they are modelled after the Egyptian hippopotamus-goddess Thueris.

One cannot say more as yet of Minoan iconography; but more light will doubtless reach us with the further progress of study, and we may be able to distinguish between different forms of different deities. For, though one may consider that Hogarth's fundamental characterization of Ægean religion, its special worship of Rhea and Zeus, is no doubt correct, yet one may doubt whether their 'Dual Monotheism' excluded all other worship. It certainly did not exclude the veneration, if not worship, of the genii already mentioned, who resemble sometimes Egyptian deities, sometimes certain queer Anatolian demons whom we see on the rocks of Yasili Kayā.

An odd feature was the veneration as idols of natural concretions of stone, which bore some fortuitous resemblance to the human figure: such crude objects of adoration have been found in the Western Palace at Knossos.

It is perhaps strange that the Minoans, with their love of art, should not have cared to represent their deities more often and more grandiosely than they did. But neither did they represent mankind in the grandiose style of Egypt, and we do not yet know how many of the representations of the human form which we have in fresco and other materials are really meant to portray men, and how many are intended to shadow forth the godhead. One would expect, as one obtains in the case of Rhea and Zeus, complete anthropomorphism.

The theriomorphic demons look exotic. The likeness to Thueris may have some special reason of which we are ignorant. Can it be referred to the most ancient days, when the Ægeans first came from the Nile-delta (as they probably did) to Crete? They might have brought with them a memory of the great hippopotamus, a beast associated in their minds with water. This is but a suggestion. The cat on the head of the Knossian goddess points, as we have seen, to Egyptian influence. This may have acted occasionally, but we have no further trace of it. The goddess and her male companion have nothing Egyptian about them; and there is nothing Egyptian about the Thueris-headed demons but their heads. Thueris never carries water-pitchers in Egyptian iconography. We must regard this as a chance bit of foreign influence, like the cat, which is, by the way, treated in quite un-Egyptian fashion.

The demons themselves, however, cannot be exotic. They are emphatically racy of the soil of Greece, the land of naiads and hamadryads. The two great gods are, of course, closely related to the Anatolian Kybele and Atys, and this Anatolian relation of the Minoan religion is not contradicted by the Greek naiads and hamadryads, since we know from the treaty of Rameses II. with king Khattusil of Khatti (1279 B.C.) that the Hittites worshipped innumerable spirits and divinities of mountain, wood, and stream, as well as the great gods.

LITERATURE.—C. Tsountas and J. I. Manatt, *The Mycenæan Age*, London, 1897, ch. xiv.; A. J. Evans, *Mycenæan Tree and Pillar Cult*, do. 1901; D. G. Hogarth, 'Ægean Religion,' in *ERE* i. 141 ff., and 'Ægean Civilization,' in *EBr*[11] i. 245 ff.

H. R. HALL.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Babylonian).—Idolatry and image-worship form a very striking feature of the Babylonian religious system, and already meet us in an advanced stage of development in the earliest cultural period of which material remains have been preserved. In Babylonia we have no means of tracing the gradual evolution of image-worship out of the fetish and the stock-and-stone worship which necessarily preceded it. The earliest inhabitants of the country, of whose existence we have obtained evidence by excavation, were the Sumerians, and they were immigrants who brought with them an extraneous civilization from some mountainous region of Central Asia. Their gods were already anthropomorphic, and their cult-images undoubtedly combined the character of portrait with that of fetish. It is a remarkable fact that even the earliest representations of Sumerian deities that we possess are not of the Sumerian racial type: they exhibit characteristic features of the Semite, the other racial element in the country which gradually displaced the Sumerians after absorbing their culture. The most probable explanation that has been suggested is that the Sumerians found a Semitic population in possession of Babylonia, and that the representation of their own deities was subsequently influenced by the Semitic cult-images in the ancient centres of worship which they took over.[1] But the question is one of externals only, and, though of interest in another connexion, does not affect the essential character of the divine image itself. Fashioned in the god's human form, it was believed to enshrine his presence, and for the Babylonians of all periods it never lost this animistic character. It never became a mere portrait or memento of the deity, but was believed to have a life and spirit dwelling within it and acting through it.

Originally, no doubt, a Sumerian tribal or city-god was wholly identified with his cult-image. No more than one image of each deity was worshipped, and the idea of the god's existence apart from this visible form must have been of gradual growth. It is possible to conjecture circumstances which would tend to encourage speculation in that direction. The capture and deportation of a god, followed by the substitution of another figure in its place and the subsequent recovery of the original image, would have led to the incorporation of two figures within one shrine. A king's ambition to rebuild or beautify a temple might have been extended to the image itself, if the latter had suffered damage or decay. The misfortunes of the material image, especially if unaccompanied by national disaster, would in any case foster a belief in the god's existence apart from his visible body of wood or stone. And such a belief undoubtedly developed at a comparatively early period into the Babylonian conception of a heavenly division of the universe in which the great gods had their dwelling, making their presence manifest to men in the stars and planets which moved across the sky.

This was a great stage in advance of pure image-worship, and the development undoubtedly followed the growth of a pantheon out of a collection of separate and detached city-gods. The identification of the more powerful of these deities with the great forces of nature emphasized the distinction between the god and his image. The sun god could not be confined within his shrine, if he was seen to pass daily overhead from one gate of heaven to the other; and the moon-god's continual activity

[1] See Eduard Meyer, 'Sumerier und Semiten in Babylonien' (*Abh. der königl. preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1906, Phil.-histor. Classe, iii.), and L. W. King, *History of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, p. 47 ff.

and changing phases precluded the possibility of such a limitation in his case. The god of lightning must surely leave his temple, since he is seen riding upon the storm-cloud, while the true dwelling of the god of the abyss must obviously have been the abyss of waters below the earth until he was translated to the Southern heaven. We have no means of dating this association of some of the greater gods with natural forces. It is possible that the Sumerians had passed this stage of thought before their arrival in Babylonia, and also that they found some of the ancient religious centres of the country already associated with sun- and moon-cults and with other divisions of nature-worship. However that may be, it is quite certain that during all subsequent stages of Babylonian history the divine images never degenerated into mere symbols of divinity. They continued to enjoy a very real, though mystical, connexion with the gods they represented. Without consciously postulating a theory in explanation of his belief, the Babylonian never lost his faith in his god's actual presence within the image, and he found no difficulty in reconciling such a localization of the divine person with his presence at other cult-centres and with a separate life in the heavenly sphere. That this was actually the case will be at once evident if we refer to a few historical examples of image-worship taken from different periods.

Of the Sumerian epoch it is unnecessary to speak at any length, as Gudea's cylinder-inscriptions prove the sacrosanct character of a city-god's image even in the latter half of the period. The elaborate ritual and purification of both people and city, preceding the removal of Ningirsu's image from the old shrine at Lagash to the new,[1] are a sufficient indication that the god and his image were still identified. With the rise of Babylon we note the important part which the actual image of Marduk played in each king's coronation-ceremony and in the renewal of his oath at every subsequent Feast of the New Year; the hands of no other image than that in Esagila at Babylon would serve for the king to grasp. In the reign of Hammurabi, the real founder of Babylon's greatness, we see the Babylonian's conception of his visible gods reflected in his treatment of foreign images. It was not merely as booty, but in order to gain their favour, that Sin-idinnam and his army carried off to their own land the images of certain Elamite goddesses. And, when misfortunes followed, it was simply because these foreign goddesses resented their enforced banishment from their own country. On the careful restoration of the images to Elam, the goddesses themselves returned thither.[2] Later, in the 15th cent. B.C., we know that an image of the goddess Ishtar was carried with great pomp and ceremony from Mesopotamia to Egypt, and in one of the letters found at Tell el-Amarna the statue and the goddess herself are absolutely identified. The land of Mitanni and Egypt were on friendly terms at the time, and the city of Nineveh was under the former's control. So, when Amenophis III. requested Tushratta, king of Mitanni, to send Ishtar of Nineveh to Egypt, he consented, and with the image sent a letter which throws light on the relation which the goddess was believed to bear to her image.[3]

[1] Cf. E. de Sarzec, *Déc. en Chaldée*, Paris, 1884-1912, pl. 33-36; F. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sum. und akkad. Königsinschriften*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 88 ff.; L. W. King and H. R. Hall, *Egypt and Western Asia*, London, 1907, p. 195 ff.

[2] Cf. King, *Letters of Hammurabi*, London, 1898-1900, i. p. xxxvii ff.

[3] H. Winckler, *Die Thontafeln von Tell-el-Amarna* (Schrader's *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, v. [Berlin, 1890]) 48 f., no. 20; and J. A. Knudtzon, *Die El-Amarna Tafeln*, Leipzig, 1907, etc., p. 178 ff., no. 28.

In the letter the goddess Ishtar herself is made to declare her intention of going to Egypt: 'Thus saith Ishtar of Nineveh, the lady of all lands, "Unto Egypt, into the land which I love, will I go."' Tushratta exhorts Amenophis to pay her due honour and to send her back, saying: 'Verily now I have sent (her) and she is gone. Indeed, in the time of my father, the lady Ishtar went into that land; and, just as she dwelt (there) formerly and they honoured her, so now may my brother honour her ten times more than before. May my brother honour her, may he allow her to return with joy.' There is here no question of the image being a mere symbol of the goddess: the image is the goddess herself.

It is clear from Tushratta's letter that this was not the first occasion on which Ishtar had paid a friendly visit to Egypt. Indeed, we may infer that, at any rate at this period, the custom was not uncommon for the image of a deity—in other words, the deity himself—to be sent on a ceremonious visit to a foreign country, where, if properly treated, he would, no doubt, exert his influence in favour of the land in which he was staying. And this conclusion explains the great value that was always set on the capture of another race's gods. The captured images were not valued simply as symbols of victory; they constituted the conquered nation's chief weapon of offence. Not only were the conquered deprived henceforth of their god's assistance, but there was a very great probability that, if the captured image was pleased with its new surroundings and the deference paid to it, it would transfer its influence to the side of its new worshippers. This explains the care with which captured images were preserved both by the Babylonians and by their more civilized neighbours, and the joy which marked any subsequent recovery of them.

It is needless to cite instances: the most striking is Ashurbanipal's recovery of the goddess Nanâ's image from Susa in 650 B.C., which an Elamite king had carried off from Erech sixteen hundred and thirty-five years before.[1] During this long period the Elamites had doubtless carefully ministered to the image, for their civilization and their religious cults had much in common with those of Babylonia. It is probable that, even when a barbarous mountain tribe was conquered and its villages sacked, its divine images were never destroyed, but carried off and preserved in the same spirit. This close connexion between the god and his image endured into the Neo-Babylonian period, and Nabonidus's offence in the eyes of the priesthood, which rendered Cyrus's conquest of Babylonia so much more easy,[2] was simply the fact that he ignored this feeling. With his natural instincts blunted by archæological study, and probably in furtherance of some ill-advised idea of centralizing worship, the king collected all the old images throughout the country into his capital, little recking that he was tearing the gods themselves from their ancient habitations. The gods had long had their real abode in the heavens, but this had in no way weakened their mystical infusion of their images on earth.

Far less close was the connexion between a Babylonian deity and his sculptured symbol or emblem, by means of which his authority or presence could in certain circumstances be insured or indicated. The origin of such emblems was not astrological, nor is it to be sought in liver-augury: the emblems were not derived from fancied resemblances to animals or objects, presented either by constellations in heaven or by markings on the liver of a victim. They clearly arose in the first instance from the characters or attributes assumed by the gods in the mythology; their transference to constellations was a secondary process, and their detection in liver-markings resulted not in their own origin, but in that of the omen. The spear-head of Marduk is a fit emblem enough for the slayer of the demon of chaos; the stylus or wedge of Nabu suits the god of writing and architecture; the lightning-fork was the natural emblem of the weather-god, and the lunar and solar disks for the moon-god and the sun-god. Some divine emblems were purely animal, such as the dog of Gula, the walking bird of Bau, the scorpion of Ishkhara. In these cases there is nothing to indicate a totemistic origin, and the analogy of the goat-fish of Ea, the god of the Deep or the Abyss, suggests that they

[1] H. C. Rawlinson, *Cun. Inscr. West. Asia*, London, 1861-84, iii. [1870] pl. 38, no. 1.

[2] O. E. Hagen and F. Delitzsch, *Beitr. zur Assyr.*, Leipzig, 1890 ff., ii. [1894] 205 ff.

are not to be traced beyond the mythological stage. In the earliest period the emblem of the city-god was the same as that of his city, and might sometimes symbolize the city's power, as in that of Ningirsu of Lagash, represented by a lion-headed eagle grasping lions. Images of divine emblems, when sculptured upon a stone monument, ensured that the monument was under the protection of the deities to whom the sculptured emblems belonged. Legal documents concerning ownership of land were protected in this way from the Kassite period onwards,[1] and it was with a similar object that the later Assyrian kings carved at the head of their stelæ the emblems of the chief gods of their pantheon. Divine emblems, in addition to the figures of patron deities, were also engraved upon cylinder-seals,[2] and both were, no doubt, intended to ensure the owner's protection.

Another class of animal images entered very largely into the Babylonian religious scheme, and, though not the emblems of gods themselves nor the objects of direct worship, are entitled to be referred to in this connexion. The colossal lions and winged bulls which flanked the doorways of Assyrian palaces and were borrowed for the Persian palaces at Persepolis, the enamelled lions of Sargon's palace at Khorsabad and of the Sacred Way at Babylon, and the brick bulls and dragons of Ishtar's Gate were not purely decorative, but symbolized protective influences under animal forms. Texts of earlier periods also describe the lion, the bull, the raging hound, the serpent, the dragon, and other mythological monsters as characteristic of religious decoration. In two instances at least, the lions of the Gates of the Sun on whose backs their pivots rest, we may undoubtedly trace their origin to the noise of the creaking gate;[3] and it is probable that sound, rather than sight, was the more important factor in determining the outward form of many mythological creations, whose protective qualities were portrayed in images which were often strange and ferocious.[4] Other Babylonian images of repulsive form represented evil and not beneficent beings, and spells engraved upon them were intended to ensure the employment of their powers in the owner's favour or, in any case, not to his detriment.[5] Clay images of gods, along with those of doves, were also buried near the gateways of palaces and temples to ensure their protection; but these, again, were not objects of worship, but merely foundation-figures.[6] For the use of images by the Babylonians in sympathetic magic, see MAGIC (Babylonian).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references given in the footnotes, the general works dealing with Babylonian religion and cult may be consulted, such as M. Jastrow, *Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1902 ff., with *Bilderatlas* (1912); R. W. Rogers, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, New York, 1908; or L. W. King, *Babylonian Religion and Mythology*, London, 1899. For a convenient survey of the religious literature (which has a close bearing on the subject), see O. Weber, *Die Literatur der Babylonier und Assyrer*, Leipzig, 1907. LEONARD W. KING.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Buddhist).—It would naturally seem as though, of the great religions of the world, Buddhism were the least likely to have developed a system of idol-worship and veneration for images. The founder consistently deprecated the rendering of any special honour or reverence to himself, made no claim to divine prerogative or rights, and ignored, if he did not distinctly repudiate and deny, the presence and influence of the supernatural in human affairs. What he had done in the way of the attainment of perfect knowledge and of achieved deliverance or salvation, every man might do by the force of his own will and perseverance. The office of the Buddha was but to show the way. Each man must tread the road and win the goal for himself, none helping or hindering him in the supreme task. In a system of philosophy controlled by such principles there would appear to be no room for adoration or worship, and no authority to whom such worship might be addressed. Ultimately, however, and after no great interval of time, the tendency to create or conceive supernatural beings to whom homage might be rendered and from whom assistance might be hoped for re-asserted itself. Apparently the conception of the deification of the Buddha himself began to find a place in the thought of his immediate disciples even during his lifetime, and thus a system in intent and purpose non-theistic, neither postulating nor requiring the divine, became endowed with as extensive and varied a pantheon as the most frankly polytheistic religion ever conceived. In the monasteries and temples expression was given in plastic form, in image and sculpture, to these deities, the recipients of a true worship, which in concrete and visible presentation embodied and satisfied the desire of the worshipper for a substantial object of his adoration and regard.

1. Deification of Gautama himself.—It was upon the person of the Buddha that this reverence and worship concentrated itself; and throughout the entire history of Buddhism the figure of the founder remained central for all art and imagery. The degree of prominence assigned to him, however, varied greatly in the different countries in which Buddhism found a home. In some instances the influence of pre-existing faiths, with their popular divinities, proved too strong for the doctrines and principles of the imported creed; and the figure of the historic Buddha was in effect superseded by forms of gods or goddesses, to whom a more sympathetic and helpful rôle was assigned. Theoretically, for the present age, Gautama Buddha is supreme; and in general it is his image that occupies the place of honour in the temples, and is indefinitely multiplied in the halls of the monasteries, and in all places where an opportunity offered itself for a work of merit in erecting an image designed to embody in actual concrete form the gentle spirit and teaching of the founder of the faith.

The tendency, therefore, to regard Gautama as more than human, and to endow him with some at least of the attributes of divinity, began to develop itself during his lifetime, and therewith the tendency also to represent him in imagery and sculpture as an object of adoration. The earliest sculptures, however, do not yet venture apparently to depict him as a man, but his presence is symbolically indicated by the sacred wheel (*dharmacakra*), the Bo-tree, the footprint (*pada*), or a *dāgaba*, etc. In the older representations also, the more important figures of the Hindu pantheon retained a place, especially Sakka (Sakra, Indra) with his thunderbolt, who was later identified with one of the celestial Buddhas, Vajrapāni, and to the end occupied a considerable place in Buddhist legend and tradition.

It is not possible to determine at how early a period this desire for concrete and visible por-

[1] See W. J. Hincke, *A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar I.*, Philadelphia, 1907, p. 87 ff.; King, *Bab. Boundary-Stones and Memorial Tablets in the Brit. Mus.*, London, 1912, p. x ff.

[2] See J. Menant, *Recherches sur le glyptique orientale*, Paris, 1883; L. Delaporte, *Cylindres orientaux*, do. 1910; and W. Hayes Ward, *Seal Cylinders of Western Asia*, Washington, 1910.

[3] Cf. I. Heuzey, *RAssyr*, IX. iii. [1912] 85 ff.

[4] Cf. King, 'The Origin of Animal Symbolism in Babylonia, Assyria, and Persia' (*JRSBA*, Dec. 1912, p. 276 ff.).

[5] For examples of such devil-images, see R. C. Thompson, *Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia*, London, 1903-04, i. pl. ii. frontispiece; C. Frank, 'Köpfe babylonischer Dämonen' (*RAssyr*, VII. i. [1909] 21 ff.).

[6] Cf., *e.g.*, R. Koldewey, *Die Tempel von Babylon und Borsippa*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 19, 26, 29.

traiture of the Buddha himself did in fact find expression in art. Images of him were certainly known before the time of the Chinese pilgrims Fā-Hian and Hiuen Tsiang. Their narratives suggest, if they do not assert, that such images were neither rare nor a novelty. A more or less conventional and idealized type also was adopted, alike of choice and from the necessities of the case, which then imposed itself upon all representations of the Buddha in every country and for all future time. The type was Hellenic, not native Indian; and was derived from the Græco-Buddhist art of Gandhāra and the North-West. Its artistic development, however, was checked and limited by the historical conditions of Gautama's life and character, and the need to preserve a general identity of aspect and feature throughout the wide area to which the Buddhist faith had gained access. The type, therefore, became stereotyped, the conventional and recognized form under which the Buddha was depicted. Almost the only variety permitted to the artist was in the pose of the hands (*mudrā*), and, to a less extent, the arrangement of the feet. The Hellenic character also was consistently maintained throughout, and is noticeable especially in the expression of the face and the disposal of the folds of the robe. In the earliest and oldest representations this is most apparent; in the later there is a distinct approximation to Hindu forms and ideals. The figure thus delineated is that of a young Indian in the garb of a monk, with gentle and thoughtful countenance. In frescoes and paintings the head is often surrounded with a nimbus or halo, the symbol of deity and of the claim to adoration, a feature which is derived from Greek model and precedent. The type adopted was severely simple, and afforded comparatively little opportunity for the development of artistic taste or the display of artistic skill. These found a limited opportunity for expression in the figures of the Buddha's disciples, and more widely in the extensive pantheon of divinities, Bodhisattvas and others, of the Mahāyāna school.

The character of the type was thus determined, and is easily recognizable. From whatever part of the Buddhist world the figure may be derived, the general features are the same, and convey the same impression of calm dignity and untroubled repose. The painter or sculptor had, as it were, the main outline and framework of his subject already laid down, and comparatively little latitude was admissible in the filling in of details. Three attitudes or poses of the figure are represented—sitting, standing, and lying or recumbent. Within each of these there are varieties of type, which are usually associated with events of the Buddha's life or offices which he performed. The ascetic ideal was maintained in all, and in all the dress and outward appearance were plain and decorous, contrasting strikingly, on the one hand, with the richly ornamented figures of the Bodhisattvas and other divinities, and on the other with the nude statues of the Jaina saints. Images, however, in each of the three attitudes are by no means equally common on the sculptures or in the temples. The sitting posture is most frequently represented in all Buddhist countries. The recumbent figure, on the contrary, is hardly met with in the monasteries of the north.

2. Types of sculptures.—There are three main types or varieties of the seated Buddha.

In all of them the Buddha was represented sitting cross-legged, the right foot resting on the left, the soles usually upturned and bearing one or more of the auspicious marks which indicated his character as a 'perfected' being. The body is clad in the conventional robe of the monk, which leaves the right shoulder bare, and in some examples is very lightly indicated by a mere line across the chest. Less commonly the robe is drawn over both shoulders. The latter arrangement of the dress is found at all periods and in all the three attitudes, but is perhaps more characteristic of the early Græco-Buddhist art. The head is shaven, but is never entirely bare, a few tufts of hair being left to represent the stumps of the locks which remained when Gautama cut off his own hair with his sword on the occasion of his flight from home.[1] On the top of the skull also is the swelling or protuberance known as *uṣṇīṣa*, a mark of the sacred character of the wearer, but perhaps originally representing merely the coil of hair on the head.[2] A tuft or circlet of hair (*ūrṇā*) also appears in the centre of the forehead, for which a pearl is frequently substituted both in early and in late examples. The ears and arms are long, the former dependent as far as the shoulders. In Indian sculpture long arms are conventionally recognized as a sign of high birth. The figure is seated upon a lotus flower or throne (*padmāsana*), or upon the coils of the cobra which then raises its crest above the Buddha's head to protect him from the heat of the sun. In the Indian sculpture the face is always clean-shaven, but in images from China and Japan, or from Korea, a light moustache or beard is sometimes found. Others also of the *lakṣaṇas*, the marks of physical beauty or perfection, may be represented, the most common perhaps being the *chakra*, the wheel of the law, figured on the upturned soles of the feet.[3] Moreover, in the southern school the entire treatment is more stiff and formal, and seems to lack the freedom and spontaneity of the earlier northern types.

The three fundamental types are distinguished by the position of the hands (*mudrā*), which is always symbolical, designed to express the thought or office of the Buddha in some great crisis or event of his life. There are numerous less important varieties, devised by the artists to correspond to the biographical details contained in the tradition.

(1) The 'witness' attitude. The left hand lies flat upon the lap, while the right is stretched downwards, the palm towards the body, and touches the ground. The scene commemorated is the conflict with Māra before the attainment of Buddhahood, when Gautama called upon the earth to testify to the events of his previous existences, and it responded with a roar like thunder.[4]

(2) The 'meditative' attitude, representing the Buddha in profound thought upon the mysteries of existence. The crossed hands lie flat in the lap with the palms upturned, the right resting upon the left.

(3) The 'teaching' attitude. The right arm is half raised to bring the hand on a level with the breast, with the palm outwards, while the left hand hangs down by the side or grasps and supports the robe. As the name indicates, Gautama is engaged in preaching or teaching his disciples, as in the Isipatana Park at Benares.

In the standing figures the hands are represented as in the teaching *mudrā*. The robe is more frequently drawn over both shoulders, and falls to the ground, covering the entire body. The feet are held close together. A rare variety of the upright pose represents the Buddha moving forward, the right foot raised and slightly advanced beyond the other.

The 'lying' or 'recumbent' attitude represents the Buddha at the moment of death, when he passed into *parinirvāṇa*. The figure lies at full length on the right side, the right hand supporting the head, the left arm and hand extended and resting upon the body. The face, turned towards the spectator, retains its thoughtful and placid aspect. The attitude and features convey no impression of old age, although, according to the tradition, Gautama had reached the age of fourscore years at death.

The earliest figures of the Buddha that have been preserved are from the North-West of India and the border-land of Afghānistān, the ancient Gandhāra. They all exhibit the same Grecian type of features and pose, a type which changes slowly, approximating more and more to a Hindu ideal in the later centuries and more particularly in the southern school. Many of the later statues and images are rough and rude in comparison with the delicacy and refinement of the early Indian examples. The difference, however, consists entirely in the execution. No innovation was made upon the normal and established Buddha type, and no departure therefrom was admissible. The general lines of the workmanship of the figure were determined by precedent, and it was only within narrow limits that the genius or capacity of the artist found opportunity to express itself. It is unlikely that any tradition of the real appearance of

[1] *Jāt.* i. 64.

[2] Hackmann, *Buddhism as a Religion*, p. 105.

[3] There are 112 *lakṣaṇas*, of which 32 are primary and 80 smaller or secondary. They are enumerated, *e.g.*, in Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, p. 161 f.

[4] *Jāt.* i. 74.

Gautama Buddha himself should have been preserved. The presentation of face and figure is entirely ideal, and is that of a young Indian prince of noble birth, embodying the conception of a gentle, thoughtful, deeply mystical and religious character, which tradition associates with the name of Gautama.

3. Ancient images.—The Chinese Buddhist pilgrims in their writings make reference to existing images, which were believed to be authentic and, in some instances, contemporary portraits of Gautama himself. The earliest of which mention is made by Fā-Hian was a sandal-wood image which Prasenajit, king of Kosala, had caused to be carved and placed in the Jetavana *vihāra* in Srāvastī in the seat usually occupied by the Buddha, but now vacant during his absence in the Trayastriṁśa heaven. On his return Gautama is said to have recognized the image as a faithful copy of himself. Not long after, the monastery was accidentally set on fire and consumed. The image, however, was preserved unscathed, and later was restored to its place.[1] A second and even more famous sandal-wood image about 20 ft. high is described by Hiuen Tsiang, erected by Udāyana, king of Kauśāmbī, a replica of which the Chinese monk carried with him on his return home from India. The royal city was in ruins at the time of Hiuen Tsiang's visit, but the statue stood within an ancient *vihāra*, a stone canopy above its head, having resisted, as it was said, every attempt to remove it. This image also had been carved in the Buddha's lifetime, the work of an artist who had been transported to the Trayastriṁśa heaven that he might there observe the appearance of the Buddha and take note of the sacred marks on his body. A miraculous and bright light shone forth from it intermittently.[2] Mention is made of other images, and, in addition to sacred relics and books, Hiuen Tsiang took with him on his return a considerable number of statues of the Buddha in silver and gold as well as in sandal-wood.

4. Hīnayāna school.—With the exception of the figures of the Buddha thus stereotyped in normal and regular form there is no uniformity in the number, character, or disposition of the images worshipped in the different Buddhist countries. No general or comprehensive description which would be of universal application is practicable. It will be most convenient, therefore, to give a brief account of each of these separately, in regard to the nature and variety of the images recognized, following as far as possible the geographical order. The pantheon of the Hīnayāna is usually simpler, of a more severe and restricted character, than that of the Mahāyāna.

(1) *Ceylon.*—In Ceylon, and in the southern school generally, no representation is found of the earlier Buddhas, or of the Bodhisattvas whose images fill so large a place in northern Buddhist lands; except of Maitreya, the Buddha of the future. The images are exceedingly numerous, but the effect of the constant repetition of the same features and pose is to a certain extent monotonous. They are of all sizes, huge figures being sometimes seen carved in the living rock. The materials used are various, but for the most part the ordinary images in the temples are made of clay, overlaid with chunam highly polished, and are usually gilded and ornamented with real or imitation precious stones. The mouth and eyes are frequently painted, to render them more distinct. Stone figures are also numerous, and more rarely cast images of metal are found, copper or bronze, and also statues of ivory and wood. Formerly in all Buddhist countries and for many centuries the manufacture of the images was almost entirely in the hands of the monks, who were able to bless and consecrate their handiwork. It is now for the most part a specialized occupation or trade, and the work is done by skilled artisans. Some of the more ancient and famous idols were traditionally said to have been self-produced. The temples also contain frequently a specimen of the sacred footprint (*śrīpada*), to which adoration is paid. Of these footprints the most renowned is the hollow upon Adam's Peak, held sacred by Hindus, Muhammadans, and Christians alike, as well as by Buddhists, and explained in accordance with the creed of each as the footprint of Gautama or Śiva, of Adam, Muhammad, or St. Thomas.

By the side of the principal image in the *vihāras* are frequently represented one or more of the Buddha's chief disciples, especially Moggallāna and Sāriputta, or, with the recumbent Buddha in the *nirvāṇa* scene, Ānanda. They stand on either side or at his feet in attitudes of worship. Figures also of the ancient Hindu deities, especially Brahmā and Viṣṇu, are found, usually in buildings (*devāla*) attached to the *vihāra* itself, and representations of demons, etc., to which homage is paid by Buddhists equally with Hindus. The members of the stricter sect of the Rāmanya, however, refuse to associate themselves with this worship of strange gods, which they denounce as heretical. In an ancient temple, *e.g.*, at Kelani near Colombo, said to be on the site of an older shrine built at the close of the 4th cent. B.C., there is a recumbent figure of the Buddha, 36 ft. long, by the side of which stand huge images of the guardian deity of the temple, and of the Hindu gods Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Gaṇeśa. In the temple of the sacred Tooth also, at Kandy, either side of the central shrine is occupied by images. In the country *vihāras*, where the worshippers are few in number and poor, the images often suffer from neglect, and little heed is paid to them even by the priests or monks themselves. Not far from the same temple at Kandy there is an ancient shrine of Viṣṇu with a silver-gilt image about 6 in. high, wearing a rosary. Shrines also are found in Ceylon dedicated to Skanda, the brother of Gaṇeśa. The only prominent Hindu divinity, indeed, whom the Buddhists appear never to have adopted is Kṛṣṇa.

The sites of ruined cities which have been excavated in Ceylon have supplied many ancient and remarkable figures. It is evident that in former times the concrete representations of the Buddha for purposes of worship were no less numerous than at the present day.

One of the oldest is a dark granite statue of the seated Buddha, 8 ft. high, carved from a single block of stone, believed to be more than 1000 years old, now deserted and lonely in the jungle not far from Anurādhapura. In the rock temple at Polannaruwa also are three colossal images, that of the Buddha lying at full length, 46 ft. long, the head resting on the right hand on a bolster, and the details of the robe carefully and skilfully rendered; the erect image by the Buddha's side on a pedestal ornamented with lotus leaves, 23 ft. high, probably represents Ānanda, the favourite disciple. Within the temple is a large seated Buddha, carved in high relief out of the rock; and at the further end behind the altar a similar figure, 15 ft. high, on a pedestal with lion ornamentation, in front of a carved and decorated screen. At Anurādhapura itself all the great temples and monasteries were possessed of countless images; and numbers of monolithic statues still exist there, prostrate on the ground, or standing amidst the ruins. On the circular platform of the Ruanweli *dāgaba*, for example, together with royal statues are three of the standing Buddha more than life-size. The larger statue by their side, 10 ft. high, represents king Duṭṭhagāmaṇi, of whom the Ceylonese chronicles report that he caused a golden image of the Buddha to be made, and set up near the sacred Bo-tree of Anurādhapura.

(2) *Burma.*—In the monasteries of Burma the principal hall or room set apart for the reception of the images contains usually a large central figure of the Buddha against the further end,

[1] *Fā-Hien's Travels in India and Ceylon*, tr. J. Legge, Oxford, 1886, ch. xx.; cf. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1906, ii. 4.
[2] Beal, *op. cit.* i. 235 f.

while others stand on either side or are ranged round the walls. Smaller figures are placed on brackets or shelves. The material employed is brick, wood, or alabaster, or, for more costly images, brass, silver, or gold. The process of casting an image is accompanied by religious ceremonies, and the occasion is made a public holiday. Formerly, and perhaps in some places at the present day also, offerings of silver, gold, and jewellery were thrown into the melting-pot by pious donors—to whom much merit accrued, as their gifts were thus incorporated in the body of the image. Similar offerings are said to have been made at the casting of bells for the temples.

The same three positions of the figure are found as in Ceylon, but the seated Buddha is more usually in the 'witness' attitude. Kneeling in front of the figure of the Buddha, the two disciples, Sāriputta and Moggallāna, are frequently represented, worshipping or listening to his words. Gautama's three predecessors also, the earlier Buddhas of the present age, Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, and Kassapa, sometimes find a place, and Dipaṅkara, the first of the 24 great Buddhas, his forerunners. In the larger temples and *vihāras* other buildings beside the central hall are filled with images. Great and important temples like the Shwe Dagon at Rangoon contain numerous shrines with many hundreds of images of different sizes. These are, for the most part, the gifts of Buddhist laymen, presented as an act of merit. It is prescribed also that the offering of the images must be made in a definite order, first the standing figure, then the seated, and, finally, in the recumbent attitude. In the courtyard of the temple will often be found, as in Ceylon, a delineation of the sacred footprint. The steps that lead up to the temple or shrine are ornamented with fantastic figures, in plaster or stone, of lions, dragons, and other monsters.

Offerings of incense, flowers, and plain or coloured candles are made before the images, with prostrations and prayers. The more enlightened Burmese declare that worship is not thereby intended, but that the image serves as a reminder of Gautama himself, and excites in their minds similar feelings of reverence and devotion. It is only in the temples of Lower Burma that considerable numbers of images are seen. In Upper Burma few except the more important images are to be found. Of these the standing figures in the attitude of preaching are often of great size, some of the Pagan images reaching a height of over 40 feet. A Buddha in marble at the foot of the hill at Mandalay is 25 ft. high; and around the dimly-lit building in which it stands are smaller shrines, the gilt images in which direct their gaze towards the central figure. In Burma, as elsewhere, the recumbent attitude is the least common; but very large figures exist, usually constructed of brick, as at Pegu and Ava. These are often surrounded by the figures of the disciples, or of mythological rulers of the heavens or other deities.

It is comparatively seldom that the images are found in the open air. There exists, however, a large seated statue at the ancient capital, Amarapura, which is judged to be 90 ft. high; smaller figures are grouped around. At a few riverside places on the Irawadi, rock-cut statues may be seen, facing Ava, and a few miles below Prome, some of which are of great size. Opposite Pegu and elsewhere, with the aid of bricks, the rocks themselves have been moulded and shaped into the form of enormous Buddhas. These, for the most part, are now crumbling to ruins, and are overgrown with jungle.

(3) *Siam.*—The images and worship of Siam are entirely similar to those of Ceylon and Burma, and further description of them is therefore unnecessary.

5. Mahāyāna school.—In the pantheon and imagery of the Mahāyāna school new developments of the most rich and ornate character have been introduced. In some forms of the faith and doctrine, Gautama Buddha himself has ceased to occupy the central and most important position; and the sculpture and temple furniture reflect the views of the worshipper, who addresses his prayers to one or another favourite divinity, and in practice ignores the personality and claims of the founder of the faith. In the result, the Buddhism of some of the northern countries has become endowed with perhaps the largest pantheon in the world. The imagery and cult, however, vary in the different lands, in each of which the introduced worship of the Buddha has blended with the native religion, and more or less completely taken over the native gods to form a composite whole, the characteristic features of which are clearly seen in the figures and images with which the temples are provided. The restrained and ascetic type of the image of the Buddha himself is preserved unchanged. The artistic sense of the worshipper, however, finds its opportunity in the variety and lavish adornment of the figures of the deities that surround him, whose popularity and influence exceed that of Gautama himself to a very marked extent. The source and home of all these developments and varied types, as of the legends and traditions on which they were based, was Northern India, and especially the districts of the North-West and the border-land of Afghānistān, where the Græco-Buddhist art of Gandhāra was responsible for more or less rigidly determining the conventional forms under which the principal gods should be delineated. These chief types or classes of images, therefore, which are more or less common to all the northern Buddhist countries, it is possible summarily to describe. In greater detail account may then be given of the features in which the imagery and worship of the different countries vary from that which may be supposed to be the original form, the modifications which have been introduced, or the actual additions that have been made to the accepted figures of the pantheon.

Reference has already been made to the adoption by Buddhism of the principal Hindu gods. These retain their distinctive attributes and appearance in the carved representations and idols. The most ancient images found in India are Buddhist. In the older Buddhist sculpture, however, at Sāñchī, and on the Bhārhut *stūpa* of the 2nd cent. B.C., the Buddha himself is not depicted, although the figures of other gods appear. Only in the early centuries of our era do images of the Buddha become common. Their existence at a previous date cannot, however, be disproved; and it would appear most probable that as the attractive centre of worship the Buddha early dispossessed the ancient Hindu deities. Later carvings at Ellora and elsewhere exhibit numerous figures of the Buddha, among which are some of great size. Occasionally a triad is found, in which Brahmā and Indra are represented on either side of the Buddha, as if guarding him, or in an attitude of reverence. The lesser deities or semi-deities also of Hinduism, as the Nāgas, etc., sometimes find a place.

The sacred triad of the Buddha, the Law or Religion, and the Order (*Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha*) found early and frequent representation, and, although Gautama usually occupied the central place, the relative order seems not to have been invariable. It has been suggested indeed, perhaps without adequate justification, that in this triad Buddhist thought first gave concrete expression to its feeling of reverence to the person of its founder,

and the personified doctrine and order in which he embodied and perpetuated his teaching. Ancient examples have been found at Bodh Gayā and elsewhere.

The Saṅgha is usually depicted as a male figure with the right hand resting on the knee, and holding a lotus flower in the left. The images of the Dharma have four arms and hands, two of which are raised and touch one another in front of the breast; the others grasp respectively a book or lotus and a rosary of beads (*mālā*). In Nepāl and Sikhim the Dharma is always represented as female, the personification of *prajñā pāramitā*, 'supreme wisdom.' The worship of Dharma still maintains itself in India (in Orissa and Western Bengal), a solitary survival and witness to a faith once so wide-spread and influential throughout the peninsula. In some of these districts images of the Dharma are common, before which animal and other sacrifices are offered by the lower classes of the people, and in parts of Bengal a Dharma temple stands in nearly every village. A figure of Dharma, recently discovered at Badsai in Orissa, exhibits an arrangement of the arms and hands which seems designed to be a compromise between that described above and one or more of the *mudrās* of the Buddha. Two of the hands are laid on the knees, the right pointing downwards; the others, uplifted to the level of the head, bear a rosary and an open lotus. At a village in the Bānkurā District an actual image of the Buddha is, or was, worshipped as Dharma.

In the elaborate and extensive pantheon of the Mahāyāna the favourite figures are those of the Bodhisattvas (*q.v.*) and the Dhyānibuddhas, none of which find a place in the south. The general type is that of a young Indian prince, with turban or crown on the head; and the richness of the dress and ornamentation forms a striking contrast to the severe plainness of the monk's robe in the statues of the Buddha. The principal Bodhisattvas appear in the ancient Indian sculptures; and in the Buddhist caves at Ellora Avalokiteśvara and Vajrapāni are represented in attendance on Gautama. These two with Mañjuśrī form a kind of second Buddhist triad, the members of which are sufficiently distinct to be identified for the most part, without much difficulty, in the sculptures. For others a general character or type is made to serve, and it is often impossible to determine which particular Bodhisattva is intended. It is worthy of note also that, in scenes before the attainment of *bodhi*, the figure of Gautama where it appears is always depicted after the Bodhisattva model, not according to that of the Buddha.

The most usual emblem in the hands of the Bodhisattva images is the full-blown lotus, or sometimes a bunch of blossoms. The presence of the flower is due not only to the fact that it is the emblem of purity, but also to its constant association with offerings and worship. Figures of Padmapāṇi or Avalokiteśvara are the most common, and are frequently mentioned by the Chinese pilgrims, who state that the images were found on the summits of the high hills.

The portraiture of this Bodhisattva seems to have been borrowed from that of the ancient Indian deities, especially Viṣṇu. He appears usually with several faces, with two or four pairs of arms, and bears on the front of his crown a small figure of a Buddha. Two of the hands are raised in the attitude of adoration; the others carry emblems, as the lotus or the *chakra*. Figures of Avalokiteśvara, therefore, resemble those of Viṣṇu, but may readily be distinguished by the position of the hands, which in the case of the Hindu god are never in the attitude of worship. A special form or representation of Avalokiteśvara is known as the eleven-headed; this is especially common in Tibet and Nepāl, but is met with already in early Buddhist cave temples. The heads are arranged in pyramidal form, in three tiers of three each, with two single heads one above the other at the top. The uppermost head represents Amitābha, the spiritual father of the Bodhisattva. The rows or tiers of heads sometimes exhibit each its appropriate colouring in the order upwards of white, yellow, red, blue, red. Other figures have a larger number of arms, and the god is then described as 'thousand-handed.'

Vajrapāṇi carries a *chaitya* or *dāgaba* on his forehead, and a *vajra* in his hand. Mañjuśrī is represented as a seated figure, holding a sword and a book, the latter either grasped directly by the hand or supported on a flower which the hand holds. The two other principal Bodhisattvas have each their appropriate emblem or emblems by which they may be recognized. Mahāsthānaprāpta has the *vajra* and *chaitya*, like Vajrapāṇi; Viśvapāṇi carries a sword resting on a flower.

Of the Dhyānibuddhas only Amitābha, judging from the frequency of the representations, established a claim to popular approval and worship. He is depicted seated in the 'meditative' pose, the hands laid one upon another, in the *dhyāna-mudrā*. According to a well-known form of the legend, he was born from a lotus flower, and is sometimes so represented in the sculpture.

Kāśyapa, the Buddha who immediately preceded Gautama, may be recognized by his close-fitting robe, which hides the right hand in its folds at the level of the breast, while the left, resting on the knee, supports the garment.

Of the series of Buddhas besides Gautama himself, only Maitreya, the Buddha of the future, finds a place in all the schools, and is worshipped by all Buddhists. His image was apparently common in North India at the time of the visits of the Chinese pilgrims. Both Fā-Hian and Hiuen Tsiang report having seen a wooden image of Maitreya, 80 cubits in height, from which a bright light proceeded. A second figure of sandal-wood was possessed of the same light-giving virtue; a third at Bodh Gayā was made entirely of silver. Since he has not yet become a Buddha, Maitreya is not usually represented in the conventional Buddha pose, but appears in the dress and equipments of a young Indian prince. Both standing and seated figures are found, the former being more common; in the latter case, the feet are not crossed, but the legs hang down, as though seated in Western fashion on a chair. In standing figures the robe is often drawn up, to leave the left leg bare. His emblems are the water-flask and rosary, both of which are sometimes depicted resting upon lotus blossoms, which the hands hold. The latter usually assume the attitude known as the *dharmachakramudrā*, in which the hands are raised to the breast with the fingers touching. The hair is abundant, and often curls. His image is also found in the conventional Buddha form; but it retains in all cases the characteristic position of the hands.

(1) *Tibet.*—A marked feature of the imagery and worship of the Lāmaistic type of Buddhism is the prominent place assigned to deities of Hindu origin, and to gods and demons derived from the native mythology. 'The pantheon is perhaps the largest in the world. It is peopled by a bizarre crowd of aboriginal gods and hydra-headed demons, who are almost jostled off the stage by their still more numerous Buddhist rivals and counterfeits.'[1] The number of images and statues is correspondingly great; and these are not confined, as for the most part in other Buddhist lands, to the temples, but are found everywhere in the open air and in private houses; and in the form of charms, talismans, etc., they are carried on the person. Local and tutelary divinities are also very numerous; and a place is given to deified saints, to present and past incarnations of Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, and to mythological conceptions of every kind, the offspring of an unrestrained fancy and speculation.

The largest images are usually those of Maitreya, the Buddha of the future. The material employed is clay moulded into shape and painted or gilded. Wooden images are not common, and, except in the rock-cut figures and bas-reliefs, stone is rare. Others are of metal, ordinarily copper or, less frequently, bronze. The more costly are gilded, and often inlaid with real or imitation precious stones. In the temples and halls of the monasteries (*lha khang*, 'hall of the gods'), the arrangement of the images is the same as is usually found in other Buddhist countries, but no uniform rule is observed. The image of Gautama is placed in the centre behind the great altar, and on either side are the figures of Maitreya and Avalokiteśvara. The latter is usually present, as would naturally be expected, seeing he is incarnate in the Dalai Lāma; but Amitabha not seldom takes the place of Gautama, and instead of Maitreya there stands the founder of the sect to which the monastery belongs. The triad of the 'three holy ones'—Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha—is said to be rare.

[1] L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 325.

Waddell apparently does not cite a single instance; in comparison with other countries, therefore, it is little if at all known or held in regard.

The normal attitude and pose of the Buddha images are determined, as elsewhere, by convention and precedent. The seated 'witness' attitude is the most common, few figures are represented standing, and the recumbent position is seldom found. The Buddha is usually seated upon a lotus, and wears the *uṣṇīṣa*; behind and overshadowing him is the sacred *pīpal* tree, beneath the shade of which Gautama attained supreme wisdom. Accompanying the larger figures the two disciples frequently appear, Śāriputra on the right of the Buddha, and Maudgalyāyana on his left.

The same general type was employed to represent the earlier Buddhas, the predecessors of Gautama. The more distant and mythical of these were not as a rule depicted, except Dīpaṅkara, whose image is often found, with small holes or sockets in which lighted lamps are placed at the festivals. Of the more recent Buddhas a frequent arrangement is in groups of seven or five. The former consists of Gautama together with his six immediate predecessors; the latter, of the three latest Buddhas, Krakuchchhanda, Kanakamuni, and Kāśyapa, with Gautama himself and Maitreya. The five corresponding celestial Buddhas, or Jinas, are depicted in general in the same attitude, but they never carry a begging-bowl such as is often seen in the figure of the earthly Buddha. Each, moreover, has his appropriate *mudrā*, or pose of the hands, and a different colour. Amitābha is the only one of the five who receives a popular worship, as is attested by the frequency with which his image meets the eye. He is seated in the 'meditative' attitude, without begging-bowl, and is coloured red. Healing or medical Buddhas so-called are also present and are held in high honour, being resorted to in times of sickness; their pictures or images are believed to be possessed of magical healing virtue. Images of these Buddhas, however, are not common in Tibetan temples. A superior or primeval Buddha is also worshipped. He is represented seated in the 'meditative' attitude, as Amitābha, but with the body of a blue colour, and often unrobed.

The most distinctive feature, however, of the Mahayāna, or Northern, school of Buddhism in art and sculpture, as in doctrine and cosmology, was associated with the Bodhisattvas. In Tibet their images are to be found everywhere, and their cult far surpasses in popularity that of the Buddha himself. The figure of Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhisattva who becomes incarnate in the Dalai Lāma, is most frequently encountered; but the others—Mañjuśrī, Vajrapāṇi, and especially Maitreya—are to be seen in very considerable numbers. The original type is that of the youthful Indian prince as on the Gandhāra sculptures, in rich embroidered robes, crowned and wearing earrings, and carrying in the hands distinctive emblems. The typical form, however, has been modified and transformed almost beyond recognition under the influence on the one hand of the ancient Indian deities, and on the other of the native gods, tutelary divinities, demons, and others, of the early religion of Tibet. The result is that the pictures and images are presented under various 'aspects,' which are distinguished not only by appearance and mien, but usually also by colouring.

The mild or Indian type is coloured white or yellow, and a halo surrounds the head, and not infrequently the entire body. A red or black shade is characteristic of the fiercer forms, designed to excite terror and remorse. These last forms belong more especially to the Tāntrik type of Buddhism, which has close affinities with the Śāktism of the Hindu faith. The figures are both male and female, the latter differing only in the absence of the beard and by the prominent breasts. The head is large, with a third eye in the centre of the forehead, and the whole expression is uncouth and terrifying. They stand or are seated upon a 'vehicle,' in the form of some animal. In other instances they are represented trampling upon the bodies of their victims, brandishing weapons, and wearing necklaces of skulls.

Mañjuśrī, as the personification of wisdom, carries a book and sword. With the latter he dispels the clouds of ignorance. Almost alone of the Bodhisattvas he has no female counterpart. He is usually represented seated in the 'mild' aspect.

Vajrapāṇi bears a *vajra* or bolt in his right hand, and a bell or other emblem in the left. His aspect is fierce, and his image is correspondingly coloured dark blue or black.

Maitreya's figure usually appears seated in the 'teaching' attitude with the legs hanging down. Colossal figures of this Bodhisattva are to be seen, carved in the rock.

Avalokiteśvara is said to have twenty-two forms. In all he is represented with features or members beyond those appropriate to ordinary men. The eleven-headed figure is the most usual, but a type almost as commonly depicted is four-handed, with the ornaments and dress of a prince. Two of the hands carry respectively a lotus and a rosary; the others are joined in the attitude of worship. As Vajrapāṇi has borrowed the manner and weapons of Indra, so the figure of Avalokiteśvara is modelled on that of Brahmā.

In Tibetan Buddhism not only Avalokiteśvara but the other Bodhisattvas also frequently bear on the head a small figure of one or other of the Dhyānibuddhas, who is the spiritual father of the Bodhisattva represented. Exceptionally, however, Maitreya is found with the figure of his predecessor Gautama. Instead of the actual figure the symbol or emblem alone of the Jina sometimes appears, placed on the head or seated among the locks of the Bodhisattva's hair.

Moreover, each of the female powers who are worshipped has its characteristic figure or delineation, and appears under a 'mild' or 'fierce' type. The most common and popular is Tārā, wife or consort of Avalokiteśvara, who corresponds to the Chinese Kwanyin. Her forms are 'green' and 'white' respectively; and the two foreign wives of king Sron Tsan Gampo, who introduced Buddhism into Tibet in the 7th cent., are believed to have been incarnations of Tārā, the Chinese princess of the white form, the Nepalese of the green. The latter is depicted as an Indian lady seated, with a lotus in her hand and the left leg pendent; the face is green. The 'white' form of Tārā, with a white face, is seven-eyed, the palms of the hands and the soles of the feet being each provided with an eye, while another is placed in the centre of the forehead; her worship is said to be confined mainly to the Mongol peoples. Like the Mahāmātṛis of India, the number of Tārās was multiplied almost indefinitely.

Marichī, the queen of heaven, is represented with three faces and eight hands, carrying weapons. She is seated on a lotus throne, drawn by swine, and one of her faces is that of a sow. The abbess of the Samding monastery near Lhasa, who bears a high character for sanctity, is an incarnation of a sow-goddess who is perhaps to be identified with Marichī. At Lhasa there are shrines of Kālī, where the figure of the goddess is black, ornamented with skulls, masks, etc., and others of a mild type of handsome aspect, wearing robes of silk and adorned with pearls and precious stones.

The four Guardians of the four quarters appear frequently in the temples. Yama also, the god of the under world, has numerous shrines. His consort, Lhamo, is the tutelary divinity of Lhasa. The images of local and tutelary deities are to be found everywhere; and the demoniacal powers of evil are not less numerously represented. Deified saints and the founders and patrons of local monasteries obtain considerable worship, and are frequently represented with unnatural features or members in excess of the normal, to emphasize their superhuman character. Of these the Dalai Lāma is the most popular. Padma Sambhava also, the founder of Lāmaism, takes a high place.

Of the disciples of Gautama Buddha, besides Sāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, a group of sixteen is commonly found. These are the early *arhats*, or saints; and the same group reappears in the other countries of Mahāyāna Buddhism, enlarged to eighteen in China, and there known as the Lohan.

Few of the images are of skilful or attractive workmanship. In the more important monasteries at Lhasa and elsewhere may be seen statues of Buddha or of other deities, of much value, either from the material employed or the costly precious stones and ornaments with which they are adorned. In the private chapel of the Dalai Lāma at the Potala palace in Lhasa there stands an image of Avalokiteśvara of solid gold. The great temple in the same city contains, among many other images, a celebrated gilt figure of Gautama, said to have been brought from Peking by the Chinese wife of Sron Tsan Gampo. Another representation is that of Gautama as a young prince, crowned and robed, at the time when he left his home. The workmanship of the latter figure is said to be poor and inartistic, but the crown and shrine are thickly set with precious stones. In a third temple in the same city, the 'Temple of Medicine,' is a renowned figure of the 'healing' Buddha, with a bowl of blue lapis-lazuli stone, surrounded by other statues, which are supposed to represent physicians whose skill and fame have won for them deification after death. Cf. IMAGES AND IDOLS (Tibetan).

(2) *China.*—The Buddhist images of China are similar in character, but not so numerous as those of Tibet, and they are almost entirely confined to the monasteries and temples.[1] In addition to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, tutelary deities and demoniacal powers, together with patriarchs and saints of olden time who have been raised to the position of gods and receive homage, occupy a large place. In the monasteries there are usually two halls set apart for the service of the gods. A central and more important hall contains the effigies of the Buddhas, with their disciples, and of the Bodhisattvas, placed at the further end of the hall and ranged round the sides. Large monasteries have, in addition, more than one entrance hall, where the figures of the guardian spirits stand, and of the protecting genii of the place, the images of founders or patrons, and of the native popular gods adopted by Buddhism into its pantheon.

Of the Buddhas, Gautama is the chief.

His image is most frequently found in the 'meditative' posture, seated on a lotus, with *ūrṇā*, and pendent ears. The robe is usually drawn over both shoulders so that the arms also are covered, the neck and chest being exposed. Frequently a halo surrounds the head, or an ornamental screen behind the image represents the leaf of the sacred Bo-tree, and serves the purpose of a bright and gilded background. Two standing postures are not uncommon: the one as a child, with the arms extended and pointing upwards and downwards, in reference probably to the shout of victory and conquest uttered immediately after birth; the other as an ascetic, with begging bowl, rough and unkempt, in ragged monastic dress. Recumbent figures are rare. They are represented fully clothed, lying in the usual attitude upon the right side, sometimes even upon an ordinary Chinese bed.

Of the celestial Buddhas, Amitābha (in Chinese, *O-mi-to-fo*) is the most reverenced and popular. The normal Buddha type of figure is adopted for all, but each has his characteristic *mudrā*. Amitābha is usually depicted in a standing position, with long arms hanging at his sides. Among the Buddhas of the past, Dipaṅkara alone is generally recognized. His image is often found with the niches and lamps. The number of these last varies; but usually there are 108, a number said to correspond to that of the sacred books.

With the exception of Gautama himself, certain of the Bodhisattvas are more widely reverenced and receive more constant worship than the Buddhas. The image of Kwanyin, the 'goddess of mercy,' the female form of Avalokiteśvara, is universally honoured. There is evidence that in the early centuries this Bodhisattva was worshipped in his proper male form; and the circumstances under which the transition to a female deity took place are altogether obscure. There seems to be no definite or accepted type for the figure of Kwanyin. The goddess is represented under very varied forms. Universally, however, she is beloved, and perpetual offerings are brought to her shrine. Of the other well-known Bodhisattvas of Indian origin, Mañjuśrī (Chin. *Wen-shu*) and Samantabhadra (*Pu-hsien*) are perhaps the most widely known and most frequently delineated in painting and sculpture. Each is depicted riding upon his 'vehicle,' Wen-shu on a lion, Pu-hsien on an elephant. They often appear as members of a triad in which Kwanyin takes the middle place. A frequent triad also is that of the 'three holy ones of the western region,' *i.e.* the paradise of Amitābha. In this triad Amitābha himself is in the centre, Kwanyin on his left in the place of honour, and the Bodhisattva Mahasthamaprāpta (Chin. *To-shih-chi*) on the right. The Chinese Yama, *Ti-tsang*, the ruler of Hades, with his twelve subordinates, who execute punishment and torture upon the wicked, is a familiar effigy in the idol temples and halls.

An altogether strange and anomalous figure is that of the Bodhisattva Maitreya (*Mi-le-fo*), the Buddha of the future age. He does not occupy so prominent a position as in Tibet and elsewhere, and seems to have become identified with a native genius or tutelary deity.

He is usually represented in a crouching attitude, the robe thrown back so as to expose the breast, with long pendent ears and shaven head, and the left leg drawn up in front of the body. In the right hand is a lotus flower or a rosary, in the left a purse or bag, described as containing the 'five lucky gifts.' The expression of the face is lively and even merry, and the whole figure is reminiscent of a comfortable, well-living friar of the Middle Ages.

Other tutelary deities are the four Guardians of the four quarters, whose images stand in a defensive or protecting attitude on either side of the entrance to the temple or hall of the monastery.

Their figures are usually of more than life-size, and each has his own appropriate colour, and emblem or device which he carries in his hand. The Guardian of the North (*To-wen*) is black, and bears a snake and a pearl; the Guardian of the East (*Chih-kwo*) is blue, with an instrument of music; the Guardian of the South (*Tseng-chang*) is red, with an umbrella; the Guardian of the West (*Kwang-mu*) is white, and holds in his hand a sword. In the same hall, in addition to the Guardians, two figures are generally placed in the centre, facing in opposite directions, towards and away from the entrance. Moreover, a special deity presides over the culinary department, and his figure is said to be found in the kitchens of most monasteries. The well-known and popular god of war, Kwangti, is a deified hero of early Chinese history; and the images of other gods, saints, or demons, of native origin or derived from Indian sources, are very numerous, and are more or less closely associated with Buddhist worship.

Of the disciples of the Buddha, the most commonly figured are Ānanda and Kāśyapa. They stand or kneel on either side of Gautama, in reverential attitude, with upraised hands, Ānanda having the appearance and mien of a young man. The group of the 18 Lohan frequently finds a place in the temples, where their statues are ranged along the sides of the buildings. In the older monasteries the original group of 16 disciples is sometimes found, as elsewhere in the Northern school. Comparatively rarely a larger group of 500 Lohan is met with, consisting for the most part of deified emperors or other notable heroes and men of former times. Of deified saints, the most prominent and popular are the six patriarchs of Chinese Buddhism. The first of these, Bodhidharma (*Ta-mo*), who established the patriarchate

[1] The alienation within recent years of many Buddhist temples and halls to educational purposes, and the neglect and destruction of the images, make it difficult to determine how far the changed conditions of the country have affected either the number or the cult of the idols.

in China in the 6th cent., is universally known and honoured. His appearance lends support to the tradition of his foreign origin, the face being bearded and possessing none of the characteristic Chinese features. His image usually stands near the principal altar, at the further end of the great hall.

In the principal hall a trio of images is often found behind the principal altar. The members of the trio vary. Frequently Gautama is accompanied by Amitābha and Yo-shih-fo, the Buddha of healing; sometimes by other Buddhas or Bodhisattvas. Maitreya seems never to be represented. If the figure of Gautama is unaccompanied by others of his own rank, then the two disciples, Ananda and Kāśyapa, stand before him. In front of the altar are smaller images of Bodhisattvas and others. The 18 Lohan, occasionally with other gods, occupy the sides of the room.

The material employed for the images is generally wood or clay. Bronze images are rare and costly; a few are of marble. They are painted or gilded, and a curious ceremony is observed, by virtue of which the deity is supposed to take possession of his habitation. Through a hole at the back of the statue a living animal—a frog, snake, or other small creature—is introduced into the hollow interior. The hole is then sealed up, and the soul of the animal passes into and gives life to the image of the god. The last act is the painting in of the eye, that the deity may have complete vision. This is known as *kai-kwang*, the giving of light.

(3) *Korea.*—There is little that is distinctive of the temple images and statues of Korea as compared with China or Japan. The most remarkable feature is the presence of pictures on the walls of the rooms of the monastery. These are never so found in the two countries named, with which the Buddhist thought and practice of Korea have otherwise been in the closest relation. The images themselves are few in number, and with little or no decoration; they are usually also of comparatively small size, gilded as in China, the material used being wood or clay. The five chief Buddhas are represented, and the corresponding Bodhisattvas, Kwanyin taking the place of Avalokiteśvara. Amitābha maintains a popular worship, which rivals, if it does not surpass, that of Gautama himself. Of the celestial beings and deified saints, Indra and other gods recur, and the 16 Lohan; the larger group also of the 500 disciples is met with in some of the temples. Tutelary deities are common, and personifications of the forces of nature. The mountain god, whose emblem is the tiger, and the 'kitchen' god are well known, and are worshipped with offerings and prayer. Perhaps the most feared divinity, whose wrath is most to be deprecated, and whose image is most frequently set up, is Ti-tsang, the ruler of the lower world. There are traces also of a solar cult, adopted by Buddhism, in the reverence paid to the sun and moon, the Great Bear, etc. For the last a special hall or chapel is sometimes provided within the monastery.

(4) *Japan.*—The most striking feature of Japanese Buddhism is the extent to which it has asserted its independence of Chinese influence. The independence of thought is reflected in its images and worship. There is similarity in the external form, in the architecture and arrangement of the temples, and the general disposition of the figures of the deities therein, but in the spirit and in detail the differences are very considerable. In the principal hall of the temple the chief images are placed, as in China, on the altar at the further end. In front a partition is sometimes erected, and the remainder of the hall remains free and unoccupied for the purpose of worship. There is usually also a chapel dedicated to the founder of the sect to whom the temple or monastery belongs, and separate rooms or chapels with the image of Kwannon, Amida, or other favourite divinity. In addition to deities of Hindu and Buddhist origin, Japanese Buddhism has adopted Shinto and Chinese gods also into its pantheon.

Of deities that are definitely Buddhist in origin the five Buddhas and Dhyānibuddhas, and the five corresponding Bodhisattvas, are naturally the most prominent. The Ādibuddha is not represented. Of the Dhyānibuddhas Amitābha (Amida), the compassionate ruler of the western paradise, is the favourite, and his figure is to be met with everywhere, especially in the temples and monasteries of the Pure Land Sect. His effigy is represented in the usual Buddha attitude, cross-legged, with the hands lying in the lap. The *ūrṇā* on the forehead is said to be indicative of wisdom. At Kamakura the great bronze *daibutsu* represents Amida. The figure is nearly 50 ft. high, and is hollow, with a small shrine within to which access is obtained by means of a ladder. The larger *daibutsu* in the Todaiji temple enclosure at Nara is said to represent Vairochana (Jap. *Dainichi*). The image has suffered from successive fires, and has been repaired. It is 53 ft. high, and is seated on a lotus throne, with the right hand upraised to the level of the shoulder, the left resting on the knee. The whole is believed to have been originally gilded. Behind is a wooden halo richly gilt, and on either side of the principal figure and at the back are images of Bodhisattvas and other deities, of more than life-size.

In Japan as in China Avalokiteśvara has become a female deity, Kwannon, the Chinese Kwanyin, the goddess of mercy.

She is depicted under various forms, sometimes with three heads and many arms. The hands grasp objects typical of Buddhist doctrine or practice, as the wheel, a pagoda, a lotus, or an axe, etc. A begging bowl is sometimes held in the lap. The Sanjusangendo temple at Kyoto contains 33,333 images of Kwannon. A thousand larger figures, each 5 ft. high and gilded, represent the goddess in her 'thousand-handed' form. On the hands, foreheads, etc., of these there are executed smaller figures, the arrangement of which is said to be different in every instance. Besides Kwannon, the Bodhisattvas most commonly represented are Manjuśrī (Jap. *Monju*) and Samantabhadra (*Fugen*). They often appear seated on the left and right hands respectively of the Buddha. The only other Bodhisattva who commands wide reverence and worship is Daiseishi, joint ruler with Amida and Kwannon of the western paradise. The figure of Maitreya (*Miroku*) also is sometimes seen rock-carved, of great size; but it is not found in the temples.

The temple entrance is usually guarded by the ancient Hindu deities Brahmā (*Bonten*) and Indra (*Taishaku*), who stand in threatening attitudes on the left and right sides respectively. The popular divinity *Fudo* is by some authorities identified with Śiva, but others regard him as representing Vairochana. His appearance is fierce and grim, with black face, and he bears in his hand the sword of justice. Other Indian gods are found, as Vaiśravana (*Bishamon*), the god of wealth, who has become one of the seven deities of good fortune, and Ganeśa. The real god of wealth is Daikoku, who carries with him bales of rice. The ruler of Hades, Emma-O, is frequently depicted. He is seated with a judge's cap on his head and a staff in his hand, and is usually accompanied by attendants who bear writing materials. The name is probably a corruption of the Sanskrit Yamarāja. Ti-tsang, the Chinese ruler of the world below, is represented by the Japanese *Jizo*, whose stone image is perhaps the most common and popular object of worship throughout the country. He is the patron of travellers, the guide and helper of all who are in trouble, and is represented in the attitude of a monk sitting cross-legged, with

closely shaven head, holding in his hands a jewel and a staff.

Of the disciples of the Buddha, Ānanda and Kāśyapa (Jap. *Anan* and *Kasho*) are most usually found with Gautama. The 16 Lohan (Jap. *Rakan*) are often represented, and the larger group of 500, the latter sometimes in a special hall or chapel. Of the Rakan by far the most popular is *Binzuru*, the healer of disease, whose image in the forepart of the temples is frequently defaced and has its features almost obliterated by the constant rubbing to which it is subjected, the practically universal belief among the lower classes being that relief from pain may certainly be secured by rubbing in succession the corresponding part of Binzuru's image and the affected limb or other portion of their own bodies. The Chinese patriarch Bodhidharma (*Daruma*) is also present in many instances; and the founders or patrons of the various sects are deified and their images erected in the temples.

Of Shinto deities that have been adopted by Buddhism the most popular is Hachiman, the god of war, to whom many temples are dedicated. He is said to represent a deified Emperor of the 3rd or 4th century.

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IMAGES AND IDOLS (Celtic).—**1. Terminology.**—A specific Celtic terminology for idols is found only in Irish, Ir. *idal*, 'idol,' being borrowed from Gr. through Lat., while Ir. *arracht* is a native term meaning 'shape, likeness, spectre, or idol.' A more common word is *lám-dia* or *lám-deo*, 'hand-god,' a small, portable idol, a kind of household god somewhat similar to the *penates* of the Romans (*ZCP* ii. [1895] 448). In Cormac's *Glossary* (tr. J. O'Donovan, ed. W. Stokes, Calcutta, 1868, p. 163), O'Donovan cites the word *tromdhe* from an old Irish glossary as meaning 'tutelary gods, *i.e.* floor-gods, or gods of protection.'

2. Gauls.—For lack of evidence to the contrary, it has been hitherto an accepted fact that the pre-Roman Gauls had no images or idols of their gods. The reasons advanced in support of this belief are that the Druids, who were pre-Celtic in origin, but who became eventually the priests of the Celts, were opposed to image-worship, which they prohibited in Gaul as early as the end of the palæolithic age (S. Reinach, 'L'Art plastique en Gaule et le druidisme,' in *RCel* xiii. [1892] 189 ff. = *Cultes, mythes, et religions*[3], Paris, 1908, i. 146 ff.). No direct evidence, however, has been found of the existence of such a prohibition, save that various classical authors postulated a connexion between the Pythagoreans and the Druids, and that the analogy which they saw between these doctrines was obviously hostile to anthropomorphism. More recent authorities, who refuse to accept this explanation, claim that the similarity between the two sects is to be found in the common belief in metempsychosis or the immortality of the soul. Since no evidence of the existence of a prohibition against image-worship has been found in the doctrines taught by the Druids, or in the observations of Latin and Greek historians, who would, no doubt, have been quick to notice it, it is maintained that the reason why no pre-Roman images have been discovered, while those of Gallo-Roman times have been unearthed in rather large numbers, is that the Gauls made their idols, like their houses, of wood only (J. A. MacCulloch, *Rel. of the Anc. Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 288).[1] Yet it remains to be explained why the primitive Gauls were able to carve on stone various animals, which may or may not have been objects of worship, but did not make use of the same material to represent their gods—unless one or two figures among those that have been recently discovered belong to the period antedating the invasions of the Romans.

Most authorities seem to hold that, though anthropomorphism was an accepted belief among the primitive Gauls, their gods did not figure in visible form at the rites performed in their honour because they were considered to be invisible (C. Jullian, *Hist. de Gaule*, Paris, 1908, i. 359). This was especially true of those tribes who dwelt in other countries than ancient Gaul. Only after the gods had for a long time assumed a more or less clearly defined human shape in the belief of the people did poets and artists attempt to relate their lives and deeds and give to them an individuality like that of man (Jullian, *Recherches sur la rel. gaul.*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 48).

According to Diodorus (*Bibl.* xxii. 9), the Celtic chief Bremos, having entered a Greek temple and found there images of wood and stone, laughed loudly at the Greeks who made their gods in their own likeness. This chief was obviously not acquainted with deified images of the anthropomorphic kind; although that fact does not preclude the possibility that he as well as his soldiers worshipped the crude figures of animals painted or scratched by man in the neolithic age on the walls of grottos or on stones—a cult that persisted in most of the tribes (H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Druides et les dieux celt. à forme d'animaux*, Paris, 1906, p. 150). But in primitive times in Ireland, even these divinities were invisible. Among the many that could be mentioned, the most interesting is probably Badb, the goddess of war and murder, who only on important occasions—usually the death of a great warrior—appeared to the human eye, always in the form of a raven (J. Strachan, *Stories from the Táin*, Dublin, 1908, p. 6; W. M. Hennessy, *RCel* i. [1870–72] 34).

Anthropomorphism arose among the Celts from the cult of trees and stones, principally of those set up over the graves of the dead. The stone associated with the dead man's spirit became an image of himself, and was perhaps later on rudely fashioned in his own likeness (MacCulloch, 284). This is probably the point of departure of the neolithic idol whose artistic history has been so aptly traced by J. Déchelette (cf. 'Les Origines de l'idole neolithique,' in his *Manuel d'archéol. préhist. celt. et gallo-romaine*, Paris, 1908–10, i. 594 ff.). Lucan describes trunks of trees in a sacred wood roughly carved to represent gods *simulacra maesta deorum* (*Phars.* iii. 412 f.), and this rude likeness became an image of the spirit or god of trees. When Cæsar states (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. xvii. 1) that there were *plurima simulacra*, especially of the god Teutates in his time, he does not mean carved

[1] St. Maurilius is said to have burned several idols at Prisciacus in Gaul (*AS*, Sept. iv. [1868] 73), and Clovis, on his conversion, burned his idols (*AS*, Oct. i. [1866] 136). St. Firminus of Amiens destroyed idols wherever he could find them (*AS*, Sept. i. [1868] 179), and St. Mello routed the fiend Seragon, who apparently dwelt in a brazen, gilded idol of Roth, near a 'fons qui Meretricum dicitur' at Rouen (*AS*, Oct. ix. [1869] 572). Whether the idols destroyed by St. Columban and St. Gall on the continent, especially in Germany, and by St. Augustine in England (*AS*, Oct. vii. [1869] 886; *Mal.* vi. [1866] 382), were Celtic is uncertain.

images, but probably boundary stones, like those of the Greeks and Romans, or shapeless pillars that symbolized the god but did not show him. On seeing them objects of a special cult, he concluded that they were really *simulacra* of a god (MacCulloch, *op. cit.*). Some authorities even maintain that these *simulacra* were nothing else than accumulations of stones, menhirs, etc., found all over ancient Gaul (Reinach, *loc. cit.*); and Jullian maintains that there is only one statue found thus far that really belongs to the pre-Roman period—a stone inscribed with geometrical figures, swastikas, and the like (*Bull. archéol.*, 1898, pp. 339–401). If this be true, then it forms the sole exception, for not another one has been found anywhere in Gaul belonging to a period previous to the Roman epoch (G. Dottin, *Rel. des Celtes*, Paris, 1903, p. 32 f.).

The adoration of boundary stones and pillars, or menhirs, continued until well into Christian times. In the life of St. Samson of Dol, written at the beginning of the 7th cent., there is mention of a standing stone—*simulacrum abominabile*—worshipped by the ancient Bretons (J. Mabillon, *Acta sanctorum ordinis S. Benedicti*, Paris, 1668–1701, i. 177 f.; *AS*, Jul. vi. [1866] 584[b]). For the purpose of stopping these heretical practices, the saint carved a cross upon this stone. The fact that many menhirs have been found in France containing this mark is an indication that this was the usual method adopted by the Church to oppose such worship (Reinach, *RA* xxi. [1893] 335 = *Cultes*, iii. 402 f.).

Later on a terrestrial abode was assigned to the gods; usually an oak-wood, for the oak and the mistletoe were especially sacred, according to the doctrines of the Druids (G. Callegari, *Il Druidismo nell' antica Gallia*, Padua, 1904, p. 58 ff.). Then, when the tribes had more fully developed the custom of apotheosizing their dead chiefs, the divine and the human were brought into still closer relations with one another, which tended to strengthen the belief in anthropomorphism. Thereafter, such gods as Teutates, Esus, Taran, and Belenos not only assumed human form, but, under the influence of other nations, were clothed and armed like the Gauls (Jullian, *Hist.* ii. 152).

The Gauls at Ephesus and Marseilles were the first to take up the practice of idol-worship, due, without doubt, to their contact with the Greeks and Romans. Justin (xliii. 5. 7) informs us that the Celto-Ligurians in the environs of Marseilles worshipped the image of Minerva. Other classical authorities state that the Galatian Celts had images of their native Jupiter and Artemis, while the conquerors who entered Rome bowed to the senators as to the gods (Strabo, XII. v. 2; Plutarch, *de Virt. Mul.* xx.; Livy, v. 41). What was the attitude of the Druids towards the spread of idolatry among the people? Reinach maintains that they discouraged it as far as they could, because they realized that the moment a man gives to his god a figure and lodges him in his home he has less need of the intervention of priests (*RCel* xiii. 189 ff. = *Cultes*, i. 146 ff.). Whatever may be our opinion of this ingenious explanation, it is possible that the Druids did not encourage the spread of this worship; for, according to Lucan (i. 452, iii. 416 f.), much of their prestige was due to the fact that they claimed to have sole knowledge of the divinity. This might lead us also to the belief that they had such a high idea of their gods that they disliked to clothe them with the human form.

While in remote parts of Gaul the statues of the gods reveal attributes approaching closely those of the early Germanic tribes (G. Grupp, *Kultur der alten Kelten und Germanen*, Munich, 1905, p. 153 ff.), the gods of those Celts who fell under the yoke of the Romans assumed at times so many of the attributes of the divinities of their conquerors that complete identification was the result.

The images of the Gallo-Roman period are usually divided into two categories. First, we have the native divinities, such as Tarvos Trigaranos, Cernunnos, Smertullos, and the tricephalous gods, the crouching gods, the horned gods, etc., all of which belong to the pre-Roman period (Jullian, ii. 155, n. 3). To this period belong also the statues of water-goddesses, of Epona, and of the Matres, usually in the form of three seated figures with baskets of fruit or flowers, or with one or more infants (MacCulloch, 289). The second category comprises those images bearing the name of a Roman god, but often with a Celtic name added thereto. Of these images that of Mercury is the most common. Finally, we must include also in this class the small figures of white clay, representing probably some kind of *ex-voto*, which have been found in large quantities (for the archæological history of these images see Déchelette, *op. cit.*).

3. Irish.—That the Irish were given to the worship of idols or images in pre-Christian times is obvious from the explanation of the word *indelba* in Cormac's *Glossary*. According to this authority, the name *hindelba* was given to 'the altars or those idols from the thing which they used to make (?) on them, namely, the *delba* or images of everything which they used to worship or of the beings which they used to adore, as, for instance, the form or figure of the sun on the altar.' Again, the word *hidoss* is explained as being derived from 'the Greek *εἶδος* which is found in Latin, from which the word *idolum*, namely, the shapes or images [*arrachta*] of the idols [or elements] the Pagans used formerly to make.'

To these idols or images sacrifices were offered, usually for the purpose of securing abundant harvests. Whether the Druids had private idols for their own worship cannot be definitely ascertained, though some authorities affirm that they had (D. Hyde, *Literary Hist. of Ireland*[2], London, 1906, p. 84), this supposition being based on the evidence given in a passage of Cormac's *Glossary* which describes the incantation called *imbas forosnai*, or 'knowledge that enlightens.'

'This describes to the poet or druid,' says the glossator, 'whatsoever thing he wishes to discover, and this is the manner in which it is performed. The poet chews a bit of the raw red flesh of a pig, a dog, or a cat, and then retires with it to his own bed behind the door [or, according to Stokes, 'he puts it then on the flagstone behind the door'], where he pronounces an oration over it and offers it to his *idol gods*. He then *invokes the idols*, and if he has not received the illumination before the next day, he pronounces incantations upon his two palms, and takes his idol gods unto him [into his bed] in order that he may not be interrupted in his sleep. He then places his two hands upon his two cheeks and falls asleep. He is then watched so that he be not stirred nor interrupted by any one until everything that he seeks be revealed to him at the end of a *nomad* [*i.e.* a day] or two or three, or as long as he continues at his offering, and hence it is that this ceremony is called *imbas*, that is, the two hands upon him crosswise, that is, a hand over and a hand hither upon his cheeks. And St. Patrick prohibited this ceremony, because it is a species of *teinm laeghdha* [another kind of incantation mentioned in the *Glossary*], that is, he declared that any one who performed it should have no place in heaven or on earth' (Stokes, *loc. cit.*; Hyde, *loc. cit.* 84). It is related also in the *Book of Leinster* that Dathi, who succeeded Niall of the Nine Hostages as King of Ireland in A.D. 405, consulted the Druids on the eve of the great festival of Samhain in the seventeenth year of his reign, or A.D. 422, regarding his destiny during the next year, for he was then contemplating an invasion of the continent. Dathi and nine of his chiefs were taken to the plain of Rath Archaill, where the Druids had their idols and altars, and there the prediction was made (E. O'Curry, *Lectures on the MS Materials of Anc. Ir. Hist.*, Dublin, 1878, p. 284). As stated above, these passages seem to indicate that the Druids had private images at that time which they alone were permitted to consult. They show also that, whatever may have been the attitude of the Druids on the continent towards idol-worship, those in Ireland had no hesitation in accepting it and adapting it to their own ends.

As for public idols, there is sufficient evidence that they were very numerous throughout the country. To these sacrifices were offered up by the people, or rather by the Druids on behalf of the

people, for the purpose of securing good weather for the crops and an abundance of cattle. St. Patrick states in his *Confession* (xviii.) that previous to his arrival in Ireland the people 'worshipped only idols and abominations' (*PL* liii. 810; N. J. D. White, 'The Latin Writings of St. Patrick,' in *Proc. Roy. Ir. Acad.* xxv. [1905] 270, § 41). According to the *Tripartite Life*, during a certain year Patrick found no more fitting place to celebrate Easter than Mag Breg, 'in the place wherein was the chief (abode) of the idolatry and wizardry—*baili imbai cend idlachta ocus drúidechta*—of Ireland, to wit, in Tara' (W. Stokes, *Tripartite Life of Patrick*, London, 1887, p. 41). Again, when Patrick visited Oengus, the son of Natfraich, in Munster, the morning after his arrival 'all the idols were on their faces—*inna arrachta huili inna ligib*' (lit. 'in their beds'; *ib.* p. 195). Furthermore, Jocelinus, in his biography of Patrick, remarks that 'idola corruunt ad adventum S. Patricii in Momoniam' (*AS* Mart. ii. [1865] 553). That the chief purpose of Patrick's sojourn in Ireland would be the destruction of 'all the images of the idols' was, in fact, foretold by the wizards and enchanters at the court of King Laegaire, son of Niall (*ib.* pp. 32–35); and when, at the end of the *Tripartite Life*, we are told that, 'after destroying idols and images, and the knowledge of wizardry, the time of holy Patrick's death drew nigh,' the prophecies were fulfilled (*ib.* p. 259). So strong a hold had idolatry upon the people that two maidens, converted to Christianity, were persecuted and drowned by a petty king named Echaid for having refused to engage in the pagan form of worship (*ib.* p. 225).

These idols were generally very rudely carved, most of them, in fact, being mere pillar-stones (J. B. Bury, *Life of St. Patrick*, London, 1905, p. 74). There was, however, in the plain of Magh Slecht one great idol which apparently was of much finer workmanship. The image, ornamented with gold and silver, was called, according to the *Dinnsenchus* in the *Book of Leinster* (p. 213[b]), Cromm Crúach ('Bloody Crescent'), but in the *Tripartite Life of Patrick* the name given to it is Cenn Crúaich ('Bloody Head'; Stokes, 91). This gold-covered idol, surrounded by twelve lesser ones ornamented with brass, was the special tutelary deity of certain Irish tribes, representing, in all probability, the sun-god ruling over the twelve seasons. According to the *Dinnsenchus* mentioned above, this great idol exacted a terrible tribute from its worshippers. In return for the beautiful weather they desired for their crops, they offered up to it their first-born children 'with many cries and heart-rending moans for their death, assembled about Cromm Crúach' (d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Le Cycle mythologique irlandais*, Paris, 1884, p. 107).

The Rennes MS of this poem tells us that Cromm Crúach was, before the arrival of Patrick, the *rig-ídal h-Erenn*, or 'king idol of Ireland.' 'Around him [were] twelve idols made of stones: but he was of gold. Until Patrick's advent he was the god of every folk that colonised Ireland. To him they used to offer the firstlings of every issue and the chief sclons of every clan. . . . And they all prostrated themselves before him, so that the tops of their foreheads and the gristle of their noses, and the caps of their knees and the ends of their elbows broke, and three-fourths of the men of Erin perished at these prostrations' (K. Meyer and A. Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895–97, ii. 149 f.; for the versified form, see *ib.* p. 301 ff.). Many were the legends grouped about this idol. The *Dinnsenchus* in the *Book of Leinster* informs us that, several centuries before the Christian era, King Tigernmas and crowds of his people were destroyed in some inexplicable manner while they were worshipping it on the eve of the first of November, or Samhain Eve (P. Joyce, *Soc. Hist. of Anc. Ireland*, London, 1903, i. 275). According to the *Tripartite Life* (pp. 91–93), this idol, which was worshipped by King Laegaire and many others, was overthrown by St. Patrick, who cast his curse upon it. The ground opened up and swallowed the twelve lesser idols as far as their heads, which may be interpreted that, when the life of the Saint was written, the pagan sanctuary had so fallen into decay that only the heads of the twelve lesser idols remained above ground (J. Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom* [*HL*, 1886][3], London, 1892, p. 201).

Another famous idol in western Connaught was Cromm Dubh, or 'Black Crescent,' whose name, according to O'Curry, is still connected in Munster and Connaught with the first Sunday of August (*MS Materials*, 632). This Sunday, the anniversary of its destruction, is still called 'Cromm Dubh's Sunday' (*Domnach Cruimm Duibh*). There was also an idol called Kermand Kelstach, which, it appears, was the special tutelary god of the province of Ulster (Joyce, *loc. cit.*). Cormac's *Glossary* (p. 23) mentions the idol *Bial*, which is called elsewhere *Bél* (G. Petrie, *On the Hist. and Antiq. of Tara Hill*, London, 1839, p. 84). At the festival of *Bron-Trogin*, *i.e.* the beginning of autumn, the young of every sort of animal was assigned as an offering to this god (*RCel* xi. [1890] 443). According to another legend, 'a fire was always kindled in Bial's name at the beginning of summer, and cattle were driven between the two fires' (Stokes, *Cormac's Glossary*, p. 23).

According to the passage quoted above from Cormac's *Glossary*, St. Patrick abolished the *imbas forosnai* and the *teinm laegda*, because the performance of these incantations needed an offering of some kind to idols or demons. These probably include the *lám-dia*, or 'hand-gods,' which were small images used for divination. When Cormac mac Art refused to worship idols and was punished therefor by the Druids, it is probable that the *lám-dia* are referred to (*RCel* xii. [1891] 427; MacCulloch, 286); and, before the lady Cessair decided to make a trip to Ireland, she consulted her hand-gods to see if the omens were favourable (*ib.*). In the account of the Battle of Moytura, mention is made of a speaking sword, which had that power, because at that time 'men worshipped arms, and they were a magic safeguard' (d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Epopée celt. en Irlande*, Paris, 1892, i. 444).

Notwithstanding St. Patrick's prohibition, idol-worship in certain forms continued in many places in Ireland far down into Christian times; and traces of these rites exist even to-day in some of the more remote districts of the country.

4. Welsh.—The lives of the early Saints of Britain inveigh frequently against idolatry or image-worship, to which the British Celts were addicted (MacCulloch, 286 f.). Gildas tells us that in his time there were images 'mouldering away within and without the deserted temples, with stiff and deformed features' (*de Excid. Brit.* ii.). Like the Irish, the Welsh had also their speaking stone, called *lech-lawar*, or 'stone of speech.' Giraldus Cambrensis relates (*Hib. expug.* i. 38) that, when Henry II., king of England, landed at St. David's on his return from Ireland, a Welsh woman threw herself at his feet and made a complaint against the bishop of the diocese. Receiving no redress, [illegible]ped her hands loudly and shouted: 'Avenge us this day, Lechlawar, avenge our race and nation on this man.' According to the same authority, this was a stone 'which was placed across the stream, dividing the cemetery of St. David's from the north side of the church, to form a bridge.' The surface of the stone, which was of beautiful marble, was worn smooth by the feet of pedestrians. Once, when a corpse was carried over it, the stone spoke, but in the effort it cracked in the middle. Giraldus also mentions (*Itin. Camb.* ii. 7) a stone in the island of Mona which always returned to the same place, no matter where it was transported.

5. Scots.—M. Martin relates that the inhabitants of the Scottish islands worshipped an image of a god called Bel, without doubt the same as the Irish god of that name (*Descrip. of the Western Islands of Scotland*[2], London, 1716, p. 105).

6. Bretons.—The ecclesiastical canons of Brittany mention stones, fountains, and trees as being

worshipped even as late as the 10th cent. (J. Fergusson, *Rude Stone Monuments in all Countries*, London, 1872, p. 24 f.). Processions of images were quite common in Brittany up to a recent date. St. Martin stopped one of these processions, because he considered them a form of pagan worship (Sulp. Severus, *Vita S. Martini*, xii.). These processions were forbidden by the edicts of various councils, and often, finding this method of inveighing against them to be of no avail, they Christianized them. Thus the rogation processions with the crucifix and the Madonna, as well as the pilgrimage of St. John's image, at the Midsummer festivals, were but a continuation of these ancient forms of worship. The *Groah-goard*, or 'Venus of Quinipily,' which may date back to pre-Roman times, was for many centuries an object of important rites in Brittany (D. Monnier, *Trad. pop. comparées*, Paris, 1854, p. 362).

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article.

JOHN LAWRENCE GERIG.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Chinese).—China is full of images. Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism have all fostered the use of them, and they are to be found in Buddhist and Taoist temples in the greatest abundance, in private houses, in boats, in streets, and almost everywhere.

The Emperor Wu Yik (1198–1194 B.C.) is credited with having made the first images or idols. The objects of worship then were heaven and earth, the spirits of mountains and streams, etc. The Emperor looked upon them as mythical; and, to show his disbelief in, and contempt for, them, he had images of clay and wood made to represent them, and ordered men to fight with them. As a result, he said that men were stronger than the gods, and it was folly to worship them.[1]

The art of sculpture and the making of images of stone do not reach back in China to the high antiquity that they attained in Egypt and some other ancient lands, though the germ was present before the Christian era, and revealed itself in sculpturing in bas-relief on the surface of stone. The earliest known specimens were executed in the 2nd cent. B.C. They display a primitive character in their composition, and convey the impression that the art was in its infancy and could not have been in existence more than one or two centuries, though the development of art in China was nearly as old as Egyptian and Chaldæan civilization.[2] The mural decorations of buildings were apparently the precursors of the isolated image which later on came out, as it were, from the stone stelæ of which it had previously formed a part, and on the surface of which it was carved. Chinese art is also greatly indebted to Buddhism in the treatment of animal and human life as we see it revealed at a later period; for it, again, developed the germ of the idea in the Chinese mind, and gave a great extension to it. It inspired the statue which hitherto had only half emerged from the stone, and, copying the examples introduced by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims on their return with the idols which they brought from India, the first Chinese statues were of Buddhist deities.

1. Buddhist.—The majestic forms of some of the gigantic images—one is 100 ft. in height—bear a certain grandeur in their mien; a serenity and calmness appears in their faces in keeping with the control which a Buddha should have over the passions. The Indian inspiration is distinctly to be seen, and for some time the Chinese were mere copyists. In the stone work of images there has been no development in an artistic sense. Arrested progress has been the type of it, whether seen in the gigantic figures of warriors that line the approaches to royal tombs or in the more common stone idol of Buddhism. Images of animals also appear, cut in stone, at these royal mausolea, and a pair of lions before temples and official and public buildings, these stone images of lions, as well as clay images of cats on the topmost part of a roof, being believed to act as charms against the malign influences.[1] Clay images placed by evilly-disposed builders and plasterers in the wall of a house are believed to exert an evil influence, since these images, it is said, are imbued with life by the infusion into them of some of the men's own life-blood.[2] 'Ghosts of idols are not unknown.'[3] Straw images are used to injure enemies in witchcraft.[4] Two miniature images of white cocks in sugar are conspicuous objects at a Chinese wedding. Bits of them are broken off and given to the newly-married couple to eat. A white cock, or a paper image of one, is carried on the coffin in a funeral procession to induce one of the souls of the deceased to enter it.[5]

Both Buddhism and Taoism have legends of images of their founders being revealed in dreams to Emperors, and the introduction of the former into China is ascribed to one of these—a dream of a golden image. As the result of the Taoist dream, a stone image of foreign material, 3 ft. in height, was found. P. L. Wieger is inclined to believe that this image, discovered in A.D. 741, was Nestorian, and not that of Lao-tse; for he says that it was a Nestorian service conducted by seven priests which was held in the palace on receiving the image, and it was the same Emperor who showed favour to that sect.[6]

In bronze-work (gilded bronze is much used for Buddhist images) copied from Buddhist sources, it was not servile copying, but judicious imitation, with freedom for the artist to carry out his own ideas in the world which he created of gods, goddesses, heroes, sages or patriarchs, ascetics, and others. The technique is such as to call forth the unstinted praise of the artist. In the image of Buddha himself the Chinese have adhered most closely and longest to the Indian models which were introduced centuries before, and which give the characteristics of Buddha as told in the sacred books (cf. IMAGES AND IDOLS [Buddhist]). The Chinese have excelled in their images of the Goddess of Mercy, some of which have been compared to the work of Donatello and Ghiberti.[7]

2. Taoist.—Viewed from an artistic standpoint, the Taoist bronze images as well as some of other materials are most interesting. Here there is a freedom from foreign influence, and a national expression shows itself. The images thus produced are not confined to one type, but much variety is seen. An animated life often reveals itself in place of the serene contemplative mood of many of the Buddhist images, which have, of course, a beauty of their own. The founder of Taoism, Lao-tse, is often represented with long beard, bushy eyebrows, and huge forehead; and the Eight Genii are also often produced. It would be impossible to particularize all the celebrated Taoist deities which are constantly to be seen. One must confine oneself to a mention of only a few of the most notable. One of the most interesting is the Star-god of Literature, who is more a Confucian god, and whose attitude is most artistic. Poised on one foot on a sea-monster's head, with outstretched arm and hand holding a pen, he recalls some of the classic statues of Mercury. Another common one is the Northern Ruler, with unbound locks, and bare

[1] J. Macgowan, *Hist. of China*, London, 1897, p. 137; also E. Faber, *Hist. of China*, Shanghai, 1902, p. 9.

[2] E. Chavannes, *La Sculpture sur pierre en Chine*, Paris, 1893, and *Mission archéol. dans la Chine*, do. 1909; R. Petrucci, *Peintres chinois*, do., n.d., p. 30 f.; G. M. Paléologue, *L'Art chinois*, do. 1888, pp. 131–140; S. W. Bushell, *Chinese Art*, London, 1904–05, pp. i–xv and ch. ii.

[1] N. B. Dennys, *Folklore of China*, London, 1876, p. 48; H. Du Bose, *Dragon, Image, and Demon*, do. 1886, p. 343 f.

[2] Dennys, 83. [3] *Ib.* 78.

[4] Du Bose, 339. [5] Dennys, 16, 22.

[6] *Le Canon taoïste*, Paris, 1911, Introd. p. 19 f.

[7] Paléologue, pp. 47, 50, 52; Bushell, p. 50.

feet, one placed on a tortoise, while his banner has a sombre ground on which appear the seven stars of the plough, or Charles's Wain. There are also the Ten Judges of Hades, and in their courts are images of men and women undergoing the punishments of Hell. Besides these, there are the State-gods, such as the God of War, the Patron Saint of the late Manchu dynasty, and a number of others.

3. Confucian.—Statues of Confucius came into vogue during the T'ang dynasty (A.D. 618–905). It may be noted here that there is not much scope in China for images or statues except for religious purposes, since the form which monuments take is not that of statues, but of ornamental arches over roads or streets in town or country. These images of Confucius, however, seem to approach nearer to our idea of a statue than any others; for the tablets to the Sage are retained as well. At one time these images were prayed to for the granting of posterity; but this was stopped. The adoration offered to him is adulatory and not supplicatory in its nature. For some time the images were of wood, but in A.D. 960 clay images were used.

In A.D. 1457 a copper statue of the Sage was placed in the Imperial Palace and saluted by ministers before admission on State business. The *literati* did not approve, and it was done away with. In A.D. 1530 the images were removed from Confucian temples.[1] There are still, however, images of Confucius and his disciples to be found here and there throughout the country. No image of the Sage is allowed in Buddhist or Taoist temples; but there are some temples styled 'Three Religion Halls,' in which Buddha, Lao-tse, and Confucius are enthroned as a triad.[2]

4. Images of ancestors.—Images have not been used in ancestor-worship, tablets for one of the souls of the deceased being considered the proper mode of providing an object of worship. But a notable instance of a contrary practice is recorded: one of the Twenty-four Paragons of Filial Piety carved wooden images of his parents, and served them as if alive. His jealous wife pricked the fingers of the images, and they wept.[3]

5. Aboriginal images.—In the south-east of the empire there is a large boat population who are descended from aborigines. They have customs of their own, and one is that of having wooden images made of their dead children, which they worship. As the space on the boats is limited, the shrines, which every boat has, are small, and consequently the images are likewise of small dimensions, ranging from about 4½ to 8 or 9 inches in height. Most of these images represent what are evidently older persons than mere children. There is quite a variety in the positions and attitudes: some, like many of the gods, are seated on thrones and are clothed in official attire; others are represented as standing, perhaps even on dragons, and clad in warlike robes; and many of them carry swords or daggers and halberds in their hands. One in the writer's collection has English clothes on—a blue jacket, light green trousers, and a low-crowned hat. One curious feature of these images is that some of the girls, or women, are represented as riding on storks—that bird being supposed to carry the soul to heaven—and some of the boys, or men, on small ponies. In others, not content with one, the image is astride two ponies or two tigers, and has its feet resting on two of these wild beasts as well.

6. The spirit of the being worshipped is supposed by the Chinese to be present in the image when a ceremony has been performed invoking its presence. At a temple near the writer's home in Canton, where extensive repairs were to be effected, the spirits were asked to vacate their abode in the images; and, when the repairs were finished, another ceremony was held in which the spirits of the gods were invited to return.

Some images are made hollow, and models of the internal organs are placed inside them. At times a live creature, such as a lizard, is placed inside, and the idol is then apparently considered to be vivified.

There is a niche or shrine or loft in a Chinese house or shop for images, or a red-painted board, or red paper, with the names of one or more gods, in addition to ancestral tablets, unless the clan has an Ancestral Hall; but in Central China this general rule does not hold good, for 'a considerable proportion of the houses . . . are devoid of idols or even Ancestral Tablets.'[1] The changes now taking place in China are causing a movement towards disbelief in idols and a discarding of them.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the footnotes.

J. DYER BALL.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Egyptian).—**1. Early methods of representing deity.**—In the earliest stages of the Egyptian religion, the images of the gods were of the rudest and simplest description—mere fetish emblems such as pillars of stone or wood, trees, or cairns. Thus the god of the high-ways, Min of Koptos, revealed himself either in a rough stake, or in a heap of stones by the wayside; the goddess Hathor dwelt in a sycamore tree; and Osiris was represented by a curious pillar apparently composed of the capitals of several pillars superimposed. An alternative method of representing divinity, which co-existed in early times with the crude fetish emblem, was that in which the god was presented in the form of an animal. Sebek, the water-god of the Fayum, manifested himself as a crocodile; Khnum, the god of the cataract district, as a he-goat; Upuat of Siut as a jackal; while Sekhmet, the goddess of Memphis, appeared as a lioness, and Hathor of Denderah as a cow. These rude early methods of representing deity maintained their influence in a modified form down to a very late period, and, even when the original emblems had been superseded by more elaborate images, traces of the original emblem are still to be perceived in the form of the image. Thus down to the very latest stages of the worship of Osiris, the original pillar, which was supposed to represent the backbone of the god, was still an object of worship, and its setting up, which typified the restoration of Osiris after his murder by Set, was the occasion of great festivals in particular localities, while the later images of Min of Koptos, though adorned with a human head and rudely shaped to human form, are merely the original stake wrapped in swathings of linen. The animal form of representation was also perpetuated, in the case of many of the gods, by the curious combination of an animal's head with a human body. In the case of the Sun-god, Ra, the exploration of the Sun-temples at Abusir has made it evident that, as late as the period of the Vth dynasty, this god was worshipped under the guise of his original emblem. The central object of adoration in these temples was, not an image of Ra, but a huge truncated obelisk, standing on a pedestal in the midst of an open court. The earliest divine images known to us are the three colossal figures of the god Min, found at Koptos by Flinders Petrie. These belong to a very early dynastic period, are of very rude work-

[1] B. Laufer, 'Confucius and his Portraits,' in *Open Court*, xxvi. [1912] 166; E. H. Parker, *Studies in Chinese Religion*, London, 1910, p. 182.
[2] *Chinese Recorder*, xl. [1909] 104.
[3] S. W. Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, London, 1883, i. 539, and *Chinese Recorder*, xxxi. [1900] 397.

[1] W. A. Cornaby, *Call of Cathay*, London, 1910, p. 33.

manship, and, among other reliefs sculptured upon them, have representations of the fetish emblem of the god—a tall pole, adorned with a garland.

a. Images of deity in human form.—Somewhere about the time of the IInd dynasty the Egyptians began systematically to represent their gods by images of a human form. The god appears as a man wearing the ordinary clothing of an Egyptian, a tunic, adorned, as in the case of a king, with the tail of an animal. On his head he wore a helmet, a crown, or a head-dress of tall plumes, while in his hand he carried a sceptre or leading staff, the goddesses carrying, as their distinctive emblem, papyrus stalks. From this time onwards throughout the historic period, the use of images, either human in form or human with an animal's head, to represent the gods to the senses of the faithful was constant, save for one short interval, when, in the reign of the reforming King Akhenaten (*c.* 1385-63 B.C.), all such representations of deity were forbidden, and the only image tolerated was the figure of the solar disk with outspreading rays ending in human hands.

Of the images of the gods used for purposes of worship, the most important type was that of which, unfortunately, we have no surviving example—the small cultus image which was kept in a costly shrine in the Holy of Holies of each Egyptian temple, duly tended day by day by the priests, and exposed to the view of the general public only on great ceremonial occasions. While no identifiable specimen of this most sacred object of Egyptian worship has survived, we can form a fair idea of its style and material from the literary references which have come down to us. The sacred image was in curious contrast to the gorgeous and gigantic temple which existed for its sake. It was generally neither of large size nor of costly materials. Thus in the temple of Hathor at Denderah, there were, among others, the following sacred statues: Hathor, painted wood, copper, inlaid eyes, height 3 ells, 4 spans, and 2 fingers; Isis, painted acacia wood, eyes inlaid, height 1 ell; Horus, painted wood, inlaid eyes, height 1 ell and 1 finger. The largest, therefore, was scarcely of life size, the smallest only about 16 inches in height. The reason for this insignificance in size was that for certain acts of worship the images had to be easily portable.

The paltry size and material of these little wooden dolls were, however, atoned for by the splendour of their abode, and the reverence with which they were served. The shrine of the god was in the innermost chamber of the temple, which was in total darkness save on the entry of the officiating priest bearing artificial light. It consisted generally of a single block of stone, often, especially in the later periods, of enormous size, hewn into a house which surrounded with impenetrable walls the image of the god. The doorway in front was closed with bronze doors, or doors of wood overlaid with bronze or gold-silver alloy; and each day, after the daily ritual had been gone through, these doors were closed, fastened with a bolt, and then tied with a cord bearing a clay seal. On either side of the sanctuary of the principal god of the temple were subsidiary sanctuaries, containing images of the other two members of his triad. Thus in the temple of Amen at Thebes, Amen would occupy the central sanctuary, while his consort, Mut, would be on one side, and the Moon-god, Khonsu, on the other. Within the shrine, the image of the god reposed in a little ark, or portable inner shrine, which could be lifted out and placed upon the barque in which the deity made his journeys abroad on stated occasions.

The daily ritual of service to the image was in its main outlines the same in all the temples, though there were many minor variations, and in some temples the ritual was much more elaborate than in others. At Thebes the priest of Amen had sixty separate ceremonies to perform each day; at Abydos there were only thirty-six.

Generally speaking, the procedure was as follows. Early in the morning the priest of the day, after lustrations, entered the Holy of Holies, bearing incense in a censer, and stood before the shrine. He first loosened the door that closed the shrine, repeating as he did so a stereotyped phrase: 'The cord is broken, and the seal loosened,—I come, and I bring to thee the eye of Horus. Thine eye belongs to thee, O Horus.' The breaking of the clay seal was accompanied by another set phrase, and also the drawing of the bolt. As the doors of the shrine opened and the god was revealed, the priest prostrated himself and chanted 'The gates of heaven open, the gates of earth are undone. . . . The gates of heaven are opened, and the nine gods appear radiant, the god N is exalted upon his great throne. . . . Thy beauty belongs to thee, O god N; thou naked one, clothe thyself.' Taking his vessels, the priest then began to perform the daily toilet of the god. He sprinkled water on the image twice from four jugs, clothed it with linen wrappings of white, green, red, and brown, and painted it with green and black paint. Finally he fed the image, by laying before it bread, beef, geese, wine, and water, and decorated its table with flowers.

This was the regular daily service; but in addition there were great festival occasions when enormous quantities of food and drink were offered to the god. After their ceremonial appropriation, the greater part of these provisions, no doubt, became the perquisite of the priests; but a certain portion was reserved for the use of the distinguished dead who had adorned the temple by the dedication of votive statues. 'The dead desired to share in the food from the altar of the god, after that the god had satisfied himself therewith.' In addition the wrappings of the divine image were taken off, and given as bandages for wrapping the mummies of those who had been benefactors of the temple—thereby, no doubt, securing their blessedness in the other world.

On great festival occasions, there was one special addition to the ordinary ritual, besides the multiplication of offerings. The chief event of such a day was that the people should 'behold the beauty of their Lord.' The little image was, therefore, taken out of its chapel in its portable shrine, which, carefully swathed in veils, was placed on a barque carried by poles on the shoulders of several priests. This barque was carried through the open court of the temple, and thereafter through the town. At intervals it was set down upon a stone pedestal, and, when one of these stations of the god was reached, incense was burned and prayers were offered, and at last the hangings which closed in the sides of the ark were withdrawn, and the image of the god was revealed for a moment to the eyes of the faithful. Besides these journeys through his own town for the benefit of his faithful people, the image was in the habit of making occasional ceremonial visits to the gods of neighbouring towns—voyaging, on these occasions, in one of the ships which were attached to the temple. The visit, which doubtless had its origin in some traditionary intercourse of the two gods, was duly returned by the image which had been visited.

These little cultus images were supposed to be endowed with the power of giving oracles. For a discussion of the consultation of images, see art. DIVINATION (Egyptian), vol. iv. p. 793 ff.

One other attribute of these images remains to be noticed. They were endowed with magical powers of healing, and, on sufficiently great occasions, these powers were brought into requisition. A late legend, composed for the glory of the Moon-god, Khonsu, relates how Bent-resht, princess of Bekhten, and sister of Neferu-ra, the wife of Ramses II., was possessed by an evil spirit which could not be driven out. In answer to a request

made to Ramses by the prince of Bekhten, the image of Khonsu was sent to the rescue, healed the distressed damsel, and was detained in the land of Bekhten for more than three years. The prince of Bekhten would fain have kept the wonder-working image altogether, but was induced to send the god back to Egypt by a vision in which he saw Khonsu coming out of his shrine in the form of a golden hawk, and flying back to his native land (cf. art. DISEASE AND MEDICINE [Egyptian], vol. iv. p. 753).

These little images were the chief objects of Egyptian worship, so far as the temples were concerned; but, in addition, the temples of the various deities were provided with innumerable other images of the gods. These were mainly votive offerings contributed by pious people who believed themselves to have been the recipients of favours from some particular god, or who desired to receive favours. Thus the little temple of Mut at Thebes became, for some reason, a perfect store-house of votive images of the goddess Sekhmet; and the bronze and stone images of the gods found in most museums are largely of this votive class. Further, images of the gods were extensively used in connexion with the family religion of the Egyptians. The remains of several houses give evidence of the existence of a recess in the wall of the central hall, whose adornment of religious scenes points to it having been the focus for family worship, and the multitude of little statuettes of the gods in pottery, bronze, silver, and even gold, shows how wide-spread was the custom of having a tutelary image of the favourite god to watch over the house. In the later stages of the Egyptian religion the image of Horus subduing the powers of evil seems to have been the standard protective figure for the house; but under the Empire the favourite domestic divinities were not any of the great gods, but minor deities. Chief among these were the grotesque little bandy-legged god Bes, and his wife, the hippopotamus-shaped Taurt. Images of these very humble gods had an unbounded vogue, and were supposed to protect against evil spirits. They were found in every household, and were often wrought into the handles of mirrors and other toilet articles, while they were frequently worn, especially by children, as amulets. The curious little images of deformed children, called *pataikoi* by Herodotus (iii. 37) and regarded as the sons of Ptah, shared in the popularity of Bes and Taurt.

3. Animals as living images of deity.—It must not be forgotten that, in addition to all their graven and molten images, the Egyptians possessed living images of certain of their gods, and that in the later historical period the worship of these developed to an extraordinary extent, so much so as to have impressed upon other nations the idea, totally erroneous at least as regards the greater part of Egyptian religious history, that the Egyptians were a race of animal-worshippers. Originally, as we have seen, certain deities were conceived of under the guise of animals, and through the whole historic period certain animals were held to be living images, incarnations of divinity. Chief among these, of course, were the Apis-bull of Memphis, the incarnation of Ptah, and the Mnevis-bull of Heliopolis, the incarnation of Ra. But, while this is so, the development of animal-worship which excited the attention of Herodotus and the derision of Juvenal belongs only to the decadence of the religion. 'It was a remarkable adjunct to the Egyptian religion, but it did not belong to its original structure. In later times veneration for the sacred cat, monkey, sheep, and serpent increased greatly . . . but the ancient faith of the people knew nothing of this craze' (A. Erman, *Handbook*, p. 24). Of one Egyptian divinity alone no image was ever made for purposes of worship. This is Maat, the goddess of truth, who appears in the scenes of judgment before Osiris, and whose little figure, crowned with a single feather, is continually presented by the king as an offering to the god whom he is worshipping.

4. Images of human beings used in a religious connexion.—There remains to be noticed the extensive use made by the Egyptians of images of human beings in a religious connexion, especially in connexion with their belief in the life after death. The necessity of securing that the *ka* of the deceased person should have a recognizable habitation to which to return resulted in steps of a very elaborate kind being taken to secure so important an end. First of these was, of course, the mummification of the body, ensuring its continuance for a long period. But the mummy might perish or be destroyed, so there grew up, from a very early period, the custom of placing in the tomb of the deceased an image, or many images, of him in stone or wood. The first requisite of these images was that they should be absolutely faithful likenesses of the person whom they were meant to represent; and the result is a series of statues which aim, not at beauty, but at life-like resemblance—physical deformities being reproduced with as much care as beauties. No other nation offers anything in the least corresponding to the series of portrait-statues which has been preserved to us in the tombs of Egypt.

Besides the portrait image or images, the tomb of an Egyptian was furnished with a number of other images, of tiny size, representing the servants who were supposed to discharge for their master any work which he might be called upon to do in the Sekhet-Aaru, or 'Fields of the Blessed.' These *ushabtis*, or 'answerers,' probably represent the survival from a time when the slaves of the Egyptian grandee were slain at his tomb to accompany and serve him in the other world (cf., further, art. DEATH, etc. [Egyptian], vol. iv. p. 460).

In common with many other nations, the Egyptians believed in the magical power of images of gods and men. These images, made of wax, and smuggled into the house of the person to be injured, were believed to 'cripple the hand of man.' The standard instance occurs in the trial of certain conspirators against Ramses III., where it was proved that the 'superintendent of the cows' had taken a magical book from the Pharaoh's own library, and, in accordance with its directions, had made waxen images, and introduced them into the palace for the purpose of injuring Ramses. This belief plainly comes down from a very early period, as a waxen crocodile is used to punish a criminal in the earliest of Egyptian folk-tales, whose action is supposed to take place in the time of the IIIrd dynasty.

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JAMES BAIKIE.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Greek and Roman).—**1. Greek.**—The cult of images belongs to a later stage of religious development than mere fetishism, or the holding sacred of any object which has acquired supernatural power (*mana*). It is devel-

oped out of such fetishism by growing anthropomorphism, as the gods become humanized and come into closer relations with the human spirit. Among primitive peoples there is a belief in a near connexion between an image and the person or thing portrayed; so that what affects the image must also affect the original of the image. Connected with beliefs of this kind were some of the customs of early Greek religion. The temple was the abode of the deity, his image being his surrogate, and taking his place. The deity in a measure resided in the image; petitions to him were laid on its knees, incense was burned before it, and the treasures given to the god were heaped about it. Among the most pleasing gifts to the god were other images, whether of himself or of votaries. The notion appears to be that, as the image of a votary stands in the presence of the image of the god, so the god will be near the votary's person to aid and direct him. The tomb rivalled the temple as a place for images, and with the dead were buried a great quantity of terra-cotta figures.

The religious objection to the use of images in the worship of gods and heroes, which was strongly developed among the Jews, and has been adopted by the Muhammadans and some branches of the Christian Church, can scarcely be said to have existed in Greece. We have learned from the brilliant discoveries of Schliemann and Evans that idols were known in the country many centuries before the arrival there of the Greek race. The chief deity at Knossos in Crete seems to have been a great goddess of nature, of the same class as Mylitta and Cybele, who is represented on gems as flanked by lions, and in a remarkable statuette of enamel as holding snakes in her hands. With her was associated a male deity of less importance, who is sometimes depicted on gems, but who was usually worshipped in the symbol of a double axe, which is of frequent use in Crete (see, further, 'Ægean' section above, and art. AXE).

After the decay of the Minoan and Mycenæan civilizations, and the entry of the Greeks upon the scene, still in a barbarous condition, the art of image-making, like all other products of civilization, seems to begin again at the lowest level, and gradually to rise. When a site of an ancient city in Greece or on the coast of Asia is excavated, there is usually found on the lower levels a multitude of rude terra-cottas. The same is true, in some districts, of graves.

It is a noteworthy fact that the great mass of these images represent the female figure. This may be the result of religious conservatism, as the Greeks probably adopted from their predecessors in the country the cultus of goddesses of growth and procreation, the varieties of the great Mother-goddess whose cultus was spread over the whole East, from Babylon to the Ægean. Figures of the characteristic deities of Greece—Zeus, Apollo, Poseidon, and others—do not appear. Figures of men on horseback and in chariots do, however, occur (fig. 1),[1] most commonly in Cyprus, but also in Greece Proper. Whether these images represent ordinary mortals or the heroized dead is a question not easy to answer.

Before the 7th cent. B.C. these works are of a very primitive character, and their date is not easy to determine. If of stone, they represent the naked female body in rudest form, the arms and legs being roughly indicated, and the head a mere flat protuberance. These figures are especially characteristic of the Islands of the Ægean. Commoner on all the coasts of that sea are figures of terra-cotta of conical form. Sometimes they are naked, more often draped, the legs hidden by the garments, the arms mere stumps, the head formed by a few pinches of finger and thumb in the soft clay. Some points, such as the breasts, are roughly indicated. There is the standing type (fig. 2, 3) and the seated type but slightly distinguished from it by a bend




FIG. 1.




FIG. 2.

in the front of the figure (fig. 4). Jewellery and adornments are added, for the most part in paint. Sometimes the image grasps an infant in its arms.

Such images have been found in abundance on the great religious sites of the Greek world—Ephesus, Argos, Naucratis, and elsewhere. Num-



FIG. 3.



FIG. 4.

bers of them are also found in the early tombs. That they had a religious meaning can scarcely be doubted; but clearly to define that meaning is not easy. In some way they were regarded as a gift pleasing to the gods, and as talismans to protect the spirit of the dead in his journey to the land of souls. The outstanding feature is that they are predominantly female, male figures being almost entirely absent; here we have a point of contact with pre-Greek religion in Greek lands. It seems that the worship which in the Mycenæan age adhered to certain sites, and dedicated them to the worship of the ancient goddess of nature, still survived for many ages. It has, in fact, survived in those regions to the present day, when the Mother-goddess of Christianity takes in the beliefs of the people the place of her heathen prototype.

In the 6th cent. B.C. the old generalized type of goddess becomes differentiated in various localities. She merges in the goddesses of the Greek pantheon, and carries their symbols. As Aphrodite she carries the dove, as Artemis the stag (fig. 5), as Persephone the sacrificial pig; as Athene she wears the helmet or the ægis. Excavations, *e.g.*, on the Athenian Acropolis have brought to light a multitude of seated and standing figures which can represent only Athene herself, and are sometimes armed (fig. 6). In Corfu there is a series extending over a long period, in which Artemis may clearly be recognized. Many such local series may be studied in our museums; and at this time male

[1] Figures 1 to 6 are from F. Winter's *Typen der figürlichen Terrakotten*, Stuttgart, 1903.

deities as well as female become common. The terra-cotta figures are now swept from the vague and merely traditional use of the pre-historic age into the full current of Greek Olympian religion.



Fig. 5.



Fig. 6.

In the 4th cent. B.C., if not earlier, we may trace a further change of usage. The great mass of terra-cottas from temples and from graves at sites like Myrina in Æolis and Tanagra in Bœotia are clearly not religious in character. They represent youths and girls of pleasing type, either simply or as engaged in conversation or in games. Sacred figures are rare among them. When such figures were thrown into a grave, they seem to have been purposely broken, as if to unfit them for any but sepulchral use. The meaning of these images has been much discussed. Some archæologists would see in them survivals of the primitive custom of slaying wife or slave to accompany the dead to the world of shades; others would see an intention to furnish the tomb with pleasing copies from the world without. Probably the true explanation is a very simple one. Figures of terra-cotta were used as playthings by children, and they were part of household decoration. When representing the gods they served as images for domestic worship, and were placed in niches or on pedestals. The Greeks were so devoted to the representation of the human form that they applied it everywhere, even to common household utensils. So they naturally regarded little images as gifts grateful alike to the gods and to the dead, fitted to people alike the temple and the tomb. And they had one very great advantage as offerings—they were extremely cheap.[1]

Meantime, for the larger cultus-images of the gods and goddesses who were brought in by the Greek invaders we may trace another origin. The primitive Greeks have no scruple in attaching divine virtues to stocks and stones; but they must be stocks and stones of a special character, such as the divine powers themselves had marked out and chosen. Trees which for some reason were regarded as full of divine energy, and meteoric stones which had fallen, or were supposed to have fallen, from the sky, easily acquired a sacred character. That mere obelisks, called ἀργοὶ λίθοι, were even in later Greece regarded as sacred we learn from Pausanias,[2] who saw ranged in the agora of Pharæ thirty conical stones, each of which received the name of a particular deity. The testimony of Pausanias has been confirmed by the recent discovery in Arcadia of a number of square pilasters, each surmounted by a conical stone, and inscribed with the name of a god—Zeus, Artemis, the Hero, and so on.[3]

As the spirit of anthropomorphism in religion grew strong in Greece and Asia Minor, it was very natural to add something of human appearance to a conical stone or the trunk of a dead tree. The coins struck in the Roman age in cities of Asia preserve for us the outlines of *simulacra* which can scarcely be said to be of human form, yet are by no means shapeless blocks. Of such a kind were the images at Perga of Anassa or Artemis (fig. 7),[1]



Fig. 7.

at Ephesus of the local goddess (fig. 8), at Euromus in Caria of the Carian god of the double axe (fig. 9). A head, wearing a tall crown, emerges from the stone; arms are inserted; the wooden cylinder is covered with bronze or gold wrought by an artist. The process is well described in Is $40^{19f.}$. Some-



Fig. 8.



Fig. 9.

times rude images excavated from the ground, or brought from foreign lands, were accepted as a kind of revelation of a deity. Their uncouthness was no obstacle; for there is truth in the well-known saying of Goethe: 'Wonder-working images are usually but ugly pictures.'

The origin of idols is similar in most countries. But what is most interesting in the present connexion is the way in which Greek artistic taste and the love of human beauty formed out of such unpromising beginnings a pantheon of exquisite forms. In this the Greeks are almost unique; for, although mediæval Europe ran riot in the production of images of angels, apostles, and saints, there was not then in existence the appreciation of beautiful bodies which is shown in Greek sculpture.

In the religion or religions of historic Greece there were several strata or tendencies; and the tendency to religious sculptural idealism does not belong to all of them. To the philosophers the representation of the gods in human form did not appeal; and the writings of Plato and other great thinkers show a steady contempt for plastic art. At the other end of the scale, the uncultured husbandmen and slaves were ready to venerate figures of the gods in proportion to their wonder-working power rather than in proportion to their beauty. The Dionysiac and other mysteries afforded to their religious feelings a more suitable field of exercise than did the staid worship of the great temples. But between the intellectuals on the one hand and the superstitious on the other came the mass of intelligent and art-loving citizens. To them the State-religions, belonging to the cities and great shrines of Greece, centring in the worship of the deities of Olympus, and the heroized ancestors of the clans, afforded full satisfaction. For them

[1] An excellent general account of Greek figurines will be found in E. Pottier's *Statuettes de terre cuite*, Paris, 1890.

[2] VII. xxii. 4.

[3] Ἀρχαιολ. Ἐφημερίς, 1911, p. 160.

[1] Figures 7 to 18 are from coins in the British Museum.

the poets and dramatists worked into beautiful poems the tales of mythology; and for them the artists incorporated in bronze or marble or ivory and gold the ideas of the race as to the higher powers. As to the great city festivals, they were of mixed character. The conservative tradition, which is so marked a feature of all religious cult, retained in them much that had belonged to prehistoric and even to non-Hellenic days, scraps of savage religion preserved as flies are preserved in amber. But as a whole the festivals were remoulded by the Olympian religion and filled with Hellenic sweetness and light.

Maximus of Tyre, a rhetorician of the Antonine age, has left us a pleasing, if somewhat verbose, defence of Greek image-worship.[1] Men, he says, who can raise their spirits directly into communion with the divine perhaps need no images. But this kind of man is rare; and it would be impossible to find any whole race conscious of the divine and needing no such aid. The Persians worship fire, and solemnly feed it with logs; the Egyptians regard the animals of the Nile as sacred, poor things though they be; the Celts venerate the oak, the Pæonians a sun-disk set up on a pillar; the Paphians worship Aphrodite in the form of a white pyramid. But the Greek custom is to represent the gods by the most beautiful things on earth, pure material, the human form, consummate art. The idea of those who make divine images in human shape is quite reasonable, since the spirit of man is the nearest of all things to God and most god-like. If the Greeks are lifted to the contemplation of God by the skill of a Pheidias, and the Egyptians by honour given to animals, while others honour a river and others fire, the variations do not vex Maximus: only let men know God, love him, think of him.

There is a well-known saying of Herodotus,[2] that it was Homer and Hesiod who first distinguished the functions of the gods and assigned their forms. Of course, in the time when the Homeric poems were written, there could be no question of statues of the gods; there can have been none but the rudest images. But it is doubtless true that Homeric incidents and descriptions may have dwelt in the minds of great sculptors of subsequent ages, and inspired them. It is expressly told us[3] that, when Pheidias made the great statue of Zeus at Olympia, he had in his mind the lines of Homer which describe how the nod of Zeus shook Olympus, and how his hair floated out, although in fact the Homeric lines would far better suit a Zeus of the Hellenistic age than the stately and self-contained colossus of Pheidias. Homer did much to settle the order and personalities of the Hellenic pantheon; but, as a matter of fact, he has not a statuesque imagination. We should be mistaken if we took back to Greek times that predominance of literature over art which has been, though of late years less markedly, a feature of modern times.

The great difference between the religious art of the Greeks on the one hand, and that of Babylon, Egypt, and India on the other, is that, whereas the Oriental nations were content with merely symbolic representations of the divine powers, the Greeks were ever struggling to merge mere symbolism in anthropomorphism.

The gods of Egypt differ one from the other not in shape but in the attributes which they hold, or in the animal heads which are placed on their shoulders. Isis has the head of a cow, Horus of a hawk, and so on. The deities of the Babylonians are often furnished with wings to indicate swiftness, but they are only ceremonial wings, and not meant for real flight. Sometimes they hold a pair of animals or birds in their hands to indicate their power over animal nature; but the arrangement is merely a conventional one; the creatures are not carried suitably. In India the symbolic turn given to art runs riot: the varied powers of the gods are indicated by giving them many heads, and many hands full of instruments for various purposes.

In the earliest distinctive Greek art, deities like those of Egypt and Babylon sometimes make their appearance. On the chest of Cypselus, preserved at Olympia, Pausanias saw represented a female figure which puzzled him. It was inscribed with the name of Artemis, but it had wings on the shoulders, and carried in the two hands a lion and a panther.[1] As it became adult, Greek taste set aside this crude symbolism, and preferred to represent the swiftness of Artemis not by wings, but by the lithesness and vigour of her frame, and her power over nature by giving her as an attendant and friend a dog or a stag. In the art of the 6th cent. the Greek deities almost always carry an attribute by which they may be identified—Zeus an eagle or a thunder-bolt, Hermes a herald's staff, Apollo a bow or a lyre, and the like; but these become less necessary later, when the deity can be identified by bodily type. There is no fear of hesitation whether a 5th cent. image represents Apollo or Herakles, Athene or Aphrodite, since in each case the qualities of the deity are thoroughly incorporated and revealed in the bodily form. In mature Greek art external symbolism is not entirely absent. Eros (Love) and Nike (Victory) still retain their wings, though they use them to fly with, and do not merely carry them. Hermes has small wings on his cap or on his heels, and river-gods are still bull-headed. These, however, are little more than survivals.

If we bring together Pliny's *Natural History* (bks. xxxiv.–xxxvi.) and the descriptions of Pausanias, we are able to discern the historic origins of religious sculpture. Just as Homer stands at the source of Greek poetry, so at the source of Greek sculpture we have the figure of Dædalus, who is himself merely mythical, and who was set down as the maker of most figures the actual origin of which was lost in the mists of antiquity. But a number of artists classed by the ancient writers as pupils of Dædalus (Dædalidæ) really existed, for we find their signatures on existing bases of statues. Beginning about 600 B.C., we can trace lines of descent in a variety of materials. One school in Peloponnesus began with work in wood: and so, by inlaying the wood with gold, ivory, and ebony, or clothing wooden statues with metal, worked their way towards that technique in gold and ivory which was used in the 5th cent. for the most magnificent of the statues of the gods. Another school, of which Rhœcus and Theodorus of Samos were the most noted members, discovered or improved the art of casting statues in bronze, and so made antiquated the earlier fashion of beating out plates of bronze into the required shape, and fastening them with nails. Other schools, belonging mostly to the Greek islands, such as Chios, Paros, and Naxos, used their native marble, and superseded the old rude figures cut out of limestone by delicate and beautiful statues of glittering material.

It is impossible here to follow, even in outline, the process whereby the sculptors of Greece succeeded in embodying more and more completely the types of the great deities of their race. It was a long and intricate history. A great English book on the subject is L. R. Farnell's *Cults of the Greek States* (5 vols., Oxford, 1896-1909). A still larger work had been planned by J. Overbeck (*Kunstmythologie*, Leipzig, 1871-89), but he died after publishing only three volumes. The articles in W. H. Roscher's *Ausführliches Lexikon der gr. und röm. Mythologie* (Leipzig, 1884 ff.) contain usually the most recent information on the subjects with which they deal; but the material grows every day; and a complete digest of it is scarcely possible. Three statues of Apollo, represented on coins, may serve to illustrate the process: fig. 10 is of the Apollo of

[1] *Dissert.* viii. [2] ii. 53.
[3] Strabo, VIII. XXX. [p. 354].

[1] Paus. v. xix. 5.

Delos, a 6th cent. work of Dædalidæ; fig. 11 is of the Apollo of Miletus, made by Canachus of Sicyon late in the 6th cent.; fig. 12 is of the Apollo at Alexandria Troas, a work of Scopas, but in a somewhat stiff and archaic style.

It is evident that the higher qualities of the deity are much less easy thus to incorporate than the



FIG. 10.—Coin of Athens.

lower. Apollo as the god of the gymnasium was easy to render in art, since he had to be only an idealized athlete. Apollo, the god of music and song, could also be embodied, a rapt and poetic expression being not beyond the resources of developed Greek art. But Apollo as the prophet



FIG. 11.—Coin of Miletus.




FIG. 12.—Coin of Troas.

of the supreme Deity, or as the great patron of purification, was a less easy subject for art. In the same way, Artemis as an archeress or as the queen of the nymphs naturally attracted the artist, but Artemis as goddess of moisture and source of the springing powers of nature was less easy to depict. Thus the rendering of the gods in human form did undoubtedly tend in a measure to limit them, and to throw into the background that which in them inspired awe rather than pleasant appreciation. Perhaps, however, we may make a few exceptions to this rule. Of the gold and ivory colossus of Zeus at Olympia (fig. 13), Quintilian says that it added something to the accepted religion;[1] and Dio Chrysostom in the 1st cent. A.D. tells us how it affected educated men.



FIG. 13.—Coin of Elis.

'Our Zeus is peaceful and gentle in all ways, as the overlooker of an undivided and united Hellas . . . set up gentle and stately in form above all grief, giver of life and means of living and all good things, the common father and saviour and guardian of men, so far as it was possible for a mere man by meditating to copy the divine and infinite nature. . . . If any man were utterly burdened in heart, after meeting in life many misfortunes and troubles, a stranger to sweet sleep, even he, I think, standing before this image would forget all the terrible pains and sufferings of our mortal life' (*Orat.* xii.).

In the same way, the great statue of Athene Parthenos at Athens (fig. 14) concentrated about herself the patriotic ardour of the people of the city; she was not only the deity who gave wisdom in council and skill in craft, but she also embodied the common life, the destiny, the star of the Athenians, and all the better because she was as dignified and majestic as Pheidias could make her. So also, when, about 300 B.C., Eutychides the sculptor made for the people of the newly-founded city of Antioch a representation of the Fortune, or Tyche, of that city, he represented her as a most graceful figure seated on a rock, with the river-god Orontes emerging at her feet. The statue, of which copies are extant (fig. 15), not



FIG. 14.—Coin of Athens.



FIG. 15.—Coin of King Tigranes.

only gained wide admiration, and was copied in many other cities, but we are told that it was held in the highest religious reverence. Probably it greatly helped to make the people of Antioch feel that they were citizens of no mean city. In Greece, civic politics and religion were nearly related: the general or the statesman was often also a priest of the deity of the city.

A different fate attended another sculptural creation of the same period—the Sarapis of Bryaxis. Religiously, Sarapis was of great importance, as he united the conquering Greek and the conquered Egyptian in a common cultus,[1] since the former could see in him a form of Hades, and the latter a modification of Osiris. But the sculptor, if we may judge from the poor copies extant, tried to introduce into the expression of the face of the deity too much of mystery and solemnity, and so passed the bounds of possible sculpture. In a painting he might have been more successful.

Strict anthropomorphism in the embodiment in art of their deities was eminently suited to the Greeks. They were little inclined to mysticism; their minds were clear-cut and practical; and they were content to abide within the limits set them by the eminently statuesque character of their art. At the best, they could produce images perfectly adapted to the character of their worship and their religious festivals—figures which a good citizen of fine taste could look on with pride, and which he could with self-satisfaction contrast with the poorer inventions of surrounding peoples. But in the latter part of the 4th cent., when the city-State was falling into decay, and the city festivals were becoming mere pageants, we cannot be surprised that the statues of the gods lost their high dignity. Sculptors of that age, notably Praxiteles, though they could still produce exquisite forms, produced them at a lower level. The images of the gods no longer embodied human nature at its highest ideal stage, but rather human nature on the level of the average sensuous man. The Apollo killing a lizard, by Praxiteles, represents the deity on the model of an idle and sportive youth. His Aphrodite, though she cannot be called impure or sensual, is yet little more than a woman of exquisite form engaged in taking a bath. The tendency thus begun soon went further, and in the Hellenistic age we find images of male and female deities which could satisfy only a sensual and pleasure-worshipping people. Of course, there were reactions. The great statues of Demeter and Persephone set up by Damophon at Lycosura in Arcadia in the 2nd cent. B.C., still extant in a

[1] *Inst. Orat.* XII. x. 9.

[1] Cf. GRÆCO-EGYPTIAN RELIGION, § 2 (1), vol. vi. p. 376.

fragmentary condition, have much of the ancient dignity. Sculptors who were set to make cultus-images for temples went back for their models to the great creations of the 5th century. Some new types, such as that of the Fortune of Antioch already mentioned, had real religious value. But an art which cannot produce original types suited to the genius of a new age must soon decay. In the Roman age the figures of the Greek deities which were produced in unlimited abundance in the workshops of the sculptors have no vitality. They are only elegantly eclectic — charming compositions, but not at all stimulating to the powers of worship. We are not, therefore, surprised to find, from the trustworthy evidence of coins, that many of the cities of Asia Minor set aside the fine Greek statues of their city deities which held the place of honour after Alexander the Great, and re-installed the quaint and ugly figures which those statues had superseded. In the time of St. Paul the people of Ephesus had gone back to the image which fell from heaven. Rome was filled with splendid statues of the gods brought from Greece by conquering generals and by Emperors; but they were cherished mainly as works of art, and not as cultus-images. In fact, the same transition from worship to admiration took place in regard to these statues which has occurred in the change of modern feeling in regard to Gothic cathedrals.

2. Roman.—In Roman religious usage, images do not take nearly so important a place as they do in Greek. Neither the anthropomorphic tendency nor æsthetic taste was so highly developed among the Romans. In fact, the primitive deities of the Romans were in nature too vague and abstract to be at all appropriately rendered in plastic art. At lowest, they were mere traditional daemonic forces connected with agriculture, or the pastoral life, or the various activities of man; at highest, special aspects of a great spiritual force. Perhaps, apart from Greek and Etruscan influence, the Romans would not have had any statues of the gods. The early graves of central Italy furnish us with no such population of terra-cotta figures as do those of Greece and Asia. Perhaps the only images of true Roman type, which the Romans themselves called *imagines*, were the naturalistic portraits or masks, in wax or metal, of heroes and ancestors which Romans of birth set up in their houses and carried in funeral processions, and which served to localize the spirits of the departed, and bind them to the living. But Greek influences began at an early period to tell upon Rome, alike radiating from Greek colonies such as Cumæ, and coming through the mediation of the Etruscans. As the Greek gods, through the influence of the *Sibylline Books*, were called to Rome on the occasion of famine or pestilence, or any crisis with which the native deities seemed unable to cope, they must needs have their temples, and Greek sculptors were called in to make images for those temples. On the coins of the Roman Republic we find copies of many such statues; but there is little that is Roman about them; they are merely Greek figures of the Hellenistic age. Occasionally the sculptor was called on to portray beings of Roman origin, such as Vejovis (fig. 16), Saturnus, Janus (fig. 17), Nerio, or Acca Larentia; but he fulfilled his task by merely adapting the nearest Greek type in his repertory. The veneration of images, however, by the 1st cent. B.C. had become part of the ordinary domestic religion. We learn from the excavations at Pompeii that many houses had a *Lararium*, or private shrine, presided over by the *Lares* (fig. 18), who were represented either by snakes or by the figures of young men, the type of whom was probably taken from the Greek Dioscuri.

The vast crowd of images of the gods which had been constantly increasing in Greece and Italy until the 3rd cent. A.D. met with extreme hatred from the Christians, who were as eager to destroy them



FIG. 16.—Roman coin.



FIG. 17.—Roman coin.

as were the Puritans of England to break up the sculptured figures of our churches. A few great statues were carried to Byzantium, as works of art



FIG. 18.—Roman coin

rather than as objects of cultus; but they gradually disappeared; and naturally none survived the Turkish conquest.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in the course of the art., reference may be made to H. B. Walters, *Art of the Greeks*, London, 1906, and *Art of the Romans*, do. 1911; P. Gardner, *Principles of Greek Art*, New York, 1913; S. Reinach, *Répertoire de la statuaire grecque et romaine*, 3 vols., Paris, 1897–1904; G. Wissowa, *Rel. und Kultus der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912. P. GARDNER.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Hebrew and Canaanite).—I. *HEBREWS IN PRE-PALESTINIAN TIMES.*—Israelite tradition on this subject is confused and contradictory. In its oldest form (J) there is no suggestion of idol-worship among the forefathers of the nation, except in the Golden Calf episode (Ex 32), which is a satirical narrative directed against the bull-worship of the Northern kingdom. The E cycle, while admitting that not only the Fathers, including Terah, the father of Abraham, but also the Hebrews in Egypt (Jos $24^{2.\ 14f.}$) worshipped other gods, shows no knowledge of the legend according to which the father of Abraham was an idolater and even a maker of idols (*Jubilees*, 12; *Apoc. Abr.* 1–8; *Gen. R.* xxxviii. 13; *Qur'ân*, ix. 115, xix. 43 ff., xxi. 53 ff., xxvi. 70 ff., xxxvii. 81 ff. etc; cf. *JE*, *s.v.* 'Abraham'). This cycle represents the worship of the *t'râphîm*, that is to say, of at least one class of images, as a foreign custom (Gn $31^{19.\ 34\ f.}$). Ezekiel, on the other hand, accuses the Israelites of having worshipped 'abominations,' no doubt images, in Egypt ($20^{8.\ 18}$ $23^{3.\ 8}$; cf. 16^{26}), and perhaps also of having served their tribal gods ('the "abominations" of the house of Israel') under the form of 'creeping things and abominable beasts' ($8^{10\text{-}12}$).

It is probable, however, that, as long as the Hebrews led a nomadic existence, they made little or no use of figured representations of the divinity, at least in public worship (cf. the case of the pre-Islâmic Arabs [J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1897, p. 102]). Even at a more advanced stage of culture, the Semitic peoples still represented the divinity in their most venerated sanctuaries (*e.g.* on Mount Carmel) by objects which had little or no resemblance to the human form (Tac. *Hist.* ii. 78). Analogies may be found in the case of the Romans (Varro, in Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, IV. xxxi. 2; Plut. *Numa*, 8; Pliny, *HN* xxxiv. 4 [15]), Greeks (Lucian, *de Sacrif.* 10 f.), Egyptians

(Lucian, *de Dea Syr.* 3), and Persians (Deinon, in Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* 65 [ed. Dindorf, i. 71]; Herod. i. 131; Strabo, xv. iii. 13 [732]).

As a matter of fact, the religion of Jahweh at the time of the sojourn in the desert probably did not carry with it such a strict prohibition against the use of images in worship as the first decalogue ascribes to Moses (Ex $20^{4f.}$, Dt $5^{8f.}$); otherwise it would be difficult to explain the freedom with which the most faithful worshippers of Jahweh made use of them down to the 8th cent. (see II. 2). The much more ancient decalogue of Ex 34 condemns only a certain kind of images (34^{17}). It is probable that the nomadic Hebrews used statuettes as amulets and in private worship (Gn $31^{19.\ 30-35}$ 35^{2-4}; cf. Ex $33^{5f.}$ 35^{22}). Among the Arabs of the time of Muhammad (W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], London, 1894, p. 208 f.), the Phœnicians, and the Canaanites, images were much more frequently employed for domestic purposes than for public worship. The same is true of the Ægean peoples (G. Karo, *ARW* vii. [1904] 155 f.).

II. *AFTER THE SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE.*—**1. Idol-worship among the Canaanites.**—Canaan was a land of idols (Nu 33^{52}, Dt 7^{25} 12^{3} 29^{17}, Ps 106^{38}, etc.)—a fact which has been confirmed by the excavations recently made in Palestine. As yet nothing has been found in the sanctuaries but stelæ, and it is probable that the deity was usually represented on them under the form of a *maṣṣēbhā*, an *'ašērā*, or some natural object. But in private houses, in tombs, and in a sacrificial trench at Gezer, statuettes have been discovered in profusion which were obviously used in private worship (amulets, *ex-votos*, etc.). Those of most frequent occurrence are images of goddesses (Astarte) in bas-relief or, more rarely, in the round, tending towards the Babylonian type in the North and becoming more 'Egyptized' in the South. An Atargatis (?) has also been found, some phalli, heads and shoulders of the bull, a brazen serpent, figurines of doves, cows, fish, statuettes of Egyptian divinities—Ptah, Osiris, Thōth, Naprit, Thueris, and, above all, Bes. Although statues were of rarer occurrence in the public sanctuaries of Palestine, we need not conclude that they were entirely lacking (1 S 5^{2-4}); they were naturally much more exposed to destruction than private ones.

LITERATURE.—*PEFSt*, especially from vol. xx., new ser. (1890); *ZDPV*, from vol. xxv. (1902); *MNDPV*, from vol. viii. (1902); *Harvard Theol. Review*, ii. [1909] 102–113, iii. [1910] 136–138, 248–263, iv. [1911] 136–143; *RB*, vols. i.–xii. (1892–1903), new ser. vol. i. ff. (1904 ff.); H. Vincent, *Canaan, d'après l'exploration récente*, Paris, 1907, pp. 152–180 (an excellent general survey).

2. Idol-worship in Jahwism.—After they had settled in Palestine, the Israelites, no doubt taking their lead from the people of the country, proceeded freely to the fabrication of images of Jahweh (and eventually of other gods), and began to worship them in the public sanctuaries as well as in private. Micah had in the 'house of gods' of which he was proprietor a graven image and a molten image (according to another version, an *'ephōd* and a *terāphīm*) which were afterwards transferred to the great sanctuary of Dan, where priests of the line of Moses officiated (Jg 17–18). Gideon made an *'ephōd* which was worshipped by the whole of Israel (8^{24-27}). At Nob there was an *'ephōd* served by the priests of the family of Eli, which was often consulted by Saul and David (see II. 7). David had a *terāphīm* in his house (1 S 19^{13-16}).

In the great sanctuaries of the Northern kingdom, *e.g.* at Bethel and Dan, and perhaps in Samaria (Hos 8^{6}), Jahweh was worshipped in the form of a golden bull (1 K 12^{28-30}). The author of the Book of Kings, who looks on the past from the point of view of the prophets of the 7th cent. B.C., describes these acts of idolatry as innovations of Jeroboam I., but they were quite in keeping with the ideas which were dominant in the Jahwism of the 10th cent. B.C.: neither Elijah nor Elisha, nor even Amos in the 8th cent., thought of censuring the worship of 'golden calves.' In the kingdom of Judah a brazen serpent, said to have been made by Moses himself, received sacrifices till Hezekiah destroyed it (2 K 18^{4}). The land was full of idols (Is 2^{8}). Ezekiel, about 592 B.C., mentions an 'image of jealousy' set up in the Temple ($8^{3.\ 5}$).

At Gezer and at Taanach several statuettes of Astarte have been found in heaps of Israelite débris (Vincent, *op. cit.*, 162, 164 f.).

3. The meaning attached to idol-worship.—The first Semitic statues were probably stelæ (*maṣṣēbhā*) which had been given a human or animal form: the statue of Panammon is called *nṣb*, the same word as *n'ṣṣēbh* (a Heb. synonym of *maṣṣēbhā*), and the Arab. *nuṣb*. Idolatry was thus in principle only a variety of fetishism, commonly practised by the Hebrews and the other Semites (*maṣṣēbhā*, *'ašērā*, 'ark'). We must, then, consider the image as having been, like all other fetishes, a dwelling-place offered to the god, where he consented to take up his abode only after the performance of certain inauguration ceremonies (Jg 8^{27}; cf. C. Fossey, *La Magie assyrienne*, Paris, 1902, p. 132 f.; M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les rel. sém.*[2], do. 1905, pp. 166, 229; E. B. Tylor, *PC*[3], London, 1891, ii. 168 ff.).

4. The rites connected with idol-worship.—In ancient Israel images were kissed (Hos 13^{2}, 1 K 19^{18}; cf. Job 31^{27}; Mish. *Sanh.* vii. 6; Apul. *de Magia*, 56; S. I. Curtiss, *Ursemit. Rel. im Volksleben des heut. Orients*, Leipzig, 1903, pp. 164, 287); incense was offered to them (Ezk 8^{11}); they were consulted as oracles (see II. 7 and 8); they were placed in a closed *cella*, differing thus from most of the other sacred objects of the ancient Semites (Jg 17^{5}; cf. Ep. Jer. $13.\ 17f.\ 21.\ 55$, 1 Mac 10^{83}, Wis 13^{15}); they were clothed in sumptuous garments (Ezk 16^{18}; cf. Jer 10^{9}, Ep. Jer. $11f.\ 20.\ 33.\ 58.\ 72$; Mish. *Sanh.* vii. 6).

Other customs connected with idol-worship are mentioned, but in passages which refer expressly only to pagan idolatry—*e.g.*, the custom of carrying idols in procession (Is 46^{1-7}, Jer 10^{5}, Am 5^{26} (?), Ep. Jer. 4. 26), of giving them food (Sir 30^{18} [Heb. 19], Ep. Jer. $28.\ 30$; Bel and the Dragon), of embracing them, anointing them, washing them, and sprinkling them with water (Mish. *Sanh.* vii. 6), of bowing before them (*ib.*; Ep. Jer. 9), of decorating them with jewels and garlands (Ep. Jer.[9]; Mish. *Aboda Zara*, i. 9), of fixing them in their place with nails (Is 41[7], Jer 10^{4}, Wis 13^{15}) or chains (Is 40^{19}), and of lighting candles for them (Ep. Jer. 19).

5. Names for idols.—The diffusion of the worship of images in ancient Israel is attested by the multiplicity of words used to designate them (cf. *HDB* ii. 451; G. F. Moore, *EBi* ii. 2146–2150). (*a*) *General terms.*—(1) *Ṣelem*, 'image' (2 K 11^{18} [2 Ch 23^{17}], Ezk 7^{20} 16^{17}, Nu 33^{52}, Am 5^{26} [gloss]); (2) *semel*, 'statue' (Dt 4^{16}, Ezk $8^{3.\ 5}$, 2 Ch $33^{7.\ 15}$); (3) *tabhnīth*, originally 'model,' whence 'representation' (Dt 4^{16-18}, Is 44^{13}, Ezk 8^{10} [gloss ?]); (4) *t'mūnā*, 'form' (Dt $4^{16.\ 23.\ 25}$ 5^{8} [= Ex 20^{4}]; (5) *n'ṣīb'ā*, 'portable idol' (Is 46^{1}). (*b*) *Names taken from material or manner of fabrication.*—(6) *'Aṣabbīm* (sing. *'eṣeb*; to it, as to many of the reputedly pagan terms, the Massoretes gave the vowels of בֹּשֶׁת 'shame,' and it thus became identical with עֶצֶב, 'grief'). This term, which is usually applied to idols in general, even idols of silver and gold, doubtless originally meant clay statues (cf. עָצַב, יָצַר); this is probably the reason why the עֲצַבִּים are sometimes distinguished from the graven image (Is 48^{5}, Mic 1^{7}) and from the molten image (Is 48^{5}, Hos 13^{2}). Besides clay statues (Vincent, 158–162, 166, 169, 172 [idol mould]; cf. Wis 15^{7-13}), there are also: (7) the *p'ṣīlīm* (sing. *pesel*), 'graven images,' made of wood (Dt $7^{5.\ 25}$ 12^{3}) or of stone (Is 21^{9}, 2 Ch 34^{4}; Vincent, 153, 157, 173), and sometimes (at least in the case of pagan idols) painted (Wis 13^{14} 15^{4}) or ornamented with silver and gold (Jer 10^{4}). This must have been a very common kind of image, for the word *p'ṣīlīm* could be applied to idols in general, even those made of metal (Is 40^{19} 44^{10}, Jer 10^{14}).

There was also (8) the molten image, *massēkhā*, *nesekh* (Is 41^{29} 48^{5}, Jer 10^{14} 51^{17}), *nāsīkh* (Dn 11^{8}), in gold, silver, or sometimes bronze (see II. 6 (2)). According to certain texts, the bulls of Dan and Bethel were *massēkhōth* (Hos 13^{2}, Ex 32^{4}, Dt $9^{12.\ 16}$, Neh 9^{18}), made by pouring the molten metal into a mould (Ex $32^{4.\ 8.\ 24}$): נסך = 'to cast,' 'to melt' (Is 40^{19} 44^{10}). Cf. Vincent, 163 f., 167 f., 173–175. Again, we have (9) the *περίχρυσα* and *περιάργυρα* (Dt 7^{25}, Is 30^{22}; cf. also Ep. Jer.$^{8.\ 24.\ 39.\ 50.\ 55.\ 57.\ 70f.}$). The framework on to which the sheets of gold or silver were hammered and soldered might be of some common metal (Is 40^{19} 41^{7}; cf. the statuette of Osiris, R. A. S. Macalister, *PEFSt*, new ser., xxxv. [1903] 39) or of wood, such as the 'golden calves,' according to the evidence of Hos 8^{6} ('in pieces'), Ex 32^{4} ('fashioned it with *a graving tool*'), 32^{20} ('*burnt* it with fire . . . strewed it *upon the water*'). (10) Figured stones, *'ebhen maśkīt* (Lv 26^{1}, Nu 33^{52}, Ezk 8^{12} [?]), probably intermediary between the stele and the statue (Lv 26^{1}), were used as idols, and also (11) images carved out (or, according to others, 'drawn' ['graven' images]) on the inner walls of the Temple (Ezk 8^{10}).

There are numerous ironical descriptions of the manufacture of idols, but they are all post-Exilic, and are directed against foreign idols—Hab $2^{18f.}$, Is 40^{18-20} $41^{6f.}$ 44^{9-20} $46^{6f.}$, Jer $10^{2-5.\ 9.\ 14f.}$, Ps 115^{4-8} = 135^{15-18}, Wis 13^{10-16} 15, Ep. Jer. (= Bar 6 [cf. Welgand Naumann, *Untersuchungen über den apokr. Jeremiasbrief*, Giessen, 1913, pp. 3–9]), *Apoc. Abr.* 1–8.

6. Forms of idols.—(1) *Human.*—The Israelites, like the Canaanites (see II. 1), the Philistines (1 S 5^{4}), and the pagans (Is 44^{13}, Ps 115^{4-8}), possessed human idols (Dt 4^{16}, 1 S 19^{13}, Ezk $16^{17f.}$), but theriomorphic images were of much more frequent occurrence (Dt $4^{17f.}$ $5^{8f.}$ = Ex $20^{4f.}$).

(2) *Animal.*—(*a*) The *nᵉḥuštân*, 'brazen *serpent*' (*nᵉḥōšeth*), was worshipped in Jerusalem down to the 8th cent. B.C. (2 K 18^{4}). As far as one can judge from tradition (Nu 21^{4-9}), the Israelites regarded this statue as the image of the *jinn*—subject to Jahweh rather than identified with Him, as has been supposed (A. Loisy, *Rel. d'Isr.*[2], Paris, 1908, p. 81 f.)—who becomes incarnated in fiery serpents (*śᵉrāphim*), and in turn heals and inflicts mortal wounds (cf. E. Meyer, *Die Isr. und ihre Nachbarstämme*, Halle, 1906, pp. 116, 426 f.). It is quite probable, however, that this bronze statue was originally an ancient Canaanite idol representing the spirit of a spring (there was a 'serpent stone' by the side of the sacred spring of Rôghēl in Jerusalem [1 K 1^{9}]), perhaps the eponymous ancestor of the Hivvites. In the Canaanite high place of Gezer a little brazen serpent, and at Taanach six or seven real serpent heads and one in terra-cotta, have been found (Vincent, 117, 174–176). (*b*) Jahweh was usually represented under the form of the *bull*, as a symbol of His irresistible force (Nu 23^{22} 24^{8}). Hosea and the prophetic writers call these statues 'calves,' perhaps derisively, from their small size. Reisner, however, in 1910 found on a Samarian ostracon the proper name *'Eghelyo* (*Harvard Theol. Rev.* iv. [1911] 141), which may be interpreted: 'Jahweh is a calf, *i.e.* a young bull' (said in no spirit of mockery); the name, however, seems rather to signify 'calf of Jahweh,' *i.e.* 'son of the bull-Jahweh' (cf. Abel, *RB*, new ser., viii. [1911] 293). The Israelites probably borrowed this symbol from the Canaanites (see BULL [Sem.]), who in their turn may have got it from the Egyptians.

In Palestine, besides several bulls' heads and figurines of cows, statuettes of goddesses have been found with horns on their head [Vincent, 160, 164, 169 *f.*, 174]—a decoration probably copied from the statues of the Egyptian goddess Hathor.

This symbol occurred with great frequency throughout Israel, and played a great part in the ornamentation of the temple in Jerusalem. The seal of a certain 'Śᵉma'yāhû ben 'Azaryāhû' bears the figure of a bull (I. Benzinger, *Heb. Archäol.*[2], Tübingen, 1907, p. 227). From this probably comes the epithet of *'ᵃbhīr* ('strong man' or 'bull') of Israel' or 'of Jacob,' given to Jahweh (Is 1^{24}, Gn 49^{24}, Is 49^{26} 60^{16}, Ps $132^{2.\ 5}$), and perhaps also the custom of placing horns at the corners of the altar (1 K 2^{28}, Am 3^{14}; cf. Lagrange, *RB*, new ser., iv. [1907] 501, for the same custom in Crete).

7. The Ephod.—The *'ephōd* and the *t'rāphīm* must be treated separately because of the uncertainty as to their true nature. The word *'ephōd* signifies: (*a*) in certain ancient texts, a garment worn by the priest (*'ephōd badh*) (see *HDB* i. 725); (*b*) in P, a piece of cloth which the high priest wore above his dress and from which hung a pocket (חשן) containing the oracle (*ûrîm-tummîm*) (see art. DRESS, vol. v. p. 67[a]). But there are (*c*) a certain number of ancient passages where *'ephōd* certainly stands for some symbol of the divinity, and probably for a sort of statue.

In Jg 8^{24-27} Gideon, with the golden ear-rings taken as spoil from the Midianites, the weight of which amounted to 1700 shekels, made an *'ephōd* which he set up (or 'put') in Ophrah, and 'all the sons of Israel went a whoring after it there,' which means, according to the ordinary sense of this expression, that the Israelites offered it an illegal worship (cf., however, Hos 4^{12}, Lv $20^{5f.}$, Nu 15^{39}). It would obviously be impossible to wear a garment or an oracle pocket weighing over 60 lbs. It was also the custom to manufacture divine symbols out of gold or jewels used as amulets or otherwise held sacred—the Golden Calf (Ex 32); the ark (Ex 33^{4-6} 35^{22}; cf. Dt $7^{25f.}$). In the story of Micah (Jg 17–18) the *'ephōd* is mentioned in connexion with *t'rāphīm* and 'a graven image and a molten image.' In the sanctuary of Nob, there was an *'ephōd* behind which the sword of Goliath was kept wrapped up in a cloak (1 S $21^{9f.}$). This *'ephōd* was often consulted by Saul and David in their campaigns; the priest on those occasions held it 'in his hand' (1 S 23^{6}); he was asked to 'bring it hither,' and carried it to the person who was consulting it (14^{18} 23^{9} 30^{7})—he 'carried' it (נשׂא = 'to carry,' not to wear'; 14^{3} 22^{18} [LXX]).

It would be utterly impossible to bring together all the different acceptations of the word *'ephōd* under one general meaning, by supposing, *e.g.*, that the word had always the signification of 'pagne,' one corner of which formed a pocket for holding the *sortes* (Foote, *The Ephod*, pp. 19, 27, 41–44; Moore, *EBi*, art. 'Ephod' [exception made for *'ephōd* of Gideon]), or that it was the golden mask of the divine statue which the priest put on when he was delivering oracles (Duhm, *Handkomm. zum AT*, Göttingen, 1892, on Is 30^{22}).

One would rather do well to remember that semantics has disclosed in every language diversities of meaning which are far more singular than those attaching to the word *'ephōd*. אפד, whatever its etymological significance, and whether the verb אָפַד, 'to cover,' is a denominative of אֵפוֹד or not, could mean a 'garment,' then a 'covering' of precious metal on a statue (this is the natural meaning of אֵפוֹדָה in Is 30^{22}; ‖ צפה), and in the end a 'statue' covered with a layer of gold or silver (cf. II. 5 (9)).

The objection has been raised that a statue does not declare oracles, especially oracles obtained by a sort of drawing of lots like the Urim and Thummim (1 S 14^{41} [LXX]). Yet the *t'rāphīm* (Ezk 21^{26}, Zec 10^{2} [see, however, II. 8]) and the molten image (Hab 2^{18}) gave consultations. In Babylonia, questions were apparently 'whispered' to newly consecrated idols (Lagrange, *Études rel. sém.*[2], 232). In Egypt there were statues which nodded their heads or spoke, the priests who made them move or speak being supposed to be inspired by the god. Another suggestion is that the *'ephōd* was a statuette which, when set in motion by the priest, could stop in two or three different positions, or an idol with a cavity containing sacred lots, possibly like the vases of female or animal shape found in the Palestine excavations (Vincent, 229, 314).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works quoted above, see G. F. Moore, *Judges*, London, 1898, p. 381; T. C. Foote, *The Ephod, its Forms and Use*, Baltimore, 1902 (with bibliography); H. T. Elhorst, *ZATW* xxx. [1910] 259–276.

8. The Teraphim.—It is difficult to draw from the text any coherent idea of what the *t'rāphīm* were.

Rachel steals those of her father Laban, and, when he asks for 'his gods,' she conceals them in the camel's furniture (Gn 31[19. 30-35]). Later, Jacob buried these 'strange gods' under the (sacred) terebinth of Shechem (35[2-4]). Here *terāphîm* signifies small statues representing strange gods. Micah has in his sanctuary an *'ephôd* and *terāphîm* (Jg 17-18), which were used in the worship of Jahweh. Hosea also mentions the *terāphîm*, connecting them closely with the *'ephôd* as one of the indispensable elements of the Israelite cult of his day (3[4]). Michal assisted her husband David in his flight from Saul by putting 'the *terāphîm*' in bed in his place (1 S 19[13]); for the subterfuge to be successful, the *terāphîm* in question must have had the size and appearance of a man. From this anecdote we gather that in the time of David the *terāphîm* was one of the normal articles of furniture in an Israelite house. On the other hand, in all texts belonging to a date later than the 8th cent. B.C., the *terāphîm* are condemned side by side with divination (1 S 15[23]), necromancy, and idolatry (2 K 23[24]). Nebuchadnezzar, hesitating between two ways, consults the oracles: he shakes the arrows to and fro, consults the *terāphîm*, and inspects the liver; the divination for Jerusalem having come into his right hand, he sets his face towards that town (Ezk 21[26f.]). Here *terāphîm* is used for a pagan means of divination. In Zec 10[2] the word is used of a pagan or illegal mode of consultation (connected with soothsayers and dreams).

The suggestion has been made that *terāphîm* should be identified with *śerāphîm* (C. S. Wake, *Serpent Worship*, London, 1888, p. 47), but there are no clear grounds for adopting it.

Others think that the *terāphîm* were statuettes used as *sortes* and enclosed in the *'ephôd*, which would then be a kind of pouch (Foote, *op. cit.*; K. Marti, *Kurzer Handkomm.* xiii., Tübingen, 1903, on Hos 3[4]; cf. John Spencer, *de Leg. Hebræorum ritualibus et earum rationibus*, Cambridge, 1685, bk. iii. diss. 7). This explanation, however, would not suit Michal's *terāphîm* of human size, and in any case the use of *terāphîm* for divination is supported only by late texts.

It is held that the *terāphîm* were images of ancestors (Lippert, Stade, Schwally, Nowack, Budde, Charles, Torge). If this were proved, the fact that the *terāphîm* sometimes appeared as domestic idols (Laban, Michal) and were used in various countries (Laban, Nebuchadnezzar) would be explained. But why should the Danites have transported the images of Micah's ancestors into their public sanctuary, or why should the daughters of Laban have stolen the *terāphîm* of their father, since ancestor-worship could not be taken part in by women? Would Rachel and Michal have treated the images of the ancestors of their family with such scant ceremony? Again, no traces have been found up till now of any statues of ancestors among the Babylonians.

According to another explanation, the *terāphîm* originally represented the familiar spirit of the house, and were analogous with the *lares* and *penates* (Cornelius à Lapide, *Comm.*, Antwerp, 1681; E. Reuss, *Die Gesch. der heil. Schriften Alten Testaments*[2], Brunswick, 1890, p. 177; J. Frey, *Tod, Seelenglaube und Seelenkult im alten Israel*, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 102-104; C. Grüneisen, *Der Ahnenkultus und die Urreligion Israels*, Halle, 1900, p. 175; H. Gunkel, *Gen.*[3], Göttingen, 1910, p. 345; A. Loisy, *Rel. d'Isr.*[2], 202).

In Babylonia each place has its tutelary genius, each individual even has 'his god' and 'his goddess.' The cult of the *genius loci*, of the *gad* (Fortune) of the house, continued among the Jews down to Talmudic times (Bab. *Sanh.* 20[a]; *Ned.* 56[a]); clear traces of it are found in the foundation sacrifices of modern Syria (Curtiss, *Ursem. Rel.*, pp. xvi, 208 f., 265-267). This interpretation seems the most plausible, at least if the word *terāphîm* always signifies one and the same thing. It still seems rather curious, however, in spite of the analogy of the *kerûbhîm*, that these statues of *genii loci* should almost always have had a place in the sanctuaries of Jahweh (Jg 17-18, Hos 3[4]), and that the Danites should have carried off to Laish the statue of a *genius loci* of Mount Ephraim.

The explanation of the difficulty of finding any agreement between the different contexts in which *terāphîm* occurs may be that the word, for which no satisfactory etymology has been found, is one of the opprobrious terms used by the Jews of recent times in Biblical texts as a substitute for the abhorred names of idols and false gods (see III. 3). *Terraphîm* may be the plural of *tôrph*, which in the Hebrew of the Mishna means 'foulness,' 'obscenity.' Now, in this case, we have no assurance that this abusive term was everywhere and always substituted for one single expression. In Zec 10[2] the Peshitta still appears to have read ידעונים ('spirits of divination' or 'necromancers'), כשפים (cf. Lv 19[31] 20[27], 1 S 28[9], 2 K 23[24] etc.); in other contexts there may have been some term signifying idol in general (*pesîlîm*, Ezk 21[26] LXX; *'aṣabbîm*) or god (*'ĕlôhîm*).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works quoted, reference may be made to A. Lods, *La Croyance à la vie future et le culte des morts dans l'antiquité israélite*, Paris, 1906, i. 231-236; P. Torge, *Seelenglaube und Unsterblichkeitshoffnung im AT*, Leipzig, 1900, pp. 141-143.

III. *REACTION AGAINST IDOL-WORSHIP.*—1. **Before the 8th cent. B.C.**—The worship of images soon became suspect to the upholders of the true religion of Jahweh; Asa is said to have done away with those which his fathers had made, but the second decalogue (Ex 34[17]), towards the 9th cent., condemns only the worship of 'molten gods,' *i.e.* statues whose splendour contrasted too strongly with the simplicity of olden times. The history of the Golden Calf (Ex 32) reflects the same point of view.

2. **The Prophets.**—Hosea is the first to lay down the principle of the incompatibility of idol-worship with the true worship of Jahweh (8[4-6] 13[1f.]; cf. 3[4]). Isaiah forbids the use of idols of gold and silver (2[8. 20]); and Hezekiah, apparently at his instigation, breaks the brazen serpent in pieces (2 K 18[4]). It was probably about this time that all manufacture or worship of images of the deity was absolutely prohibited (Ex 20[4f.]). The reforms instituted by Josiah (621 B.C.) include a prohibition against all representations of Jahweh—even unfigured ones (Dt 16[21f.], 2 K 23[6. 14. 24]). Dt 4[15f.] (7th–6th cent. B.C.) indicates a motive—the only one formulated in the OT—for this prohibition, namely, the fact that the Israelites on Mount Horeb saw no form or shape.

One of the arguments used by the prophets of the 7th cent. B.C. and later against pagan gods is that they are gods of stone and wood. They describe the manufacture of these idols with complacent irony, and identify them purely and simply with the divinities that they represent (a frequent theme from the 6th cent. B.C. onwards; see II. 5). This line of argument presupposes that it is an accepted Jewish belief that Jahweh has not, and cannot have, any material representation.

3. **Judaism.**—These divine images still retained their prestige among the common people to a certain degree (2 Mac 12[40]; cf. perhaps Ps 16[4] 31[7], Zec 10[2] [?], Is 30[22], if these passages are post-Exilic and refer to Jews). In the ruins of Jewish houses at Elephantine some bas-reliefs and statues have been found, which were probably worshipped by the members of the Jewish colony of that town (O. Rubensohn, *ZA* xlvi. [1909] 30; E. Meyer, *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 65 f.). But probably idol-worship was now only a popular superstition; and, when the author of Enoch (99[14] 104[9]) accuses his Jewish adversaries of 'following idols,' it is apparently to be understood as a polemic exaggeration respecting their tolerance of the pagans and Greek art.

Among the Jews who were most rigorous in keeping the law, the Second Commandment was

so scrupulously followed that all manufacture of images was forbidden, even when the images were not intended for worship at all (cf. Wis 14^{12-20}). Thus, while animal representations abounded in the decoration of the pre-Exilic Temple (cf. Sir 38^{27}), a perfect storm of disapproval arose when Herod set a golden eagle above one of the doors of the sanctuary (Jos. *Ant.* XVII. vi. 2-4, *BJ* I. xxxiii. 2-4). Pilate also met with great opposition when he attempted to allow the legions to enter Jerusalem with their ensigns (*Ant.* XVIII. iii. 1, *BJ* II. ix. 2 f.). In A.D. 66 the Jewish insurgents destroyed the palace of Herod Antipas at Tiberias because it was decorated with sculptures representing animals (Jos. *Life*, 12). It was out of regard for this scruple that neither Herod nor the Romans put human or animal effigies on the *as* or fractions of the *as* coined for Judæa.

The pious Jew avoided even pronouncing words signifying 'images,' 'idols,' etc. (Zec 13^2, Ps 16^4), substituting for them opprobrious terms, which were usually those used to replace the names of pagan gods (Ex 23^{13}, Dt 12^3, Hos 2^{17}; בַּעַל, *e.g.*, was read בֹּשֶׁת, 'shame,' in proper names), so that it is often difficult to tell whether idols or strange gods are meant: *'ĕlîlîm*, 'nothingness' (according to others, 'small gods'); *gillûlîm*, 'dung' (RV 'abominations'; according to others, 'shapeless masses,' 'grotesque figures'); *šiqqûṣ, tô'ēbhâ* (Is 44^{19}, Jer 16^{18}, Dt 27^{15}), 'abominable thing'; *miphleṣeth*, 'object of horror'; *p'ghārîm* (Lv 26^{30}), *n'bhēlâ* (Jer 16^{18}), 'carcass'; *mēthîm* (Ps 106^{28}), 'the dead'; *'āwen*, 'trouble,' 'wickedness'; *hebhel*, 'vanity'; *lō' 'ĕlôhîm* (Hos 8^6), 'not God.' Some of these terms of abuse go back to the Prophets (*e.g.*, Am 5^5, Jer 2^8, Is 44^{20}); but in many cases they were introduced into Scripture at a very late date by Jewish scribes as a substitute for neuter terms. As a matter of fact this process continued even after the time of the Septuagint version (2 S 5^{21}, 1 K $11^{5.7.33}$, 2 K 23^{13}, Is 19^3). Cf. G. F. Moore, *EBi* ii. 2148-2150.

LITERATURE.—W. W. Baudissin, *Stud. zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, Leipzig, 1876-78, i. 49-177; P. Scholz, *Götzendienst und Zauberwesen bei den alten Hebräern und den benachbarten Völkern*, Regensburg, 1877; B. Stade, *Bibl. Theol. des AT*, Tübingen, 1905, pp. 119-121; W. Nowack, *Heb. Archäol.*, Freiburg, 1894, ii. 21-25; I. Benzinger, *Heb. Archäol.*², Tübingen, 1907, pp. 219 f., 327-329; E. Kautzsch, *Bibl. Theol. des AT*, do. 1911, pp. 94-99, 215-217, 220 f., etc.

ADOLPHE LODS.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Indian).—**1. Introductory.**—In no part of the world, perhaps, can the characteristics of idolatry be investigated with more success than in India, owing to the abundance of the material, and the attention given to it since Hinduism and its allied faiths, Buddhism and Jainism, came under the observation of the foreigner. A visitor to one of its sacred cities is at once aware of the prevalence of image-worship. The streets, like those of Athens in the time of St. Paul, appear to be 'wholly given to idolatry' (Ac 17^{16} AV). Writing forty-five years ago, M. A. Sherring estimated that the city of Benares contained 1454 temples, and that

'the number of idols actually worshipped by the people certainly exceeds the number of the people themselves, though multiplied twice over; it cannot be less than half a million, and may be many more.' 'Idolatry,' he adds, 'is a charm, a fascination to the Hindu. It is, so to speak, the air he breathes. It is the food of his soul. It is the foundation of his hopes, both for this world and for another' (*The Sacred City of the Hindus*, London, 1868, p. 41 ff.).

Since his time, for reasons elsewhere explained (§ 3), the number of temples and images in this and other sacred cities has largely increased. There are in all about sixty temples in Nāsik, a number which has earned for it the name of the Benares of W. India (*BG* xvi. [1883] 503). Within the sacred enclosure at Puri rise about 120 temples 'dedicated to the various forms in which the Hindu mind has imagined its god' (W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, i. 128). At all the Hindu sacred places the minor idols enshrined in little niches along the streets and the entrances to the bathing-places are innumerable.

Among the more primitive tribes only a few, like the Mundās or Kandhs, are said to practise no image-worship; but this does not exclude the cult of rude stocks and stones (E. T. Dalton, *Descript. Ethnol. Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 256; S. C. Roy, *The Mundas and their Country*, do. 1912, p. 122; S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, London, 1865, p. 102). According to J. G. Scott, in Burma 'none of the races have, or at any rate admit that they have, idols. There is no bowing down to stocks and stones' (*Upper Burma Gaz.*, 1900, pt. i. vol. ii. p. 83). There are, of course, numerous images of the Buddha, but to the Burman 'the accusation of bowing down to stocks and stones is intolerable, and the implication is combated with feverish energy. Where there are no prayers, in the technical sense of the word, there can be no idolatry.' The words uttered before his impassive features 'are not a supplication for mercy or aid, but the praises of the Lord himself, through the contemplation of whose triumphant victory over passions and ignorance the most sinful may be led to a better state' (Shway Yoe [J. G. Scott], *The Burman*, London, 1882, i. 220).

Many writers, missionaries in particular, fiercely denounce the grossness of Hindu idolatry (J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners and Customs*³, Oxford, 1906, pp. 548, 581, 590 f.; W. Ward, *The Hindoos*³, Serampore, 1818, Introd. ii, x f.). Some later writers, however, recognize that the prevalence of image-worship is not the chief obstacle to the spread of Christianity. The growth of agnosticism, the revival of Vedāntism, and the rise of modern sects, like Sikhism, or the Ārya and the Brāhma Samāj (*qq.v.*), which reject the idolatrous Puranic cults, and seek to revive an earlier and simpler form of worship, are a more serious hindrance to Christian propaganda.

2. The historical development of idolatry.—The universality of image-worship in its more elaborate form is comparatively modern among the Hindus. In the Vedas we observe the deification of terrestrial objects—rivers, mountains, plants, trees, implements, and weapons; and 'material objects are occasionally mentioned in the later Vedic literature as symbols representing deities' (A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Myth.*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 154 f.). The existence of idols in Vedic times has been asserted in the cases of a painted image of Rudra, of Varuṇa with a golden coat of mail, in the distinction drawn between the Maruts and their images (Rigveda, II. xxxiii. 9, I. xxv. 13, v. lii. 15, in J. Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, v. [1872] 453 f.). The comparative scarcity of these references, however, does not support the conclusion that idolatry, in its general sense, as contrasted with the lavish idol-worship of a later age, is modern, because, though the higher Vedic religion may not have admitted images or sacred places, there must have been a lower stratum of Animists, who did not confine their worship to the deities of Nature (cf. A. Barth, *Rel. of India*, London, 1882, p. 60 f.). Fergusson (*Hist. Ind. Arch.*, do. 1899, p. 183) pressed the case too strongly when he suggested that 'it may become an interesting investigation to inquire whether the Greeks were not the first who taught the Indians idolatry.' The influence of the Hellenistic school of Gandhāra on Hindu sculpture is undoubted (V. A. Smith, *Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, p. 97 ff.). But it is more than doubtful whether the use of idols can be solely attributed to this influence. Manu (*c.* A.D. 200 in the present recension, but embodying much more ancient

material) gives rules about circumambulating an image, forbids stepping on its shadow, and refers to the taking of oaths in its presence (*Laws of Manu*, iv. 39, 130, viii. 87). In the *Mahābhārata*, with which the *Laws* are closely connected, idol-worship is found fully established (E. W. Hopkins, *Rel. of India*, London, 1902, p. 370 ff.). Early Buddhism knew nothing of image-worship, which arose with the spread of the Mahāyāna school (A. Cunningham, *Mahābodhi*, London, 1892, p. 53 f.). In fact, the worship of the image of Buddha, if the attitude of the Buddhist to images of the Master can be considered a form of idolatry, dates from the 1st cent. A.D., about four or five centuries after his death (L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 13; H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 95; A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, London, 1901, p. 67; Smith, *Hist.* 79, 106). The early artists did not dare to portray his bodily form, which had for ever vanished, being content to attest his spiritual presence by silent symbols—the footprints, the empty chair, and so forth. Further, the absence of images of Buddha from early Indian art does not imply that images of the Hindu gods were then unknown; they were certainly in use as early as the 4th cent. B.C. (Smith, 79 n.; *IA* xxxiii. [1901] 145 ff.). The modern idolatrous system dates from the establishment of neo-Brāhmanism on the downfall of Buddhism. Though image-worship prevails widely in S. India, it must be comparatively late in its present form, because all the Malāyālim terms for images are of Sanskrit origin (W. Logan, *Malabar*, Madras, 1887, i. 184).

3. The aniconic stage.—It is needless to discuss whether the stage of aniconism historically precedes or leads up to that of pictures and images—an evolution denied by some modern anthropologists (*EBr*[11] xiv. 329). In India the two stages exist side by side, and it is possible in many cases to watch the rude stock or stone developing into the anthropomorphic image. The so-called 'fetish'—to use a term which has lost most of its significance to students of the present day—appears in many forms, included in the two general types of poles or stocks and stones. We observe, first, the pre-animistic type, in which a rude stock or stone, from its quaint or unusual appearance, is looked on as the manifestation of some unknown, vague power, which impresses the imagination of the observer. In the case of stones, this form of belief is more apparent in the great alluvial plains, where stone is a rare substance, and is naturally regarded with a feeling of awe. Thence we pass to the animistic stage, where the stone, stock, or pole suggests a well-defined form, animal or human, which fits it to be the abode of a spirit. In one type of such beliefs the stone is supposed to be a petrified man or animal, the conversion into stone being due to the wrath of some offended god or saint, or it is a punishment for the breach of some stringent tabu. Many such peculiarly shaped stones are connected by some ætiological legend with the cults of one or other of the orthodox deities. Some stones, stocks, or poles, again, acquire special sanctity, like the boundary-stone, the guardian stone of the village, death and memorial stones, the stone on which the bride is made to stand so that she may acquire strength and stability, the grindstone used as a fertility charm at birth or marriage rites. Similarly, among stocks, posts, and poles, we have the sacrificial post, the wedding post, the tank post, the village guardian post, the death post, the house pillar and posts, the post burned at the vernal fire festival, the Holī, symbolizing the burning of the old year (see artt. STONES [Indian]; POLES AND POSTS [Indian]).

4. The iconic stage of idolatry; anthropomorphism.—The Hindu forms his gods in his own image, and we can trace the development, by various means, of the rude stone or stock into the idol.

In parts of the Central Provinces, squared pieces of wood, each with a rude figure carved in front, representing the village goddess with her five brothers, who are credited with the power of sending disease and death, are set up close to each other beside the highways (S. Hislop, *Papers relating to the Aboriginal Tribes of the Central Provinces*, Nagpur, 1866, p. 15). In Mirzapur, similar figures, with rude heads and faces, represent Birnāth, the cattle godling of the Ahirs (W. Crooke, *TC*, 1896, i. 63 f.). In honour of spirits, the Nāikdās of Gujarāt fix teak posts in the ground, roughly hacking them at the top into something like a human face; these posts are smeared with red dye, and rows of small clay horses, the 'equipage' of the spirits, are placed round them (*BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 327). In the Telugu country, the stake representing Poturāzu, brother or husband of the village goddess, develops into a painted image, on which the deity sits as a warrior, sword in hand, and carries a lime and nine glass bangles belonging to his sister Ellamma (H. Whitehead, *Bull. Madras Museum*, v. 124). In the same districts, four village goddesses are represented by stone pillars with the figures of women carved upon them (*ib.* 143). On the same principle, one of the chief *liṅgas*, or representations of Śiva, is shaped in front into an image of Brahmā holding a small figure of Viṣṇu on his head, thus forming the sacred Triad (*BG* vii. [1883] 551). The development of the 'fetish' into an anthropomorphic image is also shown by the use of masks which are permanently attached to the stone or stock, or used only at special feasts or ceremonies. At Nāsik in the Deccan, a *liṅga* has a silver mask with five heads, which it wears on special days, particularly the full moon of the month Kārttik (Nov.); and Bālaji, a form of Kṛṣṇa, always wears a golden mask (*ib.* xvi. [1883] 505, 507). A *liṅga* at Pūr wears a rude copper mask of a man's face, with staring eyes and a curled moustache (*ib.* xviii. pt. iii. [1885] p. 427). At Benares, Bhaironnath, warden of the city, occasionally wears a silver mask fixed on the stone which represents him, and the image of Durgā is covered with tinselled cloth and has a face of brass, silver, or other metal, according to the whim of her priests, who keep on hand a stock of masks which fit the head of the image (Sherring, 62, 166).

The result of this process of anthropomorphization is that the idol is supposed to possess powers of volition and movement.

There are numerous instances in which the image refuses to be moved by human agency, or moves only by order of certain persons. When, in anticipation of a raid by Aurangzīb, the ancient image of Keśava Deva was removed from Mathurā to Mewār, as they journeyed the wheels of the carriage refused to move, and the image, one of the most venerated statues of Kṛṣṇa, insisted on remaining at the village now known as Nāthdwārā, 'door of the Lord,' where it stands to the present day (F. S. Growse, *Mathura*[3], Allahabad, 1883, p. 130; J. Tod, *Annals of Rajasthan*, Calcutta, 1884, i. 553). The image of Śiva was being taken to his capital, Laṅka, by the demon Rāvaṇa, and preferred to remain at Gokarn (*q.v.*), where it is at present (F. Buchanan, *Journey from Mysore*, London, 1807, iii. 106). A Rāja in Berār found an image on the river bank, and prayed that the god would accompany him to his capital; the reply was that it would follow him so long as he did not look back; at Sirpur he violated the tabu, and the image refused to move farther (A. Lyall, *Berar Gaz.*, Bombay, 1870, p. 178). The image Bālmukand, found lying in the river Jumna, attached itself to the Brahmanical cord of the saint Vallabhāchārya, as he was bathing in the river (Bholanauth Chunder, *Travels of a Hindoo*, London, 1869, ii. 49). The image of Jagannāth followed a gardener's daughter as she sang a verse from the *Gīta-govinda* (M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Rel.*, Oxford, 1909, vi. 9). There is a story current in S. India that an image of Kṛṣṇa, plundered from a Hindu temple, shared the bed of one of the Delhi princesses, and that she finally became absorbed within it (F. Buchanan, ii. 70 f.). The *liṅga* at Nagardhan opened to receive a pious woman who was unjustly suspected by her husband of infidelity (R. V. Russell, *Nagpur Gaz.*, 1908, i. 307 f.). Some images are known to grow in size, like the stone called the 'cat mother' (Billī Mātā), which has grown from infancy to youth; Tilabhandeśvara, 'Lord of the sesamum storehouse,' increases daily in size to the amount of a grain of the seed (A. E. Nelson, *Raipur Gaz.*, 1909, i. 287; Sherring, 151). An image of Buddha in Burma recently began to develop a moustache (Shway Yoe, *The Burman*, London, 1882, i. 235). An old legend tells that an image sweated so copiously that the Brāhmans were obliged to cool it with their fans, and a similar story is current in Burma (Stobæus, *Physica*, i. 56, in J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described in Classical Lit.*, Westminster, 1901, p. 173; Shway Yoe, i. 234 f.). In Baroda, an ancient image is called 'Mother of the Scorpions,' because a gummy substance, like a small red scorpion, oozes from its belly (*BG* vii. [1883] 601).

5. The manufacture and consecration of images.—(*a*) *The substances from which images are made.*—These are numerous, and in the case of the so-called 'fetishes' the variety is specially great.

In Bombay, Humāi, the goddess of the Vārlis, a forest tribe, is represented by a ball made from the brains of a cow, or by a

small figure of the animal; their household deity, Hirvā, is a bunch of peacocks' feathers, or the figure of a hunter with his gun, a warrior on horseback, or a five-headed monster riding on a tiger (*BG* xviii. pt. i. [1895] p. 188). An image of one of the village goddesses in S. India is made of turmeric kneaded into a paste (H. Whitehead, 143). The Mālā goddess, Sunkalamma, in S. India, is in the form of a cone made of boiled rice and green gram; a little hollow is made in the top, and this is filled with butter, onions, and pulse; four lampwicks are put into it, a nose-jewel is stuck on the outside of the lump, two garlands are tied round it, and the whole structure is decorated with religious symbols (Thurston, *TC* iv. 357). Ashes, either from the sacred fire or from the funeral pyre, are often made into images; among the Gaudas of Madras, an image of the deceased is made on the spot where he was cremated, and to this food is offered (*ib.* ii. 275; cf. vi. 357). Balls or cones of clay often represent the deity or a sainted ancestor, as among the Aruvas, whose gods are a mass of mud in conical shape, with an areca-nut stuck on the top (*ib.* i. 60; *cf.* iii. 461 f.). Eight little heaps of brick plastered over with clay represent the village gods in the Shāhābād district of Bengal (*NINQ* i. [1891] 123). The household deity of the Koravas of Madras is a brick picked up at random (Thurston, iii. 469). The Kānphaṭā Jogis represent their ancestors by unhusked coco-nuts, changed yearly on New Year's Day, the old coco-nut being made into oil to feed the lamps of their shrine; the family god of the Mukris is an unhusked coco-nut; the house *nat* is represented in every Burmese house by a coco-nut hung in a frame of cane (*BG* xv. [1883] pt. i. pp. 354, 376; *Census Rep. Burma*, 1911, i. 156). Ambā Bhavānī, a caste goddess in Sholapur, is a lamp (*BG* xx. [1884] 108). Clay pots are commonly used to contain the deity, as among the Mālas of Madras, who represent Lakṣmi, goddess of prosperity, by a pile of six pots; in W. India pots are commonly used as homes for spirits (Thurston, iv. 369; *BG* xv. pt. i. [1881] p. 248 n.).

For anthropomorphic images the material most used in ancient times, as in the case of the Greek *ξόανα*, was probably wood (J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, 1898, iv. 245 f.; Farnell, *CGS* i. [1896] 14 f.).

Jagannāth, originally a rude block, has, under Buddhist influence, been adapted to represent the Triad—Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha (A. Cunningham, *Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854, p. 353 ff.; W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, i. 92 ff., 129). The wood of the *nīm*, or margosa tree (*Melia azadirachta*), is used for the most sacred images (*JASBo* ii. 275). Ancient wooden images have naturally, for the most part, disappeared. But there are records of their existence in Kāśmīr. 'In Inner Kashmir, about two or three days' journey from the capital, in the direction towards the mountains of Bolor, there is a wooden idol called Śārada, which is much venerated by pilgrims' (al-Bīrūnī, *India*, tr. E. C. Sachau, London, 1910, i. 117). Commenting on this passage, Stein (Kalhaṇa, *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, London, 1900, ii. 285) remarks that al-Bīrūnī associates this image with other famous idols, like that of the sun-god at Multān, Chakraswāmin of Thāneśvar, and the *liṅga* of Somnāth; 'I am unable to trace elsewhere any reference to the image of Śārada being a wooden one. There was a famous wooden statue of Maitreya, much venerated by Buddhists, in Dāril, not far from Ciläs. It is mentioned by Fa-hien and Hiuen Tsiang (see *Si-yu-ki*, tr. Beal, i. pp. xxix, 134). This image was 80 feet long, and its upturned feet 8 feet, much worshipped by neighbouring kings. Hiuen Tsiang says it was about 100 feet high.' Similar images have recently been found in Orissa (Nagendranath Vasu, *Arch. Surv. Mayurbhanja*, Calcutta, 1911, i. c). For other religious carvings in wood, see V. A. Smith, *Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, p. 364 ff.

Many of the images now in use are made of metal of various kinds. Among the more primitive tribes iron in various shapes is used.

If a Savara dies of wounds caused by a knife or other iron weapon, a piece of iron or an arrow is thrust into a rice-pot to represent the deceased (Thurston, vi. 331). Among the gods of the Gonds are found a spear, sword, or iron bar (R. V. Russell, *Census Rep. Cent. Prov.*, 1901, i. 94). Spears often represent the S. Indian village goddesses, and among the Lamāṇis of Bombay needles are worshipped in the name of dead ancestors (H. Whitehead, 124; *Eth. Surv. Bombay*, no. 140 [1909] 10). For house images and for those carried in procession, brass is usually employed, and, cast by the *cire perdue* process, is found even among primitive tribes like the Kandhs (Thurston, iii. 391). A combination of eight metals—gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, brass, iron, and steel—(*aṣṭadhātu*) is specially sacred; of this substance the face of the image of Bāgheśvarī at Benares is made (Sherring, 90).

Metal images are made at Benares, Mathurā, Ujjain, Ahmadābād, and other places; Gayā, Bardwān, and, in particular, Jaipur, supply stone images (T. N. Mukharji, *Art Manufactures of India*, Calcutta, 1888, Index, *s.v.* 'Idols'). Tavernier states that in his time Armenians used to export idols to India, and his editor asserts that at the present day Bohemia sends idols made of cast glass to India, which undersell the marble images of Agra (*Travels*, ed. V. Ball, London, 1889, ii. 261). J. G. Scott says that images of Gautama are imported from Birmingham to Burma; but this has been denied (*Burma*, London, 1906, p. 336).

(*b*) *Carving and style of images.*—The style of the sculptor is always dominated by ritual prescription or hieratic formalism, and hence the modern idol is monotonous in execution, and possesses little artistic beauty; it is only artists of exceptional ability that have been able to make their powers apparent, and elevate compositions mainly conventional to the rank of works of art (V. A. Smith, 184 f.; Shway Yoe, *The Burman*, London, 1882, i. 237 f.). The proportionate sizes of the various parts of an image are carefully prescribed by the ancient authority known as the *Śilpa Śāstra* (Rajendralāla Mitra, i. 134 ff.). In making idols the Madras stone-carver distinguishes by the ring of the stone, when struck, whether it is male or female, suitable for the image of a god or a goddess (Thurston, vi. 388). The extraordinary multiplication of images and the introduction of monstrous and impossible forms, such as the Chaturānana or Chaturmukha, 'four-faced' Brahmā, the Chaturbhuja, or 'four-armed' Viṣṇu, the Dasabhuja or Aṣṭabhuja, 'ten-armed' or 'eight-armed' Devī—the intention being to enhance the dignity and power of the deity—are, from the artistic point of view, indefensible (V. A. Smith, 6 f., 100, 182). But these are not modern inventions, as the type of four-handed figures appears in the later Gandhāra period, and polycephalic images in the Kuṣān age (*ib.* 124, 143). Even in the Buddhist period multiplication of *stūpas* was common (*ib.* 153). In modern times the multiplication of images, generally of the *liṅga*, has assumed a monstrous form (R. V. Russell, *Bhandara Gaz.*, 1908, i. 241; *BG* xiv. [1882] 175; Sherring, 42 f.). Colossal images are more common among the Jains than among the Hindus.

'Undoubtedly the most remarkable of the Jain statues are the celebrated colossi of Southern India, the largest free-standing statues in Asia, which are three in number, situated respectively at Śrāvana Belgola in Mysore, and at Kārkala, and Yenūr (or Venūr) in South Kānara. All three, being set on the top of eminences, are visible for miles around, and, in spite of their formalism, command respectful attention by their enormous mass and expression of dignified serenity. The biggest, that at Śrāvana Belgola, stands about 56½ feet in height, with a width of 13 feet across the hips, and is cut out of a solid block of gneiss, apparently wrought *in situ*. That at Kārkala, of the same material, but some 15 feet less in height, is estimated to weigh 80 tons. The smallest of the giants, that at Yenūr, is 35 feet high. The three images are almost identical, but the one at Yenūr has the "special peculiarity of the cheeks being dimpled with a deep, grave smile," which is considered to detract from the impressive effect' (V. A. Smith, 268).

(*c*) *Consecration of images.*—The molten or carved image, until the deity can be induced or compelled to enter it, is useless and unfit for worship among those castes and tribes which have risen beyond the level of mere 'fetishism.'

The rite of consecration, in parts of S. India, provides that the image, when brought from the workshop, should be washed with the five products of the cow, and kept in a copper pot for twenty-four hours. It is then taken out, and the sacred fire is lighted; while this is burning the priest recites verses. The image is kept buried under a heap of rice for about half an hour, and it is then covered with a silk cloth. The priest touches the image in all its limbs, and finally breathes into its mouth. The sacred fire is re-lighted, and the image is then fit for worship (*BG* xv. pt. i. [1883] p. 147 n.). In Bengal, at the festival of Durgā, the officiating Brāhman consecrates the image of the goddess, and, placing it in its appointed place in the temple, recites the proper formulæ. After this comes the giving of eyes and life to the image. With the two forefingers of his right hand he touches the breast, cheek, eyes, and forehead of the image, saying: 'Let the soul of Durgā long continue in happiness in this image!' After this he takes a leaf of the *vilva* tree (*Ægle marmelos*), rubs it with butter, and holds it over a lamp until it is covered with soot, of which he takes a little on the stalk of another *vilva* leaf and fills the pupils of the eyes with the soot (Ward, ii. 85). In other places, when an image is not prepared, the goddess Devi is caused to enter an earthen pot by a priest, who is obliged to undergo fasting and submit to other tabus of food during the nine days' ceremony (*NINQ* iv. [1894] 20 f.). Following a still cruder form of ritual, among the Tibetan Buddhists, 'internal organs of dough or clay are sometimes inserted into the bodies of the larger images, but the head is usually left empty; and into the more valued ones are put precious stones and filings of the noble metals, and a few grains of consecrated rice, a scroll bearing "the Buddhist Creed," and occasionally other texts, booklets, and relics. These objects are sometimes

mixed with the plastic material, but usually are placed in the central cavity, the entrance to which, called "the charm-place," is sealed up by the consecrating Lāma' (Waddell, 329). The rite of making the eyes of the image is often supposed to confer life upon it, and until this is done it is not worshipped (Thurston, iii. 106 f.). A strange story is told regarding Jagannāth, that the priests periodically make a new image of the god, and place something inside—according to some, a bone of Kṛṣṇa, according to others, 'the spirit of the god.' 'When two new moons occur in Assur [Aśāḍh] (part of June and July), which is said to happen once in seventeen years, a new idol is always made. A Nim tree is sought for in the forests on which no crow or carrion bird was ever perched. It is known to the initiated by certain signs. This is prepared into a proper form by common carpenters, and is then entrusted to certain priests who are protected from all intrusion; the process is a great mystery. One man is selected to take out of the idol a small box containing the spirit, which is conveyed inside the new; the man who does this is always removed from this world before the end of the year' (Col. Phipps, *Mission Register*, Dec. 1824, quoted by A. Sterling, *Orissa*, London, 1846, p. 122; Ward, ii. 163; *Calcutta Review*, x. 223, quoting Brij Kishore Ghose, *Hist. of Puri*, 18). The Rath-jātra, or car festival, of 1912 was of special importance, because the image, after thirty-six years, was to be changed (*Times of India*, weekly ed., 20 July 1912). It is, of course, quite contrary to the spirit of the Vaiṣṇava cultus of Jagannāth that anything in the shape of a bone should be enclosed in the image. The tradition obviously represents a survival of Buddhist relic-worship, as in the Tibetan customs quoted above.

6. The ritual of image-worship.—(*a*) *Forms of worship.*—The ritualistic worship of images takes various forms, ranging from that adopted by the more primitive tribes in the cult of the rude stocks and stones in which their spirits, usually malevolent, are embodied, through the more highly organized cult of the village and local deities, up to the worship of the orthodox gods conducted by Brāhmans or by members of the ascetic orders.

Among the forest and menial tribes the worshippers, more particularly when disease or other calamity menaces the hamlet, make a sacrifice to the stone or collection of stones which represents their local or tribal deity. The victim, usually a chicken or a castrated goat, is taken to the shrine, the worshipper or his priest decapitates it with a single stroke of an axe or knife, the form and material of such ritualistic implements being sometimes specially prescribed, and they are placed in charge of the Baigā or other medicine-man, who hands them down to his successor, at the same time explaining to him the form of the ritual and the invocations which are used at the service. Some of the victim's blood is then dropped on the stone, and sometimes rude offerings consisting of milk or the fruits of the soil are laid on an earthen platform or altar in the hut which the deity is supposed to occupy. After this the victim is cooked and eaten in the immediate presence of the deity by the worshipper and his friends, the head being usually reserved as the perquisite of the priest.

Among the more settled tribes, particularly in S. India, the ritual assumes a coarser form. Thus, at the worship of Māriyamma in the Bellary district, men and women substitute garments of the margosa tree (*Melia azadirachta*) for their ordinary clothing, and offer to the image milk and curds, which are drunk by the priest. The change of dress possibly points to a survival of the leaf clothing which up to quite recent times was worn by the Juāngs and other primitive tribes, or it may merely indicate that they are in a state of tabu and remove their usual clothing lest it may become infected (cf. the special dress (*iḥrām*) worn by the Muhammadan pilgrim at Mecca [W. R. Smith, *Rel. Semites*, 1894, pp. 333, 484; T. P. Hughes, *Dict. Islam*, 1885, p. 196]). A buffalo bull is bound with ropes and dragged with shouts to the shrine; it is beheaded and its head is placed on the ground beside the goddess, with the right foot, which is also cut off, in its mouth. On the fourth day of the festival a booth is erected in which the goddess is represented by a brass plate containing ashes, red powder used by women for their adornment, earthenware bangles, and a gold necklace. 'The people congregate there, and a man whose patronymic is Pōturāz ["ox-king"] brings a small black ram to the goddess. Standing in front of the goddess he holds the ram in his arms, and seizing its throat with his teeth bites the animal until he kills it. He tears the ram's bleeding flesh with his teeth and holds it in his mouth to the goddess. The body of the ram is then buried beside the booth, and Pōturāz is bathed by the headmen of the village, who put a new turban on his head and give him a new cloth' (*JASBo* ii. 164 ff.; G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa*, Westminster, 1893, p. 475 f.). Accounts of similar rites of sacrifice will be found in H. Whitehead, 'The Village Deities of Southern India,' *Bull. Madras Museum*, v. [1907], no. 3. Similar brutality is shown at the sacrifices performed by the Gorkhas at the Dasahrā or Durgā Pūjā festival in Nepāl (H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, London, 1880, ii. 345 ff.). A survival of these rites of blood sacrifice appears in the custom of smearing rude stones and images with red paint, in order to endow them with a warm vitality, or as a substitute for an older practice of feeding a god by smearing the face, and especially the lips, of an idol with the blood of a sacrificial victim (*CGS* v. [1909] 248; *GB*[3], pt. i. 'The Magic Art,' vol. ii. [1911] p. 175 f.).

When the worship falls into the hands of Brāhmans, who are influenced by the humanistic traditions of Buddhism, particularly in the Vaiṣṇava cultus, the grosser types of worship disappear. Thus, in the case of the cult of Devī at Bechrāji in Baroda, though the local legend implies the former prevalence of animal sacrifices, the chief priest, in the morning, after ablution, enters the sanctuary, and pours five holy liquids (*pañcāmṛta*)—milk, curds, butter, sugar, honey—over the image, and drops cold water on it from a perforated pot. While this rite (*abhiṣeka*) is taking place, the Brāhman chants Vedic hymns. The goddess is then dressed and ornamented with coloured powder and flowers, and incense is burnt. The first meal, known as the 'child's meal' (*bālbhog*), is offered in the morning, and then the waving rite (*ārtī*) is performed, in which lamps are waved, camphor is burnt, and hymns are sung to the ringing of bells and beating of gongs. She is again fed at noon, a little food being sprinkled over the image and the food consumed by the priests. In the evening, passages from the sacred books describing the exploits of the goddess are read, and the evening meal, known as the 'great offering' (*mahānaivedya*), with gifts from pilgrims, is presented (*BG* vii. [1883] 611 f.).

The widest extension of the rites of feeding and dressing the image is found in the Vallabhāchārya cult of Kṛṣṇa, which includes the washing of the idol at dawn, dressing it, feeding it at noon—the food being shared between the temple priests and the votaries—the siesta and the awaking, the afternoon repast, the evening toilet, and the repose for the night (*BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 535 f.; F. S. Growse, *Mathurā*, p. 290).

In contrast to this elaborate ritual, that of Śiva is much simpler. To the *liṅga* are offered sandal-wood paste, water, and the leaves of the *vilva* or bel tree (*Ægle marmelos*). It is only on his special 'nights' that the stone is covered with a mask (§ 4), or decked with pieces of refrigerated butter, or carried in procession (*BG* ix. pt. i. [1901] p. 641). Sometimes as a rain-charm, a form of sympathetic or imitative magic, the *liṅga* is covered with water (*PR*[3] i. 76; *BG* xiv. [1882] 5, xviii. pt. iii. [1885] p. 339; *GB*[3], pt. i. vol. i. pp. 304 ff.).

(*b*) *Processions of images.*—There is a common custom of carrying images in procession, often accompanied with a 'sacred marriage,' of washing them in water to remove pollution and strengthen them for the discharge of their duties, or of flinging them into water as rain or fertility charms. The idol procession, which is intended, partly to please the deities, partly to spread their beneficent influences through the streets along which they pass, usually implies Jain or Buddhist tradition, and is more common in S. than in N. India.

A typical instance of such processions is the car festival (*rath-jātrā*) of Jagannāth. At Madura, during the spring festival, Śiva is wedded to Mīnākṣī, the local goddess, and a leading incident of the rite is the dragging of the images through the streets (W. Francis, *Madura Gaz.*, 1906, i. 270, 273). The rite of bathing their patron goddess, Gauri, consort of Śiva, by the Rājputs of Udaipur is one of their most solemn festivals (J. Tod, *Annals of Rajasthan*, 1884, i. 603 ff.). At the Kundalpur temple the chief rite is the ceremonial bathing (*jaljātrā*) of the god Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna; the water in which the god has been bathed is sold by auction, and votaries buy a little to rub on their hands and faces (R. V. Russell, *Damoh Gaz.*, 1906, i. 203). Among the Prabhūs of the Deccan, their goddess, Gauri, is fed, laid on a winnowing-fan, and stripped of all her ornaments, except her nose-ring, glass bangles, and black bead necklace. Some food and four copper coins being tied to her apron, she is placed in the arms of a servant, who, without looking back, while an elderly woman sprinkles water on his footprints, walks straight to a river or lake, and, leaving the goddess in the water, brings back her silk waist-cloth, the winnowing-fan, a little water, and five pebbles (*BG* xviii. pt. i. [1885] p. 248). On the banks of the Indus, Darya Sāhib, the river-god, is represented by an image made of reeds, which is ornamented with flowers, worshipped, and finally thrown into the river (H. A. Rose, *Punjab Census Rep.*, 1901, i. 118).

(*c*) *Images used in divination.*—The use of images for the purpose of divination is common.

At the Dharmāvaram temple, when any worshipper craves a boon at the shrine of a famous Sannyāsi, the priest puts a leaf of the *vilva* tree on the head of the image, and, if soon after it falls off, it is believed that the request will be granted (W. Francis, *Vizagapatam Gaz.*, 1907, i. 316). At the shrine of Pisharnāth, on Matherān Hill, near Bombay, the priest explains to the god what is desired, and lays two stones in a hollow formed in the breast of the image; if the right-hand stone is first to fall, he tells the worshipper that his request is granted; if the left-hand stone falls, an additional offering is needed (*BG* xiv. [1882] 263 n.). When the Muhammadans destroyed the temple at Mandhāta on the Narbada river, the leader was told that the *liṅga* had the power of showing by a reflexion within its surface the creature into which the soul of the inquirer would pass at the next metempsychosis; when the Musalmān officer looked into it he saw a pig, and in his rage flung the *liṅga* into the fire; this explains how it gained its jet black colour (C. Grant, *Cent. Prov. Gaz.*, 1870, p. 251).

(*d*) *Binding the god.*—The custom of binding an image so as to keep the deity under control is found in India (*FL* viii. [1897] 325 ff.).

The image of Hanumân, the monkey-god, is sometimes barred in by means of strips of wood nailed in front of his shrine, to prevent him from wandering in the jungle (R. V. Russell, *Betul Gaz.*, 1907, i. 53). In Kumaun, some of the local gods are shut up in a copper vessel or covered with a cylinder, lest they may do mischief (*NINQ* iii. [1893] 145). Near Madras is a temple where the reformer, Śaṅkarâchârya, put the goddess Kâlî down a well, and placed a large stone on the top to keep her confined, because she used to eat a Brâhman daily (*JASBo*, ii. 281). The Kurumbas of Madras worship their god, Vîra, the 'hero,' only at his annual festival, and for the remainder of the year keep him shut up in a box (G. Oppert, 238).

(*e*) *Stolen images.*—Images which have been stolen from other people are more valuable than those acquired by purchase or gift, because they bring with them the luck of the former possessor, and are more easily propitiated (*NINQ* iii. [1893] 55; cf. J. Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882-88, iv. 1321; Gn 31[19]).

Among the Meitheis, in recent times, a celebrated ammonite, which had been stolen more than once, was the subject of a lawsuit in the British Courts. In ancient days the Meitheis used to plunder and remove to their capital the sacred stones of the Nâgas (T. C. Hodson, 102). The Kallans, a thieving tribe in Madras, do not hesitate to steal a god, if they think he will be of use to them in their predatory excursions (Thurston, iii. 85; F. R. Hemingway, *Trichinopoly Gaz.*, 1907, i. 331[3]). It was the habit of some Kandhs to steal their neighbours' gods in order to acquire influence as priests (S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials*, 200 ff.). A Râjâ of Kulu, afflicted with leprosy, was advised in a dream to steal the image of the god Raghunâth from Oudh; his messengers stole the god, were pursued and overtaken, but the god showed such a decided wish to go to Kulu that they were allowed to take him away, and the Râjâ was cured (*FL* ix. [1898] 184 *f.*).

7. **Legends of discovery of images.**—Most of the legends of the discovery of images are ætiological, invented to explain the rudeness of the type, their existence in spite of iconoclasm, or other miraculous powers attributed to them.

The image is often said to have been originally a shapeless log which was found floating down a river or discovered on the seashore. That of Gokulnâth in Mewâr was discovered in a ravine on the river bank (J. Tod, i. 580). That of Jagannâth was discovered by a Savara, one of the jungle tribes (W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, i. 92 ff.). About a century ago the god Manoharji appeared to a Khârvâ fisherman in Bombay, and informed him that his image had floated ashore; when search was made, it was discovered (*BG* v. [1880] 81). Many famous *liṅgas* have been identified by a cow dropping her milk on the spot where they were subsequently discovered. That of Balachari still bears the mark of the cow's hoof; that at Indi was identified by a cow dropping milk on it, and, when being dug out, it sank into the ground, and was thus proved to be self-existent (*svayambhu*) (§ 3). At Bhîmaśankar, a man, while cutting timber, saw blood oozing from a tree, but the wound healed when a cow dropped her milk on the stump, and a *liṅga* came out of the tree; at Pashân, a man found a cow feeding a snake in an ant-hill, which, when excavated, disclosed five *liṅgas* (*BG* xiii. [1884], 655, xxiii. [1884] 655, xviii. pt. iii. [1885] pp. 120, 265). An image is often discovered as the result of a dream, like one which recently appeared in Bombay, or that of Jagiśvara Mahâdeva at Bandakpur (*NINQ* i. [1891] 165; C. Grant, *Cent. Prov. Gaz.*, 1870, p. 175). Sometimes, when attacked by foreigners, an image is miraculously defended by swarms of hornets, as in the case of the Bileśvar *liṅga* in Kâṭhiâwâr, or that at Bherâgarh on the Narbadâ (*BG* viii. [1884] 401; W. H. Sleeman, i. 66 *f.*). When the Muhammadans attacked the image of the bull Nandi, at Nirvangnî, or that of Omkârjî on the Narbadâ, blood gushed out, and the assailants were discomfited (*BG* xviii. pt. iii. [1885] p. 263).

8. **The future of idolatry.**—The attitude of the Hindus towards their images has been discussed elsewhere (art. HINDUISM, § 38). The influence of monotheistic religions, like Christianity and Islâm, has done much to suggest purer conceptions of the Godhead—the belief in a single, spiritual, benign Providence. A similar effect has been the result of sectarian movements, such as Sikhism, the Brahmâ and the Ârya Samâj, and other recent movements of the same kind which encourage the study of the Vedânta, reject the Purânic scheme of Hinduism, and aim at restoring the Nature-worship of the Vedic age. But, granting this, idolatry still not only prevails widely among the menial and forest tribes, but is actively encouraged by the Brâhman hierarchy, and, in particular, by those priestly classes which act as pilgrim guides at sacred cities and places of pilgrimage. The growth of a moneyed class under British rule has largely encouraged the erection of temples, which are still built in great numbers, as the result of religious enthusiasm and ostentation, and from the belief that little merit can be gained by the restoration of an ancient shrine or the repair of an old image. It is improbable that a form of worship which is so deep-rooted and universal, and which, in the present state of their culture, meets the wants of the masses of the population, will readily disappear.

To quote A. C. Lyall (*Asiatic Studies*[2], London, 1907, ii. 151): 'Idolatry is only the hieroglyphic writ large, in popular character; it came because unlettered man carves in sticks and stones his rude and simple imagination of a god; and this manner of expressing the notion by handiwork continues among even highly intellectual societies, until at last the idea becomes too subtle and sublime to be rendered by any medium except the written or spoken word.'

LITERATURE.—The vast subject of Indian idolatry has as yet been investigated in no single monograph. The illustrations of images contained in the popular works on Hinduism are, as a rule, taken from the coarse lithographs found in the houses of many castes. It is understood that the Indian Archæological Department contemplates the preparation of a complete iconography showing the development of the idol during historical times—a work which is much needed. Many illustrations of Indian sculpture will be found in V. A. Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911. The existing books on Hindu mythology and cults, such as E. Moor, *The Hindu Pantheon*, London, 1810; C. Coleman, *Mythology of the Hindus*, do. 1832; W. J. Wilkins, *Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Puranic*[2], Calcutta, 1900; J. Dowson, *Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology*, London, 1879; B. Ziegenbalg, *Genealogy of the South Indian Gods*, Madras, 1869, are largely based on literary sources, and give little information on local temples, their images, and cultus. The illustrations of these works are, as a rule, inferior. For the earlier period much information will be found in the various series of Archæological Reports edited by A. Cunningham, J. Burgess, J. H. Marshall, and others, with special works, such as A. Cunningham, *The Bhilsa Topes*, London, 1854, *Stupa of Bharhut*, do. 1879, *Mahabodhi*, do. 1892; J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, do. 1880; A. Grünwedel, *Buddhist Art in India*, ed. J. Burgess, do. 1901; J. Fergusson, *Tree and Serpent Worship*, do. 1868, [2]1873, and *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*[2], do. 1910; al-Birûnî, *India*, tr. E. C. Sachau, do. 1910; the article, including a bibliography, in *IGI*, 1908, ii. 89 ff.; J. N. Farquhar, *Crown of Hinduism*, Oxford, 1913. For the Tantrik worship of images, see *Tantra of the Great Liberation (Mahanirvâna Tantra)*, ed. A. Avalon, and *Hymns to the Goddess*, tr. A. and E. Avalon, London, 1913. For idolatry in its modern forms the information is scattered through a wide literature of Indian ethnography—accounts of tribes and castes, local gazetteers, census reports, and similar publications, to which reference is made in the course of the present article.

W. CROOKE.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Japanese and Korean).

—I. *JAPANESE.*—i. IN THE INDIGENOUS RELIGION. —1. The use of images and idols as objects of worship is not indigenous to Japan, for one characteristic of pure Shinto is the absence of all figures. Among the archæological remains of greatest antiquity, however, many clay images of men, and of horses and other animals, known as **haniwa**, have been found in the burial vaults of Imperial and noble families. It had been the custom at a funeral to sacrifice attendants, servants, and beasts of burden, that they might accompany their master upon his journey and attend him in the spirit land. In the reign of Suijin (29 B.C.–A.D. 23), when the Queen died, Nomi-no-sukune, councillor to the throne, advised the Emperor to substitute clay images for living victims. One hundred potters were summoned from Idzumo to the court, and these made figures which were placed about the royal tomb. The custom thus established was followed by the nobles and prominent families for several hundred years, down to the 7th cent. A.D. Recent excavations in ancient tombs have brought *haniwa* to light in as many as 32 provinces of the Empire, thus witnessing to their widely prevailing use. The rules concerning tomb-construction issued in the first year of Taikwa (A.D. 645) make no mention of *haniwa*;

but in special cases their use was probably continued to a later date. The latest instance was in 1912, when *hanica* were placed by the tomb of the Emperor Meiji Tenno, in deference to ancient custom and sentiment. At no time were these images objects of worship, though they possessed religious significance as symbolic offerings to the spirits of the dead (see, further, art. HUMAN SACRIFICE [Japanese and Korean]).

2. Although in Shinto no images are used to represent objects of worship, a mirror is usually placed in the holy place within the shrine. The mirror within the Shrine at Ise is alleged to be the one used by Ama-terasu, the sun-goddess, or ancestress of the Royal Family. It is octagonal, although usually the mirrors are round. They are not strictly objects of worship, but typical of the human heart which in its purity reflects the image of Deity; and faithful followers of Shinto are instructed to bow before the mirror of the shrine morning and evening in an act of self-examination.

3. Before the mirror of the Shinto shrine hang the **gohei**, strips of white paper cut into small squares and draped upon an upright of wood, supposed to symbolize the ancient offerings of cloth. Together with the mirror, the *gohei* are not infrequently objects of popular worship.

4. About the shrine the **shime-nawa**, a straw rope with tufts of straw or cut paper at regular intervals, is often hung. This rope may be placed about anything considered sacred or worthy of reverent care, and is supposed to avert evil influences. Trees, rocks, and caverns are occasionally so defended; and the custom of surrounding with straw rope the area upon which a house is to be erected may have its origin in the idea of thus averting evil.

ii. AS INFLUENCED BY BUDDHISM.—The beginning of real image-making in Japan dates from the coming of Buddhism, whose influence is to be noted even in Shinto shrines, for a gradual mutual adaptation took place and various images came to be placed in the shrines.

1. The most popular of these is that of Sugawara Michizane († A.D. 901), worshipped by the people under the posthumous name of **Tenjin**, as the god of learning, especially of calligraphy. He is represented in the robe of an ancient court-noble seated on a matted floor.

2. The **Ni-o** or **Deva**, as gate-guardians to scare away demons, are often found before Shinto shrines as well as before the temples of certain Buddhist sects; and the images of animals traditionally associated with specific deities are placed in their shrines and popularly worshipped as images of the deity itself. For example, *Inari*, called also Uga-no-Mitama, is the goddess of rice, and hence much worshipped by Japanese, who are rice-raising, rice-eating people. The fox is her servant or messenger; and images of foxes are always found at Inari shrines, being regarded by many as images of the goddess herself. In the case of *Benten*, one of the seven deities of luck, the snake, her attendant, is often imaged as an embodiment of the goddess.

3. **Images of Buddha.**—For the most part, images to which religious reverence is paid are closely associated with Buddhist temples. The first record of the introduction of Buddhistic images is to the effect that, in A.D. 522, Shibatatsu of Ryo (one of the provinces of China at that time) came to Japan and settled in Yamato, bringing with him several images which were worshipped in his home. The people in general, however, paid little attention to the fact. Some time later, in A.D. 552, the Korean king sent ambassadors to the Japanese court, who brought a gilt-bronze statue of Buddha with hanging canopies and several Buddhist Scriptures. The new faith gained ground through favour of the court circle, and the making of images became a professional art. Shibatatsu was himself a skilled sculptor, and was succeeded by his son and grandson, the latter, Tori-busshi, being considered one of the greatest ever known in Japan. Several of the most famous images at Horyuji, the oldest Buddhist temple in Japan, are declared to be by his hand. In the sixth year of Bintoku (A.D. 577) the king of Kudara made a present to the court of Japan of a large image of Buddha which was accompanied by the artist; and in A.D. 585 a Japanese sculptor is known to have executed two images of Buddha. The images of this early period were of wood; but during the reign of Bintoku a large stone image of Miroku was presented by the court of Kudara, and set the fashion for work in stone. Gradually bronze, clay, and hard lacquer were used; and images were made in great numbers, especially about the middle of the 8th century. This continued till the 12th cent., when the art began to decline. From the 8th to the 12th cent., many famous sculptors, including Keibunkai and Kasuga (8th cent.), Eshin (10th cent.), Jocho, Kokei, and Unkei (11th cent.), and Tankei and Kwankei (12th cent.), devoted their energy and skill almost exclusively to the making of Buddhist images and idols. Among the most famous images are the *daibutsu* in Nara, Kamakura, and Kyoto. See art. DAIBUTSU.

4. One of the most popular objects of worship is the image of **Kwannon** (Skr. Avalokiteśvara [*q.v.*]), the goddess of mercy, who listens to the prayers of the unhappy. The sex of the deity is a matter of dispute, but in popular worship the pity invoked is that of the eternally feminine. The San-ju-san-gen-do, a temple to Kwannon in Kyoto, contains 33,333 images of the deity. The temple was originally founded by the ex-emperor Toba in 1132, and in 1662 the present building was erected. Ranged in rising tiers throughout the length of the temple are 1000 figures, each 5 ft. high, and bearing upon its head and hands smaller images, making a total of 33,333. Some of these were executed by the best artists of their time; and, while all represent the same deity, no two are exactly alike in the arrangement of the myriad hands which hold forth various articles.

5. **Jizo** (Skr. Kṣitigarbha) is a very common figure, not only in temples, but also along country roadsides and by mountain paths. He is a helper of those in trouble; and is especially besought by pregnant women and by children. A stone image of Jizo swathed in little bibs, the offerings of women in distress, is one of the most pathetic sights amid all the image-worship of Japan.

6. Among other popular Buddhist images may be mentioned **Rakan**, **Emma**, **Fudō**, and **Benzuru**. Rakan (Skr. Arhan) includes all the immediate disciples of Śākyamuni, such as the five hundred disciples (Gohyaku Rakan) or the sixteen disciples (Juroku Rakan). Emma (Yama-rāja) is the ruler of the Buddhist hell, a most ferocious-looking image. Fudō (Achala), the immovable, is represented in blazing fire. Benzuru, one of the sixteen Rakan, is a god of healing sympathy; and the lower classes believe that their bodily diseases will be healed by their touching the corresponding part of his sacred image.

7. **The seven gods of Luck**—Ebisu, Daikoku, Benten, Fukurokuju, Bishamon, Jurojin, and Hotei—receive special regard from merchants and small traders. Their images, now as much in jest as in earnest, are frequently to be seen; and figures of them adorn popular advertisements. The present trend of things is clearly seen in the

fact that less and less respect is paid to the images which once meant something very real in the life and thought of the people.

8. Besides images, the commonest object of worship is the ancestral tablet, *ihai*, which plays a prominent part in Japanese Buddhism. The custom was introduced from China and is universal among all classes of people, and with Shintoists as well as Buddhists. The tablets are usually of rectangular shape, a slip of planed wood, rounded at the top, and placed on a pedestal. The size differs according to the rank or wealth of the family and the age of the dead. On the front side is inscribed the posthumous name of the dead, and on the back the date of his or her birth and death. They are put in a small shrine or on a shelf, not infrequently with the images of Amida or other Buddhist deities, and are placed in a room specially prepared for the purpose or in a sitting room of the family. Often duplicates of the tablets are kept in the Buddhist temples of their own attachment. For a certain length of time after death food and drink are offered, generally until the 49th day, and thereafter on the 100th day and on the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 13th, 25th, 33rd, and 50th anniversary. The idea of these offerings before the tablets is not the same as for deities. It is with the idea of feeding the souls in the world beyond, or simply to keep bright the memory of the dead. Priests are invited on the anniversaries to read scriptures before *ihai*. In the time of the *bon*-festival on the 13th, 14th, and 15th days of July (old calendar) the souls of the dead are believed to come to the world in order to visit the members of their family, when special feasts are offered before the tablets. The custom is steadily declining, giving way to the coming in of more intelligent faith.

9. **Picture-trampling.**—It may be of interest to note that, following the introduction of Roman Catholic Christianity by the Jesuit missionaries in the 16th cent., the persecution found expression in a peculiar form of *efumi*, or picture-tramping, all suspected of Christian sympathies being required to trample upon the picture of the Christ. Later, an iron plate was substituted for the picture; and the practice was continued until the beginning of the Meiji era, when religious freedom was allowed to the people.

II. *KOREAN.*—Buddhism was introduced into Korea at a time when the country still formed three separate kingdoms—Shiragi, Korai, and Kudara.

1. **Buddhist images.**—Korai, being nearest to China, was the first to receive Buddhist missionaries, with whom came the idols of that faith, in A.D. 343. Soon after there was built a large Buddhist temple called *Iburanji*. Twelve years later, Buddhism was introduced into Kudara, and forty years later into Shiragi, gradually spreading over the entire peninsula. The idols and images in the Korean temples are for the most part not different from those in Japan, images of Buddha, Kwannon, Amida, Jizo, Emma, and Rakan being most frequent. The largest Buddhist statue in Korea is that of *Miroku* (Maitreya), in the temple of Kwanchokji in the province of South Chusei (Chung Chong). It was made in stone about 1000 years ago, by a priest called Emyo (Heimiung), who, it is said, employed one hundred workmen for thirty-seven years. It is 55 ft. in height, with a width of 30 ft. On the forehead, which measures 6 ft. in width, is set a precious stone.

2. In addition to Buddhist images, the image of **Kwang-woo** is frequently seen. Kwang-woo was an ancient Chinese general; and in the city of Seoul alone there are four shrines to his honour, one each in the north, south, east, and west. He is popular as a household deity with the common people; and the images of Gentoku, Chohi, and Komei, three other generals, are often placed near his.

3. **The mountain-god.**—The image of the mountain-god is that of an old man mounted upon a tiger. He is very popular, and occupies small shrines upon the hill-tops.

4. **Post-gods.**—Everywhere in Korea, by the wayside and at the entrance to villages, stand demon-posts, rudely cut with grinning teeth and horrible faces. They were originally distance-posts, which gradually became objects of worship, believed to be strong defences against the countless forces of the unseen world.

5. **Ta Chue**, or 'the Lord-of-the-place,' is made of straw in a hollow form generally about 1 ft. long and 5 in. wide; and within him are placed old coins, bits of pretty cloth, and similar treasures. He is enshrined in the corner of the roof, of the kitchen or store-house, and offered *mochi* (rice cake) on the 1st and the 15th of the old calendar months. He is supposed to avert evil and bring luck to his owner.

LITERATURE.—B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*, London, 1902; John Murray, *Handbook for Japan*, do. 1907; Kakuzo Okakura, *The Ideals of the East*, do. 1904.

TASUKU HARADA.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Lapps and Samoyeds).—The worship of idols and images of wood and stone appears to have been at one time common to all the Ugrian races occupying the Arctic regions of the Eurasian continent. This worship still survives among the Samoyeds of the Russian Empire, and it has not been long abandoned by the Samelats, or Sameh, of Lapland, otherwise known as Finns or Lapps, the former term being current in Norway, and the latter in Sweden, Denmark, Britain, and other countries. It is true that the people of Lapland outwardly professed the Lutheran form of Christianity as early as the 17th cent.; but even at that time they secretly retained the religious ideas which they had inherited from their forefathers. Of the condition of the Lapland Samelats in the 17th cent., the best contemporary exponent is John Scheffer, Professor in the University of Upsala, whose *Lapponia*, published at Frankfort in 1673 (Eng. tr., Oxford, 1674), contains very precise accounts of the existing religious practices of these people. A striking feature of the Lapp religion was the worship of certain idols.

These were two in number, popularly known as 'the wooden god' and 'the stone god.' The wooden god (*muora jubmel*) was called Aijeke, 'the ancestor,' and, alternatively, Thor, or Tiermes, 'the thunderer.' It may be that the name of Thor, and his association with this particular idol, ought properly to be regarded as a Teutonic intrusion in Lapland, but that is a detail into which it is unnecessary to enter here. The image of Aijeke or Thor was always made of birch wood.

'Of this wood they make so many idols as they have sacrifices, and, when they have done, they keep them in a cave by some hill side. The shape of them is very rude; only at the top they are made to represent a man's head' (Scheffer, p. 40, Eng. tr.).

Scheffer's book portrays one of the rudest of these idols, a mere wooden block, but there is also a more elaborate representation of Thor's image, standing upon a table or altar. The trunk is simply a block of wood, with sticks projecting on either side to represent arms. At the end of the right arm is fixed a mallet, intended for the hammer of Thor. Across the chest are cross-belts or bandoliers. The head is shaped to resemble a human head, with eyes, eyebrows, nose, and mouth. On either side of the skull are two spikes, in accordance with Scheffer's words:

'Into his head they drive a nail of iron or steel, and a small piece of flint to strike fire with, if he hath a mind to it' (p. 40).

On the table, in front of the figure, is a plate of

birch bark, containing portions of a sacrificed reindeer. Behind the figure are deer's antlers, and round the base of the table are branches of birch and pine. A Lapp kneels in adoration before the altar.

Gustaf von Düben, in his work *Om Lappland och Lapparne* (Stockholm, 1873, p. 288), reproduces a drawing from a MS of the year 1671, by Rehn, Stockholm, which is in close agreement with Scheffer's contemporaneous picture. Rehn's drawing shows three images of Thor upon one table, and in front of them are three upright sticks bearing portions of the sacrificed animal. Von Düben draws attention to the branches adorning the sides of the altar, to the two antler-heads between the images of Thor, to the hammers wielded in each hand of these images, and to the haloes encircling their heads. It is noteworthy that the sacrifice of animals is an essential element in the worship of these idols. Scheffer states that the Lapps make a new image to Thor every autumn, consecrating it by killing a reindeer, and smearing the idol with its blood and fat. The skull, feet, and horns are placed behind the image. Part of the meat is eaten by the Lapps, and part is buried, together with the bones.

In addition to 'the wooden god,' the Lapps also worshipped 'the stone god' (*kied kie jubmel*), otherwise, in Swedish, *Storjunkar*, or 'the great Lord.' The term *seita* was also applied, generically, to a stone god. In form, the *seita* sometimes resembled, or was supposed to resemble, a bird, or a man, or some other creature.

'The truth is, its shape is so rude that they may sooner fancy it like something themselves than persuade other people that it is so. Their imagination is so strong that they really believe it represents their *Storjunkar*, and worship it accordingly. Neither do they use any art in polishing it, but take it as they find it upon the banks of lakes and rivers. In this shape, therefore, they worship it, not as though it were so made by chance, but by the immediate will and procurement of their god *Storjunkar*, that it might be sacred to him' (Scheffer, p. 41).

The last sentence, it will be seen, implies that the *seita* was the medium through which an invisible deity was worshipped, and was not itself an object of worship. Von Düben shows (*op. cit.* pp. 236–246) representations of three Lapp *seitas*, one taken from a reindeer-pasture and another from a stream, while the third, of white marble, with a covering or cap of calcareous spar, was found in a small island, at a spot known to Lapp tradition as a place of sacrifice, where many horns and bones were found. It may be added that, although the *seitas* are generally quite unworked, there are some instances in which the upper part has been carved sufficiently to bring out a resemblance to the head of a man or of an animal.

The ceremonies connected with the worship of *Storjunkar* were very similar to those associated with 'the wooden god.' The animal specially selected for sacrifice was a male reindeer. Its right ear having been pierced and a red thread run through it, the reindeer was killed, and its blood carefully preserved in a barrel. The officiating priest then took the blood, some of the fat, the antlers, the bones of the head and neck, and the feet and hoofs, to the hill where the sacred stone had already been placed. Uncovering his head and bowing reverently, he then anointed the stone with the fat and blood, and placed the antlers behind it, the right horn having the penis of the reindeer attached to it, while on the left horn was an amulet of tin and silver worked together with red thread.

Although not represented by any special image, the sun was also worshipped by the Lapps of the 17th century. Scheffer states his belief that the sun was incorporate in Thor, who, it may be noted, was sometimes decorated with a nimbus round his head. The act of sun-worship, at any rate, was performed before the altar of Thor, upon which occasion the sacrificial bones were arranged in a circle upon the altar.

In return for the reverence paid to them, or through them, the wooden and stone gods were believed to protect their worshippers against misfortune and to aid them in hunting and fishing. Each family had its own sacrificial mount, with its wooden or stone god; but in some cases individuals possessed *seitas* who were understood to be specially interested in their welfare and to whom they prayed.

Rites similar to these are common to other cognate races in Northern Europe and Siberia.

'The Samoyedes, Ostiaks, Voguls, and Lapps all smear the mouths of their idols with blood and fat' (John Abercromby, *Pre- and Proto-historic Finns*, London, 1898, i. 159).

Among the Samoyeds of to-day the religious practices of the 17th cent. Lapps are still in full swing, as several modern travellers have shown. In 1875 and 1878 the Swedish explorer Nordenskiöld and his comrades visited sacrificial sites on Vaygatz Island and the Yalmal Peninsula. To these places the Samoyeds are accustomed to make pilgrimages, sometimes from a distance of six or seven hundred miles, in order to offer sacrifices and make vows. At a sacrificial eminence on the south-western headland of Vaygatz Island, the Swedish explorers found a large number of reindeer skulls and horns, bones of the bear, various objects of metal, and several hundreds of idols, described as

'small wooden sticks, the upper portions of which were carved very clumsily in the form of the human countenance, most of them from fifteen to twenty, but some of them 370 centimetres in length. They were all stuck in the ground on the south-east part of the eminence. Near the place of sacrifice there were to be seen pieces of drift-wood and remains of the fireplace at which the sacrificial meal was prepared. Our guide told us that at these meals the mouths of the idols were besmeared with blood and wetted with brandy, and the former statement was confirmed by the large spots of blood which were found on most of the large idols below the holes intended to represent the mouth' (Nordenskiöld, *Voyage of the Vega*, Eng. tr., London, 1881, i. 94 f.)

That these customs are still in force seems quite evident. In 1894, Frederick Jackson, in the course of his expedition to Franz-Josef Land, learned that the Samoyeds of Vaygatz at that date were accustomed to sacrifice a reindeer to their god, killing the animal by slow degrees. The Samoyeds, moreover, carry small portable gods with them during their sledge-journeys. In 1878, Nordenskiöld purchased four of these gods from a Samoyed woman. Two of them were dolls, one was a miniature garment, and the fourth was 'a stone, wrapped round with rags and hung with brass plates, a corner of the stone forming the countenance of the human figure it was intended to resemble' (*op. cit.* i. 86). This last appears to have been identical with the 'stone god,' or *seita*, of the Lapps.

'Professor De Harlez thinks it possible that the small domestic idols of felt and rags, used by the Mongols, and mentioned as early as the year 1200 by Armenian authors, may have been introduced by the Buddhist preachers, as Vartan states without hesitation' (Abercromby, *op. cit.* i. 163).

The stationary wooden idols of the Samoyeds seem to have been larger in past times. Martinière in 1653, Linschoten in 1601, and an old Dutch engraving reproduced by Nordenskiöld (i. 84) all show images as large as a man; and in the last instance the human trunk as well as the head is carved with some elaboration. Probably the earliest written description of Samoyed idols is that given by an English traveller, Stephen Burrough, in 1556 (Hakluyt's *Voyages*, new edition, Glasgow, 1903–05, 'Principal Navigations,' ii. 338). Burrough speaks of his visit to

'a heap of the Samoeds idols, which were in number above 300, the worst and the most unartificiall worke that ever I saw: the eyes and mouthes of sundrie of them were bloodie, they had the shape of men, women, and children, very grosly wrought, & that which they had made for other parts, was also sprinckled with blood. Some of their idols were an olde

sticke with two or three notches, made with a knife in it. . . . There was one of their sleds broken, and lay by the heape of idols, & there I saw a deers skinne which the foules had spoyled: and before certaine of their idols blocks were made as high as their mouthes, being all bloody, I thought that to be the table whereon they offered their sacrifice.'

A comparison of these various statements makes it evident that the idol-worship of the Samoyeds and of the Lapp Samelats was substantially the same. The only striking difference is that the Samoyed idols have not the outstretched arms wielding the hammer of Thor which formerly characterized the wooden gods of Lapland. It is reasonable to presume, therefore, that the idea of Thor and his hammer was introduced into Lapland from the South.

LITERATURE.—Appended to Von Düben's *Lappland* (Stockholm, 1873) there is a list of over 250 works relating to Lapps, a considerable number of which include references to their religion. Nearly as ample is the bibliography prefixed to Abercromby's *Finns* (London, 1898). Special mention may be made of C. E. Lenequist, *De superstitione veterum Fennorum*, Abo, 1782; C. Ganander, *Mythologia Fennica*, do. 1789; A. Andelin, 'Religion der heidnischen Lappen,' in Erman's *Archiv für wissenschaftl. Kunde Russlands*, xx. 167–180 and 349–365; and V. M. Mikhallovskii, 'Shamanism in Siberia and European Russia,' in *JAI* xxiv. (1894) 62.

DAVID MACRITCHIE.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Muslim).—Muḥammad protested strongly against idolatry, but other Arabs had done so before him. While he was yet a lad, there were men, called the Ḥanīfs, who rejected the gross idolatry around them. Some of these afterwards became Christians; some remained unitarians. Of the latter, Zaid ibn 'Amr was one of the chief. He embraced neither Christianity nor Judaism, but said that he worshipped the God of Abraham. He kept entirely aloof from idol-worship and all connected therewith, and had a great influence on Muḥammad's early preaching. So long as Muḥammad only exhorted to better lives, or spoke of the Last Day, the Meccans treated him with good-humoured contempt; but when he attacked the idolatry of the Ka'ba, the case was different. He must respect their temple and its gods, for which Mecca was famed far and wide. His uncle Abū Ṭālib begged him to make some concession, but he replied, 'Say there is no God except Allāh, and renounce what you worship beside Him.' So the friendly offices of his uncle came to nothing. The persecution now became severe. The Meccans called him a liar, a demoniac, a sorcerer. Again he had to seek the protection of his powerful relatives. Some of the Meccan leaders then proposed that the God of Muḥammad should be worshipped at the same time as the Meccan deities, or alternately each year. Muḥammad did not fall into the snare, but produced this revelation, showing that the two religions must be kept quite distinct:

'Say, O ye unbelievers, I worship not that which ye worship, and ye do not worship that which I worship; I shall never worship that which ye worship, neither will ye worship that which I worship. To you be your religion; to me my religion' (cix.).

Very soon after he gave the most emphatic testimony to the doctrine of the unity of God which is to be found in the Qur'ān:

'Say, He is God alone: God the Eternal! He begetteth not, and He is not begotten; and there is none like unto Him' (cxii.).

Still the people of Mecca were hard-hearted, and the preaching of the Prophet at this time is full of denunciations of the despicable person, the backbiter, the defamer, the insolent, as he terms the prominent individuals who led the opposition. Protected himself by his powerful family connexions, the Prophet could not save his followers from persecution, and a number took refuge in Abyssinia. His cause did not gain ground. Then came another proposal for compromise. A leading man of Mecca was deputed to call on Muḥammad and to point out to him that blaspheming their gods, reviling their religion, and charging them and their forefathers with unbelief had done no good. Would it not be better to come to some terms? If he would only acknowledge their deities, the Meccans would accept Allāh as one of their gods and worship him. It was a great temptation. Under circumstances such as these, Muḥammad one day came upon a group of men near the Ka'ba, and in a friendly way began to recite the opening verses of *sūra* liii.:

'By the star when it setteth, your compatriot erreth not, nor is he led astray, neither speaketh he from mere impulse. The Qur'ān is no other than a revelation revealed to him: One mighty in power taught it him.'

Then he went on to refer to some of the Meccan idols by name. 'Do you see al-Lāt and al-'Uzzā and Manāt, the third besides?' Then, to the astonishment and joy of the Meccans, came the words: 'These are the exalted females, and verily their intercession is to be hoped for.' They prostrated themselves in worship and said, 'Now we know that it is God alone that giveth life and taketh it away; that createth and supporteth. These our goddesses make intercession for us, and, as thou hast accorded to them a position, we are content to follow thee.' Thus were they willing to fulfil their part of the compact. But to the credit of Muḥammad it must be said that he saw the grave error that he had committed, and that the people would still retain their idols. Tradition records that a verse inserted in a later *sūra* now came, showing Muḥammad that as other prophets had been tempted of the devil so had he:

'We have not sent an apostle or prophet before thee, among whose desires Satan injected not some wrong desire, but God shall bring to nought that which Satan had suggested' (xxii. 51).

The mind of the Prophet being set at rest, the revelation came as it now stands in the Qur'ān:

'Do you see al-Lāt and al-'Uzzā, and Manāt, the third idol besides? What, shall ye have male progeny and God female? This were, indeed, an unfair partition! These are mere names: ye and your fathers named them thus' (liii. 19–23).

The Meccans were much displeased at this, and said, 'Muḥammad hath repented of his favourable mention of the rank held by our goddesses before the Lord. He hath changed the same and brought other words in their stead.' The persecution recommenced; but Muḥammad henceforth attempted no compromise, and now and for ever broke with idolatry. He received a solemn warning never to run into such danger again:

'Verily, they had well-nigh beguiled thee from what we revealed to thee, and caused thee to invent some other thing in our name' (xvii. 75).

The idols of Mecca are derided:

'What think ye of the gods whom ye invoke besides Allāh? Show me what part of the earth they have created' (xxxv. 38).

Before he left Mecca, Muḥammad said to his opponents:

'Call now on those whom ye made God's companions; and they shall call on them, but they will not answer them' (xxviii. 64).

The statues of false gods furnish fuel for hell:

'Fear the fire prepared for the infidels, whose fuel is men and stones' (ii. 22).

Idolaters are likened to

'the spider who buildeth her a house: But, verily, frailest of all houses surely is the house of the spider' (xxix. 40).

They are not to be prayed for (ix. 115); their end is to enter into the fire (vii. 36). Marriage with an idolatress is forbidden (ii. 220). Idolatry is an unpardonable sin (iv. 51).

A few converts were gained at Medīna, who, when they came to Mecca to perform the annual pilgrimage, took an oath of obedience to Muḥammad, in which a promise to give up idol-worship, as with all converts, was an important point. Later, in Medīna the Prophet made it quite clear that idolatry was a great crime, an unpardonable sin:

'Verily, God will not forgive the union of other gods with Himself! But other than this will He forgive to whom He pleaseth. And he who uniteth gods with God hath devised a great wickedness' (iv. 51; cf. 116 f.).

In the year A.D. 629, Muḥammad, with the permission of the chief men in Mecca, was able to perform the pilgrimage to the Ka'ba, and went through the usual ceremonies—after which he returned to Medina. The time, however, soon came when it was necessary that Mecca should be the centre of the new religion; and so, seizing an opportunity for a quarrel, he marched with 10,000 men against the city. The Meccans saw that the time for opposition was past, and submitted. Muḥammad proceeded to the Ka'ba, saluted the Black Stone, but destroyed all the idols. Idolaters are henceforth to be severely dealt with:

'When the sacred months are past, kill those who join other gods with God, wherever ye shall find them; and seize them, besiege them, and lay wait for them with every kind of ambush; but if they shall convert, and observe prayer, and pay the obligatory alms, then let them go their way' (ix. 5).

Idolaters are no longer to make the pilgrimage:

'O Believers! only they who join gods with God are unclean! Let them not, therefore, after this year come near the sacred Temple' (ix. 28).

The people of Ṭā'if made a stout resistance to Muḥammad, and, when they finally submitted, begged to be allowed to retain their idols. They received fairly good terms, but this request could not be granted, and the idols were all destroyed by Muslims appointed to do the work. Whilst Muḥammad destroyed all the idols at Mecca, he still retained the pagan ceremonial of the Pilgrimage and the Black Stone as an object of superstitious reverence, thus leaving the old stone-worship of the pagan Arabs intact. The retention of the Pilgrimage was perhaps a necessity in order to win over all the Arab tribes, by yielding to their reverence for Mecca as the centre of a national faith; but it has worked evil since, not only by giving undue importance to the mechanical performance of the old pagan ritual, but by emphasizing the fact that Islām was started as a local and national religion, and that rules suited for Arabs in the 7th cent. are binding on the most diverse peoples in the 20th.

There is a curious tradition which relates how Muḥammad was lost when a little boy. An old man comforted his nurse and led her to the idol house. He then walked seven times round the idol, kissed its head, and said, 'O exalted Hubal, will thou be pleased to bring back Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Allāh, whose wet-nurse this woman is?' Hubal and the other idols fell prostrate to the ground, and Hubal said, 'O old man, do not mention Muḥammad's name before us; the destruction of ourselves and the other idols and the idolaters is to be in his hands. Tell the idol-worshippers that our greatest sacrificer is to be Muḥammad; that is, he is to kill us all, whilst they that follow him shall be safe' (Mirkhond's *Rauḍat-aṣ-Ṣafa*, pt. ii. vol. i. p. 115).

The Wahhābites, who are most careful to avoid anything which might seem to impair the dogma of the unity of God, and who look upon many practices of other Muslims as tending towards polytheism, or *shirk*, have defined the latter in these four terms: *shirk al-'ilm*, ascribing knowledge to others than God; *shirk at-taṣarruf*, ascribing power to other than God; *shirk al-'ibāda*, offering worship to created things; *shirk al-'āda*, performing ceremonies which imply reliance on other than God. It is *shirk al-'ilm* to suppose that prophets and holy men have any knowledge apart from that which God gives them. Hence it is wrong to place any reliance on the words of soothsayers and astrologers. It is *shirk at-taṣarruf* to look upon any human being as an intercessor with God. The orthodox view is that Muḥammad is now an intercessor. The Wahhābites deny this and quote the verses:

'Who is he that can intercede with Him but by His own permission?' (ii. 250). 'Say: Intercession is wholly with God' (xxxix. 45). 'No intercession shall avail with Him but that which He shall Himself allow' (xxxiv. 22).

It is *shirk al-'ibāda* to prostrate oneself before any created thing, or to visit the shrines of saints. It is *shirk al-'āda* to trust in omens and lucky days and to keep up superstitious practices. Though idolatry is severely condemned and the worship of idols is unknown, saint-worship is very common, and in all Muslim lands pilgrimages to the tombs of holy men are constantly made.

LITERATURE.—*The Koran*, tr. G. Sale[2], London, 1825, 'Preliminary Discourse'; D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed*, London, 1905; W. Muir, *Life of Mahomet*, London, 1861, Edinburgh, 1911; E. Sell, *The Life of Muḥammad*, London and Madras, 1913; T. P. Hughes, *Dictionary of Islam*, London, 1895; E. Sell, *Historical Development of the Qurān*, London and Madras, 1906.

EDWARD SELL.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Persian).—**1. Introductory.**—From the earliest antiquity the Persians had no idols in the sense of a representation of the godhead set up as an object of worship. Such allusions to the practice as are found are always in the way of condemning it as an abhorrent custom employed by foreigners and unbelievers. Zoroaster, the Prophet of Ancient Irān, makes no reference to idol-worship, even though his vision saw graphic pictures of the hosts of heaven. These vivid images, however, which might easily have been given a plastic form, remained, with the seer and with his people, simply a visualization of the ideal. Throughout the history of the religion of Irān, idolatry played no part.

This is true despite the fact that the Persians of Achæmenian and Sasanian times had no religious scruples against images, as is shown by the delineation of the divine being, and occasionally of other spiritual manifestations, on the monuments of the great Persian kings and the monarchs of the House of Sasan. This use of sculptured forms, however, did not mean to them in any sense a worship of graven images. If Darius and the other Achæmenian sovereigns portrayed in bas-relief on stone a conventionalized half-figure of Ormazd as floating in a circle above the head of the king, and presenting to him, as by divine right, a ring or symbol of sovereignty, it was a motive borrowed from Assyrian and Babylonian art, and was doubtless chosen with the express purpose of appealing to the non-Persian conquered nations, who were more anthropomorphic in their ideas.[1] Nor is an exception made by the Sasanian bas-relief at Naqsh-i-Rustam, on which Ormazd is represented on horseback approaching to offer the sovereignty to Ardašīr, who is similarly mounted; the intent was the same as before.[2] There is kindred evidence regarding the nimbus-crowned figure, holding a fluted staff, in a Sasanian sculptured niche at Tāq-i-Bustān, near Kirmānshāh, which is supposed to represent Zoroaster, but may possibly portray Mithra, genius of the sun (see Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, pp. 215–220, for a discussion of the subject and for photographs). A like possibility may be claimed, though it seems less certain, for the view that the figure graven in a group in the adjoining vaulted arch portrays Anahita (*q.v.*), goddess of the heavenly streams; yet such an interpretation still awaits more authoritative corroboration (cf. Jackson, *op. cit.* p. 225, n. 3). Other examples of images as effigies, but not as idols, may likewise be cited from Sasanian carvings as referred to in ART (Persian), in vol. i. p. 881 f. The general result is the same, and the statements of the Greek and Latin authors bear out this fact, as shown by the testimony from the classic writers cited in the following paragraph.

[1] For a discussion of this special subject and for reasons against assuming (as some do) that the conventionalized figure represents not Ormazd but the *farawahi*, or idealized spirit of the king, see Jackson, 'Ormazd,' in *The Monist*, ix. (Chicago, 1899) 168 f.

[2] The figure is known to represent Ormazd, because his name appears in the inscription on the stone as describing the purport of the bas-relief; for references see Jackson, *op. cit.* p. 169, n. 1; and cf. E. W. West, 'Pahlavi Literature,' in *Grd'r* ii. (Strassburg, 1904) 77.

2. Greek and Latin testimony to the Persian abhorrence of idols and image-worship. — The oldest Greek reference, though somewhat indirect, to the Persian hatred of images and temples is found in Æschylus, *Persæ*, 809 (produced in 472 B.C.), in which the Athenian dramatist places on the lips of the spectre of Darius the statement that the Persian hosts,

'when invading Greece, shrank not from destroying the wooden figures (*βρέτη*) of the gods, nor from burning the temples.'

Well-known above all, however, is the classic passage, which was written a few years later in the 5th cent. B.C. by Herodotus (*Hist.* i. 131), in which the father of history said of the Persians:

'They do not make it a custom to erect images (*ἀγάλματα*) and temples and altars; on the contrary, they impute a charge of folly upon those who do so; because, as it seems to me, they do not conceive of the gods as having the nature of men, as the Greeks do.'

This statement by Herodotus has always been justly regarded as representing in its tenor the true facts of the Persian view.

Four centuries later the same statement was reiterated by Strabo (*c.* 63 B.C.–A.D. 21) when he emphasized it as holding good in his time, for he says (*Geog.* XV. iii. 13 [p. 732]):

'The Persians do not erect images (*ἀγάλματα*) and altars,' though he does mention, a few paragraphs beyond (xv. iii. 15 [p. 733]), the existence of 'temples of Anaïtis ['Ανάϊτις, *i.e.* Av. *Anâhita*] and of Omanes ['Ωμάνης, *i.e.* Av. *Vohu Manah*] as belonging to these shrines; and a statue [*ξόανον*] of Omanes is carried in procession; we ourselves have seen these things' (cf. XI. viii. 4 [p. 512]).[1]

The Church Father Clemens Alexandrinus (at the end of the 2nd cent. A.D.), when referring to the Persian Magi in his *Protrept.* 5, cites the older authority of Deinon in his statement that

'they, as Deinon says, sacrifice beneath the open sky, regarding fire and water as the only images (*ἀγάλματα*) of the gods; . . . nor have they presumed stocks and stones to be images of the gods, like the Greeks (*ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν οὐ ξύλα καὶ λίθους ὑπειλήφασιν, ὥσπερ* 'Ελληνες), nor ibises and ichneumons, like the Egyptians, but fire and water, as do the philosophers; and Berossus, in the third (book) of his *Chaldaica*, shows that it was later—after many periods of years—that they worshipped images in the likeness of man,[2] this practice having been introduced by Artaxerxes, son of Darius Ochus,[3] who first, after setting up the image of Aphrodite Anaïtis in Babylon and Susa and Ecbatana [and] Persepolis [lit. Perses],[4] and Bactra and Damascus, and Sardis, taught that she be worshipped.' In connexion, furthermore, with the latter half of this citation it may be added that the names Mithra and Anahita appear in the inscriptions of the Achæmenians first on the monuments containing the edicts of Artaxerxes II., 404–358 B.C. (cf. Justi, 'Gesch. Irans,' in *GIrP* ii. 467).

The great patristic writer Origen (*c.* A.D. 185–253), in his controversial defence of Christianity in opposition to Celsus, inveighs against all the points made by that Epicurean philosopher, but dialectically admits some matters in favour of the Persians, who had a natural aversion to idols and image-worship. In referring to other peoples who, like the Persians, were non-idolaters, Celsus says of the latter (in Origen, *c. Celsum*, vii. 62):

'They cannot tolerate temples, altars or images,' and he continues by citing the passage quoted above from Herod. i. 131 as to the Persian abhorrence of such usages; to which Origen replies (vii. 63 *f.*) that the Persians do not reject idols for the same reason as do Jews and Christians.

Equally strong is the statement of the later Greek historian and biographer, Diogenes Laertius (fl. *c.* A.D. 200), in his reference to Persian Zoroastrian Magi, of whom he says:

'The Magi . . . give accounts of the existence and generation of the gods, saying that they are fire, earth, and water; and they condemn the use of carved images (*ξοάνων*), and above all things do they condemn those who say that the gods are male and female. . . . It was quite consistent (therefore, for Xerxes) to destroy the images (*ἀγάλματα*) of the gods' (*de Clarorum Philosophorum Vitis, Procem.* 6, 9).

The allusion in the last sentence of Diog. Laert. is evidently to the burning and pillaging of the temple on the Acropolis at Athens by Xerxes when he took the city (cf. Herod. viii. 50–54). Barbaric as was the act (and Cicero sufficiently condemns it, *de Leg.* II. x. 26), it did not prevent Xerxes from carrying away to Persia two cult-statues of Greek divinities — one the Brauronian Artemis, plundered from Attica, and the other the bronze statue of Apollo, stolen from the noted shrine at Branchidæ near Miletus, as told by Pausanias (*c.* A.D. 175) in his *Description of Greece*, VIII. xlvi. 3, I. xvi. 3.[1] Nor, again, did it deter Xerxes from taking to Sardis a Greek statue in bronze of the 'Water-carrier' (Plutarch, *Themist.* 31), or from removing from Athens the famous sculpture of the 'Two Tyrannicides' (see Paus. I. viii. 5; cf. Pliny, *HN* XXXIV. viii. 70; Arrian, *Anab.* III. xvi. 8; Val. Max. *Mem.* ii. 10, ex. 1).[2] The significance of these passages in their general bearing upon the religious attitude of Xerxes is discussed by G. P. Quackenbos, in the *Dastur Hoshang Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1913, p. 299 f. In the same connexion it is plain that the procedure of Xerxes is referred to likewise by the Greek rhetorician and Platonic philosopher Maximus of Tyre (2nd cent. A.D.) when he upbraids the Persians for their fire-worship and their destroying and robbing of Greek sanctuaries and images (*Dissertationes*, viii. 4, ed. Fr. Dübner, Paris, 1840, p. 28 = *Dissert.* 38, in the ed. of J. Davis, Cambridge, 1703, p. 397; and cf. the comments on the passage by J. F. Kleuker, *Zend-Avesta*, Anhang, II. iii. [Riga, 1783] 106 f., n. 1 f.).[3]

The late Latin historian Ammianus Marcellinus (*c.* A.D. 330–400) records, in his *History*, XXIII. vi. 23 f., that in the latter part of the Parthian period the Arsacid capital Seleucia

'was stormed by the generals of Verus Cæsar (in A.D. 164) and a statue of the Comæan Apollo (*simulacrum Comæi Apollinis*) was torn from its seat and carried off to Rome, and the attendants upon the gods set it up in the temple of Apollo on the Palatine.'

This allusion to a *simulacrum Comæi Apollinis* may possibly be compared with the existence of statues of Omanes, or Vohu Manah, as referred to by Strabo in the passage (XV. iii. 15) quoted above and again discussed below. The disasters which afterwards fell upon Rome were regarded by the superstitious as a direct visitation in consequence of this act of spoliation, and are referred to by several other late Latin writers (see the references given by G. Rawlinson, *Sixth Oriental Monarchy*, London, 1873, ch. 19, pp. 326–329, and compare Justi, p. 509 f.).

In the Greek 'Passion of SS. Acindynus and his Companions,' written at an unknown date, mention is made (ii. 9) of an image (*ξόανον*) in a temple (*ναός*) to which the persecuting king Sapor leads the martyrs. As they pray, the image falls to *καί*, 'and,' has been necessarily supplied in the tr. above from the context.

[1] From statements as to the subsequent fate of the Artemis statue, see Paus. III. xvi. 8. In this connexion it may be noted that among the sculptures in the modern Museum at Athens there is a finely carved female figure which was taken to Persia by Xerxes, but afterwards sent back to Greece by Alexander the Great.

[2] According to Paus. I. viii. 5, the latter group was eventually restored to Athens. It is possible that in carrying away this trophy Xerxes may have been influenced more by a desire to remove such a memorial than by any appreciation of it as a work of art.

[3] It would be far-fetched, if not altogether wrong, to interpret as a reference to an image the allusion by Phœnix of Colophon (in Athenæus, *Deipnosophistæ*, xii. 40) to 'touching the god with sacred rods' when he speaks of Ninus, king of Assyria, as not taking his place among the Magi in worship; the passage, however, does allude to the *barsom*-twigs, or rods, used in the Zoroastrian ritual (cf. art. BARSOM).

[1] On certain elements connected with the general interpretation of Strabo's remarks in the light of the Avesta, observe the tone in the rest of the present art. and cf. what has already been stated in ART (Persian), vol. i. p. 881.

[2] This sentence, referring to Berossus, *μετὰ πολλὰς μέντοι ὕστερον περιόδους ἐτῶν ἀνθρωποειδῆ ἀγάλματα σέβειν αὐτοὺς Βήρωσσος ἐν τρίτῃ Χαλδαϊκῶν παρίστησι*, is rendered in the tr. by W. Wilson, *Clement of Alexandria*, Edinburgh, 1867, i. 67, as: 'Berosus shows that it was after many successive years that men [*sic*] worshipped images of human shape.'

[3] *i.e.* Artaxerxes II., 404–358 B.C.

[4] On Persæ (*Πέρσαις*) as Persepolis see Curzon, *Persia and the Persian Question*, London, 1892, ii. 132, n. 3. The copula

the ground and is broken in pieces. A parallel text calls the image 'the idol of the statue' (*τὸ εἴδωλον τοῦ ἀνδριάντος*), and yet another MS names the idol 'Zeus,' which would be Ahura Mazda (*AS*, Nov. i. [1887] 470; cf. also the version of Simeon Metaphrastes, *ib.* p. 496 [=*PG* cxvi. 20]). These citations practically exhaust the material that may be drawn from outside sources; what follows is derived from the Persian sources themselves.

3. Earliest times: before Zoroaster, or at least prior to the 7th cent. B.C.—There is little or no direct evidence regarding the use of idols and images in the most remote period of Iranian history, because no truly archaic sculpture of any size has yet been found. It is possible that some of the small terra-cotta images and bronze figurines which have been unearthed from ancient graves or excavated from antique sites may indicate signs of idolatry (see ART [Persian], vol. i. p. 881); but, if so, it would be merely a witness of primitive beliefs or of foreign practices that were later rooted out when Zoroastrianism became the religion of Persia. Support is lent to such a view by the tenor of some of the passages referred to below, especially in the section on Pahlavī literature.

4. Absence of special allusions in the Avesta.—The Avestan texts, which represent the conditions prevailing in the period of Zoroaster, or before and after the 7th cent. B.C., contain practically no references that can be construed into a direct allusion to any prevalent existence of idol-worship in Irān. It is true, as already stated, that some of the passages in the Avesta referring to demon-worshippers (*daēva-yasna*) and sorcerers (*yātu*) may possibly contain an implication as to idolatrous customs existing among infidels, but, if so, an execration of such practices is equally implied.[1]

[1] An obscure Avestan word *baosavas* (possibly a plural, though its etymology is wholly uncertain), which occurs in the fragmentary *Hafṭōxt Nask*, ii. 13, and in the likewise fragmentary *Vištāsp Yašt*, 37, has been interpreted as alluding to the sin of idolatry among unbelievers, because its obscure Pahlavī rendering, *b n n d k*, is glossed by *āīghšān* (*ku šān*) *šēdīh(dēn)-yazakih*, that is, 'the demon-worship of these.' Possibly some support for this interpretation may be found in the Pahlavī rendering of the word *baoδayā* (as it is there written) in the parallel Avestan fragment, *Vištāsp Yašt*, 37, the gloss being in Pahlavī, *aūzdēsī-būt-parastīh*, lit. 'idol-image-worship'; but the whole matter remains rather uncertain (see Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, ii. 653, n. 15, and ii. 676, also in *SBE* xxiii. 316; and cf. West, *Arda Viraf Translated*, Bombay and London, 1872, pp. 287, 312, and C. Bartholomae, *Altiran. Wörterb.*, Strassburg, 1904, *s.v.* 'Baosav-,' col. 920).

A further question might be raised as to whether a passage in the Avesta (*Vend.* xix. 20–25) relating to cleansing may not imply indirectly an image of Vohu Manah, the Zoroastrian archangel of Good Thought, such a supposition being based on Strabo, xv. iii. 15 (p. 733), and possibly on Amm. Marcell. xxiii. vi. 23–25 (both cited above); but to interpret the Avestan passage in that manner would be extremely hazardous (see ART [Persian], vol. i. p. 881). On the other hand (since sculptures, though not images in the sense of idols, certainly did exist as early as Achæmenian times), it is not unreasonable to regard the description of Ardvī Sūrā Anāhita in *Yašt* v. 126–129 as possibly influenced by some consecrated type of statuary of the goddess of the heavenly stream.[2] Yet this particular passage need not be understood as involving real image-worship, any more than does the description which Xenophon (400 B.C.), in his historic romance (*Cyrop.* VIII. iii. 11 ff.), gives of the triumphal procession headed by Cyrus the Great with chariots of pomp, each of which was dedicated to a particular divine being. The same may be said of the statement of Dio Chrysostom (A.D. 100), in his *Borysthen. Orat.* 36, p. 448, regarding Zoroaster's glorification of the celestial chariot, because the Avestan passages which refer to the 'course of the sun' (Gāthā Av. *x^{v}ēng . . . aδvānem*, *Ys.* xliv. 3), 'the swift-horsed sun' (Younger Av. *hvar^{x} aurvat-aspem*, *Yt.* vi. 4, x. 13, x. 90), and the like, are purely metaphorical expressions, and in no sense imply image-worship. It may be re-affirmed, therefore, that the Avesta, especially the Zoroastrian Gāthās, or oldest part of the canon, is significantly lacking in any allusion to idol-worship.

[1] For some references also to certain passages in the Pahlavī literature which might be similarly interpreted see West, *SBE* xlvii., Introd. pp. xxvi–xxvii.

[2] Such is the interpretation by Darmesteter, *SBE* xxiii. 53, and *Zend-Avesta*, ii. 365; also by Justi, *Gesch. des alten Persiens*, Berlin, 1879, p. 95, where is reproduced from Loftus, *Travels in Chaldæa and Susiana* (reprinted), New York, 1857, p. 379, a clay figurine of Anāhita found at Susa among a number of similar small terra-cotta images of the goddess, the type, especially the profile, being decidedly Assyrian.

5. Bas-relief sculptures in Achæmenian, Parthian, and Sasanian times.—Sufficient intimation has already been given and references enough have been made to prove the existence of sculptured bas-reliefs, though not the use of images as idols, in Achæmenian, Parthian, and Sasanian times. For a discussion of the entire subject in its relation to the Achæmenian era (559–330 B.C.), it may suffice to refer to ART (Persian). A like reference may be made with respect to the antique stone lion at Hamadān (exceptional in Persian art, as being carved in the round)—a sculpture which may possibly date back to Median times, and is still regarded as a sort of talisman of that ancient city. With regard to the bas-relief winged figure of Cyrus the Great at Pasargadæ (near the modern Mashad-i-Murghāb) and the high-reliefs of Darius I., hewn on the Bahistān Rock, and again of Darius, Xerxes, and their royal successors, chiselled at Naqsh-i-Rustam and Persepolis (mod. Takht-i-Jamshīd), in all of which, as stated above, an effigy of Ormazd appears, a similar reference is enough. Besides the Achæmenian monuments themselves, Herodotus (vii. 69) refers to a golden statue of Darius's favourite queen, and (ii. 110) alludes to the fact that Darius, while in Egypt, wished to set up a sculpture (*ἀνδριάντα*) of himself in front of those which Sesostris had erected, before the great temple, in his own honour and in commemoration of his family, but was dissuaded from this act by the officiating Egyptian priest.[1]

[1] For Parthian times (c. 250 B.C.–A.D. 224), reference may be made to the still existing martial image of the Arsacid king Gotarzes (A.D. 46–51), hewn in a panel near the base of the Bahistān Rock (cf. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, p. 209 f.); likewise to the moulded effigies on the so-called slipper coffins (Loftus, *Travels in Chaldæa and Susiana*, p. 204), and to some Parthian terra-cotta figurines (Loftus, *op. cit.*); but they all are memorials, and have in them no element of idolatry and image-worship.

As to a sculptured panel possibly representing Mithra (if not Zoroaster), which belongs to the Sasanian era (A.D. 224–650), see above, § 2; and for other Mithraic monuments, as bearing indirectly upon the whole question in relation to Persia, consult ART (Mithraic) by Cumont, vol. i. pp. 872–874. In direct connexion, however, as covering the general subject of image-carvings during the Sasanian Period, reference may once more be made to ART (Persian); and for numismatic representations of Iranian divinities see M. A. Stein, in *BOR*, 1887, pp. 165–166.

6. Allusions in Pahlavī literature of Sasanian times and later.—Important in its bearing—as a sequel and to supplement the material drawn from glyptic art—is the testimony offered by the Pahlavī literature of the Sasanian age and later, or the centuries directly preceding and following the Muhammadan Conquest about A.D. 650. The entire subject will be found fully discussed in a monograph prepared for the forthcoming *Jubilee Volume of the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Zarthoshti Madressa*, to appear in Bombay, 1914. Many of these Pahlavī allusions refer back to an age, a millennium or more, before Zoroaster appeared

[1] In this connexion mention may be made, without laying undue stress upon the fact, of the action of Cambyses in slaying the Apis bull (Herod. iii. 29), and of his derision of the Egyptians for having 'gods of blood and flesh, sensible to steel,' as well as of Cambyses' mockery of the idol (*ἄγαλμα*) in the temple of the Egyptian Hephæstus (iii. 37).

as the founder of the national religion of Persia, and are the more valuable as showing the traditional attitude of Irân in regard to idols and images. Only the main references need be given here.[1]

The *Dînkarṭ* (vii. 1. 19), which is a Pahlavî work based upon very old material, contains an antique legend of Takhmûrûp (a monarch placed by tradition in the 4th millennium B.C.) that names him as a pioneer who 'cast out idol-worship (*aûzdês-parastâkîh*) and promulgated among creatures the reverence and worship of the Creator.'[2] The same work alludes in another passage (vii. 4. 72) to the idol-worship (*aûzdês parastîînîh*) and witchcraft practised by the monster Dahâk of Babylon, whose usurping reign over Irân is assigned by tradition to the 3rd millennium B.C., and whose baneful influence in this heretical regard was only eradicated two thousand years later by the establishment of the religion of Zoroaster. The passage reads in translation:

'Through that seduction [of Dahâk] mankind had come to idol-worship; . . . but through the words of the triumphant religion, which Zartûsht [*i.e.* Zoroaster] proclaimed in opposition to that sorcery, it [*i.e.* the heresy] is all dispersed and disabled.'[3]

Another legend, oft-repeated in the Pahlavî books, is the story of the crusade waged against idol-worship by the ancient ruler Kai Khûsrau (*Kavi Haosravah* of the Avesta), who is reputed to have reigned about 800 B.C. By the help of the Kingly Glory (Pahl. *x*^{v}*ârîh*; cf. Av. *x*^{v}*arenah*) this monarch demolishes the idol-shrine which his arch-enemy, Frangrâsîâk of Tûrân (Pahl. *Frâsîak*, Mod. Pers. *Afrâsiâb*; cf. Av. *Tûiryu Fraŋrasyan*), had maintained on the shore of Lake Chêchast, and substituted for it the great fire-temple of Âdhâr-gushnâsp, with which his name was afterwards associated.[4] The *Dînkarṭ* (vii. 1. 39), *e.g.*, tells of how Kai Khûsrau

'vanquished and smote Frangrâsîâk of Tûr, the sorcerer, and his fellow-miscreants, [namely] those of Vakyîr, Kêrsâvazl, and many other vile world-destroyers, and applied himself to the demolition of that idol-temple (*aûzdês-zâr*) on the shore of Lake Chêchast, which was a frightful thing of fiendishness.'

The same legend of the destruction of this noted idol-temple is referred to several times in other Pahlavî works. The *Bûndahišn*, xvii. 7, *e.g.*, in telling of this pious achievement adds a detail regarding the help given to the hero in his work by the sacred fire, Âtûr Gushnâsp, as follows:

'When Kai Khûsrau was demolishing the idol-temple (*aûsdês-zâr*) of Lake Chêchast, it [*i.e.* the Fire] settled upon the mane of his horse and drove away the darkness until he destroyed the idol-temple.'[5]

Kai Khûsrau's religious act is praised, furthermore, in two passages of the *Mainôg-î Khraṭ* (ii. 93–95 and xxvii. 59–61), which may be dated somewhere about the 6th cent. A.D. The idolatrous practices of the tyrant Frâsîak (Afrâsiâb) are alluded to in a somewhat later treatise, *Shatrôîhâ-î Aêrân*, 7, which anathematizes this foe for having transformed each of the sacred shrines in the city of Samarkand, in Sogdiana, into 'an idol-temple (Pahl. *aûzdêst-châr*), the abode of demons.'

A statement has been made above regarding the attitude which Zoroaster in his own time must have held towards anything approaching idolatry, as shown by the tenor of his religion, even though no direct pronouncement by him on the subject is preserved in the Avesta itself. Additional evidence is furnished by the fact that in the Pahlavî *Bahman Yašt*, iii. 30 and iii. 36 f., the hero Pôšyûtânû, the son of Zoroaster's patron Vîštâsp, is said to have received divine authority from Ormazd, combined with the archangelic aid of the Amšaspands and that of the sacred fires, in his crusade to 'destroy and smite the idol-temple (*aûzdêst-zâr*) of the demons'; and 'that idol-temple was destroyed through the glorious exertion of the illustrious Pêšyûtânû.' Again, a section in the Pahlavî *Jâmâsp Nâmak* (vi. 1; ed. J. J. Modi, Bombay, 1903, p. 73), which is a book probably written some time before A.D. 900 and purporting to hand down the words of the sage Jâmâsp, chief-counsellor at the court of Zoroaster's patron Vîštâsp, contains, in its Pâzand version of this chapter, a prophecy of the time (not then wholly fulfilled because of heretics) when the true spirit of the faith will prevail and 'the priests will come to the country of Irân and smite idolatry (*aûzdês*).' The *Mainôg-î Khraṭ*, ii. 93–95, looks forward to the final destruction of the wicked 'idol-worshippers' (*aûzdês-parastân*) in the last millennium of the world when the Saviour (Pahl. *Sûšâns*, Av. *Saošyant*) shall appear before the Day of Judgment.

There are several general allusions to the hatred of idolatry in other Pahlavî books besides those already mentioned.

The *Arṭâ Vîrâf Nâmak*, lxviii. 11, *e.g.*, in an account of an apocalyptic vision, enters upon the roll of the damned a woman whose perversity led her to choose the practice of 'idol-worship' (*aûzdês-châr*); and the *Šâyast lâ-Šâyast*, ix. 2 f., a compilation dating from about the 7th cent. A.D., though based on older sources, sees a like fate awaiting a priest 'who passes over to idolatry' (or, possibly, 'passes away in idolatry'). Among the most abominable places on earth, according to *Mainôg-î Khraṭ*, ii. 7, is the one 'on which they build an idol-temple (*aûzdês-âr*); and accordingly the commandment is given (ii. 93–95): Abstain from idol-worship (*aûzdês-parastîšnîh*) and demon-worship,' because its enormity is 'eighth' (Pahl. *haštûm*) among the most heinous sins (xxxvi. 10). For this reason the *Dînkarṭ*, vi. 275, sees in the disappearance of idolatry a sign of the growth of the true religion, on the ground that, 'if idol-worship be annihilated, no faith in the good spirits will thereby disappear.'

It is easy, therefore, to understand the importance attached to the exploit of Ardašîr, founder of the Sasanian Empire, in overthrowing an idolatrous monster that ruled over Kirmân and was known as the 'Worm' (Pahl. *Kerm*), a vile practiser of idolatry (*aûzdês*), as told in the Pahlavî romance *Kârnâmak-î Artâkhshîr*, vii. 1–12, viii. 1–11; this story presents interesting parallels to the OT narrative of Bel and the Dragon, as discussed, with bibliographical references to the Pahlavî editions of the work concerned, by Jackson, 'Notes on OT Apocrypha,' in *Essays published as a Testimonial to Charles Augustus Briggs*, New York, 1911, pp. 95–97.

The practice of idol-worship by foreign nations, who were outside the pale of Zoroastrian Irân, comes in for a share of condemnation in the Pahlavî texts. For instance, the veneration which the Hindus paid to images, personified as the idol *Bût* (lit. 'spectre, spook,' then 'image, idol'), is execrated in *Bûndahišn*, xxviii. 34 (cf. also *Great Iranian Bûndahišn*, ed. B. T. Anklesaria, Bombay, 1908, p. 187) as follows:

'The demon Bût[1] is he whom they worship among the Hindus, and his prayer is in the *bût*-shrine abode [*i.e.* goblin-shrine].'[2]

A similar damnable practice of the worship of a *bût* is attributed, according to the Pahlavî-Pâzand *Jâmâsp Nâmak*, vii. 3–4 (ed. Modi, p. 76 f.), to the people of China, Bârbâristan, and the Tâjiks—the

[1] For full citation of the Pahlavî passages in transliteration, with tr., see the above-mentioned monograph in the *Jubilee Volume*; tr. of almost all the texts will be found in West, 'Pahlavi Texts Translated,' in *SBE* v., xxiv., xxxvii., xlvii.

[2] The Pahlavî word for 'idol' (which is here transcribed as *aûzdês* and is also written in Pahlavî as *auzdêz*, *aûzdêst*, with other variations) is derived from Av. *uzdaêza*, the original meaning of which is 'elevation, something raised up,' and may refer to an idolatrous structure as well as to an image itself.

[3] An allusion in later Persian literature to the use of images by Dahâk (or Pahpâk, as he is called in Mod. Pers.) is found in a passage referred to below from the epic poet Firdausi.

[4] Lake Chêchast (Pahl. *Var-î cêčast*, Av. *Vairi caêčasta*) is the ancient name of the body of water corresponding to the modern Lake Urumiah and its environs in Azarbaijân, N.W. Persia; see Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, pp. 70–73.

[5] The fact that a reminiscence of this legend of the descent of the fire, in the form of lightning which settled on the pommel of Kai Khûsrau's saddle, while thus engaged, lingered as late as the 16th cent. of our era is shown by a passage in the Pers. Lexicon (*Rîšâlah*, or *Farhang*) of Vafâ, dated A.D. 1526, which is discussed by A. Yohannan, in *Spiegel Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1908, pp. 150–152.

[1] Regarding this word, which appears in Pahl., Av., Skr., and Mod. Pers., see Bartholomae, *s.v.* 'Bûtay,' col. 908.

[2] The designation in Pahl. is preferably thus to be read as *bût-gâh*, 'idol-shrine,' even though West, *SBE* v. 111, n. 6, and Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, ii. 259, n. 4, read the word as *bûtîha*, 'idols.'

name of the latter nation probably including the tribes of Central Asia as well as those of their Islāmitic ancestors in Arabia who conquered that territory and may have retained traces of pre-Muhammadan idolatry fostered by the primitive beliefs of the people they vanquished.

7. After the Muhammadan Conquest in the 7th cent. A.D.—The overthrow of Zoroastrianism as the national faith through the Muhammadan Conquest by the Arabs in the 7th cent. A.D., whatever it may have signified in other regards, meant no significant change with respect to the true Persian hatred of idolatry. Vanquished and victors were at one in this matter, and many of the citations given above from the Zoroastrian patristic works in Pahlavī may, in fact, date from a time after the Muslim victory over Persia, even if the sources on which their standards were based go back to a far earlier period. It must be conceded, however, that the iconoclastic spirit of Islām killed off all progress in the Persian art of sculpture, as being a factor that might lead to encouraging idolatry, despite the fact that there was no such inclination in the Persian heart. This circumstance accounts for the fact that no sculptured portrait was carved after the downfall of the Sasanian Empire through Islām until modern times, when, about the beginning of the 19th cent., Fath 'Alī Shāh (1798–1835) caused his effigy to be sculptured over an antique carving of Sasanian times, thus unfortunately effacing an old bas-relief that had been cut some 1500 years before; but this innovation, or, rather, this resumption of the old practice of carving portraits on rocks, combined with one or two other modern instances, is a matter of recent times (consult ART [Persian]).

8. References in later Persian literature.—The whole tone of later Persian literature, or for the past 1000 years and more, has been strongly against idolatry, and that, too, irrespective of Muhammadan influence as well as under a natural sympathy with the iconoclastic tenets of the Qur'ān. Only a few references need be given to show this. The great epic poet of Persia, Firdausī (fl. A.D. 1000), *e.g.*, tells with evident zest and in spirited heroic verse how Faridūn, 2500 years before, overthrew a talisman (Pers. *talismī*) in the form of an idol which the monster Ḍaḥḥāk (or Dahāk, whose idolatry has been alluded to above) maintained in his palace (see Firdausī, *Shāhnāmah*, ed. Vullers and Landauer, Leyden, 1877, i. 53, l. 357; tr. J. Mohl, *Le Livre des rois*, Paris, 1876, i. 72; tr. A. G. and E. Warner, *Shāhnama*, London, 1905, i. 161). Many instances might be cited from other Persian authors. The poet and moralist Sa'dī (*c.* A.D. 1184–*c.*1291) recounts how he discovered in his travels the trick by which the famous idol in the great temple of Somnāth in India lifted its hand; and, outraged by the infamous delusion, he thereupon slew the priest in charge of the sanctuary. Yet it must be confessed that, in his account, Sa'dī has hopelessly confused some of his allusions to Hindu idolatry with the so-called worship of fire in the 'Avastā and Zand' to which he refers (cf. Sa'dī, *Būstān*, ch. viii., story 9, tr. A. H. Edwards, London, 1911, pp. 106–109). Sa'dī also makes use of a story of an idolater to adorn a tale in his *Būstān*, ch. x., story 3 (tr. Edwards, p. 121 f.). The great lyrist Ḥāfiẓ (*c.* A.D. 1325–*c.*1389) often makes allusion in his *Ghazals*, or 'Odes,' to 'idol-worship' (*but-parasti*), or likens his beloved to an 'idol' (*but*) or to an 'image' (*ṣanam*); but his references are mostly in the way of poetic similes drawn from love (*e.g. Ghazals*, 301, verse 3; 210, v. 3; 254, v. 8; 297, v. 5; 172, v. 10, in the ed. by H. Brockhaus, *Die Aurang*, entitled *Khirad-nāmah-i Iskandarī*, or 'Book of Alexander's Wisdom,' represents Alexander the Great as destroying a well-known temple of idols. Citations might easily be multiplied from other later Persian writers, but they would all be of a similar character as showing the deep-seated Persian hatred of idolatry. This persistent detestation of the use of idols and images is as marked as ever in the attitude of the Parsīs, or modern followers of Zoroaster, both in India and in Persia.

LITERATURE.—The bibliographical references to edd. of the Gr. and Lat. works quoted have been given above. For the Avesta consult the Eng. tr. by J. Darmesteter and L. H. Mills, in *SBE* iv., xxiii., xxxi., Oxford, 1880–87, and the Fr. tr. by Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta, traduction nouvelle*, 3 vols., Paris, 1892–93. For trr. of the Pahlavī works, see E. W. West, *Pahlavi Texts Translated*, in *SBE* v., xviii., xxiv., xxxvii., xlvii., Oxford, 1880–1897; cf. also the forthcoming monograph by A. V. W. Jackson, in the *Jubilee Volume of the Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Zarthoshti Madressa*, Bombay, (to appear in) 1914.

A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Teutonic and Slavic).—**1. Teutonic.**—The evidence for the existence of idols and images among *Germanic* peoples is somewhat conflicting. The pronouncement of Tacitus, that the Germani had no images of their gods, is repeated by later Christian writers; but this is evidently an uncritical re-statement. On the other hand, there is sufficient, if not abundant, evidence to attest the existence of images among the different Germanic peoples, at the several periods of their conversion to Christianity.

Tacitus definitely says of the Germani:

'Ceterum nec cohibere parietibus deos, neque in ullam humani oris speciem assimulare, ex magnitudine coelestium arbitrantur' (*Germ.* 9);

and again, of the Nahanarvali, that they have no *simulacra* of their twin-gods Alcis (*Germ.* 43). Elsewhere, however (*Germ.* 7), he tells of the symbols taken from the sacred groves, and borne into battle: *signa*, probably attributes of the gods, as the ship which he names the *signum Isidis* (*Germ.* 9); and *effigies*, probably representations of animals which possessed a sacred significance. Such might be the *ferarum imagines* of the Batavi (*Hist.* iv. 22). Later examples would be the dragon-heads on poles shown among the spoils taken from the Germani by Marcus Aurelius, and depicted on the Antonine Column (cf. P. S. Bartoli, *Columna Antoniniana*, Rome, n.d., pl. 37 f.); these are perhaps similar in form to the Dragon of Wessex displayed as Harold's standard in the Bayeux Tapestry. Such representation of animals appears in a slightly different form in the *eoforcumbol* and *eoforlic* mentioned in *Elene*, line 259, and in *Beowulf*, line 303; or in the boar-helmets worn by the warrior-figures on the Torslunda helmet. On the other hand, Tacitus's account of the worship of the goddess Nerthus (*Germ.* 40), in which *numen ipsum* is immersed in a sacred lake, would seem to point to some kind of image, although it may mean nothing more than a symbol. It is probable that Nerthus appears in Norse mythology, with change of sex, as the gods Njörðr and Freyr; and in the worship of Freyr a similar ceremonial procession is described, in which an image is used (*Óláfs Saga Tryggvasonar, Fornmanna Sögur*,[1] ii. ch. 173). If the cult of Nehalennia, representations of whom were found at Walcheren, contains any Germanic elements, we then have very early evidence of the representation of a deity; but, even if she is Germanic, the whole style of the figure shows very strong Roman influence.

It seems probable that the Germanic representation of gods passed through the usual stages of development (cf. R. M. Meyer, *Altgerm. Religionsgesch.* ch. v. § 24). There is no actual evidence for the shapeless log or stone, which was probably the earliest form of idol, or for the worship of meteoric

[1] Hereafter quoted as *F.M.S.*

stones, as in classical mythology. But it is likely, from what we know of the later use of logs, straw figures, branches, etc., in plough, harvest, and other ceremonies, that this stage did exist (cf. W. Mannhardt, *Mythol. Forschungen*, Strassburg, 1884, p. 332 f.; Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* ch. 24, pp. 768, 782, 784); and it is even possible that some such rough figure may be denoted by the *numen ipsum* of Nerthus. Contemporary evidence does exist, however, for the second stage—the trunk or log, carved with a representation of the head only, or of the head and shoulders. Pillar-worship, of which the reverence paid to the Irminsul by the Saxons and to the high-seat pillars by the Scandinavians seems to have been a late survival, probably belongs to this stage. For the more artistic stage—the complete reproduction of deities—there is sufficient evidence, especially from Scandinavia; they are represented with their attributes, as Thor with his hammer; or with ornaments of gold and silver. Finally, as with some statues of classical gods, and with Christian images, one finds instances of images that can move, walk, and speak.

The earliest definite evidence for the existence of Germanic idols is connected with the *Goths*, and dates from the latter half of the 4th century. The Constantinople Column, erected by Arcadius to commemorate the wars of Theodosius, has representations of Gothic gods, borne on the backs of camels in his triumph. These are life-size figures of bearded men, of which the head and shoulders only are carefully carved; the rest of the figure is of the *xoanon* type, with slight indications of ornament to represent a robe (cf. A. Banduri, *Imperium Orientale*, Venice, 1729, ii. 417, pl. ix.). Sozomen, *HE* vi. 37, writing of the same period, mentions that Athanaric, king of the Goths, in his attempt to revive heathenism, caused a statue (ξόανον) to be carried in a waggon to the houses of Christians, that they might worship and sacrifice.

The references of Christian writers to the existence of idols among the remaining Germanic peoples are numerous, but reliance can be placed only on those in which images are specifically mentioned or described (*simulacra*, *imagines*). Phrases such as 'idola colere' are not definite enough, nor is the mention of temples positive evidence, as it is possible that Germanic temples did not invariably contain images; the custom of alluding to Germanic gods under the names of the approximately corresponding classical deities sometimes causes confusion.

For *Frankish* images, there is continuous evidence. The earliest reference, dating from 491, is the speech of Clotilda to her husband King Clovis, in favour of baptism:

'Nihil sunt dii quos colitis, qui neque sibi, neque aliis poterunt subvenire; sunt enim aut ex lapide, aut ex ligno, aut ex metallo aliquo sculpti' (Gregory of Tours, *Hist. Franc.* ii. 29).

In the *Constitutio* of Childebert, *c.* 554, punishment is decreed against those who refuse to destroy from off their land, or who prevent the priests from destroying, 'simulacra constructa vel idola daemoni dedicata' (Pertz, *MGH*, 'Leges,' Hanover, 1835 ff., i. 1). In the *Vita S. Goaris*, contained in the *Acta Ordinis S. Benedicti*, Paris, 1668–1701, sect. ii. p. 282, we are told that *c.* 649 the saint

'coepit . . . gentilibus per circuitum (*i.e.* Ripuaria) simulacrorum cultui deditis et vana idolorum superstitionis deceptis verbum salutis annuntiare.'

The only definite authority for *Saxon* idol-worship is to be found in the anonymous *Indiculus Superstitionum* of the 8th century. With entry 26, 'De simulacro de consparsa farina,' may be compared the story of the figure of Baldr, which was baked and smeared with oil (*Friðþjófs Saga*, 9; *Fornaldar Sögur*, ii.). Possibly such cakes were sometimes representations of a divine attribute, or of an animal sacred to the god, and not of the god himself. Entry 27, 'De simulacris de panais (pannis), factis,' may refer to doll-images for the private use of worshippers (cf. A. Saupe, *Indiculus Superstitionum*, Leipzig, 1891, *ad loc.*); or to figures in straw and rags, such as the effigy of Death, which in later times we know to have been carried round in procession (cf. Grimm, ch. xxiv. p. 771). Entry 28, 'De simulacro, quod per campos portant,' shows that the Saxons practised the general Germanic custom of religious processions, probably to secure fruitfulness and prosperity.

There is little definite reference to the practice of idol-worship among the *English*; the most convincing is the description of the heathen reaction in Essex, *c.* 660:

'Coeperunt fana, quae derelicta erant, restaurare, et adorare simulacra' (Bede, *HE* iii. 30).

Other references are found in Bede; Pope Gregory, writing to Bishop Mellitus, gives instructions,

'Ipsa quae in eis (*i.e.* fanis) sunt idola, destruantur' (i. 30).

Boniface v. in his letter to Edwin, king of Northumbria, quotes the description of idols in Ps 113, and reinforces it thus:

'Quomodo . . . possunt habere virtutem hi, qui ex corruptibili materia inferiorum etiam subpositorumque tibi manibus construuntur; quibus videlicet artificium humanum adcommodans eis inanimatam membrorum similitudinem contulisti; qui, nisi a te moti fuerint, ambulare non poterunt, sed tanquam lapis in uno loco positus, ita constructi nihilque intellegentiae habentes . . . nullam . . . facultatem adepti sunt' (ii. 10 [*PL* lxxx. 637]).

The force of these two references is weakened by the fact that the writers of the letters were foreigners, and not immediately in touch with English conditions. Again, in the story of Coifi, and of his active share in the destruction of the temple at Goodmanham (Bede, *HE* ii. 13), no word more definite than *ydola* is used; but in the poetic account of the incident by Alcuin, *Versus de Pontificibus et Sanctis Eboracensis Ecclesiæ*, l. 162, Paulinus is represented as saying, 'omnia sternantur fundo simulacra deorum.' The word *wih* occurs in Old English in the meaning of 'idol'; thus it is used of Nebuchadrezzar's golden image; its most peculiar use is in the phrase *Wóden worhte weós* (Gnomic Verses, l. 133, *Exeter Book*). Again, in *Beowulf* (line 176) the word *wigweorðung*, 'honour to idols,' is used in an express description of a heathen custom: 'At times they ordained worship of the idols in the temples.'

For the *Frisians* the evidence is neither full nor very conclusive; there is no direct reference to an idol in the descriptions of the sanctuary of Fosite on Heligoland given by Alcuin, *Vita S. Willebrordi*, i. 10 (*PL* ci. 700); by Altfrid, *Vita Liudgeri*, i. 19 (*MGH*, 'Scriptores,' Hanover, 1826 ff., ii. 410 [*PL* xcix. 778]); and by Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburg.* iv. 3 (*MGH*, 'Script.' vii. 369 [*PL* cxlvi. 623 f.]). Elsewhere (i. 13) Alcuin speaks of Willebrord's arrival

'ad quandam villam Walachrum nomine, in qua antiqui erroris idolum remansit.'

In Willibald's description of the heathen reaction under the Frisian king Redbod, *c.* 716, we read:

'Idolorum quoque cultura exstructis delubrorum fanis lugubriter renovata' (*Vita S. Bonifacii*, iv. 12 [*MGH*, 'Script.' ii. 339; *PL* lxxxix. 611]).

The most definite reference is that of Anskar in his account of the preaching of St. Willehad in the middle of the 8th cent. to the Frisians at Humarcha:

'Barbaris coepit . . . persuadere . . . dicens insanum esse . . . a lapidibus auxilium petere, et a simulacris mutis et surdis subsidii sperare solatium' (*Vita Willehadi*, 3 [*MGH*, 'Script. ii. 380; *PL* cxviii. 1015 f.]).

Grimm quotes from different lives of St. Gall an incident which would be a proof of the existence of idols in *Alamannia*, if, as he thinks, it can be referred to Germanic deities (Grimm, ch. vi. p. 108). Although there is some confusion in the account of Ratpert, *Casus S. Galli*, 1 (*MGH*, 'Script.' ii. 61 [*PL* cxxvi. 1058]), it seems clear that on the Lake of Constance, near Bregenz, St. Gall and Columban discovered, *c.* 612, a sanctuary dedicated to

St. Aurelia; it nevertheless contained 'tres imagines aereas et deauratas' (*Vita S. Galli I.*, i. 6 [*MGH*, 'Script.' ii. 7; *AS*, Oct. VII. ii. [1869] 886]). These the missionaries threw into the water. Walafrid Strabo says definitely that they were images of heathen gods; 'isti sunt dii veteres et antiqui huius loci tutores.' He says, further, that they were 'parieti affixas' (*Vita S. Galli*, vi. [*Acta Bened.*, sect. ii. p. 233; *PL* cxiv. 983]). Grimm cites later instances of this practice of retaining the ancient gods, 'probably to conciliate the people' (p. 108, n. 1), and it has approximate parallels in classical mythology (cf. Pausanias, III. xiv. 5: 'the wooden [*i.e.* the archaic] image of Thetis is still preserved in secret').

For *Scandinavian* images there is very full evidence, the most trustworthy coming from Christian sources; the words *skurðgoð* and *trégoð* are used in Icelandic, but the custom prevails of speaking of the image merely by the name of the deity. The most important evidence is the account by Adam of Bremen, in the 11th cent., of the great sanctuary at Upsala, with its statues of Thor, Odin (Wodan), and Freyr (Fricco). Odin is represented armed, Freyr with the symbol of fertility, and Thor 'cum sceptro Iovem simulare videtur'; this probably refers to his hammer, the attribute of the thunder-god (*Gesta Hammaburg.* iv. 26 [*MGH*, 'Script.' vii. 379; *PL* cxlvi. 642 f.]). Other statues of Thor and Freyr are mentioned (*ib.* ii. 60, p. 327, iv. 9, p. 371; *PL* cxlvi. 543, 627). The most detailed accounts we owe to the Christianizing expeditions of Oláfr Tryggvason, and St. Oláfr. Thus at Rauðsey, Oláfr Tryggvason encountered a representation of Thor which could speak, walk, and even make war upon him (*Oláfs Saga Tryggvasonar*, 150, *F.M.S.* i.). At Mori near Trondhjem the same king found an image of Thor with his hammer, adorned with gold and silver; it stood in a chariot drawn by two wooden goats, round the horns of which was a silver chain (*Flateyjarbók*, *Oláfs S. Trygg.* 268). St. Oláfr was opposed in the Highlands by Guðbrandr, a votary of Thor, and a great chief; Guðbrandr's son described Thor's image to the king:

'He has a hammer in his hand, and is great of stature . . . he is hollow within . . . four loaves are brought to him every day, and therewith meat in the same proportion.' The image stood upon a pedestal, and was adorned with gold and silver; when it was shattered, out came 'mice as big as cats, and lizards and snakes' (*Oláfs S. hins Helga*, 107–108, *F.M.S.* iv.).

Statues of Thor seem to have been particularly numerous; in *Njálasaga* 88 we find, in a temple at Hlaðir, Thor in a chariot, and with him Thórgerðr, Hölgabrúðr, and Irpa; each wears a great gold armlet, and Thórgerðr has a kerchief on her head. Reference has already been made to the story of Freyr, and of his image being borne in yearly procession (*Oláfs S. Trygg.* 173, *F.M.S.* ii.); also to the story of the baked image of Baldr (*Friðþjófs S.* 9). It seems to have been a common Scandinavian custom to place several statues in one temple; even the temple built by Hrafnkel, who was a special votary of Freyr, contained other gods (*Hrafnkels S. Freysgoða*, 15). Still, the notice of the great temple in Gautland, with its hundred gods, is probably an exaggeration (*Jómsvíkinga S.* 12).

Traces are found of the practice of carrying on the person small images, probably for secret worship, or as amulets; the skald Hallfreðr carried an ivory 'likeness' of Thor in his pocket (*Hallfreðar S.* 6); and Ingimundr wore a silver talisman of Freyr (*Vatnsdœla S.* 10). For similar protective reasons Earl Eiríkr carried an image of Thor at the prow of his ship (*F.M.S.* ii. 253). We even find such a familiar use as the image of Thor carved life-size on the back of a chair (*Fóstbræðra S.*, pt. ii. 9). The walls of Oláfr Pái's hall in Iceland were adorned with representations of old stories, probably in painted wooden reliefs (*Laxdœla S.* 29); these were described by Ulfr Uggason in the *Húsdrápa*, and, from the fragments that remain of the poem, they seem to have depicted the burning of Baldr, Heimdallr's fight with Loki, Thor's journey to Hýmir, and his fight with Miðgarðsormr. The high-seat pillars were also adorned with figures; thus Thor was carved upon the pillars which Thórólfr Mostrarskegg threw overboard on approaching Iceland, in order to find a landing-place; these same pillars were afterwards set up in the temple built by Thorolfr.

To sum up, then, our knowledge of Scandinavian images: they were very numerous, often life-size, generally of wood (cf. *trémaðr*, 'wooden man'), and frequently adorned with gold and silver. In later times the people identified the image with the god, and in this way they were able to believe that the figure had the power of movement; a very clear example of this occurs in the story of Thróndr of Gata (*Færeyinga S.* 23), where the statue of Thórgerðr loosens a ring as a sign of acquiescence, but clasps it tightly when she denies her favour. The story of Gunnarr and his intercourse with Freyr's priestess proves that the god was identified with his image. The idea of vitality and volition in the image is carried so far that the statue of Thor at Rauðsey is made to compete in wrestling with Oláfr Tryggvason, the object being to hurl the vanquished into the fire; the king proved the stronger, and the wooden figure was burned to ashes.

There is very little archæological evidence for Germanic gods; the representations of Nehalennia and of the *deæ matres* are more Roman than Germanic in style, and with them may be classed the altar to Mars Thingsus, with its representation of the god armed. Although it was found in England on Hadrian's Wall, the votaries, who came from near Deventer, were probably Batavi; the stone dates from the first half of the 3rd cent. (cf. Helm, *Altgerman. Religionsgesch.* i. 366 ff.). Again, the most important evidence is connected with Scandinavian mythology. The figures on the Gallehus horns are too problematical to count as evidence; and even the figure on one of the plates of the Torslunda helmet may represent a mere warrior, though it is tempting to identify it with Odin, accompanied by his two ravens. Undoubted representations of Odin exist on the gravestones of Ardre, Hablingbō, and Tjängvide; here we see Odin on Sleipnir, but even these are late representations and show a somewhat specialized aspect of the god (cf. Helm, i. 213). Curiously enough, the clearest representations of Scandinavian deities are found in England. The Gosforth Cross in Cumberland shows probably the last fight of Viðarr with the Fenrisulfr; another group probably represents the punishment of Loki. On the Gosforth Stone is a group evidently meant to represent Thor's fishing. From time to time wooden figures have been unearthed, especially in Jutland, which seem to show primitive types of images; for a detailed discussion of these, cf. Helm, i. 214 ff.; according to him, the majority of them may be considered to represent deities of fertility.

2. Slavic.—The discussion of Slavic images is rendered difficult by the fact that much of the early evidence really refers to Scandinavians who were settled among Slavic populations; in particular, the chief god of whom one finds images is really Thor, the Swedish thunder-god, worshipped under the same aspect, but under a Slavic name, Perun, thunder-bolt. It is therefore not easy to disentangle the Scandinavian worship from the Slavic, and only at one period does the evidence refer incontrovertibly to the Slavs—the period of

Slavic settlements in the island of Rügen, and around the Elbe. The evidence for Poland, however, appears fairly trustworthy.

The 10th cent. narratives of Arabian travellers, though nominally concerned with the Slavs, in reality treat of the Russians, *i.e.* of the Scandinavian settlers around the Volga. Ibn Fadlān (ed. Fraehn, St. Petersburg, 1823), ambassador to the Russians, describes the worship paid to 'a high wooden pillar, that has a human face and is surrounded by small figures.' Here, again, is evidence for the rougher form of image. The narrative of Mas'ūdī, in the *Fields of Gold*, is far less trustworthy; he describes gorgeous temples, one of which contained 'a colossal statue of an old man holding a rod with which he called forth skeletons from their tombs,' while another temple contains an idol formed wholly of precious stones (Mas'ūdī, *Les Prairies d'or*, ed. and tr. C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1861–77, ch. lxvi.). Apart from the inherent improbability of his account, it is difficult to know of whom he is speaking, and of what place; Arkona has been suggested, but there seem to be no means of settling the question.

Even some of the early Christian evidence really refers to Scandinavians. The so-called Chronicle of Nestor, dating from the 11th to the 12th cent., gives a detailed account of the setting up of idols in 978 at Kieff by Vladimir:

'Upon a public eminence he set up several idols; Perun in wood with a silver head and a golden beard, and also Khors, Dazbog, Stribog, Simargl, and Mokoch. Sacrifices were offered to them; the people offered their sons and their daughters as victims to the idols' (*Chronique de Nestor*, ed. and tr. L. Leger, Paris, 1884, ch. 38).

We hear again of an attempt to force a Christian Vareque to sacrifice to the idols; he replies:

'These are not gods; these are only wood, which is to-day, but to-morrow is rotten; they do not eat, or drink, or speak. It is the hand of man which has cut them out of wood' (*ib.* 39).

Ten years later Vladimir reversed his work at Kieff:

'He commanded the idols to be thrown down. Some he had burnt, and the rest cast into the fire. He commanded men to tie Perun to the tail of a horse, and to drag him down . . . to the stream; and he ordered twelve men to beat him with staves, not because he thought the wood had any feeling, but to insult the demon who in this form had insulted men, and to punish him for his deceptions. . . . While he was being dragged along the stream as far as the Dnieper, the heathen wept for him. . . . Then . . . they threw him into the Dnieper' (*ib.* 43).

Another statue of Perun was set up by Vladimir's uncle at Novgorod (*ib.* 38). There are later references to the statue of Perun at Kieff, and to the church of St. Basil which stood upon its site, but apparently nothing independent of the account in Nestor (cf. Dlugosz, *Historia Polonica*, ed. H. von Huyssen, bk. ii., Leipzig, 1711, col. 104).

From the *Chronica Bœmorum* of Cosmas of Prague, we have 12th cent. evidence for the primitive worship of idols by the *Czechs*. The passage has a legendary tone, and is not above suspicion, but is interesting as far as it goes. A certain princess Tetcka taught the people the worship of Oreads, Dryads, and Hamadryads:

'sicut hactenus multi villani velut pagani, hic latices seu ignes colunt, . . . iste lucos et arbores aut lapides adorat, . . . alius quae ipse fecit idola surda et muta rogat et orat, ut domum suam et se ipsum regant' (i. 4 [*MGH*, 'Script.' ix. 35; *PL* clxvi. 62]).

Similar practices are described more in detail in the account of the extermination of paganism by Duke Bracizlaus, but there is no mention of actual idols (*ib.* iii. 1, p. 102 [*PL* clxvi. 189]). On the other hand, the princess Ludmilla, in her pagan days, had a golden idol of the goddess Krosina, which was of more than human size (*AS*, Sept. v. [1866] 344).

Dlugosz, who wrote his *Historia Polonica* late in the 15th cent., gives a long and somewhat doubtful list of *Polish* gods, identified with Roman deities, and shows that their cult was practised by the Poles with all the apparatus of *delubra*, *simulacra*, and *flamines*. The notice on Diana or Dziewanna is interesting:

'Diana quoque quae superstitione gentile femina et virgo existimabatur, a matronis et virginibus serta simulacro suo ferebantur' (bk. i. col. 37).

Later on, at the conversion of Miecslaus, he describes the measures taken to stamp out idolatry:

'Strictissimo posthaec Miecslai edicto, . . . confringuntur idola, et falsorum deorum simulacra. . . . Quae quidem deorum et dearum idolorumque immersio et contractio tunc facta . . . simulacris Dziewannae et Marzannae in longo ligno extollentibus, et in paludes in Dominica Quadragesimae Laetare, projicientibus et demergentibus, repraesentatur, renovatur in hunc diem nec hujus consuetudinis vetustissimo effectus usque modo apud Polonos defluxit.'

This account of Dlugosz is cited by Cromerus, *De origine Polonorum*, iii., Basel, 1568, p. 33 B; for survivals of this Polish custom in Mid-Lent see Grimm, ch. 8, p. 190; ch. 24, pp. 773, 782.

The evidence of foreign chroniclers is fairly abundant, and is, on the whole, more trustworthy, although even such circumstantial testimony as that concerned with Otto of Bamberg is not free from suspicion. The greater part of this foreign evidence deals with the Slavs settled on the shores of the Baltic, and round the basin of the Elbe. An early reference occurs in the *Annales Weissemburgenses* for 1069:

'Rex Heinricus barbaros trans Alpam flumen constitutos cum exercitu invasit . . . fana cum simulacris succendit' (*MGH*, 'Script.' iii. 71 [*PL* cxli. 527]).

Adam of Bremen's testimony is important as contemporary 11th cent. evidence; he mentions the town Rethra:

'templum ibi magnum constructum est demonibus, quorum princeps est Redigas. Simulacrum eius auro, lectus ostro paratus' (*Gesta Hammaburg.* ii. 18 [*MGH*, 'Script.' vii. 312; *PL* cxlvi. 513]).

Thietmar, *Chronicon*, vi. 17 (*MGH*, 'Script.' iii. p. 812), gives a more minute description of this sanctuary in Mecklenburg-Strelitz, but differs in some important details, notably in calling the town Riedegost, and the god Zuarasici (contrast Helmold, *Chronicon Slavorum*, i. 23 [*MGH*, 'Script.' xxi.]). In the temple

'dii stant manu facti, singulis nominibus insculptis, galeis atque loricis terribiliter vestiti, quorum primus Zuarasici dicitur. . . . Vexilla quoque eorum, nisi ad expeditionis necessaria . . . hinc nullatenus moventur.'

Later, he speaks of the Liutici and of their goddess whom they carried with them into battle 'in vexillis formata' (*ib.* vii. 47, p. 857); and elsewhere he refers to the general Slavic practice of image-worship:

'Quot regiones sunt in his partibus, tot templa habentur, et simulacra demonum singula ab infidelibus coluntur' (*ib.* vi. 18, p. 812).

Next in chronological order come the references connected with the Christianizing missions of Otto of Bamberg to the *Pomeranian* Slavs, early in the 12th century. The references to idols and their destruction are frequent; unfortunately the value of these lives by Herbord and Ebbo is much disputed. The most detailed description is that of a great temple at Stetin, apparently very like that at Rethra:

'Erat autem ibi simulacrum triceps, quod in uno corpore tria capita habens, Triglaus vocabatur' (Herbord, *Dialogus de Vita Ottonis*, ii. 32 [*MGH*, 'Script.' xii. 794; *AS*, Jul. i. [1867] 357]).

At Gutzkow there was an idol of great size and beauty, which was mutilated and burned (Ebbo of Bamberg, *Vita Ottonis*, iii. 10 [*MGH*, 'Script.' xii. 866]). Ebbo gives more details on the image of Triglaus at Stetin:

'Tricapitum habebat simulacrum, quod aurea cidari oculos et labia contegebat, asserentibus idolorum sacerdotibus ideo summum eorum deum tria habere capita, quoniam tria procuraret regna, id est coeli, terrae et inferni; et faciem cidari operire pro eo quod peccata hominum quasi non videns et tacens dissimularet' (*ib.* iii. 1, p. 859; *AS*, Jul. i. 388).

In the temple at Julin were 'statuas . . . auro et argento decoratas' (*ib.* iii. 1, p. 858; *AS*, Jul. i. 387).

Helmold, who went on his mission in 1155, is the first to mention the sanctuary at Rügen, and the image of Svantovit, with the confusion between Svantovit and Saint Vitus (*Chronica Slavorum*, i. 6 [*MGH*, 'Script.' xxi.]). An interesting general reference occurs:

'Hi (*i.e.* Slavi) simulacrorum imaginaria formas praetendunt de templis, velut Plunense idolum cui nomen Podaga; alii . . . lucos inhabitant, ut est Prove . . . quibus nullae sunt effigies expressae' (*ib.* i. 83, p. 75).

In 1168, Waldemar of Denmark captured Rügen, and destroyed

'simulacrum illud antiquissimum Zvantevith, quod colebatur ab omni natione Sclavorum' (*ib.* ii. 12, p. 90).

Helmold's evidence is confirmed by the more detailed account, by Saxo Grammaticus, of Waldemar's campaign in Rügen and capture of Arkona (*Gesta Danorum*, xiv. p. 565, ed. A. Holder, Strassburg, 1886). The temple is described minutely, and the image of Svantovit:

'Ingens in aede simulacrum, omnem humani corporis habitum granditate transcendens, quatuor capitibus totidemque cervicibus mirandum perstabat, e quibus duo pectus totidemque tergum respicere videbantur. Ceterum tam ante quam retro collocatorum unum dextrorsum alterum levorsum contemplacionem dirigere videbatur. Corrase barbe, crines attonsi figurabantur ut artificis industriam Rugianorum ritum in cultu capitum emulatam putares . . . Leva arcum reflexo in latus brachio figurabat. Tunica ad tibias prominens fingebatur, quae ex diversi ligni materia create, tam arcano nexu genibus iungebantur, ut compaginis locus non nisi curiosiori contemplacione deprehendi potuerit. Pedes humo contigui cornebantur, eorum basi intra solum latente.'

On the gate-tower of the town the people displayed *signa* and *aquilas*:

'Inter quas erat Stanitia (marg. Stuatira), magnitudine ac colore insignis' (*ib.* p. 575).

Bishop Absalon found at Karentia (*i.e.* Garz), in Rügen, three temples similar to that at Arkona; in the inmost shrine of one was found a gigantic oaken figure,

'quod Rugievithum vocabant . . . In eius capite septem humane similitudinis facies consedere, quae omnes unius verticis superficie claudebantur. Totidem quoque veros gladios cum vaginis uni cingulo appensos eius lateri artifex conciliaverat. Octavum in dextra destrictum tenebat. Hunc pugno insertum firmissimo nexu ferreus clavus astrinxerat, nec manui nisi precise evelli poterat; quae res truncande eius occasio extitit. . . . Nihil in hoc simulacro iocundum visentibus fuit; lineamentis impoliti celaminis deformitate sordentibus' (*ib.* p. 577).

In the next temple was the image of Porenithus:

'Id quinque capitibus consitum sed armis vacuum fingebatur.'

In the third temple was found Porenutius;

'Haec statua, quatuor facies representans, quintam pectori insertam habebat, cuius frontem leva, mentum dextera tangebat' (p. 578).

The destruction of the idols in Rügen is described in *Knytlingasaga*, 122; Svantovit appears as Svantaviz, and the names of the three images at Karentia are given as Rinvit, Turupiδ, and Puruvit. Statues with several heads seem to be peculiarly Slavic; there is apparently no similar representation of Germanic gods.

Unfortunately there appears to be practically no trustworthy archæological evidence for Slavic images (cf. Leger, *Mythologie slave*, pp. 33 f., 221 ff.).

3. In connexion with the Teutonic and Slavic evidence, brief reference may be made to the neighbouring Prussian peoples; Simon Grunau, *Preussische Chronik*, tract II. cap. v. § 2, describes a Prussian sanctuary built in an oak, in the 6th century.[1] The description is thus adapted and rendered in Latin by Alexander Guagninus, *Rerum Polonicarum*, Frankfort, 1584, ii. 107 f.:

'Quercus haec tripartita fuit; . . . ex una parte Prutenorum Deum, qui Peruno, id est fulmen, dicebatur, habebant. . . . Ex altera parte collocatum erat Patrimpo idolum; cuius cultus erat in serpente vivo retinendo. . . . Tertia ex parte daemoniacum idolum, Patelo nomine, situm fuit.'

[1] It must be admitted that Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896, p. 83, discredits the accuracy of Grunau in general, and of his mythology in particular, thus following the lead given by M. Toeppen, *Gesch. der preuss. Historiographie*, Berlin, 1853, p. 122 ff., esp. 178 ff., 190 ff. On the other hand, H. M. Chadwick, *Origin of the Eng. Nation*, Cambridge, 1907, p. 254 ff., accepts the evidence of Grunau on the characteristics of Prussian gods, and uses it in connexion with his Nerthus-Freyr theory.

In descriptions of late survivals of Prussian or Lithuanian paganism, mention of the serpent-cult recurs frequently, but apparently there is no other reference to images.

To sum up the evidence: Teutonic and Slavic peoples alike seem to have had no idols in early times, but they must certainly have possessed them at a later stage; in their adoption of them they may have been influenced by classical cults. Although individual references by early chroniclers may not be above suspicion, the weight of their collective testimony is too great to be disregarded.

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ii. *SLAVIC*.—L. Leger, *La Mythol. slave*, Paris, 1901, *passim*; G. Krek, *Slav. Litteraturgesch.*[2], Graz, 1887, p. 410 ff.; W. R. S. Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*[2], London, 1872, pp. 94, 211, 240 ff.

M. E. SEATON.

IMAGES AND IDOLS (Tibetan).—1. **Occurrence.**—In Tibet images and idols abound, though not, perhaps, to any greater extent than in other Buddhist countries, even of the 'Southern,' or relatively primitive, division of that religion—*e.g.* Burma and Ceylon. Whilst, however, in the latter case, the images are mainly reduplicates of the conventional effigy of the historical Buddha, Śākyamuni (in one particular attitude, namely that of 'the earth-touching pose' [*bhūmisparśamudrā*], at the supreme moment of attaining Buddhahood, under the 'Tree of Wisdom' [*Bodhi*]), in Tibet, on the other hand, as in the other countries of the polytheistic Mahāyāna form of Buddhism, the images represent also a host of deified Buddhas and celestial Bodhisattvas (or potential Buddhas), saints, and demons. Besides the images enshrined in temples and other religious buildings, *chortens* (*q.v.*), etc., a large number of miniature images are met with on domestic altars, and worn by the people in amulet-boxes, as talismans. Pictures of many of these divinities are as abundant in the houses of laymen as in temples, and illuminated in colours on the title-pages of favourite scriptures and manuals of worship. Consecrated medallions are also bestowed by the grand Lamas upon generous donors of alms. The images of the pre-Buddhist aboriginal religion, the *Bon*, are now cast in Buddhist form.

2. **Divinities, saints, etc., represented.**—The great majority of the divinities represented by the idols are those of the orthodox Mahayana Buddhism of India, as was first elicited by the present writer, who has also traced the origin of the majority of these divinities and their images to an adaptation of Brāhmanist myth, and to the deification of metaphysical categories and different modes of Buddha's 'Word' (or *Logos*) by a concrete symbolism. The more commonly prevalent images are as follows.

(*a*) *Buddhas, celestial and human.* Of these the most frequently represented is perhaps the divine *Amitābha* ('*Od-dpagmed*), or 'The Buddha of Boundless Light' (see ĀDIBUDDHA) of the Western Paradise, and his mode *Amitayus* (*Ts'e-dpag-med*), 'The Boundless Life' (see AMITĀYUS). Other common forms are the Medical or Æsculapic Buddha (*sMan bla*), the primordial Ādibuddha as *Samantabhadra* (*Kun-tu-bzań-po*), or *Vajradhāra* (*rDo rje-chań*), or *Vajrasattva* (*rDo-rje-sems-dpa*), and their mystical Tantrik modes displaying their female energies; also the remaining Buddhas of the four quarters of the universe; and—less common than these—the historical Buddha, Śakyamuni (*Śakya-tu'b-pa*).

(*b*) *Bodhisattvas*: the coming Buddha, or *Mai-*

treya (*Byams-pa*), usually figured seated in European fashion, not cross-legged, and usually of gigantic size, as a several storeyed image, or carved on rocks; *Avalokiteśvara* (*q.v.*) (*Spyan-ras-gzigs*), or personified Compassion, *Mañjuśrī* (*Jam-dbyans*); personified Wisdom, *Vajrapāṇi* (*P'yags-rdor*); *Tārā* (*Sgrol-ma*), consort of Avalokita, as 'the white' (*Sitā*) and 'the green' (*Bhṛkuṭi*); *Marīchi* (*rDo-rje p'ag-mo*); *Prajñāpāramitā*, personified Divine Wisdom; 'the all-victorious Diadem,' *Uṣṇīṣavijayā*; 'the White Umbrella Invincible against others,' *Sita-ātapatra-aparājitā*; 'the Great Turner away of Harm,' *Mahāpratyaṅgirā*; 'the Flaming Crown,' *Uṣṇīṣajvala*.

(*c*) *Placid gods* (*lha*) *of Brāhmanist type*: modes of Indra and Brahmā as door-keepers and attendants on Śākyamuni; the four Guardian gods of the Quarters; and Jambhala, the god of Wealth.

(*d*) *Demoniacal tutelarics* of the fierce type of Śiva as 'Defenders of Religion' (*Ch'os-skyoṅ*), *e.g.* 'the fearful Thunderbolt,' *Vajrabhairava* (*rDorje-'jigs-byed*), a form of Yama, the god of the Dead; 'the horse-necked demon,' *Hayagrīva* (*rTa-mgrin*); 'the Goddess,' *Devī* or *Lha-mo*.

(*e*) *Local gods and demons*: chiefly indigenous, namely 'country-gods,' *yul-lha*, and earth-demons, *sa-bdag*, of which the most numerous are red (*tsan*) and black (*bdud*).

(*f*) *Saints*: the sixteen apostles or 'the sixteen Arahats'; also the two chief disciples, '*Mongol-pu*' and '*Sari-pu*'; *Padmakara* or *Padmasambhava*, whom the present writer has shown to be the founder of Lamaism; also the reformer of Tibetan Buddhism, Tsonkhapa, the founder of the Yellow-hat sect, now the dominant Church, to which belong the Grand Lamas of Lhasa and Tashilhunpo. The image of Padmasambhava is given the chief place in temples of the Red-cap sect, and Tsonkhapa in the Yellow. Each of the other minor sects accords its own particular founder a chief place on its altars.

3. Canon descriptive of images.—The authoritative source for the detailed description of the images of Buddhism is the great body of the *Sādhana* (*Sgrub-t'ab*) literature of rituals for the worship of these respective divinities. The rituals were composed in India, in the early centuries of our era onwards, during the rise of the *bhakti*, or devotional movement, which permeated both Brāhmanism and Buddhism. They number many hundreds, and each purports to contain minute descriptions of the form assumed by the deity on becoming manifest to a votary; the distinctive form, dress, posture, and pose of body and hands, as well as the colour, and the symbols held in the hands to emblemize the functions and attributes, are all detailed therein. Several recensions of these texts are on record as translated into Tibetan. Two large collections are included in the great Tibetan commentary, *Tangyur*, of which the titles have been published by F. W. Thomas and P. Cordier. It is from these Indian manuals that Tibetan artists form their images. Many of the deities are given a variety of forms, owing, it seems to the present writer, to the apparent incorporation of popular Brāhmanist and other aboriginal divinities to whom their functions and symbolism are thereby assimilated. These polymorphic forms fall into three types: (*a*) placid, mild, or benign (*śiva*); (*b*) fierce (*khroda*); (*c*) terrible and demonist (*dragpo*).

4. Style of art and technique. — The Tibetan artists have preserved to a great extent the mediæval Indian style of Buddhist art. This is especially noticeable in the dress and form of the female divinities, who are represented displaying exuberant charms of figure, according to the Indian ideals of female beauty. This character contrasts strikingly with the Chinese treatment, which tends to repress sexual distinctions. In the conventional treatment of externals, such as landscape effects, clouds, water, trees, and houses, the Tibetan images and pictures exhibit a decided Chinese influence rather than Indian, though Tibet has to some extent evolved a special style of its own, intermediate between that of its two great neighbours, and distinct from that of Nepāl. Some of the large images in Tibet were cast in Nepāl by Newar artisans.

5. Materials of image.—The commonest images are composed of plastic material—clay, or a mixture of incense-paste, flour, and clay moulded into shape, dried, painted, and gilded. The better images are fashioned from brass or copper, usually cast from moulds and gilded. The most valued images are inlaid with turquoises and other precious or imitation stones. Stone is seldom used for images or statues, though figures are sometimes outlined on rocks. Bas-reliefs and medallions are often made in butter, in the winter season, for certain festivals. Following the Indian custom, auspicious times must be selected for the preparation of the materials, and for the execution of the work, especially of the principal organs, *e.g.* the eye, etc. A remarkable realistic detail is the insertion into the larger images of models of brain, heart, lungs, stomach, and intestines. The conventional colour of Buddha's hair is dark blue.

On completion of the image, it requires to be consecrated. For this purpose sacred texts are recited, and into the hollow interior are inserted small rolls of texts, one of which often is 'the Buddhist Creed' or a spell (*dhāraṇī*). Other objects thus inserted are grains of consecrated rice from the altar, bodily relics, hair, nail-parings, shreds of the robes of holy men, and filings of precious metals. The image is usually wrapped with silk scarfs, giving the impression that it is clothed. Pictures (*z'al-t'aṅ*) of images are painted in distemper, usually on cotton, seldom on silk. Sometimes the paintings are executed on the walls of temples as mural frescoes.

6. Worship of images.—The image, as in other Buddhist countries, is popularly worshipped as a sort of fetish, holy in itself, and not merely as a diagram or symbol of the infinite or unknown. Food and drink are regularly offered to it. It is believed to hear and answer prayers. It is a common experience to hear the devotees in a temple addressing personal requests for benefits before the image. Certain of the older images of which the history has been forgotten are, like those in Brāhmanism and other religions, regarded as miraculous in construction, and credited with being 'self-formed' or as 'fallen from heaven ready fashioned.'

See also 'Buddhist' section above, esp. p. 123 ff.

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IMAGE OF GOD.—1. General view.—(1) 'God is a Spirit,' said Jesus to the woman of Samaria at Jacob's well at Sychar (Jn 4^{24}), thereby giving utterance to the deep truth that God is free and self-determining, essentially ethical in His nature. This great idea is the basal conception on which the interpretation of man as made in God's image, as set forth in Scripture, must proceed. For, if God is a Spirit, then man, reflecting Him, must be a spirit too; in other words, human nature has more in it than what we find in sensuous experiences, animal proclivities, and fleshly inclinations. He

stands erect, and is by nature allied to the Divine; and his attachments, in the first instance and properly, are heavenwards and not towards earth. He has fellowship with the Source of his being, then; and his own nature, to the extent that it is pure and unsullied, may be held as revealing the Divine. The foundation of his being is deeper than anything that may be seen or tasted or handled: it is found in relation to the unseen and the eternal. Consequently, what the nature of the great God is can be discovered in part by consideration of His image as reproduced in man; and, however much more God may be than what finite intellect, finite will, finite conscience, and finite love may disclose, He must at least correspond to the reflexion of Himself that the higher faculties and emotions of man's soul exhibit: if the human spirit is not the Divine Spirit, at any rate it reflects it, and may be trusted as a revealer to the extent of its capacity.

The line of argument which is suggested by Jesus' utterance is supported by the OT, and especially by the Creation narratives (P and J) at the opening of the Book of Genesis. Whatever be the historical or the scientific value of these two narratives, they lie at the root of both the Jewish and the Christian faith, and embody truths that are indispensable for the understanding of redemption. According to them, man is a spirit, being created by God, who is 'the Father of Spirits,' and having the breath of life 'breathed into his nostrils' by God Himself. This renders him the image of his Maker: the Divine Spirit is the Source of the human spirit, and the rational creature is thus far stamped with the stamp of the Creator.

(2) Now, if this be the Scripture teaching, OT and NT, what is the practical significance of it? Clearly this—that, if man is essentially a spirit, drawing his being from the great Creator Spirit, the agnostic position that God, even if we suppose Him to exist, is unknown and unknowable is untenable. God cannot be unknown, much less unknowable, if man bears in him the Divine image. Even the reflexion of a face in a mirror is a copy; and, although it lacks the warmth and fullness of the original, it does, nevertheless, within limits reproduce it, and thus far gives a true idea of it. Further, on the Bible conception of man's spiritual nature and original heavenly relationship, both natural theology and Divine revelation become possible, and, indeed, are seen to be inevitable; and the distinction between the two becomes one of degree and not of kind. But, on the supposition that man is not a spirit, it is not possible to see how either natural theology or Divine revelation could be. Divine revelation is shown to be a necessity from the fact that, as man's deepest need is God, and as God is a Person, it is only if God reveals Himself that we can come to know Him. It is the characteristic of personality to be self-declaratory and self-communicative. Even in the case of our fellow-men, who are persons, we cannot know them unless they themselves will to disclose themselves to us. Knowledge of a neighbour depends upon whether he opens his heart and lays bare his thoughts to us: the motion must come from *his* side; otherwise, we are powerless. We might, without his revelation, come to learn something about him; but we should not know himself. Now, the revelation of one person to another is also the revelation of that other to himself. We can never know ourselves except in the light of our experience and knowledge of others. This arises from the necessities of the case—in particular, from the circumstance that our nature is in the essence of it social, and that imitation is largely our teacher in our early days. How much more, then, is the revelation of God to us also the revelation of ourselves to us! It is only in His light that we see light. But the meaning of this is that humanity is taken up into the Divine; which, again, implies that the image of God—and, therefore, the Godward attitude—is the primary fact in man. God and man in union and communion is the same thing as saying that man is naturally allied to God, that the Infinite is not the contradictory, but the complement, of the finite.

Still more obvious is the need for revelation if we introduce, as Scripture does, and as our own experience attests, the idea of sin, or voluntary transgression, intervening to create a rupture between man and God. There is now not only ignorance or limited knowledge to cope with, but also voluntary alienation or estrangement. The understanding is weakened, but the will also is perverted, and the affections are turned away in the wrong direction. A thorough transformation has to be effected in the sinner—clearness of perception has to be brought back to his intellect, strength to his will, purity to his heart, and peace to his conscience. Only a Divine revelation can do this.

2. OT teaching.—(1) The psychology of the OT centres in the terms 'body,' 'soul,' 'heart,' and 'spirit.' Of these four factors man consists. His body is at first conceived simply as 'dust' (*'āphār*, עָפָר), or 'dust of the ground,' *i.e.* simply as the earthly part of him, composed of dust and resolved at death into dust again, but without any idea of unworthiness or degradation attaching to it. It is a work of the Creator, and, like other such works, it was pronounced at the beginning to be 'very good.' Looked at as an animated and sentient organism, it is viewed as 'flesh' (*bāśār*, בָּשָׂר), devoid, however, of any implication of vitiosity or carnal desire, which so frequently attaches to 'flesh' in the NT. Nevertheless, although 'flesh' is not represented in the OT as the source or origin of sin, it is regarded as indicating man's mortality and frailty, and also the fact that the body may be the instrument of evil desires and passions. Thus, while, on the one hand, it says, 'All flesh is grass' (Is 40^6), on the other hand, it records the depravity of the race at a particular moment in the significant phrase, 'All flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth' (Gn 6^{12}), though even then the congruity of 'flesh' with 'spirit' is not lost sight of, for it is said, in almost immediate connexion, 'My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh' (Gn 6^3). The body as flesh is congruent with spirit: hence the Psalmist can say, 'My heart and my flesh cry out unto the living God' (Ps 84^2). The 'soul' (*nephesh*, נֶפֶשׁ) is specially the seat of the emotions and the will, although other functions are frequently accorded to it. It is the soul that 'hopes,' 'fears,' 'trusts,' 'desponds,' 'praises,' 'is glad' and 'longs,' etc.—all emotive and volitional states. To the 'heart' (*lēbh* or *lēbhābh*, לֵב, לֵבָב) are assigned thought, wisdom, intellect, understanding; so that 'the heart,' in Hebrew usage, so far from signifying the chief seat of affection, as in English, is the nearest equivalent to the English term 'mind.' It is also the seat of character—the centre of man's being, moral and religious. As the seat of sin, 'the heart is deceitful above all things, and it is desperately sick: who can know it?' (Jer 17^9). It is deep and hidden from common view, and is reached only by God: 'I the Lord search the heart, I try the reins, even to give every man according to his ways, according to the fruit of his doings' (17^{10}). But neither soul nor heart constitutes man's outstanding greatness. That is reserved for his 'spirit' (*rūach*, רוּחַ), which is distinctively the heaven-derived principle in him, drawn immediately from the Divine Spirit, 'breathed' into him

directly from that Source, and thereby making him specifically a person, a self, with power to determine his actions and to control his nature, and, therefore, above all, an ethical being—an ethical being whose inmost inclination is religious, who, if unsullied, is ever looking towards God, responsive to His influence, and drawing his inspiration from Him. This is what gives him his supreme dignity and worth, making him 'but little lower than God' (Ps 8^5), and securing his dominion over the lower animals and over all the earth. Thus we are introduced to the fundamental conception of man as made in God's image: 'And God said, Let us make man in our image [lit. 'shadow,' *ṣelem*, צֶלֶם], after our likeness [*dᵉmūth*, דְּמוּת]: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them' (Gn $1^{26ff.}$).

(2) All this goes to show that, in the view of the OT, man holds a unique place in the earth. He is, like the lower animals, a creature of God indeed; but he is more. His body, like that of the brutes, is dust of the earth, and is animated as a physical organism; but he is spirit, and stands to his Creator as a son to his father. Thus are the facts of our experience interpreted. It is not for nothing that, in the first creation narrative, with its charming pictorial setting, the account of man's creation is isolated from that of the other creatures by being introduced by the solemn injunction, 'Let us make man,' and followed up by the sublime announcement, 'And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him.' There is no word here of creation 'after its kind,' which is the formula used in the case of both animals and plants: it is a peculiar and special creation. Nor is any secondary agency invoked to bring about the result, such as we read of in the case of animals, 'Let *the earth* bring forth the living creature after its kind,' and of fishes, 'Let *the waters* bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life.' The act in man's case is immediate, personal, direct, thereby indicating the exceptional worth of the spiritual being now brought into existence, and his special kinship to his Maker.

The OT estimate of the worth of the Divine image in man is further shown by the fact that it uses the possession of it as an argument for the just and impartial treatment of man by man in the world. In the pronouncement that God is represented as making to Noah, as recorded in Gn 9^6, the condemnation of murder and the punishment of it are based on this very fact: 'Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man.' And in this same spirit St. James, in the NT, tries to curb the unruly tongue, and to show the enormity of slander, backbiting, and the like (all of which are really species of murder), by the very same argument of man's native dignity and celestial relationship: 'Therewith bless we the Lord and Father; and therewith curse we men, which are made after the likeness of God' (Ja 3^9).

(3) In man's spiritual nature, drawn from its heavenly Source, is involved the fact of immortality and never-ending life. This is a logical deduction from the possession by man of the Divine image: spirit cannot die. How far, however, this was understood by the Jews is subject to dispute. What is obvious is that the idea of a future life grows in the OT as the ages run; and, when it does crop up, it comes as an intuition of the heart rather than as the result of logical reasoning, and is associated with the thought of communion and fellowship with God. It is the expression of the vision and the aspiration of psalmist and of prophet prompted by the longing for purity and righteousness, and poured out of the individual's glowing faith: 'As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness' (Ps 17^{15}: 'likeness' = תְּמוּנָה, LXX δόξα, Vulg. *gloria*).

But the objection has been raised that immortality was lost by the Fall; for our first parents were driven out of the Garden of Eden (such is the representation), lest they should 'put forth their hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.' The signification of this clearly is that an everlasting life to a fallen or sinful creature, in the condition to which his fall had reduced him, would not be a blessing but a curse, and that something better was in store for erring man, even though it should cost him labour, pain, and sorrow. To eat of the tree of life and live for ever just as he was would simply be to prolong degradation and misery. But the whole lesson of the Fall is that of hope for man. The curse of the ground was for man's sake; it was for man's sake that he was expelled from the Garden, and that access to the tree of life was strictly guarded by cherubim and a flaming sword. In a finely impressive way the myth brings out that man has now realized that his life is to be a battle of the right against the wrong, of good against evil, of strenuous resistance of temptation, of rising to higher things through personal effort; and that through this continued warfare the potentialities that are in him are to be actualized, character is to be formed, and spiritual progress secured. And the NT throws further significance into the fact when it insists that the conflict is not confined to men, but is shared by Heaven itself. It is the characteristic of the very Son of God, the Ideal Man, who was made perfect through suffering, and in whose victory over sin and temptation we have the highest revelation of the Divine purpose with men and the truest manifestation of the Father's love.

3. **NT teaching.**—The fact of sin and the universal degradation and bondage of men on account of it, and the need, nature, and purpose of the remedy offered in Jesus Christ, are the subject-matter of the NT. The worth of the individual soul lies at the root of it—the supreme value of the image of God in man, which had become corrupted, defaced, and blurred ('How is the gold become dim! how is the most pure gold changed!' [La 4^1]), and the determination of God that this image shall not be finally lost. A new creation is required: man has to be regenerated, 'renewed in the spirit of his mind' (ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν), submitted afresh (in the altered circumstances) to the enlivening, quickening influence of the Divine Spirit. The means is the person of Jesus Christ and His work of redemption—His life on earth, His death, His atoning sacrifice, His resurrection and ascension, His sovereignty and continual priesthood, and, through all, the active working of the Spirit in the hearts and minds of believing men, making application to them of the remedy, creating them anew, purifying, enlightening, subduing them, and reinstating sinners in their sonship to God and keeping them in immediate filial communion with Him. 'If any man is in Christ, he is a new creature: the old things are passed away; behold, they are become new' (2 Co 5^{17}). And not only so, but Nature itself is represented as suffering through man's sin. As he was created with dominion over all the earth, his fall had a cosmic significance; and, therefore, St. Paul pictures 'the earnest expectation of the creation' as 'waiting for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to vanity,

not of its own will, but by reason of him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now' (Ro 8^{19-22}).

This gives the meaning of the whole teaching of the NT regarding man and God.

(1) In regard, first, to the NT psychology, it is pertinent to remark that it follows largely that of the OT. Neither of them is, strictly speaking, philosophical. How should they be, seeing that religion, not philosophy, is the great end of the Bible? But Christianity is the completion of the OT revelation, and would be unintelligible if severed from it. Yet it must not be forgotten (*a*) that Divine revelation is a progressive thing, and, consequently, that the terms received new content as time went on; and (*b*) that Christianity was affected by Hellenism, especially through the LXX. It is only quite recently that scholars have come to realize how much the NT owes to the LXX, not least for its language; and, indeed, it is hardly extravagant, in the face of modern research, to say, with E. C. Selwyn (*Expositor*, 8th ser., v. [1913] 169), that 'the time is not far distant when it will be seen that the Greek Bible was the cradle of the Christian faith.' St. Paul's teaching, too, bears many traces of Hellenism, as was inevitable in the case of a man who was a Roman citizen of Tarsus (a chief seat of Stoicism in St. Paul's day), and a pupil of the scholarly and liberal-minded Gamaliel. Above all, it is essential to remember that Christianity is offered as the remedy for sin. Its object is to bring man back to the Source from which he had wandered, and to reinstate him in his rightful heritage. Consequently, it has much to say of mortality, corruption, death; and much also of immortality, incorruption, life.

(2) How, then, is sinful man's nature renewed? Through redemption brought by Christ, and applied by the Holy Spirit.

In considering this, it is well to begin with the fact that Jesus is set forth in Scripture as 'the Image of the Invisible God' (*εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*), 'the firstborn of all creation' (Col 1^{15}). This means that He is Himself a Spirit (for 'God is a Spirit'), and that, in a special sense, He is God's Son, the 'Son' of His love; for He is '*the* Image' of God, and not simply, like man, 'made *in*' it. On this account He makes to men the supreme revelation of God's nature, which is that of a Father, whose essence is love—the revelation of a compassionate God ('not willing that any should perish'), and of a suffering God with love at the core of it, bringing redemption through sacrifice.

He is also said by St. Paul (Ph 2^{6}) to be 'in the form of God' (*ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*). That refers to Christ in His pre-existent state; but it cannot fail also to suggest the Divine image in which man was at first made (Gn 1^{26}), where 'form' might not inaptly translate the Hebrew *ṣelem* ('shadow'). And, agreeably to this, St. Paul, in Ro 8^{29}, speaks of those who are predestinated as 'conformed to the image of his Son' (*συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*), where the word 'conformed' clearly takes us back to the original Hebrew term for 'shadow,' with outline or form as the predominant idea. And it is significant in this connexion that, when St. Luke traces the genealogy of Jesus from Joseph upwards (Lk 3^{23-38}), he ends with Adam, whom he designates 'the Son of God.' Thus the Lucan pedigree connects the second Adam with the first Adam: 'it places a son of God at either end of this list of names'; 'it makes *us* out to be children of God both by nature and by grace, by birth and by second birth' (S. Cox, *Expositions*, i., London, 1885, p. 27). And so it is well for us to remember that 'both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one'—*i.e.* have all the same origin—*ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντες* (He 2^{11}).

(3) How the image of God in sinful man is renewed is set forth in many ways in the NT. Sometimes we meet with terms that are common to Christianity and Greek thought, such as 'following' and 'imitating'—significant words to be found frequently in Plato and among the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists; but, when this is the case, the powerful personal influence of Jesus lies at the root of the process. It is not simply 'following' Jesus that we find, but it is Jesus' magnetic personality drawing men towards Him as disciples and Himself saying to each, 'Follow me' (*ἀκολούθει μοι*). Hence, it is not the verb *ἕπομαι* that is used (that verb never occurs in the NT), but *ἀκολουθέω*, thereby indicating that it is the following of disciples who are also *companions* that is meant—men who are living in the constant consciousness of the Master's presence with them. Again, it is not only the command to 'imitate' Jesus and take Him as our Example or Model that is issued to us, but it is also St. Paul exhorting us, 'Be ye imitators (*μιμηταί*) of me, as I also am of Christ' (1 Co 11^{1}). In other words, the personal note in this connexion is distinctive and supreme. But there are other modes of statement, all of them recognizing the fact that the renewal of the image in the individual man is a gradual process, requiring time and life's experiences, and even looking forward to the future life: 'Now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is' (1 Jn 3^{2}). Yet, although the renewal is a process, in every man who has accepted Christ the new image is there at any moment, needing only to be realized, for 'Christ is all and in all.'

This is brought out very clearly in Col 3^{5-11} and in 2 Co 3^{18}. These passages and many more go to show that re-creation, or the new birth, or regeneration, does not mean a despising or rejecting of the faculties that man as man possesses, or a making of any addition to them, but a taking of them up by the Spirit of Christ into a higher influence, imparting to them a new vigour, quickening them in their exercise, and turning the operation of them in a new direction. Intellect, feeling, and will are found in every man (that is the heritage from the original creation), but, through Christ and through Divine grace, they are purified and invigorated and dedicated afresh to the service of God.

(4) It is obvious, from the whole tenor of what has now been said, that the renewed image of God in man cannot be restricted to man's life on earth. We saw, under the OT teaching, that immortality is logically involved in the conception of man as a spirit. But this is explicitly brought out in Christianity and put in the forefront. St. Paul claims for Christ that He 'abolished death, and brought life and incorruption to light through the gospel' (2 Ti 1^{10}). That was the end and aim of His earthly mission: resurrection and immortality are effected by Himself as 'a life-giving Spirit' (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*, 1 Co 15^{45}). The assurance of immortality, therefore, is now complete: 'Because I live, ye shall live also' (Jn 14^{19}). And the life promised is to the whole man—body and soul, not soul only apart from body. There is more than philosophical immortality promised: there is the final redemption of the body, as well as the salvation of the soul—complete redemption means complete future existence for the redeemed. Even under the OT, the fact of future life might have been evident, as Jesus Himself indicated to the Sadducees (Mt $22^{31f.}$),

when He reasoned from God's revelation of Himself to Moses in the land of Midian as the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, on the ground that 'God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.' But it is accentuated now, and become the great motive power of the Christian teaching. The constraining Scripture passages are such as these: 'I am the resurrection and the life' (Jn 11^{25}), and 'When Christ, who is our life, shall be manifested, then shall ye also with him be manifested in glory' (Col 3^{4}).

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IMAGINATION.—Originally both the Gr. term *φαντασία* and the Lat. *imaginatio* meant simply the power of bringing an object before the mind in the absence from perception of the object itself. The product of imagination was an 'image' or copy of the object as perceived. Later, when perception was known to have a physiological basis in the central nervous system, the image was regarded as produced through the revival, without an external stimulus, of the same cerebral process as accompanied the original perception—a 'decaying sensation' or perception, as Hobbes put it, or, in Kuelpe's phrase, a 'centrally excited sensation.' Such images might be combined in the same order as that in which they were originally given, or in new and different orders. The former was called 'reproductive,' the latter 'productive,' imagination. But, as Wundt points out (*Grundzuge der physiolog. Psychol.*[5], Leipzig, 1902-03, iii. 631), this usual distinction of productive imagination from memory (or reproductive imagination), as that faculty by which we can reproduce ideas and experiences in altered arrangement, is quite unsatisfactory, for memory itself invariably alters the experiences it recalls. The differences must be sought either in the mechanism or in the purpose of the processes in question. In memory, as Wundt argues, the mind moves in succession from point to point, according to the ordinary laws of association by contiguity, while in imagination, in the narrow sense, some idea of the whole that is to be formed always precedes the actual formation; it is a development from within, while memory is an accretion from without of part to part. On the other hand, recent experiments have shown that in memory also there is invariably an idea of the whole anteceding the recall of the details of an experience, and that the laws of association are quite inadequate to explain the processes involved (see, *e.g.*, H. J. Watt, *Theorie des Denkens*, Leipzig, 1904). A more fruitful distinction between memory and imagination is in the purpose or function of each. The object in memory is to revive a past experience of the individual, something that has already occurred, a 'real' event, perception, or thought. In imagination the purpose is to construct or prepare for a *new* experience, something hitherto unrealized by the individual; it faces the future, as memory the past; its product is essentially new, spontaneous, original, as that of memory is essentially old, reproduced, imitative. In the history lesson, it is by memory that a child recalls the words of the textbook, or of the teacher; it is by imagination that he pictures, and 'lives himself into' the personalities and events. So I may remember what I have read or heard of Tibet, but it is imagination that makes real to me the country and its people. The two processes are to a certain extent antagonistic to each other; a strong and accurate memory for details is rarely found accompanied by a vivid power of realizing in imagination the events passed through, or of communicating their *spirit* to others.

Imagination does not work merely with images, but also with percepts—as in the child's play with doll or pet, the artist's work with colours and canvas, or the sculptor's with clay or marble—and with concepts, abstractions, non-presentational meanings and thoughts—as in scientific invention and literary creation. On the other hand, images are used not only by imagination and by memory, but also by every other process of the mind, including perception itself. Thus images are by no means characteristic of imagination, either as materials or as products. Imagination is a complex power, to be paralleled with reasoning and with will, not with sensation or feeling. It is the primitive form of reasoning, 'thinking in pictures.' Reasoning works more in the abstract, with verbal images, imagination more in the concrete, with object-images; reasoning is governed by conceptions of law and necessity, imagination is free and unlimited; reasoning in the main seeks to determine what *is*, or what *must be*, as the necessary outcome of what is, imagination is concerned with what *might be*, or *might have been*, had other conditions been present. But none of these characters is essential. Some recent criticism would reduce reasoning to a special form of imagination (see F. C. S. Schiller, *Formal Logic*, London, 1912). In all higher thinking, at any rate, imagination is as essential a constituent as reasoning in the narrow sense. Both rest, as Ribot points out (*Essai sur l'imagination créatrice*, Introd.), upon a faculty of perceiving or thinking resemblances—a preponderance of exact resemblances on the one side, or of remote and superficial resemblances on the other, making the difference between the 'thinkers' and the 'imaginatives' or 'dreamers.' One may add that vividness and accuracy of imagery may be a bar rather than an aid to imagination; the French are described by Galton as the keenest visualizers among European races; in science and criticism they are also among the foremost; but one of their own psychologists describes them as devoid of imagination (A. Fouillée, *ap.* Ribot, p. 161). No one would deny that Edgar Allan Poe had imagination, but a study of his poems and tales shows his imagery to have been vague and formless in the extreme. So it is not definiteness, but vagueness in a child's imagery, that makes its thinking 'imaginative.'

What most strongly separates imagination from reasoning is, however, the personal and individual element—the emotional tone, that characterizes

the first, and is absent, in theory at least, from the second. Imagination, like other psychophysical functions, has, in its origin, a purely practical value. It is an extended perception, an anticipation of experience, foresight of the issue of an action that is in process, of the effect from an observed cause, of the outcome of a given situation. Its possession enables the organism to adapt itself to new situations and environments, not merely, as in memory, to cope with recurring cases. It retains this practical side, from the earliest attempts to meet physical dangers or to satisfy hunger, up to the scientist's search into the hidden causes of things or the artist's pursuit of the ideal. Its driving force is, therefore, always an emotion of some kind—a want or desire and its accompanying dissatisfaction with the present. In the imaginative mind there is necessary a combination of strong desires and impulses, on the one side, and a rapid and varied flow of imagery, on the other.

'There may be in the mind an inexhaustible mass of facts and images, yet nothing is created, for example the great travellers who have seen and heard much, and who cannot draw from their experiences anything more than colourless recitals, men taking part in great political events or military adventures, which leave memories of the driest and poorest kind; prodigious readers, living encyclopaedias, crushed under the weight of their learning' (Ribot, p. 87).

Equally uncreative, however, is the vigorous active type, with poor imagery and intellect. Two good examples of the contrast referred to are to be found in the two tramps in R. L. Stevenson's essay 'On Beggars.'

Several features of imagination are explained by the closeness of its connexion with emotion: (1) the vagaries, the bizarre connexions, the inexplicable leaps, in its lower forms; ideas and experiences tend to be revived, not through their direct connexion with other ideas, but through the emotional tinge which they have in common with the excitant ideas; (2) the predominance in emotional natures of the type called 'passive imagination,' as opposed to 'active imagination'; in the former the flow of imagery is spontaneous, uncontrolled by the will of the subject, who is a spectator rather than an actor, while in the latter the subject can alter the imagery at will, but has a far poorer range and vividness (see A. Binet, *Étude expér. de l'intelligence*, p. 42); (3) the intensity and concentration of the imaginative state, as in the 'psychic' blindness and deafness of day-dreams, of play, of the creative mood (see Stanley Hall, *Aspects of Child Life*); as in all strong emotion, there is a temporary dissociation of the personality; from this point of view the imaginative state suggests comparison with somnambulism, hypnotism, and with the phenomena of double consciousness; (4) the sense of strangeness, suddenness, 'inspiration,' or 'possession,' with which innumerable creations of the imagination are accompanied. Much of the elaboration which is embodied in imaginative products takes place unconsciously. R. L. Stevenson's account of the source of some of his plots (see 'A Chapter on Dreams') is paralleled by the reports of many writers, artists, musicians, as to how their greatest creations 'came to them.' The most interesting attempt to explain this feature is that of Freud and his pupils (references in Lit.). A dream, as it is experienced by the subject (the manifest content), is the transformed, symbolic presentment of a deeper system of ideas (the latent content) suppressed by the censorship of consciousness; this latent content in its turn may be the suggested realization of some hidden desire, which the conscious subject has repressed, because impossible of attainment, absurd, childish, or immoral. These principles, originally formulated for dreams and for some forms of mental disease, are being applied to the materials of poetry, of art generally, and especially to the myths, fairy tales, and legends of primitive imagination.

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IMBECILITY. — See DEGENERATION, DEVELOPMENT (Mental), INSANITY.

IMMACULATE CONCEPTION. — The Roman Catholic Church teaches that from the very first instant of her conception the Virgin Mary was immune from original sin. This privilege is called 'immaculate conception.' Before the 12th cent. there was no thought of exempting the mother of Christ from the law of original sin. The Feast of the Conception of Mary, however, was in vogue; and it is from this Feast that the belief in the immaculate conception arose.

1. **The Feast of the Conception of Mary** originated in a legend circulated by the *Protevangelium of James*, a 2nd century apocryphal writing. The substance of the book is as follows:

Joachim and Anna had no children, and their unfruitful union caused them to be exposed to public contempt. One day an angel appeared to Anna, and said to her: 'Anna, Anna, the Lord hath hearkened to thy prayer: thou shalt conceive and bring forth a child, and thy posterity shall be spoken of throughout the whole world.' At the same moment Joachim, who was tending his flocks in the field, also received a revelation from heaven. An angel said to him: 'Joachim, Joachim, the Lord God has hearkened to thy prayer; descend hence, for behold thy wife Anna has conceived in her womb' (according to other MSS: 'thy wife Anna will conceive in her womb,' but the reading 'has conceived' seems to be the original; this is the form known and followed by Epiphanius in the *Panarium* [*Haer.* lxxix. 5]). Nine months later, Anna gave birth to a daughter, whom they called Mary, and who became the mother of the Saviour. The *Protevangelium* seems to say that Mary was conceived in the womb of Anna in a virginal manner (especially if we follow the reading: 'thy wife has conceived'). In any case it was in this sense that the story was interpreted for a long time by popular piety. But Epiphanius (*loc. cit.*) and, following him, several other writers explain that the conception of Mary took place according to the ordinary laws, after union with Joachim. Gradually the justice of their explanation was allowed, and the virginal conception gave place to a conception which was no doubt miraculous for Anna was barren—but at least conformed to the ordinary laws of human reproduction.

Christians wanted to celebrate the marvellous events related in the *Protevangelium*, and so they held a Feast of the Conception of Mary—of the conception as they understood it, *i.e.* at first the virginal conception, and later, the miraculous, though not virginal, conception. This Feast made its appearance in the East probably during the 7th cent.; but its first witnesses are Andreas Cretensis and Joannes Eubœensis, who belong to the 8th century. Andreas, in his *Canones* (*PG* xcvii. 1305 and 1312), mentions, under the date December 9th, what he calls the 'conception of St. Anna,' *i.e.* the conception of Mary in the womb of Anna. Joannes Eubœensis has left a sermon on the conception of Mary (*PG* xcvi. 1459-1500), which concludes with the words:

'On the 9th of December we celebrate the anniversary of the day on which the blessed Joachim and Anna were informed of the conception of Mary. We celebrate this festival, which is not universally accepted.'

From the East the Feast of the Conception spread into England. As regards the details of time and manner we are reduced to guess-work. Most probably Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury, was the cause. Born at Tarsus, a monk at Rome, placed by Pope Vitalian at the head of the church of Canterbury, which he governed for more than twenty years (668–690), Theodore was an Easterner dwelling in the West—a combination of the conditions necessary for the solution of the problem before us. A pontifical of Canterbury previous to 1050 contains a benediction: 'For the day of the conception of the holy mother of God, Mary'; and two calendars belonging to the abbeys of Old Minster and New Minster in Winchester contain under the date of December 8th the following inscription: 'The conception of the holy mother of God.' The Irish Church supplies similar texts, some of which go back to the 10th century. From these evidences it is clear that the Feast of the Conception of Mary was celebrated in England and Ireland long before the Norman Conquest. At the beginning of the 12th cent. wonderful stories came into circulation tending to prove that the Virgin Mary patronized this liturgical practice. Supported by these 'revelations,' the Feast of the Conception gradually spread, and was approved by the Council of London in 1129. It even reached the Continent, penetrated into Normandy, and as far as the church of Lyons, where we find it about 1128. At this date it encountered a formidable enemy—Bernard of Clairvaux. This famous abbot wrote a very strong letter (*Ep.* 174) to the canon of Lyons, in which he tried to prove that the Feast of the Conception was a 'superstition' (*superstitione deprehensa*) condemned by the principles of theology. But, in spite of Bernard's protestations, the Feast continued to spread. At the end of the 13th cent. nearly all the dioceses in France celebrated it, and England placed it among the obligatory festivals (council of Exeter, 1287). The papacy refused at this time to join the general movement; but it also yielded, during the residence at Avignon (14th cent.). Long before this the Feast of the Conception had lost its original object. Its purpose was no longer to honour the virginal, or simply miraculous, birth of Mary; what it celebrated was the exemption of Mary from the law of original sin—an important transformation, the history of which we shall now trace briefly.

2. The belief in the immaculate conception.—The Feast of the Conception caused no difficulty in the East. In the West, however, the Augustinian theory was prevalent, according to which the generative act, vitiated by the concupiscence which accompanies it, vitiates in its turn the human organism which issues from it; and this organism also vitiates the soul that comes to dwell in it. By virtue of these principles, the conception of Mary, which took place in conformity with the law of generation—they believed in a miraculous but not virginal conception—was necessarily vitiated. It could not, therefore, decently be celebrated by a Feast. Objection was made as early as 1125 by the English monks; it was made emphatically by Bernard in his letter to the canon of Lyons. An answer had to be given. Some English monks replied by explaining that, by a special privilege, Mary had escaped the defilement of the generative act performed by her father Joachim, and that, therefore, her body and soul were immaculate from the first moment of their existence; *i.e.*, the objection of the opponents of the Feast was met by the proclamation of the immaculate conception of Mary. In a word, the belief in the immaculate conception made its appearance between 1121 and 1130; its apostles were a few unknown English monks; it aimed at the legitimization of the Feast of the Conception, of reconciling this Feast with the Augustinian theory of original sin.

For nearly a century and a half scholars were unanimous in asserting that it had not attained its aim. Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard held that Mary was under the dominion of sin until the moment when the mystery of the incarnation took place within her womb, and they did not condescend even to discussion with the upholders of the new belief. Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura—in fact, all the scholars of the 13th cent.—discussed and refuted it. They all taught that Mary had contracted the original stain, and that the hypothesis of an immaculate conception was in contradiction to the principles of the faith. They should, logically, have condemned the Feast of December 8th, but it had become so wide-spread that there was no possibility of suppressing it. Being forced to tolerate it, they found themselves reduced to interpreting it. They said, therefore, that the Feast had as its object not the conception of Mary itself, but the sanctification with which Mary had been gratified after her conception at a date which was unknown, but before she came forth from her mother's womb—a false statement, for, wherever the festival of December 8th was celebrated, the homage of the people was offered to the conception of the mother of Christ. In fact, theology and popular piety were in conflict. One or the other had to come to terms.

It was theology that capitulated. Its opposition to the immaculate conception came from its Augustinian doctrine of original sin. Now, towards the middle of the 13th cent., it modified its doctrine. For the theory that concupiscence infects the body of the child, and then, by means of contact, its soul, it substituted a theory according to which the hereditary stain was constituted by the lack of original righteousness. This substitution was accomplished by Thomas Aquinas. Naturally Thomas did not intend to serve the cause of the immaculate conception, of which he was one of the keenest opponents; he allowed himself to be guided solely by metaphysical considerations, the elements of which he borrowed from Anselm of Canterbury. But the immaculate conception benefited from the operation. From the day on which the concupiscence inherent in the principle of generation ceased to be original sin, the conception of Mary might be regarded as immaculate, although taking place under the dominion of concupiscence.

Theology had come to terms; but not the theologians. They—at least those of them who were well known—remained firm. It was not until the 14th cent. that scholars took account of the new fact expounded by Thomas Aquinas. Duns Scotus, the Franciscan monk, took the initiative. He was English, and had been brought up in the belief in the immaculate conception which the English monks had handed down from the 12th century. When he became a scholar, in spite of the authority of the scholars, he remained faithful to the convictions of his childhood, and exonerated Mary from the law of original sin. He was followed by the order of Franciscans, of which he was the oracle. After that time the immaculate conception ceased to be a purely popular belief; it took first rank among the most serious, as well as the most disputed, theological doctrines. The Dominicans, out of respect for Thomas Aquinas, retained the attitude of the ancient Scholastics, and accused the Franciscans of teaching heresy. The immaculate conception became a battlefield where Dominicans and Franciscans engaged in ever renewed conflicts. In these conflicts the

sympathies of the people were on the side of the Franciscans, who maintained the most glorious theory for Mary; and the papacy, although very circumspect, found itself obliged to follow the people. The immaculate conception assumed a more and more important place in the liturgy, and in the religious life of the faithful. Pious souls gradually became accustomed to venerate it as a dogma, and were impatient for the day when it would be placed among the verities of the Catholic faith. Their prayers were answered by Pius IX., who, in the bull *Ineffabilis*, which was promulgated on 8th December 1854, wrote as follows:

'We declare, pronounce, and define that the doctrine which holds that the Most Blessed Virgin Mary, from the first instant of her conception, was, by a most singular grace and privilege of Almighty God, in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the human race, preserved from all stain of Original Sin, is a doctrine revealed by God, and therefore to be firmly and steadfastly believed by all the faithful.'

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IMMANENCE.—1. Meaning of the term.—The word 'immanence' is used in modern theology to denote the presence or indwelling of God in the world. Its opposite is 'transcendence,' which means God's apartness from or elevation above the world. The two conceptions may exist together: God is at once in the world and above it; or they may be mutually exclusive: God is wholly in the world or He is wholly apart from it. The theological use of the words is modern, dating only from the 19th cent.,[1] but the ideas for which they stand are very old.

2. History.—Christianity inherited from Judaism belief in God as a strictly personal being, Creator and Ruler of the world; and, though Jesus in His emphasis upon God's love and men's filial attitude towards Him substituted the sense of His nearness and approachableness for the notion of His remoteness and inaccessibility, which had become increasingly common in later Judaism, the idea of Divine immanence in the full sense of the word seems to have been far from His thought. At least there is no trace in His recorded utterances of the notion that God is within the world of nature or physical things. The Oxyrhynchus Logion—'Raise the stone and there thou shalt find me; cleave the wood and there am I'—is in sharp contrast with the canonical Gospels in this respect. Nature to Jesus was not the seat of God's indwelling, but the work of His hands.

In the Hellenistic world of the period two opposite conceptions of the relation between God and the universe were widely current. By many God was thought of as wholly above the world and separate from it (as in the dualism of the later Platonists), by others as completely resident within it, its soul or vital force (as in the pantheism of the Stoics). To these two contrasted views the names 'transcendence' and 'immanence' may justly be applied.

The Gnostics were the most consistent representatives of the former view in the early Church. The conception of God as a person and the belief that He was the Creator and Ruler of the world, made the latter view in its extreme form impossible to most Christians. The words of Hermas are typical of the common Christian attitude:

'First of all, believe that God is one; even He who created all things and set them in order, and brought all things out of non-existence into being, and comprehendeth all things, being alone incomprehensible' (*Mand.* i.; cf. also the *Apology* of Aristides, chs. i. and xv., and the *Apology* of Athenagoras, ch. iv. ff.).

Clement of Alexandria, following the Jewish philosopher Philo, undertook to combine Platonic transcendence with Stoic immanence by means of the Logos conception. As the Absolute, God is remote from the world, inaccessible and inconceivable; in the Logos, He is present, creating and informing all things and revealing Himself to His creatures. But the identification of the Logos with the Son of God incarnate in Jesus Christ, and its consequent personalization, tended to narrow the sphere of its activity and to confine its significance to the revelation and mediation to Christian believers of the Supreme God, in Himself remote and unapproachable. As a consequence the dogma of the Trinity, by which the Logos idea was given an assured place in Christian theology, while it has made the synthesis of Divine transcendence and immanence possible to many theologians (particularly in the West, where the subordination of the Son and His distinction from the Father were less marked than in the East), has more often had the value, which it had primarily to Athanasius himself, of guaranteeing the deity of Christ in order to the redemption of man. Christ possesses the Divine nature, and hence union with Him through the sacraments means participation in the nature of God, otherwise entirely foreign to us. Thus the Catholic doctrine of salvation denied implicitly, if not explicitly, the immanence of God in the world apart from the Christian Church.

The absorption of most *ancient theologians* in the Christian revelation and its implications prevented much speculation upon the question of God's general relation to the world and the reconciliation of the notions of Divine transcendence and Divine immanence; but, when the matter was thought of at all, it was commonly taken for granted that the transcendent God who was before the world and above it, its Creator and Ruler, is yet in some sense at least present and active in it. Sometimes this presence was interpreted in terms of substance, as, *e.g.*, by Scotus Erigena:

'When we hear that God made all things, we ought to understand by it nothing else than that God is in all things, that is, subsists as the essence of all things' (*de Div. Nat.* i. 72).

Sometimes it was interpreted rather in terms of activity or power, as, for instance, by Origen, who taught the doctrine of eternal or continuous creation, and by Augustine, who declared that God did not withdraw from the world after He had created it, but was always filling heaven and earth with omnipresent power (*de Gen. ad Litt.* iv. 12; *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 30). This was a very common notion both

[1] In the vocabulary of philosophy the words have had a long and varied history, being employed, though in different senses, by the Schoolmen, Spinoza, and Kant. With the philosophical use of the words this article is not concerned.

in East and West, it being everywhere believed that God's activity was necessary to sustain the world and keep it from lapsing into nothingness. The idea of God's ever-active power did not exclude the notion of substance, which was always present, at any rate where the influence of Neo-Platonism was felt with its conception of absolute being apart from which there is no reality; nor did the idea of substance exclude that of activity. In the passage just quoted from Erigena we read: 'In God is there no difference between being and doing, but are they one and the same thing? I cannot avoid this conclusion.'

A position similar to Augustine's was held by many of the *Schoolmen, e.g.* Anselm and Thomas Aquinas. According to the latter, God is the absolute being, apart from whom there is no real existence. He has not only created all men and things, He is in them all, and every event is but an expression of His all-controlling will. Nothing but God has any independent reality or activity of its own (*Summa*, I. qu. 8). God is thus transcendent, existing independently of men and things, but He is also immanent in the fullest sense of the word. In spite of this metaphysical theory of immanence, Thomas was an orthodox Catholic, denying the possibility of communion with God here and hereafter to any but Catholic Christians.

A still more consistent and outspoken statement of the theory of immanence is found in the writings of the Protestant theologian, Ulrich Zwingli, particularly in his striking little work entitled *de Providentia*. According to Zwingli, God is at once the only real being and the only real will. All that is exists only in Him, and all that occurs is due to His immediate agency. All the acts of men, evil as well as good, are God's acts; but, as man is under law while God is above law, what is sin in man is not sin in God. There is nowhere to be found a clearer and more fearless statement of the view that God is the alone being and the alone will, a view in which an extreme doctrine of Divine immanence is associated with the unhesitating recognition of Divine transcendence.

A conception of Divine immanence, no less thoroughgoing but of quite a different type, is illustrated by many of the great *mediæval mystics*. Some of them, *e.g.* Meister Eckhart, were so full of the sense of God's presence that they almost wholly lost sight of the difference between God and the creature, and taught a mystical pantheism of an extreme, if not always consistent, form. Eckhart's pupil, John Tauler, and the author of the famous *Theologia Deutsch*, while emphasizing the immanence of God and the possibility of immediate contact with Him, and while making religion consist in the complete loss of oneself in God, yet kept the distinction between God and the creature, insisting upon the majesty of the former and the meanness of the latter. They thus escaped the pantheism of many of the mystics and reached a religious position closely allied to the metaphysical position of Thomas.

Meanwhile in the period of the *Renaissance* a new conception of Divine immanence became common. It was not due to contempt for the world, which in Neo-Platonism and in the Christian theology influenced by it had resulted in the denial of all reality apart from God; it was due rather to the sense of the world's greatness. A more or less sentimental exaltation of the beauty, sublimity, and harmony of Nature grew increasingly common and resulted sometimes in its complete deification. The way was thus opened for a genuine pantheism in which the world itself is identified with God, and in which Divine transcendence, retained by all the Fathers and Schoolmen, entirely disappears (cf. especially Giordano Bruno).

A similar tendency to magnify the dignity and worth of the creature—in this case man rather than Nature—a tendency in which the modern age was foreshadowed, had already led Duns Scotus to exactly the opposite conclusion. Duns was interested primarily to conserve the freedom and independence of the human will. Reading reality in terms of will rather than of substance, and reacting against the determinism of Augustine, he pushed God out of the universe altogether, and gave the latter a wholly external relation to its creator. Closely allied with the voluntarism of Duns was the Nominalism of his successors, which was pluralistic in its interest rather than monistic. As Nominalism gained in popularity in the later years of the Middle Ages, the transcendence of God was inevitably more and more emphasized at the expense of His immanence.

A conception of Divine transcendence closely allied to that of Duns is found in the system of the Protestant theologian, John Calvin, who interpreted God, as Duns had done, wholly in terms of will. At the same time, sharing with Augustine and most of the mediæval theologians a low estimate of man and the world, his doctrine of God as will resulted in the belief that God is the only independent will in the universe and that all the acts of man are caused by Him. The extreme transcendence of Duns was thus supplemented by an immanence doctrine of a certain kind (immanence of will only, not of substance) which resulted not in the glorification of man but in his belittlement.

In the 17th and 18th centuries the development of *physical science* led to views of Divine transcendence more extreme than anything found in earlier days. As men became increasingly aware of the universality and invariability of natural law, the tendency was to push God back to the beginning of things, and to find Him less and less necessary to account for the ever changing phenomena of the world. Galileo's first law of motion had wide influence in this connexion: 'Every body continues in its state of motion or of rest unless acted upon by some opposing force.' Hitherto it had been commonly believed that the power of God was needed, not only to start the heavenly bodies upon their courses, but also to keep them in motion. Newton still thought Divine interference occasionally necessary to correct observed irregularities in their movements; but La Place, a century later, showed that such irregularities corrected themselves, and that Newton's assumption was, therefore, gratuitous. The steadily-growing tendency, indeed, was to find ever less place for Divine activity in connexion with the conduct of the physical universe. It came to be more and more widely believed that in the beginning God had impressed upon the world the laws by which it was thenceforth to be governed, and had then left it to run of itself. This extreme doctrine of Divine transcendence is commonly called Deistic, though it was neither shared by all the Deists nor confined entirely to them. Increasingly it took possession of the minds of the 18th cent., and it may fairly be called its characteristic conception of the relation of God and the world.

In the 19th cent. the idea gave way again to views of Divine immanence, as extreme in comparison with the ideas of an earlier age as was the 18th cent. notion of Divine transcendence. The prevalence of the new conceptions was due largely to reaction against the current notions of transcendence, but this was only one phase of a general reaction against many of the leading tendencies of the 18th cent., and it was aided by various influences. The reaction found its most striking expression in the literary and æsthetic movement known as *Romanticism*, which dominated Western

Europe during the early part of the 19th century. Romanticism was a complex phenomenon, but it was commonly marked by emotionalism, subjectivism, self-expression, often in the most untrammelled forms, by love of nature, affected if not real, and by the recognition of man as part of a larger whole, in oneness with which and in openness to whose influence he finds his true life. An important part of culture, according to the Romanticists, consisted in learning to appreciate the beauty and harmony of the universe, in coming into more intimate sympathy with it, and in acquiring a sensitiveness to the whole world of nature and of man. It was a common tendency among them to try to reproduce the conditions of earlier ages before the modern spirit of enlightenment had taken possession of the world, when every one believed in immediate intercourse between man and the universe about him, in apparitions, fairies, and fables, and when the fancy had free play and was not yet destroyed by the ruthless hand of reason. The effect upon religion was very diverse. Some of the Romanticists felt the religious impulse strongly, but were led by their hostility to the dominance of reason which they believed began with the Reformation, and by their distaste for the prevalent coldness and barrenness of contemporary Protestantism, to turn to Catholicism and to seek in it what they could not find in the newer faith. The result was a great revival of Catholicism in Germany and France, and later in England, where the Oxford Movement gave expression to certain elements of the Romantic spirit. Many of the Romanticists, on the other hand, particularly in Germany, far from finding themselves attracted by Catholicism, revolted against religion altogether, which they knew only in its rationalistic form, and looked down upon it in contempt. It was for Romanticists of this class that the theologian Schleiermacher wrote in 1799 his famous *Discourses upon Religion addressed to the Educated among its Despisers*. The most important of the Discourses is the second, on 'The Nature of Religion.' Its general thesis is that religion has its seat neither in the intellect nor in the will, but in the feelings, and consists in the sense of the universal or infinite. Schleiermacher's religious sense was simply a translation into other terms of the artistic sense of the Romanticists. What they called openness to the universe he called openness to God. What they regarded as a sense of the beauty and harmony of the universe he made a sense of the Divine. And hence he claimed that the highest culture, of which the Romanticists made so much, includes religion, and that to be without the latter is to neglect an important part of one's nature and to be content with a partial and one-sided development. Religion raises a man above his individual limits into converse with the Infinite, and the religious man recognizes in everything a manifestation of the Divine. Every event is a miracle, a sign of God's presence and activity. The ego, or spirit, and non-ego, or matter, are simply differentiations of the Infinite. In the Infinite the two exist in perfect unity; in the world they are separated, but they become one again in every impression of the world upon us. The universal manifests itself only through the individual, and, on the other hand, the individual comes to his true life only in the universal; and to be aware of this life is to be religious.

'The usual conception of God as a single being outside of the world and behind the world is not essential to religion. It is only one way of giving expression to it, seldom entirely pure, and always inadequate. . . . The true essence of religion is neither this idea nor any other, but the immediate consciousness of Deity as we find him in ourselves as well as in the world' ('Reden über die Religion,' *Sämmtliche Werke*, Berlin, 1843, i. 264).

This is a genuine doctrine of Divine immanence, and fitly illustrates the influence of Romanticism in the sphere of religion.

The influence of certain *philosophical tendencies* of the modern age has also promoted the theory of the immanence of God. Much of modern philosophy, from Descartes down, was frankly dualistic; but now and then monism, even before the 19th cent., when it became almost everywhere dominant, had its representatives, and resulted in a more or less thoroughgoing doctrine of Divine immanence, as, for instance, in the occasionalism of Malebranche and the idealism of Berkeley, both of whom made God the immediate and sole cause of all phenomena; as also in the Neo-Platonism of Jonathan Edwards, who thought of the universe as an emanation of the infinite fullness of God.

Of still greater historical importance was the system of Spinoza, in which the modern conception of Divine immanence had one of its principal roots. For a hundred years and more after his death Spinoza found little favour. The dominant spirit of the age was radically opposed to his spirit. He first came to his rights in the revolt against the one-sided rationalism and individualism of the century which began in Germany under the lead of such men as Lessing, Herder, and Goethe. In 1787, in a little book entitled *Gott* (see art. by A. C. McGiffert, in *HJ* iii. [1905] 706 ff.), Herder came to the defence of Spinoza, claiming that he had been commonly misunderstood, and at the same time setting forth an original interpretation of his system, which was in many respects a misinterpretation, but had profound influence upon his contemporaries. Reading Spinoza in the light of the philosophy of Leibniz, he succeeded in showing, at least to his own satisfaction, that the former was neither an atheist nor a pantheist. In substituting force for extension in his definition of matter, Leibniz had departed not only from Descartes, but also from Spinoza. He had departed from the latter also in substituting multiplicity for unity. The universe, according to Leibniz, is not the embodiment of one great and all-embracing force, but of an infinite number of forces. Spinoza was a monist, Leibniz a pluralist; and hence the two systems represented two radically different tendencies. But, unlike as they were, they were combined by Herder, who preserved the unity of Spinoza's system without sacrificing the multiplicity upon which Leibniz laid stress, by making force the essence of Spinoza's infinite substance. The result was a conception of Divine immanence of such a sort as to prove very attractive to multitudes of thinkers of his own and subsequent generations. The theory was essentially monistic, and yet it did not sacrifice individuality, but rather, so Herder claimed, promoted and deepened it. It thus fell in admirably with the growing Romanticism of the age.

Among others of the late 18th or early 19th cent. whose thought was dominated more or less completely by the influence of Spinoza, were the poet Goethe, the theologian Schleiermacher, and the philosophers Schelling and Hegel, and it is largely because of Spinoza's influence that post-Kantian philosophy, whether idealistic or realistic, spiritualistic or materialistic, has been so controllingly monistic. Religious thought, too, has shown the same tendency. Many of the leading religious thinkers of the 19th cent. were completely under the sway of one or another monistic system, particularly Hegelianism. But the modern conception of Divine immanence is due ultimately, not to the prevalence of any particular system of philosophy, but rather to the general monistic tendency which runs through various systems, and of which they are the exponents. It is, therefore, enough simply

to have called attention to the revival of Spinozism, and to have pointed out its general effect.

Meanwhile the influence of *science*, to which modern scepticism was largely due, was also working to promote belief in the immanence of God, or at any rate to make the belief seem natural and rational. By most thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries the universe was looked upon as a machine, and the laws of nature were viewed as mechanical laws imposed upon it from without. A classic illustration is found in the familiar passage in Paley's *Natural Theology* (1803), where the world is represented as a watch. When the universe is viewed under this aspect, God, if He exists at all, can be transcendent only, outside of the machine which He has made and set in motion. But during the 18th cent. evolutionary ideas became common, and in the 19th cent. took almost entire possession of the field. Whatever form the theory of evolution may take, the general conception means the recognition of immanent energy by virtue of which the universe is continuously changing and advancing. The world as we know it has not come ready-made from the hand of God or of any other power; it has gradually grown to be what it is through the play of forces resident within itself. This great change from a mechanical to an organic conception meant much for religious thought. With the old idea a transcendent God, maker of the world machine, Himself entirely above and apart from it, was a natural assumption. But the new idea of the universe as an organism suggests a God within rather than without the world process, and, as a matter of fact, one of the most notable consequences of the increasing prevalence of evolutionary ideas has been the rapid growth of the doctrine of Divine immanence at the expense of the doctrine of Divine transcendence. The following quotations will illustrate the situation:

'Out of all this the modern conviction has arisen that God creates now and will always create; that his creative act is normal and incessant, and that the notion of a definite era at which he brought the world into being is as puerile and gratuitous as is that of a theatrical "Day" of Judgment with God seated on a throne. Hence, whatever matter may be, it seems to follow that it is co-eternal with God, and the thought inevitably presses itself in that the great forces of the universe, gravitation, electricity, and such-like, are the means by which creation and other divine action are carried on. In fact, they seem to be strictly inseparable from the divine existence. And if what we call nature is inextricably interwoven with God, we have to make fundamental changes in the deistical theory of the last century' (F. W. Newman, *Relations of Theism to Pantheism*, Ramsgate, 1872, p. 11).

'The one absolutely impossible conception of God, in the present day, is that which represents Him as an occasional Visitor. Science had pushed the deist's God farther and farther away, and at the moment when it seemed as if He would be thrust out altogether, Darwinism appeared, and, under the guise of a foe, did the work of a friend. It has conferred upon philosophy and religion an inestimable benefit, by shewing us that we must choose between two alternatives. Either God is everywhere present in nature, or He is nowhere. He cannot be here and not there. He cannot delegate His power to demigods called "second causes." In nature everything must be His work or nothing. We must frankly return to the Christian view of direct Divine agency, the immanence of Divine power in nature from end to end, the belief in a God in Whom not only we, but all things have their being, or we must banish Him altogether. It seems as if, in the providence of God, the mission of modern science was to bring home to our unmetaphysical ways of thinking the great truth of the Divine immanence in creation, which is not less essential to the Christian idea of God than to a philosophical view of nature' (Aubrey Moore, in *Lux Mundi*[12], London, 1891, p. 73 f.).

Such passages as these, and they could be multiplied indefinitely, do not show that modern science promotes faith in God, but only that it leads many to substitute Divine immanence for Divine transcendence. Belief in God is not a scientific, but a philosophical or religious, belief. Science may affect the form which faith in God takes, but the faith itself has commonly other roots. It has proved of great religious significance, however, that the science of recent times permits for those who desire it a theistic interpretation of the universe, which was becoming increasingly difficult in the face of the science of an earlier generation.

Religious considerations have also had their part in promoting the doctrine of the immanence of God. In this connexion the influence of German Pietism and English Evangelicalism must not be overlooked. The Pietists and Evangelicals emphasized the immediate presence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers, witnessing to their regeneration. This, of course, did not mean a recognition of Divine immanence in the strict sense as distinguished from Divine transcendence, for it was only in the hearts of believers, not in the world and in nature, that immediate Divine activity was recognized. But set over against the common tendency of the age to push God far away and to admit His presence only in ages known, in distinction from their own, as the ages of revelation and inspiration, the assertion of the presence of the Divine and its constant activity, even in a limited sphere, could not fail to have its effect in breaking down the old ideas of externality and aloofness. Closely connected with this emphasis upon the presence of the Holy Spirit was the Evangelical notion of the redeemed man's possession of a special faculty enabling him to perceive spiritual things as directly as he perceived the material world with his bodily senses. This, of course, promoted the idea of the nearness of the Divine and led to the growing substitution of the witness of one's own individual experience for the external Christian evidences upon which the Rational School of the 18th cent. laid all the stress. There can be no doubt that this increasing attention to religious experience has made the older ideas of Divine transcendence less satisfying to religious men of various sects. And yet we must not over-estimate Evangelical influence in promoting the theory of Divine immanence. The Evangelical doctrine of the Holy Spirit is in some respects radically opposed to modern immanence ideas, for the essence of the doctrine is that the Spirit works in the hearts of believers in a wholly unique way, and the existing tendency to see the immediate presence of the Divine in all nature involves commonly the neglect, if not the complete repudiation, of those peculiar doctrines of Christianity which Evangelicalism made most of, such as the Fall of Man, Original Sin, and Vicarious Atonement. As a matter of fact, the influence of religious considerations upon the rise and spread of the doctrine of Divine immanence has been largely secondary, not primary, and negative, not positive. Modern science tended to make belief in a transcendent God appear superfluous and unfounded. Only by the doctrine of Divine immanence did it seem possible to vindicate the reality of God, who had been proved unnecessary to account for the creation and maintenance of the physical universe. And so their religious need of God has led many to faith in an immanent God simply because no other God seems possible.

The effects of the various influences that have been described are similar and yet in many respects diverse. All have tended to promote belief in Divine immanence, but the belief takes many forms, according as one or another interest is dominant. God is conceived as the soul of the world, the spirit animating all nature; the universal force which takes the myriad forms of heat, light, gravitation, electricity, and the like; the all-embracing substance of which men and things are but differentiations; the principle of unity underlying all multiplicity; the infinite consciousness in which all things have their existence; the indwelling personality with whom we

commune when we contemplate nature or look into our own souls. The conception may be crass or refined, spiritual or material, idealistic or realistic, but in every case it is a form of cosmical theism, faith in a god of whom the world of nature is in some real and immediate sense a manifestation or expression.

3. Present position.—An important result of the process which has been described is the outflanking of the scepticism of the 18th century. The God who had been read out of the universe by the progressive discovery of natural forces adequate to account for all phenomena has now been brought back into it, not as before to supplement its insufficiencies and incapacities, but to give it spiritual meaning and worth. Science, of course, can never prove the presence of God in the world, nor can it disprove it. The indwelling God is an object of faith, not of sight. To him who believes in an immanent God the multiplying discoveries of modern science have no terrors. Physical forces may accomplish all that is claimed for them, and natural laws be accurate descriptions of their way of working, but they are interpreted by such a believer only as manifestations of Divine activity. The doctrine of Divine immanence evidently offers a refuge for faith which science is powerless to invade, and this constitutes one of its greatest attractions to the religious men of our day, who live in an age of science and know the havoc wrought by the modern study of nature in the theism of the past.

The modern notion of Divine immanence has also led to many significant changes in the traditional system of Christian theology. The old chasms between the Divine and the human, God and the world, this life and another, have been bridged by it, and the result has been a profound modification of the old doctrines of salvation, eternal life, the incarnation, the person and work of Christ, the sacraments, religious authority, and the like.

But the conception of Divine immanence is beset, from the point of view of Christian theism, with serious difficulties. The tendency of the doctrine is undoubtedly pantheistic. In the hands of many of its exponents, indeed, it has been nothing more nor less than thoroughgoing pantheism. But pantheism imperils, if it does not destroy, the personality of God, the individuality of man, and the reality of sin, and hence seems to make religion and ethics in the Christian sense alike an illusion. As a consequence, many modern theists, while accepting the doctrine of Divine immanence, have striven to distinguish it from pantheism and to safeguard the interests imperilled thereby.

Thus they claim that, while God is immanent in the universe, He also transcends it. All things are pervaded by Him, but He is more than them all. A strict pantheism identifies God with the totality of men and things. The theists referred to recognize God as including this totality, but as more and greater than it. This form of theism has been called, in distinction from pantheism, panentheism (*e.g.* by the German philosopher, K. C. F. Krause), its formula being not 'all things are God,' but 'all things are in God.' In reaction against the extreme transcendence of the 18th cent. the tendency among Christian theists of the early 19th cent. was to emphasize immanence to the complete exclusion of transcendence. But more recent theologians have tried to make again the old combination, and it is now frequently said that the difference between theism and pantheism lies not primarily in the character or nature of the God assumed by theists or pantheists, but in the assertion or denial of his transcendence (cf. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, p. 82). When, however, it comes to the definition of transcendence, there is as great variety as in the definitions of immanence. Some take it crassly and baldly as a quantitative conception: God is larger than the universe of men and things, which exhausts only a part of His being; or the universe is but His activity in space while He Himself in His immensity transcends all space. Others interpret it temporally: God is eternal, and the universe is but a passing expression of Him, His manifestation in time, while He Himself transcends time.

Again, the objections to pantheism are avoided by insistence upon the personality of God. Herder denied the Divine personality on the ground that the term is anthropomorphic, but he ascribed intelligence and will to God, and so distinguished his theism from pantheism, which, as he claimed, makes God mere unconscious substance or blind force. Difficulties in the notion of personality as applied to an immanent God have been felt by many since Herder's day (cf. Schleiermacher's discussion in his 'Reden über die Religion,' *Sämmtl. Werke*, i. 256 f.). Personality seems to involve limitation—a self and a not-self—and hence to be inapplicable to the being who includes and embraces all that is (cf. Strauss, *Die christl. Glaubenslehre*, Tübingen, 1841, i. 500 f.). This difficulty is now commonly met by asserting that the essence of personality lies not in the distinction of self from not-self, but in free intellectual and volitional activity. Such personality, it is claimed, belongs in complete measure only to the absolute or infinite being, God. As the philosopher Lotze says:

> 'Perfect personality is in God only . . . the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of . . . personality, but a limit and hindrance of its development' (quoted from Illingworth, *Divine Transcendence*, p. 47).

To this may be added the following passage from the theologian James Martineau:

> 'For these reasons the modern scruples that are felt with regard to the personality of God appear to me not less intellectually weak than they are morally deplorable. If any one is fastidious about the word and thinks it spoiled by the Athanasian controversy, let him supply us with a better; but some symbol we must have of the divine freedom in the exercise of will, the acknowledgment of which makes the difference between theism and pantheism, and gives religion its entrance into the conscience and affections of men. As the parts of our nature which thus enter into relation with God are precisely those which make us persons and distinguish us from other living things, it is difficult to see why the same term should not be given to the corresponding attributes of rational and moral will in him, and where the idea is really present and craving expression I believe that for the most part it will be glad of the word. At all events its contents are just what we rescue from pantheism' (*Study of Religion*, Oxford, 1888, ii. 183).[1]

Similarly, the evils of pantheism are avoided by interpreting God in ethical terms. The God who is resident in the world is a God of moral ideals, and is working out His holy will through all the processes of nature and of life. Such writers as John Fiske in his *Through Nature to God* (London, 1900), Joseph Le Conte in his *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought* (New York, 1888), and C. B. Upton in his *Bases of Religious Belief* (London, 1894) assert that God must be ethical, because the ethical is the highest thing in the universe, and God is the indwelling force in all the evolutionary process from the beginning to the end. Eventuating as it does in the ethical and spiritual, the process involves the ethical and spiritual character of God, the immanent cause.

Again, immanence has been guarded against some of the defects of pantheism by emphasis upon the reality of human personality. Already in the 2nd edition of his *Gott*, Herder grappled with the problem of individuation, and maintained that Divine immanence does not destroy the

[1] Cf. also W. A. Brown's *Christian Theology in Outline*, New York, 1906, pp. 200, 229, where God's transcendence is found in His personality. God is a personal being, and so transcends, or is distinct from, the universe, which is His dwelling-place.

personality of man, but only makes it the more real and vivid (cf. also Schleiermacher's *Monologen*, which appeared the year after his *Reden über die Religion*, and in which human personality and freedom are strongly emphasized). The discussions of Josiah Royce in the volume entitled *The Conception of God* (New York, 1897) and in his Gifford Lectures on *The World and the Individual* (do. 1901) are among the most notable of modern contributions to the subject. According to Royce, individuality consists in the partial nature of human consciousness which is distinguished from the Absolute's all-embracing consciousness by its limited and fragmentary character.

A still more emphatic assertion of human individuality, providing a more secure place for freedom and initiative, and so for moral responsibility on the part of man, is found in Martineau's *Study of Religion*, according to which God is immanent in nature, but not in man. All natural phenomena are due to the immediate activity of God, who is their sole cause; but man is a free spirit, created such by God, and his actions are his own, not God's. He thus in a real sense, though, of course, by Divine appointment, transcends God, and constitutes a sphere of independent causality, a centre of free ethical life.[1] Thus the individuality of man and the reality of human righteousness and sin are preserved by a partial denial of immanence and its limitation to only a portion of existence—a significant admission of the ethical inadequacy of any thoroughgoing doctrine of immanence.

The many attempts to combine immanence with Christian theism abundantly reveal the serious difficulties involved in immanence. That the difficulties are insuperable need not be asserted, but it is evident at any rate that two disparate interests, the cosmical, leading to the emphasis of immanence, and the ethical, leading to the emphasis of personality, are involved in the combination.[2]

The modern books setting forth the doctrine of Divine immanence in one or another form are legion, but few of them have large philosophical or theological value. The doctrine of Divine immanence, indeed, common as it is, is seldom clearly conceived or carefully defined. With most it is hardly more than an instinctive protest against traditional mechanical and external notions of the relation of nature and the supernatural, or against the deistic banishment of God from the world and from human life; and, when the attempt is made to say what is involved, problems emerge most of which are neither solved nor as a rule seriously grappled with.

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IMMORTALITY.—1. Introductory.—The significance of this term—in that sense of it which has determined the shape of the problem as it has come down to modern reflexion—may be stated in the words of Kant: 'The Immortality of the Soul means the infinitely prolonged existence and personality of one and the same rational being.'[1] By 'personality' is here meant the conscious rational unity which links together the years of a sane man's life on earth; and immortality signifies the continuance of this rational consciousness *in sæcula sæculorum*—the degree of its continuity being at least as great as in earthly life, and the duration of its continuity being essentially unlimited. The purpose of the present article is to investigate the degree of truth and of value involved in this conception. Its adequacy, even as a mere conception, forms one of the primary questions to be raised; we shall have to ask whether it must not be materially modified in order to reveal even the significance of the problem itself. There are, however, certain inquiries which must first be referred to in their relation to the point of view here adopted, although the treatment of them lies outside the scope of this article.

(*a*) It is said that every form of belief in the power of human personality to survive bodily death is invalidated because such belief arose among primitive men in consequence of an erroneous interpretation of sleep, dreams, and similar psychophysical phenomena. Against this, it must be insisted that the validity of a conception is a question entirely distinct from that of its origin or genesis. When the truth or falsity of a belief is under investigation, it is a mere irrelevancy to raise the question of the manner in which the belief arose in distant ages of time. The latter question constitutes an important historical inquiry, belonging to a branch of anthropology in which valuable work is now being done (see artt. SOUL, ANIMISM, DREAMS AND SLEEP, LIFE AND DEATH, DEMONS AND SPIRITS, ANCESTOR-WORSHIP, COMMUNION WITH THE DEAD); but these historical and descriptive inquiries have no bearing on the validity of the developed forms of the belief in survival. From the historical point of view, we assume that assignable conditions and causes can be found not only for the first beginnings, but for the continued survival of any belief; and we must insist that the causes which condition its continued survival may differ fundamentally from those which originally brought about the belief.[2]

(*b*) The 'animistic' explanation of the origin of belief in the soul as distinct from the body calls for a critical comment which has a bearing on our present argument. The theory is that the dream-image is the prototype of the 'soul.' In dreams the primitive man sees himself and others, together with common objects of experience; and to all these images he attributes an independent and etherial existence. This interpretation becomes specially impressive to the man when in dreams he sees the images of those who have died (see reff. under art. ANIMISM; esp. Tylor, *PC*). This theory needs to be supplemented in one important respect. We must ask: What leads the man to attribute *mental life* to the moving image which he

[1] This is in interesting contrast with the position of the German philosopher F. H. Jacobi, who held that God is immanent not in nature, but in human personality.

[2] To how complete a repudiation of the notion of Divine immanence a controlling ethical interest may lead is strikingly shown in G. H. Howison's reply to Royce in the volume already referred to (*The Conception of God*, p. 81 ff.); and particularly in his *Limits of Evolution and other Essays* (New York, 1905). Similarly Ritschl's ethical interest led him to insist always upon the contrast between God and the world and man and the world rather than upon their oneness, and this made him more of a dualist than a monist (cf. *e.g.* his *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Bonn, 1870–74, vol. iii. ch. iv. *passim*).

[1] Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, bk. II. ch. ii. § 4 (cf. John Watson, *Selections from Kant*, Glasgow, 1897, p. 294). Kant does not intend to exclude the idea of *growth*; but he assumes that the essential element in the idea of immortality is that of mere endlessness.

[2] Cf. S. H. Mellone, *Immortal Hope*, London, 1910, ch. i.

sees in his dream, and which resembles the living body seen in waking life? It is evident that he must have had some vague awareness of a mental life of his own, before he could regard the image even as an animated 'double.' Hence some writers have spoken of a 'personifying tendency' leading primitive man to attribute an inner life, resembling his own, to forms which he recognizes as outwardly more or less like himself (*cf.* H. Siebeck, *Geschichte der Psychologie*, 'Einleitung,' Gotha, 1880–84; R. Avenarius, *Der menschliche Weltbegriff*, Leipzig, 1847, ch. iii.).

2. Survival of personality.—A marked feature of the scientific and philosophical thinking of the present century is the gradual substitution of dynamical for statical views of existence. There has prevailed a tendency to assume that (notwithstanding the universality of change) everything has a fixed nature, and that, when we know anything of this fixed nature or constitution, we know so far what the thing is. The tendency which now prevails—and which is progressively justifying itself by its results—is to regard existence as an active productive process, so that to the question 'What is it?' the first answer must be 'What it is is shown in what it does'; and 'what it does' means especially 'what it can produce or bring forth'; a thing *is* what it *does*. This is the principle which we apply in our conception of the material world, of human nature, of the human mind and its faculties—in a word, in our conception of the universe and all that it contains. In every case, it must be remembered that we thus derive only a partial answer to the question; for, if we want to know all that a thing is, we must know all that it does and all that it is capable of doing; and as yet we do not know this of anything.

In the application of it which especially concerns us here, this principle leads us to lay special stress on the idea of growth in reference to human personality. 'Growth' is not exclusive of self-direction. The growth of human personality is, so to speak, an achievement, realized through conscious activity. The essential nature of mind consists in its creative functions, which are inexhaustible, though they work under conditions which are given. From this point of view it follows (*a*) that the value of human personality must be estimated by considering not merely what men are, but what they have it in them to become; (*b*) that the future life, if it is to be anything at all, must be not a life of mere sameness, or mere endlessness, but of continued growth; (*c*) that human personalities as such—not merely the aggregate of the results of the best human achievements and ideals, but the personal lives from which these achievements spring—are themselves worth preserving, and will not perish in growing. It is evident that this involves a material modification of the conception of immortality which was stated above (after Kant). The vitally important factor in the conception, we repeat, is not mere endlessness, but continued growth. It is true, growth is the progressive fulfilment or realization of latent powers; it involves, and must involve, a process in time. But to suppose that the process is literally endless in time is to go far beyond anything that experience or reflexion warrants in our present state. When it is asked, 'If there is an end, why not at death?' the answer is that the 'end' we look for is not annihilation at some point of time; it is the absolute completion of our nature—the complete fulfilment of the purpose or meaning of each individual life. We have no means of knowing how far this fulfilment will carry us; only we know that it is not realized at death.

The survival of personality, so understood (whether as problem or as belief), must be carefully distinguished from two entirely different conceptions with which it has been confused.

(*a*) It must be distinguished from the so-called 'corporate immortality' based on the solidarity and continuity of the human race, which simply means that the effects of each man's thoughts, desires, and deeds on his fellow-men are real and permanent. The reality of this permanent influence of every personal life is not in question; but we must insist that it is mere confusion of thought to regard this as equivalent to or as an adequate substitute for the belief in personal survival. In truth, the human individual cannot be regarded as a mere means to the survival and improvement of the race. When individuality has risen to self-conscious personality, it cannot be a mere means, existing only to contribute to an end in which *as an individual personality* it has no share. For, if the individual were only a means, the humanity as a whole could be nothing more than a system of means, and, therefore, would exist only for the sake of some end outside itself; and the supposed 'corporate immortality' would prove illusory.[1]

(*b*) It must be distinguished from that 'eternal life' which means experience of the super-personal and eternal, in which we may share irrespective of time. This is not a question of survival—'Does our individuality endure?' It is not a question of what is to be. It is a question of present reality, of what is; 'Do we share in the Eternal Life of God, and may this connexion become a matter of experience?' It is evident that an answer to one of these questions is not necessarily an answer to the other. If man is a 'reproduction' or 'differentiation' of the Eternal Mind, it does not follow that, regarded as an individual spirit, he is eternal; and, if this metaphysical tie is what gives absolute value to human life, the thing of value would remain, however transient each single life might be.

The most prominent representatives of this point of view in the history of modern philosophy are Spinoza and Schleiermacher. Whether Hegel also shared it is open to debate. There is no doubt that for Hegel the essential element in experience is the eternity of Spirit, which is not merely future, but is realized even now whenever the human spirit thinks and wills what is universal; but it does not appear that Hegel made any distinct pronouncement as to the survival of the individual soul. With Spinoza it is different. In his early treatise, *de Deo, Homine, et ejus Felicitate* (c. 1655), he asserted the immortality of those souls who in love to God had come to have part in His unchangeable being. But in bk. v. of the *Ethics* this view appears in a different light. He there speaks of a *pars æterna nostri*—the eternity of the active spiritual element in the human soul, which is greater as our love to God is greater. But memory, on which the continuity of self-consciousness depends, is treated by Spinoza as part of the *imaginatio*, which is a function of the physical body and perishes at death. Hence there can be no survival of finite personality. For Schleiermacher, in like manner, the only real immortality is one which we may fully possess in this life in time, and which it is the purpose of this life to realize: in the midst of the finite to be one with the Infinite—to be eternal every moment. Hence Schleiermacher denied both the reality and the value of personal survival of bodily death. This is equivalent to saying that the value of the Eternal, as such, is not affected by the transiency of the finite forms in which it is manifested; or—as some have urged, against belief in the value of finite personality—that what we want is *depth*, not *length*, of life.

It has been our purpose not to criticize this conception of eternal life, but to point out that it cannot be substituted for, and must not be confused with, any belief in the survival of personality. We may, however, with McTaggart, seriously question the assumption that the value of the eternal, as such, is unaffected by the transiency of its finite manifestations: 'It is not justifiable to assert that a state of consciousness can ever rise so high that its duration or extinction in time should be completely irrelevant. It is true that if such a state reached absolute perfection, it would not matter if it were extinguished immediately afterwards. But why is this? Only because a perfect state is an eternal one, and the eternal does not require duration in time for its perfections to be displayed in; but then the eternal is the timeless, and therefore its end in time is not only unimportant but impossible. . . . If we deny that a perfect state is eternal, we have no reason to suppose that a perfect state is indifferent to its duration. But if the perfect is the eternal, it

[1] Cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883, § 184 ff.; J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, Cambridge, 1901, § 12 ff.

seems quite clear that no state which is imperfect enough to cease in time can be perfect enough to entirely disregard its cessation.'[1]

3. Objections to belief in immortality. — The main contentions of those who at the present time reject all belief in personal immortality appear to resolve themselves into three propositions: (*a*) there is 'no evidence' of the power of human personality to survive bodily death; (*b*) more definitely, such survival can be shown to be impossible on scientific grounds; and (*c*) if it were possible, it would have no ethical value.

(*a*) In dealing with this proposition, we must ask: (1) What kind of evidence is in fact demanded? and (2) What kind of evidence would it be reasonable to expect in the subject under consideration?

If by 'evidence' is meant 'conclusive evidence,' it must be pointed out that of conclusive evidence for anything mankind possesses comparatively very little. What we usually have is a convergence of reasons more or less fundamental in character, which, taken together, may in some cases be overwhelming, but which are not strictly conclusive. Scientific evidence is essentially of the same character as that which in law is termed 'circumstantial evidence,' and has the same elements of strength and weakness.[2]

The kind of evidence available in the various branches of physical science, where experiment is applicable, does afford a high degree of reliability in the results, because these rest on definitely measurable facts of sense-perception, constantly and uniformly recurring in our experience. The 'exactness' of physical science consists in measurement. If, then, definite facts of sense-perception are the only kind of evidence admissible, it is true that there is 'no evidence' for the survival of personality. This criterion of what is credible would, however, rule out most of the evidence on which, in this and countless other matters of serious import, we as rational beings are wont to rely, since we can find no principle of logic, or mathematics, or ethics, and no psychological fact in the way of thought, feeling, or will, whose reality and validity can be warranted by sense-perception alone. This may be said to be one of the assured results of modern philosophy since the publication of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739).

What, then, are the actual logical conditions of the argument? The truth of personal survival may be held, not as we hold the results of particular observations and experiments, but as a reasonable faith, based on the essential reasonableness of the world. The primary facts, which are appealed to, are not definitely measurable facts, and their adequate interpretation is not immediately obvious; but they form a constant and uniform experience. It has been well said that 'within the whole range of the wide world's literature we find no more constant theme than this disparity between man's possibilities and aspirations on the one hand, and the narrow scope afforded them in the brief space of the present life on the other.'[3] These possibilities and aspirations are the distinctive features of human life, which is thus planned on a greater scale than earthly life can ever satisfy; hence, if existence has a meaning, human life extends beyond earthly life. This we may call the 'teleological argument' for survival. This is the only avenue of *direct proof*; and we must repeat that what it establishes is not conclusive certainty but reasonable faith. From this point of view, the special work of philosophy in the matter is to show the connexion of this faith with the distinctive features of human personality, to demonstrate its value, and to purify it from all comparatively unworthy motives.

In addition to these considerations, there are lines of *indirect proof* converging to a conclusion which may be held with considerable confidence: namely, that there are no sound reasons for denying the power of human personality to survive bodily death. The purpose of these lines of thought is to show that the apparent indications of the annihilation of personality at death, which are supposed to be warranted by some of the facts of ordinary experience, or by some of the conclusions of 19th century science, are only apparent and not real, and break down one by one upon examination. Hence the original conclusion, established as a reasonable faith, remains in possession of the field.

The 'indirect proofs' are, as we have already implied, occupied with objections, difficulties, and denials which have actually been alleged against belief in survival. In effect, they amount to a demonstration of the impossibility of a materialistic interpretation of the world.

Those constructive philosophical systems which admit personal immortality have usually done so by combining with metaphysical spiritualism a teleological view of personality. That is to say, they defend an interpretation of existence throughout in terms of mind, implying that the world consists fundamentally of spiritual beings, sharing the Life of the Absolute Spirit, acting and reacting on one another, and carrying in their nature the power of survival; so that what we call the physical world is the result of the interaction of 'subjects,' or beings ultimately spiritual in nature. This involves the teleological view that the fulfilment of the potentialities of finite personality is part of the purpose of the universe and involves life beyond death.

The most celebrated and impressive system of this type is that of Leibniz (*q.v.*), presented in popular form in his *Monadologie* (1714), and involving the fundamental view of the soul as an independent 'monad' capable of infinite development, to which death imports no more than a transition to a new stage of growth. The more definitely pluralistic philosophy of Herbart, for whom the individual is alone the real, naturally carried with it a doctrine of the immortality of the individual soul; but an element of difficulty arises because, according to Herbartian principles, the consciousness of the soul springs only from its union with the elements which form the body; hence it is not easy to find a place in the system for the continuance of the same personal self-consciousness beyond death. The teleological argument for survival was revived and restated by K. C. F. Krause (*System der Philos.*, Gottingen, 1828; cf. Pfleiderer, *Phil. of Rel.*, Eng. tr., London, 1887, iv. 48 ff.). Dealing with the assertion that interest in the future life promotes forgetfulness of the claims and value of the present life—that our earthly life as such has its distinctive value and justifiable satisfactions, and is not to be degraded into a mere means for a life to come—Krause observes that, just as each period of our earthly life (*e.g.* childhood, adolescence, early manhood, mature manhood) has its own peculiar significance and worth, and is never merely a means to the succeeding period, so this earthly life as a whole, when compared with the life beyond death, has its own peculiar significance and worth. The fact that it is not the whole, but only a fragment, is no reason for treating it as nothing but a means; and the law of development holds of every individual life now as it will do in the future.

Among the purely metaphysical, as distinguished from the ethical and teleological, arguments for the immortality of the soul, there is one of special historic interest, which was elaborately worked out by Moses Mendelssohn in his *Phædon* (1767). He deduced the immortality of the soul from the abstract metaphysical idea of a simple substance, which idea he regarded as expressing the essence of the soul. A simple substance, from its nature, cannot cease to exist; hence the immortality of the soul follows. If so, we must add, it also follows that the soul can never have been created; it existed from the infinite past and must exist through the infinite future. Even if the validity of this use of the conception of substance be granted, it does not logically involve personal immortality, since the imperishable substance which constitutes the nature of the soul must have borne, in its past lives, qualities totally different from those which form the personality in which it now expresses itself, and it may do so again in its future lives. But in any case such a use of the conception of substance is not now admitted to be valid. It was attacked by Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 and 1787), as a serious logical paralogism (see J. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, Glasgow, 1889, vol. ii. p. 290 ff.). Kant pointed out that the unity of the soul is not that of a simple substance, but the unity of self-consciousness, in which the many different mental activities are held together in so far as they are able to be referred to the common centre, self, as 'mine.' Kant's own view, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), made immortality a postulate of the practical reason. Reason prescribes absolute obedience to the Moral Law as the *highest* good: this is virtue. Reason also prescribes, as the *complete* good, the union of

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 44.
[2] Cf. Mellone, *Introductory Text-Book of Logic*[5], London, 1909, ch. viii. §§ 3, 4.
[3] James Ward, *Realm of Ends*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 386.

happiness with virtue. The highest virtue is unrealizable in any finite period owing to the persistent opposition of man's animal, impulsive, and passional nature to the demands of the moral imperative. Further, the complete good (the union of virtue and happiness) is, as a matter of fact, unrealized in this life. Hence Kant formulates immortality (an endless duration of personal life) as a postulate which must be granted if the supreme ends of practical reason are to be possible.

The defect in Kant's argument consists in the implicit dualism of duty and inclination or desire. Duty can never completely overcome and never be completely reconciled with natural desire. But nothing less than this victory is the purpose and meaning of duty; hence an endless life is demanded for duty to do what can never be completely done (see Caird, *op. cit.* ii. 303). Apart from this ethical dualism, the inner meaning of Kant's argument is akin to what we have called the teleological proof. It is noteworthy that Mendelssohn, in addition to developing the argument referred to above (from the conception of substance), accurately conceived and stated the teleological argument from man's natural striving after ever greater perfection—a striving which Mendelssohn held to have been implanted in man by his Creator as his destiny. This destiny even death cannot hinder him from fulfilling; and, if this striving is to go on, the soul's essential properties of thought and will must continue.

It is of much interest to notice that some philosophical thinkers of the first rank have been prepared to defend a doctrine of the type described as Conditional Immortality: those shall be immortal who are worthy of it. Spinoza appears to have held such a view in his early treatise *de Deo*, etc. In like manner, J. G. Fichte at least held as a possible view that not every individual is destined to share in the life beyond death, but only those who in this life have developed out of themselves a character of abiding and universal worth. Similar views were held by Goethe, I. H. Fichte, C. H. Weisse, and Lotze. The spirit of the doctrine is well expressed in the following quotation from Lotze: 'Every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; everything will pass away which had its authorized place only in a transitory phase of the world's course. That this principle admits of no further application in human hands hardly needs to be mentioned. We certainly do not know the merits which may give to one existence a claim to eternity, nor the defects which deny it to others.'[1] (On this subject, see art. CONDITIONAL IMMORTALITY.)

(*b*) Are there any valid scientific reasons for denying that survival of bodily death is possible? We are not concerned with speculative philosophical systems which involve this denial, such as those of Spinoza or Schopenhauer. A theory of the universe may be by no means 'materialistic,' and yet may completely exclude belief in a future life. The examination of such theories is manifestly beyond the scope of this article. We are now concerned with the appeal which is made to 'modern science,' and the attempt to cover the denial of immortality with the prestige which science enjoys. Only on one condition can this attempt succeed, namely, that the view of the world known as Materialism is shown to be a valid inference from the assured results of science. We are concerned with Materialism, not as a general tendency partly ethical in character, and not merely as a mental inclination to affirm certain things and deny others; we are concerned with it as a definite conception. In this sense it rests directly on the assumption that the *mechanical* aspect of existence is the fundamental aspect, all else being derivative. Two primary principles are involved in this assumption. (1) Until recently it was believed that the material world was built up out of some seventy elementary substances which are themselves changeless in their properties and indestructible; these elements, separately and by 'combining' with one another, make up the various substances which we know. The discovery and study of 'radio-activity' have led to the modification of these conceptions in form rather than in principle. The ultimate elements of matter are differently defined—as 'units of negative electricity,'—but still, so far as experience and induction can penetrate, they are found to be indestructible: hence the 'indestructibility of matter' is assumed as an axiom of universal validity. (2) Along with this principle is likewise assumed the so-called 'Conservation of Energy.' This principle is usually stated in a semi-metaphysical form: 'the quantity of energy available in the universe is constant, and can neither be increased nor diminished.' In their actual use of the principle, scientists are not concerned with 'the universe,' but with the verifiable fact that energy passes from one form to another, passes, *e.g.*, from electricity to heat, and from chemical attraction to electricity, but in all its changes undergoes neither increase nor diminution. The direction in which these conceptions point was concisely indicated by Helmholtz:

'If, then, all elementary substances are unchangeable in respect to their properties, and only changeable as regards their combination and states of aggregation—that is, in respect to their distribution in space—it follows that all changes in the world are changes in the local distribution of elementary matter, and are ultimately brought about through Motion.'[1]

This is the fundamental assumption of modern physics; the substance of the world—however that substance may be defined—has, as its most fundamental and essential attribute, *motion*; and motion is always a change determined from behind, *i.e.* by some other mode of motion preceding it in time. This is the essence of what we may call the 'Mechanical Theory.' This theory has been applied to the human body and brain with remarkable results; it is a theory which has been found to work. The laws which regulate the constant interchange of material in the brain-cells—so far as physiology is able to investigate them—are found to be not different in kind from the laws derived from a study of the less complex forms of matter. The difference is one of complexity. It has been computed that there are in the '*grey matter*' of the brain (*i.e.* that portion of it which is specially the 'seat of mind') about 3,000,000,000 cells; and every one of these cells is 'an active organ of most complicated internal arrangements, so far independent in action, and each has attached to it as part of it "dendrites" and means of connexion with other cells and with the organs of the body.'[2] Yet, notwithstanding this unimaginable complexity, the human brain becomes merely one small aggregate in the vast material universe, and as such is swept into the system of matter and motion to which physics has reduced the world.

Now the question is not one of the right of physics and physiology, as special sciences, to regard the facts in this way and exclusively in this way. It is clear that only in the light of the hypothesis that the ordinary physical laws do hold in the brain can physiology hope to make any progress in the investigation of that organ. The mechanical assumption 'works'; and this means that life, mental and physical, actually has a mechanical aspect. And, when a special science limits itself to the exclusive study of a real and important feature of things, then for the purposes of that special science this feature of things is fundamental. We cannot, however, infer that it is the fundamental feature also *in rerum natura* and from the point of view of ultimate truth. We cannot infer that all natural law is mechanical law. We cannot infer that the series of physical changes which take place in the brain (the building up and breaking down of the brain-cells, which are the concomitants of mental activity) is in absolute conformity to mechanical law. In a word, the laws of motion do not hold good absolutely.[3]

Materialism rests entirely on the assumption which is here rejected—namely, that the mechanical theory is capable of providing a complete explanation of the facts because it is a complete and

[1] Lotze, *Metaphysic*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1884, § 245.

[1] H. L. F. von Helmholtz, *Über die Erhaltung der Kraft* (Lecture), Berlin, 1847.

[2] McTone and Drummond, *Elements of Psychology*[2], London and Edinburgh, 1912, p. 78.

[3] For a further development of the foregoing points see Mellone and Drummond, *op. cit.* ch. v.

accurate copy of the fundamental nature of things. This assumption involves a pushing of scientific hypotheses into regions where they have never been verified; and it leads to absurdities so intolerable that we have a *prima facie* right to deny that such verification will ever be forthcoming. The absurdity of the mechanical theory is seen when we ask: What is the place of consciousness in such a universe? The distinctive feature of mechanism is determination *a tergo*, by previous mechanical movement. The distinctive feature of consciousness is determination *a fronte: i.e.* human conscious activity is essentially purposive activity. It involves a specific process in the way of forecasting of ends. Now, in a purely mechanical universe consciousness is useless. Any momentary brain condition is the inevitable result of the condition immediately preceding, and both are only a part of the continuous series of mechanical movements which constitutes the universe. Hence the actions and words of every individual of the human race would have been exactly what they have been in the absence of mind. Had mind been wanting, the same empires would have risen and fallen, the same battles would have been fought and won, the same literature and art would have been produced, the same indications of friendship and affection given. Thus we have a universe devoid of purpose or rational meaning, continually evolving more and more complex forms of mechanism, and at numerous points producing a kind of existence (consciousness) diametrically opposed in its distinctive properties to those of mechanism—making no difference to the course of events—yet continually creating illusions as to its own place and importance in the course of events.

Purposive rational action is not the only feature of human experience which is inexplicable if the Mechanical Theory is true. The same may be said of the unity of consciousness. Every retrospect of our past mental life arouses the idea of the ego as the combining centre of its simultaneous variety and its temporal succession; these are thus unified by their relation to a being which is in nature one.[1] The unity of conscious life, centred in one single being, is utterly without parallel in the material series; 3,000,000,000 cells, each highly complex and variable, certainly provide no such central unity. Taking into account their molecular constitution and activities, it may be maintained that they do not even form a physical basis conceivable as the correlate of such a unity.

Further illustrations might be given of the intellectual impossibilities involved in Materialism, but it is enough to point out that careful scientific thinkers are aware of these considerations. The futility of attempting to reduce mental activities to mechanical processes is admitted. 'No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a *unit of feeling* has nothing in common with a *unit of motion* becomes more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition.'[2]

In order to evade some of the more obvious of these difficulties, the speculation has been put forward that to every particle of matter in the universe there is attached an element of feeling or sentience. Clifford, who vigorously defended this doctrine, called these minute particles of sentience 'mind-stuff'; and the use he made of the doctrine is shown in the following statement: 'When matter takes the complex form of a living human brain, the corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having intelligence and volition.'[3] This quality of sentience attributed to material particles is, of course, a mere speculation for which there is not a shadow of evidence. Hence it throws a somewhat sinister light on the attitude of some materialistic writers, when we find this hypothesis stated dogmatically as an assured 'scientific' result, as is done by Haeckel in his well-known book, *The Riddle of the Universe* (London, 1900).[4]

Haeckel calls his system 'Monism' and repudiates the name 'Materialism,' on the ground that the system affirms the reality of 'force' as well as of 'matter' and assumes the elementary particles to be sentient. The arbitrary hypothesis of mind-stuff avails little in relief of the difficulties of Materialism. The material particles are conceived to be combined in the brain according to mechanical laws: how are the corresponding particles of sentience combined? In thought, especially in the unity of consciousness involved in judgment and self-knowledge, we have a concrete indivisible activity, which, accordingly, must pertain, not to an assemblage of particles of sentience devoid of intelligence and volition, but to a single central agent or permanent principle of intelligence and volition. Nor are the difficulties of Materialism affected by any distinction between 'matter' and 'force.' In fact, such distinctions only conceal the real point at issue—the place of Mechanism in the universe. The Mechanical Theory means that the substance of the world (whether that substance is defined as 'matter,' 'force,' or 'mind-stuff') has, as its most fundamental attribute, motion determined *a tergo*. If it manifests itself not only in mechanism but also in other modes of activity, this means that there are changes in the universe where mechanical laws do not hold; and the fundamental assumption of Materialism breaks down.

In an Essay to which we have already referred (*CR* xviii. [1871] 464) Huxley said: 'There is every reason to believe that consciousness is *a function of nervous matter*, when that nervous matter has attained a certain degree of organization, just as we know the other "actions to which the nervous system ministers," such as reflex action and the like, to be.' We must ask: What is meant by a 'function of matter'? The term is ambiguous in the extreme. It might be made to cover what William James has called 'transmissive function,' in connexion with the hypothesis that brain and nerve are the instruments of transmission by which the conscious mind manifests itself in the spatial and temporal world. The mind is dependent on the instrument, but the instrument does not in any sense create or produce the mind.[1]

Those who use the language of 'function' do, however, by no means desire to turn the conception in this direction. If we keep to assured scientific results, what can the word 'function' mean when used of the mind's relation to the brain? We may answer in the words of W. James: 'If we are talking of science positively understood, function can mean nothing more than bare concomitant variation. When the brain activities change in one way, consciousness changes in another. . . . In strict science, we can only write down the bare fact of concomitance.'[2] This fact has suggested the famous hypothesis of 'psycho-physical parallelism,' that every change in consciousness corresponds to a change in the activity of the brain—a hypothesis which is well grounded as regards the more elementary facts of sensation and ideation, and is assumed to hold throughout. This principle, rightly used, should exclude materialistic and all other assumptions as to the real connexion between the mental and the physical series, for about this connexion it says nothing. It is adopted by careful writers for that reason, as a hypothesis regulating the study of mental in relation to physical facts. But many of the physiological school have given it a materialistic turn by speaking as if the mental state were entirely 'dependent' on the bodily, and assuming that the mental state is 'explained' when the corresponding bodily state is assigned. Hence the idea has arisen that the 'new' psychology has proved everything characteristic of human personality to be due to the activity of the brain and nervous system, while the truth is that, if such results appear in the end to be proved, it is only because in the beginning they were taken for granted.[3]

In addition to the works already referred to, we may add the following references to literature dealing with Materialism: F. A. Lange, *History of Materialism*, Eng. tr., London, 1892; J. Martineau, 'Modern Materialism,' in *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, London, 1890-91, iv.; James Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*; G. T. Ladd, *Outlines of Physiological Psychology*, London, 1896, pt. iii. ch. iii. §§ 15-24, ch. iv. §§ 11-25; S. H. Mellone, *The Immortal Hope*, chs. iv. and v.; Oswald Külpe, *The Philosophy of the Present in Germany*, Eng. tr., London, 1913, chs. iii. and iv.; T. M. Herbert, *The Realistic Assumptions of Modern Science Examined*, do. 1886, §§ 7-19; M. Guthrie, *Spencer's Unification of Knowledge*, do. 1882, ch. iv. § 3; artt. BODY AND MIND, and BRAIN AND MIND, in this work. On Haeckel the best is Erich Adickes, *Kant contra Haeckel*[2], Berlin, 1906 (not yet translated into English).

On the whole, modern physiology has nothing valid, positive or negative, to contribute to the solution of our problem. Physiology has effectually disposed of 'the whole classic platonising conception' of soul and body as two separate things, of which the body is necessary to the soul

[1] Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1894, bk. ii. ch. i. § 4 (on 'the unity of consciousness'), *Metaphysic*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1884, §§ 273, 268-269, 241, and *Microcosmus*, bk. ii. ch. iv. § 1 (on the 'relating activity' of the mind as a process of unification).

[2] Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, London and Edinburgh, 1890, i. § 62; cf. also the well-known utterance in J. Tyndall's *Address to the British Association at Norwich* ('the passage from the Physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is *unthinkable*') and Huxley's similar admission (*CR* xviii. [1871] 443).

[3] 'On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves,' in *Mind*, iii. [1878] 84.

[4] Cf. also *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, London, 1903, by Joseph McCabe, an enthusiastic disciple.

[1] See W. James, *Human Immortality* (Ingersoll Lecture), London, 1906, pp. 32-58, 142-144; and Mellone, *Immortal Hope*, pp. 48-54. H. Bergson's conception of the relation of mind and brain is essentially in harmony with this interpretation; see *Matter and Memory*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, *passim*.

[2] *Human Immortality*, p. 42.

[3] On the doctrine of 'parallelism,' see James Ward's Gifford Lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*[3], London, 1903, ii., lectures xi. to xiii.; and Mellone, *Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction*, London, 1897, p. 84 ff.

only in this world of sense. We find it impossible to say where body ends and soul begins; but physiology affords us no means of making clear the distinction between them. And, apart from mere assumptions, we are told nothing as to their connexion which is not obvious from common experience. We do not need the physiologist to tell us that there is a good deal of the body in the affections and emotions of the soul, that in deep thought the brain is taxed, that anxiety or joy affects the heart, that other instincts affect other organs. There is nothing in all this to prove the identity of the soul with the body, since all the facts are reconcilable with the supposition mentioned above, that the dependence of the soul on the body is the dependence of an agent on the instrument which transmits and expresses its activities. All experience points to the view which may be thus stated: the soul is distinct from the body and has a being in and for itself as the subject of its various activities; the functions of the soul are in many ways dependent on those of the body through which they act, but not dependent in such a way that the soul necessarily perishes with the death of the body; we can conceive the distinction between the two only by saying that the soul is more essential to the personality and the body less so. Our whole discussion in the preceding paragraphs tends to show that there is no scientific ground for questioning any of these propositions.

(*c*) Our third proposition raises the question of the ethical value of the belief in a future life. It has been urged that the race would rise to a higher point of view if the hope of immortality were dispensed with.

Most of those who hold that the immortal hope is grounded on truth and reason are prepared to lay down a primary and fundamental principle, namely, that the superiority of truth, beauty, and goodness to their opposites is not conditional on the permanence of the individual life. If some one doubted their superiority, we could not cure him of his moral scepticism by convincing him that his personality was to last for centuries or millenniums. To ask, as Tennyson[1] asks, what it is all worth, if death is the end, is to put the emphasis in the wrong place. Immortality is not the whole of the religious view of the world, but a part of it—a consequence of the fundamental view that truth, goodness, and love are supernal realities, whose permanent worth does not depend on the continued existence of any man or million of men. 'Human ministers of justice fail, but justice never.' Hence, far from saying that a noble earthly life is not worth living without immortality, we say the opposite: immortality is worth having, because a noble earthly life has an intrinsic worth of its own. It follows that the only true preparation for another life is to make this life noble; and the profound truth of Spinoza's saying appears—'Homo liber de nulla re minus quam de morte cogitat.'

It is affirmed that a true substitute for personal immortality may be found in the fact that, if individuals perish by the way, their work survives even after they are forgotten. This is true so far as it goes. How far it goes will be made clear to any one who tries to answer Huxley's forcible question: 'Throw a stone into the sea, and there is a sense in which it is true that the wavelets which spread around it have an effect through all space and all time. Shall we say that the stone has a future life?'[2] The universal life of humanity, deepening, developing, and advancing through the ages to its consummation, has a deeper unity than any which science finds in dead matter; but it is none the less true that to take this fact—the fact of the results of our individual lives being incorporated into this wider life of humanity—as a substitute for the belief in personal immortality is to deceive ourselves.

The desire to live after death has been declared to be merely the barren utterance of human egoism. It is admitted by believers in immortality that the desire for another life as affording 'compensation' may be so held as to become a refined form of selfishness. But it is affirmed, on the other hand, that the real meaning of the wish for 'compensation' is nothing ignoble or selfish. Frequently we can trace in it a motive like that which animated Milton in his greatest work to 'assert Eternal Providence, and justify the ways of God to men,' to live to see the meaning of the apparently undeserved sufferings of life. Even when we regard it simply as the expression of a man's interest in his own destiny, it is the opposite of a merely personal or selfish wish. The man who desires the compensation of another life is not desiring anything which he can enjoy by himself, and from which others are excluded. His desire is to go on being and doing whatever of truth and good he has realized in this life, and more than this life has ever given him opportunity to realize.

The 'ethical' objections to belief in another life are not characteristic of any particular school of writers and thinkers, though they appear to be professed most widely among the followers of Auguste Comte. It cannot be said that the objections are of great weight; but the discussion of them serves to bring out further features of the true meaning of the immortal hope. We may refer to John Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* (Gifford Lectures), Glasgow, 1899, esp. ii. 292 ff.; Edward Caird, *Lay Sermons*, do. 1907, esp. p. 276 ff.; H. Jones, *Immortality of the Soul in the Poems of Tennyson and Browning* (Essex Hall Lecture, London, 1905); Mellone, *The Immortal Hope*, ch. ii.

4. The 'teleological argument' for immortality.—We have already indicated the general nature of what may be called the 'teleological argument' for immortality (§ 3 (*a*)); and in the absence of any valid scientific or ethical reasons for questioning the possibility and value of a future life, it must be admitted that this argument holds the field. The root of the argument lies in a twofold motive which is specially prominent in forming the desire for another life: that personal affection may continue, and that personal goodness may grow;[1] *i.e.* that our faculties may be realized and exercised to their fullest capacity. In this life we do not find it possible to be and to do all that we feel and know ourselves to be capable of; every element in the life that now is seems rudimentary, incomplete, and preparatory.

This principle is applied to the distinctive qualities of human nature. Without entering into interrupting refinements concerning 'animal intelligence' or 'animal conscience,' it is evident that, while human life includes animal life, it rises above the latter; and that those higher things which distinguish man from the animals are his higher rational, spiritual, and moral qualities. It must be admitted that everything that is best in us bears witness in itself to a power of life and growth far beyond the utmost afforded by the opportunities of this world. It is, indeed, true that there are human beings in whom the higher emotional, intellectual, and moral qualities seem crushed out of existence, and there are others who seem to show no sign of possessing such qualities. Yet every one who has begun to use the higher gifts of his manhood has begun to find in them possibilities of growth to which no limit can be seen; and, the more truly he does all that this life calls for, the

[1] *e.g.* 'Vastness' (xvi.–xviii.), in *Demeter and other Poems* (p. 850 in *Works*, ed. Hallam, Lord Tennyson, London, 1913).
[2] Huxley, in *The Nineteenth Century*, ii. [1877] 334.

[1] Cf. Mellone, *Immortal Hope*, chs. i. and iii.; J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, §§ 47, 48; and A. C. Pigou, *Browning as a Religious Teacher*, London, 1901, chs. iv., v., vi.

more he feels that many such lives would not exhaust his powers.

We may make in the sphere of spiritual life an assumption similar to that which science makes in the sphere of physical life; *i.e.*, we may assume that these characteristically human qualities have their proper use and function, which is not realized until they are exercised in all their fullness. Some writers have treated this principle as a self-evident axiom. It is, rather, a consequence or corollary of a deeper principle, which is not a logical axiom but a progressively verified faith—that the world is at bottom a harmonious and completed whole, a rational whole, and not 'a confusion and dispersion'; so that nothing which exists and shares in the universal sustaining life of the whole can remain permanently incomplete and imperfect. Man, as a spiritual being, cannot completely realize his powers in that round of experience which he calls his life in this world. Their complete realization demands another life; and, if all things form, in God, a perfect system, that other life will be granted. Apart from this act of faith in the reasonableness of the world—an act of faith on which the trustworthiness of all reasoning depends, and which is progressively but never completely verified by acting on it or working it out—there would be no reason for supposing that human capacities fulfil any purpose by their growth, or that the incompleteness of life has any meaning.

These distinctively human qualities do not serve any merely physical purpose; they are not useful in the biological sense. As soon as we enter into the inner circle of human characteristics, the interpretation of these characteristics as instruments for working the bodily organism utterly fails us. In fact, to explain them, in their present form, by this means is never attempted; but it is supposed that they were manufactured out of primitive animal wants whose utility to the organism needs no demonstration. Against this whole conception it is contended that such a process of manufacture is inconceivable when seriously examined, and that it rests on a fundamental misconception of all that development can possibly mean.[1]

It appears then to be a reasonable assumption that human existence is constructed on a scale such that each man can put forth in their fullness the distinctive possibilities of his humanity; and this means that the life begun here is continued beyond death, where these endowments may find progressively more adequate scope and employment. At first sight the analogies of nature's ways do not lead us to regard this suggestion as a very hopeful one. What if the undeniable waste in the animal and vegetable world has its analogue in the human world? It appears to involve a waste of resource and a frustration of purpose and capacity; if in the case of man death ends his life, there would only be a similar blighting of promise, and perishing of capacities which have only just begun to unfold. Granting that the analogy is a true one—*i.e.* that there is mere waste in both cases—we must observe that in the one case it is a waste of physical capacity, in the other a waste of intellectual, moral, and spiritual capacity. Has this difference any significance? Have we a right to hold the growth of human love and reason as worth more—to expect that, though physical life may be wasted, spiritual life will not be wasted? A conviction of the absolute and indefeasible worth of these human ideals answers the question. These are the only things that give value to life; and, if we have a right to believe anything, we have the strongest moral and intellectual right to believe that they shall abide for ever. And, if the progress of humanity continues, while the actual human beings whose efforts contribute to it perish by the wayside, then what perishes is the best part of the whole achievement—the effects of each man's work which remain in his living, growing self; since all ideals are realized in life only by personal activities which grow by their personal use.

It is at this point that we reach the absolutely fundamental issue of all arguments really relevant to the problem of immortality. In the last resort they all depend on the view taken of the worth of human personality, as such, in the nature of things. The essential question could hardly be stated better than by Pringle-Pattison: 'Man as rational, and, in virtue of self-conscious reason, the free shaper of his own destiny, furnishes us, I contend, with our only indefeasible standard of value, and our clearest light as to the nature of the divine. He does what science, occupied only with the laws of events, and speculative metaphysics, when it surrenders itself to the exclusive guidance of the intellect, alike find unintelligible, and are fain to pronounce impossible—he *acts*. As Goethe puts it in a seeming paradox, *Man alone achieves the impossible*. But inexplicable, in a sense, as man's personal agency is—nay, the one perpetual miracle—it is nevertheless our surest datum and our only clue to the mystery of existence.'[1]

Whatever view may be taken of this question of the significance of personality, if the question is seriously dealt with, its decision will determine the decision of the problem of immortality and, in fact, of all the fundamental problems of metaphysics; and this question of personality may be used as a principle of division for the classification of philosophical systems and tendencies. In this reference, systems otherwise opposed (*e.g.* extreme Idealism and extreme Materialism) may be found on the same side of the line. This does not prove that the principle of division is not fundamental; on the contrary, it is so fundamental that it brings to light the inner affinities of philosophies which in form are diametrically opposed. Extreme idealism and extreme materialism are opposed much more in appearance than in reality. Thus, speculative materialism treats the soul as a merely derivative function of the brain and nervous system, whence it follows that the distinctive features of human personality are not what they appear to be, and personality has no real existence. Again, some forms of speculative idealism treat the soul as a derivative function (realized by means of the body) of a universal ideal principle; and, since the individuality of that soul rests exclusively on the body, the soul is in effect the derivative function of the body; and the distinctive features of human personality are an unreal appearance. From the point of view adopted in this article, it is contended that all such systems involve *ab initio* a fatal fallacy, resulting from the arbitrary rejection of a fundamental fact of experience, namely, our own immediate awareness of our individual reality and personal agency. If this primary fact is treated as an illusion, it is hard to see what else can claim superior validity. The classic example of a philosophy involving the assumption that finite personality is an unreal appearance is, of course, seen in the system of Spinoza. In quite recent years the same result has been reached by two eminent English thinkers: F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*[2], London, 1893, and B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (Gifford Lectures), do. 1912.

We must insist that the primary and fundamental aspect of experience consists in its personal form. Indeed, when we investigate the full concrete meaning of fact as such—when we ask, What is any fully concrete fact in our experience?—we seem compelled to admit that, whatever more it may be, it is always an element in some one's personal life. Whenever you have a 'fact' in the full meaning of the word, you have 'a conscious field *plus* its object as felt or thought of *plus* an attitude towards the object *plus* the sense of a self to whom the attitude belongs.'[2]

5. **Conclusion.**—From different points of view we are thus led to the conclusion that 'matter,' as it figures in the literature of physical science, is an abstraction. Some of the prophets of science would admit this, and eagerly assure us that we do not, and perhaps never shall, know what matter really is. But they would at once repudiate the supposition that the qualities of 'matter' which we do not yet know should make any difference to those which we do know; *i.e.*, that they should be capable of any efficient action inside the region which is known. It is as if we were shown 'a sort of sunlit terrace' where mathematical physics

[1] See J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, *passim*; A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*[2], London, 1902 (esp. Essay I.); H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., do. 1912, *passim*; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, Oxford, 1885, ii.

[1] *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. vi.

[2] W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (Gifford Lectures), London, 1902, p. 499.

builds up its constructions of the world; and, where that terrace stops, science stops, and the absolute metaphysical ground of the world begins (for science the unknowable). Certain types of recent idealistic philosophy[1] have done much to encourage this conception, that the teeming universe in which we live is verily nothing else than a thing of two aspects—mechanism and causation on the one hand, and meaning on the other: the world of mechanical causation being the world in which science is at home, and the other world (not a world of other things, but another way of viewing the same things) being the eternal world of the absolutely real. 'If anything,' says W. James, 'is unlikely in a world like this, it is that the next adjacent thing to the mere surface-show of our experience should be the realm of eternal essences, of platonic ideas, of crystal battlements, of absolute significance.'[2] And we may add: if anything is likely, it is that the material world contains objects of many kinds and degrees of reality operative within it, that there are kinds of matter and sources of energy subtler and more complex than were dreamt of, that the universe has in it resources deeper than any of which we have the faintest inkling, deeper than our deepest thought can reach so long as our bodily senses are limited as they now are. These statements are in accord with the whole tendency of recent science, which is opening up to us a material universe with possibilities of embodied existence far larger than any that science has destroyed.[3]

When, however, we seek for detailed knowledge of the manner of the future state, we find ourselves standing before the ultimate mystery, of that which 'eye saw not, and ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man' (1 Co 2[9]). We have not any conception, much less any mental picture, of the conditions of that existence. Dogmatic insistence on any particular representation is nowhere more blameworthy than here. But it may be maintained that this absence of knowledge is entirely beneficial. It leaves the possibility open to every one to frame such a view of the future as will meet his practical needs; and at the same time it checks the inclination (which easily becomes dangerous) to revel in these representations of the future to such an extent as to forget the claims and value of the present.

There are, nevertheless, two distinct ideas, or ideals, of the future state which may claim consideration, since both are equally based on human nature, and both have found expression in many historic types of doctrine. This question, we may observe in passing, is independent of the problem of conceiving how wilful wrongdoers will be treated in the world to come. On the one hand, we find that the dominant thought governing all representations of the future is that of restful peace; on the other hand, that of active progress. The one ideal is of that service of the Highest which finds its perfect realization in Vision and Communion; the highest blessedness is pictured to the mind as that of the Divine Home, the Heavenly Fatherland. The other ideal is of rising in an unwearying progress from one stage to another through the countless spheres of labour in the vast economy of the Infinite Whole. It need not be said that these are not two mutually exclusive ideas, one only of which can be entertained. They correspond to different types of temperament and experience, both of which must enter into the fullness of a complete life. Neither the man of Vision nor the man of Energy can claim that his experience is the whole experience; and we may be assured that both point to aspects of life which are reconciled in the Perfect Whole. It may be said that both elements are reconciled in the conception which we have suggested as defining the future life—*the development and perfecting of every personality* in thought, feeling, and will. The ideal of knowledge is Truth, and of feeling, Love; the perfect Will is that which is guided by perfect Truth and Love. These are inseparably bound up one with another; we can love only what we know to be true, and we can truly know only where we lovingly seek and find communion. The realization of these capacities brings us to God, the goodness in all that is good, the truth in all that is true. The perfect life, the final end of Divine Wisdom and Love, is the knowledge and love of God, not only God by Himself, but God along with all that is of Him in the world—all that is divine in nature and man. This conception satisfies at once the ideals of Communion and of Action (see, further, art. STATE OF THE DEAD).

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S. H. MELLONE.

IMPLICIT FAITH. — Implicit in contrast to explicit faith means believing all that the Church believes, or may in future believe. According to William of Auxerre († 1215), in nearly the first reference to the subject, *Credere explicite est credere in hoc universali, quicquid credit ecclesia, credere esse verum.*[1] He believes implicitly who, although ignorant of the details, accepts whatever is taught by the Church or is contained in Holy Scripture. The conception was designed to meet the case of the *simplices* or *minores*, *i.e.* the less instructed laity and lower clergy. The higher clergy (*doctores et maiores*) must believe explicitly, or with knowledge of detail, as being bound to give a reason for their faith. For, as the doctrine handed down by traditional theology became more complex, it was necessary to recognize an ever larger number as incapable of rightly understanding or expressly accepting all the Church doctrines. Learned theologians soon perceived the dangers of this. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus both insist that the laity must believe expressly those

[1] Cf. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*; and the same writer's Essay on 'The true Conception of Another World,' in his *Essays and Addresses*, London, 1891.

[2] 'In Memoriam F. W. H. Myers,' in *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, London, 1901.

[3] See Mellone, *The Immortal Hope*, p. 55 ff.

[1] *Com. in IV. libros Sent.*, lib. iii. tract. 3, cap. 1, qu. 5.

articles of faith which are concerned with redemption through Christ and are proclaimed in Church festivals. This practically means the Apostles' Creed. Items in the Scripture narrative, however, for which they admitted implicit faith to be sufficient are such facts as that Abraham had two sons or that David was the son of Jesse. The lower limit of express belief appears to be fixed by He 11[6]. Alarm may have been felt at the statement of Innocent III. († 1216) that no holder of an unorthodox opinion, provided he regards it as a belief of the Church, is a heretic; Innocent further says that by holding it in this sense he actually acquires merit. The scope of *fides implicita* was later much widened by William of Occam, who used it to protect himself against the charge of heresy; and Biel took a position which really permits to the implicitly believing ignorant a total indifference towards all specific Christian truth.

The conception has been defended or explained in two ways. (1) The Church believes, and my faith is contained in hers, since I am a constituent part of her. (2) The Church is the supreme doctrinal authority; hence whatever the Church teaches, I accept. I give a blank cheque, undertaking to honour it to any sum.

It is obvious that the notion of *fides implicita* is derived from the intellectualistic thought of faith current in Scholasticism. If, as with Thomas Aquinas, faith is an act of the intellect impelled to assent by the will, and if, being the acceptance of doctrinal propositions, it is an act of obedience to authority rather than of personal conviction, provision must of course be made for all those who are unable to follow the subtle obscurities of detailed theology.

The mediæval discussion ended in opaque and inharmonious conclusions, very various opinions being held regarding the scope of explicit and implicit faith respectively. Roman Catholic writers subsequent to the Reformation tend to narrow the range of the latter. Modern Jesuit divines seldom touch the subject. Ritschl argues that the Vatican Council of 1870, in its determination of the relations between faith and reason, virtually gives a wide scope to implicit faith even in the case of the learned.

Luther was the first to protest against the general notion, and Calvin echoes his denunciations. He says that it is very absurd to decorate with the name of faith what is merely 'ignorance tempered by humility.'[1] Some later Protestant writers, who revive the conception, argue that implicit faith suffices for justification but not for salvation; others, that it avails for both.

A man's verdict on the admissibility of *fides implicita* will depend on his conception of faith and of the Church. If it be held that Christ offers a present salvation, in fellowship with God, and that faith means the heartfelt trust by which we take this boon, implicit faith must be rejected as unmeaning. It is indeed a strange suggestion, in that case, that things are made easier for any one by waiving the necessity for a clear and conscious apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ. Nothing but explicit faith can avail, since the trust of others is not *our* trust. In Protestantism this can be denied only by those who assign a substantial value to what is called 'unconscious Christianity.' The fact which has been wrongly interpreted under the rubric of *fides implicita* is this, that a saving experience of Christ may be accompanied by very different degrees of knowledge. But, wherever faith is regarded as the obedient acceptance of dogmatic statements, not trustful adherence to a Person, the notion of implicit faith will appear unfailingly, and piety will so far be gauged by theological attainment.

[1] *Inst.* III. ii. 3.

LITERATURE.—G. Hoffmann, *Die Lehre von der Fides Implicita*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1903–09; A. Ritschl, *Fides Implicita* (posthumous), Bonn, 1890; L. Ihmels, *Fides Implicita und der evangelische Heilsglaube*, Leipzig, 1912; F. Loofs, *Leitfaden der Dogmengeschichte*[4], Halle, 1906.

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

IMPOSITION OF HANDS.—See HAND.

IMPRISONMENT.—See PRISONS.

IMPUTATION.—Imputation is a term which belongs in the first place to law, and in the second place to Christian theology, where that has been expressed in legal terms. The meaning is thus defined by Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* ii. 194: 'In the juridical and theological sense of the word, *to impute* is to attribute anything to a person or persons, upon adequate grounds, as the judicial or meritorious reason of reward or punishment.'

The theological use of the term belongs (apart from Biblical references) essentially to the Western Church, and may be distinguished as threefold. (1) There is a general usage, in which it has reference to God's judgment of individual persons on the basis of their own merits or demerits. He is said to impute to them fault or blame (*culpa*) or merit (*meritum*). In so far, however, as merits are transferable, the merits of others also can be imputed to a non-meritorious individual (see MERIT). (2) In particular, however, the term is used of the judgment passed by God upon the human race as guilty in view of the sin of Adam. This usage prevails in orthodox theology, Roman Catholic and Protestant alike, from Augustine onward, the view of Pelagius, that Adam's sin entailed no guilt upon his posterity, having been stamped as heretical. (3) Peculiar to the Protestant orthodoxy is the third usage, which speaks of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to believers. The last two usages demand further consideration.

1. **The imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity.**—This forms one aspect of Augustine's doctrine of original sin, for which see R. Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch.* ii.[2], Leipzig, 1910, p. 450:

'Augustine conceives the matter thus. God visited Adam's guilt with punishment. In this state of punishment Adam begat children. On the one hand, these were now involved ideally in the guilt and punishment of Adam. On the other hand, they participated thereby in the concrete condition of Adam, i.e. they received from him a *languor* of the enfeebled nature, or evil concupiscence, ignorance, and mortality. Materially, however, the two things are identical, for just in this *languor* consists the punishment for Adam's sin. In that, therefore, all are placed, through procreation and birth, in the penal state of Adam, the punishment visited upon Adam's guilt realizes itself in them, or his guilt is punished in them, and is therefore also their guilt.'

This doctrine of Augustine determined the general view of Western Catholicism. Thomas Aquinas virtually repeats it, but defines further especially the point that, since original sin involves guilt before God, and guilt necessarily implies a voluntary act, therefore it is not enough merely to teach that from Adam his posterity derived a corrupt nature, but they must be regarded as involved in the guilt of his voluntary act of transgression. Cf. *Summa Theol.* II. i. qu. 81, art. 1:

'All men, who are born of Adam, can be considered as one man, so far as they agree in the nature which they receive from their first parent; just as in civil matters all men who are of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man.' Thus all men are to be regarded as members of one body by reason of their common descent from Adam; and just as murder is not imputed to a man's hand except as part of his body, so original sin is not guilt by reason of the will of each individual man, but by reason of the will of Adam.

This is a very clear doctrine of imputation. Aquinas accompanies it with an equally clear statement, after Augustine, that materially original sin is *languor naturæ* (II. i. qu. 82, art. 1). Aquinas, however, also defines original sin (as

Anselm had done before him) as the lack of original righteousness; and this definition opened the way to a more Pelagian apprehension of its nature, which, appearing first in Duns Scotus, reaches its full development in the Roman Catholic theologians of the time of the Reformation, Albertus Pighius and Ambrosius Catharinus. Duns admitted a corruption of human nature in so far as to acknowledge a proneness to inordinate desire. This corruption, however, means for him much less than the *languor naturæ* meant to Augustine or Aquinas. Cf. F. Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*[4], Halle, 1906, p. 596:

'The will remains free in spite of the *pronitas*. . . . Sin, however, can exist only in the will. . . . Original sin is, therefore, for Duns only original guilt or, more properly, a state of condemnation, which God inflicts upon all the posterity of Adam, since they as his posterity ought to possess but do not possess the *justitia originalis data a deo ipsi Adæ pro omnibus filiis*.'

Following along this line opened by Duns, Pighius and Catharinus taught that original sin was nothing but the imputed guilt of Adam (see Bellarmine, 'de Amissione gratiae et statu peccati,' *Disputationes*, vol. iii., Ingolstadt, 1693, lib. v. cap. xvi.). It was in opposition to this tendency of Roman Catholic theology that the early Protestant doctrine of original sin was framed. The consequence is that it is chiefly the material side of the doctrine, or the corruption of human nature, that is emphasized in the early Protestant statements upon the subject (cf. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.* ii. 194, n. 1). The result as regards the Lutheran theology is thus expressed by H. F. F. Schmid (*Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*[6], Frankfort and Erlangen, 1863, p. 198):

'The doctrine of the *imputatio culpae et poenae primorum parentum* is first developed by the later doctors, say from Calov onwards, though a suggestion of it is to be found in the sentence of the Form. Conc. (sol. decl. 19), *quod hoc hereditorium malum sit culpa et reatus, ut omnes propter inobedientiam Adæ et Hevae in odio apud Deum et natura filii irae sumus*.'

The doctrine is very clearly stated by David Hollaz, who says:

'The first sin of Adam in so far as he is regarded as the common parent, head, stem, and representative of the whole human race, is imputed to all his posterity truly and by the just judgment of God, as guilt and as ground of punishment' (see Schmid, p. 196).

It was in the Reformed Church that the doctrine of imputation was most fully developed and discussed. It was here that the controversy arose as to whether the imputation of Adam's sin was immediate or mediate, *i.e.* whether men were punished directly for Adam's transgression, and the corruption that they derived from him was part of the punishment; or whether, inheriting as a matter of fact Adam's corruption, they are punished directly for this, and only indirectly for the sin which brought it into being. It is to be observed, moreover, that, in the very beginning of the history of the Reformed Church, Zwingli repudiated the doctrine of imputation altogether:

'Culpam originis non vere sed metonymice a primi parentis admisso culpam vocari' (A. Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche*, Zürich, 1844–47, ii. 54).

As to the other great initiator of the Reformed theology, Calvin's doctrine of original sin certainly leans a good deal on the doctrine of mediate imputation. He asserts that,

'being perverted and corrupted in all parts of our nature, we are merely on account of such corruption deservedly condemned by God. . . . This is not liability for another's fault' (*Inst.* II. 8).

The general doctrine of the Reformed Church, however, is undoubtedly that of immediate imputation. B. Keckermann says:

'Imputatum (sc. peccatum) est nobis, quatenus in Adamo in radice et primo nostro principio potentia fuimus' (see Schweizer, p. 54).

To the same effect also J. H. Alsted and M. K. Wendelin (see Schweizer, p. 54). The doctrine of mediate imputation is especially connected with the name of Placæus (La Place) of Saumur, who presented his views in a disputation *de Statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam*, and afterwards more fully in a treatise *de Imputatione primi peccati Adami*. But the doctrine was condemned by the National Synod of Charenton in France (1644–45), by the Swiss Formula Consensus, and by the theologians of Holland. J. H. Heidegger, one of the theologians of the Swiss Consensus, says:

'The imputation of Adam's sin is immediate and antecedent, not mediate and consequent. . . . The imputation of sin is not by the mediation of inherent corruption, but the imputation of sin is the cause of inherent corruption' (Schweizer, p. 55).

2. The imputation of Christ's righteousness.—This is a form taken by the doctrine of justification by faith in the Protestant theology, though not in its earliest stage of development.

'The expression "justitia Christi imputatur" is seldom found in the older documents of the Reformation, and first comes more generally into acceptation through the controversy with Osiander' (R. A. Lipsius, *Dogmatik*[3], Brunswick, 1893, p. 676).

Osiander taught that the forgiveness of sins was the effect of the historical work of Christ, but that justification was more than mere forgiveness, and consisted in the imputation to the believer of the essential righteousness of the Divine Person, Jesus Christ. This imputation however, involves the infusion of this same righteousness in the believer, since God's imputation is necessarily according to truth (cf. Loofs, p. 870). This doctrine was rejected by the Lutheran Church as Catholicizing, and in opposition to it the Formula of Concord (sol. decl. iv. 16) maintains:

'The righteousness (of Christ) which is imputed before God to faith or to believers, is the obedience, passion, and resurrection of Christ, by which He satisfied the law for our sake and made atonement for our sins.'

There is, however, considerable difference in the later Lutheran doctrine as to the exact relation of the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

'The Formula of Concord sometimes sets both expressions side by side, sometimes it reduces the content of the justifying judgment to the single expression of the remission of sins' (Schmid, p. 360).

J. Brenz says that the imputation of Christ's righteousness is the reason of the forgiveness or non-imputation of sins (*ib.* p. 357). D. Hollaz says:

'The remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ are acts undivided and intimately united, but still formally distinct, since the former is privative, the latter positive: the former follows immediately from the passive obedience, the latter from the active obedience of Christ' (*ib.*).

As regards the Reformed Church, we may take as typical statements those of F. Turretin (*Inst.*, Edinburgh, 1847, loc. xvi. 3. 9) and Jonathan Edwards ('Justification by Faith alone' [*Works*, London, 1817, vi. 257]). Turretin's statement is as follows:

'When we say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us unto justification, and that we through that imputed righteousness are just before God, and not through a righteousness which inheres in us; we mean nothing else than that the obedience of Christ, presented to God the Father in our name, is so granted to us by God, that it is to be regarded as really ours, and that it is the one and only righteousness on account of which, and through whose merit, we are absolved from the guilt of our sins and obtain a right to (eternal) life.'

Edwards says as follows:

'First, I would explain what we mean by the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Sometimes the expression is taken by our divines in a larger sense, for the imputation of all that Christ did and suffered for our redemption, whereby we are free from guilt, and stand righteous in the sight of God; and so implies the imputation both of Christ's satisfaction and obedience. But here I intend it in a stricter sense, for the imputation of that righteousness or moral goodness that consists in the obedience to Christ. And by that righteousness being imputed to us, is meant no other than this, that that righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted instead of that perfect inherent righteousness that ought to be in ourselves: Christ's perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves.'

It may finally be observed that in Protestant theology the imputation of Adam's sin and that

of Christ's righteousness are closely connected. The one is set over against the other, as balancing and countervailing it. B. de Moor, *Commentarius in Marckii Compendium*, Leyden, 1761–71, says:

'Imputatio justitiae Christi et culpae Adami pari passu ambulant, et vel utraque ruit, vel utraque agnosci debet' (see Hodge, ii. 207).

3. The Scriptural basis of the doctrines of the imputation of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness. — This is to be found principally in the Epistles of Paul. In the first place, Paul, following the Rabbinic theology, tends to view man's relation to God along juridical lines, though this is by no means his exclusive point of view, nor is his legalism thoroughgoing, even where it exists. In particular, as regards the imputation of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness the fundamental passage is Ro 5^{12-21}, where the effects of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness are contrasted: as sin flows from Adam, so righteousness flows from Christ. When this great passage is examined, however, it is found to lack altogether the sharp formulation of the later doctrine, and it cannot be said that the imputation either of Adam's sin or of Christ's righteousness is distinctly taught in it. All efforts to make Paul, here and elsewhere, an exact systematic theologian must fail; there is always about his statements a breadth and expansiveness in which much is left to the imagination, and the meaning is suggested rather than precisely defined. In the passage before us, while it is clear that Paul believed in the Divine imputation of sin and in the derivation of all human sin from Adam's transgression, it is by no means clear that he held, let us say, the doctrine of immediate imputation. In fact, v.[13] is inconsistent with this and with the doctrine of mediate imputation alike: 'until the law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law.' The famous ἐφ' ᾧ of v.[12] will not bear the sense put upon it by Origen and Augustine of 'in whom,' *i.e.* in Adam. 'In that case (i.) ἐπί would not be the right preposition; (ii.) ᾧ would be too far removed from its antecedent' (Sanday-Headlam, *Commentary on Romans*, Edinburgh, 1895, p. 133). Again, v.[18f.] are by no means theologically precise. It is clear in v.[18] that Paul traces back in general the condemnation of men to the trespass of Adam, but the intermediary links establishing the connexion are left vague. And so again with the connexion in the latter half of the verse between the ἑν δικαίωμα and the δικαίωσις ζωῆς. Besides, the exact meaning of δικαίωμα is uncertain, whether the righteous act or merit of Christ (K. C. J. Holsten, C. J. Vaughan, R. A. Lipsius, H. P. Liddon) or the justifying sentence (H. A. W. Meyer, E. H. Gifford, W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam). Finally, the exact sense in which we are to understand in v.[19] that the trespass of Adam and the obedience of Christ constituted the many sinners and righteous respectively is left vague. It is, no doubt, right to understand Paul to mean 'constituted' in the Divine judgment, *i.e.* imputed; but how the sin of Adam and the obedience of Christ bring about the imputation of sin or of righteousness is left unexplained.

If we turn to Ro 4^{3} we find, instead of the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, that of the imputation of faith for righteousness, which Paul derives from Gn 15^{6}, perhaps as a result of his Rabbinic training. It is at least interesting to observe that the imputation of one thing for another is known to the Rabbinic theology, *e.g.* vow for performance, willingness to suffer for martyrdom (see F. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, Leipzig, 1897, p. 282). The Mechilta actually says on Ex 14^{31}: Abraham inherited this world and the world to come solely by the merit of faith, whereby he believed in the Lord, and He reckoned it to him for righteousness (see J. B. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, London, 1896, p. 162).

4. Opposition to the doctrines of the imputation of Adam's sin and of Christ's righteousness.— With the above statements in view, it is not surprising that, even apart from the moral difficulties of the doctrines, they should have been challenged on Scriptural grounds, even where the legal terminology of St. Paul has not altogether been abandoned. The Pelagians, and the Socinians after them, entirely repudiated the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's guilt. The Socinians and Arminians objected to the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness; the Arminians proposed instead to follow Paul in speaking of the imputation of faith for righteousness. On the last point the opinion of A. B. Bruce, *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, Edinburgh, 1894, p. 155 f., is noteworthy:

'The great doctors of the Lutheran and Reformed Confessions emptied faith of all moral contents, that no pretext might remain for ascribing to it justifying virtue, and assigned to it simply the humble service of claiming an interest in the foreign righteousness of Christ. They even went the length of setting aside the scriptural idea of the imputation of faith, and substituting for it the idea of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, keeping themselves right with St. Paul by the ingenious device of taking faith, in the texts where it is said to be imputed, *objectively*, so bringing out the meaning that not the act of believing, but the object believed in, the righteousness of Christ, is imputed. This manner of handling the *locus* of justification is very open to criticism. In the first place, it is unfortunate that the Protestant doctors, in their laudable zeal against neo-legalism, should have found it necessary to become un-Pauline in their terminology, banishing from their theological vocabulary the imputation of faith as not only inexact but even heretical, and employing exclusively a phrase which, however legitimate as an inference from Scripture texts, has no express scriptural warrant. This fact is an index that somehow they had got upon the wrong track, and had fallen into one-sidedness.'

Modern theology, as governed by the new emphasis on the Synoptic teaching of Jesus, and especially on His doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, tends away from legal analogies and modes of statement. The consequence is that the term 'imputation' has tended, except on account of its historical associations, to be banished from recent theology. So far as concerns, not the term, but the matter of the doctrines of the imputation of Adam's sin and Christ's righteousness, it is widely felt to be morally impossible to maintain that men in general are guilty because of Adam's sin, and also that, as above stated, Paul himself does not distinctly teach this. The usual line of modern teaching, therefore, follows the suggestion made by Paul in Ro 5^{13}, and, while recognizing the inheritance from the past of sinful propensities, admits guilt only where there is conscious and wilful transgression (so, *e.g.*, J. Kaftan, in his *Dogmatik*[4], Tübingen, 1901).

As regards the imputation of Christ's righteousness, the passage above quoted from Bruce is, on the whole, typical. Since Kant's *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, the doctrine of justification by faith has been commonly stated in the form that God accepts our faith in Christ as the earnest of the Christlikeness which it is destined to produce, or sees in Christ the full fruition of what in the believer is present only in the germ. It is noteworthy, however, that Ritschl, with his glowing admiration for the principles of the Reformation, here substantially maintains the orthodox doctrine, though without the parallel doctrine of the imputation of Adam's guilt.

'On the other hand, when what we want is to see forgiveness become operative as the attribute of a community, this aspect of it is guaranteed by the community's Representative, whose inviolably maintained position towards the love of God, which is distinctive of Him, is imputed by God to those who are to be accounted His. Because Christ kept Himself in the love of God by His obedience even unto death, God's forgiving love is thereby secured beforehand to those who belong to Christ's

community. Their guilt is not taken into account in God's judgment, since they are admitted in the train of God's beloved Son to the position towards God which was assumed and maintained by Him. The verdict of justification or forgiveness is therefore not to be formulated in such a way that the community has its relationship to Christ imputed to it, but in such a way that the community which belongs to Christ has imputed to it His position towards the love of God, in which He maintained Himself by his obedience' (*Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1900, p. 547).

This fine passage may be regarded as the classical modern restatement of the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

See, further, artt. SIN, JUSTIFICATION.

LITERATURE.—The principal literature has been indicated in the course of the article. It is to be observed that C. Hodge's *Systematic Theology*, London and Edinburgh, 1872–73, especially ii. 192 ff. and iii. 144 ff., is particularly valuable, both for the history of the doctrines of imputation and for an exact statement of their orthodox Protestant form.

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

INCAS.—See ANDEANS.

INCANTATION.—See CHARMS AND AMULETS, DIVINATION.

INCARNATION.

Introductory (N. SÖDERBLOM), p. 183.
American (H. B. ALEXANDER), p. 184.
Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 186.
Chinese (P. J. MACLAGAN), p. 188.
Christian.—See JESUS CHRIST.
Egyptian (A. WIEDEMANN), p. 188.
Greek and Roman (ST. GEORGE STOCK), p. 192.
Indian (H. JACOBI), p. 193.
Muslim (G. A. BARTON), p. 197.
Parsi (N. SÖDERBLOM), p. 198.
Semitic (G. A. BARTON), p. 199.
Tibetan (L. A. WADDELL), p. 200.

INCARNATION (Introductory).—

The term 'incarnation' is applied to the act of a divine or supernatural being in assuming the form of a man or animal, and continuing to live in that form upon the earth. Incarnation is thus distinguished, on the one hand, from 'transmigration,' in which the vagrant entity is not a deity, but a soul; and, on the other, alike from 'possession' (*q.v.*), in which a spirit or a deity takes up its abode in a human being, but only temporarily, and not for a whole lifetime, from 'emanation,' which implies a divine source, but not the actual presence of a deity, and from the capacity of deities, or of holy men and magicians, to assume on occasion whatever forms they please (as, *e.g.*, Veretbraghna [*Yt.* xiv. 7 ff.] and Tishtrya [*ib.* viii. 16 ff.]; see art. METEMPSYCHOSIS).

Among primitive peoples there is really no such thing as incarnation in the strict sense of the term. The men and animals worshipped among such peoples are usually regarded and treated as actual deities, or at least divine, and not as the manifestations of certain gods or demons. Frequently, in cases where the men or animals worshipped have been supposed by investigators to be the embodiments of demons or other supernatural beings, a more searching inquiry has shown that in reality they ranked, and were worshipped, as living deities (J. G. Frazer, *Lectures on the Early Hist. of the Kingship*, London, 1905, pp. 132 ff., 279 f.). At a later stage, sacred beings of this type might be regarded as the incarnations of a god (*e.g.* Avalokiteśvara becomes incarnate in the Dalai Lama; see 'Tibetan' section of this art.). Among primitive races the closest approximations to the conception of incarnation are found in (1) the animals in which the primitive mind traces the peculiar and mysterious *force*[1] (see art. HOLINESS [Gen. and prim.], vol. vi. p. 735) of the dead—now regarded as divine and endowed with power—and which therefore become objects of worship, and (2) the aged and the medicine-men in the parts they play in the performance of the mysteries; here they assume the forms of the great personages of sacred tradition, and feel that they are one with these superhuman beings and deities (K. T. Preuss, *Die Nayarit-Expedition*, Leipzig, 1912, p. xcv ff.). It is true, of course, that this impersonation or embodiment was not permanent or complete. The sacrificed man-god of the Mexicans, 'our Lord God,' to impersonate whom a young and beautiful man was chosen from among ten picked captives, was regarded as the 'figurer' or representative of Tezcatlipoca (E. Seler, 'Die achtzehn Jahresfeste der Mexicaner,' in *Veröffentl. des königl. Museums für Völkerkunde zu Berlin*, vi. [1899] 194; see 'American' section). Even at a more advanced stage of religious development the craving for the immediate presence of deity gives rise, as a rule, to the practice of deifying men (as, *e.g.*, in the Athenian Hymn to Demetrius, Athenæus, vi. 253c–*e*, or in the cult of the emperors) rather than to the belief in incarnation.

Among Western peoples, again, the idea of incarnation in the proper sense seems to have originated in Egypt (see the 'Egyptian' section), and then, with Hellenism as its medium, to have reached its highest form in Christianity (see art. JESUS CHRIST) and heterodox Islām. A parallel development is the Indian doctrine of *avatāras* (see the 'Indian' section)—first mentioned in the *Bhagavadgītā*, iv. 7 f.—which in turn also exercised an influence upon the Muslim sectaries, *i.e.* in the Shī'ite doctrine of the *imām*.

The moderate Shī'ites do not teach incarnation in the strict sense; but certainly the Shī'ite doctrine that the right of succession belongs to the descendants of 'Alī, the Prophet's cousin, and of Fāṭima, his daughter, in virtue of blood-relationship and divine ordinance, and not, as the Sunnites hold, to the khalifs installed by human election and appointment (I. Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, p. 210), has some affinity with the idea of incarnation. The theory of the *imāms*, like Islām in general, rests upon various grounds. The divine sequence of these rulers is guaranteed not only by their legitimate descent from the Prophet's family and by their superhuman gifts, but also by their possession of a divine light-substance (cf. Shahrastānī, tr. T. Haarbrücker, Halle, 1850, i. 172, 206, 217 f.; it is a divine power [217], a part of deity [172, 200], and even the spirit of deity [170, 173]) which had streamed down from Adam in a succession of divine men, passed into the loins of the grandfather of Muḥammad and 'Alī, and was then portioned out to 'Abdallāh with his son, the Prophet, and the latter's daughter, Fāṭima, on the one side, and to Abū-Ṭālib with his son 'Alī, on the other; transmitted thereafter by the offspring of the marriage of 'Alī and Fāṭima, the martyrs of Kerbela, and by the successive *imāms* of the Prophet's lineage, it will culminate in the last, the 'hidden,' *imām*, who will appear in the final age.

The Sunnite tradition, too, had a place for the *nūr Muḥammad*, the 'light of Muḥammad,' which rested upon the forehead of Adam, and from which all the prophets have sprung. This light pervades all the ages, falling ever upon the bearers of the

[1] The approximation was much closer when this power came to be regarded as a soul, represented in the later civilizations of Greece and Rome as a migratory individual being.

divine tradition. It went through the forefathers of Muḥammad. But the Shī'ite sect invested 'Alī with one of the brightest aureoles of that light. Fourteen thousand years before the creation of the first man, the combined lights of Muḥammad and 'Alī shone before God, and then flowed 'through the pure and holy loins' (Goldziher, 'Neuplatonische und gnostische Elemente im Ḥadīth,' in *ZA* xii. [1909] 328 ff.). This light-substance, which attests the prerogative of each successive *imām*, and endows him with the supernatural gift, strikingly recalls the *khwarenah* of the Avesta (Pahlavi *khurrak*; in Firdausī, *farr*), and has perhaps some historical link with that Parsi conception (see Parsi' section). Goldziher (*ZA* xii. 327 ff.), it is true, rejects the hypothesis of any such relationship, though he emphasizes the close connexion between the light inherited throughout the ages and the pre-existence of the Prophet, and shows that traces of Jewish thought appear in this sphere of ideas. It is, at any rate, a significant fact that the idea of the inherited consecration, which is foreign to the orthodox doctrine regarding the Prophet, should have been specially developed in Persian Shī'itism.

It is true that Shahrastānī (Haarbrücker, i. 170, 172 f.) associates the transmission of the divine spirit or divine light to the *imām* with metempsychosis, which is unknown in the Avesta. The idea that every age must have its own *imām*—the love and trust accorded to him being regarded by the Shī'ites as a sixth pillar of the faith, and so added to the usual five—is undoubtedly influenced by the Neo-Platonic emanational theory of the cyclical manifestations of the cosmic reason (Goldziher, *ZA* xii. 339), and by the Indian doctrine that an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu is given to every successive age. The eschatological aspect of the last *imām*, who has been withdrawn from the earth, and now rules in secret, and who is destined to return and assume the final dominion, is a product of Jewish-Christian aspirations (Shahrastānī, i. 199, 216; Goldziher, *Vorlesungen*, p. 219). Jewish influence can also be traced elsewhere; thus the *sakina*, which, in the sense of a divine and holy consecration, is sometimes ascribed to the *imāms*, is derived from the Jewish *shᵉkīnāh*, *i.e.* the divine presence manifesting itself in visible symbols (Goldziher, *Abhandl. zur arab. Philol.* i., Leyden, 1896, p. 188). In like manner, the Jewish shekinah abode with Israel from the days of the Sinaitic legislation till the destruction of the Second Temple, and it rested upon Jacob and other men of God (F. Spiegel, *Erân. Altertumskunde*, Leipzig, 1871–78, ii. 50; cf. the *kᵉbhōdh Jahweh* in the OT).

The party of 'exaggeration' (*ghulāt*) were not content with the doctrine of the divine light, but taught an actual incarnation of deity, so that the title 'God' was applied at least to 'Alī (Shahrastānī, 217). Incarnation (*ḥulūl*), however, was condemned even by the ordinary Shī'ites (cf. R. A. Nicholson, *Trans. of the Third Intern. Congress for the Hist. of Religions*, Oxford, 1908, i. 295), and believers in incarnation (*ḥulūlīya*), like the 'exaggerators' (*ghulīya*), were compared by Shahrastānī (199 f.) to the Christians. In these circles 'Alī and his family, as embodiments of deity, were not infrequently exalted above Muḥammad himself, who, in relation to Allah, was clearly conscious of his human limitations, and the Semitic-Muslim conception of God was modified in the direction of Aryan thought (see art. SHI'A). In Persian Islām, God and man were regarded as more closely related. The identification of the Ṣūfī with deity, which has been fairly common since it began with the great Ṣūfī, Bāyazīd of Bisṭām,[1] in the 9th cent., must be distinguished from incarnation strictly so called. That Neo-Platonic and Indian ideas of union with the All-One played a ruling part in the rise of Ṣūfism was already noted by al-Bīrūnī.[1] Such forms of pantheistic extravagance are common in all mystical theories of the kind, and in reality involve an expansion of the idea of incarnation that results in mere indefiniteness. An incarnation that embraces all religious persons has lost its specific meaning.

The conception of one solitary incarnation of deity is peculiar to Christianity. In India the development of the idea resulted in an exactly opposite view. The earliest incarnation of Viṣṇu would seem to have been Kṛṣṇa. Thereafter there is a constant increase in the number of embodiments—we find successively the figures ten, twelve, twenty-two, twenty-four, twenty-eight (A. Barth, *Religions of India*[2], London, 1891, p. 171)—until at length they are spoken of as innumerable, so that the great teachers of any religion whatever, as, *e.g.*, Buddha and Jesus, could be numbered among the *avatāras*. Eventually every *guru* ('teacher') claimed to be an *avatāra*. Even the theory of a single incarnation for each age leads here to the idea of an infinite number, as the several ages always recur. In certain schools of the Mahāyāna the doctrine of a Buddha in each 'non-void' cosmic period (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Bud.], vol. i. p. 189 f.) developed into the theory of a celestial prototype for each earthly Buddha, and subsequently into the idea of the one Buddha-god, of whom the various individual Buddhas are emanations. Schoponhauer (*Sämmtliche Werke*, Leipzig [Reclam][2], 1892, v. 413) and others are of opinion that the idea of a plurality of Buddhas is more rational than that of the one Christ.

The Shī'a and its sects adopted an intermediate position. There is among them no unanimity as to the number of *imāms*. On the ordinary enumeration, officially recognized by the Persian State religion, there are twelve, the last of whom, Muḥammad Abu-l-Qāsim (9th cent.), will return in the final age as the Mahdī. In the Middle Ages, the 'Sect of the Seven Imāms,' the Ismā'īlites, had a great vogue. They enumerated seven *Nāṭiq* ('speaking ones') or manifestations of God, viz. Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus, Muḥammad (with 'Alī as his *Asās*, 'deputy'), and Muḥammad Mahdī, the son of Ismā'īl, from whom the sect took its name (A. Christensen, *Muhamedanske Digtere og Tænkere*, Copenhagen, 1906, p. 77 ff.). As Islām, in conformity with the Bible as its literary source, teaches that human history has a consummation, the number of possible incarnations must in any case be limited.

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the course of the article.

N. SÖDERBLOM.

INCARNATION (American). — The notion that the 'life' may be transferred from one body to another is wide-spread among the American aborigines. It is a conception fostered by that type of Animism which sees in Nature powers rather than things, or, at all events, no sensible thing without its active and concealed potency; and, again, it is a conception already mythically expressed in the frequent cosmogonies which derive the life of the Earth and of Earth's children from that of the demiurge whose transformed body the Earth is.

'The thought originally expressed by the ancient teachers of the Iroquoian and other barbaric peoples,' writes J. N. B. Hewitt (*SI RBEW* [1903], p. 138), 'was that the earth through the life, or life power, innate and immanent in its substance—the life personated by Tharonhiawakon—by feeding itself to them produces plants and fruits and vegetables which serve

[1] Bāyazīd said: 'Of a truth I am God; there is no god beside me; give homage unto me! Glory be unto me! How great is my majesty!'

[1] *India*, ed. E. C. Sachau, London, 1910, i. 38.

as food for birds and animals, all which in their turn become food for men, a process whereby the life of the earth is transmuted into that of man and of all living things.'

'Tharonhiawakon' is the demiurgic titan, descended from the sky to become the fashioner and the soul of earth-life. The word means, says Hewitt, 'He grasps the sky (by memory)'—a designation which clearly places this being in the pan-mythic group of beings cast down from heaven to become sources of earth-life (cf., further, Hewitt, in *HAI* ii. [1910] 718 ff.). Other designations, such as 'Sprout' and 'Sapling,' indicate the reverse consideration of this being, *i.e.* as already fallen and as incarnate in the vegetable life of Mother Earth. This character appears explicitly in the close of the Onondaga version of the myth, as given by Hewitt (*21 RBEW*, pp. 218–220):

'Moreover, it is said that this Sapling, in the manner in which he has life, has this to befall him recurrently, that he becomes old in body, and that when, in fact, his body becomes ancient normally, he then retransforms his body in such wise that he becomes a new man-being again and again recovers his youth, so that one would think that he had just then grown to the size which a man-being customarily has when he reaches the youth of man-beings, as manifested by the change of voice at the age of puberty. Moreover, it is so that continuously the *orenda* immanent in his body—the *orenda* with which he suffuses his person, the *orenda* which he projects or exhibits, through which he is possessed of force and potency—is ever full, undiminished, and all-sufficient; and, in the next place, nothing that is *otkon*, or deadly, nor, in the next place, even the Great Destroyer, *otkon* in itself and faceless, has any effect on him, he being perfectly immune to its *orenda*; and, in the next place, there is nothing that can bar his way or veil his faculties. Moreover, it is verily thus with all the things that are contained in the earth here present, that they severally retransform or exchange their bodies. It is thus with all the things that sprout and grow, and, in the next place, with all things that produce themselves and grow, and, in the next place, all the man-beings. All these are affected in the same manner, that they severally transform their bodies, and, in the next place, that they retransform their bodies, severally, without cessation.'

This may be regarded as the general philosophy of those Animists who have not attained a clear conception of personality; life is regarded as fluid, passing readily from one embodiment to another; it has no monadic totality, but separates into qualities and functions rather than into organisms; into effluences and simulacra rather than into individual spirits. Almost universally the Indians hold such a view—the notion of individual immortality, and even the 'Happy Hunting Ground,' being largely developed under White influence.

This conception of a fluid life permeating all material things finds an early and logical expression in the innumerable sacramental rites whereby the Indians endeavour to acquire the traits of those creatures whose flesh they eat or of those divinities symbolized in the sacramental food. Thus Le Jeune (*Jesuit Relations*, ed. R. G. Thwaites, 1896–1901, ix. 121) notes:

'A savage, seeing a Frenchman eat the heart of a certain bird, said to him, "How! thou who art a man, darest thou eat that? If we people should eat it, our enemies would surprise us and would kill us; that is a woman's food."'

The inter-continental custom of eating the flesh, especially the heart, and of drinking the blood, of an enemy who had proved his courage in death by torture, that this courage might be transferred to the partakers (cf. ETHICS AND MORALITY [American]), is but a further, and terrible, illustration of this idea. Indeed, Garcilasso (*Royal Commentaries*, ed. Paris, 1830, I. xi.) states that some of the S. American tribes, after having eaten the body of such a victim, dried the nerves and bones and worshipped these remains as divine. In Mexico, in various festivals, we find cakes fashioned into the likeness of the deity, or of its attributes, or even, in the case of Omacatl, into the shape of a bone regarded as a bone of the god, which are then eaten as sacraments. Similar sacramental notions underlay the various forms of ceremonial cannibalism practised by the Aztecs and other Mexican peoples. The hearts of victims were customarily devoted to the divinity, but the bodies were eaten by the worshippers in many, if not all, cases. It seems to be beyond doubt that the partaker was expected to derive some magical or 'holy' power from the flesh of one who had in turn derived it from consecration to the divinity.

In the large number of Aztec instances in which the sacrificial victim is regarded as a personation of the god, this is certainly true. The theanthropic idea is everywhere present. Sahagun (*Hist. gén.*, Paris, 1880, bks. i., ii.) gives a multitude of examples. Thus, in the worship of the god of merchants, with his five brothers and his sister, 'they sacrificed to all together, or to each of them, one or more slaves, clothed in the ornaments of the god, as if they were his image.' Slaves were bought for this special purpose, care being taken that they were sound and without defect; they were fed and fattened for the sacrifice and the sacramental banquet following it, all the while being encouraged to dance and sing and live a life of rejoicing, so that, says Sahagun, 'they made no case of the death that was reserved for them' (I. xix.). The typical instance of this sort is perhaps that of the young man who for a year personated the great god Tezcatlipoca, living amid the splendour of temple service, with four maidens having the character of divine consorts. At the end of this time he was sacrificed to the god, while at the same time another youth, beautiful and unblemished, was chosen in his place.

'During the year he traversed the city carrying flowers in his hands and accompanied by a great following. He saluted graciously all whom he encountered, and they, on their part, taking him for the veritable image of Tezcatlipoca, threw themselves on their knees before him and worshipped him' (II. v.; see also the brilliant description in Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico*, London, 1874, ch. iii.).

The flaying of the victims and the wearing of their skins was a not uncommon mode of transferring the divine attributes. In the worship of the 'Mother of the Gods' the woman who personated the goddess was flayed and her skin worn by a priest, who, 'thus clothed, traversed the city, where he was the occasion of a thousand insanities' (Sahagun, I. viii.; cf. II. xi.). A curious divinity was Xipe Totec, 'the flayed one,' in whose rites the worshippers wore the skins of the sacrificed victims, assuming that they were clothed in the skin of the god, and expecting thereby to be healed of skin diseases (*ib.* I. xviii.). The notion appears to some extent in the northern tribes—at least the Pottawatomi 'Story of the man with six sons,' narrated by de Smet (*Life, Letters, and Travels*, New York, 1905, VII. viii.), presents striking analogies.

Ritualistic impersonation of mythical beings, spirits of ancestors, the heroic dead, etc., is to be found in many localities. It is probably a factor in all totemic rites and in symbolic face-painting. In the Pawnee *Hako*, when the consecrated child has been painted with the lines in which, says the priest, 'we see the face of Tiráwa atius, the giver of life and power to all things,' it is told to look into a bowl which has been filled with running water:

'The running water symbolizes the passing on of generations, one following another. The little child looks on the water and sees its own likeness, as it will see that likeness in its children and children's children. The face of Tiráwa atius is there also, giving promise that the life of the child shall go on, as the waters flow over the land' (A. C. Fletcher, *22 RBEW*, pt. 2 [1904], pp. 233, 241).

The most notable development of this conception is among the Indians of the North-West, where masked shamans personate mythic powers, and among the Pueblo Indians, with whom veritable mysteries are enacted by the priesthoods—tests of initiation implying at least some degree of participation in the supernatural character represented

(see J. W. Fewkes, *15 RBEW* [1897] and *21 RBEW*; M. C. Stevenson, *23 RBEW* [1904]; J. R. Swanton, *26 RBEW* [1908]).

It is not without significance that the Shawnee prophet Tenskwatawa was regarded by his followers as an incarnation of Manabozho. For Manabozho is the demiurge, the servant of the Good Manitou, through whose labours power has been brought from heaven to earth, and the life of man made tolerable—and it is in this capacity of creator and mediator that Manabozho holds a central place in the *Midē* rites. And not only was Tenskwatawa himself an incarnation of this demiurge, so that 'his words were believed to be the direct utterances of a deity,' but his body was regarded as transubstantiated in 'four strings of beans, which we were told were made of the flesh itself of the prophet'; these

'were carried with much solemnity to each man in the lodge, and he was expected to take hold of each string at the top, and draw them gently through his hand. This was called shaking hands with the prophet, and was considered as solemnly engaging to obey his injunctions, and accept his mission as from the Supreme' (J. Mooney, *14 RBEW*, pt. 2 [1896], pp. 675, 678 f.).

It is with Manabozho, again, that Longfellow identifies the Iroquoian chief and prophet Hiawatha—possibly with some traditional right, since the Iroquoian demiurge is very similar to the Algonquian.

The Aztec myth of Quetzalcoatl is a typical case of belief in re-embodiment. This deity-god of the winds, closely associated with the quetzal (*Pharomacrus mocino*), which was his emblem, was the ruler of Anahuac in a golden age of peace and plenty; driven thence by the conquering Tezcatlipoca, he set sail, over the eastern waters, for the land of Tlapallan, promising one day to return and rule again, king of a re-juvenated realm. The appearance of Cortes was mistaken for the millennial return of this deity, re-embodied in his ancient form, for he was traditionally bearded and light of hue—a fact which modified the resistance offered to the Spaniards by the superstitious Montezuma. Possibly Quetzalcoatl is but the personification of the quetzal itself (to which temples were erected as far south as Guatemala), regarded as a symbol of the Sun, and, like the phœnix, periodically dying to be born again. The plumes of the quetzal were insignia of the Mexican rulers, and it is an interesting analogy that the Peruvian Incas wore as a special sign feathers of the 'coraquenque,' of which they supposed but a single pair to exist, the earthly representatives of their sun-descended ancestors, Manco Ccapac and his spouse (see Garcilasso, *Royal Commentaries*, VI. xxviii.).

The Aztec deity Huitzilopochtli is another deity regarded as having once been an earthly hero, to whom 'after his death they rendered the honours of godship, making him offerings of slaves' (Sahagun, I. i.). A very curious rite in his service was his symbolic slaying, an elaborate effigy being made of cereals, into the heart of which a dart was plunged by a man personating Quetzalcoatl. Afterwards the body was eaten, but the participants in this strange sacrament were compelled to undergo such penance that, says Sahagun, they sometimes fled the country, preferring death at the hands of their enemies (III. i.).

This god, like many another god and wizard, possessed the shape-shifting power; and from this to belief in transmigration and reincarnation is a step the Indians were certain to take. 'They believe that souls enter other bodies after death' is the simple form in which this general notion is expressed by the Jesuits (Thwaites, xv. 183). The most primitive and crude form in which the idea appears is in that form of cannibalism which consists in eating the bodies of deceased relatives, in order that their 'life' may be transmitted to the partakers. This custom appears only among the lower peoples, chiefly in S. America, one form of it, interesting as probably representing a transition from the cruder forms noted by Garcilasso, being that of the Yapura river tribes, who burn the bones of their dead and then mingle the ashes with their drink.

An interesting custom in this connexion is the rite of bestowing the name of the deceased upon another person, who is then supposed to have assumed the dead person's character:

'It has often been said that the dead were brought to life by making the living bear their names. This is done for several reasons—to revive the memory of a brave man, and to incite him who shall bear his name to imitate his courage; to take revenge upon the enemies, for he who takes the name of a man killed in battle binds himself to avenge his death; to assist the family of a dead man, because he who brings him back to life, and who represents him, assumes all the duties of the deceased, feeding his children as if he were their own father—in fact, they call him their father, and he calls them his children. Mothers or other relatives who love a son, or a daughter, or any of their kindred, cause such persons to be resuscitated, through a desire to see them close by them—transferring the affection that they felt for the deceased to the persons who take their names' (Thwaites, xxii. 289; cf. xxvi. 155–63, where the ceremony of resuscitating a chieftain is described in detail).

Nor must we forget the Indian messiah of the 'Ghost-Dance Religion,' who taught that the Indian dead were to be resurrected, the old life restored, and even the buffalo and other game of former days to be brought back in the body (see *14 RBEW*, pt. 2). Christian influences were at work here, but they fell on well-prepared aboriginal ground.

See also POSSESSION, REINCARNATION.

LITERATURE.—In addition to authorities cited in the article, see list appended to COMMUNION WITH DEITY (American).

H. B. ALEXANDER.

INCARNATION (Buddhist).—**1.** It has been held that certain Australian tribes deny all connexion between conception and sexual intercourse, and believe that the spirit—an animal totem or the soul of an ancestor—takes its place in the womb of the mother in accordance with certain mysterious laws and under certain trees, without the normal intervention of any physical cause.[1] The savage theories of conception, however, do not necessarily imply such ignorance of physiological laws. It would be more accurate to say that many primitive peoples believe in the pre-existence of the soul of the child, and hold that it is independent of the soul and life of the parents. From all time it has been accepted as a fact that only divine union is always productive—οὐκ ἀποφώλιοι σύναι ἀθανάτων (Hom. *Od.* xi. 249)—and from this it has been logically concluded in Australia and India that sexual intercourse, though it may condition conception, is not the cause of it. A living and intelligent germ is necessary. The Brāhmans thought that this germ was a soul descended from the moon through air, smoke, rain, rice, and seminal fluid. Among the Australians and Hindus the belief was that a kind of spirit, a totem or a *gandharva*, lay in wait for a suitable opportunity to penetrate the womb of some woman and so become reincarnated.

According to Buddhist belief, three causes are necessary to conception: (1) that the father and mother have intercourse, (2) that the mother fulfil her time, and (3) that a *gandharva* should be in readiness. Such is, in so many words, the reply of the Buddha when he is asked how children are born (*Majjhima*, ii. 156; *Divyāvadāna*, 440; *Milinda*, 123). In scholastic circles this *gandharva* is given a name which is really a definition—*antarābhava*, an intermediary being, succeeding the *maraṇabhava*, 'the being in the dying state' or 'death,' and preceding the *upapattibhava*, 'the being in the state of being born' or 'conception.'

[1] See, *e.g.*, S. Reinach on the Ratapas, in *CAIBL* xii. (1912).

A certain sect possesses a *sūtra*, which is lacking in the Pāli canon, where the Buddha speaks of the *antarābhava*; the Pāli canonical sources mention only the *gandharva*.

2. All sects do not believe in the *antarābhava*.

In this connexion we might quote more particularly the case of the Mahāsāṅgikas (W. Wassilieff, *Buddhismus*, St. Petersburg, 1860, pp. 266, 274, 281; W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, London, 1884, p. 191) and the school of the Kathāvatthu (viii. 2; cf. xiv. 2). In the time of Vasubandhu (3rd–4th cent. A.D. [?]) a certain sect of India proper considered the doctrine of the *antarābhava* heretical, and its arguments coincide in many respects with those of Tissa-Buddhaghoṣa (Kathāvatthu); but, while the Pāli school preserves the traditional text: 'Three causes are necessary . . . that a *gandharva* should be in readiness,' the Sanskrit scholars, who deny the existence of the *antarābhava*, read: '. . . that a being in the dying state (*maraṇabhava*). . . .' They believe that, just as an object projects its reflexion directly and without intermediary on a mirror, so the constituent elements (*skandhas*) of the dying being are immediately replaced by other elements, situated in a suitable womb, which form a new being who inherits the *karma* of the dying being. It is in this sense that we must understand H. C. Warren's formula (*Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, p. 234): 'Rebirth is not transmigration' (see the long and interesting discussion in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Fr. tr., London, 1914, p. 16 f.).

3. The belief in the *antarābhava*, however, is not contradictory to the doctrine of non-identity or to the denial of 'transmigration' (*saṁkrama*), *i.e.* the passage of a person (*pudgala*), or *skandhas* (the five constituents of the ego), from one existence to another. The *skandhas* do not pass from one existence to another, but, as a flame, continually renewed, sweeps over the whole prairie, so the *skandhas* of the dying being engender the *skandhas* of the intermediary being, which, being continually renewed, finally arrive at the point where they are to enter a womb and engender the *skandhas* of the new being.

The *sūtra* (*Dīgha*, ii. 63), as a matter of fact, speaks only of the 'descent of the *vijñāna* into the womb,' *i.e.* the descent of 'thought,' 'the spiritual element,' 'the series of thoughts'; but here, we are told, we must understand by *vijñāna* the five *skandhas*. In the sphere of desire and matter (*kāma°*, *rūpadhātu*; see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Buddhist], vol. iv. p. 130), thought is too weak to exist without the support of matter.

The opinion, common to several European writers, that only the *karma* is reincarnated, would be of more weight if confirmed by undisputed texts. In cases where the existence of the intermediary being is denied, it is believed that the *skandhas* of the dying being project their substitutes into the womb, and such *skandhas* indeed—infernal, brute, human, or divine—as the retribution of *karma* requires. But it is not to be explained how a *karma* could exist independently of the *skandhas*, or produce the *skandhas*.

4. The intermediary being is 'projected' by the same *karma* as projects the future existence. It will in consequence have the form and aspect of the future being, *i.e.* it will be infernal, human, divine, and so on, according to the nature of the future being. Its dimensions are those of a child of 5 or 6. Its organs are developed; *e.g.*, the intermediary being which is to generate a Bodhisattva bears all the marks of a Bodhisattva. It penetrates the womb, not along with aliments, but by the natural way; that is why the second-born of twins is considered the elder. The body of the intermediary being is transparent and subtle and is 'not susceptible to touch.' Nothing can its progress towards the place of its birth, since it is armed with the magic power of *karma*; it feeds on the aliment called 'in mouthfuls' (contrasted with touch, joy, etc.), but only on the subtle part of it, viz. the smell (*gandha*), from which it derives its name, *gandharva*, 'smell eater.' Some say there is no fixed rule as to how long this being lasts; it simply exists till the conditions requisite for conception are realized, *e.g.* till the union of the animal, human, or divine couple of the species it is to belong to is completed, or else, in the case of beings born of heat, *i.e.* from the exudation of the elements (*saṁsvedaja*), till masses of flesh in a state of decomposition permit of its incarnation as a worm, and so on. Others maintain that the intermediary being lives seven days. If, at the end of this time, incarnation has been impossible, it dies and is reborn for another week. Others put the length of the period at seven weeks. Instead of being reincarnated as an ox, a dog, or a black bear, it may be reincarnated as a buffalo, a jackal, or a brown bear, if it is not the season for oxen, etc. But the animal class may be definitely determined; in this case the *karma* which has determined the intermediary being will bring about the realization of the causes necessary to incarnation, irrespective of season.

5. How is the intermediary being incarnated? With an eye born of the force of *karma*, it recognizes, even from a great distance, the place where it is to be born and where its father and mother are united. When it is female, it conceives a desire for the father; when it is male, for the mother. Troubled by thoughts of love and hate, it hovers round the place of its birth; in its desire for the delights of love, it imagines that it is the agent, and it enters into the impurity (seminal fluid and blood) already formed in the womb. The *skandhas* of the intermediary being then grow hard; it dies, and conception takes place. Conception presupposes also the destruction of the elements of productivity—sperm and blood; the first cause of the embryo is the intermediary being, for sperm and blood are devoid of thought. This is how the beings which are to be born out of the chorion or the egg are incarnated.

Those which are to be born of the exudation of the elements are attracted by smell. There is a fourth matrix (*yoni*) or category of birth: the apparitional beings (*aupapāduka*, *i.e.* 'easily born') which come to life instantaneously, with all their organs intact, and all their members and sub-members complete. To this category belong the gods, the beings of the lower world, the intermediary beings themselves, and some privileged men, who are born without the aid of blood, seminal fluid, or the exudation of the elements. The intermediary beings who are to be born in this way are attracted to the place of their birth by a desire to be in a special place or to dwell in a certain abode, *e.g.* the nether world. 'How does the future infernal being come to desire to dwell in the lower regions? He is troubled in spirit, he thinks he is tormented by icy wind and rain, and he sees the fires of hell burning; his desire for heat hastens him thither. The inverse takes place in the case of the cold infernal regions' (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Fr. tr., p. 26). In this class, incarnation is rapid, for it depends solely on the conditions proper to the intermediary being itself. For the beings born in what is called the 'immaterial' domain (*ārūpya*; see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Buddhist], vol. iv. p. 130), the intermediary being is useless. Under the very tree where the saint dies in meditation, and at the very moment of his death, he begins an existence above and beyond space.

6. A detailed account of the incarnation of the 'future Buddha' (Bodhisattva [*q.v.*]) would require too much space, so we must be content with indicating a few of the chief points, some of them unpublished as yet.

(*a*) The old school, represented in this case at least by the Sanskrit school of Abhidharma, makes no essential distinction between the incarnation of the Bodhisattva and that of other men:

'Which is the best of all matrices (*yoni*)? The apparitional matrix (*aupapāduka*). It is exempt from sperm, blood, and all foreign matter on which an intermediary being could fix. Why then did the Bodhisattva at his last birth choose the matrix of the chorion (*jarāyu*)? He possesses the "mastery" over birth, *i.e.* he can be born where he wills. Because he saw the great advantages of being born of the chorion, the advantage of binding the great family of Śākyas by ties of parentship to the Dharma, the advantage of inspiring with respect the people who would say of him: "He belongs to a family of Sovereign Kings (*chakravartin*)," the advantage of encouraging the faithful who would say: "He is a man; even men can attain to this perfection." If he had neither race nor family, people would ask: "Who is he? A magical man or a demoniacal being (*piśāca*)?"—There is another explanation: nothing remains of the bodies of apparitional beings at death, just as no oil remains in the lamp at morning. Now, the Bodhisattva wanted to leave behind him at death remains through the worship of which thousands of men could gain heaven and deliverance. That is the reason why he was born of the chorion. But this explanation cannot be accepted by the Buddhists, who attribute to the Buddha a magic power of creation; he could have created remains' (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Fr. tr., p. 14).

The Bodhisattva, however, is not incarnated in exactly the same way as the intermediary beings destined for the human race. These generally enter the womb under the impression that it is a hut to protect them from rain and cold (in the case of common beings), or a palace (in the case of noble beings). The Sovereign Kings enter the womb knowing that they are entering it. So also do the Pratyekabuddhas, who in addition, while remaining, know that they are there. The Buddhas

alone enter the womb, remain there, and leave it in full consciousness of what they are doing.

The future Bodhisattva does not assume an animal form to penetrate the womb of the mother, the vision of Māyā (in which the Bodhisattva becomes a white elephant with six tusks) being merely a portent of the future.

(*b*) The Great Vehicle, in its first stages (viewed from the logical point of view), continues to believe that the Bodhisattva is a man, 'not a god.' Men must not be given the chance of thinking 'we are only men, incapable of fulfilling this task, incapable of reaching this state of perfection' (*Lalitavistara*, 87 f.). But the blessed or noble (*bhadrika*) character of his descent into and sojourn in the womb is insisted on; he is not soiled by the impurities of the womb or by excremental matter. The question of the 'virginity' of Māyā, of the absence of blood and seminal fluid, has been settled, since Māyā (*Lalitavistara*, 42. 9) takes the octuple vow before conception; but the author of the *Lalitavistara* does not press the point.

The *Mahāvastu*, the *Suvarṇa*, etc., hold that the Buddha is born as an apparitional being; his body is, therefore, defined as 'spiritual' (*manomaya*), which means 'produced by the spirit' without the aid of the elements of generation. It follows from this that there are no remains of his body after death.

The Bodhisattva was also regarded as a magical apparition (*nirmita*), the unreal reflexion of the true body which is resplendent in the Tuṣita heaven or in the distant and colossal empyrean familiar to the later *sūtras* (*Saddharma*).

LITERATURE.—H. Windisch, *Buddha's Geburt und die Lehre von der Seelenwanderung*, Leipzig, 1908 (numerous Buddhist, Brāhman, and medical sources); A. Barth, in *Journal des Savants*, August, 1899; L. de la Vallée Poussin, in *JA* ii. [1902] 294, *JRAS*, 1897, p. 466, *Théorie des douze causes*, London, 1913, pp. 12, 127, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Fr. tr., London, 1914; H. Oldenberg, *Religion du Veda*, tr. V. Henry, Paris, 1903, p. 209; T. W. Rhys Davids, in *JRAS*, 1899, p. 79; H. A. Jaeschke, *Tib.-Eng. Dictionary*, London, 1881, p. 367; Sarat Chandra, *Tib. Dictionary*, Calcutta, 1902, p. 867; *Mīmāṃsā-lokavārttika*, Benares, 1898, p. 703; *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, MS, Cambridge, fol. 144a; *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, ii. 3 (*SBE* xlv. [1895] 393); *Mahābhārata*, iii. 183. 76, xii. 298. 18 (E. W. Hopkins, *Great Epic*, New York, 1902, pp. 89, 175; *JAOS* xxii. [1901] 372); *Anugītā*, iii. (*SBE* viii. [1898] 241); *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, Benares, 1895, p. 33. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

INCARNATION (Chinese).—Incarnation in anything like the meaning attached to that term in Christian theology is unknown in Chinese religious thought. We find there the idea of human beings elevated to the sphere of the divine in the case of those worthies who are worshipped with divine honours. We find also the idea of the manifestation of spiritual beings, or the possession by them of human persons who are their mediums in such a way that the spiritual power may be regarded as temporarily resident in the medium; but in neither is there any approach to the thought of true incarnation.

When we disregard the secondary spiritual powers and confine ourselves to the consideration of Shang Ti, we find that the idea of the Incarnation of the Supreme is as remote from Chinese religious thought. We have, it is true, such ideas as occur in connexion with the birth of Hou Chi.

'The first birth of our people was from Chiang Yüan. How did she give birth to our people? She had presented a pure offering and sacrificed, that her childlessness might be taken away. She then trod on a toe-print made by God (Ti),[1] and was moved, in the large place where she rested. She became pregnant; she dwelt retired; she gave birth to and nourished a son who was Hou Chi. When she had fulfilled her months, her first-born son came forth like a lamb. There was no bursting, nor rending, no injury, no hurt—showing how wonderful he would be. Did not God (Shang Ti) give her the comfort? Had He not accepted her pure offering and sacrifice, so that thus easily she brought forth her son?' (*Shi King*, pt. iii. bk. ii. ode 1 [*SBE* iii.[2] (1899) 306 f.]).

[1] 'Made by God' is by some Chinese authorities translated 'made by the sovereign' and so this element of the supernatural is eliminated.

But the idea of supernatural conception and birth must be distinguished from the idea of incarnation. The former does not imply the latter, and of the latter idea, understood as Shang Ti becoming man and revealing himself in and through the development of a human personality, there is no trace in Chinese thought.

The classical conception of Shang Ti is remarkably high. Physical anthropomorphism is restrained, and no image of Shang Ti has ever been made; but he is freely spoken of as an ethical being, righteous and loving. As the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, then, finds its fundamental Biblical presupposition in the conception of man as made in the image of God, so, if within the circle of Chinese religious ideas it seeks a point of attachment, it must find such a point in the ethical affinity of Shang Ti and man, which, *e.g.*, makes Shang Ti the ethical standard for man's imitation (*Shi King*, pt. iii. bk. i. ode 7), and underlies the thought of the Emperor, in so far as he is worthy of his position, being, like the theocratic King of Israel, the Son of Heaven. Perhaps, also, there might be brought into connexion with the cosmical significance of the Incarnation the conception in 'The Doctrine of the Mean' of the Sage, in whom the principles involved in nature are brought to perfection, and who in turn brings to perfection the world of men and things.

P. J. MACLAGAN.

INCARNATION (Egyptian).—The ancient Egyptians had great difficulty in forming abstract or general conceptions,[1] therein resembling certain negro races who to this day do not frame such general terms as, *e.g.*, 'woman' or 'crocodile,' but think always of a particular woman or a particular crocodile.[2] Like children, therefore, they found it difficult to think of an ego or self as an integrating conception, and instead of saying 'I see,' 'you walk,' 'he strikes,' they said 'my eyes see,' 'your legs walk,' 'his hand strikes.'[3] Similarly, they lacked originally the concepts 'all' and 'whole'; so that, instead of the expression 'all men,' they used the phrases 'each men,' or, more commonly, 'each eyes,' 'each legs,' etc., according to the bodily organ concerned in the particular case. For 'whole' they had no distinct term, but expressed the idea by some such circumlocution as 'to its limit,' 'to its extent,' 'in its scope.'[4]

This inability to frame abstract ideas operated powerfully upon the formation of religious conceptions among the Egyptians. The thought of a more or less abstract deity, exercising his power in a transcendental manner, was entirely foreign to the Egyptian mind. Even a supreme being was conceivable only as a concrete existence. In order that such a being might conform to earthly norms, it must have earthly attributes, and give effect to its powers by earthly means. The Egyptian deities were accordingly thought of as being embodied in men, or in animals, or, though less frequently, in plants, and even in things fashioned by human hands, such as statues, obelisks, houses, and temples. A deity had to eat and drink;[5] he lived and died. He was, therefore, always connected with a particular locality. If he went elsewhere, he deserted his previous locality, as he could not in his complete individuality be present

[1] A. Wiedemann, *Muséon*, x. [1891] 42 f.
[2] K. Weule, *Negerleben in Ostafrika*[2], Leipzig, 1909, p. 56.
[3] Cf. E. de Rougé, *Chrestomathie égyptienne*, ii. [Paris, 1868] 54 ff.
[4] Examples, *ib.* p. 91 ff.
[5] According to C. R. Lepsius, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien*, Berlin, 1851–59, iii. 30b, line 16, each of the four obelisks of Thutmosis III. in Thebes received as sacrificial offerings a hundred loaves and four pitchers of beer.

in different places at one and the same time. If he desired to hear or to see, he required ears or eyes; and while, *e.g.*, ears were ascribed to a deity in large numbers[1] in order that he might perceive more sounds and words than human beings can perceive, yet the faculty was of limited range. It is true that certain texts speak occasionally of a deity as omnipresent and omnipotent, but these passages are in reality invocations designed to flatter that particular deity, and to induce him to maintain his reputation as a supreme power by granting his suppliant's prayer.[2] The conception of a truly omnipotent deity was one that the Egyptians never attained; and that the ostensible references to such are, after all, but phrases to which no real conviction attached is made quite clear by the fact that similar qualities were ascribed to the reigning Pharaoh in the panegyrics of his subjects.[3]

When the Egyptians sought to attribute a more universal character to a deity in a precise and complete sense, they had to resort to a kind of syncretism. They fabricated a number of figures as manifestations of the deity, and as bearing in that capacity various names (*ren-u*). To the Egyptian mind, however, the 'name' was not, as in modern languages, a general term. It was a thing by itself, and independent of the object which it denoted, and it possessed an immortality of its own.[4] It was related in the closest way to what it signified, but was not identical with it. To have knowledge of a name was to have power over its bearer, but in certain cases the name might continue to exist apart from the latter. The 'name,' in fact, was related to its bearer in some such way as the *ka*, the *ba*, and other immortal elements were related to the individual human being.

The several 'names' of a deity were not simple incarnations thereof, but were generally distinct personalities. Thus, if Isis was designated by, and worshipped under, various epithets, such as Hathor, Mut, etc., these were not regarded as mere emanations existing in and through Isis, but were figures complete in themselves and endowed with a power and activity of their own. The Egyptians did homage to each by itself, and did not think of such homage as accorded to the central deity. When they wished to worship Isis herself, they required to direct their thoughts specially to her. The primary deity always remained a unity, neither surrendering any of his distinctive characteristics to the subsidiary figures, nor taking from them any of their attributes or achievements.

In order that a deity might exercise his power at a particular place, he required a material body, which served him for a longer or shorter period as a vesture or embodiment; and, by way of facilitating such material manifestation, the temples were furnished with statues or symbols which corresponded to his supposed corporeal form, and could, accordingly, be used by him at once as a place of sojourn. When such object had been animated by the presence of the deity, it was regarded as actually the deity himself. But a material tenement of this kind was not absolutely necessary. Thus the god of Edfu, in order to help the sun-god against his enemies, assumed the form of a winged solar disk, and thereafter some portion of his divinity always inhered in this new figure, which, accordingly, became one of the most potent apotropæic symbols in the religion of Egypt.[1] In exactly the same way statues and symbols likewise permanently retained something of the divine personality. They became separate deities, whose existence in no way interfered with the continued existence of the original deity as an integral entity, or with his capacity to become incarnate in similar fashion at another place. Here we encounter a mode of thinking which is found among many other peoples, viz. the belief that in the painted figure, or even in a mere reflexion, there inheres permanently a part of the personality of the original, though without in any way taking from the latter any portion of his individuality.

Such modes of thought explain the rise of numerous distinct forms of one and the same deity in a single locality, and also, when once he had become embodied there in various objects, their continued co-existence. The several forms were differentiated from one another either by the attributes which the deity had manifested in his various embodiments or by the sacred localities from which he had been derived under a certain characteristic, and at which he usually resided in a particular form. Each of these forms of the original deity had a distinct individuality. They were represented side by side in long rows of statues or reliefs, or else were enumerated in extensive lists.[2]

So far as a deity was not compelled by incantations to abide in a particular place in order to serve the purposes of the person casting the spell, the choice among the various available forms of incarnation lay with the deity himself. By means of certain spells, a dead man, being endowed with magical powers, could, after his resurrection to life, avail himself of existing embodiments or not, having the power to assume whatever forms he liked, as that of a bird, a serpent, a crocodile, the god P'tah, etc., and was subject to no compulsion in the matter.

What we find here is not metempsychosis, but the capacity of the dead to incarnate themselves as they willed. The number of possible transformations was unlimited. It is true that the *Book of the Dead*[3] gives only a few—about twelve—but these are merely a selection of peculiarly important forms, and by no means exhaust the series. The fact that in a text of late origin[4] the regular twelve transformations are brought into relation with the twelve hours of the day doubtless points to a later attempt to reduce the forms to a scheme. But the arrangement of the relative chapters in the *Book of the Dead* shows no uniformity, and the forms given in that text are not exhaustive, while such a relation between forms and hours is nowhere else referred to.

The dead might also assume a human form. Thus, in the first tale of Setna, Ahure becomes incarnate in Tabubuë, and Neferkaptah in an old man. In this narrative, indeed, even the pieces of a game have incarnations as the fifty-two human

[1] A god with 77 eyes and 77 ears is met with in the Magic Papyrus Harris (vii. 6), ed. F. J. Chabas, *Le Papyrus magique Harris*, Châlon-sur-Saône, 1860, p. 99; cf. E. A. W. Budge, *Facsimiles of Egyptian Hieratic Papyri in the British Museum*, London, 1910, pl. 26, p. 26.

[2] Cf. the remarks in the art. God (Egyptian), vol. vi. p. 276.

[3] Papyrus Anastasi, ii. pl. 6, line 3 ff. = iv. pl. 5, line 6 ff.; cf. G. Maspero, *Du Genre épistolaire chez les anciens Égyptiens*, Paris, 1872, p. 79 f.

[4] Wiedemann, *Die Amulette der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 16, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, p. 293 ff., in *Muséon*, xv. [1896] 49 ff., and in *L'Égypte*, i. [Alexandria, 1895] 578 ff.

[1] H. E. Naville, *Textes relatifs au mythe d'Horus*, Geneva, 1870, pl. 12 ff.; tr. H. Brugsch, 'Die Sage von der geflügelten Sonnenscheibe,' in *AGG* xiv. [1869] 173–236.

[2] *e.g.*, the rows of statues exhibiting the forms of the goddess Sechet in Karnak, founded by Amenophis III., and completed by Sheshonk I.; cf. P. E. Newberry, in *PSBA* xxv. [1903] 217 ff., M. Benson and J. Gourlay, *The Temple of Mut in Asher*, London, 1899, pp. 31, 41, 248. Some of the figures in that series bore no distinguishing epithet, and were manifestly intended to represent new, and not as yet distinctive, types of incarnation assumed by the goddess. For a series of reliefs representing forms of Amon, cf., *e.g.*, Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, iii. 86*c*, *d*. For lists of the forms of Osiris, see the *Book of the Dead*, cxlii.—a chapter which can be traced as far back as the Theban period; cf. the important list in W. Pleyte and F. Rossi, *Papyrus de Turin*, Leyden, 1869–76, pls. 11–13, p. 92 ff.

[3] lxxvi.–lxxxviii. The texts of the *Book of the Dead* dating from the Middle Kingdom devote numerous chapters to the subject; cf. the enumeration given by G. Röder, in *AfRW* xvi. [1913] 79 f.

[4] Brugsch, *ZÄ* v. [1867] 21–26; Wiedemann, *ib.* xvi. [1878] 96 f.

menials of Tabubuë.[1] The same text tells us that Ahure and her child Merab lay buried in Koptos, and yet that they repose in the tomb of the husband and father. They desire that their mummies should likewise be brought to the tomb—a desire all the more natural because the mummy was regarded as the principal form in which the dead became incarnate; it was a vesture which he could restore to life, and in which he could once more move about.

The mummy was subject to bodily needs, and the more mobile *ba*-soul is depicted as conveying bread and water to it through the shaft of the tomb.[2] Of equal importance with the mummy were the statues,[3] which in the Old Kingdom were erected in the *serdab*, and sometimes also in the chamber of worship; in later times mainly in the latter. They were sometimes given a place in the temple,[4] where, being near the gods, they could more naturally look for a share in the sacrificial gifts than in a tomb situated at a distance. In particular, statues were placed in temples by kings as marks of special distinction for men of merit.[5]

The dead man, moreover, had a singular power of incarnation in relation to the reliefs in his tomb. When he uttered his magic formula, the incidents portrayed in the reliefs became real. He incarnated himself in his own figure, and at the same time compelled the other persons and the animals and things depicted in the relief to become embodied in theirs, and to perform the actions represented.[6] To the same mode of thought belonged the notion that a magician could by means of spells change the wax figure of a crocodile into a real crocodile.[7]

If beatified men could thus become incarnate in so great a variety of forms, there can be no doubt that the same capacity was assigned to the gods also, though it is true that our documents furnish no lists of the forms usually or possibly assumed by the individual deities, or of the magic formulæ employed by them in order to assume such incarnations.

Of more importance among the forms of incarnation resorted to by the gods were the sacred animals. This idea was not indigenous to Egypt. The god-animals were originally the independent deities of the primitive inhabitants. The normally anthropomorphic and spiritually conceived deities introduced into the country during the Nagada period by the invading and conquering peoples were brought into relation with the old indigenous objects of worship.[8] The deity of a conquering tribe that settled in a particular locality was declared to be identical with the sacred animal hitherto worshipped there, and the latter was thereafter regarded as his material manifestation. But the deity did not thereby surrender his independent existence. Thus we find, besides the Ptah incarnate in Apis, the god Ptah; and, besides the ram Amon, the god Amon. In these identifications of deity and animal, no attention was paid to possible differences in the distinctive properties of the associated pair, and this inherent disparity, as we might expect, permanently stood in the way of a real fusion between the primitive and the incarnate deity. Even when the similarity of the two was more marked, as in the case of the hawk of Edfu and the sun-god, they still maintained a mutually independent existence. The incarnation, in fact, added a fresh and independent by-form to the deity, but the distinct individuality of the latter remained as before.

These ideas emanate directly from the Egyptian conception of what is involved in personality. Man was not in himself an integral unity, nor, by analogy, was any other existent being. Each individual existence was rather a mosaic-like complex of various severally independent constituents which merely happened to be conjoined in a particular body, but was not in its own being dependent upon that body or its continued existence. Thus, in the individual human personality there were, besides the body, the various constituents of the soul—the *ka*, the *ba*, the *sechem*, etc.[1]—which, while conjoined in the man during life, first attained complete independence after death, each of them then repairing to the world beyond in order that, according to the Osirian doctrine of immortality, it might, as a result of the judgment before Osiris, be once more united with the rest in the personality so restored in the realm of the dead. In beings of a higher rank, such as kings and gods, the partition of the soul was carried still further. These had not simply a single *ka* and *ba*, but several of each, and in these the various attributes combined in the divine person were at a later date supposed to be severally incarnated.[2]

A crucial instance of the distinct individuality of these elements is found in the idea that the divinity of the king might be detached even from himself. In this case the divine personality is figured as a man bearing a general resemblance to the earthly ruler, but sometimes it wears other crowns besides his, and it seldom has even the hawk's head corresponding to the hawk-soul of the Pharaoh. It receives sacrificial offerings from the king himself, and bestows upon him heavenly gifts.[3] The proper divinity of the Pharaoh is embodied in this figure, but such disengagement of a part of the monarch's personality in no way diminishes his own individuality. The sacrificing king remains in himself complete, and is in no sense a merely partial or fragmentary being.

The *ka* of the Pharaoh is often represented as a little child—less frequently as a grown man[4]—who walks behind the king, bearing the royal *ka*-name on his head, and carrying the royal symbols. It sometimes appears also as the hieroglyphic transcript of the *ka*-name, furnished with arms in order to hold the symbols.[5] Here the incarnation of the *ka*-element in a hieroglyphic expression is effected in the same way as the individual life, power, stability, etc., of the king are embodied in the hieroglyphs for 'life,' 'power,' 'stability,' etc., which are fitted with arms and legs, and carry symbols of the monarch.[6]

Further, attributes which seem to us purely abstract were regarded as becoming incarnate, as, *e.g.*, the divine protection, which was embodied in the blood of Isis, and is represented by the knot-amulet *tet*. This amulet likewise is fitted with hands,[7] or, in some instances, with

[1] G. Maspero, *Contes populaires*[4], Paris, 1911, p. 123 ff., where further literature on the text is cited. On the figures used as 'men,' cf. Wiedemann, *Altägyp. Sagen und Märchen*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 136.

[2] Vignette in the Papyrus Nebket in the Louvre, ed. T. Devéria and P. Pierret, *Le Papyrus de Neb-Qed*, Paris, 1872, pl. 3.

[3] On these, cf. Maspero, *Études de mythologie*, i. [Paris, 1893] 53 ff., 77 ff.

[4] Cf. the numerous statues of private persons in the hiding-place at Karnak, in G. Legrain, 'Statues et statuettes de rois et de particuliers' (*Cat. du Musée du Caire*, i. [Cairo, 1906], ii. [1909]).

[5] *e.g.* Legrain, *op. cit.* i. 28, 79.

[6] Cf. Maspero, *Études égyptiennes*, i. [Paris, 1886] 193 f., *Études de mythologie*, vi. [do. 1912] 398 f.

[7] Papyrus Westcar; cf. Maspero, *Contes populaires*[4], p. 27 f.

[8] Wiedemann, *Der Tierkult der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 27 ff.

[1] Wiedemann, *The Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, also in *Congrès provincial des Orientalistes*, St. Étienne, 1878, p. 159 ff., and in *Museon*, xv. [1896] 46 ff.

[2] Lists of the sun-god's 14 *ba*s, in F. W. von Bissing, *SMA*, 1911, no. 5, pp. 5, 12 f. The sun-god, moreover, had seven *ba*s (J. Dümichen, *Altägyp. Tempelinschriften*, i., Leipzig, 1867, pl. 29; cf. P. Le Page Renouf, *Life Work*, ii. [Paris, 1903] 241; Brugsch, *Hieroglyph.-demot. Wörterbuch*, Suppl. vii. [Leipzig, 1882] 997, and R. V. Lanzone, *Dizionario di mitologia egizia*, Turin, 1881–86, p. 1205). We read often of the *ba-u* (pl.) of the king, though their precise number is not given.

[3] Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, iii. 85*a*, 189, 191.

[4] *Ib.* iii. 78*a*.

[5] Cf. the illustrations in W. M. F. Petrie, *A Season in Egypt*, London, 1888, pl. 20, p. 22; well-defined illustrations in Lepsius, iii. 20*a*, 21, 55*b*, 61.

[6] As in Lepsius, iii. 86*a*; A. Mariette, *Abydos*, i., Paris, 1869, pls. 28, 32; E. Naville, *The Festival-hall of Osorkon II.*, London, 1892, pls. 1, 9, 14; Lepsius, iii. 209*b*; Mariette, *Dendérah*, i., Paris, 1870, pls. 13, 38, 44, 45, iv., 1873, pls. 2, 12.

[7] *Book of the Dead*, civi.; cf. the vignette in Naville, *Das* p. *Todtenbuch der XVIII–XX Dynastie*, Berlin, 1886, i. .05.

a head.[1] Similarly, incarnate forms of various senses and ideas, as taste and feeling,[2] hearing and sight, year, eternity, infinity, joy,[3] male and female darkness,[4] etc., are met with as deities to whom homage is paid, and who are, therefore, expected to manifest an individual activity in favour of the suppliant. Of such forms the most frequently mentioned is Truth, who became a goddess—the Maāt worshipped in a number of temples as a woman with the symbol for 'truth' upon her head.[5] Further, the particular truth which dwelt in a particular man or deity could become incarnate in a similar figure, and this type of truth might be eaten or drunk, while the king might offer it to the deity.[6]

The possible co-existence of a number of individually distinct entities in another being which yet maintained an existence independent of them is seen also in a curious conception of the royal person. The Pharaoh comprised in himself the kings of Upper and of Lower Egypt, each of whom retained his own individuality. The monarch not only bore the titles and dignities that severally belonged to the two provinces, and had a double house and a double treasury, but, as king of either province, he also offered two distinct sacrifices, and in some instances had two tombs,[7] which, as it would seem, belonged severally to the king of Upper Egypt and the king of Lower Egypt.

The king was regarded as of divine origin, and even as a god. In this aspect, however, he was not merely the incarnate form of a particular deity, but was a new addition to the pantheon—one who, clothed in a human form and born of a human mother, lived as a man amongst men, and yet could associate with the other gods on a footing of perfect equality. At death he discarded his purely human traits, though he did not completely surrender his human nature. In the earlier period, he was supposed to eat the older gods, thereby acquiring their peculiar qualities, and so becoming the supreme divinity.[8] In later times the process of complete deification after death, by which he became a kind of Osiris, is not depicted in detail.

The Pharaoh owed his divine nature to his having been begotten by a god—a transaction which is often brought clearly before us.[9] When the procreation of a new deity had been resolved upon by the higher powers, the god Rā or Amon-Rā assumed the form of the reigning king, and visited the queen upon her couch in the palace. He revealed to her his divine character; his love suffused her person, and he begot the coming ruler, and decided what his name should be. So far, however, the god had implanted in the mother only the divine element of the son. He now commissioned the god Khnuphis to form the child's bodily members, and accordingly that deity fashioned the body of the future ruler, as also that of his *ka*, which was of like shape with himself,[1] upon the potter's wheel, while a goddess bestowed life upon these fresh creations.[2] Then at length the child was born in the presence of, and with the aid of, various gods and goddesses.

The circumstance that, when the god begot the child, only the divine element of the latter was created enables us to understand why occasionally not merely a single deity was implicated in the act, but why all the gods might claim to have begotten the Pharaoh,[3] and to exist in him. To the purely concrete mode of thought characteristic of the Egyptians such an infusion of deity could be most simply represented after the manner of a procreation. It was only in respect of this divine element, and not in respect of the whole divine personality, that the god became incarnate in the king.

That a mere particle of divinity sufficed to make the newly created king a partial incarnation and a divine person is also implied in the myth of Rā and Isis.[4] Here Isis kneads earth with the spittle of the sun-god, and forms a serpent which, in virtue of the spittle, may be a source of danger to the god himself. The same idea is found in an extant legend from the XIIth dynasty,[5] in which Isis tries to secure a portion of the seed of Set as a means of gaining power over him. In such instances the implanted particle of deity does not always carry with it the entire range of the divine nature as an incarnation in another being. Sometimes, indeed, it is only a particular attribute that is transferred in this way. Thus the man who sucks the milk of a goddess or a sacred cow absorbs thereby, not her entire divine ego, but only her inherent immortality.[6]

The choice of the reigning monarch's figure for the act of procreation was determined by the fact that the god, on other occasions of his intercourse as an incarnate being with the king, chose a form which corresponded externally to that of the Pharaoh then upon the throne. Inasmuch as the two homologous figures both existed at the same time, it is clear that the deity did not become incarnate in the king, but really assumed an independent figure of similar appearance. This figure might be designated by a special name, which applied both to the deity and to the reigning king. Thus we read of the Amon of Ramses II., of the Sechet of Saḫurā,[7] etc. When a monument, and especially a temple or chapel, was founded, not by a king, but by a private individual, the latter was, equally with the king, regarded as the creator of a new divine by-form. Thus, *e.g.*, in the reign of Ramses II. worship is said to have been accorded,

[1] *e.g.*, on the late-Theban coffin in the Museum at Cairo, first floor, vestibule, no. 1161. Similar forms of incarnation might be ascribed also to the gods, as in a relief from the reign of Amenemḥāt III., ed. H. Schäfer, *Amtliches Berichte aus den königl. Kunstsammlungen*, xxxiii., Berlin, 1911-12, cols. 40-46 (the *Sebak* of Crocodilopolis).

[2] Wiedemann, in *Sphinx*, xvi. [1912] 40 f.

[3] Altar of Pepi I. in Turin; ed. J. Bonomi and S. Sharpe, in *TSBA* iii. [1874] 110 ff., pls. 1-3.

[4] References for these and similar conceptions in Lepsius, 'Über die Götter der vier Elemente bei den Ägyptern,' in *ABAW*, 1856, p. 181 ff.

[5] Cf. E. A. W. Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, i. 416 ff.

[6] Wiedemann, *AMG* x. [1887] 561 ff.; A. Moret, *Le Rituel du culte divin journalier en Égypte*, Paris, 1902, p. 138 ff.

[7] Cf. H. R. Hall, *JHS* xxvi. [1906] 176 f.

[8] Pyramid Unas, l. 496 ff. (tr. Maspero, *RTr* iv. [1883] 59 ff.).

[9] *e.g.*, in reliefs (for Amenophis III.) at Luxor, ed. A. Gayet, *Le Temple de Louxor* [=*Mém. de la mission arch. du Caire*, xv. 1], Paris, 1894, pls. 63-67; in better form, with discussion, Colin Campbell, *The Miraculous Birth of King Amonhotep III.*, Edinburgh, 1912; at Deir el-Baḥri (for Ḥātshepsut), ed. Naville, *The Temple of Deir el Bahari*, ii., London, 1897, pls. 46-55; a fragment (for Ramses II.), ed. C. Campbell, *op. cit.* 48 f.; alluded to in the Papyrus Westcar (for kings of the Vth dyn.), in the royal titles, etc.; cf. Wiedemann, in *Muséon*, xiii. [1894] 372 f.; A. Moret, *Du Caractère religieux de la royauté pharaonique*, Paris, 1902, p. 48 ff.; Maspero, *Études*

[1] The *ka* and its relation to the man have been discussed most recently—with references to earlier works—by Maspero, in *Memnon*, vi. [1912] 125 ff.

[2] Naville, *op. cit.* ii. pl. 48; Gayet, *op. cit.* pl. 66. On the life-giving frog-deities of Egypt, cf. A. Jacoby and W. Spiegelberg, in *Sphinx*, vii. [1903] 215 ff., viii. [1904] 78 f.; and on the closely related idea that frogs might be generated from the slime of the Nile, Wiedemann, in *OLZ* xi. [1908], col. 179 ff.

[3] As, *e.g.*, in the Stele of Kuban, ed. E. Prisse d'Avennes, *Monuments égyptiens*, Paris, 1847, pl. 21, l. 3.

[4] Pleyte-Rossi, *Papyrus de Turin*, pls. 31, 77, 131-8; tr. Wiedemann, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, 54 ff.

[5] F. Ll. Griffith, *Hieratic Papyri from Kahun and Gurob*, London, 1898, pl. 3, p. 4; cf. Wiedemann, in *Sphinx*, xiv. [1911] 89 ff.

[6] Wiedemann, 'Die Milchverwandtschaft im alten Ägypten, in *Am Urquell*, iii. [1892] 259 ff.

[7] Cf. the texts given by L. Borchardt in *Mitteilungen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft*, no. xxxvii. (Aug. 1908) 29 f.; Brugsch, *Recueil de monuments égyptiens*, i. [Leipzig, 1862], pl. 4, no. 3.

not only to the Ptah of Ramses himself, but also to the Ptah of a certain Menna.[1]

Besides real incarnations, however, considerable interest attaches in Egypt to pseudo-incarnations. The adept in magic, when uttering his spells, frequently claimed to be a particular deity, and as such demanded obedience and threatened the powers that resisted him.[2] It need not be supposed that he actually believed himself to be the god in question, but he was at all events convinced that such a claim would make an impression upon other gods. By way of making the identification more emphatic, the adept in some cases had the name of the particular deity inscribed upon his person. From similar motives the names of Isis and Nephthys respectively were inscribed upon the bodies of the two principal female mourners who recited the dirges in mourning celebrations, and effected the resurrection of the dead person by sympathetic magic.[3] Whether in early times masks of the gods likewise were employed with a view to a more complete identification cannot be decided by the extant records, but the practice is attested in connexion with the cult of Isis in the Hellenistic period, and may well go back to earlier usage.

Again, the glorified dead[4] and the gods might assume the forms of other deities. Thus Isis took the form of a sacred cow, and Horus that of the Apis bull, in order to reach the city of Apis unmolested.[5] In this case the incarnation was effected, not in the sacred cow and the Apis bull themselves, but in figures resembling them, and so, of course, commanding a like degree of respect. The story in which Batau is said to have assumed the form of a bull with all the beautiful symbols in its hair, and thus to have been honoured as a sacred bull—though in reality it was not such[6]—must be interpreted in the same way. This text also shows the vast variety of possible metamorphoses which a higher being might assume in his incarnations. When the bull had been slaughtered, Batau caused two trees to arise from the drops of its blood, and in these he then took up his abode. From the trees, again, he passed, in the form of a splinter, into the body of a woman. She became pregnant, and the child she brought forth was his final form of incarnation, *i.e.* Batau himself.

In most cases a particle of the being incarnating himself was implanted in the new form that he adopted, though, as we have seen, this was not absolutely necessary. But certainly the Egyptians, with their concrete habit of thought, persistently sought to invest all beings with a tangible and material form. If the gods, or the dead, or any other entities were to endure and to evince their power, they could do so only by means of an incarnate form.

LITERATURE.—There is as yet no monograph on the Egyptian ideas of incarnation. Apart from the passages cited in the article, we have in modern literature nothing to fall back upon except treatises dealing generally with the Egyptian religion, as cited in the artt. EGYPTIAN RELIGION, vol. v. p. 236*f.*, and GOD [Egyptian], vol. vi. p. 279. A. WIEDEMANN.

[1] See a writing-palette in Berlin, no. 6764. The omission of the cartouche and the mode of writing the name Menna show that the reference here is not, as Erman (*ZA* xxix. [1891] 48 ff.) supposed, to King Menes, but to a private individual—perhaps that charioteer of Ramses II. of whom we read in the Pentaur poem.

[2] Wiedemann, *Magie und Zauberei im alten Ägypten*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 13 ff. Of peculiar interest in this connexion is the Magic Papyrus Leyden, no. 348, pl. 11, line 2 ff., ed. Pleyte, *Études égyptologiques*, Leyden, 1866, p. 173 ff.; cf. Pap. Ebers, ed. G. Ebers, Leipzig, 1875, pl. 1.

[3] See lamentations of Isis and Nephthys in the Papyrus Berlin, no. 1425, ed. P. J. de Horrack, *Œuvres diverses*, Paris, 1907, p. 34 ff.; and in the Papyrus of Nes-min in the Brit. Mus., no. 10188, pl. 1, l. 4; cf. Budge, *Facsimiles of Egyptian Hieratic Papyri in the British Museum*, p. 1.

[4] Attested as early as the time of the Pyramid of Pepi I., in which (line 166) that king takes the head of the Anubis jackal.

[5] J. Dümichen, *Die Oasen der libyschen Wüste*, Strassburg, 1877, pl. 6, p. 27; cf. Brugsch, in *ZA* xvii. [1879] 19.

[6] Papyrus d'Orbiney, pl. 14 ff.; cf. Maspero, *Contes populaires*[4], p. 1 ff.

INCARNATION (Greek and Roman).—The term 'incarnation' usually implies God becoming man, and connotes the opposite process to 'apotheosis.' But thought wavers in a curious way between the two. When virtue in man's esteem has won its way to heaven, when a Pollux, a Hercules, an Augustus, a Bacchus, a Quirinus—to employ the examples used by Horace (*Carm.* III. iii. 9–15)—have assumed their seat at the celestial board, and begun to quaff the nectar of the gods, then it is suspected that merit so transcendent must have been of heavenly origin, and a birth-story is invented which goes to show that the person who has been apotheosized was in reality already divine.

Strictly speaking, incarnation means the putting on of flesh by the divine; it need not necessarily be—although, as a matter of fact, it usually is—the flesh of man. When Zeus visited Leda in the form of a swan, that was incarnation as much as when he visited Alcmene in the form of Amphitryon; but we must insist on flesh of some kind. There would be no propriety in applying the term incarnation to the visit of Zeus to Danaë in the shape of a shower of gold. Artemis, according to one legend, compassed the destruction of Otus and Ephialtes by turning herself into a stag, and running between the young giants, who shot each other in their eagerness to hit the beast. We have also an instance of this lower form of incarnation in the tale that on the appearance of another of earth's monstrous brood the gods were so terrified that they changed themselves into beasts and took refuge in Egypt, this part of the story being perhaps a Greek attempt to account for the theriolatry in the Nile country.

To the Greek mind the specific difference between gods and men lay in the fact that the former were immortal and the latter mortal (except in case of apotheosis). All other differences, as in wisdom and beauty, were of degree, not of kind. Herein is the key to the Greek concept of incarnation, and throughout the pagan period it was really believed that the gods could and did assume the form of men. Their motives for so doing were many and various, but the most prominent was to gratify their amorous desires. The sons of Zeus by human mothers were innumerable. Among them were Perseus, Castor and Pollux, who were specially called 'the sons of Zeus' (though it is said that only one was really so), Heracles and Bacchus, Æacus and Sarpedon. The mothers of these were Danaë, Leda, Alcmene, Semele, Ægina, and Laodameia. Many, too, were the sons of Poseidon, most of whom are marked by gigantic size and insolence. Of the three brothers who divided the world between them, Hades alone seems to have been without issue of any kind.

The sons of the gods did not fail to follow the example of their sires in the way of amours with mortal maids or matrons; and, in consequence, a particular member of a human family might have in him or her a strain of the divine. Thus Theseus was said to have been the son of Poseidon, Troilus the son of Apollo by Hecuba, Deianeira was said to have been the daughter of Dionysus, Meleager the son of Ares, Linus the son of Apollo, and so on. These were perhaps appreciations arising out of the characters of those persons either in fact or in fiction; but one obvious motive for the invention of such stories was the general desire to ally oneself with the divine. Thus Hellen was said to have been really the son not of Deucalion, but of Zeus, which at once conferred the patent of nobility

upon every Hellene. All Greek physicians claimed to be descended from Asclepius, and so from Apollo; and on the same lines Socrates is made playfully to argue in the *Euthyphro* (11 C) that all sculptors were descended from Dædalus, and so from Hephæstus.

But love was not the only motive which induced divine beings to take human flesh upon them. It was anger at the gods that drove Demeter to leave heaven and incarnate herself as a woman. It was to gratify her spite against Heracles that Hera assumed the form of an Amazon. Occasionally, however, it is the censorship of human morals that is the operating motive. Thus it was to test the insolence of Laomedon that Apollo and Poseidon assumed the form of men; and the great god Zeus himself came to earth in the likeness of a working man (Apollod. iii. 98, *εἰκασθεὶς ἀνδρὶ χερνήτῃ*), in order to make trial of Lycaon and his fifty sons, who excelled all men in impiety. The same motive underlies the well-known story of Baucis and Philemon, which has been immortalized by the genius of Ovid; and we know from Hesiod that the belief was entertained that the gods roamed the earth in the likeness of men to take note of human conduct. That is the highest moral use that is made of the idea of incarnation in pagan mythology.

The idea of divine birth appears now and then among the Greeks even in historical times. Plato, after he had achieved immortality for his writings, was reported to have been the son of Apollo. He is the only philosopher who has attained the honour of a birth-story. The Spartan king Demaratus, we are told by Herodotus (vi. 69), was declared by his mother to have been the son of the hero Astrabacus; but then there was a malicious counter-statement that the supposed hero was really the donkey-driver. Alexander the Great was believed even in his own lifetime to have been the son of Ammon; and there is a story told by Plutarch (*Alex.* 3) that the reason for the loss of Philip's eye was that he had peeped through the keyhole of his wife's chamber, and had seen the god in the form of a serpent entwined about her couch. The birth-story of Romulus and Remus is an echo of many similar tales in Greek mythology.

LITERATURE.—See references in text and art. GREEK RELIGION.

ST. GEORGE STOCK.

INCARNATION (Indian).—The tenet of incarnation (*avatāra*) is a fundamental one in mediæval and modern Hindu religion as taught in the *Purāṇas* and similar works; it is so especially with the Viṣṇuites, the greater number of whom worship either Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, the two last incarnations of Viṣṇu, not that god in his proper form; the reverse holds good with Śiva, who is adored as such, or under one of his various forms which cannot be properly called incarnations. We must, therefore, examine the incarnations of Viṣṇu in order to comprehend the nature of incarnation as conceived in India, and to form an idea concerning the origin and development of the complex body of beliefs on the subject.

The theory of the incarnations of Viṣṇu presupposes the recognition of Viṣṇu, or, as he is more appropriately called in this connexion, **Nārāyaṇa**, as the Supreme God, the creator and ruler of the universe, the upholder not only of the cosmic, but also of the moral, order of the world. When the enemies to his rule endanger the order of the world, the god incarnates himself for the purpose of defending it. This is expressed in two much quoted verses of the *Bhagavadgītā* (iv. 7 f.):

'Whenever there is a decline of the Law, O Bhārata, and an increase of iniquity, then I put forth myself (in a new birth). For the rescue of the pious and for the destruction of the evil-doers, for the establishment of the Law I am born in every age.'

Originally, therefore, the number of these appearances or births of the Lord seems to have been regarded as indefinite; but theological speculation tended not only to fix the number of incarnations, but also to define more clearly their relation to the Supreme God. This can be seen from the account of the incarnations in the *Harivaṁśa*, i. ch. 42 f. It commences with a verse made up of the beginning and the slightly altered end of the passage from the *Bhagavadgītā* just quoted:

'Whenever there is a decline of the Law, O Bhārata, then the Lord appears for the establishment of the Law.'

And it continues:

'One form of him, the best one, for ever abides in heaven practising austerities [Nārāyaṇa seems to be intended], the second [form] is gone to sleep on his couch, for the destruction and creation of beings, meditating on his mysterious self; who after sleeping a thousand aeons becomes manifest for the purpose of action, at the end of a thousand years, as the god of gods, the Lord of the world [Viṣṇu].'

Then some of his incarnations are related, the last of which—that of Kalki—being designated as the tenth (v. 2368), proves that the number of his incarnations amounted to ten, as in later times. It is worthy of note that in this place the incarnations are called *prādurbhāva*, 'manifestation,' and not *avatāra*, which has since become the current term; thus it is usual to speak of the ten *avatāras* of Viṣṇu. According to the common belief these are: (1) Fish, (2) Tortoise, (3) Boar, (4) Man-lion, (5) Dwarf, (6) Paraśurāma, (7) Rāma, (8) Kṛṣṇa, (9) Buddha, and (10) Kalkī, whose incarnation is still to come.[1]

Now, if we examine the various incarnations of Viṣṇu, we shall find that they fall into several groups. First the Vāmana, or Dwarf, incarnation is a legend developed from a mythical feat of Viṣṇu frequently mentioned in the Rigveda, viz. the three strides with which he measured the three worlds. Secondly, the Kūrma, or Tortoise, and the Varāha, or Boar, incarnations ascribe to him deeds which originally were believed to have been performed by Prajāpati the Creator (see *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, VII. v. 1, 5; *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, VI. ii. 42; *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, i. 13; and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XIV. i. 2, 11). Prajāpati is frequently represented as taking one form or other for some special purpose; in our case the reason of his being assumed to have taken the form of a tortoise and of a boar may have been that his primitive worship had been of a theriomorphic character, at least with some classes of the people. When Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu) became the Supreme Deity, the Creator

[1] The incarnations (*prādurbhāva*) actually related in the *Harivaṁśa* (*loc. cit.*) are: (1) Varāha, (2) Man-lion, (3) Dwarf, (4) Dattātreya, (5) Jāmadagnya (Paraśurāma), (6) Rāma, (7) Kṛṣṇa, and (8) Kalki, which, as stated in the text, is called the tenth. In the Śāntiparvan of the *Mahābhārata* (cccxxxiv. 103=12906 f.) the following incarnations (*prādurbhava*) are enumerated: (1) Haṁsa, (2) Tortoise, (3) Fish, (4) Boar, (5) Dwarf, (6) (Paraśu) Rāma, (7) Rāma Dāśarathi, (8) Sātvata (Kṛṣṇa), and (9) Kalkī. The *Bhagavadgītā* (*loc. cit.*) speaks of the 'many births' (*janmāni*) of the god; the *Mahābharata*, *Vanaparva* (487), of the 'thousands of his manifestations' (*prādurbhāva*). Of the account in the *Matsya* and *Bhagavata Purāṇas*, Muir (*Orig. Skr. Texts*, iv.[2] [1873] 155 f.) says: 'Viṣṇu's incarnations are then enumerated (*Matsya Purāṇa*, xlvii. 234–254), viz. (1) a portion of him sprung from Dharma, (2) the Narasiṁha, or Man-lion, and (3) the Dwarf, incarnations, which are called the celestial manifestations (*saṁbhūti*), the remaining seven being the human incarnations caused by Śukra's curse. These seven are: (4) the Dattātreya, (5) Mandhātṛ, (6) Paraśurāma, (7) Rāma, (8) Vedavyāsa, (9) Buddha, and (10) Kalki incarnations. (Eight instead of seven are obtained if, with the Marathī expounder, we understand the beginning of verse 243 to refer to Kṛṣṇa.) The *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* gives twenty-two incarnations (i. iii. 1 ff.), viz. those in the forms of (1) Puruṣa, (2) Varāha, or the Boar, (3) Nārada, (4) Nara and Nārāyaṇa, (5) Kapila, (6) Dattātreya, (7) Yajña, or Sacrifice, (8) Ṛṣabha, (9) Pṛthu, (10) Matsya, or the Fish, (11) Kūrma, or the Tortoise, (12 and 13) Dhanvantari, (14) Narasiṁha, or the Man-lion, (15) Vāmana, or the Dwarf, (16) Paraśurāma, (17) Vedavyāsa, (18) Rāma, (19 and 20) Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa, (21) Buddha, and (22) Kalki. The last two are represented as future. But the incarnations (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu are innumerable, like the rivulets flowing from an inexhaustible lake. Ṛṣis, Manus gods, sons of Manus, Prajāpatis are all portions of him.'

and Lord of the world, he stepped into the place of Prajāpati, the Creator in the period of the *Brāhmaṇas*, and the deeds of Prajāpati were transferred to Viṣṇu. In this class of incarnations we may reckon, besides the Tortoise and Boar incarnations, the Matsya, or Fish, incarnation, which refers to the legend of Manu's being saved by a fish during the Deluge; for that fish, according to the later version of the story in the *Mahābhārata* (iii. 187 = 12474 ff.), reveals himself as Brahmā Prajāpati. The incarnation of Narasiṁha, or the Man-lion, stands by itself, or might be ranged with the Dwarf incarnation; it refers to a popular legend of Viṣṇu killing, in the form of a Man-lion, the demon Hiraṇyakaśipu—a legend which is once alluded to in the Vedic literature, viz. *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, x. i. 6.

The remaining three incarnations, viz. those of Paraśurāma, of Rāma Dāśarathi, and of Kṛṣṇa, have this in common, that those heroes had originally no connexion with Viṣṇu. The story of Paraśurāma itself, as told in the *Mahābhārata* (iii. 115 ff., xii. 49), has no reference to Viṣṇu, but the first book of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which is a later addition to that epic, contains a continuation of Paraśuráma's story, according to which the hero was in possession of Viṣṇu's bow and met the young Rāma, son of Daśaratha, expressly to subdue him; but the latter, who had already broken Śiva's bow, now bent Viṣṇu's bow and deprived Paraśuráma of his glory. This legend, apparently a late invention, would be absurd on the supposition that both Rāmas are incarnations of Viṣṇu, since then the god would humiliate himself; but it shows that Paraśuráma had, in popular tales, been brought into some connexion with Viṣṇu; and this circumstance, together with the name Rāma, which he shares with the more famous seventh incarnation of Viṣṇu, may have facilitated his reception in the series of incarnations of that god. He was recognized as such at the time of the redaction of the present text of the *Mahābhārata* (see note on p. 193[b]), and thus in the introduction of his story there (iii. 115) a confused passage is inserted (v. 15-19) in order to make allowance for the current belief.

The incarnations with which we have dealt seem more or less to be set up by theological speculation rather than to have constituted part of a general and popular belief. It is different, however, with the two next incarnations, those of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. They are the only ones which have any practical importance in the religion of India; for, as stated above, their worshippers form a considerable part of the Hindus and the great majority of Viṣṇuites. Hence it will be necessary to enter into more details with regard to these two *avatāras*. According to the unanimous belief of the Hindus, Rāma came long before Kṛṣṇa, the former at the end of the Tretā, the latter at the end of the Dvāpara, Yuga. The reason of this belief is, no doubt, the fact that the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which celebrates the life and deeds of Rāma, does not mention Kṛṣṇa, while, on the other hand, the *Mahābhārata*, in which Kṛṣṇa plays a most important part, not only frequently mentions Rāma and the other heroes of the *Rāmāyaṇa* as belonging to a past age, but also relates his adventure in a lengthy episode (Rāmopākhyāna).

In the case of Rāma we seem to watch an incarnation in the making, for in the original parts of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, viz. bks. ii.–vi., the poet regards his hero as essentially human, and seems entirely to ignore his divine character. The latter, however, is fully acknowledged in bks. i. and vii., which by common consent of all critics are declared to be later additions.[1] Therefore between the composition of the original work and the addition of these later parts the belief that Rāma is an incarnation of Viṣṇu must have arisen and have gained universal assent. Before that time Rāma had been an epic hero, but the *Rāmāyaṇa* seems to have made him immensely popular. Since the poet has described him as the best of men, the most dutiful son and loving husband, as possessed of every virtue, in short, as a model of morality, he became the favourite of the people at large and so the subject of veneration.[1] There is still another cause for Rāma's promotion to divine rank. His adventures are of such a wonderful character that he certainly appears more than a common mortal; he associates with superhuman beings represented as monkeys and bears, he undertakes an expedition against Laṅkā over one hundred *yojanas* of sea, fights and vanquishes the demon race of the Rākṣasas, etc. Thus it is not difficult to imagine that the epic hero became a popular god, and that in order to account for his divine dignity, notwithstanding his human character, he came to be regarded as one of the manifestations of the highest god—as an incarnation of Viṣṇu.

This belief has a popular as well as a speculative side. The latter is determined by the ideas about *brahma*, the evolution of the world from it, and the identification of Nārāyaṇa with Brahmā. The popular side of the belief in the incarnation of Viṣṇu is to some extent founded on that god's popular character as destroyer of demons (*daityāri*); Viṣṇu vanquishes the fiends to relieve the world, gods and men, from their oppression. The same function, ascribed to some minor deity, becomes the bond that connects him with Viṣṇu in popular opinion. The idea of manifestation was probably beyond the grasp of the mind of the people; they required a more material link between the god and his incarnation. In fables and epic poetry the connexion of a hero with a god is usually accounted for by a myth relating how the god begot the hero in question with some girl or woman; the hero is the offspring of the god. This relation did perhaps savour of illegitimacy; at any rate, it was not assumed in the case of the highest god and his manifestations, but was replaced by one of a more mystical character. The story about Viṣṇu's incarnation in Rāma is told in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 15 ff.

The gods complain to Brahmā about the oppression and violence of the Rākṣasa Rāvaṇa, on whom he had conferred the boon that he could not be killed by a god. But, as he could be slain by a man, Viṣṇu consents to be born as such in the persons of the four sons of King Daśaratha by his three wives. When that king celebrates a sacrifice for the purpose of begetting sons, Viṣṇu appears in the sacrificial fire and gives Daśaratha a big vessel filled with divine sacrificial food (*pāyasa*) which he enjoins him to divide among his wives. Kausalyā gets half of the potion, and Sumitrā and Kaikeyī the remaining part, but in unequal portions.[2] In due time all the three queens are delivered of sons, Kausalyā of Rāma, Sumitrā of Lakṣmaṇa and Śatrughna, and Kaikeyī of Bharata.

In accordance with this story, the incarnation of Viṣṇu is not of the same degree in all four sons; but his essence is present to a greater degree in Rāma than in his brothers. Probably Rāma alone was originally considered an incarnation, and his brothers were only later, through their connexion with him, regarded as partial incarnations. By a similar process the wife of Rāma, Sītā, came to be regarded as an incarnation of Viṣṇu's wife, Lakṣmī, though originally Sītā seems to have been a chthonic deity before she became an epic heroine.[3] These details, however, are apparently

[1] This question has been discussed at great length by Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, iv. 441 ff. As it is important for the problem under discussion, we adduce here an argument which, in the writer's opinion, is conclusive. Near the end of the original work occurs a chapter (vi. 117) which is, without doubt, a later addition. It relates that, when Sītā entered the fire, the gods appeared and Brahmā declared Rāma to be Nārāyaṇa, the highest deity, etc.; for Rāma had thought himself a man till then. Now, if in the preceding part of the original poem Rāma had been asserted to be Nārāyaṇa, no such passage as the above could have been inserted in this place; nor would the author of the original work have deferred till its end mention of the fact that the hero is no other than the highest god. It may be noted that this is the only passage in this epic in which we meet with a name of Kṛṣṇa.

[1] In the original story on which Vālmīki based his epic, the character of Rāma does not seem to have reached perfection. He perfidiously killed Vālī—a deed which the poet struggles hard to show in a good light.

[2] The same story is told in different *Purāṇas* and other works; but there is no agreement regarding the proportion of the several parts of the *payasa* given to the three queens.

[3] Cf. art. HEROES AND HERO-GODS (Indian), vol. vi. p. 661.

the outcome of theological speculations, not of popular belief.

The remarkable change in Rāma's position from an epic hero to an incarnation of Viṣṇu, which, as stated above, took place between the redaction of the original *Rāmāyaṇa* and the addition of its first and last books, does not appear to be the result of a slow development of religious ideas, but seems to have been caused by the application to him of a theory already fully established. In other words, it is not likely that the theory of incarnation was first suggested by the story of Rāma; in all probability there was already another similar incarnation of Viṣṇu acknowledged by the people of India. This must have been his incarnation as Kṛṣṇa, since the preceding incarnations, as appears from our remarks on them, seem to have had little importance as far as popular religion was concerned. In the opinion of the present writer, the wide-spread worship of Kṛṣṇa as a tribal hero and demi-god, and his subsequent identification with Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Lord of creation in that period, gave birth to the theory of incarnation, not as a philosophical speculation of learned mythologists and theologists, but as the great principle pervading and upholding a popular religion. For Kṛṣṇaism in this sense prevailed in India probably centuries before the beginning of our era, while Rāmaism, so popular from the 10th cent. A.D. downwards, is a comparatively late development. The incarnation of Kṛṣṇa is, therefore, the most important one for the elucidation of the problem under discussion—the origin and the development of the theory of incarnation.

The identity of Kṛṣṇa and Viṣṇu (or Nārāyaṇa) is generally acknowledged in the original sources of the history of his life and deeds, viz. the *Mahābhārata*, *Harivaṁśa*, and the *Purāṇas*. References to him in the literature which precedes the redaction of our text of the *Mahābhārata* are few and short; but they are of the highest interest, and therefore deserve to be examined with great care. In these ancient allusions to Kṛṣṇa we must distinguish between the names Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa, though in historical times they denote the same person. Vāsudeva is mentioned first in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, x. i. 6, as a god together with Nārāyaṇa and Viṣṇu, apparently as mystically identical with them. We next meet with this name in Pāṇini, IV. iii. 98, where the wording of the *sūtra* and the context in which it stands indicate that Pāṇini regarded him not as a Rājput, but as a person of the highest rank, probably as a god.[1] Kṛṣṇa's name occurs first in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, III. xvii. 6, where it is said that Ghora Āṅgirasa imparted a particular piece of secret knowledge to Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī. Here, then, Kṛṣṇa is still regarded as a man and not as a god. But in a verse quoted in two late *Upaniṣads*, the *Nārāyaṇātharvaśiras* and the *Ātmabodha Upaniṣads*, he, the son of Devakī, is mentioned together with Madhusūdana (=Viṣṇu) as having the attribute *brahmaṇya*; whatever that word may mean in this connexion, it is evident that the son of Devakī is here regarded as equal to Viṣṇu, or at least as a deity. The testimony adduced seems to warrant the assumption that, when the Vedic period drew towards its end, Vāsudeva was considered an equal of Nārāyaṇa and Viṣṇu, but that Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī, was still regarded in the Vedic period as a wise man inquiring into the highest truth, and only at some later time was he put on an equality with Viṣṇu. We conclude that Vāsudeva, the god, and Kṛṣṇa, the sage, were originally different from one another, and only afterwards became, by a syncretism of beliefs, one deity, thus giving rise to, or bringing to perfection, a theory of incarnation.

Vāsudeva is unanimously explained by all Indian writers as a patronymic of Vasudeva, his father according to the epic narratives. But Baladeva, who is likewise reputed a son of Vasudeva, is never called Vāsudeva. Besides, an old variant of Vāsudeva, noticed by lexicographers and used by Bhāsa in the *Dūtavākya*, v. 6, is Vāsubhadra, a form which recalls the similar name of another popular deity, Maṇibhadra, king of the Yakṣas. Now, as Maṇibhadra is also spelt Māṇibhadda (Māṇibhadda in Jainaprakrit), and Narasiṁha Nārasiṁha,[1] by an inorganic lengthening of the first syllable, so Vāsudeva and Vāsubhadra seem to have been forms, perhaps popular, of Vasudeva and Vasubhadra—names directly derived from *vasu*, denoting either 'wealth, riches,' or the gods of that name. If this etymology of Vāsudeva is right, we must assume that the story of his being the son of a knight Vasudeva and the name of his father have been developed from his very name Vāsudeva. In support of this assumption it may be said that the oldest tradition does not mention Kṛṣṇa's father, but his mother, calling him the son of Devakī.

If the narrative of Kṛṣṇa is more closely examined, we find indications that two different persons, a god and a man, are combined in him. For the story itself is naturally divided into two distinctive parts; the first (*bālacharita*) relates his early life among the cowherds as foster-child of Nanda; and the second, covering the rest of his life, relates his adventures as the leader of the clan of the Vṛṣṇis, and his alliance with the Pāṇḍavas, especially with Arjuna. In the former part it is easy to recognize him as a cowherd-god (Govinda, the cow-finder), and in the latter, as a Rājput hero. As infant, child, and young man, he worked many wonders, destroying demons chiefly, and mostly in company with Baladeva, his brother, who is also called Rāma and Hali, 'he with the plough,' or Halāyudha, 'he whose weapon is the plough.' Now, Baladeva too was a popular god—of husbandmen, as his plough proves. He is called Rauhiṇeya, the son of Rohiṇī; but the story is that he was conceived by Devaki and afterwards transferred to the womb of Rohiṇī.[2] This story is apparently invented in order to make him a brother of Kṛṣṇa; probably the two popular gods Govinda-Vāsudeva and Baladeva[3] were closely connected, and, after the former was identified with the Rājput hero Kṛṣṇa, the latter came to be regarded as his brother. They are always found together till Kṛṣṇa has slain Kaṁsa and placed Ugrasena on the throne of Mathurā. Henceforth he appears as the tribal hero of the Yādavas; he is their leader in all important events of their history, he defends their town Mathurā against mighty enemies, and when resistance seems hopeless he leads the tribe of the Yādavas to the shore of the western ocean; there he builds Dvārakā, the new capital of the Yadavas. He enters into an alliance with the Pāṇḍavas, and with their help overcomes his great enemy Jarāsandha, king of Magadha; and he slays the latter's general Śiśupāla, king of Chedi. He took part in the tribal feuds of the Yādavas, and at last witnessed their ruin and the destruction of Dvārakā. His death was occasioned by the hunter Jaras (old age), who mistook him for an antelope and pierced his foot with an arrow. The unmistakably epic character of this story seems to prove that it has been the subject of an epic or a cycle of epic songs. This epic must have been current among the Yādavas, the Rājput race which revered Kṛṣṇa as its tribal hero; and, as the numerous clans of the Yādavas were settled in Northern as well as in Western India, the assumed epic must have had a wide circulation. The originals, if ever they were written down, have been lost, but the matter they contained has been preserved in the *Harivaṁśa* and some *Purāṇas*. Their great popularity in so large a part of India seems to have been the cause of their hero Kṛṣṇa having, by an epic syncretism to be observed in other literatures also, been introduced into the great national epic of the Bhāratas, where he appears as the friend and counsellor of the Pāṇḍavas.

Now in the *Mahābhārata*, the *Harivaṁśa*, and the *Purāṇas* the poets take every opportunity of

[1] See Patañjali's remarks on the *sūtra* in question. It is clear that Pāṇini did not regard Vāsudeva as a *kṣatriya* in the usual sense of the word, since he then would fall under the rule in the next *sūtra*. The compound *Vāsudevārjunābhyaṁ* is against Pāṇini's own rule (II. ii. 33), according to which Arjuna should be placed first. The inversion of the order in the compound was apparently occasioned by Pāṇini's regarding Vāsudeva as superior to Arjuna, *abhyarhita*, though the rule which assigns the first place in a Dvandva compound to the *abhyarhita* was first given by Kātyāyana, his successor (II. 2. 34, *vārtt.* 4).

[1] *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, x. i. 7.

[2] A similar transfer of an embryo is told by the Śvetāmbara Jains of Mahāvira, who was transferred from the womb of Devānandā to that of Triśalā.

[3] Notice the similarity of the names Vāsudeva and Baladeva, and of their variants Vāsubhadra and Balabhadra

glorifying Kṛṣṇa as the Supreme God; but their description of his deeds, and especially of the counsels he gives to his allies, reveals to us a man, certainly not eminently good, like Rāma, but rather the contrary—a crafty Rājput chief who is not over-scrupulous in his choice of means for accomplishing his ends. Even the Hindus seem to have been conscious of the fact that he is not quite an ideal hero; for there is a very interesting chapter in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (iv. 13) which undertakes a vindication of the character of Kṛṣṇa in one particular instance.

The question, then, is how this Rājput hero should have come to be acknowledged not only as a god, but as the incarnation of the Supreme Deity.[1] Christian influence, assumed by Weber, is excluded by chronological considerations, for the Jains have built up their entire hagiology on the model of the history of Kṛṣṇa; they assume nine Vāsudevas, Vāsudevas, Baladevas, and Prativāsudevas. As this curious system of the Jains, which presupposes the worship of Kṛṣṇa as a very popular religion of India, is already found in some of their canonical books, and as these are prior to our era, there can have been no Christian influence at work in originating the worship of Kṛṣṇa. R. G. Bhandarkar supposes

'that a Kṣattriya of the name of Vāsudeva belonging to the Yādava, Vṛṣṇi, or Sātvata race founded a theistic system as Siddhārtha of the Śākya race and Mahāvira of the Jñātṛka race founded atheistic systems.'[2]

This theory seems scarcely tenable for a very weighty reason: the deeds and adventures of Kṛṣṇa related by the authors of the great epic and the *Purāṇas* are essentially those of a warrior and Rājput chief, and there is none which shows him in the light of a founder of a religion. All that may safely be conceded, as a surmise, is that this Rājput chief, like some other kings of *Upaniṣad* renown, took a great interest in the highest theosophical questions, and thus gave an impetus to the formation of a new religion. Bhandarkar proposes an alternative theory:[3]

'Or, perhaps, it is possible that Vāsudeva was a famous prince of the Sātvata race and on his death was deified and worshipped by his clan; and a body of doctrines grew up in connexion with that worship, and the religion spread from that clan to other classes of the Indian people.'

This theory is, in the opinion of the present writer, more probable than the former, but it requires some alteration. We must keep in mind three significant points. (1) Vāsudeva seems to have been regarded originally as a god and as distinct from Kṛṣṇa; for, besides the general reason adduced above, there is an interesting story related in the Sabhāparvan of the *Mahābhārata* (ii. 14) in connexion with the history of Jarāsandha. Paundraka, king of the Baṅgas, Puṇḍras, and Kirātas, pretended and was believed to be Puruṣottama (*i.e.* Viṣṇu); he was known under the name Vāsudeva, and had assumed the emblems of Kṛṣṇa. In the *Harivaṁśa* and several *Purāṇas*[4] his conflict with and destruction by Kṛṣṇa are related at some length. Now, whatever facts, if any, may underlie this legend, it is obvious that it could not have been invented unless at that time the dignity of Vāsudeva was not thought inseparable from the person of Kṛṣṇa; or, in other words, Vāsudeva was still regarded as an independent deity, probably a form of Viṣṇu. (2) A religious system based on the worship of Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa as the highest god is that of the Pāñcharātras or Bhāgavatas. The oldest account of it is contained in the Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata* (xii. 334-351).

There 'the Pāñcharātra is represented as an independent religion professed by the Sātvatas and is also called the Sātvata religion (cccxlviii. 55, 34, 81); and Vasu Uparichara, who was a follower of that religion, is spoken of as worshipping the Supreme God according to the Sātvata manner (*vidhi*) which was revealed in the beginning by the Sun' (cccxxxv. 19, 24).[1]

It appears from the above quotations that the new religion was originally a tribal religion confessed by the Sātvatas. Now, the Sātvatas are an important section of the Yādava race; thus we see that the religion which recognized Kṛṣṇa as the Supreme God was originated in that race to which Kṛṣṇa belonged. On this supposition we can understand that Vāsudeva-Kṛṣṇa is not found in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the early Buddhist writings; for these works belong to Eastern India and the home of the Yādavas was Northern and Western India. (3) Some indications of the character of the religion professed by Kṛṣṇa may be found in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*. There (III. xvii. 1 ff.) human life is described under the form of a *soma*-sacrifice, the natural functions—eating, drinking, etc.—are interpreted as elements of the sacrifice, and the cardinal virtues as the reward (*dakṣiṇā*). Then the text goes on:

Ghora, son of Aṅgiras, having explained this [subject] to Kṛṣṇa, son of Devakī, said: 'He who has become exempt from desire should repeat, at the time of his death, these three [Yajur Vedic mantras]: "O! thou art undecaying! Thou art unchanging! Thou art the true essence of life!" About it there are these two stanzas from the Rigveda [VIII. vi. 30 and I. l. 10]: "They see the morning light of that primeval seed which burns beyond the sky"; "Having beheld the superior light from beyond the darkness, we go to the Sun-god amongst the gods, to the highest light."'

The idea that human life itself is equal to a Vedic sacrifice is more than once expressed in the *Upaniṣads*;[2] it tends to lessen the importance of sacrificing, which was the highest duty in the old Brāhmanical religion, but has no place in a popular religion. Further, the imperishable nature of the soul is insisted upon, and its ultimate union with the Highest Light. These are some principles which have been fully developed in the religion which teaches the identity of Kṛṣṇa with the Supreme God.

The facts explained above allow us to form an opinion on the origin and gradual development of the belief in Kṛṣṇa's incarnation. During the Brāhmaṇa period Prajāpati the creator was believed to assume, on occasions of distress, various forms, as that of a boar or a tortoise, in order to rescue the creation. After him came Nārāyaṇa; he was identified with Viṣṇu, the slayer of demons. About the end of the Vedic period a popular deity, Vāsudeva, came to be acknowledged as a form of Viṣṇu. Now the race of the Yādavas, whose clans were settled both in the North and in the West of India, revered as their tribal hero Kṛṣṇa, the son of Devakī, who, like other princes of the *Upaniṣad* period, had the renown of having been an earnest seeker of religious truth. We assume that about this time the worship of Vāsudeva as a form of Viṣṇu had become the popular religion of the same people who worshipped Kṛṣṇa as their tribal hero, and that both kinds of worship influencing each other became in the end one in such a way that Kṛṣṇa was believed to be a manifestation of Viṣṇu—in a word, a human incarnation of the Supreme God.

To continue the account of Kṛṣṇa's incarnation, a myth must now be mentioned which connects his incarnation bodily with Nārāyaṇa. When the latter was implored by the gods to save the earth from the oppression of her enemies, Nārāyaṇa plucked out two of his own hairs, a black and a white one. Descending

[1] A good account of the opinions put forward by various writers on this problem is given by Richard Garbe in the introduction to his (German) tr. of the *Bhagavadgītā* (Leipzig, 1905). The reader will find there the references to the original papers.

[2] *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1883-84*, Bombay, 1887, p. 74.

[3] *Ib.*

[4] *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, v. 34, tr. H. H. Wilson, London, 1864-77, v. 123, n. 1.

[1] Bhandarkar, *Report*, p. 73.

[2] Cf. *Mahānārāyaṇa*, 64.

to the earth and entering the womb of Devaki, the black hair was born as Kṛṣṇa, and the white one as Baladeva. This legend explains the names Kṛṣṇa, 'black,' and Keśava, fancifully derived from *keśa*, 'hair'; it accounts, moreover, for Kṛṣṇa being of dark colour and Baladeva light. It is to be noted that this myth makes Baladeva also an incarnation of Viṣṇu, though he is generally declared to be an incarnation of Śeṣa, the snake-god.

As has already been mentioned, the incarnations of Nārāyaṇa seem originally to have been termed 'manifestations' (*prādurbhāva*), whereby it is indicated that the god continued to exist in his true form though at the same time he manifested himself in a form chosen for a particular purpose.[1] However, instead of *prādurbhāva*, another term has become current, viz. *avatāra*, literally 'descending.' It was imagined that a part of the deity descended from heaven and took bodily form as a man, etc., or was born as such; we find also the word *aṁśāvatāra*, 'partial incarnation,' and even *aṁśāṁśāvatāra*, 'incarnation by a part of a part.' These terms were probably originated by a somewhat materialistic conception of the process of incarnation, evidenced also in the case of the four sons of Daśaratha. The orthodox opinion in the case of Kṛṣṇa, however, denies that the Supreme Deity is not wholly present in him. What the orthodox opinion was will be seen from the following extract from a commentary on the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* which we transcribe from Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, iv. 258:

'Puruṣottama is here figuratively said to have become incarnate with a portion of a portion of himself, because in the Kṛṣṇa incarnation he was manifested in a merely sportive body in the very circumscribed form of a man, and not because of any diminution of his power, since even in the Kṛṣṇa and other incarnations he is said to have shown himself in every possible form, and to have possessed all divine power, and so forth. But is it not the case that, if a portion is taken from a whole composed of parts, there is a decrease of power, etc. [in that whole], and that thus an inferiority of power will attach to the portion relatively to the whole, just as when a heap of grain, or any other such whole, is divided? I answer, No; since such a diminution does not occur in him whose nature is light; for though there is a seeming difference in the individuality of one lamp, and of another lamp derived from it, yet an equality of power is perceived in each; agreeably to the text from the Veda . . ., "That is full, and this is full; a full arises out of a full: if a full be taken from a full, a full remains"; and also agreeably to such texts as this, "The supreme Brahmā with the form, and with the characteristics, of a man, is a great mystery; but Kṛṣṇa is the lord of himself." And the employment of the term "hairs" in the words, "My hairs shall descend to the earth," and "This hair shall slay Kaṁsa," etc., is intended to signify that the task of removing the earth's burthen was such as Brahmā in all his plenitude could effect by a very slight instrumentality, and not to assert that the two hairs were identical with [Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa: for two insensible hairs, not being conscious spirits animating the bodies of these two persons, could not fulfil their task. If it be said that the lord occupying the bodies of Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa, which were produced by the magical operation of the hairs, will do so and so, we reply, "Yes; for there is no difference in the result, and because he himself said, 'I [shall be born] on the eighth night of the dark fortnight of the moon.'"'

It remains to notice the application of the incarnation theory to other gods besides Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. We may exclude as alien to the present subject the various forms under which Śiva is adored as Rudra, Bhava, Mahākāla, Ardhanārīśa, etc., and the worship of his spouse as Gaurī, Pārvatī, Devī, Vindhyavāsinī, Chāmuṇḍa, etc.; for these are not limited and successive manifestations of the deity, as in the case of Viṣṇu's *avatāras*, but they may be said to be co-existent with each other. Different from them are the *avatāras* or *aṁśāvatāras* of many gods which are acknowledged in epic or classical works, and are intended to establish a connexion between a person, famous in mythical or legendary history, and some god or goddess. In original epics, in India as elsewhere, many of the heroes are supposed to be sons of a god. Thus, in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Hanuman is the son of the Wind-god, Vālī of Indra, Sugrīva of Sūrya, etc., and in the *Mahābhārata* Bhīma is the son of the Wind-god, Arjuna of Indra, Karṇa of Sūrya, Yudhiṣṭhira of Dharma, Nakula and Sahadeva of the Aśvins, etc. The same view still prevails in the first book of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (ch. 17) where Brahmā exhorts the gods to beget sons with nymphs and demi-goddesses—sons who as monkeys and bears will be the helpers of Rāma in his strife with Rāvaṇa. In the *Mahābhārata* (i. 67, xv. 31), on the contrary, all the heroes of the epic are declared to be partial incarnations of gods, demi-gods, demons, great saints, etc. Here it is obvious that the idea of incarnation becomes mixed with that of re-birth; for only the latter could apply to the two last-named categories. It may be mentioned that something similar holds good also in the fully developed theory of Viṣṇu's *avatāras*; for the demon Hiraṇyakaśipu, whom Viṣṇu slays as Nṛsiṁha, is born again as Rāvaṇa, and for a third time as Śiśupāla, to be killed by Kṛṣṇa. But in the case of gods we have true *avatāras*, and, in this part of the epic, partial incarnation is substituted for the original parentage. In some cases, however, opinions differed. Thus Arjuna is the son of Indra, and should, therefore, also be an *avatāra* of Indra, and so he is called in a passage of the *Harivaṁśa* (v. 3040); but in the *Mahābhārata* he is considered an *avatāra* of Nara. The reason for this opinion, apparently, was that he is associated with Kṛṣṇa, and, as the latter is an incarnation of Nārāyaṇa, who is also named together with Nara, Kṛṣṇa's friend was regarded as an incarnation of Nara. For a similar reason, Baladeva is occasionally regarded as an incarnation of Viṣṇu, because his brother Kṛṣṇa is one; but usually he is regarded as an incarnation of the snake-god Śeṣa.

This theory of *avatāras* has become very popular, and is being applied in many cases even now. When a local saint has a proper shrine where he is worshipped, and his fame continues to increase, a legend is sure to be fabricated which declares him an *avatāra* of some god or *ṛṣi*. A similar notion of *avatāras* is also frequently met with in Sanskrit and Prakrit tales; a hero or heroine of the fable is declared to be an *avatāra* of a Gandharva, Vidyādhara, Apsaras, etc., in the sense that the latter has been born as a man or woman on earth, usually by a curse of some higher god whose displeasure he or she has incurred, and will resume his divine state when the period assigned for his punishment is over. Finally, the notion of incarnation has occasioned a frequent metaphor in Sanskrit; a man may be called an *avatāra* of Kāma, or a girl of Rati, just as we would say of a man that he is an Apollo, or a woman that she is a Venus. Such expressions prove how deeply rooted the idea of incarnation is in the Indian mind.

[1] A similar power is ascribed to the accomplished *yogī*, who is credited with the faculty of creating several bodies and being present in all of them at the same time (see *Yogasūtra*, iv. 4–6).

LITERATURE.—The necessary references have been given in the article. The subject has not been treated systematically before.

HERMANN JACOBI.

INCARNATION (Muslim).—Among the Muslims an interesting development of belief in incarnation occurred, though it is confined to the Shī'ites or Persian section of Islām and is in no sense Semitic. The details of the belief have varied with different sects and individuals, but its general outline is clear. It arose out of the fact that 'Alī, whom Muḥammad desired as his successor, was set aside by the leaders at Medina until after Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān had occupied the position of Khalīf, and out of the further fact that 'Alī was assassinated in A.D. 660 by a Kharajite dagger. Al-Ḥasan, his elder son, died of poison nine years later, while al-Ḥusain, the younger, perished at the battle of Kerbela in 680. In time these tragic events led the followers of 'Alī in Persia to regard him and his sons as semi-divine, or even as incarnations of God. Thus the Shī'ites, who are called *ghāliya* or *ghulāt* ('ultras') or *'Alī ilāhī* ('deifiers

of 'Alī'), go the length of believing that God became incarnate in the person of the Prophet's son-in-law by descent (cf. T. Haarbrücker, *Schahrastâni's Religionsparthcien*, i. 199). The best known of these sects, the Nuṣairī, regard 'Alī as the first of the three persons of the triad.

According to the more general Shī'ite view, 'Alī and his two sons were *imāms*, or divinely appointed leaders, and were succeeded for a time by other *imāms*. By some of the sects these *imāms* are regarded as *Nuqaṭ*, or 'Points,' of divine manifestation. The Shī'ites are divided as to the number of *imāms*, one part holding that there were seven, the other that there were twelve. Both agree that the last *imām* did not die, but is concealed, awaiting the proper time of his full manifestation. From each of these branches of Shī'ites important claimants of incarnation have appeared.

From the believers in seven *imāms* arose the sect called by Europeans 'Assassins,' a branch of which was established in Syria during the Crusading period. 'The Old Man of the Mountain,' Rāshid-ad-Dīn Sinān, who was for many years the terror of the region, claimed to be not only an *imām*, but an incarnation of the deity. His claim won large acceptance among the Ismā'ilians, though some hesitated to believe it because he was lame (see art. ASSASSINS, vol. ii. p. 138 ff.). From those who believe in twelve *imāms* there arose in the last century the Bābīs and Bahā'īs. On May 23, 1844, Mīrzā 'Alī Muḥammad, a merchant of Shīrāz in Persia, announced himself as the Bāb, or gate through which men might communicate with the concealed *imām*. He rapidly advanced from this point, soon claiming to be an incarnation of God—a claim that was allowed by a number of enthusiastic followers, some of whom suffered martyrdom for the belief. The Bāb himself was martyred at Tabrīz, July 9, 1850. One of the followers of the Bāb named Bahā'u'llāh in the year 1866–67 proclaimed himself as 'He whom God shall manifest,' whom the Bāb had foretold, claiming that the Bāb had been but as a John the Baptist to him. This caused a schism, the followers of Bahā'u'llāh being known as Bahā'īs and claiming that their founder was an incarnation of God (see art. BĀB, BĀBĪS, vol. ii. p. 299 ff.).

Another interesting outcome of the Shī'ite doctrine occurred in Egypt, where, in A.D. 967, the Fāṭimid dynasty, founded upon the claims of 'Alī, was established. In the reign of the Khalīf Ḥākim (A.D. 996–1021), of this dynasty, there came to Egypt an Ismā'ilian named Darazī, and publicly expounded Ismā'ilite doctrines. Though repulsed by the people, he was well received by the reigning family. In time he taught that the soul of Adam had entered into 'Alī and so had passed to the Fāṭimid line, and that consequently Ḥākim was an incarnation of God. Ḥākim was an eccentric character, whose persecutions of Christians and Jews, and whose attempt to purge Egypt of sexual immorality, had taken fantastic forms. It is doubtful whether he was altogether sane. The teaching of Darazī appealed to him, and, while he lived, these views appear to have dominated the court at Cairo. When Ḥākim finally vanished in a mysterious way, the followers of Darazi were driven out and went to the Lebanon, where they founded a new sect, called Daraswan, now commonly termed Druses. The Druses still regard Ḥākim as an incarnation of God. During the lifetime of Ḥākim a difference arose between Darazī and another teacher named Ḥamzah. The teaching of Ḥamzah prevailed. He became the real founder of the Druses. It thus happened that Darazī is counted a heretic by the sect that bears his name. The Druses hold that at the beginning there emanated from God a pure spirit of light called the universal mind, who became the medium of creation, and that, when God was incarnate in Ḥākim, this universal mind was incarnate in Ḥamzah. For a fuller account of them see SECTS (Christian) and SECTS (Muslim).

LITERATURE.—T. Haarbrücker, *Abu'l-Fath' Muh'ammad asch-Schahrastâni's Religionsparthcien und Philosophenschulen*, Halle, 1850–51, i. 164–230; C. Huart, artt. ''Alī' and ''Alī Ilāhī,' in *EI* i., Leyden, 1913, pp. 283 ff., 292 f.; Silvestre de Sacy, *Exposé de la religion des Druses*, Paris, 1838; J. Wortabet, *Religion in the East*, London, 1860; F. J. Bliss, *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine*, New York, 1912. For literature on other phases of Muslim incarnation see the bibliographies under ASSASSINS and BĀB, BĀBĪS. GEORGE A. BARTON.

INCARNATION (Parsi).—Incarnation in the proper sense of the term has no place in the religion of the Avesta ('the incarnation of Ahura Mazda' not being a proper designation of Zarathuštra [R. Edulji Dastoor, *A True Zarathosti Guide*, Bombay, 1913, p. 182]), but the conception of the king's sacred endowment, or 'holiness' (see art. HOLINESS [General and Primitive]), in virtue of the somewhat vague personification of its supernatural efficacy, developed into something in the nature of incarnation. This *khwarenah* was the mysterious element which made the gods (*Yt.* xiv. 2, xvii. 15, v. 89, x. 141; *Nyā.* iii. 11; *Ys.* lvii. 3, i. 1) and the souls of the dead (*Yt.* xiii. 1, 9, 11, 14–16; *Ys.* lx. 4) powerful (*Yt.* xix. 9 ff.) and worthy of worship; which gave the sun (*Yt.* vi. 1 ff.), the moon (*Yt.* vii. 5 f.), the stars (*Yt.* viii. 1), the pre-eminent star, Sirius (*Yt.* viii. 2 ff.), and water (*Yt.* viii. 34, xiii. 65; *Ys.* lxviii. 11, 21) their benign influences; which protected the house (*Ys.* lx. 2, 7) and the nation (*Yt.* xix. 64, 69, x. 27); which, as the 'Aryan glory' (*Sir.* ii. 9), or the 'glory of the Aryans' (*Yt.* v. 42; *Sīr.* i. 25), bestowed wealth upon the Aryans, *i.e.* the Iranians (*Yt.* xviii. 1 f.), endowed men with vigour and wisdom, with the power of overcoming the hostility of nature and of demons (*Yt.* xviii. 2), with success and prosperity (*Yt.* v. 86; *Ys.* lx. 7); and effected what they sought to attain by their sacrifices (*Yt.* xiii. 24, 41, xvii. 6, x. 108, xxiv. 34, 46).

Etymologically the word *khwarenah* means 'light,' 'lustre,' and there is perhaps some connexion between this original meaning and the fact that, when Zarathuštra's mother, who was richly endowed with the *khwarenah*, was a young girl, she glowed like a great fire (*Dinkart*, VII. ii. 7 f.), and so also the body of the Saošyant will shine as the sun (*ib.* VII. xi. 2; cf. iii. 7). In the Avesta, however, the 'glory' is never spoken of as 'light.' Here it flies in cosmic space (*Dinkart*, VII. ii. 3) like a bird (*Yt.* xix. 34 ff.); it swims and hides in the sea (*Yt.* v. 42, xix. 56 ff.); it sojourns in reeds and in milk (*Bund.* xxxi. 32); in the form of an animal it accompanies the Chosen.[1]

The *khwarenah* of the Kavi dynasty was of a special and distinct type; here the 'Kavi *khwarenah*' becomes the 'king's glory' (*Ys.* i. 14; *Yt.* i. 21, xix. 9, 69 ff.). It was in virtue of this Kavi glory that the world-rulers of that dynasty acquired their title to their position, and their ability to perform their exploits. Now, as this power-substance manifested itself as a deity, and was invoked and worshipped as such (*Yt.* xviii. 7 f.; *Sīr.* ii. 9), we may speak of it in this aspect as in some sense an incarnation. The line of the Elect, of the men inspired and possessed by the *khwarenah*, begins with Haošyanha (*Yt.* xix. 26), and is continued through Takhma Urupi to Yima, the ruler of the blissful primal age (31). When once, in foolish arrogance, Yima spoke false words, the power-substance broke forth from him thrice (*Yt.* xix. 34, *i.e.*, doubtless, as priestly glory, warrior

[1] According to the *Kārnāmak*, 41 ff., and the *Šāh-nāmah* (E. G. Browne, *The Literary History of Persia*, London, 1902 ff., i. 137, 143), '"a very large and mighty ram" caught up Ardašīr and rode beside him on his horse, the fine ram being the royal glory.'

glory, and peasant glory, respectively; cf. *ib.* 53), passing to the god Mithra and the heroes Thraêtaona and Keresâspa (cf. *Dinkart*, VII. i. 25 ff.), and, finally, after a fierce struggle between the god of fire and the dragon for its possession, seeking shelter in the world-ocean. Here the Turanian chieftain Frañrasyan vainly sought by dint of swimming to gain possession of it. The legend that tells how this head of a Turanian people, hostile to the Iranians (*Yt.* v. 41 f., ix. 18, 22, xix. 56 ff.), once delivered the Iranian country from an Arab conqueror is in all probability based upon pre-historical events (cf. E. Blochet, *Introd. à l'hist. des Mongols*, Leyden, 1910 [*Gibb Memorial Series*, xii.], p. 205 ff.). A fragment preserved in the *Hymn to the Khwarenah* (*Yt.* xix. 93) actually recognizes that Frañrasyan too possessed the Kavi glory. At that period, however, it properly belonged to the monarchs of the pre-Zarathuštrian Kavi dynasty (*Yt.* xix. 71 ff.) down to Vištâspa, who at length embraced the religion of Zarathuštra. But the richest in glory was Zarathuštra himself (*Yt.* xix. 83). From him the supernatural endowment passes to the renewers of the world (xix. 22), and especially to the Saošyant, who comes in the final age (89). According to certain lost additions to the Avesta, the Kavi glory was transmitted to Ardašîr (Artaxerxes) and the Sasanian dynasty (*Dînkart*, VIII. xiii. 17 ff.).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works cited in the art. see J. Darmesteter, 'Le Zend-Avesta,' in *AMG* xxi.–xxiv. (1892–93). N. SÖDERBLOM.

INCARNATION (Semitic).—One cannot expect to find among the ancient Semites a doctrine of incarnation as the term is ordinarily understood in Christian theology, for such a doctrine presupposes a reasoned conception of the universe, in which the natural and the supernatural, or the divine and human, are set over against one another. The Semites were far too primitive in their thought to have made such a distinction. In the period in which their religious ideas took shape they conceived that gods, men, and animals formed a single society, and even plants were sometimes thought to have a connexion with this society. One might, accordingly, expect divine potency to manifest itself in men, animals, and trees. Such a stage of thought is preparatory to that in which real incarnation may be thought to take place; it is itself too primitive. The Semites did not approach the later conception of incarnation until they came under the influence of the philosophical Greeks, and even then their thoughts were coloured by their earlier and less philosophical views.

1. Rocks, springs, and trees.—In its earliest form their thought pictured the manifestation of the divine as exhibited in springs of water, trees, and crags of natural rock.[1] This was, of course, not incarnation, but materialization, or rather the recognition of a divine power as resident in these material forms. It is not really materialization, for they had never conceived the gods as pure spirits separated from these things. Survivals of this stage of thought are seen at the present day in the East, where Muslims hang personal offerings on sacred trees, as at Sûf.[2]

2. Animals.—A closer approximation to incarnation was the conception of gods as living in animal forms. This stratum of thought is exhibited in its greatest perfection in Egypt (see 'Egyptian' section, above, p. 190). The sacred animals of Egypt were at the beginning but the totems of the originally distinct tribes, and what the ultimate explanation of totemism may be is not yet clear.

[1] Cf. W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], London, 1894, pp. 132, 167, 185, 193; G. A. Barton, *Semitic Origins*, do. 1902, pp. 87–97.
[2] Cf. Barton, *A Year's Wandering in Bible Lands*, Philadelphia, 1904, p. 162.

Among the Semitic peoples the traces of totemism are not so pronounced as among the Egyptians, and yet the investigations of Robertson Smith[1] made it a probable view that the Semites had also passed through the totemistic period of religious thought. It seems that among the heathen Arabs there may have been animal-gods, for some of the tribes trace their descent from animals, as other Semites trace their descent from gods, as will be shown later. One or two animal-gods clearly existed in Arabia. Yagûth, the lion-god,[2] was worshipped in the time of the prophet. Ya'ûq was an idol in the form of a horse,[3] while Nasr was said to have the figure of a vulture.[4] At Erech in Sicily, Ashtart was thought to have the form of a dove,[5] and at Tyre the head of a bull.[6] Ancient Babylonian hymns often speak of gods as bulls,[7] and in Palestine the Baals were symbolized by images of bulls. Whether the deity was actually thought to reside in the animal, or the animal was only a symbol of the strength and creative power of the god, is an open question. It is quite possible that the thoughts of the worshippers were not clear as to this. Obscure and equivocal as some of the evidence is, it is, nevertheless, clear that in varying degrees, and at times in a shadowy way, the Semites frequently thought of the gods as incarnate in animals.

An early stratum of thought discernible in a few passages in the OT conceived of God as taking the form of a man and then discarding it at will. Such was the man who came to Abraham's tent in Gn 18, the one who appeared to Gideon in Jg 6, to Manoah's wife in Jg 13, and to Joshua in Jos $5^{13\text{-}15}$. These were special manifestations of Jahweh; cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Hebrew), I., 2.

3. Descent from gods.—The possible incarnation of a god in human flesh appears to have given rise to two different conceptions. These are the descent of men from gods, and the deification of certain men. Of these two conceptions the former seems to be the older. In Gn 2^{7} God is said to have breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. This implies that man has a kind of kinship to God. In one of the Babylonian myths of Oannes it is said that he mingled his own blood with the soil and thus made man. This myth expresses in this way the sense of man's kinship to the divine which Gn 2^{7} expressed. In Gn $6^{2\text{-}4}$ it is said that beings of the divine order (*benê hā-elôhîm*) married human wives, and that the issue of such marriages consisted of the heroes and men of renown of olden time. This is a recognition of a divine element in men of unusual or heroic qualities. The Babylonian Adapa, a man of unusual wisdom, is called a son of the god Ea.[8]

The view that unusual persons were god-begotten was undoubtedly universal in the early Semitic world. It lingered in an attenuated form down to the beginning of the Christian era. Philo Judæus declares that Zipporah was found by Moses 'pregnant by no mortal';[9] Isaac was 'not the result of generation, but the shaping of the unbegotten';[10] Samuel was 'born of a human mother' who 'became pregnant after receiving divine seed';[11] Tamar was 'pregnant through divine seed.'[12] It is possible that in the mind of Philo there was no thought of setting aside the

[1] *JPh* ix. [1880] 79 ff., *Lectures and Essays*, London, 1912, p. 455 f., *Kinship and Marriage*[2], do. 1903, p. 217 ff.
[2] W. R. Smith, *Kinship*[2], p. 224 ff.
[3] *Ib.* 242. [4] *Ib.*
[5] Ælian, *de Nat. anim.* iv. [6] *Hebraica*, x. [1893] 30 f.
[7] Cf. the references cited in *Studies in the History of Religion presented to C. H. Toy*, New York, 1912, p. 199, n. 70.
[8] R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament*, New York, 1912, p. 68 ff.
[9] ed. Mangey, i. 147. [10] i. 215.
[11] i. 273. [12] i. 598.

human father. He may have thought that the divine life-giving power of God was manifested through Abraham and Elkanah. His language with reference to Zipporah is, however, hardly open to that construction. But, whether he thought of the human father as an agent in these births or not, it is clear that the older conception lived in some form in his mind.

At least as old as this conception is the idea that whole tribes are of divine descent. Thus the Moabites are called the sons and daughters of Chemosh (Nu 21^{29}). Jeremiah ($2^{27f.}$) speaks as though the heathen Semites generally claimed descent from their gods; and, since these gods were represented by idols, he sarcastically refers to them as 'a tree' and 'a stone.' Virgil (*Æn.* i. 729 f.) by the phrase 'Belus et omnes a Belo' describes the Tyrians as claiming descent from Bel. As pointed out above, the Arabian tribes who claimed descent from animals probably in reality claimed descent from gods.

This more general conception, that whole tribes were descended from gods, is further removed from what we understand by incarnation than the conception that heroes or eminent persons are god-begotten. The ordinary plane of human life is too commonplace for early men, who are as yet unable to distinguish the spiritual from the material, or to have any strong realization that God is in it.

4. Deified kings.—Another close approach to the idea of incarnation is presented by the deification of kings in Babylonia, where, however, this was not as common as in Egypt. Most Babylonian kings recognized that they were quite distinct from the gods. Urumush, king of Kish, seems, however, to have been deified in his own lifetime, and his name enters as that of a god into the name of another man.[1] Shargani-sharri has the determinative for god written before his name[2] during his life, while Naram-Sin,[3] of the same dynasty, is constantly called a god, and had himself portrayed with the horns which represented divinity.[4] Naram-Sin is called on some seals the 'god of Akkad.' What led these kings to assume, contrary to the general Babylonian custom, that they were gods, we can now only conjecture. Some have supposed that it was the possession of the shrine of Nippur, but many monarchs who controlled that shrine never claimed divine honours. Others have suggested that it was the sudden world-wide expansion of the territory of these kings that led to their deification. Still others attribute it to Egyptian influence.

Two or three centuries later these kings of Agade were imitated by Dungi, Bur-Sin, and Gimil-Sin, kings of the dynasty of Ur. The founder of the dynasty, Ur-Engur, had not been regarded as a god, but Dungi greatly enlarged the dominion of Ur and contemporaneously began to write the determinative for divinity before his name. He had a festival ordained to himself as a god, and rearranged the calendar so that one month should be called *Ituczen-dungi*, or 'Month of the festival of the god Dungi.'[5] His name also enters, as the name of a deity, into the composition of the names of a considerable number of other men. Perhaps he and his successors in his dynasty meant by these claims to inform the world that they were the equals of the great monarchs of Agade. During the reign of these kings of Ur, offerings were made to Gudea and Urlama, former *patesis* of Lagash, as though they were gods. This was a post-mortem deification, for during their lifetime these rulers had claimed no divine honours.

[1] L. W. King, *History of Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, p. 203.
[2] *Ib.* 251. [3] *Ib.*
[4] Cf. J. de Morgan, *Délégation en Perse*, Paris, 1900, ii. 52.
[5] See King, *op. cit.* pp. 288, 298.

Apart from these cases we have no clear evidence of the deification of Babylonian kings. Ishmi-Dagan, of the dynasty of Isin, claimed to be the 'beloved spouse'[1] of the goddess Ishtar of Erech. Possibly this was because the king himself laid claim to divine rank. From whatever source or cause the deification of these kings arose, it was an even more emphatic way of marking their unusual quality than their supposed descent from a god would have been. To represent them as full-fledged gods in human form was to claim for them a real incarnation. It was all the more effective because opposed to the general customs of Babylonian thinking.

LITERATURE.—This has been fully cited in the footnotes.

GEORGE A. BARTON.

INCARNATION (Tibetan).—The theory of incarnation attains its most extreme development in Tibet. It is utilized there not merely in the usual Buddhist (and Hindu) way to explain by re-incarnations the ethical doctrine of retribution by the *karma* acquired by the individual, but also as a practical method of regulating the succession to the hierarchy, and even to postulate the perpetual incarnation of Buddhist gods within the bodies of the Grand Lamas.

The theory of hieratic succession by re-incarnation appears to have been introduced by the first of the series of Dalai Lamas, named Geden-dup (± A.D. 1473), the successor of Tsonkhapa who founded the now dominant Yellow-hat sect, the Ge-lug-pa. It seems to have been a device, on quasi-Buddhistic principles, to secure stability for the succession, by providing to some extent against the intrigues of rival party leaders. It assumes the continuous succession to the headship by the same individual under an uninterrupted series of consecutive re-embodiments. This obviously differs from the orthodox Buddhist conception of re-incarnation of an individual, which is not confined to any one particular channel. It supposes that the deceased head Lama is always re-born as a child within the country and often in the neighbourhood of the monastery, and the infant is to be discovered by oracular means and then duly installed in the vacant chair. On his death, he is similarly re-born, and so the process is repeated *ad infinitum*.

At first this system of selection appears to have been restricted solely to the Dalai Lamas of Lhasa; but about A.D. 1662 it was extended by the then Dalai Lama to the newly instituted Grand Lamaship of Tashilhunpo, and now it has been adopted by nearly all the great monasteries throughout Tibet, China, and Mongolia. It gives opportunities for much intrigue; and China as the suzerain of Tibet has found it necessary politically to take an active part in controlling the 're-incarnation' of the Dalai Lama, the temporal sovereign of the country. In A.D. 1793, China prescribed for the selection of this priest-king a lottery-scheme called the 'oracle of the urn,' by which the names of the competing infants are written on slips of paper and put into a golden urn, and, after prayer and other rites, the name first drawn is the fortunate one. The official directions for the working of this scheme are notified in a Chinese Imperial edict of A.D. 1808 engraved on stone slabs at the door of the great temple of Lhasa and translated by the present writer. It is a long document, and states near its beginning:

'On the passing away of the Lama the individual born in his stead is called "the incarnation of the illusory emanation" (*sprul-sku*), which in Chinese is called "Ho-so-i," meaning "the accepted and undoubted individual [re]-born"' (*sic*).

The lottery takes place in the immediate presence of the Chinese ambassador, the Amban, and it is also prescribed for the other three Grand Lamas of the Yellow-hat Church, namely at Tashilhunpo,

[1] See King, *op. cit.* 310.

Peking for inner Mongolia, and Urga for outer Mongolia. In practice the Lamas occasionally contrive to evade this form of nomination. In the exercise of its control over these 're-incarnations' the Chinese Government arrogates to itself powers which if taken seriously would imply direct interference with the soul, or its Buddhist equivalent. Thus the *Peking Gazette* of 31st March 1877, in denouncing a recalcitrant 're-incarnating' Lama who had insulted the Imperial Chinese Resident at Lhasa and carried off the official seals, intimates that the Emperor as 'Son of Heaven' had decreed as a punishment that 'his [the Lama's] soul should not be allowed to transmigrate at his decease.'

The fiction which credits the Dalai Lama of Lhasa with being the perpetual incarnation of the greatest and most popular of the Buddhist divinities, Avalokiteśvara (*q.v.*), the God of Mercy and the special object of the popular *Oṁ-maṇi* magical formula, has been shown by the present writer to have been the invention of that Dalai Lama who was the first of the Lhasa priest-kings, namely Lo-bzang Gya-mts'o (A.D. 1615–1682). He posed thus as a priest-god as well as temporal sovereign. Contemporary evidence of this title and position is found also in a letter from the Jesuit missionary (J. Grueber) then resident in Lhasa in the middle of the 17th cent., which refers to this Dalai Lama as 'that devilish God-the-Father who puts to death all such as refuse to adore him.'

LITERATURE.—W. W. Rockhill, 'Dalai Lamas and their Relations with the Manchu Emperors,' *Toung-Pao*, xi. (Leyden, 1910) 1 ff.; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 230 ff., 'Chinese Imperial Edict of 1808 A.D. on the Grand Lamas of Tibet,' *JRAS*, 1910, pp. 69–86, *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, London, 1905, pp. 27–36. L. A. WADDELL.

INCENSE.—The custom of burning sweet-smelling substances in religious ceremonies, or sometimes as a separate rite, has been of wide-spread occurrence, especially in the higher religions.

1. Kinds of incense.—While frankincense and other gum resins are more strictly to be called incense, many other substances have been used for the purpose of producing an agreeable odour when burned—various kinds of wood or bark, branches or roots of trees, herbs and odoriferous plants, seeds, flowers, fruits, aromatic earths, etc.

Of substances referred to in the Bible which are known to have been used by the Hebrews and other peoples as incense there are: (1) *Wood*—aloes (eagle-wood), Ca 4^{14}, cf. Dioscor. i. 21; sweet cane, Jer 6^{20}. (2) *Bark*—cassia, Ps 45^{8}; cinnamon, Rev 18^{13}. (3) *Roots*—costus, Ex 30^{24}. (4) *Gum resins*—balm (? mastic), Gn 37^{25}, Ezk 27^{17}; tragacanth (spicery), Gn 37^{25}; balsam (spices), Ca $5^{1.13}$; bdellium, Gn 2^{12}, cf. Dioscor. i. 80; galbanum, Ex 30^{34}; ladanum (myrrh), Gn 37^{25}; stacte, Ex 30^{34}; frankincense, Ex 30^{34}. (5) *Flower products*—saffron, Ca 4^{14}; spikenard, Ca 4^{14}. (6) *Animal products*—onycha (the operculum of a marine mollusc), Ex 30^{34}.

The sacred incense used in later Hebrew ritual was a compound of stacte, onycha, galbanum, and pure frankincense, seasoned with salt and reduced to a fine powder.[1] In still later times—the Herodian period—Josephus records that thirteen ingredients (sweet-smelling spices) were used.[2] Plutarch gives a list of sixteen ingredients used by the Egyptians in preparing *kuphi*—honey, wine, raisins, sweet rush, resin, myrrh, frankincense, seselis, calamus, asphalt, thryon, dock, both kinds of arcuthids, cardamum, and orris root.[3] In both cases the compounding was of ritual importance and a matter of mystery. Sacred books were read aloud while the *kuphi* was being mixed.

Frankincense (Gr. λιβανωτός, Heb. *lĕbhōnāh*, Med. Lat. *olibanum*, *libanus* in Vulg. of Sir 24^{21} 39^{18}) is the gum resin of trees of the genus *Boswellia* (*B. Carterii*, *B. Frereana*, *B. Bhua-Dajiana*), and is exported from Somaliland, probably the Punt of Egyptian inscriptions. Pliny[4] refers to it as a product of Arabia (Hadramaut), and says that the Sabæi alone behold the tree which produces it, and of these only 3000 families by virtue of hereditary succession. The trees are sacred; and, while pruning the trees or gathering the resin, men must not contract pollution by sexual intercourse or contact with a corpse. It is carried to Sabota, where the priests claim a tithe of it in honour of their god Sabis; until this is paid, none of it may be disposed of. Herodotus[1] speaks of winged serpents which guard the trees and are driven off by burning styrax. It was one of the ingredients of Jewish incense,[2] as it is still of that used in Christian ritual. Classical authors, in speaking of frankincense, usually refer to its exporting place as the seat of its origin, *e.g.* Syria and Phœnicia.

2. Purpose of incense.—The use of incense is connected primarily with the psychical aspects of the sense of smell. Pleasant-smelling perfumes, in whatever way they are obtained, are agreeable to men. They were offered to honourable persons in ancient times, or diffused over the roads on which they travelled.[3] Incense was also used at banquets as an agreeable accompaniment of food and wine. Hence it was supposed that such perfumes would also be agreeable to gods or spirits, on the same principle as that by which foodstuffs which men liked were offered to them. This is obvious when we consider that the smoke of sacrifice is pleasing to the gods, and that they are thought to seize on 'the unctuous smoke' with delight,[4] and that flowers are commonly offered to the gods, or scented oils applied to their images.[5] The bodies of the dead are also decked with flowers, aromatic oils, and perfumes for the same reason. Disagreeable odours, being obnoxious to men, were also obnoxious to supernatural beings. Hence it came to be thought that beneficent gods not only liked, but actually themselves possessed, pleasant odours.

Egyptian texts illustrate these beliefs. Isis has a wonderful odour which she can transfer to others, *e.g.* to the dead. Osiris transfers his odour to those whom he loves. At the anointing of the corpse, the 'perfume on the head of Horus' is besought to place itself on that of the deceased.[6] Similar ideas are found in Mandæan belief. The Light beings have a perfume which invigorates those who smell it.[7] In Persian belief the righteous after death are said to have a sweet odour.[8] The region of the gods, the place of bliss, has also a sweet perfume. The Polynesian *Rohutu* is free from all noxious odours.[9] In the Persian texts the deceased, approaching the blissful regions, is surrounded by a perfumed breeze.[10] Sweet odours form one of the characteristics of Hindu and Buddhist Paradises, and, where Divine beings or saints descend to the malodorous hells, they change the evil odour to sweet perfume.[11] Evil odours characterize the Persian regions of punishment, as well as the Muhammadan and Christian hell.[12] The idea that Paradise has a pleasant odour is found in Jewish, Christian, and Gnostic writings. Thus in the regions of the eastern Paradise and the 'garden of righteousness' visited by Enoch there are many fragrant aromatic trees, &c. those which yield material for incense, and among them one 'with a fragrance beyond all fragrance.'[13] The idea that Paradise is a region of fragrant perfume appears already in the *Apoc. of Peter*, and is found in most accounts of visits to or visions of the Other-World, while the same idea is referred to in inscriptions on Christian gravestones.[14] Spiritual persons and martyrs also possess this fragrance.[15] In Gnostic writings this perfume is connected with

[1] iii. 107. [2] Ex 30^{34}.
[3] Dn 2^{46}; Herod. vii. 54.
[4] Cf. G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, London, 1894, p. 681; Lucian, *de Sacr.* 9.
[5] W. Ellis, *Polyn. Researches*, London, 1831, i. 338, 351; Maspero, p. 679 (Babylonian); this caused the actual persons of the gods to be anointed.
[6] E. A. W. Budge, *Osiris and the Egyp. Resurrection*, London, 1911, i. 5, 78, 103; H. M. Tirard, *The Book of the Dead*, do. 1910, p. 32.
[7] W. Brandt, *Mand. Schriften*, Göttingen, 1893, p. 114.
[8] *Hāṭōxt Nask*, ii. 10. [9] Ellis, i. 245.
[10] *Hāṭōxt Nask*, ii. 7. [11] Cf. *ERE* iv. 652ᵃ.
[12] M. Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*⁴, London, 1907, p. 222; E. W. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, do. 1846, i. 101; J. A. MacCulloch, *Early Christian Visions of the Other-World*, Edinburgh, 1912, *passim*.
[13] *En.* $24^{3ff.}$; for other examples, cf. *Slav. En.* 8²; Syr. *Bar.* 29⁷; *Apoc. Mos.* 29, 38, 40.
[14] MacCulloch, *op. cit.* p. 11, and *passim*; A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 34.
[15] Cf. *Apocryphal Acts*, *passim*; *Martyrdom of S. Polycarp*, § 15; Eusebius, *HE* v. 1 (martyrs of Lyons and Vienne are so 'impregnated with the sweet odour of Christ that they seem as if anointed with earthly perfumes'); cf. also 2 Co 2^{14-16}, and Ignat. *ad Ephes.* § 17.

[1] Ex 30^{34}. [2] *BJ* v. v. 5.
[3] *de Isid.* 81. [4] *HN* xii. 14 ff.

the powers of the upper world, or the various heavens.[1] In Gnostic and Christian circles the anointing with fragrant oil had the effect of repelling the demons, because it was 'a type of that sweet odour which is above all things.'[2]

While evil odours are obnoxious to gods, they also scare off demons, who are likewise put to flight by pleasant odours, *e.g.* that of incense, which is one of the material objects commonly credited with magical virtues. The Andaman Islanders believe that the smell of bees'-wax is offensive to a demon of epidemic, who is kept off by stakes painted with it.[3] The Kei Islanders (New Guinea) burn the scrapings of buffalo horn to drive off demons.[4] The Thompson River Indians scare off ghosts by burning juniper.[5] In India, incense, which pleases the gods, drives off demons, who are also kept off by offensive odours.[6] In Canton, on the third day of the tenth month, filth is swept out of the house, and three sticks of incense are used to drive off the demon of penury.[7] In Palestine it is commonly used as an apotropaic,[8] and in Morocco before and during the 'Great Fast' incense is burned to keep off the *jian*.[9] Incense, because dreaded by evil spirits, is one of the ingredients of the 'amulet-box' in Tibet.[10] In Greece, at the *Anthesteria* and also at child-birth, doors were smeared with pitch to keep out ghosts and demons.[11] The Book of Tobit[12] illustrates this belief among the Jews. The liver and heart of a fish are laid on 'ashes of perfumes' so as to cause a smoke. When the demon smells this, he flees away to Egypt. In modern survivals similar ideas are found. In the Tyrol, witches are expelled by fumigating houses with juniper, and by burning rosemary, hemlock, sloe, and resinous splinters. Fairies are also kept off by strong odours, *e.g.* burning an old shoe, or by garlic.[13] Hence, generally, fumigation is a method of purifying persons and places, and of scaring off all kinds of evil influences; and for this incense is often used, as, *e.g.*, in mourning ceremonies in China.[14]

Besides the primary purpose of the use of incense as an offering pleasing to the gods, there were other practical, symbolic, or mystical uses which it served. (1) It was burned to neutralize the strong odours of bloody or burnt sacrifices, especially in hot regions. It was also used for sanitary reasons, *e.g.* in places where the dead were buried.[15] (2) It was likewise a symbol or vehicle of prayer. This is already found in Egypt, where it was thought that the smoke as it rose bore words of power or of prayer to the gods, who were pleased by its odour. The soul of the dead ascended to heaven by the smoke of the incense burned on his behalf.[16] In Jewish thought, prayer was connected with incense. In Ps 141[2] it is compared to incense. Cf. Rev 5[8], where golden bowls full of incense represent prayer. In Rev 8[3, 4] prayer rises with the smoke of the incense, as in the Egyptian view. So in Christian thought incense has usually been regarded as symbolic of prayer, though it also typifies contrition, the preaching of the faith, etc. (3) More mystical views have sometimes been entertained. Plutarch explains the beneficial effect of the Egyptian *kuphi* by saying that its sixteen ingredients are a square out of a square. Being composed of aromatic ingredients, it lulls people to sleep, loosens the tension of daily anxieties, and brightens the dreams. It is made of things that delight most in the night and exhibits its virtues by night.[1] Plutarch also gives medico-mystical reasons for the burning of other substances at other times, *e.g.* resin in the morning to purify the air, because of its strong and penetrating quality; myrrh at midday, because its hot nature dissolves and disperses the turbid qualities in the air.[2] Philo explains the four ingredients of the Hebrew incense as symbolizing the four elements, and thus representing the universe.[3] Josephus writes that the altar of incense, with the thirteen kinds of sweet-smelling things gathered from all places, points to the fact that God is Lord of all.[4] In the Orphic hymns the different substances used and offered to the gods are chosen because of some occult reason in each case.

W. R. Smith (426 f.) considers the religious value of incense as originally independent of animal sacrifice, since frankincense was the gum of a very holy species of tree collected with religious precautions. The right to see the trees was reserved to certain sacred families. While harvesting the gum they must practise continence and take no part in funerals.[5] The virtue of the gum lay in its being regarded as the blood of a divine plant.

3. Ritual use of incense in ethnic religions.—(*a*) *Lower races.*—The use of incense among lower races is hardly known, save perhaps where they have been in contact with higher races using it. We *may*, however, note the American Indian custom of offering tobacco smoke to the gods, and the Polynesian offering of flowers and aromatic substances.[6] Among the Sakai, Semang, Jakun, etc., the only common kind of offering is the burning of incense (benzoin). At a death among the Sakai, the magician waves a censer seven times over the body, recommending the dying man to think of his dead ancestors. As the smoke mounts up and then vanishes, so does the soul. Good spirits love its smell and evil spirits hate it. In sickness, among the savage Malays of Johore, the magician burns incense. The fumes rise to the abode of Jewa-Jewa and gratify him. He welcomes the soul of the magician and grants him medicine for the sick.[7] Incense is burned as an offering at shrines, saints' tombs, etc., among the Malays, and is the usual form of burnt sacrifice, with invocation to the Spirit of Incense. It reaches the nostrils of the gods and propitiates them as a foretaste of other offerings to follow.[8] It is also used in magical ceremonies, *e.g.* to make one walk on water or remain under water in an ordeal, in the use of the divining rod, or to cause a spirit to possess a magician.[9] Callaway refers to 'incense' burned with Zulu animal sacrifices (blood and caul of a bullock) to the spirits, in order to give them a sweet savour. It is apparently some native product and is also used in rites for the cure of sickness.[10]

(*b*) Among the *Semites* the use of incense came to be wide-spread. Its name among the Babylonians was *kutrinnu*, and the incense-offering

[1] *Cf.* Iren. I. iv. 1; Hippol. *Philosoph.* v. 14, vii. 10; *Apoc. Acts, passim.*
[2] Iren. I. xxi. 3.
[3] E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. (1883) 97.
[4] Frazer, *GB*[2] iii. 63.
[5] J. Teit, *Memoirs Amer. Mus. of Nat. Hist.* ii. pt. 4 (1900), p. 332.
[6] Crooke, *PR*[2], 1896, ii. 21; cf. *ERE* iii. 445[a].
[7] *L'Anthrop.* iv. (1893) 175 f. [8] *FL* xviii. (1907) 59.
[9] E. Westermarck, *FL* xxii. (1911) 132, 142.
[10] See *ERE* iii. 468[b].
[11] Hesychius, *s.v.* μισραὶ ἡμέραι; Photius, *s.v.* ῥάμνος.
[12] 6[7]. 18. 17 8[2, 3].
[13] J. G. Campbell, *Superstitions of the Highlands and Islands of Scotland*, Glasgow, 1900, p. 36; E. S. Hartland, *Science of Fairy Tales*, London, 1891, p. 99.
[14] J. J. M. de Groot, *Rel. System of China*, Leyden, 1892 ff., i. 33, 77; cf. W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], London, 1894, p. 426; M. Jastrow, *Aspects of Rel. Belief and Practice in Bab. and Assyr.*, New York, 1911, p. 318 (purification of house after sickness with torches and censers); cf. also *ERE* iv. 729[b], 762[a].
[15] Cf. Tert. *de Cor. Mil.* 10; *Apol.* 30, 42.
[16] Budge, *op. cit.* iii. 255; cf. the idea current in the New Hebrides that the soul of the departed rose to the sun on the fire kindled at the grave (G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 335).

[1] *de Iuid.* 81. [2] *Ib.* 80.
[3] *Quis rerum divin. heres.* 41. [4] *BJ* v. v. 5.
[5] Pliny, xii. 54. [6] Turner, i. 36, 71.
[7] Skeat-Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 98, 199, 352.
[8] W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 74 f.
[9] Skeat, *FL* xiii. [1902] 136, 144 f., 152.
[10] *Religious System of the Amazulu*, Natal, 1870, London, 1874, pp. 141, 174.

consisted of odoriferous woods (cedar, cypress), myrtle, cane, and sweet herbs, by which the gods were made to smell a pleasing odour. After the Deluge, its survivor offered calamus, cedar, and fragrant herbs, and 'the gods inhaled the sweet odour' and 'gathered like flies round the sacrificer.'[1] Incense is frequently mentioned in the texts—*e.g.*, 'before Samas he makes an incense-offering'—or kings are represented making this offering. Nabonnedos is described as filling the temple with the odour of incense.[2] Herodotus[3] says that 1000 talents of frankincense were offered on the great altar of Bel at his annual feast, and the author of Is 65[3] refers to Babylon as the land where incense is offered on bricks. It was burned as a ritual accompaniment of incantations, prayers, and the presentation of oracles, and also at the yearly mourning for Tammuz, with which was combined a memorial of the dead, who are said to 'arise and inhale the incense of offerings,' as well as at funeral rites.[4] It was also used as a fumigatory, *e.g.* of the gods' table and its accessaries and the place whither the gods were supposed to come, of houses, and of persons.[5]

Evidence of the popularity of incense-offerings among the peoples of Canaan and the surrounding districts is found in the fact that it is the most commonly denounced form of idolatry in Israel. Incense was offered on altars of brick or on the housetops to Baal, the sun, moon, stars, etc.[6] Lucian describes the sweet odours and the incense smoking without ceasing in the temples of the Syrian goddess.

(*c*) Although in the OT the *Hebrew* use of incense seems to be early, this is due to the rendering of the word *ḳṭôreth* as 'incense,' when, strictly speaking, it means the savoury odour or smoke of a burnt sacrifice.[7] The word translated 'frankincense' is *l'bhônāh*, λίβανος, Arab. *lubān*, meaning a sweet resinous gum, and incense in this sense was not certainly used until the 7th century.[8] *Ḳṭôreth* also came to mean 'incense.'[9] Ezekiel makes no reference to incense in his description of the reformed ritual. The first distinct reference to its use in the cult of Jahweh is in Jer 6[20] 'To what purpose cometh there to me frankincense from Sheba, and the sweet cane [calamus] from a far country?' Cf. 17[26] 41[5] and Is 43[23. 24] 60[6] 66[3]—the latter passages show that it was not required, and was an innovation in the cult of Jahweh and was expensive. Once admitted, however, it came to be a regular part of the ritual, and is frequently referred to in the Priestly Code (P). Incense was offered either (1) by itself, or (2) as a part of other sacrifices. (1) It was offered in censers, *e.g.* on the Day of Atonement when the high priest appeared before the mercy-seat;[10] or when Aaron passed through the congregation to stay the plague with his censer and incense (an atonement and fumigation).[11] The incense used in these rites was carefully compounded according to a set formula,[12] and was obviously regarded as sacred—'most holy' and not to be used for common purposes. It must not be consumed on 'strange fire,' *i.e.* fire from some other source than the glowing altar coals,[13] and it must not be offered by any but the priests.[1] Probably as a later custom a separate altar on which this incense was burned came into use, and on it incense was burned morning and evening.[2] (2) Frankincense (*i.e.* not the compounded incense of Ex 30[34]) was offered with the meat-offering,[3] and firstfruits,[4] and burned with them on the altar. It was also placed on the shewbread as a 'memorial,' *'azkārāh*, in two golden vessels and then consumed on the altar at each weekly renewal of the bread.[5] But it was not to be offered with a sin-offering or with the 'meal offering of jealousy.'[6]

In later times the daily offering of incense became an elaborate ceremony, and priests were chosen by lot to offer it.[7]

(*d*) In *Egypt* the burning of various kinds of incense was always an important rite, each ingredient of it having magical properties, and, as has been seen, its smoke was supposed to carry the words of prayer as well as the souls of the dead to heaven. Prayer was made, *e.g.*, to Rā, that he would draw the soul up to heaven on the smoke of the incense. Probably the earliest reference to the use of incense in any religion occurs in the notice of Sanchkara, a king of the XIth dynasty, who sent an expedition for aromatics through the desert to the Red Sea towards the incense land of Punt. Hâtšepsu, a queen of the XVIIIth dynasty, also sent an expedition by sea thither. Punt is probably Hadramaut and Somaliland.[8] Incense was also obtained from Gilead.[9] A common representation on the walls of temples is that of a king offering incense. He holds a censer in one hand and with the other throws little balls or pastilles of incense upon it, praying the god to accept it and give him a long life. Immense quantities of incense are often spoken of as having been offered, *e.g.* 1000 censers, or, as an inscription referring to Rameses III. reports, 1,933,766 pieces of incense, etc., during the 31 years of his reign.[10] It was offered to all the gods, who delighted in its odour, their statues being censed with it and perfumed. Often it accompanied other offerings, greater or smaller—*e.g.*, frankincense, myrrh, and other perfumes were placed in the carcass of the bullock offered to Isis[11]—or was presented by itself, as described above. The censer was an open cup holding fire, with or without a handle, but other forms were also used.[12] At funerary rites the deceased was purified with incense. Five grains were twice offered to mouth, eyes, and hand, once for the north and once for the south; then incense from foreign parts was similarly offered, along with the litany of purification. Myrrh, resin, etc., but not frankincense, were placed in the body which was embalmed.[13]

(*e*) Incense, in the sense of a gum resin, does not seem to have been used in *Greece* until post-Homeric times, and Pliny says that people knew only the smell of cedar and citrus as it arose in volumes of smoke from the sacrifice.[14] The idea of a fragrant odour, *e.g.* of sacrifice, being pleasant to the gods was well known.[15] The wood of odoriferous trees, *e.g.* a kind of cedar (τὸ θύον),[16] as well as myrtle was burned in houses for its fragrant smell. In Homer[17] θύος probably means no more than the burning of such wood or some native pro-

[1] Jastrow, *Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 503.
[2] Jastrow, p. 665; F. Delitzsch, *Assyr. HWB*, Leipzig, 1896, p. 600.
[3] i. 183.
[4] Jastrow, pp. 281, 346, 575; A. Jeremias, *The Bab. Conception of Heaven and Hell*, London, 1902, p. 11.
[5] M. J. Lagrange, *Études sur les religions sémitiques*[2], Paris, 1905, p. 239 ff.; Herod. i. 198.
[6] Cf. 1 K 11[8], 2 K 22[17] 23[5], Jer 7[9] 11[13] 19[13] 32[29], Hos 2[13], I 6[13] 8[11].
[7] Cf. Ps 66[15] 'incense of rams'; see also Dt 33[10], 1 S 2[28], Is 1[13] etc.
[8] Cf. the absence of any denunciation of incense in the well-known passages, Am 4[4] 5[21f.], Is 1[11], Mic 6[6].
[9] Cf. Ezk 8[11]. [10] Lv 16[12f.].
[11] Nu 16[46]. [12] Ex 30[34], and see § 1 above.
[13] Lv 10[1], and cf. passages just cited.
[1] Nu 16[7f.], 2 Ch 26[19ff.].
[2] Ex 30[1. 7. 8], a secondary part of P.
[3] Lv 2[1 6[15]]. [4] Lv 2[14f.].
[5] Lv 24[5ff.]; Jos. *Ant.* III. x. 7. [6] Lv 5[11], Nu 5[15].
[7] Lk 1[9. 10]; *EBi*, col. 2167.
[8] Schrader, *Reallex.*, *s.v.* 'Weihrauch.'
[9] Gn 37[25].
[10] J. G. Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs of Anc. Egyptians*, London, 1878, iii. 414, 417; A. Erman, *Ägypten und ägypt. Leben im Altertum*, Tübingen, 1885, p. 407.
[11] Herod. ii. 40. [12] Wilkinson, iii. 398.
[13] See also § 1. [14] *HN* xiii. 1.
[15] Homer, *Il.* viii. 548 ff. [16] *Od.* v. 60.
[17] *e.g. Il.* ix. 499.

duct as an offering, or it may simply mean 'sacrifice.' Later it came to mean 'incense,' and was the source of Lat. *tus*. The word for 'frankincense,' λιβανωτός, was of foreign derivation. Incense as such was not used before the 8th cent. B.C.,[1] and is first mentioned in Euripides.[2] Schrader is of opinion that it may have been introduced through the cult of Aphrodite, and it was certainly traditionally thought to have come from Phœnicia *via* Cyprus, where it was used in her cult.[3] It was brought into Greece commercially from Arabia, and imported thence by Phœnicians.[4] Incense was burned with bloody sacrifices as an offering or to combat evil odours,[5] or with fruits, cakes, wheat, etc.,[6] or as a separate offering, both in domestic ritual and in the cult of the gods; *e.g.*, it was burnt to Zeus Meilichios, to Demeter before consulting the oracle at Patræ, and to Hermes and Sosipolis.[7] The inventory lists of some temples contain evidence of the large quantities which came to be used, and it was sometimes given as a gift by one person to another.[8] Incense of different kinds was also used largely in the Orphic cult, as the hymns show. It was offered along with cakes of honey, πέλανοι, without being burned, in the rites of certain divinities.[9] The method of burning incense was to throw it on the altar so as to mingle with the smell of the victim, or to fill the victim with it,[10] or to burn it in braziers standing on or near the altar, or even outside temples, or in vessels which could be borne on the hand.

(*f*) In *Roman* religion, incense (*tus*) was one of the most important of the bloodless offerings (*libamina*), and indeed without it no rite was regarded as complete. But, as in Greece, odoriferous woods and herbs had probably been used first, as described by Ovid in his account of the Palilia[11]—olive, pitch-wood, laurel branches, and Sabine herbs.[12] Gums and resins came to be used—frankincense (*masculum tus*),[13] myrrh, crocus, costum.[14] In the case of animal sacrifices, incense, saffron, and laurel were burned as a preliminary, and, as the animal was led up, incense and wine were sprinkled on the altar. It was also offered with the blood, and burned with the *exta*.[15] Incense was also offered by itself in public or private ritual; and this is illustrated by the fact that one method of forcing a renunciation of Christianity was to burn some incense on an altar before an image or to the Emperor. Incense was offered to the *lar familiaris* daily.[16] The method of using it was to burn it on the greater altars, or in braziers, or small portable altars (*focus, turibulum*). It was carried in a casket called *acerra* (much used in funerary ceremonies), whence it was taken and burned.[17] It was also offered for the averting of prodigies *c.* 296 B.C.,[18] and burned in magical ceremonies.[19] The introduction of incense into the cult was connected with Bacchus, the first to make offerings of cinnamon and frankincense[20]—an obvious suggestion of its entrance into Roman ritual through the Greek cult of Dionysos. Elsewhere Ovid[1] speaks of its importation from the Euphrates region, perhaps connecting it with the Oriental cults which introduced it into Greece.

(*g*) Hindus have always been fond of pleasant odours, and *India* was already celebrated for its perfumes in ancient times. Incense from Arabia was early imported there, but many native kinds of sweet-smelling materials have long been in use—benzoin, and other gum resins, seeds, roots, dried flowers, and fragrant woods. These are burned ritually or in ordinary domestic usage. In ancient times sandal-wood was burned as incense in temples and as a fragrant stuff in houses, and in the daily rites the sacred fire was fed with consecrated wood, usually from the Palāśa tree.[2] In modern Hinduism the use of incense is wide-spread in all forms of cult. Thus in the cult of Śiva it is daily burned by the priest before the stone representing the god at Orissa, and perfumes are also placed on it. In the Vallabha sect of Vaiṣnavism the Mahārājas offer incense and swing lights before the images, and the same act of homage is paid to them by the people. Camphor and incense are burned before the image of Kṛṣṇa, and in the demon cults of Western India perfumes are commonly burned. In the *Pañchāyatana* ceremony of the Brāhman householder perfumes and flowers are offered, and among the sixteen acts of homage is the offering of perfumes, sandal, flowers, and incense (*dhūpa*; see Monier Williams, *passim*).

(*h*) Incense was unknown in early *Buddhism*, which was opposed to external ritual, but in the course of time its use, especially in northern Buddhism, has become general. Thus, in Ceylon, perfumes and flowers are offered before the image of Buddha, and in the Pirit ceremonial incense is burned round the platform on which the relics of Buddha are exposed.[3] But it is in Tibet that the use of incense is most prevalent, and Huc and other travellers there have referred to the likeness of its ritual use and of the censers to that of the Roman Catholic Church. It is used in the initiation of a monk; it is offered to the good spirits and Lamas in the daily cult of the monasteries and of the village priesthoods; it is one of the usual offerings in the temples, and is prominent in the festivals at which 'clouds of incense fill the air'; it is used in exorcisms, in baptisms, and other ceremonies; it is burned in censers before the Lamas at the performance of religious dramas, or in shrines and chapels, etc. Perfumes and incense form one of the five sensuous offerings, and figure prominently in the 'presentation of offerings,' which is one of the seven stages of worship. These seven offerings are 'essential,' and among them flowers and incense occur as early as the 7th century. They bear Sanskrit names, and are borrowed from Hinduism.[4] In Japanese Buddhism, incense is also commonly used, and has influenced the native Shinto religion. In earlier Shintoism incense was unknown, but it is now burned in censers at many ceremonies, *e.g.* at the new moon, and at magical rites.[5]

(*i*) In *China*, incense is much used in public and private cults. It is offered in the temples as part of the daily worship, and it is burned at festivals and in processions. It is also offered before the ancestral tablets or before the household deities, and is used in consulting the gods and in magical

[1] Farnell uses this as an argument against the likelihood of Mesopotamian influences affecting Greece in earlier periods (*Greece and Bab.*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 232 f.).
[2] *Bacch.* 144.
[3] Athenæus, xii. 10; Hesychius, *s.v. θύα*.
[4] Herod. ii. 8, iii. 107 (the trees are said to be guarded by winged serpents).
[5] Paus. ix. 3. 8; Daremberg-Saglio, iv. ii. 964*a*.
[6] Paus. v. xv. 10, vi. xx. 3.
[7] Paus. v. xv. 10, vi. xx. 3, vii. xxi. 12, xxii. 3; Lucian, *de Sacr.* 12; Plaut. *Aul.* 24.
[8] Boeckh, *CIG* 2852, 6773; Lucian, *Cronosolon*, 16.
[9] L. F. A. Maury, *Hist. des religions de la Grèce ant.*, Paris, 1857-59, ii. 116.
[10] Paus. ix. 16. 8.
[11] *Fasti*, iv. 741 f.; cf. i. 338 ff.
[12] For the burning of laurel in a magical ceremony, see Verg. *Ecl.* viii. 82 f.; cf. Theocr. *Id.* ii. 33.
[13] Verg. *Ecl.* viii. 65.
[14] *Fasti*, i. 339 ff.
[15] *Ib.* iv. 933 ff.; Arnobius, vii. 26.
[16] Plaut. *Aul.* prol. 23 f.
[17] Verg. *Æn.* v. 745.
[18] Livy, x. 23.
[19] Verg. *Ecl.* viii. 65.
[20] *Fasti*, iii. 727.

[1] *Fasti*, i. 338.
[2] C. Lassen, *Ind. Alterthumskunde*[2], Leipzig, 1858-74, i. 834 f.; M. Monier Williams, *Rel. Thought and Life in India*, London, 1883, p. 366.
[3] Monier Williams, *Buddhism*, London, 1889, pp. 315, 319.
[4] Monier Williams, pp. 320, 345, 350, 357; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, *passim*.
[5] W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, pp. 213, 292, 354.

ceremonies. Chinese Buddhism also used it extensively.[1] In Chinese funeral ceremonies the burning of incense plays an important part, both as an offering and as a fumigatory, and one purpose is to gratify the olfactory nerves of the soul of the deceased.[2]

(*j*) In the ancient *Persian* religion incense was in use. It was burned five times daily in the official cult, and at times was used in large quantities. Herodotus[3] describes Darius burning 300 talents of frankincense upon the altar. It was also burned as a method of purification or fumigation, and in a passage of the Vendīdād[4] it is called 'incense of *vohu-gaona*'—'Thou shalt perfume Vohu-mano [perhaps an idol; see above, p. 153a] therewith.'[5] Sandal-wood and incense are burned in modern Parsi ritual.[6] The *Bahman-Yašt*[7] describes how, in the 'sheep period,' firewood and incense will be properly supplied.

(*k*) Incense was very largely used in the religion of ancient *Mexico*, and was offered to all the gods, and in all festivals, processions, and sacrifices. Incense-burning was performed four times daily in the temples. Images of gods were censed in the temples and in processions, and the chief officiant was also himself censed. Some gods desired only bloodless sacrifices, of which incense was one, *e.g.* Quetzalcoatl, who delighted in fragrant odours and perfumes. The incense was carried in an embroidered bag and thrown on an open censer (*temaitl*) of baked clay containing fire. It consisted of copal, or it was sometimes made from a herb called *yiauhtli*. Its fumes were of a narcotic kind and were also used to stupefy human victims. The fumes of incense were regarded as typifying prayer.[8] Incense consisting of sweet-scented gums was used in *Peruvian* ritual and offered as a sacrifice. Golden censers or braziers stood in the temples.[9]

(*l*) In *Muhammadan* cultus proper, incense is not used, but it is commonly offered at the shrines of saints, and is permitted by the traditions as a perfume for a corpse. Muhammadans in India, possibly as an influence from Hinduism, use it in their rites, *e.g.* circumcision, marriage, funerals, etc., and it is supposed to have the effect of keeping off evil spirits. But among all Muhammadans it is burned in houses on braziers, or at marriage processions it is burned in a *mibkharah*, and it is also commonly used in magical ceremonies, *e.g.* to counteract the evil eye, or in the 'science' of *da'wah*, a method of incantations in which various perfumes are burned according to a table showing the letters of the alphabet. The letter of the name of the person for whom the incantation is made gives the required perfume. The materials used for incense are frankincense, benzoin, storax, coriander-seed, aloes-wood, etc.[10]

4. Incense in the Christian Church.—Although incense was used in Jewish ceremonial, while such a prophecy as Mal 1[11] might seem to point to its continued use in the new dispensation, and though it was one of the offerings of the Magi and its use is referred to in the Apocalypse, there is no evidence that it was part of early church ritual; indeed there is strong evidence against it. Some of the Fathers refer to it as a type of prayer; but Tertullian, Athenagoras, Arnobius, and Lactantius clearly witness against its ritual use.

Tertullian[1] says: 'Not one pennyworth of incense do I offer Him.' Athenagoras[2] declares that God does not require the sweet smell of flowers or incense. Arnobius,[3] referring to the fact that the early Romans did not use it, maintains that Christians may safely neglect it. Lactantius[4] says that odours are not desired by God, and agrees with Neo-Platonist writers that frankincense and the like should not be offered to Him.

The fact that it was a Jewish usage may have tended to make Christians neglect it, but what had probably a more powerful effect was its use among pagans and the common practice during the ages of persecution of insisting that Christians should offer a few grains of incense to the gods or on the altar of the Emperor as a token of their renunciation of their faith. Such apostates as yielded in this way during the Decian persecutions were called *Thurificati*. Incense was, however, used for fumigations as a sanitary precaution, *e.g.* at burials or in places with a disagreeable odour;[5] but otherwise its ritual use was almost unknown during the first four centuries. The *Apostolic Canons* refer to the use of incense (*θυμίαμα*) at the Eucharist, but this is probably a later interpolation. It was used at the vigil offices on Sunday in Jerusalem towards the end of the 4th century.[6] Pseudo-Dionysius[7] speaks of the priest censing the altar and making the circuit of the holy place. In the Liturgy of St. James it is used in the pro- and post-Anaphora portions, and in that of St. Mark before the gospel, at the great entrance, at the kiss of peace, and at the commemoration of the dead. In the Liturgy of St. Chrysostom the sacred vessels, the Gospels, altar, priest, and sanctuary are censed in the pro-Anaphora, and the altar is censed in the Anaphora. Evagrius[8] refers to the gift of a thurible to a church in Antioch by a Persian king *c.* 594. In the West the *Ordines* of the 8th cent. describe the swinging of the censer during the procession of the pontiff and his acolytes from the sacristy to the altar in the church at Rome. 'As for censing the altar, or the church, or the clergy or congregation, such a thing is never mentioned.'[9] The further use of incense was gradual, since it is not mentioned by writers of this period who treat of ritual, and its use at the elevation and benediction was not known in the West till the 14th century. In the Roman Catholic Church at the present time incense is burned at solemn Mass before the introit, at the gospel, offertory, and elevation, at solemn blessings, processions, choral offices, consecration of churches, burial rites, etc. In the Church of England there is no decisive evidence of its ritual use in Divine service during the period after the Reformation. It was used, however, for sanitary purposes, as a fumigatory, and for the sake of its agreeable odour in churches, at feasts, at coronations, etc. Its ritual use was resumed towards the middle of the 19th cent., but this was decided to be illegal in *Martin v. Mackonochie*, 1868, and in *Sumner v. Wix*, 1870.[10] Incense is used ritually in many churches of the Anglican communion, and the practice is certainly spreading as a pleasing adjunct to worship, and as a symbolic rite typifying prayer.

LITERATURE.—H. von Fritze, *Die Rauchopfer bei den Griechen*, Berlin, 1894; Pliny, *HN* xii. 30 ff., xiv. 33 ff.; O. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, Strassburg, 1901, *s.v.* 'Weihrauch'; Theophrastus, *de Odoribus*; H. Zwaardemaker, *Die Physiologie des Geruchs*, Leipzig, 1895; E. G. C. F. Atchley, *Hist. of the Use of Incense in Divine Worship*, London, 1909; R. Sigismund, *Die Aromata in ihrer Bedeutung für Religion . . . des Alterthums*, Leipzig, 1884. Cf. also the authorities cited in the footnotes of the present article.

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1 J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, London, 1866, *passim*.
2 J. J. M. de Groot, *op. cit.* i. *passim*.
3 vi. 97. 4 xix. 24.
5 *Vend.* xix. 24; cf. Haug, pp. 335 f., 385.
6 Haug, 404, 408.
7 iii. 40; cf. *SBE* v. [1880] 230.
8 Bancroft, *NR* iii. chs. 7-10, *passim*.
9 W. H. Prescott, *Hist. of Conquest of Peru*, 1870, pp. 47, 50; A. Réville, *Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, London, 1884, p. 218.
10 See E. W. Lane, *Mod. Egyptians*, London, 1846, i. 186, 217, ii. 71, 93, iii. 154; Hughes, *DI*[2], 72 ff., 206.

1 *Apol.* 30; cf. 42. 2 *Leg.* 13. 3 *adv. Gent.* vii. 26.
4 *Div. Inst.* vi. 25, *Epit.* 2.
5 Tert. *Apol.* 42, *de Cor. Mil.* 10.
6 *Peregr. Æthericæ*, cited by L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship*[4], London, 1912, p. 495.
7 *de Hier. Eccl.* iii. 2. 8 *HE* vi. 21. 9 Duchesne, p. 163.
10 See the summary of the evidence by L. T. Dibdin, in *EBr*[11] xiv. 352 f., *s.v.* 'Incense.'

INCEST.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, ETHICS AND MORALITY.

INCUBATION.—Incubation, a translation of the Gr. technical term ἐγκοίμησις, denotes in comparative religion the practice of sleeping (or at least of passing the night) in a shrine or other sacred place with the object of receiving a Divine revelation or Divine aid; in a still more specific sense—which is also the one most commonly denoted by the word because of the Greek use of the rite—the aid in question is currently held to be the cure of disease, though this limitation is of later development. Naturally, the subject of incubation is connected with those of communion with Deity, disease, divination, dreams, omens (*qq.v.*), etc.

In the state of sleep, when the soul is released from the ordinary trammels of the body, it is particularly subject to Divine visitations, and may receive revelations from Divine beings (cf. Gn $28^{12ff.}$ $37^{5ff.}$ 41^{1-36}, 1 K 3^{5-15} etc.). Indeed, the whole basal theory of incubation could not be better expressed than in the words of Job ($33^{15f.}$):

'In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, in slumberings upon the bed; then he [God] openeth the ears of men, and sealeth their instruction.'

It is perfectly true that Divine revelations in dreams may come in almost any place (for examples, see art. DREAMS); and, as when the American Indian goes forth in search of the revelation of his *manitou*, the inquirer may have no idea as to the spot in which the Divine will draw near to him (cf. art. COMMUNION WITH DEITY [American], vol. iii. p. 741). Yet it is obvious that a god will reveal himself more readily in a distinct locality with which he is already associated by legend or by cult, and where he has a dwelling provided in the shape of temple or shrine. In some instances this dwelling may be only temporary, and prepared for the special occasion on which Divine revelation is sought.

Thus, among the Malays, after a proper site for a house is found, four sticks are laid down to form a rectangle in the centre of the plot, and a clod is taken from this enclosure, with the prayer to the lords of the spot:

'If it [my purpose] is good, show me a good omen,
If it is bad, show me a bad omen.'

After this, 'wrap the clod up in white cloth, and after fumigating it with incense, place it at night beneath your pillow, and when you retire to rest repeat the last two lines of the above charm as before and go to sleep. If your dream is good proceed with, if bad desist from, your operations' (W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 142; cf. also p. 144; and, for a similar usage in Torres Straits, see *ERE* iv. 776ᵃ). The ancient Irish had a kindred practice in the *tarbfess*, which is usually translated 'bull feast,' although *fess*, 'feast,' is probably identical with *fess*, 'to pass the night' (H. Pedersen, *Vergl. Gramm. der kelt. Sprachen*, Göttingen, 1908-13, ii. 524, 559; cf. also i. 80). In *Serglige Conculaind*, 22 f. (ed. E. Windisch, *Irische Texte*, i. [Leipzig, 1880] 212 f.) we read that the Irish kings Medb, Ailill, Cúrol, Tigernach, and Find assembled, but did not decide upon a king for Ulster because they were united against that kingdom. 'Thereupon a *tarbfess* is made there among them, that they might know from it to which of them they should give the kingdom. 'Tis thus this *tarbfess* was done, *i.e.* a white bull to be killed, and a man to eat to satiety of its flesh and its broth, and slumber for him from this satiety, and the *ós firindi* [a certain charm] to be sung over him by four druids, and the sort of man who should be made king there was seen by him in vision from his form and from his description and the sort of work he did. The man awoke from his sleep, and his dream is told to the kings.' Similar in principle was the ancient Irish *imbas forosnai*, in which incantations were pronounced over his palms by him who sought a revelation, after which he placed his palms to his cheeks and fell asleep, being guarded against any interruption. During his slumber the future was revealed to him (see above, p. 123ᵇ; the text is conveniently given by Windisch, 610). Very frequently incubational dreams are facilitated by fasting, vigils (*qq.v.*), and the like (cf. *PC* ii. 410 ff.; M. Hamilton, *Incubation*, pp. 114, 151, 159, 164 f., 169).

The place where such a revelation was vouchsafed would naturally be regarded as an abode of the Deity (cf. Gn 28^{16-19} $35^{1.7}$), and might long be held a centre of worship, as in the case of Bethel ('house of God,' cf. 2 K $2^{2f.}$, Am $7^{10.13}$). Incubation might also be practised at sacred stones and sacred trees. An excellent example of the former is found in the instance of the pre-Islāmic priests who slept near the oracular stone of al-Jalsad (J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*², Berlin, 1897, p. 55), and of the latter in the revelation received by Alexander the Great as he slumbered under the plane tree at Smyrna (Pausanias, VII. v. 2). Consultation might likewise be sought in grave crises of the State, as was done on at least one occasion in Greece (Pausanias, III. xxvi. 1).

The usual locality for incubation is the shrine or temple.

Thus, among the Meithels, when the king and his people had been alarmed by the gods, who desired to show their power lest they be forgotten in Meithel prosperity, a *maibi* ('wise woman') gave a message to the king directing him 'to send all the *maibas* and *maibis* of the country to sleep in the temple of Thängjing [the god of the country of Moirang] wearing their sacred clothes. . . . There in their dreams they were instructed to divide the people into sections, some for one duty and some for others. . . . Then, when they had told the King all the wonderful things communicated to them in their dreams, they were bidden to do as the God had said' (T. C. Hodson, *The Meitheis*, London, 1908, p. 131).

Incubation in shrines for advice in all sorts of problems of life is common, as in ancient Egypt (cf. *ERE* iii. 762ᵃ, and especially v. 35 f.) and among the modern Berbers (cf. *ERE* ii. 513). Of modern Mesopotamia we are told that

'the shaikhs, the Muhammadan mullas, the Kurds, and the Arabs lie down in mosques or places of pilgrimage, and in ancient convents which formerly belonged to Christians, and to which they give the generic name of *mazār* [from *zār*, 'to visit, go on pilgrimage'], with the purpose of obtaining good dreams or inspirations suited to guide them in their dreams. In Mesopotamia it is not uncommon to find heretical or Catholic Christians who seek slumber in churches or convents to have good and lucky dreams' (J. Tfinkdji, in *Anthropos*, viii. [1913] 506).

From such consultation as to the proper course to be adopted in problems of various kinds has developed that type of incubation which, because of its prominence in Greece, has gained a natural, though not wholly deserved, prominence in the common parlance of comparative religion. This is incubation for the purpose of gaining cure from disease of the most diverse kinds. The subject has been so thoroughly discussed (see Literature appended below) that the briefest summary will be sufficient here (cf., for some special instances, also *ERE* vi. 542, 548 f., 552). There was a primitive American centre at Izamal.

'In their heathendom those Indians [the Mayas of Yucatan] raised one altar and temple on another to their king or false god Ytzmat-ul, where they placed the image of a hand which served them as a memorial; and they say that there they carried the dead and the sick, and that there they were resuscitated and healed by touching the hand. . . . And therefore it was called and named Kab-ul, which means "artificial hand"' (Lizana, in Landa, *Relacion de las cosas de Yucatan*, ed. C. E. Brasseur de Bourbourg, Paris, 1864, p. 358, quoted by H. H. Bancroft, *NR* ii. [1882] 796, n. 44).

The principal classical accounts, apart from the burlesque in Aristophanes' *Plutus* (v. 634 ff.), are the stelæ of cures at Epidaurus (*CIG* iv. 951 f.; J. Baunack, *Stud. auf dem Gebiete des Griech. und der arischen Sprachen*, i. [Leipzig, 1886] 120-144; Hamilton, *op. cit.* 17-27); the *Sacred Orations* of Aristides (ed. W. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1829, summarized by Hamilton, 44-62); and the inscription set up at Epidaurus in the 2nd cent. A.D. by Julius Apellas, a Carian sophist (*CIG* iv. 955; Baunack, 110-118; Hamilton, 40 f.). In the earliest period there was entire dependence upon the god for healing, and he might work the cure either by himself acting as surgeon or by advising certain medicaments. Later skilled medical men became connected with the shrines, co-operating with, but not superseding, the revelations given by the god in visions. Much obscurity exists as to the precise methods of procedure, and details doubtless varied at different times and places, and under special circumstances. The general mode, however, seems to have been as follows:

On arriving at the shrine, the patient probably received instruction from the priest or priests, and was caused to perform

some rites and sacrifices to bring him to a thoroughly recipient frame of mind. After successful incubation, during which the patient, sleeping within the shrine of the god, had been visited by the deity with actual cure or with counsel, the person thus healed was required to make payment of a fee (ἰατρεῖον), non-payment being punished by recurrence of the disease. Votive offerings would also be made, and in some instances were commanded by the god. The costliness of these votive offerings—which, it is to be conjectured, were the earlier mode of showing gratitude, the 'fee' being introduced only when the shrine had become comparatively elaborate and expensive in upkeep—naturally varied according to the means of those who had been cured. Phalysius of Naupactus gave 2000 gold staters (£1900) when healed of blindness (Pausanias, x. xxxviii. 7); a boy offering the god ten dice for cure was healed without charge (Stele of Epidaurus, i. 68–71).

The rite of incubation for the cure of disease still prevails widely in churches of the Greek and, to a less extent, Latin countries, as in Tenos, Cyprus, Mytilene, Rhodes, Argolis, Achæa, Phocis, Bœotia, Laconia, Cyzicus, Amalfi, Sardinia, and Styria; and in the Middle Ages the practice is mentioned in connexion with Saints Cosmas and Damian, Therapon, Cyrus and John, Martin, and Fides (cf., *e.g.*, Hamilton, 109–233). The reality of at least some of the cures resulting from incubation is acknowledged by even the most prejudiced of writers; and there can be no doubt that faith is a potent agency in the amelioration and even complete cure of bodily ills.

There is, however, at least one point where scepticism seems warranted. It appears rather questionable whether the Greek system of incubation can be definitely derived (as by E. Thrämer, above, vol. vi. p. 542[a]) from Babylonia by way of Lydia. Incubation in its full meaning is far too wide-spread to be traced to any single locality for its origin; it is an expression of a religious conviction to a large part of the earlier human race; even the exact relation of the incubation of Asia Minor to that of Greece (cf. *ERE* vi. 549[a]) is not certain. It may, in view of the lateness of our sources, have been influenced by the Greek practice; or it may (and this, perhaps, is the more probable hypothesis) have been an independent development.

LITERATURE.—Meibomius, *de Incubatione in fanis deorum medicinæ causa olim facta*, Helmstadt, 1659; F. A. Wolf, *Vermischte Schriften und Aufsatze*, Halle, 1802, pp. 382–430; F. G. Welcker, *Klein. Schriften*, Gottingen, 1844–67, iii. 89–114; L. P. A. Gauthier, *Recherches histor. sur l'exercice de la médecine dans les temples, chez les peuples de l'antiquité*, Paris, 1842; G. von Rittersheim, *Der medizin. Wunderglauben und die Inkubation im Altertum*, Berlin, 1878; L. Deubner, *de Incubatione*, Leipzig, 1900; O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.*, Munich, 1906, pp. 928–936, 777 *f.*, 782 *f.*, 1525, 1578, and Sach-register, *s.v.* 'Inkubationen'; S. Herrlich, *Antike Wunderkuren*, Berlin, 1911; M. Hamilton, *Incubation, or the Cure of Disease in Pagan Temples and Christian Churches*, London, 1906.

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INDEX.—The Index (*i.e.* 'librorum prohibitorum') is the catalogue of books which ecclesiastical authority forbids Roman Catholics to read or have in their possession; by an extension, the name Index is used to cover the rules for the proscription of pernicious literature, and for the examination and censorship of books before publication. The Index is a product of positive ecclesiastical law; it is based on the assumption that bad books are dangerous, and concerns society as such; the moral law forbidding the reading of pernicious books is motived by the real danger lurking in them, and affects the individual directly.

I. *HISTORY.*—It is natural that every religious authority should set itself to prevent the publication and reading of such books as might disturb the faith and religion of its followers, or corrupt their morals. In the first centuries of Christianity the Church condemned and prohibited the apocryphal and heretical writings (see especially the catalogue known as the *Decretum Gelasianum* 'de libris recipiendis vel non recipiendis' [*PL* lix. 162–164, 175–180]); and commanded pernicious writings to be committed to the flames (cf. Ac 19[19]); and the burning of heretical works, decreed by the Church, was sanctioned by Christian Imperial law (cf. lex 3 Cod., lib. i. tit. i. 'de Summa Trinitate,' anno 449). Throughout the Middle Ages we find cases of heretical books being condemned. The true history of the Index does not begin, however, until the introduction of printing—when bad books were likely to be multiplied as rapidly as good ones. Before the close of the 15th cent. the University of Cologne passed the measure that finally became the 'Imprimatur,' or preliminary censorship of books; it prescribed the examination of every book before printing, and earned for the University the congratulations of Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII. (14th Nov. 1487). By the constitution 'Inter multiplices' (1st June 1501) Alexander VI. extended this practice; he forbade the printers of the dioceses of Cologne, Mainz, Trèves, and Magdeburg, on pain of excommunication and fine, to print any book whatever without the permission of the bishop; as for books already in print, the bishops were required to demand the printers' catalogues, and make them hand over the pernicious works to be consigned to the fire. These prescriptions became common law at the Lateran Council (Leo X., constitution 'Inter multiplices,' 4th May 1515). The prohibition of books by name began in 1520 by Leo X.'s bull 'Exsurge Domine,' condemning all the writings of Luther; in 1524, Clement VII. inserted excommunication *latæ sententiæ* in the bull 'Coenæ,' as the penalty for reading books in support of heresy; this has remained unchanged to the present day.

Lists of prohibited books soon began to be published by the Universities (Paris, 1542; Louvain, 1546; Cologne and Venice, 1549, etc.), the bishops (Milan, 1554, etc.), and the Inquisitions (Venice, 1554, etc.). Such an important movement demanded the attention of Rome; Paul IV. ordered the recently established Congregation of the Holy Office to make a catalogue of prohibited books; their first effort, printed in 1557, failed to give satisfaction, and a revised edition appeared at the beginning of the year 1559—the first official Roman Index. All the books in it are prohibited on pain of excommunication, and they are classified in three divisions: (1) authors condemned, with all their writings; (2) condemned books whose authors are known; and (3) pernicious literature, mostly anonymous. This Index was very strict; after a decree of the Holy Office, recently discovered, dated 14th June 1559, Cardinal Michel Ghisleri (afterwards Pope Pius V.) published, by order of Paul IV., a modification (*moderatio*) of the Index (24th June 1561). Almost immediately the Council of Trent took up its interrupted labours. In session xviii. (26th Feb. 1562) it commissioned eighteen fathers, assisted by theologians, to re-compile the catalogue of prohibited books and revise the general rules of the Index. The Commission had accomplished its task when the Council was abruptly concluded; but a detailed discussion of its work was impossible, and the assembly remitted the whole matter to the pope (sess. xxv., 4th Dec. 1563). The catalogue was almost the same as that of Paul IV., with its distribution into three classes; the rules, ten in number, were aimed principally at the books of heresiarchs and heretics, and the editing and reading of the Bible; rule x. demanded the bishop's 'Imprimatur' for every printed publication. These rules, with several additions, remained in force until the time of Leo XIII. The Index and the rules of the Council of Trent were published by Pius IV. (bull 'Dominici gregis,' 24th March 1564).

In order to relieve the Congregation of the Holy Office without impairing its competency, Pius V.

established the Congregation of Cardinals 'de reformando Indice et corrigendis libris' in March 1571. This institution, improved by Gregory XIII., was included by Sixtus V. in the general re-organization of the Congregations (bull 'Immensa,' 22nd Jan. 1588), with the title 'Congregatio pro Indice librorum prohibitorum.' This Congregation was composed of a fixed number of cardinals, a permanent assistant, the Master of the Sacred Palace (a Dominican, specially entrusted with the preliminary censorship of books in Rome), a secretary (also always a Dominican), and several consultors, and has continued almost unaltered down to our own day, Pius X. having retained it in his re-organization of the Roman Curia (constitution 'Sapienti consilio,' 29th June 1908). It is responsible for the successive editions of the Index since Sixtus V. and for various additions to the general rules, as well as for the majority of condemnations of books deemed pernicious.

A few words will suffice about the successive editions of the Index. Those of 1590 and 1593, printed, but not published (cf. Hilgers, *Der Index der verbotenen Bücher*, pp. 12, 524, 529), were superseded by the 1596 edition, by order of Clement VIII. In Alexander VII.'s edition (1664) the three classes of the Trent Index were combined into one alphabetical series. In 1757, Benedict XIV. provided a more correct edition, of which later editions, until that of Leo XIII., were simply reprints, supplemented by works condemned since the preceding edition. Of the additions to the rules, we may mention the Instruction of Clement VIII. on the preliminary censorship; the constitution of Benedict XIV. 'Sollicita ac provida' (9th July 1753) on the procedure in carrying out the same, the only document preserved by Leo XIII.; and the general decrees of the same pope on the prohibited books not contained in the Index. Then, without any notable alteration, we come to the reform of Leo XIII. by his constitution 'Officiorum ac munerum,' 25th Jan. 1897.

II. *MODERN LEGISLATION.*—The rules and the Index of the Council of Trent had been drawn up at a time when the Roman Catholic Church had to struggle against militant Protestantism, when they hoped that it would be possible to control all books on account of their small number, and when reading was not wide-spread among the lower classes. In the 19th cent. these conditions were greatly changed, especially since the civil authorities almost everywhere lost their interest in the preliminary censure and in the publication of books. Reform was necessary: the law had to be fitted to the new conditions, and at the same time carried into execution with more force, as was now possible. In the preamble of his constitution, Leo XIII. recalls these changes: he mentions the demands for reform addressed to the Holy See by the bishops of various nations, especially at the time of the Vatican Council; it was on their account that he ordered a thorough revision of the Index and of the general rules. All previous law, except the constitution 'Sollicita' of Benedict XIV., is abrogated by the new general decrees. These are divided into two classes: (1) the prohibition of books, and (2) their preliminary censure. The first contains ten chapters, and the second five, the whole forming a single series of forty-nine articles.

1. **Prohibitions.**—(*a*) There is now no general prohibition of all the works of any heretical writer; books which uphold heresy or schism, and those which attack the very foundations of religion, are banned; but the writings of the heterodox, even on religious topics, are no longer banned if they contain nothing against the faith—much less those that do not treat of religious matters at all (artt. 1–4).

(*b*) The reading of the Bible, which was the object of the minute prescriptions of rules iii. and iv. of Trent, is the object of modified prescriptions: those who are engaged in theological studies may use heterodox editions of the sacred text, and versions in vulgar or non-vulgar tongues, provided the introductions and notes contain nothing against the faith. Before being allowed, the versions in vulgar tongues must be approved by the Holy See, or published under the supervision of the bishops, with annotations taken from the Fathers of the Church or from Roman Catholic writers; versions in vulgar tongues by heterodox authors and Bible Societies are still prohibited to Roman Catholic lay-people at large (artt. 5–8).

(*c*) Obscene books are always banned; the classics alone are allowed as far as necessary for professional ends, but they must not be put into the hands of young people without being expurgated (artt. 9–10).

(*d*) Books derogatory to God or the Saints, to the Roman Catholic Church and the liturgy, to Scripture and the hierarchy, are banned; also books which propagate magic, divination, and spiritualism; works published without approval which recommend new cults, apparitions, and prophecies; and those which defend as lawful duelling, suicide, divorce, free-masonry, etc., and also the errors condemned by the Holy See (artt. 11–14).

(*e*) Holy images which deviate from the authorized tradition, and apocryphal indulgences, are condemned; formal approval is demanded for all books, summaries, collections, and sheets of indulgences (artt. 15–17).

(*f*) Ecclesiastical approval is required for official liturgical books, litanies, prayer-books, books of devotion, and books of religious instruction (artt. 18–20).

(*g*) Ecclesiastical law also proscribes bad newspapers and periodicals already condemned by natural law; it desires the bishops to dissuade the people from reading these, and hopes that Roman Catholics will not publish anything in these periodicals without a good reason (artt. 21–22). Bishops may, and ought to, condemn and prohibit in their dioceses pernicious or dangerous newspapers and periodicals, especially 'modernist' writings.

2. **Censorship.**—(*a*) The permission to read and to keep prohibited books is given by the Congregation of the Index, accessorily by that of the Propaganda for its subjects, and for Rome by the Master of the Sacred Palace. Bishops may give this permission in isolated cases, but they receive more ample powers from Rome by indults. Those who have permission to read the books on the Index are not exempt from the observance of the moral law; they must observe the reservations regarding their permission and take care that the prohibited books do not reach other hands (artt. 23–26). Permission to read books condemned by a bishop naturally depends on that bishop.

(*b*) Denunciation of wicked books to the Holy See is open to all; it is an official duty of the representatives of the Holy See and of bishops; it is desirable that the denunciation, which is kept secret, should be accompanied by a review. To this outside denunciation Pius X. has added the obligation of the Congregation of the Index to inquire officially into pernicious books (artt. 27–29; const. 'Sapienti,' 29th June 1908).

(*c*) The steps taken by the Congregation of the Index to condemn books denounced or inquired into are explained in the constitution 'Sollicita' of Benedict XIV.: first the secretary, with two consultors, makes a cursory examination of the book; if he concludes that the work should be

retained, he appoints a competent reviewer to make a detailed study of it and indicate the objectionable passages; this report is discussed at a preliminary meeting in which several consultors take part, together with the secretary and the Master of the Sacred Palace; the opinions of these men, along with the report, are presented to the assembly of cardinals who form the Congregation; they pronounce the condemnation of the work either absolutely or until correction (the condemnation 'donec corrigatur' is now very rare). There is no injustice in condemning a book by a Roman Catholic author without hearing him, as the condemnation is directed not against him but against his book, which is circulated among the public, and against which readers must be warned. Benedict XIV., however, recommended that the Congregation should inform such an author and receive his defence. The decrees of prohibition are declared and promulgated in the name of the Congregation; the books are condemned everywhere and in every language (art. 45). Below the decrees are published the submissions of the authors received by the Congregation.

3. The preliminary censure of books and their publication.—(*a*) Certain books must be specially authorized; *e.g.*, books put on the Index cannot be reprinted unless the corrections have been approved by the Congregation; official documents and collections of decrees of the Roman Congregations cannot be edited except with their permission (artt. 30–33).

(*b*) Further, there are special regulations for certain classes of persons: missionaries must observe the decrees of the Propaganda; monks must obtain the permission of their superiors, besides that of the bishop; priests cannot publish any work or undertake the management of any periodical without the permission of their bishop (artt. 34, 36, 42).

(*c*) It is necessary to have the permission to print—the 'Imprimatur'—of the bishop of the place of publication for all books on religious topics or sciences, but not now for all books, as rule X. of Trent desired. The bishop entrusts the examination of the MS to a competent, upright, and impartial censor, who studies it without bias; if, on examination, he sees nothing objectionable, he writes on the MS 'Nihil obstat,' and signs; on this evidence, coming even from a censor of another diocese, the bishop of the publisher gives permission to print. All this must appear at the beginning of the book, except in Britain, according to a decision of 1897 (artt. 35, 38–41).

Preliminary censure of religious newspapers and periodicals was practically impossible; Pius X. substituted for it a special censor to read every publication officially and then submit his report (encyc. 'Pascendi,' 8th Sept. 1907).

4. Penalties.—There are two kinds of penalties. Excommunication is incurred by those who wittingly and without permission read, keep, print, or defend, not any book on the Index, as many people say, but any books of apostates and heretics countenancing heresy, or the works condemned directly by the pope with mention of this penalty. Excommunication is the penalty also for those who without permission print or cause to be printed the books of Holy Scripture, or annotations, or commentaries on those books. For all other delinquencies the penalties are awarded by the bishops according to the degree of culpability (artt. 47–49).

5. The Revised Index of Leo XIII.—The Index revised by order of Leo XIII. was published in 1900, and reprinted in 1907 and 1911. It has been greatly modified; and the prohibitions are mitigated; *e.g.*, the clause 'Opera omnia' put after the author's name does not now include those of his books that are not objectionable.

6. Conclusion.—While the rules of the Index are wise and prudent, we must admit that the catalogue leaves room for criticism, owing to the conditions of our time rather than the actions of authority. It is abundantly evident that the Index is unsatisfactory. While allowing numerous harmful books by non-Catholic authors to pass, it seems to reserve its severity for the works of Roman Catholics which expose themselves to criticism by certain tendencies rather than by definite errors. For this reason the uniformity of condemnations without any indication of the degree of harmfulness, as if all the books on the Index were equally pernicious, is the more regrettable. Further, the faithful are led to regard the books inscribed in the catalogue of the Index as the most harmful, while they do not pay sufficient heed to the general rules, and think that every book that does not appear in the Index may be read. It would be far more to the purpose to appeal to the conscience and the observation of the general rules; for the Church finds it difficult to sanction its prohibitions in present-day conditions, and is forced to grant permission to read prohibited books far and wide.

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INDIA.—See VEDIC RELIGION, BRĀHMANISM, and HINDUISM. CASTE and other subjects are treated separately, and under each of the great subdivided topics, like BIRTH, DEATH, DEMONS, etc., there is an Indian article. See also the various provinces and the religious cities each under its own name, and the art. MUHAMMADANISM IN INDIA. Christianity in India will be dealt with under MISSIONS.

INDIAN BUDDHISM.—The religion which was founded by Buddha (*q.v.*) towards the end of the 6th cent. B.C. is one of the three great world-religions, and has been calculated (but with considerable uncertainty) to have 500 millions of adherents. Its original and essential doctrine is that all earthly existence is suffering, the only means of release from which is renunciation and eternal death. The main importance of the Indian form of Buddhism lies in the fact that it represents the earliest phase of the religion; that it produced all the canonical texts of the faith; that without a knowledge of it the Buddhism of the many countries to which it has spread could not be understood; and that without the evidence of its architecture and sculpture the history of Indian art would be impossible. Though, like Christianity, it disappeared many centuries ago from the land of its birth, it has profoundly influenced the civilization of the Farther East, much as Christianity has done in the West. In India itself, Buddhism deeply affected the spiritual life of the country for over a thousand years, and occupies a prominent place in the history of its literature.

1. History.—Buddhism arose on peculiarly favourable soil, the S.E. half of the Ganges territory, which, being far removed from the centre of Brāhman culture, was imperfectly Brāhmanized. This geographical area comprised the two principal kingdoms of Kosala (the modern Oudh) and Magadha (now Bihār).

Buddha's death has been calculated with the greatest probability to have taken place about

480 B.C. This, the earliest approximate date in Indian history, is of the utmost importance in the chronology not only of Buddhism, but of Vedic and Epic Sanskrit literature also.

According to the statements of the Pāli texts, a few weeks after the death of the Master one of his most trusted followers, Kāśyapa the Great, proposed, now that the Order was without a head, to hold an assembly of monks who had been the immediate disciples of Buddha, for the purpose of rehearsing the precepts of the Master, and fixing a canon of the doctrine (*dhamma*) and discipline (*vinaya*) of the Order. An assembly was accordingly held at Rājagṛha, constituting the so-called *first Buddhist Council* (see COUNCILS AND SYNODS [Buddhist], vol. iv. p. 182). Buddhist tradition is unanimous in stating that exactly a century after Buddha's death the *second General Council* was held at Vaiśālī (*ib.* p. 183). In the reign of the famous king Aśoka (*q.v.*) a *third Council* was held at Pāṭaliputra after the schism of the Mahāsāṅghika (or Ācāryavāda) had arisen (*ib.* p. 183).

The reign of Aśoka, who ruled over the whole of India except the extreme south, forms an epoch of the highest importance in the history of Indian Buddhism. The patronage of so powerful a king must undoubtedly have supplied a mighty stimulus to the growth and spread of Buddhism in India, for it raised the religion of what was only one of several sects to the dominant position of a State religion. An era of zealous propaganda, not only throughout India, but in distant foreign countries, was inaugurated. Since all the Buddhist traditions agree as to the latter statement, it may be accepted as a historical fact. The conversion of Ceylon (see CEYLON BUDDHISM, vol. iii. p. 331) was the most important result of these missionary expeditions. It is ascribed to Mahendra (Mahinda), son or (according to the Skr. Buddhist texts) younger brother of Aśoka and a pupil of Tissa Moggaliputta. All sources agree in attributing the introduction of Buddhism into Ceylon to the reign of Aśoka. Another prominent apostle was Madhyāntika, who carried the faith to Gandhāra and Kaśmīr, while Mahādeva proselytized Mysore.

That a body of canonical texts already existed in the time of Aśoka is shown by one of his edicts (that of the Bairat rock), in which he enumerates some such works, and recommends their study by monks and nuns as well as by the laity. Some of the titles, moreover, show that works of the doctrinal (*sutta*) and disciplinary (*vinaya*) type of canonical text were among them.

It is to be noted that, in consequence of his zeal for the faith, there arose in Aśoka's reign that religious architecture which furnishes continuous and striking monumental illustrations of the history of Buddhism in India for many centuries till the disappearance of that religion from the land of its origin.

During the 330 years that elapsed between the death of Aśoka and A.D. 100, Buddhism steadily strengthened its position in the north of India, though it was not favoured by the kings of the Śuṅga dynasty, the founder of which, Puṣyamitra, is stated in more than one Buddhist source even to have been a persecutor of the faith. In the 2nd cent. B.C. the doctrine certainly flourished in the N.W. under the Græco-Indian rulers. There seems no reason to doubt that the most celebrated of these, king Menander (Milinda), became a convert to Buddhism about 100 B.C., as stated in the Pāli work *Milinda-Pañha*, or 'Questions of Menander.' Meanwhile, Buddhist doctrine spread beyond the confines of India to Bactria and China, while in Ceylon it established that supremacy which it has retained ever since. In India itself, however, dissensions and schisms had been growing to such an extent that by the end of this period eighteen distinct sects were in existence.

With the reign of the Indo-Scythian king Kaniṣka (*q.v.*), from whom probably dates the Śaka era (A.D. 78), a new epoch in the history of Indian Buddhism begins. The wide dominion conquered by him comprised Kabul, Gandhāra, Kaśmīr, Sindh, and part of the United Provinces of to-day. The memory of this mighty monarch was revered by the Buddhists of Northern India almost as much as that of Aśoka. Like the latter, he was not originally a Buddhist, as is indicated by the fact that most of his coins bear the symbols of an Iranian religion; comparatively few of them have Buddhist emblems, but one shows a figure of Buddha, with the legend 'Boddo' on the reverse. The Skr. Buddhist tradition ascribes his conversion to Sudarśana, but we have no evidence as to the probable date of its occurrence. Under Kaniṣka's auspices, another *Buddhist Council* was held, probably about A.D. 100 (see COUNCILS AND SYNODS [Buddhist], vol. iv. p. 184). The place where it met is variously stated as Jālandhara (in the Eastern Panjāb) or Kuṇḍalavana (in Kaśmīr). The traditional accounts given of it are vague and conflicting; but we may conclude that it was attended by representatives of all the 18 sects of the older Buddhism called Śrāvakas or Hīnayānists, and that the views of the new school of the Mahāyānists (see artt. HINAYĀNA, MAHĀYĀNA) were either not represented or found no support. Yet all the Indian Buddhists, including the Mahāyānists, acknowledged the authority of the Council. The Ceylon branch of the Buddhist Church, however, took no part in its deliberations. The main result of this meeting was the cessation of the dissensions that had prevailed for a century among the Hīnayānists, although it by no means extinguished the new doctrine of Mahāyānism; and the statement of a Tibetan authority that on the occasion of this Council the sacred books were revised, and that some parts of the canon were then written down for the first time, is not improbable. None of the sources says anything about the language in which the sacred books were now recorded, but the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang appears to assume that they were written in Sanskrit.

Under the influence of Hinduism the Mahāyāna doctrine, combining a fervent devotion (*bhakti*) to Buddha with the preaching of active compassion, was a kind of theism in which Buddha occupied the place of the personal deity in the Vedānta system of the Brāhmans. This doctrine was destined to have a far-reaching influence on the history of Buddhism as a world religion; for by appealing to the sympathies of the masses it ultimately not only absorbed all the Buddhist sects of Northern India, but became the religion of all the countries that derived their faith from Skr. Buddhism. The old orthodox faith of the Pāli canon henceforth became restricted to Ceylon and the countries proselytized from that island. Since even the name of Kaniṣka is not found in the religious literature of Ceylon, its Buddhism appears to have been cut off from that of India by the 1st cent. A.D.

Many inscriptions, ranging from the time of Kaniṣka over more than two centuries, show that Buddhism flourished at Mathurā (Muttra) by the side of Jainism. Other sources indicate that the Doctrine prospered in Kabul, Kaśmīr, and the N.W. of India. The epigraphic evidence of Nāsik and Kaṛli proves that there were numerous Buddhists in the West, while that of Amarāvatī shows that there were many in the South also.

About A.D. 400 one of the Chinese pilgrims, Fa Hian, describes the condition of Buddhism as very flourishing in Udyāna (the

Swat territory), in the Panjāb, and at Mathurā, though he makes no mention of Nālanda (in Magadha), the chief seat of Buddhist learning two centuries later. The same authority informs us that at this time four Buddhist philosophical schools were fully developed; two, the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, who were realists, were adherents of the Hīnayāna, while the Yogāchāras and Mādhyamikas belonged to the Mahāyāna. The Mādhyamikas, whose reputed founder was Nāgārjuna, were pure nihilists, holding that the phenomenal world is a mere illusion, an adaptation of the Māyā doctrine of the scholastic Vedānta of Hinduism. From Fa Hian we also learn that at Mathurā the Bodhisattvas Mañjuśrī and Avalokiteśvara were worshipped, and that at Pāṭaliputra the Hīnayānists had one monastery and the Mahāyānists another, with 600 or 700 monks between them. Two other Chinese pilgrims, Hiuen Tsiang and I-Tsing, who visited India in 629–40 and 675–98 respectively, tell us much about the state of things in the 6th and 7th centuries. During this period Buddhist scholasticism flourished greatly, the contention between the sects gradually weakening and resolving itself into rivalry between the two main parties of Hīnayānists and Mahāyānists. The great patron of the faith in the 7th cent. was the famous king Harṣavardhana of Kanauj (A.D. 606–648), who, originally a Śaivite, became an ardent Mahāyānist, but was tolerant to all sects except the Hīnayānists. In fact, such religious rancour as prevailed existed between Mahāyānists and Hīnayānists, while the relations between Hinduism and Buddhism were peaceful. Hiuen Tsiang found Buddhism prospering not only in India, but in Kaśmīr and Nepāl, where Buddhists and Hindus lived in harmony. The last great literary champion of Buddhism in India was Dharmakīrti, who flourished between the visits of Hiuen Tsiang and I-Tsing.

In the 8th and early 9th centuries a revival of Hinduism took place, chiefly under the influence of the two great dialecticians Kumārila and Śaṅkara (born A.D. 788), whom the tradition of the Buddhists regards as the two most formidable adversaries of their creed. Partly owing to the activity of these opponents and partly to its own degeneracy caused by increasing approximation to Hinduism, the religion of Buddha gradually lost ground in India. Its decline set in about A.D. 750, and was accelerated in the West by the Muhammadan conquest of Sindh by the Arabs in A.D. 712.

This decline went hand in hand with the growth of Tantrism, a kind of degraded *yoga*, which, with the aid of mental concentration, muttered prayers, spells, and other magical expedients, sought to secure all kinds of material advantages and supernatural powers. This system of sorcery flourished under the kings of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal (A.D. 800–1050), who were protectors of Buddhism. Under their successors, the Sena kings, who were Hindus, though not active opponents of the Faith, Buddhism still further declined till it received its death-blow in Magadha from the Muhammadan invasion in A.D. 1200, all the monks either being killed or escaping to other countries. It lingered on for a considerable time after that date in other parts of India. Thus a Buddhist stone inscription of A.D. 1220 from Śrāvastī shows that the doctrine was not altogether extinct in Oudh early in the 13th century. In Bengal it still had a few adherents in the 16th century. In Orissa it died out in the middle of that century, in consequence of the conquest of the country by the Musalmān Governor of Bengal. In Kaśmīr the accession to power of a Muhammadan ruler put an end to Buddhism in A.D. 1340. In Nepāl, however, Buddhism has maintained its existence, in a degenerate form, by the side of Hinduism down to the present day.

2. Literature.—For this see art. LITERATURE (Buddhist).

3. Doctrine.—Since Buddhism arose on the basis of Brāhmanism, its essential features cannot be fully understood without clearly ascertaining which of the religious ideas of the antecedent religion it rejected and which of them it retained. On the one hand, Buddha repudiated the authority of the Vedas and the Vedic sacrificial system; he condemned self-mortification; he denied the existence both of a world-soul and of the individual soul; he discarded the distinctions of caste within the monastic order, though not as a general classification of society; and he was entirely averse to speculation on metaphysical problems, to which the adherents of Brāhmanism were so prone. On the other hand, Buddha held fast to the belief in transmigration (*saṁsāra*) and retribution (*karma*) practically unchanged; he also adhered to the doctrine that the great goal of endeavour is release from transmigration to be attained by means of renunciation. But this meagre residuum of Brāhman tenets could not possibly have constituted a new religion. What, then, were the fundamental features that made the teaching of Buddha a new force in the life and thought of India? Stated quite generally, the doctrine of Buddha, on its philosophical side, was pronounced pessimism: the deep-rooted conviction that all earthly existence is suffering, the only means of release from which is the abandonment of all desire. Even this fundamental doctrine is only a development of the view of life already apparent in the *Upaniṣads*. Buddha may in this respect be regarded as a genuine descendant of the Yājñavalkya of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, who turned with aversion from this unsatisfying world and sought refuge in the homeless life of the spiritual mendicant. It must also be noted that H. Jacobi and R. Garbe hold that the Sāṅkhya (*q.v.*) supplied the foundations of the metaphysical side of Buddhism. On the other hand, we know this most pessimistic of all the Brāhman systems of philosophy only in its fully developed form, as it appears in the classical texts of the system, which are posterior by many centuries to the rise of Buddhism. Yet it is possible that, as the Sāṅkhya doctrine and the philosophical side of Buddhism have some points in common, a much earlier phase of the Sāṅkhya (of the existence of which we have no direct evidence) may have exercised a certain influence on primitive Buddhism in India. On what may be called its religious side—it was rather a religion of humanity—primitive Buddhism was a system of practical morality, the key-note of which is universal charity: kindness to all beings, animals as well as men. It is here that the originality of Buddha's teaching is chiefly to be found; for the sphere of ethics had been neglected by Brāhman thought, which was mainly directed to ritual and theosophical speculation. To this source is to be traced the profound influence exercised by Buddhism as a world religion.

The whole of the early Buddhist doctrines are set forth in the fundamental 'Four Noble Truths,' the first three of which represent the philosophical, the fourth the religious, aspect of the system. These truths are: all that exists is subject to suffering; the origin of suffering is human passions; the cessation of passions releases from suffering; the path that leads to the cessation of suffering is the eightfold path. They already play the chief part in the first address of Buddha, the sermon of Benares, and they continually recur in the sacred books of the Buddhists.

(1) The very first of them shows the thoroughly pessimistic character of the Buddhist attitude. Indeed, the Buddhist scriptures constantly dwell on the transitoriness and worthlessness of all things, and no other religion is so penetrated by the belief in the utter vanity and misery of existence.

(2) The origin of suffering is described as due to 'thirst' (*tṛṣṇā*, Pāli *taṇhā*), or the desire of life, which, until it is destroyed, leads to continued transmigration and the return of suffering. The origin of 'thirst' is explained by the formula of causation (*pratītya-samutpāda*, Pali *paṭicca-samuppāda*, 'origination from an antecedent cause'). This is one of the fundamental teachings of Buddhism as supplying a solution of the problem of evil.

'Thirst' is traced backward through a chain of several causes to its ultimate source, 'ignorance' (*avidyā*), or lack of knowledge of the doctrine of Buddha. From ignorance are derived the latent impressions (*saṁskāra*) of former acts, constituting predispositions leading to further acts. Buddha taught that man on his own initiative could influence these predispositions and determine his own fate, while his contemporary Maṅkhali Gosāla, founder of the Ājivika (*q.v.*) sect, denied the freedom of the will. But he who did not know the formula of causation could not be freed from the predisposition to a new birth. From the *saṁskāras* were produced 'consciousness' (*vijñāna*), the thinking part of the individual, regarded as a non-corporeal element that does not perish with the body, but remains along with the *saṁskāras* after death, and with them forms the germ of a new existence. From consciousness are evolved 'name and form' (*nāma-rūpa*), equivalent to 'the individual.' From these, again, arise the six organs, that is, the five senses and 'mind' (*manas*); in other words, the individual assumes a practical form. From the organs are produced 'contact,' thence 'perception,' which is the immediate source of 'thirst.' From 'thirst' arises 'attachment' (*upādāna*) to worldly objects. This leads to continued 'becoming' (*bhava*), an infinite series of new existences. These, finally, are the cause of birth, old age, and death, pain, suffering, sorrow, and despair.

The doctrine next in importance to that of causation is the doctrine of the five *skandhas* (Pāli *khandha*), or elements of existence, of which every thinking being is composed: body, sensation, perception, *saṁskāra*, and *vijñāna*. In this connexion *saṁskāra* means mental powers or emotions, such as reflexion, joy, and hate, of which there are 52. *Vijñāna* as a *skandha* signifies critical cognition or judgment, of which there are 89 subdivisions.

A being thus composed was regarded as not in a permanent condition, but always in a state of becoming, personality being only a sum of perpetually successive movements. A man remained the same in the next existence; as only the elements of which he was composed constantly changed, like the flame of a lamp in successive watches of the night, he thus suffered the consequences of his deeds in the previous existence.

Similarly, 'what was called *soul*' was regarded by Buddha only as an aggregate of changing individual elements, not as eternal and unchangeable, different and separate from the body. *Vijñāna*, 'consciousness' or 'thought,' is spoken of as ruling the body, but it is not essentially different from the mental powers and the sensations which it surveys. There is no conception of an internal entity which sees, hears, thinks, or suffers, a separate soul or self, a spirit or ghost, existing inside the human body.

(3) With the view of Buddha regarding the soul is closely connected that of *Nirvāṇa*, which means 'extinction' like that of a lamp. This is of two kinds, representing two stages of release. The first, which is a necessary condition of the second, is the extinction of desire (*tṛṣṇā*), resulting in 'blissful calm' during the remainder of life (corresponding to the *jīvanmukti* [*q.v.*], 'deliverance while alive,' of the Brāhmans). The enlightenment now attained causes the cessation of ignorance and consequently of re-birth, but the results of deeds done before enlightenment have to be suffered while the released man is still alive. The second stage is not reached till decease, after which there is no awakening, transmigration is at an end, and birth and death are overcome without a remainder. This is *Parinirvāṇa*, or 'complete extinction,' often inaccurately spoken of simply as *Nirvāṇa*.

Buddha has sometimes been thought to have avoided a clear definition of complete *Nirvāṇa*, because in many passages he puts aside the question what the exact condition after death is when release has been obtained. But he appears to have done this because he considered the question immaterial, the main object of his doctrine being deliverance from suffering. He left no doubt as to the goal to which his teaching led: the cessation of all the *saṁskāras*, annihilation of all the *skandhas*, eternal death. The glowing colours, however, in which the bliss enjoyed in the first or living stage of release is described gave rise to the transformation of complete *Nirvāṇa* into a positive paradise in Skr. Buddhism.

(4) The first three noble truths, being concerned with the philosophical side of Buddha's teaching, were meant for the learned only. It was the fourth truth, the way leading to the cessation of misery, embracing practical morality, and meant for the people, that made Buddhism a religion. It is the 'eightfold path' comprising right belief, right resolve, right word, right deed, right life, right endeavour, right thought, right meditation.

The first stage, true belief, was, of course, indispensable for all who entered on the path of salvation, but especially for the monk who had renounced the world. The next five stages comprise the five commandments prescribed for laymen, and include duties to one's neighbour. The cardinal virtue dominating them all is charity (*maitri*, Pāli *mettā*), which Buddha declared to be of far greater value than all other means of acquiring religious merit, and the practice of which is constantly emphasized in the Buddhist scriptures. From this fundamental principle of human kindness flow compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekṣā*), these together being called the four 'lives in God' of Skr. Buddhism. One of the precepts inculcated in connexion with *mettā* is to requite evil with good. The history of Buddhism shows that such precepts were actually practised.

That the standard of the moral law in Buddhism is very high appears from the five commandments mentioned above. The first of these is 'Thou shalt not kill.' The meaning conveyed by the prohibition is that one should refrain not only from taking life directly or indirectly, but from doing harm to creatures both strong and weak. With the desire to avoid crushing insects and the shoots of plants was connected the practice of remaining in the monasteries during the rains. For similar reasons the Buddhists abominated the animal sacrifices of the Brāhmans as well as hunting and war. A practical result of this appears in one of the edicts of Aśoka, which forbids the killing and sacrificing of animals. The extension of kindness to animals was undoubtedly influenced by the doctrine of transmigration. The far-reaching application of the principle made Buddhism the most tolerant of religions, for it has never extended itself by the sword or by force. But this very toleration was disastrous to it, especially when it came into contact with Islām.

'Thou shalt not steal,' the second commandment, means that one should refrain not only from taking what is not given, but from causing or approving of such action. On its positive side it implies liberality, which comes next to *mettā*, seems sometimes to be accounted the chief of all virtues, and is even expected to go the length of giving one's life for others.

The third commandment, 'Thou shalt not be unchaste,' as applied to laymen, prohibits adultery, but in regard to the monastic order further enjoins celibacy.

The full meaning of the fourth commandment, 'Thou shalt not lie,' is that falsehood of every kind, including calumny, misrepresentation, and false witness, is to be avoided. On the positive side it implies that one should say only what is good of one's neighbour and only what is conducive to harmony.

The last of the five, 'Thou shalt not drink intoxicating liquors,' also implies that one should not cause others to drink or approve of their doing so, because it leads to folly and ends in madness.

These five commandments are to be observed by the Buddhist monk also, but there are five additional ones specially applicable to him. These enjoin that he should (6) not eat at unlawful times; (7) not engage in dancing, singing, music, or plays; (8) not use garlands, perfumes, and ornaments; (9) not sleep in a high or broad bed; (10) not accept gifts of silver or gold.

The last two stages of the eightfold path, right thought and right contemplation, concern the individual himself only.

Thought could only be represented by confessional formulas and hymns in praise of Buddha and the Church. But there was no prayer; for there was no god to whom prayer could be addressed, and Buddha was only a human being who, after he had entered *Parinirvāṇa*, no longer existed. Thus to the early phase of Buddhism prayer was unknown. Its place was taken by contemplation. The four stages which are distinguished in it, and which can be practised only by the monk, are concentration of the mind on one point; the attainment of certainty; deliverance from joy and sorrow; and indifference to all things. As aids to mental concentration, exercises in expiration and inspiration were much indulged in by the monks. Thus, though Buddha rejected all self-mortification, he was not unsympathetic towards some of the practices of *yoga*.

There are, moreover, four stages of holiness called the 'four paths.' These are represented by the following four classes. (1) The *srota-āpanna* (Pāli *sotāpanna*), 'he who has joined the stream,' is one who has become a member of the community with a vow that he will obey the commandments. Such a one is freed from re-birth in the hells, or in the world of ghosts and of animals, but he must be born again seven times. (2) The *sakṛd-āgāmin* (Pāli *sakad-āgāmi*), 'who returns once,' is one who, having overcome desire, hate, and delusion, will be born again only once in this world. (3) The *an-āgāmin* (Pali *an-āgāmi*), 'who returns not again,' is one who is born again only once in one of the worlds of the gods before attaining *Nirvāṇa*. (4) The *arhat* (Pāli *arahāt*) (*q.v.*), the 'saint,' being free from all sins and desires and enjoying perfect mental calm, has attained earthly *Nirvāṇa*. The Sanskrit Buddhists have also a threefold classification comprising the *śrāvaka*, or 'disciple'; the *pratyekabuddha*, or 'individual Buddha,' who by his own efforts has gained all that is necessary for the attainment of *Nirvāṇa*, but cannot communicate the law to others; and the *bodhisattva* (*q.v.*), or 'future Buddha,' who can be born again even as an animal, but can never commit sin.

High above all is Buddha, 'the (fully) enlightened one.' In descriptions of him it is said that no being, no Brāhman, no god, can equal him, and no one can fathom his grandeur. Among his innumerable qualities 32 were later singled out as the characteristics of a great man. One of these is the *uṣṇīṣa*, a round excrescence on the top of the head, always represented in images of Buddha. In the latter there also generally appears between the brows a kind of wart (*ūrṇā*, Pāli *unnā*), which is described as emitting powerfully illuminating rays of light. Nevertheless, Buddha was regarded as a man, perfect indeed, but mortal.

Gautama is not the only Buddha. Each cosmic age is supposed to have at least one Buddha, sometimes as many as five. The names of the last 27 are enumerated, a short life of 24 of them being given in the *Buddha-vaṁsa*, a work of the Pāli canon. Of the present age Gautama is the fourth Buddha, while the fifth will be Maitreya (Pāli Metteyya), who at present is in the stage of a Bodhisattva.

4. Organization and cult.—The Buddhist Church was organized as a celibate order of monks and nuns by Buddha, who only gave fixity, by rules of ordination, to conditions which already existed in the antecedent Brahmanism. In the latter system the institution of the four *āśramas* (*q.v.*), or stages of life, already contained all the elements of a monastic order. Thus the *brahmachārin*, or religious student, was required, during the whole course of his apprenticeship to a teacher, both to practise absolute chastity and to beg his food daily. He might remain a student all his life. He did not in that case differ essentially from the mendicant ascetic (*bhikṣu*) of the fourth stage. Groups of the latter type in all probability formed the nucleus of distinct sects, which both during the lifetime of Buddha and after his death developed into monastic communities with disciplinary rules and outward characteristics of their own. Since Buddha laid great stress on the propagation of his doctrine by means of missionaries, his monks were scattered all over India and beyond its confines, forming many small and remote communities, over which his influence could not possibly extend. There was thus during his lifetime not one community, but very many. His personality, however, gave unity to the Order. But he neither designated nor made provision for a successor as visible head of the Church. This necessarily resulted in the formation of many sects, of which, two centuries after Buddha's death, there were no fewer than eighteen, with their own monasteries. The highest authority was the whole Church, or *Saṅgha*. 'Elders' (*sthavira*, Pali *thera*) were distinguished, but they were not officials, the term being merely an honorary title bestowed on monks who had long been ordained. This obvious looseness of organization in the Buddhist Church was undoubtedly a great source of weakness throughout its history, and was one of the main causes leading to its ultimate downfall in India.

(*a*) *Confession.*—The disciplinary and penal code of the Church was embodied in the *Prātimokkha* (Skr. *Prātimokṣa*), a formulary of confession constituting one of the oldest parts of the Pali canon. It is a list of sins enjoined by Buddha to be recited twice a month on the days of full and new moon in an assembly of at least four monks. At the end of each section the reciter inquired whether any of those present had transgressed any one of the articles that it contained. These two confessional days are called *upavasatha* (Pali *uposatha*), a term originally meaning 'fast-day,' since it was inherited from Brāhmanism, in which it designated the fast-day on the eve of the great *soma*-sacrifice. The eighth day after new and the eighth after full moon were also *upavasatha* days, though not for confession. These four days together constituted weekly recurring festivals of the nature of Sabbaths. On these days laymen put on their best clothes, and the pious refrained from business and worldly amusements. Laymen were also regarded as irreligious if they did not observe, on the Sabbath, the first three of the five commandments specially enjoined on monks.

(*b*) *Admission.*—A man became a Buddhist layman by pronouncing the creed consisting in the words, 'I take refuge in Buddha, I take refuge in the Law, I take refuge in the Order'—these refuges being called the three 'jewels.' He then had to promise to keep the first five commandments. To the life of a monk or nun any one, without distinction of caste or rank, could be admitted excepting murderers, robbers, slaves, soldiers, and persons suffering from contagious diseases or certain bodily defects. The act of admission is called *pravrajyā* (Pāli *pabajjā*), 'leaving the world,' every one becoming a monk (*pravrajita*, Pāli *pabbajita*) by putting on the yellow robe, shaving his hair and beard, and uttering the creed thrice in the presence of an ordained monk.

(*c*) *Ordination.*—Ordination proper, called *upasampadā* ('accession'), which gave all the privileges belonging to the Order, might be conferred on all who had been admitted excepting those who had been guilty of serious crimes or offences. Twenty was the lowest age for ordination. Young novices, above seven years of age, could be received, but only with the consent of their parents. Converts from heterodox sects were, in addition to the ordinary formalities, subjected to a probationary period (*parivāsa*) before ordination. The ceremony of ordination was more formal than that of admission, taking place before a committee of at least ten monks. The candidate was examined as to his qualifications and possible disabilities by the president, who, if the proposed ordination was

accepted by the assembly, exhorted him to restrict himself to the four 'requisites' and to avoid the four capital sins. A monk could be temporarily or permanently expelled for committing any of these sins, or for general unsuitableness; but he could also voluntarily leave the Order. A result of entering the Order was the dissolution of marriage. The new monk had also to give up all private property, and was debarred from acquiring anything individually.

(*d*) *Clothing and equipment.*—A monk might possess only one suit of clothes, consisting of three parts: an under-garment, equivalent to a shirt; a lower garment, a kind of skirt reaching to the knee and fastened with a girdle; and a mantle which, coming down to below the knees, was thrown over the left shoulder, leaving the right shoulder and part of the breast bare. The colour of the garments in early times was yellow (as it still is in Ceylon), but in the Middle Ages it was reddish. Only a few other articles were required to complete the monk's equipment. One of these was an alms-bowl, which he carried in his hand for the purpose of collecting food. He was also provided with a razor, which he used for shaving his head and his beard twice a month on the *upavasatha* days of new and full moon. The rest comprised a needle, a water-strainer, and later also a mendicant's staff. Besides regularly paring his nails, he used tooth sticks for cleansing his teeth.

(*e*) *Housing.*—Originally the monks had no fixed abodes, but lived in woods or caves, though within easy reach of a village or town, so as to be able to beg food. It was their duty to wander about preaching the doctrine, but during the rains they went into retreat (*vārṣika*, Pāli *vassa*), generally several of them together. For their use during this season pious laymen often built shelters to which they annually returned during the rains. These were called *vihāras*, in which monks later began to live even at times other than the rainy season. In this way regular monasteries gradually grew up.

(*f*) *Food.*—In early times the monk was allowed only one daily meal, and that at noon, after his return from his begging rounds. The use of *ghī*, butter, oil, honey, and sugar was permitted to members of the Order only in times of sickness; otherwise it was treated as an offence requiring confession and absolution. Fish and meat were allowed under certain restrictions. Thus Buddha himself is recorded to have eaten pork. Like the Brāhman religious student, the Buddhist monk had to beg his food, but he was not allowed to ask for alms by word of mouth.

(*g*) *Worship.*—In the early days of Buddhism, religious observances were of a very simple character. Twice a month all the monks of a district assembled to celebrate the *upavasatha*, or Sabbath days, at new and full moon. The meeting, having been convoked by the eldest among them, was held in the evening at the place designated. It was restricted to ordained monks, but all of these had to be present. It consisted, as has already been said, in a ceremony of confession. The Sabbaths in general were days of rest and fasting, when no trade or business was allowed, hunting and fishing were forbidden, and schools and courts of justice were closed. Preaching and hearing sermons were a common feature of the celebration of every Sabbath. But the regular time for this was the retreat during the rains—an institution dating from the very commencement of Buddhism. The retreat began on the day of full moon in the month of Āsādha (June–July), and ended with the day of full moon in the month of Kārttika (about the middle of October). Its conclusion was marked by the *Pravāraṇā* festival, held, before the wanderings of the monks again began, on the 14th and 15th days of the light fortnight, the latter being at the same time a Sabbath. This was made an occasion for giving presents, especially in the form of clothes, to the monks, for inviting them to dinner, and for celebrating processions.

In later times there was also a quinquennial festival, called *Pañchavārṣika*, on a grand scale, its distinctive feature being the practice of extraordinary liberality to the Order. In the first half of the 7th cent. King Harṣa of Kanauj regularly convoked such assemblies. In the 7th cent. the date of the *Nirvāṇa* of Buddha was also celebrated as a great festival.

It was not long after the establishment of Buddhism that the worship of relics and the adoration of sacred sites began to develop. Buddha himself, before he died, recommended four sites as deserving to be visited by the pious: his birthplace, the places where he obtained enlightenment, where he first preached, and where he entered into *Parinirvāṇa*. After the cremation of Buddha, his relics, as we are told in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, were divided into eight parts, over which the various recipients built *stūpas*. The veneration of relics later became a much developed form of worship. Among these, the tooth relic, with which a whole *sutta* is concerned, played a prominent part. The records of the Chinese pilgrims show that *stūpas* were also erected over the relics of Buddha's disciples and of saints in various cities, such as Vaiśālī and Mathurā. Fa Hian, about A.D. 400, saw Buddha's alms-bowl at Peshawar, and his staff near Nagara (south of the Kabul river). In the 7th cent. the head-dress of Buddha when a boy was to be seen in South India at Koṅkanapura, where it was displayed on Sabbath days and honoured with flowers. In the same century, shadows, regarded as relics left by Buddha, were shown in caves at Kauśāmbī, Gayā, and Nagara. From the 1st cent. A.D. onwards, images of Buddha, of Pratyekabuddhas and Dhyānibuddhas, and of Bodhisattvas began to be made.

5. Art.—Indian Buddhist art is peculiarly important, not only because it is of great value as illustrating the fortunes of Buddhism in India during nearly the whole course of its existence there, but because, if it had been lost, there could be no history of Indian art at all. The remains of Buddhist art in India are almost entirely architectural and sculptural. None of them, with one exception, goes back to a period earlier than the reign of the emperor Aśoka (variously fixed at 272–231 B.C. and 264–223 B.C.). The nine centuries over which they spread may be divided into three roughly equal periods. In the first, 250 B.C. to A.D. 50, stone began to be employed in India for building. Before this the architectural use of brick was known, as is shown by the *stūpa* of Piprahwa, which dates from about 300 B.C. or perhaps earlier. But the ornamental edifices of the pre-Aśokan age must have been built of wood, like the modern palaces of Burma, the substructure alone being of brick. The whole history of Indian architecture points to previous construction in wood, the stone monuments being largely imitations of wooden models.

(*a*) *Architecture.*—Indian Buddhist architecture may be divided into three classes: (1) *stūpas*, or relic mounds; (2) *chaityas*, or assembly halls, corresponding to our churches; (3) *vihāras*, or dwellings for monks.

(1) The *stūpa* was a dome-shaped structure, developed from the sepulchral mound, in which baked bricks were substituted for earth with a view to durability. They were first intended to serve as monuments enclosing relics of Buddha. Some, however, were only commemorative of important events connected with his history. The best extant example of a *stūpa* in India is that at Sānchī, which probably dates from the 3rd cent. B.C.

The *stūpa* is a hemispherical dome erected on a low circular drum, the upper rim of which formed a procession path round the base of the dome. On the top of the dome was a box-like structure surrounded by a railing, and surmounted by an umbrella. The *stūpa* itself was encircled by a massive stone railing which had gates on four sides, and enclosed a procession path and a sacred precinct. Both the rails and the gates are unmistakable imitations of wooden models. The *stūpa* became to the early Buddhist *the* religious edifice. In the oldest sculptures we constantly find representations of its adoration by

celestial beings, men, and even animals, such as elephants. It was also the sacred object always set up for circumambulation in all the temples of early Buddhism in India.

(2) The *chaitya* (*q.v.*), or assembly hall, is the exact counterpart of Christian churches not only in form, but in use. Till recently only rock-cut examples, to the number of about thirty, were known in India. The typical assembly hall consists of a nave and side aisles terminating in an apse or semi-dome. The pillars separating the nave from the aisles are continued round the apse. Under the apse and in front of its pillars is the *stūpa*, in nearly the same position as that occupied by the altar in a Christian church. The tee was doubtless usually surmounted by a wooden umbrella, which has, however, everywhere disappeared except at Kārli, the finest cave of this type in India. The roof is semicircular. Over the doorway, which is opposite the *stūpa*, is a gallery, and above this a large window shaped like a horse-shoe. This window is constantly repeated on the façade as an ornament.

In the rock *chaityas*, the excavation of which extended from about 260 B.C. to about A.D. 600, the development of their style can be followed step by step throughout these nine centuries. The oldest, dating from near the commencement of the reign of Aśoka, are at Barābar, 16 miles north of Bodh Gayā. The front of one of these is carved so as to represent in rock the form of the structural *chaityas* of the age, all the details clearly imitating those of wooden buildings. All the most important examples of *chaityas* occur at six places in Western India. As we pass from the earliest to the latest specimens, we can clearly trace progress towards stone construction on the one hand and degeneracy in cult on the other. In the later specimens at Ajantā (*q.v.*) a striking change is the fact that figure sculpture has superseded the plainer ornamental carvings of the earlier caves. The greatest change, however, is that figures of Buddha have now been introduced in all his attitudes. In the earlier caves only ordinary mortals are sculptured, but Buddha himself never appears. Now he is the object of worship, his image being introduced in the front of the *stūpa* itself, which alone was adored in the older *chaityas*. In place of the earlier total lack of images we are here confronted with an overwhelming idolatry, in which Buddha, originally regarded as a human being, is the chief deity. In the latest of the Ajantā caves, dating from about A.D. 600, the sculptures are more mythological, evidently approximating to the iconography of Brāhmanism.

The caves of Ellora (*q.v.*) are particularly interesting, because here the juxtaposition of Buddhist with Hindu and Jain temples throws light on the relation of the three religions. The large Buddhist assembly hall at this place dates from about A.D. 600.

Besides many other evidences of architectural lateness, its most striking feature is the *stūpa* which, instead of being circular, has a large frontispiece that makes it rectilinear on this side, and contains a figure of a seated Buddha surrounded with attendants and flying figures in the latest style. In what is probably the most recent Buddhist cave temple in India, at Kholvi, the *stūpa* is no longer solid, but is hollowed out into a cell, in which an image of Buddha is placed. This marks the latest step in the development of the *chaitya*. A link connecting this stage with the later Jain and Hindu temples is to be found in an old structural Viṣṇu temple dating from about A.D. 700. Here the *stūpa* is superseded by a cell for the image, but this cell still has a semicircular back, and is separated from the wall behind by a passage for circumambulation. The transition is completed by making the cell square, as is the case at Pattadkal in an early Hindu temple, otherwise the same in plan as the one just described. The archæological evidence of the development of the *chaitya* thus shows how the Buddhist religion gradually grew idolatrous, and came nearer and nearer to Hinduism. It supplies us with concrete evidence showing how by this time that religion was gradually disappearing before the encroachment of the new form of the faith, from an earlier phase of which it had itself sprung.

(3) Beside the *chaityas* there arose *vihāras*, or monasteries, as residences for the Buddhist monks. Our knowledge of these is still more dependent than that of *chaityas* on rock-cut examples. There are about 900 Buddhist examples of this class in India.

The *vihāra* consisted, as a rule, of a hall, generally square but sometimes oblong, surrounded by a number of cells or sleeping-cubicles, and shaded in front by a pillared verandah. The cubicles in the oldest caves usually contain a stone bed. There is generally only a single floor, but two-storeyed *vihāras* also occur. Nearly all the caves of this class are found in Western India. Probably about forty were excavated before the Christian era. The most important of them are found at Bhāja, Bedsa, and Ajantā. In those of the earliest period there are no figure sculptures, no reliefs, not even carved emblems. The only ornament consists of horse-shoe arches and the Buddhist rail as a string course, with an occasional pilaster. Towards the end of the first period, four pillars supporting the ceiling began to be introduced. In the second period the number of pillars was increased, and finally reached twenty-eight. This feature is always accompanied by the introduction in the back wall of a sanctuary containing an image of Buddha.

The *vihāras* at Ajantā are specially important, because they constitute a complete series of examples of Buddhist art without any admixture from Hinduism or any other religion. They extend from 200 B.C. to A.D. 600, and thus belong to all three periods. The *vihāras* at Ellora, on the other hand, are interesting mainly because they illustrate the inter-relation of the three Indian religions, Buddhism, Brāhmanism, and Jainism. For here we have three groups of caves which distinctly represent these religions, and in which the transitions from one to the other can be clearly traced. Most of the eleven *vihāras* at this place have sanctuaries containing figures of Buddha seated. Thus the Buddhist monastery is seen to be becoming a place of worship, in which images of Buddha are ousting the monks from their cells. These *vihāras* come down to about A.D. 700, at which point the earliest Brāhman examples begin. Three two-storeyed caves at Ellora illustrate clearly the transition from Buddhism to Brāhmanism. The first is entirely and unmistakably Buddhist. The second is similar in plan, and the sculptures are still all Buddhistic, but deviate sufficiently from the usual simplicity to have justified the Brāhmans in appropriating this cave as belonging to their religion. The plan of the third resembles that of the second, but the sculptures are all unmistakably Brāhman. This is evidently the earliest Hindu cave, being a close copy of the preceding Buddhist example.

(*b*) *Sculpture.*—In the earliest period there are no images of Buddhas or Bodhisattvas. No sculpture of Buddha, in any of his conventional attitudes, that has been executed in India can be assigned to an earlier date than the end of the 1st cent. A.D. Reverence was paid during the first period to relics, *stūpas*, Bo-trees, footprints of Buddha, and sacred symbols, such as the trident and the wheel of the law. These are constantly represented in the sculptures as adored by men, and even animals.

The sculptures of this period are found at Bhārhut (now in the Calcutta Museum) and Sānchi, at Bodh Gayā, and in the early temples and monasteries of Western India. They appear on the rails and gateways of *stūpas*, on monolith columns, on the pillars and façades of *chaityas* and *vihāras*. The most ancient railings, as those at Sānchi, are quite plain. But they soon began to be adorned with bosses, panels, and friezes. The railing at Bhārhut (200–150 B.C.) is covered in every part with elaborate sculptures in relief, and is practically a treatise in stone on Buddhist mythology. The gateways of Sanchi are covered with sculpture, including all sorts of incidents connected with Buddhist legend. It is worthy of note that both here and at Bhārhut occur representations of Lakṣmī, the Hindu goddess of fortune, with an elephant on each side pouring water over her from pots. This is the earliest example in Indian sculpture of worship being paid to any being, divine or human.

The commencement of the second period of Buddhist religious art coincides with the rise of the Mahāyāna school. Its history begins in the extreme north-west, the region of Gandhāra.

Representations of Buddha and of numerous Bodhisattvas suddenly appear in the Buddhist monasteries of this district for decorative purposes in the first cent. A.D. It is characteristic of this new phase of Buddhism that figures of Buddha occupy the cells originally meant for monks, and that the heads of these figures are always adorned with a halo. In this corner of India was created the conventional type of Buddha which, spreading from this source to other parts of India, was finally diffused over the whole of the Buddhist world. From the already stereotyped character of the figure on the votive casket discovered in the *stūpa* of Kaniṣka at Peshawar in 1909 we may infer that some nameless Greek artist first produced this type of the Enlightened One in the century preceding our era. It has perhaps been the most enduring, as well as the most widely dispersed, type that the history of art has ever recorded. In the hands of the artists of Gandhara the image of Buddha became a centre for groups of sculpture in which Buddha plays the same part as Christ in Christian works of art.

Buddhist art, even in the western caves, represents the figures of its mythology in ordinary human form only, while it is characteristic of Hindu sculpture frequently to represent the gods with several heads and many arms. Probably the earliest figure of a Hindu god with more than two arms is one of Śiva on a coin of Kadphises II., dating from the 1st cent. A.D. This feature of Hinduism made its way into Buddhist sculpture only in the third and decadent period. Thus we find in one of the caves at Kanheri the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara represented with eleven heads. These disfigurements never extended to images of Buddha. But the sculpture of the second period furnishes melancholy evidence of the most striking feature in the degeneration of Indian Buddhism: Buddha, who denied the existence of a supreme god and rejected the worship of gods altogether, himself came to be treated as a supreme god, and the images representing him gave rise to a vast development of idolatry in the later forms of Buddhism.

(*c*) *Painting.*—About half-way through the second period another branch of art—painting—begins to appear as a handmaid of the Buddhist religion. The actual remains of these early paintings are chiefly limited to the frescoes found on the ceilings, walls, and pillars of several of the Ajantā caves. The oldest belong to the end of the 2nd cent. A.D. They extend through the third period of Buddhist art, the best and most interesting specimens dating from *c.* A.D. 550 to 650. They comprise pictures of Buddha with drapery and nimbus in the style of the Gandhāra school of about the 4th century. The frescoes, like the sculptures on the rails at Bhārhut and Amarāvati, were intended for the edification of pious Buddhists. The subjects are confined to such as are drawn from Buddhist mythology or legend. Among them may be mentioned frescoes (of about the 6th cent.) illustrative of the *Jātakamālā* accompanied by inscriptional verses by its author, Āryaśūra.

As regards sculpture, Buddhist religious art declined more and more in the third period, gradually approximating to that of Hinduism. The Buddhists now used images as freely as the Hindus. The mediæval statuary of Bihār is found to be almost identical with that in the Hindu temples, and the two classes of images became so similar that they are often confounded even by skilled archæologists. Thus the history of the art of Indian Buddhism shows how that religion lost its original characteristic features, and became almost indistinguishable from reviving Hinduism.

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DOCTRINE.—Oldenberg, *op. cit.* pp. 235–387; Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, chs. iv.–v., *Amer. Lect.* iii., v.; Kern, *Manual*, pp. 46–73; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme, Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909; Pischel, *op. cit.* pp. 62–99; F. O. Schrader, *Ueber den Stand der ind. Philos. zur Zeit Mahāvīras und Buddhas*, Strassburg, 1902; M. Walleser, *Die buddh. Philos. in ihrer geschichtl. Entwicklung*, pt. i. 'Die philos. Grundl. des ältoren Buddhismus,' Heidelberg, 1904, pt. iii. 'Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna,' do. 1911. On the problem of the relation between Buddhism and the Sāṅkhya philosophy: H. Jacobi, 'Der Ursprung des Buddhismus aus dem Sāṅkhya-Yoga,' in *GGN*, 1896, pp. 43–58, and 'Über das Verhältnis der buddhist. Philosophie zum Sāṅkhya-Yoga,' in *ZDMG* liii. [1898] 1–16; R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894, *Sankhya und Yoga* (=*GIAP* iii. 4), Strassburg, 1896, and *Philosophy of Ancient India*, Chicago, 1897; the theory is criticized by Oldenberg, *ZDMG* liii. 681–694, and *Buddha*[6], pp. 65–71.

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ART.—J. Fergusson, *Illustrations of the Rock-cut Temples of India*, London, 1845, *Tree and Serpent Worship, or Illustrations of Mythology and Art in India*[2], do. 1873, *Hist. of Ind. and East. Architecture* (2 vols.), revised by J. Burgess, do. 1910, i. 1–223; J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, do. 1880; A. Cunningham, *Bhilsa Topes*, do. 1854, *The Stūpa of Bharhut*, do. 1879; F. C. Maisey, *Sanchi and its Remains*, do. 1892; A. Foucher, *L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra*, Paris, 1905–13, *Étude sur l'iconographie bouddhique de l'Inde*, do. 1900–05, *La Porte orientale du stūpa de Sanchi*, do. 1910, *L'Origine grecque de l'image du Bouddha*, Châlon-sur-Saone, 1913; A. Grünwedel, *Buddh. Kunst in Indien*[2], Berlin, 1900; Grünwedel and Burgess, *Buddh. Art in India*, London, 1902; J. Burgess, *Anc. Monuments of India*, pt. i., do. 1897, *Notes on the Bauddha Rock-Temples of Ajanta, their Paintings and Sculptures*, etc., Bombay, 1879; J. Griffiths, *The Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta*, London, 1896–97; Mrs. Herringham, 'The Frescoes of Ajanta,' *Burlington Magazine*, xvii. [1910] 136 ff.; Vincent A. Smith, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, with 336 illustrations, Oxford, 1911, chs. ii. (architecture), iii.–v. (sculpture), viii. (painting), with copious bibliographical notes.

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INDIFFERENTISM.—This doctrine makes its first clear appearance in Stoic ethics. Virtue consists in living according to nature; but certain things are in our power, certain things are not. The latter are *ἀδιάφορα*, things indifferent; they have nothing to do with the motives of the virtuous man; he must be entirely independent of them, taking them as they come, but trying to do nothing—for, indeed, it is really impossible—either to secure or avoid them. 'Some things are in our power, such as desire, impulse, inclination; others are not, such as the body, property, reputation. . . . If you really know what is your own, and what is not your own, no one will be able to exercise compulsion or restraint over you: you will never blame or chide another; no one will injure you, and you will never have an enemy' (Epict. *Man.* i. 1 ff.). Virtue is nothing but the good will; Epictetus illustrates this by the story of two lads who were sent to fetch Plato: the one sought for him everywhere, but missed him; the other spent his time listening to strolling jesters in the street, and then happened to see Plato passing, and gave him the message. *Ἀδιάφορα*, on the other hand, are things which, properly speaking, 'neither help nor injure, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good repute, good birth, and their opposites, death, disease, toil, disgrace, weakness, poverty,' etc. (Diog. Laert. vii. 102). It is this conception that is the chief element in the popular view of Stoicism; and it forms an interesting contrast to Aristotle's description of the 'great-souled man,' for whom the things in the first class of *ἀδιάφορα* as described above are a necessity, but who despises what can only be received from other people.

But there are three objections to the conception. (1) It leaves man without guidance in a large part of life; (2) it is too severe for most men; (3) it is impracticable, since all life involves a continuous

series of choices, even in our dealings with ἀδιάφορα. Even if pain is an indifferent thing, does it not matter how one acts under it? Hence the doctrine was modified, but only in the direction of the second—and least important—objection; and a distinction was introduced between what were known as καθήκοντα (*officia media*) and κατορθώματα (*officia perfecta*), the former denoting acts that are suitable and commendable, the latter acts that are positively right. The latter term refers to virtue and vice, *i.e.* things according or contrary to nature; they are absolute. The former refers to things relative to ends; they involve degrees, and allow of considerations of convenience; hence only with κατορθώματα can there be no compromise; there the imperative is, as Kant would say, categorical. It must be noted here that we are not dealing with counsels of perfection, as they have been called, for κατορθώματα are necessary for all; and in the same way all may have the benefit of the principle of the καθῆκον. Nor is casuistry involved; for casuistry (*q.v.*), whose existence the Stoics did not recognize to any great extent, arises in the case of a conflict of duties.

The distinction between καθήκοντα and κατορθώματα implies a further distinction in indifferent things, between προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα, things to be preferred or rejected, or ἄξια and ἀπάξια, *i.e.* things with or without value; thus, even in the class of indifferent things is found the distinction of being either according to or contrary to nature; and objects in the one class may be lawfully pursued, in the other avoided.

This, however, is really an excrescence on the system, not an integral part of it. For, if an act is according to nature, surely it is a κατόρθωμα; how could it be anything but definitely wrong to turn from what is according to nature, or pursue what is contrary to it? Or, if ἄξια are what they are because they involve ends at which we may rightly aim, on what grounds are these aims admissible? They are either good or bad. What makes them so? Nature again. Further, if ends are right, are all the means to them right? If not, how are we to decide between the different means? Only as they involve virtue or vice; in any case, we are driven back to κατορθώματα. Indeed, the Stoic ideal is now destroyed, for the sage is no longer a rival of Zeus—'rex denique regum'; he is jostling in the crowd for objects whose lack makes him confessedly in an unsatisfactory position, and to secure which he will at least be tempted to evil. Hence, the introduction of this distinction does nothing to relieve Stoicism from the burden of the doctrine of ἀδιάφορα in general.

The question did not again take an important place in ethics till Kant. Kant recognized in the Stoics a school with whose views he could not but sympathize; most austere of moralists as he appears to be, however, he blames them for not seeing that, while happiness cannot be the cause of virtue, it ought to be its accompaniment and result. It is the second, though only the second, element in the *summum bonum*. To the Stoic doctrine of ἀδιάφορα, however, he does not explicitly refer; but by implication it is roundly condemned. For, just as to Kant there is nothing good except the good will, so there is no freedom save in the absolute obedience of the will to the Moral Law; and whatever is not of freedom is immoral. But to be guided by inclination or preference is to set other ends above the Moral Law.

'Freedom and the consciousness of it as a faculty of following the moral law with unyielding resolution is independence on inclinations, at least as motives determining (though not as affecting) our desire' (*Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. Abbott, London, 1879, p. 310). So also religion is 'the recognition of all duties as divine commands, and here, too, all remains disinterested and founded merely on duty, neither hope nor fear being made the foundation springs, which, if taken as principles, would destroy the moral worth of actions' (*ib.* p. 320).

It thus appears that, while Kant criticizes the Stoics for neglecting happiness altogether, he is totally opposed to the issue in which they as a matter of fact recognize it, and there can be no doubt that he has logic on his side. On the other hand, he has certainly laid himself open to Schiller's well-known epigram.[1] Argument by epigram is dangerous, however; and Kant did not call an act done from affection wrong necessarily, but only an action done from affection instead of from respectful obedience to the Moral Law. Strictly speaking, affection which leaves such respect intact is itself an ἀδιάφορον, unimportant from the point of view of morals. But here Kant is on dangerous ground. The consideration, indeed, that led the Stoics to their doctrine of προηγμένα he would neglect, since he is confessedly describing the implications of complete virtue, and he has no interest in the secondary virtue of the ordinary man; but he cannot avoid challenging comparison with the NT, to which, indeed, he constantly, though somewhat patronizingly, refers in the *Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason*. In Paul's experience, Christianity, as with Kant, is essentially a principle of freedom; but it is freedom *from* a purely moral law, *to* a supreme person. Moreover, the spring of obedience to this person, *i.e.* Christ, is not respect, but gratitude and love. The relation of obedience to love in Christianity is similar to the relation of happiness to virtue in Kant. In each pair the former member has its roots in the latter, and without the latter is of no value. But, when it is said that Christian freedom is freedom from the law, this does not mean that the necessity for conformity to the law disappears. It is rather 'establ.shed' (Ro 3^{31}). Its scope, indeed, is infinitely extended. 'Whatsoever ye do . . . do all to the glory of God' (1 Co 10^{31}). Thus nothing can be indifferent; there is no place for ἀδιάφορα; for there are certain things at which a Christian will never think of aiming (Lk 10^{42}); there is nothing to which his attitude is not of supreme importance.

As long as respect for the law is the sole motive, it is difficult to escape such distinctions as that between προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα. But Kant himself has provided a way out in his second statement of the categorical imperative: 'Treat everyone as a member of the Kingdom of Ends.' This formula shows the real strength and weakness of Kant's system. Obedience to the formula brings one very near to the Christian rule of loving one's neighbour as oneself; and, indeed, the two formulæ explain one another; and both exclude ἀδιάφορα, since in dealing with oneself there are no ἀδιάφορα. At the same time, such an attitude is impossible unless the deepest emotions and affections, instead of being expelled, are made central.

LITERATURE.—For the Stoic doctrine see Diog. Laert. vii.; Epictetus, *Enchiridion*; E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*[4], Leipzig, 1909. For Kant see his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, pt. i. (in *Werke*, ed. Rosenkranz, do. 1842), or T. K. Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, London, 1879, p. 300 ff. For the ecclesiastical doctrines of acts and of rites and ceremonies see art. ADIAPHORISM; and for the psychological doctrine of the Liberty of Indifference see art. WILL.

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INDIGITAMENTA.—The Roman Indigitamenta were those portions of the pontifical books (Serv. *Georg.* i. 21: 'in indigitamentis . . . id est, in libris pontificalibus') whose origin was traced to King Numa Pompilius (Arnob. ii. 73: 'Pompiliana indigitamenta'). The citations made from them by the ancients go back to the work of Granius Flaccus (Censor. *de Die Nat.* iii. 2:

[1] 'Gerne dien' ich den Freunden, doch thu' ich es leider mit Neigung, | Und so wurmt es mir oft, dass ich nicht tugendhaft bin' (*Die Philosophen*, 'Gewissenskrupel').

'Granius Flaccus in libro quem ad Caesarem de indigitamentis scriptum reliquit'), and to the *Antiquitates rerum divinarum* of M. Terentius Varro (cf. R. Agahd, *Jahrb. für Philol.*, Suppl. xxiv. [1898] 131 ff.). As the verb *indigitare* (which is not connected with the *di indigetes*) has, on the testimony of the ancient lexicographers (Paul. p. 114; Serv. *Æn.* xii. 794; *Corp. gloss. Lat.* vi. 564), the same meaning as *invocare*, the Indigitamenta were formulæ of invocation not to be differentiated from the 'comprecationes deorum immortalium quae ritu Romano fiunt' which Gellius (xiii. 23. 1) cites from the *Libri sacerdotum populi Romani*—*i.e.* the books of the *pontifices*. Accordingly, the Indigitamenta were lists containing the names and epithets of the gods, and specifying the occasions on which the help of each should be invoked; and the fact that the function and sphere of a deity were generally indicated by his name explains the statement of Servius (*Georg.* i. 21) to the effect that the Indigitamenta had contained 'et nomina deorum et rationes ipsorum nominum.' The few passages that explicitly mention the Indigitamenta, or else make use of the word *indigitare*, refer to the deities Bona Dea (Macr. *Sat.* I. xii. 21), Tiberinus (Serv. *Æn.* viii. 330), Genius (Censor. iii. 2), Numeria (Nonius, p. 352), and Apollo (Macr. *Sat.* I. xvii. 15). The last-cited passage may seem to conflict with the testimony of Arnobius (ii. 73: 'non doctorum in litteris continetur, Apollinis nomen Pompiliana indigitamenta nescire?'), but we must suppose that, while the name of Apollo may not have occurred in the oldest portions of the Indigitamenta, the latter were in course of time supplemented in order to correspond with the expansion of the Roman pantheon.

The absence of Apollo's name from the Pompiliana indigitamenta is referred to by Arnobius, or his source, as conclusive evidence that that deity was unknown in the earliest religion of Rome. This proves that when the Indigitamenta were composed they must have embraced all the deities then worshipped in Rome. It is, therefore, an error, and one that has become fairly common since its promulgation by J. A. Ambrosch (occurring recently, *e.g.*, in A. v. Domaszewski, *Abhandl. zur röm. Religion*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1909, p. 159), to regard the Indigitamenta as lists of those deities whom Usener (*Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896, p. 74 f.) has designated *Sondergötter*, *i.e.* gods whose sphere of power was narrow—being restricted to particular actions and circumstances of human life—and to apply the name 'indigitamenta-deities' exclusively to these. That the Indigitamenta really contained the names of such deities is distinctly implied by Censorinus:

'Sed et alii sunt praeterea dei complures hominum vitam pro suis quisque portione adminiculantes, quos volentem cognoscere indigitamentorum libri satis edocebunt' (iii. 4; cf. Serv. *Georg.* i. 21);

but that they were not wholly confined to that class of deities appears from the mention of Bona Dea, Tiberinus, and Genius in the fragments cited above. The much discussed lists of *di minuti*, which were arranged according to the various phases of divine action, and which can be reconstructed, especially from the writings of the Church Fathers (cf. Agahd, *op. cit.* 36 ff.), are not derived in that particular form from the Indigitamenta, but were drawn up by Varro (*Antiquitates rerum divinarum*, xiv.) as lists of the *di certi*, *i.e.* deities regarding whose function and signification the ancient scholars were still able, as he thought, to speak with certainty. Varro may have taken many of the names and interpretations from the Indigitamenta, but many were derived from other sources, and most of the accompanying explanations rest entirely upon etymologies which are open to question or even demonstrably false.

LITERATURE.—J. A. Ambrosch, *Über die Religionsbücher der Römer*, Bonn, 1843; R. Peter, art. 'Indigitamenta,' in Roscher, ii. [1897] 129 ff.; G. Wissowa, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur röm. Religions- und Stadtgesch.*, Munich, 1904, pp. 176 f., 304 ff.; W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, p. 159 ff.

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INDIVIDUALISM.—The term 'individualism' may be taken either in a genetic or in a normative sense. In the former sense it denotes the systems which appear in religious and political society and their laws, as well as in the great manifestations of the human mind, creations of isolated or associated individuals; in the latter it denotes a principle according to which the integral and free development of the individual ought to be the aim of social life. Individualism in the genetic sense has a historical significance; individualism in the normative sense has a moral significance. They may stand independently of each other; but, as a matter of fact, individualism in the genetic sense of the word is often allied to a tendency which is individualistic in the normative sense, *i.e.* individualism in the genetic sense only traces back to the origins of societies, which thus form a First Cause, the aim which we claim to assign to them, or, in other words, transfers into the historical mode a certain conception of moral and social life. It seems best, therefore, to treat these two notions without separating them; as a matter of fact, they are often united and even confused. We shall discuss: (1) religious individualism, (2) moral individualism, and (3) political, social, and juridical individualism.

1. **Religious individualism.**—Primitive religions regarded the individual merely as the member of a clan, tribe, or race. Even their deities are not developed individualities, but personifications of forces of nature or of social laws. It was only gradually that the imagination of the poets gave them more definite characteristics. In this connexion the religion of Israel has the same character as the other national religions. Jahweh is the God of a people. It is to this people that He has given His law. For transgressions of this law He demands satisfaction indifferently from just and unjust—the descendants who have not sinned as well as the ancestors who are guilty. The individual simply shares the lot of the whole of which he is a part.

The time of the prophets witnesses a transformation of ideas in the meaning of individualism. The prophets themselves were powerful individualities who, strong by means of their inspiration and the revelations of which they were the conscious objects, opposed the people and the national tradition, preaching the religion of justice in opposition to the religion of worship, and realizing in their person an individual communion between God and man. They undoubtedly still speak to the people as a whole; they announce the punishments of God to the people as a whole, but in a different spirit. On the one hand, there appears the idea that the sufferings of the just are not punishments, but dispensations of God in view of the salvation of sinners by means of expiation: it is prominent in the parts of Deutero-Isaiah referring to the servant of God; on the other hand, Ezekiel develops the idea of a strictly individual justice: every one will suffer for his own sins; they will no longer say in Israel: 'The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge' (Ezk 18^2). The book of Job also marks an important stage in the development of religious individualism in Israel. Conscience was still subordinated to facts; the Israelites judged people according to their fate, and they judged themselves in the same way. This is the point of view of Job's friends: they prove to him that he is guilty because he is unfortunate. But Job protests. To the verdict of

outward conditions he opposes that of his conscience, and maintains that, even if he were to despair of the justice of God, his exceptional misfortunes are not the proof of exceptional wickedness. He does not regard himself as an example of a sinner; his predominant feeling is that his conduct has been upright; and his friends are in the end disowned by God Himself, whose cause they thought they were defending. This is the triumph of the individual conscience over the collective conscience—the slave of appearances. The victory of individualism is completed by the coming of the doctrine of resurrection and the judgment of the dead which is announced in the book of Daniel and gradually becomes implanted in the mind of the Jewish people. The triumph of this belief was due—at least in the minds of many scholars—partly to the effect of foreign influences on the Israelitish mind. Certain religions, *e.g.* Parsiism and the ancient Egyptian religion, in their beliefs concerning the life to come and the judgment of the dead, have a very important individualistic element. As regards Jewish piety, it more and more assumed the character of an individual effort to merit eternal life, by good works and a strict observation of the law. The ancient idea of national solidarity did not disappear, however, and religious hopes still continued to bear a national character.

The individual soul is the special interest of Jesus. It is the object of His appeals, His solicitude, His promises. To Him the work of saving souls is more important than that of saving His people, although this too is not neglected. He was the real initiator of religious individualism, by the announcement of His filial connexion with God and of God's solicitude for all sinners, and by His invitation to His followers to enter into a communion with the heavenly Father similar to, if not identical with, His own communion with the Father. With St. Paul also the care of individual souls is predominant; we find in him, however, the idea of the Church as the body of Christ. He does not place it above individual souls, but there appears in his Church the notion of a spiritual reality which enters into competition with the individual. Afterwards the Church is regarded as an institution of divine origin, the mediator between God and man, and the regulator of the thought and life of the individual. In fact, if not in theory, the individual exists for the Church rather than the Church for the individual. The Christian becomes a member of the Church by a sacrament which is officially administered to him at a time when he has not the power to reject it, and he remains a member, not because of personal qualities, but because of the sacrament, as long as the Church does not think fit to exclude him from its communion.

Alongside of the Church institution another type of religious association appears in the Middle Ages, viz. the sect—if we may use this word to signify communities to which persons voluntarily attach themselves on account of personal convictions, and membership in which consists in the fulfilment of certain rules or vows. The sects were incontestably, in many cases, the refuge of individual piety and conscience from the hand laid by the Church on the religious autonomy of individuals. The Reformers proclaimed the principle of justification by faith, *i.e.* by a certain disposition of the soul with regard to the promises of God, and so brought the individual face to face with God, and prepared for the maturing of personal piety and religious thought. The consequences of their principle, however, were of slow development. The two great Churches resulting from the Reformation preserved the idea of the Church-institution on the whole, and took up a position against the sect of Anabaptists, which was based on the individualist principle. But the idea of universal priesthood expounded by Luther did not readily harmonize with the Church's dogma of a special priesthood. On the other hand, the idea of predestination favoured individualism, and relegated to the second place the idea of a Church as the guardian of the means of salvation. In the Lutheran Church, Pietism sought to realize the idea of universal priesthood, and, without attacking the ecclesiastical institution in general, to revive it by the formation of groups of Christians animated by a conscious personal piety. The Reformed Church gave birth to a series of sects, Baptist and Methodist, which are all founded on the idea that the holiness of the Church and the efficacy of its work depend upon the character of its members—that the Church is an association of living and converted Christians who have adhered personally to the Christian faith.

As the doctrine of the Church came to be contested more and more by criticism, the question of the rights of individual religious thought in the Church was a pressing problem. Catholicism could not solve it except in a negative way; the traditionalist section of Protestantism could do no more than make certain concessions; while the reformist section set itself to ensure the independence of individual thought, by insisting on liberty of thought as an essential element of Christian liberty, or by reducing the doctrinal consensus to a minimum, or by making thought and doctrine quite secondary elements of the religious life, and seeking to unite souls in mystical and practical aspirations. In this order of ideas, of which Schleiermacher was the instigator, religious thought follows religious experience, which by its nature is much more individual than collective. The rights of the individual with regard to every religious doctrine are, therefore, assured, and the doctrinal decisions of the Church have to take account of them. And, in addition, although mysticism properly so called has always offered a protective refuge to individual piety, it is not positively favourable to individualism, as it tends to absorb the human individualities in God rather than to make them independent.

Once at this point of development, religious individualism necessarily generated in the bosom of the official Protestant Churches a movement in favour of ecclesiastical individualism, which the sects had been practising for a long time, and this movement had its reflex action on the connexion of the Churches with the State. The Church-institutions were all united to the State. At first the effect of this union was to enslave the Church, but afterwards it produced exactly opposite results. The Western Catholic Church very soon regarded itself as invested with spiritual glory in Christendom, while the State held the temporal glory under its authority and for its protection. The Protestant Churches too, at first, spoke more or less consciously of the idea of 'Christendom'—a politico-religious body, of which the Church (subject, of course, to the State) was the inspiration. The union of Church and State, therefore, was part of a system in which the individual was surrounded in every respect, even intellectually and morally, by society, and in which the State was the prop of a particular form of the Christian religion. In so far as the State, under the influence of the widening of ideas and the enfranchisement of intellect, became more unconfessional and even unreligious, its union with the Church appeared to many minds prejudicial to the liberty of the latter, and to the liberty of the individual. The idea of a civilization founded on religion became gradually more vague, and in some places

disappeared entirely. A new notion made its appearance—that of the Church-association, composed of men animated by one and the same faith, independent of the State, and exerting no influence whatever on it or on persons who do not voluntarily belong to its membership. This is the system of the Independent Churches, or of ecclesiastical individualism. The great theorist of this system was Alexander Vinet, the promoter of the Free Church movement in the canton of Vaud. According to this system, persons cannot become members of a church except by voluntary adherence to a confession of faith which forms the base of the Church (Churches of professing Christians). The Churches have no longer anything in common with ethnic or historical groups; they are regarded as free creations of the spirit of God by means of individual souls who, on coming into contact with each other, form religious societies. As a matter of fact, the principle of ecclesiastical individualism has nowhere been carried out to its full extent, even in the communities in which infant-baptism is not practised. It clashes with the existence of the Christian family, which is itself a small church, and which, in reality, entails membership of the Church on the children born within it.

From the Protestant point of view religious individualism is legitimate, and inseparable from every higher form of religion, in so far as it asserts the right and the duty of the individual to enter into direct communion with God, to think freely about religious matters, to join or not to join such and such a religious society, and in so far as it asserts the decisive influence of the great religious individualities on the historic march of religions. Religious individualism, however, runs the risk of weakening religion, when it does not recognize its social past, its origin in beliefs common to all the members of a society, and the inevitable connexions between the religious society and the political society—connexions which are beneficial when they are based on respect for the real nature of the two institutions.

2. Moral individualism.—Moral individualism is seen mainly in three forms: (1) the criticism of national customs and traditions; (2) the view that moral obligation is born in the individual conscience, and that the latter is also the heuristic principle of moral duties; and (3) the view that the development of the individual is, if not the only aim, at least one of the chief aims, of the moral life.

We find the first form in antiquity. The Sophists submitted the traditional morality to a dissolving criticism, which opposed individual reflexion to national tradition. Socrates, building on the ruins, appealed to reason to re-construct a morality. This we may call individualism in its second form. Naturally, this rational morality of Socrates is strongly influenced by tradition; it is even more so with Plato, who, when not under the influence of his mystic ideas, places the city above everything; and it is equally so with Aristotle. The Epicureans and the Stoics represent in their way the third form of moral individualism. They aim above all at the happiness of the wise man considered 'alone by himself.' This individualism, however, is very relative, or, rather, negative, for it allows of hardly any variety in the conception of the moral ideal. Each school produces only one uniform type, but this type is no longer that of the citizen who lives for his country; it is now the man who seeks his way and his place in the universe and in humanity. The Catholic Church regards morality essentially as obedience to a collection of divine and human laws. In the Middle Ages, Abelard was almost the only one who (in his *Scito te ipsum*) invited man to look within himself for the foundation of morality. The Renaissance was, in theory at least, if not in practice, a very pronounced individualistic movement. Powerful individualities asserted themselves to such an extent that in many cases they freed themselves from all tradition and all law. Among the Reformers, Luther especially laid emphasis on the internal character of the moral obligation; the only actions with any moral value in his eyes were those accomplished by the individual in virtue of this inner constraint; while Calvin insisted above all on the notion of the divine law, not forgetting, however, that this law is inscribed on the conscience. The philosophy of Kant exaggerates Luther's theory: moral obligation is not only internal, but absolutely autonomous, and this obligation, which proves the liberty of man, is in a way his proper aim: all the contents of morality flow from it. Kant is the most characteristic representative of the second and third forms of moral individualism: morality comes from the individual, and it has as its aim the freedom and the dignity of the individual. Fichte's idea is similar, although less formalistic. For Hegel, on the contrary, the moral subject is only a stage towards the realization of the objective mind in the State. The last word of morality for Hegel is the sovereignty of the State, which shows its majesty by sacrificing individuals, if need be, to the maintenance of its independence and authority. Hegelian morality is the finished type of an anti-individualistic morality, although Hegel had really no intention of sacrificing the individual and disregarding his dignity. It is the spirit of Hegel that animates Ludwig Feuerbach when he attempts to make the idea of space (*Gattung*) the predominating idea of morality, and D. F. Strauss when he makes a similar attempt in his work entitled *Der alte und der neue Glaube* (Bonn, 1872). Later, however, Feuerbach passes to an individualism so extreme that it was exceeded only by Max Stirner (whose real name was J. Kaspar Schmidt), author of a book entitled *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum* (Leipzig, 1893), which recommends not only individualism but egoism, and which ends in the paradoxical idea of an association of egoists.

If the philosophy of the second half of the 18th cent. and the first half of the 19th was in general favourable to moral individualism, the literature was equally so. In Germany the *Sturm und Drang* period, an age of geniuses, was ultra-individualistic; the neo-humanism of the classics also made much of human individuality, without disregarding, however, man's social aspirations and work. Romanticism, again, exalted the individual in a way sometimes approaching the morbid, and now and then carried the cult of the individual so far as to forget all moral rules. It was as a disciple of Romanticism that Schleiermacher, encountering the abstract individualism of Kant, which he criticized with sagacity, developed a concrete individualism which takes account of the difference between individuals, and no longer cultivates the single individual, but individuality. This is the object of the *Monologues* (Berlin, 1800), which are all impregnated with the Romantic spirit. If in his later works on morality Schleiermacher attributed more importance to society, he none the less sought to safeguard in every sphere the rights of individuality, whose development alone renders possible the complete moral life. Richard Rothe, the disciple of Schleiermacher, defines morality as the penetration of nature by the personality; he was clearly dominated by the idea of the value of the human person. The individualism of these two theologians can be traced back to the Gospel; it is no less connected with the philosophic and literary

movement of their time. Another theologian and writer, Sören Kierkegaard, the Dane, opposed the Hegelian tendencies in his country, and became the defender of a very extreme individualism which he identifies with true Christianity. This individualism is both intellectual and practical: subjective experience alone grasps the truth; the suffering which is born of the opposition of the individual to his surroundings is inseparable from moral life. Kierkegaard was driven by the logic of his position into conflict with the Established Church.

In England an individualism which is the parent of German Romanticism, and has yet a distinct character as in a way the privilege of the powerful, appears in Byron. Alongside of this great poet we must mention Carlyle, who, in his praise of a sort of hero-worship, sets forth great individualities as the flower and the perfection of humanity.

In France, moral individualism in the spirit of Kant was the distinctive characteristic of the morality of the spiritualist and neo-criticist school. The Positivism of Auguste Comte, on the other hand, was anti-individualistic; it made society the aim of the individual, and ended by preaching a kind of social religion. The neo-Positivism of which Emile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl are the principal representatives goes still further in this direction. It identifies morality with custom, and submits the individual unreservedly to the laws of society; for man owes everything to society—his development from the animal state, the creation of language, religion, and law.

In opposition to this extreme anti-individualism there is at present a new form of individualism, viz. Nietzschianism. Nietzsche exempts the strong man from all rule, despises moral laws as an invention of the weak in order to triumph over the strong, and sees in the Superman the terminus of human evolution. In the fragments of his last work, *The Will to Power* (in *Nachgelassene Werke*, Leipzig, 1901), however, there is a tendency to make the superman the creator of a new social rule.

3. Political, social, and juridical individualism.—Primitive races present the spectacle of the absorption of the individual in the clan or the tribe. Later, when the family, in the modern sense of the word, was constituted, it generally exercised, in the person of its chief, considerable rights over its members. The State gradually weakened this family authority in order to put itself more or less in the place of the family, although at the same time recognizing important rights in the individual. Græco-Roman antiquity, to the very end, imposed an official cult on every individual. The Roman Catholic Church afterwards tried to impose a similar conception of society upon the State, and Protestant Churches did not at first proclaim the principle of individual religious liberty. The idea of tolerance and of non-interference of the State in religious matters did not begin to obtain a footing in Europe, and especially in America, until the Revolution in England. Apart from religion, the ancient State and the feudal State of the Middle Ages, for different reasons, were less concerned about the happiness of individuals than the modern absolutist State, at least at the beginning of the 18th century. It had no hesitation in unscrupulously sacrificing the individual, when necessary, for the benefit of the State. At the beginning of the epoch of Cesare de Beccaria (1735–94), author of *Dei Delitti e delle pene*, Milan, 1764, there are signs of benevolence even with regard to criminals. From the end of the 18th cent. the system of economic guardianship and direction of commerce and industry by the State was gradually attenuated, or even abandoned, in favour of a system of liberty and of free competition, which is often called economic individualism. Adam Smith, Cobden, and Bright in Britain, and Bastiat in France, were the chief exponents of this movement.

As regards the general welfare of individuals, Great Britain was for a long time the only country where serious precautions were taken to ensure imprescriptible liberties for the individual. British traditions, the Anglo-Saxon temperament, and the Calvinist education all tended to the enfranchisement of the individual. The idea of inviolable individual liberties was afterwards recognized in several constitutions of the States of North America, whence it passed into the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme* in 1789. The French Revolution was at first bent on establishing the liberty of the individual, though it was forced in the end to sacrifice it. The Liberal school took up this aim, and reduced the State to the position of guardian of the rights of the individual. This theory, however, could not meet the reality, and to the abstract individualism of the Liberals socialism opposed a more practical care for the material welfare of all—at the risk, it is true, of compromising their liberty, and of making them purchase a moderate happiness at the expense of their independence; though idealist socialists claim that this will not follow. Anarchism is the extreme form of political and social individualism. It seeks to put free and contractual association in place of the State, and repudiates all constraint of society with regard to individuals. Down to the present it has not been able either clearly to define its ideal or to put it actively into practice.

We must now consider, independently of these theoretical and practical efforts to make the individual the chief or, at least, one of the chief concerns of the State and social life, the theories according to which governments and societies are the product of the conscious will of individuals. The idea that governments owe their origin to contracts entered into by individuals was known even to antiquity. It is found in the Middle Ages, and later among the Jesuits, with the distinct tendency to break down civil governments, originating as they do from contracts which are always revocable, in favour of the Church, an institution which goes back to God Himself. In the hands of the theorists of modern natural law, i.e. non-religious, the idea of contract becomes, on the contrary, a means of freeing the State from the Church. Hobbes was the first to trace back not only government, but society itself, to a social contract. Rousseau was his disciple in this matter, but with neither of these two thinkers did this theory profit individualism. Both of them, on the contrary, make the individual abdicate in favour of the society which he has helped to create—with this difference, that Hobbes makes society itself abdicate in favour of an absolute monarch, while Rousseau makes society supreme. Rousseau's theory of social contract, treated in the book which bears the same name (1762), shows the wildness of his dreams about the happiness of the savage, free from all fetters because he lives outside of society, and makes for the support of a civic ideal which is not even compatible with full religious liberty. The French Revolution was inspired by him when it instituted an obligatory civil religion, without any regard to the rights of conscience.

There is a kind of individualism also which has attacked the family and the institution of marriage. At the beginning of the second half of the 19th cent. marriage began to be looked at far more from the individual point of view than from the

social. Under the influence of Romantic ideas, even a theologian like Schleiermacher held for some time that marriage could be dissolved if the two individuals united by it no longer suited each other. Free love, or a conception of marriage which is very near to it, has been extolled by a series of writers (*e.g.* the brothers Margueritte, Ellen Key), in the interests of individual liberty. It is far from being the case, however, that all the attacks against marriage and the family have been inspired by individualistic tendencies; sometimes they are the result of an anti-individualistic tendency which regards the strongly constituted family as an obstacle to the omnipotence of a society which aims at equality.

With regard more particularly to the idea of law, individualist theories and social or socialistic theories stand in opposition. The former maintain that the essential origin and aim of the law is the establishing of the liberty and dignity of individuals whose spheres of action and of influence are so prescribed as not to encroach on one another. This is especially the theory of Kantianism and French spiritualism. The German historical school, on the other hand, finds in law a manifestation of the national spirit holding sway over the individual. Auguste Comte, with his Positivism, opposes the idea of individual rights, and insists on the rights of society and the duties of the individual towards it. The same theory is held by contemporary neo-Positivism. Every school that finds in law only the expression of the social relations demanded by the nature of men and things or by social utility either limits or entirely suppresses the individualist character of the law.

Moral and social individualism is an enormous improvement on the instinctive and brutal solidarity of ancient times. It ennobles man, but at the same time it runs the risk of isolating him, on the one hand, and, on the other, rendering him proud and making him forget what he owes to the community and to tradition. Individualism is fruitful only when it leads man to accept solidarity with his fellows without reserve, and to make it an instrument of justice and liberty for all.

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INDIVIDUALITY.—1. The term.—The word *individuum* is simply the Lat. translation of the Gr. *ἄτομον*, and thus originally signified 'that which cannot be cut,' or 'divided.' In this sense the word is found in Cicero, and Seneca uses it in the same way.[1] Even by the later period of antiquity, however, the word had come to denote a single thing as 'unique,' 'distinct from others,' 'alone of its kind.'[2] The mediæval writers adhered to this sense of the word, and, by the 12th cent. at latest, they had also coined the terms *individualis* and *individualitas*. The modern usage of the words in the sense specified is mainly due to Leibniz.

2. Historical survey.—Just as the word *individuum* has two meanings, viz. that of a 'single' thing, and that of a 'unique' or 'peculiar' thing, the corresponding idea is associated with two main problems, which, it is true, are closely connected. These problems are: (1) whether human society is to be traced chiefly to the action of single individuals or to a general order which is superior to them; and (2) whether the development of the qualities shared by all or the development of those peculiar to the individual is to be regarded as of more importance in the sphere of education and culture. These two questions are closely related also in the process of historical development.

The historical process of human society exhibits a rhythmical tendency; we perceive in it a movement from a general order to the individual, as also a movement from the individual to a general order, and the culmination of either seems to lead inevitably to the other. In the earliest stages of culture the human individual is but part of a social economy which hedges him in with its laws and customs, and rigorously controls his conduct. The progress of civilization brings with it a more extensive division of labour, and at the same time carries the individual to a position of greater independence; the human units do not now simply hearken and obey, but begin to question the authority of the existing order, and at length, feeling themselves superior to it, they repudiate all outward control, and refuse to recognize anything that does not clearly and definitely approve itself to their minds. Such emancipation, however, tends naturally to bring about a state of things in which the stability of life is dissolved, and all communal existence abolished, with the result that a counter-movement sets in, and attempts are made, by spiritual means, to restore that relationship of human beings which in its natural form had been irretrievably lost. At this stage the distinctive quality of the individual may be duly recognized so far as it fits in with the wider order. But, even when such an order has been attained, it by no means implies finality. In the further progress of humanity it may be found to be too narrow, too inflexible, and may at length become intolerable. There will then set in once more a movement in favour of the individual, and a concomitant transformation of the entire situation.

In this conflict between the general order and the individual the former is usually defended by an appeal to the necessity of a fixed and stable organization, transcending the aims and powers of the individual units, while, on the other hand, the individuals maintain that the true human life wells up in the individual soul alone, that that life re-

[1] Seneca, *de Provid.* 5: 'quaedam separari a quibusdam non possunt, cohaerent, individua sunt.'

[2] The various senses borne by the term *individuum* towards the end of the ancient period are set forth by Boethius in his commentary on Porphyry (Basel, 1570, p. 65): 'Individuum pluribus dicitur modis. Dicitur individuum quod omnino secari non potest, ut unitas vel mens; dicitur individuum quod ob soliditatem dividi nequit, ut adamas; dicitur individuum cujus praedicatio in reliqua similia non convenit, ut Socrates, nam cum illi sint caeteri homines similes, non convenit proprietas et praedicatio Socratis in caeteris, ergo ab iis quae de uno tantum praedicantur genus differt eo quod de pluribus praedicatur.' The leading passage in Porphyry runs as follows: *ἄτομα λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἕκαστον, ὧν τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἄλλου τινός ποτε τὸ αὐτὸ γένοιτο τῶν κατὰ μέρος.* This definition held its ground throughout the Middle Ages till modern times.

quires perfect freedom for its development, and that a far greater inwardness and fullness of life is to be looked for from such unhampered development than any general order could ever produce.

This oscillation between the two sides can be distinctly traced in the history of European civilization. The complete emancipation of the individual, as manifested in the philosophical sphere by the Sophists, was presently recognized as a grave danger, and the political constitutions drawn up by Plato and Aristotle are largely dominated by the idea of once more giving a commanding position to the conception of a general order. By availing themselves in particular of the idea of a living organism, these thinkers illustrated, on the one hand, the absolute subordination of the individual to the community, and, on the other, the distinctive function of each individual within the community. While Aristotle certainly concedes to the individual a position of greater importance than does Plato, that position must nevertheless lie within the whole; he never admits that the individual has any rights as against the community, and sets no limit to the community's claims upon its single members. Aristotle's view finds its most significant expression in his assertion that the State (the organized community) is prior to the individual.[1]

The idea of the organism was extended by the Stoics to the universe as a whole. At the same time, however, the Stoics insisted strongly upon the unique character of every particular element in the whole, asserting that no two hairs or grains of corn were perfectly alike.[2] Thereafter the metaphor was adopted by Christianity, and was applied to the Kingdom of God, as, *e.g.*, in the figure of the vine and the branches, although this conception is found only in the Fourth Gospel, which was strongly influenced by Greek modes of thought. The endeavour made in the later period of antiquity to fortify the individual by the formation of permanent associations appears also in the rise of various schools—as, *e.g.*, those of the Stoics and the Epicureans—the object of which was not merely unity of opinion, but also a certain community of life.

The movement towards a stable organization of human society, however, attained success not through the instrumentality of philosophy, but by linking itself to religion. It was, in fact, the Christian Church that first proved capable of creating an organization which united its members in a firm bond, and imparted truth and salvation to them individually. The commanding position won by that organization was largely due to the rise of new nationalities, which required to be trained to independent spiritual effort. But philosophy likewise had a share in bringing about the alliance with religion—in so far, namely, as it gave the individual a link of relationship with the cosmic whole. The outstanding name here is Plotinus, who includes all things in their multiplicity and variety in a universal life, and regards all individual existence as being permeated thereby. Thus, as the universal life is immediately present in the individual, and may indeed become his own essential nature, he is undoubtedly raised to a much higher position; nevertheless he is still dependent upon the universal, and the development of his peculiar qualities is left out of account. This mode of thought was fostered by mysticism. But, while mysticism advances to the desired unity with the All by means of individual effort, and aspires to realize that unity directly, and while it therefore admits of a greater freedom than does the ecclesiastical system, yet here too all life is derived from the universal, and devotion thereto prevails over the development of individual qualities.

Of the modern period, again, nothing is more characteristic than the fact that it came to find the mediæval form of human life too narrow and restrictive, and brought the independence and opulence of the individual life to their full development. The various civilized peoples have furthered that development in various spheres: the Italians in art, as is shown by the Renaissance; the Germans, as the people of the Reformation; the British, in the political and economic sphere; the French, in the structure of social life. These movements have generated enormous activities, unchained vast forces, and radically altered the entire conditions of life—facts so palpable as to require no fuller treatment here. In the modern period, moreover, the full development of individual characteristics came to be recognized as an end of the first magnitude. Here, on the theoretic side at least, it was especially the Germans who led the way; thus Leibniz enunciated with telling effect the unconformable character of the individual 'monads'; Schleiermacher and the older Romanticism asserted that the great end of life was to be an individual, a personality, and to invest every action with one's own individuality; while German pedagogy made it its aim to give the most careful attention to the peculiar qualities of individual children, and bring those qualities to their full development. J. H. Pestalozzi emphasizes the opposition between individual and 'collective'; he scoffs at 'collective actions,' at the idea of a 'collective conscience,' at 'official creeds,' and asserts that the collective life of the race can at best civilize it, but cannot give it a true culture ('kultivieren'; see *Werke*, ed. L. W. Seyffarth, Berlin, 1881, xii. 154). In all this we can trace the powerful influence of Rousseau, who, as regards the whole range of human life, was the first to bring out with perfect clearness the antithesis between the individual and society.

Valuable as were the results of this individualistic tendency, and powerfully as it still operates, we nevertheless cannot fail to see that its limitations and its dangers are being more and more recognized, and that a counter-movement is setting in and increasingly asserting its power. This counter-movement is due to various causes. Among these we should note first of all the theory which from various sides directed attention to the significance of societary groups, and to the individual's dependence upon them—facts emphasized by history and the historical mode of thought, to which, in particular, Romanticism gave an artistic form of expression; by philosophical speculation, which, in the hands of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, interpreted the manifold of experience as the evolution of a single principle; and by modern sociology, which showed that the individual cannot exist at all except in connexion with others, and also made manifest the close dependence of the individual's personal characteristics upon the social environment—the *milieu*.[1]

Theoretic considerations, however, were much less effective than practical experience in counteracting the preponderance of the individual. The perils of the unlimited freedom of the individual manifested themselves, above all, in the economic sphere. As labour became more and more technical in character, and was more and more concentrated in huge factories, and as, in consequence,

[1] *Polit.* 1253a. 19 (Bekker): *πρότερον τῇ φύσει πόλις ἢ οἰκία καὶ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν.*

[2] Cf. Cic. *Acad., Quæst.* iv.: 'Stoicum est . . . nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum,' etc.

[1] The term 'milieu,' as comprehending all the surrounding conditions of life, was probably first used by Lamarck in his *Philosophie zoologique*, Paris, 1809. It was transferred from the sphere of zoology to that of sociology by Comte, but it was Taine's predilection for the term that gave it general currency.

the antagonisms between varying interests became increasingly fierce, the evils of unrestricted competition became ever the more marked, and the social process seemed to be less and less capable of self-regulation. In such conditions some interference of the State was imperative, and this policy has been more and more adopted even among those peoples who by their character and their history are in a pre-eminent degree the champions of individual freedom.

If a tendency to narrow the sphere of State action was characteristic of the 18th cent., a reversion to the opposite procedure asserted itself strongly in the course of the 19th. If reason and morality were to rule the societary life of man, it appeared to be urgently necessary alike to strengthen the power of the State and to circumscribe that of the individual. No exaggeration of this idea—such as we find very specially in the proposals of Social Democracy—can detract from its rightful claims.

This reaction against a sheer individualism takes its ground, in the first instance, upon the conditions necessary to the mere maintenance of life, and treats the inward interests of man as matters of secondary importance. Yet it cannot be denied that a movement towards a closer association of mankind is increasingly at work in the inward sphere as well—that there is a growing desire for spiritual fellowship. The inner experience furnished by religion has for many people at the present day become all but evanescent, and the spiritual association based on such experience is likewise largely dissolved. The individual realizes that he is thrown upon his own resources, and begins to feel himself isolated; even in what he regards as exalted and sacred he encounters endless inconsistency. In such a state of things his convictions cannot attain stability or win power over his conduct. The more earnest a man is in the spiritual life, the more intensely does he feel his isolated position to be unsatisfactory, and, indeed, intolerable, and the more eagerly does he crave for some fresh spiritual bond of union with his fellowmen, and for the support that such a connexion would afford. It may be said, in fact, that the unmistakable movement towards religion at the present time proceeds in a special degree from such desires—from a positive reaction against the threatened isolation and the growing apathy of the individual. Here emerge great problems for the future; the present generation is engaged in the search for a new mode of life and a new framework of human society.

3. The problem of individuality.—On the problem of individuality itself we would add but a few reflexions suggested by our historical survey. Mankind is acted upon by two opposite tendencies, each of which has its own strong points as well as its own weaknesses. It is indisputably the case that the immediate sources of spiritual life lie in the individual alone, and thus a system of things which places the individual above all else must undoubtedly prove superior to any other system in originality, mobility, and variety. But, on the other hand, the individual would appear to be incapable by himself of fully developing and consolidating such spiritual capacities as he possesses, while, again, the separate individuals tend to come into such opposition and conflict with one another as threaten the existence of all fellowship whatever. Society then develops a form of organization, but this in turn is exposed to the danger not only of permanently fettering human life to the organized structure of a particular age, but also of seriously hemming in the individual and depriving him of all freedom in life and thought. It is thus quite intelligible that in the process of history now the one tendency, and now the other, should gain the upper hand.

It is scarcely to be expected that we shall arrive at a solution of the problem that would avail for all ages, but we may at least discover certain points of view which help towards a decisive conclusion. Such a conclusion will depend, first of all, upon the value attached to the spiritual and moral capacity of the individual *per se*. Those who take an optimistic view of that capacity will base society as far as possible upon the will and ability of individuals, while a pessimistic estimate prompts the demand for a social order higher than, and as far as possible independent of, its individuals. Thus modern liberalism is pervaded by a vigorous optimism, while pessimists like Hobbes and Schopenhauer were in favour of absolute forms of government. In another aspect of the subject it is important to note the value that is attached to the element of change in human history. Changes are brought about primarily by individuals, and, accordingly, the more human affairs are regarded as being in a state of flux, the greater is the rôle assigned to the individual, while, in societies where human life is felt to be sustained by eternal truths, a social order, as preserving and bearing witness to these truths, ranks as the higher factor. In any case the actual decision between the two tendencies depends, not upon abstract considerations, but upon the existing conditions of human life.

A question of a different character is how far a particular age does justice to the peculiar nature of the individual. Manifestly the various periods differ very greatly in this respect, some developing more fully the characteristics common to all, while others rather foster the qualities which differentiate individuals from one another. The present age finds itself in great perplexity in this matter, its conscious purposes being at variance with the actual social structure. Modern culture favours a high estimate of individual qualities, and seeks to develop them fully, while the contemporary forms of social, political, and economic life tend strongly to work against them. Modern life, with its technical arrangements of labour, its huge aggregations of human beings, its increased power of locomotion and its annihilation of distance, its complicated inter-relations of individuals, its railways and its newspapers, tends strongly to wear down the distinctive traits of individuals and to produce a uniform and average type. The social environment is asserting its power ever the more forcibly, and man appears to become a mere product of that environment. The dangers involved in this process were clearly recognized by John Stuart Mill, who did his best to counteract them. The immense influence of Nietzsche in our own day is due, above all, to his vigorous crusade against the levelling tendencies of our modern social system. It is true that the positive elements of his polemic, and especially his doctrine of the Superman, are hardly adequate to the task of circumventing the evils against which he fought. In a world of necessary law there can be no freedom or independence for the individual.

4. The educational problem involved.—From ancient times the demand has been put forward that education should recognize and foster the individuality of the pupil, but men have often failed to realize the perplexities inherent in this demand. To begin with, education must maintain against an extravagant optimism its right to put all individual qualities to the proof; its task here is not simply to recognize, but, if need be, to reject; and hence it must first ascertain which elements of the individual character are of value and worth cultivating. Even so, however, it is not implied that the valuable elements spontaneously combine

to form a rounded individuality; on the contrary, the several characteristics of the individual often hang loosely together and even conflict with one another, so that it is only with great pains that a leading and controlling tendency can be won from the materials. A complete individuality is not the starting-point, but the goal; it is no mere gift of nature, but a high ideal that in most cases calls for strenuous effort. Think of the travail undergone by great minds, as, *e.g.*, a man like Goethe, before they came to a clear understanding of their peculiar gift. Here too, then, we light upon an arduous task in what is often regarded as simple and self-evident.

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R. EUCKEN.

INDO-CHINA (Savage Races).—The name 'savages' is applied in French Indo-China to a group of half-civilized races inhabiting Tongking, Annam, Cochin-China, Cambodia, and Laos, and called Muongs, Mois, Penongs, or Khas, according to their locality. All these words mean 'barbarians' or 'savages.' These races are scattered over a vast district of 130,000 sq. miles, extending from 22° to 12° N. lat., from the frontiers of China to the confines of Cambodia, Cochin-China, and Annam. The length of territory occupied by them is 30 miles between 21° and 22°, 300 between 20° and 21°, and 90 to 180 between 12° and 18°.

1. **Habitat.**—The country inhabited by the savages is an immense forest stretching from the plain (where they seldom stay) to the higher slopes and mountains. This forest, which is more or less dense, has little variety of growth in the plain, but great variety on the slopes. Along the river-banks impenetrable undergrowth affords shelter for all the beasts of the forest, birds, and innumerable insects. The temperature varies, according to the season, from 30° to 40° C. during the day, and from 10° (sometimes 5°) to 25° during the night.

Visited on different occasions by missionaries, officers, military doctors, explorers, and colonists, these tribes have been the object of several monographs, which are usually sincere and interesting, but always wanting in precision and method. Since 1900 the 'École française d'Extrême-Orient' has been conducting a very full inquiry into this subject—an inquiry which will no doubt occupy many years.

2. **Origin.**—At the present day it seems possible to make the assertion that the savages of French Indo-China form one race, practically the same in all the districts in which they are found, except for modifications due to admixture with the more civilized Khmer, Tai, Annamese, and Tibeto-Burman races round about them. It is even possible to see in some of them the relics of a Malay or Indonesian race, to which the Chams of Cambodia also belong.

3. **Physical characteristics and mode of life.**—Generally speaking, the different sections of the people present certain physical, psychological, and social affinities, so that the account given of one of them may be applied to all, except in minor details. They nearly all belong to the physical type (with very slight differences) whose characteristics have been summarized as follows by Noël Bernard, medical officer to the colonies, in a study of the Khas of French Laos: 'Straight black hair, yellow skin with a tinge of red, smooth body, short stature varying in the different tribes from 1 m. 52 to 1 m. 59, long narrow head (dolichocephalic), average cephalic index 76, flat nose, generally bruised, breadth of nose average, transversal nasal index varying between 85 and 94, prominent cheek-bones, short broad face (chamæprosopic), general shape of head viewed from front pentagonal or lozenge-shaped—these are the characteristic features of the Indonesian race' (Bernard, *Les Khâs*, p. 36).

They are robust, active, and hardened against fatigue, and they sleep little. Their senses of hearing, smell, and sight are acutely developed, and seem to be much superior to their sense of taste. Very abstemious as a rule, they can live on a handful of rice or on roots torn up in the forest; but under easy circumstances they eat as much as they can, and then drink more beer or rice-wine than is wise. They are very improvident, and famine fails to make them more economical when a piece of good fortune comes, or more careful to prevent the return of want by cultivating a larger area or sowing a greater variety of crops. The only thing that rouses them from their idleness is actual need: when the savage sees his rice-granary empty, and hears his wife and children complain of hunger, he puts aside his apathy, lays down his eternal pipe, and, with a basket on his back and a pruning-hook in his hand, sets out for the forest to hunt or gather fruit; then no difficulty baffles him, and for whole days he will scour the woods in search of food for his family.

The savages have no ambition, and are naturally generous. They are, nevertheless, as greedy as children, and sometimes mercilessly impose upon ill-protected strangers who come asking guides, carriers, or simply shelter. Because they themselves are ruthlessly robbed by all the Annamese, Siamese, Chinese, and Laos who deal with them, they naïvely believe that they in their turn are justified in imposing upon any strangers whose merchandise attracts them. But they are not such thieves among themselves as might be imagined from their covetousness, and people of the same village preserve the most absolute respect for each other's property.

They are very suspicious of a stranger, because they firmly believe that he comes with evil intent on their lives or goods. Yet they very rarely break their promise to him. They are not cruel, but timid rather, in spite of their innate bravery. They never kill any one unless they believe their own life to be in danger, or when moved by a superstitious terror which urges them to avenge on an intruder a ritual offence, committed, it may be, in ignorance, which would bring misfortune on the whole village. The perpetual state of tribal war in which they live, always in danger of being taken unawares and sold as slaves, makes them reserved. Generally speaking, they are hospitable, proud, and extremely polite without becoming obsequious. Conspicuous among their qualities is their love of liberty. They submit to no authority or legal constraint. To agree to any kind of taxation is regarded as a mark of slavery. They would rather live in poverty and wretchedness, always on the alert, than obey any authority—even among themselves. Quite unconsciously they realize the spirit of perfect anarchy.

Their communism is equally striking, for a truly brotherly solidarity reigns among them. Great works are always undertaken in common, and, if a man's property keeps him, he always shares with his neighbours. In time of famine those who have rice divide their resources equally with those who have none. When one of their number kills a pig, a buffalo, or a goat, he divides it into as many parts as there are inhabitants in the village; his own share is no larger than his neighbour's, except in the case of an animal slain in the chase, when a little extra allowance is made to the hunters as compensation for their exertions. Even a hen is doled out among 50 persons to satisfy this instinct of brotherhood. So strong is this feeling, even among the children, that, when one catches an earth-crab, a lizard, or a mouse, he will not eat it until he has given all his comrades a share. By the same instinct of solidarity the whole village takes the part of any one of the inhabitants who complains of injury or loss at the hands of some member of a neighbouring village. They will even take vengeance for an insult dealt to a stranger who has once made friends with them.

All the missionaries and explorers who have stayed any time among them are at one in praising the general purity of their morals, exception, of course, being made in the case of a few tribes (Jarais, Bolovens, etc.). Although their rules of morality are not the same as ours in every detail, it is noticeable that they are modest and have a keen sense of decency. These remarks apply specially to those savages who have not come into contact with the more civilized populations. The result of such contact is that they lose the best of their traditional virtues, and adopt the vices of their Khmer, Annamese, or Laotian neighbours.

4. **War.**—Although they live with arms continually at hand and in a constant struggle with the animals of the forest, the savages (with the exception of a few bellicose tribes of pillagers like the Jarais and the Sedangs) do not like war. They hardly ever make war except to avenge some injustice suffered by one of their number, and only after repeated conferences with the enemy with a view to compromise. Nevertheless, they sometimes launch into war from sheer covetousness, or even from poverty, in order to steal cattle or elephants, or to get possession of prisoners, whom they then release for a ransom, employ, or sell as slaves, and thus enrich the village. Slavery, in fact, is a perpetual menace to their lives, and war is their best means of obtaining those feasts for which they long so much after the periodic famines.

The savage employs a very clever ruse to start an offensive war: he glides noiselessly across the almost impenetrable undergrowth of the forest either to surprise the hostile village—this is a common occurrence—or to carry off women, children, or solitary men who have left their shelter to work in the fields. In either case, old men are mercilessly massacred, being worthless as slaves, and liable to raise the alarm if spared. Except in cases of offensive war, the fighting of the savages is not very serious; it is merely a few simple and dexterous razzias. In defensive war, however, the savage sometimes proves resolute even to heroism; he would never dream of leaving wife and children and fleeing. When the village is surrounded, the warriors place the old men, women, and children in the middle and defend them to the death. Under such circumstances there is nothing that will make them draw back—neither fire-arms nor the prospect of a cruel death,—and the enemy, excited by the fight, usually finish it with a general massacre of the weak. The Sedangs have a custom of eating the livers of their slain enemies.

Before declaring war, the village always convenes an assembly of the men, at which the youths' enthusiasm for war is some-

times in conflict with the prudence of the older men. This council is always accompanied by invocations to the spirits, sacrifices, and a feast. If war is decided on, one of the councillors announces it to the enemy, giving an enumeration of the wrongs which his tribesmen have suffered without reparation. Of course, the exact time of the war is not specified, and from this event onwards the two villages live in a state of constant alarm, while their neighbours maintain an anxious neutrality, lest they too become involved in the conflict.

When the war has been bloody and directed against the whole village, the rejoicings on the return of the victors are in proportion to the risks that they have run. Among the Bahnars, especially, the very solemn feast called the 'Festival of Victory' is announced every night for a fortnight beforehand by the beating of gongs and warlike marches in the common house. The number of buffaloes to be slain is equal to the number of prisoners taken.

If weariness of the war on both sides does not lead to reconciliation by means of a mediator, every expedition is inevitably followed by a series of others, for vengeance is a sacred duty among the savages. The tribes which are too weak themselves will suffer injustice under force, but will never become resigned to it; they cherish the secret hope of some day being avenged by means of alliance with a more powerful tribe. The savage spirit of independence of each village, however, makes these alliances very rare. The confederation attempted in 1884 between the Bahnars, Röngaos, and Sedangs by J. B. Guerlach, director of the Roman Catholic Mission, who assembled almost 1200 warriors of different villages under his command, in order to put an end to the continual and unjust incursions of the Jarais, was such an extraordinary phenomenon that it succeeded in defeating the Jarais by its moral effect. When establishing Christianity among the more peaceable tribes, which are always the first to receive them, the missionaries try to unite them in order to guarantee them material as well as moral security.

5. Social organization.—The family, constituted among the savages by marriage, as a rule includes the immediate predecessors and descendants as far as first cousins; but first cousins on the male side are often excluded, as marriages are allowed to that degree in almost all the tribes though forbidden on the female side. This reservation arises from the belief that in heredity the maternal strain is much stronger than the paternal. Among the Radès it is the woman who occupies the first place in the home. Consanguinity among the savages forms a sacred bond which entails the avenging of each other's injuries, and never permits war with each other.

Marriage is endogamous, although some small tribes, such as the Alak, allow their daughters to marry men of neighbouring villages. It generally takes place at puberty, *i.e.* at the age of fourteen or fifteen years; and in almost all the tribes the older the girls are, and, therefore, the more skilled in household work, the better marriages they make. Among the Kha-Pi, however, marriages are mentioned where the wife is only eight years of age. Rich Halang chiefs often marry girls at this age, who continue to live with their parents at the husband's expense until puberty, when the marriage is consummated. As a general rule woman is greatly respected among the savages, and everywhere rape and seduction are punished by a heavy fine. It is even forbidden to abuse women prisoners of war. Among the Western savages, sexual relations before marriage are not considered improper, and a woman is often married at an advanced stage of pregnancy. The custom of sending the young boys to sleep in the common house fosters a strict morality. The Niahöns and the Bolovens impose a fine of three buffaloes for a case of seduction; but, if there is an acknowledged betrothal, the betrothed pair have full liberty of intercourse.

The woman nearly always chooses her husband, and the latter very often pays an indemnity to the woman's family; or he lives for a certain time—for some months to several years—in a kind of slavery in the family of his parents-in-law, in order to compensate them for the loss of their daughter. When he does not want to do this, he nearly always offers them a strong healthy slave instead. Under these conditions we can understand how many of the tribes welcome the birth of a daughter with more enthusiasm than that of a son: if the one will afterwards defend the tribe, the other will enrich it. Among the Alak the husband is compelled to provide a dowry, which usually includes four buffaloes and two Cambodian jars. Among the Kha-Pi, custom prescribes that the rich must marry among themselves, and the poor likewise members of their own class.

Among a great number of tribes, the intended husband gives only a few unimportant presents, and works for a year with his future father-in-law. The eldest daughter, however, even after marriage, never leaves the paternal roof. The asking in marriage is almost always done by the youth himself, through his parents or a mutual friend. The length of the betrothal depends on individual circumstances, especially on the time necessary for the making of all the rice-wine for the marriage-festival. The date of the marriage is usually fixed by the chief of the village, who for this purpose examines the entrails of a chicken. After the omens relating to the marriage have been received, and invocations and sacrifices made to the spirits, the marriage is celebrated, followed by a feast more or less magnificent according to the resources of the couple, in which the whole village takes part until a state of satiety and complete intoxication is reached. Rich and poor alike find means to pay the expenses. Among the Kha-Pi, where marriages take place earlier, it is noteworthy that they are arranged by the parents; among the Radès, on the contrary, it is the girl herself who chooses her husband and asks him in marriage.

Although chiefs and rich men marry as many wives as they can support, monogamy is the rule. The savage has generally only one wife, to whom he is very much attached and faithful; but the wife is never in any way opposed to new alliances, which would bring her valuable assistants in her household work.

Divorce is rare, and takes place on either side. The man sometimes seeks divorce on account of incurable illness or barrenness in his wife; the wife, when she sees an opportunity of getting a better home, or when her husband requires her to do too much work. The assembly of the old men, or the chiefs of the village, hears complaints and pronounces judgment. The husband as far as possible avoids seeking a divorce, for his wife represents for him an actual value—the dowry he has paid to get her and the compensation he will have to pay for casting her off. Among the Niahöns this fine is three buffaloes; among the Halangs seven slaves. In a case of divorce the children are divided between the two parents, the mother usually taking the younger ones. As a rule this course of action is seldom resorted to, for the family ties of the savages are nearly always very strong.

Adultery is even rarer than divorce; some missionaries state that during twenty years among the Bahnars, Sedangs, and Stiengs they have not recorded a single case of it. Among all the tribes it is punishable by heavy fines, varying according to the rank of the injured husband, who always has the right to kill culprits taken *flagrante delicto*, and in some cases the right to sell the lover as a slave. Among the Stiengs, only the man is punished by being sold into slavery, the woman being considered irresponsible. As a rule, in practical life, punishment is limited to a fine paid by the lover; then the husband takes back his wife.

Among the Kha-Pi there is a sort of expiatory ceremony before this peaceful settlement: a pig is killed at the expense of the culprit, and the right foot of the injured husband is sprinkled with its blood; then he takes back his wife.

Though the moral and legal condition of the

women is based on the principle of complete equality of rights with the men, their material condition is miserable. On them devolves all the labour of the household, the fields, etc. They work from dawn like beasts of burden, carrying water and wood, grinding rice, cooking, weeding, planting, weaving, plaiting, and dyeing, under the calm eye of their husbands, who pass most of their time drinking or smoking on the doorstep of the common house. In spite of real affection for his wife, the savage would feel degraded if he did anything but fish, hunt, or fight. His duty is to protect the home, and to provide sustenance in time of famine, when he can show extreme bravery and devotion.

As a result of the spirit of anarchical independence of these tribes, the authority of parents over their *children* is very feeble. Correction is rare, and, besides, useless. Owing to the sweetness of the domestic harmony, parents are honoured by their children, and love them tenderly. In cases of serious offence on the part of children, the Kha-Pi perform the expiatory ceremony mentioned above in connexion with adultery.

The *old men* are very much respected, but in spite of this their importance in the life of the village is diminished by their physical uselessness. Their number is very small, however, on account of the hardness of the savage life.

6. **Death and disposal of the dead.**—When a savage dies, his family proclaim their grief by cries and tears, and among certain southern tribes, particularly the Bahnars, by laceration of their bodies and faces with their nails or even with weapons. Young men have been known to wound themselves even mortally in such circumstances. In the north, under the influence of the Laotians, death soon loses its mournful character; and relatives and friends flock to the house of the deceased in order to prevent the near relatives from giving themselves over to too keen sorrow, as well as to mourn. Hence the Bolovens, Niahöns, etc., hold great feasts, with generous supplies of alcohol, at which the survivors get intoxicated in honour of the dead. In the south, as well as in the north, burial, not cremation, is the rule; the ceremony is more or less complicated according to the wealth and position of the dead man.

In the case of the death of a poor man, as soon as he has breathed his last, his relatives or his children wash him, put on his best clothes, and, leaving his eyes wide open, wrap him in a mat, along with several small axes, pots, necklaces, and baskets for his use. They close the mat with a strong piece of rattan, and then bury him in a grave with the remainder of his personal goods, within 24 hours, taking care to put beside him two baskets of rice and two jars of alcohol, one of each at his head and one at his feet. The grave is filled up and covered with tree-trunks to prevent wild animals from disinterring the body. For a chief or a rich man a coffin is always made, hollowed out of a tree-trunk. The use of coffins is becoming more prevalent throughout the south, and the shape of the coffin is improving the nearer the savages come to civilized races. The making of the coffin of a chief requires from 48 to 72 hours, that of a poor man 24 hours: this is what settles the time of burial.

Before laying the dead man in his coffin, the Bahnars bind up his lower jaw with a cotton thread fastened on the top of his head, his arms are stretched by his sides, and his great toes are tied together with a cotton thread. The Radès bind the dead man's hands and feet with a cotton thread. Among these two tribes the coffin is filled to the brim with the dead man's most precious belongings, closed up with a resinous substance, or, more simply, with a paste of glutinous rice, and carried out of the house to the sound of gongs. At the burial-place, while one party of mourners digs the grave, the other kills the buffalo, ox, pig, or chicken (according to the station of the survivors) which is to be given to the dead man. A bamboo, pierced from one end to the other, is fitted into a little opening made in the coffin at the place where the head is. When the grave is sufficiently deep, the coffin is lowered into it with the customary two baskets of rice and two jars of alcohol; then, besides these, part of the buffalo, ox, pig, or chicken, raw; and, finally, various utensils for the dead man's use. The generosity with which the relatives deprive themselves for his sake shows the depth of their sorrow at his death. The grave is filled up, everything being covered except the bamboo tube. But the soul of the dead man is not yet supposed to have left his original dwelling; the body alone is in the ground with its vital needs. This is the reason why the widow or the children of the deceased come every morning for a variable period of time, usually two or three months, and pour a little soup, rice, and alcohol down the bamboo tube, and blow down some puffs of tobacco smoke, to cheer him. At the end of this period a small thatched shed is erected over the tomb, which becomes the dwelling-place of the ghost. As soon as this is achieved, the dead man finally leaves the family. This event is celebrated by a feast, and the animals which are to form the banquet are sacrificed near the tomb. The dead man receives his share of the food, and what is left is carried back to the home of his heirs.

From that time the dead man is not visited any more except at the end of each lunar month. When the moon is disappearing from the horizon, the relatives and friends, to the sound of tom-toms, gongs, and tambourines, carry food and alcohol to the dead man with the customary lamentations. The offerings are left on the tomb, and, after begging the deceased not to come back and torment the living, the mourners retire. They eat and drink till sunset, when they return home to wait until the next moon. This ceremony is called *glom por*, 'throwing down cooked rice,' among the Bahnars.

This worship hardly ever lasts for more than a year, and it is completed by a ceremony which marks the final separation of the deceased from his terrestrial parentage and his entrance into the kingdom of the dead. It varies in grandeur and importance in different tribes. Among the Bahnars the ceremony is very costly; the families of all those who have died within the year in a village unite in celebrations at the common expense. A month or two before the appointed day, the cleverest artisans of the neighbourhood carve wooden statuettes representing each of the dead to be honoured, and bearing the name of *kon ngai*, 'eyeball.' These puppets are dressed in mourning costume, ornamented with hair or beards of grass tufts, and set up in a row side by side on a common burial-mound covered with a roof of bamboo trellis-work. Each one has its arms stretched out, laden with little pieces of food, and holds in its left hand a wax torch, and in its right a piece of meat; and a pipe rests on each one's breast. At their feet are little wheels, baskets, axes, cross-bows, pots, and cups—all the utensils which the dead had used during life. This common tomb is surrounded by a strong enclosure of stakes, many of which are surmounted by other *kon ngai*, seated, with their heads in their hands as if weeping.

On the morning of the ceremony the relatives and friends come great distances, each bringing a chicken and a jar of rice-wine—the rich sometimes bringing a pig. A large opening allows the mourners to enter the enclosure and present their offerings to the dead. Buffaloes, oxen, and pigs are killed; and the frontal bones of the buffaloes and the jaws of the pigs are carefully fastened to the arms of the *kon ngai*. The mourners dance, laugh, play most unmusical instruments, and make most licentious jokes, all to entertain the dead, to whom they offer wooden platters of carefully prepared food. The living in their turn eat and drink by the side of the tomb until they are quite intoxicated; then, as the day advances, they plant banana-trees, pumpkins, and sweet potatoes in the enclosure, the fruit of which nobody will dare to eat. Any person impious enough to risk it, besides incurring the anger of the gods, must pay a heavy fine to the village. Before departing the mourners tie a chicken to a little stake by a cotton thread and imprison it in the enclosure. The creature soon breaks its feeble bonds: if it escapes into the forest, it is a good sign; if it returns to the village, it is pursued with bows and arrows, and, when killed, is thrown into the forest. There is no more thought of the dead after this feast.

The period of mourning varies with the different tribes and circumstances. Mourning for a chief always lasts longer than that for an ordinary man.

The rules regarding re-marriage are also very variable.

Among the Radès the widow may give a feast after three months at her own expense in the home of her deceased husband's parents, and, if they have another son, she may ask him in marriage. If refused, she marries any man whom she chooses. Among the Kha-Pi the duration of mourning and, consequently, of inability to contract a fresh marriage is two years. Of course, these rules do not affect the poor; they may re-marry whenever they get the opportunity. One of the characteristics of mourning among all the tribes that wear long hair is that they keep their heads shaved during the whole period.

From what has been said, it is clear that ancestor-worship is by no means general among the savages, and that, as far as death is concerned, all that takes place is a few funeral rites performed at the time of death and at intervals comparatively soon thereafter.

There is a vague notion among certain tribes that the soul of the dead relative wanders round his former dwelling-place, on the threshold of which the son places offerings for his acceptance; but this practice is neither fundamental nor general. At the end of a year the dead are supposed to have gone to join their fellows 'in the mysterious regions

of the South.' If they return, they are feared rather than honoured, and it is not necessary to offer sacrifices except to the *manes* of those who have been very rich or powerful during their lives and might be able to transmit a little of their good luck to their descendants.

Suicide is very rare, though not unknown, among the savages. It entails, particularly among the Bahnars, an isolated burial, in the forest, far from the haunts of men. Those who have buried a suicide must not enter the village again until they have performed certain purificatory rites and a sacrifice.

7. Eschatology.—If ancestor-worship is vague among the savages, their ideas of what follows death are even more so. They almost all believe that the personality subsists after death and continues its terrestrial life in another place and another way; but among many of the tribes the idea of a judgment of the dead and a reward for good deeds in this world is very confused. The Bolovens, the Kha-Pi, and the Radès do not, as a rule, believe in the rewards and punishments of a future life. The Kalangs believe in these things, but without any clear notion as to what they may be.

The Bahnars believe in a whole *mang lung*, 'kingdom of the dead,' which the dead enter, a year after their burial, by means of the feast described above and called *mut to kiek*, 'to enter the cemetery.' This kingdom is hidden in the depths of the earth. The dead do not reach it until after they have crept in fear and trembling between two huge stones which continually strike against each other. They must slip through at the instant when the stone which is acting as hammer is raised in the air. They have next to avoid the formidable motion of two gigantic scissor-blades, and then to cross a frightful precipice on a bridge of tree-trunks, stripped of their bark, and animated by a constant rotatory movement which makes the smallest step dangerous. The bridge, moreover, does not reach across the whole abyss; there is a considerable empty space, which the dead man must leap across. Only those who have done good deeds on earth can accomplish this leap; thieves and liars fall into the chasm, without hope of resurrection. When a person issues victorious from this third trial, he finds himself standing before the cottage of an old witch or sorceress who is busy pounding rice from morning till night, and who in return for glass-ware or little axes provides the *manes* with fire and light, which are absolutely necessary in these gloomy realms. If the ghost cannot pay in current coin, he must allow his ears to be cut off. They immediately attach themselves to the sorceress's ears, which, as a result of additions of this kind, reach down to the ground. Equipped with safe fire, the dead man reaches a cross-road—the junction of two roads leading to two cities. One of these roads, strewn with brambles and briars, is for men who died a natural death; the other, very smooth and bordered with red flowers, is taken by those who have met a violent death—*e.g.*, warriors slain by the enemy, in expedition, or by their own arms, or from wounds inflicted by a dart. Dressed in brilliant red, because of the blood which they have shed, they dwell in a specially privileged village. In both the cities and the village, life is much the same as it was on earth, and the dead there are happy in proportion to the abundance of the supplies of meat, flocks, utensils, slaves, and necklaces which their relatives place in their coffins or on their tombs, of *glom por*, and, above all, of *mut to kiek*. Slaves are represented by rough little figures placed along with pots, cross-bows, wooden sabres, etc., at the foot of the *kon ngai*.

The Bahnars have no definite idea of a judgment of men after death, but their traditions imply that only the good can reach the cities of the kingdom of the dead; the wicked succumb to the trials of the journey.

8. Sorcerer-chiefs and sorcerers.—Although the savages of Indo-China do not recognize any constituted power, it is worthy of mention that there are among them three individuals with mysterious moral power. The best known are the 'water king' and the 'fire king.' We have only vague information about the 'wind king.' The designation *sadetes*, which they receive in Indo-China, is simply the Laotian *sadet* (=Khmer *sdeč*), 'king.' They belong to the powerful Jarai tribe. In spite of their title, they have no effective power, and their authority, which is purely spiritual, is not even recognized except by the few villages bordering on their own territory. But all the savages know them by name, and dread them. They seem to offer an analogy with the god-kings of whom Frazer speaks (*GB*[2] i. 104). Their influence can greatly facilitate the movements of an explorer if he manages to approach them and to get into their good graces. The *sadete* who is most feared is the fire *sadete*, known especially by the savages of the Annamese slope; the water *sadete* exercises a less perceptible sway over the Laotian slope; the power of the wind *sadete* seems insignificant.

The *sadetes* live in the neighbouring villages, and it is believed that at least those of fire and water are always at hand in a certain pair of families which are related to each other. They possess objects endowed with magic power. The fire king has a sacred sword, or magic blade, badly hewn, and carefully rolled in white cotton rags. No savage would dare to approach it. If the *sadete* drew this blade half-way, they say it would be enough to make the sun disappear and men and animals fall into a profound sleep; if he were to draw it full length, the whole world would be devoured by flame. The traditions of Chams, Cambodians, and Laos claim that this magic sword was stolen from them long ago. The Cambodians, monks and laymen, and even a rebel chief, it would appear, have several times gone right into these inhospitable regions to ask for it or to try to get it back again. They never returned, being destroyed, the savages say, by fire from heaven in punishment of their unjust claim.

The water *sadete* has a magic cup and wand, according to some authorities, and, according to others, a rattan bearing flowers that never fade, and a bindweed saved from the Deluge, but still green. Armed with these objects, the *sadete*, if he is roused to anger, is able to bury the earth under the waters.

Although legends of the most confused kind are current about the *sadetes*, and although the savages shrink from giving explanations of the subject to strangers, and the *sadetes* themselves are very difficult to approach, it seems certain that, in spite of their occult power, they live the simple life of the other savages, and go through the villages asking a tribute of alms, which is seldom refused them, but still more rarely offered. Certain Radè villages, of their own accord, present the fire *sadete* every year with a little cotton, some rice, and a chicken.

The *sadetes* must never die a natural death.

When one of them falls ill, the chiefs and the old men assemble to examine his condition. If this is judged to be very serious, the invalid is dispatched by spear-thrusts. The *sadetes*, alone among the savages, are cremated, not buried. The ashes are gathered, and honoured for five years. The widow receives some of them, which she has to carry on her back in an urn when she goes to mourn at the tomb of her husband.

It is certain that, in spite of its prerogatives, the office of *sadete* seems to be forced upon the members of families which benefit from it. To succeed the *sadete* a descendant on the female side is always sought; and the nomination of the new *sadete* often meets with undisguised unwillingness from the privileged family. This has given rise to several stories.

It has been claimed that immediately after the death of a *sadete*, all his relatives eligible for succession flee to the forest to escape this honour. The village inhabitants set out to look for them, and the first one discovered is nominated. Another tale is that all go to sleep in the common house; an old man enters quietly during the night, and asks the sleepers in a loud voice, 'Who will succeed?' The spirits prompt one of them to answer, 'I.' The old man ties a cotton thread, as a guarantee of the will of the spirits, to the wrist of the chosen one, who is thus recognized next day. Surer and more numerous testimonies lead us to believe that the new *sadete* is chosen by the old men from the appointed family.

Until the time of king Norodom, predecessor of the present king Sisowath, the sovereigns of Cambodia, at their accession, used to send expensive presents to the fire *sadetes*: elephants, silk stuffs to wrap round the sacred sword, glass trinkets, etc. The two savage chiefs in return sent several rural presents to Phnom-Penh: rhinoceros-tusks, rice, sesame, and cakes of unwrought wax, on which was seen the impress of a finger as signature. Rice, sesame, and wax were sent to the *bakus*, or Brâhman priests of the royal palace, who used them in certain ritualistic ceremonies. In spite of the objections of the *sadete*, Norodom put an end to these traditional customs without giving any reason for his action. Perhaps he saw in this gift a form of disguised tribute to Cambodia, which doubtless recalled either the services rendered long ago to the Khmer kings in the evolutionary epoch, or a relation of kinship between the sovereigns and the savages.

The *sadetes* or *pataos*, still so little known, remain, as regards both origin and attributes, one of the most interesting problems to be solved in

the political and religious organization of the Indo-Chinese.

The extremely wavering beliefs and the complicated worship of the savages have given rise also to a whole class of sorcerers expert in soothsaying and in nullifying the evil designs of the *yang*. They may be grouped in two categories: (*a*) wizard-doctors, who are employed in exorcizing diseases and prescribing remedies and sacrifices; they are in greatest demand, and best paid, but not most influential; (*b*) wizard-soothsayers; they alone know how to burst eggs, and their business is to discover by this means theft, murder, or death by witchcraft. All-powerful among these superstitious tribes, they are very much feared, for their word alone is sufficient to have a man convicted of witchcraft and reduced to slavery. Naturally many sorcerers abuse their terrible power. Certain wizard-soothsayers practise casting spells by means of wax figures, and belief in the effects of this practice is general among the Indo-Chinese savages.

A man is either born a sorcerer or may become one; there is, in the one case, direct inspiration of the spirits, and, in the other, preliminary initiation. The wizard-soothsayers who practise divination by means of the crushing of eggs receive their mission directly in a dream from the spirit of the lightning. The wizard-doctor (*bòjâu*) may also be directly inspired by a special spirit called *yang gru*.

When the *yang* takes possession of a man, the latter becomes aware of it from the fact that he can no longer eat certain foods without becoming sick or fevered: dogs, frogs, lizards, and mice, from which sorcerers always abstain. Soon he is seized with a sort of hysterical delirium, which often lasts five or six days, and flees into the forest to follow the *yang*; then he has paroxysms of fever, refuses to eat, and holds long conversations with his *yang gru*, who reveals to him all the diseases with which such and such inhabitants of the village are to be smitten; and then he goes to sleep, overcome by fatigue. These paroxysms seize him periodically for several months, but each time becoming feebler, and at last the initiated one appears to have returned to his normal condition, except that he has become a *bòjâu*, *i.e.* seer and healer. He always has with him in a little bag his special *dômong*, one of which contains the *yang gru*, or spirit which inspires him.

The *bòjâu* may also be initiated by another sorcerer.

He first of all feels himself becoming feverish after having eaten the foods mentioned above. An initiated sorcerer examines him, and then, lifting up his eyelids, by the light of a small candle, and repeating a certain incantation, communicates the magic power to him. Thereupon the *yang* makes sure that the initiated man finds several *dômongs*, and he immediately becomes a perfect sorcerer. But many of the savages show greater confidence in the sorcerer who has waited till the spirit possessed him than in one who compels it by means of a fellow-sorcerer.

It is a remarkable fact that the majority of these sorcerers, the soothsayers as well as the doctors, are women. The *bòjâu* of the Bahnars, Röngaos, and numerous other tribes, with her hysterical stamping and her cataleptic sleeps, resembles the *pajau*, the pythoness of the Chams.

9. Penal law.—The crime most severely punished is theft, especially of domestic animals or of rice; the latter is sometimes punishable by death. A less serious theft is punished by a fine, almost always equal to double the value of the stolen object. If the thief cannot pay, his debt makes him the slave of the man whom he has robbed. Crimes of passion—adultery, rape, and murder—are, as a rule, punished with a variable fine, which is handed over to the injured family or person. The laws of the savages are averse to punishing by death, because a man can always be useful to the village. Crucifixion, however, is practised among certain tribes, and cudgelling to death is allowed. Slavery for debt is fairly frequent, but the slave may always regain his freedom by paying the sum due.

10. Oaths and ordeals.—When a person denies his guilt, the savages have recourse to ordeals, which are undergone in the presence of a sorcerer. The most usual, the water test, is a custom still in vogue among the Khmers:

The accused and the accuser, both holding on to a post firmly fixed in the river, plunge at the same time underneath the water. If the accuser remains longest under the water, the accused is judged to be guilty; if the accused, he is innocent. The savages firmly believe that the hæmorrhage which occurs in the weaker of the two at the beginning of asphyxia results from the fact that the spirit of the waters, indignant at his falsehood, has pricked his nostrils.

Other ordeals consist in making the culprit plunge his hand into boiling pitch or even into molten lead. If his hand remains unhurt, he is proclaimed innocent. A more formidable test, because it allows more scope for manipulation or wickedness, is the ordeal of 'breaking an egg between the thumb and the first finger,' among the Bahnars, Röngaos, Sedangs, etc. It is used in cases of theft and poisoning; and, especially in cases of witchcraft, it takes place with the aid of a sorcerer or a sorceress.

When, by superstition, ignorance, or brazen-faced falsehood, a savage of any village accuses a member of the same village, or, more usually, of a neighbouring village weaker than his own, of having stolen something from him, or cast over him a spell of illness or of death, the two villages assemble to decide the issue. As a rule the accused is a poor man or woman, or one of no lineage; and it also very often happens that, having no faith in the fairness of the ordeal, and fearing that he will be abandoned by his village or that he may involve it in war, the victim pleads guilty rather than resist, and, though innocent, allows himself to be sold as a slave to the Annamese or the Laotians. When the accused is rich and of influential family, the attitude of his relatives and of the whole village sometimes makes the accuser beat a rapid retreat. When the parties are about equal in rank, the case is nearly always decided by the egg-test. The *bòjâu* takes an egg between his thumb and forefinger and asks it if there has really been *deng*, 'witchcraft.' The egg, if cleverly pressed, never fails to break if the sorcerer wishes it. Other eggs are then taken to find out in which village the *deng* is; generally one of the eggs collapses with a crackle at the name of the guilty village. A third time the sacred eggs are interrogated, to find out which person in this village, the inhabitants of which are all enumerated by name, has the power of casting spells (*deng*); when the egg breaks at the mention of one of these names, the unfortunate individual, irrefutably convicted, is immediately bound, and handed over as a slave to the accuser. It is evident that the greed or wickedness of the *bòjâu* may draw great profit from such a custom.

Another very repugnant test is to make the accused lick the decomposed corpse of the person he is suspected of having poisoned, while saying: 'May I die within the year if I am guilty of the death of this man!' If he reaches the end of the year without accident, he is pronounced innocent. When the body has been buried for some time, the accused may clear himself of the accusation of poisoning by repeating the same formula while swallowing some of the earth taken from under the coffin and pounded with dry leaves.

Very often the peaceable tribes, *e.g.* the Bahnars, are satisfied with a more kindly ordeal.

The families of the deceased and of the accused and the accused himself go into the cemetery. A little earth is taken from the grave, and a model of a tombstone is made with it. This is sprinkled with rice-wine and the blood of a chicken, while one of the company pronounces the following imprecation: 'Thoué! We are making libations of chicken's blood and wine in order that this business may be ended! May the perjurer die, slain by the axe or the knife! May he be caught in a snare! May he be drowned in the water! May the lightning strike him! May his enemies pierce him with arrows! May they slay him with the sword in battle! May cancer eat him away! May the blood gush from his nostrils and his mouth!' Then they mix the earth, moist with the blood and wine, with a little ground stag-horn, each one present swallows some of it, and a bumper of alcohol all round closes the ceremony. According to the savages' ideas, the culprit, if there is one, is sure to die within the year.

The oath of friendship is a complicated one, for it serves to create a bond as sacred as kinship between those who exchange it.

Intermediaries are chosen between two persons who wish to swear allegiance to each other, and are charged with sounding their intentions. They receive two jars of rice-wine and two chickens from the contracting parties; one half is to pay them for their trouble, and the other is required for the ceremony. One of the chickens is roasted, and each of the future friends receives an equal share of the heart, the liver, and the legs,

which he must eat. Then both drink together from the same jar of rice-wine by means of a flexible bamboo tube, while the spectators utter the usual imprecations: 'Remember that today you become brothers. . . . If one of you betrays his brother, may he be struck by lightning! May he be reduced to slavery! May he die miserably, and may his unburied body become the prey of the ravens!' In most cases they prick the arms of the two friends with the point of a dagger, in order to mix their blood with the wine, which they have to drink together. The solemnity is greater still when not two individuals, but two villages, swear indissoluble friendship after a war. Into the jar of rice-wine are put a boar's tusks, spear-heads, and arrows; above it are hung fish, ropes, fetters, and a serpent's head. Then the whole assembly drinks, after having uttered the most terrible malodictions against the village which should try to break the peace.

The savages are somewhat extravagant with their oaths when they wish to affirm or convince. They 'eat' their sword, their spear, their pipe, or their clothing—which means that, if they lie, they give themselves over to be killed by the sword or by the spear, or to smoke their last pipe, or wear their last dress in this world.

11. **Religion.**—The religion of the Indo-Chinese savages appears to be Animism strongly tinged with fetishism and polytheistic naturalism. It is both public and private, demands an infinite number of duties, often very onerous, and constitutes a utilitarian worship based on the fear of evil powers and the desire to conciliate them in order to obtain satisfaction of personal interests. The savages give souls or spirits to animals, objects, plants, and phenomena; these evil spirits take vengeance for even involuntary neglect of a rule or an offering. Famine, bad luck at fishing, hunting, etc., illness, accidents, and death are the result. Everything that the savage does to guard his wretched life must be preceded or followed by rites and sacrifices to baffle those formidable powers. These spirits, which are very numerous, are the possessors of considerable but not hierarchical power, and are dependent on one another. Having the same passions as men, they are in constant rivalry, contending for the offerings of men. Among the savages all manifestations of a supernatural power —genii, souls, spirits—bear the generic name of *yang*, a word of Malayo-Polynesian origin.

The spirits, or genii, are divided into two great categories: the good and the wicked. Among the good are those whose mission is to make the fruits of the earth grow, who dispense light and heat, rain, cold, or wind as there is occasion, and who bestow rich harvests, health, and happiness. Although much honoured (for their anger might become dangerous in a case of neglect of an offering), yet they are less honoured than the maleficent spirits, who hate men, and try to torment them in every possible way, or to make them die, and whose neutrality must be conquered by means of sacrifices. These evil genii live in large trees, in huge rocks, or in mountain caves. A savage would not dare to cut down a large tree or begin to cut wood in the forest without first having killed a dog, dipped some arrows in its blood, and drawn them across the tree. Then the tree may be cut down; the *yang* has changed its abode.

These spirits vary in power, attributes, and dwelling-place. First of all, there are the most powerful, the spirits of the sky. At their head is the god of lightning, whose voice is the thunder. This god, called by the Bahnars *Bŏk Glaih*, 'the Grandfather who thunders,' comes down to the earth in the guise of the storm, and with a stone axe strikes those who have offended him; hence the veneration among the savages for cut flints and meteoric stones. He is also the god of war, and then he assumes the form of a goat or of a shaggy old man with a long beard. He lives in the sky with the goddess of the harvest (Bahnar *Yang Sŏri*; cf. Skr. *Śrī*, and Malayo-Polynesian *Sĕri*) and her mother, who has a pair of wings, and is ugly, dirty, and poor, but very fond of the liver of victims, and who comes down to earth to test the enthusiasm of men. The person who gave her a good welcome, in spite of her repulsive appearance, was immediately loaded with fortune's gifts, but he who turned her away through pride came to misery.

Between the sky and the earth, in a zone of space, live certain ill-intentioned spirits, of whom the most famous is Grandfather Nu, who, without a rag to cover him, tries to snap up the livers of victims, the blood, and the wine offered to other gods. These deities hurl their wrath on the unfortunate savage who is believed not to have offered anything, and becomes the prey of mischance. This spirit is by nature such a thief and so maleficent that it would be useless to attempt to stop his depredations by heaping him with sacrifices.

The inferior spirits live in holes under the earth. Wounded unwittingly by the savage who is ploughing his field, they have their revenge by inflicting internal diseases upon him, which become fatal unless they are disarmed by means of offerings. Along with these should be mentioned the earth-spirit and the water-spirit.

Among the inferior spirits, many become incarnated in the form of human beings or enter inanimate objects. There are certain crickets whose cry always foretells a successful hunting expedition to the savage. In order to thank them, an offering is made in their honour of certain hairs of the captured game (these hairs are roasted and a libation of rice-wine is then poured out) and of birds whose singing is taken as an omen. Omens are also taken from the kite—the sight of which in time of war fills all hearts with joy—and certain sparrows, whose flight, to right, to left, in front, or behind, decides what action the savage is to take. He never starts on any expedition or voyage without consulting the birds.

The savages also worship rocks which have roughly the shape of a man or an animal; they are supposed to harbour a *yang*. There is nearly always a legend attached to them. Libations are offered to them, or a leaf from a neighbouring tree is plucked in passing.

Practically all the Bahnars, Sedangs, Jarais, and Hadrongs still believe that spirits reside in those huge jars which, along with the gongs, constitute the chief wealth of the savages. The presence of spirits in the jar is shown by some external sign, but they are not incontestably *ge yang*, 'spirit-jars,' nor are they honoured as deities, until a dream reveals their value to the savage who possesses them or wishes to buy them. On holidays the mouths of these jars are coated with blood and rice-wine. When a Sedang makes up his mind to sell a very expensive one, he breaks off one handle of the jar in the hope of keeping the *yang* in the handle, and continues to worship it in the same way as before.

We have still to mention the protecting spirit of villages. The coarse figure which represents him is made of wood and adorned with a plume of grass, and he is armed with a sword and a bow, bound to his diminutive arms. As soon as the grain is cut and the rice stored, the images of this spirit, carefully sprinkled with the blood of a chicken and with rice-wine, are fixed on the palisade of the village and on the roofs of the houses, with the notion that he will pierce with his arrows the evil genii who might kill or ruin the inhabitants. The next year the little figure, very much worn out, is replaced by another of the same kind without ceremony, the spirit having left the old one when it became too dilapidated.

More formidable is a malevolent spirit with human form, his body torn with wounds, his en-

trails hanging out of his lacerated body, and his heart visible in his open breast. He wanders about unceasingly through the mountains and forests, chuckling and groaning alternately, leaving large bloodstains as he goes. The savages are in mortal terror of him, and never dare to ask: 'What blood is this?' The angry *yang* would pursue them, seize them by craft, and drown them in a sea of blood. Perhaps we may recognize in these spirits, whom the Bahnars call *laih lem kleng bri*, 'spirits which bar the forest,' the souls of men who have died a violent death and lain unburied in the forest or been devoured by wild animals: for these and the souls of women who have died in child-birth are particularly malevolent spirits in the eyes of the savages. This last belief is very wide-spread throughout the whole of the Far East, and is found among the Malaysians, the Khmers, and the Annamese.

The worship of the savages consists chiefly in *sacrifices* and offerings, varying according to the circumstances and rank of the *yang* to whom they are offered. Almost every action of their life entails a sacrifice: the choice of the site of a village, the building of a house (there are special rites for the erection of the first pillar and for the arrangement of the hearth), the act of drawing water from a well for the first time, birth, marriage, death, war, hunting, fishing, sowing, reaping, the gathering of roots in the forest, etc. These sacrifices include several ritual actions, an invocation, and the presentation of certain offerings and certain dishes to the gods. They are always concluded by a feast, at which the savages consume almost the whole of the victims and drink rice-wine until they are quite intoxicated. The principal animals offered in sacrifice are the buffalo (for expeditions of war, to celebrate a victory, in cases of serious illness, and at funerals), the pig, the goat (in cases of reparation of a crime or to celebrate a gorgeous *glom por*), and the chicken (in all the many daily occasions). The share of the *yang* is the victim's liver, a little of its blood, and some rice-wine. In sacrifices made after a successful chase, the hunter generally adds to the liver and the blood an ear or the tip of an ear of the quarry. Offerings of food are usually presented to the *yang* by the sorcerer on a board adorned with little candles stuck on the edge; he then throws several grains of rice over his left shoulder, reciting formulas which the bystanders repeat in chorus. In several villages small buildings are erected with a miniature roof and a platform, on which are placed dishes of meat for wandering or hungry spirits.

The Radès still remember the *human sacrifices* which they used to offer at the funerals of great chiefs; but this custom has disappeared everywhere except among the Sedangs, who, at the construction of a common house, cast a prisoner of war alive into the hole dug for the first post, and crush him under the post.

12. **Cosmogony.**—Almost all the savages of Indo-China have ideas, identical in their confusion, of the creation of beings and of the world. The sky and the earth existed always, but the human race comes, in their opinion, from the 'Grandfather and Grandmother with the big box.' These two survivors of a deluge which destroyed everybody long ago were saved in a large box, where they took refuge along with a pair of animals of every species. Warned by the cry of a chicken sent by the *yang*, they came out at last from their floating prison, and, while the animals again spread over the earth, from their union was born a new race of human beings—a race happy in every way, for another messenger from the *yang*, a big black ant, had brought to the 'Grand parents of the big box' two grains of celestial rice which grew without cultivation, and a single grain of which filled a pot. By the help of a magic fire, which burned without fuel and made savoury dishes—a fire which one of the sons of the Grandfather of the big box had stolen from a powerful fairy—the Golden Age reigned on the earth; the dead, buried at the foot of a certain tree, were restored to life in adult state; the earth abounded in happy beings. Then credulity and the malice of the *yang* deprived them of order; the magic fire, the celestial rice, and the tree of resurrection disappeared. Since then the savages have been troubled, and suffer famine, cold, and death.

The evil was aggravated by the confusion of tongues which, among the direct sons of the Grandparents of the big box, followed the building of a vague tower of Babel. This confusion led to the dispersion of the races, or, rather, of the different savage tribes.

The legends of the savages still mention the existence of heroes of gigantic size who declared war against the gods. All were killed except their chief, Diông, a Bahnar who conquered Bôk Glaih, the god of lightning. This Diông also became reconciled with the *yang*, for he fought the Jarais, who sought a quarrel with him, by getting the gods to stop the sun in order to allow him to obtain his victory. In order to console the Jaral chief, trampled in the *mêlé*, the *yang* transformed him into a constellation—an honour granted to several other people famous for their misfortunes or their bravery in the savages' traditions.

Although the savages do not know how or by whom the world was created, they hold that it will come to an end by a terrible fire due to a giant who lives in the centre of the earth.

13. **Fetishes.**—Pebbles of uncommon shape or colour, pre-historic axes or arrows of flint, and splinters of meteoric stones are the favourite fetishes of the Indo-Chinese savages. When a savage comes upon one of these objects, he picks it up, wraps it in cotton thread, and puts it into a basket which he carefully closes. He waits until the spirit of his fetish manifests itself in a dream and shows him by what sacrifice it wishes to be honoured. If the *yang* of the fetish-pebble does not reveal itself during the night in human form, or if it demands a sacrifice as costly as, *e.g.*, a buffalo, the savage throws the pebble away in the forest, and there the matter ends. Otherwise he offers it a chicken and a jar of rice-wine; then the pebble, rubbed with the chicken's blood and sprinkled with wine, is put, along with similar objects, into a bag made of bamboo fibre, and the bag is attached to one of the pillars of the house.

These fetish-pebbles, which among the Bahnars receive the name of *dömong*, are not peculiar to any individual; the village possesses a large number of them, carefully preserved in the common house, on a little altar placed on the principal pillar, or *jörang*. They are the city-protectors, and a savage is specially employed to sprinkle them with blood and wine during the ceremonies. Those most reverenced are the *dömong* of war, which are generally picked up on the return from an expedition, and whose spirits manifest themselves in the form of strong shaggy men. After the return from a successful razzia, they are coated with the blood of a sacrificed buffalo.

When fire breaks out, if the flames reach the *dömong*, they are thrown away, for it is believed that the *yang* must have gone away before the fire had reached them. These *dömong* are the protectors of the rice, of fishing, hunting, health, etc. Each one has his own particular sacrifice by which the others also benefit, receiving after him their share of blood and wine. Perhaps the *dömong* who is most worshipped is the rice *dömong*, but great care is taken not to sprinkle him with

buffalo's or even pig's blood. In order that he may not get accustomed to such costly sacrifices, he is never offered anything but a chicken. Both male and female *dömong* exist. Their sex is determined by the sorcerer. Their power is equal.

We may add that, according to the missionaries, the savages, amid the great number of supernatural beings to whom they render worship, have an idea of a higher Being, the creator and absolute master of all that exists, rewarding good and punishing evil; but this Supreme Being, stripped of all ill-will towards men and inspiring no fear in them, is not an object of worship.

14. Tabu.—Prohibitions are as numerous as offerings among the savages. The words *dieng, deng, kò, tan, man, köm*, etc., in Lower Laos, *kalum* in Upper Laos, or even *tabung*, among certain tribes bordering on ancient Champa, mean the prohibition against doing certain things at certain times, certain ritual interdictions—in a word, an ensemble of tabus.

When a village removes to another place, no one is allowed to walk on the road which it followed at its exodus. When a woman is confined, or when any one is married or dies, the village, or merely the house, is tabued for a variable period. When there is a famine, the village which is suffering from it is forbidden to strangers, for fear that the rice-*yang*, already angry, may want to go with them. When the wind blows in a certain way, hunters must not kill such and such an animal in the chase. The small spaces round the *ge yang*, 'spirit-jars,' and round the pillars where the *domong* are hung are tabued. Gold and silver are *kalam* for several villages of the Stiengs round Attopen (Laos), who, on the other hand, accept copper. Every action not in accordance with the settled traditions of the savages at once appears to them unlawful, and a great many presents and arguments are required to prove their innocence. It must be said, however, that among the savages who are neighbours of more civilized races, and especially since the French occupation, the extent and inflexibility of tabus are on the decline.

15. Totemism.—Properly speaking, food abstinences do not exist among the savages; nor do they appear to render special worship to any animal, and so far no clearly totemistic tradition has been recognized among them. Nevertheless it must be said that all the savage tribes speak of the tiger with timid reverence, and, when they do bring themselves to eat its flesh, it is only out of revenge, and only among tribes which abstain from the flesh of the domestic elephant.

Among the Radès, when a domestic elephant is wounded, they offer him a roasted pig, place some rice on his head, and pour libations of alcohol, all the while reciting prayers. The Stiengs beg the animals' pardon before slaying them. A curious legend of the Bahnars 'of the first ages of the world' relates that the men of the village had gone away on business, and, on their return, found their wives and children transformed into monkeys, doubtless by the vengeance of the *yang*. In order to restore these metamorphosed beings to their human form, their relatives made incisions on themselves, and with the blood that flowed forth rubbed them limb by limb; all that were thus treated immediately resumed their human appearance. All the savage tribes and the Indo-Chinese in general—like the Indonesians—have a strong antipathy to killing monkeys.

16. Festivals.—The chief festivals are the Festival of Victory (see § 4), the Festival of the Dead (see § 6), and the Festival of the Fructification of the Rice.

When rice is sown, a chicken is first sacrificed; but the real ceremony in its honour does not begin until the rice is in the blade. To ensure fructification, the *dömong* are taken down from the granary where they stay, and placed in the house after a chicken or a goat and a jar of rice-beer have been offered to them. Then early next day the owner of the field carries them off with a chicken whose beak and claws have been washed in the juice of a certain forest-plant, and a tube of bamboo filled with millet-wine. In the middle of the field he digs a hole, into which the *dömong* of the rice are laid; he surrounds this hole with a circle of sticks ornamented with tufts of bamboo and joined together by seven strands of cotton thread. The chicken is killed, and with its blood are sprinkled the fetish-pebbles, which are then buried. Over their grave a post is stuck, adorned with tufts of bamboo, and smeared with blood; this post ends in a leaf rolled up into the shape of a horn and filled with wine and chicken's blood; to the foot of the post is fastened a small bamboo tube full of millet, wine, and chicken's blood. The sacrificer offers the contents to the beneficent *yang*, after having adjured the malevolent spirits to depart from his field.

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ANTOINE CABATON.

INDONESIANS.[1]—1. Names for the conception 'soul.'—The Indonesian peoples use two names for the conception 'soul,' and by these names they express two different things. The first soul plays a part only in this life on earth; it occurs both impersonally as the vital force which animates all nature, and personally. With the peoples whose life is still strongly communistic, and among whom there is therefore little room for the individual, the impersonal character of the soul stands out more clearly. Where the feeling of individuality is more developed this soul is more personal. The second soul plays a part only in the next life; then the first soul vanishes, and the second appears as an essence of the human being itself. The first soul we shall call 'soul-substance,' in contradistinction to the second soul. Soul-substance is therefore the spiritual substance which pervades man during his life on earth; in its impersonal character man can have too little of it, and then he must add some soul-substance to it, derived from men, animals, plants, or things; in its personal character it is addressed and flattered. After the death of the human being this soul-substance animates another part of nature—an idea which has given rise to the belief in metempsychosis. The soul, however, which only after death separates from man, carries on a personal existence in a realm of spirits, which is similar to the earth. This soul dies several times (mostly seven or nine times), and finally turns into soul-substance. Sometimes the Indonesian says that he has more than one soul, even as many as seven; but these are simply different modes of appearance of the one soul-substance which is in him during his life on earth. For the impersonal soul the Indonesians have no general name. A very common name for the soul-substance is *sumangat* with the Malays, with several variations, as *sumangè* in Minañkabau, *sumanga* and *sumange* with the Macassars and the Buginese, *esmangan* in Buru, and *sumangan* in Ambon. In Northern and Central Celebes we find words meaning 'little man,' whereas the Dayak words *ham-*

[1] On the geography and ethnology of the region dealt with in this article cf. art. AUSTRALASIA. See also art. PAPUANS.

baruan and *bruwa* point to a derivation from *ruwa*, 'two'; so that these names probably mean 'companion,' a meaning which we find in *rĕngarĕngan* of the inhabitants of Minahassa, *kakĕduañ* of the Sañirese, *kɛtutubo* ('of the same nature as another') in Luzon, and *ikararua* of the Ibanag. Among the Batta tribes in Sumatra we meet with *tĕndi* and *tondi*; and the races which have been strongly under the influence of the Hindus, as the Javanese and the Balinese, use Sanskrit words, e.g. *yitmă* and *sukmă*. Besides these names for the soul-substance, *njawa*, originally 'breath,' is often used. The soul, *i.e.* man as he lives on after death, bears quite different names. A word of frequent occurrence is *nitu*, *anitu*, *onitu*, meaning 'souls' in the Moluccas, but 'spirits' in Celebes, Nias, and other islands. The Batta tribes and the Niassians use the word *begu*, which means 'spectre,' *anga* in Central and *andja* in Southern Celebes. The Dayak tribes in Borneo have words such as *liau*, *andiau*, *luwa*, etc. The belief in a life after this life is so vague with the Indonesians, and the conception they form of the soul is therefore so indistinct, that, having come into contact with monotheistic religions, they have adopted words for the soul from other languages—*e.g.*, the Sanskrit *jiva* among the Malays and Javanese, and the Arabic *mala'ekat*, which all through the Malay Archipelago does not stand for 'angel,' but for the soul of man after death.

2. The impersonal soul-substance in man.—All parts of the human body, and its secretions, contain impersonal soul-substance. This may be extracted from any part; and then pain is felt at the part.

(1) Many customs show that the Indonesians consider the human *head* to contain soul-substance. The great object of head-hunting is to possess themselves of their enemy's soul-substance, in order to increase their own. In the Moluccas, missionaries have sometimes been charged by the natives with having made medicine out of human heads.

(2) Other important storehouses of soul-substance are the *bowels* and the *liver*. For this reason it is a general usage in the Archipelago to offer to the gods a piece of the liver of an animal, which means that not only the material part, but also the soul-substance of the animal is sacrificed. The Olo-Ngaju in Borneo and other Dayak tribes regard the liver as the seat of all emotions. The Battak also hold this belief, and are therefore very much afraid of abdominal operations, because they think that then the soul-substance is removed from the body. With the Javanese, the Malays, and the inhabitants of the Mentawey Islands and Halmahera also the liver is the seat of the emotions, with the Papuans the bowels. Among a few tribes (Minañkabauians, Niassians, and Kailians) the heart is believed to be a receptacle of soul-substance.

(3) The *blood* is of much greater importance in this respect. It is sacrificed as containing soul-substance. In the consecration of the house it is customary to rub the blood of the victim on the woodwork, in order to give it strength. The Macassars smear old sacred objects with blood, in order to infuse new life into them. The Orang Sakai in Siak sprinkle, as *pars pro toto*, a few drops of their blood on a corpse, lest the soul of the dead man should take with it all their soul-substance and they should die. Throughout the Archipelago the law holds that the blood of a man guilty of incest must not be spilled, because this would make the soil barren.

(4) That soul-substance is found in the *placenta* and *umbilical cord* appears from the connexion which the Indonesians see between child and afterbirth; the latter is called elder or younger brother. The placenta is carefully preserved or buried. The Battak call upon the soul of the afterbirth. Other peoples (Macassars, Tomorians) preserve the placenta with salt and tamarind. The little piece of the umbilical cord which has fallen off is generally preserved by the Indonesians, and administered as medicine to the child when it is ill.

(5) A great amount of soul-substance is thought to reside in the *hair* of the head; hence many object to having their hair cut, as this might cause them to fall ill for want of soul-substance. When a Javanese has lost two or more children by death, he does not shave the head of the next child. After their conversion to Christianity, many of the Battak were afraid that they would die if their long hair was cut. In case of accident or disease the mother rubs her child with her hair, to supply it with new soul-substance (Minahassa, Sañi, Central Celebes, Añkola, Central Nias). Among the Dayaks, parents protest against the cutting of the hair of school children, for fear of disease. Hair is laid at the foot of fruit trees to make them more fruitful, *i.e.* to adduce soul-substance (Torajas, Malays, Karo Battak, Timor, Dayaks). The Kayans in Borneo administer burnt human hair to delicate people by way of medicine. Betrothed couples exchange some of their hair, in order to become one in soul and always to think of each other (Moluccas, Central Celebes, Minahassa, Timor, Battak, Dayaks). With the Karo Battak the hair of bride and bridegroom is knotted together at the wedding. Father and mother give some of their hair to a child, that it may feel that its parents are near it, and that it may not cry too much during their absence (Central Celebes, Minahassa). Therefore it is a prevailing custom to preserve some hair of deceased relatives, lest they should die with longing for the dead. According to Indonesian belief, a little hair (hence a little soul-substance) taken from a man gives power over all his soul-substance; whatever happens to the hair happens also to the man. This idea is at the root of all the sorcery with hair which occurs among the Indonesians. As a rule the hair is first wrapped up in a parcel with pungent spices, and then buried or hung in a tree; the owner of the hair is afflicted with all kinds of diseases as the consequence of this. The worst thing one can do is to burn a person's hair with an imprecation. The person is then sure to die. Hair is also used as a sacrifice: a Toraja pulls out a hair when he has told a lie the consequences of which he fears. A Boni prince offered his hair when he had delivered his country from the enemy. Dayaks sacrifice some of their hair when they have returned uninjured from war. A general form of sacrifice in the Malay Archipelago is the cutting off of the hair of children. Frequently, however, a lock of hair is spared, as if to retain the soul-substance. The sacrifice of hair at a death is common: the relatives offer part of their spiritual existence, that the soul of the dead one may leave them undisturbed (Moluccas, Halmahera, Timor, Bali, Dayak tribes, Eñgano, Malays, Battak, Malagasy). This entire or partial cutting or shaving off of the hair is sometimes required only of the widow or widower, sometimes of the nearest relatives, at other times (when a chief of special importance has died) of all the subjects.

(6) Of equal value with a man's hair are his *nails*. Hair and nails are therefore generally mentioned together. Great care is taken that nail parings do not fall into the hands of people who might do harm with them. Among many of the tribes the nails must not be cut after sunset, because the spirits wandering about then might seize them.

(7) The Indonesians imagine the *teeth* to be filled with soul-substance. This appears from the knocking out of teeth (as it occurs still in Central Celebes, Formosa, and Efigano), and from the general custom of filing off teeth, which reaches its height in the skilful way practised by the Javanese and others. Originally this was intended as a sacrifice when entering upon puberty. What is left of the teeth after they have been filed off is blackened—originally for the purpose of hiding from the spirits the fact that part of the sacrifice was withheld. The sacrifice of teeth as a mourning rite is still found among the Indonesians in Kedu in Java, in Benkulen in Sumatra, and in the isle of Saleier.

(8) The *secretions* of the human body also contain soul-substance, as, *e.g.*, the *saliva*. Many Dayak tribes spit on an offering or bite it, that the spirits may know that it comes from them. Spitting occurs as a sacrifice, in order to get rid of something impure or sinful. When the Indonesian hears some ominous sound, he spits; the Battak do so when a corpse is carried past them; the Galelarese immediately spit when they have pronounced a forbidden name. A dying man leaves some of his saliva, that the survivor may not long too much for him (Macassars, Olo-Dusun in Borneo, and Javanese). By the possession of a person's saliva one gets power over all his soul-substance; therefore the Indonesians do not spit near graves or high trees, because the spirits might avail themselves of this saliva to take away all their soul-substance. Saliva is used in sorcery also, generally in the form of a quid (Moluccas, Nias). All the tribes are careful with everything that has been in contact with the mouth (with saliva), *e.g.* remains of food. That saliva contains soul-substance, force, is proved by the fact that tools are rubbed with it to make them stronger (Minañkabau)—especially rifles (Añkola, Kaili, and others). The Land Dayaks of Sarawak begged Europeans to spit on bits of coco-nut shell, which were then scattered over the fields to make them fertile.

Sweat also—and consequently the clothes saturated with it—contains soul-substance. Hence a Javanese thinks that his child will fall ill if an article of its dress has been carried away by the stream; and it is customary among different tribes to ask for worn clothes of European children, that their children, wearing them, may thrive the better through the sweat which the clothes contain. *Water* in which persons of high standing have washed off the perspiration of their hands and feet is believed to have the power of making the soil fertile, or is taken as a medicine (Dayaks, Macassars, Javanese); and the water in which clothes of certain people have been washed is used to cure all kinds of diseases, but especially (and in this case it is a garment of the husband which is washed) to hasten a confinement. Even *earth* from footprints, to which something of a person adheres, is sometimes used to injure that person by sorcery (Malays, Battak, Galelarese).

From the stories current among Galelarese, Torajas, and Javanese relating to deceased persons who were restored to life by means of *tears*, it appears that this secretion of man is also thought to contain soul-substance. *Urine* has similar effects where it is used as a medicine (Javanese, Kailians, Macassars, Battak, Dayaks). The Buginese rub people with urine to make them bullet-proof, while in Añkola and Halmahera a person's urine is used to destroy him; in the island of Kisser a young man urinates on the urine of his heart's elect, hoping that this will make her love him. Moreover, many stories are found among the Indonesians about animals which were impregnated with a human being by drinking human urine. Among the Macassars and Torajas *fæces* are used to heal wounds. Among the former and the Karo Battak they are also used to practise in sorcery.

3. Ways in which man increases his soul-substance.—In the opinion of the Indonesians the soul-substance discussed above is impersonal; it can be both increased and decreased. Primitive man was always bent on increasing his soul-substance in order to make his life stronger. (1) He accomplished this by *eating* and *drinking*. The Indonesian imagines that the soul-substance of the food is absorbed by him (though he does not always realize this), as may be seen from the food which he forbids in different illnesses. This prohibition is not founded on empiricism, but on shape, taste, name, and properties of the various foods. On account of their form, name, etc., they are considered injurious to the patient, and their soul-substance corresponds to their name, form, etc. The Dayaks do not eat the flesh of deer, lest they should become cowardly (like a deer). The eating of white buffaloes causes leprosy (Central Celebes), etc. The Malays believe that they strengthen their own soul-substance when absorbing the soul-substance of the food. They tell a story, in which a poor man grows strong and healthy by eating the flavour of a rich man's food; whereas the rich man, eating the food itself, grows thinner and weaker. Moreover, many Indonesian peoples call rice the strengthener of soul-substance. If a person's shadow falls on food, the food must not be eaten, else the soul-substance of the person is also eaten (Atchc, Halmahera). Cannibalism is founded on the idea of eating some one else's soul-substance. It existed (or still exists) among the Battak, some Dayak tribes, and the Papuans; among other peoples we find traces of it in the drinking of human blood, the eating of brains and other parts of the body. That the great object was to add to their soul-substance appears from the parts eaten: the palm of the hand was eaten to get strong hands (Battak, Dayaks, Galelarese); knee-caps, to get strong knees (Battak); scrapings of human bones, to make the whole body strong (Olo-Ngaju, Macassars, Torajas). In the Moluccas, pieces of the heart, liver, and lungs are eaten to become 'brave'; and for the same reason dogs are eaten (Nias, Torajas, Moluccas). It is a general precept that a pregnant woman must not eat pungent, stimulating, hot things, else the child she brings forth will also be 'hot,' *i.e.* unhealthy.

(2) A way of adding to one's soul-substance is by *drinking blood*. The Macassars, Buginese, Torajas, Kailians, Gorontalese, Minahassians, and Tobelorese drink the blood of a slain enemy in order to become brave and strong. Those who conclude peace drink each other's blood, as well as those who wish to become blood-brothers; some drops of blood from the shoulders or arms of the two parties were mixed and drunk; this betokened that their soul-substance, and so also their wishes and thoughts, had become one. This custom is specially prevalent among the Dayak tribes; but it also occurs among the Battak, in many of the islands of the Molucca group, and in Timor. Among the Olo-Ngaju in Borneo, when a child was adopted by others, it was given some blood to drink from the right shoulder of the foster-father and from the right breast of the foster-mother; and a newly married couple on their wedding-day, a man who has been appointed chief, or persons who settle a quarrel are smeared with blood to strengthen their soul-substance. The same customs also occur in the south of Celebes. In Java it is believed that the blood lost during confinement by a woman who has borne a child in *jumat lĕgi* or *sĕloso kliwon* has a special healing power.

(3) Since saliva contains a large amount of soul-substance, the Indonesians think that they can add to a man's soul-substance by *spitting* on him. This spitting is very general; sometimes some herb or root is chewed to strengthen the effect of the saliva. Dayak parents spit on their children daily to promote their growth; sores and wounds also are spat on; the remuneration which a witch-doctor receives for this spitting is still called 'reward of the saliva' among the Madurese. Some years ago there was a holy man in Padang whose saliva was said to be particularly efficacious; many people had themselves spat on by him to become strong and healthy. The Indonesians try to cure a benumbed leg by rubbing it with their saliva, the numbness being, in their opinion, caused through temporary want of soul-substance.

(4) The *breath* is another manifestation of soul-substance; hence a man may be supplied with new soul-substance by being breathed upon. It is therefore a prevailing custom among the Indonesians to breathe on sick or dying people. This is also done in cases of confinements which do not go smoothly, and when any one faints. With the Muhammadans water is exorcized and breathed on to give it healing power. Soul-substance is also transmitted from one man to another by mere contact. In most parts of the Archipelago the people like Europeans to touch their children; and offerings are touched by the participants. Connected with this is the belief that, if a person has been infected with a skin disease through contact with a person suffering from the disease, the latter will have got rid of his illness.

4. The personal soul-substance in man.—The soul-substance of a man is also imagined to be personal; this is specially the case with the tribes among whom the idea of individuality is more highly developed than in the case of a communistic society. This personal soul-substance is then the personification of all the impersonal soul-substance in man. It has the shape of its owner, but the Indonesian always imagines it as a diminutive human being, as large as a thumb; hence it is concentrated soul-substance. It can separate from the body voluntarily or by compulsion. Some tribes, *e.g.* the Toba Battak, endow it even with an independent existence outside of man. This is also found among the Karo Battak, who recall the soul-substance when it is going away, not to its owner, but to his house. A Loda (Halmahera) story tells of a person who keeps his soul-substance in a bottle. Sometimes people procure a certain object of which the soul-substance is supposed to be very fond, and this object is then thought to bind the soul-substance to the house. This custom is specially prevalent among the Battak. Most of the Indonesians hold the belief that, although the soul-substance may carry on an independent existence, it has its home *in* the body. If it is too long separated from the body, the person falls ill and dies.

(1) The Indonesian sees his soul-substance embodied in his *shadow*. To the question whether a new-born child has soul-substance, the answer in Halmahera is: 'Of course, for it has a shadow.' Some assert that there are people who have no shadow, or only a very faint one; they will die soon, as their soul-substance is gone (Macassars, Kailians, Afikolaians). Food on which a person's shadow falls must not be eaten, else the person is harmed, for his soul-substance is eaten (Dayaks, Niassians, Achinese, Afikolaians, Javanese, Malays). Throughout the Malay Archipelago no one must stand on a shadow, tread on it, hew, or stab it, nor let his shadow fall on a grave or a tree or any other object in which a spirit is thought to reside, as the soul of the dead person in the grave or the spirit in the tree might seize the shadow (soul-substance), and cause the person's death.

(2) There is also a close relation between the *name* and the soul-substance of a man. If sorcery is practised, the soul-substance of the man who is to be ruined is called upon by his name to approach. The Javanese think that writing some one's name on a bier is sufficient to destroy him. The names of those who are out hunting, or on a journey, must not be mentioned by those at home, else their soul-substance returns home, or they fall ill—at all events, they are unable to carry out their intention (Torajas, Galelarese). The Indonesians think that an evil spirit loses its power as soon as its name is pronounced. Many plants owe their supposed healing power only to their name. The names of those who are ill are changed, in order to mislead the spirit who is annoying them. A child who has not yet received a name is not regarded as a human being; when such a child dies, it is put into the earth without any ceremonies (Dayaks, Torajas, Macassars, Javanese, Afikolaians, Toba Battak).

(3) During *sleep* the soul-substance separates from the body, and wanders about; what it sees the man dreams. In sleep the soul-substance meets the souls of the deceased. It is universally assumed by the Indonesians that, when the souls of the deceased receive the dreamer kindly, and give him food, he will soon die. The Dayaks, Torajas, and Javanese court meetings with spirits by going to sleep in places inhabited by them. On various occasions an attempt is made to learn through a dream what the dead say, *e.g.* in case of marriage (Dayaks, Niassians); when trying to find suitable trees when seeking camphor (Battak); when choosing a branch of trade (Javanese), etc. Among some tribes a person watching near a corpse must not sleep, because the soul of the deceased might easily seize the roving soul-substance; and a sick person is not allowed to fall asleep, lest the soul-substance should go away and never return. After an oppressive dream, which may have frightened the soul-substance and caused it to depart, it is necessary to bring an offering to call it back. It is wrong to wake a person suddenly, because the soul-substance may not have had time enough to return. The strict prohibition against stepping across a sleeping person, which at present is only looked upon as bad manners, may be traced to the same idea.

(4) *Fright*, a *yearning* for some one or something, *want*, and *discontent* also cause the soul-substance to move to another place, with the result that the person falls ill. Hence it is only when in a passion that Indonesian parents dare to beat their children; when it is beaten the child gets discontented, then its soul-substance may run away and the child fall ill. To prevent the loss of soul-substance, *e.g.*, in times of epidemics, bits of tape are tied round the wrists (Torajas, Dayaks, Minañkabauians, Niassians, and Battak). The soul-substance goes into and out of the body through mouth, nose, or ears, but usually through the crown of the head, through the large fontanel. Only the Papuans say that it goes in and out at the shoulder, under the collar-bone. The soul-substance does not always leave voluntarily; it may be carried off by other people, or it may follow a man of its own accord. The custom of refusing a stranger admittance to mother and child during the first few days after a confinement must be owing to fear of this; the very frail soul-substance of the child might cling to the stranger and go with him (Achinese, Dayaks, Macassars, Javanese). Women must abstain from festivities, dances, and some daily occupations while their husbands are travelling, in order not to hamper them on their journey

(Central and Southern Celebes). The fear which most Indonesian tribes have of being photographed arises from the thought that the soul-substance may be carried off with the photograph. The soul-substance of a man is often lured away by sorcerers for the purpose of injuring him; and in times of war the soul-substance of enemies is lured away in the conviction that the enemies themselves will follow it—thus causing them to fall an easy prey to their lurking foes. Rice and eggs are always used as an enticement (Battak, Niassians, Torajas, Dayaks). Finally, a man's soul-substance may be tempted away by the soul of one of his deceased relatives, either because it longs to have him with him or as a revenge for some offence.

If the soul-substance remains long separated from its home in the man, the man must die. When it is suspected that the soul-substance is gone it must be brought back. The sick person tells where he first felt ill, and the soul-substance is found there. After a burial the soul of the deceased is accused of having stolen the soul-substance, and it is brought back from the grave. If a spirit has taken away the soul-substance, this is revealed by sorcery or in a dream. The calling back of the spirit is very simple: a mother, thinking that the soul-substance of her child is gone, calls, 'Come, soul-substance,' sometimes accompanying this by the sound with which chickens are called. Among the Olo-Ngaju, when a child falls downstairs, the mother scoops up in a basket the soul-substance, which she thinks has been lost by the fright; and among the Javanese, if a person comes home feeling ill, a relative takes one of his garments, and, trailing this along behind him, runs to the spot where the person first felt ill, catching up the lost soul-substance in this way. Generally, however, they have recourse to a sorcerer. He goes to the spot in question with an offering and a piece of cotton or a branch of a tree. The soul-substance is caught in the piece of cloth or in the branch, carried home, and applied to the sick man's head (Moluccas, Minahassa, Central and Southern Celebes, Timor; among the Dayaks, Javanese, Sundanese, Niassians, Battak, and Gayos). In Bolañ Mońondou and among the Malays it is sometimes caught in a doll; among other tribes generally in a bowl or in a bag of rice (Southern Celebes, Watubela, Olo-Dusun, Land Dayaks, Karo and Timor Battak, Malays). The priestesses among the Bahau Dayaks declare that they split the sick man's head, and thus open a way for the soul-substance; or remove it by placing a beautiful garment on the patient's head. Occasionally the sorcerer uses a ladder for the soul-substance to pass along; this is a thread (Timorese) or a string of beads (Land Dayaks of Sarawak). When the soul-substance has been caught, it looks like a piece of a leaf (Minahassians, Torajas), a little spider (Timor, Nias), or hair (Dayaks of Sarawak), coal, oil, earth, or blood (Olo-Dusun and others).

(5) *Sneezing* is generally looked upon as one of the signs that the soul-substance is leaving the body or returning to it. The belief is wide-spread that a sick man will recover when he sneezes, because then the soul-substance has come back. The wishes pronounced by a mother when her child sneezes are to the effect that a spirit may not take away the soul-substance which has issued out of the child (Torajas, Javanese, Battak, Dayaks). For grown-up people sneezing is a sign either that friends think of them or that enemies want to harm their soul-substance. In consideration of the latter case imprecations are frequently uttered with sneezing.

When a spirit has caught the soul-substance, a doll is often made representing the sick person, and this, instead of the soul-substance of the patient, is offered to the spirit (Uliassians, Torajas, Minahassians, Macassars, all Dayak tribes, Malays, Battak, Niassians). The name given to this doll often has the meaning of 'ransom,' 'substitute,' 'price for which something is bought,' etc. The doll is generally brought beforehand into closer connexion with the sick person by adding to it a thread of his clothes, a hair, some saliva, or some scrapings of skin and nails, or by simply pressing it against him. Another kind of substitute is a doll representing the patient, which is ill-treated, in order to give satisfaction to the spirit which has caused the disease, that it may refrain from troubling the sick man any longer.

5. **Voluntary departure of soul-substance.**—When the sick person continues to be ill in spite of all efforts, this is a proof for the Indonesian that the spirit has taken the soul-substance to a spot whence men cannot bring it back. Then a priest or a priestess must be summoned, who is conversant with the spirits, and who can conjure up well-disposed spirits to help them in their search for the soul-substance. These priests and priestesses generally intone a litany, in which they record their experiences on the journey to the spirit world. Then the priest invokes the help of the spirits which are well disposed to man. The spirits come for the priest in some vehicle (generally the rainbow), and conduct him (*i.e.* his soul-substance) to higher regions, where after many meetings with gods and spirits, and after some vicissitudes, he regains the lost soul-substance, and, having returned to earth in the same vehicle, restores it to the sick person. The idea which gives rise to this practice is that in sleep the soul-substance can move about freely in the haunts of the spirits. Among the Javanese and Buginese, and in the Moluccas, the priests and priestesses still actually lie down to sleep. Among other tribes sleep is only feigned. The language used by the priests is a mixture of words of their own, circumlocutions, and words derived from foreign languages. All these things have certainly been used to enhance the importance of the priests and priestesses, but among the Indonesians the priests have never practised a secret cult. The above is true of Dayaks, Torajas, Minahassians, Tobelorese, Buginese, Minañkabauians, and Javanese.

The personal soul-substance may separate from the body in order to harm a person. Those who possess this power are wer-wolves and witches. Some tribes believe that the whole wer-wolf changes into a tiger (Malacca, Sumatra, Java), into a crocodile (Philippine Islands, Lombok), into a dog or cat (Timor); but most of them believe that only the soul-substance changes into an animal, and the body remains at home. As a rat, dog, snake, milliped, owl, etc., it penetrates into the houses of people to injure them. When the soul-substance leaves or enters the body, it does so in the shape of a mouse (Timor), a firefly (Bali, Central Celebes), or a lizard (Malays). The harm which the wer-wolf is supposed to do to people is to eat their soul-substance; he does this by taking the entrails (especially the liver) out of a man (Bali, Halmahera, Central Celebes, and other places), by drinking the blood (Southern Timor), or by preying upon the heart (Korinchi). A man becomes a lycanthrope by inheritance or by transmission (Central Timor, Central Celebes, Dayaks, Malays), by pronouncing certain charms (Java, Bali), or by offerings to evil spirits (Halmahera). It is not always possible to recognize a lycanthrope; sometimes, however, he may be known either by twisted feet (Atchc), or by want of the groove under the nose in the upper lip (Korinchi), or sometimes by peculiar actions, as, *e.g.*, standing naked on his head (Central Timor). When some

one is suspected of being a wer-wolf, it has to be decided by an ordeal whether he is really guilty or not; if he is guilty, he is killed.

The witch (vampire) is a woman, who can sever her head from her body, and make it fly through the air to harm people; the bowels fly along with the head; she uses her ears (sometimes her lungs) as wings. Generally the name for witch points to this power; *e.g.*, among most of the Indonesian tribes the word is connected with the Malay *tanggal*, 'to draw out, to pull out.' The witch may be recognized by the noises which she makes on her journeys (represented by *ko* or *po*). She works harm in the same way as the wer-wolf. She can go on her expeditions only by night; if she has not returned to her body before daybreak, she dies. The Indonesians try to protect their homes from visits of witches by all kinds of means, the most common being the hanging up of some thorny boughs. The witch is killed when her guilt has been convincingly proved.

6. Soul-substance of animals.—According to the Indonesians, the soul-substance of animals is similar to that of man. This appears from their folklore. In the story of creation of the Karo Battak, men were to be born from eggs, but through the carelessness of a mythical personage the eggs broke too soon, and animals and plants issued forth. Numerous stories tell that animals were originally men; this applies specially to monkeys, crocodiles, and birds; but also to deer (Macassars, Torajas, Malays) and to dogs (Halmahera). Women give birth to animals, as is generally told of the crocodile, of the iguana (Papuans, Madurese), of snakes and lizards (Battak). Animals also may bring forth human beings, as monkeys (Malays), dogs (Java, Lombok, Southern and Central Celebes, Nias), buffaloes (Macassars), and deer (Dayaks). Men sometimes turn into animals by eating part of an animal, into birds by eating birds' eggs (Minahassa), into crocodiles by eating crocodiles' eggs (Dayaks), into snakes by eating the flesh of snakes (Minahassa, Padang). Animals sometimes play the part of allies of man.

Man uses the soul-substance of animals for his own benefit: the ashes of the milliped or of the burnt prehensile tail of the cuscus are rubbed between the hands to make them strong in combat (Galelarese); lizards are used in cases of leprosy, on account of their regenerating power (Java); the head and the fat of the tortoise are used to bring splinters to light, in virtue of its power of drawing in or putting out its head from under its shell (Torajas, Battak). The bones have special power; bones of crows make a person dexterous in stealing, and in Central Celebes they make a person invisible. Everywhere we meet with stories that miraculous trees grow out of buried bones of animals. Skulls of deer and pigs are hung up in the house to call the soul-substance of their fellows (Macassars, Torajas, Galelarese, Niassians). The blood of animals plays an important part at sacrifices. Sacred heirlooms are rubbed with blood to give them power (Macassars and Buginese); padi-seeds are sprinkled with blood to make them grow rapidly (Torajas, Dayaks). The Macassars drank deer's blood to assimilate themselves to these animals, in order to catch them more easily. The saliva of animals also has power; we find cases where people are cured by the saliva of a cow (Padang *panjañ*), a tiger (Javanese), and dogs (Afikola, Halmahera). The saliva of hens is applied to cure stings or bites of venomous beasts. On the other hand, the animal itself is very often used, burnt and pounded to powder.

Animals which are of special importance to man are endowed with a personal soul-substance. Thus, among a tribe of hunters dogs are considered to possess personal soul-substance; they have names, and are spoken to and treated as men (Torajas, Galelarese, Dayaks). This continues up to the time when they are no longer hunters (Minañkabauians, Malays). Buffaloes and cows also have personal soul-substance; they are addressed, their soul-substance is invoked, and offerings are given to them (Minañkabauians, Achinese, Battak, Dayaks, Javanese, Timorese, Macassars, Buginese, and Torajas). As a rule one animal in a herd is considered as the leader which keeps the herd together, and is neither killed nor sold.

7. Soul-substance of plants.—According to the Indonesians, plants too have soul-substance similar to that of man. The close relation between man and plant appears from stories. Sometimes a person going on a journey gives the relatives whom he leaves behind a plant, which will languish when he is in danger or ill. Many tribes plant a coconut at the birth of a child; the soul-substance of the child is then bound to the tree when it grows up. Other stories tell that some trees were originally men, *e.g.*, the *Metroxylon* and the *Arenga saccharifera*; others deal with persons who have come forth from trees or plants, especially from rotan and bamboo. There are plants to which a particularly strong soul-substance is attributed, on account of their tough vital power. With all Indonesians the *Dracæna terminalis* stands foremost among them. It is the sacred plant, which is used by the priests in all their proceedings, and whose strong soul-substance they try to transfer to man. The name and shape of plants characterize their soul-substance, and to this the Indonesian pays heed when seeking for cures for diseases, or for bringing about some change in his body. In Central Celebes there is a tree called *lenturu*; now *turu* means to sleep, and therefore the leaves of this tree are used to alleviate (cause to go to sleep) pain. The soul-substance of the principal trees and plants which are of great use to man is imagined to be personal: thus fruit-bearing trees are often addressed as persons. The rice is fed by touching the stalks with rice-porridge; wood and leaves of trees with large fruit are laid between the rice, that it may form large grains; all kinds of precautions must be taken, lest the soul-substance of the rice should be frightened and flee. If from the languishing condition of the rice it appears that the soul-substance is gone, then it is brought back as with man. This soul-substance is imagined in the shape of a bird or a snake; particularly at the moment when the rice is to be cut, it is necessary to be careful not to startle the soul-substance; then an object is made out of rice-plants, the 'rice mother,' which will keep back the soul-substance of the other rice; it also attracts the soul-substance of rice which has got lost through birds or in other ways; the soul-substance of the rice mother is still more strengthened by the addition of stones, iron, and plants with strong soul-substance; it is spoken to kindly, and it is told what is desired from it; with great show of honour the rice mother is carried home, and preserved in the barn with the other rice. Among trees the coco-palm has a personal soul-substance. It is said to have grown out of the head of a man. The nut is frequently used in sorcery; various animistic actions take place when planting it. In order to prevent the tree from shooting up too rapidly it is planted in the afternoon, when it casts a short shadow, or the people who plant it squat down; in order to make it bear much fruit, it is planted by a person who has many children and grandchildren, etc. The *Arenga saccharifera* grew out of a woman; the palm wine is milk from her breasts, or it is her tears; during all the operations to which the tree is subjected it is also

spoken to (Torajas, Dayaks, Javanese, Niassians, Battak). In the Moluccas the clove tree is considered and treated exactly in the same way as a woman with child, during the time that it is in bloom; people are particularly careful to avoid anything that might frighten the soul-substance of the tree. The Battak believe that the camphor tree has a spirit of its own to which sacrifices are offered; the camphor-seekers use a language of their own making, lest the soul-substance of the tree should understand what their object is and hide its camphor crystals from them. In Sumba the natives call the sandalwood tree *ai nitu, i.e.* spirit wood, and formerly nobody dared cut down such a tree. In a grove of caoutchouc trees there is one tree which is considered the chief of all, and which takes care that the soul-substance of the other trees does not vanish (and with it the sap); such a tree is never tapped.

8. Soul-substance of objects. — That objects also have soul-substance appears from the use that is made of them. Very often people carry with them iron objects, stones, china, beads, or hard fruits, as some kinds of nuts, or make their children carry them about, that their soul-substance may be as hard as that of the objects mentioned (Malays, Battak, Gayos, Dayaks, Sundanese, Macassars, Torajas, Galelarese). Brittle objects are brought into contact with hard ones, to make them hard; *e.g.*, an earthen pot is touched with iron or stone (Macassars, Torajas). Objects are also fed: agricultural tools are fed on the new rice (Dayaks, Torajas, Central Timor); the plough gets an offering (Macassars); the loom is given rice to eat (Southern Timor); the rifle gets part of the game (Central Timor); the Javanese offer sacrifices to all kinds of objects—to their cart, their barn, etc. The Indonesian smiths in particular offer sacrifices to their tools. A large piece of gold is supposed to attract other gold (Achinese, Parigians, Torajas, Dayaks); a particularly large diamond to attract other diamonds (Dayaks). The soul-substance of iron plays an important part among the Indonesians: they sit down on iron to make their own soul-substance strong (Malays, Macassars); iron is used to make people invulnerable (Karo Battak); water in which iron has lain is drunk to produce strength (Nias, Java, Central Celebes, Halmahera); a Javanese woman-doctor always carries iron about with her, in order to give additional force to her massage; among the Torajas and Dayaks iron plays an important part in various solemnities. The smith, who handles iron every day, is considered a very important man (Battak, Dayaks, Torajas), and among the peoples who have become Muhammadans he has continued to be the representative of heathenism. In those countries where gold is found there are all kinds of precepts not to drive away the soul-substance of the gold (and with it the gold itself) (Malays, Minañkabauians). The Dayaks believe that the soul-substance of gold can avenge itself on the gold-seeker and make him ill. In the tin explorations among the Malays it is necessary to avoid everything that might frighten the soul-substance of the tin; the tin ore is always heated with great respect.

9. Metempsychosis.—What becomes of the soul-substance after death? Some of the tribes believe that it passes into soul, but most of them do not. The facts prove that after the death of a person the soul-substance continues to be distinguished from the soul (Dayaks, Torajas, Papuans, Timorese, and others). The general idea is that after death the soul-substance returns to the chief god, who doles it out again to other people, animals, and plants; or this animation takes place directly. The conceptions concerning the soul-substance have given rise to the belief in metempsychosis—which in its turn has been superseded by the belief in the soul, in man living an independent spiritual existence after death. Even in this earthly life the soul-substance can move to another person. It is universally believed that, when a child resembles its father (or its mother) strongly, it has got possession of that parent's soul-substance, and he (or she) must die. If a child resembles a person who has died, the dead one has been incarnated in the child (Javanese, Balinese, Niassians, Dayaks). The soul-substance of the dead is also transmitted to animals and plants: beasts of prey are ancestors who avenge a violation of moral laws. The dead are also supposed to live on in animals which have something in common with the spirits: the firefly, because of its mysterious light; birds and butterflies, because they can soar up to the realms of the spirits; snakes, because they come forth from holes in the earth, from the under world, etc.; and house lizards and mice, because they live with men in the same house, etc.

The soul-substance of a living person is imagined as a firefly (Torajas, Battak, Niassians); also that of deer and swine (Battak, Dayaks), and of plants (Javanese). Moreover, all the Indonesian tribes look upon the firefly as the incarnation of a deceased person. The soul-substance leaves a sleeping person in the shape of a cricket (Sundanese and Galelarese). The cricket is a dead person, showing the living the way to the Land of Souls (Torajas). Sometimes a blowfly is an embodied curse which comes to some one (Kailians, Dayaks); generally, however, it is a dead person who comes to fetch a relative to the Land of Souls (Torajas, Javanese, Añkolaians, Battak, Niassians); sometimes it is a person who has died abroad, and has come to announce his death to his relatives (Galelarese, Macassars). Only in Añkola and Nias is the butterfly regarded as a dead person; everywhere else it is looked upon as the soul-substance of a friend who has come to announce his visit to some house; sometimes it is the soul-substance of animals (Torajas, Battak). If a butterfly settles on a sick person, the latter improves in health, for his soul-substance has returned (Torajas, Minahassians, and Añkolaians). Soul-substance is also supposed to have the shape of a bird, as is proved by the fact that it is summoned back by interjections with which chickens are called (Buginese, Macassars, Malays, Minañkabauians, Central Celebes). The idea that birds are incarnations of the dead is prevalent throughout Indonesia.

Among the Torajas, Dayaks, and Timorese the mouse is supposed to be the soul-substance of a living person. When a mouse nibbles at the clothes or nails of some one, it is considered by nearly all the tribes as a dead person who has come to take him to the Land of Souls. A snake is generally looked upon as a dead person, whose coming forebodes evil. Among some tribes, *e.g.* the Dayaks, the soul-substance appears as a snake, but as a rule a reptile represents a dead person. If it enters a house, it is a person who has died and has come to fetch one of the inmates. The soul-substance of a lycanthrope appears among some peoples as a house lizard (Malays); but in other cases this animal is taken as the incarnation of a dead person who wishes to continue living in the same house with his relatives.

Remnants of the belief in the transmigration of souls are found everywhere throughout the Archipelago. Man can pass into all kinds of animals; but in these ideas concerning metempsychosis there is not a trace of any thought of retribution. This is met with only among the Javanese and Balinese, who have been under the influence of the Hindus, and who try to find charms to secure

for themselves a new birth into a higher being, or lead the life of a hermit for this purpose.

10. **The worship of animals.**—Closely connected with the belief in the transmigration of souls is the worship rendered to some animals by the Indonesian peoples, because they think their ancestors are embodied in them; such animals must not be harmed. Examples are the white hen (Battak), or another bird (Tagalas), or a species of monkey (Battak, Dayaks), pig (Babar), buffalo, deer (Dayaks), eel (in the Philippine islands, in Southern Celebes, and the Moluccas). An object of universal worship among the Indonesians is the crocodile. In Java and Sumatra it is believed that the souls of the ancestors have become crocodiles, which protect their descendants. They are killed only by way of revenge when they have killed a man. Mothers place the placenta of their children in a small vessel and let it float down the river, as an offering to the crocodiles (to the ancestors). In Bañka good and evil are supposed to be due to the crocodile; it is addressed as 'high lord'; at festivals sacrifices are offered to it; the highest thing imaginable is to become a crocodile after death. Buginese and Macassars see their ancestors in crocodiles, and throw offerings into the water; a crocodile is believed to devour a man only by mistake. Formerly a virgin was offered to the crocodiles by the Timorese when a new ruler ascended the throne. All through the Moluccas the crocodile is worshipped, and people refrain from eating its flesh. In Celebes and the islands north of it the crocodile is called 'grandfather.' In all the temples of the Torajas figures of crocodiles are found. Many Indonesian tribes consider the lizard as the incarnation of the household gods of the ancestors living in the house. If an offering is put ready for those household gods, and a lizard is heard, this means that the souls of the departed have eaten enough, or that they want more (Halmahera, Southern Celebes, Nias). A worship proper, however, as is found among the Polynesians, does not occur in Indonesia. It is probably because there were no crocodiles found there that the lizard cult has developed so strongly. Wherever tigers are found (Java, Sumatra, and Malay peninsula) they are worshipped as incarnations of ancestors; they are called 'grandfather,' and are never hunted. The Timor Battak believe that only very old men who have lived exemplary lives change into tigers, and protect their descendants in this shape.

11. **Fetishism.**—The fetishes of the Indonesians are objects with a soul-substance which is thought to be personal. These objects are used by men to their own advantage. All through the Archipelago stones are found in the shape of men, animals, and plants, but they are not generally fetishes. The Indonesians do not pray to their fetishes, but they feed them on rice, eggs, and blood to strengthen their efficiency and power to bless. The fetish is addressed as a person.

(1) All *objects* can become fetishes; this depends on their singularity or rarity, or the circumstances under which they are found. Very common fetishes are bezoar-stones, which are found in animals and plants. The Indonesians consider them as the concentrated soul-substance of the animal or plant. They are used for various purposes: they are worn on the naked body, to make the strength pass from them into the body; they are supposed to ensure a long life, to stanch blood, to procure invulnerability. In some parts of the Archipelago a trade is carried on in these stones. So-called thunder-stones, objects from the Stone Age, are also treated as fetishes. They are considered as the 'teeth' of thunder and lightning. They occur everywhere, and are used to allay the elements and bring about rain or dry weather. They also render a person invulnerable in war. Among the fetishes common stones are also found. The Indonesians look upon stones and mountains as the skeleton, the bones, of the earth; and, just as they consider the bones of man as the most important, the least transitory part, so they think stones the most important part of the earth; hence their objection to the chipping of stones by explorers. Special stones may become fetishes; sometimes they are indicated in dreams, or their shape or colour reveals them, or they strike some one's fancy. Stones as fetishes are found everywhere; the Minañkabauians have even stones producing sound; they are rubbed with blood to make them efficacious, and fumigated with incense. Stones are used as fetishes mainly in Timor; they tell their owners in a dream what sacrifice they wish; altars are erected for them; they are generally fed on rice and eggs. There are State and family fetishes. The soul-substance of the precious sandalwood is embodied in a stone. Among some tribes a large stone is erected at every village, and this embodies the soul-substance of the whole population (Nias, Minahassa, Borneo). Stones which are said to have brought forth little stones are also found as fetishes (Minañkabau, Central Celebes). Fetishes are frequently used as amulets; they are worn round the neck, on the belly, or across the shoulder, and consist mostly of stones, twigs or roots of a peculiar shape, or teeth of men and animals. War amulets are in general use as fetishes which give luck in warfare. The Torajas use a string of horned shells for this purpose. In Timor this amulet is a little bag filled with stones and roots, which is kept at the top of the house, where the ancestors are supposed to live. In Halmahera and among the Dayaks little pots filled with sacred oil are often worn round the neck. The Dayaks also use strings of the teeth of beasts of prey. Other amulets are hung in fruit-trees, to save them from being robbed of their fruit. They are often known by the name of 'red-eye,' and mostly consist of nettles and other things causing itching, which will bring illness to the thief. They have the distinguishing feature of fetishes—viz. to act self-consciously like persons. A remarkable fetish is the *pangulubalang*, a rough stone image, in which holes have been bored, and filled with a pulpy substance made of eyes, lips, nose, and other parts of a corpse. With this mixture the stone is animated, *i.e.* made into a person. The soul of the corpse of which the mixture has been made has nothing to do with this. These stone images are planted near the villages, and warn the inhabitants of an approaching danger. These stones are also found among the Dayaks, Minahassians, Niassians. Among the first and the last mentioned, life is infused into them by means of blood. The Dayaks sacrificed to them before they went to war, and the captured heads were placed near them. Among the Battak this principle is applied in the magic wands, carved sticks, which are also animated by means of blood, and are used for various purposes—especially to bring about rain or dry weather. The *perminakan* is a pitcher filled with blood, with a wooden stopper, on which a human figure has been carved. *Pagar* ('fence') consists of fetishes prepared in different ways and hung up in the house; these objects guard the owner against all kinds of evil practices and magic spells and poison.

Objects which have gradually become fetishes are old heirlooms, known in the Archipelago as *pusaka*. They derive their fetish power from the circumstance that in olden times they were used by the ancestors. The objects are so sacred that nobody would think of selling them. It is impossible to give an enumeration of the different *pusaka*;

their number is continually added to. We need mention only the *bĕlangas*, or sacred earthen pots, of the Dayaks, seen all through Borneo. These pots are old and of foreign origin—the Dayaks say, of supernatural origin. Frequent attempts have been made to copy the pots, but the Dayak easily distinguishes the genuine ones from the imitations. The Dayaks pay fabulous prices for these objects. It is recorded that vessels have been bought for £330, £1200, and one for as much as £2000. When a pot breaks the shards are sold separately at high prices. These pots have supernatural power: they bring luck and avert evil. They secure to their owners a flourishing trade, a plentiful harvest, success in hunting and catching fish; they ward off diseases and disasters, and banish all evil spirits from their neighbourhood. Water drunk from them has healing power. They are worshipped like gods; after one has been bought a sacrificial feast is given; frequently they are rubbed with the blood of pigs or of fowls.

Among the *pusaka*, or heirlooms, the State ornaments call for special mention. Each of the different Toraja districts in Central Celebes preserves some object—as a spear, a *baju*, a wooden rice-spoon, a ladle of coco-nut shell, or an earthen pot. These objects are said to have belonged originally to the household of a prince who ruled all the Torajas. Nobody dares to take charge of these old heirlooms but the chief himself, who is the representative of the tribe. Among more primitive tribes these State ornaments are no more than fetishes which bring luck to the country. They have become of more importance to more civilized tribes, as the Macassars and the Buginese. Their State ornaments consist of all kinds of objects; offerings are made to them, and they are fumigated with incense; frequently a vow is made, in cases of disease, pregnancy, childlessness, etc., to sacrifice an animal to these objects. In cases of general disasters, sacrificial feasts are organized for them, at which they are rubbed with the blood of a buffalo. The man to whose care they are entrusted is the ruler of the people. All kinds of wonders are told about the State ornaments in the Padang highlands; they are said, *inter alia*, to emit a glow which is injurious to the health of children. People wash themselves with water in which they have lain. Another ornament killed the person whose shadow was cast on it. In some regions of the Malay Peninsula the natives were so afraid of the ornaments that they did not dare to look at them. The State ornaments at the courts of the Javanese princes are displayed only at feasts and ceremonies; they consist, for the greater part, of solid gold objects representing mythical beings or animals. A cannon was supposed always to warn the prince of imminent dangers, and another cannon could make women fruitful; for this reason barren women made offerings to that fetish, during which they sat astride on horseback like men.

(2) *Persons* may also become fetishes even during their lives,[1] *i.e.* some persons are considered to be endowed with supernatural power, which renders them objects of adoration. This may be said to be generally true of all native princes in the Archipelago: their parents are supposed to have descended from heaven; they have white blood; their curse alone is sufficient to ruin all the land, and so forth. Perhaps the most striking example of this may be found in the *singa-mangaraja*, or priest-king of the Battak: he was said to have been in the womb for seven years; his birth was attended with all kinds of miraculous natural phenomena; when at a more advanced age he slept with his legs upwards and his head downwards, all the rice grew with its roots in the air. His tongue was overgrown with hair, and one word uttered by him could destroy a man or lay waste a region. Another example is furnished by James Brooke, the raja of Sarawak: water which he had blessed, or in which he had washed his hands or feet, was scattered over the land to make it fertile; and he was invoked by the Dayaks in their prayers.

(3) We know only one example of *living animals* becoming fetishes, viz. the worship of the turtle-dove by the Javanese and Malays in Sumatra. This, however, is not purely Indonesian, but was introduced by the Hindus. For the dove with the special marks a high price is paid; it brings its owner all kinds of blessings, averts disease, gives a good harvest of rice, and so on. These birds are tended with great care. Their dead bodies are embalmed and preserved, as they retain their power even after death. (See art. AUSTRALASIA.)

12. Spiritism; the appearance of the soul.—The soul living on after death is to the Indonesians a kind of essence of the dead body, having the same shape and the same defects as the material body; *e.g.*, the souls of people whose heads have been cut off by the enemy enter the Land of Souls without heads.

On this belief is based the practice of tatuing, which, as far as the Malay Archipelago is concerned, occurs only in the Moluccas and in Borneo. The tatu marks are also impressed on the soul. It is no longer possible to ascertain for what purpose this is done—whether it serves as clothing for the soul, or as a record of important events, or (and this is most probable) whether it is connected with puberty. Of the same nature is the practice of wounding shoulders and breast, as a proof that one does not shrink from pain, and as a test of courage—a virtue which is highly valued in the Land of Souls.

Most of the Indonesian races believe that the soul is black. During or after a funeral they blacken each other with charcoal, soot, or ashes (Torajas, Minahassians, Dayaks, Niassians, Karo Battak, inhabitants of Halmahera and the Aru islands, Papuans), to make the soul of the dead person believe that they also are souls; else it might resent its own death so much that it would kill its relatives. In Timor people cover themselves with a piece of black cotton for this purpose. There are other occasions when the artifice of making people black is practised to delude souls or spirits; babies are blackened when they are left alone (Dayaks, Niassians), and the custom is followed during a thunderstorm or other natural phenomena, in which spirits are supposed to have a hand (Añkolaians, Toba Battak, Karo Battak).

13. Man's fear of the soul.—Now and then we meet with instances of the love for the dead one overcoming the fear of his soul; this happens especially with dead children. But as a rule the Indonesians feel great fear of the soul of a dead person. They naturally think that the dead person resents leaving this earth, and in his resentment wishes to have his fate shared by others. He therefore tries to carry off the soul-substance of the surviving people into the grave, which will cause them to die.

The soul of a woman who has died in childbed is especially feared. Such a soul is called *pontianak* with some variations. It has the appearance of a bird with long claws, which utters a plaintive sound. Resenting that she has died in childbed, she tries to make other pregnant women suffer the same fate that has befallen her. She penetrates for this purpose into the woman's belly, and drives her claws into it. In this way she kills both mother and child. Some peoples believe that

[1] Objections may be raised to ranking men and animals with supernatural power among the fetishes. We have classed them here because they come very near to fetishes.

the *pontianak* tries to emasculate men (Western division of Borneo, Ceram, Key Islands, Savu). As a safeguard against the *pontianak*, people hang up thorny boughs (generally of a particular lemon tree) at the entrance of houses in which there are pregnant women. The *pontianak* will keep outside for fear of being wounded by the thorns. The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands bare the genital parts in order to drive away the *pontianak*.

The fear of the souls of the departed has given rise to innumerable methods of keeping them at a distance. Soul and body are believed to be in close connexion with each other, and it is thought that what is done to the body happens also to the soul. Therefore the corpse of a woman dying in childbirth is bound down to prevent her soul from turning into a *pontianak*. Needles and thorns are stuck into her hands and limbs, that she may be afraid to stir for fear of hurting herself. Eggs are placed in her arm-pits, that she may not open her arms like wings, for fear of losing the eggs. Besides these measures, which are universal, the Achinese give such a corpse an entangled ball of cotton and a needle without an eye; when the *pontianak* wants to go off, she must first sew trousers from her shroud, but spends the time in disentangling the cotton and seeking the eye of the needle.

The corpses of other people also are bound (Eñgano, Malacca, Halmahera, Central Celebes, the Moluccas), or the thumbs and the big toes are tied together, that the soul may not be able to run and seize (Battak, Niassians, Dayaks). The openings of the head, eyes, ears, and mouth are filled up, that the dead person may not be able to see, hear, or speak (Malays, Achinese, Battak, Niassians). Another way of keeping souls from doing harm is to throw ashes, by which the soul is blinded (Torajas, Battak, Niassians, Baduis in Java, Dayaks, Galelarese in Halmahera, in Ceram, and in Babar). The Indonesians also feel the need of representing symbolically the breaking of all connexions with the dead person: by splitting or cutting through a piece of rattan (Toba Battak, Torajas, inhabitants of Babar); by hewing a bamboo into two (Tanimbar), or a coco-nut (Macassars); by tearing a leaf in two (Papuans); by tearing the waist-cloth of the deceased in two (Niassians). Among the Karo Battak, if a woman dies, the widower splits the oblong stone with which spices are ground or tears a sirih-leaf in two. Another common method of separating oneself from the soul is bathing. Bathing is in general a means of getting rid of something unpleasant, something ominous, especially of something in connexion with the dreaded soul. Among the Olo-Ngaju in Borneo this bathing takes place in a curious way. After the burial the relatives of the dead person sit down in a boat, which is upset in the river, so that they all fall into the water; this is done three times. Among some tribes this rite has been reduced to a partial bathing. Some wash only their hands or their feet (Karo Battak, Torajas, Minahassians, and in Babar). The Dayaks in Sarawak break a stone bottle of water to pieces on the ground after the funeral. The tribes which have adopted Islām generally sprinkle water on the grave. Numerous are the methods used to make the soul lose its way to the house, lest it should return to it and haunt it. The Karo Battak bury the corpse of a person who has died a violent death, and whose soul is therefore supposed to bear malice even more than others, with its head towards the village, that the dead man, when he rises, may not be able to see the village. Some, as, *e.g.*, the Battak and the people of Halmahera, run away from the grave, every one trying hard not to be the last. Of very general occurrence is the custom of making the dead body leave the house through a window or a gap in the wall; this window or gap in the wall must face the west (Central and Southern Celebes, Halmahera, New Guinea, Borneo). Some peoples carry out in this way only the corpses of special personages whose souls are particularly dreaded; thus the Battak and the Balinese of earlier times did so only with the bodies of persons of high rank; in Nias the corpse of a woman who has died in childbirth is removed from the house through the floor. The Minahassians try to bewilder the soul of a dead person by running quickly a few times round the house with the corpse. This is probably the origin of the rapid pace at which the Muhammadans in Java and elsewhere in the Archipelago bury their dead. The Niassians make a special path to the burial-place to mislead the soul. It is a common practice, when returning from a funeral, to erect a forked stalk or piece of wood behind oneself on the road to keep back the soul (Tobuñku, Sea Dayaks, Battak, Niassians). Others block up the road with poles (Buru, New Guinea), or light fires and make noise (Sunda, Minahassa, Bolañ Moñondou, Southern Celebes, Dutch New Guinea; among Dayaks, Battak, and Niassians). Some tribes make the coffin as narrow as possible, to prevent the dead person from taking one of the survivors with him into it (Torajas, Galelarese, Olo-Ngaju, Niassians).

14. Mourning customs.—The Indonesians assume that, when a person has died, his soul is angry at renouncing life on earth. Afterwards it gets used to its new condition, but at first it is in a mood dangerous for the survivors. Therefore great care is recommended for the first few days after a death; this fear has given rise to the institution of mourning customs.

During the first days after a death the inhabitants of a village must keep perfectly quiet. No noise must be made, dancing or singing is forbidden, music must not be heard, rice must not be pounded, nor coco-nuts thrown down from the trees, nor shots fired; in fact, they go so far as to forbid fishing, sailing on the water, and carrying goods in the usual way. The intention is that no sound should meet the ear of the soul to indicate the way to its home; people try to conceal themselves from it. Such injunctions are found among all Indonesian peoples.

In the mourning clothing of the Indonesians is embodied the idea of hiding from the departed spirit or making oneself unattractive to it by wearing old, worn clothes; but these clothes have another purpose: the wearer wishes to make himself as much as possible similar to the dead person. Hence the Galelarese wear pieces of the shroud as clothes or as wraps round the wrists. This is found in the Tanimbar Islands and in Southern Celebes. It is also advisable to wear old clothes, or clothes no longer in use, because the souls of the departed in the Land of Souls are supposed to wear old-fashioned clothes. Thus the rule survives here and there to wear mourning clothes of bark (Dayaks, Central Borneo, Torajas), or to return in some way to old times (Ceram, Ambon, Aru, Boni). It is a wide-spread custom to take off all ornaments, or to wrap pieces of cloth round them, to prevent them from being seen.

These mourning customs are observed by the nearest relatives, or by a wider circle when the deceased was the chief of a tribe. Widows and widowers especially have to beware of the revenge of the soul. They must have their hair cut or shaved off; among some tribes more distant relatives also submit to this rule (New Guinea, Halmahera, Luañ-Sermata, Babar, Timor, Sarawak, Borneo, Eñgano, Battaland). In Timor all male subjects shave their heads at the death of a chief,

and among some Dayak tribes the serfs do so at the death of their master. Sometimes this shaving of the head is considered as the laying down of the ornament of the hair, but more probably it betokens a sacrifice of a part of oneself to save the whole.

Widows and widowers must also hide themselves from the souls of their dead mates in a special way, namely, by covering the head with a mat (Torajas), a piece of cotton or bark (Babar, Boni, Kenyah Dayaks, and Battak), a hat or cap (Papuans, Minahassians, Bahau Dayaks, Olo-Ngaju, Efigano), or a net (Papuans).

One of the mourning customs is abstinence from certain food, especially daily food; hence sago-cakes are eaten instead of the usual sago-porridge (Papuans, Galelarese, Tobelorese); or maize instead of the daily rice (Torajas, Minahassians, Dayaks); eating in the house of death is not allowed (Silinduñ, S.-E. Borneo, Southern Celebes); eating is allowed, but not cooking (Minahassa, Minañkabau); among some tribes the widow is fed (Efigano, Southern Nias). Several authorities regard these customs as a renunciation in order to propitiate the souls of the departed. More probably they are attempts to be taken for souls, and thus to escape the vengeance of the departed soul. The rationale of these practices is that the souls of the departed do not eat—at least not in the same way as men; what they eat is invisible; hence those who wish to pass for companions of the dead must pretend not to eat; therefore they leave the house, or the food is put into their mouths by others.

The Indonesians have a short, deep mourning-time and a long, light mourning-time. The former is generally observed by a wide circle of relatives, and lasts from three to seven days (sometimes also till the new moon, as in some islands of the Moluccas). The light mourning is observed only by widow or widower, and lasts till the feast of the dead has been celebrated, when the soul is supposed to have gone to the Land of Souls. Among some Dayak and Toraja tribes the deep mourning is ended by the sacrifice of some animal, which pacifies the vexation of the departed soul. This may have been general in earlier times.

15. **Human sacrifice.**—The fear that a person who has died, especially when he is of high rank, wishes to have a companion in his misfortune, has led the Indonesians to kill a human being, that the departed soul may be satisfied. Afterwards the thought has been attached to this custom that the victim may serve the dead person in the future life. The Indonesians have also a bloodless human sacrifice. Among the Torajas on the south and east of Lake Posso and among the Balinese, when a chief dies, a family of slaves who are to live in the grave-hut are set apart, and treated as souls; nobody may deny them anything, or talk with them. After the feast of the dead has been held, this family is set free, but they are not allowed to live in the village; they are looked on as dead. This custom must also have been prevalent among the Toba Battak; in former times nobody was allowed to give shelter or food to such slaves. Among the Buginese and the Macassars the custom survives to the present day that the slave, male or female, who receives the water in which the corpse of a high-born personage is washed is set free. The Baduis in the west of Java, who guard the sacred graves of the princes of Pajajaran, are most likely descendants from such a slave-family. It is recorded of numerous Indonesian tribes that for some nights after the death of a person watchers are placed on the grave, that the dead person may not feel lonely. This bloodless human sacrifice might be called the link between the mourning rites and the bloody human sacrifice; it was a preliminary measure, which, however, did not do away with the bloody human sacrifice.

In order to get a victim the Torajas go out head-hunting, or buy a slave from another tribe. The scalp is stripped off the head; with it the people who have captured the head dance seven times round the grave, after which they nail bits of the scalp on the coffin and the posts of the hut. The leader of the expedition rips up the widow's or widower's mourning *baju* in the middle of the back, and cuts off a piece from the other mourning clothes. The Mountain Torajas sing for several days round the victim before they kill him; then the head is placed on the sleeping-mat of the deceased, and the scalp is stripped off and hung up in the house. In former days head-hunting on behalf of a dead person was universal in Minahassa. With the blood of the person killed the woodwork of the grave-hut was painted red, and the heads were buried by the side of the grave. Among the Dayaks in S.-E. Borneo the victim was exorcized on the evening before his death, to drive the soul out of his body; hence they thought that they were killing a soulless man the next day. The bodies of the victims were burned, and the ashes placed with the corpse in the coffin. The Kinjin Dayaks threw the heads into the grave, and placed the coffin on them. In Central Borneo they generally bought a person of another tribe, whom they slowly speared to death; the body was buried under the pole which was erected in honour of the dead person, and the head was placed on the top of it. Among the tribes in the district round Sarawak human sacrifices were of frequent occurrence. The victim was tied to the grave, and left there to starve, or he was slain, or buried alive; generally he was a slave from another tribe. In earlier times the custom of finding victims must have been prevalent among the Battak, as it still is among the Niassians. In Bali it has died out, but there are indications that formerly it was deemed necessary to offer a human sacrifice for a dead person. In Sumba, Savu, and Timor the custom existed, and continues to exist. In the first-mentioned island sometimes thirty men were slain for one chief. Human sacrifice was also universal among the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. Sometimes a favourite slave was given as a companion to the dead person. Under the corpse of a brave man a bound warrior was buried alive.

The meaning of human sacrifice is generally held to be that it gave the dead man a servant to attend on him in his future life. Taking into account, however, that originally there were no slaves, this conception must be of later date; besides, the conception formed of the Land of Souls is incompatible with the idea of servitude. No doubt the fear of the disappointed soul of the dead man, which would like to make others sharers in his fate, has been one of the principal motives. But there is another reason: valour secures a foremost place to the departed soul in the life hereafter. The human sacrifice was intended to endow the departed man with a show of valour; the idea must therefore be that the valour displayed in head-hunting by the relatives left behind would profit the departed soul. This is rendered the more probable by the custom prevalent among the Torajas and Dayaks of enumerating the brave deeds (which are much exaggerated) of the deceased on certain occasions, in the firm conviction that these brave deeds will benefit the departed soul. That the slaughter of slaves must be of a later stage than head-hunting is proved by the fact that those slaves had nearly always to be from another tribe.

16. Widow sacrifice.—Widow sacrifice occurred only in Java, Bali, and Lombok. (It is also reported of the Bimanese and the Orang-bênuwa, but this is open to doubt.) It has been said that widow sacrifice was universal, and that the mourning rites are a mitigation of that custom; but this is not probable. In Java and Bali widow sacrifice has undoubtedly been introduced under Hindu influence. In Java women vowed that they would follow their husbands in death, and insisted on being burned with the corpse. The last recorded widow sacrifice took place at the end of the 16th cent. in the empire of Balambañan in East Java. At that time women were stabbed with a dagger. They carried a turtle-dove with them, in which the soul was supposed to soar up.

In Bali the burning of widows exists up to the present day, in spite of the earnest attempts of the Government to prevent it. Only women of the second and third castes are burned. Among the Brâhmans widow-burning is rare; and the fourth caste is too poor to pay the cost required for the ceremony. Widow sacrifice is perfectly voluntary. As soon as they have offered themselves they are considered as saints; offerings are made to them, and all their wishes are satisfied; they are in a state of exaltation about all the delights which await them in heaven. Their death raises their relatives also in the estimation of the people. Widows are burned alive, or they kill themselves beforehand by falling upon a dagger. In Bali also the turtle-dove is used to convey the soul to higher regions.

17. Sacrifices to the dead.—Sacrifices to the dead are not voluntary gifts; the dead are receiving what is due to them, *i.e.* their own possessions. Originally there was no private property; everything was the common property of a group of people; there was no question of offerings to the dead; they were not necessary, for the feeling of individuality was so undeveloped that there was no thought of an independent existence of the soul after death. The first individual possessions were no doubt hunting trophies and, in a wider sense, all personal adornments. These ornaments were, of course, taken into the grave, as they were supposed to be of no use to anybody but the deceased.

The offerings to the dead are paid from the inheritance of the deceased; sometimes presents are added, but this is not essential, and is done more for the sake of the survivors than for that of the dead; these presents are returned later. The Indonesians exert themselves, therefore, during their lives to provide themselves with clothes and sacrificial animals which may be given to them at their death. The distribution of the inheritance is also connected with the offerings to the dead. As a rule, the inheritance is not divided; but, if it is, this takes place only after the great festival of the dead, because first all expenses must be paid from the inheritance. Generally the dead man receives the mat on which he slept, his clothes, cooking-pan, rice, water, betel, tobacco, valuables, and ornaments.

In earlier times, when giving possessions to the departed soul to take with him, people were prompted by fear of the dead man's envy, if he should see that his property was used by his descendants, rather than by the wish that the gifts might be useful to him in the life hereafter. This fear must have given rise to the custom of giving the possessions of the dead to others (New Guinea, some islands of the Moluccas, Minañkabau).

At present the Indonesians are universally of opinion that the departed soul really uses these objects, or rather their souls, in the life hereafter; and in order to detach the soul from the objects, the food offered must be cooked and the objects broken. It is also usual to give the deceased some trees of his plantation; these trees are then cut down (New Guinea, Moluccas, Halmahera, Minahassa, Borneo, Eñgano, Nias, Malacca).

The conviction that the departed soul makes use only of the soul of his possessions must have led primitive men to spare the real objects, and to present the dead person only with representations of them. For this reason shrouds and coffins are painted with figures of men and animals; the Dayaks give two boards to their dead, on which all kinds of desirable objects are represented. Arms especially, so valuable to the Indonesians, are copied in wood and given to the dead man (Key Islands, Buru, Halmahera, Batu Islands, Malacca). All other property of the deceased is only exhibited and put away again after the funeral.

Many of the tribes provide the dead person with money (Madagascar, Battaland, Nias, Timor, Halmahera, Macassar, Central Celebes, Borneo), which is laid on his eyes, in his mouth, on his breast, or in his hand. It is supposed that he can procure something for the money in the Land of Souls; but this interpretation is of later date. The money may be considered as part of the dead man's property, which is given to him to take with him, or as an indemnification for all the rest of his property which is not given to him.

The Indonesian thinks it of the highest importance that at least one sacrificial animal should be slain at his funeral, and this is universally done in the Archipelago. Often at the funeral of a man of rank so many animals are butchered that a great many of them remain unused. Among agricultural peoples, like the Indonesians, cattle constitute the greatest riches, and in order to be rich in the life hereafter the dead man must therefore take cattle with him. Among those that have become Muhammadan the animal slain at the funeral is considered as a beast to ride on across the bridge to the future life. It is also customary to kill one or more horses for the departed soul (Madagascar, Battaland, Rotti, Timor, Sumba). There are also a few records of dog sacrifice (New Guinea, Leti, Rotti, and among the Bahaus in Borneo).

18. Lingering of the soul temporarily near the grave or the house.—The soul of the dead person does not go to Hades immediately after death, but roves about for some time in the neighbourhood of the grave; therefore the Indonesian builds a hut on the grave as an abode for the soul. In the house of the dead man a kind of bed of state is arranged for his use, near which his property is exhibited and a light is burned every evening. This bed of state is left from three to forty days (Galelarese, Ambonese, Torajas, Philippine Islands, Dayaks, Minañkabauians). The third day after death plays an important part among the Indonesians, for they hold the belief that the soul is unconscious of the death of the body, and does not find it out before the third day after death. Generally the soul of the person who has just died must first be convinced of his death by the souls of the departed (Dayaks, Galelarese, Battak, Niassians). The native Christians in the Moluccas spend this day, therefore, in prayer and psalm-singing. For the same reason people attach great importance to having the bodies of their relatives with them in their native country, that the soul may immediately have the souls of the departed of his own tribe as companions. When a person dies abroad, his friends, if possible, take his skeleton with them, or only the head. If this is impossible, they take at least his clothes, his hair, or rarely (in Añkola) some earth from the spot where he has died. If they cannot get any part of his corpse,

a doll is sometimes used to represent him (Papuans, Galelarese, Alfkolaians). The objects mentioned are used as a medium to convey the soul of the departed to his native country. The soul remains bound to the corpse, to the earth, till the great festival of the dead has been celebrated. This celebration cannot take place until all the flesh has been consumed; for until then the soul 'stinks,' and is not admitted to the Land of Souls. The most important part of the feast of the dead is the collecting of the bones of the deceased, which are then buried or put away in a cave (Central Celebes, Aru and Key Islands, Ceram, Timor Laut, Halmahera, Buru, Timor, Borneo, Battaland, Nias). Sometimes (as in Nias) all these solemnities are performed only with the head of the dead man. Many Indonesian tribes take the bones to a cavern, which they consider as the entrance to the Land of Souls.

19. **Burning of corpses.**—Generally corpses are buried in the ground, or placed on a scaffold or in a tree. One tribe sometimes practises different methods. The essential thing is that the flesh must be decayed before the soul is really soul, and for this purpose corpses are burned among the Dayaks, Battak, and Balinese. The Dayaks in the Southern and Eastern division bury the bodies, and then at the festival of the dead burn the bones. This custom is also prevalent among some Dayak tribes in Sarawak; corpses of chiefs are often burned two or three days after death. Among the Battak, only the Karo Battak and some more Northern tribes burn the bones of their dead. The ashes and the remnants of the bones are gathered in earthen pots and entombed. One of the divisions of the Karo Battak, the Marga Simbiring, put the pots with the ashes into miniature vessels, and let these float down the river. Among the Balinese, cremation is in direct relation to metempsychosis; for this enables a soul to ascend to heaven, and descend from there to the earth to animate another body. The souls of those whose bodies have not been burned become spectres, or ghosts. The corpses of people of rank are sometimes burned only a few days after death. Investigations have made it certain that cremation is not originally an Indonesian custom, but has been introduced by the Hindus.

20. **Conducting the soul to the Land of Souls.**—When the soul has got quite clear of the body because all the flesh has decayed, it is not sufficient to give it various objects to take with it on its way to the Land of Souls at the feast of the dead; it must also be 'conducted' there. This is done by the priests and priestesses whose soul-substance leaves their bodies in their songs, and conducts the soul of the departed to the Land of Souls. Among the Papuans the bones of the departed are wrapped up into a parcel and carried round in the dance; afterwards they are collected and put into a hut, round which the people dance faster and faster till at last they run back to the village. By this dance the soul is led or, rather, driven away. Among the Galelarese the feast of the dead consists chiefly in performing dances, which after some days end in the people running four times round the house of the family, and four times round the grave; on this occasion a daughter or sister of the dead man arrays herself like a warrior; she represents the deceased, and as such is treated with homage and reverence by the guests. The Tobelorese keep the feast of the dead for several dead persons at the same time, whose bones are wrapped up in a piece of cotton and placed in the temple. On this occasion the priests are supposed to deliver the souls from the power of evil spirits and convey them safely to their destination. After the feast the bones are placed on scaffolds round the temple, and left there to decay, or they are taken to a small island, pointed out for the purpose. The Sumbanese believe that the souls of the departed trouble men in many ways; through the feast of the dead they find rest, *i.e.* they settle finally in the Land of Souls. The Sundanese have a ferryman, who is summoned by the priests during the feast of the dead to ferry the souls to the island where they are supposed to assemble. In the Luañ Sernata islands a very old person calls upon the souls to place themselves in a diminutive vessel, which is then buried by the side of the grave. In the island of Babar only the skulls are dug up from the graves; they get something to eat at the feast of the dead, after which the women take them to a cavern. In Central Celebes the feasts of the dead are very elaborate. At the opening of the feast the souls are summoned; the next day the bones are dug up; they are cleaned and wrapped up in white bast. Among some tribes they are provided with a mask with a human face. These collections of bones are placed in huts erected for the purpose in the temple. The priestesses are constantly engaged in conducting souls to the Land of Souls through their songs, and to illustrate this dramatically the bones are now and then carried round the temple. The *tiwah*, or feast of the dead, of the Dayaks in the Southern and Eastern division of Borneo is generally very extensive. Three days before the feast commences, a chest containing the bones is placed in a hut built for the purpose, where it is decorated, and where the dead person receives something to eat. The priest summons Tempon telon, the Dayak Charon, to convey the souls to the Land of Souls; he himself also accompanies them, and in his song he informs the assembled guests what place he reaches on his journey. At this feast the bones of those who have been buried in the earth are dug up, and in festive procession they are carried to the *sandong*, the family grave. They cross the water in native boats. When the bones have been entombed in the family grave, the priestesses dance round it, and pray the souls of those who have previously been interred in this grave to welcome kindly the newly arrived souls. A separate ceremony takes place to convey the souls of the offerings to the Land of Souls. The whole ceremony is concluded with a sumptuous banquet, at which the older people are supposed to drink palm-wine with the souls from the Land of Souls. With another Dayak tribe (the Manyan) the priestess relates that she sees the souls chase a pig without being able to catch it; the newly arrived soul kills the animal without the slightest difficulty, since this is the pig which has been killed for him at his funeral. The Dayaks of Sarawak make a vessel of bamboo, and call upon the spirit of the winds to convey the souls. On account of the expense of the feast which must be held when the bones of the dead are dug up, the Battak celebrate it only with the bones of people of rank; these souls then go to the Land of Souls, and gradually rise in rank till they are gods; the souls of the common people, for whom this feast is not held, continue to wander about on earth. Even among the Indonesian tribes who have been converted to Islām, this feast of the dead, at which the departed soul is conveyed to the Land of Souls, survives. It is generally celebrated on the fortieth or hundredth day after death.

21. **Experiences on the way to the Land of Souls.**—The priest or priestess conducts the soul to the Land of Souls, because, according to the idea of the Indonesians, there are many difficulties to be overcome—*e.g.*, the climbing of high mountains and the crossing of rivers; the Dayaks even speak of passing through a cataract of fire. Some

tribes believe that it is a dog (Sarawak, Olo-Ngaju), others that it is a hog (Minahassa, Central Celebes), that keeps watch; in order to pass the animal the soul gives it a hard nut (Central Celebes) or a bead (Sarawak) to eat; while the animal is trying to chew the hard object, the soul can pass unmolested. It is a common idea that there is a guardian in the Land of Souls who interrogates the souls. In Central Celebes he is called Lafikoda, and is a smith by trade. Unmarried people and those who have never been incontinent receive a blow on their knees, which prevents them from going on; also the souls of men who have never killed any one are not allowed to pass undisturbed. Of the same nature is the *kukañ* of the Dayaks: the soul of a chaste man is pushed into a ditch, and that of a chaste woman crushed by a trunk of a tree (the ditch represents a vagina, the tree a penis). Among the Minahassa the guardian of heaven is Makawalang, who treats the souls of the rich to a piece of pork, but sends away those of the poor. According to the Macassars, the guardian of heaven asks the souls whether they have faithfully observed the duties imposed by Islām. Among the Orang Lom in Bañka the guardian of heaven is called Ake Antak. An aged person always whispers to the corpse what it has to answer to the questions of this spirit. In Afikola two spirits are supposed to keep watch near a trap. If the soul answers to their questions with lies, the trap comes down and the soul is crushed to death. Among the Karo Battak it is Bapa nibadabadia, 'the illustrious father-guardian,' who questions the souls, chiefly concerning the way in which they have died (this being, in Indonesian thought, closely connected with the character of their earthly life); he makes the souls pass over a plank which lies across a precipice; then he draws back the plank, and the souls are separated from the earth for ever. In Nias the guardian of heaven is called Kalekamô; he inquires about the deeds of the people on earth, and about the number of feasts they have given. When he judges a soul to be evil, he makes him cross the river on the edge of a sword; the soul wounds his feet, falls into the water, and dies. Many Papuan tribes also believe in a guardian of heaven; he admits to the city of souls only those who have brought something.

An idea common to all conceptions of the hereafter is that the soul has to cross a sea; this belief found its origin in the sun, which crossed the sea every day on its way to the Land of Souls under the earth. It is only with further development that this notion has begun to play an ethical part in the ideas about retribution. Originally the coffin must have been the vessel in which the soul was supposed to cross the sea. The Torajas, Dayaks, and Niassians still use words for 'coffin' which have also the meaning of 'vessel.' Some tribes put the corpses in vessels even to this day (some Dayak tribes, Karo Battak, in the Moluccas); the Kayans give an oar to the dead person. In the Moluccas and in New Guinea the dead receive miniature vessels in which to make the voyage.

Among the tribes who lived far inland, the idea of the sea gradually gave place to that of a river, across which a bridge was laid (Central Celebes, Southern Celebes, Minahassa, New Guinea, Borneo, Sunda, Battaland). This bridge consists of a plank or tree trunk, which bends and rocks violently when it is crossed, or it is a sword, or at least something as sharp as a sword (Galelarese, Bahaus, Niassians). It is only among the Papuans that we find the idea of a snake serving as a bridge to the Land of Souls.

22. Retribution.—The Indonesians have no idea of retribution, in our sense of the word; yet they try men by a moral standard. Whether they will be allowed to enter the Land of Souls is made dependent on the possession of some virtues: valour, liberality (and in connexion with this, riches), the gift of eloquence, or the observance of the marriage-duty. Killing an enemy after the death of a chief had also the purpose of endowing the chief with the character of valour. The souls of some people were not allowed to enter the Land of Souls; in the idea of the Indonesians they either have their own City of Souls or continue to wander about on earth. They are the souls of those who have perished suddenly by some accident, of those who have been killed in battle, of suicides, and of those who have died of smallpox, leprosy, or cholera. Such a sudden death was regarded as a judgment of the gods: they had offended in some way or other, and therefore the gods had suddenly cut off their lives. People are afraid of these souls: their bodies are often left unburied, and, if they are buried, this is done without any ceremonial. Some Indonesian tribes have notions about retribution which must have been borrowed from other peoples—*e.g.*, when thieves are condemned to carry for ever the things stolen by them (Battak, Southern Celebes, Sañir Islands), or when souls have to pass through a fire in which those of the bad perish and those of the good are uninjured.

23. The Land of Souls.—The course of the sun, which disappears in the West every day, and is supposed to take the souls with it to the land of the dead, gave rise to the belief that the Land of Souls was situated in the West, and also to the custom of indicating the age of people by the different positions of the sun; thus the word for 'setting of the sun' is used for 'dying' (Torajas, Macassars, inhabitants of Halmahera, Afikola, Battaland). Allied to this is the custom of building houses with the ridge from East to West, the entrance facing the West, so that a person, on entering the house, will have his face turned to the rising sun. For the same reason corpses are buried from East to West; or, in places where the Land of Souls is no longer supposed to be in the West, with the feet in the direction where it is supposed to be. Many peoples think that the Land of Souls is under the earth, and they look upon chasms and caves as being passages leading to it. Originally all the Indonesians believed in the under world, as may be seen from data still extant. At present many imagine the Land of Souls to be on the earth—on a mountain or in a valley. Among the inhabitants of Northern and Central Celebes it lies in the land which is their original home, so that the direction in which it is supposed to lie also shows where the people have come from. The religious conviction of the Teñgerese and the Baduis (both in Java) has had a share in the determination of the Land of Souls: the former consider it to be the volcano of Bromo, the latter the tombs of the last princes of the empire of Pajajaran.

The views about life in the Land of Souls harmonize fairly well among the different tribes. Two features in them are strongly marked: life in the realm of the dead is simply a continuation of the life on earth; he who was important here is important there; he who was of no consequence here is of no consequence there. The second feature is that there are different divisions in the realm of the dead; in every division the souls who have died in the same way live together: those who have perished in warfare live in one village, those who have been drowned or committed suicide, etc., live in others. Certain actions are done in the Land of Souls contrary to the way in which

they are done on earth: thus the souls give each other things with the left hand; the language of the souls is the same as that of men, but the meaning of the words in the Land of Souls is the direct opposite of their meaning on earth; *e.g.*, 'black' there means 'white,' 'backward' means 'forward,' etc. (Borneo, Ceram, Halmahera).

Some tribes believe that the hereafter consists of layers, generally seven, one above the other. This is, no doubt, connected with the belief that the soul dies several times—three, seven, or nine; finally, it turns to water or dew (Torajas, Macassars, Dayaks, Balinese), a tree or a species of grass, a fruit or a blossom (Dayaks, Karo Battak, Papuans), earth (Minañkabauians), an animal (Niassians, Minañkabauians, Papuans). This belief is another proof of how material the soul is thought to be. When it has died a few times, it finally becomes soul-substance, and animates another part of nature. If, *e.g.*, the soul which has been converted into dew or into a fruit is eaten, a new man is animated.

24. Nature of the souls worshipped.—About the Land of Souls and the life of the soul the Indonesians are indifferent; but there is frequent intercourse between the souls and the living people, which shows itself in the greater or less reverence which the people feel for the souls (the difference between the souls of the departed and spirits which have always been considered as such is often hardly noticeable). For the souls of the departed continue to live with their descendants; they are feared for their superior power, but they are also looked up to for help in the daily work; they have power over rain, and they accompany the living in war. The souls punish with bad crops, illness, or death, when the *'Ádat* ('customary law') is not observed. Therefore the living always try to conceal from them careless observance of the old customs. Thus an oath which has been made must be kept. The Indonesians have a strong sense of justice, and, when they know that they are wrong, they do not think that they can rely upon the help of their ancestors. The souls of the departed have a very exclusive character; the souls reverenced by one tribe will not help members of another. The Indonesians cannot form a conception of a universal God. Strangers may violate the *'Ádat* without being punished by the souls, but the latter avenge themselves in this case on the inhabitants of the land, or their descendants, over whom they have power; this punishment can be averted only by killing the offender.

Among the Karo Battak the souls of stillborn children, or children who have died before teething, are honoured with sacrifices, which induce them to avert illness from the house and to grant the wishes of their relatives. In the eastern part of the Archipelago it is chiefly the souls of those who have perished in warfare and who have died by accident that are reverenced as helps by their living relatives. Very often the Indonesian does not realize what souls he invokes, as he very rarely mentions them by name.

The souls of people who have called into life a new state of things are worshipped. So in Java every village worships the soul of the man who founded the village or first cultivated the land. At the beginning of every year a village-feast is held in his honour. In many islands of the Moluccas the founder of the village is reverenced; sacrifices are offered to him when a disaster is imminent. This is found also among the Galelarese, Minahassians, and Niassians. An even more natural object for adoration is the soul of a man who has brought about a great change in the economic or political state of things—*e.g.*, the first tiller of the soil, the first smith, etc.

25. Accidental meetings with souls.—As the Indonesians believe that many souls wander about on earth, they must sometimes come in contact with them. So there are stories relating how some one has seen a soul, and as a rule the consequence is that he dies soon after. It is generally believed that, when a dog howls without reason, it is seeing a soul or a spirit. This power of seeing spirits is often ascribed to chickens, cats (Macassars and Battak), and pigs (Niassians). Occasionally a spirit or soul copulates with a woman, and the result is an 'albino'—a timorous person who is afraid of the society of his fellow-men and soon withdraws to the wood—or a man endowed with supernatural strength. Some peoples pretend that they can perceive footprints of souls in ashes which are scattered on the floor for this purpose; these footprints are either transverse or only as large as the joint of a finger (Philippine Islands, Central Timor, S.E. of Borneo, Afikola, Battaland). When a soul returns to the house, it generally makes its presence known by imitating the noise of some one moving or dropping all kinds of household articles. When a soul or spirit speaks to, hits, or bites a person, the consequences are generally bad; a headache, fever, or a feeling of illness ensues. An irritating eruption of the skin, shingles, and similar diseases are also attributed to contact with a spirit or soul.

26. Incidental worship of souls.—At such casual meetings there is no question of adoration. Reverential acts generally take place in the house, because the souls of the departed usually stay in places where they lived during their lives. At feasts the souls of the departed always get a share; it is placed in the attic, or in the ridge of the roof, the places where the souls are supposed to reside. But the souls receive a share not only of the food, but of everything that is made in the village or outside it; if a house is built, the souls get a miniature dwelling (Torajas, Gorontalese, Galelarese, Dayaks; the Torajas also make miniature smithies and salt factories for the souls); if a rice field is made, a small garden is specially laid out for the souls (Niassians, Minahassians, Torajas).

27. Worship of souls in houses specially erected for the purpose.—The souls worshipped in the homes are naturally the ancestors of the family living there. Besides these, there are ancestral souls that look after the interests of all the village. These are the souls of chiefs and brave warriors, who protected the inhabitants of their own village during their lives, and continue to do so now that they are dead. For them a home is built—a temple. We find such houses among nearly all Indonesian tribes; and, where they are no longer extant, there are usually indications that they did exist. We sometimes read that souls, battling for the people in war, live in the temple (Timor, Halmahera, Central Celebes, Nias), but the village guardian spirit has joined them. Where, through the influence of the Government, warfare has been made impossible, as among the Macassars and Buginese, only the village guardian spirit is worshipped in the temple. When the people go to war, sacrifices are made in the temple, and the souls are asked to march with them; as a rule nobody is allowed to enter the building till the warriors have returned. But offerings are also made in the temple when a general disaster visits the village, or when the people join in work of a general nature, such as planting or reaping rice. Some tribes keep the captured skulls of enemies in the temple (Papuans, Dayaks of Sarawak, Torajas); among the Niassians the idols in the temple are touched with the skulls. Even among such tribes as the Kailians and the Luwuians in Celebes, who have adopted Muhammadanism, heads of slain enemies are preserved in

the temple, which in other respects has more or less assumed a Muhammadan character.

One of the chief functions of the chiefs is to discuss matters of general interest with their fellow-villagers (=relatives). The souls of the departed chiefs, however, must also have a share in the consultations of their descendants; therefore the temple of the village has come to be used as a council-house (Solor, Halmahera, Central Celebes, Borneo, Nias, Battaland).

The temples are mostly decorated with figures of animals, especially of crocodiles and serpents (New Guinea, Solor, Halmahera, Central Celebes, Borneo). These figures are believed to represent the incarnations of the souls that live in the temple. In the temples are kept the instruments with which the souls are summoned or their attention drawn, such as drums, bamboo speaking-trumpets, and triton shells (New Guinea, Ceram, Solor, Central Celebes).

28. Corpse and parts of the body as mediums in soul-worship.—When the Indonesian invokes the souls, he has in view either a certain class of souls or the souls of the departed in general. When he wants to have intercourse with the soul of a definite person, he does so usually by a medium. The medium must always be something with which the dead person was in close connexion during his life on earth—*e.g.*, the corpse or the bones. So the corpse of a person is sometimes used to find out who is guilty of his death; if the coffin begins to move at one of the questions, this is considered to be an affirmative answer (Babar, Buru). Among the Torajas a skeleton is preserved in his former home or in the temple to remain in contact with the soul. The numerous graves where the Indonesians continue to bring their offerings from year's end to year's end to obtain the fulfilment of a wish prove that the skeleton is considered as a medium for the soul. Among the Torajas an ancestor's skull is sometimes kept in the house, and on certain occasions people bring it offerings and ask it to heal their sick. Particularly among the Dayaks, preserving the skulls of deceased chiefs is of frequent occurrence. The Battak consider the loss of such a skull so important that they would sacrifice anything to get it back; all the happiness of the house is intimately connected with it. The Niassians bury the skulls of their men of rank before the house; in times of illness a cord is passed from the graves into the house, and prayers are uttered for the patient's recovery. In the islands of Timor Laut, Ceram, and Buru, and among the Papuans, skulls are often used as mediums. Hair and nails of the deceased are used throughout the Archipelago to get into contact with the departed soul. The Papuans frequently use the teeth and the lower jaw for this purpose.

29. Objects as mediums.—Objects used by the deceased are considered as mediums, for something of its late possessor is supposed to cling to them. Many objects which have now become fetishes must originally have been mediums, which carried on intercourse with the former owners; the State ornaments mentioned above are examples. Besides these old heirlooms which constitute the connexion with the deceased, many other objects are used as mediums, not to get into contact with a definite soul, but with any of the souls—experiments, resembling our table-turning, by means of which thieves are found out. The experiment with the rice-van resembles our table-turning very closely it is laid on the extended fingers, and, when it begins to tap on the floor, the answer is considered to be affirmative (Luwu, Ambon); among the Macassars the van rolls over the floor and falls at the feet of the thief. The Dayaks spin an axe on the top of their fingers. In Babar, Leti, and Halmahera a piece of rattan or bamboo is made to vibrate; the Galelarese measure a piece of rattan with the span of the hand, and, if the fingers begin to trill when stretching the span, this is considered to be an affirmative answer. A lemon, a basket, or a stick is suspended on a rope; the answer is affirmative when the object begins to swing to and fro (Malays, Macassars, Buru). There are countless experiments of this kind among the Indonesians.

30. Images as mediums.—Making images which represent the departed is certainly of a much more recent date than the use of relics as mediums. The Torajas use wooden masks, which are bound before the bones at the feast of the dead; after the feast the bones are buried, but the masks are preserved till another feast of the dead; they are rarely used as mediums, yet people are very much attached to them. An image in itself has no value. It gets its value only when something of the deceased has been transmitted to it. Among the Torajas the masks owe their sacredness to their contact with the bones of the dead person. In Nias one of the shapes in which the soul appears, namely, a spider, is brought into contact with the image. In New Guinea the Papuans drive the soul into the image, etc. The Papuans call their images *korwar*; they are hideous things, carved in wood, a foot long; people pay homage to them, and on important occasions consult them, *e.g.* when going on a journey. When the questioner is seized by a fit of trembling, the affair looks ominous, and he gives up his plan; in cases of illness the images are placed at the head of the sick-bed. When a *korwar* has predicted something that has not come true, the image is ill-treated or sold. In many of the Molucca islands images of the departed are found, which are generally stored away in the attic of the house; in times of need or illness the father of the family feeds them, and asks for their assistance. Sometimes the tribes of the Moluccas do not use images as mediums, but stones and pieces of wood (Wetar, Timor), or palm-leaves cut in the form of a hand with six fingers (Rotti). At every death such an object is made, hung on the roof, and sprinkled with blood; it is left there till it has completely decayed. In Halmahera the soul is gradually lured into an image, but only temporarily. In earlier times the Javanese must have made images of the departed; we meet with a remnant of this in a children's game, called *Nini Towong*, in which a doll made in a special way is animated, after which it jumps about in a jerky manner, to the great enjoyment of the children. From many particulars of the game it appears clearly that we have really to do with an image used as a medium in former times. The Tengerese in Java have their household gods, consisting of images, up to this day. The Battak use some images of ancestors which they call *debata idup*. They are kept among the rafters of the roof, and frequently receive food-offerings. They are believed to give life and to bestow blessings, and are particularly worshipped by barren women. The Niassians always worship their ancestors by means of skilfully carved images called *adu*. They feed them by rubbing them with blood and egg, and adorn them by sticking feathers of fowls and bristles of pigs on them. If an image receives a crack, it is thought that the soul has escaped, and a new image is made. Offerings are made to the images on all important events of life, in illness, etc. Several Dayak tribes in Sarawak keep images, which they feed at stated times, and which guard the village and watch over the work of the fields. Some tribes in the Philippine Islands used images of ancestors made of stone, gold, and ivory. They were kept in the houses. Here and there, as, *e.g.*, in the

Philippine Islands and in Borneo, the souls of the departed are worshipped by means of pots.

31. Shamanism.—It is possible to get into contact with the souls of the departed not only by means of objects, but also by means of men. Spirits wandering about freely enter a human being, take possession of him, and act and speak through him. Such a human medium is called a *shaman*. To summon the spirits, drums are beaten (Central Celebes, Halmahera), dracæna leaves are woven, rice is stewed, etc. During the ecstatic trance the soul remains on the shoulder of the medium or in the apex of his heart. The spirits enter through the joints, under the nails, through the anus, and so forth. The spirit generally leaves the medium imperceptibly; sometimes the medium snaps his fingers, or presses his hands on the back of his head; sometimes people blow into his ear to expel the spirit.

The spirits are believed to arrive when the body or the limbs begin to tremble. This trembling passes into shocks, after which the medium calms down, and answers the questions put to him; or else he leaps to his feet and begins to dance to the measure of the drums. A shaman is simply a medium who allows himself to be used as a mouthpiece for the spirits. A priest's only aim is to make his soul-substance rise up to the lord of the heavens, and to reclaim the lost soul-substance of a man. Among some Indonesian tribes this is still the salient trait in their shamanism, and the medium phenomena are a mere appendage; among others priesthood and shamanism have been blended; and among others priesthood has been merged in shamanism. Among the Torajas of Central Celebes, priesthood only is found. Among the Toba Battak the two classes are sharply distinguished. A shaman is called *sibaso*; he works quite spontaneously, and is perfectly unconscious of what he says or does; *datu* is the word for the real priest, who practises sorcery, banishes the spirits of disease, and recalls runaway soul-substance to a man. At sacrificial ceremonies it is the *datu* who calls upon the spirits, but they manifest themselves in the *sibaso*. The Papuans also keep the two functions separate; the *inderri* reveals his predisposition to be a shaman by a fainting fit in the presence of a corpse; the *konoor*, on the other hand, is simply a priest who acts as a mediator between men and spirits. The Javanese, too, distinguish the ordinary *dukun*, who bears the same character as the Batta *datu*, from the *dukun* shaman; the Javanese dancing-girls are probably a degeneration of the earlier shamans.

There is a blending of shamanism and priesthood among the Dayaks, Buginese, and Minahassians. The priests perform some shamanistic actions in addition to their priestly functions. Among the Dayaks the only shamanistic element is that the spirit which has helped the priest in discovering the soul-substance, or in conducting the soul of the dead person, incarnates itself finally in the body of the priest, who in this condition performs some actions as if it were the spirit itself that did so. Among the Minahassians the only sign of the shamanism part is that, wherever the priest in his peregrination through the heavens to seek the soul-substance meets a spirit, he makes the latter speak through himself. With the Buginese priests and priestesses the shamanistic side is not essential.

Among the inhabitants of Halmahera and the Parigians in Central Celebes, priesthood has been resolved into shamanism. Among the Halmahera the priest is entirely inspired by a spirit called *jini*; then he speaks another tongue; different spirits manifest themselves, according to which the *jini*-feasts are divided into different divisions. The shamanism in Parigi is exactly the same. It may be demonstrated with all but absolute certainty that both these peoples have adopted shamanism from the Muhammadans.

32. Demonology.—For different reasons souls of dead people may rise so high in the esteem of the people that they come to be regarded as gods. Besides these, the Indonesians have other gods who have never been men. They ascribe the mystery of the origin of man, natural phenomena —*e.g.*, volcanic eruptions, landslides, storms—to gods who have always been gods. With the souls of his ancestors the Indonesian has daily intercourse; he fears them, but at the same time he is familiar with them. With gods and spirits he comes only occasionally into contact—*e.g.*, when he happens to cross their path or offends them; but for the most part he feels indifferent towards them and leaves everything to the priests, who know how to manage them.

33. The Creator and Creation.—In the Archipelago we find some Hindu names for the gods, but it is going too far to say that the gods have been borrowed from the Hindus: the foreign names were given to existing conceptions. Thus the name of *Batara Guru* is found among Battak and Malays; among the Dayaks in *Mahatara* and *Betara* or *Pitara*; among the Balinese in *Pitara*; and among the Tagals in the Philippine Islands in *Bathala*. In the same way we find the Arabic *Allāh ta'ālā* in *Hatalla* among the Dayaks, *Lahatala* in Buru, and *Latala* in Solor.

Among all peoples we find a supreme Being who has created the world; sometimes his functions are divided among different gods. In the Moluccas the creator is often called Upu lero, but the connexion between him and the creation of man is very vague. In some islands people are supposed to descend from a woman who came down from heaven. In others the first men are believed to have originated from trees or bamboo. In Buru the highest god is called Opo-geba-snulat, 'the lord moulder of man,' 'the lord creator of man.' He is said to have sent his messenger to the earth in olden times; this is Nabiata (the 'prophet Adam'). The name has certainly been derived from the Muhammadans, but messengers of gods who descend to earth are prevalent among all Indonesian peoples. Among the peoples living more to the West we find creation stories. Thus the Buginese say that the first men were born from a union of a son of the god of the upper world with a daughter of the god of the under world. Their children were the first men, who, when their parents returned home, were left behind in this world, which was formed from a handful of earth given by the god of the upper world to his son. This is the poetic expression of an idea current among the Indonesians that man has arisen by conjunction of sun and earth. It is also strongly pronounced among the Minahassians. The first human being, a woman, is moulded from the earth, and is impregnated by the west wind. She bears a son, who wanders about on the earth, and, meeting her afterwards, but not knowing her to be his mother, marries her, and in this way becomes the progenitor of the first men. The son, Toar, is merely the sun, who in the morning arises from his mother, the earth, and in the evening returns to her again as her husband. Among the Torajas of Central Celebes the two gods Ilai, 'man,' and Indara, 'maid,' make man. These two again stand for the sun and the earth. They make a couple of men of stone, who are animated by the wind and live. In Siau the highest god is called *Duata* or *Ruata*, a corruption of the Skr. *Devatā* ('divinity'). (This name is also found among the Macassars and Buginese in *Dewata*; among the Javanese in *Dewata*, *Debata*, and *Juata*; among the Dayaks in *Jebata* and *Jata*; among the

Mongondouians in *Duata*; in the Philippine islands in *Divata*, *Davata*, and *Diuata*.) The Dayaks in S.E. Borneo think that the world was created by Mahatara and Jata, who are simply the sun and the earth. The Battak believe that the first men were born from the daughter of the chief god Ompu Tuhan mula jadi, who descends on earth, after having moulded it in the world-ocean with the aid of her father. Probably this daughter stands for the earth itself. In Nias the chief god Lowalangi (Lubu-langi) and the lower gods and men are all believed to have come forth from the buds of one and the same tree.

34. The preserver of Creation.—Nature-worship, which is found in the Eastern part of the Archipelago, passes into myths of gods towards the West. The chief god is the sun, and this god continues to exert influence on his creation; he makes the earth fruitful, penetrates with his light everywhere, sees everything, and punishes what displeases him (chiefly incest, sexual intercourse with animals, lies, and theft). On the other hand, this sun-god has entered so little into the life of the people, that he is not worshipped to any extent.

Sometimes creator and preserver are united in one person; but often the creator has transferred to one or more other gods the task of the administration of created things. Then the creator retreats to the background and he is known only by name, while his servants, to whom he has transferred his task, are worshipped. In the Moluccas, creator and preserver are one person; he is worshipped under the symbol of a lamp. Once a year a great sacrificial feast is held, at the time when he is thought to descend to earth to make it fruitful. He never interferes with the deeds of other spirits, whether good or evil; he does not rule. In Buru the chief god is invoked only on special occasions, at oaths, at ordeals, or in general calamities. The Timorese calls upon the preserver when making a vow, or by way of confirmation of the truth of what he has said.

The chief servant of the creator among the Torajas is Puë mpalaburu; he is the sun, who sees everything and punishes; he receives offerings in cases of general disaster, and his name is called upon when some one takes an oath or is cleansed from sin. The myths of the Minahassians set forth with great clearness how the creator has divided the administration of the world among different gods, but all these different gods may be traced back to the sun. The Mahatara of the Dayaks does not take notice of unimportant things; he is called upon only in cases of the utmost need, and then it is always necessary to sacrifice a buffalo to him, the sacrificial rites being performed by seven priestesses. Tamei Tifigei is the chief god of the Baiaus, who punishes misdeeds and gives rewards. Other gods have the charge of husbandry, and are therefore called upon at harvest-festivals. The chief god of the Battak, Ompu mula jadi, has transferred his power to three gods: Batara guru, Soripada, and Mañalabulan. The last is a wanton, inconstant, and fickle divinity. He has the principal share in the conduct of human affairs, and is always able to thwart the good intentions of the other two gods. For this reason the Battak are particularly anxious to secure his favour. The Niassians assert that the god Lature resides in the sun; he is the owner of mankind, and can kill people at pleasure; therefore offerings are made to him that he may spare them. But Lowalangi (Lubulangi) is even more powerful than Lature. Lowalangi has power over life and death, blessings and curses, riches and poverty; he appoints kings and deposes them; he is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, and an avenger of evil. His name occurs in numerous expressions in daily life, but in spite of this the Niassians pay very little heed to him.

The administrator often interferes with men by means of animals, which are his messengers. Thus birds of bad omen are sent as the messengers of the gods to warn men. Among different peoples, crocodiles and tigers are sent by the gods to avenge some evil, and by ordeals also the gods judge guilt or innocence among men.

35. Predestination.—The Indonesians always consider an accident which has befallen a man as a punishment for some evil that he has committed. They also believe that their lot here on earth is predetermined, and that they themselves have wanted it to be as it is. This idea is illustrated in a great many stories. There is, for instance, a story of a man who was dissatisfied with his lot, and went to the supreme lord to ask him to change it. The lord consented, and allowed the complainer to choose again, and then it was found that he had chosen the same as had fallen to his share before (Torajas, Battak, Dayaks, Galelarese, Niassians). The way in which a person is to die is also predestined at his birth; to prove this a story is told about a man who was always on his guard against tigers, because at his birth he had been told that a tiger would kill him, and who was crushed by a falling wooden image of a tiger; of a child who was killed by a string of crocodile teeth, because it had been foretold that crocodiles would cause its death (Torajas, Battak). The length of a man's life is predestined among the Battak and Sea Dayaks by means of a plant; among the Dayaks of S.E. Borneo and the Torajas by means of a rope; among the Karo Battak by means of a measure for rice; among the Minahassians by a burning torch.

36. Moon-worship.—At the present stage of development of Animism in Indonesia a definite moon-worship is rarely found. Here and there in the Moluccas the moon is worshipped. In Babar the war-spirit is supposed to reside in the moon; the Tomorians point out the moon as the abode of the rice-spirit; and they have many songs in its honour. The Mafors in New Guinea receive the crescent of the new moon with shouts of joy, and the women sing in its honour. The Papuans believe the moon to be the abode of a woman. Many Indonesian peoples believe that happiness and misfortune are caused by the different positions of the moon—which proves that its influence on their spiritual conceptions must have been much greater in earlier times.

37. Intermediate gods.—Just because the gods who have never been men are so far above the inhabitants of the earth, the latter have felt the need of intermediate gods, souls of the departed who have risen to be gods. They can assist man in approaching the original gods. A frequently recurring name for these is *sañiañ*, and other modified forms. They are of little use to the people, but of infinite use to the priests, who call upon them to assist them in their work, and then the spirits accompany and help them. The Dayaks have the most intimate knowledge of these intermediate gods. According to them, they have not been souls of men, but are allied to men. They used to live with them on the earth, but a quarrel induced them to move to the heavens. Every priest (or priestess) has his own *sañiañ* who assists him, from which it appears that here we really have souls of the departed. This is also seen from the fact that heroic exploits are told of some of these *sañiañs*. In a storm a special spirit is called upon, whilst another has power over the tribes. These spirits punish their servant (the priest) when he does not fulfil a promise. The Torajas say that their intermediate spirits carry on an endless war-

fare with other evil spirits, who live in the air, and who always lie in wait to fall upon men.

38. Abode and manner of living of the gods.—These gods and spirits are supposed to live in heaven or on high mountains. As they always live in the light, they are imagined as white figures, who for that reason require white offerings: white hens, white buffaloes, etc. Stories prevail everywhere that heaven used to be close to earth, so that it was possible to reach it with the hand. Grease or oil was scraped off from heaven, but, in consequence of some injudicious action of an inhabitant of earth, heaven was drawn up (Moluccas, Central Celebes, Borneo, Nias). In former times there was a lively intercourse between men and gods; numerous stories survive telling of somebody climbing up to heaven along a liana or rattan. Mountains are considered as leading up to heaven (Minahassians, Toba Battak); or the rainbow is the way upward (Central and Southern Celebes); or a gossamer thread (Halmahera). In the abode of the gods everything is imagined as earthly, only much more beautiful; often wonderful trees are found there, which bear cotton, or gold and silver fruits. A peculiar trait in the conceptions which these people form of the gods is that they are easily deceived and imposed upon, one of the commonest deceptions being that a buffalo, pig, or other animal is promised as a sacrifice, whereas in reality nothing is given but an egg or some such trifle.

39. Volcano gods and sea gods.—Volcanoes and seas, with their dangers, in which some perish and from which others escape, are thought by the Indonesians to be inhabited by spirits. In Minahassa every volcano is supposed to be inhabited by a god, and numerous stories are current about these volcano gods. The volcano Gunuñ Awu in the island of Siau received an annual sacrifice of a child. Human skulls were occasionally thrown as sacrifices into the crater of Ternate. Every year the Teñgerese in Java hold a great sacrificial festival for the crater of the volcano Bromo.

Throughout the Archipelago sacrifices are made to the spirits of the sea. The most widely known of all these is the goddess Njai or Ratu Loro Kidul, who lives in a beautiful palace at the bottom of the ocean on the south coast of Java, whence she holds sway over the spirits living in the caverns. With great reverence and with offerings the Javanese enter this region. She is also supposed to live at some definite places on the south coast; there people lie down to sleep in order to receive revelations from her. Those who live by gathering swallows' nests in the crevices of the rocks especially reverence her. A temple has even been built for her there, in which sacrifices are made.

A spirit, Karaeng lowe, 'the high lord,' is worshipped in Southern Celebes under the sign of the *linga* and *yoni*. This is the only instance of this kind of worship in the Malay Archipelago. In many places in Southern Celebes there are houses dedicated to this spirit, where he is worshipped under the sign of two stones, which evidently represent the genitals of the two sexes. Karaeng lowe dispenses fortune and misfortune; he has dominion over life and death; the patient who desires health, the mother who desires a child, the merchant who desires success, the gambler who desires gain, the husbandman who desires a good harvest, all pray to Karaeng lowe, and vow to give him something if he will grant them their desire. When they have obtained what they wanted, it would be very dangerous to refrain from keeping their vow; Karaeng lowe would avenge this by sending illness. The Karaeng lowe worship is probably of Hindu origin.

40. Tree spirits.—Besides gods and demi-gods, the Indonesians have lower spirits, who reside in trees, mountains, and rivers. It is only when people cross their paths that they injure them. If a person supposes himself to have been made ill by such a spirit, he makes offerings to him; otherwise there is no worship offered to these lower spirits. Among them the tree spirits occupy a foremost place. Every tree has soul-substance, but not every tree has a spirit. These spirits inhabit large trees, generally some species of ficus. If the Indonesians cut down a large tree, they first make an offering to the spirit, and beg him to go to some other place. These tree spirits are very dangerous. They often carry off the soul-substance of a man, and then a sacrifice is made to reclaim it. The Dayaks believe that they sometimes carry off even living people. They can also cause lunacy. Some tribes (as in Borneo and in Siau) imagine the tree spirits to be spirits wandering about independently. The Minañkabauians believe that they appear in the shape of animals. The Dayaks of Sarawak hang on a tree a piece of their clothing, as being a part of themselves, as an offering for the spirit.

41. How spirits appear and how they are banished.—We have already mentioned that tree spirits sometimes appear as animals. This is also the case with other demons, when they reveal themselves to man. They sometimes appear as serpents (Buru, Sunda, Borneo), as fireflies (Babar), as birds (Minañkabau), as tigers (Sundanese), or as men. Some tribes believe that the spirits may appear in all possible shapes. The universal means of keeping them away is the use of pungent and bad-smelling things, among which onions and ginger-roots take a foremost place; very often a bad smell is produced by burning something. A custom of frequent occurrence in the Archipelago is to lay women after childbirth near a smouldering fire, to keep the spirits at a distance from them. Besides fire, thorny boughs are used to ward off spirits, who are supposed to be afraid of being wounded by them. When a man knows the spirit's name and pronounces it, the spirit's power over him is broken. ALB. C. KRUIJT.

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INDULGENCES.—Indulgences, as employed in the Roman Catholic Church, are a partial survival of the primitive discipline of penance; they are the remission of the penitential satisfaction due for pardoned sins, and are granted by spiritual authority for the performance of optional works of merit. In order, therefore, to understand the true nature of indulgences, we must first trace their historical evolution.

1. **History.**—The fundamental principle, admirably stated by the Council of Trent (sess. v. n. 5, sess. xiv. chs. i., ii., viii.), lies in the different conditions controlling the pardon of sin by baptism and by sacramental penance. Baptism brings complete remission of all sins previously committed, and entails no further expiation; as soon as he leaves the baptismal font, the adult, born to supernatural life by the sacrament, is no longer responsible to God or to Christian society for any past fault or punishment. But the same conditions do not hold for the remission of sins committed after baptism, in violation of baptismal vows. Remission of post-baptismal sin takes the form of a sort of judgment, comprising a confession of guilt and a punishment—a penal reparation called 'satisfaction' in theological language. The Christian who by mortal sin violates the law which he promised at baptism to observe assumes a moral responsibility of which he must give an account to God; and he also renders himself unworthy of the holy society into which he has entered, unworthy of the sacred mysteries into which he has been initiated. To recover his former status, to participate worthily once more in the holy mysteries, he must present himself as guilty before the tribunal of the priest, confess his unworthiness, and ask to be reinstated by sacerdotal authority. Absolution remits his fault (*culpa*), and at the same time the punishment due for unpardoned sin ('eternal punishment'); but it still obliges the sinner to undergo a certain penalty, and to earn full rehabilitation by reparations or 'satisfactions' ('temporal punishment' for pardoned sin). It is to this satisfaction, or temporal punishment, that the concession of indulgences refers. Following the development of penitential discipline, indulgences did not attain their final form until the 11th cent.; but the essential element was present from the very beginning, viz. the remission, in consideration of certain good works, of such penances as the sinner would otherwise be bound to perform. In the early centuries this remission would result in hastening the return of the sinner to ecclesiastical communion; later, it would consist in the substitution of easier works or works of shorter duration for the required penances; and, when penances ceased to be individually imposed, they would be remitted all the more readily and generously.

The characteristic feature of ancient public penitential discipline was the exclusion of the culprit, by way of satisfaction, either from ecclesiastical communion or at least from eucharistic communion, this exclusion being supplemented by penances under ecclesiastical control. But the Church always reserved the right to terminate this exclusion; the bishop, who had judged the fault and given the sinner his penance, could also decide when the penitent had made sufficient satisfaction. The principle is clearly stated by one of the most ancient penitential canons:

'The bishops shall have the power, after having tried the conduct of each, to mitigate the penalties, or to extend the time of penitence; but they must take care to inquire what has passed before and after their fall, and their clemency must be exercised accordingly' (Council of Ancyra [A.D. 314], can. 5; cf. 2, 4, 7; Nicæa, can. 12; Basil's canonical letter [cexvii.], can. 74 ff.).

We have facts of even earlier date. If Cyprian denied confessors, imprisoned for the faith, the right of admitting penitents to ecclesiastical communion by giving them 'certificates of peace' (*libellus pacis*), he himself reclaimed that right; for we know that he absolved all the penitents of Carthage *en masse* at the approach of the persecution (Cyprian, *Ep.* x., xiv., lv., lxiv., ed. Hartel, ii. [Vienna, 1871]); and it has always been the custom to give full ecclesiastical communion to repentant sinners at death. So much for the indulgence in the initial stage of penitential discipline.

In the system of the Penitential Books, the most important part of the satisfaction is no longer exclusion of the sinner from communion, but works of reparation, prayer, psalms, fasts, mortifications, and alms, every sin having its penance assigned, and the whole system being reckoned by days, weeks, months, or even years. The priest imposed penances on the various sinners in accordance with the Penitentials, and naturally had the right to see that they were fulfilled. Primitive indulgence took a new form analogous to that new form of penance. Not only did the Penitentials allow the priest great latitude in assigning the penance, but they provided various methods of compensation and commutation with a view to mitigating the satisfactions required. Thus, a bread-and-water fast equalled two or three ordinary fasts; the recitation of a psalter (50 psalms), or a flagellation, was equivalent to several days of penance; while alms, which could not be prescribed indiscriminately for all, served as a basis for compensation which varied with the wealth and charity of the penitent. This gave rise to 'redemptions' of penance, left at first to the discretion of the confessor, and then officially regulated, in particular by the Councils of Tribur (A.D. 895, can. 50 ff.) and Rheims (A.D. 923). A relic of this method of imposing and remitting penances has been preserved in the scale of indulgences, which are granted for a stated number of days, months, or years; the remission is in proportion to the penances indicated by the Penitential Books, though the scale is no longer employed in imposing them.

The control of penance by the priest who had imposed it gradually fell into disuse, and penitents could proceed to redemptions of penance on their own account. It was then possible to offer them not only compensations, which were calculated according to the amount of their personal debt, but even general reductions, from which all might

profit, by performing a work, not prescribed for each one of them, but which all were invited to do, even though they did not know their own exact penitential debt. From the 11th cent. onwards we meet with reductions of penances, either proportional (a seventh, a quarter, or some other fraction) or absolute (ten, twenty, or forty days), offered to every one on such occasions as the consecration of a church, the translation of relics, the festival of a venerated saint, or a pilgrimage, or even for alms towards the building or upkeep of churches, abbeys, hospitals, etc. This method of redemption or substitution reached its zenith when it covered all kinds of penance, which was done at the indulgence of the Crusade. At the Council of Clermont (1095), Pope Urban II. passed the following decree:

'Whoever, out of pure devotion and not for the purpose of gaining honour or money, shall go to Jerusalem to liberate the Church of God, may count that journey in lieu of all penance' (can. 2; Mansi, *Concilia*, Venice, 1759 ff., xx. 816).

Moreover, he preached the same thing to the masses. This was not only an indulgence, but a plenary indulgence—indeed for a long time the type of plenary indulgence—until it was imitated by so many others. Though the work proposed to Crusaders was peculiarly hard, the Crusade indulgence contains all the constituent elements of an indulgence according to the accepted definition: ecclesiastical authority remits the penitential satisfaction, without considering the personal debt of each sinner, in virtue of the accomplishment of an optional task proposed equally to all. This remission, far from dispensing with confession of sins, presupposes and demands it, since it is the confessor who imposes the penance when he pardons the fault. On the other hand, an indulgence is valid directly in the eyes of the Church, and indirectly in the eyes of God, in the same way as absolution is; for the Church, the authorized intermediary between God and the Christian for the pardon of sin, is none the less the intermediary for the imposition, and consequently the reduction, of satisfaction.

In those days, just as in our own, it was mainly for their value in reference to God that indulgences were sought, and, then as now, above all by those who had least need of them, since it is never the greatest sinners who frequent the confessional most. Thus people set themselves, as they still do, to pursue penitential works for their own value and to have the right to be liberated from penance, without considering carefully whether their penance had been determined or even incurred. And, when the gradual mitigation of penitential discipline had reduced penance or sacramental satisfaction almost to the vanishing point, the remission obtained by indulgences, by the performance of less and less arduous works, served to reduce this indeterminate but certain debt of every one to the divine justice, even for pardoned sins. The importance of commutation, which is the basis of all indulgence, decreased as that of condonation increased; at the same time, the primitive idea of debt to the Church and of the penitential scale disappeared gradually from the view and practice of the faithful and even of theologians, so that the indulgence has come to be the extra-sacramental remission of the temporal punishment due to God for our pardoned sins.

The transition evidently took place by degrees; towards the end of the 11th cent. we meet with the practice of getting definite penances imposed on oneself in order to ransom them more surely. St. Peter Damianus relates (*Sanctorum vitæ*, viii. [*PL* cxliv. 1015 f.]) that a pious hermit, St. Dominic of the Cuirass (Loricatus; † 1062), so named from the iron cuirass which he always wore for mortification, made his confessor impose years of penance, once even a thousand years, on him; and this the holy man accomplished in a single Lent, thanks to the methods borrowed from the ancient Penitentials; by singing a psalter, *e.g.*, while dealing himself fifteen thousand disciplinary blows, he did five years of penance. This exceptional fact, even in the 11th cent., practically marks the end of penances actually imposed on and redeemed by individuals; sacramental satisfaction could no longer be redeemed. There was, accordingly, nothing left but penitential works proposed indiscriminately to all. These, however, continued to be quite considerable, so that the remission of satisfaction had a very real counterpart. The Crusade indulgence, the first of the plenary type, was almost a commutation; though it was extended later to those who did not go themselves to the Holy Land, but sent a representative to fight, and then to those who merely supported the holy enterprise by their alms, it was still not too easily won. On the other hand, partial indulgences were still reckoned by ten, twenty, and forty days in the 12th and 13th centuries; there was no more than a year's indulgence for a pilgrimage to the tomb of Christ or to the basilicas of the holy apostles in Rome. This means that figures still retained nearly all their old significance. Further, when the Lateran Council (1215, Decr. lxii.), after checking the abuses of certain churchmen and alms-gatherers, decreed that bishops should not grant more than a year's indulgence after the consecration of a church, and forty days in other circumstances (by a concession of Pius X., of 28th Aug. 1903, this is extended to fifty days for bishops, a hundred for archbishops, and two hundred for cardinals), it must not be imagined that it was making a great reduction of a right that had hitherto been exercised to a much larger extent. Undoubtedly the Council was aiming at making episcopal concessions uniform and restricting abuses; but the limits which it assigned were by no means excessive at the time.

The whole history of indulgences after this, however, is summed up in constantly increasing concessions, ever more easily obtained, for the most varied acts of piety and charity. By the end of the 13th cent. there were numerous indulgences for a year, five years, and so on. We then come to the second plenary indulgence, the Jubilee, granted for the first time in 1300 by Boniface VIII. for the pilgrimage to the apostles' tombs in Rome. Originally proclaimed for secular years, the Jubilee was afterwards renewed at shorter periods, and was then extended beyond Rome, and imitated on various solemn occasions. Later, plenary indulgences were multiplied and made extremely easy of access; but by this stage the evolution of the indulgence was complete.

2. Theology.—The theology of indulgences was, in early times, complete according to the principles stated above: temporal punishment to be undergone after sin has been pardoned; penance imposed, controlled, and even reduced, by ecclesiastical authority, its concessions being approved by God, as pardon given in His name, but in a degree which cannot be definitely stated. When theologians came to consider, chiefly in relation to God, both the remission of the penalty and the absolution of the sin, they were inclined to ask how this temporal debt to divine justice was paid. This is where the theory of 'treasure' came in—the theory not, as has been alleged, invented by Alexander of Hales, but brought into relief by him and introduced into everyday teaching. It is no more than an aspect and a consequence of the Communion of saints: ought we not to pray for one another? If merit properly so called is not directly communicable between the members of the Christian society, at least satisfaction can

be transferred, almost as a man can pay a friend's debts. The infinite satisfaction of our Lord and the superabundant satisfaction of the Virgin Mary and the saints form a treasure which the Church guards and administers, drawing upon it for the payment of the debts remitted to the faithful by indulgences. This explanation pleased the realist spirit of the scholastics, and was accepted by the whole school; provided the limits of the comparison with debts between human beings are not transcended, it is indeed quite satisfactory. Clement VI. was the first to make much of it, in his bull promulgating the Jubilee of 1350, and the Church upheld it against the attacks both of Luther (Leo X.'s bull 'Exsurge Domine,' 15th June 1520) and of the Jansenist Synod of Pistoia (Pius VI.'s bull 'Auctorem fidei,' 28th Aug. 1794).

Connected with the theory of treasure are the theory and practice of the application of indulgence to the dead, a new form which helped, rather than hindered, the development of prayer for the dead, a custom always employed in the Church. The transfer of indulgence to the dead seemed to clash with the principle that the Church has no control over the other world; to this the theologians replied that it was not a case of granting indulgences directly to the dead, but simply a matter of offering to God for them the indulgences which the living could acquire; they added that the application of indulgences to the dead was not made in the form of strict, just payment, but by means of prayer—'per modum suffragii,' according to the accepted expression; in other words, it depended on the mercy of God. On this understanding the application of indulgences to the dead was adopted by the whole school (cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In IV. Sent.*, dis. 45, qu. 2, art. 3; Bonaventura, *In IV. Sent.*, dis. 20, p. 2, art. 1, qu. 5). It was not included in any official document till 1476 under Sixtus IV. This Pope, the first to accord indulgences to the dead, explained its significance; and from this time it became official doctrine and general practice (see the response of the Congregation of Indulgences of 28th July 1840 [*Decreta authentica*, no. 283]). The most notable official document on the theology of indulgences is the decree of the Council of Trent (sess. xxv.), affirming the traditional authority of the Church to grant them (cf. Mt 16^{19}, Jn 20^{23}), and declaring the practice most salutary for the Christian people.

This decree avoids precise statement, but this is because the real efficacy of indulgences cannot be estimated with precision. Not only is the Christian ignorant of the degree of temporal punishment that is his due (the scale for imposition of penance has not been preserved, but only that for remission), but he does not know how God measures this punishment or in what proportion He accepts the indulgence; and this uncertainty is, of course, more marked in the case of the efficacy of indulgences for the dead.

At least it is clear what indulgences are not: they are not merits, though some pious persons seem to think they are; nor the remission or pardon of sin itself, though this has been inferred from the celebrated expression, 'a culpa et a pœna'; nor the purely gratuitous, unconditioned remission of the expiation due for pardoned sin; nor a sort of authority to sin gained by making a promise of some simple expiation. Without entering into discussions raised by so-called indulgences 'a culpa et a pœna,' we may formulate some conclusions: (*a*) no single extant text implies the remission of mortal sin without recourse to the sacrament of penance; (*b*) a person who, after receiving absolution from his sins, obtains a plenary indulgence is actually free 'a culpa et a pœna'; (*c*) as a matter of fact, this expression is not found at first, except in reference to the two early plenary indulgences, the Crusade and the Jubilee, for which every one was allowed to apply to the confessor of his own choice; (*d*) the same explanation holds for letters of confession and indulgence, so frequent from the 14th cent.; (*e*) the expression has always been correctly interpreted by theologians: after all, it is no more difficult to explain than such expressions as 'peccatorum remissiones,' which continue to appear in pontifical letters without being misunderstood by any one; besides, is sin fully remitted so long as it leaves an expiation to be accomplished?

3. Abuse and reform.—The abuse commonly known as the 'sale of indulgences' was a very real exploitation of the concessions of indulgences granted in return for almsgiving to the churches; but it must be remarked that this was always an abuse, never a legitimate custom, and that it was always combated and finally suppressed by the Church. The principle that the Church can reward the contributions of the faithful to the temporal needs of the religious society by spiritual favours is unassailable, and requires no justification. The abuse consisted in the exaggerated and inaccurate statements made by preachers in order to encourage generous giving (especially for the deliverance of souls from purgatory), the culpable maladministration of alms, the deductions made from the alms for the benefit of the Church dignitaries and even of civil authorities, and other modes of procedure which gave to the granting of indulgences the appearance of a traffic. It is well known that the granting of indulgences for reconstructing the church of St. Peter in Rome was the occasion of Luther's revolt; if the doctrine was sound, as Tetzel proved, appearances were very unfavourable.

The Lateran Council (1215) and the Council of Vienne (1311) had tried to crush the abuses of alms-gatherers, but without much effect; it fell to the Council of Trent to strike at the root of the evil by condemning abusive practices, and abolishing the collecting of alms and trading in indulgences (sess. xxi. 'de reform.', ch. 9; sess. xxv.); the publication of indulgences was put in the hands of the bishops, assisted by two canons: they had to collect the alms of the faithful themselves, and keep nothing back. A further step was taken; indulgence-alms were completely suppressed (except the bull for the Crusade in Spain, which was also freed from all abuse); on the rare occasions when general indulgences included almsgiving, the latter was only one of the prescribed duties; its taxation and employment were left to the free choice of the faithful.

The reform of indulgences was energetically pursued by the popes, and the problems relating to them were entrusted by Clement VIII. to a provisional commission of cardinals. Clement IX. re-established it on a stable basis in 1667, charging it 'to resolve the difficulties that arose, to correct and suppress abuses, to do away with false, apocryphal, and indiscreet indulgences, etc.' This Congregation of Indulgences continued to exist till 1904, when it was united with the Congregation of Rites; in 1908, at the re-organization of the Roman Curia, indulgences were entrusted to a section of the Congregation of the Holy Office.

4. Practical remarks.—A plenary indulgence is one which covers all penance required of the penitent; a partial indulgence covers a part of the penance, and is counted by days, months, or years. A better distinction would be that the latter is reckoned, not according to the actual debt of the sinner, but according to the ancient penitential scales, while the former is not. While all indulgences really refer to persons, those which

are granted directly to persons, *e.g.*, to a confraternity, are called personal; those directly attached to a church, an altar, etc., are called local; while those attached to holy objects—crucifix, medals, beads, etc.—are called real. It is easy to understand the distinction between temporary and permanent indulgences, indulgences obtained for certain specified days, or once a day, or 'toties quoties,' whenever the penitential actions are repeated, and so on. The chief indulgences are, as formerly, the Crusade (still kept up in Spain in a special form); the Jubilee, which occurs every quarter-century, and is imitated more or less frequently by solemn indulgences called 'in form of Jubilee'; indulgences attached to the most popular devotions, as the Rosary or the Stations of the Cross; those of famous sanctuaries, as Rome, Jerusalem, Compostella, Assisi's Portiuncula, etc.; 'apostolic' indulgences, attached by the pope (or the priest authorized by him) to holy objects blessed by him, etc. The Congregation of indulgences published an official collection (*Raccolta*) of indulgenced devotions (Rome, 1854, and numerous editions), and two collections, one of decisions (*Decreta authentica ab anno 1668 ad annum 1882*, Ratisbon, 1883), the other of rescripts and summaries of indulgences (*Rescripta authentica . . . necnon Summaria indulgentiarum*, Ratisbon, 1885). Numerous other private collections exist, recognized and approved by Roman or Episcopal authority.

LITERATURE.—(*a*) *HISTORY.*—J. Morin, *Commentarius historicus de disciplina in administratione sacramenti pœnitentiæ*, Paris, 1651 (bk. x. is devoted to the history of indulgences); E. Amort, *De origine, progressu, valore, et fructu indulgentiarum*, Venice, 1738 (a rich store of texts); H. C. Lea, *A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences*, Philadelphia, 1896, vol. iii. (Protestant); T. Brieger, art. 'Indulgenzen,' in *PRE*[3] (Protestant); above all, numerous artt. by N. Paulus in various reviews, esp. *ZKT*.

(*b*) *THEOLOGY.*—All theologians are occupied more or less with indulgences. The *Tractatus dogmatico-moralis de indulgentiis* of Theodorus a Spiritu Sancto, Rome, 1743, has long been regarded as classical. The best recent practical treatments and collections are: F. Beringer, *Die Ablässe*[12], Paderborn, 1900, Fr. tr. by P. Mazoyer, *Les Indulgences*[3], Paris, 1905; P. Mocchegiani a Monsano, *Collectio indulgentiarum*, Quaracchi, 1897.

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INDUSTRIALISM.—The conditions governing the progress of a country in civilization are exceedingly complex. Among these the industry of the people occupies a position of considerable importance. Wealth and culture are far from being interconnected; but, at the same time, a very poor country is unlikely to attain to the same stage of progress as one in which commerce has developed sufficiently to provide a moderate standard of comfort for the majority of the inhabitants. Thus industrial progress becomes the potentiality from which other agencies can realize a higher stage of civilization. In some recent discussions of progress, there are two forms of description, each of which is liable to mislead. On the one side, industry is spoken of in terms which imply that it is something altogether modern, while, on the other side, it appears to be inferred that industry alone will create a satisfactory amount of national wealth. Against the first trend of thought, it is to be noted that among primitive peoples, whose situation is disadvantageous, there are periods of sustained and painful labour. A tribe, trembling on the verge of starvation, will be condemned to severe toil, and the demands which this condition makes on mind and body account for the stationary or even declining state of such a society. Hence there must be conjoined with habits of industry a not unfavourable geographical position, in order that progress may be made—to modify a saying of W. Petty: 'Labour is the father, and natural resources the mother of wealth' (*Economic Writings of Sir W. Petty*, ed. C. H. Hull, London, 1899, p. 377). But of these two conditions of progress it is easy to over-estimate the importance of natural resources. There is some instinct or gift in certain peoples which urges them either to force their way from a disadvantageous situation or by their labour to modify a country which was originally almost barren so that it becomes moderately fruitful.

Wherever a society maintained itself for any considerable period, industry was a characteristic of its life. If it existed in a nomadic or pastoral state, there was the care of the cattle, while at the same time there was, no doubt, in most cases the work of providing clothing for the tribe. With the general advance of civilization there came the time when, as in England during a great part of the Middle Ages, the occupations of the people were predominantly agricultural. At this stage, the manor constituted a complete economic unit, providing for almost all its own normal wants. In it one can trace the beginnings of organization in the allocation of specific functions to certain workers. The rise of the towns involved important economic and social consequences. The bringing together of a population of some size and the contact with distant markets enlarged the horizon of the mediæval burgess as compared with the man living in the country, and the towns were centres of initiative and, on the whole, stood for the breaking down of oppressive customs. In fact, with the growth of towns the way was prepared for the beginnings of the period which is distinguished as the modern one, as compared with Mediævalism.

The problem of the 17th cent. was the substitution of some new method for the series of customs and laws which had been found to hamper industry during the previous two centuries. The method available was the enlarging of the productive unit, and for this capital was required. Gradually capitalistic production began to replace the purely domestic system. The former had been early adopted in the woollen, the coal, and the iron trades, and it had the advantage of enabling a certain amount of division of labour to be adopted; but in the 17th cent. and the early part of the 18th cent. there were limits to the specialization that was possible. When, for instance, one reads of a Glasgow woollen 'manufactory' which in 1700 employed 1400 hands, it is to be inferred that the majority of the workers were engaged in their own homes, while power was used for the finishing of the cloth. Such industries were, in fact, carried on under the domestic system in the preliminary processes, under factory conditions in the final processes, and there was a capitalistic regime in the marketing of the product.

During the first part of the 18th cent. in England considerable additions were made to the capital of the country. At the same time markets were being extended, and by the joint action of both causes it became possible to increase the quantity of capitalistic production. The latter again led to further division of labour—a phenomenon to which Adam Smith drew attention in *The Wealth of Nations*. Then there followed a series of important mechanical inventions, affecting first the textile trades and later other industries. As a result there was a great displacement of hand labour, followed by increased specialization and organization of industry. In many ways the period from 1770 to 1840 was one of change, even of upheaval, and it is usually termed 'the industrial revolution.' In the middle of the 18th cent. British industry was largely of the cottage or domestic type. A hundred years later the factory system had become predominant. Nor did the change end here; the second half of

the 19th cent. witnessed a revolution in transport, which is still continuing. The facilities of communication tend to bring distant places into commercial relationship, and thus to render possible production on a larger and larger scale, with further specialization of industry and increased invention of machines.

All these changes may be summed up in the word 'industrialism,' and they have profoundly modified not only the mode of production, but also the whole social life of those countries where they have taken place. The effects of industrialism extend into almost all departments of the national life. Under the domestic system the power required for the primitive instruments then in use was supplied either by the workers or by animals. Now it is drawn from purely mechanical sources. Thus it has become possible to use the labour of men and women for purposes which, on the whole, require greater skill, while the total product can be very many times greater. Real wages are much higher, and the condition of the skilled artisan is certainly much better. The concentration of factories in large towns gives the workers the advantage of city life, and their lives are brighter and fuller than those of their predecessors who worked under the domestic system. These constitute some of the chief gains of the system, as against which allowance must be made for its losses and its evils. During the transition period of the industrial revolution great classes of the population sustained severe hardships, and in the early days of the factory system the conditions of female and child labour were deplorable. These, as well as other abuses, have been lessened by the Factory Acts; but there remain certain dangers to national well-being in the aggregation of large populations in the towns. When public sanitation was little regarded, the mortality of urban life was high; and, even yet, when so large a proportion of the population lives in towns, there is a certain danger to the physique of the people. There are signs which encourage the anticipation that for large numbers of the working class population this disadvantage is capable of remedy. Town-planning, the opening up of slums, increased air space in the smaller houses, greater care of the children, and better knowledge of hygiene among the people themselves point to an ultimate improvement in the physique of those who live in towns. Then, as regards the state of the worker in the course of his employment, some occupations are 'dangerous trades,' either through the mechanical processes involving risk of accident or through danger to health from the substances which have to be dealt with. Regulation of factories tends to limit the number of the former, and, while the total accidents are distressingly great, the percentage according to the numbers employed has diminished as compared with earlier periods. Thus the number of accidents per 100 stage-coach drivers was higher than that per 100 engine-drivers, and similarly with the travellers. The best medical opinion points to trade diseases being preventable. From the purely economic standpoint there are strong inducements to their eradication. As a rule, where there is risk of a trade disease the nominal wages of the workers tend to be higher than they would have been otherwise, since such risk checks the inflow of labour and lessens the earning time of those employed. Besides, almost every trade disease is traceable to a waste of material, the saving of which represents an economy of human life. It has been urged against the factory system that it tends to create a surplus of labour which is little more than on the verge of starvation, which, indeed, apart from Poor Law relief, would be in the deepest distress. This 'submerged' portion of the population suffers either from irregularity of employment or from the unremunerative character of the employment that it can obtain, as in the case of sweated industries. Neither of these characteristics is generally prevalent among the artisan classes which have been called into existence by the factory system. Accordingly, it may be concluded that the cause of a depressed market for certain kinds of unskilled labour is to be sought elsewhere. Attempts have recently been made to deal with these unfavourable conditions by legislation—as regards sweating by the institution of wages boards, and as regards irregularity of employment by the second part of the Insurance Act of 1911 (see INSURANCE).

It follows then, on the whole, that, while the disadvantages of industrialism appear to be capable of gradual amelioration by the exercise of knowledge, forethought, and improved organization, the advantages are substantial, and they tend to be cumulative. At the same time, it is a dangerous error to suppose that, because industrialism has increased the material welfare of the nation, it has established a condition of life which is to be regarded as altogether satisfactory. Opinion has fluctuated between two extremes. For some years after the success of the industrial revolution it was commonly held that industry throve best in the absence of all interference and regulation by the State—a doctrine which reached its most forcible development in the interpretation of *laissez faire* by the Manchester School. Gradually this attitude was modified by the acceptance of exceptions from the principle of *laissez faire* in industry—as, for instance, in the Factory Acts. Of late the pendulum of opinion has tended to swing in the direction of increased State-regulation of industry. And, if this tendency is carried too far, there is the danger that initiative may be checked. Economic forces are so complex that the prevention of one evil sometimes occasions another no less serious. Thus the problem of the future will be, on the one hand, to correct, or at least diminish, some of the ills of the industrial system; while, on the other hand, this should be effected without the sacrifice of any of its essentially valuable characteristics.

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INDUSTRIAL SCHOOLS.—See JUVENILE CRIMINALS.

INFALLIBILITY.—I. *GENERAL: INFALLIBILITY IN COMMON LIFE.*—1. **Infallibility a universal idea; its basis and general significance; equivalent terms and cognate ideas.**—At the heart of such universal questions as What shall I believe? Whom shall I trust? Whom shall I obey? Where shall I find certitude? What is the foundation of faith? What is truth? there lies a principle of faith in the existence of a source and channel of infallible knowledge. The quest and discovery of an infallible authority has, in some form or other, been the business not only of the great systems of religion throughout the world which have canonized the utterances and injunctions of their prophets, priests, and legislators, but also of innumerable social and political associations, each inspired with an analogous hope and confidence. Usually, it may be said, it is a practical or working infallibility that men agree to recognize; but just in proportion

as that infallibility is challenged and placed in need of vindication it is apt to be invested with a robe of mystery, and advanced to a dignity which it is fondly hoped will make it absolute and above question.

The word 'infallibility' is late Latin in its origin; but the idea, both religious and political, which it conveys is as ancient as authority in Church and State. As a negative virtue or perfection it is practically equivalent to 'inerrancy' and 'indefectibility,' the root notions of 'stumbling,' 'straying,' and 'failing' representing obvious and kindred defects in a guide to truth. As a positive virtue or perfection it has for its counterpart 'reliability,' 'trustworthiness,' or 'trueness.' The same difficulties and problems inhere in both sets of terms. In considering them we are brought face to face with an impressive series of ultimate questions, moral, social, political, legal, ecclesiastical, and religious. It is impossible to define, analyze, and weigh the concept of infallibility without recognizing that there are involved in it the foundations upon which human thought has built up its ideas of an absolute authority, a court of final appeal, a majesty of law and government, a divine right of persons or of institutions, a warrant of certitude, a rule of faith, a code of honour and of duty, a system of truth. To believe in inspiration, in revelation, in illumination, to accept a dogma, to proclaim a truth, implies in every case a faith in some infallible. Human intelligence may locate this ultimate ground of faith and conduct very variously. A man may be convinced that it resides in his own unaided mind or heart or conscience, or in the unaided faculties of some ruler or official or dignitary, or in the unaided instinct of some family or corporation or people, or in the contents of a sacred book or law or literature, or in any one of these conceived as dictated or imparted by supernatural instruction. But that an infallible seat and oracle of authority does exist is axiomatic in ethics and in politics not less than in religion. 'Oh that I knew where I might find it!' is the burden of a longing for it, hardly to be distinguished from the aspiration after God Himself. It is easy to say that to err is human, that inerrancy as a perfection belongs to God alone, that any human claim to it savours of rank presumption and, indeed, of blasphemy. And certainly it would be insufferable that any mortal mind or will should arrogate it to itself as an indefectible individual possession. But, as we shall see, its claimants in Church and State seek to elude the condemnation which they would otherwise incur, and which they freely inflict upon others in like case, by representing themselves as hereditary or official life-renters of a divinely delegated authority and wisdom. Kings or castes claim divine right, not as created or won by themselves, but as given irrevocably to themselves. A prophet or a priest claims to express the very will of God, not as a maker but as a recipient of revelation. The maxim of civil law, 'The King cannot err,' is neither more nor less intelligible and defensible than the later maxim of canon law, 'The Supreme Pontiff cannot err.' Each rests upon a philosophy of absolute monarchy as profound, subtle, and elusive as the other; each springs from an instinct deep-seated in human nature, and satisfies in its own way psychological needs that never fail to assert themselves. It will be the principal suggestion of this article that ecclesiastical or papal infallibility is not to be explained or criticized in theological or philosophical terms so much as in political and practical. Forensic and public rather than academic considerations have defended it during its protracted development. Sentiment and a sense of corporate discipline have done more for it than logic and apologetic. It was no accident that in the Vatican Council of 1870 and in the Roman Catholic Church outside that imposing assembly the conflict resolved itself into a bitter opposition between the scholarly and the administrative genius of the Church, the former as hostile to the definition of papal infallibility as the latter was urgent in its favour. The Curia is a court, not an academy. Its utterances are decrees, not theories. Its language is not theological so much as legal, and is to be interpreted and judged as such. To construe it literally, as if its vocabulary were derived from science, is perhaps as imprudent as to insist that court dress be made compulsory in the schools, or that wig and gown be borrowed from the hall of justice and made the dress of commerce and of recreation. It is true, of course, that infallibility, like other dogmatic formulations, has called into being a scholarship, or a scholasticism, of its own. But it rested on grounds distinct from scholarship and philosophy. It had silent reasons superior to the texts of Scripture which it cited. It was the canonization of a practical and essentially political principle. For its ecclesiastical promoters the doubts and hesitations and objections of their learned and eloquent opponents served no other purpose than the set speeches of the *advocatus diaboli* at the canonization of an already venerated saint. They were as shadows to enhance the new illumination. They were the resistance needed to give zest and triumph to a victory.

2. Degrees of infallibility; qualified forms of the idea.—The term 'infallible,' as applied to an individual, an organization, a system of doctrine, or a body of literature, does not, on the face of it, lend itself to qualification or modification. As a thing is either perfect or imperfect, so is a thing either fallible or infallible. But, in fact, the term is confidently employed, especially in controversy, in a variety of senses, its extreme asserters having in reserve a citadel of common sense for refuge when their exaggerations have been exposed and made untenable. As the term 'truth' has had to sustain a formidable diversity of interpretations, infallibility, as befits an idea so near of kin to it, has passed through the same experience. It may denote, as we have stated, absolute or practical immunity from error or failure. At the top of the scale a person may be conceived as in himself so perfectly constituted as not only in all circumstances to be found never to fail of right and truth in any degree, but as to be incapable of thus failing. At the bottom of the scale one may conceive a person not in himself, but by external influence, saved, on the whole and in the long run, from material or irremediable error. Between these two conceptions there lies a considerable series of descending degrees of infallibility, each of which is an adequate basis of faith and conduct, though it comes short of the ideal. Viewed scientifically, the proud boast of infallibility tends more and more to qualify itself. Though real, it is virtual, official, conditional, occasional, derived, or relative, in every claimant except God. The Bible is deemed infallible as inspired and kept pure by divine agency, either in every syllable and letter or as a whole, either in matters of faith and morals only or in matters of historical fact also, either in text or in substance, either in the original or in a particular version, either in the literal, in the historico-literary, or in a figurative sense, either as interpreted by the Fathers, by the Reformers, or by a particular branch of the living Church, and so on. The Church is deemed infallible in its clergy alone or in the episcopate, in councils or in popes, or in its clergy and laity together, either in matters touching faith and morals only, or in discipline or science or scholar

ship also, either at a certain era or in its unbroken practice, either in a certain denomination or in its entirety, and so on. But, when viewed through the medium of religious or patriotic faith, infallibility rises in the scale and ascends to the lofty altitude at which truth and authority are absolute and divine. Of infallibility, as of truth, there are idealist, utilitarian, and pragmatist interpretations, and each varies in an individualistic or an institutionalistic direction.

3. **Wide range of the idea.**—It is important that the wide range of the idea should be recognized. Infallibility is claimed in some measure or degree in a large number of regions of human activity. While the ecclesiastical and political uses are the most familiar as themes of literary and academic discussion, others deserve mention in an article like this, since the analogies they present are valuable, and have undoubtedly lent support to the former. Wherever in human affairs authority is respected and truth recognized, a degree of infallibility appropriate to the circumstances is implied. Usually the quality of perfect trustworthiness is attributed simply to the object, person, or institution in which it is believed to reside. But in reality it is also implied that the mind which recognizes infallibility has itself formed an infallible, an absolutely trustworthy, judgment, whether directly on the basis of evidence before itself, or indirectly on the basis of evidence accepted by a reputed infallible, external witness or authority, such as tradition, usage, or a living organization. Nothing assists the student of infallibility more effectively to appreciate its essential complexity and subtlety than a swift glance at the less notorious and controversial regions of life in which it is acknowledged to be operative.

(1) *In external Nature.*—External Nature, upon any view of an ultimate explanation, presents the eye of man with a spectacle of infallibility. Think what you will of her achievements, her products in detail, her tragedies, and her catastrophes, her laws operate with a serenely or a grimly perfect regularity, her processes are so absolutely reliable that an alleged suspension of them or exception to them becomes a miracle, and no one credits it except a theist who may find himself able to explain it as a divine suspension of a divine custom for divine ends, and thus implicitly leaves intact the general conception of Nature's normally unbroken regularity and uniformity. The sequence of the seasons, the alternation of day and night, the undeviating course of physical processes and of natural laws which know no exceptions, have passed into a proverb of unfailing trustworthiness. For religious faith Nature is infallible within her appointed sphere, because her Author and Upholder is infallible, and expresses His mind and will, within limits, through her. Failure in her would be failure in Him.

(2) *In human Nature.*—Trust Nature, says one school, and she will guide you rightly in the end. In other words, instinct is infallible. Convention is artificial and represses Nature. But Nature, though you expel her with a pitchfork, will make her way back and master you. A return to Nature in its primitive sense, however, is not more attractive than a return to his cradle would be to a grown man. The trouble for a sansculottist philosophy of any type is that the great conventions of life are themselves profoundly natural; they are the dictates of instinct guided by long experience. It is more natural to the genus *homo* to go clothed than naked, to observe law than to be anarchist. And for the individual the rule to trust one's instinct as a sure guide is not to be crudely simplified into a wanton and libertine indulgence of each passing whim or fugitive passion. Even the brutes are above that. Instinct, the nature in us, is as complex as the universe, nature around us. Each has required an age-long evolution to bring it to what it is. Nature, instinct, is a perfectly trustworthy authority, but it needs patience and impartial investigation to know her mind and catch her final mandate. 'Be natural,' a first law of manners and of style in art and literature, and, rightly understood, also in morals and religion, does not mean 'Play the new-born babe, or play the backwoods savage,' but 'Be true to your real genius and station and mission in life.' Nature is infallible, in the region of human instinct as in her own external province, the world of the elements and forces; but her mind and will are expressed in decrees which are not momentary or intermittent or capricious, but are in time discerned as universal laws making for progress and cohering in consistency.

(3) *In human society.*—In human social life various degrees of infallibility are recognized under the conceptions of authority and discipline. No one pretends that all parents or that any parents are incapable of making mistakes and misleading their children, yet the will of the parent and the information and instruction of the parent are for a time infallible to the child, gladly accepted by him as such, and within limits authorized as such both by law and by public opinion. The rights of the parent in the child who is flesh of his own flesh and is brought up by him, the mutual affection that is natural to both and inspires trust, sympathy, and understanding, and makes submission to authority no hardship, the special knowledge which the parent possesses of the temperament and capacity of the child and his natural desire to develop the best in him—such considerations make interference between parent and child at a certain stage in life profoundly undesirable, and lend at least a temporary infallibility to parental authority. The same is true of the authority of the teacher in school and university not only to command obedience, but to command faith in his instruction. The apprentice in business or in handicraft, the subordinate official in well-nigh every organization in commercial, military, professional, and public service, accepts, and is authorized to accept, within limits as final for him the mandate or advice of his superior. Such infallibility is maintained as socially economical and as conducing to efficiency in the common interest. It is held to be justified as working well, and flagrant instances of abuse of power are held to discredit the individual, not the system. Democracy itself is not less a form of government, entailing discipline and subordination in its public departments, than a theory of citizen equality. Expediency alone, based on confidence in special knowledge, is the warrant of military infallibility with its autocratic subjection of all ranks to one mind and will, of legal infallibility with its judicial *cul de sac* in a court of final appeal, and of political infallibility with its autocratic or constitutional vesting of all authority ultimately in a sovereign power. The physician in practice is assigned an all but arbitrary infallibility, tempered by occasional appeal to the specialist, and restrained from gross incompetency or crime by professional honour fortified by the common law and the Medical Council. 'Trust the expert' is a rule in which humanity for the most part has a childlike confidence, utterly misplaced in numerous particular instances, yet based generally on a solid foundation of close observation and long experience. Proverbial though it is that doctors differ, no proverb encourages the patient to differ from his doctor. Proverbial though it is that tastes differ, each generation suffers itself willingly to be

directed in its architecture, art, and music by the experts of the day, in spite of the fact, too clearly shown by history, that their judgment in many cases proves to be as transitory and as unfortunate in its issue as the æsthetic canons and decrees of sartorial fashion.

(4) *In reason.*—If we turn to reason, the ultimate differentia of mankind in the world of life, in search of an infallible principle, our quest is not in vain, but the result is not the discovery of an automatic solvent of all problems. Reason is infallible. It is the organ of truth. But, though it resides in every normal human being, it confers no immediate miraculous identity of judgment or opinion upon humanity. All men reason; but not all reason accurately or consistently. Fortified though it is by increasing personal experience and individual knowledge, and fostered and assisted though it is by tradition and by common intercourse, the individual reason is not delivered from errors and shortcomings. When we speak of reason as infallible, we look beyond the individual and even beyond the aggregate to what is anything but an abstraction, to the common principle of all our thinking and judging, which is not many but one, which guides and directs our science in all its departments, which appeals to men of every race. The rationalist isolates it as a standard and criterion of faith and duty, forgets that it is but an instrument, though the highest in our use, and in its favour ignores other elements in our spiritual constitution which give force and value to life. But reason, by which we discriminate truth from error, religion from superstition, and in great measure right from wrong, as an indwelling principle in humanity, must be infallible. Apart from its complete and unimpeded exercise there is no rest to the soul. Through it the observation of nature and its operations rises from a pastime into science, enhancing not more man's knowledge than his power, and approximating his intelligence and his insight nearer and nearer to the divine. But, as with nature or instinct, so with reason—it is infallible as an ultimate principle, fallibly employed by individual intelligences even in the exalted sphere of science, which, outside the somewhat frigid bounds of pure mathematics, is never altogether innocent of questionable dogma and changing fashion.

(5) *In conscience.*—It is an axiom of all schools and all sects that a man ought to obey his conscience in all circumstances and at all costs. Religion, indeed, recognizes in human conscience the very whisper of the infallible Spirit of God. But what one man's conscience sanctions for him another's sometimes in the same circumstances refuses to permit. The slavery which one generation contemplates with equanimity and justifies without a qualm revolts the soul of its successor. The polygamy which one race practises deliberately as its social duty appears abhorrent to another people. The pride, the ambition, the love of power and wealth, which are the breath of life to one class of men, are as death to the soul of another. Usages and impulses which pass unchallenged in the OT, or are regarded as directly approved, are condemned in the NT. Yet conscience is not dethroned from its sovereign dignity, nor is it acknowledged to lack essential unity. For the individual, the time, the race, it is final; it is to be believed implicitly, and obeyed. But even conscience can be developed and trained, as in the individual so also in the race. It is the same principle in all its variations, in all individuals, periods, and peoples. Its function is the same. Its genius or spirit is the same. But, like everything human, it has to grow, to come to itself, to increase in self-knowledge and in vision. If it is the whisper of God, it is also a still, small voice sounding in human ears amid the distractions of other sounds, and it speaks a language whose vocabulary, accent, and tones man does not learn at once without education and taking pains. Conscience is not an oracle before whose tripod the human soul can sink its native intelligence and responsible discernment and resign itself to passive listening. To regard it as an automatic index to duty, operated supernaturally apart from the dispositions of the heart and mind in which it is resident, is to degrade both it and its divine operator. The compass is an infallible pointer to the pole, but science which gave it to the seaman for his guidance has had to toil and search in order to discover its true direction and to instruct him how to house it, how to allow for its deflexion, how to strengthen its power and protect it from external interference, how to construe its behaviour in all circumstances. So conscience in the individual, for all its dignity as a divine voice speaking in the soul of man, is no exception to the sacred law that revelation, though it comes to earth from heaven, enters through human faculties, entrusted to human vision, human intelligence, and human utterance. Essentially the same conjunction of human and divine which Christological theology has made familiar in the Incarnate Word as a mystery to faith, and which baffles prosaic analysis in the divine message of the prophets and in the written Word of God, which are at the same time intensely human, presents itself to reverent inquiry in the divine Word which we call conscience. It is infallible for religious faith, though its organs of utterance are in themselves found to be imperfect and errant. In the moral world it is better to do the wrong thing under the conscientious conviction that it is right than to do the right thing in spite of the conscientious conviction that it is wrong. But in either instance the organ of moral discrimination is at fault and is in need of further education. Thus the infallibility of conscience, absolute as it rightly is for the individual, is always relative to his enlightenment, and ought to be consciously so, and therefore open to fresh enlightenment. Education and development may modify its actual decrees, but as a principle it represents a consistent attitude towards ethical values as in the course of time and experience they are successively understood and rightly appreciated.

(6) *In the State and in political life.*—Again, it is a maxim and mark of good citizenship that the laws of one's country are to be loyally obeyed. They possess a certain majesty more sovereign even than the king in whose name they are promulgated and enforced. They express the genius and spirit of a people, mould its life incessantly, and outline for common instruction a certain minimal suggestion of its ideal of justice. What represents the settled conviction of many generations of experience must, it is readily felt, be true, and has a right to be enforced. Conscience and expediency combine to dignify its authority. But in all civilized countries the development of parliamentary legislation has introduced so great an amount of legal detail into statutory obligations, and the victories of party which carry legislative programmes into the statute-book frequently represent so attenuated, shortlived, and doubtful a majority of public opinion in their favour, that the majesty which once rightly belonged to the greater and often unwritten codes of earlier days has become at once a moral and a psychological impossibility. Party government is everywhere in just disrepute, except among the politically ambitious whose ends alone it serves, because more and more it presumes to employ coercion in

the name of the whole State and with the resources of the whole commonwealth to enforce the will of a section of the people in things morally indifferent. On one plea or another it will not wait to secure moral unanimity, the only legitimate basis of compulsion. It seldom cares to invite an explicit mandate, but prefers to merge a number of separate issues in its appeal to the constituencies, juggling as it pleases with their aggregate response. Yet in the Crown, the State, the commonwealth, however organized for government and administration, there resides a real infallibility. Its authority, like that of conscience, articulates itself in different lands and at different periods in very various utterances, and sanctions things which in course of time it would fain repudiate. Even with the best and most honourable intentions it may do wrong, act tyrannically, and retard progress. But such cases constitute to the right-minded reformer simply a signal of the need of education. The just authority of public opinion, and of immemorial tradition, and of the institutions which they have constructed for the public good must not be overthrown if it is to be brought to bear with a freshly enlightened purpose upon the establishment of a better order of things. Infallibility, therefore, in the State, vested in its head and officers, its government and administration, absolute though it appears from moment to moment when the interests of individuals collapse in conflict with it, is and always has been relative and conditioned. Autocracy at its worst has its restraints, and owes the very continuance of its power to them. Democracy is but a readjustment and redistribution of responsibilities and authorities. The legal principle that the king or the legislature cannot err holds its own only by the help of the seemingly inconsistent rule that the sovereign power is in duty bound to redress wrongs and to promote reforms as need arises. The same ministers and members of parliament who on admission swear to uphold the constitution of their country are vested with power to alter or modify it. If the interest of common order and public peace demand immediate obedience to the existing law, that obedience will not long be rendered where there is no confidence that the highest good of the people is being vigilantly promoted by the occupants of official power. Closely as the ecclesiastical claimants to infallibility have modelled their politics upon the theory and practice of the secular powers under whose shadow they have had to live, they have not found in them any example or analogy for an absolute regime whose decrees were not only affirmed to be final for the time but irreformable and unalterable for all time. It was reserved for ecclesiastical statesmen to endeavour to erect a hierarchical autocracy distinguished from all secular organizations by its steadfast and immovable exclusion of innovation even by constitutional means.

(7) *In religion.*—It is in religion that the principle of infallible authority asserts itself most powerfully. Every religion has its solemn ordinances and obligations, its absolute decrees which rule the public and domestic life of its people. The higher religions, which claim in some sense to save men here and hereafter, use the same order of language and operate with the same instruments of instruction and discipline as the lower, but they leave the lower far behind in respect of the urgency of their appeal, the dignity of their claims, and the wealth of means which they bring to bear upon mankind for the accomplishment of their lofty purpose. They make explicit and articulate the presuppositions and the genius of earlier faiths. They are theologically and ecclesiastically self-conscious. They are not content merely to proclaim, but feel bound also to explain. They develop organizations for their propagation and diffusion comparable in extent and in cost with the secular politics of history. They are not content to rest on the authority of custom or usage as the valid basis of their law, but affirm their direct origination by divine agency. They describe their authority not only as a power demanding to be obeyed, but as a power desiring and requiring to be believed. The truth they preach does not derive its credibility or its cogency from human sources. It is God's Word. It is a divine revelation, not a human discovery. Tradition itself can add no sanctity to it: it can only keep it pure and pass it down the generations. In such a setting infallibility takes on an enhanced solemnity. It is no longer an empirical convention founded on natural right and supported by simple expediency, but rises into an august principle of dogmatic faith. In Christianity most of all it has come to mature self-consciousness, and found expression in a series of transcendent affirmations of faith. Buddhism, Muhammadanism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Parsiism, have precisely analogous dogmas associated with their conceptions of an inspired founder, an inspired literature and canon, a holy organization or fraternity, and a providentially safeguarded tradition and interpretation. But in Christianity the questions relating to infallibility have been developed and worked out both by scholarship and by administration with a completeness that is without rival, and a literature of extreme value and great impressiveness is available for the student who desires to master them for himself.

II. *SPECIAL: INFALLIBILITY IN THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.*—1. **Introductory considerations.**—In the Christian life and within the Christian organization of society the various types and degrees of infallibility which have been sketched in the first division of this article all have their counterparts. Each of the Churches and every type of Christian has a seat of authority, simple or complex, accessible or remote, to which it habitually refers its doctrinal and practical difficulties. The response of the oracle may not be regarded as final for more than the occasion or the party concerned, but it is believed to represent an independent and in some sense authoritative voice, confirming or correcting individual opinion. This authority in the Christian world is at once a rule of faith and of duty, promoting, if not demanding, belief in its testimony and obedience to its injunctions. In every case it is believed to owe its prerogative and power to divine inspiration and to a permanent divine commission. In argument and counter-argument the advocates of these authorities are apt to draw distinctions between the rival principles as in themselves either more or less spiritual in character. But the Christian rationalist, for example, who makes reason supreme, does so only under the conviction that God gave reason to man to be his guide through all his perplexities of faith and conduct, and that it is impiety towards the Author and Upholder of that noble faculty to doubt its authority and its adequacy. He can point effectively to the fact that all schools of Christian thought argue or reason, when they can, the correctness of their views, even when those views have reached the paradox *Credo quia absurdum*; and there is justice in his judgment that for Christendom reason is infallible within its own legitimate province, inferring truth from the data supplied to it by nature, experience, or revelation, correlating truths derived from whatever source, and exposing error either directly or by reduction to absurdity.

Broadly speaking, infallibility has been sought by Christian faith in a direction either external or internal to the individual. In historical documents, the Scriptures or the Creeds and Confessions of Faith, or in sacred traditions embedded in literature or embodied in life, or in the living Church either as a whole or represented by some class or individual, or in the historical Jesus, a fundamentally external norm of infallible truth is found. In the Christian reason, or in the witness of the Holy Spirit within the individual Christian soul, an inward norm is accepted. But the common presupposition of all these views is that God may be trusted not to fail the believing soul, that His guardian and guiding Spirit is increasingly at work in the Church, bringing infallible conviction to those who, officially or personally, use the means of grace and knowledge available in the Church in reliance upon God. Individuals and Churches emphasize differently the particular instruments and vehicles of infallible guidance, but under all their differences it is clear that they operate with the same elements of spiritual power and knowledge. There is one Spirit, the common ultimate; and His instruments, though they are many, are essentially alike for all. In a sense no claims to infallibility are more provincial than the ultra-catholic in so far as they are ultramontane, and none are more individualistic than the papal since they are vested in one man. Thus do extremes meet in their pursuit of a common object.

The principal forms of infallibilist theory which have been urged by Christian thinkers locate the seat of Christian authority in sacred writings, in the organized or visible Church, in the historical Jesus, or in the Christian reason, conscience, or spirit. In that order they are here reviewed.

2. Infallibility of Holy Scripture.—Christianity was born to revere a Bible. Its earliest place of worship was the Galilæan synagogue, a House of the Book, a provincial equivalent for the distant Temple, whose open Holy of Holies, in the full view of the congregation, contained the Old Covenant, the rolls of the Word of God, in their shrine or ark. Master and disciples had alike learned in the synagogue and its schools to regard the Law and the Prophets as the veritable utterance of the Spirit of God. For them a visit to the Temple at the great feasts owed its impressiveness not less to the Scriptural instruction than to the ritual and sacrifice which it housed. Their nation, in the phrase so picturesquely used by Muhammad in the Qur'ān to describe them, was the 'People of the Book.' The most admired and distinguished class in the nation, according to the popular judgment, were the scribes and Pharisees, whose profession it was, not by birth, but by learning and talent, to be the priests and Levites of the Temple and Cultus of the Book. If the Temple priesthood who served in the sight of Israel principally at the great festivals represented Aaron in their ephods, the Rabbis sat in Moses' seat with the phylactery on their forehead as their symbol, exercising an authority which practically overshadowed the direction of public ritual in the Capital alone, since it reached the infinitesimal details of daily life and piety throughout the country. Public opinion invested them in the period of the ministry of Christ with an authority in matters of faith and morals which Christian priesthoods with significant and ominous avidity have made the precedent and the model for their own. Yet it was the Book they handled rather than the way they handled it that surrounded them with popular veneration. To the almost superstitious awe with which the popular mind universally regarded book-learning in ancient times, the transcendent character of the Holy Book which they expounded lent vastly added force. If we remember what the OT in Hebrew and in Greek was to Israel, and also bear in mind the profound impression that it made, in spite of its foreign atmosphere and peculiar exclusiveness, upon the cultured classes of neighbouring races among whom it gained thousands of disinterested proselytes by its sheer grandeur, elevation, and spiritual uniqueness, we shall not wonder that from the beginning something verging on Bibliolatry was native to Christianity. The NT, which has no infallible pretensions for itself any more than the OT had for itself, and gains our allegiance none the less readily because of their absence from its unaffected pages, from first to last quotes from the OT and defers to it as a treasury of literal oracles of God. The reader of it does not need to recall particular references of Jesus to the authority of the Bible of His people whose 'Scripture cannot be broken' (Jn 10^{35})—ignorance of which and of God's power is a cause of error (Mt 22^{29})—an authority which was common ground for the strangely different interpretations of it made by Him and by His enemies. The 'oracles of God,' as Paul calls them (Ro 3^{2}), are as truly the basis of Christ's teaching, and, as in the Temptation and the Transfiguration, the strength of His life, as they are the source of the language and imagery in which the Apostolic writers set forth His teaching and His life and character. The most consummate scholarship of our time is only coming to realize fully the minute and profound dependence of the NT upon the OT, Gospels and Epistles, Master and disciples alike. For one and all the OT was the Infallible Book, God's own Word and Revelation through inspired seers, singers, thinkers, statesmen, and annalists, every word of which was authoritative for the soul, if rightly understood.

The composition and publication of the Apostolic writings was necessarily followed by an almost immediate extension of the Canon, the infallible rule of faith and life. For, apart from their intimate connexion with the Lord Himself as veracious records and expositions of Him composed by men belonging more or less closely to His earliest following, they have a spiritual tone, power, and distinction, and they proclaim a message, which not only raised them at once to the exalted level of the OT, but made them in sober truth its completion and perfection, the crown of its hopes and promises, the light that in earlier days had projected moving shadows as it drew near the world. If the OT was inspired, much more the NT. If the OT was infallible, much more the NT. If the OT formed a Canon, with or without the late Apocrypha, much more the NT, also with or without the later writings, which were painfully marked by waning power. Detailed examination, sentence by sentence, of these newer writings only served to vindicate the comparison. They preserve, to this day, the same inexhaustible edification and stimulus for religious minds which Israel and the first Christians found unfailingly in the reverent perusal and study of the older Bible of their race. Both Testaments remain inextricably bound up together as the Bible and Common Rule of the whole of Christendom. Greek, Roman, and Protestant alike use it, and cherish it, as the fountain of sacred truth, the unfailing and inerrant source of Christian instruction, God's literal Word for all time, dictated by His Spirit and phrased by his chosen servants to be an eternal possession of the faithful in His Church. For the Greek and Latin Fathers, for the Schoolmen great and small, for all branches of the divided modern Church, the unmistakable teaching of the Bible is infallible. 'It is written,' for them as for the first Christians, is officially final proof, where the Scripture is at

one and its sense correctly reached, just as 'Thus saith the Lord' is final on the lips of a true prophet.

Then how comes it that there are so many Churches, and so many Biblical theologies at their foundation, it may be asked, if the Bible is one, and infallible, and accepted by all Christians? The answer is twofold.

(*a*) While the Bible is one, its contents are far from homogeneous, representing many historical strata of religious experience and many types of religious temperament; so that a Book which comes to us from so many minds may very naturally appeal to men very differently, some responding to one element in it, others to others, no single individual and no Church, it may be, ever being capable of appreciating all alike. It lends itself, not unintentionally, to as many interpretations as it finds interpreters. The rival Church theologies are neither wrong in themselves nor, as we are apt to judge in haste, destructive of the unity of Holy Writ, any more than the rival tendencies within its own pages, as, for example, of priest and prophet or of Paulinism and Petrinism, are subversive of it. Scholarship and common sense have come to doubt the wisdom and the justice of making the Bible into a code, or a quarry of materials for a code, of statute law which must be rigorously administered if justice is to be done to it and to the lieges. The letter killeth; the spirit giveth life. Faith cannot be legislated; it has to be 'inspired.' Unity or conformity may become a fetish, and its cult a superstition, if it is not comprehensive enough to admit of a certain play of freedom and spontaneity in the faith which inspires it. The division and subdivision of the Church in all lands, far from disclosing a merely schismatic spirit, is in great measure a proof that the Christian mind has been alive and awake, that it has demanded a wider catholicity than orthodoxies would acknowledge, and that the many-sidedness of the Christian Scriptures has received recognition in spite of all legalistic repression and restraint. Bossuet's controversial use of the variation of Protestant doctrine rests on a grotesque misconception of the nature of unity, and consorts very ill with the spirit of his native Gallicanism. Christianity itself was at first known as a sect, a *αἵρεσις*, because it rested upon an interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures which was contrary to that of the accepted schools. The Sermon on the Mount, with its 'It was said of old time . . . but I say unto you,' is a perfect illustration of the mingled reverence and independent discrimination of Jesus' attitude to the OT. The conflict of texts in the threefold temptation in the wilderness, some being rejected as lower and worldly, others accepted as spiritual, is another proof of the critical position which He took up towards the letter and details of the Book whose inherent infallibility He invariably assumes. And, far from discouraging a like reverent freedom in His followers, He was at no pains to preclude variation in Christian thought, and prescribed no dogmatic interpretation either of the OT or of His own words and ordinances, although the daily conversation of His immediate disciples, even the inner circle, revealed with unmistakable clearness the grave differences of opinion which were inevitable in the future. It may, indeed, be part of the moral vocation and intellectual responsibility of every Christian to form his own best judgment as to the message of the Word of God, and Christian unity may find expression less in identity of opinion than in identity of attitude, less in finding a uniform doctrine than in finding the truth for oneself, whatever others may seem to find. Certain it is, in any case, that from the very outset of its career Christianity has expressed itself through diverse interpretations of its common Scriptures, retaining its sense of their divine authority notwithstanding unimpaired.

Moreover, the infallibility of Scripture was not incompatible with a varying Canon. At first the Canon was simply the accepted OT, but it existed in both its Hebrew and its Greek form, each of which was authoritative, and was, in fact, employed as the textual basis of quotations in the NT. An artificial identity of Hebrew text was secured by rabbinical care, greatly to the loss of later scholarship; but, though the legend of the Septuagint credited the work of the seventy Greek translators with miraculous identity in a similar interest, the same miracle-loving Providence omitted to supply an identical text or even an identical number of books to the received Hebrew and to the received Greek Canons, suggesting thereby that infallibility was to be found in something higher than the hireling work of the copying scribe and the selective judgment of the Canon-former. It was not otherwise with the Christian Bible when by degrees the NT drew together as the complement of the OT. No doubt it was comparatively easy to set aside inferior aspirants to a place in the completed Canon, though some writings ultimately included and some excluded hung in the balance for a considerable time. But, as time went on, and versions into the vernaculars of Christian Europe, Asia, and Africa were made and recognized for use, and the process of manuscript reproduction steadily increased the distance between the current copies and the lost originals, the difficulties which beset the natural ideal of a single interpretation of the Bible were greatly multiplied. Rome in its own practical and not over-scrupulous fashion cut the knot by ordaining that the Greek and Hebrew texts should retire into academic seclusion as antiquarian matter, and that a standard revision of Jerome's Vulgate should for all time coming be the only Bible for doctrinal and disciplinary and liturgical use. Even that Vulgate has come to need textual revision and standardization by a Biblical Commission. The Scriptural infallibilist who desiderates a single authentic text as the basis of his scholarship and dogma might well despair. But it is clear that the kind of infallibility which Jesus Christ and the early Church recognized in Scripture was not textual or linguistic or historical in character, but spiritual, and the Roman Catholic or Protestant controversialist who flees for refuge to an arbitrarily selected version and text as his infallible Canon, or postulates an infallible authority to be its interpreter, has succumbed to an unchristian panic, and has failed to recognize the true nature of the inerrancy of Holy Writ. It must be acknowledged without reserve that scholarship has made it simply impossible for any man or any church to point to one text, or one rendering, or one interpretation of the Bible and say, 'This is the one true Word of God, infallible and exclusive.' It is self-delusion, and in the strictest sense superstition, to set up any authority, whether amateur or expert, and appeal to it to settle controversy either temporarily or finally. We may make increasing approximation to the true answer, but nothing is more certain than that a certainty upon it which is beyond question can never be reached. Can Christendom, however, not be content to take up its Lord's position in the matter? He lays down no rule for posterity about the Massoretic text or the Septuagintal rendering. He frames no rules for exegesis. He proclaims the establishment of no court to settle such disputes. The inerrancy of Scripture for Him was compatible with its inclusion of much that was or had become imperfect. He distinguished weightier from minor matters of the Law (Mt 23). For Him there were Messianic elements in it so misleading and seductive as to be satanic, and there were encouragements to what in a Christian would be vice and sin. The divine kernel of Scripture was what alone concerned Him, the Canon within the Canon, the element which reached and held fast the Christian conscience and satisfied the demands of the Holy Spirit operating in the Christian soul.

(*b*) There are many divergent schools of Christian opinion and many types of church life for this further reason, that, apart from the differences of text, rendering, and interpretation just considered in relation to the Bible as one and infallible, traditions external altogether to the Scriptures have been taken as a conjunct and co-ordinate basis of faith and duty. No Church, however devoted or however servile in its Biblicism, has succeeded in eliminating the authority of tradition altogether, for in the sphere of interpretation it makes its presence universally felt. But in no Church is a tradition hostile to the plain sense of Scripture welcome in itself. Roman Catholic dogma expressly co-ordinates tradition with Scripture as a source of revealed truth and duty. 'This [saving] truth and [moral] discipline,' says the Council of Trent in its 'Decree concerning the Canonical Scriptures,' 'are contained in the written books and the unwritten traditions, which, received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or from the Apostles themselves, the Holy Ghost dictating, have come down even unto us, transmitted as it were from hand to hand: the Synod, following the examples of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with an equal affection of piety and reverence all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament—seeing that one God is the author of both—as also the said traditions, as well those appertaining to faith as to morals, as having been dictated, either by Christ's own word of mouth, or by the Holy Ghost, and preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession.' And in the 'Decree concerning Original Sin' it professes to follow 'the testimonies of the sacred Scriptures, of the holy Fathers, of the most approved councils, and the judgment and consent of the Church itself.' But conflict between them is not conceived as possible, the function of tradition being to make explicit as need arises what has lain implicit in the treasury of ecclesiastical authority and Scriptural truth. But any addition of Church tradition to the letter of Scripture on equal terms must increase the room for divergence in men's interpretation of the Bible viewed as an infallible document. Great as is the opportunity for honest difference of opinion on the teaching of Scripture, it is as nothing compared with the opportunity provided by accumulated custom and convention in the Church. It may be difficult to determine the harmony or 'consent' of Scripture, but will any one seriously maintain that a *consensus patrum* or a *consensus traditionum* with any approach to unanimity could be produced for a similar range of doctrine?

The infallibility of Scripture consists of no absolute immunity from error in matters of historical and scientific fact. Even the Gospels defy the harmonist in some details, misquote at least one passage from the OT (Mk 1^2, Lk 7^{27}, where 'thy' is substituted for 'my,' and the whole meaning of Malachi altered), and misattribute another passage (Mt 27^9, where 'Jeremiah the prophet' should be 'Zechariah'). The OT, in its cosmogony and in its history, fails again and again to satisfy an exact standard of accuracy and to consist with modern knowledge, while its statistics are not seldom inconsistent in detail. Many of its lapses are covered up by the kindly offices of textual tradition and translation, though every scholar knows them familiarly. Others have been smoothed over by the indulgent resources of an ingenious interpretation. It is now a commonplace of

Biblical learning that God has been at no pains to prevent errors of history and knowledge and defects in the text and its transmission from finding an entrance into the sacred pages of His written Word. The marvel is, in truth, that detected errors are so few. The devout reader of Scripture may indeed accept them as there, if not from accident, on purpose, to protect him from the sin of Bibliolatry, and to chasten the religious instinct which demands infallibility of a literal sort and insists on revelation as an *opus operatum* and on inspiration as a finished fact. Add together the sum of Biblical inaccuracies and flaws, and, while they do disprove the notion, formed *a priori* of all divine instruments, that the Book contains no blemish, the aggregate is so slight as to be practically negligible. It merely serves to admonish us that Biblical infallibility is not to be sought in the letter, and proves to the discomfiture of our instinctive literalism that jots and tittles can pass away without disturbance of the spirit of the Book. No one will suspect the Westminster divines of disloyalty to the doctrine of Scriptural infallibility, and there is therefore a peculiar impressiveness in their discriminating conclusions regarding it. Speaking, as they do, the last dogmatic word of the older Calvinism, they devote a great part of the opening chapter of their Confession to the subject as the key to their whole doctrine.

'The authority of the holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the Author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts. . . . Those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them. . . . The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself; and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly. The Supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the Scripture.'

Thus, in Calvinistic as in Lutheran orthodoxy, rooted though each is in a thoroughgoing Biblicism, a spiritual principle of dogmatic authority was resorted to in distrust of all external infallibility. The infallible in Scripture was not to be learned by scholarship nor by application to Church Councils in their wisdom.

As A. B. Davidson says in *The Theology of the OT* (Edinburgh, 1904), p. 205, 'When we speak of the infallibility of Scripture, we must remember it is not a scientific or philosophic infallibility, but the infallibility . . . of common-sense.'

It could be divined by the simple through the illuminating grace of God's Spirit. It concerned not secular knowledge but salvation. In the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England there is no formal reference to Scriptural infallibility, but, instead, to 'the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures for Salvation.'

'Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith, or be thought requisite as necessary to salvation' (Art. VI.). 'The Church hath power to decree Rites or Ceremonies, and authority in Controversies of Faith: and yet it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to God's Word written, neither may it so expound one place of Scripture, that it be repugnant to another. Wherefore, although the Church be a witness and a keeper of Holy Writ, yet, as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce any thing to be believed for necessity of Salvation' (Art. XX.).

In both these articles the authority of Scripture is drawn upon only so far as relates to the great practical needs of religious life and experience.

3. Infallibility of Creeds and Confessions, of dogma.—The dogmatic symbols of Christendom, on any view of them, invite discussion in this connexion as a sequel to Holy Scripture and as a preliminary to the Church in the series of accredited authorities; for, on the one hand, like the Bible they are written documents, scriptures, and they are also canonical in their own degree; and, on the other hand, they owe their official authority to the consent of the Church and to unbroken tradition. They are regarded as inspired, but only in a secondary and derivative sense; not as delivered by prophetic men by whom the Holy Spirit uttered fresh truth, but as compiled from Scripture or deduced from Scripture by saints, scholars, and churchmen under the guidance or illumination of the same Spirit. In high theory they are all subordinate to Scripture, and unmistakably sprung from it. To the primary Canon of Apostolic writings they form an appendix of ecclesiastical dogma. But in practice they came to receive a liturgical, disciplinary, and didactic deference hardly inferior to Scripture. Not seldom, indeed, in their character as authoritative summaries of its contents and definitions of the sense in which a Church accepted and construed God's Word, they effectively supplanted Scripture. Scripture, by its many-sidedness, its informality, its popular speech, its unconventional freedom, and its infinite suggestiveness, everywhere prompted men to think for themselves and fashion systems of doctrine for themselves. All the heresies, great and small, appealed to it. Each of the Churches was convinced that it was founded on it, and could cite a wealth of passages palpably in its favour. Thus, if uniformity was to be secured in Christendom, Scripture was seen to be inadequately narrow and exclusive as a standard of orthodoxy, and Creeds and Confessions (*qq.v.*) with growing elaborateness were employed by supreme ecclesiastical authorities, ostensibly to condense and supplement it, but in effect, for disciplinary purposes, to replace and supersede it. That has been a virtually universal process throughout Christendom. There is much to be said for it. Much of it was salutary. It represented a long-continued endeavour not only to exclude grave error and to keep the faith pure by the help, where possible, of Scripture itself, but also to define the essence of Christianity as a faith. The ancient Creeds have a character and a venerableness all their own, so impressive as well-nigh to disarm criticism. Yet even the simplest of them is scarred by controversy. The Apostles' Creed, the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan, the Athanasian, or Quicunque Vult, and the Te Deum form a monumental group of dogmatic symbols, owing less of their authority to formal acceptance by councils and enforcement by discipline than to their willing and, indeed, proud acceptance by the devotion and the scholarship of the Christian centuries. But, different as they are in character, origin, form, and popularity, they are alike acts of faith in Scripture, human responses to the initiative of revelation rather than inspired objects of faith. Their authority is Scriptural in so far as their clauses are borrowed from Scripture with all the advantages and the limitations of mere quotation. If they gain by leaving out much that can be dispensed with in Scripture, they necessarily lack its comprehensiveness, catholicity, and intimate touch with life and experience. What they add to Scripture is controversial in its

origin, and as majority-opinion claims only a questioned immunity from error. What they gain through their approbation or imposition by councils is but a ministerial and, as compared with Scripture, a secondary authority. Fashioned by the Church—for the most part quite obscurely, since even the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan largely consists of pre-conciliar materials—the Creeds differ from formal decrees and definitions like the Confessions, inasmuch as they represent a more spontaneous growth and wield an authority less widely resented; but ultimately the question of their infallibility is the same as that of the infallibility either of the Scriptures from which they are drawn or of the Church which gave them birth, shelter, and recognition. Whether one has regard to the Scriptural elements within them or to the theological additions made in the varied interests of orthodoxy, comprehensiveness, and precision, they are one and all to be interpreted historically; their language, vocabulary, topics, and scope must all be understood in the light of their particular times. What Scripture owes to the affectionate patience of Christian scholarship dare not be withheld from the Creeds and Confessions, if they are either to be understood or regarded with affection. No Creed, not even the Apostles', has the universal currency of Scripture. No Confession has the ecumenicity of the Bible. The same agency which produced dogma is at any time competent to emend, augment, or unmake it. The same authority which gave it sanction is at liberty, if duty should demand it, to set it aside. Few such documents make any claim to be infallible, except in so far as conviction of their truth may be taken to imply infallibility; and those which do—the Athanasian Creed, the appendix to the Nicene, and, for example, the Decrees and Canons of Trent—betray on close inspection no generic difference, no theological elevation, no religious genius, to warrant such distinction. Though Newman and his school counted it a point in favour of the title of the Roman Catholic Church to be the exclusive representative of the infallible Church Catholic that it persistently and deliberately claimed to be such, nothing can exempt the products of the human intellect from the conscientious scrutiny of a living and enlightened scholarship, or from the practical but never completed test that by their fruits they shall be known. Most of them, it may freely be acknowledged with gratitude, served their original purpose admirably, and were faithful to the assured results of the learning and experience of their time.

But, as W. Sanday says in *Christologies Ancient and Modern* (Oxford, 1910), p. 237, although they are 'great outstanding historical monuments of the faith of the Church,' which we cannot but regard with veneration, and to which we desire in loyalty to conform our opinions, 'it is impossible that the thought and language of those centuries should exactly coincide with the genuine, spontaneous, unbiased, scientific . . . language of the present day. We must modernize, whether we will or no.'

4. Infallibility of the Church.—(*a*) *The Universal Church.*—Christian faith in the infallibility of the Church has expressed itself in a protean variety of ways. Some of these verge closely upon the theories which have already been considered. All of them rest on principles which have already been touched upon.

'Whatever various modes,' says W. Palmer in *The Church of Christ*, London, 1838, ii. 123 f., 'of treating the authority of the church there may have been, I believe that scarcely any Christian writer can be found, who has ventured actually to maintain that the judgment of *the universal church, freely, and deliberately given, with the apparent use of all means*, might in fact be heretical and contrary to the gospel.'

At their foundation is a common appeal to the promises of Christ regarding His Church, and an *a priori* theory or presumption as to the means which Providence must needs employ to have them fulfilled. Undeterred by the scantiness of Christ's allusions to the Church as an organization, by His silence regarding its government, and by the unmistakable immediateness of the communion which He taught and promoted between the individual believer and the Father and Himself, churchmanship has fastened upon a few allusions in the Gospels, and erected upon their slender basis an imposing doctrine of the duty of the Christian, in all matters of faith and morals, to trust and obey the Church. Appeal is made to the dictum of Augustine: 'Ego vero Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Catholicae Ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas.' The Church, it is urged, is a living institution, linking all the Christian generations together, nourishing and fostering the faith of individuals, bringing the Scriptures and other means of grace to bear upon them, and investing those saving instruments with authority, whereas the Bible is a mere book, holy but inanimate in itself, requiring the attestation of the Church, requiring authoritative interpretation by the Church, itself indeed originally a product of the Church's experience and self-utterance as well as a compilation made and adjusted by its care. In the nature of the case, the Church, as the Society which was founded to promote God's Kingdom, preceded the NT, just as Israel, the older theocracy, preceded the Hebrew oracles, and, as it preceded it, also ushered the Canon into being and opens its mysteries to view. Plausible as this theory appears, its inadequacy to fit the facts of history and to bear the inferences which have been drawn from it is becoming more and more evident. It is valid only against a doctrine of Scripture as a book, a mere record and compilation as distinct from the utterance and activity which it records. Thus, for example, though the Gospels as books were composed by members of the Church, and were preserved by the Church from loss, the Church did not utter the words of Jesus which they record. We have to thank the Church for recording and transmitting them, not for their authority. The words and acts of Jesus founded the Church, not *vice versa*. He preceded both Church and Scripture. No matter how accurate and honest the Apostolic writers were, no matter how careful and trustworthy the transmitting and explaining Church, it would avail nothing but for the ulterior authority of the voice which they echo. The Protestant preference of Holy Writ to tradition and Church authority rested upon the simple conviction, derived from sorrowful observation and painful experience, that the two mandates differed, and that the Christ of Scripture was unspeakably superior to the Christ who, they were commanded to believe, spoke through the tainted lips of the Renaissance papacy, or through the very human and variable opinions of Schoolmen and Fathers. And it is significant that Rome itself betrays an unmistakable preference for Biblical authority where texts can be cited in favour of its views with any show of exegetical warrant. It will not do to set Scripture over against Church tradition as a dependent and apologetically inferior authority, and then to proceed to prove the superiority of Church and tradition by appeal to Scripture texts. Both sides in the long controversy have erred. If Protestantism has tended to harden its doctrine of Scripture and to evade the duty of discriminating between its contents in the light of the mind and spirit of Jesus Christ, Roman Catholicism, while guilty of the same error, has added to it a grave exaggeration of the independent value of tradition. The Bible itself is tradition at its highest, supremely valuable and authoritative because of its intimate proximity to Jesus Christ, and its undimmed reflexion for all time of His image. The Bible is not a person, it is true; but

neither is the Church. The Bible is not more 'dead' than the words of pope or Council, once they are spoken. Its divine spirit and power are deathless. When ecclesiastical tradition is invited to make an inventory of all the truth in Jesus Christ which it has stored up in its treasury apart from Scripture, the aggregate is ludicrously meagre and painfully at variance with Biblical tradition. At once, in fact, the ecclesiastical claim is driven to shrink into a mere office of interpretation. It cannot, it is said, pretend to new revelations. Its inspiration is scholarly, its authority is rabbinical, its office is hermeneutic. Scripture is there. Scripture is God's undeniable Word. But it is in places obscure, and its testimonies are at times divergent. The Church must save the unity of faith by possessing and by exercising the prerogative of definition. It can say, and it must say, what Scripture means upon any point of controversy. And what by the grace of God it is pleased to say, the faithful ought, without question, to receive as God's very Word. There must be in every age, in every generation, at any moment, some voice on earth, whether single or conjunct, which can allay mortal questionings by the sincere and lawful use of the formula of the Apostolic Council: 'It seems good to the Holy Spirit and to us.'

Leaving out of account OT passages which have been brought to bear upon ecclesiastical infallibility, such as Is 59[21], quoted in the Preface to the Vatican Decrees, where the prophecy of the coming of a Redeemer to Zion is followed by the divine covenant, 'My spirit that is upon thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed . . . from henceforth and for ever,' ecclesiastical infallibility in general is founded upon the following Scriptural warrants: Mt 16[18, 19] 28[18-20], Jn 14[16-26], and 1 Ti 3[14, 15]. In Mt 16[18, 19], immediately after Jesus' acceptance of Simon Peter's confession of Him as the Christ, which He declares to have been revealed, not by 'flesh and blood,' but by His Father in heaven, He continues: 'And I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter (Πέτρος), and upon this rock (πέτρᾳ) I will build my church; and the gates of death shall not prevail against it. I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.' In Mt 28[18-20] the risen Jesus says to the Eleven: 'All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name . . . teaching them to observe (τηρεῖν) all things whatsoever I commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.' In Jn 14[16-26], after the words 'If ye love me, ye will keep (τηρήσετε) my commandments,' Jesus says: 'And I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete, that he may be with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth: whom the world cannot receive; for it beholdeth him not, neither knoweth him: ye know him; for he abideth with you, and shall be in you'; and in 14[26]: 'But the Paraclete, even the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you'; and in 16[12-14]: 'I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he shall guide you into all the truth: for he shall not speak from himself. . . . He shall glorify me: for he shall take of mine, and shall declare it unto you.' In 1 Ti 3[14, 15] Paul writes: 'These things write I unto thee, hoping to come unto thee shortly; but if I tarry long, that thou mayest know how men ought to behave themselves in the (a) house of God which is the (a) church of the (a) living God, the (a) pillar and ground (στύλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα) of the truth.'

The passages in the Gospels belong to portions f the NT which have not escaped controversy as to their authenticity and historicity. The two passages in Matthew have not unnaturally been subjected to the same kind of doubts as the Johannine narrative regarding their fidelity to the mind and words of Jesus, and the inherent nature of the teaching they contain, the acute differences of opinion they have ever since occasioned, their divergence from other teachings in the NT, and the silence of the other Gospels upon their momentous affirmations have lent confirmation to those doubts. But we may accept the passages as they stand and consider them as a group. They belong to the same order of utterance as the sayings: 'Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away' (Mk 13[31], Lk 21[33]), 'The words that I have spoken unto you are spirit and are life' (Jn 6[63]). Their common aim is to proclaim the eternity of Jesus' message, and the security of the guarantees for its continuance after His departure from visible fellowship with His disciples. 'This gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world for a testimony unto all the nations; and then shall the end come' (Mt 24[14]), and 'Behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and scribes' (Mt 23[34]), are also cognate passages. The same message which upon Jesus' lips gave rest to the souls that laboured and were heavy-laden under the bondage of the scribes and Pharisees, and replaced a hard and heavy yoke and burden of teaching by one that was easy and light, since it was imposed by a Master who was not proud and self-righteous, but meek and lowly, was not to fail upon the lips of His Apostles who were to carry on His earthly work and mission and be His 'prophets, wise men, and scribes.' It is to be remembered that 'binding' and 'loosing' were rabbinical technical terms current at the time, which denoted 'forbidding' and 'authorizing' a practice or an opinion; so that, when the Apostles, Peter and his fellows, were empowered to 'bind and loose,' it was signified that, whereas the Jewish Synagogue had its wise men and scribes, the Apostles would be the corresponding teachers n the Church, very different in spirit and in message, exercising an altogether different type of authority, shunning claims to precedence, avoiding the title of Rabbi, Master, or Teacher, not lording it over one another or over the flock entrusted to their care, but remembering that they had one Master or Teacher only.

When these passages are taken in conjunction it seems clear that Jesus was confident, and intended to assure His disciples and Apostles, that His gospel would never cease to be proclaimed while the world endured; that faith like Peter's, or the utterance of faith like Peter's, or men of faith like Peter, would be the rock-foundation of His Church against which the powers of death and decay would war in vain; that His bodily withdrawal would neither terminate nor impair His mission; that a substitute for His bodily presence would be provided, to teach His followers His truth, to remind them of His words, to lead them into all needed truth- in a word, to 'glorify' the Son by fulfilling the purpose for which He came, and revealing His divine person and mission. In the exercise of His 'full authority' He bids His disciples make disciples of all nations, baptizing them and teaching them to 'keep' all his 'injunctions'; and He promises them, what is manifestly the same assistance phrased in two alternative ways, first, His own unfailing and everlasting presence—'I am with you alway even unto the end of the world,' that is, His positive help and approval; and secondly, in

answer to His prayer to the Father, the Spirit of Truth, as it is in Christ Jesus. In Mt $10^{19.20}$ the Spirit of God their Father is promised to the Twelve Apostles to give them utterance when they are arraigned by their accusers and persecutors, so that they are not to be anxious how or what they are to speak. In Lk 10^{16} Jesus says to the Seventy Apostles: 'He that heareth you heareth me; and he that rejecteth you rejecteth me; and he that rejecteth me rejecteth him that sent me'; and in Lk 11^{13} He says: 'If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?'

As to the passage in 1 Timothy, it is far from certain that 'a pillar and ground of the truth' refers to the 'household of God' which is the 'church of the living God.' Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus make it refer to Timothy, while Bengel links it with the 'mystery or revelation of godliness' which immediately follows it in the text. But, assuming that it does refer to the Church, God's household, and that ἑδραίωμα means 'ground' rather than 'stay' or 'support,' the passage teaches simply that the Church is a pillar and ground or base of revealed truth, just as individuals like James, Cephas, and John are called 'pillars' by Paul in Gal 2^{9}, and in Rev 3^{12} 'he that overcometh' is to be made 'a pillar in the temple' of God. There is no suggestion that the 'house of God' is the only 'pillar' of the truth, or that the temple of truth is so ruinous as to have only one column and base.

It seems clear, upon a review of the evidence of the Gospels, that Jesus gave His disciples to understand that, as His words would never pass away, but would live on in the world by the power of the Spirit of truth, so His Church, built as on a rock upon Apostolic faith in His Messianic Sonship to the living God, would never perish, the gates of death would never close upon it. Faith in His followers' mission was the necessary complement to faith in His own. Faith in their teaching was essential to faith in the future of His own. He would inspire and teach them unseen as He had inspired and taught them in the flesh. His Spirit would lead them aright to the truth which they required. But of the teaching that His Church would never err, would never have to learn through experience of misjudgment and occasional error, would be able through certain Councils or officials to command immunity from mistake or fault in matters of faith and morals, there is no trace. History lends no sanction to any such interpretation of the mind of Jesus. As the prayer of Jesus that Peter's faith might not fail (Lk 22^{32}) was followed by Peter's desertion and denial before it was fulfilled through his 'turning again' and subsequent fidelity so that he could stablish his brethren, so the 'ultimate' or the 'essential' guidance of the Church into all truth may satisfy the requirements of its Lord's promises. The Providence which makes all things work together for good does not preclude the incidence of evil in the experience and conduct of God's saints. The Church may by the grace of God withstand the gates of death and be guided into all truth, in spite of many partial and temporary and local defections and mistakes. It will not help the Church to walk circumspectly if it is convinced *a priori* that it enjoys infallibility at every step that is precarious or debatable. What it needs is to know itself fallible in detail, to be ready to confess error and to profit by experience, and to maintain a steadfast faith that the Spirit of God is leading it, however deviously, to the truth that it needs. Further, the gift of the spirit of truth is not promised to the Church and denied to the individual. Each of the Seventy, as we saw, was identified with his Lord, so that those who heard them heard Him. The Father in heaven will no more withhold the Holy Spirit from individual believers than an earthly father will deny good gifts to his children. Is the Holy Spirit unable, or unwilling, to bestow the same immunity from error upon the individual Christian that He confers upon the Church? *Ubi Spiritus ibi ecclesia. Ubi Spiritus ibi veritas.* The same promise of guidance is given to the individual as to the Church; the same assurance belongs to each. The faith that can move mountains, the believing prayer whose persistence will prevail, is not vouchsafed to the Church and withheld from the Church-member. The High Churchman or the Roman Catholic and the Quaker are on the same ground when they claim infallible guidance for the Church or the pope or the individual Christian through the inner light or illumination of the promised Spirit, except that the preponderance of authority derived from the Gospels lies unmistakably in favour of the Friends. All Christians are agreed that the Spirit of God can and will guide God's believing children, the humblest not less than the most exalted or the most learned; but experience has taught most Christians to beware of constructing that faith into an assurance of particular infallibility. History deepens the conviction that on man's part a lively sense of liability to err, and a willingness to be corrected and to acknowledge fault, are an indispensable pre-requisite and guarantee of ultimate arrival at the goal of truth.

(*b*) *The universal consent of Christendom.*—Few minds would hesitate to acknowledge the impressiveness and authority of the unanimous consent of Christendom in favour of any matter touching faith and morals. We are all so profoundly indebted to authority, voicing the lessons of long experience external to ourselves, that the strongest presumption arises that what all Christians are agreed upon must be right and true. The *consensus Ecclesiæ Catholicæ* counts for Christian faith as the *argumentum e consensu gentium* counts for theistic faith. 'De quo omnium natura consentit,' says Cicero (*de Nat. Deorum*, I. xvii.; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 117), 'id uerum esse necesse est.' It is the principle, urged by Augustine against the Donatists, which appealed so powerfully to Newman: *securus iudicat orbis terrarum.* It is the principle also which finds expression in the Vincentian Canon of faith and practice: *quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus creditum est.* Unquestionably the moral unanimity of all types of Christian belief in every land and in every period of the Church's history could not fail to inspire trust in a doctrine or a usage, and would go far to protect it in advance against any onslaught of scepticism or criticism. But in practice the rule fails us lamentably. Outside the Holy Scriptures, and indeed outside the cardinal elements in their narrative and teaching, it is exceedingly difficult to point to any extensive group of universally accepted traditions and usages. Even the great Creeds and the great Festivals and the great Sacraments fail to satisfy a demand so exacting. Catholicity so complete is the attribute of few things in the Christian system.

But short of an extreme form of the Vincentian Canon of infallibility the principle of a 'common sense' of Christian people still asserts itself in all Christian lands. Even the Churches which elevate the clergy as authorities high above the laity and use 'church' and 'clergy' as almost equivalent terms, assign, when it suits them, no small virtue to the consent of the people. If the clergy have authority as teachers, their teaching gains added force when it carries the people with it, for they

can bring experience to reinforce and vindicate the experts who are their guides. To a far greater degree than is generally credited the determination of orthodoxy has rested with the popular mind. What appeals to the people, helps their life, stirs their imagination, inspires their faith or satisfies their credulity, or calls forth their good works and piety, is naturally regarded by their instructors as demonstrably good and right and therefore inherently true. Very often there is divergence between the churchman and the theologian because of the different attitudes which they tend to adopt towards popular ideas and experience. The ecclesiastic may value as a help to piety and obedience what the scholar distrusts as promoting superstition and servility. The ecclesiastic may be suspicious of the scholar's 'truth' and 'open-mindedness' as savouring of scepticism and private judgment. The *vox populi* not only enthroned an Ambrose in the cathedral of Milan and procured for a Newman the red hat of his ambition, but it has, not less wholesomely though less obtrusively, controlled the selection of many a form of dogma and many a pious usage. When true to itself our religion has always cared for the poor, the simple, the humble, the masses of the people, the 'little ones,' the 'babes and sucklings,' as Jesus called them. It has founded universities, but no university founded it or fashioned its forms of thought and speech and piety. The people may be easily led astray. They may make a poor judge, but they form the best of juries. Like the first Apostles, who represent them in their strength and weakness, they are apt to confound poetry with prose, parable with fact, myth with truth. But their heart is essentially as sound, and their instinct as reliable, to-day as when they heard Jesus gladly and gave Him His first followers and friends. It is from their ranks that the Christian priesthood and ministry are still mainly recruited. It is for their minds that Christian dogmas and devotions are still principally framed.

(c) *Particular representatives of the Church; the Episcopate; general Councils.*—Impressive as the consensus of Christendom is, and weighty as is the authority of Christian common sense and popular feeling, their movement and utterance are too slow and unwieldy to enable them to be employed for the speedy solution of faith's problems, perplexities, and controversies. Accordingly, infallible direction has been sought in the consensus of office-bearers of the Church. The testimony of the Apostles, or the Fathers, or the Councils deemed Ecumenical, or the Episcopate, or the papacy, has been regarded and proclaimed in certain relations and at certain times as the final organ of infallibility. Even in these groups of official representatives a perfect consensus is in every case lacking; as between the groups it is equally hard to find. But the assertion of their claims to implicit credence interestingly illustrates the determination of humanity to leave no stone unturned in its search for an infallible oracle of divine truth. One might have supposed that the Old Dispensation would have taught the Christian Church to beware of trusting either the official or the hereditary transmission of hierarchical authority or prophetic vision or interpretative insight or governing power. But, as time advanced and the interval which separated each generation from the historical person of Christ steadily widened, it was natural and inevitable that men should cherish with augmented force the conviction that their Lord had constituted the Apostles and their successors in some definitive sense the heirs to His own divine authority and infallibility. Had He not laid His ordaining hands upon them, bestowing His Holy Spirit upon them for the discharge of their sacred responsibilities, and had they not transmitted to successors the ordination and the gift of the same Spirit? Further, since the Apostles had differed from one another upon occasion and had met in council at the chief seat of the infant Church to confer upon their differences and difficulties, and had issued authoritative decisions for the guidance of the local churches, what more natural than that their successors should do likewise with results as binding upon the Christian conscience, especially if they were similarly unanimous in their decisions? Thus reliance came to be placed on the conjunct mind and unanimous consent of the Episcopate met upon occasion in duly convened universal councils, or acting through the administration of common creeds and ritual and discipline, or accepting the doctrine of certain great teaching Fathers or Doctors on faith and morals. Faith was turned into dogma; a mission into a hierarchy; a brotherhood into a group of federated but rival monarchies. Unanimous consent became majority-finding raised to the dignity of a conceded or a coercive uniformity. The Canon of Scripture was reinforced by a Canon or rule of faith constructed by authority out of creeds hitherto voluntarily cherished by local churches. The Church insensibly became an empire after Constantine's adhesion. The patriarchs, spiritual overlords of subject groups of bishops and dioceses, received among themselves an order of precedence, partly through unsolicited court influence, partly through general consent and usage, partly through deliberate and unashamed arrogation. At length through the vicissitudes of history Rome emerged as the sole vigorous survivor of the patriarchal family, practically untouched by the Arab conquests, at the centre of the culture, the art and architecture, and the politics of the western world.

It is not necessary to dwell at length upon the limitations of the graded office-bearers and courts of the Church as organs of infallible utterance. The summoning of local and general Councils, the arty differences in each, the variations of their ndings according to their time, place, and racial composition, are sufficient evidence that spontaneous unanimity in doctrine was not to be found in the Episcopate or in the hierarchy. Bishops were seldom selected for purely theological or doctrinal eminence: their business called for other qualities more urgently. It was an extremely distinguished representative of the Episcopate who, according to Lord Acton ('The Vatican Council,' in *North British Review*, liii. [1871] 208), said at the beginning of the Vatican Council:

> 'We bishops are absorbed in our work, and are not scholars. We sadly need the help of those that are. It is to be hoped that the Council will raise only such questions as can be dealt with competently by practical experience and common sense.'

They were often not so much leaders as mouthpieces of religious opinion, chosen by their clergy to administer rather than to receive illumination. For that reason they may justly be claimed as representative men, living epitomes of the faith and common sentiment of their people. If they were incapable of securing freedom from controversy throughout their dioceses, and in crises had recourse to Councils in which to confer upon their difficulties, they were at once confronted with the problem of method. The gathering which in theory was an ideal instrument for the determination of the Church's belief and practice appeared in a very different light at close quarters. Councils convened by princes and intended to be ecumenical were seldom, if ever, attended by bishops from all parts in geographical, racial, or populational proportion. Nicæa, the first meeting-place, was con-

venient enough for Constantinople, the Emperor's own seat, but the prelates who came at the Emperor's summons were almost to a man Easterns or Greeks, the bishop of Old Rome himself being absent though the occasion was one of extreme gravity for the peace of Christendom. And so it has always been. Ecumenical in name, general Councils have invariably assumed the complexion of the region of the Christian world in which they chanced to be held. Not seldom the locality was selected with a definite view to secure certain results. Moreover, they were increasingly restricted through the abstention or exclusion of particular Churches, the Oriental first, and the Greek Orthodox next, until the claim of the latest Councils of Trent and the Vatican to be ecumenical was reduced to the verge of the farcical by the absence of the Greeks, the Protestants, and all but Roman Catholic delegates. The conciliar illusion was yet further disturbed by the problem of a common language in which effective debate and controversy might take place without substantial disadvantage to any section of the membership, by the problem of rules of debate, of the determination and preparation of the subjects to be propounded, of the method of voting, and the means of securing 'unanimity.' The breakdown of the conciliar apparatus of infallibility was evident in the long-drawn-out and continually interrupted proceedings at Trent, when the prestige won at the close of the Great Schism by the Council of Constance (A.D. 1414–18), the unmaker and maker of popes, was dissipated under papal and Jesuit influence, and it was remarked that the 'inspiration' of the Council, in which, as always, Italian bishops and abbots predominated, was strangely affected by each arrival of the courier from the Vatican. In 1854 the publication by Pius IX., before a mere congress of assembled cardinals and bishops, of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception as a papal decree, and in 1870 the preliminary determination of the business and method of the Vatican Council by the same pope, the adoption of the principle of the sufficiency of majority-findings, and the final supersession of Councils by the dogma of papal infallibility were signs that, so far as the Church in communion with Rome was concerned, the age of Councils was at an end. Christendom had scarcely ever derived prestige from the meeting and proceedings of a Council. Wire-pulling, manœuvring, wrangling, recrimination, and acute division of sympathies had almost always been unconcealable features of their sessions.

Under the rhetoric and polemical exaggeration of James Martineau there is a solid foundation of fact when he says ('Catholic Infallibility,' ch. ii. of his *Rationale of Religious Enquiry*, London, 1836): 'When you tell me of an infallible *assembly* – an inspired parliament, whose decrees are nevertheless liable to error, till confirmed by the signature of a certain bishop, I try in vain to conceive where the divine agency can take place, of what separate atoms of inspiration the collective miracle is made up, from what distribution of influence on the faculties of the several parties the elimination of error results. Every individual member in his separate capacity, and before he entered the assembly, is perfectly fallible; when there, he utters the very opinions which he brought thither, and tenders the vote which he previously designed; yet the aggregate of these fallibilities is inspiration. . . . When I remember the motives which actuate the members of such assemblies, and of the vehement operation of which no reader of ecclesiastical history can doubt; the anxiety for imperial favour, or dread of popular displeasure;—the love of display, the passion for influence, the ambition of promotion;—the dread of episcopal molestation, and the hope of party triumph, and the horror of the reputation of heresy,—I look in vain for the resting-place of the divine and guiding light; it escapes me like an *ignis fatuus*, quitting every point on which I gaze; and goes out at last in those mists and marshes of human corruption.' And again (*Seat of Authority in Religion*, London, 1891, p. 67), 'No crowd of pigmies can add themselves up into a God.'

Whatever might be said of the value of their decisions—and there is to this day no ecclesiastical agreement as to which of them are genuinely ecumenical—it was impossible to pretend that the speeches and votes were invariably free and disinterested, or that their 'unanimity' in the Holy Ghost was cordial and voluntary. Each Council could determine in the plenitude of its constitutional authority which of its predecessors were to be regarded as ecumenical, and as a matter of fact they differed among themselves in their verdicts on the question. They were unwieldy, unmanageable, insubordinate, polyglot, costly, inconvenient, and inefficient. They disturbed discipline in the effort to promote it. They took men away from the administration of their dioceses and ecclesiastical offices, in many cases to a work which was uncongenial and outside the range of their individual competence. And, within the Roman Catholic regime, they had no freedom of initiation or of action or of utterance. Over against a settled and continuous system like the papacy, with its administrative bureaucracy and its gradation of offices culminating in the autocratic head, the spasmodic and intermittent and heterogeneous authority of Councils was bound to lose ground. When they ceased to command absolute loyalty to their decisions, and could not obtain a disinterested unanimity in their decrees, they were reduced to employing something of the same coercive force of excommunication that Rome was accustomed to use. The logical outcome of that conception of authority and infallibility is the papal system, close-knit, outwardly homogeneous, imperial, imposing, and continuous. It is difficult to conceive how this method, conciliar or papal, can be harmonized with the teaching of the Gospels or with the practice of the Apostolic Church. How it appeared to so gifted and so loyal an observer from within as Döllinger on the eve of the Vatican Council may be gathered from the closing section of the work entitled, in its English version, *The Pope and the Council*, by 'Janus' (p. 419 ff.):

'The experiences of the non-Italian bishops at the Council of Trent, its results, which fell so far short of the reforms desired and expected, the conduct of Rome in strictly prohibiting any explanations or commentaries on the decrees of the Council being written and reserving to herself the interpretation of them, while she quietly shelved many of its most important decisions (*e.g.* on indulgences, and many others), without even any semblance of carrying them out—all this led to the call for a new Council, so often repeated previously, being silenced from that time forward. In countries subjected to the Inquisition, the mere wish for another Council would have been declared penal, and have exposed to danger those who uttered it. The Roman See had no doubt suffered considerable losses of privilege and income in consequence of the Tridentine decrees, and still more from the opposition of the different Governments; but, on the other hand, those decrees, the activity of the Jesuits, and the establishment of standing congregations and of the nunciatures, which had been previously unknown, had very materially increased the power and influence of Rome. But at Rome Councils were always held in abomination; the very name was strictly forbidden under penalties there. When in the controversy about grace in 1602 the Molinists spoke of its being decided by a Council, the Dominican Peña wrote that in Rome the word Council, at least in matters of dogma, was regarded as sacrilegious, and excommunicated.

And thus it has come to pass that three centuries have elapsed without any earnest desire for a Council making itself heard anywhere—a thing wholly unprecedented in the past history of the Church. It is commonly taught in theological manuals, schools, and systems, that the Councils of the Church are not only useful but necessary. But this, like so much else in the ordinary teaching, was held only in the abstract. It was at bottom universally felt that Councils as little fitted into a Church organized under an absolute Papal monarchy as the States-General into the monarchy of Louis XIV. The most faithful interpreter of the Roman view of things, Cardinal Pallavicini, put this feeling into words when he said, "To hold another Council would be to tempt God, so extremely dangerous and so threatening to the very existence of the Church would such an assembly be." In that point, he thinks his History of the Council of Trent will make the same impression on the reader as Sarpi's. Even National Synods, he says, the Popes have always detested.

But the chief reason why nobody any longer desired a Council, lay in the conviction that, if it met, the first and most essential condition, freedom of deliberation and voting, would be wanting. The latest history showed this as much as the theory. In the Papal system, which knows nothing of true bishops ruling independently by virtue of the Divine institution, but only

recognises subjects and vicars or officials of the Pope, who exercise a power lent them merely during his pleasure, there is no room for an assembly which would be called a Council in the sense of the ancient Church. If the bishops know the view and will of the Pope on any question, it would be presumptuous and idle to vote against it; and if they do not, their first duty at the Council would be to ascertain it and vote accordingly. An œcumenical assembly of the Church can have no existence, properly speaking, in presence of an *ordinarius ordinariorum* and infallible teacher of faith, though, of course, the pomp, ceremonial, speeches, and votings of a Council may be displayed to the gaze of the world. And therefore the Papal legates at Trent used at once to rebuke bishops as heretics and rebels who ever dared to express any view of their own. Bishops who have been obliged to swear "to maintain, defend, increase, and advance the rights, honours, privileges, and authority of their lord the Pope"—and every bishop takes this oath—cannot regard themselves, or be regarded by the Christian world, as free members of a free Council; natural justice and equity requires that. These men neither will nor can be held responsible for decisions or omissions which do not depend on them. There have certainly been the weightiest reasons for holding no Council for three hundred years, and avoiding such a "useless hubbub," as the infallibilist Cardinal Orsi calls Councils.

Complete and real freedom for every one, freedom from moral constraint, from fear and intimidation, and from corruption, belongs to the essence of a Council. An assembly of men bound in conscience by their oaths to consider the maintenance and increase of Papal power their main object,—men living in fear of incurring the displeasure of the *Curia*, and with it the charge of perjury, and the most burdensome hindrances in the discharge of their office—cannot certainly be called free in all those questions which concern the authority and claims of the See of Rome, and very few at most of the questions that would have to be discussed at a Council do not come under this category. None of our bishops have sworn to make the good of the Church and of religion the supreme object of their actions and endeavours; the terms of the oath provide only for the advantage of the *Curia*. How the oath is understood at Rome, and to what reproaches a bishop exposes himself who once chooses to follow his own conviction against the tradition of the *Curia*, there are plenty of examples to show.

In Rimini and Seleucia (359), at Ephesus (449), and at Vienne (1312), and at many other times, even at Trent, the results of a want of real freedom have been displayed. In early times, when the Popes were as yet in no position to exercise compulsion or intimidation upon Synods, it was the Emperors who sometimes trenched too closely on this freedom. But from Gregory VII.'s time the weight of Papal power has pressed ten times more heavily upon them than ever did the Imperial authority. With abundant reason were the two demands urged throughout half Europe in the sixteenth century, in the negotiations about the Council,—first, that it should not be held in Rome, or even in Italy; and, secondly, that the bishops should be absolved from their oath of obedience. The recently proclaimed Council is to be held not only in Italy, but in Rome itself, and already it has been announced that, as the sixth Lateran Council, it will adhere faithfully to the fifth. That is quite enough—it means this, that whatever course the Synod may take, one quality can never be predicated of it, namely, that it has been a really free Council.

Theologians and Canonists declare that without complete freedom the decisions of a Council are not binding, and the assembly is only a pseudo-Synod. Its decrees may have to be corrected.'

Döllinger's words are deliberate, and are based on unrivalled knowledge. But they provoke a still deeper reflexion than they intend, for they expose to view the weakness of both papacy and Councils. In neither is true freedom, such as he desiderates and demands, conceivable. To bind the conscience of Christendom is the motive and the office of both institutions. Neither in reality is at liberty to claim the freedom it would withdraw from its subjects. The binder need not complain if he finds himself in bonds. Admit the principle of coercive authority in your Council and you will not be able to deny it to the permanent officials of your Church. Better on such principles a living pope than a dead Council, or a Council yet unborn. You cannot indulge in Councils very often. The pope is always with you. He need not act arbitrarily. He has advisers innumerable, informants innumerable, and access, presumably, to the mind of the vast dominion over which he rules. May not God be trusted to give none but the best popes to His confiding Church, and none but the best advisers to His confiding Vicegerents, and pour out His Holy Spirit upon them all to save them from error and lead them to truth? The theory is plausible, and valid as against Councils for those who believe in a hierarchy endowed with corporate infallibility. But, as we have seen, there is nothing in our Lord's teaching to suggest that God values the Church or watches over the Church with a more fatherly solicitude than over the individual. On the contrary, individual infallibility through perfect faith in God's readiness to bestow His Holy Spirit has a much stronger and more explicit warrant in the Gospels.

If it be assumed, though none but Roman Catholics are prepared to acknowledge it, that the Vatican Council of 1870 was ecumenical and ecumenically binding, its results are interesting in the present connexion. For it, a valid Council, decreed, in assent to the mind of the pope, that the pope is, when pronouncing on faith and morals *ex cathedra*, infallible. It follows that, if the pope is not infallible, neither is the Council which pronounced him immune from error. It does not follow that Councils are henceforth set aside for ever. They remain infallible instruments of authority, obsolete but revivable at any time. Princes or popes may still convoke them, though it would be strictly unnecessary to do so in the lifetime and health of a supreme pontiff, and might be construed as an insult and act of treason to the office and prerogative of the occupant of St. Peter's throne. But henceforth, unless the Council of 1870 is ruled out as merely Roman Catholic and therefore provincial and sectarian, or as morally lacking in unanimity, or as devoid of genuine freedom in voting, debate, and business, it may be maintained that, while a Council is infallible only when its decrees enjoy the adhesion of the Roman See, when it acts in communion and harmony with its chief bishop, the infallibility enjoyed by the reigning pope does not depend upon any consent of future Councils. It may, however, be observed that in a great autonomous institution no law or convention can absolutely fetter the resources of corporate freedom, or destroy its initiative in great crises of its existence. The Council of Constance may serve as an example of an extreme emergency calling out into active service extreme and scarcely contemplated methods of procedure. The Vatican has not yet decreed that henceforth Councils are incompetent, lacking in infallibility, and therefore prohibited. It is one thing to supersede them, and to prevent their resumption; quite another to forbid them altogether or to pronounce them for all time defunct.[1]

(*d*) *Papal infallibility.*—The Church of Rome is but one of the sects of Christendom, but it is outwardly at least the most catholic of Churches. The most exclusive in its communion, it is the most comprehensive in geographical diffusion and in racial distribution. The most complex in its organization, it is the most rigorously unified in its discipline. Its history, its service to Christian life, piety, and tradition, and its numerical strength lend a peculiar importance to the theory of infallibility with which it has come finally to be identified. The term 'Papist,' which might formerly have been resented throughout Roman Catholic lands, is now, since 1870, at least as accurate a designation as the term 'Roman Catholic.' Since that date the doctrine that the pope is infallible, which had hitherto been repudiated in the strongest terms by the Roman Catholic authorities and manuals in Great Britain and in Ireland, has become a dogma of faith, part of the distinctive working creed of the Church. Its evolution is one of the most interesting and, in certain aspects, one of the most significant episodes in Church history. Thanks to the voluminous literature which arose out of the controversy in which the completion of the dogma was involved, the story can be studied with

[1] For the Roman Catholic view see artt. CHURCH, DOCTRINE OF THE (Roman Catholic), PAPACY.

unusual thoroughness and ease. In the present article a review of its broader features and main facts must suffice.

It is beyond dispute that the dogmatic infallibility of the bishop or patriarch of Rome stands in the closest possible relationship to his general authority as a ruler in the Church.

In a letter to Lady Simeon, of date 1867, quoted in W. Ward's *Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*[2] (London, 1912, ii. 193), Newman writes: 'I say with Cardinal Bellarmine whether the Pope be infallible or not in any pronouncement, anyhow he is to be obeyed. No good can come from disobedience. His facts and his warnings may be all wrong; his deliberations may have been biassed. He may have been misled. Imperiousness and craft, tyranny and cruelty, may be patent in the conduct of his advisers and instruments. But when he speaks formally and authoritatively he speaks as our Lord would have him speak, and all those imperfections and sins of individuals are overruled for that result which our Lord intends (just as the action of the wicked and of enemies to the Church are overruled), and therefore the Pope's word stands, and a blessing goes with obedience to it, and no blessing with disobedience.' And in a letter to Pusey (*ib.* ii. 217) in the same year he writes: 'Any categorical answer would be unsatisfactory—but if I *must* so speak, I should say that his jurisdiction (for that I conceive you to mean by "powers") is unlimited and despotic. And I think this is the general opinion among us. . . . There is nothing which any other authority in the Church can do, which he cannot do at once—and he can do things which they cannot do, such as destroy a whole hierarchy. . . . As to the question of property, whether he could simply confiscate the funds of a whole diocese, I do not know—but I suspect he can. Speaking generally, I think he can do anything, but break the divine law. . . . But such a jurisdiction is (1) not so much a *practice* as a *doctrine*—and (2) not so much a *doctrine* as a *principle* of our system.'

In an institution which rests faith upon authority or tradition and makes belief a duty of obedience, the right to prescribe or decree dogma is naturally included within the wider right to rule *in spiritualibus*. Much of the wide-spread reluctance on the part of Protestants to regard with seriousness the dogma of papal infallibility is due to their instinctively different attitude towards faith and the means by which it may be secured; they find it difficult to conceive of faith as a product of obedience, as an activity to be ordered. In Roman Catholicism, under the demands of ecclesiastical discipline, the principle has broken down that obedience to the supreme earthly head of the Church is to be restricted in any way so as to exclude the authoritative interpretation of revealed doctrine, and the definition of the sense in which Holy Scripture, the Creeds, and the Conciliar Decrees are to be understood and applied.

On the Roman Catholic view our Lord bestowed upon Peter, after his great confession and again after the Resurrection, a unique authority and office as His peculiar representative in the Apostolic company and in the Church. 'Peter' and 'Cephas' mean 'rock,' it is urged, and Peter is the rock-foundation of the imperishable Church; not simply his confession, or his faith, but he himself, the living Apostle, the utterer of his faith in the Christ. Not a doctrine, not a belief, but a living person is the basis of a standing Church. The gift or charge of the keys of the kingdom denotes his authority as a teacher; what he 'binds or looses,' *i.e.*, in rabbinical language, 'affirms or denies,' in teaching spiritual truth is 'in heaven,' *i.e.* 'divinely,' affirmed or denied. In Lk 22^{32}, though the context and sequel are painfully adverse to the Roman Catholic theory, it is said by Christ that He has prayed for Peter that his faith 'fail not,' from which it may be deduced that the prayer has been answered; and the command is laid upon Peter: 'Do thou, when once thou hast turned again, stablish thy brethren.' The risen Lord, moreover, commissions the forgiven Peter to feed His lambs, to tend His sheep, and to feed His sheep (Jn $21^{15ff.}$). It is inconceivable, it is urged further, that our Lord intended such a charge to terminate with Peter's individual tenure of it. Each successive generation would require at least the same guaranteed infallibility in a living inspired instructor. A living rock-foundation cannot have been withdrawn on Peter's decease; his faith cannot be allowed to fail in any age; his brethren still need stablishing; the sheep of Christ still need not only to be fed but to be shepherded, which implies guidance and protection from error. The need grows greater rather than less with the passage of time, since faith tends to cool as distance from its objects is increased.

On the face of them, these passages in the Gospels cannot be so construed with any confidence. Simon Peter is anything but a model of infallibility either in the Gospels or in Acts or in the Epistles of the NT. To the same person who received the words 'Thou art Peter' came all too soon the words 'Get thee behind me, Satan.' The 'Rock' of the Church's foundation became in a few hours a 'stumbling-block,' a rock of offence. The same Apostle who confessed the Christ not only denied Him, but endeavoured to deter Him from going to His death, and, as mistakenly though as naturally, tried to defend Him with the sword. It is the faith he utters that fits him for our Lord's beatitude, since it is recognized by its recipient as divinely revealed; yet that faith did soon 'fail,' Satan did 'have' him. If he has infallibility in any sense, it is ultimate or practical infallibility, and it does not render him immune from particular failure of judgment in faith and duty. Further, it is brethren that he is to stablish, not subjects, after his restoration, and the duty of stablishing is plainly enough a duty that each Apostle owed to the others, however their gifts might vary (cf. the parallel use of στηρίζειν with reference to Paul and others in Ac 14^{22} $15^{32.\ 41}$ 18^{23}, Ro 1^{11}). 'Binding and loosing' is not a prerogative conferred upon one man alone; it is given to all the Apostles as such, the Seventy as well as the Twelve, as an essential of authoritative proclamation of Christ's message. There is no indication that particular infallibility was given to every Apostle, or that Peter's gift differed in kind from that of the others. It is also unfortunate that Lk $22^{31.\ 32}$ should follow immediately Christ's rebuke to the disciples in their contention on the very subject of precedence, and His warning to them not to be like Gentile princes who lord it over their people, and assume grandiloquent titles such as 'benefactor.' Peter's final commission, thrice repeated, contains no single unique element; it is simply a pastorate, whose triple injunction refers to his threefold denial and repudiation of his Master. As for the claim that Peter's office could not die with him, it proves too much for papal theory, since no pope has ever claimed an apostolate identical with his; but it contains a kernel of truth. Apostolic faith, and faithful Apostles, are needed by the Lord of the Church in every generation, and we are justified in believing that they will not fail. But we are still in total ignorance, as was the general Church in the first four centuries, of any evidence that our Lord desired to have Peter's faith and Peter's prerogative confined to one man, and in particular to the bishop of Rome.

'Of all the Fathers,' writes Döllinger (*op. cit.* p. 91 ff.), 'who interpret these passages in the Gospels (Mt xvi. 18, Jn xxi. 17), *not a single one applies them to the Roman Bishops.* How many Fathers have busied themselves with these texts, yet not one of them whose commentaries we possess—Origen, Chrysostom, Hilary, Augustine, Cyril, Theodoret, and those whose interpretations are collected in catenas—has dropped the faintest hint that the primacy of Rome is the consequence of the commission and promise to Peter! Not one of them has explained the rock or foundation on which Christ would build His Church of the office given to Peter to be transmitted to his successors, but they understood by it either Christ Himself, or Peter's confession of faith in Christ; often both together. Or else they thought Peter was the foundation equally with all the other Apostles, the Twelve being together the foundation-stones

of the Church (*Apoc.* xxi. 14) . . . they did not regard a power first given to Peter, and afterwards conferred in precisely the same words on all the Apostles, as anything peculiar to him, or hereditary in the line of Roman Bishops, and they held the symbol of the keys as meaning just the same as the figurative expression of binding and loosing.

Every one knows the one classical passage of Scripture on which the edifice of Papal Infallibility has been reared, "I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, confirm thy brethren." But these words manifestly refer only to Peter personally, to his denial of Christ and his conversion; he is told that he, whose failure of faith would be only of short duration, is to strengthen the other Apostles, whose faith would likewise waver. It is directly against the sense of the passage, which speaks simply of faith, first wavering, and then to be confirmed in the Messianic dignity of Christ, to find in it a promise of future infallibility to a succession of Popes, just because they hold the office Peter first held in the Roman Church. No single writer to the end of the Seventh Century dreamt of such an interpretation; all without exception—and there are eighteen of them—explain it simply as a prayer of Christ, that His Apostle might not wholly succumb, and lose his faith entirely in his approaching trial. The first to find in it a promise of privileges to the Church of Rome was Pope Agatho in 680, when trying to avert the threatened condemnation of his predecessor, Honorius, through whom the Roman Church had lost its boasted privilege of doctrinal purity.

Now the Tridentine profession of faith, imposed on the clergy since Pius IV., contains a vow never to interpret Holy Scripture otherwise than in accord with the unanimous consent of the Fathers—that is, the great Church doctors of the first six centuries, for Gregory the Great, who died in 604, was the last of the Fathers; every bishop and theologian therefore breaks his oath when he interprets the passage in question of a gift of infallibility promised by Christ to the Popes.'

Human nature and political analogy can supply many reasons for vesting in the single holder of an eminent office a monarchical authority in faith and morals as in government, but we turn in vain for any warrant in the words of Jesus Christ for such a claim. Think what one may about the limitations of argument based on silence, it is a grave omission indeed on the part of an infallible and divine Teacher and Legislator to have left His infant Church entirely without authorization and explicit instruction in so vital a matter, and entirely without a single allusion either to Rome or to its Episcopate. Think what one also may about the legitimacy of a doctrinal 'development,' the postponement till 1870 of a revelation of dogma so momentous to Christendom seems to call for delicate explanation.

The fact is that, while all the world deferred in many ways, especially after Constantine's accession, to the See of Rome, while the frequent dependence of lesser sees upon its guidance and direction prepared for the Western Church's ultimate submission to its authority, and while the bishop of Rome was a great power to reckon with in any ecumenical interest, the ancient Church betrayed no sign of any recognition of his infallibility. A patriarch among patriarchs, bishop of a diocese which came to overshadow and usurp the Empire itself since it proved itself more lasting and more trustworthy, heir to traditions of office without rival in historical prestige, it was inevitable that the Roman pope should be given, and should accept, a rank of his own as the centuries attested the permanence and the power of his office. No competent student of history would desire to detract from the dignity of the papal name as a historic fact. But it is plain that neither the early popes themselves nor the rest of the world credited their office with infallibility. The unapostolic See of New Rome erected by Constantine in his Eastern capital never acknowledged its authority as overruling its own. Councils, deemed ecumenical by East and West alike, were convened and issued their decrees without submitting them to the separate or final approval of the ruling pope. No one suggested that the existence of the Roman See made Councils unnecessary, much less presumptuous and incompetent. How much trouble might have been saved to the Christian world if direct appeal to an oracle in the Eternal City had been recognized as sufficient to decide all controversies in faith and morals! But, as Döllinger (*op. cit.* p. 64 ff.) says:

'None of the ancient confessions of faith, no catechism, none of the patristic writings composed for the instruction of the people, contain a syllable about the Pope, still less any hint that all certainty of faith and doctrine depends on him. For the first thousand years of Church history not a question of doctrine was finally decided by the Pope. The Roman Bishops took no part in the commotions which the numerous Gnostic sects, the Montanists and Chiliasts, produced in the early Church, nor can a single dogmatic decree issued by one of them be found during the first four centuries, nor a trace of the existence of any. Even the controversy about Christ kindled by Paul of Samosata, which occupied the whole Eastern Church for a long time, and necessitated the assembling of several Councils, was terminated without the Pope taking any part in it. So again in the chain of controversies and discussions connected with the names of Theodotus, Artemon, Noetus, Sabellius, Beryllus, and Lucian of Antioch, which troubled the whole Church, and extended over nearly 150 years, there is no proof that the Roman Bishops acted beyond the limits of their own local Church, or accomplished any dogmatic result. . . . In three controversies during this early period the Roman Church took an active part,—the question about Easter, about heretical baptism, and about the penitential discipline. In all three the Popes were unable to carry out their own will and view and practice, and the other Churches maintained their different usage without its leading to any permanent division. . . . In the Arian disputes . . . Julius and Liberius (337–366) were the first [Popes] to take part in the course of events, but they only increased the uncertainty. Julius pronounced Marcellus of Ancyra, an avowed Sabellian, orthodox at his Roman Synod; and Liberius purchased his return from exile from the Emperor by condemning Athanasius, and subscribing an Arian creed. . . . The apostasy of Liberius sufficed, through the whole of the middle ages, for a proof that Popes could fall into heresy as well as other people. . . . During all the fourth century Councils alone decided dogmatic questions. If the Bishop of Rome was ever appealed to for a decision, it was understood that he was desired to call a Synod to decide the point at issue. At the second Œcumenical Council in 381, which decreed the most important definition of faith since the Nicene, by first formulizing the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, the Church of Rome was not represented at all; only the decrees were communicated to it as to other Churches. . . . Pope Siricius (384–398) declined to pronounce on the false doctrine of a bishop (Bonosus) when requested to do so, on the ground that he had no right, and must await the sentence of the bishops of the province, "to make it the rule of his own."'

It is impossible in an article like the present to trace in minute detail the long course of the development of the papal claims, and of the resistance to them; but the following historical facts are of interest, and in various ways have a significance of their own. They are set down almost as a miscellany in a roughly chronological sequence, and they reflect the varying attitude adopted by popes, Councils, and teachers of the Church.

In the middle of the 3rd cent., Stephen, bishop of Rome, in controversy with Cyprian of Carthage on the validity of heretical baptism, asserted his claim to a superior authority as the occupant of Peter's chair, and claimed for Roman tradition a supreme value as having been delivered by Peter and Paul; but Cyprian rejected the notion of the existence of a bishop of bishops, and appealed to the Apostolic Scriptures as a higher authority, and Eastern bishops at once supported his attitude.

'None of us,' he writes (cf. G. Salmon, *Infallibility of the Church*3, London, 1899, p. 407), 'sets himself up as a bishop of bishops, or by tyrannical terror forces his colleagues to a necessity of obeying; inasmuch as every bishop, in the free use of his liberty and power, has the right of forming his own judgment, and can no more be judged by another than he can himself judge another.'

In the 3rd cent. the Church was still a federation of bishopries in communion with each other, each with its own distinctive influence and prestige, Rome manifestly the most powerful, but all together in a fraternal parity. But in 313 the Council of Sardica, from which the Eastern bishops had departed in indignation, made the pope, in certain circumstances, a court of appeal for aggrieved bishops in the West. This step was taken in the interest of security of episcopal tenure in

times of heated controversy and frequent depositions.

It provided that 'as due to the honour of St. Peter, the Roman bishop Julius shall be informed . . . by letter, in order that, under the presidency of a presbyter sent by him, a new trial may be held by bishops of a neighbouring province' (cf. K. von Hase, *Handbook to the Controversy with Rome*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, i. 226).

In the 5th cent., Augustine's much abused saying in a sermon (cxxxi. 10), 'Rome has spoken; the case is ended,' had reference to local African controversy, and does not contradict his reiterated adherence to Cyprian's position. For him, Councils as well as bishops were fallible, though venerable, and appeal might be taken as need arose. To give his words an ecumenical application is unhistorical. But the pontificate of Leo the Great enhanced the dignity and power of the Roman See in all eyes. In 445 the Emperor Valentinian gave supreme judicial and legislative power to it over the bishops of Italy and Gaul. Leo's Epistle to Flavian in 449 was the first doctrinal utterance of a pope to be accepted ecumenically; but it did not receive dogmatic force until it had been submitted to the Council of Chalcedon, and examined by the bishops therein assembled, and ratified by them—a procedure whose necessity its author acknowledged. But Leo's successors quickly dissipated the authority which his powerful personality and successful enterprise had won. Vigilius in 546 pronounced orthodox the 'Three Chapters' of Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas, which had been accused of Nestorianism; a year later he condemned them, though he had formally anathematized their accusers; later still he reversed his judgment a second time, only to be condemned himself by the Fifth Ecumenical Council, to whose decree he bowed in 554, saying, very sensibly, that it was no disgrace to perceive and recall a previous error. Even more serious was the fate of Honorius I., who in 638, in two public letters to Eastern patriarchs, had endorsed the Monothelite heresy, and after his death was solemnly condemned as a heretic by the Sixth Ecumenical Council without any dissentient voice, in presence of the legates of his successor—a sentence which his own successors carried out, expunging his name from the liturgy.

Until the fabrication of the Isidorian decretals nothing more than an episcopal and patriarchal primacy was effectively claimed by the popes or conceded to them: that primacy no one in Church or State seriously disputed. The bishop of Rome could not summon Ecumenical Synods: he had to petition the Emperor to do so. It was not his right to preside over them in person or by legate. Rome was not their usual place of meeting. The Pope's signature was not required as a final formality to validate their decrees. His legislative, administrative, and judicial powers, *i.e.* his sovereign authority, did not extend beyond his own province; neither Africa nor the East acknowledged it. No counsellor and no arbiter enjoyed the same acceptance or the same influence; but as yet there was no Curia or sovereign Court, no tribute, no granting of sovereign dispensations from the obligations of ecclesiastical law. Of the power of the keys, the power to bind and loose, the power to excommunicate, Rome had no monopoly, either claimed or conceded. But there was a spirit at work which operated steadily in the direction of securing these things. The Sardican canons, the name, prerogative, and throne of Peter, the social influence and appellate counsel of Rome, were steadily turned to increasing account. As the Empire weakened, the papacy found its opportunity and became heir to its secular methods and spirit as well as to its dignity and power. The sixth canon of the First Nicene Council had recognized the rights of the Roman See over part of the Italian Church, but had assigned similar rights to the bishops of Alexandria and Antioch over their patriarchates; but the local Sardican canons were speedily confused with it in the West, and the resultant claims were advanced by Innocent I. as recognized by 'the Fathers' and the Synod. At the Council of Ephesus it was affirmed by the Roman legates that Peter lived and judged in the persons of his successors in the Roman throne. Leo I. reiterated the same plea. But the Council of Chalcedon, in its 28th canon, maintained that Rome owed its primacy to the decision of the Fathers in view of the political eminence of the city, and, in spite of Leo's opposition, it recognized Constantinople as a patriarchate of the highest rank, second only to Rome in precedence, and equal to Rome in rights. When Leo declined to recognize that canon, he did not base his action upon any complaint of injury to his own bishopric, or on the lack of his consent, but only on the injustice done to the older patriarchates of the East, especially those of Alexandria and Antioch—the one founded by Mark, Peter's disciple, the other by Peter himself before he went to Rome—and on the alteration of the Nicene canon. When dealing with other than Eastern bishops, he made much of the 'merit of St. Peter' as a ground of Roman dignity, and strengthened his disciplinary hold upon the West. But nothing demonstrates so clearly the long distance which the papacy had yet to travel, before it reached its final claims, as the rebuke of Gregory the Great addressed formally to the patriarch of Constantinople, who assumed the title of 'Ecumenical Bishop' (lib. v. ep. 18; lib. vii. ep. 33; cf. von Hase, *op. cit.* i. 225; Salmon, *op. cit.* p. 423).

'It is with tears that I say that a bishop, whose duty it is to guide others to humility, has himself departed from it. Paul was unwilling to suffer that any one should call himself after him or after Apollos. What art thou prepared to say to Christ, the Head of the universal Church, at the last day, when thou seekest to bring all members of the Church into subjection to thee by means of the title of the universal ruler? This haughty name is a copying of Satan, who also exalted himself above all angels. . . . Far from Christian hearts be that blasphemous title, in which all priests have their honour taken away, while the one foolishly usurps it.'

Gregory did not hesitate to contrast his rival's pretensions with those of St. Peter, who, although first of the Apostles, did not place himself in a superior rank to his brethren—a piece of historically sound pleading which was to prove subsequently embarrassing to the pope's successors.

The subsequent course of the papal development is matter of common knowledge. The decretal forgeries, beginning about the middle of the 9th cent., many of them motived by provincial, not primarily Roman, ambitions, assisted powerfully the extension of the papal primacy into an absolute monarchy combined doctrinal with disciplinary powers, required papal confirmation for the decrees of every Council, and elevated the bishop of Rome into the sovereign bishop, from whose hands all other bishops receive their authority in matters of faith as well as government and order. It was assumed that the extension of papal dignity and authority over bishops would liberate them from secular control and jurisdiction—a policy which survives at the present time in full vigour. But, in liberating the provincial bishops from one yoke, another yoke was imposed. Secular authority was avenged. The bishops found themselves in the grasp of a power once spiritual, now both secular and spiritual. The power from which they shrank in the dioceses laid its firm hand upon them in the Vatican. For a papacy which wielded temporal power as a spiritual prerogative it was impossible to exclude dogma from the sovereign function. The papacy accordingly assumed control of synods

greater and lesser; it alone could convene, accredit, and dissolve them. It assumed the appointment and institution of bishops; dealt with vacant sees; made subjects of princes and kings; and claimed the right to overrule Councils and the teaching of the Fathers. The theocratic achievements of Gregory VII. made it easy for the most extreme views of papal authority to impress the imagination of Christendom as a realizable ideal. He did not hesitate to claim personal sanctity as the successor of Peter, and to make the supernatural holiness of popes the foundation of their absolute power. 'In Peter' they had 'power to bind and loose on earth and in heaven.' They were subject to no man's judgment, but answerable alone to God. The forged decretals of Isidore and Gratian were eagerly employed by an age already prepared for them; and in good faith mediæval Schoolmen, like Aquinas, drew from them, and frequently from corrupted texts of conciliar decrees and writings of the great Fathers, materials which confirmed their confidence in papal autocracy. In the 13th cent. the rise of the great monastic Orders, under vows of obedience through their generals to the pope, and exempt from episcopal authority, increased yet further the exaltation of the papal dignity, while the Reunion Council of Florence, 1439, short-lived though its recognition of the Roman primacy proved, revealed the extent to which dignitaries of the Eastern Church were prepared to abate their claims and their rivalry, under pressure of that growing Muhammadan peril which was so soon to cripple them, and leave Rome without an effective rival in the ecclesiastical world. Unfortunately, however, for the papal regime, access of temporal and spiritual authority brought with it no guarantee of a noble employment of its perilous privileges. Instead there ensued a swift deterioration of the papal personnel, and even more of the curial entourage. At length Christendom was amazed and shocked by the spectacle of rival popes, and disgusted and revolted by the gross luxury and unconcealed immorality of the Vatican. The secularization of the Roman bishopric was responsible for both scandals. Both combined to make the work of reformation not only an urgent and clamant need, but by their notoriety a thing possible for part at least of Europe. In an age of new learning and kindled imagination—an age which explored the Apostolic past as enthusiastically as it thought about the future—the papacy proved incapable of supporting its triple crown. The lofty theory of a working infallibility and a practical autocracy broke down abjectly before the Great Schism and the Great Scandal. With three claimants of the heritage of Hildebrand in power, the common sense and the reserved energies of Christendom asserted themselves in the Reforming Councils of Constance and Basel. Whatever popes in their majesty had asserted, their subject bishops, met in Council and supported by the conscience of the Christian world, dealt sternly with their rival overlords. The Church's necessity knew no refinement of law. The Council pronounced deposition. The rivals, one after another, submitted. For a brief period the Council came to its own again as a supreme authority in the Church. In its 4th and 5th sessions the Council of Constance decreed that

'every lawfully convoked Ecumenical Council representing the Church derives its authority immediately from Christ, and every one, the Pope included, is subject to it in matters of faith, in the healing of schism, and the reformation of the Church.'

Without protest, the painfully elaborated doctrine and practice of papal infallibility and monarchy was cut down to modest proportions by a lawfully convoked Council, which appointed the new pope, Martin V., as well as deposed his predecessor or predecessors, and thus gave practical illustration of conciliar authority. The Council of Constance, indeed, decreed that Councils should meet every ten years. In 1431 the Council of Basel met, and, in spite of dissolution by Eugenius IV., who viewed with misgiving its energetic assertion of the principles of Constance, it persevered with its work and secured the withdrawal of the papal dissolution, the pope acknowledging that the Council had been justified in proceeding, promising to adhere to it 'with all zeal and devotion' as 'the holy Ecumenical Council,' and renouncing his claim as pope to the right to suspend or dissolve any Council. Reaction followed, intensified by the natural reluctance of the remnant of the Fathers of Basel to dissolve and to lay aside their power. The very name of Council became a by-word. The opportunity of the papacy returned. Reform had been accomplished neither by Council nor by pope; but the papacy had at least continuity, whereas the Council had none. In 1516, Leo X. issued the bull *Pastor Æternus*, with the approval of the Fathers of the fifth Lateran Synod, in which he asserted the authority of the pope over general Councils, including the right to convoke, transfer, and dissolve. In the Council of Trent the papal view was powerfully strengthened by the new Jesuit Order, itself built upon the absolutist theory of authority, and dedicated from the first with unquestioning devotion to the service of the mind and will of the sovereign Father. It would have been too much to expect that an Order whose conspicuous talent was prostrated in the cause of the needful counter-reformation before the papal throne would encourage independence either in faith or in morals on the part of the secular clergy. It was inevitable that in the absence of the Reformers, who had no faith in papal infallibility, the restorers of the residual Church should use every instrument in their power to strengthen its disciplinary unity and homogeneity. The lessons of recent centuries were still so freshly impressed upon all minds that a decisive victory was impossible in the Council for either side. National feeling asserted itself in the deliberations, and the bishops were too gravely exercised concerning the condition of the Church to be willing to abdicate their own responsibility. The influence of the Vatican was so strong as to give point to the wit of the French ambassador when he remarked that the Holy Spirit appeared to arrive every Friday from Rome in the mail-bag; but no decree of papal infallibility was then procurable. The Tridentine Catechism is content to affirm that the Church cannot err in matters of faith and morals, without defining the particular organ of that infallibility. But it was significant that the administration and interpretation of the decrees of the Council, with the completion of the ecclesiastical manuals other than the Catechism, were entrusted to the Vatican. In France, Bossuet's *Declaration of 1682* represents the attitude of the Gallican clergy towards the papal prerogative. Its four propositions deny the pope's authority in secular affairs, assert its inferiority to that of Councils in accordance with the decrees and action of the Council of Constance, and subject it to the judgment of the Church (see art. GALLICANISM, vol. vi. p. 161 f.). Not until the alarms and vicissitudes of Pius IX.'s troubled reign did the papal and Jesuit policy of the rigorous centralization of all ecclesiastical authority find its final opportunity. On the eve of the loss of the temporal power, the Vatican Council met to compensate a venerated pope for the withdrawal of a worldly crown by the bestowal of a spiritual (see art. COUNCILS AND SYNODS [Christian], vol. iv. p. 201). Ever since Pius IX., in his own exile from Rome, had turned

for help to the then proscribed Society of Jesus, his policy had been more and more closely identified with the principles for which that Order had worked and had suffered. His first great experiment in dogma—the proclamation of the Decree on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the bull *Ineffabilis Deus*, read before a Concourse of Cardinals and Bishops in St. Peter's, in Dec. 1854—acknowledged no other authority than 'that of our Lord Jesus Christ and the blessed Apostles Peter and Paul and . . . our own.' Though it was preceded by a formal epistolary consultation of the individual bishops throughout the Church, the Decree was uttered without conciliar assistance, and, with the long succession of dogmatic judgments which were gathered together to form the *Syllabus of Errors*, 1864, it signalized the practical advent of a consummated infallibility. Nothing was left for the Vatican Council of 1870 to do but to add the ceremonial form of a conciliar sanction, and to furnish the already operative principle with a definitive form of words. For good or for evil, the vision held out before the eyes of a long line of pontiffs seemed to be realized in accomplished fact. The work of Isidore and Gratian, of Loyola and Lainez, of Cajetan, Bellarmine, and Torquemada, appeared to have been justified. In faith as well as morals and discipline the pope was at last declared, in his own person, as the official teacher of the Christian world, supreme and infallible.

The terms of the Decree and of some portions of its setting, in Manning's rendering, are as follows (*Petri Privilegium: Three Pastoral Letters to the Clergy of the Diocese*, p. 214 ff.; they occur in the *First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ*, chs. iii. and iv.):

'We teach and declare that by the appointment of our Lord the Roman Church possesses a superiority of ordinary power over all other Churches, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is immediate; to which all, of whatever rite and dignity, both pastors and faithful, both individually and collectively, are bound, by their duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, to submit, not only in matters which belong to faith and morals, but also in those that appertain to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the world; so that the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme pastor through the preservation of unity both of communion and of profession of the same faith with the Roman Pontiff. This is the teaching of Catholic truth, from which no man can deviate without loss of faith and of salvation. . . . Wherefore they err from the right course who assert that it is lawful to appeal from the judgments of the Roman Pontiffs to an Œcumenical Council as to an authority higher than that of the Roman Pontiff.

Moreover, that the supreme power of teaching is also included in the apostolic primacy, which the Roman Pontiff, as the successor of Peter, Prince of the Apostles, possesses over the whole Church, this Holy See has always held, the perpetual practice of the Church confirms, and Œcumenical Councils also have declared, especially those in which the East with the West met in the union of faith and charity. . . .

To satisfy this pastoral duty our predecessors ever made unwearied efforts that the salutary doctrine of Christ might be propagated among all the nations of the earth, and with equal care watched that it might be preserved genuine and pure where it had been received. Therefore the Bishops of the whole world, now singly, now assembled in synod, following the long-established custom of Churches, and the form of the ancient rule, sent word to this Apostolic See of those dangers especially which sprang up in matters of faith, that there the losses of faith might be most effectually repaired, where the faith cannot fail. And the Roman Pontiffs, according to the exigencies of times and circumstances, sometimes assembling Œcumenical Councils, or asking for the mind of the Church scattered throughout the world, sometimes by particular Synods, sometimes using other helps which Divine Providence supplied, defined as to be held those things which with the help of God they had recognised as conformable with the Sacred Scriptures and Apostolic Traditions. For the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter that by His revelation they might make known new doctrine, but that by His assistance they might inviolably keep and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith delivered through the Apostles. And indeed all the venerable Fathers have embraced, and the holy orthodox Doctors have venerated and followed, their apostolic doctrine; knowing most fully that this See of holy Peter remains ever free from all blemish of error, according to the Divine promise of the Lord our Saviour made to the Prince of His disciples: I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and, when thou art converted, confirm thy brethren.

This gift, then, of truth and never-failing faith, was conferred by Heaven upon Peter and his successors in this Chair, that they might perform their high office for the salvation of all; that the whole flock of Christ, kept away by them from the poisonous food of error, might be nourished with the pasture of heavenly doctrine; that, the occasion of schism being removed, the whole Church might be kept one, and, resting on its foundation, might stand firm against the gates of hell.

But since in this very age, in which the salutary efficacy of the apostolic office is most of all required, not a few are found who take away from its authority, we judge it altogether necessary solemnly to assert the prerogative which the only-begotten Son of God vouchsafed to join with the supreme pastoral office.

Therefore, faithfully adhering to the tradition received from the beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic Religion, and the salvation of Christian people, the Sacred Council approving, we teach and define that it is a dogma divinely revealed: that the Roman Pontiff when he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church; by the Divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding faith or morals: and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.

But if any one—which may God avert—presume to contradict this our definition, let him be anathema.'

It is not necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of the somewhat painful features of the process through which this definition came to light, and of the policy which issued in this long-desired result. Nothing would be easier for a future Council more representative of ecumenical Christianity than on technical grounds to pronounce the Vatican Council no true and Ecumenical Council, *e.g.* because of its lack of freedom and autonomy in debate, in conference, and in final vote, or because of papal interference and dictation, or because of its lack of voluntary unanimity. The result is not a Decree of a Council, but a Decree of the pope, with the approval or submission of the Council. The papal correspondence with the bishops of the Church had tested their attitude beforehand, and confronted each as an individual with the prospective displeasure of the Vatican as an inevitable consequence of dissent from the policy of their venerable Head. Eminent theologians, like Döllinger and Newman, known to be hostile, were not officially invited to attend. Eminent prelates of the same mind who had to be invited *ex officio* were harassed throughout the proceedings by papal remonstrances. The proceedings were anything but reassuring to contemplate (cf. Lord Acton's account in the *North British Review*, liii. [1871], art. 'The Vatican Council'). But, while it is true that learning and ecclesiastical statecraft were in irreconcilable opposition, the opponents of the dogma were in an impossible position from the first. For 'Decrees' are essentially matters of statecraft, not of learning, science, or philosophy, and are proverbially fashioned with reference to expediency and opportunism, not with reference to truth. The ground on which alone they dared or desired to fight the issue out was that the Decree, though true, would be untimely. They were Inopportunists, whose intense feeling in debate and in controversy threw grave doubt upon the genuineness of their faith in the doctrine itself. Probably the failure both of pope and of Council to trust the divine illumination and guidance in serious and free deliberation and conference was never more distressingly displayed For purposes of dogma, for *ex cathedra* utterance, the majority were entitled to brush aside questions of mere timeliness. They knew their own mind; they knew the mind of their beloved and compassionated pope; they were smarting under an acute sense of injustice and humiliation inflicted upon him and upon the Church by the times; they

were practical men bent upon drawing tighter the bonds of unity and discipline; and they, not their more brilliant antagonists, were the true representatives of the genius of the Roman Catholic Church. Without being philosophers, they grasped the logic of the system to which they belonged more accurately than such academic minds as Newman and Döllinger. No one can survey the past of the papacy without recognizing that, however undignified and desperate the method was by which the definition was secured, it was profoundly consistent with the traditions of the papal Church. A Church which gave authority so exalted a place in faith as well as government, whose bishops were bound by oath to obey the bishop of Rome and accept his conscience and his judgment as their own, a Church which made external unity one of its vital notes and counted coercion when necessary a duty, could not be accused of betraying its past by crediting its visible Head with that infallibility, that absolute assurance of divine guidance, without which unquestioning obedience to him was manifestly a crime. In von Hase's words (*op. cit.* i. 251), infallibility is 'the supernatural condition of the unlimited power.' From one standpoint the Decree of 1870 is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the venerable Roman method of securing unity, a method as old as the desire of the Apostles that Jesus should forbid those who followed not with them, as old as the contention of the Apostles concerning precedence. From the opposite standpoint it was the consummation of the system, the crown or climax of its development. For once Newman's dialectic failed him when he opposed the dogma; he had forsaken one *via media* only to be discovered plodding along another. In 1867 he had urged to Pusey (Ward, *Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, ii. 222):

'Our feeling as a *fact* . . . is this:—that there is no use in a Pope at all, except to bind the whole of Christendom into one polity; and that to ask us to give up his universal jurisdiction is to invite us to commit suicide.'

In 1870, in the famous letter to Ullathorne (*ib.* ii. 288 f.), he counted the threatened Decree a 'calamity':

'As to myself personally, please God, I do not expect any trial at all, but I cannot help suffering with the various souls that are suffering. I look with anxiety at the prospect of having to defend decisions which may not be difficult to my private judgment, but may be most difficult to defend logically in the face of historical facts. What have we done to be treated as the Faithful never were treated before? When has definition of doctrine *de fide* been a luxury of devotion and not a stern painful necessity? Why should an aggressive and insolent faction be allowed to make the hearts of the just to mourn whom the Lord hath not made sorrowful? . . . If it is God's Will that the Pope's Infallibility should be defined, then it is His Blessed Will to throw back the times and the moments of that triumph He has destined for His Kingdom; and I shall feel I have but to bow my head to His Adorable Inscrutable Providence.'

But the fact is that the Decree was not substantially in advance of the theory and practice of the Church. In 1862 at Whitsuntide the bishops had addressed the pontiff in these words: 'Thou art the centre of unity, thou art the Divine Light prepared by the Divine Wisdom for the nations, thou art the rock, thou art the very foundation of the Church.' He had taken them at their word. He desired, in fact, his official apotheosis in the Decree for the same reason that alone made Newman eager for his Cardinal's hat, viz. to protect and guarantee his teaching in the future, and to prevent it from being set aside. He had made no secret, as Lord Acton points out (*op. cit.* p. 186), from the first of his policy:

'In his first important utterance, the Encyclical of Nov. 1846, he announced that he was infallible; and the claim raised no commotion. Later on he applied a more decisive test, and gained a more complete success, when the bishops, summoned to Rome, not as a council but as an audience, received from him an additional article of their faith. But apart from the dogma of infallibility, he had a strong desire to establish certain cherished opinions of his own on a basis firm enough to outlast his time. They were collected in the Syllabus, which contained the essence of what he had written during many years, and was an abridgment of the lessons which his life had taught him. . . . The Syllabus was not rejected; but its edge was blunted and its point broken by the zeal which was spent in explaining it away. . . . In private he said that he wished to have no interpreter but himself.'

What the divine right of anointed kings meant for past ages this divine right of popes to decree or interpret faith means for the papal Church. Its strength lies in the fact that it forms a focus of institutional loyalty and unity. The breast of the pope is, as a mediæval pontiff put it, 'the shrine of all rights,' as in the State the hand of the sovereign is the source of all authority. Every one knows that a king is fettered, even though the fetters be of gold, by the custom of his predecessors and by the law and the circumstances of his time. So with the pope—his infallibility is not unlimited, though he is answerable to none and there is none to limit him. In wise and holy hands the decreed right need do no harm. In unwise, in worldly, in selfish hands such as have often held the office, and in times of panic and unrest, the power may be employed to the Church's hurt. In normal circumstances its attribution to the Vicar of Christ may intensify the care with which his peers in the Sacred College select him from their number. It is questionable whether the dogma conferred any really new power. A distinguished Cardinal prophesied that, as worded finally, it would be such as to prevent any substantial exercise of the power to innovate. Newman's own fears were considerably allayed when he read its terms. In the historical introduction of the authoritative publication, prepared by Fathers Franzelin and Kleutgen (Ward, *Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, ii. 307), occurs the statement:

'The Roman Pontiffs, as the state of things and times has made advisable, at one time calling Ecumenical Councils or finding out the opinion of the Church dispersed through the world, at another by means of particular Synods, at another using other means of assistance which Divine Providence supplied, have defined those things to be held which by God's aid they had known to be in agreement with sacred Scripture and the Apostolic traditions, for the Holy Ghost was promised to the successors of Peter, not that by His revelation they should disclose new doctrines, but that by His *assistentia* they might preserve inviolate, and expound faithfully, the revelation or deposit of faith handed down by the Apostles.'

Newman recognized all that, but based his fears less upon the risk of papal vagaries or arbitrariness than upon the fact that 'there will necessarily always be round about the Pope second-rate people who are not subjects of that supernatural guidance which is his guidance' (*op. cit.* ii. 635). The trouble also is that no one but the ruling pope can authoritatively determine what is and what is not *ex cathedra* definition and *de fide*. Newman, Manning, and a host of theologians tell us, each in his own fashion, what are the tests of this august qualification, and unlimited ingenuity has been expended upon the problem. One by one the awkward instances of historical misdemeanour on the part of popes in the definition of doctrine have been taken in hand with a view to their elimination by hook or by crook. When misdemeanour has to be admitted, it is pleaded that the act was an indiscretion and less than *ex cathedra*, or that the intention was good, but that the pope was under compulsion, and so on. The result has certainly been to curtail, as far as subordinate opinion can curtail, the limits of the pontifical power; but the real foundation for legitimate anxiety lies in the fact that in any crisis the personal will of the pope must prevail by virtue of his unbounded claim to obedience in faith, morals, and discipline. It is obvious that matters which pertain to morals and the discipline of the Church, not to speak of faith, may touch at a thousand points the private conscience and the prerogative and interests of the civil powers. Gladstone in his powerful and impressive attack upon the

dogma has no difficulty in exposing this danger, and in espousing the legitimate cause of the threatened State. But in the statesman for once he forgot or sank the churchman, and his argument is open to the retort that the Church has the same need for autonomy, the same right to legislate for itself with sovereign authority, as the State. By all the principles which fence about the jurisdiction of the Crown, the tiara may equally be guarded by its cassocked defenders. With no consistency can civil power reproach ecclesiastical power for copying its own methods and invoking the same instruments of order. The churchman is subject to no temptation whose counterpart the statesman has not to encounter; his fault is the greater because the King of his allegiance sanctioned no coercive discipline, deprecated precedence and titular dignity, and authorized no legislative apparatus to pass laws for human faith and conscience. Short of the complete renunciation of the life-long tradition and policy of Rome, it is difficult to see how the Roman Catholic Church could have laid aside the manifestly unworkable and unmanageable instrument of world-wide Councils either for the determination of doctrine or for the exercise of discipline, without vesting in the papacy the right and duty of using all proper means of consultation, learning, and prayer to ascertain the will of God by His Spirit for the instruction and edification of the flock entrusted to its charge. There is no need to vindicate this faith in divine providence by appealing, with an old-time Jesuit professor and theologian of Mainz, to OT Scripture and urging that 'a thoroughly ignorant Pope may very well be infallible, for God has before now pointed out the right path by the mouth of a speaking ass.' Trusting the Church, trusting the Episcopate, and trusting the 'assisted' head of the Church on earth are co ordinate duties for the Roman Catholic mind. They rest on the same order of faith in the Holy Spirit which animates every individual Christian, and they are subject to the same order of limitations. But it will not fail to impress the reflective student of history as a singular fact that in the cycle of its progress the Church which condemns private or personal judgment in things of faith should now anathematize those who distrust the personal or individual judgment of popes 'apart from the consent of the Church.' Even Rome cannot evade the awkward circumstance that, after all, our acceptance of the pope as in any character and capacity infallible depends in the last resort upon an exercise of individual conscience and private judgment. 'How otherwise,' wrote Mivart to Cardinal Vaughan in 1900, 'could we know that authority had spoken at all, or what it had said?' Before the soul has any right to fling itself into arms extended to receive it in its quest of truth and peace, it must first convince itself that the arms are everlasting and that the proffered bosom is divine. If even popes have justified the withdrawal of their pledges by reason of their having been extorted under fear, is the individual faith which is yielded on pain of spiritual anathema to be accounted any whit more valid? Most readers of the history and proceedings of the Vatican Council, and, for that matter, of the Tridentine Council also, will rise from their occupation with a profound sense of the soundness of the papal conviction that ecumenical Councils are not to be trusted any longer, if they ever were, that the spirit guiding them is not infallibly holy, that they are subject to a multitude of infirmities inherent in their nature. But it is not every reader who will be guided by these histories to the further conclusion that the Sacred Breath which has been withdrawn from the Chamber of Council is now both assured and restricted to the apartments of the Vatican.

5. Infallibility of Jesus Christ and His Spirit.—It was indicated above that, while Scripture has been authoritative for all types of Christian faith, the infallibility it possesses for them resides, even within the Gospels, in the person of Jesus Christ. The Bible is for Christianity the record of a Life and its setting.

(1) Objectively, Jesus Christ is the authority which lends it its unique impressiveness. His life, His teaching, His character, His person, and His attested influence upon the world around Him constitute a fact of history to which the human heart and mind go back again and again, to test it and anon to bow before it. System follows system of doctrine, mode succeeds mode of piety and devotion, but Jesus Christ, learned from history and tried by experience, remains the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. Other foundation can no man lay. Back to Him, down to Him, up to Him, are the watchwords of reviving faith. Age after age rediscovers Him behind the veil of tradition and convention and religious pedantry. To enjoy His sanction or authority is the highest boast of any Christian usage, ordinance, or teaching. Amid all their differences of sectarian opinion and sectarian life, Christians are at one in acknowledging His historical life to be their ideal and their example, not only an incarnation of the divine, but at the same time a complete embodiment of human excellence. Though there is no agreement in the Christian world as to the details of His teaching, there is in progress a steady approach towards a common understanding and exegesis of His words. No year passes without bringing some new light upon the record of that holy and sublime life, and, instead of taking Him further from us into the past, time seems but to define His character and genius and message more sharply. Faults have been found in His character by hardy critics. He has been adjudged too stern, too gentle, too visionary, too ascetic, or not ascetic enough. Scholarship has recast traditional notions of the meaning of His words and of the composition of the Gospels. To some extent the halo and the Fact which it encircles and illumines have been distinguished. The mind of the Master and its interpretation by His disciples stand out with a new distinctness. But, in spite of all, the Figure and the Countenance form a Presence which decomposes but to recompose, and without wincing abides the unsparing scrutiny of every passing generation. Philosophy, history, science, poetry, art, and devotion show no signs of faltering in their interest in Him. Their acknowledgment of His greatness and all-sufficient perfection has not grown fainter. There is no sign that Christendom has discerned an example more appealing, a message more arresting, an authority more commanding, an ideal more exacting, a goodness, truth, and beauty more satisfying to the soul.

(2) Subjectively, Jesus Christ and His Spirit experienced in the soul have proved the unfailing authority before which Christian people without compulsion and without humiliation are content and glad to kneel. To contemplate Him from without is sooner or later to admit Him within, and to admit Him within is to surrender to His influence and guidance without a murmur. Christ and His indwelling Spirit are for Christian experience the source of power from above, yet from within. Something more than a memory, however tender, however sacred, possesses the believer. A Power demonstrates a Presence. Faith says from age to age: 'He is not dead: He is risen.' History has not enclosed Him within a niche. Experience

does not exhaust Him. His words have not passed away, but are still spirit and life to those whose ears are gladdened and solemnized by them. His Church has not succumbed to the gates of death. He has never been so intimately realized by men as at the present time. Social life is reckoning with Him on a scale never previously attempted. He is transforming the world more radically than science and invention can. In all that constitutes spiritual influence the infallibility of Jesus Christ and His Spirit is the common faith of Christendom. By the fruits of His contact with us we know Him. Every evidence of His divinity is testimony to His infallibility in thought, word, and deed. He is not only flawless but unfailing.

6. Infallibility of the Christian conscience.—The Christian conscience or consciousness, human conscience stimulated, educated, transformed, transfigured, possessed by the Spirit of Christ, is, for the individual, the nation, the Church, the world, the final arbiter of all duty and all faith. Whether we speak of Christ dwelling in the soul, of the soul at one with Christ, or of the Christian conscience, our meaning is essentially the same. The seat of judgment on earth is that tribunal within the heart. The Spirit of Christ, the Christian Spirit, is the common denominator of all Christian authorities. It is the power that animated the Christian Scriptures and breathes from them still, that inspired the Creeds and Confessions, that prompted the heroism of the faithful, that enlightens the judgment of clergy and laity, of pope, bishop, presbyter, and deacon alike. It is invoked to constitute and sanctify and overrule the deliberations of Synods and Councils. It is divinely promised to the two or three met in the name of Christ, and promised to the solitary believer whose isolation it ends not less than to the world-wide fellowship of the Faith. It is not the monopoly of the individual, nor is it the monopoly of the organization. Its authority is as universal as truth, as various in its embodiments. All mechanical or official oracles of the Christian Spirit are to be regarded with distrust. Our *a priori* assumptions of the modes in which God *must* have provided for our need of guidance and enablement are very liable to be overturned in the school of daily experience. The letter of Scripture does not more surely kill or deaden faith and discernment than would unreasoning reliance upon the mere word of an official or a caste or an organization, however devout and well-intentioned. The Church which vests infallibility exclusively in an order of office-bearers who are human, humanly trained, and humanly appointed fetters the very liberty of God to choose His instruments as of old from every class, every race, and every type of men. One may honour the faith in divine providence and divine predestination which can bind together a great communion of believers, yet recognize the dangers, which inhere in it, of superstition, arrogance, and illusion. To err is human: not to err is a divine perfection. To learn through error is our lot, both Churches and men. Therefore it is essential to a reverent faith, on the part of both, while believing that God's Spirit will not fail us, to avoid the presumption of believing that we shall never fail God's Spirit. Timorous mistrust and reckless arrogance are equal enemies to faith. To trust majority-findings in all cases is as fatuous as to trust no one but oneself. Genius is greater than majorities or averages. An inspired priest is a higher guide than a commonplace and conventional prelate or pope. God has sanctioned and hallowed many forms and instruments of authority in the Church as in the world. The teaching of history, which is the sphere of His providence, seems to admonish us to learn from all, to give all their just place in our confidence, to be loyal to their dictates according to our conscience. The promise stands that the Church will not perish, but the promise also stands that the Spirit will not fail the individual believer. The heart of the Master-shepherd goes out to the one sheep even more than to the ninety and nine. One with God is a majority. Where the Spirit is, though there be but two or three, there is the Church. Where the truth is, there alone is infallibility, a revelation that is divine. Every Christian is a vicar of Christ, representing Him and His Spirit in the world. The servant is not greater than his Master. If Christ disclaimed or deprecated the name of 'good,' assigning it to God, and if Christ disclaimed or deprecated titular dignity and precedence, interpreting His Master-hood in terms of service, there is surely danger and disloyalty in any claim of particular human infallibility. Earthly authority, even the best, is intended to educate its subjects into independence of its help and its restraint. Every historic authority, as Sabatier justly says, demands at once respect and criticism. One may be loyal without being obsequious. One may be obedient without being a slave. It is as dangerous for obedience as for authority to be blind. For both there is no organ of vision save an open eye, no organ of truth save a reverently open mind.

'There have always been,' wrote W. E. Gladstone in his *Vaticanism* (London, 1875), 'and there still are, no small proportion of our race, and those by no means in all respects the worst, who are sorely open to the temptation, especially in times of religious disturbance, to discharge their spiritual responsibilities by *power of attorney*. As advertising Houses find Custom in proportion, not so much to the solidity of their resources as to the magniloquence of their promises and assurances, so theological boldness in the extension of such claims is sure to pay, by widening certain circles of devoted adherents, however it may repel the mass of mankind. There are two special encouragements to this enterprise at the present day: one of them the perhaps unconscious but manifest leaning of some, outside the Roman precinct, to undue exaltation of Church power; the other the reaction, which is and must be brought about in favour of superstition, by the levity of the destructive speculations so widely current, and the notable hardihood of the anti-Christian writing of the day (p. 46). . . . There are those who think that the craving after an infallibility which is to speak from human lips, in chapter and verse, upon each question as it arises, is not a sign of the strength and healthiness of faith, but of the diseased avidity of its weakness. Let it, however, be granted for the sake of argument that it is a comfort to the infirmity of human nature thus to attain promptly to clear and intelligible solutions of its doubts, instead of waiting on the Divine pleasure, as those who watch for the morning, to receive the supplies required by its intellectual and its moral trials. A recommendation of this kind, however little it may endure the scrutiny of philosophical reflection, may probably have a great power over the imagination and the affections of mankind (p. 106).

One thing is clear: Between the solid ground, the *terra firma* of Infallibility, and the quaking, fluctuating mind of the individual, which seeks to find repose upon it, there is an interval over which he cannot cross. Decrees *ex cathedra* are infallible; but determinations what decrees are *ex cathedra* are fallible; so that the private person, after he has with all docility handed over his mind and its freedom to the *Schola Theologorum*, can never certainly know, never know with "divine faith," when he is on the rock of infallibility, when on the shifting quicksands of a merely human persuasion' (p. 108).

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Cologne, 1617, and many other edd.; C. Mirbt, art. 'Vatikanisches Konzil,' in *PRE*[3] xx. 445 (very full bibliography); C. A. Briggs, *Theological Symbolics*, Edinburgh, 1914; A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Eng. tr.[3], London, 1894–99; systems of Christian doctrine of various representative writers.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS.

INFANCY.—The period of individual life immediately following birth. In law, human infancy extends to the attainment of one's 'majority,' usually the age of twenty-one years. In other than legal usage the term signifies, according to convenience, any number of years from one to seven. The present article concerns a period of about five years during which, in an unusually complete sense, the family is the child's educator.[1]

1. **The relation of infancy to moral evolution.**—John Fiske has shown[2] that the extreme unripeness of the human child at birth and the extreme length of his immaturity are crucial points for intellectual and moral evolution. (*a*) Life begins with fewer 'sets,' and fewer of them are formed early, than is the case with other species of animals. Here is the opportunity for accumulating experience in an individual way—for originality, individuality, and progress. Applying this to morals, we may say that the prolongation of infancy in the human species makes character possible. (*b*) The peculiar and prolonged helplessness of the human child has been the chief factor in producing, first, maternal affection, and then the stable monogamic family. It is chiefly from the family, in turn, that regard for others has radiated into the wider social groups. Human infancy, then, is a hinge on which both the moral growth of the individual and the moral evolution of the race have turned.

2. **The physical basis of the beginnings of character.**—At two points the body of the infant has the closest relation to his start in the moral life. (*a*) In the absence of the habits and inhibitions of later life, incidental physical conditions, whether good or ill, have a peculiarly pervasive effect. Wrong feeding, *e.g.*, is a potent cause of depressed states, such as peevishness. Inadequate care, or overstimulation, produces nervousness. The significance of nervous poise and of physical comfort or their opposites reaches far beyond the date of their occurrence, for all of them tend under the law of habit to become fixed as disposition. (*b*) The acquisition of muscular co-ordinations constitutes the earliest will-formation, which includes self-control and self-direction. Hence each of the following conditions is unfavourable to moral growth: swaddling the body so as to prevent free movement of any part; lack of objects to handle (though toys can easily be too numerous or too complicated); repression of free movement and experimentation; failure of the parents to play with the infant.

3. **The moral endowment of infants.**—The individual begins life neither moral nor immoral, but pre-moral. Yet is there not a moral nature or hereditary endowment that favours the attainment of a positive moral character? In view of the moral evolution of the race, it cannot be that the endowment of individuals is, on the whole, either unfavourable or neutral. Two questions, however, remain.

(*a*) Specifically where, among the instincts and other unlearned tendencies, do we find the infant's *moral nature*? The answer, in general, is that a complex of unlearned tendencies towards truly voluntary social reactions is the moral nature. One of these tendencies, the sexual instinct, does not appear in infancy. But even in infancy we can discern gregariousness, imitation, sympathy, and rudiments of the parental instinct in attitudes toward babies, pet animals, and even toys. These do not of themselves constitute a genuinely moral endowment, however; there must be provision, also, for the growth of an individual will that may erect into deliberative, discriminative, and generalized ideals the otherwise fitfully exercised social motive. Without individual wills there is no true society. We include, therefore, in the infant's moral endowment his enjoyment in being a cause, his curiosity, his instinct for collecting and hoarding, and certain instinctive self-assertions, as jealousy, and what Thorndike calls 'mastery and submission' and 'approving and scornful behaviour.'[1] Granted this whole complex of original tendencies, together with a human environment in which they may find expression, the individual tends to become deliberately as well as instinctively social. That is, he has a moral nature.

(*b*) But a moral nature grows into *moral character* only under some sort of stimulus. What, then, is the special condition or stimulus under which an otherwise fitful social motivation becomes the principle of a socialized will? The answer is that character is formed through conflict within the very tendencies that have just been described as constituting the moral nature. Moral growth does not pursue a straight line such as might represent a single instinct, but a zigzag from predominant self-regard to predominant other-regard and back again. This inherent conflict of impulses is intensified by the pains and pleasures incident to the child's membership in a regulated group. Thus arises conscience. In its earlier forms, which clearly appear in infants who live in well-regulated families, conscience is simply the coincident experience of egoistic and social impulses which have not yet found their unity. Yet the resolution of the conflict may begin very early. Even in infancy, wherever wise nurture prevails, we behold genuine efforts at self-control in the social interest, and genuine victories over mere egoistic desire. That such victories bring a heightened sense of individual self-realization is an added evidence that a genuine moral nature is growing into moral character.

The common impression that the conduct of every infant is purely egoistic arises from the relative immediacy of his objects, *i.e.* his lack of consideration. Such impulsive action on the part of an adult would, indeed, connote selfishness, since adult society depends upon the pursuit of remote ends; but the ends of infant conduct are often social in the sense of pleasure in the pleasure of others, and even, as we have just seen, in the sense of preferring the social good even when it conflicts with egoistic desire.

4. **The infant's life in the family.**—Not only has human infancy produced the human family; but this is the only social organization that is inherently adapted to the infant's moral needs. The family develops individuality; the members cannot be dealt with as classes or impersonally. Yet the intimacy that prevails among its members, based partly upon natural affection, partly upon the smallness of the group and the physical conditions of home life, is the most powerful socializing influence in the world. Institutional care of children, as in orphan asylums, can provide the

[1] The art. GROWTH (Moral and Religious) contains a systematic description of the stages of growth, infancy included. See also CHILDHOOD.

[2] *The Meaning of Infancy*, *passim*.

[1] E. L. Thorndike, *Education*, New York, 1912, ch. v., also *The Original Nature of Man*, do 1913, ch. vii.

conditions of physical health, but not the individualizing and socializing influences that are essential to normal moral growth. It is now an axiom among social workers that a child who is deprived of his natural family connexion should be placed, as promptly as possible, in another family, not in an institution.

Even the intellectual growth of the infant is best fostered by the same individualizing intimacy. The reason is that genuine intimacy between parent and child becomes reciprocal—the parent fondles and plays with his child, but also grants him access to mature thoughts, attitudes, and activities. The soundest educational practice provides a rich environment for the child, never fearing that he will partake too freely or extend his interests unduly as long as fellowship with mature mind is part of the situation. To answer a child's questions in a serious way, to create situations in which his curiosity will lead him to ask important questions, to cultivate his imagination, and to enjoy with him mutual intellectual discovery—this is the proper method of promoting intellectual progress in infancy. Children who have an early intellectual development without forcing or abnormality are generally those who are admitted to such intellectual intimacy with their parents.

These considerations, to say nothing of freedom as included in the individual's moral destiny, make against the popular belief that the first virtue to be inculcated in infants is absolute obedience. What parent, moreover, is wise enough to prescribe rules that deserve such obedience? The first moral need of an infant is to act consciously as a member of the family group. This conscious mutuality involves law and obedience, but it gives content to the moral will as 'absolute' obedience does not, and it begins at once the process of acquiring freedom.

5. **The infant and religion.**—No one at the present day looks for innate ideas of God, but there is a common notion that infantile thinking is spontaneously animistic. If the term 'Animism' is used in Tylor's sense of belief in spirits, then Animism is not spontaneous in the infant, for he acquires the notion of spirits just as he acquires other concepts. On the other hand, the abstractions that characterize adult thought have not yet been made; the infant thinks in wholes, and these wholes are of the sense order. Yet emotional thinking still prevails with him, and this gives an anthropomorphic tinge to his objects. The reason is simply that the emotionality of a whole mental situation still inheres in particular objects as they appear in it; *i.e.*, a strictly objective point of view, which implies abstraction of the object experienced from the experience itself, has not yet been attained. The infant's mind moves freely within stories that attribute language and motives to any object of his experience. As early as the age of four there is delight in dramatic 'make-believe,' which, helping the infant to make himself and other persons definitely individual, helps also to differentiate persons from things. At this age, and even younger, one easily believes in God; but the nature of this belief appears in the acceptance of fairy stories, and stories of the 'black man,' so unwisely used by nurses to secure obedience.

This god-belief is not yet distinctly monotheistic, for neither the thought-problem nor the moral problem underlying monotheism has yet arisen. The infant's belief may be polytheistic, or simply vague. (Concerning its relation to the child's scientific and religious growth respectively, see CHILDHOOD, § 4.) Further, the idea does not necessarily have any specifically religious value. The writer has a drawing, made without suggestion or guidance, by a child of four years and eight months, in which a toy railway train, a house, a Christmas tree, Santa Claus, and God all figure, evidently on terms of approximate equality. This child's interests have not been much differentiated; the idea of God is on substantially the same plane as that of Santa Claus. Another child of about the same age invented during the Christmas season a play in which he himself impersonated God, and brought in the star of Bethlehem, a crude device made of sticks that he had fastened together. The infant's possession of an idea of God, then, is not of itself an evidence of religion.

Does the infant mind show traces of a religious instinct? The fact that religion is not altogether a deliberate device or a product of logical thinking has led to the assertion that it is instinctive. This use of the term 'instinct' is too broad and indefinite. In strictness an instinct implies a definite motor response in a type of situation that is objectively definable. The readiness of infants to believe in God and to perform religious acts requires no special instinct as its cause. These ideas and acts originate in the same way as those that concern a human relative as yet unseen, or those that concern Santa Claus. The ideas are acquired on authority; they are made real through imagination, and the acts are imitative.

The springs of real religion are present, however, in what we have just described as the moral nature. As the Christian religion, broadly taken, is an idealized expansion of family relationships, Christians should regard infants as religious to the extent that they idealize parenthood in the direction of a universal Divine Fatherhood, and childish goodwill in the direction of universal brotherhood. Under instruction and example, infants do, in fact, make idealizations of this kind that become potent in conduct. To focalize one's social ideals in the thought of a Heavenly Father; to talk to this Father in prayer; to submit one's impulses to this superior will—this is religion, and it is easily produced in infants under Christian nurture.

LITERATURE.—John Fiske's essay on 'Infancy,' originally published in his *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, London, 1874, pt. ii. chs. xvi., xxi., xxii., is now available in briefer form, together with 'The Part played by Infancy in the Evolution of Man,' in a booklet bearing the title, *The Meaning of Infancy*, Boston, 1909. The best brief analysis of unlearned tendencies is ch. v. of E. L. Thorndike's *Education*, New York, 1912. For a full, critical discussion of this subject see his *The Original Nature of Man*, do. 1913. The line of the child's social growth is traced most fully in E. A. Kirkpatrick, *The Individual in the Making*, Boston, 1911. Help in getting the small child's point of view will be found in Patterson du Bois, *Fireside Child-Study*, New York, 1903, and *Beckonings from Little Hands*, do. 1900. E. P. St. John, *Child Nature and Child Nurture*, Boston, 1911, is a series of simple studies for parents with respect to the moral and religious nurture of children. It contains useful reading lists. On child religion see, further, CHILDHOOD, § 4, and Literature appended. See also G. Compayré, *L'Évolution intellectuelle et morale de l'enfant*[2], Paris, 1896; J. Sully, *Studies of Childhood*, new ed., London, 1896; A. F. Chamberlain, *The Child*, do. 1900; W. E. Urwick, *The Child's Mind*[2], do. 1910; W. B. Drummond, *An Introduction to Child-Study*[4], do. 1912; and art. FAMILY (Biblical and Christian).

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INFANT BAPTISM.—See BAPTISM.

INFERENCE.—All attempts at logical science assume that inference is a source, distinctive, effective, and authoritative, of knowledge. It is in view of these three characteristics that schemes are framed for the self-conscious revision of it, and that mutual criticism goes on between different logical systems.

1. **Distinctiveness of inference.** — Inferential knowledge is distinctive because of its dependence on other knowledge the security of which is differently founded and cannot be helped or hindered in the same way by revision. At the first beginning of logical science, the Hindu Gotama distinguished inference from the deliverances of sense-perception, the recognition of likeness between things, and doc

trine intrinsically worthy of belief or commended to us by the good and wise (see artt. LOGIC, NYĀYA). On these inference is dependent. From its obvious dependence, Aristotle, in his theory of science, argued to the independence of other knowledge, though he could not for science, as he did for mere debate, appeal to the opinion of the good and wise; and he left in some obscurity the share in the complete function of intelligence which should be assigned to sense-perception and intellectual intuition respectively—these being the independent faculties which he mentions. Modern epistemology has raised the latter question more definitely. Kant's logical teaching seems to accept as independent the whole interplay of the two faculties, sensibility and understanding, which are required by his epistemology, until it sunders into the distinct moments of reason and consequent, and then it becomes inference (*Introduction to Logic*, tr. Abbott, London, 1885, § vii.). Modern psychology has encouraged a more definite list, such as that given by Mill: perception, conception, memory, belief—the forms of 'immediate consciousness' by reference to which inference may be viewed as dependent. Dependence may also be treated as a mere matter of degree. Even the 'irreducible datum' contained in perception exists only through qualifications imposed by judgment, and judgment itself is nascent or implicit inference, while inference owes its stability to its place in total knowledge; so that the paradox which Aristotle wished to avoid by his theory of independent sources of knowledge is accepted as a truth, and the system of our inferences is one that returns into itself like a circle (B. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, London, 1895, § ii., and *Logic*, Oxford, 1888, ii. 7). But this still allows a dependence that is relative.

2. Effectiveness of inference.—Inference becomes worthy of its special theory through its effectiveness in enriching our endowment with truth. Mill acknowledges it only when we 'believe a fact or statement by reason of some other fact or statement' (*Logic*[6], 1872, ii. 1. 1). Kant defines it as 'that function of thinking by which one judgment is derived from another' (*Logic*, § 41). Hamilton, consistently with the stress he lays on the concept as an instrument of thought, requires merely a new recognition of the relation of whole and part between one concept and another. While Hamilton's requirement, as Mill urges (*Exam. of Hamilton's Philosophy*, London, 1872, ch. 19), is too slight, in view of the countless riches of truth open to us beyond immediate consciousness, Mill's own demand for belief in new facts is too stringent. It sterilizes both immediate inference and the syllogism taken apart from an inductive foundation, and perhaps even scientific induction taken apart from deductive applications in detail. And it might well excuse the logical paralysis affected by Meno in Plato's dialogue (*Meno*, 80 D) when he was invited to proceed to knowledge out of conscious ignorance: 'How will you know, when you light on a result, that this is what you did not know?' Aristotle, with this affectation in mind, required merely that the 'manner of knowing' should be new: 'We possess knowledge after a certain fashion before induction or the assumption of a syllogism, but in another manner not' (*Anal. Post.* i. 1). And a recent writer remarks: 'Much of inference consists in demonstrating the *connection* of matters that as facts are pretty familiar' (Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 138).

3. Authoritativeness of inference.—The despair of Meno in regard to novelty was a sequel to the demand of Socrates for cogency; and the union of these two requirements constitutes the crisis in pursuing any systematic logical theory. Mill's insistence on new 'facts' hampers him throughout a long labour to show a satisfying authority. He unites the two requirements, as the primitive logic of Gotama did, in the 'recognition of signs.' And he perverts incidentally the scholastic axiom of intensive reasoning to suit this conception and to mean that whatever possesses any significant attribute possesses the significate of which it is a sign. But that one thing can be a sign of another is not a truth that can be left in this primitive crudity; and Mill only slightly softens the crudity when he appeals to empirical or causal laws. These do, indeed, confer signification on facts, but, being themselves inferences from facts, they appear to have no more title to do so than facts have to assume it for themselves. Signification remains a mere shadow from the unseen. In contrast with Mill, Hamilton's choice of the minimum in his requirement for novelty allows inference to carry with it the full authority of the conceptual faculty, but at the expense of effectiveness. With Kant it has the authority of a law of the understanding imposing the relationship of reason and consequent, while other logicians, with doubtful success, attempt some formula which pledges reality more definitely than a reference to understanding can do.

'The logical forms and the laws of their application are the conditions through the fulfilment of which thought satisfies its own requirements, and brings the connection of its ideas with one another into that form, which for it, for thought itself, is truth' (H. Lotze, *Logic*, Oxford, 1884, § 334).

And it is sufficient for the reassurance of philosophic doubt that the Kantian principle of rational consequence 'is but the side, normally turned towards empirical thinking, of the fact that there is in the thought-content itself such an immanent inter-connexion that if something is true then something else is true and something else not true' (W. Windelband, in *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. i. p. 25; see also Losskij, *ib.* p. 240 ff.).

4. Immediate inference.—If the same fact, understood through the same concepts, nevertheless comes to be known in a new way without a new reference to independent sources, there is immediate inference as distinguished from mediate. In speech or in writing, the transition from one judgment to another appears as a change in the order of ideas, 'A is B,' 'B is A'; or in the use of one rather than the other of a pair of contradictory ideas, 'A is B,' 'A is not other than B'; or in what may be described as the logical self-consciousness of judgment, 'A is B,' 'It is false that A is not B.' To Mill such 'ways of knowing' are merely schemes for the use of whatever equivalent expressions may be available for the same fact. To Kant they suggest distinct plans of synthesis in the interplay between sensibility and understanding, of which one may be a reason for the other; and he names them syllogisms of the understanding. And other logicians recognize an internal development of the concepts employed in a judgment, which alters the judgment in 'type,' but not in 'substance.' There may thus be a change from a historical import to a scientific, or *vice versa*: 'Some sovereigns are tyrannical, A tyrant may have sovereign power.' Or a contradictory idea may arise as a species complementary within an implicit genus: 'Lovers are prone to jealousy, Lovers are not indifferent to each other's friendships'; though the formula for this, 'A is B, A is not other than B,' is considered meaningless by Kant.

5. Mediate inference.—Where the new way of knowing is through a concept new in substance and boundaries, 'X is P,' 'S is P,' the authoritativeness is due to some mediating idea, and the inference is entitled 'mediate.'

A scheme of expressions with letters as symbols for concepts has been inherited by current Logic from Aristotle, to which nearly all examples of mediate inference can by ingenuity be made to conform. As a personal discipline in making clear the mediating idea that is employed in any example, this scheme has been almost universally commended; but it fails to make clear the ground and hazard of the mediation. And its rules can justify only the classifications or the intensive subordinations of concepts which accompany inferential belief. That 'All men are mortal, and the king is a man and therefore mortal,' reveals 'the human' as mediating idea, and arranges king, man, and mortal in a classificatory or conceptual hierarchy. That 'Alexander, Muhammad, and the other persons of history have died, and these are men, and therefore man is mortal,' reveals the list of historical persons as mediating idea, correlates the list with 'man' as a class concept, and subordinates this to 'mortal.' Nature, however, as Mill contends, has not arranged all the objects of the universe into definite *a priori* classes (*Logic*, people's ed., London, 1884, ii. 2, § 2), and we might add that neither does the universe present itself as a museum of permanently assorted attributes. And it is only inferential predication already accomplished that enables us to systematize our concepts either in extension or in intension, or to correlate a list with a concept.

6. Interpretative deduction.—A more material value may be given to such schemes, as representing a plan of co-operation between different minds in building up a common inferential system. The insight transforming incident into generalization or law, 'Man is mortal,' may be accomplished by one mind; and concrete expectation may be framed accordingly, 'The king is mortal,' by another. The rules of the deductive syllogism mark a dividing line between originative and interpretative thought in their co-operative function, whether the personality requiring the distinction be that of teacher and disciple, audience and orator, legislator and magistrate, earlier and later self, or otherwise. Mill considered that deductive interpretation does not amount to inference unless there is a reference back to the original datum for the authoritative rule itself (*Logic*, ii. 3, § 4). If, however, the formula of authority be not merely understood as a meaning, but also adopted by the interpreter as a conditioned rule for his own beliefs, and then developed into a specific belief according to the rule, there really arises in the passage from rule to instance a 'new way of knowing.' The traditional maxim for the deductive syllogism—whatever is predicated concerning a class distributed may be predicated in like manner concerning anything contained therein—does not express this. But Kant's maxim does: Whatever fulfils the condition of a rule falls under the rule itself (*Logic*, § 57). And it is relatively to such inference that Gotama's inclusion of extrinsic authority, as an independent source of knowledge, along with perception and intuition may be still approved.

7. Demonstrative deduction.—Independently of authority as a source, the deductive intersubordination of concepts also represents inference when the 'conditions' of a rule are fixed and their fulfilment exemplified, intuitively, that is to say, when the occasion of inference is what has been known in widely separated epochs of philosophy under such phrases as 'intrinsic worth of a doctrine' (Gotama), primary scientific principle (Aristotle), *a priori* synthesis (Kant). Mill as a empiricist in epistemology would reduce this kind of inference to the same level as the interpretative—a treatment which is the less plausible in logic because the class extensions so natural and useful in the interpretation of experiential knowledge are here a superfluous gloss on the demonstration. It is as easy to see that a triangle ABC, constructed in Euclid's first proposition, is equilateral, without referring to anything outside that figure, as with the aid of generalizations.

Where intuition fails us, and, according to empiricists, in all knowledge, the ultimate occasion of inference that is not merely interpretative must be the coincidences and sequences of experience, and the 'new way of knowing' converts special features of these into a 'conditioned rule' for our expectations. The universality of the rule is not the 'logical' or *a priori* universality conferred by intuition (Kant, *Logic*, § 81), but analogous to it—a reaching towards 'the thought by which all things through all are guided' in the flux of Heraclitus. Inference here is 'belief' in contrast with trict knowledge (cf. art. BELIEF [Logical]); and Kant entitles it 'syllogism of reflective judgment.'

8. Enumerative induction.—Where many experiences repeat the connexion of some attribute with the instances of a given concept, we infer the concept as the condition for a rule as to predicating the attribute. The concept may be simple, Yellow is the brightest colour'; or it may be composite, 'Metals conduct electricity.'

'From perception memory results, and from repeated recollections of the same phenomenon comes experience; from experience, or from the entire universal which is retained in the soul . . . comes the elementary principle of art and science' (Arist. *Anal. Post.* ii. 19).

Recurrence has no meaning except when environments or specific determinations change, but it is the recurrence, and not the change, that appeals to our inferential activity. The maxim followed is: Many things do not agree in one characteristic without a reason (Kant, *Logic*, § 84). The numbering of recurrences is, for progressive intelligence, the primitive mode of inference; and Mill considers that out of it scientific analysis grows as an effort to sustain or correct a narrower enumerative induction by a wider (*Logic*, iii. 3, § 2). And, converting this psychological precedence into a logical one, he declares that the distinctive maxim of scientific analysis, the Law of Causation, can 'have no better foundation' than our wider faith in uniformity as mere recurrence (iii. 21, § 2). But, while faith in recurrence is an indispensable factor in our expectations if these are to meet the requirements of concrete life, its authority is less secure than that of inference from change of environing circumstances or in specific determinations. Bacon describes it as 'puerile, precarious, and exposed to danger from contradictory instances.' Aristotle's doctrine that 'the universal becomes evident out of a plurality of particulars' must be supplemented by Bacon's, that the evidence depends on 'rejections and due exclusions' (*Nov. Org.* i. 105). Current logic prefers to justify enumerative induction as a nascent causal analysis, and so reverses the order of precedence assigned by Mill.

9. Eliminative induction.—Where the instances of a concept differ in their environing circumstances or in their specific determinations, variations that are concurrent with each other may become condition and rule. Friction between flint and steel is an incident that concurs with heat; minute grooving and iridescent colour are specific determinations of surface that concur in mother-of-pearl. Mill's two types of elimination, entitled 'Method of Agreement' and 'Method of Difference,' are ways of isolating and defining such concurrences. With Agreement, the relation becomes isolated by repeating itself throughout several instances while any passing concurrence of its terms with other circumstances or determinations is inconstant. The condition for iri-

descent colouring of a surface cannot be the peculiar chemical composition of mother-of-pearl, for the colouring appears also on grooved wax or metal; nor can it be molecular consistence, nor weight. With Difference, on the other hand, an instance or species of the concept is found where the concurrence is isolated even as a passing one. Only friction and heat distinguish the moment of use from the moment of rest, in flint and steel.

Because eliminative induction infers a rule of change or variation, that is to say, a causal or determinative relationship rather than a class attribute, its influence on our concrete life is distinguishable from that of enumerative induction. The latter enables us to select from among means provided by Nature the best for our end—*e.g.*, the camel for desert transport. The former subserves the invention of new mechanisms for an end—*e.g.*, the conversion of electric strain into light, heat, or movement. But neither of the two ventures of our reason can thus pass freely into practical wisdom without the co-operation of a further venture which constitutes a distinct species of inference—the analogical.

10. **Analogy.**—In connexion with environments or specific determinations that remain unchanged or are repeated, the partial exemplification of a concept is the condition for a rule that completes it. Mars is habitable, because it is so like our habitable earth. Such a venture of belief fulfils the same function in practical wisdom as the *a priori* construction of examples fulfils in demonstrative science. And it is in view of this function that Aristotle submerges it in a double syllogism which he entitles 'Example.' War between Athens and Thebes would be calamitous, as being a border war, like that between Thebes and Phocis. Gotama classes the 'recognition of likeness,' not as an inference, but as an independent source, like perception, that may contribute to inference. Modern Logic allows it as a kind of inference, or at least as an independent source of inductive hypothesis, co-ordinate with enumerative induction (C. Sigwart, *Logic*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, § 83).

Within a sphere of belief where environments and specific determinations are sustained by purpose or by the power of organic life—*e.g.*, when we follow judicial precedents or recognize physiological functions—we may justify analogy by a maxim corresponding to Kant's maxim for induction: since the many characteristics do not unite in one thing without a reason (cf. Kant, *Logic*, § 83). But even where the finality which unifies a collocation is not definable in terms of purpose or of life, our conceptual faculty still demands, in the spirit of the ancient realism, that destiny shall pre-ordain the repeated exemplification of limited conceptions, and that the impending shall not be infinite in surprise (see art. CONCEPT; and cf. J. Venn, *Empirical Logic*[2], 1907, ch. 4). It is not sufficient that the world of facts follows, as Mill describes it, 'from laws of causation together with a primeval collocation of forces that is inexplicable' (*Logic*, iii. 5, § 9).

'It is necessary to suppose that not merely do general laws hold good in the world, while the arrangement of facts on account of which a definite form of actuality flows from the laws is . . . given over to chance, uncontrolled by any principle; but rather that in the arrangement of the aforesaid facts also, a principle (that is to say, an 'Idea') is effective, and that this principle fixes beforehand . . . the whole system of the future phenomena which are to be actualized' (Lotze, *Outlines of Logic*, Eng. tr., Boston, 1887, § 62).


LITERATURE.—This is co-extensive with systems of Logic. Among recent writers, in addition to those quoted above, may be mentioned as specially important on the nature of inference: T. H. Green, *Lectures on Logic*, London, 1886 (*Works*, ii.); F. H. Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, do. 1883; L. T. Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, do. 1896; J. Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, do. 1909; *EBr*[11], art. 'Logic'; and the several contributors to the *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, vol. i., Eng. tr., London, 1913. Among recent German writers, W. Schuppe, H. Lotze, W. Wundt, and C. Sigwart are most frequently referred to. There are numerous monographs and essays on species of inference specially connected with philosophy or with particular sciences.

J. BROUGH.

INFINITY.—The problem of infinity is one of considerable complication and difficulty; and all that it is possible to do in such an article as this is to give some account of the place of the conception in the development of human thought, to indicate some of its chief difficulties, and to suggest methods by which they may be met.

1. **The meaning of the term.**—There are two senses in which the term tends to be used, and it is very important to distinguish them. It may mean simply that which is *endless*, or it may mean that which is *complete* or *perfect*. One of the simplest illustrations of infinity in the former sense is to be found in the series of cardinal numbers. When we arrange the numbers in order—0, 1, 2, 3 . . .—it is evident that no point can ever be reached at which the series can be regarded as complete. However large the number may be that we have reached at any point, it is always possible to add one more. Hence this series is infinite, in the sense that it never reaches an end. On the other hand, the circumference of a circle may be said to be infinite, in the sense that it is complete. It seems clear that these two senses of the term are not identical, and are even in some respects opposed to one another. Yet they are apt to be confounded.

A simple mathematical instance may serve to bring out the reason for this. The series 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{7}{8}$ . . . is infinite in the former of the two senses. Each member of the series is of the form $\frac{2^n-1}{n}$, and the value of n is doubled at each successive step. Here, again, however large n may be made, it is always possible to double it. But, in this case, when n is made very large, the value of $\frac{2^n-1}{n}$ is very little different from that of $\frac{2^n}{n}$. Hence it may be said that 2 is the ultimate value to which the series is approximating. This is sometimes expressed in the form that, when n becomes infinite, the value is 2. Here the series is represented as becoming completed when it reaches infinity. The endless series is thus regarded as reaching an end, in which it is completed. A more concrete illustration of this is found in one of the puzzles that were put forward by Zeno with regard to motion—



If a body moves from the point A to the point B, it is evident that it must first traverse half the distance, AC, and that in order to do this it must first traverse the half of that, AD; and so on, indefinitely. Hence it may be said that, in the motion from A to B, an infinite series is completed. In such instances the two notions of endlessness and completion, which appear to be opposed to one another, are somehow brought together.

Another illustration, from the sphere of religion, may now be given. God has sometimes been represented as infinite, in the sense of having no assignable end as regards duration of existence in time or possibility of action. He has been said to be Eternal and Omnipotent. These attributes may be interpreted as meaning simply endlessness with respect to two characteristics. They may be taken to imply that, however far we may go back in His history, there is something prior to the point that we have reached; and, however far we might go forward, there would be something to come after; and, again, that, however great may be the action that is performed by Him, there is something greater that He might do. Here we have simply the conception of endlessness. But God has also been represented as infinitely wise and infinitely good; and it is clear, on the face of it, that these are qualitative conceptions. They do not mean endlessly wise and good, but completely or perfectly wise and good. We can hardly suppose, in these cases, that what is meant is that, however wise or good God may be at any particular point, He has always the possibility of being still wiser or better. The meaning would seem to be rather that at every point His wisdom and goodness are complete or perfect. But, as perfection with regard to duration and action tends to be thought of as implying endlessness, perfection with regard to wisdom and goodness is apt to be vaguely conceived in a similar way.

How far the term 'infinite' is rightly applied to any form of perfection is a question for further consideration. In the meantime it may suffice to note that the conception of endlessness appears to be applicable only to things that consist of numerable parts. If there are any things that do not

consist of numerable parts, they cannot be said to be either finite or infinite, in the purely quantitative sense of the word. This appears to be true of goodness, wisdom, beauty, colour; and, in general, of all things that are essentially qualitative rather than quantitative. But it is common to apply the term 'infinite' to such things when they have a high degree of perfection—as in such phrases as 'infinite penetration,' 'infinitely pure,' and the like. As the term means primarily 'endless,' it may be best to use it only in this sense; but, as the two meanings are not always easy to disentangle, the more qualitative sense of the term must also be taken into account.

2. History of the conception.—At a very early period in Greek speculation we find traces of the conception that the universe is to be regarded as formed from a material that is in some sense boundless. Anaximander, in particular, took this as his starting-point, and thought of the different forms of existence as having been 'separated out' from a vague and chaotic mass to which no definite bounds could be assigned. What we have here is perhaps rather the conception of the indefinite than that of the infinite; but the transition is easy from the one to the other, and we seem to see it being made most clearly in the development of the Pythagorean school. It would appear that the fundamental view of the early Pythagoreans was that a boundless material, described as τὸ ἄπειρον, received definite form through the imposition of limits. This may be regarded as the earliest form of the doctrine that 'determination is negation.' Against this may be set the Eleatic doctrine, which involves the denial of negativity. According to the view of Parmenides, reality is to be thought of as always definite, and not boundless. It is compared to a well-rounded sphere. Here we may perhaps recognize the first statement of the conception of a perfect whole, as opposed to that of a chaotic mass. Melissus, however, appears to have urged that this perfect whole should be conceived as infinitely extended both in time and in space, thus bringing together the two conceptions of the complete and the endless. But it was apparently Zeno who first realized the difficulties involved in the conception of the infinite. Reference has already been made to the way in which he brought out the difficulty involved in the recognition that the space through which a body moves may be regarded as capable of indefinite subdivision. His familiar paradoxes—that 'the flying arrow rests,' and that 'Achilles could never overtake a tortoise'—were evidently intended to emphasize the same difficulty. The service which Zeno rendered to exact thought by the statement of such difficulties can hardly be exaggerated. The Atomists, however, whose views were developed from reflexion on the points brought out by the Eleatics, do not seem to have taken much account of the problems of Zeno when they postulated an infinite space and, apparently, an infinite number of atoms moving in the void, though, no doubt, they gained something by avoiding the conception of the infinitely little. In the later developments of Greek thought, especially under the influence of Socrates and his school, the conception of endlessness becomes relatively unimportant; and its place may be said to be taken by the thought of perfection. This change is perhaps partly due to Parmenides, but appears to be more directly traceable to the speculations of Anaxagoras. The view that Mind is to be taken as the principle of order was readily interpreted as implying that determination is not merely negation or limitation, but is due rather to the effort after perfection. The 'Form of Good' thus comes to be the central conception, as it is especially with Plato; and the material tends to be thought of only as something by which the working out of the Good is in some way limited. This may almost be said to involve the inversion of Pythagoreanism—an inversion which comes out most definitely in the philosophy of Aristotle. The Form has now become the positive aspect, and the Matter is the negative by which it is limited; and that which is thus limited is no longer the boundless, but the perfect.

This brief sketch must suffice as an account of the way in which the conceptions of endlessness and perfection first came into prominence in European speculation. The most definite attempt to combine the two conceptions is found in the doctrines of the Cartesian school. The most fundamental doctrine of the Cartesians is that the absolutely perfect must be thought of as existing. The grounds on which this is maintained cannot be considered here. It is enough to say that the absolutely perfect is regarded as the standard by reference to which all other things are determined. But this standard tends to be thought of as boundless. Space is conceived as an infinite whole, and all other realities are thought of on the analogy of space. This is most definitely the case in the philosophy of Spinoza, in which the fundamental conceptions of the Cartesians are most logically developed. Thus the perfect comes to be identified with the boundless, and everything determinate is regarded as involving negation. Leibniz corrected this tendency by treating space as a confused mode of thought, and by definitely reintroducing the Platonic conception of the Good. On the other hand, he sought to give a positive significance to the conception of the infinitely little, and thus revived those problems which had, on the whole, lain in abeyance since the time of Zeno.


The difficulties involved in the conceptions of the infinitely great and the infinitely little were strikingly set forth by Kant in his first two antinomies. The main point there urged is that the conceptions of infinite extent and infinite division involve the recognition of a completed endlessness, which is self-contradictory. Reflexion on this led Hegel[1] to regard the simply endless (*schlecht unendlich*)[2] as an incorrect conception to take as the opposite of the finite. The positively infinite, according to him, means that which is complete; but he urged further that the complete should not be simply opposed to the incomplete, but should rather be regarded as including it. The perfect whole necessarily includes parts which, regarded in abstraction from the whole, are imperfect. It is in this way that his conception of perfection differs from those of Plato and Leibniz. Thus conceived, however, the perfect is not, it would seem, to be regarded as boundless.

More recently the conception of infinity has been largely dealt with from the more purely mathematical side. It is impossible here to enter into any full consideration of the work that has been done in this direction. The most important result would seem to lie in bringing out the fact that the conception of infinity, as employed in mathematics, is not that of simple endlessness, but rather that of a definite kind of endlessness, due to the formal working out of some system of relations. The infinite thus comes to be sharply distinguished from the indefinite. Every infinity that has mathematical significance is a definite infinity; and there

[1] Hegel's distinction was partly anticipated by Spinoza and, more definitely, by Leibniz.

[2] Sometimes, not quite happily, translated 'bad infinite.' *Schlecht*, as Hutchison Stirling pointed out (*Secret of Hegel*, new ed., Edinburgh, 1898, p. 553), has here its original meaning of 'simply'—as it still has in *schlechthin*. Stirling translates it 'downright.' But Hegel seems to have been punning. He intended the term to convey the implication of 'bad' or 'vicious' as well. He calls it also 'negative.'

are as many different infinities as there are systems of relations that can be worked out without limit.



A simple case of this is found in the conception of a part that is exactly similar to the whole of which it is a part. Thus, if the small square B is exactly similar to the large square A, its similarity implies that it also will have a part C which is exactly similar to itself and to A. C also must have a similar part, and so on without end. The endlessness arises here from the constant repetition of the same relation of similarity; and the constant repetition is necessitated by the statement of the first relation. This particular case has a special interest from the way in which it has been applied by Royce to the relation between the universe and its parts.

3. Critical summary.—We may now consider more definitely the exact significance which the conception of infinity has for us at the present time. In doing so, we may set aside the conception of perfection and also the conception of simple endlessness, and concentrate our attention on the definite conception of an endlessness that is involved in the working out of a system of relations.

It seems clear that certain systems of relations do lead us into an infinite series. The instance already referred to is evidently such a case, and it seems to have a large range of possible applications —*e.g.*, to the parts into which the path of a moving body may be subdivided, and the like. It is important, therefore, that we should consider the exact significance of this conception.

There are three main ways in which it may be regarded. It may be contended (1) that such mathematical determinations are essentially subjective, and need not be supposed to have any objective validity; (2) that they express definite characteristics of existing things; or (3) that they are hypotheses having a certain objective significance, but not necessarily having any direct application to particular existences. To discuss these views thoroughly would involve a metaphysical investigation of the meaning of reality, and of the place of mathematical determinations in it. It must suffice to say here that the first view at least appears to be erroneous. It connects with such theories as those of Berkeley and Hume and the modern pragmatists; and it falls to the ground along with the general doctrines of subjective idealism. The arguments of Frege and others have probably convinced most people that mathematical determinations cannot be regarded as purely subjective. Hence we are left to choose between the other two views. The former of them appears to err by overlooking the distinction between the possible or hypothetical and the actual or existent, or, in other words, between what is formally valid and what applies to particular concrete objects. Any hypothesis, or (in Meinong's language) 'Annahme,' is no doubt, in a certain sense, objective. It is a real meaning, and is subject to the conditions that are involved in that meaning. The thought of a centaur, for instance, is subject to the determinations that are implied in a definite union of certain characteristics of horse and man. Nevertheless, so far as we know, centaurs do not exist and never have existed; or, if a mathematical mode of expression is preferred, we may say that the number of existing centaurs is zero. Similarly, it may be asked, with reference to any other hypothetical determination, how far it can be applied to any existing things. In some cases undoubtedly a direct application can be made, whereas in other cases this is not legitimate. For instance, any number is capable of subdivision; and there are some numerable things to which such subdivision is immediately applicable. A flock of 100 sheep, for instance, can readily be divided into two halves; and each half can again be subdivided into two. But the flocks thus formed could not again be cut into two equal portions without destroying some of the sheep. Yet the conception of such a subdivision has a real meaning; and, though it is not directly applicable to the sheep, it may be applicable to some special aspect of them (*e.g.*, their price). Similarly, the conception of an endless number has a real mathematical significance; but the question remains to what particular objects, if any, that conception is directly applicable.

Some illustrations may serve to make this clear. Take the case, previously referred to, of an object that contains a part exactly similar to itself. It is clear that in this case we are led to the conception of an endless series. The meaning of this is quite definite and objective. But the question remains whether we can point to any existing object that contains a part exactly similar to itself. It has been suggested that such an object would be provided if within any country a perfectly accurate map of that country were constructed, showing every detail. For such a map, being perfectly accurate, would contain, among other things, a representation of itself; and the map of the map would, of course, contain another similar map within it, and so on without end. But this is manifestly an unreal illustration. A picture always represents something other than itself. Further, no materials could be provided by which such a detailed map could be constructed. At the same time, the conception is, no doubt, objective, in the sense that it conveys an intelligible meaning. Again, it has been said that, if it is true to hold that when I know anything I know that I know it, then it must also be true that I know that I know that I know it, and so on *ad infinitum*. This is a better illustration; for, in this case, there is no definite limit that can be set to this knowledge of knowledge. The knowledge is actual, however, only in so far as we produce it by reflexion; and, as a matter of fact, we should soon tire of this reflective process. Another illustration that has been given is that of two mirrors facing one another. Each mirror contains a reflexion of the other, and in this reflexion there is an image of itself, and so on without end. But this also is unreal. The conditions of the reflexion of light would not allow the process to go on beyond a certain point. Another ingenious application of the conception of endlessness has been given by B. Russell in his statement of the problem which he has called 'the Tristram Shandy':[1] 'Tristram Shandy, as we know, took two years to write the first two days of his life, and lamented that, at this rate, material would accumulate faster than he could deal with it, so that he could never come to an end. Now, I maintain that, if he had lived for ever, and not wearied of his task, then, even if his life had continued as eventfully as it began, no part of his biography would have remained unwritten.' This seems to be a clear case of a *reductio ad absurdum* of the attempt to apply the mathematical conception of infinity directly to a concrete problem. For, however convincing the mathematical reasoning may be, it is surely obvious that the conclusion must be wrong. The longer Tristram Shandy lived, the more would he be behindhand with his biography. It would, indeed, be difficult to find a clearer instance to show that the mathematical conception of infinity has only a formal validity, and that its applicability to any concrete case must be tested by other considerations. Every existing thing excludes certain abstract possibilities. This is at least one of the senses in which we may interpret the saying that 'determination is negation.'

With this general view in mind, we may now consider briefly some of the chief cases to which the conception of endlessness has been thought to be applicable.

4. Infinite extension.—The conception of infinite extension is commonly thought to be applicable to things in space[2] and to events in time, and also to the series of conditions (whether temporal or not) upon which existing things are dependent. It might be supposed to be applicable also to series of degrees and qualities (*e.g.*, degrees of heat or shades of colour). From a formal point of view, it is evident that there is no reason for stopping short anywhere in such relations as that of before and after, side by side, greater and less in degree, more and less of particular qualities, or causal antecedent and consequent. However far we may proceed in the application of these relations, it appears to be always possible to think of a further extension; and it seems quite arbitrary to stop at any particular point. It does not follow, however, that there is an endless number of existent cases that can be determined by these formal relations.

[1] *Principles of Mathematics*, London, 1903, p. 358.

[2] Jonathan Edwards has an ingenious argument against the application of infinity to spatial objects. But it does not appear to be convincing. See *Works*, London, 1840, vol. i. p. cclxii.

In the case of the alphabet, B comes after A and before C, but there is no letter prior to A. Here the limitation is arbitrary; *i.e.*, it is dependent on a human convention. On the other hand, grey is darker than white and lighter than black, but there is nothing darker than black or lighter than white. The fact that this particular scale of qualities has two ends is not arbitrary, like the similar limitation of the alphabet; but the limitation seems to be quite as definite. Similarly, red and blue appear to present themselves as end-points in a scale of colour-qualities. May it not, in like manner, be the case that there is some occurrence that has nothing before it, that there is some star that has nothing due west of it, that there is some happening that has no determining antecedent, and so on in other instances? There are, no doubt, difficulties in conceiving any such end-points. The difficulty in the case of spatial extension was vividly stated by Lucretius.[1] He supposed himself to stand at an extreme end of the physical universe—say, at its extreme western verge—and to shoot an arrow outwards. What, he asks, is to prevent him from doing so? The answer seems clearly to be that there is nothing in the formal constitution of space to prevent him; but, on the other hand, it might be physically impossible for him to get to the extreme verge or to shoot his arrow outwards. Though there is nothing in the form of space to prevent him, there may be something in the general conditions of the Cosmos. A more serious difficulty was urged by Kant in the case of time. He contended that we could not suppose a first occurrence in time, because there could be no reason for it to happen at one point in time rather than at any other. It seems clear, however, that this is not a difficulty with regard to the temporal series as such, but rather with regard to the causal series. If causation is conceived, as Kant conceived it, as temporal sequence, the first member in the series of causes would be unexplained. If, however, the causal series is thought of in a different way—*e.g.*, teleologically—this difficulty would disappear. In a teleological series there may be a reason for beginning at one point rather than at another. What is necessary is only that something should be taken as self-explanatory or *causa sui*. It does not, of course, fall within our present scope to consider whether this is a legitimate hypothesis. It is enough to urge that it is a conceivable one. If this is granted, all the series to which reference has been made might be supposed to be finite, *i.e.*, not endlessly extended.

But, of course, this does not prove that they *are* finite. It may still be asked whether there is any real objection to the supposition that they may be endless. The chief objection appears to be the one that was urged by Kant with reference to the particular case of time—viz. that the supposition of an endless series which is actually completed seems to be self-contradictory. If we say that, however great anything may be, there is always something else that is greater, we seem to be in effect stating that there both is and is not something which is greatest. If there is a greatest—viz. the infinitely great—the series is not endless; if there is not a greatest, the series is incomplete. Similarly, if we say that every ground has another ground, we seem to be saying both that there is and that there is not an ultimate ground. But, it may be urged, does not the conception of a limited whole involve difficulties quite as great? Not, it would seem, if some real ground can be assigned for the limitation. In most cases of limitation, the limits seem arbitrary or imperfectly explained. Why, for instance, it may be asked, are there only three dimensions in space as commonly conceived in the interpretation of the physical system? Why is there only a limited number of possible colour-experiences? Perhaps grounds could be given for such limitations. At any rate, there seems to be no reason for assuming that no ground could be given for the limitation of any particular series of concrete things. The conception of limits to existence in time is perhaps the most difficult. For some considerations bearing upon this, reference may be made to art. ETERNITY.

[1] *de Rerum Natura*, i. 968-973.

5. **Infinite division.**—The objections to endless division are even more apparent than those to endless extension. It involves the same difficulty of the completion of an endless series; but it has a further difficulty with respect to the limiting conception that is involved in it. When we think of anything as being divided without end, the ultimate parts have to be conceived as infinitely little. Now the infinitely little seems to be indistinguishable from zero; and zero seems to be indistinguishable from the non-existent. On the other hand, the grounds that lead us to postulate endless division are in some respects more cogent than those that lead us to the conception of infinite extension. We start in this case with a completed whole, so that at least its completion cannot be questioned; and yet there seems to be no reason for stopping at any point in its subdivision. Hence Kant urged that, in the case of division, the series must be supposed to be actually infinite, and not merely indefinitely extensible. But it is to be observed that Kant's argument depends upon the homogeneity of the whole that is to be divided. And this is where the weakness of the argument lies. If we assume that a given whole is homogeneous throughout, we are assuming that it is divisible throughout. The real question is whether any given whole *is* homogeneous. Now, this at least is clear, that we are not entitled to make any such assumption in the case of degrees and qualities. An intense heat does not appear to be made up of a number of smaller heats; nor does it seem legitimate to say that the distinction between any intensity and the next intensity below it is the same as the distinction between any other intensity and the next below it. Nor are we entitled to say that the distinction between blue and green is the same as that between green and yellow. Hence in such cases we do not seem to have any ground for the postulation of an infinite series of homogeneous units within a given whole. Moreover, if we confine ourselves to recognizable distinctions in degrees and qualities, it seems certain that the number is finite. Similarly, modern physical science tends more and more to throw doubt on the view that physical bodies can be indefinitely divided into homogeneous parts. Rather it seems at least probable that physical bodies consist of parts which cannot themselves be described as physical bodies. If so, the argument from homogeneity is not cogent. There may be parts that are not capable of further subdivision. Similarly, it may be doubted whether any such conception is applicable to conscious states. An experience of pleasure, for instance, does not appear to be capable of subdivision into a number of homogeneous parts.

The strongest case is probably that of *motion*, to which reference has already been made. When any body moves from one point to another, it is certainly natural to think of it as passing through an indefinite number of intervening positions; and it is here that we come upon the paradoxes of Zeno. With regard to Achilles and the tortoise, however, it seems clear that the motion does not

consist of homogeneous parts. Both of these moving bodies would presumably advance step by step. This suggests the question whether it may not be the case that all motion is discontinuous. If so, we, of course, come upon one of the other paradoxes of Zeno, viz. that 'the flying arrow rests.' If the flight of the arrow is discontinuous, this may be interpreted as meaning that it *is* successively at the points A, B, C, etc., but is never moving between them. But is this a serious objection? If it occupies these points successively, it *does* move from one to another. Its motion would not be made any the less real by the fact that it did not occupy any intervening positions. The fact that there is no cardinal number between two and three does not make the transition from two to three any the less real. Considerations of this kind may serve to show that there is no real reason for denying that the number of parts in the subdivision of any concrete thing may be finite.

6. **Infinite attributes.**—The conception of infinity—especially in the Cartesian school, where it was most freely applied—has been specially used as a determination of the idea of God. In this use it is generally regarded as being applicable to certain attributes, of which the chief are knowledge, power, and goodness. Temporal and spatial infinity have also been frequently ascribed to God; but with these it is not necessary to deal further. The other three forms of infinity call for some notice. As regards the first, it may be observed that, if infinite is interpreted as meaning boundless, infinite knowledge would seem to mean the knowledge of an endless number of things. Now, there is evidently a sense in which any one who has a clear apprehension of number at all does know an infinite number. A competent mathematician may be said to know all conceivable numbers, since the formation of numbers depends upon a single principle; and, if it be allowed that an infinite number is conceivable, the mathematician knows that. But he does not know all the relations that might be ascertained as holding between different numbers. Infinite knowledge would presumably include this. It would also include a full apprehension of the temporal, spatial, causal, intensive, and qualitative orders, and of all the different kinds of existences, and of all the relations that could be ascertained as holding within or between these various types; and this kind of knowledge might be held to be boundless. As regards particular existences, the knowledge of these would not be boundless, unless the things to be known are boundless—which is at least doubtful; but it would include the apprehension of every particular thing that actually does exist. In this respect it would be all-inclusive, but not endless.

Infinite power is more difficult to interpret when infinity is understood in the sense of endlessness. Some writers have interpreted it in a way that seems to lead to absurdity. J. M. E. McTaggart,[1] for instance, takes it as meaning the possibility of bringing about anything, however self-contradictory it may be—of making black white, good evil, the existent non-existent, the infinite finite, 2+2=5 or 100, and so forth. This, however, seems meaningless. A being infinitely powerful in this sense might evidently also be lacking in all power. Such a being would be, in the fullest sense, unconditioned or indeterminate. We might, however, interpret infinite power as meaning the possibility of accomplishing whatever is chosen. It would then be limited by the condition that what is chosen is not evil or absurd—*i.e.*, it would be taken in conjunction with the conceptions of infinite goodness and knowledge. Infinite power, thus interpreted, would be boundless, if there is an endless number of things to be chosen.

Infinite goodness, again, interpreted as boundless, would seem to mean the choice of what is best in every case. If the number of cases is endless, the choices would be endless. In dealing with goodness, however, it is certainly better to regard the attribute as essentially qualitative. The attitude of always choosing the best seems to be in itself a simple determination of will or character. It does not really consist of a number of distinct things. The endlessness lies only in the number of cases to which the one principle of choice may be applied. Hence it seems better to speak of *perfect* goodness than of *endless* goodness.

And this suggests the question whether the same is not really true of the other attributes as well. If infinite power means the possibility of bringing about what is chosen as best, this also does not seem necessarily to involve in itself anything that is endless, though there may be an endless number of things in which the potentiality is displayed. Similarly, infinite knowledge might be interpreted as meaning complete insight into the conditions on which anything is to be known. A thoroughly skilled mathematician might in this sense have infinite knowledge within his own domain, and yet not have an endless number of facts present to his mind. It may be urged, therefore, that it is better to apply the conception of perfection, rather than that of endlessness, in the interpretation of all these attributes.

It is perhaps partly the difficulty in the application of the conception of endlessness that has led some writers to postulate the existence of a 'finite God.'[1] If an infinite God exists, it seems clear that such a being must be thought of as complete; yet it is difficult—if not self-contradictory—to think of anything that is endless as being complete. It is, however, mainly from the point of view of perfection that the conception of a finite God has been brought forward. It is urged that what we know about the imperfections of the world forces us to believe that, if there is a God at all, He is either not perfect in goodness or not perfect in knowledge or in power. But the consideration of this question lies beyond the scope of the present article.

7. **The infinity of the Cosmos.**—It is evident that, in a certain sense, the Cosmos includes the endless; for it includes number, and number is endless. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the Cosmos contains an endless number of existences. This distinction has been partly brought out in the present article; but to explain it fully would require a careful consideration of the distinction between existence and reality. It must suffice to say here that existence seems to present itself as a selection from a larger realm of possibility. If we mean by existence that which occurs in the time order, within which our own conscious experience falls, it seems clear that some things—*e.g.*, perfect knowledge, goodness, and power—may be real, though they do not in that sense exist. Again, there is a sense in which anything that is conceivable may be said to be real. If it is conceivable, it is *really* conceivable; and the conditions of such conceivability would seem to be contained within the structure of the Cosmos.[2] In this sense it may be said that endlessness—inasmuch as it has a real meaning—is contained in the Cosmos. But it does not appear to be correct to say that the Cosmos itself is endless. Rather it

[1] *Some Dogmas of Religion*, London, 1906, ch. vi.

[1] One of the best statements of this view is to be found in H. Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil*, Oxford, 1907, ii. 237-244; cf. also McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, ch. vii., and J. Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, Cambridge, 1911, especially p. 443 f.

[2] Reference may be made to an article on 'The Meaning of Reality,' in *Mind*, Jan. 1914.

would seem that, if there can properly be said to be a Cosmos at all, it must be supposed to be a complete whole. But it may be infinite, in the sense that it is perfect and all-inclusive. Indeed, to say that it is a complete whole seems to imply that it is perfect and all-inclusive; but whether it is to be really so conceived, and, if so, how, is a problem that cannot be adequately dealt with in such an article as this. Nor is it possible to discuss here how far the conception of such a perfect Cosmos would agree with or differ from the conception of an infinite God referred to in the preceding section.

See also artt. GOD, GOOD AND EVIL, HEGEL.

LITERATURE.—The literature dealing with Infinity is very extensive; but the following references may be found useful: J. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, 1st ser., London, 1901, esp. supplementary essay; A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, do. 1903, esp. bk. ii. ch. iii.; J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], do. 1908, esp. ch. viii.; H. H. Joachim, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, Oxford, 1901, esp. bk. i. ch. i. sect. 2; B. Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, Cambridge, 1900, esp. ch. ix.; R. Latta, *Leibniz, the Monadology*, Oxford, 1898, esp. pt. iii.; E. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Glasgow, 1889, bk. i. ch. xii.; J. M. E. McTaggart, *A Commentary on Hegel's Logic*, Cambridge, 1910, esp. ch. iii.; B. Bosanquet, *Logic*[2], Oxford, 1911, esp. bk. i. ch. iv.; B. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, vol. i., Cambridge, 1903, esp. pts. ii., iii., and v.; A. N. Whitehead and B. Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, vol. ii., do. 1912, esp. pt. iii. sect. C; E. W. Hobson, *The Theory of Functions of a Real Variable*, do. 1907, esp. ch. i. J. S. MACKENZIE.

INFORMERS.—One who has knowledge that a crime has been committed is morally, and frequently legally, bound to lodge information of such crime in order that justice may be done. This holds both in the strictly legal and in the religious sphere; indeed, in many strata of civilization there is no demarcation between the two. The duty is binding, moreover, not only upon the official classes, whether civil or religious, but upon every one who has cognizance of the crime. Morally speaking, he who conceals his knowledge of, *e.g.*, a murder, and thereby assists the murderer to escape detection (to give the least possible consequence of his dereliction), is *particeps criminis*. This principle is recognized in primitive codes, as when, among the Aztecs, one who had cognizance of treason and did not divulge his knowledge was enslaved (H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1894–95, ii. 314, 324, with further instances and lit.). At the same time, there may be limits to this obligation. Thus Chinese law forbids a kinsman or a slave to lodge information, and even punishes with death anonymous informers, if their identity is established, while the African Kru regard as a culprit one who divulges information concerning a crime in which he has no concern (Post, ii. 314 f.).

The important assistance rendered to justice by the informer receives recognition in the usage of giving him a substantial reward, generally from the fine which the convicted must pay, this reward being a ninth among the Kalmuks; and the same code also recognizes the principle of 'king's evidence,' so that he who deserts a robber band and lodges information regarding them escapes punishment (Post, ii. 315 f.).

Such is the ideal theory of the informer, whose importance in aiding the ends of justice must be frankly recognized. Yet the informer is a hated creature, often despised by those who profit by what he tells. The code of Manu, for instance, places him in the same category as madmen and scoffers at the Veda; no Brāhman may eat food proffered by an informer; and the lodging of (false [?]) information is equivalent to the most heinous sin of killing a Brāhman (iii. 161, iv. 214, xi. 56). In Europe any private citizen who, with the most unexceptional of motives, seeks to secure evidence of the violation of the laws of the land, such laws, for example, as those governing the sale of liquor or those regulating houses of ill-fame, may, indeed, further the ends of justice, but will too often be exposed both to the more or less concealed contempt of the official service and almost certainly to the contumely of the public, even of the more enlightened and thoughtful of its members.

This attitude, too, has its justification. The informer may be the most honourable of men; but he may also be a thoroughly despicable creature, serving not for the promotion of the welfare of society, but for the mere money that he can make, or he may be influenced by personal hatred. This is why the informer is loathed, with the added factor that all peoples of even moderately advanced ethical development have a predilection for fair play and for open fight, if fight must needs be.

To summarize the ethical aspect of the informer, we may say that in many cases he undoubtedly advances the cause of law and justice where without his aid crime could be perpetrated and flourish. That by his means many an instance of unjust punishment has been inflicted does not in the least militate against the use of his services; it merely signifies that his motives and evidence need to be tested with more rigidity than in the case of official guardians of the law. Indeed, he is a check upon these guardians, who may err on the side of leniency (and not always from disinterested motives), just as he may be guided by undue severity (and sometimes from motives at least equally interested). As regards the ethical position of the informer, each case is to be judged separately. If he is convinced that the offence concerning which he lodges information is indeed wrong and that it should be punished, his act is commendable and in the interests of society, even though he may have a sub-motive of personal hate (perhaps in consequence of injury which he has suffered either from the system of crime as a whole or from the person or persons involved in the particular offence). If, however, his motive is merely to gratify personal resentment or to secure the pecuniary or other reward offered, then, while his act may be to the welfare of the social organism, he himself is ethically to be condemned.

The informer does not seem to have become a real problem until the days of the late Republic and early Empire of Rome. By the former period he must have become a peril, for Cicero urges (*de Offic.* ii. 14) that his statements must be received only for cogent reasons and in infrequent cases, and then with caution. Yet under the worst of the emperors the evil side of the *delator* waxed luxuriant. Tiberius 'decreed special rewards to accusers, and sometimes to witnesses; credence was refused to no informer' (Suetonius, *Tib.* lxi.); and probably the rhetoric of Pliny the Younger was not very far beyond the mark when he said (*Panegyr.* xxxiv.):

'Vidimus delatorum agmen inductum, quasi grassatorum, quasi latronum. Non solitudinem illi, non iter, sed templum, sed forum insederant. Nulla iam testamenta secura, nullus status certus: non orbitas, non liberi proderant. Auxerat hoc malum principum avaritia.'

While the system of *delatio* flourished in all its worst forms, repeated efforts were made to curb it. Nero reduced to a fourth the rewards offered by the Lex Papia (Suetonius, *Nero*, x.), and in his reign was passed the Senatusconsultum Turpillianum, by which assistance of informers by procuring evidence or supporting unjust charges was penalized (Digest, XLVIII. xvi.; Cod. Justin. x. xi.). Women, 'viri clarissimi,' veterans, etc., were absolutely forbidden to act as informers, while soldiers and guardians could do so only in special cases (Dig. XLIX. xiv. 18). But despite every effort, as S. Dill

remarks (*Roman Soc. from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, London, 1904, p. 35 f.),

'the profession grew in reputation and emolument. It is a melancholy proof of the degradation of that society that the delator could be proud of his craft and even envied and admired. Men of every degree, freedmen, schoolmasters, petty traders, descendants of houses as old as the Republic, men from the rank of the shoemaker Vatinius to a Scaurus, a Cato, or a Regulus, flocked to a trade which might earn a fabulous fortune and the favour of the prince. There must have been many a career like that of Palfurius Sura, who had fought in the arena in the reign of Nero, who had been disgraced and stripped of his consular rank under Vespasian, who then turned Stoic and preached the gospel of popular government, and, in the reign of Domitian, crowned his career by becoming a delator, and attempting to found a juristic theory of absolute monarchy.'

After scourging delators, Titus either sold or exiled them (Suetonius, *Tit.* viii.); every possible impediment was placed in their way (Dig. XLVIII. ii. 7. 1; Cod. Justin. IX. i. 3, ii. 17, iii. 2); in 319 Constantine imposed the death penalty on any delation (Cod. Theodos. X. x. 2); and in 365 Valentinian and Valens forbade anonymous delations (Cod. Justin. IX. xxxvi.); but all these measures proved ineffectual.

Yet in all these enactments attention was evidently directed to the suppression of the abuses of the system rather than to the abrogation of the system itself. It is true that Trajan banished the delators (*Panegyr.* xxxiv.–xxxvi.); but, at least in the provinces, they were not merely tolerated, but their evidence was received. This is admirably attested by Pliny's famous letter (xcvii.) regarding Christians and the Emperor's reply.

Certain individuals were denounced (*deferebantur*) to Pliny as Christians, and he tried each case strictly upon its merits. To this course the Emperor replies approvingly, directing that 'they [the Christians] are not to be sought out; if they are denounced and convicted, they must be punished' ('conquirendi non sunt: si deferantur et arguantur, puniendi sunt').

The early Christians must frequently have suffered from the zeal of informers, whether honest or not (doubtless both types were to be found). It was not, however, until the early 3rd cent. that the Councils of the Church took official cognizance of them. The 73rd canon of the Synod of Elvira (305 or 306)—a canon incorporated in the Canon Law (C. 6, causa v. qu. 6)—enacts that

'Delator si quis extiterit fidelis, et per delationem eius aliquis fuerit proscriptus vel interfectus, placuit eum nec in finem accipere communionem: si levior causa fuerit, intra quinquennium accipere poterit communionem; si catechumenus fuerit, post quinquennii tempora admittetur ad baptismum.' The 13th canon of the Synod of Arles (314) requires the degradation of all ecclesiastics who had delivered over (*tradidisse*) sacred vessels, copies of the Scriptures, or 'names of the brethren.' 'But this penalty was only to be inflicted in case the offence of *traditio* was proved, not merely by private denunciations (*verbis nudis*), but by the public laws, by writings signed by officers of justice (*ex actis publicis*), which the Roman officers had to draw up in executing the Emperor's edict' (C. J. Hefele, *Hist. of the Christian Councils*, Eng. tr., I.² [Edinburgh, 1894] 192). The ordinations previously performed by bishops who had turned delators were, however, valid. The following canon of the same Synod excommunicates until they die ('usque ad exitum') those 'who falsely accuse their brethren' (cf. Hefele, I.² 191 f.).

If, however, the Church condemned those who delated against her, she encouraged those who informed for her, and even bade them do so. In her efforts to suppress all manner of heresy in the Middle Ages, the informer was called into service. To further the extirpation of the Cathari, penitents were obliged to denounce all whom they knew or suspected to be heretics of that type, and delation was regarded as necessary proof of conversion.

'How useful this was is seen in the case of Saurine Rigaud, whose confession is recorded at Toulouse in 1254, where it is followed by a list of one hundred and sixty-nine persons incriminated by her, their names being carefully tabulated with their places of residence for immediate action. . . . Delation was so indispensable to the Inquisition that it was to be secured by rewards as well as by punishments. Bernard Gui tells us that those who voluntarily come forward and prove their zeal by confession and by betraying all their associates are not only to be pardoned, but their livelihood must be secured at the hands of princes and prelates; while betraying a single "perfected" heretic insured immunity and perhaps additional reward. . . . It became, in fact, a settled principle of law that either husband or wife knowing the other to be a heretic and not giving information within a twelvemonth was held to be a consenting party without further evidence, and was punishable as a heretic' (H. C. Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, London, 1908–11, i. 409, 432).

Where it was possible to take vengeance on the informer, he was not spared. This is clearly exemplified by the history of delation among the mediæval Jews. Under Arab dominion, information was rife in Jewry, as when, about 1089, Khalfa ibn al-A'jāb and his son Ḥayyīm drove Isaac al-Fāsī from N. Africa to Spain; and after the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the informer continued to harass the Jews under Christian rule, as was the case throughout Europe generally. No new principles appear, but the penalty of death was not merely pronounced upon the delator, but was actually carried into effect, often with the consent of the King, notably in the cases of Joseph Pichon, royal farmer of taxes, beheaded at Seville, 21st Aug. 1379, and of a notorious delator executed by royal authority at Barcelona about 1280. So heinous was the offence of an informer deemed that he might be seized and condemned to death forthwith, and the penalty might even be imposed in his absence. In Germany the tribulations brought upon the Jews by the informer (מֹסֵר, 'traditor,' מוֹסֵר, 'delator,' מְלַשֵּׁן, 'slanderer') were especially severe, as in the expulsions from Augsburg, Nüremberg, and Regensburg; and in Poland, where, with government sanction, an informer's tongue or ears might be cut off, the death penalty is said to have been inflicted as late as the close of the 18th century.

'As a survival of that gloomy phenomenon of mediæval history, there had long existed in the Ritual of Congregations a prayer, which was repeated on Mondays and Thursdays and at other times, against this social evil, and which in various lands was extant in manuscript for the use of the readers of congregations. Excommunication and execution had thus yielded to prayer and imprecation' (D. Kaufmann, *JQR* viii. 228).

LITERATURE.—The various treatises on Roman Law (conveniently summarized in Pauly-Wissowa, iv. [1901] 2427 f.); J. Bingham, *Ant. of the Christian Church*, XVI. x. § 10 (Oxford, 1843–45); artt. 'Delator,' in W. Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant.* (London, 1875), p. 388 f., 'Informers,' in *DCA* i. [1875] 833, 'Moser,' in *JE* ix [1905] 42–44; D. Kaufmann, 'Jewish Informers in the Middle Ages,' in *JQR* viii. [1895–96] 217–238.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

INHERITANCE.

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INHERITANCE (Primitive and Savage).—1. Primitive property and the conception of inheritance.—Among primitive races, both religious beliefs and social organization are such as to hinder rather than favour the origin and growth of the conception of the transfer of estate, by regular succession, to a representative of a former possessor. This is especially the case with material property. In-

dividual possessions are confined to a few weapons, implements, ornaments, and utensils. At death these are buried with the owner or destroyed by breaking or burning, either that they may serve for his use in the future life, or because of the pollution of death which has made them useless to the living. The hut is pulled down or allowed to decay.

Even when the principle of inheritance is recognized, this custom of destroying property is continued, and may seriously diminish the estate, although not unnaturally there is a tendency to limit the practice to articles of little value.

In Savage Island the heir receives only what remains of the material possessions of the deceased after the greater part has been destroyed in his honour.[1] The Nâgas of Manipur seriously reduce the value of the inheritance by placing a number of articles in the grave—usually those most closely associated with the deceased in his lifetime—though as a rule the custom is confined to articles of small value.[2] Death among the Bathonga is regarded as a great pollution, and is followed by elaborate purificatory ceremonies: part of the property of the deceased, such as rugs, clothes, mats, and old earthen pots, is placed in the grave; articles of value are purified and the hut is crushed.[3]

It is clear that the practice, whether based upon the idea of continued ownership after death or upon pollution, did not, in the earlier stages of development, allow for any rights of the heirs. Nor are the conditions of land tenure such as either to originate or to foster such rights. Among nomad hunters, even if their sense of possession is strong enough to lead them to guard their hunting grounds from trespass by their neighbours (which is not invariably the case), rights of individual ownership, which might be inherited, are, as a rule, not recognized; and the same applies to lands in the occupation of primitive pastoral tribes such as the Yakuts, while among agricultural peoples, where transmission of land to heirs is from the nature of the case of greater moment, it frequently happens that the conditions of tenure and the custom of periodical redistribution are such as to indicate a communal tenure, not entirely superseded, rather than an absolute individual ownership. The right to hunt or pasture over certain lands, however, although belonging to the individual in virtue of his membership of a certain group, is hereditary in a somewhat vague and undefined manner, inasmuch as it is in fact transmitted from father to son.

It is said of the tribes of the Lower Hunter River that the males inherited the hunting grounds of their fathers.[4] Probably it would be more correct to say that the rights were transmitted to them as members of the local group to which their fathers belonged. An initiation custom practised by the natives of Cape York in reference to territorial rights seems to stand midway between this form of transmission in virtue of group membership and inheritance in the stricter sense. Inheritance is through the mother, or a man's heirs are his uterine nephews, but the country over which the youth who is being initiated shall have the right of hunting and collecting roots and fruits is determined at one stage of the ceremony when one of his teeth is knocked out by repeated blows with a bone. At each blow the operator names the 'country' of his mother, his mother's father, or one of her relatives. The country named as the tooth falls out is the one over which he has rights.[5] He has been admitted to a group to which the country belongs; at the same time it is a group with which he has a hereditary and not merely a local connexion.

2. Origin of inheritance.—Although custom and religious belief operate in this way to prevent personal property from passing to those who might be regarded as the heirs of a deceased person, it is, nevertheless, probable that the practice of inheritance and the rules of succession first grew up in connexion with this rather than with land, rank, profession, or calling, and the like, which, though at this early stage transmitted by other means, are inherited at a higher level of culture (see below, 3 (*d*)). This seems clear from the fact that inheritance of personal property is recognized while the tenure of land continues to be communal, or subject to rights originating in communal tenure; the chieftainship or headship of a group is wholly or partly elective; and a profession, such as that of the medicine-man, or an industrial calling is assumed by association rather than by relationship. Further, it arises out of the action of the living rather than the dead. Testamentary disposition appears at a comparatively late stage of development, and gifts *inter vivos* are frequently rendered void by death. It is the desire of the living to possess some specially valuable weapon or ornament which has overcome religious scruples, rather than the wish of the owner to benefit those who come after him.

Among the Arawak it is not uncommon for the hammock in which the body is laid in the grave to be withdrawn afterwards if it is new and good.[1] In New Guinea, among the Koita and Motu tribes, although the house of a dead man is allowed to decay, the floor beams, which are valued on account of their fine workmanship, are not allowed to suffer the same fate, but are regarded as the most important part of the inheritance.[2]

The familiar custom of substituting ceremonial objects or models for objects of utility or value, and avoiding the sacrifice of slaves and wives, which is found in its most highly developed form in the burials of ancient Egypt, is probably due to the wish of the heir to prevent too serious a reduction in his inheritance rather than to the desire of the owner to pass on his estate intact. It may also be noted that an important or a chief part in the rites accompanying the burial ceremony, which would afford the opportunity of withholding any of the personal property from destruction, is frequently entrusted to a near relative, who at a later stage is either the heir or takes a considerable share of the estate.

In Samoa only the sister or the sister's child had the privilege of sitting at the head of the grave and breaking the bottle of scented oil to pour over the uncovered face of the dead man,[3] while among the Bathonga the younger brother, who inherited the chief wife of the deceased, entered her kraal, of which he became the master, performed the 'rite of the twig,' and delivered the address to the ancestors.[4] If a Kikuyu son refuses to assist in digging his father's grave, he is disqualified from receiving a share in the estate.[5] The sons or grandsons chosen by the Baganda clan to perform the burial ceremonies each took a widow from the inheritance, and the sister's son received a woman for performing the ceremonies which brought the mourning to an end.[6]

3. The inheritable estate.—(*a*) *Personal property.*—Material things, such as weapons, implements, utensils, and ornaments, would be among the earliest kinds of articles to be regarded as falling by succession to a man's connexions at his death. In ordinary circumstances these are affected by no special rule, but follow the regular line of succession, although certain articles may be by custom assigned to a particular person or class of persons.[7]

The Tube-tube tribes of New Guinea distinguish two categories of personal property. Drums, lime-pots, lime-spatulæ, and canoes go to the sister's children, even if they are girls, but in this case for their children. If the sister has no children, this class of property would pass to the maternal uncle, but with a reversion at his death to a man's own brothers and sisters. Property of the second category, such as arm-shells and the like, and also pigs, was divided between a man's own children and those of his sister. Among the Waga-waga tribes, ornaments given to a wife by a husband are regarded at his death as the heritage of his *gariauna*, a man who performs certain ceremonies

[1] B. Thomson, 'Note upon the Natives of Savage Island or Niué,' *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 143.
[2] T. C. Hodson, *The Naga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 99.
[3] H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, London and Neuchatel, i. [1912] 140, 142; cf., further, on the subject as a whole, A. H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, ii. 174 f.
[4] B. McKiernan, 'Some Notes on the Aborigines of the Lower Hunter River, New South Wales,' *Anthropos*, vi. [1911] 888.
[5] A. C. Haddon, *Head Hunters*, London, 1902, p. 191.

[1] E. Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of British Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 225.
[2] C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 90.
[3] G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, pp. 42, 403.
[4] Junod, i. 142, 200.
[5] C. W. Hobley, 'Further Researches into Kikuyu and Kamba Religious Beliefs and Customs,' *JRAI* xli. [1911] 418; cf. Post, ii. 186.
[6] J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 270.
[7] On the primitive regulations concerning alienable and inalienable property see Post, i. 200 f.

at the grave, or his brothers.[1] Among the Bathonga, of the two assegais which are a part of a man's regular equipment, one, the larger, passes to the son, the other to the uterine nephew; the nephew has first choice, but by custom leaves the big assegai to the son.[2] A regular classification of inheritable property among the Kayans and Kenyaks of Borneo allots all or most of the domestic utensils to the widow; old beads, cloth, bead-boxes, and female slaves to the daughters; and war-coats, weapons, and canoes to the sons.[3]

(*b*) *Land.*—Inheritance of land is closely bound up with the system of land tenure. Individual ownership is a late development, and even among civilized races communal ownership still affects the terms upon which land is held. In the more primitive types of society—the hunting, pastoral, and early agricultural stages—it is the right of user and not the absolute ownership that is transmitted. Indeed, in the case of a nomadic community of hunters ranging over a wide tract of country, the term 'inheritance,' as has been stated above, is hardly applicable in the strict sense to the methods by which members of the tribe enter into or are admitted to the territorial rights of their group. They obtain and hold their rights primarily in virtue of birth in a group, and not in virtue of their relationship to an individual. The same applies in a less degree to the conception of land held among pastoral tribes, except that the group tends to be smaller or a subdivision of a larger group, such as the *sib*, or the family, among the Yakuts and the mediæval Basques. The land descends through the head of the family as a joint possession and not as the property of a single individual. The strong gentile organization of the tribes of the north-west coast of America points to group tenure as the origin of the custom whereby the hunting grounds of the Western Dénés and other tribes of that region are the hereditary property of the chiefs or the nobles.[4]

In an agricultural community, some degree of recognition of individual right of ownership with power of transmission to heirs is usual.

Uganda affords an instance to the contrary. All the land, with the exception of the clan burial-grounds, belongs to the king. The holdings cultivated by a man's wives are granted him by the chief or directly by the king, who gives estates to the nobles holding office in various districts of the country. These estates are not inherited, and, on the promotion of the official, pass to his successor without allowance for improvements.[5]

It is more usual, however, where all land is regarded as the property of the chief, for the custom to be modified by what is practically a grant in perpetuity from the chief, either with or without an annual payment, the land then being transmitted as hereditary property, but being inalienable by sale.

This form of tenure was found in ancient Mexico, where, among the Nahua races, the property of the nobles was held directly from the king by the individual, but the land of the common people was the property of the clan, and held from it as inalienable but inheritable property by the individual.[6]

In Nigeria, land was granted in perpetuity subject to an annual rental and occupation. Although the grantee had no power to alienate, at his death it did not revert to the chief, but descended to his heir, usually a son,[7] who held it on the same conditions as his father. Similar rules of tenure and succession are found among the Bathonga, with the exception that the grants are made by the chief in the first instance to the local headman by whom the lots are apportioned among the members of the village, without, however, affecting the right of transmission to heirs.[8]

The mode in which land may be inherited sometimes varies in the same community, the variation being based upon a distinction between group and individual ownership, with the result that the right to inherit is vested in two distinct classes of persons.

[1] Seligmann, p. 522 f. [2] Junod, i. 208.
[3] C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, i. 83; cf., for further examples, Post, i. 224 f.
[4] C. Hill-Tout, *The Far West*, London, 1907, p. 146.
[5] Roscoe, pp. 238, 278.
[6] H. H. Bancroft, *NR* ii. 224 ff.
[7] R. E. Dennett, *Nigerian Studies*, London, 1910, p. 195.
[8] Junod, ii. [1913] 6.

Among the Mafulu, each man has a house site in the village, which at his death ceases to be the property of his family and reverts to the village; it is, or may be, then allotted to another member of the group. In addition, he possesses garden land and bush land, which are his absolute property, but in the latter case subject to a right of the villagers to pass over it. This land descends to his sons, but is held in common by them and their heirs; it is never divided, so that the number of individuals holding a plot of such land in joint ownership in time may become very large. Any house built upon this site remains the property of the family.[1] In Melanesia an analogous distinction is maintained. There, however, the ancient garden lot (because, it may be assumed, it was originally cleared by the labour of a group of settlers organized on a kinship basis) descends to the members of the owner's kin, his sisters' children, but bush land cleared by the owner himself and made into a garden lot descends to his children and continues to be inherited in the direct line so long as the origin of the clearing is remembered.[2] In Fiji, though the bush land was held in common, and the tenure of arable land, descending according to a fixed law of inheritance, was little more than a grant of user from the chief, land in the Rewa province, consisting of tracts reclaimed from the delta of the river, was appropriated by individual families, and as such was subject to ordinary chattel law, alienable, and inheritable by the eldest son in the first instance, and not by the eldest brother.[3] An interesting point arises in connexion with the tenure of trees as apart from land tenure in Melanesia and the adjacent area. Property in the trees being distinct from property in the land on which they stood, they might, and, indeed, frequently did, descend to an entirely distinct class. Trees planted with the consent of the owner of the land were inherited by the planter's sons; and trees planted on his own land might be declared to be the property of his sons instead of the members of his kin.[4]

As the principle of individual tenure becomes more generally recognized, the custom regulating its transmission at a break in continuity of ownership caused by death tends to approximate more nearly to the rules of inheritance characteristic of a highly developed type of civilization, and to ignore claims outside the direct line. If any traces of the more ancient system remain, they may be sought in the rules for the disposal of the house and the house site, this being the part of the land in which the individual first makes good his claim to absolute ownership, and as such tending to preserve the original form of transmission.

In New Guinea the house site formed an important part of the inheritance, although the house itself was usually allowed to rot. It passed either to the son (Koita, Motu) or to the brother's sister or sister's son (Waga-waga, Tube-tube, Bartle Bay).[5]

(*c*) *Women as inheritable property.*—Many primitive peoples, especially in Africa, regard wives and daughters as an important part of the estate, to be transmitted in accordance with the regular rules of inheritance with the rest of the property. The explanation is to be sought partly in the economic value of women either as workers, or, in the case of daughters, as potential wealth in the shape of a bride-price; partly in the solidarity of group feeling which tends to regard everything over which the head of the group has authority as his absolute possession, and, as such, to be transferred to his successor; and partly in the necessity, where the independent status of women is not recognized, for every woman to be attached by some definite relation to a male protector. As a rule the heir married the widow, except when she was his own mother, and received the bride-price for the daughters on their marriage.

Among the Akikuyu the son, if adult, inherits his father's widows, but, as a rule, takes as his own wives only those in excess of three; as it is usual for a man not to marry more than three wives until his son has been received into the tribe, these widows would be of about the same age as the heir.[6] In Nigeria (Kagoro) the son takes any of the widows not taken by his paternal uncles.[7] According to the rule of the Wa-Sania, the wives become the property of the eldest brother of the deceased; but, if he already has three wives, or if the number inherited would give him more than three, the number allowed,

[1] R. W. Williamson, *The Mafulu*, London, 1912, p. 117.
[2] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 61 f.
[3] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, pp. 358, 369.
[4] Codrington, *loc. cit.*
[5] Seligmann, pp. 89 f., 521-524.
[6] W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, London, 1910, p. 143.
[7] A. J. N. Tremearne, 'Some Nigerian Head Hunters,' *JRAI* xlii. [1912] 189.

he hands them over to other men, while their children remain his property.[1] Among the Bahima, if the brother already has two wives, the eldest son takes charge of the widows, although they are looked upon as the property of his uncle.[2] The Araucanos assigned the widows to the eldest son, but in default of a son they were either given to the eldest brother or distributed among all the brothers in the order of their marriage.[3] Among the Arunta the wife passes to the younger brothers.[4]

(*d*) *Chieftainship, rank, status, etc.*—Although the tendency is for the chieftainship or headship of a group to be hereditary, this is by no means a matter of course, and among many primitive peoples other considerations are taken into account in choosing or accepting a leader of the group.

In the Australian tribes the office is elective; though the choice usually falls on a son of the previous headman, he must have distinguished himself as an orator or bard, and as a rule be skilled as a medicine-man and qualified to perform magic rites at initiation ceremonies.[5] Among the Salish of the upper waters of the Fraser River the office is elective, but among the tribes who live lower down the river social conditions become less democratic until the coast is reached, when the chieftainship becomes purely hereditary in the normal course.[6] The hereditary principle is so clearly recognized by the Halkómélem tribes that the daughter of a headman transmits the chieftainship to her husband, though ineligible to hold it herself,[7] while the headship of the Roro-speaking and Mekeo groups of New Guinea is not only hereditary, including in the latter case the war chieftainship, but may be held by a daughter of a deceased headman.[8] On the other hand, personal prowess may be all-important, and may delay or prevent recognition of a regular line of descent. In most American tribes the office of *sachem* was hereditary in a family or clan, but elective within that group. When a war chief existed side by side with the *sachem*, the office was conferred in virtue of personal prowess, while among the Tlingits election was dependent upon wealth.[9] The war chieftainship of the Araucanos in the time of the Spanish wars was elective; now the chieftainship is hereditary in the families claiming to be descended from the founders of the local groups.[10] Both election and hereditary succession were found among the ancient inhabitants of Central and South America. In the royal line of Peru, in Ecuador, and in Colombia, hereditary succession was the rule.[11] The Nahua monarchy at Tezcuco and Tlacopan was hereditary and lineal, while in Mexico it was collateral and elective, the election falling upon the king's brother. Among the Jakun of the Malay Peninsula, the eldest son of the deceased headman is presented for election, while among another group of jungle tribes of the Peninsula, the Sakai, the office is hereditary.[12] In Cumana, on the other hand, it is the youngest son of the head wife who inherits the chieftainship.[13] In Borneo, among the Kayans, the office of chief is elective, with a bias in favour of the son, who, if not of mature age, is held to have a strong claim to election after the death of his father's successor; but among the Kenyahs, where the chief has greater authority, the heir (a son or a nephew) is recognized during the lifetime of his father, and given a certain amount of authority as a preparation for the duties he will have to perform later.[14] In Uganda the chieftainships of the various districts were not hereditary, but in the disposal of the king. As a rule the son of the deceased chief, especially if he was killed in battle, was appointed, as being by upbringing and training most fitted to hold the position. The principle of office being subject to appointment but hereditary in a limited group also appeared in Uganda in the appointments to the great offices of State, which by custom were frequently assigned to members of the clan of the previous holder, and even in the royal succession; the three great officers of State chose as the successor to the throne the prince whom they considered the most suitable, without necessarily paying regard to the nomination customarily made by the previous king at the time of his death.[15] The lucrative village offices of the Nágas, which are the most valuable part of an estate, are hereditary in the male line,[1] but among the neighbouring Lushei Kuki tribes both elective and hereditary offices exist, sometimes side by side in the same village.[2] The great offices and the accompanying grants of land of the Mayas and peoples of ancient Mexico and Central America either were hereditary or, when in the gift of the monarch, tended to become hereditary, while the nobles about the person of the king formed a hereditary caste.[3] Hereditary castes or classes are found in many parts of the world, the most noteworthy examples perhaps being in British Columbia, where hereditary social distinctions are most strictly observed.[4] In Samoa the office of councillor was hereditary in certain families, descending to the next eldest brother.[5]

The position of medicine-man of a group or tribe, although, like the chieftainship—an office with which in the early stages it is usually combined—not originally hereditary, but the result of a real or supposed mental or physical peculiarity, becomes in the course of development an office which is transmitted in accordance with a rule of inheritance. This may be due partly to the influence of association.

In New Britain, on the death of the chief, who is regarded as a powerful sorcerer, his brother frequently assumes the position on the strength of a declaration that his brother's powers have passed to him—a declaration in full accordance with the Melanesian conception of *mana*, and its power of affecting persons or objects with which it comes into contact.[6]

On the other hand, those who are closely associated with the medicine-man by ties of kinship may be held not only to be infected with his powers, but to have special opportunities of acquiring a knowledge of magical rites and incantations—an idea which would be fostered by a not unnatural desire to keep a position of power and profit for children and relatives.

Not only is the Baloki medicine-man succeeded by his son, to whom he imparts the secrets of his powers, but it is extremely difficult for any one who is not a member of his family to become a medicine-man.[7] At Bartle Bay, in New Guinea, the headman, who is also a kind of medicine-man, is succeeded by his brother or sister's son, to whom he has passed on his knowledge.[8] The inheritance of the priesthood either by individuals or by families or groups, as among the Chibcha of Colombia[9] or among the ancient inhabitants of Central America—at Yopaa the office of priest was hereditary in the family of the Wiyatao[10]—may be assigned to an origin in similar ideas.

In connexion with these sacred offices may be mentioned the inheritance of special functions, privileges, and objects in connexion with religious matters.

The Arunta sacred objects, including the *churinga*, and the privilege or duty of performing certain parts in the religious ceremonies are the property of individuals. As such they form part of the property transferred by inheritance, but not otherwise alienable. The women may also own *churinga nanja*, though they may never see them; these are inherited, but not according to the ordinary rule, passing to the women's younger brothers and not to the other half of the tribe, as they must not leave the local group. The same conditions are found in other tribes of the region.[11] Among the Kwakiutl of the north-west coast of America the right to wear a certain crest, to perform certain duties, to sing certain songs, to eat human flesh, to have certain *manitous*, and the membership of secret societies (after initiation) are hereditary in the clan or the family, and may be acquired for the children by marriage to an heiress or by killing the possessor. It may be noted that the position of the owner of these privileges is defined by the fact that only one person at a time is regarded as the representative of the ancestor from whom they are ultimately derived.[12] Names and crests in the British Columbian tribes are regarded as family property, and as such are transmitted to the heir.[13]

1 W. E. H. Barrett, 'Notes on the Customs and Beliefs of the Wa-Giriama, etc., British East Africa,' *JRAI* xli. 31.
2 Roscoe, 'The Bahima,' *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 103.
3 R. E. Latcham, 'Ethnology of the Araucanos,' *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 360.
4 N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, London, 1906, p. 202.
5 *Ib.* p. 142.
6 Hill-Tout, p. 158 f.
7 Hill-Tout, 'Ethnological Report on the Stseélis and Skaúlits Tribes of the Halkómélem Division of the Salish of British Columbia,' *JAI* xxxiv. [1904] 318.
8 Seligmann, pp. 219, 342.
9 F. S. Dellenbaugh, *The North Americans of Yesterday*, New York and London, 1901, p. 424.
10 Latcham, p. 355.
11 T. A. Joyce, *South American Archæology*, London, 1912, pp. 19, 59; Letourneau, *Property*, p. 326.
12 W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, i. 500 ff.; for other instances see Post, i. 218 f.
13 T. Waitz, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker*, iii. (Leipzig, 1862) 883.
14 Hose-McDougall, i. 66–68.
15 Roscoe, *The Baganda*, pp. 189, 249, 269.

1 Hodson, p. 98 f.
2 J. Shakespear, *The Lushei Kuki Clans*, London, 1912, p. 153 f.
3 *NR* ii. 187, 636 ff.
4 Hill-Tout, *The Far West*, pp. 146, 160.
5 Brown, p. 287. 6 *Ib.* p. 270.
7 J. H. Weeks, 'Anthropological Notes on the Bangala of the Upper Congo River,' *JRAI* xl. [1910] 381.
8 Seligmann, p. 466. 9 Joyce, p. 32.
10 See *NR* ii. 142 f.
11 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 615 ff.
12 F. Boas, 'The Social Organization and the Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl Indians,' *Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus.*, Washington, 1897, p. 334 ff.
13 See Hill-Tout, *JRAI* xxxiv. 322 f., 'Report on the Ethnology of the Siciatl of British Columbia,' *ib.* p. 21, 'Report on the Ethnology of Stlatlumh of British Columbia,' *ib.* xxxv. [1905] 130 ff., 'Report on the Ethnology of the South-Eastern Tribes of Vancouver Island,' *ib.* xxxvii. 308 ff., and *The Far West*, *loc. cit.*

For the inheritance of the totem and of tabus, reference must be made to the special articles dealing with these subjects.

Mention may be made, however, of an inheritance of a food tabu which is found among the Bangala of the Congo, whereby a man who may be forbidden a certain food by the medicine-man, as part of the course of treatment for a disease, transmits the disability to his descendants,[1] while among the Bambala a hereditary class, wearing a distinctive head-dress and a bracelet which passes at death to the uterine nephew but cannot be purchased, also inherits a tabu against eating human flesh or fowls.[2]

(*e*) *Debt.*—Inheritance usually connotes the acquisition of property by the heir. It may, however, on occasion involve the reverse, as among the Bangala[3] and the Ba-Yaka,[4] where a man's heir is responsible for his debts, even if there is no property, or as among the Johor Jakun, where the heirs must pay one half of the debt, irrespective of the size of the inheritance.[5]

4. The heir.—(*a*) *The kin and its members.*—As inheritance tends by custom to follow the line of descent, in a matrilineal society the heirs to a man's estate will be not his own children, but the members of his kin either as a whole or as represented by those members who are more immediately related to him (see art. FAMILY [Primitive], § 12). There is ground for believing that inheritance by the kin was far more wide-spread than it is at present, even if it was not at one time universal. It still survives, with or without modification, in a considerable number of instances, of which the following may be regarded as typical.

Among the Melanesians the normal heir to a man's property is his nephew, the son of his sister.[6] So also among the Kurnai.[7] The Arunta rule is that a man's property shall pass to that half of the tribe to which he himself does not belong, *i.e.* to his mother's brothers or his daughters' husbands.[8] In the Louisiades, land is inherited by the owner's brothers, sisters, and sisters' children, *i.e.* by the members of his kin. Among the Waga-waga tribes of New Guinea, garden land passes to the sister's children, or, if these are too young, to the maternal uncle, or the owner's mother, with reversion to the sister's children. On the other hand, a woman's garden property, including coco-nut trees, descends to her children, while her personal property, such as ornaments not given her by her husband, is divided between her children and her sisters.[9] Among the North American tribes this rule was followed in the majority of cases. Property was shared among the clan, and chiefly by the kin.[10] It sometimes occurs in Africa, *e.g.* among the Bambala[11] and some of the tribes of the Great Lakes.[12] The Selangor Sakai choose the successor to a deceased headman from among his sister's children,[13] and among the Orang Berlanus the chieftainship falls to the sister's son.[14] Among the Chibcha of Colombia, as already mentioned, the priesthood was hereditary in the female line. In New Britain, land, it is said, could not pass to a son because descent was traced in the female line.[15]

Only certain classes of property may be hereditary in the female line.

Among the Zaghâwa, succession to the headship passes to the son of a sister or, failing him, the son of a maternal aunt, though property descends to the children,[16] and among the Picts a sister's son likewise succeeded to the chieftainship.[17] Among the Nairs, personal effects pass to a sister's children, and land belonging to the wife is inherited by a daughter or sister.[1]

Property may pass exceptionally to a sister or her children when direct heirs fail.

Among the Bathonga a sister holds the property in trust for her own children, if her brother should leave no direct heirs—in this case if no brothers survive him.[2] In New Guinea the Koita rule of inheritance of the clan chieftainship is that, failing sons, or if the sons are too young, the property passes to the sister's sons. In the latter case it would revert to the sons if they were grown up when their uncle died.[3] The heir among the Congo tribes, failing a brother, is the sister's son[4] (see, further, below, (*d*)).

Some instances of the privileged position of women and of those related in the female line seem to point to an earlier system which has been superseded in general usage.

The peculiarly close relation between maternal uncle and nephew existing in the Torres Straits and in Fiji (where it is known as *vasu*), which allows the nephew to treat his uncle's property with the greatest freedom, suggests that, although now patrilineal, these people were once matrilineal, and the nephew was the uncle's heir.[5] A similar relation in dealing with property as between maternal uncle and nephew (and to a limited extent between paternal uncle and nephew) is found among the Nandi and the Masai. In this case it is reciprocal: an uncle may claim any article from the father of his nephew, and the nephew must buy it for him. The nephew, on the other hand, may claim any property belonging to his uncle.[6] In Savage Island, where the people are in a transition stage, though the son inherited his father's property, the daughters had a claim on their maternal uncle.[7] In Uganda the fact that one of the queens is the king's sister and that princesses are not allowed to marry and have children suggests that at one time the kingship was transmitted in the female line.[8]

(*b*) *Transition from kin to family.*—It is not surprising to find that, with the growth of family, as opposed to kin, feeling, an attempt should be made to avoid this law of inheritance by various means, either by gifts *inter vivos*, as among the Melanesians, or the Buntar of South India, among whom, however, these gifts become null and void at death,[9] or by adoption of the heir, a common device among the Iroquois, in order to perpetuate the chieftainship in their family,[10] or by marriage of the heir—the sister's son—to the daughter, as among the Carriers (Déné).[11]

Evidence of what appears to be a transition stage is afforded by arrangements such as that which prevails among the people of Tiga Loeroeng, whereby the inheritance is divided equally among the children of the man himself and of his sister.[12] A similar compromise between the maternal and paternal branches among the Wolaroi of Australia divides the boomerangs, waddies, etc., between a man's sons and his brother-in-law.[13] Among the Koita, personal property, such as canoes, spears, etc., is divided among the *nana* (elder brother, sister, or cousin) and *rora* (younger brother, sister, or cousin) by the eldest son, but a portion is put aside for any young children, while the garden land, assigned out of the clan holding, descends to the children, and the house site descends rigidly in the male line.[14]

(*c*) *The family and its members.*—In addition to the father's increasing desire to benefit his own children rather than those of his sister, as the family ties gradually assume an ascendancy over those of the kin, two influences are at work which would tend to divert the line of inheritance to sons in preference to nephews. As the sense of property in land grows stronger, increased importance is attached to residence as a factor determining the heir. Even in Australia, where, as has been mentioned, in the case of the chieftainship the idea of inheritance is not highly developed, and the hunting grounds are regarded as the common property of the tribe and not of the individual, hunting

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1 Weeks, p. 366.
2 E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Mbala,' *JAI* xxxv. 409.
3 Weeks, p. 425.
4 Torday-Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Yaka,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 44.
5 Skeat-Blagden, i. 519; cf. also Post, ii. 186 *f.*, 206–209.
6 Codrington, p. 59 ff.
7 A. W. Howitt and L. Fison, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 129.
8 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 523. 9 Seligmann, pp. 521, 739.
10 L. H. Morgan, 'Houses and House-Life,' *Contrib. to Amer. Ethnol.*, Washington, 1881, p. 5; for instances see Morgan, *Ancient Society*, London, 1877, p. 528 ff.; *NR* i. 273, 505 (Salish, Navahos).
11 Torday-Joyce, *JAI* xxxv. 411.
12 R. Burton, *Lake Region of Central Africa*, London, 1860, i. 37, 38.
13 Skeat-Blagden. i. 504, quoting Logan.
14 F. W. Knocker, 'The Aborigines of Sungei Ujong,' *JRAI* xxxvii. 294.
15 Brown, p. 272; for numerous other instances see Post, i. 77 *f.*
16 H. A. MacMichael, 'Notes on the Zaghâwa and the People of Gebel Midôb,' *JRAI* xlii. 336.
17 H. Zimmer, in *Zeitschr. der Savignystiftung für Rechtsgesch.*, Rom. Abt. xv. [1894] 209 ff.

1 J. F. McLennan, *Primitive Marriage*, Edinburgh, 1865, p. 147.
2 Junod, i. 208. 3 Seligmann, p. 52.
4 Torday-Joyce, *JAI* xxxvi. 40, 'Ba-Huana,' *ib.* p. 284.
5 W. H. R. Rivers, 'On the Functions of the Maternal Uncle in Torres Straits,' *Man*, no. 136 (in *JAI* xxxi. [1901]); cf. Thomson, *Fijians*, p. 75.
6 A. C. Hollis, 'A Note on the Masai System of Relationship,' *JRAI* xl. 479.
7 Thomson, *JAI* xxxi. 143. 8 Roscoe, p. 287.
9 McLennan, p. 170. 10 Morgan, *Anc. Society*, p. 71 f.
11 Hill-Tout, *The Far West*, p. 145.
12 Wilken, quoted by E. S. Hartland, *Prim. Paternity*, ii. 12.
13 Letourneau, p. 320.
14 Seligmann, p. 87 ff.; cf., further, Post, i. 82 f.

rights descend from father to son, because the patrilocal organization, providing a residence for the sisters and daughters with their husbands' tribe, makes any assignment of these rights to another than the sons an impossibility.

This cause underlies the Nāga custom, in case of default of sons, of assigning immoveable property to the deceased man's brothers, and moveables to his daughters;[1] among the Lushels, the son who is to inherit the paternal house and land—usually the youngest—remains with the parents, while the other sons at their marriage leave the parents to found a village of their own.[2]

The substitution of an agricultural for a pastoral life, with the consolidation of individual property in land, strengthens this tendency. Further, where the cultivation of the ground is the duty of the men, the inheritance of land is, as a rule, confined to the male members of the family.

Among the Basques, while pastoral pursuits predominated, the estate passed to the eldest child, whether male or female; but with an increased practice of agriculture, of which women were unsuited to take charge, and the gradual obsolescence of land tenure based upon the communal idea, male inheritance tended to become the rule exclusively.[3] In Nigeria, where security of land tenure depends upon the land being kept under cultivation, women cannot inherit it, because they are regarded as unable to comply with this condition.[4]

The second set of circumstances which supports the patrilocal organization in diverting inheritance from the female collateral to the male collateral or direct line, but affects moveable as well as immoveable property, is that which is connected with the payment of the bride-price. This custom not only frees the woman from the claims which the family or tribe may have over her, but at the same time, by effecting her transfer to her husband, cuts off herself and her children from participating in the estate of her father or brothers (see art. FAMILY [Primitive]). It is found, accordingly, among most of the African races, *e.g.*, where the bride-price is a regular institution, that inheritance in the male line is commonly the rule. Exceptions, however, are to be found among races in a state of transition or who retain some traces of the institution of mother-right (see below, p. 294).

When once the predominance of the female line has broken down, it does not follow that the inheritance will fall to the sons as a matter of course, nor that the eldest son will take precedence over his brothers. Indeed, there is ground for believing that, in some regions at least, the course of development has been from the female collateral to the male collateral rather than from the female collateral to the direct line; that is to say, the principle of group inheritance continues to hold good, but it is organized on a basis of male relationship rather than female. This is suggested by the priority or prominence given to the brothers of the deceased. A factor of importance which also helps to support the claim of the brothers or other adult members of the group as against the children is that only those are allowed to inherit who are able to hold the property, by force if necessary, or to take their share in the affairs and the defence of the group if required. This leads to the exclusion of women and minors.

The custom among the tribes of Manipur, that a clan should take a part of the estate when daughters inherit in default of male heirs;[5] the trace of clan tenure of burial grounds in Uganda, the only land which is not regarded as belonging to the king, and for which at the death of the holder, who is a tenant for life rather than owner, a successor is chosen by the clan subject to the king's sanction, as well as to the control exercised over the inheritance of personal property by the clan;[6] the fact that in Ashanti the king is theoretically the heir of all his subjects, though in practice he receives only a certain quantity of gold dust on the death of chiefs;[7] the family tenure of burial lands in Korea;[1] and other analogous customs of which instances could be adduced—suggest that the place of the kin as collective heir was taken by the clan, and that this group was later narrowed to the more immediate relatives, the brothers. Among the Ba Kwere the heir is a brother; among the Bathonga all the brothers must hold the inheritance before it can fall to the heir, the son.[2] In Nigeria (Kagoro) a grown-up son inherits such of the wives as are not taken by his paternal uncles.[3] The Buduma of the Chad assign the wives to the eldest brother, while personal property is divided into two equal parts between the children and their uncle.[4] The ceremony performed by the Kamba heir before he can assume possession of his father's property, in the course of which he throws a branch at his paternal uncle, saying, 'I pay you before the elders,' and the ceremonial cohabitation of the uncle with the wives of the deceased, seem to be a form of compensation or propitiation of the uncle, either, as is suggested by Hobley, as the representative of the deceased, or, more probably, as an heir whose claims have been superseded. In either case it implies the solidarity of the family group.[5] The Wa-Sania chieftainship is inherited by the eldest brother and by the son only in default.[6] In Samoa the legitimate heir was the next eldest brother.[7] In Fiji the succession to the chieftainship depended upon a limited election for which the son was eligible only in default, firstly of brothers, and secondly of sons of the late chief's paternal uncle. The normal heir to the house site is the eldest brother.[8] Among the Nahua, Maya, and other races of Central America, where the succession was strictly hereditary, it descended to the son, but, where there was a limited election, choice was made from among the brothers.[9] The uncle, if the children are minors, is usually regarded as the natural holder of the estate until they are of age, when, in some cases, as with the Suk, he shares it with them,[10] and sometimes hands it over to them as a whole.

When the inheritance passes to the children, the eldest son being normally the strongest, primogeniture is a common but not an invariable rule;[11] but, should the eldest son be unsuitable, he may be set aside by his father, or, in the case of a chieftainship, by those in authority. A chieftainship may descend in a family while the actual member to hold office is chosen by election. A rule of inheritance may definitely set aside the eldest son.

Among the Nāga tribes, especially among the Maos, the youngest son, as already mentioned, inherited the house. Sometimes, as among the Suk, the eldest son inherited the father's, the youngest son the mother's property, or, according to the En Temusi rule, the eldest takes all the mother's property and the largest share of the father's.[12] An interesting parallel in a civilized community is afforded by the custom of 'Borough English,' still in existence in certain parts of England, whereby certain classes of property descend to the youngest son.

When primogeniture is the rule, it is generally an obligation on the eldest son to look after and provide for his brothers out of the estate, as among the Akikuyu, where each son ultimately receives about an equal share.[13] In some Naga villages the eldest son has to maintain his brothers; among the Quoirengs he supports the rest of the family;[14] at Ladak, when the eldest son marries for himself and his brothers, the paternal possessions are transmitted on the understanding that he maintain his brothers.[15] Sometimes the younger brothers acted as the eldest brother's assistants, or were virtually his slaves, as among the Bahima.[16] A rule which places a further restriction on primogeniture, not uncommon, especially among the Bantu tribes, confines the inheritance to certain of the children only. In Uganda the eldest son of the king, who acted as his brothers' keeper or guardian, was expressly debarred from inheriting. The successor to the throne must be chosen from 'children of the drum,' i.e. children born after the accession of the father.[17] Frequently only the children of the chief or principal wife are eligible to succeed to the father's position, as among the Nandi[18] or the Zulus,[19] the chief wife in the latter case being the first of the wives for whom the bride-price was paid with cattle from the father's estate and not from cattle earned by the man himself. In ancient Mexico at Tezcuco only children born of the

1 Hodson, p. 103. 2 Shakespear, p. 42.
3 A. R. Whitway, 'Customs of the Western Pyrenees,' *Eng. Hist. Rev.* xv. [1900] 625–640.
4 Tremearne, *JRAI* xlii. 189.
5 Hodson, p. 103. 6 Roscoe, p. 270.
7 A. B. Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, London, 1887, p. 277; cf. Post, ii. 184 f.

1 W. Hough, 'Korean Clan Organisation,' *Amer. Anthropologist*, new ser., i. [1899] 150–154.
2 Junod, i. 383. 3 Tremearne, *JRAI* xlii. 189.
4 P. A. Talbot, 'The Buduma of Lake Chad,' *JRAI* xli. 248.
5 C. W. Hobley, *JRAI* xli. 411 f.
6 Barrett, p. 35. 7 Brown, p. 314.
8 Thomson, *Fijians*, pp. 356, 358.
9 *NR*, *loc. cit.*
10 M. W. H. Beech, *The Suk*, Oxford, 1911, p. 35.
11 For examples see Post, i. 220 ff.
12 Beech, p. 35 f.
13 Routledge, p. 144.
14 Hodson, p. 103 f.
15 W. Moorcroft and G. Trebeck, *Travels*, London, 1841, i. 120
16 Roscoe, *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 103.
17 Roscoe, *Baganda*, p. 188.
18 A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, Oxford, 1909, p. 73.
19 H. Callaway, *Nursery Tales, Traditions, and Histories of the Zulus*, Natal and London, 1868, i. 256 ff.

principal wife, generally a princess of blood royal, or at Tlascala of a wife married according to certain rites, could succeed.[1] Except in the last-named case, this disability has no reference to the question of legitimacy.

At the stage of development where the value of the individual as adding strength to the tribe is the chief consideration, children of free and slave women are treated equally, while those of doubtful paternity are regarded without question as members of the putative father's family. As already mentioned, adoption is practised for the purpose of inheritance, though sometimes the adopted child is disqualified from sharing the estate of his adopted parents.

In Korea, where only the eldest son can hold the family estates, it is a frequent practice, in a family without sons, to adopt the second son from another family.[2]

Even slaves are permitted to inherit in certain circumstances.

The Bangala might free slaves after long service, and allow them to receive a portion of the estate.[3] Among the Ba Yaka, in default of heirs a slave may inherit the estate, thereby becoming a free man.[4]

(*d*) *Women as heirs.*—Notwithstanding the importance attached to female descent and the part it plays or has played in determining the disposal of property, women are, among many peoples, debarred from inheritance.[5] This is due partly to the unstable conditions of a primitive society mainly based on physical force, and partly to the fact that, where the economic value of women is high, it tends to keep them in a subordinate position, without rights to hold or receive property apart from their male relatives or connexions. Throughout the greater part of Africa not only is a woman incapacitated from receiving a share of the property of her husband or father, but she frequently constitutes the most valuable part of the estate.

(*a*) *Widows.*—The custom of regarding the widow or widows as part of the responsibility or part of the property falling to the heir, which arises from the fact of their close incorporation into the group by marriage, secures a provision or a protector for them after the death of the husband. Where the wife holds a position of greater independence, she may return to her own relatives when she is left a widow. In neither case, generally speaking, would it be consonant with primitive modes of thought that she should hold property belonging to her husband's group. A woman may, however, sometimes be allowed at the death of her husband to retain such articles, especially clothes, utensils, or ornaments, as have become closely associated with her by use, although her right of ownership during her husband's lifetime has not been recognized.

Among the Arunta, a man's widows are allowed to take nothing but the yam sticks.[6] The Mafulu widow takes the current season's crop, which she has helped to plant, unless she has returned to her own people.[7] On the other hand, among the Waga-waga tribes of New Guinea, valuable shell ornaments given to a wife revert to the husband's brothers at his death.[8] In Nigeria the widow appears to have an interest in the house if she has no grown-up family and no relatives by marriage. In this case she may marry again, taking her husband to the house.[9] Among the tribes of the Baringo district of East Africa, the property given to the wife at marriage is divided among the children on the death of the husband.[10] Among the Nilotic Kavirondo, each widow receives a certain number of cattle, which, at her death, pass to her sons.[11] Among the Wagiriama and the Kikuyu, personal ornaments are distributed among the female members of the family of the deceased.[12]

It sometimes happens that, in cases where there is apparent transmission of property to a female, it is held upon terms resembling a trust.

The Mafulu widow, on the death of her husband, receives a pig from the estate, which does not, however, become her property, but is kept by her for the mourning rites which take place at the end of a year.[1] Among the Dinkas the property of a man who dies without a son passes to his widow, the reason being that it is her duty to perpetuate the family; she must provide an heir to the property by taking a second husband, whose children are regarded as children of the first husband.[2] Among the Akikuyu, each of the widows at the death of the husband retains the plantation and the hut which were hers during his lifetime, together with the goats which lived in her hut, to enable her to provide for her children; but they are in no way regarded as her absolute property, and, as her sons marry, a portion of the land is cut off and transferred to the first wife of each.[3]

Even where there is a distinct tenure of lands, as among the Tube-tube tribes of New Guinea, and the husband and wife work side by side on their respective plots, the wife has to give one half of her first year's crop after her husband's death to his relatives as the product of his labour.[4]

(*β*) *Daughters.*—Although it is generally true to say that among primitive races of to-day women do not inherit, there is evidence to suggest that at an earlier stage, and in a community organized on matriarchal and matrilocal lines, women were regarded not only as heirs, but as even taking precedence of men (see art. FAMILY [Primitive], § 6).

In the island of Kythnos the eldest daughter inherited the house,[5] and in Telos she inherited all the property.[6] The Cantabrians, on the authority of Strabo,[7] are, like the Lycians,[8] said to have transmitted property to their daughters, while among the Basques property descended to the eldest child, whether a son or a daughter.[9] The Iroquois bride stayed in her own house at marriage, as the heiress.[10] The influence and predominant position occupied by women among the American tribes are shown by the customs affecting inheritance among the tribes of the south-western region of the United States. Among the Hopis, the Zuñis, the Spokanes, and other tribes, the house and its contents belong to the woman, and are transmitted in the female line.[11] Among the Navahos, a woman's property descended to her nieces.[12] The peculiar social organization of the Nairs extends to the tenure of property. All land belongs to the women, and the heir is the eldest daughter or the sister.[13] In Egypt, a daughter had an equal, or in early times a preferential, right to a share in her father's property.[14]

In some cases, when the daughter does not inherit, she may transmit the inheritance to her husband or to her children; this is especially frequent when the husband takes up his residence with the family of his wife.

Among the Puyumas of Formosa, the son-in-law resides with his wife's parents, and on their death takes possession of the house and property.[15] In Japan the man who marries an only daughter may be adopted as a son, and his children inherit the grandfather's property.[16] Among the Bororo the husband, after the death of his wife's parents, takes up his residence in the family house and becomes head of the family.[17] An analogous transmission through a woman is found among the Salish (Halkomélem) and among the Kwakiutl of North America, where the husband transmits the hereditary name, crest, and privileges of his wife's father to his own children.[18] In those cases where, as in the Malay *ambil-anak* system, a man on marriage sustains no further relation to the family in which he was born, he naturally forfeits all rights to inheritance from it. His rights as regards the family into which he marries range widely according as his status there varies from that of a slave, as in Kaur and the Ranau districts of S. Sumatra, to that of a son of the house, as in Kroë, where his property passes to his children or the nearest female relatives of his wife, while he himself can have the usufruct of inherited property only so long as he resides with his parents-in-law.[19]

1 *NR* ii. 132, 141.
2 Hough, *Amer. Anthrop.*, new ser., i. 150–154.
3 Weeks, *loc. cit.* 4 Torday-Joyce, *JAI* xxxvi. 44.
5 For instances see Post, i. 218 f.; on the general relations of female to male inheritance, *ib.* i. 222–225.
6 Spencer-Gillen[b], p. 651.
7 Williamson, p. 119. 8 Seligmann, p. 522.
9 Tremearne, *JRAI* xlii. 189 ff.
10 K. R. Dundas, *JRAI* xl. 60.
11 G. A. S. Northcote, *JRAI* xxxvii. 61.
12 Barrett, *JRAI* xli. 25; Hobley, *ib.* 419, 431.

1 Williamson, p. 199. 2 H. O'Sullivan, *JRAI* xl. 173.
3 Routledge, p. 144. 4 Seligmann, p. 523.
5 H. Hauttecœur, *Le Folklore de l'île de Kythnos*, Brussels, 1898, p. 17.
6 F. von Vincenz, in *Globus*, 1877, p. 46.
7 III. iv. 18 (p. 165). 8 Nic. Damasc. 129 (*FHG* iii. 461).
9 Whitway, p. 627.
10 Charlevoix, quoted in Hartland, *Prim. Paternity*, ii. 67.
11 See Hartland, ii. 73 ff., for detailed references.
12 *NR* i. 505. 13 McLennan, p. 147. 14 Letourneau, p. 326.
15 J. W. Davidson, *The Island of Formosa*, London, 1903, p. 577.
16 *ASoc* viii. [1905] 422.
17 K. von den Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1894, p. 501.
18 Hill-Tout, *JAI* xxxiv. 317; Boas, pp. 334–338.
19 G. A. Wilken, *Over het huwelijks- en erfrecht bij de volken van Zuid-Sumatra*, The Hague, 1891, pp. 68, 71, cited by Post, i. 215; cf. also Post, ii. 182 f.

It is also possible, in exceptional circumstances, for an estate to fall to a woman, among a people who do not, as a rule, recognize female inheritance.

Among the Bangala, failing male heirs, a man's sister will inherit his property. Married daughters, however, among the Bangala usually take from the estate of their deceased father the women who were paid as bride-price for themselves, and hand them to their brothers, who thereafter make presents periodically to their brothers-in-law.[1] In Samoa, land might be held by females when all the males in the family were dead.[2] The inheritance may be in the nature of a temporary provision. Among the Nandi, the daughters received the mother's utensils and ornaments as well as a share in her plantation until their marriage, while the eldest son of the principal wife, who inherited the chief share of the property, was expected to give a cow to each widow.[3] Clan or kin rights may be revived to emphasize the exceptional circumstances, as in the customs followed at Laiyi and Liyal among the Maos, whereby, in the event of the inheritance falling to girls through lack of male heirs, the clan, the male relatives, or a paternal uncle took a share of the inheritance, usually the house.[4]

Where it is generally recognized that women may hold property, the inheritance is frequently shared among all the children,[5] subject to any regulation as to a larger or special share being allotted to any one or other of them.

The Mafulu woman can hold as property only clothes and personal ornaments, which, at her death, go to her husband, or are divided equally among her children.[6] Among the Benua Jakun of the Malay Peninsula, one-third of the property is assigned to the daughters, two-thirds to the sons, and the Jakun of Johore make an equal division among all the children.[7] The Tuareg children divide equally all lawful property, *i.e.* property acquired by labour.[8] Among the Koita and Motu tribes of New Guinea, coco-nut trees are divided equally between boys and girls, while the latter inherit a life interest in the land which is commonly extended to their children.[9] Among the Kenyahs and other jungle tribes of Borneo, there is a customary allocation of the different classes of property to the widow, sons, and daughters, the latter obtaining old beads, etc.; while among the Dayaks the Chinese jars, which are highly valued, are divided equally among all the children.[10] Artificial brotherhood and kinship frequently involve the rights and obligations of inheritance.[11]

5. Testamentary disposition of property.—It is evident from what has already been said that inheritance to the primitive mind depends upon a rule or custom, invariable outside certain limits, over which the deceased person has no control. Property, in so far as it is not required by the owner in the life after death, is at the disposal of the living, originally the group-kin--family, village, or the like--of which he was a member, and subsequently the limits of this group are restricted until it is composed only of his children or more immediate relatives. Virtually the disposal of the property is with the living; but by usage it comes about that those to whom it shall fall stand in certain relations to the former owner. In these circumstances it is not surprising to find that it is not usually possible for a man to dispose of his property by will. It is definitely stated in most cases that no such power exists. On the other hand, it is clear that in some cases the desire to modify the regular line of succession does exist, and attempts are made to evade the rule. This is a frequent cause of gifts *inter vivos*.

Reference has already been made to the gifts presented by the Melanesian father to his sons in his lifetime to keep property in the family, or, in the case of a chief, to secure the chieftainship for them, and the marriage of a daughter to the heir among the Salish. Among the Veddas, the gifts made to a daughter on her marriage are counted against anything she might inherit at her father's death. But it was also usual for a man on his death-bed to give to his unmarried nephew—the man allotted by custom as the husband of his daughter—the land which he would not otherwise have received until his marriage, and also to divide his land and property among his children in preparation for death, handing to each the tokens of possession—usually a stone, a tooth, flint and steel, and a lock of hair—to be produced as title-deeds in the event of dispute.[12] In this case the wishes of the dying man seem to be regarded with more respect and to carry more force than is usual. In Uganda, the king designated his successor, but his wishes might be disregarded if, in the opinion of the officials who made the selection from among the sons, the one designated was not suitable. The clan in determining the apportionment of an estate might also disregard the wishes as to its disposal expressed by the owner before his death.[1] It is usual among the Akikuyu for a man to call his family together and express his wishes as to the disposal of the property; the heir-at-law is expected to carry out those wishes in making provision for the members of the family. Theoretically the owner had absolute power of appointment; practically the demise was dictated by custom. Although it is customary for a woman to keep the goats and land which she has tended in her husband's lifetime, she might, if not on good terms with him, be assigned a smaller share. It was also possible, by means of the *kiruma*, or dying curse, to 'tie up' a particular piece of property, such as a cow, so that it could not be alienated, but must remain a family possession.[2] Among the Kenyahs and Kayans of Borneo, property was divided among the women and children at the death of the father. The division, however, was frequently made before death to avoid disputes.[3] In Samoa, part of the property was sometimes apportioned by the owner on his death-bed. In New Britain, a dying man would call together his relatives and tell them what to do with his property; but his directions would, as a rule, be strictly in accordance with custom, except that he might assign a small portion of *diwara* to his children and wives.[4] In Savage Island, house, land, and such personal property as would not be destroyed out of respect to the memory of the deceased was transmissible by testamentary disposition;[5] so also in Tahiti.[6] The limitations usually imposed upon the wishes of the owner are perhaps best indicated by the custom among the Tube-tube peoples and in the Louisiades, where, though the property fell in the one case partly to his sister's children, partly to his own, and in the other to the kin, a man might suggest to his heir-at-law that certain ornaments or personal possessions should be given to particular children. In the latter locality, gifts *inter vivos* did not revert to the estate for division, nor were they counted as part of an individual's share.[7] Melanesian customs also paid considerable deference to an owner's wishes as to the disposal of his property. In Florida he might direct that his canoe be given to his son. In Banks Island he might ask his heir to allow his sons to remain in possession of his land, and this might be permitted on payment by the sons, while personal property could be disposed of by an *ante mortem* declaration which held good on the same terms.[8]

Among the Basques there was a limited power of testamentary disposition, the individual being permitted thus to dispose of any property acquired by himself, but not of that acquired as part of the family inheritance.[9]

An ingenious method of evading the laws of succession has been devised by the Bangala. The dying man sent for the one whom he wished to benefit and committed a technical assault upon him; after the death had taken place the assaulted man then claimed compensation from the heirs. Another method was to promise that the property should pass to the individuals whom it was desired to benefit and to hand them tokens in the presence of witnesses. After the death of the owner, the property was handed over to the heir on production of the tokens.[10]

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INHERITANCE (Babylonian).—We must be careful not to assume the implications in English law of words used to translate into our tongue the legal terms occurring in Babylonian and Assyrian documents. The Assyrian civilization and customs were so entirely the same as those of Babylonia that they may be treated as one. The sense in which the verb 'inherit' is here used implies a right on the part of another to take possession, on the death of the possessor, in virtue of a personal relation between the 'inheritor' and the deceased. The nature of that relation constitutes for our purpose the 'law of inheritance.'

The prime source of information as to inheritance in Babylonia is the Code of Hammurabi, which appears to have remained in force from the close of the 3rd millennium B.C. down to the

1 Weeks, *JAI* xxxix. 426. 2 Brown, p. 287.
3 Hollis, p. 78. 4 Hodson, p. 103.
5 Cf. the English custom of *gavelkind*.
6 Williamson, p. 123. 7 Skeat-Blagden, i. 516, 519.
8 Letourneau, p. 326. 9 Seligmann, p. 90.
10 Hose-McDougall, i. 83. 11 Post, i. 96, ii. 177.
12 C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 113f.

1 Roscoe, pp. 183, 270.
2 Routledge, p. 143f.; Hobley, *JRAI* xli. 427.
3 Hose-McDougall, i. 83. 4 Brown, pp. 288, 384f.
5 Thomson, *JRAI* xxxi. 143.
6 W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1831, ii. 362.
7 Seligmann, *Melanesians*, pp. 523, 739.
8 Codrington, p. 63ff. 9 Whitway, *loc. cit.*
10 Weeks, *JRAI* xxxix. 426f.

6th century. The almost endless legal documents which deal in some way or other with the practice of which the Code records the theory may be noticed as illustrations and occasional exceptions.

The rules as to inheritance differed with the status of the deceased possessor.

1. **Father's estate.**—On the death of a father his children divided his estate equally. But real estate was often kept together and enjoyed in common. It thus constituted the *bît abishu*, 'his father's house,' on which a son had claims of revenue and which he was bound, if possible, to preserve intact and redeem if sold. When portions had been parted with by the family, by way of sale, lease, pledge, or inheritance, to distant branches, it was redeemable, and an heir had a right to exercise this power of redemption to the prejudice of another claimant's power to sell. If one son sought to sell his share, another had power to stop the sale by buying it in.

All estate was divided equally by agreement among the heirs, who executed documents asserting that they were satisfied and pledging themselves not to dispute the settlement. Each took a signed and sealed document setting out the items of his share and giving attestation of acceptance. In the case of real estate which could not be conveniently divided, as a house, pond, or even a right to revenue from office, etc., the division was often stated formally and liquidated on some convenient sale, or one heir paid off the others. The division was subject to some reservations. A father might give a favourite child real or personal property by executing a deed of gift explicitly defining its extent. In such a case the gift was not brought into 'hotchpot,' and the son so favoured could claim to share equally with the other children in the residual estate.

A father was bound to provide every son with a bride-price, or means to procure a wife, and usually set him up with his 'portion,' which would include both real and personal property. At the division of the residual estate an attempt was made to allow for this portion already received in estimating the share then to be taken, unless exempted by deed of gift as above. But, if a son was still unmarried at his father's death, the others had to reserve him a bride-price and then share equally with him.

A father was bound to provide a dowry for each daughter, on her marriage, or on taking vows, if this were done with his consent or at his instigation. Apparently a daughter might take vows without his consent. In that case she was entitled to her dowry on his death. If a daughter was left unmarried, she was entitled to receive her dowry from her brothers and sisters, and in addition they were expected to find her a husband. The daughter's dowry was her portion, but her right in it was only for life, unless she had children, when it passed to them. If she died childless, it reverted to her family—brothers in the first instance, and their heirs after them. A deed of gift might convey real property as well as personal, the dowry usually consisting of the latter. In the case of vowed women the brothers were usually stewards to their sister; but, if not satisfied with their administration of her estate, a votary might appoint her own steward.

The sons and daughters, having grown up, been married, and therefore portioned off during their father's lifetime, were bound to maintain him in his old age. But for various reasons this duty might be burdensome to them or their ministrations unsatisfactory to the father. It was in his power to adopt a son by deed, leaving to him all his residual estate and usually specifying the maintenance to be given (cf. ADOPTION [Semitic], vol. i. p. 114 f.). On such an adopted son devolved the funeral rites so important in the Babylonian's eyes (cf. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Babylonian], vol. iv. p. 444). This arrangement excluded the other children from any further share in the father's estate, but also relieved them of further responsibility. Hence they usually appear as parties, or at any rate witnesses, to the deed of adoption. It is not clear that they could object to or veto such a settlement, but there is often an express statement that they shall have no claim on the adopted heir. There may here be an indication that the son adopted was a natural son by a slave woman on whom the legitimate children might have a claim, but, as such sons were freed at their father's death, it could in any case be pressed only during his life. It is more likely to refer to a claim to share in the property left by the father to the adopted son.

But sons were not always adopted solely because the earlier children had grown up and left the paternal roof. A wedded pair might adopt a child while they still cherished hope of a family. In such a case, they might stipulate in the deed of adoption that the child now adopted should rank as elder brother to the family, if they should have other children.

If a man acknowledged his natural sons by a slave woman during his lifetime, at his death they shared equally with his legitimate sons; but these took first choice at the division of property on his death.

2. **Mother's estate.**—The same things held *mutatis mutandis* for mothers and daughters. In fact, more evidence is available of cases where women, widows or vestals, nuns or votaries, adopted daughters to care for them in their lonely old age and succeed to their estate and property. As a rule, women could not transmit estate which had come to them from their own family, but only what was given by their husbands, or purchased with their own money, although the Hammurabi Code expressly gives to a votary of Marduk power of testamentary disposition of whatever estate she received from her father. In some cases, a votary of some other god did so dispose of real property, which she had received by will from another votary, who had in turn received from yet another. In these cases, however, there was a blood relationship between the women, as aunt and niece, etc.

In the case of a married woman her children inherited or divided what had come to her from her father on marriage, what she had been given by her husband, and whatever she had otherwise acquired during her life.

If, after her death, her husband married again, the children of such a second marriage had no share in her property, nor had the natural sons of her husband by a concubine or a slave wife, even though he acknowledged them as his. If she married again and had a second family, both her families together shared in her estate; except that the second family had no claim on her first husband's gift to her on marriage, which was divided among his children by her. This expressly applied only to her 'dowry,' *nudunnu*, or gift on marriage, but may not have touched presents made to her afterwards, which seem to have been hers to dispose of as she pleased among her children. But the *nudunnu*, what he 'paid' her, was the price of the children, and she must leave it to them. The husband also paid her father a price for her—the bride-price, or *terkhatu*—which the father usually handed over to her. The presents which as suitor a man had made to his prospective parents-in-law, and which he forfeited to them if he jilted the girl, seem to have been retained by them on her marriage, although they often formed part of her

property. In every case half-brothers and half-sisters shared in the estate of their common parents, but not in that of a step-parent.

If a woman died childless, all she had received from her father went back to his heirs, except the 'bride-price' which her husband had paid for her to her father. If her father had given her that, her husband could keep it; if not, her father or his heirs had to repay it to her husband. But, if her father had given her the right of disposal, she could dispose of it where she chose.

A widow would be left in possession of what her father had given her on marriage, but had only a life interest in it. She could not leave it away from her children. She had the right to live on in her husband's house, which, however, she could not dispose of, as it must go to her children. If her husband gave her a gift on marriage, she continued to enjoy it; and, if not, she took the same share of his property on his death as a child of his would do, but it reverted to their children. If, however, she preferred to leave her husband's house, she could return to her own family, but must leave her children the wedding gift she had from her husband, and could carry off what her father had given her on marriage and re-marry if she chose. But her children by the first husband, if any, retained the right to share equally with her children by the second marriage in her father's gift to her on the first marriage. So long as she lived she would enjoy it as her child's portion of her father's estate; on her death all her children shared equally. If she had no children by either marriage, it reverted to her family.

3. Slave marriages.—If a man married a slave woman, or, being married to a free wife, had natural sons by another woman, he could acknowledge them in his lifetime by the same formula as that of adoption. In any case, they were free on his death, and the slave wife obtained her freedom also. But, unless so acknowledged by the father, these sons would not inherit his property. If he made them heirs, they shared equally in his property with the legitimate sons, but took second choice.

If a slave married a free woman, as well-to-do slaves often did, their children were free. They, of course, inherited their mother's property and half their father's, the other half going to his master.

The children of two slave parents were, of course, slaves. It appears that custom allowed them to inherit, as if free, from their parents and under the same laws, but probably the master had a large share also.

4. Vowed women.—Some special features attached to the cases of women who were vowed to a religious life. It is doubtful if these were ever temple prostitutes, but they did include vestals who were expected to be childless. A woman who was vowed by her father to a religious life was given her portion as if on marriage, and her brothers were constituted her trustees. If her father chose, he could by deed make it her absolute property and she could devise it as she willed; otherwise it went back to her brothers, like the portion given to a married daughter who proved childless. If her father died without giving her a portion as for marriage, she, like an unmarried daughter, would take an equal share with her brothers, and, whether she subsequently married or not, this would be her brothers' on her death unless she had children to inherit it.

It is not altogether certain how the various classes of votaries should be distinguished, but in some cases where the father had not given a vowed daughter a share before his death she came in for only one-third of a son's share at his death. Of this she had the life interest, and on her death it reverted to her brothers.

The votary of Marduk had a special treatment. If her father had not given her a share during his lifetime, she was entitled only to one-third of a son's share of his personal estate. But she had always the disposal of it at her death; it did not revert to her brothers. Further, she was not responsible for the State obligations which such property usually carried with it. By deed of gift her father might give her both real and personal property, over which she had absolute power.

5. Concubines.—The children of concubines were free, but did not inherit unless acknowledged. A father might give his daughter to be a concubine, and he might give her a marriage portion and also a deed of gift. But she had no share in his property on his death. If the father, however, made her no provision, her brothers were bound to give her a proper marriage portion.

6. Disinheritance.—Sons might be disinherited, but only by legal process. If a father intended to disinherit a son, the judges were bound to look into the story of the disagreement, and, if the son had not committed a serious crime such as could be held to justify disinheritance, they would forbid it. Even if the crime was bad enough to justify such a penalty, they were bound to reconcile the father and son on the first offence; but, if repeated, disinheritance was permitted. The exact nature of crime which would be held sufficient to deserve this penalty is nowhere stated, nor is the exact nature of the consequences. It would, however, certainly imply exclusion from share in the father's estate at his death.

The child adopted to care for a parent's old age was usually bound to perform certain duties of maintenance and personal care. These were specified in the deed of adoption, and a failure to perform them involved the annulment of the deed. This was a cutting off from sonship which amounted to disinheritance.

The adopted son might be repudiated by the adoptive father. In the old Sumerian Family Laws this was most heavily penalized. The father forfeited all his estates and the adopted son took them over. Whether this rule continued into the time of Hammurabi is not yet certain. The Code deals with a different case. A man might take a child to adopt as a son, and repudiate him when he grew up. If he did so, the young man had no claim, probably on account of the advantages he had already received. But, if a man had so adopted and reared a child and afterwards acquired a family of his own, he was not allowed to send away the young man empty-handed. He must give him one-third of a son's share, but not of real estate. An artisan who adopted a son was bound to teach him his trade or handicraft, and there his obligation ended. But indentures of apprenticeship were often entered into which strictly defined the obligations of both parties, so that this form of adoption may be merely a legal fiction for apprenticeship.

A man who committed incest was cut off from his father's house. This, of course, involved disinheritance, but was always more; it was outlawry also.

LITERATURE.—S. A. Cook, *The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi*, London, 1903; H. Winckler, *Die Gesetze Hammurabis*, Leipzig, 1904; C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, Edinburgh, 1904; J. Kohler and A. Ungnad, *Hammurabis Gesetze*, Leipzig, 1909–11.

C. H. W. JOHNS.

INHERITANCE (Celtic).—As has been already indicated in artt. FAMILY (Celtic) and CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Celtic), one of the chief features of Celtic society in ancient times was the prominence therein of the social factor, and this feature is conspicuous in the case of Celtic inheritance. The

succession to property is here essentially the continuity, with any necessary readjustments on the death of one or more of its members, of a society of joint-owners and tillers. For this purpose, Celtic society, as known to us from Irish and Welsh law in historic times, had been articulated and organized into distinct family groups within the wider group of the tribe (Ir. *cenél*, Welsh *cenedl*). In theory the land of the tribe belonged to the tribe as a whole, and doubtless originally the land was so held as a matter of fact; but in course of time, through the evolution of the definite family groups in question, the land of a tribe had come to be allotted in a regular customary manner, and, though inheritance still continued to be regarded from the collective standpoint, cases of liability through contract had often arisen which required the emphasizing of individual responsibility. In mediæval times, side by side with the older system, much of the land even of Ireland had come to be held by individual owners. Since the Celtic legal system of Scotland was that carried over by the Dalriad Scots from Ireland, the essential features of Scottish land tenure can best be studied in the Irish laws, especially in some of its earlier phases, such as the original exclusion in Ireland of women from any right to succession. When the Dalriad Scots entered Scotland, the few concessions afterwards made to women in Ireland through the influence of the Church had not been made, and, in the custom of the Highlands, never were made under Celtic law.

I. *IRELAND.*—**1. General.**—Lands of inheritance were in Ireland technically called *orba* lands. These belonged in theory to the tribe (*cenél*), and were subdivided into *coibne* and *dibad* lands. The tribal land had upon it the dwellings of its members, the share of the chief, which was tilled by his special tenants, portions in exclusive ownership (made as grants), and the portion cultivated by common tillage. The portions cultivated by common tillage would be divisible into those held by members holding through recognized family groups, notably the *gelfine*, and those held under the chief, as representing the tribe, by others. For the present purpose, the important portion of the land was that held by the recognized family groups (see FAMILY [Celtic]), called the *gelfine*, the *derbfine*, the *iarfine*, and the *indfine* respectively. The *gelfine* consisted of the group of agnates or male kinsmen comprised in the series father, son, grandson, great-grandson, and great-great-grandson; the *derbfine* was a similar and wider group commencing with the grandfather; the *iarfine* with the great-grandfather; and the *indfine* with the great-great-grandfather. Of these, the most important group in practice was the *gelfine*. This consisted essentially of a group formed of a father with his sons and their descendants, the father occupying until his death the main dwelling of the group, while his sons, beginning with the eldest, would, as they came of age and married, occupy dwellings of their own, until at last, on the death of the father, the youngest son occupied the original family dwelling.

On the extinction of the *gelfine* division, ½ of the property passed to the next in point of exclusiveness, viz. the *derbfine* division, while the other quarter was divided between the *iarfine*, which received $\frac{1}{16}$, and the *indfine*, which received $\frac{1}{16}$. On the extinction of the *derbfine*, ½ of its property went to the *gelfine*, while the other quarter went to the *iarfine* and the *indfine*—the *iarfine* had $\frac{1}{16}$, while the *indfine* had $\frac{1}{16}$. On the extinction of the *iarfine*, ½ of its property went to the *derbfine*, the other quarter to the *gelfine* and the *indfine*, i.e. $\frac{1}{16}$ to the *gelfine*, and $\frac{1}{16}$ to the *indfine*. On the extinction of the *indfine*, ½ of its property went to the *iarfine*, and the other quarter to the *derbfine* and the *gelfine*, the *derbfine* receiving $\frac{1}{16}$, the *gelfine* $\frac{1}{16}$.

The land was held by the *gelfine* as land held by a community, or, to use the Irish technical term, as *coibne*-land. The *gelfine* family-group owed its stability largely to the fact that it was a union not of individuals, but of householders with separate homesteads.

The right of hereditary succession in the *gelfine* was not transmissible beyond the fourth generation of the descendants of the original acquirer of the plot of ground on which the *gelfine* was settled; the sons of the fifth chief or head had no right to allotments; and no more independent households could be formed. The youngest son of the fourth occupier had to divide the original holding. The land of the family was broken up among the members of the various independent properties. It is this that explains a reference to covenants relating to *coibne* property, which the sixth chief could not confirm, while the power of confirming them was allowed his five immediate predecessors. He was disqualified, because the sixth chief of the family, in whatever way elected, would be the first who was not a representative of the rights of the original acquirer of the property.

It naturally followed from this system of tenure that a close restraint was placed on the alienation of property; and so we find that the head of a family who owned property could not part with it for his own purposes, to the injury of his descendants. A person's sons, even in their father's land, had a sufficient right to restrain the latter's power of alienation. While the *gelfine* was in existence, assent of the *gelfine* chief was necessary for the validity of contracts dealing with *coibne* property and with the head of the main tribe (*cenél*). Great importance was attached to correct conduct on the part of members of the family groups in the matter of contracts.

Inheritance lands (*orba*), outside those which the *gelfine* had occupied, were called *dibad*-lands. The latter term is a very difficult one, since it appears to be also used for the property that passed from a deceased person to the persons entitled to succeed him; and, in the latter sense, it is clearly used to describe the share of a deceased co-owner in *coibne*-land, when land of that kind passed by succession.

The term *dibad* seems to stand in opposition to *coibne* rather than to describe any specific class of lands. It appears to call attention to the divisible character of land among various persons as tenants in common, and not as members of an associated group. The same land might conceivably be classed as *coibne* or *dibad*, according to the standpoint from which the rights of the individuals holding it were regarded.

2. Tanistry.—This term (in Ir. *tánaisteachd*) comes from the Irish *tánaise* ('next'), and refers to the Irish system whereby a king's successor was not his eldest son, but the oldest member of the family, or possibly one from another family. The term *tánaise* was used for the heir-presumptive of a king.

3. Inheritance of fuidir-tenants.—These tenants were mainly recruited from those members of the tribes who had lost land and kinship, and who were settled on the chief's share of the tribe-land. In the tribal system they were supposed to form a portion of the *fine*, or family group, of the chief; but they appear, at an early period, to have formed artificial family-groups, based on the principle of reciprocal liability, and among them the custom of the hereditary transmission of property came to be established. They do not appear to have been originally regarded as kinsmen for the purpose of paying compensation for crimes; but, if there were five houses of *fuidir*-tenants, each householder having a stock of a hundred cattle, and all under one chief, they formed an association recognized as a part of a tribe. Each in that way shared in the common tribe-land (*dibad*), and paid compensation for the crimes of the other members of their separate organization. In their case, too, it was said that the father sold nothing to the prejudice of his sons, grandsons, great-grandsons, or great-great-grandsons.

4. Inheritance of an adopted child.—An adopted child (*mac foesma*) could not inherit without the consent of the family. If the *gelfine* or the *derbfine* had concurred in the verbal act from which the

adoption resulted, and if the distant branches had not objected, the consent was presumed.

5. Inheritance through the mother.—Originally in Ireland a woman could receive only a dowry (*tinól*), but no inheritance. At the same time, a sister or a daughter of a member of the agnatic group who was married to a stranger with the consent of the tribe could obtain tribal rights for her son (see H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *La Famille celtique*, Paris, 1905, p. 72). Among the Pictish kings there appears to have been a tendency for the crown to be transmitted to a sister's son (W. F. Skene, *Chronicles of the Picts*, Edinburgh, 1867, p. 7), and in the Welsh Mabinogi stories of Branwen and Math ab Mathonwy there are apparently echoes of such a practice even in Wales. The evidence is not sufficient to warrant us in seeing in this custom the vestiges of a decayed matriarchal system. It is possible that the marriage of an acceptable stranger into the tribe was regarded as an accession of strength, and, accordingly, it would not be unnatural to see provision made for the incorporation of his sons in the tribe. The will was the instrument adopted in Ireland by fathers for enabling their daughters' sons to succeed them in the inheritance technically known as *orba cruib ocus sliasta*. The property, however, which a daughter owed to a father's will was not indefinitely transmissible by her to her heirs, and, in Irish law, there was a maxim that 'the property of a woman returns.' As a matter of fact, the daughter had to give a security in such cases that the property would in future be restored to her father's kinsmen on the male side, *i.e.* to her father's agnates. When property passed from a mother to her son, care was taken to see that there was a guarantee of concurrence in the payment of the composition for crimes, and also of the share in the private wars waged by the family.

II. *WALES.*—**1. General.**—The Welsh evolution of the tribe (*cenedl*) was essentially parallel to that found in Ireland, and, consequently, it is clear that a form of the family group has been developed which was practically identical with the *gelfine* of Ireland. This family group was known as a *gwely* (lit. 'bed'), and the land occupied by it was called *tir gwelyog*. The members of these family groups were called free tenants in contradistinction to the *taeogiaid*, or unfree tenants, of Wales.

On the death of their father the daughters took nothing, unless there was a failure of male heirs; the sons divided the land among them in the following manner:

'When brothers share the patrimony between them, the youngest is to have the principal homestead and all his father's buildings and eight acres of land, his boiler, his fuel hatchet, and his coulter; because a father cannot give these three to any one but to the youngest son; and though they should be pledged, they never become forfeited. Then let every brother take a homestead with eight acres of land; and the youngest son is to share, and they are to choose in succession from the eldest to the youngest' (Aneurin Owen, *Ancient Laws of Wales*, London, 1841, i. 543; Wade-Evans, *Welsh Medieval Law*, Oxford, 1909, p. 199).

When the inheritance had been thus divided among the first generation of descendants, it was again divided among the grandsons, and again among the great-grandsons, after which time there was no further apportionment. The re-sharing had to be so arranged that no one should remove from his homestead to another, because the homesteads were of such a number that no one was obliged to be a builder for another.

The right to inherit the share of any deceased relative was not held by any one as a collateral heir of the deceased, but as a direct descendant of the original ancestor. The inheritance, however, stopped short at the fourth generation of descendants. The descendant of the fifth degree had no hereditary claim derived from his ancestor to any portion of the lands of inheritance. Consequently, kinsmen more distantly related than third cousins could not be heirs to each other in the matter of shares in lands of inheritance. On the failure of relatives within this degree, the land escheated to the king. According to the *Venedotian* (or North-West Wales) *Code*, the division between cousins-german and their children took place only if they wished it.

It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the Welsh equivalent of the Irish *gelfine* did not take into account the great-great-grandson; otherwise the two groups are identical, and are a clear proof of the parallel development of the tribal institutions of the two countries. In Wales there were special provisions for inheritance beyond the sixth degree in the case of the descendants of an exile. The process was called *dadanhudd*.

2. Succession through the female.—In Wales, as in Ireland, the son of a woman who was married to a stranger that joined her tribe was allowed, under certain conditions, to become a member of his mother's father's tribe, and to inherit along with the tribesmen. In N. Wales, the brothers had a say in the case of a daughter's marriage to a stranger, while in S. Wales (according to the *Dimetian Code*, II. cxxiii. art. 7) a woman might inherit in the absence of a son. In a system of tribal law there was an obvious objection to female succession, in that it naturally tended to alienate the lands of the family, and, by marriage with strangers, to transfer them to members of foreign tribes. When the idea of female succession enters into a social system, it is usually a clear sign of the emergence of the principle of absolute ownership, in place of the older conception of collective agnatic tenure. In Welsh law, the woman's counterpart to succession was her dowry (*gwaddol*).

'As a brother is rightful heir to his patrimony, so is his sister rightful heir to her *gwaddol*, through which she may obtain a husband entitled to land: that is to say, from her father, or from her co-inheritors if she remain under the guidance of her parents and co-inheritors' (Aneurin Owen, *op. cit.* i. 545).

3. Succession to a kingdom.—The heir-apparent to a kingdom is called in the Welsh laws *edling*, a term borrowed from the English 'etheling.' He had to be either the king's son, his brother, or his nephew (brother's son).

LITERATURE.—See Literature under FAMILY (Celtic).

E. ANWYL.

INHERITANCE (Egyptian).—*Introductory.*—The sources from which we gather our knowledge of this subject are of several kinds: (*a*) mural inscriptions (or isolated stelæ) from private tombs, hypogees of the feudal lords of the provinces, sepulchres of high Theban dignitaries, and funerary temples; (*b*) indirect information furnished by the official temple-inscriptions; (*c*) *graffiti*; and (*d*) papyri, referring more especially to the six last centuries of Egyptian history—a more abundant source than any of the other three. Generally speaking, the sources known to us cover a period extending from the end of the IIIrd dynasty (Amten inscription) to the Græco-Roman period (to which belong the Greek texts, which have enabled Revillout to find the exact equivalent for numerous Egyptian legal terms). As a matter of fact, however, we have no positive information on our subject till about the Saite period. Before that, except in the case of the XIIth dynasty, we have only conjecture and analogy to help us, rather than positive sources of information. Discoveries like the Kahun papyri and the more assured interpretation of Memphite inscriptions allow us to hope for better things in the future.

In spite of the inequality and the restricted number of our sources, and the many differences of opinion among authors on this difficult subject, we may give a certain number of sufficiently well-

founded details concerning inheritance (1) in the succession of the nobility belonging to the provinces or 'nomes'; (2) in the priesthood; and (3) in private family law. As a preliminary, we might note that, as is the case with everything connected with Egyptian property, the question is dominated by a general principle: more or less fictitiously, yet theoretically, all land of the 'eminent' property belongs to the Pharaoh.[1] Even the cessions that he has made by special act from his nominal right of property may always be recalled. This is a principle which we find frequently in other Oriental civilizations, with the same consequences.

1. Inheritance among the feudal nobility.—The largest amount of information regarding the laws of feudal inheritance is gained from some inscriptions belonging to the Middle Empire, the theory of investigation being founded on the idea that the laws of the old nobility would preserve more clearly than the laws relating to ordinary private individuals visible traces of the rules of primitive society, and thus furnish a means of guessing what the Egyptian family was like in its origins.

Feudal inheritance must be divided into several different categories. The succession to the exercise of the law and to the position of head of the province, from an administrative point of view, is hereditary from father to son, but is subject to the royal investiture.[2] It bears with it also the inheritance of the priestly prerogatives or laws peculiar to the feudal province.[3] Such a succession is entirely distinct from the inheritance of goods or lands constituting the lordly domain. In this case, as is seen from the 'Contracts of Siut,' for example, Egyptian law distinguishes between two kinds of property for which the hereditary rights are different: (1) the private domain, and (2) the feudal fief.[4] In spite of the lack of agreement on this subject resulting from the obscurity or the small number of the sources at our disposal, it would appear that the feudal fief is regarded as forming part of the succession to the dignity of head of the province, and is, consequently, handed down to the one whose investiture is confirmed by the Pharaoh.[5] As for the private domain, the rule seems to have been equal shares for each of the children, carrying with them the same rights for sons and daughters, and again in turn for their sons and daughters.

It should be added that the patrimony of a daughter is never fused with that of the man she marries, but passes intact to her child at birth.[6] The child inherits separately from its father and from its mother—a characteristic which we find again in the laws relating to private inheritance (see below).[7] This peculiarity of Egyptian law clears up a great deal of the mystery surrounding the difficult feudal inscriptions of el-Bershēh and Beni-Hasan, which have sometimes been interpreted (not without hesitation, however)[8] as signifying that in ancient Egypt there were traces of an inheritance passing to the son of the eldest daughter. This, however, is a confusion arising from the fact that sisters have the same hereditary rights as their brothers, and can pass on these rights after their marriage to their own children.[9] It is a mistake, then, to suppose that there is, in this connexion at least, any text which would suggest the existence of a matriarchate in ancient Egypt. On the other hand, all the acts and other documents known to us establish the independence of the woman in the disposal of her hereditary share, her equality with man in all laws, and the high rank that she holds in the Egypt of history.[1] This generosity towards the woman, which is so apparent in feudal law, is found again in everything regarding succession in private family law.[2]

2. Inheritance of priestly functions.—These do not pass to the eldest son by law. As a matter of fact, no charge or function of a priestly character constitutes a property which an individual can dispose of in another's favour *de jure*.

A mistake has been made in taking as a legal assertion of the exercise of this right a series of formulæ like the following: 'I shall leave my son in my place after me.' This assertion is frequently made, but is merely an euonymous expression.[3] An even more definite case would seem to be the office left to a son 'between his hands, as an inheritance for ever,'[4] but it is simply another example of the preceding. This is seen more clearly if we consider the case of the dead, who in their formulæ of adjuration make exactly the same promise to those who are faithful to their memory or to their funerary cult. They promise them that 'you will transmit your offices to your children as an inheritance for ever'—a thing over which they have obviously no control whatsoever.[5]

Legally, the 'titularization' in a priestly charge belongs to the king, as it does in the case of public functions. What really takes place in practice, however, is that the priestly functions are transmitted *de facto* to the members of the same family, and generally from father to son. The Pharaoh considered that this transmission was desirable, and regarded it as the legitimate reward for services rendered by the father.[6] All the same, it remained a favour, even though the favour came to be the general rule. The formal proof of this lies in inscriptions like those of the priest Roy mentioning that Siphah is handing over his father's charge to him.[7]

It is of importance to distinguish carefully here between the priesthood properly so called and the 'perpetual revenues' instituted in connexion with some priestly group or body in return for a funerary cult or some other favour. In the case of these revenues, it may be stipulated in the contract that the benefice is to form part of the inheritance (always supposing, of course, that the priestly function is to remain in the family). In the same way, the benefits attaching to the possession of a priestly charge may be disposed of in an act of cession (*amitpi*), so that they pass to one of the children, to several of them, to a collateral relation, to a stranger,[8] in return for certain payments, or, again, to the eldest son on condition that he will provide a maintenance for his father[9] (literally: so that he may be his father's 'staff of old age'). This is, however, not a real hereditary transference. These priestly functions might be compared in a summary fashion with the modern professions of lawyer, summoner, recorder, or notary, the office and benefices of which may be sold or transferred to another, but never without the sanction of the head of the State.

3. Inheritance in family law.—The law relating to private individuals offers numerous difficulties, principally as a result of the scarcity of legal documents belonging to the ancient period of Egyptian history. The time of Amasis and the following periods, on the other hand, abound in testamentary acts or acts connected with inheritance, and the untiring work of Revillout on the demotic papyri has thrown a great deal of light on these times.[10] For the preceding centuries, no definite statements can be made without the greatest reserve. The discovery by Petrie, however, of the splendid Kahun documents (XIIth dynasty) enables us to give a far greater cohesion to the fragmentary indications furnished by certain stelæ and certain passages of the tomb inscriptions. The combina-

[1] Maspero, *Histoire*, i. 296, 328; for further details see Revillout, in *REg* vii. [1893] 49.
[2] Cf. Maspero, *Bibl. égyptol.* viii. [1899] 161, 163.
[3] Maspero, *Histoire*, i. 297, 299.
[4] Revillout, *REg* i. [1880] 75.
[5] Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 91 ff.
[6] Maspero, *Bibl. égyptol.* viii. 163, 166.
[7] Revillout, *REg* x. [1903] 55.
[8] Erman, p. 156 *f.*
[9] Maspero, *Grande inscription de Beni-Hassan* (= *Bibl. égyptol.* viii. [1900]) 163, 166.

[1] Maspero, in *Journal des Savants*, Feb.–March, 1897.
[2] Revillout, 'Condition de la femme,' in *JA* x. vi. [1905] 473, and vii. [1906] 57, 162, 345.
[3] Cf. *e.g.* Breasted, *Ancient Records*, ii. nos. 53, 766, 925.
[4] Cf. *ib.* iii. no. 622. [5] Cf. *ib.* iii. no. 626.
[6] Cf. Erman, pp. 290, 292, 294.
[7] Cf. Breasted, iii. no. 647 *f.*
[8] *e.g.* Griffith, *Hier. Papyri from Kahun*, pl. xiii. lines 19–38.
[9] *Ib.* pl. xi. lines 10, 27.
[10] See, in addition to the literature quoted at the end of this art., Revillout, in *REg* i. 97 *f.*, 'Les Régimes matrimoniaux,' and vii. 71 *f.*, 'Notice sur les papyrus démotiques.'

tion of these, already connecting, to a certain extent, the laws of the XXVIth and following dynasties with those of the Theban and even the proto-Theban period, enables us to interpret the Memphite monuments far more clearly than formerly, at least in their essential points.

The initial principle that the 'eminent' property always belongs (at least theoretically) to the sovereign (or to the lord of the province, or to the provincial god of the temple) lies at the foundation of every interpretation of the laws regulating inheritance. It explains the registering of testamentary or similar acts in the presence of representatives of the sovereign,[1] the forms of publicity, the ratifications given by officers of the crown,[2] and also the mutation taxes collected by them. Revillout has proved at great length the ancient and permanent character of these taxes.[3] As constant characteristics of these laws, we have: (1) the absolute equality of the rights of men and women to will and to inherit, (2) the equal rights of inheritance of all children, whether male or female, (3) the preference given to the eldest, but *only as administrator of the real estate*, (4) the *hæres sui* character of each of the children, and (5) their right of intervention, even in the lifetime of the *paterfamilias*, in the acts disposing of real estate, either gratuitously or under burden of certain conditions.

The act disposing of an inheritance is known by the general name of *amitpi* (lit. 'what belongs to a *domus*,' taking the Latin word to mean what constitutes 'the family estate'—buildings, gardens, lands, etc.). The exclusive meaning of 'will,' suggested by Chabas, and accepted by Griffith, Maspero, and Revillout, was afterwards extended by the three last-mentioned to include various acts of donation, cession, constitution of usufruct, etc. The antiquity of the terminology of the *amitpi* itself and the legal expressions referring to it have been established by tracing it back from the Saite period to the XIIth dynasty, and even up to a certain point of the Memphite period.

The formality of registering the *amitpi* attested by the demotic contracts is proved to have existed as early as the Theban period by a passage of the great Rekhmara inscription. It is called *hobsu*. An examination of the Kahun documents shows that it was in existence even in the XIIth dynasty. This registration of wills is often accompanied by an attestation to ensure the carrying out of the will and to prevent future lawsuits. It consists in a copy or an extract from a copy being placed in the funerary temple of the king or prince to whom the testator is bound, on the one hand, by some function which he performs for him or by a royal pension, or, on the other hand, by a religious endowment (analogous to the Arab. *waqf*). A good example of this is found in the Sonames stela, placed in the funerary chapel of Uadzmāsu.[4] The copy may also be placed in the testator's own tomb.

The act regulating inheritance ought to be completed, if it is to have its full value, by the production of family registers (*uaprotu*), which are necessary to put the heir in legal possession of the property. These registers give an account of relationships, the origin of the property, and the legatee's right to inherit. They are submitted to legalization by competent magistrates, and at the same time the Exchequer is enabled to levy the mutation taxes. The Ptolemaic custom of (1) proving one's right to inherit by authentic documents, (2) paying the ἀπαρχή, and (3) registering the transaction, on public tablets, on pain of a fine of 10,000 drachms, is a prescription from the time of the Pharaohs, going back at least as far as the XIIth dynasty, which is as far as our present research can follow it.[1]

The pre-eminence of the eldest son, which has been definitely proved for the whole of the last period of history, from Amasis onwards, is supposed, and not without reason, to have existed from the earliest times,[2] or at least from the time of the Kahun papyri.[3] Revillout and Maspero have shown that this peculiarity of Egyptian law persisted in modern Egypt, especially in Coptic families, until the introduction of the civil law emanating from Europe.[4] Later, in the time of Nepherites, we find that the shares to be inherited are regulated by the father, who deals exclusively with his eldest son. He, in his turn, has to settle the claims of his younger brothers and sisters. It is he that administers the hereditary domain for the common good.[5] He is responsible for the dividing of the revenue, as his father's will has decreed, into the shares due to his brothers and sisters and the usufruct instituted for his mother's benefit,[6] whether by will, marriage contract, or act registered during wedlock, before or after the birth of the children.[7] The eldest, as representing his mother, brothers, and sisters, is legally bound to defend their inheritance against strangers. He acts as *nib*, or 'master.' Revillout's opinion is that he had even the right to prevent the family property from being disposed of by his father in any way contrary to family law.[8] This last point, however, has not been definitely proved. Generally speaking, the eldest seems to have taken the place of *paterfamilias* at the death of his father, administered the estate, pleaded in the law courts, and been generally responsible for the family estate to each of his brothers and sisters and other members of the family, including his mother, his aunts, and any children who were still minors. At his death the inheritance passed to the second oldest son,[9] who must observe the clauses regarding usufruct for the benefit of the testator's wife, which he accepted as binding by registered act. The share to which the eldest was entitled does not seem to have been in any way larger than that given to the rest, and the principle of equal shares seems to have been the rule down to the Ptolemaic period, when a law was made entitling the eldest to a larger share than his co-heirs.[10]

In these rules regarding inheritance, we find the same Egyptian characteristic as in everything relating to property in general—the permanence and fixity of the domain (*nuit*) is set above the claims of individuals. The estate, as we find from the stelæ, is often preserved intact with the same name, personality, and boundaries for several centuries.[11]

Two examples of wills belonging to the XIIth dynasty will give us a good idea of the general scheme:

'The last will and testament of . . . surnamed Ankhrannu. All my goods, in the gardens or in the town, are for my brother the priest . . . Uahu. Everything connected with them belongs

[1] *e.g.*, *Kahun papyri* (XIIth dyn.).
[2] Cf. *ib.* and *Rekhmara inscription* (XVIIIth dyn.).
[3] Revillout, *REg* viii. 147 ff., vii. 59, 64.
[4] Cf. Daressy, 'La Chapelle d'Ouadzmès,' in *Ann. Serv. Antiq.* iii. [1903] 155.

[1] Cf. Revillout, *Transmissions héréditaires* (= *REg* x. [1903]), p. 172, doc. 82, 88, 90, 92–97.
[2] *e.g.*, the Amten inscription and the information about it given by Maspero, *Études égyptiennes*, ii. 238.
[3] Maspero, *Journal des Savants*, Feb.–March, 1898.
[4] Revillout, *Origines égyptiennes du droit civil romain*, p. 87. Maspero (*RC*, Nov. 1905, p. 843) thinks that 'indivision' was not obligatory.
[5] Revillout, p. 89.
[6] *REg* i. [1880] 91, 97 (= Pap. Leyden, 370).
[7] *Ib.* vii. [1893] 49.
[8] Revillout, *op. cit.* At any rate it is certain that the father could not by *post mortem* disposal of property infringe the rules relating to inheritance.
[9] Maspero, 'Petrie Papyri,' *Journ. des Savants*, March, 1898, p. 137.
[10] Revillout, p. 87.
[11] Cf. *REg* vii. [1893] 58.

to this same brother. This was registered at the office of the second conservator of Acts for the South canton, in the year 44, in the 2nd month of Shomu, on the 13th day.'

The above is an example of an elder brother's will, giving his younger brother full possession *post mortem* of all that he had as administrator of the common estate. The following is the will of Uahu himself:

'The last will and testament of the priest . . . Uahu. To my wife . . . surnamed Teti, I bequeath all that was left to me by Ankhranu, all moveable estate which I inherited from him, so that she may give it to any one she likes of the children she has borne me. I leave her also the four slaves bequeathed to me by my brother, so that she may give them to any of the children she likes. With regard to the sepulchre where I shall be laid with my wife, let no one, whosoever he may be, take away any part of it. Touching the buildings which my brother constructed for me and where my wife resides, let no one dare to evict her from there. The *Wakil* Sibu will be my son's guardian.' (Then follows a list of witnesses.)[1]

Hereditary patrimonies always seem to have been kept quite separate. The daughter has the same rights as her brothers. At her marriage, her share remains distinct, as far as we can gather from the contracts known to us. She still has the administration of it and bequeaths it, separately and with entire independence, to her children. The husband may pass part of his property over to his wife, but only in the name of the children born or to be born of the marriage[2] (see MARRIAGE [Egyptian]). The children then have two distinct inheritances, one from the *paterfamilias* and one from the *materfamilias* (Egyp. *nibitpi*). The woman's right to will away her own personal estate has been attested by many different texts. The marriage contracts published up to date lead us to suppose that the widow might receive a usufruct decided by marriage contract or after marriage (by will, etc.). The acquisitions to the joint property during marriage were not subject to the rigorous rules affecting the family estate. In this case (as we find, *e.g.*, in contracts of the time of Psammetichus) these acquisitions are registered in the name of the children that the husband will have or has had by his wife.[3]

All that has been said so far concerns the inheritance of family estate exclusively, and has nothing to do with the transference of an income from any employment or office. This is regulated by a far more complicated law, of which we get some idea from inscriptions of the Memphite period, like the *mastabas* of Nikônkhu[4] and Sanuônkhu.[5] Generally speaking, the divisible revenue from the fixed or casual income coming from the employment is equally divided, wherever possible, among all the children; if not, the benefice goes to the eldest son to divide among his younger brothers and sisters. The remarks concerning the priesthood (see above) apply to the inheritance of the dignity or functions of office properly speaking (distinct from its material advantages).

The double formality requiring (1) a warrant from the central power (the king, the feudal lord, or the temple administrations), and (2) the presence of the children interested at the signing of the act of partage, has given rise (as, *e.g.*, in the case of testamentary acts or *ante mortem* acts of cession in connexion with the family estate) to *ahrégés* which describe the event, in a conventional way, in the form of frescoes or bas-reliefs, and may serve, in case of future dispute, to bear witness to what really took place. The conferring of an emblem or insignia by the *paterfamilias*, or the holding of a baton, a *sistrum*, a sceptre (*hikū*), etc., or the wearing of some special article of dress by the inheriting son or daughter, serves in these cases as a sort of résumé of the solemn ceremony gone through in the past. There is still a great deal of work to be done in the way of interpreting a number of Memphite and Theban stelæ and frescoes of this kind.

Of lawsuits or disputes concerning inheritance, the best example is found in the long inscription discovered by Loret, in 1898, in the tomb of Mes, a scribe in the treasury of Memphis under Ramses II. This functionary claims and finally obtains a piece of land, his right to which was disputed by relatives. It had been given to one of his ancestors more than a century before by the Pharaoh, who stipulated that it should be the common property of the whole family. The series of lawsuits over this lasted several generations, and exhausted every kind of trial and all the different methods of jurisdiction. An epitome will be found in Maspero, *RC* (Nov. 1905, p. 842), of the masterly publication of these texts by Alan H. Gardiner (see Literature).

LITERATURE.—J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1906–07, i. 200–209, 215–230, 231–235, 393, 405, 414, ii. 53, 766, iii. 622–626, 647 *f.*, iv. 532; F. J. Chabas, *Mélanges égyptologiques*, 3rd ser., Paris, 1873; E. Daressy, 'La Chapelle d'Ouadzmès,' in *Annales du Service des Antiquités*, iii. [1902] 155; A. Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, tr. H. M. Tirard, London, 1894, pp. 91 ff., 156 *f.*, 290–294; A. H. Gardiner, *The Inscription of Mes* (= *Untersuchungen zur Gesch. und Altertumsk. Aegyptens*, ed. K. Sethe, iv. iii. [Leipzig, 1905]); F. Ll. Griffith, The 'Petrie Papyri,' *Hieratic Papyri from Kahun*, London, 1897–98, pl. xi.–xiii. and pp. 29, 36, 'Wills in ancient Egypt,' reprinted from *The Law Quarterly Review*, do. 1898, and 'The Earliest Egyptian Marriage Contracts,' in *PSBA* xxxi. [1909] 212; G. Maspero, 'Grande Inscription de Beni-Hassan,' in *Bibliothèque égyptologique*, viii. [1900] 149, 185, 'De quelques Documents relatifs aux statues des morts,' in *Bibl. égyptol.* i. [1893] 52 ff., *Histoire ancienne des peuples d'Orient*, i. [Paris, 1894] 296, 299, 328, 523, 'Les Fouilles de Petrie au Fayoum,' in *Journal des Savants*, 1897, pp. 206–221, and 1898, pp. 98–113, 145–158 (= *Bibl. égyptol.* viii. [1900] 403–464), 'The Life of Rekhmara,' in *Journal des Savants*, 1900, p. 544, *Études* xii. [1908] 124, and in *JA* x. vi. [1905] 473, vii. [1906] 57, 162, 345, also *Précis du droit égyptien, comparé aux autres droits de l'antiquité*, Paris, 1899–1902, and *Origines égyptiennes du droit civil romain*, do. 1912, pp. 4, 44, 87, 127; W. Spiegelberg, in *RTr* xxviii. [1906] 190; A. Wiedemann, 'Kahun Papyri,' in *OLZ* i. [1898] 86.

GEORGE FOUCART.

INHERITANCE (Greek).—The general unity of Greek law is seen in the rules governing inheritance, adoption, and participation in the blood-feud.[1] Rights of property and succession were universally based upon the principles regulating the life of the family, in its extended form as γένος (*gens*, clan); they were the outcome neither of caprice nor of policy directed by a legislator or Assembly, being, in fact, prior to the State, and religious in origin. These primitive ideas, and the rules to which they gave birth, were only slowly subjected to reconstruction as society developed. The general course of this evolution consisted in the discovery or creation of the individual as the unit with which the State had properly to deal. In some departments the substitution of the individual for the group was carried out with logical completeness, but in others the older ideas were very tenacious of life and led to strange results. Naturally, our knowledge is chiefly confined to the details of Attic family law, but the Athenian rules were not necessarily in all respects the most admirable and enlightened.

I. The family property and family cult were conceived as forming a whole, which, as far as possible, remained stable in the hands of successive generations of male representatives. Under such a conception intestate succession within the family (*oikos*) was necessarily the rule, for there was no place for a personal expression of will to direct the devolution of a body of rights and duties which could proceed only along lines sanctioned by immemorial, and

1 Maspero, *Journal des Savants*, Feb.–March, 1898.

2 This was separate from the indemnity, consisting of moveable estate (*hannu*), money, or income, decided upon in the marriage contract, to be paid in the case of desertion or divorce. There was also a resolutory clause for the case of adultery on the part of the woman (see MARRIAGE [Egyptian]).

3 Cf. Griffith, *PSBA* xxxi. 212; Revillout, *Précis du droit égyptien* (= *REg* i. [1880]), pp. 91–100.

4 Cf. G. Fraser, *Ann. Serv. Antiq.* iii. 122–130; Maspero, *ib.* 131–138

5 A. Mariette, *Les Mastaba de l'ancien empire*, Paris, 1882–89, p. 318.

1 See Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, p. 72: 'es ist nicht eine Summe einzelner Stadtrechte, sondern das Recht einer grossen, weltbeherrschenden Nation.'

therefore sacred, usage. Even when testation became possible, the will was for long but a precarious means of regulating succession, because generally in conflict with the cupidity of relatives who could always fall back upon the traditions of intestate succession. 'At Athens a will was thought fair game' (Wyse, *The Speeches of Isæus*, p. 650).

According to the letter of the Solonian law, a man with a legitimate son of full age could not make a will at all, the devolution of his estate being entirely beyond his control (Is. vi. 28). Whether he could by any legal means disinherit his son is at best uncertain—at any rate not by will.[1] Nor could he disregard his daughter's rights (Is. iii. 42: *οὔτε γὰρ διαθέσθαι οὔτε δοῦναι οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν ἐξεστι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ἄνευ τῶν θυγατέρων, ἐάν τις καταλιπὼν γνησίας τελευτᾷ*). Isæus certainly speaks too strongly, as he practically asserts that the testamentary power permitted to a man whose only legitimate descendants were girls, still unmarried, meant simply the appointment of their husbands, and did not include the right to bestow legacies outside his family. Usually, if a man wished to divert his estate from his next-of-kin, he would adopt the legatee in his will, with the essential proviso that he must marry the daughter; but it seems clear that he might, if he wished, bequeath her and the estate together, without adopting.[2] The original significance of a will being to enable a man without a son to adopt one, thus in effect also enabling him to defeat the anticipations of the next-of-kin, a will which adopted any other than the next-of-kin himself, and *a fortiori* one bequeathing both daughter and estate without at the same time adopting the devisee, challenged assault; and a perfectly legal will was always liable to be annulled by the omnipotent jury on grounds of equity.[3] If the estate was worth powder and shot, the girl would inevitably become *ἐπίδικος*, claimed at law as 'heiress' (*ἐπίκληρος*) by the next-of-kin. Anyhow, the law was explicit that the estate could not be willed away from daughters, but must go 'with them' (Is. iii. 68). It was generally futile for a man to try to divert his estate from his legitimate offspring on the one hand, or from his next-of-kin on the other. But custom, if not law, allowed him to give by will a special legacy to a son, even an illegitimate son, or to non-relatives or religious bodies, such bequests often being of considerable magnitude. Only the childless man of full age and in full possession of his faculties was at liberty to choose his own heir; and even he was powerless to thwart the application of the traditional rules of inheritance *ab intestato* if the cupidity of the next-of-kin tempted him to try his luck against the will.[4]

The right of inheritance of legitimate male descendants, including the son adopted *inter vivos* (see ADOPTION [Greek]), was indefeasible, and was placed on a different footing from all other claims; for collaterals and testamentary heirs must claim before the Archon (*ἐπιδικάζεσθαι*), and get an order of him, or ultimately of a *δικαστήριον*, before taking possession of the estate; *i.e.*, they must submit their claim to public challenge (Is. iii. 59). Sons of the body, or one adopted *inter vivos*, entered on possession at once without this process, and had as against a third party in actual possession an 'action of ejectment' (*ἐξούλης δίκη*). On the other hand, lineal heirs could not escape the inheritance with all its encumbrances, whereas for all other heirs declinature was possible.[5] Rights of primogeniture were unknown in Greece, although an eldest son had by courtesy, as *primus inter pares*, a privilege of choice (*πρεσβεία*). The law asserted the principle of equal division (Is. vi. 25: *τοῦ νόμου κελεύοντος ἅπαντας τοὺς γνησίους ἰσομοίρους εἶναι τῶν πατρῴων* [whether the sons were by the same mother or not was immaterial]). If a married son predeceased his father, his sons were entitled to his share in equal parts; *i.e.*, distribution was *per stirpes*.[6]

[1] At Sparta in the 4th cent. B.C., if the story of the law passed by the Ephor Epitadeus is true (Plut. *Agis*, 5), this was possible.

[2] Cf. Aristoph. *Vesp.* 583.

[3] Cf. Is. i. 41: *χρὴ δέ, ὦ ἄνδρες . . . ὅπερ ποιεῖτε, τοῖς κατὰ γένος ψηφίζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ διαθήκην ἀμφισβητοῦσιν.* It was a symptom of the moral collapse of Bœotia in the 3rd cent. B.C. that childless men left their property by will away from collaterals, while many who had children left the bulk to their clubs (Polyb. xx. 6).

[4] Hence the Speeches of Isæus, being all about claims to property, turn not upon evidence of its legal transfer, and the like, but upon proofs of kinship. For the statute of limitations, which only partially protected the will, see Is. iii. 58.

[5] Cf. Dem. xxii. 34: *κληρονόμων καθίστησιν ὁ νόμος τῆς ἀτιμίας τῆς τοῦ πατρός.* In the Gortynian Code the son is not *heres necessarius*, as at Athens.

[6] The principles of equal shares to all of the same degree, and of representation and distribution *per stirpes*, seem to have been applied also to collaterals and when the estate passed through daughters.

At Athens daughters had absolutely no rights of inheritance by the side of their father's sons; but their brothers were under obligation to provide them with a suitable dowry and to give them in marriage (Dem. xlv. 74).[1]

Failing lineal heirs, or a valid and undisputed adoption by will, it was necessary to fall back upon the rules of intestate succession.

The law, obscure already in the 4th cent. B.C.,[2] ran as follows: 'Whosoever dies without a will, if he leave behind him daughters, [the next-of-kin] with their hand [shall inherit]. If he do not [leave daughters], the following shall be masters of his estate. If there be brothers of the same father [as the deceased, they shall inherit]; and if there be legitimate children of brothers, they shall take their father's share. If there be no brothers or brothers' children, [sisters, of the same father as the deceased, and children][3] of them, shall inherit, in the same way. But males and the issue of males shall have precedence [over females and the issue of females], if they have the same origin [as the said females], even if [such males] be in degree more distant. If there be none on the father's side as far as children of first cousins, the collaterals on the deceased's mother's side shall in like manner inherit. But if there be no descendants on either his father's side or his mother's side, within the prescribed limits, the nearest in descent on his father's side shall inherit. But an illegitimate son or illegitimate daughter cannot claim as next-of-kin either family cult or family estate, if born after the Archonship of Eukleides.'[4]

Succession at Athens, therefore, was arranged according to a series of stocks: (*a*) lineal descendants of the deceased; failing these, an heir must be sought in (*b*) that inner circle of relatives constituting the deceased's *ἀγχιστεία*: (1) descendants of his father; (2) descendants of his paternal grandfather; (3) descendants and collaterals of his mother; (4) failing all these, the nearest kinsman of any degree discoverable on the father's side.[5] The downwards and outwards limit, which was also the limit of the *ἀγχιστεῖς*, was given by the deceased's first cousins once removed, *i.e.* children of his first cousins (cousins-german). That is to say, ultimately any great-grandson could claim as heir-at-law to succeed any grandson of a common ancestor; with respect to that inheritance a new succession began at this point, so that second cousins, as such, had no claim upon one another's estate, but each found his heir, failing a son, in the circle of his own *ἀγχιστεῖς* as aforesaid.[6] The *οἶκος* included four generations, down to great-grandsons (second cousins to one another).[7] Such an one could not inherit from any below the third generation, being himself, as heir (=son), the fourth. That is to say, the third generation could call upon the fourth to undertake the duties of sonship—in primitive times doubtless without escape.

'Whether we look at the rights of succession, or at the duties of the blood-feud, or at the honours owed to the dead, we discover on all sides signs that the *ἀγχιστεία* was not a conception that could be extended indefinitely' (Wyse, p. 566). It is an archaic classification, one of the oldest facts of Greek social

[1] There was no legal definition of a suitable dowry. A father in Lys. xxxii. 6 stipulates in his will the amount to be given; but this probably could not bind his heirs as a matter of law. Inscriptions seem to prove that at Mykonos (*BCH* vi. [1882] 590), and at Ephesos (Dittenberger, *Syll.*[2], Leipzig, 1898-1901, no. 510, l. 55), the law was the same as at Athens.

[2] Cf. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 9: *διὰ τὸ μὴ γεγράφθαι τοὺς νόμους ἁπλῶς, μηδὲ σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ περὶ τῶν κλήρων καὶ ἐπικλήρων, ἀνάγκη πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις γίγνεσθαι.* Solon, who perhaps really was the first to redact these laws, was, of course, simply formulating the practice of immemorial antiquity. The law is paraphrased by Isæus (xi. 1).

[3] But the gap here may be much larger (see J. H. Lipsius, *Att. Proc.*[2], Berlin, 1887, p. 584).

[4] The text of the law, clearly not complete, is quoted in [Dem.] xliii. 51.

[5] Nothing is known about the disposal of *bona vacantia* at Athens. Perhaps the case never arose; at any rate there is nothing like the Roman *usucaptio pro herede*.

[6] Strictly, the term *ἀγχιστεία* did not embrace sons or grandsons, but meant those who succeed on failure of lineal heirs, and must, therefore, prove their title (*Is.* iii. 59).

[7] Cic. *de Off.* i. 17: 'Prima societas in ipso coniugio est; proxima in liberis; deinde una domus, communia omnia . . . sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt.'

organization, perhaps designed to apply not originally to the transmission of property, but to distinctions of religious obligation towards the dead, and community in blood vengeance.

The effect of the maxim *κρατεῖν τοὺς ἄρρενας* was to split each stock into two sections, the male excluding the female. Sons and sons' sons inherited before daughters and daughters' issue. Similarly, a brother's son, though a step further from the common ancestor (the deceased's father in this case), excluded his own aunt, the deceased's sister. This principle governed all successions, whether in the direct line or as between collaterals. But it held only within each in turn of the orders or stocks of succession, so that a female in stock (1) excluded a male of stock (2). Thus, a sister of the deceased by the same father (*ἀδελφὴ ὁμοπατρία*) ranked before his male cousin on the father's side (*ἀνεψιὸς πρὸς πατρός*), because, the condition *ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν*, or issue from the same point on the stem, not being realized, male preference did not here operate; a female cousin on the father's side (*ἀνεψία πρὸς πατρός*) would, on the same principle, exclude the uterine brother (*ἀδελφὸς ὁμομήτριος*). The law called to succession the paternal kindred down to and including first cousins once removed before admitting the relatives on the mother's side. And these in their turn ranked as follows: (1) uterine brothers, and issue; (2) uterine sisters, and issue; (3) maternal uncles of the deceased, and issue; (4) maternal aunts, and issue. The limit here also was first cousins' children. The symmetry of the table of orders of succession is intelligible; the real difficulty is to understand how precedence of males was combined with the principle of representation.[1]

Greek family law does not exemplify the *levirate*, or marriage of the widow by the deceased's brother for the purpose of perpetuating the line. The wife, as such,[2] could not inherit from her husband, whose estate, failing lineal heirs, must pass to his father's or mother's relatives. An analogy to the levirate is perhaps to be found in Sparta, where a wife might be commissioned by her husband to bear children to another (Xen. *Resp. Lac.* i. 7; see M. P. Nilsson, 'Die Grundlagen des spartanischen Lebens,' in *Klio*, xii. [Leipzig, 1912] 325 ff.).

Did Attic law recognize the 'melancholy succession' of parents to the estate of deceased children? A passage in Isæus (xi. 30) seems to assert that under certain conditions a mother might succeed her son, and perhaps in his time the law was interpreted as containing an implicit recognition of her right; but this contradicts another passage in the same speech (xi. 17). That a father ranked before all collaterals has been deduced from the obligation of sons to maintain parents and grandparents (Is. viii. 32); but this would prove too much, if it will bear any inference at all (cf. J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren*, ii. 550).

If a man, having no son of his body, died without adopting an heir, leaving only a daughter (or daughters), she was in a peculiar position, in that she could not claim her father's estate, but was herself liable to be claimed at law (*ἐπίδικος*) by collaterals as an appendage thereto (Is. x. 5). She was an *ἐπίκληρος* 'on the estate,' and became the object of a claim at law (*ἐπιδικασία*), in which a court[3] decided who was next-of-kin and entitled to take her to wife (*συνοικῆσαι τῇ γυναικὶ κύριος*, Is. viii. 31) with the estate.[4]

The rules of succession to an *ἐπίκληρος* followed those of intestate succession to the estate (*κλῆρος*)

[1] Would representation be possible when the division was amongst cousins' children, and so bring in the fifth generation, which fell outside the *ἀγχιστεία*? When Isæus (vii. 18 f.) says that male preference really began only with first cousins, he is simply dishonest (see Wyse, p. 560).

[2] She might be, and in fact perhaps generally was, related to him by blood.

[3] At Sparta it was the duty of the kings *δικάζειν πατρούχου παρθένου πέρι, ἐς τὸν ἐκνέεται ἔχειν, ἢν μή περ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτὴν ἐγγυήσῃ* (Herod. vi. 57). This power of decision was important, and sometimes entailed serious consequences for the body politic (cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* 1304*a*: *καὶ περὶ Μυτιλήνην ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γενομένης*, κτλ.; and so in Phokis, *ib.*). At Sparta, king Kleomenes having died *ἄπαιδος ἔρσενος γόνου*, his daughter Gorgo was married by her uncle Leonidas (Herod. vii. 205).

[4] The law in respect of girls not yet marriageable is not known. The Gortynian Code permits the 'heiress' (*πατρῳώκος*) to be married when she is twelve. If Blass has rightly restored Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 56. 7, fourteen was the lower limit at Athens.

itself, with the obvious modifications, the general principle being that she was the prize of that male relative (*ἀγχιστεύς*) who would have inherited the estate *ab intestato* had she not existed. Claimants fell into stocks as before. Within each stock the rule of *seniores priores* may have been followed. As the primitive aim had been to continue the male line, descendants and collaterals of the deceased's mother were perhaps not originally admissible; the tendency would be to enlarge the list of claimants when property was at stake, and in the 4th cent. B.C. the mother's relatives had a legal claim to the *ἐπίκληρος* just as they had to the *κλῆρος*.

The next-of-kin could not be compelled to marry the girl if she was poor; he had the choice of bestowing her in marriage with a portion on a scale fixed by law according to his own property-classification, and it was the Archon's duty (on which see Is. vii. 30) to see that he adopted one or other course (law in [Dem.] xliii. 54: *τῶν ἐπικλήρων ὅσαι θητικὸν τελοῦσιν*, κτλ.). The decision of the next-of-kin would generally turn upon the size of the estate, and a rich 'heiress' was naturally a coveted prize. If he was himself below the third property-class, he was apparently free of obligation to dower. Contumacy was probably construed as *κάκωσις ἐπικλήρου*,[1] the penalty for which was serious. Her enforced dowry would probably make it worth the while of a more distant kinsman to take the girl. In the case of a rich *ἐπίκληρος*, waiver by the first kinsman entitled to her opened the door to the next in succession. In Sparta apparently the next-of-kin gained the right to bestow in marriage an *ἐπίκληρος* upon whom he pleased, and this was one cause of the gradual concentration of wealth (Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 9. 1270*a*; see W. L. Newman, *Pol. of Ar.*, Oxford, 1887, ii. 327).

The estate to which an *ἐπίκληρος* was appended did not pass to the next-of-kin who married her, but to the son (*θυγατριδοῦς*) or sons on attaining majority—their father in the meantime being controller (*κύριος*) of the estate, and enjoying the usufruct (Is. iii. 50). The *ἐπίκληρος* was thus not strictly an 'heiress,' but an intermediary through whom the estate passed to her father's heir (Is. viii. 31).[2] Whether her first son had an exclusive right to his grandfather's estate is not clear ([Dem.] xlvi. 20: *καὶ ἂν ἐξ ἐπικλήρου τις γένηται, καὶ ἅμα ἠβήσῃ ἐπὶ διετές, κρατεῖν τῶν χρημάτων, τὸν δὲ σῖτον μητρεῖν τῇ μητρί*—not in accord with Is. viii. 31: *οἱ γενόμενοι παῖδες*, κτλ.; see Wyse, p. 361). It is obvious that it might indeed be little to the advantage of the boy to pass out of his father's *οἶκος* into that of his maternal grandfather by posthumous adoption, leaving his brothers to inherit the paternal estate. One thing, however, is certain—that primitive family law or custom took no account whatever of personal likes or dislikes; it was left to *esprits forts* and the lawyers of a later age to defy or evade its rules, pending their abrogation by the emancipated community.

Interest in the *ἐπίκληρος* culminates when the complications of previous marriage are considered. What happened if she had been given in marriage by her father to one[3] who was not also next-of-kin? Isæus is explicit that the next-of-kin had an absolute right to compel her to abandon her husband and to marry her himself (Is. iii. 64: *πολλοὶ συνοικοῦντες ἤδη ἀφῄρηνται τὰς ἑαυτῶν γυναῖκας*). In practice, doubtless, she might escape by sacrificing the estate, if the next-of-kin would be satisfied with that; but such bargains can hardly have been legalized, and what fiction was in use to prevent the next in succession from asserting his claim upon waiver by the first is not known (cf. Is. iii. 74; And. i. 121: *Καλλίας λαγχάνει τῷ υἱεῖ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἐπικλήρου, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιδικάσωμαι ἐγώ*). Perhaps the existence of male issue of the marriage may have extinguished the claims of the next-of-kin, as at Gortyn. General considerations of equity are quite inapplicable to the problem. 'All the rules

[1] It must be borne in mind that a female, married or unmarried, without brothers or grandfather became *ἐπίκληρος* on her father's death, though she had not a penny in the world (and whatever her age), and had a claim as such upon the next-of-kin. The intention of the institution was not to discover who should receive a windfall, but upon whom lay the sacred duty of perpetuating the dead man's line. Naturally, as the older religious ideas at the basis of the family decayed, the purely financial aspect of the situation tended to become paramount.

[2] Hence she is never called *κληρονόμος* (cf. Dem. lvii. 50: *ἐπικλήρου κληρονομήσας*).

[3] If he had been adopted, in lifetime or by will, he was, of course, 'son,' and his wife did not become *ἐπίκληρος* on her father's death. If the will or the act of adoption were contested and declared invalid, she would at once become *ἐπίκληρος* and be subject to claim.

concerning the *ἐπίκληροι* are a violation of equity' (Wyse, p. 609).

It seems that a man, on becoming entitled to an *ἐπίκληρος*, could put away his wife, or at least bestow her on another, in order to take advantage of his good fortune (cf. Dem. lvii. 50: *ἐπικλήρου κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου*).

II. The interest of the Attic law of inheritance lies largely in its application of the rules governing primitive society to a democratic organization steadily drifting away from the old point of view. The Gortynian Code[1] exhibits these principles as modified in a Dorian oligarchical society.

At Gortyn intestate succession is the rule, for testamentary power is unknown, so that the Code in this respect is more archaic than Solon's laws. Male precedence is in force, as at Athens. The estate passes to the following series of heirs: (1) the deceased's children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren; (2) his brothers, their children, or grandchildren; (3) his sisters, their children, or grandchildren; (4) failing these, it goes to 'those entitled' (*οἷς κ' ἐπιβάλλῃ ὀπῶ κ' ᾖ*, *i.e.* the next-of-kin); (5) failing a kinsman, to 'those constituting the family lot' (*τᾶς Foικίας οἵτινές κ' ἰωντὶ ὁ κλᾶρος*, *i.e.* the serfs on the estate, who are thus a man's heirs in the last resort).[2]

The Code is in advance of the Athenian law in its treatment of women, for (1) although sons have sole right to the townhouse and its furniture, and the cattle, daughters share in the rest of the patrimony, a daughter's share being fixed at half that of a son;[3] (2) a woman has rights of several property absolute during her lifetime against both husband and children; (3) her property is transmitted in the same way as a man's estate.

The Code contains elaborate rules about the *πατρῳῶκος* (=*ἐπίκληρος*). Clearly the original idea of providing male succession to the deceased has come to be felt less strongly than at Athens, and the pecuniary interests of the relatives override the conception of duty to the dead; in especial, the institution conflicts with the right of inheritance given to women by the Code. The Gortynian *πατρῳῶκος* is, in fact, a true 'heiress,' retaining her inheritance in severalty for life, and is not, as at Athens, a mere vehicle of the estate to her son.[4] The right to marry the heiress belongs to (1) her father's brothers according to seniority—if there are several *πατρῳῶκοι*, the second brother is entitled to the second sister, and so on; (2) if there are no living brothers of the dead man, the sons of the senior uncle claim their cousins in order of seniority; but any living uncle excludes his nephews, sons of a predeceased elder brother. There is nothing to show that the right to marry the 'heiress' passes beyond these to the other collaterals; *i.e.*, the conception of the *ἀγχιστεία* is looser than at Athens. The rule is that each claimant lays his account with one *πατρῳῶκος* only (v. 27: *μίαν δ' ἔκεν πατρωιῶκον τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα, πλίαδ δὲ μή*); *i.e.*, if a compromise is accepted by him, he cannot go on to assert a claim to the next sister; and, conversely, compromise with the senior claimant frees the *πατρῳῶκος* from all. But, if there are no next-of-kin, she is required to find her husband among her tribesmen, if possible—giving them the chance by public advertisement.

The Code deals with the situations arising when one or other of the parties is too young to marry, or is unwilling to do so. Neither is, in fact, compelled to marry the other; the next-of-kin may simply waive his claim, in which case it is open for the next in succession to claim, or he may accept the legal indemnity of half the estate (which frees the *πατρῳῶκος* from further claims of next-of-kin). It rests solely with the *πατρῳῶκος* to decide whether she will marry or indemnify the claimant.

The Code lays down definite rules for the following interesting cases: (*a*) when a woman who is already married becomes *πατρῳῶκος* by the death of her father and (or) her brother, and (*b*) when a *πατρῳῶκος* becomes a widow. In each case the liabilities turn upon the presence or absence of children. (*a*) The married *πατρῳῶκος* is not compelled, but is at liberty, to separate from her husband: (1) if there are children (*τέκνα*), the rights of all claimants are extinguished, and she may remain *in statu quo*, or, by surrendering one-half of the estate to her husband,[1] regain her freedom to remarry within her tribe; (2) if there are no children, the rights of the next-of-kin operate, but, at the price of half of the estate paid to him who has first claim, she can either remain *in statu quo* or separate from her husband and re-marry within her tribe. (*b*) In the case of a *πατρῳῶκος* who becomes a widow: (1) if there are children, rights of relatives lapse, and she may re-marry, if she pleases, within her tribe, without penalty; (2) if there are no children, the first marriage is of non-effect, the rights of relatives revive, and she must either marry the next-of-kin or indemnify him, as before. The 'heiress' must, therefore, marry under any circumstances; she is not free from that obligation either through failure of next-of-kin or by indemnifying. Again, it is not until she has borne a child that she has fulfilled her duty wholly, and is thenceforth free. On the other hand, she cannot, as at Athens, be forced into a distasteful union.

III. An interesting inquiry is as to what happened when this body of Hellenic legal principles came into contact with other systems—those of the East and Egypt, and finally with that of Rome. Especially interesting must have been the relations established in the great Hellenistic foundations of the Seleucids. As regards Ptolemaic Egypt, the answer is being given by the Papyri (cf. Mitteis, p. 46 ff.). In the East the Syrian Code shows how the social structure was modified by the combined working of Hellenic tradition and Roman legal ideas in the early centuries of the Empire.

The Syrian Code, in its rules of intestate succession, exhibits the following chief analogies with Hellenic law: (1) natural right of legitimate children to inherit the patrimony;[2] (2) a succession of stocks; (3) male precedence;[3] (4) equal distribution within the stocks; (5) rights of inheritance given to relatives of the deceased's mother on failure of the paternal side.

On the other hand, the Code exhibits the following departures from the Athenian rule: (1) daughters rank with sons, and sisters rank with brothers of the deceased, for equal share; (2) his mother ranks with his brothers and sisters for an equal share with them; (3) yet issue of daughters and sisters inherit *after* the agnates,[4] *i.e.* after his uncles and their sons, but before his aunts and their issue. A fourth divergence would lie in the fact that, by the Syrian rule, the father inherits before brothers and sisters of the deceased—if it were proved that at Athens he could not inherit from a son.

The right of daughters to some share in the patrimony was already recognized in the Gortynian Code; but it seems probable that these divergences from the general Hellenic practice are due to the influence of Roman law, and perhaps to definite interference on the part of Constantine (see Mitteis, p. 342 ff.).

[1] The date of the actual Code is perhaps not earlier than the 5th cent. B.C., but its basis is very much older. The sections concerning inheritance and heiresses seem to give the whole law on their subject, and to belong to the newest section of the Code.

[2] But on this see Kohler-Ziebarth, *Das Stadtrecht von Gortyn*.

[3] A daughter previously given in marriage with dowry by her father has no further claim, the dowry being fixed in amount by law as half a son's share in the intestate estate. Ephorus (quoted by Strabo, p. 482: *φερνὴ δ' ἐστίν, ἂν ἀδελφοὶ ὦσι, τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μερίδος*) makes this the universal rule in Crete.

[4] This is marked as an innovation in the Code by the fact that a retrospective limit of its working is given. The definition of a *πατρῳῶκος* is the same as at Athens.

[1] The law says simply, 'parting the estate as laid down by law' (*διαλακόνσαν τῶν κρημάτων ᾗ ἔρατται*); and this might mean that in this case also the indemnity goes to the next-of-kin (see *Recueil des inscr. jurid. grecques*, i. 474). The next-of-kin might, of course, already be her husband.

[2] Cf. Varro: 'Venio nunc ad alterum genus testamenti quod dicitur physicum, in quo Graeci belliores quam nostri' (fr. quoted in F. Schulin, *Das gr. Testament verglichen mit dem römischen*, Basel, 1882, p. 16).

[3] The Code gives a reason for this: 'Denn die Gesetze suchen den reinen Samenherans, und wer der Nächste ist, den bringen sie der Erbschaft nahe' (quoted in Mitteis, 326).

[4] *i.e.*, daughters and sisters cannot be represented, as in Attic law, by their children; but sons are represented by their sons.

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INHERITANCE (Hebrew).—Our word 'inheritance' has no exact equivalent in Hebrew. The various terms which denote possession may be used when the possession comes in the way of succession to a person deceased. But, if this is the case, the context must show how the possession came about. When we inquire of the documents in the Canon how this succession was regulated, we find no answer until we come to the latest period of the history. The oldest code of laws is silent on this point, and the patriarchal narratives reflect later conditions. The Biblical writers evidently supposed matters of this kind to be regulated by well-known family and tribal customs.

For Israel's nomadic stage, therefore, we are left to conjecture. Fortunately the customs of the desert are much the same in all ages, and conjectures based on the analogies of nomad life may claim a considerable degree of certainty. Individual ownership of land is unknown in this state of society, and personal property is small in amount. The man owns his arms, the woman her ornaments. The cattle, while nominally the property of the shaikh, are really common to the whole clan. The spoils of war are divided among the able-bodied men. At a man's death his arms are seized by the next-of-kin, or are divided, like the spoils of war, among the men able to bear arms. Women do not inherit, because they are themselves the property of their husbands and pass to the heirs with the rest of the estate. This was the rule in Israel even after the settlement in Canaan. Muhammad's regulation, giving a daughter half as much of the estate as went to a son, was an innovation on the earlier custom, according to which none could be heirs who did not take part in battle.[1] In the nature of the case Hebrew custom must have been the same.

Israel established itself in Canaan partly by conquest, partly by amalgamation with the older inhabitants. So far as the arable land was acquired by conquest it was treated like other spoils of war. Each family group assigned portions for tillage to its able-bodied men, but without relinquishing title. On the other hand, we must suppose the Canaanites to have had private property in land. The cultivation of the vine and olive is hardly practicable under any other system. Light on the state of things in this period may be got from present custom in Palestine. Here we find private ownership of part of the land, and along with it communal ownership of another part. The land of the commune is laid out in portions of equal value, and then assigned by lot to the cultivators.[2] The frequency with which the *lot* is spoken of in the OT indicates some such system of allotment. But private property in land is also indicated. Naboth refuses to sell his vineyard, and the narrative shows that there were no restrictions on his title.[1] The patriarchal stories represent Abraham and Jacob as buying land from the earlier inhabitants.[3]

While we suppose that private property in land was fully recognized in this period, it is probable that the right of inheritance was limited to male kinsmen. There is no clear case of women owning land before the Exile, though they had personal property. The mother of Micah saved a considerable sum of money, and her title was recognized by her son.[5] Abigail brought five slaves to David, though this seems to have been the whole of her fortune. Rachel and Leah each received a slave girl from her father.[4] The case of Achsah, who is said to have received territory from Caleb,[5] forms no exception, for Achsah is only the eponym of a clan. Laban's daughters, just referred to, say quite frankly that there is nothing for them in the house of their father, and that he has sold them and eaten up the price. The language shows conclusively that at the time when the account was written daughters had no claim as heiresses, and that the most they could hope for from a generous father was some part of the price that he had received for them. The persistency with which the Hebrew writers represent the widow as an object of charity indicates that widows were without claim on the estates of their husbands.

The dormant rights of the clan may have reasserted themselves when a man died. But in the period of the monarchy it probably came to be recognized that the sons were the rightful heirs. Gifts by the father during his lifetime were recognized as valid, if we may argue from the conduct of Abraham towards the sons of his concubines.[6] But the inheritance went to all the sons—there was no difference between the son of a wife and the son of a concubine. The sons of Zilpah and Bilhah are on the same footing with the sons of Rachel and Leah.[7] Probably this was always the theory, and we may venture to adduce the Babylonian parallel. Here we read that, if a man recognizes the son of a slave woman by calling him 'my son,' that son is entitled to a share of the estate. In Hebrew practice the son of a slave woman often suffered injustice. The expulsion of Ishmael is an illustration, and so is the banishment of Jephthah by his brothers.[8]

The first-born son had special rights.

The law in Deuteronomy, which probably reproduces ancient custom and guards it from abuse, is as follows: 'When a man has two wives, one beloved and the other hated, and they bear him children, if the firstborn belong to the hated wife, then in the day in which he gives the inheritance to his sons he shall not be allowed to treat the son of the beloved wife as the firstborn instead of the son of the hated. He shall recognize the firstborn (son of the hated) by giving him a double portion of whatever he has; for he is the firstling of his strength and the right of the firstborn is his.'[9]

The birthright seems to have been originally connected with the chieftainship of the clan. That some sort of priestly prerogative also belonged to the oldest son seems clear from the Pentateuchal narrative, which makes the tribe of Levi a substitute for the first-born sons of the people, and this prerogative was probably connected with the worship of the clan ancestors.

The sharpness with which the law forbids the transfer of the birthright to any but the actual first-born indicates that earlier the matter had been in the power of the father. This also is illustrated by the patriarchal story where Isaac is induced (unwittingly, to be sure) to give the

[1] Qur'ân, ii. 12; W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, Cambridge, 1885, p. 54.

[2] F. Buhl, *Die sociale Verhältnisse der Israeliten*, Berlin, 1899, p. 57 ff.

1 1 K 21[16]. 2 Gn 23[9ff.] 33[19]. 3 Jg 17[7ff.]
4 1 S 25[42], Gn 29[24. 29]; cf. 31[14-16].
5 Jos 15[16-19], Jg 1[12-15]. 6 Gn 25[6]. 7 Gn 35[23ff.]
8 Gn 21[9ff.], Jg 11[2]. 9 Dt 21[15-17].

blessing to Jacob, and where Jacob in turn prefers Ephraim to Manasseh. The Chronicler believes that the birthright was taken from Reuben and given to Joseph.[1] All these stories are the reflexion of tribal relations, but they show that the transfer of the birthright was not a strange conception to the writers. We are nowhere told that the double portion given to the oldest son was to enable him to support the widow and the younger children, though this has usually been assigned as the reason. That the dependent members of the family passed into the care, or rather into the possession, of the heir, we have already had occasion to note. The right of the first-born son of a king to succeed to the throne was not necessarily a part of his prerogative, as we see in the case of Solomon.[2]

In default of sons the patriarchal system makes the brothers inherit, and after them uncles, that is, father's brothers. Next come cousins in the various degrees, always on the father's side; for, the women being excluded, their descendants have no rights. The Hebrews, however, always felt it to be a misfortune that a man should have no son to succeed him. The root of this feeling must be sought in the animistic stage of religion. The spirit of a man is left without sustenance and honour if he has no son to pay these dues. To prevent the name from being blotted out, custom early enjoined the levirate marriage, and, as in other cases, the custom was finally embodied in the written law. Deuteronomy is specific on this:

'When brothers dwell together, and one of them dies leaving no son, the wife of the deceased shall not be given to a stranger. Her brother-in-law shall come to her and take her to him for a wife and perform a brother's duty. And her first-born son shall succeed to the name of the brother who is dead, and his name shall not be blotted out from Israel.'[3]

How seriously the brother's duty is taken is made clear by the story of Tamar in the book of Genesis,[4] where the reason given for Onan's early death is his refusal to raise up seed to his brother, and where, also, it is held that Tamar, when refused another husband, is justified in taking a substitute by deception. In Deuteronomy the recalcitrant brother is put to open shame by the ceremony of pulling off the shoe.[5]

The arrangement under discussion is a survival from the time when a man's wives went to the next-of-kin. In fact, the levirate was the duty, not of the brother alone, but of the next-of-kin, whoever he might be. So Judah was the one upon whom the duty devolved when his son was in default. This is also the theory of the book of Ruth. Ruth offers herself as wife to Boaz in the belief that he is next-of-kin to her deceased husband. Boaz informs her that there is a nearer kinsman, and he takes her only after this other has refused. Here the connexion with the right of inheritance is made clear by the statement that the kinsman has the right of redemption of such real estate as belonged to the deceased, the wife going with it. The book is not altogether clear, because it does not give the first-born son to the deceased; but in its general conception it agrees with what we know elsewhere of the levirate. At the present day it is Jewish custom to release the brother from his duty. The subject has a place here only so far as it throws light on the Jewish ideas of inheritance. The levirate was in force so long as it was thought necessary for a man to have a male heir. When the right of daughters to inherit was recognized, the law forbade the marriage of a woman to her brother-in-law.

The device of adoption, by which a man who has no heir of his body begotten takes a child from another family to be his son, seems not to have been much in use among the Hebrews. Where Abraham expects his slave to become his heir, however,[1] we think of the slave as having been made a 'son' of the clan. In the patriarchal period we find also the recognition of Ephraim and Manasseh by Jacob,[2] which may be called an adoption; and the reception of Moses into the family of Pharaoh[3] shows the idea not to have been unknown to the writers of these stories. At a later date one of the genealogists tells of a Hebrew who had no son, and who gave his daughter to his Egyptian slave to wife, and the children were counted in the Hebrew line.[4] None of these cases can be called historical; and Esther, who was brought up by Mordecai, came to him not by adoption, but as his ward by the ordinary law of inheritance.[5] The declaration of the book of Proverbs, that a maid may 'inherit' from her mistress, is too slight to build upon.[6]

We come to a time, finally, when daughters are allowed to inherit. It would not be strange to discover that the idea of women holding property arose in connexion with the clan sagas. When the clans were brought into genealogical relations, those which had feminine names appeared as daughters of the eponym heroes of the whole people. As all the clans had territory in the land of Israel, it was believed that the patriarchs had given portions to daughters as well as to sons. The story of Achsah, already mentioned, is in point.[7] So is the statement that a daughter of Asher has a place in the genealogy. Further, we find an explicit declaration in the book of Joshua that the daughters of Manasseh took possession along with his sons.[8] The genealogy in Ezra knows of a certain Barzillai who received that name because he married the daughter of Barzillai the Gileadite.[9] We must suppose the daughter to have been an heiress, and the case naturally leads up to that of the daughters of Zelophehad. We read in the book of Numbers that, when Israel was about to take possession of the Promised Land, the daughters of Zelophehad came to Moses informing him that their father had died, leaving no son. In consequence they fear that his name will be blotted out, for he will receive no portion in the coming division of the land. On consultation with the oracle, Moses is directed to grant their implied request, and to assign them the portion which should fall to their father. The conclusion of the paragraph is a specific direction that hereafter daughters shall inherit where there are no sons. The law, however, is amended, or supplemented, in another chapter by the requirement that, where daughters succeed to landed property, they shall marry within their own tribe; otherwise the land of their father will be lost to the tribe of which he was a member.[10] The regulation here given shows how precedents for new laws were sought in the history of the people. When it was seen to be an injustice that daughters should be shut out of the inheritance in favour of remoter relatives, a precedent was found in the tribal traditions. If females inherited in the patriarchal age—which seems to be shown by the narratives—why should they not now have the privilege? The answer to the question is given in the law here promulgated. But along with the desirability of giving these rights to daughters was a sense of the inviolability of the tribal boundaries as fixed in the Mosaic age. On this account the regulation was supplemented, as we have seen. The arrangement by which the

1 Gn 27$^{32\text{-}37}$ 48$^{17\text{-}20}$, 1 Ch 5^{1}. 2 1 K 1, and cf. 2 Ch 21^{3}.
3 Dt 25$^{5\text{-}10}$. 4 Gn 38$^{8\text{-}26}$. 5 Dt 25^{9}.

1 Gn 15^{3}. 2 Gn 48$^{5ff.}$. 3 Ex 2^{10}.
4 1 Ch 2$^{34\text{-}42}$. In Babylonia we find elaborate regulations on the subject of adoption (Code of Hammurabi, §§ 185-193; cf. B. Meissner, *Aus dem bab. Rechtsleben*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 27).
5 Est 2$^{5ff.}$. 6 Pr 30^{23}. 7 Jos 15$^{16ff.}$.
8 Jos 17^{6}. 9 Ezr 2^{61}.
10 Nu 27$^{1\text{-}11}$ 36$^{1\text{-}13}$, Jos 17$^{3\text{-}6}$.

daughters are obliged to marry within their own tribe could not have seemed a hardship—perhaps it hardly seemed an innovation—because from the earliest times a kinsman was thought to be the most desirable suitor for a young woman's hand. Arab custom in this matter is well known, and as late as the time of Tobit the cousin had a presumptive right as against other suitors.

In the post-Exilic period, therefore, the idea of women holding property and inheriting it became thoroughly established. Job gave his daughters portions along with his sons, and the author of the last chapter of Proverbs found it natural that a capable woman should buy a field with the earnings of her own hands.[1] Written testaments are nowhere spoken of in the OT, but it is assumed that a man about to die will dispose of his estate by word of mouth. So Ahithophel 'gives orders concerning his house' before committing suicide;[2] and Hezekiah, when dangerously ill, is advised to regulate his affairs.[3] The last words of a father to his sons would naturally couple advice and admonition with directions concerning property. Hence the character of the testament (though not so called) put into the mouth of Jacob. Ben Sira recommends that one distribute his goods at the end of life, but not earlier.[4] It is not certain that a written will is intended in any of these passages, or in the passage in Tobit sometimes cited in this connexion.

The latest portions of the Pentateuchal legislation aim at limiting the right of testamentary disposition in accordance with the theory of divine ownership. The land being Jahweh's, and assigned by Him to the various tribes, it should be kept in perpetuity in possession of those tribes. To this end no man was to have the right of disposing of his share to any one but the next-of-kin. Moreover, in case he were driven by poverty so to dispose of it, he could give only a lease for the time to the next Jubilee year, when it would revert to him or his direct descendants. The basis of this regulation is probably the old clan order by which the individual held only what was assigned him by the commune. We learn from Jeremiah that, when land was sold, it was offered first of all to a kinsman.[5]

Whether a criminal forfeited his property rights is nowhere specifically told us. When Naboth was executed for blasphemy,[6] his estate was seized by the king; but this may have been simply an act of tyranny, and without authority of law or custom. If we may argue from Achan's case,[7] the man guilty of sacrilege had his property destroyed with himself. What became of his lands when he had any is not clear. We should expect them to be forfeited to the temple, as 'devoted' to the divinity.

LITERATURE.—The Hebrew law as understood by the traditional authorities is formulated in the Talmud treatises *Baba Bathra* and *Yebamoth*. The most thorough discussion, and one still valuable, is J. Selden's *De Successionibus ad Leges Hebræorum in Bona Defunctorum* (1638), in his collected works, London, 1726, vol. ii. 1–70; J. D. Michaelis treats the subject with his usual learning in his *Mosaisches Recht*, Frankfort, 1770 (Eng. tr. *Commentaries on the Laws of Moses*, London, 1814), §§ 78–80 and 98; L. Lévy, *La Famille dans l'antiquité israélite*, Paris, 1905, and T. Engert, *Ehe- und Familienrecht der Hebräer*, Munich, 1905, give good summaries of what is known on the subject. On the levirate, see S. R. Driver's commentary on Dt 25[5-10], where other literature is cited. The cus-

INHERITANCE (Hindu).—The rules of succession, as developed by the Brāhman lawyers of India, may be described as to some extent a spiritual bargain in which the right to succeed to another depends on the successor's capacity for benefiting that person by the offering of funeral oblations (*śrāddha*). Thus the term *sapiṇḍa*, which is commonly used to denote a heritable relation, means literally a relation connected through funeral oblations of food, such as a ball of rice (*piṇḍa*). The more remote ancestors, viz. the great-grandfather, his father and grandfather, who are offered only the fragments of that ball of rice which remain on the hands of the offerer, were therefore called 'partakers of the wipings' (*lepabhāgin*, Manu, iii. 216). Still more distant is the relationship of *samānodakas*, or kinsmen, connected by the mere offering of water, said to extend to the fourteenth degree. In a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it was declared that 'there is in the Hindu law so close a connexion between their religion and their succession to property, that the preferable right to perform *śrāddh* is commonly viewed also as governing the preferable right to succession of property.' Dubois (in India, 1792–1823) observes (*Hindu Manners*[3], p. 374) 'that the right of inheritance and the duty of presiding at the obsequies are inseparable one from the other. When, therefore, a wealthy man dies without direct descendants, a crowd of remote relatives appear to dispute with each other the honour of conducting the funeral rites. The contest is occasionally so tumultuous and prolonged that the body of the deceased is in a state of complete putrefaction before a definite settlement of these many pretensions is arrived at.' And so an old Sanskrit authority says, 'He who inherits the wealth presents the funeral oblation,' and 'A son shall present the funeral oblations to his father, even though he inherit no property' (*Institutes of Viṣṇu*, xv. 40, 43). The doctrine of spiritual efficacy was further developed, and relied on as a corroborative argument in favour of certain expositions of the texts on inheritance, in the *Dāyabhāga* and other leading works of the Bengal School of law. The *Mitākṣarā*, on the other hand, which is the leading authority on the law of inheritance for the majority of the Hindus, explains the term *sapiṇḍa* as denoting one of the same body, *i.e.* a blood relation, and does not give countenance to any other principle than propinquity, or proximity of birth, as regulating the order of succession. Nevertheless, the connexion between the right of succession and the obligation to offer the customary *śrāddhs* may be supposed to have been constantly present to the Hindu mind. The widow, in particular, who succeeds to her husband's property on failure of male descendants, is enjoined to offer up the regular oblations to him at stated times.

The religious element enters largely into the Indian law of inheritance in other respects besides the general rules of succession. Thus civil death, *i.e.* the exclusion of a man from his caste on account of some offence or breach of caste rules, has the same consequences as natural death, and causes the property of the person out-casted (*patita*) to devolve on his heirs, and himself to lose the capacity to inherit any property devolving on him. Civil death is now inoperative, as loss of caste, according to an Act of 1850, does not affect a man's civil rights. Spiritual relationship is recognized as well as blood relationship, the pupil succeeding to his spiritual teacher and *vice versa*. No relative can, as a rule, claim any property acquired by a man during the time he was a *sannyāsī* (ascetic). It is taken by one of his disciples, who should perform the funeral rites according to custom. The succession goes either by nomination by the previous

1748, pp. 148–168. Reference may be made also to the articles 'Heir,' in *HDB*, 'Erbe,' in Hamburger, 'Inheritance,' in *JE*, and 'Familie und Ehe bei den Hebräern,' in *PRE*[3], vol. v. (1898), condensed as 'Family and Marriage Relations,' in Schaff-Herzog, vol. iv. (1909).

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1 Job 42[15], Pr 31[16]. 2 2 S 17[23]. 3 2 K 20[1ff.].
4 Sir 33[19-23], Tob 8[21]. 5 Jer 32[6-14]. 6 1 K 21[13ff.].
7 Jos 7[24f.].

sannyāsī or by election after his death. The *sannyāsis* are, in many cases, heads of a *maṭha* (*mutt*), *i.e.* of a religious institution founded and endowed for the purpose of maintaining and spreading the doctrines of some religious sect. These monastic institutions were endowed with considerable grants of land by Hindu princes and noblemen, their property being vested in the preceptor or head for the time being, generally called *mahānt*. Though many of these *mahānts* have become worldly, or are not even versed in the first principles of their religion, the acquirement of wealth by trade being their great object, the old rule of succession remains, and the property passes by inheritance to no one who does not fill the office. It is devoted to the maintenance of the establishment, but the superior has large control over it and is not accountable for its management. The two principal Sanskrit treatises on inheritance and succession on which the law as administered by the British Courts of India is supposed to be based are the *Mitākṣarā* and the *Dāyabhāga*. Colebrooke's English translation of these two works was first published in 1810.

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J. JOLLY.

INHERITANCE (Jewish).—The Jewish law of inheritance based itself on the Biblical regulations (on which see W. H. Bennett, art. 'Heir,' in *HDB* ii. 340). In the Rabbinic Code these regulations were systematized, and the accepted principles are given in the Codes of Maimonides (*Hilkhoth Naḥaloth*) and Joseph Qaro (*Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ*, §§ 250–258 and §§ 276–289). In modern times, Jewish practice naturally conforms to the civil laws of the States in which Jews are domiciled. So far as the older Rabbinic laws are concerned, the rule of inheritance may be summarized as follows:

'The order of succession in intestacy is: first, sons (eldest son taking a double portion), their descendants; daughters, their descendants. Failing issue, the father succeeds, then brothers (Mishn. *Baba Bathra*, viii. 2). Sisters come after brothers and their descendants (*ib.*). If a son dies in his father's lifetime, grandchildren succeed to their father's share in the estate of their grandfather (Bab. *Baba Bathra*, 122*b*). A man is his mother's heir, the husband is the wife's heir, but the wife is not her husband's heir. She has, however, her dower. Illegitimacy is no bar to inheritance or transmission. Recognition by father is accepted as proof that children are his (*ib.* viii. 6). Hotchpot was not recognized in Jewish jurisprudence (*ib.* viii. 8)' (M. Hyamson, *Mosaicarum et Romanarum Legum Collatio*, London, 1913, p. 161; cf. J. H. Greenstone, in *JE* vi. 583).

The owner of property could not depart from this order in bequeathing by way of inheritance, though he could do so if he bequeathed by way of gift.

'The law of testamentary succession, as laid down in the Bible (Nu 27[8-11]), is unalterable; and any attempt made by the owner of property to bequeath it as an inheritance to those who would not naturally inherit it is null and void. No one can be made an heir except such persons as are mentioned in this Biblical law; nor can the property be lawfully diverted from the heirs by the substitution, either orally or in writing, of some other person as heir (Mishn. *Baba Bathra*, viii. 5); but the owner of property has such control over it that he may dispose of it by sale or gift to any person, to the exclusion of his heirs. This important distinction, therefore, must be noted, that a bequest by way of inheritance to persons other than the legal heirs is null and void, whereas a bequest by way of gift is valid' (D. W. Amram, in *JE* iii. 43).

Such procedure was, however, regarded with much disfavour by the Rabbis (Bab. *Baba Bathra*, 133*b*; *Kethuboth*, 53*a*), and it was very unusual for the owner to depart through bequest by way of gift from the order of succession (see L. N. Dembitz, in *JE* xii. 522). One important point deserves special mention. The Pharisaic Law denied to daughters any share in the inheritance if there were sons, though the Sadducees (Bab. *Baba Bathra*, 115*b*) and later on the Qaraites (J. Fürst, *Gesch. des Karäerthums*, Leipzig, 1865, i. § 9) gave the daughters equal rights with their brothers. Nevertheless, in the Pharisaic scheme the daughter had ample rights for maintenance while unmarried. Very significant is the decision of Admon (first half of 1st cent. A.D.)—a decision confirmed by Gamaliel:

'If a man die, leaving sons and daughters, and his estate be large, the sons inherit it and the daughters are maintained by it; but if the estate be small, the daughters are maintained by it, and the sons may go begging' (Mishn. *Kethuboth*, xiii. 3).

The Court might set aside a part of the estate in trust for the maintenance of the daughters (on all these matters see D. W. Amram, in *JE* iv. 448). In general, it must be remembered that the family solidarity (see art. FAMILY [Jewish]) and sense of good-will among its members secured an equitable distribution of the family goods, which were to a large extent enjoyed in common.

As to the extra-legal ideas associated in Jewish thought with the idea of inheritance, the Rabbis were concerned to combat the view that the Israelite *inherited* the Law. He had to acquire his part in the Torah by his active study and performance of it. R. Josê (Mishn. *Aboth*, ii. 12) said: 'Set thyself to learn Torah, for it is not an heirloom unto thee.' This, at first sight, may seem contradictory of Dt 33[4] 'Moses commanded us a law, an inheritance for the assembly of Jacob.' But the Sifrê (§ 345, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1864, p. 143[b]) interprets the text to mean that the Law is not an aristocratic possession; it belongs to all Israel. The Rabbinic attitude closely illustrates the saying of Goethe: 'What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, be sure thou earn it, that it may be truly thine.' This is enforced in another saying: 'Pay special regard to the sons of the poor, for from them the Torah goeth forth' (Bab. *Nedarim*, 81*a*), the point being, as the Talmud remarks, that a learned man's offspring are not always learned, lest it be believed that the knowledge of the Torah is an inheritance. On the other hand, the children of the unlearned might be among the active promoters of the knowledge of the Law (*Sanh.* 96*a*). All Israel (and the righteous of all nations were included in the boon [Tosefta *Sanh.* xiii.]) had its share in the future life (Mishn. *Sanh.* x. 1), in accordance with the Rabbinic exegesis of the text (Is 60[21]), 'thy people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land for ever.' So, for a while Israel may forsake the law, but, when he seeks to return, he need feel no shame; it is his ancestral inheritance that he resumes possession of (*Exod. Rabbah*, xxxiii. 7). This combination of confidence in Israel's future and demand for Israel's present effort is a unique quality in the Rabbinic system of morality. Yet another way of meeting the difference between the two points of view may be cited. The Torah is Israel's *communal* inheritance, but the *individual* has to win for himself the right to share (cf. Comm. of W. Einhorn to the passage cited from *Exod. Rabbah*, ed. Wilna, 1878, p. 123).

Turning to another aspect of the idea of inheritance—it was considered a misfortune for a man to leave no son to inherit his estate. Such misfortune was sometimes regarded as due to the father's misconduct; witness such sayings as: 'If one destroys by fire his neighbour's produce, he leaves no son to be his heir' (Bab. *Soṭah*, 11*a*). Absalom (*loc. cit.*) was childless at his death; his three sons and his daughter predeceased him as a punishment for his having set fire to Joab's grain (2 S 14[30]). The pious Israelite was also considered to have neglected one of his main duties unless he married with the hope of leaving issue (Bab. *Berakhoth*, 10*a*; *Yebamoth*, 63*b*, and often). The idea went beyond the desire to continue the race. Almost mystically the divine presence dwelling in a man was carried over to his children (*Yeba-*

moth, 64), or—and this is significant—to a disciple (cf. Bab. *Baba Bathra*, 116*a*). In particular, it was the father's duty to ensure that the inheritance of fidelity to God was carried on through the generations. This thought was based on the example of Abraham. 'I have known him, to the end that he may command his children and his household after him, that they may keep the way of the Lord, to do justice' (Gn 18^{19}). And, further, he who teaches his son's son is esteemed as though he had himself stood at Mt. Sinai, a personal participator in the original revelation (Bab. *Qiddush.* 30*a*). From the text in Genesis just cited was derived the custom of Jewish fathers writing for their children an ethical testament containing moral and pious directions; and these testaments were an honoured heirloom (see I. Abrahams, art. 'Jewish Ethical Wills,' in *JQR* iii. [1891] 436). For the part played in Judaism by the conception of the child's inheritance of the father's merits see S. Levy's volume on *Original Virtue and Other Studies*, London, 1907.

LITERATURE.—This is given throughout the article.

I. ABRAHAMS.

INHERITANCE (Roman).—As compared with the Greek, two features in chief distinguish the Roman laws of inheritance taken as a whole: (1) the very early, and relatively extended, power of devising, by the *testamentum calatis comitiis* or the *testamentum in procinctu*, i.e. the recognition of the individual will as a decisive factor in the activity of the group; and (2) the peculiarly Roman conception of the paternal relationship, the *patria potestas*.

In the regal period the estate of a *paterfamilias* was inherited by such of his descendants as were 'under his power' (*in potestate*) at the time of his death and became by that event *sui iuris*. Such were his sons and grandsons (unless they were no longer subject, through emancipation), his daughters (unless they had passed by marriage *in manum* of their husband, *i.e.* into another family), and his wife *in manu*, and, therefore, standing *loco filiæ*. All these were styled *sui heredes*, 'self-heirs,' as having an inherent right dormant during the father's life. All, including the widow, took an equal share. Failing *sui heredes*, the *gens* of the deceased inherited. Of primogeniture there is no trace. But from the first the father was able to regulate the succession by testament, if he cared to do so, within such limits as recommended themselves to his peers in the Curies.

Succession of agnates, as such, was perhaps established by the XII Tables, so as to bring both plebeians and patricians under the same law as far as possible.[1]

Strictly, a man's agnates were those of his collaterals who were under the same *patria potestas* as himself, or would have been had the common ancestor been alive. His children (whether of the body or by adoption) *in potestate*, and his wife *in manu*, being *loco filiæ*, were mutually agnates; but a wife not *in manu*, or a daughter who had passed *in manum mariti*, or emancipated children, were not their agnates, nor were they *sui heredes* to the father—for the tie of the *potestas* was broken (and in the case of the wife not *in manu* had never been created). So a man was agnate to his brothers and their children (assuming that there had been no *capitis minutio* on either side); but not to his sister married *in manum* or to her children, for they were not of the same *familia* (having become agnates of her husband's relatives).

In the absence of a will, succession was now open to the agnatic heirs *ab intestato* (law: 'si intestato moritur cui suus heres nec escit, adgnatus proximus familiam habeto'). How far the agnatic circle extended is not clear. The order of succession established by the XII Tables was, therefore, as follows: (1) *sui heredes*; (2) the nearest agnate or agnates; (3) the *gens* as a body—this last possible only in the case of a patrician. The law was interpreted in the sense that only the nearest agnate[1] (or agnates of the same degree) could claim, so that, if they declined, the next in degree could not take the estate, and, further, that no female agnate more remote than a sister could inherit.

Sui heredes, whether instituted by will or taking *ab intestato*, could not decline the inheritance however burdensome (hence they are called *heredes necessarii*); but a stranger instituted by will, or an agnate heir *ab intestato*, could reject the inheritance.

The interpretation put upon the clause in the XII Tables—'uti legassit super pecunia tutelave suae rei, ita ius esto'—together with the growth of that form of testament called *per æs et libram* (originally not a testament, but a fictional substitute for one) made the testator's will supreme, even to the extent of disinheriting his *sui heredes* in favour of a stranger, if he expressly mentioned the disherison (*exheredatio*). In the later Republic, owing to the decline of religion and family morality, children were often disinherited, or cut off with a mere fraction of the estate, for the benefit of a stranger. This led to the recognition of the *querela inofficiosi testamenti*, or the challenge of the will by a *suus heres* capriciously treated. Under the early Empire this developed the rule of the legitim of children, giving them a right to at least one-fourth of the father's estate in spite of the will, except for good grounds.

Very important was the effect of the *bonorum possessio* (*secundum tabulas*), by which the Prætor gave provisional enjoyment of the estate to the heir named in a will *prima facie* valid, pending possible claim by heirs-at-law.[2] A year's undisturbed possession gave him full ownership by usucaption. The ultimate effect of the Prætorian action, in granting *bonorum possessio* in relief of various classes of petitioners, was to establish the following Prætorian order of intestate succession: (1) in place of the *sui heredes* of the old *ius civile*, they put descendants (*liberi*), including the wife *in manu*, sons and daughters of the body whether *in potestate* or emancipated, and representatives of predeceased sons and adopted children who were *in potestate* of the deceased when he died; (2) *legitimi heredes*, i.e. the nearest collateral agnates; (3) cognates, this class not being precisely defined; (4) survivor of husband and wife. It was open for these classes in turn to petition for *bonorum possessio*; but it was for them to maintain the grant against any who claimed as heir according to the *ius civile*.

The above changes were in part the outcome of the doctrine of the *ius naturale* as embodying a higher ideal of justice than the old *ius civile*. The process was carried further in the Tertullian *senatusconsultum* in Hadrian's reign. This gave preference to the mother over all agnates of her deceased child, except father, brother, or sister—father and brother excluding her; but with a sister, and failing father and brother, she shared equally. This right was confined to women with the *ius liberorum*, i.e. free women who had three children, or freedwomen who had four. In A.D. 178 the Orphitian *senatusconsultum* gave legitimate or illegitimate children a prior right over all her agnates to succeed a mother. The Code of Justinian made a mother's right of succession independent of the *ius liberorum*, and extended that of a daughter or sister to her descendants. In his 118th and 127th *Novellæ*, Justinian wiped away the rights of agnates entirely, except as regarded adopted children, and settled the orders of succession purely on a basis of blood-relationship: (1) descendants of the intestate, male and female alike taking

[1] Ulp. fr. xxvii. 5: 'legitimae hereditatis ius . . . ex lege Duodecim Tabularum descendit.'

[1] Division between agnates was *per capita*, not *per stirpes*. In the case of a freedman his *patronus* and his children took the place of agnates.

[2] There were two other forms of *bonorum possessio*—*contra tabulas*, practically setting the will aside, and *ab intestato*.

per capita if of the same degree, *per stirpes* if of different degrees; (2) the nearest ascendants, concurrently with full brothers and sisters and children of predeceased brothers and sisters (division equally *per capita* when there were ascendants and brothers and sisters, or brothers and sisters only; *per stirpes* when children of a deceased brother or sister participated; if there were only ascendants, the estate was divided equally to the paternal and maternal sides of the account); (3) half-brothers and half-sisters, and their issue, and grandchildren of full brothers and sisters, dividing on the same principle; (4) all other collaterals of all degrees, those nearest akin excluding those more remote, and dividing *per capita* between all of the same degree.

In his 119th *Novella*, Justinian laid down the principle that a child had an indefeasible right to some share at least as an heir of his father, and conversely, and enumerated the legal grounds of disherison. It followed, therefore, that a will to be valid must state the reasons for disherison; and, further, that it was liable to challenge upon the facts. A child not given some share, however small, could have the will nullified; and, if not given his legitim (at least one-third of the estate, and under certain circumstances one-half), he could claim to that amount; but nullification could not extend to any accessory provisions of the will.

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INHERITANCE (Teutonic). — For the last sixty years this subject has been a prolific source of controversy, which at present shows no sign of abating. Thus, it is not decided whether the right of inheritance was originally limited to the near family, or whether the wider kindred reserved it for themselves. The organization of this wider kindred is still a matter of debate, and scholars are not yet agreed as to whether matrilineal inheritance prevailed at the beginning of our era among the Teutons, or whether inheritance fell exclusively to males descended through males. A few facts, however, stand out clearly. Tacitus (*Germ.* 20) tells us that the Germans had no system of testamentary dispositions, but that they had rules of intestate succession; and his statement holds good of almost all Teutonic countries until far into the Middle Ages. The heir, as some of the laws tell us, is born, not chosen. Adoption during lifetime is the only way of selecting an heir, and this proceeding is hedged about by restrictions. It is permitted only if the adopter is without near kinsmen of his own, as in the case of the Frankish *affatomy* and the Langobardian *thinx*; or else the amount which may be bequeathed to an adopted son is limited and subject to the consent of the legal heirs or kindred (Scandinavia).

Wills, which were introduced by the Church under the influence of Roman law, made their way very slowly, though encouraged by ecclesiastical institutions, which would otherwise have been debarred from receiving bequests of land. In most Teutonic countries such bequests were of the nature of a *donatio post obitum*, and were subject to the consent of heirs or kindred. Among the Frisian inhabitants of the little island of Wangeroog, testamentary dispositions were almost unknown far into the 18th cent., the children, or, in their absence, the nearest kinsmen, succeeding automatically to the inheritance, which they divided among themselves by agreement, disputes being very rare. Certain mediæval laws will not admit disputes as to inheritance among kindred in the ordinary courts of law, regarding them as a matter to be settled by the 'common kinsmen' of the parties concerned.

The principle of primogeniture appears to have found no place in ancient Teutonic society. Tacitus says (*loc. cit.*) that the children inherit, and in later times (with the exception of the feudal nobility) all the sons, at least, had an equal claim to inheritance. Where there are two heirs, the division of the shares usually devolves on the elder, the younger having the right of choice between them. In the case of a number of heirs, the matter is decided by the casting of lots after the eldest has divided the shares. Equal division among all the sons or other heirs is still common in many parts of Teutonic Europe, and this feature survives in the Kentish *gavelkind*.

In many parts, however, the farm is not divided among all the heirs, either for purely economic reasons or in order to facilitate the collection of dues or taxes. In such cases the farm is either held in common by all the co-heirs—a system which seems to have been common in England—or one of the heirs is allowed to purchase it at a price quite irrespective of its market value, but calculated not to be an undue burden on the farm. This system persists in Schleswig-Holstein to the present day. Sometimes this right of purchase is granted to the eldest, but more often to the youngest son, the idea being that, while his brothers have had time to set up establishments of their own, he has not done so, but has remained with his parents. In the custom known as Borough English, still prevailing (in the case of intestacy) in certain English districts and boroughs, the youngest son inherits land to the exclusion of all the other children.

The inheritance of real property is often limited to males, especially in the case of ancestral land such as the *terra aviatica*, which appears in the earliest Frankish (ripuarian) law, and the Norwegian *odal*. Frequently the son excludes the daughter, but she inherits in his absence. In other parts—Denmark and Friesland—the daughter receives half as much land as the son. Low Saxon law gives preferential treatment to sons; but, as soon as an inheritance falls to collaterals, it makes no distinction between males and females, nor between the paternal and maternal kindred. On the whole, we may say that a tendency to limit inheritance to agnates (persons descended through males) is observable chiefly in South Germany. The supporters of the mother-right theory lay weight on certain statements of Tacitus (with regard to the privileged position of the mother's brother, and to inheritance by children, not by sons only), but find the chief confirmation of their view in the earliest texts of the Frankish Lex Salica, which, in the absence of children, gives all moveable property to the mother, or, in her absence, to her relatives, females taking precedence of males (Lex. Sal. tit. 29). It must be pointed out that it is unsafe to base theories of inheritance mainly on the rules governing the transmission of real property, since individual ownership of land was of late growth among the Teutonic races. Neither Tacitus (*Germ.* 26) nor Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 21 f.) knows of it; and as late as 574 a Frankish edict intimates that tribal land had only recently and partially become heritable.

Moveable property may be regarded under three

heads: (1) cattle, farm implements, etc.; (2) armour and weapons (*Heergewäte*); (3) household furniture, clothing, and women's ornaments (*Gerade*). (1) Except in some of the earliest laws, cattle, etc., went with the land. (2) In Old Saxon law, agnatic kinsmen, males descended through males, succeeded to armour, weapons, and the war-horse. This form of property was restricted to persons of noble birth, but in certain towns we find the workman's tools, even the tailor's scissors, being treated as *Heergewäte* as regards succession. (3) *Gerade* falls in almost all early laws, and in the Old Saxon *Sachsenspiegel*, to women, and generally to those whose connexion with the deceased person is to be traced through women. It cannot, however, be regarded merely as dowry, for we find unmarried women also in possession of it. It is best defined as consisting of those chattels which are under the woman's charge. The *Sachsenspiegel* enacts that, on the death of a man's wife, the successor to the *Gerade* must leave the widower his bed, a table and cloth, and a stool and cushion, so that evidently the entire household furniture is included in the term. With regard to (1) and (2), it is important to remember that in heathen times a considerable proportion of the personal property of the deceased (weapons, ornaments, cattle, and even slaves) would be buried or burned with the original owner. The Arabian traveller Ibn Fadlān says that among the Scandinavians in Russia one-third of a man's personal property was burned with him, and another third expended on the funeral banquet. A memorial banquet was common all over Scandinavian territory, and was usually made the occasion for the heir to succeed to the dead man's property. In Scandinavia this was signified by his taking up his position for the first time in the 'high-seat.' In Germany the inheritance was usually entered into on the thirtieth day after the death of the previous owner.

In historical times rank is so closely bound up with the possession of land that its transmission necessarily follows the rules governing inheritance of real property. There can, however, be little doubt that in earlier times succession to hereditary royal rank and title was independent of inheritance of land, indeed probably of any form of inheritance.

With regard to the order of inheritance, we must make a distinction between the immediate family (persons related within the first degree) and the wider kindred; for the principles governing inheritance are different in the two groups. The inner group, which is supposed to have once formed a 'house-community,' consists of children, parents, and brothers and sisters. The Frisian law calls these the 'nearest six hands': *i.e.* (1) son, (2) daughter, (3) father, (4) mother, (5) brother, (6) sister. To this group the Salic law added mother's brothers and sisters, and, later, father's brothers and sisters. It seems that, if the son was dead, his sons did not originally precede all other relatives, but were regarded as no nearer to the inheritance than grandfathers of the deceased. This, however, is disputed by some authorities.

In the outer group the degree of consanguinity is alone regarded: all persons equally related to the deceased have an equal claim, though, as we have seen, in certain forms of inheritance preference may be given to persons related through the father's or the mother's kindred. It is necessary to indicate the mode of reckoning kinship which prevailed among the Teutons. This is a subject round which a storm of controversy still rages; but, without committing ourselves too deeply to any theory, we may say that the Teutonic kindred was regarded as falling into groups centring round the person whose property was to be inherited, and that any one tracing his descent through the grandfather of this person was nearer than one tracing his descent from the great-grandfather. Thus kinship was not reckoned by the number of births between the persons concerned, as in Roman law, but by the number of generations ('knees') between one of them and the common ancestor. The first 'knee' is formed by the parents: thus brothers and sisters are in the first degree; the second by the grandparents: first cousins are, therefore, in the second degree, and so on. To describe persons related in the unequal collateral line, Teutonic languages employ circumlocutions.

Sometimes the kindred is clearly thought of as divided on a 'parentelic' system, the first parentela being (*a*) the parents and their descendants; the second (*b*) the grandparents and their descendants, exclusive of (*a*); the third and fourth (*c*) being the two pairs of great-grandparents and their descendants, other than (*a*) and (*b*); while the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth are the descendants, other than the preceding, of the four pairs of great-great-grandparents. The descendants of these are called in Dutch dialects the four 'quarters' (*vierendeele*) of the kindred, while the eight groups descended from the couples one degree higher are known as *achtendeele*. It is supposed that the Scandinavian *ætt*, 'kindred,' is derived from a word meaning 'eight' and referring to these eight divisions; otherwise there is little evidence for a 'parentelic' ordering of the kindred in the North. There are, however, traces of a reckoning of the kindred in 'cousinships' both in Scandinavian and in old Continental law.

The outer limit of the kindred is variously described in the early Continental laws as the fifth, sixth, or seventh generation. It is probable that the degree of kinship referred to is the same, the reckoning beginning in one case with the common ancestor himself, in another with his children, and in the third with first cousins, the children being in this case regarded as belonging to the family. When the outer limit of the kindred varies, as in Norway, popular ideas on the subject have probably been affected by ecclesiastical ordinances determining the prohibited degrees of affinity.

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INHIBITION.—Inhibition is a term commonly and loosely applied to certain aspects of physiological and mental processes in which one process is checked or displaced by another. It is thus not a function comparable, *e.g.*, with nutrition or circulation on the physiological side, or with perception, memory, or emotion on the mental side; it is rather descriptive of a condition resulting from the action or inter-action of these or other functions.

Whether regarded as a mental or as a physical phenomenon, it is a result of the incapacity of the organism to give simultaneous expression to its many different impulses to action. The organism's energy being limited, under ordinary circumstances it tends to be more or less concentrated in a few directions. If it is scattered over much ground, it is less effective. If it is concentrated, it is correspondingly more effective. For instance, great activity of one part of the body, while not necessarily or always incompatible with the action of other

parts, may frequently interfere with the action of these other parts through the draining off of needful energy; when, *e.g.*, the forces of the body are devoted to the digestion of a full meal, there is not much energy available for mental work or for vigorous physical exercise. If two such processes involving the large use of bodily force are attempted at the same time, the effectiveness of each is greatly diminished. Then, again, one type of action may be antagonistic to another. An athlete cannot run a race and observe the scenery at the roadside at the same time. If he wishes to run well, he must suppress the impulse to gaze about.

Inhibition is, then, an incident of the fact that effective action must be relatively concentrated, both because of the limitation of one's energy and because too many disparate processes interfere with one another.

On the physiological side there is some evidence of specifically inhibitory nerves. The best attested example is that of the vagus, which, when stimulated, tends to check the action of the heart. According to Yerkes, however,

'the cases of inhibition which result from the functioning of inhibitory nerves or centres, if such exist, are few and unimportant in comparison with those which appear to be due to the conflict or competition of impulses within the nervous system' (art. 'Inhibition,' in *Cyclop. of Education*, iii. 457)—the inhibition, in other words, which results from the fact that the action of the nervous system tends to be confined at any one time to relatively few channels.

Only in extreme cases is this actually due to the limited fund of energy at the disposal of the organism; but every such case is a manifestation, in degree at least, of the fact of the limitation of the organism's resources. It may in its simplest form be due, however, to the neutralization of one nerve impulse by another when they meet in the same centre, as when

'the appropriate reflex of the leg of the frog to stimulation of the foot may be inhibited by simultaneous stimulation of the other leg' (*ib.*).

The higher nerve centres, especially those of the cortex, tend to hold in check the impulses emanating from the lower centres. Hence in a broad sense the brain may be regarded as an inhibiting centre. The function of the brain is in part

'to hold back or to inhibit the activity which other centres, left to themselves, would carry out in response to the sensory stimuli which reach them' (Royce, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 70).

On the psychical side, there is abundant illustration of the apparent interference of states of consciousness. Within narrow limits one sensation, as an auditory, seems sometimes to enhance the vividness of another, as a visual; but, ordinarily, two vivid sensory experiences interfere with each other, both being diminished in their conscious effects, or one being ignored for the sake of the other. The distraction of attention by some exciting situation will render one suffering from acute pain unconscious of it. Strong emotions interfere with ideation and tend to annul weaker feelings or emotions. One absorbed in thought is unaware of many sensory impulses impinging on his nervous system. Two disparate trains of thought cannot occur with complete effectiveness in consciousness at the same time.

Historically, several different views of the nature of inhibition, as it appears in mental phenomena, have been held. The oldest, that of Herbart, regarded ideas as permanently existing entities or psychical forces which constantly tend to interfere with each other, some being thus prevented by the repellent force of others from appearing in consciousness. Another view is that 'inhibition is the negative side of the associational process' (Breese, 'On Inhibition,' p. 12). The number of mental elements which may co-exist is limited, and those which cannot fit into the associative system that is uppermost are suppressed. According to this view, inhibition is an aspect of the control of mental elements through attention. Logical contradiction has been considered by others as one phase of inhibition; *e.g.*, one cannot think of an object as white and not-white at the same time. In so far as this is true, however, it is really a special phase of the preceding type. Others have regarded inhibition as an aspect of the control of mental and physical processes by the will. It is pointed out that the will may not only excite and direct, but also hold in check, a movement or a mental process.

All views, however, which assume that inhibition may be a purely psychical process are inadequate. It is rather a phenomenon of the action of the organism as a whole, *i.e.* of the psycho-physical organism. It depends ultimately upon the drawing off of the nervous energy from certain centres, resulting in the checking of their action, and the concentration of the energy in other centres, resulting in their heightened activity. Every case of apparent psychical inhibition is associated definitely with some re-adjustment of the energies of the physiological organism. Hence it is only relatively true that we can say that thought is opposed to action. It is opposed only to some kinds of action, for thought itself is bound up with and expresses itself through the expenditure of a definite amount of energy of the physiological system. In fact, to the degree in which there is inhibition of movement, to that degree mental processes are themselves rendered impossible. The problem of inhibition, then, whether on the side of the physical organism or on that of the mind, is the problem not of merely suppressing action, but of substituting one kind of action for another kind. When we speak of thought as suppressing bodily activity, we mean only that *one kind* of bodily activity is suppressed. When a person thinks intently and his outer movements are inhibited, there has simply been a shifting of the locus of psycho-physical action. For the gross overt forms of bodily movement there have been substituted the more subtle inner movements of the vaso-motor system and those of the cortex itself, which are more intimately associated with the thought processes. Only relatively speaking, then, does inaction take the place of action when a process is inhibited. What actually occurs is a transfer of psycho-physical energy from one point to another, a lessening or suppression of one form of action and a corresponding intensification of another form.

It is frequently and truly said that the higher the process (*e.g.*, the more intellectual), the more numerous are the inhibitory influences which it exercises on the nerve centres controlling the more primitive forms of action; but this means, as we have just pointed out, not that the psychical, as such, inhibits the physical, but that different action complexes are associated with the higher intellectual processes, and that, if the latter are to function, it must be at the expense of the former or lower types of action. It is for this reason that all phases of character development and growth of personality involve a large amount of inhibition. In fact, it is through the capacity of the psycho-physical organism to suppress inconsistent modes of action that it is possible for any definite type of behaviour to emerge at all. The growth of an individual from childhood to effective maturity is associated from start to finish with the building up of certain complexes of conduct, the obverse of which is always the draining of energy from the lower, less organized forms of action and their consequent inhibition. Thus the little child has an excess of gross, overt, bodily activity. He is apt to be flighty and inconsistent in his behaviour. He gives way to all sorts of

instincts and impulses. The problem of character development is not that of suppressing the energy thus exhibited, but of gradually organizing it into more definite and desirable forms. The higher types of behaviour, therefore, displace the lower by consuming their energy or by giving it outlets in accord with more definite purposes and ideals.

The re-construction, which thus takes place so conspicuously in the development of child-nature into maturity, is typical of the process which occurs in every instance of change of attitude in the adult. Whenever an adult inhibits an undesired act or mode of behaviour, he must accomplish it by fixing his attention upon some other mode of action, which thereby has a chance to develop. Nor is this fixing of attention to be thought of as some intervening outside agency. It is simply the expression of the fact that another impulse, or set of impulses, is present which, for the time being, is felt to be more definitely in accord with the real personal character as that has gradually integrated through many previous reactions. The inhibition of one mode of behaviour by another is due to the superior power of the then dominant complex of psycho-physical attitudes over those less perfectly organized and for the time being inconsistent with the action of the dominant mode. The re-construction thus effected may be partial or complete. It is partial when the suppressed impulse is merely suppressed or ignored rather than utilized. In that case the suppressed factor may drop out of consciousness and be apparently forgotten, but it is still capable of exerting an influence or of causing a stress beneath the level of consciousness which is injurious.

The strain of merely holding the undesired tendency in check or of preventing its finding expression acts as a drag, though unconscious, upon conscious processes, preventing their attaining their highest degree of efficiency. Moreover, the suppressed impulse may have various pathological effects. In extreme cases, as Freud has shown (*AJPs* xxi. [1910] 191 f.), it may result in producing the condition of nervous disease known as hysteria. All those modes of training which attempt flatly to prohibit the expression of undesirable tendencies in children incur this danger. The inhibition resulting is not genuine. The better method, and the one which would accomplish real inhibition, would be that which would seek to re-direct the impulse into some more desirable channel. The energy of the impulse could thus be saved and turned to positive account in character formation. The tendency to tell falsehoods is undesirable, but it is of little avail to say to the child, 'Thou shalt not.' What is needed is to determine the underlying motive leading to lying, and see that it can find expression in a more desirable form. The correction must, in other words, be positive, by opening to the child other lines of action which will afford an outlet to the energy thus far finding expression in an undesired form.

What is true of child-training is true of every phase of character development. Many adults suffer from excessive inhibitions. The energy they expend, sometimes unconsciously, in holding in check their undesired tendencies greatly reduces their positive efficiency. The root of the difficulty is that their inhibitions are only partial. The undesired forms of behaviour are struggling to assert themselves instead of being assimilated by more approved complexes of conduct. The work of Freud, referred to above, and of his followers in the treatment of hysteria furnishes many examples of this condition. While some pathological conditions of adults have been traced to the improper suppression of impulses in early childhood, in the majority of cases they are the outcome of the determined repression of intense desires which develop in youth and which are usually connected, directly or indirectly, with the sex impulse. This normal and necessary phase of human nature frequently runs counter to accepted social usages. Desires recognized as improper are thrust into the background of the mind, are ignored or even forgotten, but when thus dealt with are apt to continue to exert a harmful and mysterious influence over the person's conscious life.

Thus, a governess treated by Freud for hysterical tendencies, finally confronted with the question as to whether she was not in love with her master, replied: 'Yes, I believe it is so, but I did not know it, or rather I did not wish to know it. I wished to crowd it out of my mind, never to think of it, and of late I have been successful.' But this impulse, thus ignored and forgotten, became the exciting cause of a host of hysterical symptoms.

The problem presented by this case, which is typical, was to dispose of the energy of the impulse in a manner that would not conflict with the woman's own sense of social propriety. One of the serious problems of the education of the adolescent is that of finding ways of using in sports, in physical and mental labour, in artistic creation of various types, and in social intercourse impulses which, though intrinsically sexual, may thus be transmuted into forces of the utmost worth in the development of a well-rounded character. Here, if ever, it is important to recognize the practical character of the psychological dictum that the most effective inhibition occurs only through the re-direction of the energy into other channels of expression.

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INITIATION.

Introductory and Primitive (G. D'ALVIELLA), p. 314.
Buddhist (J. TAKAKUSU), p. 319.
Greek (J. E. HARRISON), p. 322.
Hindu (J. JOLLY and W. CROOKE), p. 323.
Jewish (W. BRANDT), p. 324.
Parsi (J. J. MODI), p. 324.
Roman (C. D. CURTIS), p. 327.
Tibetan (L. A. WADDELL), p. 328.

INITIATION (Introductory and Primitive).—**1. Definition and nature of initiation.**—Initiation in its general sense is synonymous with 'beginning' (*initium*), 'training,' 'instructing.' The word is usually applied in a restricted sense to signify admission to ceremonies or traditions of a religious or magical order. The communications made to the initiated are not necessarily secret; they may consist of teaching whose efficacy depends on the authority of the one who gives it, the

character of the one who receives it, and the conditions in which it is imparted. But ordinarily they are a secret carefully guarded from the profane, and so initiation comes to mean 'introduction to a mystery,' whether we take 'mystery' as meaning truths beyond the reach of vulgar comprehension or practices jealously reserved for a chosen few. Among the Romans *initia* was a generic term for mysteries.[1]

Two exegetical schools, which have often held rival opinions on the subject of the history of religion, differ also in their conclusions as to the origin and function of initiation ceremonies. According to the one (Dupuis, Creuzer, Guigniaut, etc.), initiation furnished a philosophical explanation of vulgar beliefs and led to a rational and moral interpretation of official cults. The other school (Lobeck, Andrew Lang, etc.) holds that it tended rather to perpetuate, under cover of secrecy, rites and myths of primitive barbarism, which their adepts were ashamed to lay bare to the open day. These two theories may both be applied in particular cases, but neither of them can be accepted as a general view. Another theory, which is no better founded, is that every initiation is invariably an embodiment or a dramatic representation of old legends or myths. In most cases it is not the myths that have given birth to the ceremonies of initiation, but rather, as has been superabundantly proved by Robertson Smith and Frazer, the ceremonies that have been explained by myths, after their original meaning has been lost sight of. In any case, an unbiased study of the forms and circumstances of the initiation ceremonies themselves in the different regions where they are found will enable us to gain some enlightenment as to their nature and function.

All known peoples admit the existence of a sacred world, peopled by mysterious influences, which are sometimes propitious, sometimes baleful, but always to be feared. In every country, too, there are individuals or groups of individuals who claim to be able to find out these forces, disarm them, and use them for their own purposes. This power is given by initiation into certain processes. The ceremonies of initiation are divided into two categories. (*a*) In the one the ceremony has as object the granting of a certain power to the neophyte, who uses it exclusively in his own personal interest, or, in return for a remuneration, for the benefit of others. This is the kind of initiation which is practised by sorcerers all over the world—shamans, angakoks, and so on. Those to be initiated are chosen by preference from young men showing a tendency to hysteria or visions, a tendency which is developed by the aid of intoxicants or narcotics, fasting, over-fatigue, hypnotism, and all kinds of devices. The apprenticeship at an end, these new sorcerers set out to apply the magic recipes which have been imparted to them, and add new ones from their own experience. Even when, as is sometimes the case, men set up as sorcerers of their own accord, they do so only after dreams or hallucinations either naturally or artificially induced, which are regarded as being a veritable initiation in which they have received direct revelations from above.[2] (*b*) The second category includes initiation ceremonies forming an integral part of the social institutions of so-called primitive peoples; they are usually performed on behalf of the community by a natural or artificial group. It is impossible to say with certainty which is the older of these two forms of initiation, but the second is by far the more important, not only because it forms a necessary part of the life of individuals and communities in primitive society, but also because its development is parallel with the modifications taking place in the structure of the social body.

2. **Aims of initiation.**—Those who penetrate the domain of the sacred with the sole ambition of finding there a means of satisfying their personal desires run the risk of entering into conflict with the community, and not without reason. The day is sure to come when the community will recognize the distinction between witchcraft and priesthood, and these sorcerers will be finally and utterly proscribed. Yet, in the heart of primitive societies, and later in the less developed strata of cultured populations, the magician's claims are still acknowledged or submitted to, not only because of the fear he inspires, but also for the services he can render to most individuals, and even to the community itself, by curing disease, bringing rain, favouring the multiplication of useful animals or plants, ensuring the periodicity of heavenly phenomena, finding out the guilty, exorcizing evil spirits—in a word, fulfilling real priestly functions in the dealings of the people with certain parts of the sacred world or certain personages belonging to it. This function of influencing natural phenomena is frequently assumed by groups of initiated persons representing a subdivision of the tribe or by secret societies, which gain new recruits by co-optation. Where division into clans still prevails, the principal magical operations are undertaken by the clans for the benefit of the community, each clan acting on its own particular totem.

Among the natives of Australia, *e.g.*, it is the emu clan that performs the rites supposed to be capable of ensuring the multiplication or the capture of this species; the rain clan which recites the incantations necessary for forming clouds, and so on.

In all primitive societies, individuals of the same sex and age, having the same interests, tastes, and occupations, have a tendency to group themselves into particular societies within the general society. Thus arise many classes standing in juxtaposition and including respectively youths, adults, celibates, married men, old men, women in different conditions, totemic groups, clans, phratries, inhabitants of the same territory, strangers, even dead men, and also, as Van Gennep has noted, certain social categories constituted by normal though particular and temporary events, such as illness, pregnancy, a common danger, travel, seasonal occupations, etc.[1] It was not until later that distinctions founded on permanent professions appeared. Now every passage from one of those states to another is accompanied by a modification in the form or nature of the superhuman influences with which the individual has to deal. In each group these influences, whether personified or not, are inoffensive and even highly useful to those who are within and who know how to avail themselves of their help, but dangerous and extremely harmful to strangers. On the other hand, those passing into a new group are apt to bring with them the magical and infectious taints of their old *milieu*. They must therefore be purified, assimilated, and instructed, which is the threefold object of initiation.

Among initiation ceremonies of this nature, one of the most important and most common is that which marks the attainment of puberty, or rather the ceremony which about that age officially breaks all ties binding the adolescent to children and women, and admits him into the society of men. This ceremony is found, either as an established institution or as a survival of an older ceremony, among nearly all uncivilized peoples—among the Fuegians, the natives of North and South America, Arctic populations, in Australia, Poly-

[1] Varro, *de Re Rust.* iii. 5 (ed. H. Keil, Leipzig, 1889).
[2] H. Hubert and M. Mauss, 'Théorie générale de la magie,' in *ASoc* vii. [Paris, 1902-03] 239.

[1] Van Gennep, *Rites de passage*, 1 ff.

nesia, Melanesia, in New Guinea, and in India—not to speak of the traces of it still found among the civilized peoples of antiquity. Its function is to confer on the adolescent the rights and obligations of an active member of society; *i.e.*, it enables him to take part in war, to lay the foundations of family life, and to observe the customs and rites necessary for the well-being of the tribe. Initiation, so understood, may be considered as the oldest form of public instruction.

This was realized by the Tuscarora of North Carolina when they explained to Lawson more than two hundred years ago that initiation 'was the same to them as it is to us to send our children to school to be taught good breeding and letters.'[1]

This instruction, nevertheless, retains a magico-religious character which often envelops the whole official cult of the tribe. Women also are divided into similar age classes; but with them initiation, even when it is a close imitation of the men's ceremony, is less important because it confers fewer privileges.[2] There are many other social transitions entailing rites which may be considered as initiatory—*e.g.*, naturalization, adoption, marriage, the consecration of priests, funeral ceremonies, etc. Sacrifice, too, at least in connexion with cults which regard it as a means of penetrating into the sacred world, assumes the form and functions of initiation. The spot on which all these ceremonies take place is, as it were, a sanctuary, to which access is forbidden to the uninitiated. The organization of the rites of initiation remains in the hands of the old men, who are the natural guardians of the tribal traditions, and they lay down as the first duty of man obedience to the ancients and to their teaching.

3. **Evolution of initiation.**—The initiation of adults loses its general character in proportion as the authority of the chiefs develops and legal institutions become separated from the magico-religious rites of which they were at first part and parcel. The age classes tend to become subdivided into a hierarchy of different grades, which fill up their ranks sometimes without regard to age or seniority. The initiated of the higher grade think that they have a right to rule over those of the lower grades. Sometimes even their privileges become hereditary, at least to the extent that their children alone have a right of initiation into the grade. The age class is thus turned into one or more secret societies, which sometimes recruit their members from various tribes and even open their doors to women, as, *e.g.*, in West Africa and North America.

In the district of Gabun, we are told, there was a secret society exclusively composed of women, who, like the ancient Bacchantes, celebrated orgiastic rites in the depths of the forest, and were much feared by men, who ran the risk of death if they surprised them in their ceremonies.[3]

The same individual can thus belong to several 'brotherhoods,' especially when they have different aims. Some of these societies become mere schools for working magic arts, and thus assimilate themselves to the societies of sorcerers who unite for mutual benefit in the exercise of their art. Most of the societies, however, continue to play some part in the affairs of the community. In Africa they sometimes reinforce and sometimes limit the authority of the chiefs. Sometimes, like the *Vehmgericht* of mediæval Germany, they form a sort of superior police acting with repressive justice, and they are all the more to be feared that they do their work in secret. The societies whose members belong to different tribes contribute towards the maintenance of peace, and on occasion we find them performing the function of arbiters. Yet almost all these societies respect the social and religious traditions and customs that have come down to them, and transmit them to their successors. As de Jonghe says with regard to the Lower Congo, they form, in spite of their abuses, 'a centre of religious instruction and civic formation.'[1]

An analogous evolution has taken place among the Kafirs, the Polynesians, the Melanesians, and the tribes of New Guinea. Each of the numerous secret societies of the natives of North America deals with some kind of magical operation which influences the course of nature—the ripening of crops, the falling of rain, the success of hunting or fishing, and the treatment of innumerable individual ailments. In the Oceanic Islands and among the American Indians, the ceremonies connected with all these societies are partly public and partly secret, according as they represent scenes from current mythology or explain to their neophytes the esoteric meaning of these representations.

When belief in the efficacy of magic begins to disappear, or when public cults gain in importance, secret societies gradually develop into mere clubs, from which all mystic element has disappeared; their old sanctuaries become the social meeting-places of the club, and their rites degenerate into popular rejoicings or mere buffoonery. But we must not lose sight of the fact that these brotherhoods, which monopolize all communication with the domain of the sacred, are able to fulfil the characteristic functions of a cult as well as the magic rites proper to sorcery.

The transition may be seen in the order of the Arcoi in Polynesia, who accompany the worship of the god Oro with all sorts of magic practices. There were eight or nine different grades, entrance to which was gained by successive ceremonies of initiation. All the great religions of the East had room for initiation ceremonies over and above their public cults. Some of the Greek mysteries certainly go back to the pre-Homeric period.[2] Texts analyzed by Moret, Lefébure, and others confirm the opinion of Herodotus and Plutarch that there was in the Egyptian cult an initiation reserved for a chosen few, which besides the regular and official cult included the celebration of the passion of Osiris.[3] The famous Chaldæan poem describing the descent of Ištar to the gloomy abode of Araḫû to look for her lover Tammuz presents all the characteristics of an initiation ceremony. From texts edited by A. H. Sayce we learn that certain priests or soothsayers had to submit to a formal initiation; they were made to pass through an artificial representation of the under world, where they were shown 'the altars amid the waters, the treasures of Anu, Bel and Ea, the tablets of the gods, the delivering of the oracle of heaven and earth, and the cedar-tree, the beloved of the great gods, which their hand has caused to grow.'[4]

C. P. Tiele has shown that, among the Western Semites, Byblos and other centres of Syrian cults had their mysteries from before the time of the Assyrian conquest of the country.[5] The OT has more than one allusion to mysteries reproved by the Prophets.[6] In India, a man was a Brâhman by right of birth, but could not exercise sacrificial functions without first having passed through a complicated initiation.

Even the subjection of a nation by conquerors and the superimposing of new cults tend rather to develop than to discourage initiation ceremonies. Sometimes the victors organize them for the use of peoples desirous of adopting the cult of the victorious god.

Thus the Mazdæan religion, which was essentially a national religion (to be born a Mede or a Persian was also to be born a worshipper of Ormazd and Mithra),[7] had no initiation ceremony other than the admission of children into the cult; but, when the Achæmenians had extended their sphere of influence as far as the Mediterranean, Mazdaism had to organize the mysteries of Mithra, which were to become of such importance in the Western world.

On the other hand, the victorious people often become converts to the cult of the conquered nation.

After the subjugation of Eleusis, the Athenians could not gain admission to the *sacra gentilicia* of some Eleusinian families who

[1] J. Lawson, *History of Carolina*, London, 1714, p. 380 ff.
[2] H. Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, p. 46.
[3] J. L. Wilson, *Western Africa*, London, 1856, p. 208.

[1] E. de Jonghe, '*Les* Sociétés secrètes au Bas-Congo,' in *Revue des questions historiques*, 9th ser., xii. [1907] 511.
[2] K. Otfried Müller thought the origin of the Greek mysteries was to be found in old Pelasgian cults, which were turned into secret cults after the invasion of the Greeks (see art. 'Eleusinien,' in *Allgemeine Encyclopädie*, vol. xxxiii. [1840] sect. I.).
[3] A. Moret, *Mystères égyptiens* (Musée Guimet Lecture), Châlons, 1911, p. 1 ff.
[4] A. H. Sayce, *Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians*[3] (Hib. Lect. 1887), London, 1891, p. 241.
[5] C. P. Tiele, *Religions de l'Égypte et des peuples sémitiques*, Fr. tr., Paris, 1881, p. 296.
[6] W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*[2], p. 358 ff.
[7] F. Cumont, *Les Mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1900, i. 289.

worshipped Demeter, until they had gone through the formalities of an initiation ceremony. This ceremony, which was instituted exclusively for the citizens of Attica, was gradually opened to the other inhabitants of Greece, and even to all the subjects of the Roman Empire, 'as a sanctuary common to the whole earth' (Aristides, *Eleusinios*, ed. W. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1829, p. 415). Every foreign religion which spread through the Roman world assumed the form of mysteries open to all who showed themselves worthy or merely desirous of being initiated into them.

Thus initiation paved the way for universalistic cults by substituting community of beliefs and rites for nationality as the foundation of religious ties.

The Christian sacrament of baptism (*q.v.*), the primary rite of initiation into the Church, was elaborately developed by the Gnostics. Two MSS, belonging to the sect of the Valentinians, the *Pistis Sophia* and the *Book of the Great Logos according to the Mystery*, give a description of four grades of initiation: the Baptism of water, 'which gives access to the place of Truth and the place of Light'; the Baptism of fire, 'which admits one into the company of the heirs of the kingdom of Light'; the Baptism of the Spirit; and, finally, 'the mystery which forces all the Archons to remove iniquities from off the Disciples and make the Disciples immortal.'[1] Among the Druses, according to the Arab historians al-Maqrīzī and al-Nuwairī, there were no fewer than nine grades of initiation where the hidden meaning of the *Qur'ān*, the real origin of the universe, the inaccessibility of the supreme principle, and, finally, the equivalence of all cults were successively taught.[2] The Christian sects of the Middle Ages had frequent recourse to initiation ceremonies, the secrecy of which served to protect them from the attacks of orthodoxy. The favour which symbolism then enjoyed allowed them to attribute to texts and to sacred or at least inoffensive emblems an esoteric significance which was gradually revealed to neophytes. Even such exclusively technical details as the formulæ and tools employed in the art of building lent themselves in the apprenticeship of mediæval freemasons to a moral or philosophical interpretation, which has preserved their use in the initiation of modern Freemasons, though freemasonry (*q.v.*) has long ago lost its professional character.[3]

It is of importance to note that, while preserving its outward form throughout this evolution, initiation changed its object somewhat in passing from magic to the service of religion. What was required of it now was to make the gods better known, and to bring about a closer intercourse with them. As a consequence, we notice among neophytes new feelings of curiosity, anxiety, and even anguish, allied with an ardent desire for communion with their religious and moral ideal. The rites giving them access to the sacred world—whether these ceremonies were originally held in connexion with the changing of the seasons, the revolutions of the stars, or the transformations of the crops—recurred in a rhythm of periodicity and alternation which the initiated applied to their own destiny. In the liturgical drama, in which he had to play a part, the novice now saw the passion of a god—some divine sacrifice, the benefit of which he was personally called upon to reap. All the symbolism of the ancient mysteries found an outlet in this direction. The aim of initiation thus became once more the attainment of an individual advantage, but this time on a different plan: 'Thanks to these beautiful mysteries which come to us from the gods,' we read in an Eleusinian inscription, 'death is for mortals no longer an evil, but a boon.'[4]

The question is to discover whether, as Paul Foucart maintains,[5] initiation confined itself to furnishing the neophyte with topographical information, as it were, to prevent him from losing his way in the under world, and with magic formulæ to baffle the demons lying in ambush in his path, or whether it insisted also on the necessity of his having led a just and righteous life. It would seem that initiation was sufficient in itself to ensure eternal life, and Diogenes of Sinope was more or less justified in putting the crucial question: 'Will the brigand Poetacion be happier after his death because he has been initiated than Epaminondas, who has not been initiated?'[1] In Greece an attempt was made to satisfy the demands of morality more or less by excluding from initiation all traitors, perjurers, and criminals—in a word, all those who had not 'clean hands.' The Egyptians had found a more practical expedient. They introduced as part of the ceremony representing the supreme journey into the infernal regions a summons before the tribunal of Osiris; only those who were acquitted there could benefit by the formulæ and amulets provided to help the dead to attain safely to the blessed region of the fields of Aalu. If this had not been the case when the culture of the ancients was at its height, men like Plato, Cicero, Plutarch, and Diodorus would have been more careful about proclaiming the moralizing and civilizing influence of initiation into the mysteries of their time.

4. The ritual of initiation.—The formalities of initiation, whether its dominant function is magical or religious, present striking general resemblances. Andrew Lang notes the following general characteristics: (*a*) mystic dances; (*b*) the use of the *turnalun*, or bull-roarer (*q.v.*); (*c*) daubing with clay and washing this off; (*d*) performances with serpents and other 'mad doings.' To these we might add: (*e*) a simulation of death and resurrection; (*f*) the granting of a new name to the initiated; (*g*) the use of masks or other disguises.[2] In any case, we may say that initiation ceremonies include: (1) a series of formalities which loosen the ties binding the neophyte to his former environment; (2) another series of formalities admitting him to the superhuman world; (3) an exhibition of sacred objects and instruction on subjects relating to them; (4) re-entry or reintegration rites, facilitating the return of the neophyte into the ordinary world.[3] These rites, especially those of the first three divisions, are found fulfilling a more or less important function in all initiation ceremonies, both among savages and among the civilized.

(1) *Separation rites.*—In every initiation of any importance the neophyte has to leave his family, live in isolation, consent to all kinds of restrictions and tabus, and submit to purifications, aspersions, purgations, fasting, flagellation, even mutilation (and, more particularly, circumcision), and, finally, assist at his own burial, or at least pretend to have left this world. Sometimes spirits wearing masks corresponding to their supposed character come and carry him off to some hut or enclosure, or to some isolated spot where he lives in their company for a certain period, which may be months or even years, as in Africa, America, New Guinea, and other countries. Even when initiation is nothing but a mere transmission of magical powers, the neophyte is supposed to be carried off to the spirit world.

Among the Eskimos, an *angakok* goes through the ceremony of killing the aspirant to magical powers, and his soul then flies off to probe the depths of sky, sea, and earth, and thus learn the secrets of nature. On its return it resuscitates the body, which has been lying stretched on the frozen ground, and the patient then becomes an *angakok* in his turn.[4] It would be useless to insist upon the importance of this practice of simulating death in the initiation ceremonies of the ancients. Many mysteries included, we are told by Lampridius in connexion with Mithraic mysteries, something similar to an immolation 'which was described or represented so as to produce unnecessary fear.' There is a story that the Emperor Commodus, filling

[1] E. Amélineau, *Le Gnosticisme égyptien*, Paris, 1887, p. 243 *f.*
[2] A. I. Silvestre de Sacy, *Exposé de la religion des Druses*, Paris, 1838, p. lxxiv f.
[3] R. F. Gould, *Concise History of Freemasonry*, London, 1904, pp. 127, 304 ff.
[4] Ἐφημερὶς Ἀρχαιολογική, Athens, 1883, p 82.
[5] P. Foucart, *Recherches sur l'origine et la nature des mystères d'Eleusis*, Paris, 1895, 1st Mémoire, p. 63.

[1] Plutarch, *de Audiendis Poetis* (= *Moralia*, ed. F. Dubner, vol. i. [Paris, 1841] p. 26).
[2] Andrew Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, i. 283.
[3] Van Gennep adds to these what he calls 'marginal' rites or periods, the object of which is 'to facilitate changes of state, without violent shocks or abrupt stops to individual and collective life' (*Rites de passage*, 14).
[4] Hubert and Mauss, 'Théorie générale de la magie,' in *Année*, vii. 38.

the rôle of mystagogue, one day took his part too seriously and really killed the unfortunate candidate.[1] The allusion of Apuleius to his initiation into the mysteries of Isis is well known.[2] Even to-day, in the 'profession of vows' in use among the Benedictines, the novice is laid out on the ground between four candles, and covered with a winding sheet, the service of the dead is performed above his body, and the whole congregation chants the *Miserere* for him.

It is noticeable that among nearly all peoples funeral ceremonies themselves imply a sort of initiation of the deceased into the society of the dead; without this, he would have no choice but to remain on earth and torment the living.

(2) *Admission rites.*—Plato has rightly written τελευτᾶν τελεῖσθαι, 'to die is to be initiated'; we might reverse the order and say, 'to be initiated is to die.' But it is only to die so as to be re-born under better conditions. 'That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die' (1 Co 15[36]) is a reflexion which must always have occurred to man from the day when he conceived the idea of a higher life in the sacred world. We find this notion wherever initiation ceremonies exist, as we may see by a glance over the examples collected by Frazer in *GB*[2] ii.

In the Lower Congo, initiation ceremonies are called *kimbasi*, which means 'resurrection.' During a dance the neophytes fall dead, and then the sorcerer resuscitates them.[3] Sometimes the rôle is filled by persons who have already been initiated, and the neophyte is present simply as a spectator. On the River Darling in New South Wales, an old man lies down in a grave which has been dug and holds a small bush in his hand. He is then covered with a thin layer of earth and the branch is allowed to protrude, to look as if it were growing. Other bushes are stuck in the soil to heighten the effect. The novices are then brought to the edge of the grave, when a singer begins a chant invoking the totem, and a dance is performed by old men. The dancing and singing are continued till the bush held by the buried man begins to quiver, and he rises from the grave.[4] In the Fiji Islands the novices are set before a row of men lying on the ground and seemingly dead, their bodies having been previously covered with the blood and entrails of pigs. At a given signal they rise and run down to wash in the neighbouring river.[5] Among the Omahas of the United States the neophyte is bound to a plank, after which one priest pretends to kill him, and another brings him back to life.[6] Where we can penetrate behind the veil of secrecy overhanging the initiation ceremonies of the ancients, we find in nearly all cases the representation of the passion of a divine or semi-divine being, who is attacked or carried off by infernal powers, descends to the realm of the dead, is liberated by the intervention of some higher divinity, and brought back to the region of light in the presence or company of those assisting in the ceremony. It is curious to find the same idea not only in Japan, Polynesia, etc., but also among peoples who could never have had any connexion whatever with the mythology of the ancient world. Father de Smet discovered in 1840 among the Pottawatomies of North America a legend about the introduction of agriculture and organization of mysteries which bears an astonishing resemblance to the drama played at Eleusis.[7] Still more recently, J. W. Fewkes, describing the secret rites performed among the Hopi of Arizona by the Brotherhood of the Antelope and the Snake, reports that there the initiated are treated to a representation of the adventures of a personage called Ti-Yo—his journey to the spirit world, the ordeals he passed through there, and his return to the land of the living, bringing with him the knowledge of the rites for making rain.[8]

Sometimes the idea of re-birth is still more clearly marked: the initiated passes into a state of embryo.

Initiation with the Nosairis of Lebanon was closely connected with child-birth, and the neophyte received the embryonic name of *alakati*, lit. 'clot of blood.'[9] In Egypt the Pharaoh, who was solemnly consecrated in ceremonies which were supposed to ally him with Osiris, had to wrap himself up in an animal's skin which was called 'the cradle skin,' or 'the place of becoming, of transformations, of renewed life,' and this skin was used also in funeral ceremonies as a temporary shroud. According to A. Moret, a similar ceremony was celebrated for certain privileged persons, whose return to a state of embryo was simulated in the same way as in the legend of the resurrection of Osiris; this is what is called 'passing through the skin.'[1] The same symbolism is found in India, where the young Brâhman had also to assume the attitude of an embryo in the course of his initiation, by setting himself on a black antelope's skin which represented the womb.[2] After this ceremony he was called *dvija*, 'twice born.' The Romans had an analogous expression (*in æternum renatus*) to designate one who had passed through the ceremonies of the Taurobolium and the Criobolium; and we find the same expression again in an inscription which Pope Xystus III. had carved on the baptistery of the Lateran:

'Coelorum regnum sperate, hoc fonte renati.
Non recipit felix vita semel genitos.'

It is obvious in all these cases that initiation is literally a *re-generation*. This is brought about in two ways: (*a*) the ceremony evolves mystic influences which modify the spiritual and even the physical nature of the neophyte.

Among the Australians these influences materialize as pebbles or bits of quartz which are supposed to enter the body of the candidate for magicianship.[3] Some clans even believed that his entrails were replaced by new ones. In other parts, a snake is supposed to enter his head.[4] In still other cases there is the substitution or even the superposition of a new soul which comes down from the spirit world; J. G. Frazer has shown that this is a very common way of explaining the change, but he is mistaken in thinking that this *avatar* is invariably the work of a totem which communicates its own soul to the novice, while retaining its own individuality. There is, as a matter of fact, nothing to prevent the soul or spirit thus incarnated from being ascribed to an entirely different source. This new factor may be merely a quality, a virtue, or a gift of grace, which the sanctifying influence of initiation has poured down on the neophyte to purify and exalt his inner nature.

(*b*) The neophyte may pass for the time being into the spirit world. He lives the life of the spirits, becomes like one of them, and so enjoys their privileges. Perhaps the idea here is, reasoning from imitative magic, that, since the neophyte has once died and been resuscitated, the same thing will happen again when he dies in reality.

It is impossible to enter into details of the rites which finally admit the neophyte into the superhuman world. Those which are quoted by Andrew Lang nearly all belong to this category. It is a curious thing that among almost all uncivilized peoples the noise produced by the bull-roarer, or rattle, is supposed to be the voice of spirits; but it is still a moot point whether this instrument was in general use in initiation ceremonies among the ancients. Daubing with clay, chalk, or other colouring substances is a very common rite, but the washing which follows it is not to be confused with the lustrations whose object is to rid the novice of all pernicious taints, and which belong rather to the rites of separation. On the other hand, the mutilations which were classed under separation rites (circumcision, the drawing of a tooth, the removal of a phalanx, etc.) may also be taken as admission rites when their object is to test the courage of the neophytes and their power of resistance, or to set a mark on them by which they will know each other. Dancing, as Lucian noted when he wrote 'there is no mystery without dancing,'[5] may be regarded as of universal use in initiation ceremonies, if we include under it all rhythmic movements, from the *corroboris* in which the Australians imitate the actions and gestures of their totems, to circumambulations (*q.v.*), which aim at drawing a circle to separate the two worlds (except when these circumambulations are a magic ceremony to influence the course of nature). The giving of a new name is often accompanied by the use of a new language, formed either from archaic expressions or turns of speech, or from everyday words which are given a new intonation. Again, we must notice the frequent recourse to communion, through which the neophytes,

[1] Lampridius, *Commodus*, ch. ix.
[2] Apuleius, *Met.* xi. 23.
[3] De Jonghe, in *Revue des questions historiques*, 9th ser., xii. 467 ff.
[4] A. W. Howitt, 'On some Australian Ceremonies of Initiation,' in *JAI* xiii. [1883-84] 453 *f.*
[5] L. Fison, 'The Nanga,' *ib.* xiv. [1884-85] 22.
[6] J. G. Kohl, *Kitschi-Gami*, Bremen, 1859, i. 59 ff.
[7] P. de Smet, *Missions de l'Orégon*, Ghent, 1848, i. 284.
[8] J. W. Fewkes, 'The Snake Ceremonials at Walpi,' in *Journ. of Amer. Ethnol. and Archæol.* iv. [Boston, 1894].
[9] R. Dussaud, *Histoire et religion des Nosaïris*, Paris, 1900, p. 110.

[1] A. Moret, *Mystères égyptiens*, 90.
[2] *Satapatha Brâhmaṇa*, III. ii. 1. 6 (=*SBE* xxvi. 27).
[3] M. Mauss, *L'Origine des pouvoirs magiques dans les sociétés australiennes*, Paris, 1905, p. 16.
[4] *Ib.* p. 43.
[5] Περὶ ὀρχήσεως, xv.

by partaking of the food of the initiated, become assimilated with them, or, in the case of sacrifice, with the gods themselves.

(3) *Communication of the sacra.*—The communication of the *sacra* is at once the complement and the essential object of the admission rites. It includes: (*a*) exhibitions, (*b*) actions, and (*c*) instructions—a threefold distinction already made by the ancients (at Eleusis: τὰ δεικνύμενα, 'what is shown'; τὰ δρώμενα, 'what is done'; and τὰ λεγόμενα, 'what is said'). (*a*) The exhibitions include magical or evocatory instruments (amulets, charms, relics, the *churingas* of the Australians, certain shells, the rattle of the American Indians and Negroes, the contents of the medicine bags, the cithern of the Egyptians, the fan, the cist, the tympanum of the Greeks); representational and symbolic objects (various images and effigies, masks, animals, ears of corn, etc.); or pictures representing the adventures of superhuman beings or scenes from the other world. In this way the novice gets to know the inhabitants of this higher world, to familiarize or identify himself with them, and to live their life. (*b*) The performances vary according to the goal aimed at, but we must distinguish between those whose object is initiation properly so called, and which are performed only once for each neophyte, and those which are repeated periodically and form the essential aim of the institution.[1] (*c*) The instruction, which often comprises several grades or degrees, bears of necessity on what the neophytes are to gain by initiation, but it generally extends to other matters than the explanation of rites and the teaching of formulæ. It includes the communication of the real name of divine personages, theogonies, and cosmogonies, mythical history, common law, the exercise of certain arts, moral and social obligations, tabus, and marriage laws.

Among the Basutos, the initiated are adjured to 'be men, fear theft, fear adultery, honour your father and mother, obey your chiefs.'[2] Here we are reminded of the laws attributed to Triptolemus, and said by St. Jerome to have been carved in the sanctuary of Eleusis: 'To honour one's parents, to worship the gods by offerings, and not to eat flesh.'[3]

The revelations may even include, under pressure of a more advanced state of culture, a supposed rational interpretation of vulgar beliefs, or even a religious philosophy agreeing with the most advanced philosophical views of the time. In any case, this instruction is protected by the obligation of secrecy, which the neophyte cannot infringe without laying himself open to the gravest consequences. But, as Seneca says, speaking of the mysteries of his time, the secrecy could apply only to the *sacra*, *i.e.* to the formulæ of incantation, the esoteric explanation of symbols, and the signs by which the initiated recognized each other; it could not cover philosophical precepts, if philosophy there was, because they were current among the uninitiated also.[4]

(4) *Reintegration rites.*—It is only very rarely that the initiated can remain for ever in the realm of the sacred. By some means or other he has to renew his relations with the ordinary world. But he does not return in exactly the same state as he went away. Since he reappears laden with mystic influences, which are, of course, dangerous for the uninitiated, he has to be, so to speak, 'detabuized' and readmitted to his original sphere. He has, for a certain period, to submit to rules of silence and abstinence, and, yet more, he must, in his new character, pretend to have forgotten all about his previous existence and re-learn everything connected with ordinary life.

In the Congo, he must pretend that he cannot either walk or eat by himself, and he has to be fed like a new-born infant. In Virginia, he has to learn the language of his tribe all over again. In New Guinea, he has to go backwards into his house. Among the Brāhmans, he throws his old garments into the river and puts on new ones.

These precautions are only transitory, yet a man who has once been initiated is, throughout his whole life, subjected to a special and more or less strict discipline. Sometimes he bears a special mark or wears special garments or insignia, as, *e.g.*, the cord worn by the Brāhmans, the white dress of the Essenes and Pythagoreans, etc.; he must also respect certain tabus and avoid certain localities. In every case he gains great prestige in the eyes of the uninitiated. When one has visited the infernal regions, even though it is only after the manner of Dante, some trace of it always remains.

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GOBLET D'ALVIELLA.

INITIATION (Buddhist).—**1. Forms of initiation.**—Admission to the Buddhist Order (*saṅgha*) is gained by two forms of initiation, a lower, *pravrajyā* (Pāli, *pabbajjā*), and a higher, *upasampadā*, though the former is only preparatory to the latter and, in fact, a probationary part of it.

(*a*) *Pravrajyā* means 'going out'; and by this ceremony one goes out from a prior state of life, either from the worldly life in the case of an ordinary person, or from a monastic life in the case of one changing to another faith. This is in a certain way analogous with the Brāhmanical initiation (*upanayana*) by which a boy is admitted to a teacher's hermitage (*āśrama* [*q.v.*]) in order to live with him (*antevāsin*) as a *brahmachārin*. With the Buddhists a layman is thereby admitted to the Order, and is henceforth obliged to live with a preceptor, without whose directions he is not allowed to do anything. The lowest limit of age is eight, children under that age being ineligible. With this ordination the child begins his life as a 'homeless one' (*pravrajita*, *pabbajita*), and is called a *śrāmaṇera* (*sāmaṇera*), 'novice.' The period of novitiate lasts for twelve years, and, in the case of one initiated at eight, his higher ordination takes place only in his twentieth year.

(*b*) *Upasampadā* means 'arrival,' and is the entry into the circle of the fully accredited members of the *saṅgha*. This second and full ordination is never conferred on a novice under twenty years of age; but, if he receives the *pravrajyā* ordination at or after twenty, and is otherwise properly qualified, he can proceed at once to the *upasampadā*. One who has gone through the *upasampadā* is henceforth an *upasampanna bhikṣu* ('fully ordained mendicant'), and will be called, after ten years' standing, a *sthavira* (*thera*), 'elder,' elders only being allowed to instruct others, that is, to become an *upādhyāya* (*upajjhāya*), 'preceptor,' or an *ācārya* (*ācariya*), 'tutor.' Those who cannot as yet be named 'elders' are called *daharas* ('small teachers'), according to I-tsing.[1]

The names, *śramaṇa* (Pāli, *samaṇa*), 'one performing austerity, ascetic,' *bhikṣu* (Pali, *bhikkhu*), 'one begging, mendicant,' and especially *Śakyaputriya śramaṇa* (*sakyaputtiyasamaṇa*), 'an ascetic belonging to the son of the *Śākya* tribe,' are ap-

[1] Perhaps some such distinction is alluded to in *Hom. Hymn to Demeter*, 481, where the author seems to mention successively 'initiation into' and 'participation in' the mysteries: Ὅς δ' ἀτελὴς ἱερῶν, ὃς τ' ἄμμορος (*cf.* Goblet d'Alviella, *Eleusinia*, Paris, 1903, p. 60).

[2] E. Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1860, p. 278.

[3] Jerome, *adv. Iovinianum*, ii. 14.

[4] Seneca, *Ep.* xcv.

[1] I-tsing, *Record of the Buddhist Religion as practised in India*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, p. 194.

plied to all the members of the Order except the laity, though, strictly speaking, these terms can be applied to the elders only, for no one can be designated an ascetic or a mendicant until he is fully confirmed by the *upasampadā* and becomes himself responsible for such a mode of life.

While the *pravrajyā* resembles the initiation (*upanayana*) to the first stage of the Brāhmanic life, the *upasampadā* makes the Buddhist system quite different from that of the Brāhmans. Coming of age and finishing his study, a *bramachārin* becomes a *snātaka* ('bathed') and returns to household life (*gṛhastha*), whereas a *śrāmaṇera* becomes by the *upasampadā* a *sthavira*, a full member of the Order, or a *bhikṣu* in the proper sense of the word, corresponding to the fourth and last stage of the Brāhmanic life, i.e. *sannyāsin*, an ascetic.

2. Particulars of initiation.—(*a*) The *pravrajyā* ordination chiefly consists of (1) the investment with a yellow robe, (2) a tonsure, (3) the declaration of the Three Refuges (*saraṇattaya*), and (4) the imparting of the Ten Precepts (*dasasikkhāpadāni*).

A lay person desiring to enter the Buddhist Order first chooses a *vihāra* ('monastery'), approaches an elder living therein (bringing with him a suit of yellow robes), and requests to be initiated. The elder invests him with the robe, and instructs him to keep the Three Refuge creed by repeating it:

'I take refuge with the Buddha, I take refuge with the Religion, I take refuge with the Order. For the second time I take refuge with the Buddha. For the third time I take refuge with the Buddha,' etc.

After this the candidate is again taught to adhere to the Ten Precepts (*dasasikkhāpadāni*):

'Abstinence from taking life, Abstinence from taking what is not given, Abstinence from impure practices, Abstinence from telling a lie, Abstinence from intoxicating drinks, Abstinence from eating out of time, Abstinence from dancing, singing, and seeing shows, Abstinence from the application of perfume, incense, etc., Abstinence from the use of a high or large couch or seat, Abstinence from receiving gold and silver.'

So far the ceremony. Henceforth the novice lives with his preceptor and acts under the latter's supervision until he is fully qualified for the next ordination.

The *pravrajyā* is in reality a preparatory ceremony by which one enters into the probationary course of the priestly life. Without this course of novitiate one cannot proceed to the higher Order, the relation between a *śrāmaṇera* and a *śramaṇa* being analogous to that between deacon and priest in the Anglican Church.

(*b*) The *upasampadā* ordination is not so simple as the *pravrajyā*, since it involves the fullest possible enjoyment of the privileges of the Buddhist Order and the final registry of the right of seniority among the younger brethren. Every step of the ordination has to be performed before a chapter of fully equipped elders, the number of the members being in this case at least ten.[1] An ecclesiastical vote of the chapter of elders is called *kammavācā*, and there are two forms of arriving at a resolution: (1) a summary decision (*ñattidutiyakamma*), in which a resolution is arrived at by the first reading, and (2) a decision by the third reading (*ñattichatutthakamma*).[2] In the *upasampadā* ordination all questions are decided by three readings. The method of voting is very simple. Those who assent remain silent, while those who dissent speak out. Occasionally, however, when there are dividing opinions in case of a difficult question, the chapter has recourse to the use of voting slips (*salākā*), which are divided in colours, generally white and black, but sometimes of several different colours. The time generally chosen for holding the ordination is the full-moon day of Vaiśākha (April–May), and the three successive days of quarters of the moon.[1] The proceedings are as follows.

First a preliminary examination of the candidate takes place A novice is brought by a tutor before the president of the chapter,[2] and an *upadhyaya* (*upājjhāya*, 'preceptor') is appointed for the candidate. Meanwhile one of the assembly comes up as a second tutor, or, rather, witness. By these two tutors he is questioned as to his name, his preceptor's name, his bowl, and his robes. All being well, he is ordered to stand on a certain spot, while the tutors remain before the president, and, having asked the permission of the chapter, they instruct the candidate to tell the truth, and further examine him as to his qualifications. He is first questioned if he has any such diseases as leprosy (*kuṭṭha*), boils (*gaṇḍa*), itch (*kilāsa*), asthma (*sosa*), or epilepsy (*apamāra*). These questions being answered in the negative, he is asked if he is a human being (*manussa*), a male (*purisa*), and a free man (*bhujissa*); if he is free from debt (*anaṇa*), exempt from military service (*rājaḷhaṭa*), and permitted by his parents (*anuññāta mātāpitūhi*); and, further, if he is of the full age of twenty. The questions as to the state of the bowl, and the robes, and his name and his preceptor's name, are also asked.

This strict and searching examination being over, the two tutors go up to the president of the chapter and report the result, and then the candidate is called out (*āgachchhāhi* or *ehi*).[3] Thereupon he comes out and stands between the two tutors and says: 'Venerable sirs, I ask the chapter to confer upon me the *upasampadā*. Have pity on me and lift me up (*ullumpetu*).' He repeats this request three times.

Now the tutors repeat the above examinations once more before the assembly, and finally a motion (*ñatti*) is proposed publicly with the words:

'This Nāga desires the *upasampadā* under the venerable Tissa. He is free from disqualifications (*antarāyikā dhammā*). If any of the venerable chapter approves the ordination of the candidate, let him be silent; but if any objects, let him speak.'

This motion also is repeated three times. If all are silent, the president declares that the resolution is carried.[4] As soon as the ceremonies are over, the shadow of the sun (*chhāyā*) must be measured, and the season (*utupamāna*) and the division of the day (*divasabhāga*), with the details of the assembly (*saṃgīti*), should be recorded.

The four requisites (*nissayā*) for a *bhikṣu* and the four interdicts (*akaraṇīyāni*) must be minutely taught.

The four requisites are (1) food collected in the almsbowl (*piṇḍiyālopa-bhojana*); (2) robes made of rags (*paṁsukūlachīvara*); (3) lodging at the foot of a tree (*rukkhamūlasenāsana*); and (4) cow's urine used as medicine (*pūtimutta-bhesajja*). To each of these several exceptions are given

The four interdicts are (1) sexual intercourse (*methunadhamma*); (2) theft (*adinnādāna*); (3) killing (*pāṇātipāta*); and (4) a claim of superhuman power (*uttarimanussadhamma*). To these also many exceptions are allowed.

With the instructions as to these two series of important moral precepts the ordination comes to an end.

3. **Training of the initiated.**—The *upasampadā* ordination confers on the candidate no mystic power, as is the case in the *abhiṣeka* described below; nor is it regarded as an indelible Order imposed upon him, for one's free will is always respected in the Buddhist Order. But the *upasampadā* ordination alone does not give a man freedom of conduct, for he has further to live under the supervision of the superiors whom he has chosen. The superiors are generally two, one being the preceptor (*upādhyāya*), the other the tutor (*ācārya*).

[1] *SBE* xiii. [1881] 175. [2] *Ib.* p. 169.

[1] The full-moon day of Vaiśākha is the day of the Buddha's *parinibbāna*; see Buddhaghosa's *Samantapāsādikā*, in H. Oldenberg's *Vinaya Pitaka*, London, 1879–83, iii. 283.

[2] An elder who becomes president must be of more than ten years' standing after his *upasampadā* ordination; see *SBE* xiii. 178.

[3] Cf. Rigveda, III. viii. 4, which is used in the Brāhmanic initiation in the Gṛhyasūtras. The first verse, *Yuvā suvāsāḥ parivīta āgāt*, etc., is recited by a candidate, and the second verse, *Taṁ dhīrāsa Kavaya unnayanti*, etc., is said by the teacher. *Āgachchhāhi-āgāt* and *ullumpetu-unnayanti* are interesting. The ordination is sometimes called *ehi-bhikkhupabbajjā*, 'come-priest-ordination' (V. Fausböll, *Dhammapadam*, Copenhagen, 1855, p. 119).

[4] *SBE* xiii. 170.

The duties of the two superiors are very difficult to define; it is perhaps impossible to draw a line between them. Their offices, as detailed in the *Mahāvagga*, i. 25–33,[1] are exactly identical. Most probably, as the general purport of the two words indicates, the *upādhyāya* (preceptor) is responsible for his pupil's study of the sacred texts, while the *ācārya* (tutor) takes charge of the pupil in respect of conduct. The latter is sometimes called *karmā-chārya*, meaning, most probably, a tutor in the ecclesiastical act, but personally a tutor in discipline.[2]

Thus an *upasampanna bhikṣu* is dependent on the two teachers. Though the *upādhyāya* seems to be more important than the *ācārya*, contrary to the Brāhmanic usage,[3] the duty of giving a *nissaya* (dependence, protection) properly belongs to the *ācārya*. It is prescribed by the Buddha in the Vinaya that a *bhikṣu* after the *upasampadā* should live ten years in dependence (*nissaya*) on an *ācārya*, and that he who has completed his tenth year may himself give a *nissaya* to others.[4] Thus an *ācārya* is a proper *nissaya-da* ('giver of protection'), and his protégé is *nissaya-antevāsika* ('pupil in dependence'). The pupil should be regarded as a son, and the tutor should be looked up to as a father.[5] Yet it is said in the *Vinaya* that a *nissaya* will cease when the *upādhyāya* and the *ācārya* come together.[6] This would imply that, though a pupil is always dependent on his *ācārya*, when he is in the presence of his *upādhyāya* for instruction or otherwise his dependence on the *ācārya* would cease for the time being.

As a *bhikṣu* is an *antevāsika* ('dwelling close by pupil') towards his *ācārya*, so he is a *saddhivihārika* ('living in the same *vihāra*, co-resident') towards his *upādhyāya*. Of the two superiors one is something like a private tutor whose duty is chiefly towards the progress of morals, while the other is a professor in the college (*vihāra*) who is mostly responsible for the instruction of the pupil.

4. Initiation in the mystic school of Buddhism (Japan).—The mystic doctrine of Buddhism is imparted only by the *abhiṣeka* ('anointing') rite, which is important, as it raises one above the level of ignorance and reveals the real state of nature. Through this one can witness the true *bodhichitta* ('mind arising from perfect knowledge') of the Buddha, unite one's mind with it, and become blessed and enlightened. An *ācārya*'s sprinkling over the head of a novice of the water of knowledge (*jñānodaka*) of the Mahāvairochana Buddha (one of the Dhyānibuddhas) is at once symbolical of dispelling one's ignorance and one's sins. The *abhiṣeka* is certainly a reproduction of the crowning of Indian Rājas.[7]

In contrast to the *upasampadā*, liturgical elements come to the front, which are considered to effect a mystic transmission in the candidate's mind and person. A new name is always given to the anointed (*abhiṣikta*).

In the Buddhist *abhiṣeka* there are, theoretically, the three following forms: (1) the *abhiṣeka* of signs (*mudrā*); (2) the *abhiṣeka* of actions (*karma*); and (3) the *abhiṣeka* of mind (*chitta*). The *mudrā-abhiṣeka*, chiefly consisting of finger interlwinings symbolical of actions, is a curtailed form of initiation to be conferred on an earnest believer who is short of means, whereas the *chitta-abhiṣeka*, which is beyond the scope of speech and action, is conferred only on a holy personage (*ārya-pudgala*) like a Bodhisattva (*q.v.*). The *karma-abhiṣeka* is the ordinary rite which an *ācārya* performs for a fully equipped pupil, and is important in proportion as it is elaborate in details. The *karma-abhiṣeka* is again divided into three kinds: (*a*) the *abhiṣeka* for forming a sacred connexion (*pratityabandha-abhiṣeka*); (*b*) the *abhiṣeka* for holding a magical power (*vidyādhara-abhiṣeka*); and (*c*) the *abhiṣeka* for transmitting the law (*dharmasaṁchāra-abhiṣeka*).

These ordinations are the stages of training in the mystic school. The most common of all is the *pratityabandha abhiṣeka*, which may be performed for any person, making no distinction whatever of qualifications, either good or bad; sometimes one is forcibly brought to the ordination hall so as to improve one's character. The object of this particular rite is to form a sacred connexion with a Buddha or a saint in the *maṇḍala* (sacred diagram), a fact which in the end will lead one to perfect knowledge. Every one who believes in the mystic doctrine is entitled to receive this ordination. During the rite the candidate is made to throw a flower over the sacred *maṇḍala* placed before him. If the flower falls on a Buddha or a Bodhisattva, he is considered to be worthy of the Buddha-gotra; but, if it falls on the outer circle of the *vajra-kula*, as on Vināyaka (Ganapati), he is not allowed to study the mystic doctrine, though at the present day there is no strict adherence to this rule. The *vidhyādhara-abhiṣeka* is a step higher than the *pratityabandha*. It is conferred on the best qualified pupils who are able to grasp the highest truth. *Vidyā* ('science, especially 'occult science') means *mantra* ('incantations'), *stotra* ('praises'), *dhāraṇī* ('charms'), and *mudrā* ('signs'). One who is possessed of this knowledge is called *vidyādhara* ('holder of occult science'). An *ācārya* through this ordination gives his select pupil permission to acquire the *vidyā* above specified, and also the *kriyā*, a religious achievement such as the four *pāramitās* ('perfections'); and this rite is, accordingly, also called the *abhiṣeka* for the position of a pupil (*śiṣyasthāna-abhiṣeka*). While the *pratityabandha-abhiṣeka* is an admission to the mystic circle, the *vidyādhara-abhiṣeka* is an introduction to the mystic doctrine, and is therefore placed much higher than the *pratityabandha*. Still higher in grade is the *dharma-saṁchāra-abhiṣeka*, which gives one, not the position of a pupil, but the position of a teacher, especially a transmitter of the mystic doctrine. The name means, therefore, the transmission of the teaching (*dharmasaṁchāra* or *śāsanasaṁchāra*), but sometimes it is called the *ācāryasthāna-abhiṣeka* (the *abhiṣeka* for the position of a teacher). This ordination is not conferred on a *bhikṣu* under fifty years of age, however well qualified he may be. This was in any case the rule set forth by Kūkai, the founder of the Japanese school of mystic Buddhism.

5. The ceremonial of the Buddhist abhiṣeka.—The object of the *abhiṣekas* as specified is to create (*a*) an ideal religious personage, (*b*) an ideal religious scholar, and (*c*) an ideal religious instructor. Consequently the rules of the religious performance preparatory to the *abhiṣeka* (*samaya-śīla*) are very minute and strict. By the *samaya* practice the candidate should produce a believing mind ('faith'), a compassionate mind ('compassion'), deep *prajñā* ('wisdom'), and a great *bodhi-chitta* ('mind arising from perfect knowledge'), and remain firm in determination. *Samaya* means 'agreement,' 'union,' 'communion,' and the *samaya-śīla* is intended to keep a man in communion with the Mahāvairochana Buddha. Through the efficacy of this preparatory performance the candidate now assumes the position of the Buddha-son, Vajrasattva, and enters into the hall of ordination (Pāli, *sīmāmaṇḍala*).

Among the chief objects in use during this rite are a tooth-stick symbolizing the cleansing of passion and sins, a bundle of *vajra* threads in five colours representing the five Buddhas in union, a pot of the holy *vajra* water indicating the firm determination to seek *bodhi* ('supreme knowledge'), and so on. This ended, the *ācārya* blesses the candidate and covers his eyes, meaning to shut the gate of evils so as to open the divine eye. He is now led into the room of ordination with his eyes covered, and is made to throw a flower as before described, his object of worship being determined in this way. Afterwards he is allowed to gaze on this sacred *maṇḍala*. He is then led into the terrace of Bodhi (*bodhi-maṇḍa*), and is made to sit in the *padmāsana* fashion or on a lotus seat, and wear a diadem of the five Buddhas (*ratna-mukuṭa*) and a necklace (*hāra*). The *ācārya* sprinkles over his head the holy water of knowledge from five jars (*pañcha-kuṇḍaka*), and furnishes him with several things, such as a wheel (*chakra*) and a conch-shell (*śaṅkha*). While the *abhiṣeka* is still going on, a *homa* rite is performed, in which a sacred fire is lighted to burn all the past sins of the candidate.

Each ceremony is performed twice, first for the *garbhakośadhātumaṇḍala* (or *dharmadhātu*), and

[1] *SBE* xiii. 151–180. [2] I-tsing, tr. Takakusu, pp. 106, 198.
[3] *Ācārya* is more important; Manu, ii. 145; Yājnavalkya, i. 35; see *SBE* xiii. 179, note.
[4] *SBE* xiii. 179. [5] *Ib.* xiii. 179; I-tsing, p. 104.
[6] *SBE* xiii. 182.
[7] See art. ABHIṢEKA, vol. i. pp. 20–24.

then for the *vajradhātumaṇḍala*, or *vice versa*. Without entering into details of these *maṇḍalas*, it will be sufficient to say that these two are quite different in Japan, whereas in Nepāl the distinction is very vague, one *maṇḍala* serving for the other, in spite of the existence of two separate names.

The description here given follows the practices of the Japanese *mantra* school which were originally taught in China, by Subhākara Siṁha, an Indian *ācārya*, who was active in China A.D. 716–724, and which were brought to Japan by Kūkai (A.D. 774–835).[1] The tradition on the whole is no doubt much older than that in Nepāl.

6. The pravrajyā rites (Nepāl).—

In the Nepālese *abhiṣeka*, called the *pravrajyāvrata*,[2] the initiation of the Nepālese *banra* (Skr. *vandya*, 'worthy of honour, priest') is again different from those given above. A *guru* (teacher) in charge of the candidate prepares a pot (*kalaśa*) full of water and puts into it a lotus made of gold. Five confections, five flowers, five drugs, threads of five colours, etc., are properly provided. The candidate sits in the *vajrāsana* fashion before the pot and the four sacred *maṇḍalas* specially provided. He repeats the formula of the Three Refuges, and the first day's service is over. On the second day the candidate sits on the *svastikāsana*, and the *guru* gives him (1) the *vajra rakṣa* ('protection') by placing a *vajra* on his head; (2) the *loha* ('iron') *rakṣā* by placing three iron padlocks on the belly and on the two shoulders; and (3) the *agni* ('fire') *rakṣā* by placing a wine-cup (*surāpātra*) on his head. Then comes (4) the *kalaśa-abhiṣeka*, in which the holy water is sprinkled over his head. The *nāyaka banra* (head priest) of the *vihāra* ('monastery') now comes to him and puts a silver ring on the finger of the pupil. To the sound of a bell he sprinkles rice on the pupil and on the images of the protecting deities. On the third day, all necessary preparations being made, the pupil sits again on the *svastikāsana* and performs worship of the *guru maṇḍala*, the *chaitya* ('memorial tope'), the Three Treasures (*Tri-ratna*, *i.e.* Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha), and the *prajñā-pāramitā* text, and, lastly, he receives the Ten Precepts. He is again given three *rakṣās*, invested with a robe, and tonsured by a barber. Thereupon a diadem of the five Buddhas is put on his head, and the holy water is sprinkled on it, *mantras* being repeated all the while. With an offering (*pūjā*) the ceremony comes to an end, and a new Buddhist name is given to him.

Though *maṇḍalas*, five-coloured threads, the holy water, and the diadem of the five Buddhas are in common with the Japanese *abhiṣeka*, the Nepālese rite is more Hindu in its appearance. The ceremony of initiation in Tibet is generally similar to that of the southern Buddhists.[3] The *vinaya* school in Japan also mainly follow southern Buddhism in their ordination. The *abhiṣeka* belongs only to the *mantra* school of the mystic Buddhism.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references given in the art. see F. Spiegel, *Karmavākyam*, Bonn, 1841; J. F. Dickson, 'Kammavāca,' in *JRAS*, 1875, pp. 1–16; T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, i. (*SBE* xiii. [1881]); R. C. Childers, *Dict. of the Pali Lang.*, London, 1875, pp. 305 f., 582, 180 f.; H. Kern, *Man. of Ind. Buddhism* (= *GIAP* iii. 8), Strassburg, 1896, pp. 76–79.

J. TAKAKUSU.

INITIATION (Greek).—The Greek word for 'initiation,' τελετή, has until quite recently not been rightly understood. The lexicons tell us that it means 'accomplishment,' 'fulfilment,' 'attaining an end,' a τέλος; hence a rite of accomplishment, hence initiation into the mysteries. But we are left uncertain as to what end is to be accomplished. The word τελετή is derived from τελέω; its gist is best seen in the cognate τέλειος, which means 'full-grown.' A τέλειος ἵππος is a full-grown horse as contrasted with a foal. A τέλειος ἀνήρ is a full-grown man, an *adult*; τελετή is the rite of the first human accomplishment, the rite of growing up, of coming to maturity.

This meaning of τελετή is very clearly shown in the myth of the Prœtids told us by Apollodorus (II. ii. 2). The daughters of Prœtus, king of Tiryns, went mad and ranged over the mountains. They were finally cured by the soothsayer Melampus, who healed them by a ritual dance, and eventually married one of them. The time *when* they went mad is most instructive: 'when they had grown to maturity' (ὡς ἐτελειώθησαν). The reason *why* they went mad is equally so: 'they refused the maturity rites of Dionysos' (τὰς Διονύσου τελετὰς οὐ κατεδέχοντο). It is not safe to grow up without the orthodox rites of maturity; the crisis is momentous, and needs *rites de passage*. Not only baptism is needed, but confirmation.

Another version of the story given by Apollodorus says that the maidens went mad because they held the image of Hera cheap. Hera was worshipped in three forms: as child (παῖς), as full-grown woman (τελεία), and as widow (χήρα); she represented the three stages of a woman's life. This explains the sequel of the story of the Prœtids. The maidens who are healed by initiation are immediately married. Marriage, in fact, is the sign-manual of maturity. A boy among primitive peoples cannot take a wife till he has been initiated. In some cases initiation is not complete till after the birth of the first child. This explains the statement of Pollux (iii. 38): 'The married are mature'—τέλειοι οἱ γεγαμηκότες. This explains also why to the Greeks the Danaids both were 'uninitiated in marriage' (ἀτελεῖς γάμου) and became the prototypes of those who were 'uninitiated' in the Mysteries. To the Greeks, as in the English Prayer-Book, marriage is 'an excellent mystery.'

Initiation rites will be discussed under the head of MYSTERIES (Greek). All that concerns us here is to grasp the important fact that the primal τελετή, or initiation rite, was the rite of maturity. This rite was, of course, carefully concealed from the immature, and in sex rites from the uninitiated sex. Therein resided the *mystery*, which was indeed the social sanctity of the whole proceeding.

How little 'mysterious' in our sense the rite of maturity was is seen from a marble relief, probably funerary, now in the Central Museum at Athens, and dating about the 1st cent. A.D. A matronly figure seated on a decorated chair is inscribed 'Increase' (Ἔπικτησις). Before her, on a base, is a statue of 'Fertility' (Εὐθηνία), who carries a basket of fruit. Behind 'Fertility,' on a Doric pillar, is a goddess of the Artemis type. Near her in the field is the inscription Τελετή, 'Rite of Maturity.' Whether this refers to the figure on the pillar or to the whole scene is not very clear. What is clear is that Τελετή, 'Initiation or Maturity Rite,' stands both for the fertility of man and for that of the fruits of the earth, for behind the figure on the pillar is a great tree with a fillet hanging from one bough and round the stem a snake, the emblem of the fertility of the ground. According to ancient thinking, the same rite promotes and protects the maturity of man and of nature. In the light of this conception we understand why the great Eleusinian Mysteries were a festival of sowing. In the light of the fact that Τελετή stands on a gravestone we understand those hopes of immortality which centred round the Mysteries. Death was a *rite de passage* to a new life. 'It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body.' 'Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die' (1 Co 15[44. 36]).

LITERATURE.—For Greek initiation rites see MYSTERIES (Greek) and KOURETES; for possible survivals of initiation rites in the mysteries of the Kouretes and the Myth of Zagreus, J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 1–29; for marriage as an initiation rite, J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore*, do. 1910, p. 590; for the Danaids as unmarried and uninitiated, J. E. Harrison, *Proleg. to Study of Gr. Rel.*[2], do. 1908, p. 618; for death as initiation rite, R. Hertz, 'La Représentation collective de la mort,' in *ASoc* x. [1905–06] 48; for sculptured relief of

[1] The above account of the *abhiṣeka* was furnished by S. Yoshida, who himself went through the rite with the object of studying the mystic doctrine.

[2] See B. H. Hodgson, *Religion and Literature of the Nepalese Buddhists*, xv., London, 1874, p. 212; L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 179, note 3.

[3] See 'Tibetan' section below, and Waddell, 173–185.

Τελετή, A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, Cambridge, 1918, p. 535, fig. 407; for survivals of initiation rites in the customs of the Greek *Ephebeia*, Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Ephèbe.'

J. E. HARRISON.

INITIATION (Hindu). — The ceremony of initiation, or girding with the sacred thread, is considered one of the most important events in the life of a young Hindu. Before it he is, under the ancient Sanskrit law, equal to a low-born Śūdra, but the investiture is supposed to confer a spiritual birth in virtue of which he is reckoned a member of the higher classes, and these are therefore called the twice-born (*dvija*). It appears probable that the original meaning of this Indian custom has been preserved in those celebrations which take place among wild tribes all over the world at the time when a youth attains puberty, the Indian notion of a spiritual re-birth, or beginning of a new life, being present at many of these ceremonies. The Brāhmanical law of India seems to have narrowed the original meaning and importance of the custom by converting it into an 'introduction' (Skr. *upanayana*) to the future teacher, but the extension of the privileges conferred by it to many non-Brāhmanical castes was retained, and the now prevailing neglect of the course of sacred studies prescribed for the young novice seems to have been very common from an early period even among the Brāhmans. The Sanskrit law-books and the *Gṛhyasūtras* (domestic rules) are prolix in their descriptions of the rite of *upanayana*, the principal part of which consists in the communication of an ancient Sanskrit prayer (*gāyatrī*) to the novice by his future teacher, and in the investiture of the boy with a girdle which he puts round his waist, and with the sacred thread which he carries over the left shoulder. The performance of this rite is enjoined in general for a Brāhman in his eighth year, for a Kṣatriya in his eleventh, and for a Vaiśya in his twelfth. After initiation the youth has to live at the house of his spiritual teacher, studying the Veda under him, obeying his commands, begging for alms on his behalf, and collecting fuel for his fire. The period of studentship lasts for twelve years, or until the student has acquired a knowledge of the Vedas, and it terminates with another ceremony called *samāvartana* ('return'). The expense incurred by initiating a boy is defrayed by his parents, and after their death it becomes a charge on the inheritance.

At the present day the rite of *upanayana* is performed by Brāhmans and other high castes all over India, and the ancient ceremonies are preserved more or less in their original form. Thus among the Mādhva class of Deshāsth Brāhmans in Dhārwār (Bombay Pres.) eight is the usual age for a boy's thread-girding, and the season from mid-February to mid-July is the right time. An astrologer chooses a lucky day for the ceremony, for which great preparations are made, the house being cleaned and whitewashed, a porch erected in front of it, with posts ornamented with twigs and flowers, an altar raised facing the east, and invitation letters sent to friends and kinsmen. The lucky day having arrived, musicians begin to play at the boy's house; he is anointed with oil and turmeric, and bathed; a barber shaves his head, leaving three or five locks, according as he is supposed to study the Rigveda or the Yajurveda. He is then taken to the dining-hall, where his mother places him on her lap, feeds him, and for the last time eats from the same plate with him. The barber shaves the boy once more, leaving only the top-knot on his head; he is bathed, and made to sit down on a low wooden stool between his parents, and the Brāhman priests present chant eight auspicious hymns. As soon as the 'lucky moment' has arrived, the musicians raise a loud noise, the guests clap their hands, and the Brāhman priests and guests throw red rice over the boy. The priest then formally girds him with the sacred thread, one part of which rests on the boy's left shoulder, the rest falling below the right arm. A piece of deer-skin is tied to the sacred thread, and a staff is placed in his hand. Money presents are made to Brāhman priests, and fruits and flowers are handed round among the guests. At noon the boy is made to say his midday prayers, and in the evening his evening prayer. He asks alms of his mother in Sanskrit, and afterwards of his father, and in the same way of friends and kinsmen. Each drops rice and silver coins into the boy's cloth wallet. On the following three days he is taught to say his regular prayers, and is made to worship the sacred fire. On the fifth day he is dressed in fine clothes and taken in procession with music to a temple in the village, where he worships the idol and returns home. Among the Paradesa Brāhmans of Travancore, in the extreme south of the Peninsula, the *upanayana* consists of no fewer than fourteen parts, which have retained their old Sanskrit names, and correspond in the main to the ceremonies in vogue at Dhārwār as above described. The actual initiation, however, is performed by the teacher instructing the boy in the holy *gāyatrī* prayer, which he mutters in a low voice so that the assembled throng of friends may not hear it. Elsewhere it is the father who mutters the *gāyatrī* in the boy's right ear, whereas it rests with the priest to kindle the sacred fire and to gird the boy with the sacred thread. The initiation ceremony entails considerable expense; thus it is said to cost 40 to 100 rupees among the Deshāsth Brāhmans of Bijāpur, and 20 to 50 rupees among the Patane Prabhus of Poona. The course of instruction in the sacred books and prayers after *upanayana* has in most cases dwindled down to a period of a few days, but the privilege of wearing the sacred thread continues to be highly prized. In the 17th cent. the valiant Śivaji, the founder of Mahratta power, on account of his low origin did not venture to wear the sacred thread till his solemn coronation had taken place. On the other hand, customs precisely analogous to the initiation of the Brāhmans are found to occur even among those castes the members of which never wear the sacred thread. Thus among the Agarvāls of Poona it is customary for every boy at the age of eight or nine to prostrate himself once before his teacher, who presents him with a wreath of flowers and mutters a sacred verse in his ear. The Kanphatas of Cutch, a religious body, give every novice a black woollen thread, which he ties round his neck with a knot; and on receiving him into their Order the teacher whispers a certain verse into his ear.

LITERATURE.—J. Jolly, 'Über die indische Jünglingsweihe,' in *Jahrbuch der internat. Vereinigung für vergleich. Rechtswissenschaft*, Berlin, 1897; A. Hillebrandt, *Ritualliteratur*, Strassburg, 1897; *The Census of Travancore*, 1891, vol. i., Report; *Bombay Gazetteer*, *passim*.

J. JOLLY.

In modern practice only a few of the initiatory or purificatory rites (*saṁskāra*) remain in force. In the case of a boy, on the twelfth or on some other lucky day after the fortieth from birth the naming rite (*nāmakarma*) is performed, the name being regarded as a part of the personality. It is selected either by astrological calculations, by adoption of that of some deceased ancestor, or in other ways. In the sixth or eighth month after birth comes the 'food-giving' rite (*annaprāśana*, in W. India *boṭan*), at which boiled milk with rice and sugar or coarse wheat-flour mixed with sugar and clarified butter is laid on a rupee or gold plate and given to the child by the maternal uncle or by some other near relation (*BG* ix. [1901] pt. i. p. 35; *Census Reports*, Kashmir, 1911, i. 145,

Central Provinces, 1911, i. 156; W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*, London, 1887, p. 13). This is regarded as an initiation into caste, and the child henceforth is supposed to observe the food rules and tabus peculiar to his group. In the Central Provinces, the lower Hindu castes and the Gonds (*q.v.*) regard the ear-piercing (Skr. *karṇavedha*, Hindi *kan-chhedan*) as the mark of admission to the caste community. It is generally done when the child is four or five years old, and up to this time he or she is not considered to be a member of the caste, and may consequently take food from any one (R. V. Russell, *Ethn. Survey, Central Provinces*, pt. viii. Allahabad, 1911, p. 99 ff.).

There have been various explanations of this rite. F. B. Jevons (*Introd. Hist. Rel.*, London, 1896, p. 171 f.) considers it to be a survival of the offering of blood to the deity. A. E. Crawley (*The Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, p. 135) classes it with other forms of savage mutilation:

'When we find that the mouth and lips, the teeth, nose, eyes, ears, and genital organs are subjected to such processes, we may infer that the object is to secure the safety of these sense-organs, by what is practically a *permanent* amulet or charm.'

Russell (*op. cit.* 101) suggests that

'the continuous distension of the lobe of the ear by women and the large hole made is supposed to have some sympathetic effect in opening the womb and making child-birth easy.' In this connexion he refers to the horror felt by women if the flesh surrounding the hole is torn by accident or design. In such case the woman has to undergo a rite of purification as severe as in the case where it is found that maggots have formed in a wound or sore.

On the whole, the theory that it is intended as a protection to one of the body exits appears most probable (cf. KAṆṆAKRIYĀ).

The initiation of a child of one of the higher castes into the Hindu religion is provided by the rite in which the *guru*, or spiritual teacher, whispers into the ear of the child a formula containing the name of some god, which thenceforward becomes his special personal deity (*iṣṭadevatā*), 'by repeating whose name he is to obtain present and future happiness' (W. Ward, *A View of the Hist., Lit., and Mythol. of the Hindoos*[2], Serampore, 1815, ii. 253 f.). Marriage is the only form of initiation required for a girl, as she thereby enters the group of her husband; but in some cases tatuing (*q.v.*) is an indispensable preliminary to marriage, and is regarded as a form of initiation.

LITERATURE.—Besides the authorities quoted above, see M. Monier Williams, *Brâhmanism and Hinduism*[4], London, 1891, p. 357 ff.; H. A. Rose, 'Hindu Birth Observances in the Punjab,' *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 226 ff.; *Census Reports*, Assam, 1911, i. 76 ff., Central Provinces, 1911, i. 156 ff., Rajputana, 1911, i. 163 f.

W. CROOKE.

INITIATION (Jewish).—**1.** Philo of Alexandria regards the assumed allegorical sense of the Scriptures as a mystery. Thus, in a fragment of his *Quæstiones in Genesin* entitled περὶ θείων λόγων, and preserved by Johannes Damascenus (*Sacra Parallela*, p. 782; in Philo's *Opera*, ed. Mangey, London, 1742, ii. 658), he declares that it is not proper to divulge the sacred mysteries to the uninitiated before they have been purified by a perfect purification,[1] and speaks of the words of Scripture as the true mysteries (τὰς ἀληθεῖς τελετάς) which must not enter into profane ears (ὦτα μεστὰ φλυαρίας). That these are only metaphorical terms, by which the author does not allude to any initiatory rite of mysterious description, appears from the conditions he lays down for those to whom the Scriptural mysteries may properly be communicated, viz. (1) piety and holiness, corresponding to a strict belief in the one true God; (2) 'to be cleansed by the sanctifying purification, in body and soul alike—by (through?) the laws and customs of the fathers';[1] (3) seriousness of mind. Here the 'cleansing of the body' (καθαρθῆναι κατὰ σῶμα) can be regarded only as being effected by the purifying baths prescribed by the law (see PURIFICATION [Jewish]), perhaps also by abstinence from forbidden foods, and by observation of the traditional Jewish fasts, while the 'cleansing of the soul' (καθαρθῆναι κατὰ ψυχήν) must be understood as that which is effected by the influence of religious and moral principles. The words διὰ νόμων πατρίων, κτλ., require this interpretation, which we find fully confirmed by similar utterances of the same author.[2]

2. In another work Philo (*de Pœnitentia*, p. 717; Mangey, ii. 406), in counselling a kind behaviour towards proselytes, says that, having abandoned polytheism in order to worship the one God, they are 'like men who, once blind, have recovered their sight, having from the deepest darkness descried a most glorious light.'[3] The context, as given here, shows that the statement of Philo is simply a rhetorical simile, for the instruction and baptism of Jewish proselytes cannot rightly be regarded as an initiation into a mystery, nor were they ever associated with any such rite.

3. The 'dreadful oaths' required of the neophytes of the Essene order (ὅρκους . . . δεινοὺς φρικώδεις) might with more confidence be regarded as forming part of an initiatory ceremony. Josephus, after recounting the obligations which the candidates were bound by oath to fulfil, continues as follows:

'Moreover, they swear that they will communicate the doctrines to no one on any other condition than those on which each himself received them, . . . and that with like care they will preserve the books of their sect and the names of the angels,'[4] and adds: 'By such oaths do they [i.e. the Essenes] make their proselytes trustworthy.'

Now, in his autobiography (*Vita*, 2), Josephus tells us that, when a youth, he became a pupil successively of the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes, and thereafter of an eremite named Bannûs, with whom he remained in solitude for three years, and then, at the age of nineteen, returned to the city. It is thus clear that he must have parted from the Essenes in his sixteenth or seventeenth year—at an age, that is to say, when he could not yet have been received into the full membership of the sect. Accordingly, he had not taken the oath that would have obliged him to maintain the secrecy of the Essene doctrine, nor had he undergone the consecrating ceremonies or taken part in the initiatory rites of the order, so that, however willing he may have been, as a historian, to speak of these things in detail, he was not in a position to do so.

The present writer is, nevertheless, inclined to believe that, if initiatory rites were now and again performed among the Essenes, either in connexion with the admission of new members or on other occasions, Josephus would certainly have become aware of the mere fact, and in that case would doubtless have expressly attested it. Our conclusion, accordingly, is that, although baptism of proselytes is an initiatory rite, there was among the Jews no practice of initiation in the technical sense; that is to say, no mysterious initiation and no initiations into a mystery.

W. BRANDT.

INITIATION (Parsi).—There are two distinct forms of initiation among the Parsis: *naôjot*, the reception of a child into the Zoroastrian faith; and

[1] *Sacra Parall.* 782 A: οὐ θέμις τὰ ἱερὰ μυστήρια ἀκαλλεῖ ἀμυήτοις, ἄχρις ἂν καθαρθῶσι τελείᾳ καθάρσει. The reason given is that an uninitiated person will laugh at what is not to be laughed at (μωμηθήσεται τὰ ἀμώμητα).

[2] *Sacra Parall.* 782 B: καθαρθῆναι τὰς ἀγνευούσας καθάρσεις [illegible]

[3] καθάπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ τυφλοὶ πρότερον ἐκ τάχου σκότους αἰγυειδέστατον φῶς ἰδόντες.

[4] *BJ* II. viii. 7 adds ἀφέξεσθαι δὲ λῃστείας; these words seem not to be in their proper place here.

nāvar and *marātib*, the initiation into the priesthood.

1. **Naōjot.**—The *naōjot* is essentially the ceremony of investing a child with the sacred shirt (*sudrah*) and girdle (*kustī*), which must be worn throughout the remainder of a Zoroastrian's life, though otherwise he may adopt any costume he desires.

The word *naōjot* (Pers. *nūzūd*) is derived from Avesta * *nava-zavtar*, 'new priest,' because after the completion of the rite a Parsi child is held responsible for prayer and for the observance of religious customs and ceremonies. According to another view, it represents Pers. *nauzād*, 'new-born,' thus implying spiritual re-birth. The modern Persian Zoroastrians term the ceremony *šīb-kustī*, 'basal girdle.'

The age of initiation is seven, when, according to the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades Primus* (121 D), as confirmed by the *Vendīdād* (xv. 45) and the *Dīnkart* (ed. and tr. P. B. Sanjana, Bombay, 1874 ff., iv. ch. 170), the education of the child began (see, further, art. EDUCATION [Persian]). If a child is not sufficiently intelligent to understand the ceremony and to know its responsibilities, the *naōjot* may be postponed to any age below fifteen, when investiture must take place, or the child will be claimed by the Evil Spirit (cf. *Vend.* xviii. 54–59; *Sad-dar*, x. 1, xlvi. 1; *Šāyast la-Šāyast*, x. 13), and is guilty of the sin of 'running about uncovered' (*Dīnā-ī-Maīnōg-ī-Xraṭ*, ii. 35; *Arṭā-ī-Virāf Nāmak*, ed. and tr. J. Hoshang and M. Haug, Bombay, 1872, xxv. 6; *Paṭēt* 10).

Both the *sudrah*[1] and the *kustī* bear a symbolic meaning, though the symbolism is not explained in the Avesta, but only in later Persian works.

The *sudrah* is made of white cambric, the white colour being symbolic of innocence and purity. It must not be made of one continuous piece of cloth, but of two pieces sewn together on the sides, so that one seam may be on the right-hand side and the other on the left-hand side, thus dividing the shirt into two parts, front and back. These two parts are said to be symbolic of the past and the future, both being related to each other through the present. The most important part of the shirt is the *girihbān* ('that which preserves the knot') or *kīsah-i-karfah* ('bag of righteousness'), which signifies loyalty to or faith in the religion. It is made in the form of a bag or purse, a little below the throat. It indicates symbolically that a man has to be industrious, and has not only to fill his purse or bag with money, but also with *karfah*, i.e. righteousness.

The *kustī*,[2] or girdle, is made of lamb's wool, which is first combed and then spun into a fine thread on a hand-spindle (*chhātri*). Two such threads are twisted into one, and this is woven into the *kustī* on a hand-loom, the ends of which are movable, so that it can be adjusted to the length required. The twisted thread is passed round the loom seventy-two times, so that the *kustī* consists of seventy-two threads, which are divided into six strands, each of twelve threads. In the process of weaving, a continuous thread is made to pass through each of the six strands, and, when the weaving is almost finished, and only about a foot of the threads remains to be woven, the whole thread is removed from the loom and handed to a priest to be cut and consecrated. It is the privilege of the women of the priestly class to weave and prepare the sacred thread, and it is the privilege of a priest finally to cut and consecrate it.

To consecrate the thread, the priest first performs the *pādyāb* (see next col.), and then recites the *vraōš bāj* (for which see J. Darmesteter, *Le Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892–93, ii. 686–688) as far as the word *aśahe*. He next recites the *nīrang* (liturgical formula) for cutting and consecrating the thread, followed by the *aśem vohū* and *yaθā ahū vairyō* (*Ys.* xxvii. 14. 15), and while reciting the latter he cuts the *kustī* into two parts as he utters the word *śyaoθananām*. On finishing the *yaθā ahū vairyō*, he utters a brief Pazand formula, and then finishes the *bāj*.

The women who prepare the *kustī* generally get it cut and consecrated by the male priestly members of their own families. When they have no such members, and have, therefore, to get it consecrated by other priests, they have to pay a small fee for it.

After this consecration the *kustī* is returned by the priest to the owner, who now completes it. First, by means of a needle, she turns the *kustī*, which is hollow, inside out, and then knits by hand the remaining part of the thread. Three tassels, each of four threads, are formed at each end of the woven thread. The *kustī* is then finally washed before being used.

The *kustī*, being prepared from the wool of a lamb, is held to remind a Zoroastrian of the purity of life and action which he has always to observe; the seventy-two threads composing the *kustī* symbolize the seventy-two chapters of the *Yasna*; the twenty-four threads which make up each of the three tassels at each end of the *kustī* symbolize the twenty-four sections of the *Visparad*, a part of the liturgy; the six strands, each of twelve threads, into which the seventy-two threads of the *kustī* are divided at the time of weaving, are said to symbolize the six religious duties[1] of a Zoroastrian; the twelve threads in each of the strands symbolize the twelve months of the year; the six tassels symbolize the six seasonal festivals of the Zoroastrian year; the hollow of the thread symbolizes the space between this world and the next; the doubling of the thread in the beginning symbolizes the connexion between the present corporeal world and the future spiritual world; the turning of the *kustī* inside out symbolizes the passage of the soul from the corporeal to the spiritual world; the final uniting of all the threads into one symbolizes universal brotherhood.

The *kustī* is said to have existed in the pre-Zoroastrian religion, and to have been adopted by Zoroaster, who held it to be a symbol of obedience to God, closing the door against sin, and breaking the power of evil.[2]

Except when bathing, the *sudrah* and *kustī* must always be worn, but the latter must be untied and re-tied immediately after rising in the morning, after answering a call of nature, before prayer, after bathing, and before meals. After performing the *pādyāb*, or ablution of the face and other exposed portions of the body, the Parsi recites the *aśem vohū*, and then (facing the sun by day, and the moon or a lamp or the stars by night) the *kēm-nā Mazdā* (*Ys.* xlvi. 7, xliv. 16; *Vend.* viii. 21; *Ys.* xlix. 10), after which he unties the thread and, holding the doubled end in his left hand and taking in his right the centre of the remaining portion, recites the *nīrang kustī* (for which see Darmesteter, ii. 685, and E. W. West, *SBE* xviii. 384 f.). After re-tying the *kustī* (for which see below, p. 326) *Ys.* xii. 8 is recited. When the *kustī* is put on, it must be fastened with two knots, one on the front and the other on the back. While forming the first half of the first knot on the front in the second round of the thread, a Zoroastrian must think that Ahura Mazda exists, and that He is one, is holy, and is matchless. While forming the second half of this first knot, he must remember that the Mazdayasnian religion is the word of God, and that he must have full faith in it. In the third round of the thread, while forming the first half of the second knot on the back, he has to remember that Zoroaster is the prophet of God, and shows the proper path of worship. While forming the second half of the second knot, he must bear in mind that he has always to attend to 'good thoughts, good words, and good actions' (*Sad-dar*, x.).

Before a Parsi child is eligible for the *naōjot*, it must know a few short prayers, of which the *nīrang kustī* is the most important. A short time before the actual ceremony, which may now be performed in the evening, though formerly only in the morning,[3] the child, until recently required to be fasting, is bathed and taken to the room where the *naōjot* is to be performed. The child, the upper part of whose body is covered with a piece of white cloth, is seated on a low stool, facing the east, with a lighted lamp, new clothes, etc., near him, and with the officiating priest sitting before him. After all the priests have taken their places, the officiating priest places a new *sudrah* in the child's hand, and all recite the *paṭēt* (for which see art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT [Parsi], § 1, vol. v. p. 664 f.) or *Yt.* i., the child repeating this or reciting the *yaθā ahū vairyō*. The priest and child now rise, and the investiture proper begins.

This consists of four parts: (*a*) the recital of the Confession of Faith[4] by the child, led by the officiating priest, who then invests the child with the *sudrah*; (*b*) the recital of the *nīrang kustī*, prefaced by *Yt.* i. 0, and accompanied by investiture with the *kustī*; (*c*) the recital of *Ys.* xii. 8 f., as a brief summary of the Zoroastrian faith; (*d*) the recital of the *tan darustī*, or final benediction.[5] The process of donning the *kustī* is as follows. The priest holds the centre of the *kustī* in his left hand, and takes in his right a part of the two cords thus formed, the remainder hanging vertically until the recital of the words *manaŋhā, gavaŋhā, kunaŋhā* ('thought, word, deed') in the

[1] The term is probably Persian, and may mean 'advantageous path.' Anquetil du Perron (*Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1771, ii. 529) traces it to an alleged Avesta *setθr peeschenghé*, 'tapis (étoffe) utile.'

[2] The word *kustī* is the rendering of Avesta *aiwyaŋhana*, 'girdle' (cf. *Ys.* ix. 26, *Yt.* i. 17, *Vend.* xviii. 54, 58). It is variously derived from Pers. *kušt*, 'direction,' or *kušt*, 'waist,' or *kušt*, 'limit, boundary,' or is even identified with Pers. *kišti*, 'ship.' The true etymology is quite uncertain.

[1] The enumeration of these duties differs in different Pahlavi and Pazand books (cf. *Šāyast la-Šāyast*, xii. 31; *Sad-dar*, vi. 2; *Dīnā-ī-Maīnōg-ī-Xraṭ*, iv.; *Sar-namah-i Ruz-i-Yazdani*, ed. P. J. Hātaria, Bombay, 1255 A.Y., pp. 38–40).

[2] *Sad-dar*, x.; *Dāṭistān-ī-Dīnīk*, xxxix.

[3] The priest recites, in the course of the *naōjot*, the *hōšbām*, or prayer to the rising sun (on this see Darmesteter, ii. 688–690).

[4] See art. CREED [Parsi], vol. iv. p. 247 f.

[5] For the text of this see E. K. Antia, *Pâzend Texts*, Bombay, 1909, p. 100 f.; for the tr., F. Spiegel, *Avesta übersetzt*, Leipzig, 1852–63, iii. 250 f.

nirang kusti. With the recital of these words, a part of the string is then formed into circular curves in both the hands, and then, on reciting the words *xšnaoθra Ahurahe Mazdão* ('through the joying of Ahura Mazda'), the curves are let loose, and with the recital of the *aśem vohū*, the thread is passed around the child's waist. With the recital of the first *yaθā ahū vairyō*, the second round is completed, the first knot in front being tied with the recital of the word *šyaoθananām*. With the recital of the same word in the *yaθā ahū vairyō* the second knot in front is tied, and then, with the recital of another *aśem vohū*, the thread is passed round the waist for the third time and the final two knots at the back are tied.

After being thus invested with *sudrah* and *kusti*, the child recites *Ys.* xii. 8 f., and the initiation, in the strict sense of the term, is now complete. The officiating priest then repeats the *tan darusti*, with a special invocation of blessing on the new member of the Zoroastrian faith; and as he recites it, he showers over the child's head a mixture of rice, pomegranate grains, raisins, almonds, and slices of coco-nut, after which all the priests join in another *tan darusti*. The priests then receive their fees, and, like the assembled guests, are given presents of flowers, betel-leaves, and rose-water, after which a formal dinner is given in honour of the event.

2. Initiation into the priesthood.—Among the Parsis only the son of a priest is eligible for the priesthood (see, further, art. PRIEST, PRIESTHOOD [Iranian]). This law, reintroduced by the Dastur Tansar, in the reign of Ardašīr Pāpagān,[1] is traditionally as old as the mythic period of Jamšīd (Yima),[2] and there have been but few exceptions, notably Dastur Rustām Guštāsp Ardašīr, who, in the 17th cent., 'is said to have sprung from the laity, and not from a priestly family,'[3] being raised to the priesthood for his services in averting a massacre by proving to the Muhammadan king of Persia that the Zoroastrians were monotheists. At the present time it is held that a priest's father need not necessarily have been a priest, but, after the fifth generation of a priestly family, the right of its members to enter the priesthood is forfeited if in the meantime none of them have been priests.

To become a thoroughly qualified priest two grades of initiation are requisite, *nāvar* and *marātib*.

(*a*) *Nāvar*.—The first rite of initiation into the priesthood is termed *nāvar* (also written *nāvar, nāgbar*; Pahlavi *nāpar, nāīvar*).[4] The etymology and exact meaning of the word are uncertain.[5]

The rites connected with the *nāvar* are three in number: the *barašnūm* (for which see art. PURIFICATION [Iranian]), the *gewrā*, and the initiation proper. The *barašnūms* are two: one for the priest himself who is being initiated; and the other for the person, whether dead or living, in whose memory or honour the priest is initiated. The two *barašnūms* may be performed either consecutively or with an interval of a few days. When they have been completed, two priests perform the *gewrā*[6] ceremony, which consists of the recital of the *Yasna*, with its ritual, for six consecutive days.

The priest who recites the whole *Yasna* is called *jōtī* (Pers. *zōt*, Avesta *zaotar*), or the officiating priest; and his assistant is the *rāthwī* (Pers. *raspi*, Avesta *raēθwiškara*, 'mixer').[7] The two alternate in the performance of the *gewrā*, the *jōtī* for each day being obliged to remain awake on the night of that day to obviate danger of *pollutio nocturna*, which would vitiate the whole *gewrā* and require it to be begun again. As a further precaution two priests frequently act as *jōtī*, and a third as *rāthwī*.

During these six days the candidate must devote himself to religious duties and avoid contact with any non-Zoroastrian. On the seventh day he bathes and is clothed in white *jāmā* (loose robe) and *picchori* (linen girdle). In his left hand he carries a shawl as insignia of temporary office and function, and in his right a mace or club (Pers. *gurz*, Avesta *vazra*) to symbolize his resolution to fight against all evils, physical or moral.[1] If local conditions permit, as at Naosari, the headquarters of the Zoroastrian priesthood in India, the candidate, escorted by the head-priest or by his deputy and other elders of the community, heads a procession of invited friends of both sexes to the Dar-i Mihr, or fire-temple, in which he is to be initiated. Where conditions are unfavourable to a public procession, as at Bombay, the candidate lives in the Dar-i Mihr during the *gewrā*, and the friends assemble there, representing the procession by moving from one part of the temple to another.

The guests having taken their places, the candidate goes to the *yaziśn-gāh*, where he is to perform the *yaziśn*, or recital of the *Yasna*. The assembled priests are generally seated on carpets spread on the floor. The candidate removes his upper garments, performs the *pādyāb-kusti*, and puts on the *padān* (mouth-veil), which, at first, is not thrown across the face, but is held up and made to lie on the turban. Thus prepared, the candidate is brought before the assembly by one of the priests, who asks permission to initiate him. The head-priest present, after the interval of a few seconds, takes the silence of the assembly for assent, and nods his head or puts forward both his hands to signify the acquiescence of the gathering.

If the candidate suffers from leprosy,[2] or if he has a wound on his body from which blood oozes, it is expected that he may be rejected, and, accordingly, in order to enable the assembly to see him well, he is presented after the removal of his upper garments.

The candidate now returns to the *yaziśn-gāh* to go through the ceremonies of his initiation and to recite the *Yasna* with its ritual. The visitors disperse after flowers and rose-water have been presented to them. If the father or the guardian of the candidate is well off, he distributes money among the assembled priesthood. Relatives and friends are, at times, feasted at noon and even at night when the parents can afford to do so.

On retiring to the *yaziśn-gāh* the candidate recites the *mīnō nābar Yasna* (*Yasna* without the *Visparad*)[3] with its ritual, he acting as the *jōtī*, and the priest who initiates acting as the *rāthwi*. In the afternoon he performs the *bāj*[4] ceremony and takes his meals, after which he performs the *āfringān* ceremony.

On the second day, on which, as also on the third day, the candidate is allowed only one meal, these three ceremonies are repeated in honour of Sraoš, the *bāj* being performed in the morning instead of the afternoon, as on the first day. On the third day they are again repeated in honour of *Šīh rōčak* (the thirty days of the month). On the fourth day, the *Yasna* is recited with the *Vīsparad*, the *bāj* and *āfringān* being in honour of Ahura Mazda.

Thus qualified, the priest, now called *hērbad* (Avesta *aēθrapaiti*, 'teacher'), can perform the *āfringān, naōjot*, marriage, and such other rites, but not the *Yasna*, the *Vendīdād*, or the *bāj* ceremonies.

It appears that the *nāvar* has been, from the first, a ceremony of trial—of self-abnegation, self-denial, and self-renunciation. (1) The candidate is expected to pass his days during the whole ceremony, which lasts about a month, in a kind of retreat, in order to be free from worldly thoughts and engaged in pious thoughts; he must sleep on the floor and not on a cot, take his meals at stated hours after prayers, etc. According to the present custom, if the candidate has a *pollutio nocturna* during the two *barašnūms*, he is disqualified and has to go

[1] J. Darmesteter, 'Lettre de Tansar au roi de Tabaristān,' *JA* IX. iii. [1894]. 18-520.

[2] Firdausi, *Šah-nāmah*, tr. J. Mohl, Paris, 1876-78, i. 49 f., A. G. and E. Warner, London, 1905 ff., i. 132; cf. Tabari, *Chronique . . . sur la version persane de . . . Bel'ami*, tr. H. Zotenberg, Paris, 1867-74, i. 103.

[3] E. W. West, *SBE* v. p. xxxiii. [4] *Ib.* xviii. 284.

[5] Cf. Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, i. p. liv, note 2.

[6] The word is derived from Avesta *garew*, 'to seize, acquire.'

[7] For the etymology see Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, i. p. lxxi, note 4.

[1] Cf. the mace of Mithra *Yt.* vi. 5.

[2] On the Iranian horror of leprosy cf. *Vend.* ii. 29 and Herod. i. 139.

[3] On the meaning of *Yasna*, *Visparad*, and *Vendīdād* in this connexion see Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, i. p. lxvii.

[4] On the *bāj* see Darmesteter, *Zend-Avesta*, ii. 152 f.

through the *barašnūm* again, since the untoward occurrence is held to show that he was not passing his time in pure meditation, which he was expected to do, as a would-be priest, but that he thought of worldly matters.[1] (2) During the last four days, when he is being initiated and performs the *Yasna* ceremony himself as *jōti*, he may take only one meal on the second and third days, this also implying that the *nāhar* is intended to prove whether he has control over hunger and thirst, and hence over other passions.

To obviate risk of the special danger just indicated, candidates are now made to pass through the *nāhar* before the age of fifteen or sixteen. Furthermore, not only those intended for the priesthood, but many others whose parents plan for them very different walks in life, are thus initiated with the idea that the *nāhar* is a good ceremony to have performed, whatever the future occupation is to be. In these cases only a portion of the *Yasna* is recited.

(*b*) *Marātib.*—Since the *hērbad* is forbidden to perform for others the *Yasna*, *Vendīdād*, and *bāj* ceremonies, or to officiate at the rites of purification, even though he has himself performed them at his *nāhar*, he must, in order to qualify for these higher functions, undergo a second initiation called *marātib* (Arab. 'high degrees,' pl. of *martaba*). For this he must read the *Vendīdād*, in addition to the *Yasna* and *Vīsparad* read for his *nāhar*.

In the *marātib* the candidate has to go through one *barašnūm* of ten days. On the eleventh day, in the company of a qualified priest, he performs the *khūb* ceremony[2] and recites for it the *mīnō nāvar Yasna* with its ritual. On the second day, in the morning, he has to recite another *Yasna* in honour of Sraoš, and at midnight he recites the *Vendīdād*. This completes the *marātib*. He is then entitled to perform and recite any of the Zoroastrian ritual and prayers, and his official title is *mōbad* (Pahlavi *magupat*), 'chief of the magi.'

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JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI MODI.

INITIATION (Roman).—Although the word *initio* is used by Latin writers of the best period to express the same idea as our 'initiation,' the concept of advancement from a lower to a higher stage in cult hierarchy, by means of a rite which often partakes of the mysterious, is not native to Roman religious practice. In early Roman times the worship of the gods was more a matter of State than of private enterprise. It involved a complicated ritual, for the observance of which a trained body of men was required. Naturally this priesthood had its method of obtaining and training new members, but this can hardly be classed as 'initiation.' Apart from the State worship, it may be said that the very life of the people was a continuous practice of religion. They imagined themselves surrounded by unseen forces, and practised innumerable means of appeasing those that were evil, and returning thanks for favours received. This was a matter of everyday usage, and required no special training or initiatory rites.

The practice of initiation involves a close organization of a more or less secret character, into which the initiate is received after an examination and ordeal, of which the tendency is to excite the imagination and render of more apparent value the knowledge he is to receive. It is but human nature to desire that which is difficult to attain, and this is the trait which, at all periods, the wiser or more clever of mankind have used for their own advantage.

It must also be remembered that we ourselves use the word 'initiation' rather carelessly, and that in all probability the Romans did the same. Thus, even when we find the word in their literature, without some explanatory context, it is often impossible to determine whether the writer means a distinct ceremony, or merely that the individual referred to has attained some slight degree of knowledge over and above those about him, or is well informed concerning a given subject. Moreover, the border line between initiation proper and cult practices which deal with the admission of new members is very narrow. Thus, in the cults of Vesta and Bona Dea, in which no men were allowed to participate, new followers were of course taken in. For the sake of limiting the subject, the word 'initiation' is here understood to involve a more complicated ceremony, with secret and mysterious rites, by means of which one was admitted to a close organization.

Even at a fairly late period initiation did not play the part in Roman religion that one would expect from its use at other times. The references to it in literature are by no means frequent; they are so slight, in fact, that the more important modern classical encyclopædias and dictionaries (*e.g.* Pauly-Wissowa, Daremberg-Saglio, etc.) include no treatment of the subject save for scanty references under other headings. In Roman literature there is no mention of any such practice before the introduction of the cult of Demeter (identified with the Roman Ceres) in the first years of the Republic. The Eleusinian mysteries connected with the worship of this goddess must soon have become known, although they were not officially introduced into Rome until much later. Cicero refers to them in *de Leg.* ii. 9:

'Let no one be initiated into the mysteries save those of Ceres, and according to the Greek rite'; cf. also ii. 14: 'Certainly I do [*i.e.* make an exception of the mysteries into which we have been initiated], for among all the excellent and divine institutions which Athens has given to mankind, there is nothing better than these mysteries, which have raised us from a wild and savage state to one more noble and refined. As is indicated by the word *initia*, in very truth have we learned the first principles of life, and not only to live happily, but to die with hope for a better future.' In *de Leg.* ii. 15 also Cicero insists that the initiation of women into the rites of Ceres must take place as it is done in Rome.

These passages bring out the respect in which the Eleusinian mysteries were held, and also the fact that they received some modifications at the hands of the Romans. They show indirectly that there existed at the same time other cults of a more harmful nature.

Something of the same import is also found in Varro, *de Re Rustica*, III. i. 5:

'Not without reason do they call her Mother Earth, and Ceres, and believe that those who worship her lead a virtuous and useful life, and that they are the sole survivors of the ancient Saturnian stock. With this is in harmony the fact that the term *initia* is generally applied to those rites which are held sacred to Ceres.'

Here, too, *initia* means the sacred mysteries to which only the initiated were admitted. In this connexion may be mentioned two references of merely general import in Seneca. In *Ep.* xc. 29 he says:

'These are her [wisdom's] initiatory rites, by means of which are revealed, not the mysteries of a municipal temple, but of the world itself, the vast temple of all the gods.' And in *Lucil.* xcv. 64: 'Thus, just as only the initiates know the most holy of the sacred rites, so in philosophy,' etc.

We learn from Vitruvius that in temple construction account was sometimes taken of those who were to be initiated. In the preface to bk vii. he says:

[1] If this occurs during the last four days, the candidate is called *nābūd* ('non-existent') and is absolutely rejected as unfit for the priesthood.

[2] The *khūb* is of two grades. For the major the recital of the whole *Yasna* is requisite; for the minor the recital of *Ys.* li.–vi.

'Thus by the addition of a vestibule he gave to the initiates an increase of space, and to the work a supreme dignity.'

There is also a reference to initiation as a general practice in Terence (*Phorm.* i. 13, tr. Sargeaunt):

'Then again Geta will be hit for another present when a child is born: and another on its birthday, and another at the initiation ceremony.'

On the whole, however, in spite of these and a few other references, we know very little of the actual rites of initiation—a fact which is not surprising when we consider the mystery in which they were involved.

Even in the case of the cults of Cybele, Isis, Bacchus, and Mithra, we know comparatively little concerning the initiation ceremonies. In Livy we have several references to the Bacchanalia, especially in bk. xxxix., and the verb *initio* is often used [*e.g.* xxxix. 9: 'Bacchis eum se initiaturam (vovit)'], showing that certain definite rites were performed. Concerning the Mithra cult something more is known (see art. MITHRAISM). Still other mysteries were connected with the worship of Isis and Serapis, and their cult attained great importance in Rome. In Apuleius (*Met.* xi.) are described the various stages by which the initiate gradually became familiar with the secrets of the cult of Isis; but not even here are the actual details revealed, and the language used is purposely figurative; *e.g.* xi. 23:

'I approached the confines of Death. Having trod the threshold of Proserpina, I returned through all the elements. At midnight I beheld the sun brightly gleaming. I was in the presence of the gods above and the gods below, and worshipped them close at hand.'

All of these cults appealed to the love of the mysterious. They aroused the interest of their followers, and often led them on to the highest pitch of frenzied excitement and fanaticism. With this in mind we understand why the initiates were numbered by the thousands, and why the cult of Mithra was for some time a serious rival to Christianity. This state of affairs could not have existed at an early period, when individual action was suppressed and made subservient to the welfare of the family and of the State. The banding together of men of different walks in life for some cult practice meant the downfall of the early unity, and of the cold formalism of a State religion as well.

LITERATURE.—*Thes. Ling. Lat.* (the material for *initio*, *initia*, etc., was kindly placed at the present writer's disposal in Munich); artt. on different cults, in Roscher, Daremberg-Saglio, Pauly-Wissowa, etc.; G. Wissowa, *Rel. und Kultus der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912; J. B. Carter, *The Religion of Numa*, London, 1906, *The Religious Life of Ancient Rome*, do. 1911; F. Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1895-99, *Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans*, New York, 1912; J. Toutain, *Les Cultes païens dans l'empire romain*, Paris, 1908; W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, *Social Life at Rome*, do. 1909; E. Rohde, *Psyche*[4], Tübingen, 1907.

C. DENSMORE CURTIS.

INITIATION (Tibetan).—Admission into the Buddhist Order in Tibet follows generally in its details the orthodox practice of ancient Indian Buddhism. The most notable exception is that in Tibet, in common with the countries of 'Southern' Buddhism, the nominal age limit is reduced to considerably below the sixteen years of primitive Buddhism. This earlier entrance, however, is in the case of Tibet expressly regarded as a preliminary stage of probation, anterior to the actual novitiate, and is, therefore, analogous to the period of 'probation' (Skr. *parivāsa*) imposed in early Buddhism upon adult converts from a heterodox religion before their initiation into Buddha's Order. In Tibet, therefore, we find three stages in the process of initiation—probation, novitiate, and full initiation or ordination.

1. **Probation.**—In this preliminary stage, which corresponds to the 'leaving home to become an ascetic' (*pravrajyā*) of primitive Buddhism, there is little ceremony. The boy-candidate is brought to the monastery by his parent or guardian between the ages of eight and twelve. His parentage is inquired into by a senior monk (not necessarily the head of the monastery) to ascertain that he is not the son of a butcher, smith, or other irreligious trade, and that he is free-born; and he is physically examined to ascertain the absence of any disqualifying bodily or mental defect. On passing this examination, he has a tuft of his hair snipped off, as a preliminary tonsure, and he is clad in the monastic robe, and made over to one of the senior monks, preferably a relative, as a tutor. He is now a 'pupil,' or *ḍā-pa* (*grva-pa*) of the monastery. His tutor or teacher (*ger-gan*, Skr. *upādhyāya*) takes him to an informal conclave of fellow-monks, and gains their consent to taking the boy as his pupil. The boy is not allowed to take part in the public services, but performs acts of personal service to his teacher. After several years spent in learning to read and write and recite from memory the elementary scriptures, he becomes eligible for the novitiate.

2. **Novitiate.**—This may not be entered before the age of sixteen years, and the ceremony is more formal and solemn than for the preliminary entrance. In Tibet it has two stages, a lower and an upper initiation. The candidate himself applies for admission into the Order. He is conducted by his tutor to the abbot or prior of the monastery, who examines him with any other candidates as to his desire to enter the Order, and his knowledge of some elements of the religion, and hears him recite some sacred texts. The candidate, on being passed, has his head shaved, excepting a tuft on the crown, and he is given a new religious personal name, usually that of some ancient Buddhist divine. He is taught to repeat the 'Three-Refuge' formula, 'I go for refuge to Buddha, His Word, and His Congregation,' and is exhorted to keep the fasts, the first five (or eight) moral commandments (*śīla*), and 'the ten precepts' (*śikṣā-pada*), the transgression of which creates 'the ten sins.' The novice is now of the class called *ge-ñen*, 'the approacher towards virtue,' a translation of the Skr. *upāsaka*, with which stage it generally corresponds, so that it is practically equivalent to the stage of the lay devotee of primitive Buddhism. The great majority of the so-called 'monks' of Tibet do not advance beyond this stage of what is practically a lay devotee, and they still are called *ḍā-pa*, or 'pupil.'

The higher grade of the novitiate, which is the real novitiate, is attained only by the more intelligent and meritorious pupils and those who can afford to pay the somewhat heavy educational fees necessary. In this stage the neophyte is called *ge-ts'ul*, 'follower in the path of virtue,' the equivalent of the *śrāmaṇera* of Indian Buddhism. He must be specially approved by the superior of the monastery, and he solemnly vows to renounce the world for a religious life, to embrace poverty and celibacy, and to keep the thirty-six moral and disciplinary rules. He is then permitted to mix with the other higher monks in the routine of the monastery, recite with them the sacred texts, participate in the various celebration rites, and take part in discussions. Initiation into this grade takes place in a formal chapter or conclave of the monks, presided over usually by one of the higher 're-incarnating' Lamas, who during the ceremony completes the tonsure by removing the remaining tuft of hair, and calls the novice by his religious name, which now is exclusively used as his personal designation. This consecration to the higher novitiate is supposed, in Tibet, to bind the individual to the Order for life.

3. **Full initiation or ordination.**—Admission to

the final stage of full monkhood cannot take place before the age of twenty, and is usually much later. In this stage the monk receives the title of *ge-long*, 'the virtuous beggar,' the literal equivalent of the Indian *bhikṣu*, or mendicant friar, the usual epithet of Buddha and his disciples. This stage is attained by comparatively few of the monks in Tibet, owing to the high standard of qualifications, intellectual and moral, demanded, and the educational expense. For this purpose several years of study must be passed in one or other of the great collegiate monasteries, at Tashilhunpo, Gahldan, Sera or Depung at Lhasa, Kumbum, etc., for the yellow-hat sect, or at Saskya, Mindolling, etc., for the red-hat sects. To reach these centres of learning the novice has to undertake long journeys on foot, and great privations, and be for a time in a very literal sense a 'beggar of virtue.' The examination, which is searchingly severe, is undertaken by a chapter of the most learned monks available, usually over ten in number. The successful candidate formally vows to keep the full rules, 253 in number. The fully fledged monk, or *ge-long*, is the acme of the Buddhist Order in Tibet. The Dalai Lama himself rejoices in this title. From the ranks of the *ge-long* are recruited the abbots, teachers, chief celebrants, high priests, and astrologers of the great monasteries and temples.

The initiation of nuns is substantially identical with that of the male members of the Order. Into the esoteric doctrines and practices of Yoga mysticism special personal teaching is imparted by adepts.

LITERATURE.—L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, do. 1904. See also art. INITIATION (Buddhist) and the literature appended to it.

L. A. WADDELL.

INNER LIGHT.—See CERTAINTY (Religious), EXPERIENCE (Religious), FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF.

INNOCENCE.—There are two words in the NT which, though not uniformly translated in the English versions, seem to convey the ideas suggested by the word 'innocent.' In Ro 16^{19} the word ἄκακος is translated (RV) 'innocent'; in He 7^{26} (of Christ) 'guileless.' The other word, ἄδολος, occurs in 1 P 2^{2}, where the Apostle exhorts his readers to 'long for the spiritual milk which is without guile' (ἄδολον). Each word, however, has its own strict sense.

1. The ἄκακος (Vulg. *innocens*) is he who hurts nobody by word, deed, or thought—the character virtually described in 1 Co $13^{6.7}$. In He 7^{26} our Lord is described as ὅσιος, ἄκακος, ἀμίαντος (cf. Cypr. *de Orat. Dom.* 15: 'Voluntas Dei est quam Christus et fecit et docuit . . . iniuriam facere non nosse, et factam posse tolerare'). Cicero perhaps overlooks the word ἀκακία (used by Demosth.) when he remarks that *innocentia* has no exact Greek equivalent, but that possibly ἀβλάβεια would express that state of mind which injures no one (*Tusc. Disp.* iii. 8; the same definition is given by Augustine, *Serm.* cclxxviii. 8). It is obvious that the character which 'taketh not account of evil,' and which believes to any extent in the integrity of others, is apt to be credulous and easily deceived. Hence the word ἄκακος, like ἁπλοῦς, tends to acquire a contemptuous sense in some heathen writers, suggesting the notion of one who is inexperienced and readily imposed upon.

2. ἄδολος (Vulg. *sine dolo*, 1 P 2^{2}) clearly connotes the absence of conscious fraud or intention to deceive (cf. Jn 1^{47}). The word may thus be regarded as virtually synonymous with ἁπλοῦς. Thus Augustine asks, 'Quid est dolus nisi aliud agere et aliud simulare? . . . dolus duplicat cor' (*Serm.* ccclii. 1). But it seems also to include that kind of quality which we describe by the word 'innocent,' or, in other words, the characteristic grace of childhood, the grace commended by St. Paul in 1 Co 14^{20} (τῇ κακίᾳ νηπιάζετε) and by St. Peter in 1 P 2^{1-3}.

3. The ἄκακος, then, is he who has no *malitia* in him, and who harms no one; the ἄδολος is without guile,' and deceives no one. The two words taken together express the childlikeness, the simplicity, which our Lord requires in the citizens of His Kingdom (Mk 10^{14}). In fact, 'innocence' is specially claimed by Tertullian as the characteristic grace of Christians: 'Nos ergo soli innocentes. . . . Innocentiam a Deo edocti, et perfecte eam novimus ut a perfecto magistro revelatam, et fideliter custodimus, ut ab incontemptibili dispectore [*al.* dispensatore] mandatam' (*Apol.* 45). Cf. the aphorism of Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* vi., 'de Vero Cultu,' 1: 'Nihil sancta et singularis illa majestas aliud ab homine desiderat quam solam innocentiam; quam si quis obtulerit Deo, satis pie, satis religiose litavit.'

In a sermon ascribed (incorrectly) to St. Bernard[1] some useful distinctions are drawn.

(i.) There is an 'innocentia *secundum potestatem*,' the innocence which is incapable of committing sin. Innocence in this sense is the attribute of Christ alone. He only is without sin; the Evil One comes 'and hath nothing in' Him (Jn 14^{30}). In Him only is there 'that absence of all evil which implies the presence of all good.' He is innocent because He fulfils 'all righteousness' (cf. Aug. *Enarr. in Ps.* 100 [101][2]: 'Tota ergo iustitia ad unum verbum innocentiae redigitur').

(ii.) There is also an 'innocentia *secundum aetatem*,' the 'harmlessness' of those who through weakness of body or simplicity of mind know not how to sin. This is the primal innocence of childhood, a negative state—the state of those who either are untempted or have not yet awakened to the consciousness of good and evil in choice and action. The 'innocence' of the first man was of this kind. He was not 'perfect' in the sense of having reached his full or final development, but 'upright' in the sense that he was on the right line towards the perfection of which he was capable. He had not the perfection either of knowledge or of sanctity (we must not confuse 'innocence' with 'sanctity'); but he possessed those faculties which made him capable of a progressive development, which was to be conditioned, ennobled, and secured by communion with God (see G. Bull, *Discourses*, no. 5, 'The State of Man before the Fall,' in his *Works*, Oxford, 1846, ii. 52–136; H. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Edinburgh, 1878, § 78).

Perhaps it is also appropriate to mention under this head the assertions of innocence and integrity, both personal and national, with which we meet in the Psalter. It must be remembered that side by side with language of this tenor we find the most heartfelt acknowledgment of sin (*e.g.* in such Psalms as 32, 51, and many others), together with a deep sense of dependence on the divine mercy (*e.g.* Pss. 25, 86, 130). The fact is that the consciousness of innocence awakened in devout Israelites by the study of the Law is 'relative, not absolute.' 'The assertion of integrity . . . is that of the *ḥasîd*, the "godly" man, who is determined to keep well within the bounds of the covenant which is the charter of national religion, or is conscious of having done so' (W. T. Davison, in *HDB* iv. 157[b]). Further, the spirit of childlike confidence in God which pervades many of the Psalms in question is entirely opposed to the temper of self-righteousness. It is significant that, in the argument of Ro 4 on the blessedness of justification by faith, St. Paul illustrates his point by citing the language of a Psalm ($32^{1f.}$).

(iii.) There is, finally, an 'innocentia *secundum voluntatem*,' *i.e.* the confirmed habitual innocence of those who have retained their purity of heart in spite of temptation, and have consistently striven to be true to their highest ideals. This state is compatible with minor faults of ignorance or infirmity, but it is essentially a Christ-like state. The Christian believer does fall into sin; but for him sin is exceptional, and contradicts the *habitual*

[1] *Opera*, ed. Paris, 1839, ii. 1520 (*PL* clxxxiv. 1119).

tenor of his life, leaving his essential character intact (1 Jn 1^8 2^1 3^6).

Here, then, we pass beyond the conception of innocence as mere harmlessness. The innocence which man lost in the Fall is restored to us in Christ. He enables men to become what He bids them to become—as 'little children,' and so 'simple concerning evil' (Ro 16^{19}; cf. Ph 2^{15}). Innocence is practically equivalent to that simplicity or singleness of mind which springs from whole-hearted and entire devotion to God. As Augustine more than once insists, innocence belongs to him who injures neither others nor himself; that is, who abstains from the wilful self-injury involved in sin. Innocence, then, means the personal integrity of which the heathen dreamed, but which he had no means of realizing (Hor. *Carm.* i. 22). Nor does it exclude zeal for the good of another. 'Pertinet ad innocentis officium, non solum nemini malum inferre, verum etiam cohibere a peccato vel punire peccatum, ut aut ipse qui plectitur corrigatur experimento, aut alii terreantur exemplo' (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, xix. 16).

4. The question may be raised whether innocence once lost can be restored. Augustine touches upon this point in his *Op. Imperf. c. Julian.* vi. 19. The answer to the question is that there is no limit to the power of true repentance so long as the soul is capable of it, and is willing to accept the discipline which penitence implies. There is such a thing as a re-created purity and beauty of character. And in this re-creative process a chief agent is the very spectacle of innocence. Christ acts upon the sin of the world, not only or chiefly by unveiling and denouncing it, but also by exhibiting to men a flawless pattern of goodness, which exercises its own attractive power and elicits goodness in others. Men are drawn to Christ by what He *is*, not less than by His words of grace and works of power. The vision of stainless purity, combined with perfect humility and gentleness to the sinful, awakens the longing for holiness; the dumb yearning of the soul for righteousness is kindled by the actual presence and influence of a righteous personality. This power of kindling the desire for holiness is one of the many precious privileges of innocence. Others might be mentioned, such as 'the boldness and frankness of those who are as if they had no sin, from having been cleansed from it; the uncontaminated hearts, open countenances, and untroubled eyes of those who neither suspect, nor conceal, nor shun, nor are jealous' (Newman, *Paroch. and Plain Serm.* viii. 268)—the clear conscience, strong will, and joyous temper of those who have experienced the renewing power of grace, and have 'tasted the powers of the world to come' (He 6^5).

LITERATURE.—R. C. Trench, *Syn. of the NT*, Cambridge, 1854, § lvi.; J. H. Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, London, 1868, vol. v. no. 8, vol. viii. no. 18; J. R. Illingworth, *Univ. and Cath. Sermons*, London, 1893, no. vii. 'Innocence'; R. Rainy, *Sojourning with God, and Other Sermons*, London, 1902, no. ix.

R. L. OTTLEY.

INQUISITION.—1. History.—Inquisition was a method for searching out heretics, instituted by the Church with a view to bringing them to repentance, or punishing them in proportion to their offence.

In the present article we shall confine our discussion to the Inquisition of the 12th and 13th centuries against the Cathari and the Waldenses, and of the 14th cent. against the Franciscan heresies. The Spanish Inquisition established in 1478 by the Catholics Ferdinand and Isabella, with the approval of Sixtus IV., and specially directed against the lapsed Jews, Moors, and Moriscoes, is outside of our scope; we shall also leave out of account the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office or Inquisition which Paul III. established by his Constitution *Licet* of 21st July 1542, and to which Sixtus V. put the final touch (Constitution *Immensa* of 25th Jan. 1587 or 1588).[1]

From the 12th cent. onwards the repression of heresy was the great business of Church and State. The distress caused, particularly in the north of Italy and the south of France, by the Cathari, or Manichæans, whose doctrine wrought destruction to society as well as to faith, appalled the leaders of Christianity. On several occasions and in various places, people and rulers sought justice at first in summary conviction and execution; culprits were either outlawed or put to death. The Church for a long time opposed these rigorous measures, its representatives forming three classes—those who denied the right of punishing heterodoxy as a crime, and limited their opposition to discussion; those who wished to use only spiritual weapons against it, such as excommunication, and so preserve the orthodox from contamination; and, lastly, those who, while advocating temporal punishments for the heretics, resorted to extreme measures only half-heartedly and against their better feelings. The death-penalty was never included in any system of repression.

Towards the end of the 12th cent. and the beginning of the 13th a change took place. At the Lateran Council of 1179 (can. 27), Pope Alexander III. invited sovereigns to employ force of arms to protect the Christian people from the violence of the Cathari, Brabançons, etc., giving princes the right to imprison offenders and confiscate their property. The pope even offered indulgences to those who should accomplish this work of piety. In 1184, Pope Lucius III., in consort with the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, published an edict at Verona with still more severe measures: heretics, once excommunicated, were to be handed over to secular authority to be punished according to their deserts (*animadversio debita*). This *animadversio* did not mean the death-penalty, but it included exile, confiscation of property, demolition of their houses, *infamia*, loss of civil rights, and so on.

The most noteworthy measure of the Council of Verona was the institution of episcopal inquiry, or inquisition. Every bishop was required to inspect carefully, in person or through his archdeacon or by means of trustworthy clerks, all suspected parishes, and to make the inhabitants denounce under oath all heretics, acknowledged or secret. The latter were then required to free themselves from suspicion by oath; and, if they refused to take the oath, or recanted later, they were sentenced and punished. Counts, barons, rectors, and consuls of towns and other places were required to assist the Church in this work of repression, on pain of forfeiting their office, being excommunicated, and seeing their lands laid under interdict.

The pontificate of Innocent III., which began in 1198, marks a lull in the development of the penal legislation of the Church. Neither his Letters nor the Lateran Council of 1215, over which he presided, did anything beyond confirming the decisions of his predecessors. But, if Innocent III. did not add to the canons, he justified them by motives which afterwards served to make them considerably more severe.

'According to civil law,' said the pontiff, 'criminals convicted of treason are punished with death and their goods are confiscate; if even their children's lives are spared, it is simply out of pity. With how much more reason then should they who offend Jesus, the Son of the Lord God, by deserting the faith, be cut off from Christian communion and stripped of their goods, for it is infinitely more serious to offend against the Divine majesty than to injure human majesty' ('cum longe sit gravius aeternam quam temporalem laedere majestatem').

[1] For the further history of the Inquisition, see art. OFFICE (Holy).

This saying, addressed to the magistrates of Viterbo on 25th March 1199 (*Epp.* ii. 1), will live for ever. Frederick II. set himself to deduce the consequences implied in it; and the Constitution which he promulgated on 22nd Nov. 1220 for the whole empire exactly reproduces (ch. vi.) Innocent III.'s phrase (*Mon. Germ. Leges*, sect. iv. vol. ii. pp. 107–109). In the Constitution of 1224 for Lombardy, the death-penalty is decreed against the Manichæans; and, as the ancient legislation imposes upon them the penalty of death by burning, we may take it that Frederick II. condemned heretics to die at the stake. In 1230, the Dominican Guala, bishop of Brescia, exacted this law in his episcopal town.

Pope Gregory IX., who had frequent dealings with Guala, adopted his point of view. The Imperial Constitution of 1224 was entered in the register of pontifical letters either at the end of 1230 or at the beginning of 1231, and is found there under the number 203 in the fourth year of Gregory's pontificate (Auvray, *Registres de Grégoire IX.*, no. 535). The pope then set himself to put this Constitution into practice, beginning with the city of Rome. He promulgated a law, probably in Feb. 1231, in which he commanded that heretics convicted by the Church should be abandoned to secular justice, to be punished as they deserved (*animadversio debita*). A municipal regulation published at the same time by the senator of Rome, Annibaldi, established the new jurisprudence for the Eternal City (J. F. Boehmer, *Acta Imperii selecta*, Innsbruck, 1870, xiii. 378). The penalty to be imposed was not specified; but the kind of punishment was sufficiently indicated by the Constitution of the Emperor, which had just been entered in the registers of the pontifical office. From the month of Feb. 1231 onwards a number of Patarins were arrested in Rome; those who resisted conversion were condemned to be burned alive, and the others were sent to Monte Cassino and Cava to do penance (*Mon. Germ. Script.* xix. 363). The actual facts thus showed, in a very striking manner, in what sense these documents were to be interpreted (see Vacandard, *L'Inquisition*, pp. 129–134).

The bishops, who, in virtue of their ordinary powers, were originally charged with the duty of searching out heretics and judging them in concert with the secular authority, performed their duty with more or less precision. Where their zeal was insufficient, Rome was obliged to step in. The popes commissioned their legates to take action against heresy over and above the bishops; and, from the end of the 12th cent., we find two inquisitions at work at the same time—the episcopal inquisition of the ordinary bishops in their own respective dioceses; and the legatine inquisition carried on by the legates throughout the districts under their supervision, in virtue of their commission from the Holy See. For example, we know that, in 1178, Pope Alexander III. had sent the cardinal of St. Chrysogonus to Languedoc as legate, with full power to repress heresy.

'In virtue of this commission, the legate and the Cistercians who accompanied him extracted a promise under oath from the bishop of Toulouse, a section of the clergy, the consuls, and all the citizens whose orthodoxy was not under suspicion, to give written information against all heretics and their abettors' (*Hist. gén. de Languedoc*, Toulouse, 1879, vi. 79).

Similarly, in 1198, Innocent III. gave absolute power to the Cistercian religious whom he sent into the county of Toulouse as apostolic legates. The princes received orders to put themselves at their disposal:

'It is our wish also that all the people take arms against the heretics whenever brother Raynier and brother Gui may deem it advisable to give the command' (Potthast, *Regesta*, no. 96).

St. Dominic, who has been credited with being the first inquisitor, acted at first only as a subordinate; any services that he rendered to the Inquisition were done in fulfilment of an office which he held—the Cistercian legateship under the direction of Arnaud of Citeaux and Pierre of Castelnau (cf. *AS*, Aug. i. [1867] 410 f.).

The time was approaching when the papacy was to confine the office of inquisitor exclusively to religious Orders, and, among them, particularly to the Dominicans and Franciscans. It was in this form that the Inquisition was established nearly everywhere under Pope Gregory IX. In 1132, the pope put the prosecution of the heretics in Bourgogne into the hands of the Dominican prior of Besançon and Fathers Gautier and Robert. This mission, limited at first to a well-defined area, soon extended over the whole of France. On 13th April 1233, Gregory IX. advised the bishops of France that he had invested the Dominicans with the office of inquisition in this country, because 'the cares of their multifarious duties hardly left the bishops time to breathe.' Finally, by another bull, dated 21st Aug. 1235, the pope nominated as Inquisitor-General of the kingdom of France ('per universum regnum Franciæ') brother Robert (surnamed 'le Bougre' because, before he joined the Dominican Order, he himself had been a member of a body of Cathari known by the name of Bulgari, Bougres). Robert was required to act in concert with the bishops and religious Orders (Frederichs, *Robert le Bougre, premier inquisiteur général de France*, p. 13).

It is well known how these pontifical measures were welcomed by the king of France. The statute-book known as *Establissements de Saint Louis* and the *Coutumes de Beauvoisis* of Beaumanoir attest the readiness of the civil power to support the work of inquisition:

'Quand le juge [ecclésiastique] aurait examiné [l'accusé], se il trouvait qu'il fut bougre [hérétique], si le devait faire envoier à la justice laïque et la justice laïque le doit faire ardoir [brûler) (E. J. de Laurière, *Ordonnances des rois de France*, Paris, 1723, i. 211, 175). 'En tel cas,' says the *Coutumes de Beauvoisis* (ed. Société de l'hist. de France, Paris, 1842, i. 157, 413), 'doit aider la laïque justice à sainte Eglise; car quand quelqu'un est condamné comme bougre par l'examination de sainte Eglise, sainte Eglise le doit abandonner à la laïque justice et la laïque justice le doit ardoir, parceque la justice spirituelle ne doit nul mettre à mort.'

The Inquisition soon overstepped the boundaries of France. Flanders and the Low Countries, for example, were subject in 1233 to the authority of the Grand Inquisitor of France, Robert le Bougre (cf. Fredericq, *Corpus documentorum inquisitionis neerlandicæ*, i., *passim*).

In the south, the ecclesiastical dioceses had their seat on the two slopes of the Pyrenees; hence the frequent communications between the orthodox, as also between the heretics, of Spain and France. The King of Aragon, Jayme I., was always interested in questions of faith. On the advice of his confessor, the Dominican Raymond of Pennafort, he requested Gregory IX. to send him some inquisitors; and in a bull of 26th May 1232 the pope invited the archbishop of Tarragone and his suffragans to institute a general inquisition in their dioceses, either personally or with the help of the Dominicans or some other religious Order. A little later (30th April 1235), in reply to several questions, Gregory IX. handed over to the king of Aragon a whole code of inquisitorial procedure which had been drawn up by Raymond of Pennafort. From this time the Inquisition operated regularly throughout Aragon, with the co-operation of Dominicans and Franciscans, and extended its sway into Navarre (Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisition*, ii. 162 ff.). Castille could not escape its influence. The *Fuero real*, a code promulgated by Alphonso the Wise in 1255, and the *Siete Partidas* of 1265 reproduce the prescriptions against heresy inserted into the *Decretals* of Gregory IX., and also those of his successors, which figured later in the *Sextus* of

Boniface VIII. (cf. *El Fuero real*, iv. 1; *Siete Partidas*, i. 6. 58, viii. 24. 7, vii. 25).

The Cathari heretics in the south of France had come over from the north of Italy; but Italy still cherished a goodly number in her breast. Even before Gregory IX. adopted the laws of Frederick II., the Inquisition was doing active work in these regions. As early as 1224, Honorius III. had ordered the bishops of Brescia, Modena, and Rimini to expel the heretics from their dioceses. In 1228 the papal legate, Geoffrey, commanded the unconverted and lapsed heretics of Milan to be handed over to the secular authority. We have already noticed the inquisitorial work of Guala in Brescia in 1230. Seeing the trend of the movement, Gregory IX. nominated the Dominican Alberic inquisitor in Lombardy (1232), the Dominican Peter of Verona (St. Peter Martyr) inquisitor at Milan (1233), and the Dominicans Aldobrandini Cavalcanti and Ruggieri Calcagni inquisitors at Florence—the former in 1230, the latter about 1241 (cf. Lea, ii. 201 ff.).

In Germany, it was given to the Dominican Conrad of Marburg to apply the Imperial ordinances and pontifical bulls relating to the Inquisition. A letter from Gregory IX., dated 11th Oct. 1231, gave him minute directions as to the procedure to be followed (J. P. Kuchenbecker, *Analecta Hassiaca*, Marburg, 1730, iii. 73).

From Germany the Inquisition spread into Bohemia and Hungary and even into the Slavic and Scandinavian countries. In short, with the exception of England, it soon covered the whole of Latin Christendom.

2. Procedure.—The working of the Inquisition is explained in a letter addressed by Gregory IX. to Conrad of Marburg on 11th Oct. 1231 as follows: 'When you arrive in a town, convoke the prelates, clergy, and people, and deliver a solemn address; then, with the help of some discreet persons make a very diligent search for heretics and suspects (who will have been denounced to you). Those who, after examination, are considered guilty or suspected of heresy must promise absolute obedience to the orders of the Church; otherwise you will have to proceed against them in accordance with the statutes recently promulgated by us' (Kuchenbecker, *loc. cit.*).

Here we have the whole inquisitorial process: the 'time of grace'; the summoning and depositions of witnesses; the examination of the accused; the sentence of reconciliation of repentant heretics; and the sentence of condemnation of the unrepentant. The several acts of this drama call for separate explanation.

The first duty of the inquisitor was to invite those who acknowledged heresy to present themselves voluntarily before him, within a fixed time varying from fifteen days to a month. The time thus set apart for voluntary confession was called the 'time of grace' ('tempus gratiae sive indulgentiae'; cf. *Processus inquisitionis*, composed between 1244 and 1254, in Vacandard, App. A, p. 315). Those who took advantage of this and whose offence had not been previously discovered were exempt from all penalty, or were prescribed a secret and only nominal penance; those whose heresy was already known before confession were exonerated from the penalties of death and life-imprisonment, and suffered no worse punishment than a short pilgrimage or some other of the usual canonical penances (Consultation of Cardinal Pierre of Colmieu, bishop of Albano, formerly archbishop of Rouen, in fonds Doat, xxxi. fol. 5; cf. Tanon, *Hist. des tribunaux de l'Inquisition en France*, p. 144 f.).

With the edict of grace was connected an 'edict of faith,' which made it incumbent upon any one who knew a notorious heretic or any person suspected of heresy to point him out to the inquisitor (Eymeric, *Directorium*, pt. iii. nos. 52, 53–56). Thus, if they failed to give themselves up voluntarily, the heretics were rooted out by the denunciation of the orthodox catholics. The number of witnesses required to make an accusation valid was not fixed at first, but was finally settled as two. Gui Foucois (afterwards Pope Clement IV.) thought that more than two witnesses would be advisable in certain circumstances (Consultation in Doat, vol. xxxvi. qu. xv.; cf. Eymeric, pt. iii., 'De testium multiplicatione,' p. 445). In theory the inquisitor was not supposed to accept the evidence of any but discreet persons, and it had long been acknowledged by the Church that the evidence of a heretic, an excommunicated person, a homicide, a thief, a sorcerer, diviner, or false witness was not valid in a criminal prosecution (Gratian, *Decretum*, pt. ii. causa v. qu. iii. cap. 5). But the great fear of heresy made room for an exception in matters relating to the faith. In the 12th cent. Gratian decreed that the evidence of a heretic or a person under civil disability (*infamis*) should be received on the question of heresy (*Decretum*, pt. ii. causa ii. qu. vii. cap. 22, causa vi. qu. i. cap. 19). The edicts of Frederick II. denied the right of appearing in a court of justice to members of a sect, but this disability was removed in the Constitution of Ravenna of 22nd Feb. 1232: 'adjicimus quod haereticus convinci per haereticum possit' (cf. Huillard-Bréholles, *Historia Diplomatica Frederici II.*, iv. 299 f.). At first the inquisitors sometimes hesitated to consider evidence so obtained. But in 1261 Alexander IV. soothed their consciences (bull *Consuluit* of 23rd Jan. 1261, in Eymeric, App. p. 40). From this time onwards it was agreed that the evidence of a heretic should be valid at the discretion of the inquisitor. This principle was accepted generally, incorporated in canon law (cap. vi. 'In fidei favorem,' *Sextus*, v. ii.; Eymeric, p. 105), and confirmed by constant practice. Of all the legal pleas of common law that an accused person could bring forward against the witnesses to a charge, only one held good—mortal or very serious enmity (Eymeric, pt. iii. qu. lxvii. p. 606 f.; cf. Penna's remarks, *ib.* pp. 607–609).

It was quite useless to count on witnesses for the defence; in fact, we very seldom hear of their presence (cf. Lea, i. 446 ff.). And this is natural, for they would be practically certain to be suspected of complicity as abettors of the heretics.

For the same reason, the accused could not put their case in the hands of advocates except under conditions. The bull *Si adversus nos*, signed by Innocent III. in 1205 and inserted by Gregory IX. in the *Decretals* (cap. xi. 'De haereticis,' lib. v. tit. vii.), expressly forbade advocates and notaries to defend heretics; and this rule, though meant by the pontiff to concern only the acknowledged heretics, was insensibly extended to the accused who were striving to establish their innocence (Eymeric, pt. iii. qu. xxxix. p. 565; cf. p. 446; Vacandard, p. 151, n. 3).

The heretics and suspects, therefore, usually found themselves quite alone in the presence of their judges. They had to reply to the various charges (*capitula*) collected against them. It was important that the sources of these denunciations should be known. But the fear—a fear, moreover, that was justified (cf. Vacandard, 152, n. 1)—that the accused or their friends might take vengeance on their denunciators made the judges keep a prudent silence as to the names of the witnesses (see *Processus inquisitionis*, in Vacandard, App. A, p. 317; cf. bull of Alexander IV., *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, vol. iii. [1875] no. 4221). When Boniface VIII. incorporated this rule in the canon law (*Sextus*, v. ii. cap. 20), he made express reservations, and required the inquisitors to communicate the names of the witnesses to the accused when there

was no danger involved in doing so (cf. Eymeric, pt. iii. qu. 72: 'An nomina testium et denuntiatorum sint delatis publicanda,' p. 627). But, as a rule, the accused had no other means of invalidating the evidence against him than the privilege of naming enemies whom he knew to be bent on his destruction; if his denunciators were of their number, their evidence was dropped (Eymeric, p. 446 ff.).

But the real aim of the inquisitor was to induce the heretic to confess. For this purpose various means were employed, an account of which is given by David of Augsburg (analyzed in Douais, *L'Inquisition*, p. 170): (1) the fear of death; the supreme penalty and the stake were held before the prisoner's eyes if he should refuse to confess; on the other hand, he was promised that he would be spared these punishments if he would consent to speak; (2) more or less strict imprisonment, made more trying by very scanty fare and the total absence of friends; (3) the visit of two capable judges who could force a confession from the prisoner by clever insinuations and tricky questions; (4) finally, from the time of Innocent IV., torture (*Tractatus de inquisitione hæreticorum*, ed. Preger, Mainz, 1876, p. 43).

Torture could not be resorted to until the judge had exhausted all the gentler methods on the prisoner, and unless the latter was under very serious suspicion. Even in the torture-chamber, while the prisoner was being stripped and bound, the inquisitor continued his exhortations to confession. The *vexatio* then began with the mildest ordeals; if these were ineffectual, others were tried, and from the very beginning care was taken that the prisoner should see the whole series of punishments, so that he might be inspired with a salutary fear by the thought of the pains in store for him (Eymeric, pt. iii. p. 481, col. 1). But, of course, the prisoner's life and limbs were not meant to be endangered: 'cogere citra membri deminutionem et mortis periculum,' says the bull *Ad extirpanda* of Innocent IV. (in Eymeric, App., p. 8). Originally it was not even allowable to repeat the torture; but later it became the rule that, if necessary, torture might be applied several times and even at intervals of a few days, not by way of 'repetition,' but by way of 'continuation' ('ad continuandum tormenta, non ad iterandum,' as Eymeric says in *Directorium*, pt. iii. p. 481, col. 2).

If on leaving the torture-chamber the accused repeated his confession, his case was easily disposed of; but, if he withdrew the confession made under the pressure of torture, he necessitated recourse to witnesses. The rule of the *Processus inquisitionis* was that the accused must not be condemned without confession or certain and clear proofs (cf. Vacandard, p. 321). But, whether he confessed or not, if two witnesses deemed competent by the inquisitor agreed in charging him, he was declared a heretic.

Helpless in the face of such witness, the accused could only choose between two courses: either he had to make a confession and show his penitence by submitting to whatever penance the Church, in the person of the judge, decided to impose upon him, or he might stand firm in his denial of crime or in his profession of heresy, and bravely take the consequences.

If converted, the heretic bowed before the inquisitor as a penitent before his confessor. He had no cause to fear his judge, for the latter did not inflict real punishments, but rather penances.

These penances 'consisted, firstly, of pious observances—recitation of prayers, frequenting of churches, the discipline, fasting, pilgrimages, and fines nominally for pious uses, such as a confessor might impose on his ordinary penitents. These were for offences of trifling import. Next in grade are the "*pœnæ confusibiles*"—the humiliating and degrading penances, of which the most important was the wearing of yellow crosses sewed upon the garments; and, finally, the severest punishment among those strictly within the competence of the Holy Office, the "*murus*," or prison' (Lea, i. 462; cf. C. Molinier, *L'Inquisition dans le midi de la France aux xiiᵉ et xivᵉ siècles*, pp. 358–398).

Imprisonment might be temporary or for life.

'There were two kinds of imprisonment, the milder, or "*murus largus*," and the harsher, known as "*murus strictus*" or "*durus*" or "*arctus*." . . . In the milder form, or "*murus largus*," the prisoners apparently were, if well behaved, allowed to take exercise in the corridors, where sometimes they had opportunities of converse with each other and with the outside world. This privilege was ordered to be given to the aged and infirm by the cardinals who investigated the prison of Carcassonne and took measures to alleviate its rigors. In the harsher confinement, or "*murus strictus*," the prisoner was thrust into the smallest, darkest, and most noisome of cells, with chains on his feet—in some cases chained to the wall. . . . When the culprits were members of a religious Order, to avoid scandal the proceedings were usually held in private, and the imprisonment would be ordered to take place in a convent of their own Order. As these buildings, however, usually were provided with cells for the punishment of offenders, this was probably of no great advantage to the victim. In the case of Jeanne, widow of R. de la Tour, a nun of Lespenasse, in 1246, who had committed acts of both Catharan and Waldensian heresy, and had prevaricated in her confession, the sentence was confinement in a separate cell in her own convent, where no one was to enter or see her, her food being pushed in through an opening left for the purpose—in fact, the living tomb known as the "*in pace*." . . . While the penance prescribed was a diet of bread and water, the Inquisition, with unwonted kindness, did not object to its prisoners receiving from their friends contributions of food, wine, money, and garments, and among its documents are such frequent allusions to this that it may be regarded as an established custom' (Lea, i. 486, 487, 491).

The greatest penalty was that of death. The inquisitor, indeed,

'never condemned to death, but merely withdrew the protection of the Church from the hardened and impenitent sinner who afforded no hope of conversion, or from him who showed by relapse that there was no trust to be placed in his pretended repentance' (Lea, i. 460).

It was then that the civil authority intervened. The ecclesiastical judge handed the prisoner over to the secular arm (cf. *Liber sententiarum*, in Limborch, *Historia Inquisitionis*, p. 91), and it applied the legal punishment (*animadversio debita*), death by fire. The prisoner had one last resource, however: to save his life he could, even at the stake, renounce his error, and his sentence was immediately commuted to imprisonment for life (Constitution of Frederick II. of 1232; cf. Eymeric, pt. iii. p. 515).

Death did not protect heretics from the condemnation of the Inquisition. Trial after death was not unknown to the Romans; it was applied to criminals who had committed treason, and, in case of conviction, entailed confiscation of property and spoliation of heirs. The analogy established by Innocent III. (bull of 25th March 1199, inserted in the *Decretals*, v. vii. 10) between heresy and the crime of treason led the tribunals of the Inquisition to punish deceased heretics just as if they were still alive. They were regarded as condemned in default, and treated accordingly; their goods were seized and their remains exhumed. The exhumation was carried out with great solemnity; bones and even semi-decomposed bodies were carried through the streets to the sound of trumpets, and then burned at the stake. The names of the dead were proclaimed, and the living were threatened with a similar fate if they followed their example: 'qui aytal fara, aytal périra,' says the *Chronique de Guilhem Pelhisso*, first inquisitor of Albi (published in Douais, p. 110).

These various penalties could be applied only after sentence pronounced in a public assembly convoked for the purpose and known by the name of *Sermo generalis* (see Tanon, pp. 425–431). This assembly was what is commonly called the *auto da fé*, or *auto de fe* ('act of faith'). To the masses and to many others the name *auto da fé* suggests the very worst horrors of the Inquisition; they

can scarcely picture it without towering flames and fierce-eyed hangmen. In reality there was neither hangman nor burning stake. The heretics who appeared at this tribunal had simply to listen to a speech and then hear their sentence, which was sometimes very light. The death-penalty was not always the result of these 'solemnities,' which were meant to appeal to the imagination of the orthodox. Of the 18 *auto da fé* presided over by the famous inquisitor Bernard Gui, 7 pronounced no greater penalty than prison or dungeon. When the heretic deserved a worse punishment, he was handed over to the secular arm. This was the device employed by the Church to avoid transgression of the principle forbidding her ministers to shed blood ('Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine').

3. **Appreciation.**—We need not discuss the abuses which crept into the inquisitorial system through the fault of individuals. Whatever their origin, history, and extent, they should be the object of inexorable and universal reprobation. No one would ever dream of defending the memory of Cauchon, the sole judge of Joan of Arc. Nor is there any excuse for those inquisitors like him who used their authority to convict all suspects brought before their tribunal with no thought of justice or moderation.

It is the institution itself that we must judge here, according to our idea of a higher social justice. The form of inquisitorial procedure appears in itself to be inferior to that of accusatory procedure. In the latter it was the accuser's duty to prove the truth of his words; in the former the accused had to prove his innocence, no one was allowed to speak in his defence, he was reduced to a desperate self-defence before a secret tribunal without the help of an advocate. It is possible, indeed, to allege important reasons in justification of this system. The risks that the witnesses would have run if their names had been divulged are patent to all; and publicity of debate would certainly have hindered the success of the work. But these considerations do not alter the nature of the institution; the large part left to the discretion, or rather licence, of the judges marks an inferiority that leads inevitably to suspicions of its strict justice. All that can be said in defence or even to the credit of the Roman pontiffs is that, once the principle of inquisition was admitted, they did their best to prevent its inconveniences and to repress its abuses. They stipulated for exceptionally high moral qualities in inquisitors: Alexander IV. (1255), Urban IV. (1262), Clement IV. (1265), Gregory X. (1273), and Nicholas IV. (1290) insisted on spiritual qualities, moral purity, and scrupulous honesty in these judges (Potthast, *Regesta*, nos. 16132, 16611, 18387, 19372, 19924, 20720, 20724, 23297, 23298); Clement V. made a decision, in confirmation of one already made by his predecessors, that, in order to guarantee against any possibility of frivolity, no one under the age of forty should exercise inquisitorial power (Clementin. ii. 2). In Bernard Gui (*Practica*, vi., ed. Douais, p. 232 f., tr. in Vacandard, p. 156) we have a portrait of the ideal inquisitor; it is a model which leaves nothing to be desired. It was, further, decreed by Innocent IV. and Alexander IV. that, in order to protect the judges themselves against sudden outbursts of passion, they should be guided by a certain number of *boni viri* and gather a body of experts (*periti*) about them (cf. *Layettes du trésor des chartes*, iii. no. 4111; Potthast, *Regesta*, no. 15804; Vacandard, p. 165, n. 1). The official reports of sentences, in fact, often mention the presence of *periti* and *boni viri* in great numbers (see Douais, 'La Formule "Communicato bonorum virorum concilio" des sentences inquisitoriales,' in *Congrès scientifique international des catholiques*, section 'Sciences historiques,' Freiburg, Switzerland, 1898, pp. 316-367). We see in these councillors a foreshadowing of the modern jury; and it has been rightly observed that the inquisitors generally followed their advice and even tempered it with mercy (Douais, pp. 324-326, with examples). They were, furthermore, forbidden, from the time of Clement V. (bull *Multorum querela*) to make any serious decision without first hearing the advice of the bishops, the natural judges of the faith. In a word, although they do not present 'a sublime spectacle of social perfection' (*Civiltà cattolica*, Rome, 1853, i. 595), the tribunal of the Inquisition conformed to a very high ideal of justice—an ideal as lofty as that conceived by the best spirits of the Middle Ages.

We could not adopt this ideal for our own; for among the methods employed by the Inquisition there was one, namely, torture, which could never find favour in the eyes of criminalists with a love of justice. If they had even restricted themselves to flagellation, such as was administered, to quote St. Augustine, at home, in school, and even in the episcopal tribunals of the early ages, or such as was recommended by the Council of Agde in A.D. 506, and applied by the Benedictine monks (Augustine, *Ep.* cxxxiii. 2; cf. clxxxv. 23; *Concil. Agath.*, can. xxviii.; *Benedicti Regula*, xxvii.; cf. Vacandard, p. 38, n. 3), their conduct would not have appeared so scandalous. We might have looked upon it as a sort of domestic or paternal practice, somewhat rigorous, of course, but harmonizing with the ideas of goodness prevalent at the time. But the rack, *strappado*, and lighted torches were particularly inhuman inventions (cf. St. Augustine, *Ep.* cxxxiii. 2). When they were employed in the first centuries against Christians, every one agreed in regarding them as relics of barbarism and inventions of the devil. Their character did not change when they were employed by the Inquisition against heretics; and it is a sad fact that, in spite of Innocent IV.'s appeal for moderation ('citra membri diminutionem et mortis periculum'), it was possible to draw a comparison between the pagan and the ecclesiastical tribunals. Pope Nicholas I. delivered a judgment on torture as a means of getting judiciary information which is worthy of remembrance.

> 'Such processes,' he said, 'are contrary to both Divine and human law, for confession should be spontaneous and not forced; it should be made voluntarily, not extracted by violence. The prisoner can endure all the torments you inflict without confession, and then what shame there is for the judge, and what an exhibition of his inhumanity! If, on the other hand, the prisoner is overcome by pain and confesses a crime of which he is innocent, on whom does this enormous impiety recoil if not upon him who forced the poor wretch to tell a lie?' (*Responsa ad consulta Bulgarorum*, lxxxvi., in Labbe, *Concilia*, viii. col. 544).

Innocent IV. was, of course, ignorant of this text when he recommended the use of torture. His excuse, if he had any, was that he was only following the example of the civil courts and conforming to the customs of his time.

The penalties imposed by the tribunals of the Inquisition are more difficult to judge. The death-penalty is of the first importance. Let us notice, to begin with, as a point of history, that the punishment of death for the crime of heresy owed its origin to the people, and passed into the penal code only at the wish of the princes, without any intervention of ecclesiastical power; the Church never admitted the penalty of death into her code. This being so, it remains for us to see whether heretics could be justly condemned to death, and whether the Church could have, or actually had, any share in their condemnation.

The early Fathers, notably Origen, Cyprian, Lactantius, Chrysostom, and Augustine, did not approve of the death-penalty for heresy (see texts

in Vacandard, pp. 3, 5, 20, 34); and their doctrine seems to conform to our Lord's parable of the wheat and tares: 'Is it not possible,' said Wazon, bishop of Liège, in the 12th cent., 'that those who are tares to-day may be converted into wheat to-morrow?' (*Vita Vasonis*, xxv. [*PL* cxlii. 753]). To put them to death, then, was to deprive them at a stroke of any possibility of conversion.

Those who advocated the death-penalty, Frederick II. and Thomas Aquinas (*Summa*, II. ii. qu. xi. art. 3), tried to support their doctrine by arguments from reason. The supreme penalty, they said, was the recognized punishment for persons guilty of treason or forgery, and accordingly . . . and so on. Their argument is, of course, a case of mistaking comparisons for reasons. The State criminals in question were a serious menace to the social order, which could not be truly said of all and every heresy as such. There is nothing in common between a crime against society and a crime against God; and, if these were to be assimilated, it would be quite an easy matter to prove that every sin is Divine treason, and consequently punishable with death.

To tell the truth, the heresies of the Middle Ages were nearly always interwoven with anti-social systems. Such a sect as the Cathari, for instance, which wrapped itself round in mystery and corroded the heart of the people, inevitably called down the vengeance of society and the sword of the State for no other crime than existing and acting;

'and, however much we may deprecate the means used for its suppression and commiserate those who suffered for conscience' sake, we cannot but admit that the cause of orthodoxy was in this case the cause of progress and civilization. Had Catharism become dominant, or even had it been allowed to exist on equal terms, its influence could not have failed to prove disastrous. Its asceticism with regard to commerce between the sexes, if strictly enforced, could only have led to the extinction of the race, and as this involves a contradiction of nature, it would have probably resulted in lawless concubinage and the destruction of the institution of the family, rather than in the disappearance of the human race and the return of exiled souls to their Creator, which was the *summum bonum* of the true Catharan. Its condemnation of the visible universe and of matter in general as the work of Satan rendered sinful all striving after material improvement, and the conscientious belief in such a creed could only lead man back, in time, to his original condition of savagism. It was not only a revolt against the Church, but a renunciation of man's domination over nature' (Lea, i. 106).

Its development had to be stopped at any cost. In fighting it to the death, society was only acting in self-defence against the inroads of an essentially destructive force. It was the struggle for existence.

It is not surprising that Church and State should combine to oppose their common enemy. If all disturbers of public order and ordinary law-breakers were to be struck from the list of sect-members sent to the stake or the dungeon, we should find the remaining number of condemned heretics to be very small indeed. They were, according to commonly received doctrine, equally amenable to the jurisdiction of Church and of State. It was inconceivable that God and His revelation should lack defenders in a Christian kingdom: the magistrates were held responsible to a certain extent for offences committed against the Deity. Hence heresy belonged indirectly to their tribunal. It was their privilege and duty to combat errors of faith as they did anti-social theories.

As regards the Church's attitude, in principle no heretic was condemned to death. The sacred formula ran: 'Damnati per ecclesiam seculari judicio relinquantur, animadversione debita puniendi' (ch. *Excommunicamus*, 15, x. lib. 5, tit. 7 [ed. E. Friedberg, Leipzig, 1882, col. 789]); and the sentence of delivery to the civil judges added: 'We recommend the secular court, and with confidence, to such moderation in your sentence as will avoid all effusion of blood or danger of death' (Eymeric, p. 588). But these formulæ evidently belong to a time when the *animadversio debita* did not include death at the stake; Lucius III. (bull *Ad abolendam*, in *Decretals*, v. vii. 9) and Innocent III. (*ib.* v. vii. 13) could use them without any reservation. But it was different from the time when Gregory IX. and Innocent IV. sanctioned the code of Frederick II. and imposed it upon the tribunals of the Inquisition. The Church continued to recommend the State to act with moderation and avoid all 'effusion of blood and danger of death.' This was, unfortunately, only an empty formula that deceived no one. Its purpose was to safeguard the principle which the Church had taken for its motto: 'Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine.' The inquisitors imagined that, by boldly proclaiming this traditional rule, they removed all responsibility in the matter from their own shoulders. It was their only safeguard against being soaked in judgments of blood, and it must be taken for what it is worth. It has been described as a 'device' and 'hypocritical' (Lea, i. 224); we may call it simply a legal fiction.

It is impossible to claim that the Church had never any responsibility for the execution of heretics. This was attempted, however, in the 13th cent.:

'Our Pope,' so says a clumsy apologist ('Disputatio inter Catholicum et Patarinum hæreticum,' in E. Martène, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum*, Paris, 1717, v. col. 1741), 'neither kills nor orders to be killed any person; it is the law that kills those whom the Pope allows to be killed, and it is they themselves who cause their own death by committing deeds that must be punished by death.'

The same position has been taken up by modern apologists. But they forget that the Church excommunicated princes for refusing to burn the heretics delivered into their hands by the Inquisition (Boniface VIII., *Sextus*, 'de Hæreticis,' xviii., in Eymeric, pt. ii. p. 110; cf. qu. 47, p. 360 f.). It was undoubtedly the princes who passed the death-sentence; but there were two authorities involved—the civil power, which applied its own laws; and the ecclesiastical power, which forced it to apply them. Hence the command to Peter the Cantor not to kill the Cathari immediately after an ecclesiastical judgment, as this might compromise the Church; 'illud ab eo fit cujus auctoritate fit' was added in justification (*Verbum abbreviatum*, lxxviii. [*PL* ccv. 231]).

The question whether the Church's responsibility was a juridical or simply a moral responsibility is of no importance historically. Let us notice, however, that in the tribunals of the Inquisition sentences involving death were not frequent. We have the sentences of Pamiers from 1318 to 1324, and of Toulouse from 1308 to 1323. During 9 *Sermones* or *auto da fé* held by the tribunal of Pamiers, and involving the sentence of 75 persons, only 5 heretics were handed over to the secular arm (Vidal, *Le tribunal de l'Inquisition de Pamiers*, pp. 50–56). Bernard Gui presided over 18 *auto da fé* in Toulouse, and pronounced 930 sentences; of this number only 42 were marked with the fatal sign, 'relicti curiæ seculari' (cf. Douais, *Documents*, i. p. ccv; Vacandard, App. B). The proportion is, therefore, one in 15 for the tribunal of Pamiers, and one in 22 or 23 for that of Toulouse (cf. Vacandard, p. 236 f., with notes). Taking everything into consideration, we may hold that the institution and working of the tribunals of the Inquisition were the means of real social progress: not only did they close the era of summary judgment (cf. Vacandard, pp. 38–66), but they also considerably lessened the number of sentences involving the death-penalty. Lea, who could not be charged with any bias in favour of the Church, has found it possible to say in all truth: 'The stake

[of the Inquisition] consumed comparatively few victims' (i. 480).

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INSANITY.—I. *INTRODUCTION.*—There is no comprehensive definition that can adequately embrace the various types of insanity. The nervous system, which is the physical substratum of mental manifestations, is liable to disorder of function arising from many causes. Among these may be mentioned congenital defects in its development, lesions of its structure due to disease such as tumours or apoplexies, and toxic conditions such as the poisons of fevers, or syphilis, or alcoholism, or metabolic changes within the body which, although imperfectly understood, have nevertheless been proved to act after the manner of toxins, causing not only mental disturbance but also well-marked physical changes. The nature of these poisons has not been wholly determined, and those who most strenuously support the theory of their influence admit also that other elements enter into their action in the causation of insanity. The chief of these is immunity, or the resistance which the tissues of the body offer to the action of certain toxins. Were it not for this element of immunity, which varies greatly in different individuals, all persons would be equally liable to acquired insanity. Upon immunity, therefore, depends, to a large degree, heredity or predisposition, which plays so large a part in the causation of mental diseases. But there is another aspect of heredity which is not necessarily concerned with the question of immunity, namely, the germinal transmission of inborn variations in the structure and functions of the nervous system, and which are manifested by the repeated appearance of idiocy, imbecility, eccentricity, and anomalies of various kinds in members of certain families. We see, therefore, that the main divisions of mental unsoundness are: (1) congenital defects in the structure of the brain, which prevent the proper manifestation of its function, and produce idiocy and the various grades of imbecility and mental weakness or imperfection; (2) the acquired insanities which occur as a rule between the ages of 20 and 50 years, and which chiefly depend upon, or are invariably accompanied by, definite physical changes of a subtle nature, indicating in the majority of forms a general toxæmia of the system; (3) the toxic insanities caused by the effects of poisons such as metabolic toxins, syphilis, alcohol, lead, etc., acting directly or indirectly upon the cortical cells in the convolutions of the brain; (4) the insanities which accompany such nervous affections as epilepsy, hysteria, etc.; (5) the mental unsoundness caused by gross lesions of the brain, including injuries, tumours, apoplexies, and other vascular diseases which destroy or injure its substance; and (6) the mental symptoms which accompany the decline of physical and mental vigour in old age.

1. **Causes of insanity.**—As scientific investigation proceeds to throw light upon certain limited fields of this broad question, two facts begin to assume prominence: the great influence of hereditary predisposition, and the extreme complexity of the changes in the human system which occur in all cases of mental disease. As we contemplate these facts we are compelled to admit the importance of hereditary predisposition, and to relegate to a more distant sphere of influence the host of popular influences which our forefathers regarded as the proximate, intimate, and essential causes of insanity.

The question of *heredity* itself is beset with great difficulties, and it has to be admitted that we are very far from a true comprehension of its intricacies (cf. art. HEREDITY, vol. vi. p. 597 ff.). It is clear, however, that the individual inherits from his ancestors both his mental and his physical characteristics. In most ordinary families it is impossible to obtain the accurate information upon which to found an undoubted history of transmitted disease. On the other hand, in the case of certain races, sects, and castes, *e.g.* Jews, Quakers, and the aristocracy, fuller information on these points can be obtained, and the result shows indubitably that insanity in the ancestors tends to reproduce itself either in the same form or as a mental anomaly of some kind in the descendants. But, according to the law of reversion to the normal which has been expounded by Galton, and according to the law of atavism, the incidence of this heredity varies greatly in different members of the same family, so that the majority of the members may escape the taint altogether. Even although it may be shown that actual mental disease has not occurred in the family history of an insane person, it is often possible to ascertain the presence of nervous degeneration as exemplified by epilepsy, neuralgia, sexual and alcoholic excesses, or paralysis of various kinds, in the past and present members of his family. Perhaps the most common precursory symptom of insanity in a family is what is known as mental degeneracy, which includes feeble-mindedness, great impres-

sionability, suspiciousness, violent temper, impulsiveness, or excessive timidity. Certain families show a marked tendency to produce at intervals individuals afflicted with certain physical deformities of various types. This is, of course, the result of an innate germinal variation. When this variation affects the structure of the nervous system, especially that of the brain, it is apt to be accompanied by idiocy or imbecility. In estimating the influence of mental defect and aberration in ancestors upon the production of insanity in their descendants, it must be kept in view that the strain of circumstances may determine the appearance of insanity in a predisposed person who might, under different conditions, have escaped the incidence of the malady. Nor must it be forgotten that a person predisposed to insanity by heredity may, in favourable circumstances, manifest no symptoms of insanity during his life, and yet transmit the tendency to his children. Here we meet face to face one of the problems of hereditary predisposition. What is, in the latter instance, transmitted? There can only be speculation on such a problem, but, so far as we can perceive, there are probably two elements, among others, transmitted, namely, a structural, functional delicacy of the nervous system, and a defective immunity of the body tissues against the action of toxins of various kinds.

Races and families become acclimatized to special *environments* and modes of life, and their removal from them is attended by degeneration. It is a well-established fact that the type of town dweller differs in many respects, physically and mentally, from the rural inhabitant. A little consideration will show that the change from the one type to the other is effected, chiefly, by the elimination of those individuals who are not fitted for the life of the new environment. The process of this elimination of the unfit must necessarily be attended by disease both of the body and of the mind. It has also to be remembered that the conditions of all localities, whether urban or rural, are constantly varying, in consonance with the universal surrounding change. Populations fluctuate; new inventions disturb old social relations; food, dress, and customs vary. To one and all of these changes the human organism has to adapt itself, and always the less fit types—not necessarily the less strong or the less favoured—with respect to these variations in the environment have to suffer. But those who become first, and most readily, the victims of mental alienation as the result of changes in their environment are the hereditarily predisposed.

Closely allied with the influence of the environment in producing insanity is the question of the influence of certain *habits and excesses*. Chief among these is the alcohol habit. There can be no question that over-indulgence in alcohol exercises a baneful effect upon the nervous system, and that a considerable number of people now insane might have remained sane had they abstained from its use. Sexual excesses are, though to a less degree, accredited causes of insanity. There is also to be mentioned indulgence in narcotic drugs, such as opium, hashish, and cocaine. With regard to all these causes of insanity it must be pointed out that their causative relation to insanity is complicated by the following facts: (1) in some cases they constitute symptoms of an incipient or an already established insanity; (2) in regard to certain of them (alcohol in particular) there undoubtedly exists a special inherited tendency towards their excessive use, and this in itself gives alcoholism a right to be regarded as a separate neurosis; (3) unfortunately, the tendency to both alcoholism and insanity may be inherited by the same individual. This double heredity and the independence of alcoholism and insanity are established by the existence in the same family at the same time of alcoholic members who do not become insane, and of insane members who never become alcoholic.

With regard to the hosts of *moral causes* which are popularly regarded as producing insanity, their influence has to be accepted with great caution. That a sudden moral shock may cause insanity in a highly nervous individual is probably true, but such shocks when they do occur must be regarded more as of the nature of traumata, or direct injuries affecting the nerve cells and fibres, than as subtle influences of a spiritual nature. That prolonged anxiety and worry may cause insanity in predisposed individuals is probably also true, but here the effect is indirect, and due to the lowering of the general health and nutrition of the body as a result of insomnia, decreased appetite, and disorder of function.

The wide field of *toxæmia* and its rôle in the causation of mental troubles can only be touched upon. It is usual to divide such toxic agents into two great classes: (*a*) those introduced into the system from without, *e.g.* alcohol, syphilis, etc.; and (*b*) those formed within the system, *e.g.* uric acid, oxalic acid, gastro-intestinal toxins, and toxins due to defective gland secretion, especially that of the thyroid gland. The effect of these toxins will be referred to under the headings of the diseases which they are supposed either to cause or to influence.

2. Terminology of the symptoms of mental aberration.—(*a*) *Mental exaltation or mania* is a condition in which the subject, under the influence of a corresponding emotion, exhibits intellectual excitement with defective self-control, impaired judgment, and consequent anomalies of conduct. This condition is known as simple mania. When the excitement becomes acute, the flow of ideas more rapid, the conduct of the patient less and less restrained, the speech incoherent, and the bodily restlessness incessant, the condition is known as acute mania.

(*b*) *Mental depression or melancholia* is the antithesis of the preceding condition. It is characterized by mental pain and gloom, slow reaction to stimuli of all kinds, slow muscular action, and diminished general sensibility. The ideational centres are always implicated in melancholia, and the thoughts of the patient are constantly engaged in formulating explanations of his misery, and in the invention of self-accusatory and self-deprecatory ideas. When the condition becomes acute, there may be motor restlessness, and, under the influence of gloomy delusions, strenuous resistance to any offers of assistance on the part of others. Suicide is probably contemplated seriously by all sufferers from this affection.

(*c*) *Mental confusion or delirium.*—In this condition, in contrast to both mania and melancholia, where the intellectual functions and memory remain clear, there is obfuscation of thought, greater or less unconsciousness of surroundings, and an imperfect memory, or total loss of memory, of what has taken place during illness. The condition is met with most typically in the delirium of fevers, in acute alcoholism, and in many forms of mental affections which owe their origin to toxic infection.

(*d*) *Stupor* is a symptom which may occur in the course of any mental affection. It is especially characteristic of the katatonic form of 'dementia præcox' described below. Patients suffering from stupor manifest little or no volition, and do not respond to any of the ordinary sensory stimuli. They usually retain the power of walking and

eating, but in severe cases even these functions may be suspended. The conscious state varies greatly, some patients being aware of and capable of recalling all that occurred during the attack, while others are unconscious and without memory. Most of the subjects exhibit in greater or less degree the curious phenomenon of catalepsy, or the tendency of the muscles to maintain a limb in any position in which it is placed by another person.

(*e*) *Delusions or insane ideas.*—A delusion is a partially dissociated train of ideation which invariably involves the personality of the subject, which possesses a distinct emotional tone, and the content of which refers to subjects either inimical or beneficial to the welfare of the individual.

The new school of morbid psychology has done much to extend our knowledge of the origin of delusions. According to their teaching, certain ideas or trains of thought possessing a strong emotional tone which tend to interfere with the ordinary thought processes must either be wholly excluded from the mind or suppressed. When they are suppressed and sunk below the level of conscious thought, they manifest a tendency—stronger in ill-balanced minds—to force themselves upon attention. Hence arises in some persons a constant conflict between the will and the morbid idea. In time the suppressed idea may gradually force itself into the sphere of conscious thought and capture for itself a place in the ideation and personality of the individual, but in the great majority of such instances the sphere of influence of the morbid train of thought is rigidly delimited and to a large extent independent. Having once entered the sphere of personal ideation, it assumes the position of an intuitive certainty similar to that occupied by any other fundamental belief of the individual. The fact that it may be absurd in the opinion of others does not affect the individual's belief in its truth, for he builds around it a system of 'rationalization' whereby he satisfactorily accounts to himself for its validity in the same way as a normal individual explains his religious, political, or social opinions apart from any rational bases. The partial dissociation of the morbid train of thought and its rigid delimitation from the ordinary normal ideation of the individual explain the otherwise incongruous phenomenon of divided personality and the not uncommon spectacle of an individual endowed with intelligence above the average and eminently capable in the affairs of life being yet dominated by beliefs wholly incredible to ordinary people, and being often thus influenced in his conduct to an extent which compels his sequestration in his own interests or that of others. Delusions form the basis of the two large and important groups of insanity described below under the headings 'dementia præcox' and 'paranoia.'

(*f*) *Hallucinations* of the senses are frequently observed in different forms of insanity. All the five senses may be implicated, but by far the most common is that of hearing. Next in order of frequency come false sensations of touch or pain, of taste, of smell, and of sight. Hallucinations are of two kinds—primary or peripheral, and secondary or ideational. When the stump of an amputated limb is electrically stimulated, the absent fingers and toes are distinctly perceived—the cause of which can only be that the excessive irritation of the afferent nerves forces into association neuron paths long previously disused. In the same way peripheral irritation of the aural or optic nerves tends to arouse latent ideas by forced association, and in this way to cause auditory or visual hallucinations. Secondary hallucinations are of ideational origin, and are intimately associated with the emotional tone of the mental state of the patient. Thus a man who believes himself the victim of persecution generally develops hallucinations corresponding to his delusions, and a man who is the subject of delusions of pride and grandeur is liable to hallucinations corresponding to these ideas (see, further, art. HALLUCINATION, vol. vi. p. 482 ff.).

(*g*) *Obsessions and impulses.*—An obsession is a dissociated idea, or group of ideas, which suddenly enters consciousness, disturbing the ordinary course of ideation, but not involving the personality of the individual—that is to say, the subject of obsession regards it as an unreality, and as apart from his ordinary ideation. Obsessions are most common in neurasthenic, hysteric, or hereditarily degenerate people. The number of obsessions is endless, there being almost as many forms as there are of thought. Some are harmless and meaningless, as, *e.g.*, the desire to repeat certain words or phrases, to count objects of no interest, or to touch certain articles. Others are fateful, as the desire to kill, to commit suicide, or to steal.

As thought precedes action, so does obsession lead up to impulse. Some impulses are harmless; others are serious. Among the latter are suicidal and homicidal impulses, the impulse to drink (dipsomania), or the impulse to steal (kleptomania). True impulse is generally preceded by mental distress, due to the strength of the obsession against which the purposive will of the individual contends. The recognition of this contest between impulse and will is important in the diagnosis of obsession and impulse.

(*h*) *Dementia or mental enfeeblement.*—Mental enfeeblement is of two kinds—primary and secondary. The first is congenital, and will be referred to under congenital mental defect; the other is a terminal condition of many forms of mental disease. Secondary dementia varies greatly according to the nature of the preceding malady, the hereditary power of resistance of the individual, or the character and extent of the injury to the nerve cells of the cortex of the brain. It may manifest itself variously from a mere change in disposition up to the most complete ineptitude for the simplest duties, with abolition of the faculty of ordinary thought, loss of memory, and absence of the human instincts.

II. *CONGENITAL MENTAL DEFECTS.*—1. **Idiocy** varies from a condition in which the mental faculties are rudimentary, if, indeed, they can be said to exist, up to a state of mind characterized by such limited ideation that the subject is unable to take proper care of himself, or to perform ordinary social or civil functions. All idiots are incapable of acquiring literary education. The higher grades of them, however, may be trained to habits of decency and cleanliness. There are various types of idiocy, *e.g.* the genetous or congenital type, which are malformed germinal variations; the paralytic type, in which an early brain injury or inflammation has resulted in infantile paralysis, with accompanying arrest of mental development; the microcephalic type, in which the head measures less than 17 inches in circumference, and in which the skull sutures are for some reason prematurely ossified; the hydrocephalic type, accompanied by enormous enlargement and deformity of the head; and cretinism, a condition associated with failure of development of the thyroid gland, and accompanied by dwarfishness and abnormality of the skin and its appendages. In addition to a paucity of ideas, idiots usually present speech defects and a host of physical abnormalities. Their resistance to disease, especially to tubercle, is low, and they are liable to suffer from caries of the teeth, and from gastro-intestinal disorders.

2. **Imbecility** is a much less pronounced form of mental degeneracy than idiocy, from which it differs more in degree than in kind, so that it is

often difficult to classify borderland cases. The absence of mental power in imbeciles may be so slight that it becomes apparent only in the continuing infantilism which the subject manifests as puberty is approached. On the other hand, it may manifest itself by inability to acquire ordinary education at an early period of life. Not only so, but imbecile young children generally manifest peculiarities of conduct, unusual attitudes of mind, and abnormal ways of thought, all of which are characterized by a feeble and undeveloped mind. Physical deformity is rare, as compared with idiocy, and many imbeciles, though not well developed physically, are of robust bodily constitution.

The mental reaction of imbeciles towards their environment is, generally speaking, defective; they are incapable of learning by experience the common social relationships of everyday life, or of understanding anything beyond the merely animal and the simpler human necessities of existence. At the same time, these defects are, in a few exceptional individuals, associated with some musical or arithmetical faculty, with an extraordinary memory for dates, or even an aptitude for certain limited mechanical skill. The power to protect themselves varies greatly, from helplessness in the midst of ordinary dangers up to a capacity for partially or even wholly earning their own means of livelihood by the performance of, as a rule, unskilled labour. The majority of imbeciles are deficient in self-control and in the moral sense; and, though many are good-natured, not a few are impulsive, passionate, and vicious.

3. **Higher grade imbecility or degeneracy.**—This class of imbeciles, though often apparently normal, physically and mentally, are only a degree removed from imbeciles. As a rule, such individuals, though of average intelligence—occasionally even exhibiting genius—are mentally ill-balanced, and the subjects of certain distinguishing peculiarities. Chief among these are eccentricity in manner, extravagance in thought or conduct, extravagant immorality of various kinds, and anomalies of emotion either in the direction of hyper-emotionalism or in the absence of certain emotional qualities, such as sympathy, which not infrequently results in cruelty. Certain types of criminals undoubtedly belong to this class. The intellectual development of such persons is always defective, and presents well-marked irregularity. On the physical side they do not present any constant signs of degeneracy. As a class, they are subject to various forms of psychopathic affection, such as paranoia or hysteria, and to such nervous diseases as epilepsy.

III. *THE ACQUIRED INSANITIES.*—The acquired insanities include those mental affections which manifest themselves between puberty and the end of the fourth decade in life. Undoubtedly they may appear, though rarely, both before and after these periods.

i. MANIA-MELANCHOLIA GROUP.—The relationship between mania and melancholia, which until recently were regarded as separate entities, consists in the fact that they are often associated in the same individual. The manifestation may be alternate (circular insanity); or the recurrent attacks of mania may be ushered in by a slight mental depression, which rapidly disappears; or an attack of melancholia may be followed by a slight transient mental exaltation; or, finally, a person who has suffered for many years from attacks of recurrent melancholia may suddenly develop an attack of mania, or *vice versa*. Notwithstanding the fact that one solitary attack of mania or melancholia may be the sole manifestation of the disease in an individual lifetime, the validity of the relationship is not thereby affected.

(*a*) *The circular form of mania-melancholia.*—The attacks of mental exaltation and of mental depression succeed each other usually without intermission, and are followed by a lucid interval of longer or shorter duration (*folie à double forme*). When the alternate attacks follow each other without a lucid interval, or are continuous, the form is known as 'circular insanity' (*folie circulaire*). The term 'circular insanity' is, however, used to embrace both forms. It is unimportant whether the mental depression succeeds or precedes the mental exaltation.

Although the form of mania which occurs in circular insanity may assume an acute type, it is usually of the form known as 'simple.' There is a general exaltation of the mental functions, without any apparent incoherence of ideas, without hallucinations of the senses, and without the presence of marked delusions. The memory becomes extraordinarily acute, and the patients talk or write incessantly. At the same time, although they appear capable of reasoning correctly, they lose their sense of proportion and of the fitness of things, and their judgment loses its normal balance. Thus they become less reticent regarding themselves and their affairs, and less cautious in speculation, or in what they say to or about other people, and their moral conduct becomes faulty and untrustworthy. They lose their natural affection for their relatives, and affect the company of people of an inferior type. In short, they become extraordinarily active, vain, vindictive, quarrelsome, and lose their moral status. When this condition has lasted for months, it may be years, the subject gradually loses his abnormal energy, though occasionally it may flicker up, and lapses into a state of mental depression. The contrast between the same patient labouring under melancholia and in his previous maniacal condition is profound. He becomes silent, pale-faced, seeks solitude, and shows a disinclination to converse. His former energy is replaced by extreme lassitude and an almost paralyzing disinclination to, or an incompetence for, mental or physical work. The durations of the two periods of mania and melancholia are not always the same, the period of depression being generally longer than that of excitement. Great irregularity also exists in the duration of the lucid interval, although there are some cases in which it bears a stated relation to the length of the mental affections which go to form the cycle. Circular insanity is, from the point of view of recovery, a very unhopeful condition; for, though the individual attacks are almost always recovered from, the condition tends to recur with an almost fatal certainty. It is a condition that is more common among the educated classes of society, and which occurs not infrequently in persons with an inherited tendency to insanity.

(*b*) *The recurrent forms of mania-melancholia.*—1. **Mania.**—The form in which mania appears may be either simple or acute. The description of simple mania given above in connexion with circular insanity must suffice for the present purpose. Acute mania differs from it only in degree of intensity, and simple mania may in any patient suddenly pass into the acute form. In acute mania there is great mental exaltation combined with intellectual disturbance, sensory disorders, and uncontrollable motor restlessness. The first appearance of the affection is usually ushered in with malaise and mental depression generally of short duration. Gradually mental excitement supervenes, sometimes suddenly, at other times after lapses into depression. The patient's ideas soon become confused, for the ideation becomes so rapid that there is difficulty in consecutively

expressing them, until finally speech becomes incoherent. The exaggerated excitability of the senses of sight and hearing becomes so intense that a stray word or an object starts a train of ideation unconnected with the train of thought. Thus the patient's attention becomes unfixed, and he tends to associate his ideas more by their external than by their essential relationship. The motor excitement manifests itself by incessant movement and loquacity. The will-power at this stage can hardly be said to exist, and actions are determined, not by any formulated principle, but by the idea predominant for the time. Further, there is complete loss of the moral sense and of natural affection, and the emotions are equally disturbed: grief, joy, fear, and hatred may be manifested by the patient within a few minutes of each other. Notwithstanding this extraordinary mental disturbance, the memory in many cases remains intact. Not only do many of the patients remember afterwards what had been said and done to them, but they are able to describe their sensation and repeat their own sayings. The physical symptoms comprise a marked change in the facial expression, which betrays the instinctive and varied passions which dominate the mind. The disorder of movement to which reference has been made expresses itself in an agitation of all the voluntary muscles, which during intense mental excitement results in violent movements. Insomnia is always a more or less marked symptom of acute mania; it often resists all treatment, and, when long continued, has a deleterious effect upon the patient. The functions of digestion and nutrition are always disordered during the attack; the appetite, whether diminished or increased, is capricious, and the patients invariably lose weight during the acute stages. The body temperature is only slightly, if at all, increased. Finally, there is high blood pressure and a marked increase in the relative number of the white corpuscles of the blood. This last change is regarded as indicating a toxic condition of the blood. Mania may be associated with various nervous and cerebral affections, such as hysteria, epilepsy, and general paralysis. After one attack the disease tends to recur at regular or irregular intervals. Although it is not a usual occurrence, it is right to remark that at any time in the course of recurrent mania an attack of melancholia may take the place of one of the maniacal attacks. The termination of the attacks is by recovery in from 70 to 80 per cent, a small percentage die of some complication, and a certain number pass into chronic mania.

Chronic mania is simply the indefinite persistence, in a milder form, of the symptoms of acute mania. The excitement is continuous but less intense, and the patients are more manageable. Many of the subjects are able to perform some simple work. The illusions and morbid ideas of the acute stage become more fixed and crystallized, so that many patients exhibit the symptoms of delusional insanity (paranoia). A certain degree of mental enfeeblement is always present, and many such patients are unable to express themselves coherently. The patient may be liable, from time to time, to acute attacks of excitement which resemble those of the primary condition.

2. Melancholia.—The characteristic feature of melancholia is a morbid depression of feeling which expresses itself in every degree from silent resignation up to the most violent despair. At the same time, there is intellectual disturbance in which painful impressions predominate. In contradistinction to mania, the ideational centres are more or less depressed and inactive, so that instead of the pleasurable feelings which accompany their activity there is produced a feeling of pain and misery. The treatment of the attacks of manic-depressive insanity is symptomatic, and as a rule the patients make satisfactory recoveries from the individual attacks. From the point of view of prognosis, however, the matter is more serious, for the danger of a relapse at some future period can never be ignored. In the circular form of the disease the recurrence of the attacks is almost certain.

ii. THE DEMENTIA PRÆCOX GROUP.—Dementia præcox is essentially a disease of adolescence; by far the greater number of cases develop between the ages of 20 and 35 years. The fact that some cases develop before the age of 20 and a few after 40 does not affect the validity of the above statement. The onset of the disease is so slow and insidious as almost to escape observation. The early symptoms extend over a period of years. Patients, the majority of whom have given promise of a normal development, may gradually exhibit, in early adolescence, unmistakable signs of progressive mental deterioration. This intellectual decadence is almost always accompanied by emotional disturbances, such as outbreaks of temper, impulsive conduct, or violent language. These irritable manifestations are at first rare and isolated, and the patient may fully realize, and be truly repentant for, his behaviour. As the disease progresses, these unaccountable and unprovoked emotional outbreaks may become more numerous, alarming, and even dangerous, and the patient becomes apathetic, careless in his habits, tends to lie in bed too long, and often gives up work altogether without any adequate reason. Then his natural affection abates until it may disappear or become perverted into an antipathy towards his nearest relatives. Finally, he may develop loose ideas of persecution, rarely co-ordinated except in the paranoiac form of the disease. These delusions of persecution are accompanied by hallucinations and illusions of the senses. The disease ends, in the great majority of instances, in dementia or permanent mental decay.

Dementia præcox presents three forms: hebephrenia, katatonia, and paranoia, or the delusional form.

1. **Hebephrenia** occurs, as a rule, in young subjects who, although fairly normal up to a certain point in the intellectual sphere, yet have always presented some symptoms of emotional instability or eccentricity. The mental deterioration, which sets in very gradually, is characterized by a desire for solitude, reticence, shyness, and suspicion of others. Suddenly a period of slight mental exaltation may appear, during which the behaviour of the patient attracts attention; or, on the other hand, an attack of depression may supervene, in many respects similar to a mild attack of melancholia. These mental disturbances quickly pass off, but sooner or later they recur. The patient may suffer from indefinite delusions, or even hallucinations, but these, as a rule, are rare in hebephrenia; meantime the mental deterioration progresses. The patient comes to lose all initiative, all interest in his work or surroundings; becomes indifferent towards relatives; careless of appearance and negligent of duties. His speech becomes jerky and hesitating, and the power to carry on a conversation is gradually lost. Throughout the course of the disease, and up to the time when actual dementia sets in, there is a surprising degree of accurate knowledge of his surroundings and of what is being said or done in his presence. The inability of the patient to respond or react is the characteristic feature of the disease. Sooner or later, however, the patient lapses into a state of irresponsiveness due to permanent loss of mental

power. Before this final stage is reached, it is not infrequent to observe violent and impulsive conduct, as a result, probably, of hallucinations, of delusions, or of both.

2. **Katatonia** differs from hebephrenia chiefly in the presence of peculiar attacks of muscular tension or cataleptic rigidity of the muscles; in mutism-phases of the disease, during which the patients refuse to speak; and in the peculiar symptoms of negativism in which the patients resist all attempts on the part of others to do anything for them. Impulsive actions are perhaps more marked in the katatonic form than in the other varieties of dementia præcox. In other respects, such as the presence of acute temporary attacks of mental excitement and depression, and in the gradual mental deterioration of the subject, katatonia bears a general resemblance to hebephrenia.

3. **Paranoia.**—This variety of dementia præcox may commence exactly like hebephrenia, or katatonia, or with an acute attack of manic-depressive insanity followed or not by katatonic symptoms. Its chief and distinguishing feature, however, is the presence of delusions of a more or less systematized nature, and of hallucinations of the senses. These delusions lack the clearness and consistency of true paranoia (see below); and, moreover, the patients almost always exhibit peculiarities and mannerisms indicative of mental degeneration. Sooner or later one or other of the symptoms which have been described as characteristic of dementia præcox supervenes and is followed by a tendency towards dementia.

From the point of view of prognosis, dementia præcox is a particularly grave form of mental disease, and only a small minority of the subjects make a satisfactory recovery. It has been estimated that no less than 80 per cent of the cases fall into permanent dementia, that about 15 per cent recover partially, though more or less mentally crippled, and that only 5 per cent recover absolutely. So little is as yet known of the pathology of the disease that no scientifically formulated line of treatment can be laid down. As regards causation, the hereditary factor would appear to be of great importance, no less than 75 per cent of the cases showing a hereditary tendency to mental affections. The environment of the subject is also, apparently, important, and it has been pointed out by some observers that dementia præcox is particularly liable to occur in families which have been subjected to sudden and extreme social changes, such as from poverty to wealth, or from a country to an urban life.

iii. THE PARANOIA GROUP. — Paranoia is a chronic mental disease of which systematized delusions, with or without hallucinations of the senses, are the prominent characteristic. The delusions may take the form of ideas of persecution or of grandeur and ambition; these may exist separately or run concurrently in the same individual, or they may become transformed in the course of the patient's life from a persecutory to an ambitious character. The disease may begin during adolescence, but the great majority of the subjects manifest no symptoms of the affection until full adult life. The prominent and distinguishing symptom of paranoia is the delusion, which is gradually organized out of a mass of original but erroneous beliefs or convictions, until it forms an integral part of the ordinary mental processes of the subject and becomes fused with his personality. This slow process of the growth of a false idea is technically known as 'systematization,' and the delusion is then said to be 'systematized.' As such delusions are coherently formed, there is no manifest mental confusion in their expression. Notwithstanding the fixity of the delusion, it is subject in some cases to transformation which permits of the gradual substitution of delusions of grandeur for delusions of persecution. It happens also that periods of remission from the influence of the delusion may occur from time to time in individual cases, and it may even happen, though very rarely, that the delusion may permanently disappear.

Paranoia is classified for clinical purposes according to the form of delusion which the patients exhibit. Thus there are the persecutory, the ambitious, the amatory, and the litigious types, these divisions depending upon the prevalence of the primary emotions of fear or suspicion, pride or vanity, and love.

1. **Persecutory paranoia.**—This form is characterized by delusions of persecution, with hallucinations of a painful and distressing character. In predisposed persons there is often observed an anomaly of character dating from early life. Towards the commencement of the insanity the patients become gloomy, preoccupied, and irritable. Suspicions regarding the attitude of others take possession of their minds, and they ultimately come to suspect the conduct of their nearest relatives. Certain physical symptoms caused by sleeplessness and anxiety gradually supervene, and the patients become pale and worried in appearance, and their appetite is affected. The mental symptoms slowly become more pronounced, until the patient believes that people are conspiring against him. The conversations of his friends are supposed to be interlarded with phrases which, on examination, he believes to contain hidden meanings, and the newspapers appear to abound in veiled references to him. A stray word, a look, a gesture, a smile, a cough, a shrug of the shoulders on the part of a stranger, are apt to be misinterpreted and brooded over. The extraordinary prevalence of this imagined conspiracy may lead the patient to regard himself as a person of great importance, and may result in the formation of delusions of ambition which intermingle themselves with the general conceptions of persecution, or which may wholly supplant the persecutory insanity.

At this juncture, however, it generally happens that hallucinations begin to appear. These, in the great majority of instances, are auditory, and usually commence with indefinite noises in the ears, such as ringing sounds, hissing, or whistling. Gradually they assume a more definite form, until isolated words and, ultimately, formed sentences are distinctly heard. There is great diversity in the completeness of the verbal hallucinations in different patients. Some patients never experience more than the subjective annoyance of isolated words, generally of an insulting character, while others are compelled to listen to regular dialogues carried on by unknown voices concerning themselves. A not uncommon form of verbal hallucination is formulated in the complaint of the patients that 'all their thoughts are read and proclaimed aloud.' Even more than the enforced listening to verbal hallucinations this 'thought reading' distresses the patient, and often leads him to acts of violence, for the privacy of his inmost thoughts is, he believes, desecrated, and he often feels helpless and desperate at a condition from which there is no possible escape.

Though some of the subjects do not develop any other form of hallucination, it is the unfortunate lot of others to suffer, in addition, from hallucinations of taste, smell, or touch. The misinterpretation of the subjective sensations in these sense organs leads to the formulation of delusions of poisoning, of being subjected to the influence of

noxious gases or powders, or of being acted on by such agencies as electricity. Such are the persons who take their food to chemists for analysis; who complain to the police that people are acting upon them injuriously; who hermetically seal every crevice that admits air to their bedrooms to prevent the entrance of poisonous fumes; or who place glass castors between the feet of their beds and the floor with the object of insulating electric currents. Such patients obtain little sleep; some of them, indeed, remain awake all night—for the symptoms are usually worse at night—and have to be content with such snatches of sleep as they are able to obtain at odd times during the day. It is obvious that a person tormented and distracted in this way may at any moment lose self-control and become a danger to the community.

This type of the disease may persist for an indefinite period—even for 20 or 30 years—without any change, except for the important fact that remissions in the intensity of the symptoms occur from time to time. These remissions may be so marked as to give rise to the belief that the patient has recovered; but in true paranoia this is never the case, and sooner or later the persecution begins again in all its former intensity.

2. **Ambitious paranoia.**—After a long period of persecution, a change in the symptoms may set in, in some cases, and the intensity of the hallucinations may become modified. Delusions of grandeur begin to appear, at first faintly, but gradually they increase in force until they ultimately supplant the delusions of persecution. At the same time, the hallucinations of a disagreeable nature fade away, and are replaced by auditory hallucinations conformable to the new delusions of grandeur. Undoubtedly, however, paranoia may commence, so far as can be observed, with delusions of grandeur, in which case there is seldom or never a transformation of the personality, or of the delusions from grandeur to persecution, although delusions of persecution may engraft themselves upon or run side by side with the predominant ambitious diseases. The emotional basis of ambitious paranoia is pride, and every phase of human vanity and aspiration is represented in the delusions of the patients. There is, moreover, considerably less logical acumen displayed in the explanations of their beliefs by such patients than in the case of the subjects of persecution. Many of them, without any regard for accurate genealogical detail, affect to be the descendants of historical personages. They have no compunction in disowning their natural parents or explaining that they have been 'changed in their cradles,' in order to account for the fact that they are of exalted or even of royal birth. Dominated by such beliefs, paranoiacs have been known to travel all over the world in search of confirmation of their delusions. It is people of this kind who drop into the ears of confiding strangers vague hints as to their exalted origin and kindred, and who make desperate and occasionally alarming attempts to force their way into the presence of princes and rulers. The sphere of religion affords an endless field for the ambitious paranoiacs, and some of them may even aspire to divine authority; but, as a rule, the true paranoiac does not lose touch with earth. The more extravagant delusions of persons who call themselves by divine names and assume omnipotent attributes are usually found in patients who have passed through acute attacks of such insanity as mania or 'dementia præcox,' and who are mentally enfeebled.

A not uncommon form of paranoia, combining both ambition and persecution, is where the subject believes that he is a man of unbounded wealth or power, of the rights to which he is, however, deprived by the machinations of his enemies. These patients frequently obtain through auditory hallucinations the knowledge on which they base their delusions. They are often so troublesome, threatening, and persistent in their determination to obtain redress for their imagined wrongs that in the public interest they have to be forcibly detained in asylums. On the whole, however, the ambitious paranoiac is not troublesome, but calm, dignified, self-possessed, and reserved on the subject of his delusions. He is usually capable of reasoning as correctly and of performing work as efficiently as ordinary people. Many of them, however, while living in society, are liable to give expression to their delusions under the influence of excitement, or to behave so strangely and unconventionally on unsuitable occasions as to render their seclusion either necessary or highly desirable.

3. **Amatory paranoia.**—A distinguishing feature of this form of paranoia is that the subjects are chivalrous and idealistic in their love. Some of them believe that they have been 'mystically' married to a person of the opposite sex, usually in a prominent social position. The fact that they may have never spoken to or perhaps never seen the person in question is immaterial. The conviction that their love is reciprocated and the relationship understood by the other party is unshakable, and is usually based upon suppositions that to a normal mind would appear either trivial or wholly unreal. The object of affection, if not mythical or of too exalted a position to be approached, is not infrequently persecuted by the admirer, who takes every opportunity of obtruding personally or by letter the evidences of an ardent adoration. The situation thus created can easily become complicated and embarrassing before it is realized that the persecutor is insane.

The subjects of this form of paranoia are in the majority of instances unmarried women well advanced in years who have led irreproachable lives, or men of a romantic disposition who have lived their mental lives more in the realm of chimeras than in the regions of real facts.

4. **Litigious paranoia (paranoia querulans).**—The clinical form of litigious paranoia presents uniform characteristic features which are recognized in every civilized community. The basic emotion is vanity, but added to that is a strong element both of acquisitiveness and avarice. Moreover, the subjects are, as regards character, persistent, opinionative, and stubborn. When these qualities are superadded to a mind of the paranoiac type, which, as has been pointed out, is more influenced by the passions or emotions than by ordinary rational considerations, it can readily be appreciated that the subjects are capable of creating difficulties and anxieties which sooner or later may lead to their forcible seclusion in the interests of social order.

It is important to observe that the rights to which such people lay claim, or the wrongs of which they complain, may not necessarily be imaginary. But, whether imaginary or real, the statement of their case is always made to rest upon some foundation of fact, and is, moreover, presented, if not with ability, at any rate with forensic skill and plausibility. As the litigants are one-ideaed and capable of seeing only one side of the case—their own—and as they are actuated by convictions which preclude feelings of delicacy or diffidence, they ultimately succeed in obtaining a hearing in a court of law under circumstances which would have discouraged any normal individual. Once in the law-courts, their doom is sealed. Neither the loss of the case nor the payment of heavy expenses has any effect in disheartening the litigant, who carries his suit from court to court until the methods of legal

appeal are exhausted. The suit may be raised again and again on some side issue, or some different legal action may be initiated. In spite of the alienation of the sympathy of his relatives, and the advice of his friends and lawyers, the paranoiac continues his futile litigation in the firm belief that he is only defending himself from fraud, or seeking to regain his just rights. After exhausting his means and perhaps those of his family, and finding himself unable to continue to litigate to the same advantage as formerly, delusions of persecution begin to establish themselves. He accuses the judges of corruption and the lawyers of being in the pay of his enemies, and imagines the existence of a conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining justice. One of two things usually happens at this stage. Though well versed in legal procedure, he may one day lose self-control, and in open court resort to threats of violence. He is then probably arrested, and may on examination be found insane and committed to an asylum. Another not uncommon result is that, finding himself non-suited in a court of law, he commits a technical assault upon, it may be, some high legal functionary, or on some person in a prominent social position, with the object of securing an opportunity of directing public attention to his grievances.

Paranoia is generally a hopeless affection from the point of view of recovery. From what has been stated regarding its genesis and slow development it is apparent that no form of ordinary medical treatment can be of the least avail in modifying its symptoms. The best that can be done in the interests of the patients is to place them in surroundings where they can be shielded from influences which aggravate their delusions, and in other respects to make their unfortunate lot as pleasant and easy to endure as possible.

IV. *THE TOXIC INSANITIES.*—In this division are included those forms of mental affection which we know to be associated with the presence of toxic substances within the body. Among these substances are the poison of infective fevers and of syphilis, the auto-intoxication of the body by waste products, as in fatigue, the disturbance of metabolism by shocks, either physical or mental, or by exhausting and wasting illnesses, and, finally, the poisoning of the system by the habitual abuse of such drugs as alcohol. Such a number of causes necessarily produce different clinical symptoms, which for convenience and clearness have been labelled as distinct varieties of disease. It is manifest that only the typical forms can be dealt with here.

There are certain general symptomatic features common to all these affections. On the mental side there is more or less marked confusion of ideas, in striking contrast to the mental clearness found in patients labouring under the so-called acquired insanities, especially in the manic-depressive and paranoiac groups. The mental state is dreamy, thought is dissociated, speech is incoherent, and memory is blurred. There is great restlessness of an aimless character, accompanied often by mental and physical uneasiness, or pain, or an anxious emotional state. False sense-perceptions amounting to hallucinations, accompanied by delusions of a passing kind, are common. All the mental manifestations are further coloured by the bodily weakness which is present. On the physical side there are grave bodily symptoms, characterized either by fever and prostration, or by slow, chronic changes and wasting of the tissues. There is always a tendency to destruction of the finer nerve elements and cortical cells of the brain. In the acuter forms the prognosis is always serious, but the course is more rapid, and recovery often takes place. In the more chronic forms, such as chronic alcoholism and general paralysis, the prospect of recovery is almost hopeless.

1. **The delirium of fevers.**—This delirium is typical of the whole of the toxic insanities. The delirium varies greatly in different fevers, being, as a rule, more severe in typhus and certain types of smallpox, and less severe in the milder exanthemata, such as measles or scarlet fever. Much, however, depends upon the individual resistance of the nervous system to the influence of the toxin. Some persons, children in particular, tend to become confused and delirious when subjected to the action of any disease poison, *e.g.* pneumonia or influenza, which raises the temperature of the body. The delirium generally subsides after the crisis of the fever.

2. **Septic delirium.**—Delirium is also apt to occur when the system is invaded by certain poisonous micro-organisms. This condition is frequently observed in the blood-poisoning arising from wounds, in puerperal conditions, and in purulent affections of the pleural and abdominal cavities, and in some conditions unaccompanied by purulent inflammation. The puerperal insanities, because of their frequency, are important; but there are various forms of this disease. In predisposed individuals, insanity may occur during pregnancy, especially in the later months; at the time of parturition the ordinary forms of manic-depressive insanity may occur. The shock of parturition may induce the symptoms of exhaustion delirium, or the system may become infected by some pathological micro-organism which may occasion an attack of septic delirium. It is with the last variety that we are at present concerned, because it is in all respects similar to the other septic deliria associated with blood-poisoning as distinct from the delirium of fevers. The mental symptoms of septic delirium reach their climax of intensity very rapidly after infection, though in some cases there is a preliminary period of mental depression, with apathy and listlessness. The speech is incoherent; there is great motor restlessness, and a subdued but intense excitement. Vivid hallucinations of sight and hearing are present, so that the patient loses touch with the environment and lives in a world of phantasy. Sleep is invariably suspended, and the expression is anxious and morbidly mobile. The bodily symptoms point to prostration with fever, and the temperature ranges from 100° to 103° F. or higher. The pulse is weak and rapid, the tongue furred, and there is marked loss of appetite. The great majority of the patients (70 per cent) recover, the recovery being often preceded by a period of stupor. In those cases which do not recover, the patients, as the disease advances, become more and more prostrate, their movements become more feeble, and they lapse into coma from which they do not emerge.

3. **Delirium of collapse (the exhaustion insanities).**—These mental affections are most apt to occur in persons who have been exhausted by long-continued fatigue, insufficient food, or wasting diseases; but they are found most frequently after the crisis of fevers or during convalescence from fevers, after surgical operations, injuries of a severe kind, or shocks. The insanity breaks out, as a rule, with suddenness. The prevailing mental condition is one of confusion, with excitement, incoherence of speech, and weakened ideation. The patients suffer from vague hallucinations, and not infrequently express delusions of persecution or of self-importance. Such delusions are, however, fleeting and ill-defined. On the physical side the patients are weak, and manifest profound disorder of nutrition; the pulse is feeble and slow,

the pupils are dilated, and the skin is clammy; the tongue is furred, and the appetite so perverted that the patients are averse to taking food. The great majority of the patients recover, but the prognosis is by no means always favourable. When the predisposing cause has been comparatively slight, as, *e.g.*, influenza or pneumonia, the patients rapidly recover; but, when it has been prolonged and grave, as, *e.g.*, some forms of typhoid fever, long-continued wasting illnesses, or severe injuries, the prospect, depending always upon the patient's strength, is more grave.

4. **Alcoholism.**—Many other drugs besides alcohol, when habitually taken into the system, may produce chronic poisoning, accompanied by mental disturbances; but, in view of their greater frequency, the effects of alcohol only will be referred to here.

(*a*) *Ordinary intoxication.*—Alcoholic intoxication is itself an insanity, and a person who drinks himself from sobriety into unconsciousness passes through many phases of mental alienation. In certain predisposed or degenerate persons, ordinary alcoholic intoxication may develop great excitement, with a tendency to violence. In this condition, of which the patients retain but a confused recollection, serious crimes against others, or suicide, may be committed.

(*b*) *Acute alcoholism* (*delirium tremens*) is the result of excessive drinking, but it is a secondary and not a direct consequence of alcoholic poisoning. For instance, a person who has drunk to excess, but who has abstained from alcohol for several days, or even for several weeks, may, after some physical shock, such as a surgical operation, an illness like pneumonia, or a bodily injury, develop the symptoms of acute alcoholism. Such an onset points to a secondary toxæmia from the intestinal canal, for alcohol is very rapidly eliminated from the system. The chief mental symptoms are vague terror, mental distress, and confusion of ideas. These symptoms are further complicated by vivid hallucinations of the senses, especially of sight and hearing. The dangers attending the mental symptoms of acute alcoholism are the violent impulses to which the patients are liable—impulses to homicide and suicide. These impulses are partly obsessional, but they are undoubtedly often the result of the despair produced by the hallucinations. The chief bodily symptoms are insomnia, want of appetite, great thirst, and trembling or twitching of the muscles. The danger accompanying the physical symptoms is death from heart failure, from pneumonia, or from nervous exhaustion. Under suitable medical treatment the great majority of the patients recover.

(*c*) *Dipsomania.*—Dipsomania is really more an obsessional condition than an alcoholic disease, but it is more convenient to consider it here. Probably all the subjects have a hereditary predisposition to alcohol, but the chief inherited quality is an instability of the nervous system which renders them liable to obsession, and consequently to impulse. The impulse to drink probably would not appear in a person who had never experienced the pleasurable effects of alcohol, but an attack may occur suddenly in a predisposed person of perfectly irreproachable character. There are generally, however, exciting causes, such as moral shocks or strain or physical illness, and the attack is usually preceded by malaise or mental depression. The attacks usually last several weeks, often with short intermissions, during which the patient strives with all his might to overcome his obsession. According to circumstances and the environment, the attacks tend to become more numerous or less frequent. If the former, then rapid physical and mental deterioration takes place, and the case becomes hopeless; if the latter, (unfortunately the minority), the patient may experience only one or two attacks and afterwards be immune.

(*d*) *Chronic alcoholism* is a somewhat vague term including numerous conditions. It may be defined as a condition of mental deterioration, emotional depression, and enfeeblement of the will, with a progressing tendency towards dementia, met with in persons who have habitually used alcohol to excess. The enfeeblement of the will-power, which is the cardinal mental symptom, is not confined to the inability to resist the craving for alcohol, but extends into all the social and business relations of the individual. So much is this the case that the subjects are apt to become the tools or dupes of other people. In more advanced types of the disease there is loss of memory, especially for recent events, with confusion of ideas. The bodily symptoms are also characteristic, and include tremor of muscles, weakness of certain muscle groups, various sensory disturbances, and, not infrequently, epileptiform seizures. Certain internal organs, especially the liver, kidneys, and heart, are liable to organic disease. The condition is incurable.

5. **General paralysis.**—While modern authorities have long been agreed that syphilis is the antecedent cause of this disease, the recent discovery by Noguchi of the spirochæte of syphilis (*Treponema pallidum*) in the cerebral tissues of persons dying of general paralysis has placed beyond doubt the fact that the disease is of direct syphilitic origin. General paralysis is a disease chiefly of middle life, occurring most often between the ages of 35 and 45. It is a disease of modern civilization, and affects chiefly persons residing in industrial urban centres. It may be stated generally that it does not exist in the remoter rural parts of England, or of Ireland, or in the Highlands of Scotland. The male sex is more liable than the female. General paralysis is a subacute inflammatory disease of the brain, occasionally involving the spinal cord and the larger nerve trunks. It is characterized by the concomitant appearance of mental and physical symptoms. On the mental side there is progressive dementia, to which is superadded, in the majority of instances, insanity of the maniacal, melancholic, or confusional type; on the physical side there is weakness of the muscles and incoordination of movement, with partial degeneration of the osseous, cartilaginous, and muscular tissues.

For clinical purposes the disease is divided into three stages, although a prodromal stage is also recognized. The symptoms of the first stage are chiefly mental, although certain bodily symptoms can be detected by medical experts, or by the near relatives of the patient. These bodily symptoms vary, but they may include lassitude, headache of a severe type, nervous pains, or epileptiform convulsions. Insomnia is almost always a feature of the early period. Mentally, while the intelligence remains apparently unimpaired, the patients are usually conscious of defects of memory, revealing themselves in odd and unaccountable lapses in writing, in spelling, or in the performance of their ordinary routine duties. The chief change, however, is in the moral character: at home the patient is irritable, and occasionally violent; among strangers he is facile, versatile, and easily led astray. Gradually there develops in typical cases a condition resembling simple mania, with, however, a certain amount of mental confusion depending upon the underlying condition of progressive dementia. Delusions of grandeur are common in this stage; these delusions, which result from the predominant state of mental

exaltation, do not always exceed the bounds of possibility and credibility. It is important to bear in mind that the insanity of the first stage may be a simple mental confusion without any conspicuous feature, or may be of the melancholic type. The latter forms are more common in females. Towards the end of the first stage, the affection of the innervation of the muscular mechanism becomes more pronounced. The muscles of the face show tremulousness, and the speech becomes incoordinate. Difficulty is experienced by the patient in pronouncing certain words, such as 'artillery,' 'British Constitution,' 'incompatibility,' etc. The staccato manner of pronouncing such words is characteristic of the disease.

In the second stage, the mental weakness and confusion are more marked, the delusions become extravagant and absurd, and the conduct of the patient uncertain and foolish. He is apt to steal useless objects, to stuff his pockets with rubbish, and to lose all sense of propriety, especially with regard to instinctive human habits. The embarrassment of speech becomes painfully apparent, and the muscular incoordination becomes so great that the patient loses the power of performing accurately such habitual movements as buttoning clothes or untying knots. The handwriting becomes shaky and unrecognizable, the gait ataxic, and all muscular movements feeble; towards the end of this stage there appear convulsive seizures which are known as congestive attacks, and which appear to accelerate greatly the downward course of the patient's strength.

The state of mental weakness and confusion reaches its acme in the third stage. The patient appears to be devoid of emotion, sentiment, or memory, and the only animal instinct which seems to remain is that for food. The physical symptoms of the third stage are characterized by a progressive weakness and paralysis which necessitate ultimately the patient's continued confinement to bed. The third stage terminates his life. He usually dies in a convulsive seizure, or from extension of the disease to some vital centre in the brain, or from blood-poisoning or pneumonia.

General paralysis is the most fatal of all diseases, for no authentic instance of recovery is known. The average duration is from 2 to 3 years in the male, and from 3 to 4 years in the female.

V. *INSANITY CONNECTED WITH THE NEUROSES.*—There are many forms of neurosis, but the types with which insanity is most usually associated are, in order of importance, epilepsy, hysteria (*q.v.*), neurasthenia, and chorea. It must be remembered that the majority of persons who are the subjects of the neuroses do not become insane. As epilepsy is the most important of all the neuroses, and the one most commonly associated with insanity, it alone will be described here.

Epilepsy is a disease which is characterized by convulsions of a definite type, or by sudden and temporary loss of consciousness without convulsions. The former is known as the 'grand mal,' the latter as the 'petit mal.' In the severer form the patient falls to the ground and is violently convulsed; in the milder form he does not usually fall; he is suddenly overwhelmed with mental darkness, but after a few seconds he is able to continue the work in which he may have been engaged at the time of the seizure. The two forms of fit are often combined in the same individual. As a rule, beyond the congenital degeneracy or mental deterioration, to which reference will be made, the subjects of epilepsy who manifest insanity are free from mental symptoms in the interval between the seizures. Mental disturbances are most commonly observed either immediately preceding the fit, immediately succeeding it, or replacing it. The last form is designated 'larvated' or 'masked' epilepsy. Of all the forms of insanity accompanying the fit, either before or after it, mania is the most common. The kind of mania varies, not only in different cases, but very markedly in the same cases at different times. From mere irascibility with capricious conduct it may vary to the most violent excitement, incoherence, and fury. But insanity does not always accompany the fits in the same person, and an epileptic may be free from it for long periods notwithstanding the regular recurrence of the fits. The insanity may then occur quite suddenly and be attended by acts of violence of which the patient retains afterwards no recollection. In the pre-epileptic mania the mental symptoms usually come on gradually, and may last a few days preceding the fit; the post-epileptic mania, on the other hand, is sudden in its onset, and usually of very short duration.

Another, but less common, post-epileptic form of insanity is stupor. When stupor occurs it is more persistent in its duration than mania, and may be accompanied by hallucinations and a tendency to automatic impulsive action.

The least common form of insanity connected with epilepsy is melancholia, which is not a passing insanity accompanying the fits, but a progressive, chronic, and usually incurable condition.

Many epileptics exhibit mental degeneracy of a congenital kind which manifests itself by certain oddities and eccentricities of conduct, want of self-control, and instability of the emotions. An extreme form of degeneracy is observed in epileptic idiots where epilepsy is superimposed upon a markedly degenerate physical and mental constitution. On the other hand, epilepsy is often the cause of mental deterioration. Under the influence of repeated attacks the mental faculties tend to become enfeebled; the patients gradually become more and more demented; their movements lose energy; and the facial expression reveals a condition of feeble-mindedness. Sooner or later, in greater or less degree, all prolonged cases of epilepsy tend towards mental feebleness and mental deterioration. Generally speaking, the younger the age at which epilepsy occurs, the greater the tendency to mental enfeeblement because of interference with mental development. When it occurs in infancy or childhood, the normal development of the brain is more or less arrested, with the result that idiocy or imbecility may be produced in otherwise normal children. Recovery from epileptic insanity is rare. The insanity depends upon the recurrence of the seizures, and epilepsy is a chronic persistent disease.

VI. *INSANITY CAUSED BY GROSS LESIONS OF THE BRAIN.*—1. Of these various lesions, **apoplexy** is by far the most common in ordinary life. 'Apoplexy' is a vague popular term which in medical nomenclature is generally divided into two distinct lesions: (*a*) haemorrhage from a blood vessel within the skull, and (*b*) the blocking of a small artery supplying an area of the brain. Although any cerebral artery may become diseased, the most commonly affected artery is the middle cerebral; and, as it supplies the motor cortex of the brain and the chief basal ganglia, the symptoms are usually well marked, and depend upon the branch of this artery affected. In haemorrhage, or blocking of the branches of this artery, there is generally paralysis of some limb or portion of the body; as in every cerebral affection, the resulting mental symptoms depend upon the health, age, and state of nutrition of the brain. If, *e.g.*, the person is young and the lesion slight, complete recovery may take place; on the other hand, if the arteries are atheromatous and the brain tissues feeble,

recovery does not take place so readily, if at all. In a typical case of apoplexy occurring after middle life, there ensues as an almost invariable result a certain amount of dementia accompanied by emotional disturbances. Depending upon the nature, situation, and extent of the lesion there may also occur loss of memory, mental confusion, and an impairment of judgment. Again, in most of the older patients the mental enfeeblement is slowly progressive, but in the majority of the younger cases and sometimes, though exceptionally, in the older cases, the condition is not progressive.

Apoplexy may be followed by any of the chief forms of insanity. Perhaps the most common form is mania which is greatly modified by the underlying condition of dementia. The mania is characterized by a noisy excitement accompanied by restlessness, and illusions or hallucinations of the senses. The symptoms are usually more accentuated during the night, so that it is not uncommon to find a patient either quiet or slightly excited during the day become noisy and sleepless during the night. This form of mania is also often intermittent, the attack lasting for two or three weeks, followed by a period of calm which, however, cannot be regarded as a true lucid interval. Melancholia is less frequently an accompaniment of cerebral lesions of this kind. It is usually acute in appearance, but there is probably less mental distress than the restlessness and noisy emotionalism of the patient would lead one to suppose. Delusions with visual and auditory hallucinations may also be met with as a result of such lesions. The delusions are of the persecutory form, but are irregular and badly systematized.

2. With regard to the insanity arising from tumours and injuries to the head, it may be said in a word that it is very irregular and difficult to describe. In cerebral tumour, by far the most common form is a progressive enfeeblement ending in complete dementia. Traumatic injuries may undoubtedly cause a confusional insanity in predisposed persons, immediately following the injury. Where a portion of the skull has been depressed and affects the brain, serious cerebral affections may be caused, which are relieved by operation. In the class of case in which insanity is said to occur long after the receipt of the injury, some excusable doubt has been cast upon the relation of the injury to the mental trouble. It is believed by many authorities, however, that profound moral deterioration accompanied by impulsive tendencies may supervene as a result of injuries to the head received years previously.

VII. *SENILE INSANITY.*—The insanity of old age has been divided into: (*a*) cases in which there is no dementia present, and (*b*) cases in which dementia is the most prominent mental symptom.

(*a*) In the first class any form of insanity may be observed, but by far the most common are mania and melancholia. The mania usually presents itself in an acute form, the patients being restless, confused, and often troublesome and destructive in their habits. The subjects are generally hereditarily predisposed, or have suffered from mania at previous periods of their lives. The melancholia is also acute. The patients present a debilitated appearance, and suffer from delusions of persecution and from hallucinations of hearing. Melancholia in senile persons is not so favourable as mania so far as recovery is concerned, and either lasts a long time or becomes chronic.

(*b*) The second class, who present dementia, owe their condition to advancing age, which varies in its onset according to the cerebral integrity of the individual. In some cases it occurs as early as 50, in others as late as 90. Superadded to this dementia there may be either mania-melancholia or a form of systematized delusional insanity. The mania and melancholia correspond closely to the types already described as accompanying gross lesions of the brain. Systematized delusions may take the form of either persecution or ambition. In the former type the patients are in constant dread of being robbed. They may hide their more valuable possessions in out-of-the-way places which on account of their faulty memory they are afterwards unable to find; or they barricade their house or room doors to prevent the ingress of imaginary thieves or robbers. The delusions of ambition usually exist side by side with those of persecution, and are generally accompanied by hallucinations both of a pleasant and of a disagreeable character. The progress of senile insanity combined with dementia is always unfavourable.

For primitive views concerning the insane, cf. the various sections of art. POSSESSION.

LITERATURE.—L. Bianchi, *Text-Book of Psychiatry*, Eng. tr., London, 1905; L. C. Bruce, *Studies in Clinical Psychiatry*, do. 1906; T. S. Clouston, *Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases*[4], do. 1896; M. Craig, *Psychological Medicine*, do. 1905; B. Hart, *Psychology of Insanity*, Cambridge, 1912; E. Kraepelin, *Psychiatrie*[8], Leipzig, 1913; J. Macpherson, *Mental Affections*, London, 1899; H. Noguchi, *Serum Diagnosis of Syphilis and Luetin Reaction*[3], do. 1912; W. H. B. Stoddart, *Mind and its Disorders*[2], do. 1912.

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INSPIRATION.

Primitive.—See POSSESSION (Primitive).
Christian (Protestant) (J. STRAHAN), p. 346.
Christian (Roman Catholic) (E. L. VAN BECELAERE), p. 350.
Greek and Roman.—See POSSESSION (Greek and Roman).
Hindu (A. S. GEDEN), p. 352.
Japanese.—See POSSESSION (Japanese).
Muslim (E. SELL), p. 354.

INSPIRATION (Protestant doctrine).—Protestant scholars of the present day, imbued with the scientific spirit, have no *a priori* theory of the inspiration of the Bible. They do not attempt to define the term by abstract reflexion. Their method of inquiry is critical and inductive, not metaphysical and deductive. They do not, of course, attempt to make the mind which receives and weighs evidence a mere *tabula rasa*—that is neither possible nor desirable—but they do their best to free it from prepossessions and presuppositions. They reject every foregone conclusion as to the mode and shape in which God must reveal His ways to men. They do not open any book of the OT or NT with the feeling that they are bound to regard its teaching as sacred and authoritative. They yield to nothing but what they regard as the irresistible logic of facts. They feel that, if they are not convinced of the inspiration of the Bible by its intrinsic merits, they cannot be legitimately convinced in any other way. And, if in the end they formulate a doctrine of the Divine influence under which the Scriptures were written, this is an inference from the characteristics which, after a free and fair investigation, they are constrained to recognize.

The time of privilege and prestige among books is past for them. The attitude of all liberal thinkers

towards the Scriptures was admirably indicated half a century ago by Richard Rothe:

'Let the Bible go forth into Christendom as it is in itself, as a book like other books, without allowing any dogmatic theory to assign it a reserved position in the ranks of books: let it accomplish what it can of itself through its own character and through that which each man can find in it for himself: and it will accomplish great things' (quoted by W. N. Clarke, *The Use of the Scriptures in Theology*, p. 154).

Some believers in inspiration prefer to avoid 'the ancient, ambiguous, confusing word.' They think that this word

'has lost its clearness without losing its claim: it bears the urgency of sacred tradition after definableness has forsaken it: it is now an enemy to clear thought, and a misleading guide to reverence for the Scriptures. It will be a good day for theology, and for religion, when we fearlessly take the Bible for exactly what it is, with an abiding value resident in itself' (*ib.* 155).

The term 'inspired of God' (*θεόπνευστος*) is, however, used in the Bible itself (2 Ti 3^{16}); and if, after the application of the most rigid tests, inspiration is proved to be a fact, it is better not to abandon the accepted word, but, if possible, so to re-mint it as to free it from all misleading associations.

1. Inspiration and experience.—It is through an experience of the spiritual power of the Bible that the term first comes to have a real meaning. Something more than the 'criticism of pure reason' is required for the correct and just valuation of the Scriptures. They make their appeal not only to the intellect but to the imagination, the heart, and the conscience. Their light is for the seeing eye, their message for the spirit which hungers and thirsts after righteousness and truth; and it is the testimony of one generation after another that through the Scriptures God finds the soul and the soul finds God.

Two Christian utterances may be regarded as typical. In his *Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures* (Letter I.), Coleridge tells how he re-read the books of the Old and New Testaments, each book both as a unit and as an integral part, and then he continues: 'Need I say that I have met everywhere more or less copious sources of truth, and power, and purifying impulses; that I have found words for my inmost thoughts, songs for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs, and pleadings for my shame and my feebleness? In short, whatever *finds* me, bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit, even from the same Spirit, *which remaining in itself, yet re-*

Word of God, and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer with all the fathers of the Protestant Church, *Because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God drawing near to man in Jesus Christ, and declaring to us in Him His will for our salvation. And this record I know to be true by the witness of His Spirit in my heart, whereby I am assured that none other than God Himself is able to speak such words to my soul*' (*Exp.* IV. x. [1894] 250).

2. Inspiration and ecstasy.—The theory that inspiration is an ecstasy, or possession, has probably few advocates to-day. It was the view propounded by Plato, from whom it was borrowed by Philo, Josephus, and some early Christian writers.

'God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or possession' (Plato, *Timæus*, 71). 'For a prophet gives forth nothing at all of his own, but acts as interpreter at the prompting of another in all his utterances, and as long as he is under inspiration he is in ignorance, his reason departing from its place and yielding up the citadel of the soul, when the Divine Spirit enters into it and dwells in it and strikes at the mechanism of his voice, sounding through it to the clear declaration of that which He prophesieth' (Philo, *de Spec. Leg.* iv. 8 [ed. Mangey, ii. 343]). Josephus takes Balaam as a typical prophet, who spoke 'not as master of himself, but moved to say what he did by the Divine Spirit,' and makes him express himself thus to Balak: 'God is stronger than my resolve to serve thee. For those who fancy that of themselves they can foretell the fortunes of men are all too weak to help saying what God suggests to them or to resist His will; for when He has entered into us nothing that is in us is any longer our own' (*Ant.* IV. vi. 5). Athenagoras, the Christian apologist (*c.* A.D. 177), said, in reference to the prophets, that, 'while entranced and deprived of their natural powers of reason by the influence of the Divine Spirit, they uttered that which was wrought in them, the Spirit using them as its instruments as a flute-player might blow a flute' (*Apol.* ix.). Another favourite figure was that of a plectrum striking a lyre (Epiphanius, *Hær.* xlviii. 4).

This theory commended itself to the Montanists (*q.v.*), whose excesses were castigated by Miltiades in a treatise bearing the title, *That the Prophet ought not to speak in Ecstasy*, which recalls the words of St. Paul, 'The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets' (1 Co 14^{32}). Few people now cling to the idea that the Divine influence was communicated to the Bible by dictation to its writers. It is seen that the prophet, the psalmist, and the apostle are degraded if they are regarded as the mere mouthpieces or penmen of Deity. Inspiration does not suspend the powers and faculties of the soul, but raises them to their highest activity, the supernatural intensifying the natural. A cognate word to inspiration (*θεοπνευστία*) is enthusiasm (*ἐνθουσιασμός*, from *ἐν* and *Θεός*), and the Divine energy is comparable to a breath which quickens, a seed which fertilizes, a flame which kindles the human spirit to the finest issues.

3. Inspiration and revelation.—Inspiration is the correlate of revelation. Whenever God revealed Himself, He inspired men to receive and to communicate the revelation. It is a truism that no lesson, human or Divine, is taught until it is learned; and it is inconceivable that the facts of the Kingdom of Heaven should have failed to find appreciative minds. There were seekers ready to be initiated into the mysteries. Spiritual truths made their due impression upon the finest minds in the Hebrew nation and the Christian Church, in order that they might ultimately make a similar impression upon all mankind. Amos was disciplined to become the stern prophet of Divine righteousness. Hosea had an experience which sensitized his mind to receive a new image of Divine love. Isaiah's regal spirit apprehended the Divine majesty. Paul knew himself to be separated and called that God's Son might reveal Himself in him (Gal 1^{16}). Rare indeed were the minds which at first were possessed by any new truth, and impelled to utter it with a power greater than their own. Yet the Divine influence felt by the few was not essentially different from that which affected a much wider circle. Without a general inspiration there could have been no special one. Behind the inspired prophets and psalmists of the OT there was the inspired Hebrew nation, and behind the inspired apostles there was the inspired Christian community. The organ of revelation was never a solitary visionary. It was in the religious consciousness of the many, purifying itself in the life and the teaching of their noblest representatives, expanding itself from age to age, and ultimately concentrating and consummating itself in the Gospel of Jesus Christ, that the voice of God was heard.

4. Inspiration and literature.—It is self-evident that the true medium of revelation is not a book, but a man. Inspiration is a condition of the soul in relation to God, and can be ascribed to a roll or book only in so far as this is the record of a vital experience. It was not into prophecies and histories, laws and psalms, gospels and epistles, that the Spirit of God was directly breathed, but into their authors. The living truth always shaped itself first in some living mind, and whether it was published *viva voce* or by writing was immaterial. As a means of preserving the truth the art of writing was of immense value, but it could make no difference to the inspiration.

'The authority of the word written was precisely the same as that of the word spoken, neither less nor more. It was inherent in the person who wrote or spoke, and was derived from the special action upon that person of the Spirit of God' (W. Sanday, *Inspiration*[3], 226 f.).

5. In OT.—(*a*) The *prophets* are by pre-eminence the inspired men of the OT. Their inspiration is

the type of all inspiration. The 'madness' of the earlier prophets, such as those among whom Saul found himself (1 S $10^{10ff.}$), had certain well-marked affinities with heathen mantic and with the excesses of the Muslim dervish, but the inspiration of the later Hebrew prophets purified itself from that taint; and, if the claims which they made can be established, the Divine influence upon the minds of men is an indisputable fact. Judged by their *gesta*, their credibility is the highest. The establishment of ethical monotheism as the religion of Israel was their achievement, and their affirmations regarding the righteousness and love, the faithfulness and holiness of God, are to-day the kernel of the world's faith. It was their characteristic that, instead of reasoning and conjecturing, they announced and commanded. Each of them spoke as if he was commissioned to publish the laws of heaven in the language of earth, as if his mind was a medium for the transmission of the white light of eternity. The ideas of which they were the bearers were not proclaimed as their own pious opinions or shrewd guesses. They drew a firm and unwavering distinction between the thoughts of their own minds and the sacred authoritative truths which came to them by God's own prompting. They thus separated themselves from the false prophets who uttered the deceits of their own hearts. The whole fellowship of the prophets, whose activities extended over several centuries, made the same claim to inspiration. 'Thus saith the Lord,' or some equivalent expression, was the formula with which they habitually introduced their utterances. And on the fact of their own consciousness, the belief of their contemporaries, the unanimity of their testimony, the ethical quality of their teaching, and the beneficent results of their labours a strong foundation is laid for the truth of their assumption that they were the organs or instruments of the Most High.

'There is no alternative between accepting this belief as true and regarding it as a product of mental disease or delusion. But to bring such a charge, not against a few individuals but against the whole line of prophets from Moses or Samuel to Malachi, is a step from which most of us would shrink' (Sanday, *op. cit.* 304).

(*b*) In what sense and to what extent were the *historians of Israel* inspired? It is a remarkable fact that the books of the OT from Joshua to the end of Kings (Ruth excepted) are called 'the Former Prophets.' Historical criticism justifies this title, finding, as it does, that all the older historical writings were the work of men imbued with the prophetic spirit. That imbuement was their sole and sufficient inspiration. They had the double function of relating and interpreting events, and as narrators they were dependent upon the ordinary channels of information—folk-ballads, oral traditions, State annals, and the like. In their researches they were as liable as ordinary historians to fall into errors. Their inspiration did not fill up lacunæ in their knowledge of events. If their sources of information were good, their narratives were full and accurate, but not otherwise. It is evident that they sometimes glorified the institutions of which, as patriots, they were justly proud, and that they frequently idealized the past by reflecting upon it the beliefs and practices of a later time. The monuments of Assyria have shown how unreliable is their chronology. In the execution of the whole technical part of their work—the collecting, sorting, and combining of materials—the scientific historian of to-day finds many grounds for criticism. Yet their value remains unimpaired. It is by their insight into the true meaning of events, their interpretation of history, and the lessons which they educe from the past for the guidance of men in the present, that they demonstrate their prophetic inspiration. History as well as Nature was for them a book written by the hand of God, and their community of spirit with Him made it possible for them to read His secrets. The stories which they tell—often with astonishing dramatic power—might, if otherwise related, have done infinite mischief, but in the light of inspiration the annals of Israel's fortunes and misfortunes are so transfigured as to become the vehicles of spiritual and eternal truth for all men of all ages.

(*c*) If a measure of inspiration is also conceded to the *Pentateuch*, this cannot mean—except for the orthodox Jew—that the Torah is still authoritative in matters of conduct and worship. The ancient Rabbis considered that the highest degree of inspiration was necessary for the Law, a lower for the prophets, and only a small degree for the other Scriptures (called the *Kethûbhîm*, or Hagiographa). The 'Reform Judaism' of to-day, on the contrary, recognizes that the inspiration of the prophets excels that of the Law, and accordingly would like to see such a revision of the synagogal lectionaries as would do justice to the finest parts of the OT (C. G. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism*, London, 1903, p. 125; see, further, art. LIBERAL JUDAISM). Those elements of the Torah which have an intrinsic and permanent value—such as the humane provisions of Deuteronomy—are just the parts that embody the ideals of Prophetism, and, for the rest, the ritual of Judaism may be regarded as a sacred form without which the volatile spirit of true religion would perhaps have perished in Israel's days of tribulation and distress.

(*d*) The common origin of certain *Chaldæan and Biblical legends*—notably those of the Creation, the Fall, and the Flood—cannot be disputed; but, with all the apparent affinities, which are too close to be mere coincidences, the stories in Genesis display a remarkable difference, and the difference is the measure of their inspiration. The spirit of true religion penetrated the primitive traditions of the human race, purified them of their grossness and polytheism, and brought them into harmony with the ethical monotheism of the prophets of Israel.

(*e*) If one of the marks of a book's inspiration is its spiritual power over its readers, no part of the OT is more fully inspired than the *Psalter*, which was originally the hymn-book of the second Temple, and is now the world's chief classic of praise and prayer, giving lyric expression to every mood of religious feeling, every phase of spiritual life. Its authors were the successors of the prophets. It need not be denied that some of them had a primary inspiration, a direct and original insight into the things of God; but as a class they were poets and singers who assimilated the characteristic ideas of the prophets and applied them to all the varied relations of human life. The products of their secondary inspiration are certainly not inferior in practical value to those of prophecy. Expressing for every man the grief of repentance and the joy of forgiveness, the agitation of doubt and the serenity of faith, the agony of spiritual abandonment and the rapture of communion, the Psalter bears on the face of it the unmistakable stamp and sign of the Spirit of God. Not that every psalm is equally inspired, or that every sentiment can be endorsed by a Christian.

'We cannot and we do not mean that the passages which show an ignorance about the immortality of the soul, or the passages which breathe out cursings and threatenings against personal enemies, are in any sense whatever the words or the utterances of God' (R. F. Horton, *Inspiration and the Bible*, 224 f.).

(*f*) The inspiration of the *Wisdom literature*—Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes—is for the most part secondary. Impregnated with the ideas of a

religion whose first principle is the fear of the Lord, the writers apply their minds now to the ordinary questions of conduct in the household and in society, now to the world's ultimate enigmas of sin and suffering, of life and death, and nearly always as sages observing, reflecting, and even speculating, rather than as seers coming forth from God's immediate presence with authority to publish new truths in His name. Yet in some of the noblest passages of Job, where a great mind wrestling with deep and difficult problems is rewarded, if not with a satisfying solution, at least with glimpses of Divine greatness and goodness which make life's mystery bearable, and in such passages as the eighth chapter of Proverbs, where Wisdom is personified as God's Master-workman in creation, the inspiration may be regarded as primary.

(*g*) In the *Book of Esther*, whose canonicity was long disputed by the Rabbis, and which Protestant Christian theologians accepted only in deference to Jewish tradition, inspiration is at a minimum. A certain vague doctrine of providence is presupposed, but God's name is never mentioned in the story, and no spiritual interpretation is attempted, while the massacre over which the reader is invited to gloat sends him, by reaction, either to the critical verdict that one is here perusing romance and not history, or to the higher criticism of Marjory Fleming, 'But then Jesus was not then come to teach us to be merciful' (John Brown, *Horæ Subsecivæ*, Edinburgh, 1882, iii. 214). The *Song of Songs* is instinct with at least the highest *poetic* inspiration, and, though the allegorical interpretation which secured it a place in the Canon is regarded by Protestants as a mistake, it cannot but be welcomed on other grounds, such as its passionate delight in nature, its enthusiastic praise of a pure idyllic love strong as death and mightier than the grave.

To sum up: the old doctrine of the equal and infallible inspiration of every part of the OT, with its correlated doctrine of the absence of inspiration from every book outside the Hebrew canon, is now rapidly disappearing among Protestants. There is, in reality, no clear dividing line between what is and what is not worthy of a place in the Scriptures. If some of the books of the Apocrypha could be admitted into the canon, few would be found to object.

'It is out of the question to say that the Book of Esther is wholly filled with the Spirit of God and the Book of Wisdom wholly devoid of it. . . . Just as there is a descending scale within the Canon, there is an ascending scale outside it. Some of the books in our Apocrypha might well lay claim to a measure of inspiration' (Sanday, *op. cit.* 258 f.).

Further, our leading authority upon the Apocalyptic books finds in their contribution to the doctrine of immortality 'a genuine product of Jewish inspiration,' and in the ethics of some of them an advance upon the highest morality of the OT and a preparation for the Sermon on the Mount (R. H. Charles, *Eschatology*[2], London, 1913, pp. 179, 226 ff.).

6. In NT.—The writers of the NT were as conscious of their own inspiration as those of the OT. The apostles, like the Lord, spake with authority. They were not pedants like the scribes. Whether they used tongue or pen, they somehow knew that their minds were under the control of the Spirit of God. (*a*) *St. Paul's* claim to teach is based on a special call and a special endowment. The gospel which he preaches was not received from man, but came to him through the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1^{12}). He had no need to confer with flesh and blood. His inspiration was primary, immediate, and personal. Having drunk at the fountain-head, he affirms that he and others who share his inspiration speak 'not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Spirit teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual' (1 Co 2^{13}). Like the OT prophets, he can in general distinguish clearly between the revelations of God and his own opinions. After expressing his preference for the celibate life, he adds, 'and I think also that I have the Spirit of God' (1 Co 7^{40}). Evidently there is a borderland between inspiration and uninspiration, a region in which he has to tolerate, if he cannot welcome, difference of opinion, because the oracle is silent. On some important points—*e.g.* 'concerning virgins'—he has no commandment of the Lord, but can only offer his own judgment for what it is worth (v.^{25}). When he is about to give advice to the brother who has an unbelieving wife, or the woman who has an unbelieving husband, he is careful to premise that his counsel is based merely on his own sense of the fitness of things: 'But to the rest speak I, not the Lord' (v.$^{12f.}$). When, however, he admits that he speaks 'after the manner of men' (*ἀνθρώπινον λέγω*, *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω*, Ro 6^{19}, 1 Co 9^{8}, Gal 3^{15}), he implies that, unless he chooses to descend from a privileged position, he speaks and writes under a Divine influence to which most men are strangers.

(*b*) If the writers of the *other Epistles* do not directly refer to their inspiration, this is apparently because their authority has never, like St. Paul's, been questioned and resisted. When St. Peter, St. James, and St. Jude teach and command, warn and exhort, they expect to be believed and obeyed. St. John's claim to first-hand knowledge of Christ and His gospel is peculiarly impressive:

'That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life . . . declare we unto you' (1 Jn 1^{1-3}).

(*c*) The author of the *Apocalypse* makes a strong, explicit claim to inspiration. He is a prophet, and his book a prophecy (1^{3} $10^{7.11}$ $22^{6f.\ 9.\ 18f.}$). The things of God are revealed to him when he is 'in the Spirit' (1^{10} 4^{2} 17^{3} 21^{10}). His letter to each of the seven Churches is 'what the Spirit saith.'

(*d*) Like the OT historians, the *Evangelists* did not depend on inspiration for any of the facts which they wished to record.

The Prologue to the Gospel of St. Luke is in this relation singularly instructive. It indicates that a narrator required to be in touch with 'eye-witnesses, and ministers of the word,' and thus be able to trace the course of all things accurately from the first, before he could 'write in order.' Papias of Hierapolis indicates the source of St. Mark's information by saying that this evangelist, 'having become interpreter of St. Peter, wrote down, as far as he remembered accurately, the things said or done by Christ' (Eusebius, *HE* III. xxxix. 15).

Inspiration cannot, and there is no reason why it should, do the work of memory and research. It rather makes its presence felt in the spirit which was breathed into the evangelical narratives, and which is exhaled from them by the receptive reader. Two of the evangelists, according to tradition, were themselves apostles, and the other two belonged to the apostolic circles, St. Luke being the companion of St. Paul as St. Mark was of St. Peter. But behind all the narrators was the Spirit-filled Church, and many parts of the Gospels are doubtless not the composition of the evangelists themselves, but their transcripts from vivid traditions, first oral and then written, which had taken definite shape within the Church as the result of the apostles' own preaching and teaching. It may be assumed that the Logia of the Synoptic Gospels come, as a whole, directly from Christ Himself, whose words are the standard of the highest inspiration. While the Divine power which seized the OT prophets was intermittent, and even that which worked in the apostles was not without breaks and flaws, the inspiration of Jesus was continuous and perfect. His words are revelations which touch the common heart of mankind as no other utterances of human lips. He is

the incarnate Word, and no part of the Bible can be profitably used as a rule of faith and life until it proves itself to be in harmony with His Mind and Will.

7. Non-inspired Bible passages.—Tried by this standard, there are not a few passages in the Bible which cannot be regarded by Protestants as in any true sense inspired. Its sixty-six books certainly have not all the same measure of the Divine fire. Yet the old phrase 'the inspiration of the Bible' continues to have a real significance, which is thus expressed by Sanday:

'It may be hard to sum up our definition in a single formula, but we mean it to include all those concrete points in which as a matter of fact the Bible does differ from and does excel all other Sacred Books. . . . And if we are asked to define the measure of this special influence, we can see it reflected in that wide margin which remains when the common elements of the Biblical religion and other religions have been subtracted and that which is peculiar to the Bible is left' (*op. cit.* 128, 140).

8. Inspiration in the Church and individual.—The last matter is the bearing of the doctrine of inspiration upon the living Church and the individual believer. Every Christian is inspired in so far as he is enlightened and renewed by the Divine Spirit. It is sometimes maintained that there is a distinction in kind between the inspiration of the apostles and that of the ancient or modern Church. This is probably a mistake. The real distinction is one of degree rather than of kind. The inspiration of an apostle should be conceived as that of a common Christian raised to a higher power in proportion to his clearer vision of Christ, his closer fellowship with Christ, and his deeper devotion to Christ.

'This must be insisted on, that the inspiration of the NT writings is not due to the mysterious endowment of a few choice souls, but must be traced to the inspired life of Christian believers of greater or less intensity according to the moral and religious condition. If the Church of Christ to-day were as a whole cleansed and renewed, so that a like receptivity for the divine truth and grace were secured, who can doubt that the divine activity in the presence and power of the Spirit of God in man would once more be made manifest?' (A. E. Garvie, *A Handbook of Christian Apologetics*, London, 1913, p. 66).

LITERATURE.—W. Sanday, *Inspiration*[3], London, 1896; R. F. Horton, *Inspiration and the Bible*, do. 1888; C. A. Briggs, *The Bible, the Church, and the Reason*, Edinburgh, 1892; W. N. Clarke, *The Use of the Scriptures in Theology*, do. 1906; Marcus Dods, *The Bible, its Origin and Nature*, do. 1905; James Orr, *Revelation and Inspiration*, London, 1910; P. Gardner-Smith, 'Revelation,' in *The Parting of the Roads*, ed. F. J. F. Jackson, do. 1912, p. 328 ff.

J. STRAHAN.

INSPIRATION (Roman Catholic doctrine).—**1.** In ascertaining what is meant and must be understood by inspiration in Roman Catholic doctrine, we are helped by several dogmatic definitions issued at different times. For the Catholic these are documents of the greatest possible weight and authority, next to the texts of the Scriptures themselves, since they are accepted by all, within the Church, as pronouncements of an infallible authority. All are of a comparatively recent date—from which it is plain that the doctrine of inspiration remained for many centuries a universally recognized tradition, and that it was only later, under the pressure of accidental and historical circumstances, that it was considered necessary to crystallize it, partially at least, into a defined dogmatic form.

The date at which the first authentic doctrinal statement concerning the Scriptures was issued in the Church (at the Council of Toledo in 442)[1] is, accordingly, both comparatively late and comparatively early. The eighth anathema then formulated reads thus: 'Si quis dixerit vel crediderit, alterum Deum esse priscae Legis, alterum Evangeliorum, A. S.' (Denzinger, no. 28; cf. also no. 707). The obvious meaning of this declaration is that the one and only God whom the Christians adore reveals Himself in both Testaments alike, and that they are, therefore, of equally Divine authority. Several similar declarations were made later, at different times, explicitly stating the belief of the Church in the Divine authorship of the books of Scripture, for the detail and text of which H. Denzinger's *Enchiridion Symbolorum*[11] (Freiburg, 1911, nos. 348, 421, 464, etc.) may be consulted.

[1] Cf., however, Denzinger, nc. 19, note, where the *Libellus in modum Symboli* is tentatively ascribed to a Gallœcian bishop of about the middle of the 5th century.

The first definition, however, in which the doctrine of the Divine authorship is stated with use of the word 'inspiration' is the decree of the Council of Florence for the Jacobites (1441), in which we read (Denzinger, no. 706) that the Roman Church

'Unum atque eundem Deum Veteris et Novi Testamenti, hoc est, Legis et Prophetarum atque Evangelii profitetur auctorem: quoniam eodem *Spiritu Sancto inspirante* utriusque Testamenti Sancti locuti sunt.'

This decree evidently marks an important doctrinal advance, since it not only asserts, as a dogma of faith in regard to the Scriptures, the Divine authorship, but explicitly assigns inspiration as the peculiar mode by which it exercises itself. The same assertion was afterwards renewed by the Vatican Council in the following terms:

'Si quis sacras *Scripturas* libros integros cum omnibus suis partibus, prout illos sancta Tridentina Synodus recensuit, pro sacris et canonicis non susceperit aut eos divinitus inspiratos esse negaverit: A. S.' (Denzinger, no. 1809; for the Tridentine *Decretum de canonicis Scripturis*, see *ib.* no. 783 f.; cf. also the present Pontiff's condemnation of the Modernist assertion, 'Nimiam simplicitatem aut ignorantiam prae se ferunt, qui Deum credunt *vere esse Scripturae sacrae auctorem*' [*ib.* no. 2009]).

To the doctrine of the Divine authorship we find here added the important statement that inspiration must be held to extend to the books in their entirety and including all their parts. It remains, therefore, established as an undisputed dogma of the Catholic Church that God is the author of the Holy Scriptures through this peculiar mode of influence to which the Church gives the name, borrowed from the Vulgate,[1] of 'inspiration.'

2. The texts that we have quoted thus far establish the belief of the Church in the *fact* of inspiration. But, in order to understand what is meant by it, and what is the *nature* of the fact expressed by that name, we must have recourse to another doctrinal pronouncement—a definition of the Council of the Vatican, which is both very explicit and very guarded. After having once more re-asserted the Divine character of the books of the two Testaments enumerated by the Council of Trent and contained in the Vulgate, as extending to all their parts, the Vatican Council adds, by way of explanation:

'Eos vero [libros] Ecclesia pro sacris et canonicis habet, non ideo, quod sola humana industria concinnati, sua deinde auctoritate sint approbati; nec ideo dumtaxat, quod revelationem sine errore continent; sed propterea, quod *Spiritu Sancto inspirante conscripti Deum habent auctorem*' (Denzinger, no. 1787). It is plain, from this definition, that in the interpretation of what is meant by inspiration two hypotheses are excluded. The first is that of what has been called *subsequent* inspiration, a theory propounded in 1582 by the two Jesuits L. Lessius and J. du Hamel, in the following terms: 'Liber aliquis . . . humana industria, sine assistentia Spiritus Sancti scriptus, si postea Spiritus Sanctus testatur ibi nihil esse falsum, efficitur Scriptura Sacra.' Manifestly the Council rejects the notion of books which were originally human in authorship being raised, by a subsequent approbation, to the dignity of sacred Scriptures. The second hypothesis, which is also excluded by the above definition, is the theory held, at a later date, by another theologian, J. Bonfrère, and proposed by him in the following terms: 'Hoc modo potest Spiritus Sanctus scriptorem dirigere, ut in nullo eum errare fallive permittat; ita ei adstat ut sicubi videret eum erraturum, inspiratione sua illi esset adfuturus.' This way of conceiving inspiration makes it practically identical with the 'assistance' of the Holy Spirit which the Church understands to accompany the Supreme Pontiff in his *ex cathedra* definitions, both guiding and pre-

[1] Cf. 2 Ti 3[16] 'omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata' (*πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος*); 2 P 1[21] 'Spiritu sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines' (*ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι ἐλάλησαν ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι*).

serving him from error; but inspiration implies more than this. The meaning of the Council requires something of a higher order, something positive, not negative; antecedent, not concomitant, a motion *sui generis* by which man acts as an instrument, conscious and free, while God remains the primary and responsible author; or, as it has been very happily expressed by J. B. Franselin (*de Div. trad. et script.*[2], p. 234 f.), 'Deus est auctor Scripturae Sacrae per conscriptores humanos.'

If the formula of the Vatican Council implies this much and no more, inspiration is not necessarily either a mechanical, automatic performance, in which the Holy Spirit is the exclusive agent, and the human writer the mere material writing machine or 'penholder,' so to speak; nor is it necessarily a process of dictation, in which the writer acts simply as a scribe or registrar of *effata*, or oracles, in relation to which he is a mere conscious but passive recipient. On the contrary, the definition of the Council does not even require that the things thus inspired by the Holy Spirit should always have been new and revealed to the sacred writer. It may have been so, and in some cases at least the Council does not exclude such a possibility; it might very well not have been, and the Council says nothing about it.

3. If we seek now to form a theory in harmony with the definition of the Vatican Council, we can, by applying to the dogma of inspiration the old scholastic doctrine of the instrument, give a notion of it which will appear both very luminous and very consistent, although this is no longer a matter of faith, but merely a theological explanation. An instrument may be defined as a cause which receives its impulse and activity from a superior and principal agent, in virtue of which it produces the effect of that principal agent, but produces it according to its own peculiar mode of action. An instrument is bound to show the traces of its own particular, specific, or individual characteristics in the effect which it produces in virtue of the impulse of the principal cause. Assuming now that, in the case of inspiration, God is the principal cause, and man the instrument, an instrument of a conscious and free nature, we understand that man will act through the impulse of God, who supernaturally inclines his will and illumines his mind to enable it to grasp, conceive, and view such things as God desires and in the light in which God means the agent to do. Sometimes God might reveal to the mind of the writer new and hitherto unknown facts or doctrines; sometimes He might content Himself with inspiring him with regard to facts or things already previously known to him through natural means. At the same time we shall find no difficulty in understanding why the result of inspiration, viz. the sacred book of one writer, is very unlike the work of another equally inspired writer. The conscious and free 'instrument,' of which God makes use, retains his own individual characteristics, either congenital or acquired, his own temperament, culture, style, idiosyncrasies, etc., which will necessarily be reflected in his work. Hence the inspired writings of Isaiah must needs be unlike those of Jeremiah, the Gospel of Matthew unlike that of John, etc.

4. Such being the most accurate conception of the Catholic doctrine of inspiration—viz. that God is the moving agent and responsible author, and the sacred writer His free and conscious instrument—we are naturally led to inquire about the consequences that are likely to follow from such premisses. We have already seen, by referring to the definition of the Vatican Council, that all the books and all the parts of each book enumerated as canonical by the Council of Trent and contained in the Roman edition of the Vulgate are Divinely inspired. Hence, if a Catholic should convince himself, through critical researches, that the history of the adulteress, for instance, in the Gospel of John, or that the final chapter of the Gospel of Mark, cannot possibly have been written by the same authors as those Gospels themselves, he must nevertheless maintain that they are the work of some (other equally) inspired writer. But, if we grant, as we must in the Catholic Church, that inspiration extends to all the *books* and to all the *parts* of the books, it does not necessarily follow that we are bound to believe that all the *things* which we find referred to in them are, by that very fact, to be declared sacred, Divine, and God-appointed in themselves, so that God should be made answerable for every one of them; the definition of the Council, at least, does not say so. Accordingly, Catholic theologians are in the habit of distinguishing several classes of *things*, such as the teachings of faith and morals, the historical or scientific facts that may be known to the writer by natural means, the minor details or *obiter dicta*, the quotations, etc., and, finally, the words of the text themselves, and to inquire of each class separately whether they too are inspired.

The obvious cause for establishing such distinctions and separate inquiries is the difficulty often experienced, apparently at least, of reconciling some statements contained in the Scriptures with what seem to be the well authenticated and reasonably certain conclusions of modern science. The natural tendency of some theologians is to limit inspiration to such things (viz. dogmatic and moral teachings) as belong exclusively to the domain of revealed religion, getting rid of scientific or historical objections by asserting that inspiration does not extend to scientific or historical matters, even when they are touched upon in the Scriptures.

5. Previous, therefore, to entering upon the question whether inspiration extends to the various classes of things or facts that can be distinguished among the contents of the Scripture, it is advisable, first of all, to answer the often mooted and vexed question, Can there be any errors in Scripture? It is granted on all sides, and the concession has been officially recognized in the Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* of Pope Leo XIII., that, once committed to writing, the sacred text became subject to alterations and vicissitudes, analogous to those to which all books subject to repeated transcription are exposed; that, as a consequence, some errors foreign to the original slipped into the copies through the mistakes of the transcribers, or otherwise. The original text itself might even contain such expressions or modes of speech as a fastidious and scientifically trained mind might consider not strictly and rigorously accurate from a scientific point of view, since the authors themselves saw no reason for departing from the modes of speech that were prevalent at the time, lest they might uselessly arouse controversies foreign to their main object by ostentatiously discarding the received notions in the minds of their hearers in non-religious matters. Every one nowadays will grant this. The question, however, remains, and must be solved, Can any inspired writer ever utter a false statement or perpetuate a positive error?

The older theologians for whom the problem did not exist, and those modern theologians who apparently do not suspect that the question exists, used to decide the question by simply answering in the words of Thomas Aquinas (*Sum. Theol.*, prima pars, qu. I. art. 10, ad 3): 'Patet quod sensui litterali sacrae Scripturae numquam potest subesse falsum.' The sacred text, giving expression to an utterance of the first truth, can contain no error, since God can neither deceive nor be mistaken. Other theologians, however, for whom the problem does exist, have often endeavoured to modify in a more or less subtle way the rigour

of the Thomistic axiom, while, of course, claiming to remain, both at heart and in word, perfectly orthodox.

As it would be tedious to enter upon a detailed historical account of the various phases of the question, we shall content ourselves with recalling a simple distinction, in which, in our opinion, might be found a means of conciliation between the opposing parties. If and whenever it is the manifest intention of a sacred author authoritatively to teach us a fact, however slight or unimportant, in any department whatsoever, the principle of Thomas Aquinas must find its full and irresistible application. Thus, to use a comparison of Thomas Aquinas himself, if it should be definitely the intention of the Scripture to teach us authoritatively that Samuel was really the son of Elkanah, it is impossible that the statement should be erroneous, and that Samuel should have been in reality the son of another. There are, however, obviously many cases when such an intention is absent, and can be introduced only by arbitrarily forcing one's private view on the text; the author writes in conformity with received historical or scientific views, which are evidently immaterial to his purpose. Who could, for instance, without assuming to himself the rôle of an authoritative interpreter of the mind of the sacred writer, maintain that the latter certainly meant to teach us that, at the battle of Gibeon, the sun itself stood still in the heavens in the literal sense of the words, and that any other interpretation of the text is positively excluded?

Briefly, to assert in an absolute manner that error is compatible with inspiration in the mind of the sacred writer is to adopt a position which most Catholic theologians would characterize as 'erroneous' or 'errori proxima,' as being indirectly opposed to the Catholic dogma of inspiration.[1] To maintain, on the other hand, that every statement in the Scripture must be taken as strictly accurate in the literal sense in which it appeared in the original text seems unnecessary, besides being out of harmony with many clearly established and well authenticated facts.

It will be enough to note here, by the way, that no one nowadays thinks of claiming inspiration for any of the versions of Scripture, either the Septuagint or any other; and, indeed, the decree of the Council of Trent declaring the Vulgate of St. Jerome 'authentic' (*pro authentica habeatur*) means only that, being sufficiently accurate for the purposes of Catholic theology, it is adopted by the Catholic Church as its official version.

6. The question of the compatibility of inspiration with error being thus disposed of by denying the possibility of any falsehood being authoritatively asserted in the Scripture, even by mistake, it becomes comparatively easy to answer the various questions raised concerning the extension of inspiration to the various classes of subjects contained in the Scripture. There is really no necessity for any classification whatsoever. Everything that is contained in the sacred books—be it dogma, moral precept, historical statement, quotation, or the words themselves—was clearly selected and put there by a mind under the actual influence of inspiration. Inspiration, therefore, must be understood as extending to everything; for why, indeed, ought it to have stopped short at anything in the sacred text?

Leaving out of account the desire to avoid imputing to the Holy Spirit a certain number of supposed erroneous statements in matters not strictly religious — a desire which apparently haunts some minds—there is no class of things contained in the Scripture to which there is any apparent reason to deny the benefit of the influence of inspiration, except perhaps the words themselves, those material particles, so to speak, of which the text is composed. Verbal inspiration, indeed, is denied by a large number of theologians, but mainly on two grounds: (1) it seems impossible, on that hypothesis, to account for the diversity of style, which is so marked between two different authors; (2) because most theologians are averse to the notion of dictation, which they consider inseparable from that of verbal inspiration. But, for any one who has read and understood our exposition of the theory of the instrument, as applied to the case of inspiration, those difficulties do not exist. Inspiration is the same in all sacred writers, in kind at least; but its result, the style and wording of the Divine oracles, ought nevertheless to be different, owing to the natural differences that exist between the various free and conscious instruments. An Isaiah and a Jeremiah, a Matthew and a John, write under the same pervading Divine influence, but each one in his own natural way, *modo proprio*. Moreover, the same theory has nothing in common with the conception of a dictation of God to the sacred writer. For to inspire is to illumine, and to illumine is not to dictate. Instead, therefore, of conceiving of a kind of diminished inspiration, stopping short at the selection of the words, we ought to conceive of a supernatural influence full and one, pervading the sacred writing throughout, and casting its Divine splendour on everything contained in it, even the most minute particles of the sacred text. There is no necessity to assume that inspiration enlightened the mind of the sacred writer in regard to his thoughts only, but abandoned him to his own natural industry when endeavouring to give literary utterance to his Divinely inspired conceptions.

[1] The recent condemnation of the Modernist proposition that 'Inspiratio divina non ita ad totam Scripturam sacram extenditur, ut omnes et singulas eius partes ab omni errore praemuniat' expressly reproves that opinion (Denzinger, no. 2011; the pronouncement of the Commissio Biblica of 23rd June 1905 may also be consulted in this connexion (*ib.* no. 1980)).

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INSPIRATION (Hindu).—Indian authorities and scholars in their references to the Hindu writings draw a clearly marked distinction between Scripture, revealed and inspired, and other compositions which, however great their antiquity and worth, have, in their judgment and in accordance with the verdict of tradition, no valid claim to divine inspiration, or to direct derivation from a superhuman source. The former are *śruti*, that which is heard, the human ear receiving the divine voice, and communicating its message direct to men by the pen or by oral teaching. The latter are *smṛti*, that which is stored up in the mind, learning acquired by observation and study, which is then delivered as the ripe fruit of human intelligence and application, moulded and fashioned at the writer's will, and presented as the reasoned conclusions of his meditation and thought. The writings known as *smṛti*, therefore, however choice their theme and style, or however high the regard in which they are held, occupy an entirely subordinate position of authority. They furnish no proof-texts, and, great as their popularity may be, they may not in a formal and strict sense be drawn upon for the establishment of rule and doctrine. The theory formulated with regard to *śruti*, on the other hand, assumed and taught a doctrine of literal and verbal inspiration, as consistent and exacting as has elsewhere ever been conceived. In practice the line was not seldom overstepped, especially in regard to works which appealed to the general taste and inclination, and enjoyed in consequence a wide popularity. In many instances these gained and retained a hold upon the allegiance and affections of the people, and especially of the non-priestly classes, which lay entirely outside of any theory or dogma of inspiration limited in its application to certain books and to these alone. The volume of *śruti*, however, was absolutely closed, and was incapable of either addition or diminution.

The language also that is employed with regard

to the Vedas is sufficiently definite to remove all doubt as to the religious estimate which the writers themselves placed upon them. For, although in certain passages a degree of inspiration appears to be claimed for other and later works, yet in more formal doctrine and practice the distinction was always observed between the Vedic writings which possessed authority as *śruti* and other compositions, in the production of which the mind and skill of man played the predominant part. Thus in *Brhad. Up.* II. iv. 10 it is said that the Rigveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvāṅgirasas, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, and other works have been breathed forth from Brahman alone. The same theory is expounded elsewhere in the same Upaniṣad, not always with an identical enumeration of texts.[1] A definite doctrine of inspiration is assumed and stated, *e.g.*, by Rāmānuja on Vedāntasūtras, II. ii. 43: 'the Veda . . . on account of its non-human character, is raised above all suspicion of error and other imperfections';[2] and the Veda, therefore, is the final authority and court of appeal on all questions of teaching and interpretation. The epithets applied to the Veda appear to be intended to convey the same idea, *e.g.* 'imperishable,'[3] 'eternal,'[4] etc. And the most comprehensive and profound teaching is enunciated when the Veda, or the syllable *Om*, which is the beginning and the end of the Veda, is identified with Brahman.[5] The same thought also is poetically expressed when it is elsewhere said that the deity is resident in the sacred text.[6]

A further indication of the sacred character attached to the Vedic writings was the elaborate provision made in the schools for the exact preservation of the letter of the text. Apparently each of the schools had its own traditional recension, of which the members of the school were jointly and severally in charge, and which it was their office and duty faithfully to bear in mind, and to communicate orally to their disciples. The Vedic texts, therefore, were committed to memory by all; and the precise and perpetual recitation of them was their safeguard, and a sufficient check against alteration even in the least detail of the accepted order and form of words. Moreover, as an additional precaution against accidental variation, the sacred text was learnt and recited not only directly, but also according to a method known as *kramapāṭha*, or 'serial reading,' in which each word was repeated twice in progressive order, with the preceding and also with the succeeding word. An extension of the same method, which further illustrates the anxious care with which it was sought to secure the *ipsissima verba* of the sacred text, was the *jaṭāpāṭha*, 'twisted' or 'inverted reading,' in which each successive pair of words was repeated three times, in one instance in inverted order. Moreover, the verses and words of the hymns were laboriously counted, and the records preserved in the works of the Sanskrit grammarians; these numbers are found to be in agreement with the extant texts. It was in harmony also with this conception of the peculiarly sacred character of these writings that the communication of them to Śūdras, or out-castes, was strictly forbidden.[7] They were the heritage and possession of the 'twice-born,' and might not be carried beyond the circle of the elect, lest defilement in any form should reach them. Parallel instances to this scrupulous limitation of the circulation of a sacred book or books are numerous among other peoples. A *sūtra* of the Vedānta prohibits to Śūdras the hearing or studying of the Veda.[1]

Further, it would appear that the method of revelation, as it was conceived by the Hindu authors themselves, and the descriptive terms employed with regard to it were intended to imply the same sacred and inviolable character of the text. The *ṛṣis*, the ancient poets and seers of the Vedic hymns, are said to have 'seen' (*dṛś*) the sacred texts which they then conveyed to men. Although in some instances they claim in so many words to have been the authors of the hymns which bear their names, the claim is disallowed, as far as the play of individual character is concerned, or the application of human intelligence and skill. Their part is limited to that of exact recorders of a message in the ordering of which they have no share, as regards either subject-matter or form. Their merit is that of faithful transmission of the words and teaching which the eye 'saw.'[2] No doubt the language employed is to a very considerable extent figurative and metaphorical. The 'eye' is the eye of the mind. The figure, however, in harmony with the universal tendency of thought and language, became obscured, and was literally interpreted. The mental or spiritual vision was transformed into a real 'seeing' of the actual letters and words, presented to the eye in material form. It is not improbable also that to the mystical meditative temperament of India a strong capacity for visualizing the creations of the mind may have played a considerable part in the elaboration of the metaphor, and have contributed not a little to its ready acceptance and popularity.

Moreover, in India and, it may be said, to the Eastern mind in general, inspiration is much more a matter of men than of books or of the written word. The Veda was regarded, indeed, as the source and spring of all knowledge, and the teaching which it conveyed was the final and infallible standard of practice and belief. Even so, however, the veneration with which the Vedic text was regarded by the people as a whole hardly equalled the strict and anxious care with which the Jewish Rabbis erected a 'hedge' about their Law. In part this was due to the fact that the sacred writings were so jealously guarded by the Brāhmans, and screened from profane knowledge, that to the great majority of the Hindus they were and always have been invested with attributes of distance and mystery rather than accepted and known as a guiding presence and authority in the life. The *theory* of the inspiration and inerrancy of the scriptures was universally taught and received, being denied only by the *nāstikas*, the atheists

[1] *Brhad. Up.* IV. v. 11; cf. Śaṅkara on *Vedāntasūtras*, I. i. 3, a text which he interprets to mean that Brahman is the source of Scripture, the latter being defined as consisting of the Rigveda and other Vedas, with the works subsidiary to them.

[2] Cf. *SBE* xlviii. [1904] 485, 478 f., 529 f.

[3] *Śatap. Br.* X. iv. 1. 9.

[4] Manu, iii. 284, *purātanī*, rendered 'eternal' by G. Bühler (*SBE* xxv. [1886] 127), but perhaps connoting rather high antiquity, and the dignity and authority which the texts accordingly were believed to possess.

[5] Baudhāyana, II. x. 17. 40, IV. i. 26; cf. Vasiṣṭha, xxv. 10.

[6] 'I [Lakṣmi] reside . . . in the sound of the Veda' (*Inst. of Viṣṇu*, xcix. 14 f.).

[7] *e.g.*, 'The Veda must not be recited in the presence of a Śūdra' (*Vasiṣṭha*, xviii. 12); 'Let him not recite (the texts) indistinctly, nor in the presence of Śūdras' (Manu, iv. 99).

[1] *Vedāntasūtras*, I. iii. 39; cf. Śaṅkara's comment and citation of passages (*SBE* xxxiv. [1890] 228 f.).

[2] Cf. Manu, xi. 244: 'the sages . . . obtained (the revelation of) the Vedas through their austerities'; and *ib.* 234. Śaṅkara (on *Vedāntasūtras*, I. iii. 30) quotes the authority of earlier writers that the ten books of the Rigveda were 'seen' by the ancient *ṛṣis*; and elsewhere asserts the same of the *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* portion of the Veda (on I. iii. 34). Rāmānuja seems to make an attempt to combine the theory of inerrancy with a natural belief in the effective authorship of the poets: 'The eternity of the Veda admits of being reconciled with what scripture says about the mantras and kāṇḍas of the sacred text having "makers,"

or infidels, whose influence appears at no time to have been wide-spread, or their numbers considerable. But its practical effect upon the everyday thought and experience of the Hindu was slight. Like the books themselves, it was the doctrine and possession of a learned class. And, although theoretically acknowledged and accepted by all, it was in reality little in touch with the needs and movements of everyday life.

It was entirely otherwise with the belief in the inspiration and authority of the teacher, the man upon whom the spirit of the god had descended, and whose utterances, like his actions and person, were invested with the sanction and force of the divine. It would be difficult to indicate any one doctrine or belief which has had a more profound influence on the habits and character of the Indian peoples. Beginning with the *ṛṣis* themselves, and passing down through a long series of deified men, among whom the *guru*, the teacher, has in India always occupied the most important place, the doctrine of the direct inspiration of the individual has never ceased to be an effective and influential article of faith. The repeated incarnations of the gods bear witness to the same tendencies of thought and belief. And, although modern conditions of life, and the forms under which modern education is being conveyed, are gradually and perhaps inevitably undermining and destroying the ancient reverential habit of thought and life, it will be long before the Hindu affection deserts its ancient ideals, or regards as other than unwelcome a new theory of life, which minimizes the spiritual element in the heart and character of the individual.[1]

These numerous incarnations of the gods, and the readiness with which men or women endowed with unusual qualities or an attractive and dominating personality are deified, are evidence of similar characteristics of thought. The high-priests of the different sects, in their formal visitations of the districts under their charge for purposes of pastoral oversight and confirmation of the young men, journey in state and are greeted by all with a reverence which implies the assumption of divine or semi-divine rank. Their persons and utterances are inspired; their touch confers happiness and deliverance from the bondage of evil. In a similar manner the recognition of authority concentrated in the hands of an individual, whether European or Indian, is separated by a very narrow line in the thought of the Hindu from a belief in definite inspiration by the deity, who in greater or less fullness has taken up his abode within, and thus manifests his presence and power. The experience of any Englishman who has come into real touch with the mind and heart of the Indian would furnish many instances of the facility with which exceptional or unfamiliar gifts and powers are set down to the credit of a supernatural afflatus which for the time being, or permanently, confers upon the man the rights and dignity of a god.

To the Hindu, therefore, the conception of an inspired personality or an inspired book is perfectly natural. In neither case would the affirmation of inspiration suggest doubt, or the necessity of an inquiry into the validity of the claim advanced or the possibility of the fact asserted. The disposition would rather be in favour of its acceptance as part of the natural order of things. It is regarded as not improbable, it is even looked upon as highly probable, that the god will thus communicate his will and make known his ways. The burden of proof lies with those who deny. And this disposition or tone of mind is part of the larger bias and tendency of the Eastern nature, which, for whatever reason, seems to live in closer touch with the realities of the unseen and the spiritual than the more practical and unemotional mind of the West.

[1] The conception is illustrated, *e.g.*, by Manu, iv. 182: 'The teacher is the lord of the world of Brahman'; ii. 233: 'By obedience to his teacher [the student gains] the world of Brahman'; cf. ii. 144–154, *Inst. of Viṣṇu*, xxxi. 10, etc., *Āpast.* i. iv. 14. 7: 'The feet of all Gurus must be embraced (every day) by a student who has returned home.'

LITERATURE.—See artt. GOD (Hindu), HINDUISM.

A. S. GEDEN.

INSPIRATION (Muslim).—Inspiration may come to a prophet in an external form, and consist of the very words which God wishes him to give forth as the divine message. This is called *waḥī ẓāhir*, 'external inspiration.' It is the highest form of inspiration, in the opinion of Muhammadans, and was used for the production of the Qur'ān. The mind of Muhammad was passive, and the message, an external one, was brought to him by Gabriel. A somewhat lower form of this is called *ishārat al-malak*, 'the sign of the angel.' Muhammad refers to this when he says: 'The Holy Ghost has entered into my heart,' that is, the inspiration came through Gabriel, but not orally. The other term is *ilhām*, which means the saint or prophet using his mental powers and, under divine guidance, giving forth the message of God, though not in the very words of God.

The recipient knows the medium, *i.e.* the angel, by which he receives the information. This is *waḥi*, the inspiration of prophets, the inspiration of the Qur'ān. The recipient receives information from an unknown source and in an unknown way. This is the inspiration of saints and mystics. It is called *ilhām*. The difference between *waḥi* and *ilhām* is that in the former an angel is the medium of communication, and in the latter he is not. It comes direct to the mind of the Prophet (see al-Ghazālī in the *Mudāq al-Arifin*, an Urdu tr. of the *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm ad-Dīn*, Lucknow, 1873, iii. 30).

Some theologians hold that, whilst the Qur'ān was revealed by the *waḥi* method, the teaching of the Prophet as recorded in the traditions was by the *ilhām* mode; that is, the traditions are a real revelation and convey divine injunctions, only the mode was different. Others hold that even the traditions were of *waḥī* authority, and ash-Shahrastānī speaks of 'the sayings of the Prophet which have the marks of wahi' (quoted in *Dābistān*, ed. Bombay, A.H. 1242 [A.D. 1826], p. 21). In support of this view this verse is quoted:

'By the star when it setteth, your companion Muhammad erreth not, nor is led astray, neither doth he speak of his own will. It is none other than a revelation which hath been revealed to him' (Qur'ān liii. 1).

The latter part seems to refer to the Qur'ān, but the former distinctly asserts that he was rightly guided either by the *waḥī* or by the *ilhām* mode of inspiration, and so all his words and actions form a rule of faith called the *Sunna*, which all Muslims must accept, for they were said and done under the constant influence of a divine inspiration.

The revelation given to Moses is thus described in the Qur'ān.

'We wrote for him upon the tables a monition concerning every matter, and said, "Receive them thyself with steadfastness, and command thy people to receive them for the observance of its most goodly precepts"' (vii. 142).

This equally describes the inspiration of the Qur'ān. The Muhammadan cannot conceive that there can be a human as well as a divine side to inspiration. This is clearly stated in the verse in which Muhammad is directed to disclaim any knowledge apart from the words revealed:

'Say: I say not to you, "In my possession are the treasures of God"; neither say I, "I know things secret"; neither do I say to you, "Verily, I am an angel"; only what is revealed to me do I follow' (vi. 50).

The Qur'ān, then, comes direct from God. The word 'say' is either expressed or implied before each sentence. This to the Muslim mind is its highest perfection. It is verbal inspiration in its most extreme form. The Christian view of inspiration—the divine mind working through the human consciousness—is considered to be very

inferior, and any book so revealed to be altogether on a lower plane.

Thus, Ibn Khaldūn says:

'Of all the divine books, the Qur'ān is the only one of which the text, words, and phrases have been communicated to the Prophet by an audible voice' (*Prolégomènes*, tr. de Slane, i. 196).

This is the universal belief, and it shows how mechanical is the Muslim view of inspiration. The Qur'ān, both as to matter and as to form, is all of God; but the mode in which it was revealed varied. It is only once clearly stated in the Qur'an that Gabriel was the medium of communication:

'Say, "whoso is the enemy of Gabriel?" For he it is who by God's leave hath caused the Qur'ān to descend on thy heart' (ii. 91).

Other passages, though they do not mention Gabriel by name, are generally believed to refer to him.

'The faithful spirit hath come down with it' (xxvi. 192); 'one terrible in power taught it to him' (liii. 5); 'the Holy Spirit hath brought it down with truth from thy Lord' (xvi. 104).

Tradition, however, is very clear on the point that Gabriel was the medium. Sometimes a brightness surrounded the Prophet, out of which Gabriel delivered his message; sometimes the angel appeared in the form of a man called Duḥiyya, one of the Companions of the Prophet, renowned for his beauty. This statement is supported by the verse:

'And if we had appointed an angel, we should certainly have appointed one in the form of a man' (vi. 9).

When the revelation was one of denunciation or a prediction of woe, the angelic nature of Gabriel overcame the nature of Muhammad, who was then transported to the angelic world; when the message was one of comfort and consolation, the angel, in the form of a man, delivered his message. Gabriel sometimes made his message known through the tinkling of a bell, a mode of operation which had a most disquieting effect on the Prophet. His body became agitated, and even on a cold day the perspiration rolled off him. His countenance bore witness to the agitation of his mind. If riding, the camel on which he sat would fall to the ground.

Zaid said: 'One day when God sent *waḥy* on the Prophet, his thigh was on mine, but it became so heavy that I feared mine would be broken' (*Ṣaḥīḥu'l-Bukhārī*, 'Kitāb aṣ-Ṣalat,' Leyden, 1862–68, i. 105).

Gabriel sometimes, without appearing in person, so influenced the mind of the Prophet that what he spoke was a divine message. This is *ilhām*, the inspiration of the traditions.

On the occasion of the night journey to heaven, 'great mysteries and numerous conversations took place' (Mirkhond's *Rauḍat aṣ-Ṣafā*, Ras, 1893, II. i. 211). God is said to have spoken to the Prophet directly, though whether with face veiled or not is a matter of doubt. God sometimes appeared to the Prophet in a dream and made known His will. On two occasions angels, each having six hundred wings, appeared and brought the message (for other accounts see *Rauḍat aṣ-Ṣafā*, II. i. 135–148).

The seasons when it came were usually periods of anxiety and care. His countenance changed; his fear seemed uncontrollable. This terrifying effect of inspiration is shown in the verse:

'The best of recitals hath God sent down, a book in unison with itself and teaching by repetition. The very skins of those who fear their Lord do creep at it' (xxxix. 24).

The fear caused to men is not to be wondered at when it is believed that in heaven the effect of it is that angels become senseless and that Gabriel is the first to return to consciousness (*Khulāṣat at-Tafāsīr*, Lucknow, A.H. 1311 [A.D. 1893], iv. 75). The revelation of *sūras* xi., lvi., and ci., known as the '*sūras* of terror,' turned the hair of the Prophet grey.

Ibn Khaldūn thus describes inspiration.

After stating that some souls cannot attain to a perception of spiritual truth, and that others can enter into a state of contemplation and ecstasy, which is the intuition of the saints, he goes on to speak of those whose souls can rise from the human body to the angelic state and there hear the divine voice. Such are the souls of the prophets. God has given them the power of leaving the human body and, when so separated from it, they receive His revelations, which, when they return from the spiritual world, they make known to men. The journey to and the journey from the angelic world and the comprehension of the message received occupy less time than the twinkling of an eye. This is why inspiration is called *waḥy*, which, according to Ibn Khaldūn, means 'to make haste' (*Prolégomènes*, i. 196–205, quoted in full in Sell, *Faith of Islām*[3], p. 242 f.).

The orthodox view is that a prophet knows all things without having received previous instruction, that he gives information regarding the past and the future, otherwise than by analogical reasoning, and that he is superior to other human beings, as he has communion with the angelic world.

The sacred month of Ramaḍān has been specially selected as the time for the descent of divine books: on the first day the book of Abraham, on the sixth the book of Moses, on the thirteenth the Gospel, and on the twenty-seventh the *Lailat al-Qadr*, or 'Night of Power,' the Qur'ān which then came complete to the 'House of Glory,' situated in the lowest of the seven heavens, from which, as occasion required, portions were brought by Gabriel and revealed to Muhammad: 'Verily we have caused it [the Qur'an] to descend on the Night of Power' (xcvii. 1 ff.). This is the blessed night, the night 'better than a thousand months,' the night 'which bringeth peace and blessings to the rosy dawn' (*ib.*).

Some suppose that the first revelation was 'Warn thy relatives of nearer kin' (xxvi. 214), but the objection to this opinion is that the words of the context, 'kindly lower thy wing over the faithful who follow thee' (*ib.* 215), and 'who seest thee when thou standest at prayer and thy demeanour among those who worship' (218 f.), presuppose the existence of a small Muslim community. There are other objections also connected with the style and use of words in this chapter which show that it must be a later one.

The general view, then, may be accepted as correct, which is that, when in the cave at Ḥira, a little distance from Mecca, the Prophet heard a voice calling on him to recite the opening words of the *sūra* xcvi. Tradition has surrounded the event with many marvels. The following is a condensed account of the narrative concerning the inspiration of the Prophet given in Mirkhond's *Rauḍat aṣ-Ṣafā* (II. i. 140).

The Prophet was sleeping in the cave of Ḥira when Gabriel made his appearance in the form of a man, and said, 'Read.' But his Lordship answered, 'I am not a reader.' Then Gabriel squeezed him so hard that he thought his end was near; but the angel again said 'Read,' and received the same answer. Having again given the command, Gabriel said: 'Recite thou in the name of thy Lord, who created man from clots of blood. Recite thou! For thy Lord is the most Beneficent, who hath taught the use of the pen; hath taught man that which he knoweth not' (Qur'an, xcvi. 1–4). The first squeezing purified his august nature from all concupiscence; the second, from all sinful desires. Though free from all ignominious qualities, his purification was necessary to divest his heart from all human failings and to prepare it for the reception of divine revelation. His terror was so great that he meditated suicide, but Gabriel called out: 'Thou art the Apostle of Allāh and I am Gabriel.'

Another account is that, when the third call was made, Gabriel struck his foot on the ground, and a spring of water gushed out. He then performed the ablutions before prayer and taught Muhammad to do the same, after which they said the *namāz*, or stated prayers. When the Prophet was terrified at the appearance of Gabriel, whose feet were yellow and his wings green, and between whose eyes the words were written, 'There is no God but Allāh, and Muhammad is the apostle of Allāh,' Gabriel comforted him by saying that he was the messenger of God to prophets. When Muhammad said that he could not read, Gabriel took from beneath his wing a piece of the silk of Paradise, embroidered with pearls and gems, and threw it on his blessed face.

All this very much alarmed the Prophet. He hastened home, and Khadija, his wife, said: 'I perceive a light in thy countenance, the like of which I have never beheld'; but in terror he lay down in a paroxysm of fear. When he recovered, he said, 'O Khadija, I have become a soothsayer or mad.' She replied, 'God will not surely let such a thing happen to thee, for thou speakest the truth, dost not return evil for evil, keepest faith, art of a good life, kind to thy relatives and friends. Hast thou seen aught terrible?' He then told her what had happened, whereupon she said: 'Rejoice, dear husband, and be of good cheer. He in whose hands stands Khadija's life is my witness that thou wilt be the Prophet of His people' (*Literary Remains*

of Emmanuel Deutsch, London, 1874, p. 77). She then went to Waraqa, one of the Ḥanīfs, and told him that Gabriel had appeared to Muḥammad. He assured her that great benefits and blessings would follow from this (see *Rauḍat aṣ-Ṣafā*, II. i. 146).

Then, for a while, the revelations ceased, and the mind of Muḥammad was much disturbed thereby. He doubted the reality of his call and became so melancholy that he sought to put an end to his life. On such occasions Gabriel appeared and strengthened him in the belief that he was to be the apostle of God, and so gave him comfort. A tradition states that Khadīja, alarmed at his state, not only wrapped him up, but sprinkled cold water upon him, which seems to show that he had a fit (*Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ*, Madras, A.H. 1274 [A.D. 1857], p. 846). Bukhārī relates how on one such occasion he saw the angel seated on a throne midway between heaven and earth. Alarmed, he hastened home and said to his wife: 'Cover me with a cloth.' Then God revealed to him *sūra* lxxiv., beginning 'O thou, enwrapped in thy mantle, arise and warn' (*Ṣaḥīḥu'l-Bukhārī*, i. 2). This became the first of a continued series of revelations. The period of suspense—the *fatrah*—was now over. Henceforth there was no intermission in the revelations, which came with remarkable aptness to time and circumstance for the rest of his life.

The doctrine of *waḥī*, the inspiration of the Qur'ān, is closely connected with the attribute of God, called *kalām*, 'word,' or 'speech,' and concerning which there was a long and bitter conflict between the Mu'tazilite and the orthodox section of the Muslims. It ranged round the great dispute as to whether the attributes of God were eternal or not. The orthodox belief is that the Qur'ān was written from all eternity on the Preserved Table.

'The unbounded reverence of the Muslims for the Qur'ān reaches its climax in the dogma (which appeared at an early date through the influence of the Christian doctrine of the eternal Word of God) that the Book, as the divine word, *i.e.* thought, is immanent in God, and consequently eternal and uncreated' (T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, p. 58).

This view has been well stated by D. B. Macdonald:

'There had grown up very early in the Muslim community an unbounded reverence and awe in the presence of the Qur'an. In it God speaks, addressing His servant, the Prophet; the words, with few exceptions, are direct words of God. It is, therefore, easily intelligible that it came to be called the word of God (*kalam Allah*). But Muslim piety went further and held that it was uncreated and had existed from all eternity with God. Whatever proofs of this doctrine may have been brought forward later from the Qur'an itself, we can have no difficulty in recognizing that it is plainly derived from the Christian Logos and that the Greek Church, perhaps through John of Damascus, has again played a formative part. So, in correspondence with the heavenly and uncreated Logos in the bosom of the Father, there stands this uncreated and eternal Word of God; to the earthly manifestation in Jesus corresponds the Qur'an, the Word of God which we read and recite. The one is not the same as the other, but the idea to be gained from the expressions of the one is equivalent to the idea which we would gain from the other, if the veil of the flesh were removed from us and the spiritual world revealed' (*Development of Muslim Theology*, p. 140).

It is interesting to notice how, right in the heart of the Islāmic system, there is such a near approach to a great truth, and how, in rejecting the Incarnate Word, the eternal Son of God, Muslims have accepted instead the dead letter of a book.

The history of the development of the Qur'ān and of its exegesis lies outside the scope of this article; and so it only remains to state the various views on *kalām*, 'the word,' so far as they are connected with the question of inspiration (see, further, art. KALĀM). The orthodox view of *kalām*, one of the attributes of God, is that

God 'speaks, but not with a tongue as men do. He speaks to some of His servants without the intervention of another, even as He spoke to Moses, and to Muḥammad on the night of the ascension to heaven. He speaks to others by the instrumentality of Gabriel, and this is the usual way in which He communicates His will to the prophets. It follows from this that the Qur'ān is the word of God, and is eternal and uncreated' (Muḥammad al-Birkawī, quoted in Sell, *Faith of Islām*[2], p. 187).

The speech (*kalām*), then, that is necessary to God is not the glorious expressions revealed to the Prophet, because these are originated, and the quality that subsists in the essence of God is eternal. Both the glorious expressions and the eternal quality are called the Word of God; but the former are created and written in the Preserved Table, from which on the Night of Decree they were brought to the lowest heaven, and thence were revealed to the Prophet.

These are the views held by the Sunnī Muslims. They were earnestly opposed by the Mu'tazilites, who deny the eternity of the Qur'ān on the following grounds. It is written in Arabic, it descended to earth, and is written and read. Events are described in the past tense, whereas, if the Qur'ān existed before all time, the future tense would have been used; it contains commands and prohibitions; who, then, were commanded, and who were prohibited? If it existed from eternity past, it will exist till eternity future, and so in the next world its laws will be incumbent on men who must perform the same religious ceremonies as they do now; if it is eternal, then there are two eternals, God and the Word, which would destroy the Unity of the Divine Being. If it is said that it is speech only which is eternal, and not the word and sounds, then how can there be speech without sound? To the latter objection the Sunnīs reply that a man's thoughts are a kind of speech without sound. It is true that, as man's thought is originated, it cannot be compared to God's speech, which is eternal; yet the illustration is good as far as it goes to show that speech does not necessarily need sound.

The Mu'tazilites produced such texts as 'Verily we have made it an Arabic Qur'ān' (xii. 2, xiii. 37, xx. 112, xxxix. 29, xli. 2, xlii. 5, xliii. 2). Now, what God made He created, as it is said: 'Who hath created the heavens and the earth' (vi. 1). To which the reply is made: 'Are not the creation and the command His?' (vii. 52). Here there is a difference between the creation and the command, and, inasmuch as the command 'Be' creates, it cannot itself be created, and is, therefore, eternal. Some of the 'Abbāsid Khalīfs of Baghdād were supporters of the Mu'tazilites, and the Khalīf Ma'mūn in the year 212 A.H. issued a decree declaring that all who asserted that the Qur'ān was eternal were heretics. A little later on the Khalīf sent an order to the Prefect of Baghdād denouncing as a mere rabble and mob, as men of no insight or knowledge, those who held the orthodox views. He was told to assemble the Qārīs, the Qur'ān readers, to question them as to their opinions, and to inform them that the Khalīf neither wished for nor would retain in his service any one whom he considered to be untrustworthy in the faith. The inquiry was unsatisfactory, and so this order was issued:

'What the pretenders to orthodoxy and the seekers after the authority for which they are unfitted have replied has reached me. Now, who does not admit that the Qur'ān is created, suspend his exercise of judicial powers and his authority to relate traditions' (Jalāl-ad-dīn as-Suyūṭī, *History of the Khalifs*, Calcutta, 1881, ch. on Ma'mūn).

The next Khalīf, al-Mu'taṣim, severely punished and imprisoned the Imām Ibn Ḥanbal (*q.v.*), a theologian of great repute, because he would not admit that the Qur'ān was created. Al-Buwaitī, a theologian, was brought from Cairo to Baghdād, and there imprisoned till the day of his death for the same reason. Whilst they led him on fettered and chained, he kept repeating to himself, 'Almighty God created the world by means of the word "Be." Now, if that word was created, one created thing would have created another,' which he held to be impossible.

The reference here is to the verse, 'Verily our speech unto a thing, when We will the same, is that we say to it only "Be," and it is' (xxxvi. 82). This was a standing argument against the Mu'tazilites. So also the verse, 'Nay, but it [the Qur'ān] is a warning . . . written on honoured pages, exalted, purified' (lxxx. 11 f.), is said to refer to the eternal copy of the Hidden Table, an argument repudiated by the Mu'tazilites.

When times changed and the orthodox returned to power, Imām ash-Shāfi'ī called before him a theologian named Ḥafs, and, quoting the verse,

'God said "Be" and it is,' said, 'Did not God create all things by the word "Be"?' Ḥafs assented. 'Then, if the Qur'ān was created, must not the word "Be" also have been created?' To this Ḥafs agreed. 'Then all things were created by a created thing, which is a gross inconsistency and manifest impiety.' Such was the effect of Shāfi'i's reasoning that Ḥafs was put to death as a pestilent heretic (Sell, *Faith of Islam*[3], p. 217).

The Mu'tazilites opposed the orthodox view, for they said that it limited their freedom of thought. To them the Qur'ān had a human as well as a divine side; but, if it was an eternal word, it was clearly beyond even reverent criticism. Their view of the nature of the divine attributes also led them to fear that there was a danger lest this idea of an eternal attribute (*kalām*, 'word') should impair the great doctrine of the Unity of God. However, the reaction came, and the orthodox school gained the day. The Mu'tazilite movement was a great one, and, when it failed, Islām again resumed the rigid form which has characterized it till this day. In India, under the influence of Western thought and a liberal government, there has been some attempt to revive Mu'tazilite teaching. The leaders of the movement see that the mechanical view of inspiration taught in Islām is fatal to enlightened progress, and they have selected this very subject as one to be discussed, and as one on which sounder views should be propagated. One of them says:

'A prophet is neither immaculate nor infallible. A prophet feels that his mind is illumined by God, that the thoughts which are expressed by him and spoken or written under this influence are to be regarded as the words of God. This illumination of the mind, or effect of the divine influence, differs in the prophet, according to the capacity of the recipient, or according to the circumstances—physical, moral, and religious—in which he is placed' (M. Cherāgh 'Ali, *Critical Exposition of Jihad*, p. lxix).

Another well-known writer, an avowed Mu'tazilite, speaks of the realistic description of heaven and hell as borrowed from Zoroastrian and Talmudic sources (see Syed Amir Ali, *Spirit of Islām*, London, 1891, p. 394). It may be said that, as his followers grew in the apprehension of spiritual conceptions, so the mind of the Prophet developed; but the objection to this is that the later chapters of the Qur'ān are, as a rule, less spiritual than the earlier ones; and so the development, if such there was, tended in a downward direction. But it is clear that there are a few Muslims who see wherein the weakness of their system lies, who boldly repudiate all the teaching of the past, and adopt what is practically a Christian view of inspiration. These men, however, are repudiated by the great mass of the Muslim world, as men having forsaken a revealed religion, and are to be shunned as innovators, a class most distasteful to the orthodox Muslim. But herein the only hope of Islām lies; for, until more reasonable views of inspiration become general, until the dead weight of traditionalism is lifted off, and until intelligence and reason are allowed some force, there can be no enlightened progress in the community.

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INSTINCT.—With regard to the exact meaning which we should attach to the words 'instinct' and 'instinctive' there is much difference of opinion. There is, indeed, a general agreement that, as W. Paley long ago phrased it, an instinct is, in some sense, 'a propensity prior to experience [in the individual] and independent of instruction' (*Natural Theology*, London, 1802, ch. xviii.). But the word 'propensity' is somewhat vague. Then it must be asked to what end the propensity leads. Is it a propensity to behave in some more or less specific manner, or to experience certain emotional states, or to believe certain things, or to frame certain types of judgment? Is it one of these, or all of these? Furthermore, what are we to understand by *an* instinct? Is it a propensity to a specific mode of behaviour, a particular belief, a definite type of judgment? And can such a propensity be clearly marked off and isolated in analytic treatment? There are difficulties in doing so; and it is probably better to use the noun as a grouping term—as we use 'intelligence'—to cover all those processes to which the adjective 'instinctive' is properly applicable. *But this still leaves on our hands the question*: What is the distinguishing nature of these processes?

Those who approach this question from the biological side tend to limit the term 'instinctive' to certain more or less specific modes of behaviour which are characterized by the fact that they just come, without any intervening and guiding mental process, when the organism is appropriately stimulated by the presentation of a more or less complex situation, often supported by stimulations arising within the organism. And on this view they so come because the organism, and, especially in higher forms of life, its nervous system, have been prepared by a long evolutionary process to respond to such stimulation in more or less specific ways. The chick pecks, the duckling swims, the moorhen dives, the infant sucks, because the inherited organic constitution is such that these modes of behaviour are the automatic outcome when the requisite situation is presented, without any mental realization of the meaning of the situation or of the instinctive response. The word 'instinctive' is thus, for those who accept this view of the matter, primarily a biological term. But the presented situation, and the process of behaving in such and such a manner in its midst, are accompanied by a coalescent mode of experience—the instinctive experience—and this is assimilated to or incorporated with such prior experience (revived through association) as the organism may have already gained in other ways and on previous occasions. Thus, although the word 'instinctive' is primarily a biological term, it is secondarily a psychological term which labels a somewhat complex factor in the development of the mental life of the individual.

Now, such a definition of the term 'instinctive' as has been briefly indicated, tenable as it may be in the appropriate universe of discourse, seems hardly acceptable in connexion with the topics of ethics and religion. It seems desirable, therefore, so to extend the connotation of the word 'instinctive' as to bring our treatment into line with current usage in the familiar speech of educated persons, who are often impatient of subtle psychological distinctions. In this broader sense of the word, the traditional distinction between that which is instinctive and that which is based on carefully reasoned foundations is preserved and emphasized; stress is laid on the spontaneous as contrasted with the deliberate nature of the mental processes involved; and, though it may be difficult to distinguish between that which is the outcome of the net results of previous training and education and that which is due to congenital and hereditary disposition, it is generally implied that what is instinctive in this larger sense is in the main unlearnt and, at least predominantly, the expression of the innate constitution of the mind.

William James has given a graphic description of the manner in which he was affected by the

Californian earthquake of 1906, which lasted some forty-eight seconds. It may be quoted in illustration of the spontaneous as contrasted with the volitional attitude of mind.

'In my case,' he says, 'sensation and emotion were so strong that little thought, and no reflection or volition, were possible in the short time consumed by the phenomenon. . . . As soon as I could think, I discerned retrospectively certain peculiar ways in which my consciousness had taken in the phenomenon. These ways were quite spontaneous, and, so to speak, inevitable and irresistible. First, I personified the earthquake as a permanent individual entity. . . . It came, moreover, directly to *me*. It stole in behind my back, and once inside the room, had me all to itself, and could manifest itself convincingly. Animus and intent were never more present in any human action, nor did any human activity ever more definitely point back to a living agent as its source and origin. . . . For "science," when the tensions in the earth's crust reach the breaking-point, and strata fall into an altered equilibrium, earthquake is simply the collective *name* of all the cracks and shakings and disturbances that happen. They *are* the earthquake. But for me *the* earthquake was the *cause* of the disturbances, and the perception of it as a living agent was irresistible. It had an overpowering dramatic convincingness. I realize now better than ever how inevitable were men's earlier mythologic versions of such catastrophes, and how artificial and against the grain of our spontaneous perceiving are the later habits into which science educates us' (*Memories and Studies*, London, 1911, pp. 210–214).

In this graphic account of his mental attitude at a moment of crisis given us by a leading psychologist and a master of description, although the term 'instinctive' does not occur, what is commonly understood by the word in its wider and currently popular sense is admirably exemplified. The outlook of the moment was not that which calls into play the rational faculties developed by scientific thought; it was far more primitive and unsophisticated. What James wished to emphasize is, seemingly, that, in face of a new and thrilling experience, deep-seated natural tendencies, spontaneous and nowise explicitly volitional, emerged unsummoned in the light of consciousness—and especially a tendency to personify the cause of the disaster, and to attribute to that cause malign intent. The natural man in William James was, during those forty-eight seconds, laid bare; his science, his psychology, his philosophy had not, just then, a word of protest to utter. The sudden onslaught of the earthquake shock caught the guardians of the citadel of reason asleep at their post. Whether the verdict of reason or that of instinct was the truer verdict is not here the point. The point is that the verdict of instinct was in possession. That James's attitude was spontaneous rather than deliberate, and that his swift interpretation of the meaning of the calamitous situation was charged with a sense of its being inevitable and irresistible—as much beyond his control as the earthquake itself—is clear from the description he gave just after the event. But whether this direct and immediate pronouncement of the natural man within him was due to something innate in his mental constitution, or was the unbidden outcome of acquired habits of mind—habits perhaps acquired in quite early stages of his development—he does not attempt to determine. And, if it was partly due to the one and partly to the other, he does not pause to assign something like approximate values to the innate and to the acquired determinants of the attitude spontaneously assumed. No doubt, since his aim was to describe faithfully what passed through his mind at the moment when the earthquake caught him in its grip, he was wise not to enter upon a discussion of an exceedingly difficult problem. So difficult, indeed, is this problem that it is questionable whether it is possible to solve it on the basis of the broader definition of the term 'instinctive.' Innate tendencies are undoubtedly profoundly modified in the light of the experience which is personally acquired through education, through commerce with the world of nature, and through a thousand social influences in childhood and in later life. Can we eliminate these if the question arises whether the moral and religious attitude of the adult is instinctive in the sense of being, strictly speaking, innate and not acquired—or even predominantly inborn, no matter how much they have been directed in early education? To differentiate the strictly congenital factors of the tendencies and propensities of mature life from those which have been insensibly developed through individual training and habit seems, at present, to be a task beyond the powers of psychological analysis.

Still, analysis may help us on our way towards the solution of such problems. A resolute and suggestive attempt to lay bare the innate foundations of the mental life of man is made in W. McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* (London, 1908). He holds that the problem for solution has been mis-stated—nay more, completely inverted.

The doctrine has been accepted, he says, that 'men normally and in the vast majority of cases act reasonably and as they ought to act,' so that the question arises why they sometimes act otherwise; 'whereas the truth is that men are moved by a variety of impulses whose nature has been determined by long ages of the evolutionary process without reference to the life of men in civilized societies; and the psychological problem we have to solve . . . is—How can we account for the fact that men so moved ever come to act as they ought or morally and reasonably?' For 'mankind is only a little bit reasonable and to a great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways' (pp. 10, 11).

This is McDougall's way of asking the question how moral and rational conduct have been evolved. But he renders the question more concrete by asking from what primitive impulses, common to men and the higher animals, this progressive evolution has proceeded. And his answer is: From a relatively small number of primitive instincts.

These instincts are directly or indirectly the prime movers of all human activity. By the conative and impulsive force of some instinct, or of some habit derived from an instinct, every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, is borne along towards its end, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained. There is on the inlet side the presentation of some situation or of some problem; there is on the outlet side an appropriate response in bodily behaviour or in mental activity; and between these two there is the conative impulse emotionally toned in some more or less specific manner. Analysis discloses in any such emotional impulse, no matter how complex, a subtle combination of a few primitive instincts; and any higher secondary or tertiary product of evolution may, therefore, be regarded as a synthesis of a few primary constituents. What, then, are these primitive and elemental factors in the conative life of social mankind? The principal instincts of man, each of which is also a primary emotion, are, according to McDougall's analysis, seven in number: (1) the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear; (2) the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust; (3) the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder; (4) the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger; (5) and (6) the instincts of self-abasement (or subjection) and of self-assertion (or self-display), and the emotions of subjection or of elation (positive or negative self-feeling); (7) the parental instinct and tender emotion. These seven instincts

'are those whose excitement yields the most definite of the primary emotions, and from these seven emotions together with the feelings of pleasure and pain (and perhaps also feelings of excitement and of depression) are compounded all, or almost all, the affective states that are popularly recognized as emotions, and for which common speech has definite names' (p. 81).

To these are added, in a supplementary list, the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct,

the instinct of acquisition, and that of construction. Among the more general innate tendencies, whose behaviour-outlet is less definite and circumscribed, are sympathy, suggestibility, imitation, play, habit, and certain ingrained temperamental factors.

It must be remembered that the presented situations which call forth such emotional impulses as self-abasement, or self-assertion, or the parental instinct with its tender emotion are very varied, and may be much modified in the course of the development of individual experience as life runs its course. It must be remembered also that the resulting behaviour is no less varied and no less subject to modification through acquired habit. But McDougall contends that the central emotionally-toned impulse remains relatively unchanged amid changing circumstances and varied response. All the principal instincts of man, he says, are liable to modifications of their afferent and motor parts, while their central parts remain unchanged and determine the emotional tone and the visceral changes characteristic of the excitement of the instinct. No doubt this must be taken in a relative sense; but even on these terms it is open to question whether there are not as many different shades and varieties of, say, tender emotion as there are situations which call it into being, and modes of behaviour which further qualify its experiential nature. We must, however, attempt to classify modes of instinctive experience which are bewildering in their rich variety and multiplicity, and of which perhaps no two are in all respects quite alike. McDougall's treatment is a helpful step towards such a classification of experiences which are differentiated, with much residual overlap, and what H. Bergson terms 'interpenetration,' through the presentation of diverse situations and by means of that instinctive behaviour in their midst which is a legacy of ages of evolutionary preparation.

We have thus a list of seven or more elementary 'propensities' or impulses which may be predicated of man in virtue of his innate and hereditary constitution. Each concrete case of predication is, of course, conditional upon the presentation of a situation of somewhat varied nature, and upon the performance of sundry appropriate activities linked therewith. But, as experience develops and becomes more complex, the life of emotion and conduct becomes richer, more subtly differentiated, and more harmoniously integrated. Still, according to McDougall, whom we are taking as our accredited guide, no new elementary factors are introduced. The higher and richer emotions are compounds of the primary emotions subtly combined or blended. We may take as examples admiration, awe, and reverence, since these are salient features in the religious attitude. With regard to admiration, McDougall says, there seem to be two primary emotions essentially involved in the state provoked by the contemplation of the admired object, namely, wonder and negative self-feeling or the emotion of submission. Thus admiration is a binary compound. But awe is a tertiary compound, since an element of fear is also present. Awe is, indeed, of many shades, ranging from that in which admiration is but slightly tinged with fear to that in which fear is only slightly tinged with admiration. But, unless fear is in some measure incorporated with wonder and submission, the emotion which we name awe is not fully constituted. And, when to awe, as a tertiary compound, gratitude is also added, we experience the highly compound emotion of reverence. Now, gratitude itself is a binary compound of tender emotion and submission or negative self-feeling. Submission is thus doubly emphasized, for it is a constituent both of admiration and of gratitude. Thus we have a highly complex and predominantly submissive emotional state, but still one which is compounded of elementary instinctive and emotional constituents. Now,

'reverence is the religious emotion *par excellence*; few merely human powers are capable of exciting reverence, the blend of wonder, fear, gratitude, and negative self-feeling. Those human beings who inspire reverence, or who are by custom and convention considered to be entitled to inspire it, usually owe their reverend character to their being regarded as the ministers and dispensers of Divine power. . . . The history of religion seems to show us the gradual genesis of this highly complex emotion. Primitive religion seems to have kept separate the superhuman objects of its component emotions, the terrible or awe-inspiring powers on the one hand, the kindly beneficent powers that inspired gratitude on the other, and it was not until religious doctrine had undergone a long evolution that, by a process of syncretism or fusion, it achieved the conception of a Deity whose attributes were capable of evolving all the elements of the complex emotions of reverence' (*ib.* pp. 132, 135).

McDougall has an interesting suggestion with regard to the difference in attitude which characterizes religion on the one hand and magic on the other. He suggests that the fundamental distinction between religious and magical practices is not, as is sometimes said, that religion conceives the powers it envisages as personal powers, while magic conceives them as impersonal, but rather that the religious attitude is always that of submission, the magical attitude that of self-assertion, and that the forces which both magical and religious practices are concerned to influence may be conceived in either case as personal or impersonal powers. Hence the savage, who at one time bows down before his fetish in supplication, and at another seeks to compel its assistance by threats or spells, adopts towards the one object alternately the religious and the magical attitude. In this connexion we may ask whether William James's attitude in presence of the personified earthquake, as an attitude of submission, was religious in its nature.

The point of view which McDougall has developed in his discussion of reverence in its relation to religion is interesting and suggestive. But questions of no little difficulty arise. Granted that reverence may be regarded as such a compound of elementary factors as McDougall has indicated, how far may we regard the process of compounding as an innate propensity, and thus look upon reverence in its developed form as instinctive in the broader acceptation of the term—an acceptation somewhat broader than that which he advocates? Is the process of blending as instinctive as the elementary factors which are blended? And, if so, instinctive in what sense? Is it instinctive in its unreasoned and involuntary spontaneity? Is it instinctive as wholly unlearnt? Can we say that it is entirely congenital and nowise acquired? And, if in some measure acquired, are we to regard the acquisition as a relatively negligible modification of an attitude that is fundamentally innate? The answers to these questions in some degree turn upon the previous answer to that most vexed of vexed questions with regard to the inheritance of that which is acquired in the course of individual life. But apart from this question, which cannot here be discussed, it is exceedingly difficult to determine how far attitudes which are seemingly racial in character are due to inborn proclivities or tendencies, and how far these attitudes are due to the influence of the environment on each succeeding generation and to the traditional outlook imparted through early education. W. C. D. and C. D. Whetham, in *Science and the Human Mind* (London, 1912, p. 25 f.), have drawn attention to the fact that, whereas

'in Chaldæa and, more markedly, in Assyria, the gods were usually conceived as hostile to man, pursuing him in life and death with implacable hatred; in Egypt, as in Greece, the

divine powers were represented in mythology as friendly, ready to watch over, to protect, and to guide mankind in life, in death, and in the after-world. It would be interesting to enquire what share the external conditions of their lives have in shaping their attitude towards the forces of nature and the mythology by which they endeavour to interpret the phenomena of the world and of consciousness. In Egypt, the Nile, with its regular and unfailing rise and fall, was the source of all fertility—steady, trustworthy, and friendly. In Chaldæa, the tempestuous and incalculable flooding of the Euphrates and the Tigris made life on their banks dangerous and uncertain. Nature was hostile, ready to sweep away man and his puny works in one unforeseen ruin. . . . In the one case, any attempt to understand or to control the elemental forces becomes an impious and useless action. Deceit and trickery by magic and sorcery, or, at the best, propitiation of the hostile powers by sacrificial bribes, represent the logical outcome of this view of nature. . . . But in the other case, where the deities are friendly, any increase of man's mastery over his surroundings is approved by the tutelary powers, and is probably directed by them, since it is their good pleasure to help him on his way. One or other of these alternative attitudes of mind predominates in every religious system, according to the race and circumstances of those who hold to it.'

Here we have different attitudes as the result of differences of environment. We speak of the net result as illustrating racial characteristics. But it is hard to say how far the 'instinctive' attitude assumed is congenital and innate, and how far it has been handed on by tradition in the social *milieu* of the race.

Although McDougall deals with admiration, awe, and reverence under the heading of 'complex emotions that do not necessarily imply the existence of sentiments,' his treatment of their connexion with religion leads us to infer that, at the stage of mental development when religious conceptions are in being, they are incorporated in that higher ideational synthesis in which the sentiments play so conspicuous a part. By sentiment we are to understand, following A. F. Shand ('Character and the Emotions,' in *Mind*, new ser., v. [1896]), an organized system of emotional tendencies centred around the idea of an object. The object here is not merely a presentation to perceptual experience evoking such naive behaviour, adapted to the immediate situation, as is found in animal life. It is a centre, not only of a system of emotional dispositions, but of a system of knowledge in some degree organized, and of a system of conduct which is significantly related to the idea of the object or class of objects. It is always in some measure a centre of thought, of emotional tendency, and of conscious endeavour. Otherwise it does not attain to the level of sentiment, which is always in alliance with concepts and with conduct. On these terms the sentiment cannot be wholly instinctive in the sense that it is on the same plane as the innate ideas of early writers. As McDougall says,

'the organization of the sentiments in the developing mind is determined by the course of experience; that is to say, the sentiment is a growth in the structure of the mind that is not natively given in the inherited constitution' (p. 159).

None the less, it may be founded on an inherited basis.

If, then, the question be raised whether the moral sentiments (centred around the ideas of self and of alter) and the religious sentiments (centred around the idea of a super-alter as source and cause of mundane happenings) are instinctive, our answer must again depend on the connotation to be attached to this perplexingly elusive term. That in the course of life they may become instinctive, in the sense that they rise unbidden and spontaneously within the mind without explicit rational backing, when the circumstances are of the appropriate kind, can scarcely be questioned. That they are instinctive, in the sense that they are the outcome of a hereditary bias or proclivity in the native constitution of man, is more open to question, and is as roundly asserted by some people as it is flatly denied by others.

The fact is that, when once we accept the broad and general usage of popular speech, anything like a precise and clear definition of instinct becomes very difficult, if not impossible. And perhaps some measure of vagueness and elasticity is commonly regarded as only right and fitting where strict accuracy of scientific interpretation is at present unattainable. If the instinctive in man is to be taken as synonymous with 'of or belonging to his constitution as human,' do we mean the constitution of the infant at birth, or the constitution of the adult after a prolonged period of education and development? Or do we mean neither of these, but rather some indwelling principle of synthesis—or, if it be preferred, a synthetic tendency the existence of which is inferred from certain observed facts—in virtue of which man is at birth and throughout life what he is or may become? By this nothing more mysterious is implied than that which is commonly accepted as the ground of embryological development in the organism, or even, in inorganic nature, as the ground of crystalline synthesis or of the formation of complex chemical compounds. The acceptance of a specific constitutional factor is only carrying up into the realm of mind what is by many regarded as scientifically legitimate in the interpretation of other natural phenomena. Assume, *e.g.*, that tender emotion (to select one item from McDougall's list) is what, to borrow a term from Mendelian interpretation, may be regarded as a 'unit character.' Even thus regarded, it is a synthesis of no little complexity. Its components are more elementary factors which are additive in the emotional state; and they are probably more than additive in that in their combination they possess a constitutive quality which gives to the algebraical sum of the factors what we may perhaps term its peculiar and specific emotional *timbre*. Just as a note played on the violin gives a complex periodic wave affording to our consciousness a simultaneous combination of the fundamental tone and an orderly series of fainter overtones, and yet there is something about the timbre of the note which is not merely additive but constitutive of that peculiar auditory experience, so in tender emotion there is a constitutive supplement to the additive factors—a supplement which gives to these factors in combination the characteristic property of the unit character as a synthetic whole. To pursue the analogy a stage further, just as a musical chord is not only the additive sum of the constituent tones and overtones simultaneously presented to hearing, but has its constitutive property *as a chord*, so, too, the blend of wonder, negative self-feeling, and fear, as generators of the complex emotion of awe, affords in consciousness what we may term an emotional chord, the specific nature of which is not exhausted by giving a list of its factors. When the emotional chord has its definite place in life's symphony, and derives further and richer significance from its context, it is raised to the level of a sentiment, and, in relation to the context, has a higher constitutive value.

Not all psychologists would concur in such statements as these. But many are prepared to accept what W. Wundt (*An Introduction to Psychology*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 164) has termed the principle of creative resultants—creative in the sense that the resultant compounds have new properties. This principle, he says, attempts to state the fact that

'In all psychical combinations the product is not the mere sum of the separate elements that compose such combinations, but that it represents a new creation' (p. 164).

This is extended to the whole realm of life in Bergson's doctrine of creative evolution, which many biologists can accept without subscribing to his radical vitalism. Even in the inorganic world

the same principle holds. W. Nernst teaches (quoted in *The New Realism*, New York, 1912, p. 238) that, while a large number of physical properties are clearly additive, there are other properties which are not merely additive. Such non-additive properties, he says, are termed constitutive.

Granted, then, that in the course of mental development new constitutive properties of, let us say, the moral and religious emotions and sentiments are characteristic evolutionary features that supervene at critical periods of synthesis, our immediate question is whether they should be regarded as instinctive in that broader sense of the term which is here provisionally accepted. They appear to be distinctive of man in virtue of his inherent constitution as human; they appear to be in large measure beyond volitional control; from the ethical point of view they appear to be the outcome of character (which is the constitutive factor) rather than the sum of the conditions which, of course, must supply the requisite additive data; and on such grounds they may well be claimed to be instinctive in the widest sense of the term. On such grounds, therefore, it can scarcely be denied that the moral and religious sentiments, so widely prevalent in mankind, though they assume varied forms under varied circumstances, have an instinctive basis in the human constitution.

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C. LLOYD MORGAN.

INSTITUTIONS (Indian).[1]—A native of India, as observed by R. C. Bose in his attractive little work, *The Hindoos as they are*, is a religious character. 'He is born religiously, lives religiously, eats religiously, walks religiously, writes religiously, sleeps religiously, and dies religiously.' All the more important ancient institutions of the Aryan Indians may be said to have a religious tinge. Even the *rules of Government*, as framed by the Brāhmans, are essentially theocratical. It is true that they could never have been fully enforced, but, whenever Brāhmanism was in the ascendant in a Hindu State, the orthodox union of Church and State was carried into practice as much as was found practicable. Thus one of the eight ministers appointed by the great Śivaji, the founder of Mahratta power, was entrusted with the exercise of all the sovereign's ecclesiastical powers, and was to order punishment to be inflicted after investigating into what is and what is not in accordance with the religious law (A.D. 1674). The main inspiring principle of the whole movement initiated by Śivaji, and carried on by his successors, was the preservation of the Hindu religion against foreign aggression.[2] The administration of justice, which was considered one of the principal duties of a king, is similarly characterized, the test by ordeal being a regular feature of judicial proceedings (see LAW).

Caste, whatever its origin, is another important institution of an essentially religious or hierarchical nature. As observed in the Report on the Census of 1901 (p. 360), the most obvious characteristic of the ordinary Hindu is his acceptance of the Brāhmanical supremacy and of the caste system. Although the political power of the Brāhman caste is gone, their influence with Hindu society continues to show itself in what has been called the Brāhmanization of non-Hinduized castes—the endeavour to rise in the social scale by adopting the characteristic social customs of the Brāhmans, such as infant marriage and the prohibition of widow remarriage.

Passing to religious institutions in the proper sense of the term, we may perhaps mention the following as specially characteristic. *Purity*, both external and internal, is a great object with Hindus of every sect and persuasion, and manifold are the rules regarding the avoidance of pollution or defilement, and the removal of its consequences where it has been contracted (see PURIFICATION, FOOD). There is not only a fully developed system of penances (see EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT), but an endless round of devotional acts tending to the expiation of guilt and to the acquisition of spiritual merit. The *saṁskāras* or sacraments, to be performed during pregnancy (*puṁsavana*, *sīmantonnayana*), at childbirth (*jātakarma*), when the child receives a name (*nāmakaraṇa*), when it first gets rice to eat (*annaprāśana*), on the first hair-clipping (*chūḍā*), when the boy is girt with the sacred thread (*upanayana*), on marriage (*vivāha*), after death, etc., are still kept as of old, and form a regular source of income for the Brāhmans officiating at these ceremonies. Thus among the Patane Prabhus of Poona, a highly respectable caste, a birth was said to cost £20 to £40, a thread-girding £20 to £50, the marriage of a son £150 to £400, of a daughter £100 to £500, a girl's coming of age £10 to £20, a pregnancy £10 to £15, the death of an adult £20 to £30, of a child 10s. to £5 (*BG* xviii. 194). Marriage is a particularly expensive and solemn celebration, at which many of the old rites described in Sanskrit literature are still observed, together with many new ones. The special importance and sanctity attributed to the institution of marriage in the Hindu religion become conspicuous equally in the before-mentioned customs of infant marriage and of prohibition of widow remarriage. By betrothing their children at an early age, parents could best provide for their not remaining unmarried, a spinster, especially of the Brāhman caste, being considered a disgrace to her family. This early betrothal was in reality the decisive act, though married life could not begin till some years later; and thus arose the peculiarly Indian institution of virgin widows, remarriage of a woman, like divorce, being unknown to the Brāhmanical law of India (see CHILD-MARRIAGE). The former practice of *satī*, or self-immolation of widows, has been abolished by the British Government. The two ceremonies of tonsure (*q.v.*) and of thread-girding (see INITIATION) are considered important events in the life of a Hindu boy. The ordinary mode of disposing of the dead is by cremation (see DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD). Every death is followed by a certain period of impurity, and by the offering, at regular intervals, of sacrificial oblations called *śrāddha* to the manes. Adopting a boy, though not a sacrament, is a religious act of considerable importance for Indian family life (see ADOPTION). According to the religious duties prevailing in each successive stage of life, there are four *āśramas*, or orders, in the life of a Brāhman, of pupil (*brahmachārin*), married householder (*gṛhastha*), hermit (*vānaprastha*), and ascetic (*yati*, *bhikṣu*). Of these, however, the order of hermits has died out, and the pupil and ascetic are chiefly represented by the *chelas* and *gurus* of the monastic orders of the

[1] The institutions of other countries are sufficiently described, each under its own title.

[2] See K. T. Telang, 'Gleanings from Marāṭhā Chronicles,' in *Trans. of the 9th Cong. of Orientalists*, London, 1892, i. 252 ff.

present day, so that the householder is the ordinary type of the modern Brāhman (see ĀŚRAMA).

Monastic life is common enough in India, and many convents (*maṭha*) possess considerable endowments, for the devolution of which, after the death of their heads, there are special rules of succession (see INHERITANCE). *Idol-worship* exists both in private houses and in public temples. *Bathing*, particularly in a sacred river, is considered highly efficacious, and belongs to the class of daily duties. There are brotherhoods of priests, such as the *Gaṅgāputras*, waiting on the bathers. *Sacrificing* was considered one of the principal duties of a Brāhman, from the discharge of which a considerable part of his income was derived. The horse-sacrifice (*aśvamedha* [*q.v.*]) is an instance of a sacrifice on a large scale which not only is described in Sanskrit literature, but of which there are several historical instances as well, such as the horse-sacrifice of king Puṣyamitra (2nd cent. B.C.), and of king Samudragupta (4th cent. A.D.). The practice of animal sacrifice is nowadays confined to certain religious sects, but other oblations to the gods, to deified ancestors, etc., are very common. Thus the tutelary deity of a respectable Hindu household is worshipped every morning and evening by the hereditary *purohit*, or priest, of the family, who is allowed to carry home, after the close of the service, the offerings of rice, fruits, sweetmeats, and milk made to the god. Endowments for a family idol are very usual, especially in Bengal. *Public charities* are also recommended a great deal, and supposed to confer the highest bliss in a future state on those who offer them. They include the foundation and repair of temples and sanctuaries, together with endowments for the maintenance of the priesthood and of the idol; the establishment of an image in a temple; the digging of pools and tanks, especially near a public road, to supply the thirsty with water; the planting of trees, particularly of sacred trees; the building of lodging-houses or sheds for travellers; the building of flights of steps to descend into a tank or sacred river. Thus king Aśoka in his inscriptions (3rd cent. B.C.) boasts of having planted banyan-trees on the high-roads to give shade to man and beast, of having planted mango-groves, of having ordered wells to be dug and rest-houses to be built, and numerous watering-places to be prepared here and there for the enjoyment of man and beast. Arrangements for the healing of man and beast were provided by the same king. Benevolent institutions and religious establishments were also founded by king Harṣa throughout his empire (7th cent. A.D.).

Hospitality (*q.v.*) is enjoined as a religious duty, being one of the five great devotional acts (*mahāyajña*) according to the Code of Manu (iii. 69), who declares that a Brāhman sojourning in a house without being honoured takes to himself all the merit of the householder's good deeds (*ib.* 100). Making gifts to Brāhmans, and honouring and serving them, are also considered highly meritorious (see GIFTS). Austerities (*tapas*) of every kind, and mortification of the body, are believed to lead not only to heavenly bliss, but to the acquisition of miraculous power in this life, the great deity Śiva himself being represented as practising severe asceticism in a forest. The wonderful performances of Indian ascetics in the way of self-torment are sufficiently well known. *Fasting* is an important element in many of these self-imposed austerities and penances, and seems to have been carried to a surprising extent. It also enters very largely into the composition of the so-called *vratas*, or devotional acts, tending to the gratification of some special desire (see FESTIVALS AND FASTS, VOWS).

Visiting sacred places of *pilgrimage* (*tīrtha*) is supposed to have the effect of wiping off the guilt of even a heavy sin. An ancient Sanskrit text, the *Viṣṇusūtra* (ch. lxxxv.), names no fewer than 53 different places of pilgrimage, including Pushkar, Bodh Gayā, Prayāga (Allahābād), the banks of the Ganges, and of other sacred rivers, etc. Great feasts and pompous religious displays, such as the *Durgā Pūjā* in Bengal and the Car Festival at Purī, still tend as of old to excite the religious fervour of worshippers. In the devotional practices and daily worship of the Brāhmans, texts from the Veda, such as their sacred prayer called *gāyatrī*, occupy a conspicuous place. According to the *smṛti*, Brāhmans had to devote a large number of years to the study of the Vedas, and there were lifelong students (*naiṣṭhikabrahmachārin*) leading an unmarried life in the family of their teacher. Religious education was also to a great extent in the hands of the monks, some of whose educational institutions, such as the great convent of Nālanda (2nd cent. A.D.), were frequented by thousands of pupils. Though Sanskrit learning has gone down very much at the present day, the monastic establishments of the different religious sects continue to be centres of religious instruction. Public recitations from the *Purāṇas* and other sacred books also continue to be in vogue, and the mere repetition of the name of one's guardian deity is considered a meritorious practice.

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J. JOLLY.

INSTITUTIONAL CHURCH.—The 'Institutional Church' is a clumsy title used to describe a modern development of Church life necessitated by new social conditions. It is not clear how the term originated, but it was first heard in America about a quarter of a century ago. Before that time many attempts had been made sporadically to minister through the Churches to the social needs of the community; and social settlements had arisen which were in some instances definitely linked to certain Churches, and in all cases a product of the Christian social spirit. These 'settlements' consisted, at first, of groups of men or women, associated for the study of social conditions, and living the community life. As they developed, however, more elaborate buildings were erected, in which provision was made for educational work and social engagements, so making the settlement central to the life of the community alike for instruction, inspiration, and recreation. In a sense the settlement aimed at the recovery of an old ideal, for time was when the Church stood for education, for the relief of poverty, and generally for the practical care of the community. But many settlements not only had no direct connexion with any Church, but were anxious to emphasize the fact lest any suspicion of proselytizing should attach to their work. On the other hand, those who valued the Church idea and who were anxious to strengthen the position of the Church within the life of the community, looked at the modern problem from this point of view. They saw that there was no institution through which the settlement workers brought their influence to bear upon their neighbours which might not with equal advantage be used by the Christian Church.

It goes without saying that this conviction was

confirmed by the new sense which was being developed among the members of all Churches as to their duty to the young. The English Sunday Schools have seldom succeeded in retaining their older scholars. Even in schools where large Bible Classes exist, the need for some week-day provision for keeping in touch with these young men and women was increasingly felt. The statistics were alarming as to the small number of young people who went forward in membership from the school to the Church. R. W. Dale, on a memorable occasion, pressed home the question, 'How have we lost them?' Certain religious associations sprang into existence to meet this felt need. The Christian Endeavour Societies (see art. CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOUR) were probably the most successful in making appeal to the religious nature of the young. But the Church was even then hardly prepared to recognize that the physical and intellectual needs are equally urgent, and that it may form part of her duty to make provision for these. In some communions this ideal was advocated; and what were known as 'Guilds' were formed upon the explicit basis of the organic unity of our nature, and that just because we are human beings we must be treated as such. Hence the Guild had its athletic and social programme as well as its intellectual and religious one. The Guild movement had a partial success. Where the home-life is normal and strong, it is evident that the need for many of the activities of such societies is less insistent. But modern Britain and modern America have tended increasingly to produce overcrowded areas, where little or nothing deserving the name of home-life exists, and where all social and recreative satisfactions must be sought for elsewhere. Earnest people in all Churches began to see that the problem before them was to adapt the Church's institutions to the needs of areas such as these.

One other movement had brought home this problem to the conscience of Christian people. This was what was known as the 'P.S.A.' movement, by means of which large congregations of men and women were brought together on Sunday afternoons for purposes which, it would be fair to say, were at once religious and social. These people were not exclusively young people. They were workmen and their wives, for the most part; and very many belonged to the poorest classes in the community. They enjoyed and profited by the Sunday afternoon meeting, with its freedom from conventionality; and they soon formed themselves into societies with branches designed to promote thrift, to encourage reading, and to secure effective house-to-house visitation. But, in the majority of cases, the Churches had no hospitality to offer them apart from the Sunday meeting. It was borne in upon the minds of those who were especially concerned that the Church should prosper in the industrial districts that something must be designed more satisfactory than the orthodox place of worship, with rigid pews, which is usually closed from Sunday night to Sunday morning. The Institutional Church was an inevitable product of the new-born ambition of the Church of Christ to minister to our modern social needs.

The Institutional Church, therefore, was a practical experiment along the lines indicated. It aimed at bridging the gulf between the Sunday School and the Church; it aimed at ministering to the development of a man's all-round nature; it aimed at making such provision as is necessary under social conditions which make true home-life impossible. In many instances old places of worship were modernized into halls, with seats instead of pews, platforms instead of pulpits, and equally serviceable for public worship, lectures, concerts, and other meetings. This becomes the central meeting-place of the Church, where its members receive their vows of dedication to the social service to which Christ calls His people. There, too, the obligations of the Christian life are pressed upon those who have not as yet accepted them. There the Gospel of Brotherhood, with its innumerable applications, is preached to gatherings of men and women. Then, round about the central building are smaller halls and rooms of various kinds, some of them for conferences and discussions, some of them for music or art, some of them for recreation and games, some of them for reading and writing, and some for social conversation. Clubs are formed for working lads or girls; and gymnastics, singing, elocution, cooking, wood-carving, dressmaking, signalling, and many other wholesome activities are organized. The settlement idea is conserved by means of sisterhoods, whose members conduct such classes, and do much of the visitation and administration of relief inseparable from a many-sided work like this; and who commonly live together either in rooms on the Church premises or in a house in the immediate neighbourhood. Lectures, scientific, literary, historical, and economic, bring the public together on the basis of some general interest. By all these means an attempt is made, and realized, to strengthen the social bond, and demonstrate that everything that makes for human happiness and efficiency is part of the mission of religion.

It will be seen from this that the Institutional Church is best able to carry out what is known as the policy of 'counter-attractions.' W. S. Rainsford, formerly rector of St. George's, New York, has described (*Preacher's Story of his Work*, New York, 1904) how this policy was gradually forced upon him by the necessities of the situation. The evil associations of the saloon compelled him to provide a social centre with wholesome food and drink; the undesirable dancing saloons drove him to permit dancing in his church hall; the doubtful dramatic exhibitions of all kinds led him to organize a dramatic society for the production of good, wholesome plays. Probably few, if any, of the similar experiments in England have been on so comprehensive a scale as Rainsford's; but the need to provide counter-attractions to the public-houses, and to supply refreshments, good and lively music, billiards and other games, and abundant social opportunities, apart from the unwholesome atmosphere of licensed premises, is just as great in England as in New York. Instances might be quoted in which social enterprises of an even more ambitious character have been successfully carried out, such as labour-yards, night-shelters, and even hospitals and orphanages; but there is an increasing disposition not to burden the Church with work which the State should properly undertake. Nevertheless, the Church has led the way in many new forms of work among the young. The *crèche*, or day nursery, where infants are well nursed and fed while their mothers are away at work, and the 'play-centre,' where, outside school hours, children who have no playground but the street are taught organized games, form part of the operations of nearly all Institutional Churches.

The ideal aimed at is of a Mother Church which thus offers hospitality to all men, women, and children, and applies herself to discover and to satisfy their needs. The centre of the whole organization is the society of avowed disciples of Christ, who are inspired by His example and teaching, and who, in His spirit, are dedicated to the ends of His kingdom. The members of the Institutional Church would always feel that they had failed in their mission to any one who had come within their influence, and joined one or other of their


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institutions, unless they had converted him into a Christian citizen, and inspired a disinterested zeal for human betterment. This can be brought about only, as they would confess, by contact with a living Church. Thus the Institutional Church is not under any temptation to magnify its institutions and depreciate the Church. On the other hand, the necessity for keeping the institutions Christian leads to the emphasis of the Church and its ordinances. By common consent the highest success of the Institutional Church has been realized where the worship and teaching of the Church have been effectually central to all the manifold operations of the institutional work.

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C. SILVESTER HORNE.

INSURANCE.—1. Origin and development of insurance.—The principle of the averaging and distributing of risks is one which, no doubt, existed from the time when commerce began to emerge from the more primitive needs of a pastoral community. Among Western nations there was a scheme for the insurance of slaves at Athens which is attributed to Antigenes of Rhodes (356–323 B.C.), and loans on 'bottomry' (that is, an advance on the hull or 'bottom' of a ship, which was repayable, with interest, on the return of the vessel, but was not repayable in case of a total loss) were well known among the Greeks. Such loans, under the title of the *fœnus nauticum*, were so common at Rome that legislation was devised to prevent fraud; thus at this early stage the problem of an 'insurable interest' had arisen. In the Greek Empire the rate of interest upon loans on bottomry was regulated by an edict of Justinian in A.D. 533. The incursions of barbarians disorganized the mechanism of commercial life, and it is not till the 13th or early in the 14th cent. that allusions to bottomry begin to reappear. These occur at Florence, Pisa, Bruges, and Barcelona. In the Laws of Wisby and the *Recessus Hansæ*—both being codes of the Hanseatic League—bottomry is mentioned, and the system was introduced into England, either by this body or perhaps earlier, through the shipments of wool to the Mediterranean by Italian merchants. Hence, when an Act was passed in 1601 'concerninge matters of Assurances amongste merchantes,' this practice was described as having been 'an usage tyme out of mynde.'

Meanwhile transactions of the nature of insurance had grown up independently among the gilds, which took quite a different direction (see FRIENDLY SOCIETIES, GILDS). Among the Anglo-Saxon gilds it was the custom to give to the members, in addition to opportunities for social intercourse, certain benefits which were provided from the contributions of the gildsmen, as, for instance, blood-compensation (*wer-geld*), where a gildsman slew another without wantonness, also what might be described as funeral benefit, namely the furnishing of a funeral, mourners, and masses by the agency of the gild. Again, in the gild at Exeter, in the event of the house of a member being destroyed by fire, a contribution was levied from each member. This practice constituted a rude approximation to the principle of fire insurance on a mutual basis, except that the amount of the contribution was limited (B. Thorpe, *Diplomatarium Anglicum Ævi Saxonici*, London, 1865). In the Anglo-Norman gilds the range of benefits was extended—while that for funerals remains most prominent, cases occur in which gilds made provision for the loan or the replacement of stock and the providing for the children of a deceased gildsman, by apprenticing the sons to trades and offering dowries for the daughters.

A species of insurance which related to persons and not to goods, and was no doubt one of the first of this type, was that for a ransom. There are traces of this in the statutes of gilds, and, in the 17th cent., this risk was undertaken by individual underwriters. Under this type of insurance, if the traveller was captured by pirates or an enemy, the assurer was bound to provide the necessary ransom.

The decay of the gild system after the Reformation left many blanks in the national life, and prominent among these was the absence of the compensation against some of the great risks of life which it provided. It is true that marine insurance was unaffected, and this system was gradually extended. Before the end of the 16th cent. the loan on bottomry had been supplemented by a type of policy which provided compensation on the loss of a ship in proportion to the premium paid (*Guidon de la Mer*, Rouen, 1607); and at the end of the reign of Elizabeth there was an 'Office of Assurances' or 'Chamber of Assurance' in London, where the whole risk on a ship was subdivided among a number of underwriters. During the first half of the 17th cent. there were few new ideas relating to insurance, though marine underwriting was increasing in popularity, and the grading of risks came to be better understood.

The period bounded on the one side by the Great Fire and on the other by the feverish promotion of companies in 1720 was one in which insurance made great strides, both in the insuring against new risks, or to provide new benefits, and in the prosecution of existing types of assurance by new methods. In the reign of Charles II. marine insurance was well understood, and, with the growth of coffee houses, those interested in shipping began to use certain of those resorts as meeting-places and offices. By 1688, Lloyd's Coffee House had been started, and *Lloyd's News*—a newspaper dealing with the movements of ships—was founded in 1696. Then, between 1717 and 1719, two companies were established, both of which received incorporation in 1720 as the Royal Exchange Assurance and the London Assurance. These bodies, at their foundation, were endued with a monopoly against any other companies, but not against individuals. Thus from 1720 marine insurance has been effected, partly by individual underwriters, partly by joint-stock companies. The Great Fire naturally turned attention to fire insurance. In Germany, mutual fire insurance societies had been founded at least as early as the 16th cent., and Sir William Petty mentioned associations of this type as being worthy of imitation in England. After the disaster of the Great Fire three or perhaps four distinct kinds of fire insurance were attempted. The Corporation of London opened an office in 1679 or 1680, that is, insurance by a municipality. Then there was a mutual society, known as the Friendly Society, which had issued proposals in 1683. The remaining methods were practised by an individual underwriting fire risks, or by several individuals in partnership. Nicholas Barbon had opened an office in 1667 which was transformed into a joint-stock company in 1680. Of these four types of fire insurance only two survived. Insurance by individuals never became prominent as regards fire risks, and municipal insurance was soon abandoned. There remained the mutual fire insurance societies and the joint-stock companies, both of which continued side by side in competition. The Hand in Hand Society was a mutual one. It was founded in 1696, and was absorbed by the Commercial Union

Assurance Company in 1905. On the other hand, the Sun Fire Office, which was founded by Charles Povey between 1706 and 1708, was a joint-stock company. In the first twenty years of the 18th cent. many fire offices were established in London, and some in the provinces.

Besides the provision made against losses by shipwreck or by fire, other risks to property were gradually insured against. Thus by 1684 goods sent by waggon or cart could be insured against thieves (*Merchant's Dayly Companion*, London, 1684). By 1720 schemes had been projected for insurances against losses by highwaymen, by the dishonesty of servants, for the payment of seamen's wages, and for making good losses sustained by owners of horses through disease, disablement, or theft. Thus schemes had been propounded resembling burglary, fidelity, guarantee, and live stock insurance, though, owing to the excessive number of promotions, long periods elapsed before all of these were established.

Meanwhile, the provision for life contingencies lagged behind marine and fire insurances. In the middle of the 17th cent. a species of life insurance could be effected whereby any one who borrowed money to purchase a place or office could arrange by means of payments from the income that, in the event of his death, the part of the loan outstanding would be repaid to the lender. It is after the Revolution that something of the nature of life insurance can first be traced. One of the methods by which the Government raised funds for the carrying on of the war against France was by the guaranteeing of annuities in return for loans. In 1698 the Mercers' Company also began to issue annuities. These schemes were very imperfect, owing to the want of anything approaching mortality tables. Even the population of the country was unknown. It is true that the labours of Petty and Halley were providing a basis for future statistical investigations, more particularly in relation to the Bills of Mortality; but, as yet, these inquiries were in such a tentative condition that they did not admit of practical application. Accordingly, insurance relating to life contingencies was developed in a different direction from modern life insurance, being concerned chiefly with such risks or eventualities as terminated at a comparatively early date as compared with that of the payment of the premium. Before the Revolution a scheme was considered for the State Endowment Insurance of children on their attaining the age of 20 years (Add. MS. 28,078, f. 462). Early in the 18th cent. there were many offices which transacted professedly provident business of this character. These were all dividend societies —that is, the premiums collected in a quarter or in a year, as the case might be, were divided among those claimants who, in the same period, ranked for the specified benefits. Thus, in a marriage society, all insured persons who had been married since the last division participated *pro rata* in the distribution. Similarly in other societies the parents of all children born in wedlock, who had paid premiums regularly, ranked for the benefit. Then again, in the same way, a sum could be secured to enable a young man to start in business for himself when his apprenticeship was finished. These were known as marriage, christening, and apprenticeship insurances respectively. In 1709 and 1710 there was quite a rage for participation in these schemes; since the amount of benefit varied greatly, the idea appealed to the gambling spirit of the times. There were many scandals, and insurance of this type was prohibited by legislation in 1710. It was out of these crude schemes that the earliest general life insurance emerged. It was based on the dividend principle. Just as in marriage insurance, the premiums were divided periodically among those who were entitled to claim. There was no distinction at first as to the age or sex of the life insured. One of the earliest life offices was the Society of the Assurance of Widows (1699), which was followed by the Amicable Society in 1706. The latter existed independently till 1866, when it was absorbed by the Norwich Union Life Insurance Society.

During the remainder of the 18th cent. the chief progress in marine and fire insurance was in the extension of the system. As the various offices acquired reputation, the number of persons insured increased. In life insurance, on the other hand, great progress was made. The researches of de Moivre, Kersseboom, Hodgson, Corbyn Morris, Simpson, and Price gradually provided materials for the construction of tables of the expectation of life, and these were used by the Equitable Society (which was founded in 1762) in the establishing of graduated premiums. In 1825 insurance began to attract the attention of the company promoter, and a great number of new offices were started, the majority of which were soon forced to discontinue business. The remainder of the century is marked by a more exact classification of risks, by the variation of the forms of policies, by the issue of policies against risks which were not previously insured, and, finally, by a great increase in the total sums insured.

In the early forms of insurance the benefits were confined to persons who were comparatively well-to-do. The working-class population was altogether outside most of the schemes which had been started. The amount and the times of payment of premiums were unsuitable to the wage-earner, nor were the benefits offered of the kind of which he stood most in need. As early as 1773 a bill was introduced into Parliament which was designed to extend some of the advantages of insurance to the poor, but it failed to become law. The gradual development of Friendly Societies tended to provide some of the benefits of which the wage-earning classes stood in need (see FRIENDLY SOCIETIES). Though the first Friendly Societies Act was passed in 1793, it was some time before the operations of these societies became general. While many of these bodies have proved insolvent, others have attained a high degree of financial stability, and the growth of the benefit side of Trade Unions has also aided in extending the benefits of insurance. The general method of the organization of a Friendly Society or of a Trade Union, in relation to the part of its activities resembling those of a Friendly Society, is by the collection of contributions from the members each week. Thus the payment of what is, in effect, a premium is arranged so as to accord with the budget of the contributors. The chief benefits provided for the members are sickness, medical, out-of-work, and funeral benefits.

The essence of a Friendly Society is that it must be a voluntary organization, though it may be assisted and controlled by the State. Naturally the membership of such bodies will consist of those workers who are most thrifty. Thus, even in a city or district where there are Friendly Societies, very many of the working classes remain uninsured; and to meet this situation State insurance has been devised. Unlike all the other kinds of insurance already described, it is not permissive but compulsory. In Germany and France the idea of insurance by the Government may be traced back to the beginning of the 19th cent., since it arises out of the conceptions of Fichte, Lassalle, and Sismondi. As early as 1854 Prussian miners were compelled to belong to one of the

Knappschaftskassen, or associations for sick funds; and in 1883 the same rule was applied to other labourers. The next year accident insurance was established, while in 1889 old age and invalidity insurance were provided. The old age pensions in Germany are to be distinguished from those in Great Britain, since the former are contributory, the latter are non-contributory. State insurance applies compulsion not only to the worker but also to his employer. The usual method is to provide that the worker, his employer, and the State contribute.

State insurance on a large scale was established in the United Kingdom by the National Insurance Act, 1911 (1 and 2 George v. cap. 55). This scheme has two main divisions, the one relating to health, and the other to unemployment. Thus an attempt is made to provide for two of the great risks of wage-earners, namely, sickness and unemployment. As regards the first of these, it is intended that, while the payment of contributions is compulsory for all employed persons as defined by the Act whose ages are between 16 and 65, and whose remuneration does not exceed £160 a year, the administration is committed to Friendly Societies under the supervision of a Government department. What may be described as the normal rate of contribution in Great Britain is 7d. per week for men and 6d. for women. The man pays 4d. per week, and the woman 3d. per week; while, in each case, the employer adds 3d. per week. The State adds a sum which amounts to 2d. per week for both sexes. Where the total earnings in Great Britain are less than 2s. 6d. per day these rates are modified, and there is a reduced scale for Ireland. The benefits consist of medical benefit (including medicines and such medical and surgical appliances as are prescribed by the Insurance Commissioners), sanatorium benefit (being the treatment in sanatoria, in other institutions, or otherwise, of persons suffering from tuberculosis), sickness benefit, disablement benefit (comprising periodical payments to persons rendered incapable of work by disease or disablement after termination of sickness benefit), maternity benefit (being a payment of 30s. on the confinement of the wife of an insured person or of any other woman who is insured), additional benefits, which are dependent on the financial success of the Friendly Societies working the Act, and which may include additions to the amounts of the foregoing benefits, or further benefits, such as dental treatment, superannuation allowances, payments to insured persons who are out of work through infection, etc. Though the intention of the Act is that it should be administered by Friendly Societies or similar bodies, account has to be taken of those persons who, while compelled to pay contributions, are not members of a Friendly Society. These become deposit contributors. The sums paid by and for them are lodged at the Post Office, and they are entitled to benefits only till the end of the year in which the amount standing to their credit may be exhausted. Though this system is described as 'deposit insurance,' it is clear that the element of insurance is relatively small. The second part of the Act—that relating to unemployment—deals with those trades in which irregularity of work is common, *e.g.* building, construction of works, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, iron-founding, construction of vehicles, saw-milling. Contributions are provided by the workers in these trades, their employers, and the State. Subject to certain minor exceptions, the worker and the employer both pay 2½d. per week. The normal rate of unemployment benefit is 7s. per week; there are numerous rules to prevent malingering; and provision is made for a court of referees to which the insured person may apply in case his unemployment benefit is stopped by the insurance officer.

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2. Modern insurance.—i. RISKS OF PROPERTY.—(*a*) *Marine insurance.*—Allusion has already been made to the resort of underwriters of marine risks to Lloyd's Coffee House, and from this grew the body now known as 'Lloyd's.' While insurances on ships are effected both by the members of Lloyd's and by marine insurance companies, Lloyd's is the centre of this class of business, since the society is not only an association of underwriters, but, in addition, it has gradually undertaken important functions in connexion with the obtaining and the circulation of shipping intelligence. By means of its agents, it is in touch with all places from which ships can be reported, and thus materials arrive in London which determine the positions of ships, as well as any casualties they may sustain. Since 1834, *Lloyd's Register* has been published annually; it provides for an elaborate classification of ships according to their condition. Lloyd's is a voluntary society resembling in its constitution the Stock Exchange. The affairs of the body are managed by a committee, and each 'underwriting member' is entitled to accept risks subject to the rules of the committee. In addition to the shipowner who is insured and the underwriter who insures, there sometimes intervenes an insurance broker who acts as an intermediary between the two interests, both in the initiation of the insurance and in the settlement of any claim that may arise through it. Besides the members of Lloyd's and marine insurance companies, there is another type of this class of insurance, namely, where a shipping company, owning a large fleet of vessels, insures them itself by paying to a fund the premiums which would otherwise be handed over to an underwriter; or a company may itself insure a part of the value of its ships and place the remainder with an insurance company or with members of Lloyd's. The method by which marine insurance companies maintain their financial solvency is similar to that adopted by fire and life companies, but the way in which the individual underwriter meets his losses is not so clear. This is effected by a minute subdivision and diffusion of any 'line' he may underwrite; that is, the member of Lloyd's who insures a ship for a large sum will at once re-insure the greater part of his risk with other underwriters. In this way the stability of a Lloyd's policy is very great.

(*b*) *Fire insurance.*—Fire insurance has long been standardized. The chief offices have formed a tariff association, according to which they charge identical rates of premium for risks classed as the same. To some extent this body serves a similar purpose to that of *Lloyd's Register*, though, in the case of fire risks, the property is not capable of the same exact graduation as is possible with

regard to shipping. Originally insurance began upon a basis of specialization—that is, the early offices were established in order to effect a particular class of insurance. It was not long before a tendency manifested itself to combine the underwriting of different classes of risks. Thus in 1720 the Royal Exchange Assurance added to its marine business that of fire insurance by the purchase of an undertaking which had been formed for the latter type of risk. While labour tends more and more to minute division, industry works on a larger and larger scale. In insurance the movement towards large scale operation finds expression in the combining of different classes of risks by the same office, either by amalgamation with other companies or by the adding of new branches to its business. Of recent years in both banking and insurance the grouping together of companies, which were previously independent, has been very marked, while the combination of other kinds of insurance with that against fire has become so common that among British offices there now remain very few which confine themselves to fire risks only. There are 138 companies which made returns under the Insurance Act of 1909 as being engaged in fire insurance. The business of some of these was small, and the number which transacted a fair amount of business was about 100. In 1910 the total net premiums of British offices effecting fire insurance were returned at £29,157,780. Some of these companies insure buildings and goods in America, other foreign countries, and the colonies; but, on the other hand, re-insurances with foreign companies have been deducted.

(*c*) *Other insurances of risks to property.*—In addition to marine and fire insurance, certain other classes of risks have been selected for regular insurance. The chief of these are boiler insurance, burglary insurance, insurance of horses, cattle, and other animals, insurance against hailstorms (*e.g.*, in tea plantations, where damage by hail is a serious risk), insurance of licences, insurance of mortgages, insurance of plate glass, insurance of motor cars. The system of registration of packages or letters sent by the Post Office is in effect an insurance of the contents against loss or damage, and the same principle is shown in railway rates in excess of those at owner's risk. While workmen's compensation insurance and guarantee insurance appear to relate rather to persons, in principle they belong to the class now under consideration. The compensation to a worker is secured to him, once the injury has been legally established. The insurance in this case relates to the liability for the payment of that compensation, which by this device is transferred from the employer to the office which insures him against it.

The foregoing may be described as risks to property which are constant. For instance, as long as a boiler is in use, there is the risk of an explosion; or, again, in any business where the clerks have the handling of large sums of cash, there is the danger of embezzlement. There are other risks which are occasional. A reduction in the tax on tea would mean, other things being the same, a loss to merchants who held stocks on which the former and higher duty had been paid. Such a reduction of duty will be announced only in the statement at the introduction of the Budget; and hence it is usual, when changes in indirect taxation are expected, for insurances to be effected against them by those who expect to be affected prejudicially. Necessarily no insurance of this kind prevents an alteration in taxation from taking place, but it secures pecuniary compensation to those who have insured. Circumstances of this kind are numerous, since almost any considerable alteration in trade will affect some one. A prolonged Court mourning will injure businesses which are largely interested in the West End trade. The danger of a war arouses anxiety among many important interests. Further, many social functions require favourable weather conditions. In fact, a list of adverse contingencies might be extended almost indefinitely. Though the actual occurrence of any one of these is comparatively rare in comparison with the number of transactions which are subject to that contingency, it often happens that the trader who encounters the actual happening of prejudicial circumstances loses not only possible profits but also his original capital. Hence it is usual to insure against some contingencies of this kind. Such policies are effected at Lloyd's. Thus people who would suffer in their business from a general election will sometimes take out a policy against the dissolution of Parliament within a specified period. The premium is determined by the opinion formed by underwriters as to the degree of probability of the event insured against. Transactions of this type are often described as 'wagering insurances'; and, when the possibilities as to the occurrence of the event, which is the subject of a policy, are obscure, the rate often varies very rapidly.

ii. RISKS OF PERSONS.—(*a*) *Life insurance.*—The payment of a fixed sum on the death of the insured to his legal representatives may be described as the fundamental type of modern life insurance. The system requires a number of conditions, among which may be mentioned the possession of a satisfactory mortality table. This will show the average expectation of life at each age, and is important in determining the amount of the premium. The assured pays premiums annually during life, and therefore the insuring office has the interest on these, less expenses, either to add to the premiums themselves or as profit. Assurance of this type is known as whole life insurance. Life insurance offices are of two kinds—proprietary and mutual. In the latter any surplus after providing for future claims is available for the benefit of the members insured, generally by way of additions to the sums originally insured. The proprietary offices allocate a portion of their surplus funds as bonus, and the bonus is available for those who insure subject to bonus additions, and in that case the premium for whole life insurance at a given age is slightly higher than for whole life insurance without bonus. In such insurances, in any individual case, there is a gain to the representatives of the insured if death takes place before the time indicated by the mortality tables; while, on the other hand, there is a loss if that time is passed. To lessen the latter contingency insurances are effected whereby premiums are paid for a term of years, and the specified sum is handed over by the office either at the death of the insured or on his attaining a specified age. A modification of the last type is that by which, on the birth of a child, premiums are payable against which a sum is disbursed on the child attaining the age of 21 years or any other age agreed upon.

(*b*) *Annuities.*—An annuity may be either for a term of years, or for a life, or for joint lives. The insurance principle enters into all annuities for lives, since the length of time during which such annuities will be payable depends on the chances of mortality. While the principles in life annuities and life insurance are the same, each is the complement of the other. In a life annuity the insurance office receives a capital sum and pays an annual income; in life insurance this process is reversed.

The progress of life insurance has been very marked. Excluding colonial and foreign offices in the United Kingdom and also industrial life com-

panies, the ordinary life companies had a premium income (after deducting re-insurances) in 1882 of £11,658,319—a figure which increased in 1910–11 to £28,994,404. At the earlier date the income from interest and dividends (less income-tax) was £5,369,007, while at the later one it was £13,166,857. In 1910–11 the ordinary life policies numbered 2,863,851, and the amount assured was £800,215,506.

(*c*) *Personal accident insurance.*—The number of offices filing returns in 1910 was 84, and their premium income for the year was £1,829,710. Many ingenious methods have been adopted to extend this type of insurance as, *e.g.*, the printing of coupons in diaries and certain periodicals, which entitle the holder to compensation should he sustain an accident of a specified character and under certain conditions within a fixed period.

(*d*) *Other contingencies relating to persons.*—Sickness insurance is the chief of these, whereby provision is made for the expenses of an illness and, if desired, for the loss of earnings through disease. Transactions of this character are of minor importance in the business of insurance offices, whereas these are most important in the work of Friendly Societies and of State Insurance in relation to the wage-earning classes (see above, § 1).

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3. The principles of insurance.—The general principles of insurance are fairly obvious, but they have many ramifications which require to be traced with some care. Some of the uncertainties of life and business at times involve most serious consequences to the individual, unless some method has been devised by which he can provide against them or against their pecuniary results. When Shakespeare makes all the ventures of Antonio to miscarry and 'not one vessel 'scape the dreadful touch of merchant-marring rocks' (*Merch. of Ven.* III. ii. 269 f.), the owner is confronted with ruin. But, while some ships are wrecked, many complete their voyages in safety; while some houses are destroyed by fire, the great majority escape this catastrophe; indeed, there are certain risks to which property is liable which, on the one hand, involve the total destruction of the things, but, on the other, are comparatively rare. Similarly, in the case of labour, death or illness involves the total or the temporary cessation of earning power. It is clear that these risks can be divided into classes, and all those which fall within a certain class are subject to that risk, though it may result in a loss to a very few. Further, the damage sustained by those who suffer is relatively great. Hence it is to the advantage of the members of such a class to sacrifice a small part of their income, upon condition that the estimated amount of the loss shall be made good. In the special case of life insurance the sum assured may be regarded in most instances as a compensation for the loss of income, accruing to the person who insures, either by his labour or in other ways which may be of a terminable nature. Thus, in fact, the risk of loss by a calamity which may occur to any one of a certain group is distributed over the members of that class. The method by which what may be termed 'loss-sharing' is distributed depends on the law of averages, and requires a collection of statistics. Taking the period of adult life, every one is subject to the risk of illness which would interrupt the earnings derived from his occupation; but, as between individuals such illnesses fall unequally, some may have none, others may have a few, and others may have many. Where statistics of uncertainties are available upon a sufficiently extended scale, it is generally found that an average will be established for a special kind of risk; and, therefore, the average liability to that risk can be made the subject of actuarial calculation. Accordingly, it is on this basis that the premium to insure against it is arrived at. In the absence of statistical data, any calculation of a premium is impossible. Suppose, for instance, that insurances were effected against damage to aeroplanes which occurred through their flying. If existing offices undertook this risk, any mistake in the rate of the premium would not be serious, in view of the relatively small part of such insurance as compared with the total transactions of the insuring companies. In the event of a number of new offices being formed for this class of insurance, it is probable that at first, owing to the imperfection of the data, there would be considerable variations in the rates; and, as shown by the outcome, some would prove to have been too high and some too low.

The application of the theory of insurance in practice is modified by the conditions under which the event insured against takes place. In some cases there is the danger that this event may be simulated. Life insurance is least subject to this disadvantage. In fire insurance, fraud may take the form of arson, where the insured himself creates the conditions insured against, with a view to obtaining the proceeds of his policy, should the crime be undetected. In marine insurance there is the possibility of 'barratry' in order to defraud the underwriters. Sickness insurance is subject to a greater degree of difficulty, in so far as illness may be feigned. As a general rule, those risks commonly insured against are such as admit of easy proof of loss by the claimant, and verification of his claim by the insurer. Outside the risks usually insured against at insurance offices there are other uncertainties which are similar from the point of view of theory, but which are not usually insured against in this way. A business may not suffer from fire, accidents, or losses of ships, and yet may experience most serious losses. The reason why the latter risk is not undertaken by insurance companies is that such business risks are inseparably connected with the general management of the business; and thus an office underwriting them would in effect become responsible for the management of the business (A. Marshall, *Principles of Economics*[4], London, 1898, p. 470). At the same time fluctuations in profits, due to variations in trade, enter into and form part of the expenses of the business, and thus come to be added to the prime cost of its products. The amount which it is necessary to charge under this head represents a species of premium against this risk, and attempts are made to reduce it by the making of, or the dealing in, a number of commodities the demands for which are subject to varying conditions; or, again, by securing access to different markets for the same commodity in which there is some chance that changes in demand will operate in different directions. Again, a manufacturer may insure his machines against accident, but he is subject to the further risk of the wearing out of these instruments of production, against which he provides by a depreciation fund to which a sum is contributed each year that with compound interest

will replace the value of the machines by the time they are worn out. But machines suffer not only from wear and tear, but from the risk of being superseded. In so far as this contingency differs from that due to variations in trade, a further provision will be required, and depreciation and a contribution towards obsolescence together constitute a species of insurance resembling life insurance as applied to inanimate things. In fact, this analogy has been so fully recognized that it is usual to speak of 'the life of a mine,' and the process just described is often termed 'amortization' —*i.e.* the formation of a fund which will make good the capital outlay when the source of income will have expired. In like manner, any use of capital in a business which is subject to risk may be described as having only a limited life. The principle of the spreading of risks has been applied here, partly through the agency of the joint-stock system, whereby the investor, instead of risking his resources in one enterprise which may result in a total loss of his capital, distributes his funds in several investments, and, if he displays equal judgment in each case, both his income and his capital are likely to fluctuate less on a system of dividing the risk. The same result is attained by Investment Trust companies, where the stockholder who makes only a single investment has the advantage of participating in the united results of many employments of capital. In addition he should gain by the specialized knowledge of the officials, though the practice of forming investment trusts in order to place capital in a certain country or a certain industry may lessen the full gain from a system of averaging. It is obvious that, in these instances, the method adopted is an application of the principles of insurance.

If one asks, 'Why should people risk their capital in enterprises of a hazardous nature?' the answer is not quite so easy as it might appear at first sight. A little consideration will show that the gains in appreciation of investments must at least balance the losses in depreciation, after allowance is made for the interest which would have been received on a first class security. But, as is well known, uses of capital, which are subject to business risks, commonly return a higher rate of income per cent than those that are more secure. Accordingly, the difference between the rate of interest on a perfectly secure investment (known as 'interest proper' or 'economic interest') and that returned by capital employed subject to hazard constitutes a fund as against depreciation of the capital. This difference is known as 'insurance against risk.' Such insurance, it should be noted, is only a partial one. It may be supposed to suffice to make good wastage of capital (after allowance is made for increments to capital value of other investments) on the whole and over long periods. Thus it is insurance against depreciation of trading capital over the whole community. But this is not insurance for the individual. If what may be termed the expectation of life of his investment at the time he makes it is exactly borne out by events, even though at the end of that time his original capital will have disappeared, he will have received not only economic interest but, in excess of that, a sufficient amount to replace at least the amount of his first investment. Such a phenomenon is rare: the prospects of undertakings subject to business risks change from day to day. Even though, after the investment is made, these become less favourable, he has no opportunity of increasing his insurance against risk, since its rate is determined, once for all, by the price paid for the stock, the dividend then paid, and the rate of economic interest at that time. The decline in prosperity will contract the estimated sum available for insurance against risk; and, if ill success continues, a loss of capital will result. The converse would apply where the history of a company was more favourable than had been expected at the time when the investment was made; and there might well be an appreciation of capital altogether independent of the provision available in insurance against risk.

Insurance, both in its common forms and in its wider signification, has important advantages, both for the individual and for the community. It lessens the dislocation of industry which would otherwise arise through the cessation of production by some firm that has sustained a sudden calamity through a fire which destroyed all its works, or any other similar disaster. In fact, in so far as insurance tends to make production more uniform, it tends to augment its efficiency. Similarly it makes labour more efficient also, since it relieves all those workers who have persons depending on their earnings from the harrowing anxiety as to the pecuniary position of those persons in the event of the early death of the earner of the income. Further, the system undoubtedly prevents cases of actual poverty which would otherwise have arisen. It is thus beneficial not only to the families of persons insured, but to the community. Besides, there are important psychological effects. The necessity of the punctual payment of premiums tends to form habits of saving, which are valuable towards the accumulation of capital in a country. For these reasons Governments are disposed to encourage life insurance as well as certain other forms of insurance. The encouragement takes various forms, such as the provision of statistical material and departmental supervision. In Great Britain income tax is rebated on that part of an income, otherwise subject to it, which is employed in the payment of life insurance premiums. These aids are of the nature of indirect bounties on insurance, and on the Continent cases occur where direct bounties are paid by the State. In the National Insurance Act, the principle of a double direct bounty to the insured (*i.e.* in the contributions of the State and the employer) is adopted, reinforced by compulsion. The latter element conflicts with some of the accessory advantages of insurance, *e.g.* in the formation of habits of thrift. At the same time, even in the case of ordinary life insurance, while the person who insures himself is free in law to discontinue the payment of his premiums and to obtain the surrender value (if any) of his policy, once a policy has been begun, in the great majority of cases there is a feeling almost amounting to compulsion towards the maintaining of the insurance. The problem in relation to the insurance of the working classes is in reality a choice of the line of least disadvantage. Bounties would maintain the voluntary principle, and would extend its applications under a certain artificial stimulus. Compulsion secures at once that, in a properly devised scheme, a greater number of persons obtain the benefits. Every effort has been made to conserve as much individual action as is possible, within a scheme of general compulsion, by associating Friendly Societies with the actual working of the Act.

Finally, the tendency to the more exact gradation and valuation of general business risks has important social effects. Here, too, there is a development in averaging, and thus the hazard of uncertainty tends, on the whole, to be reduced. The element of 'uncertainty-bearing' in production thus becomes more efficient. Hence, on the whole, the provision required for insurance against risk can be reduced with safety; and, therefore, *pro tanto* there is an economy in production. Further, external circumstances co-operate in increasing the

saving. Outside the risks insured by underwriters, there remain many uncertainties, which are gradually being reduced by improvements in organization, by increase in commercial knowledge and experience, and by developments in communication. The last two always afford increased opportunities of averaging, while the first lessens the amount of uncertainty, and in favourable circumstances may remove large classes of transactions from this category altogether.

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W. R. SCOTT.

INTELLECT.—A. Bain says:

'Thought, Intellect, Intelligence, or Cognition includes the powers known as Perception, Memory, Conception, Abstraction, Reason, Judgment, and Imagination. It is analyzed, as will be seen, into three functions, called Discrimination or Consciousness of Difference, Similarity or Consciousness of Agreement, and Retentiveness or Memory' (*Mental and Moral Science*[4], London, 1884, p. 2).

Sully (*Human Mind*, i. 64) objects to the inclusion of retentiveness among the functions of intellect, on the grounds that it is not confined to the phenomena of intellect, but underlies the processes of feeling and willing as well; that the representation, like the sense-impression, is nothing but material for the process of intellection; and that the revival of past impressions takes place according to laws of association which are closely connected with the processes of assimilation and integration. Sully substitutes for retentiveness, as the third function of intellect, associative integration or the connecting of a given material with its concomitants in time and place.

If we exclude the presentations of sense and the representations of memory and imagination, 'intellect' is the name given to the higher cognitive powers of the mind. It may be considered as identical with what Sir W. Hamilton called Thought Proper, the Faculty of Comparison, and also to include what he called the Regulative Faculty—the Faculty of Principles. So understood, it includes the *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* of the Greeks, and stands opposed to merely sensitive knowledge, although always regarded as standing in close inter-connexion with the latter.

While the above may be taken as roughly describing what intellect means in almost any system of philosophy or psychology, yet the whole significance of the description depends on the way in which intellect is conceived to stand to sensation, feeling, will, and the psychic principle itself.

In the Platonic philosophy, the soul is, so to speak, externally related to the body. It exists in the body as a detached principle, which directs and controls it, as the charioteer the chariot. Although Plato distinguishes various parts of the soul, or even various kinds of soul, still it is only through the soul considered as intellect, as pure thought, that the passions of the irrational part are known (R. D. Archer-Hind, *Phædo*, London, 1883, Introd. p. 30). The same holds true of sensuous perception (Archer-Hind, *Timæus*, London and New York, 1888, p. 256, note). As Beare says (*Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition*, p. 273),

'It may help us to understand Plato's distribution better if, distinguishing *αἴσθησις* as we have done into two elements, the element of feeling and the element of cognition, we refer the latter element of *αἴσθησις* uniformly to the intellectual soul, which has its seat in the *cranium*.'

Sensation, therefore, as known, is an affection of the pure psychic principle, and is not to be regarded as something *sui generis*, distinct from intellect. It is rather to be regarded as a phase of intellectual activity itself—intellect entering into relation with phenomena.

In the philosophy of Aristotle, the psychic principle occupies a different position. It is not related to the body as agent to instrument, but as form to matter, as *relatum* to correlate, as entelechy, actualization of what the body potentially is. It is not, in itself, purely intellectual. Not only do the merely vital activities proceed from the same principle which exerts the cognitive activities, but the latter also, at least those which belong to sense and imagination, stand in the same conditioning and conditioned relation to the organism in which the vital activities stand. If Aristotle had remained at this standpoint, he would have held a position substantially identical with modern Sensationism, as we find it, for example, in Bain, which reduces intellect to a mere self-elaboration of the fundamental attributes of sensation—assimilation, discrimination, retention—a system in which relations of similarity and difference between sensations are conceived to become the conscious apprehension of resemblance and difference as such.

Aristotle, however, did not remain at this position. He postulated the presence of a Divine element in the human soul—the *νοῦς*, emanating from the Divine *νοῦς*, and constituting the really immortal part of man. It enters from without. Aristotle's doctrine of *νοῦς* has been a problem from his day until now. What is its relation to sensitive knowledge? The answer to this question is contained in the celebrated doctrine of the active and passive *νοῦς* — *intellectus agens* and *intellectus patiens*. The active intellect is that which illuminates the sensitive phantasm and transmutes what is there apprehended into the intelligible form which is then received by the passive intellect. But this process may be conceived in different ways. Of what nature is the transmuting process? On the one hand, the active intellect may be thought to create the form, as light does colours—in other words, to generate it on the occasion of the sensuous phantasm, so that the passive intellect does not really receive anything from the phantasmata or sensible species, but rather an entirely new creation produced from itself by the active intellect. In the Middle Ages it was maintained that no material agency could act on this immaterial intellect, nor could the latter fabricate intellectual species from the material phantasm (cf. Maher, *Psychology*, p. 308; and Hamilton, *Reid's Works*[7], p. 953 f., and the references there given). The species *intelligibilis impressa* is thus elaborated by the active intellect, and received by the passive intellect, where, together with the act of intellection, it constitutes the species *intelligibilis expressa*. It is consonant with this view that the active intellect and the passive intellect should be regarded as two powers or faculties, as was held by the majority of the scholastic philosophers. On the other hand, the active intellect may be regarded as playing a far less important rôle, as not producing the intelligible species, but as simply supplying the illumination, as it were, through which the passive intellect receives the intelligible form abstracted from the sensuous phantasm. From this point of view the passive

intellect is not a distinct principle, but simply the recipient phase of the active intellect.

In which form was the doctrine of the active and passive intellects held by Aristotle himself? Intellect, he says, is 'a distinct kind of soul' alone capable of separation as the eternal from the perishable (*de Anima*, 413^b, 26). In *de Anima*, 430^a, 10-25, he says:

'But, since in all Nature there is something which is the matter to each kind of thing and is all those things potentially; and another something which is the cause and efficient in making them all, as art is related to its material, it is necessary that in the soul also these differences should subsist. The intellect is one thing because it becomes all things, another thing considered as it makes all things—as an effective force like light; for in a manner light makes what are only potentially colours to be colours actually.' 'And this intellect is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essence activity; for the efficient is ever held more in honour than the patient, and the principle than the matter. Knowledge in activity is identical with the thing; potentially it is prior in time in the individual, but universally it is not prior in time. This intellect does not at one time think, at another not think. When separated, it is alone what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. But we do not remember because this intellect is not passive. The passive intellect is, however, perishable, and thinks nothing without this.'

Aquinas and Duns Scotus regarded not only the active but also the passive intellect as distinct from the faculty of sensuous cognition.

The following modern interpretations of the passive intellect are cited by Hicks (*de Anima*, Introd. lxvii). F. A. Trendelenburg identifies it with 'all the lower faculties in contradistinction to the active intellect,' E. Zeller with 'the sum of those faculties of representation which go beyond imagination and sensible perception and yet fall short of that higher Thought, which has found peace in perfect unity with its object,' F. Ravaisson with 'the universal potentiality in the world of ideas,' F. Brentano with 'imagination,' G. Hertling with 'this cognitive faculty of the sensitive part,' and W. A. Hammond with 'the life of sensation as a potentially rational mass,' 'the sum of the deliverances of sense-perceptions and their re-wrought form in memory and phantasy, regarded as potentiality.'

These various interpretations, with the exception of those of Zeller and Ravaisson, really identify the passive intellect with sensitive perception, imagination, or with the *sensus communis*; that is, with something which is not intellect at all. This view has been ably controverted by Hicks:

'If these modern interpreters were right in equating the intellect which becomes with one or other of the lower faculties or with the sum of them, then the function of these faculties would be identical with the function of thought, so far as the intellect becomes all things. But the lower faculties, sense and imagination, never succeed in obtaining an object which is a true universal' (*op. cit.* lxviii).

If both the active and passive intellects are distinct from the inferior faculties of sense and imagination, are they to be regarded as two faculties, or one and the same faculty? The question has been debated both in mediæval and in modern times. The answer given by Wallace, Hicks, and many schoolmen seems to be the true one. They are not two intellects, but only two different modes of viewing the same intellect. This interpretation, as pointed out above, is naturally allied to that view of the active intellect which assigns to it a very unimportant rôle—that merely of illuminating the image. As Hicks says, 'the functions of the latter [the active intellect] are then reduced within the narrowest compass.' Moreover, it is the passive intellect which cognizes, and which, therefore, seems to be identical with the conscious side. It was precisely one of the difficulties urged against the separation of the active and passive intellects that it seemed to make of the former a faculty blindly and instinctively operating. The *intellectus agens*, if distinct and viewed as creating the intelligible species, has no perception beforehand of what it creates. This difficulty is not confined to ancient philosophy. It is precisely for this reason that E. von Hartmann (*Religion des Geistes*, Berlin, 1882, p. 145) refuses to regard the creative idea as conscious. In relation to God, von Hartmann identifies consciousness not with a productive ideal archetype of the world, but with a receptive ideal ectype. The parallelism of the distinction of the active and passive reason to the pure Ego and the empirical self of Fichte, and the consequent absence of consciousness in God both in Fichte's system and in Hegel's, as interpreted by the Hegelian Left, have been pointed out by Pringle-Pattison (*Hegelianism and Personality*, London, 1887, pp. 46, 226). The present writer has maintained (*Objectivity of Truth*, London, 1884, p. 106 f.) that, alike in the human and the Divine thinking, the two aspects coincide and are to be conceived as one. Intellect in its very receptiveness is determinative, and receptive in its determinativeness. If this determinativeness is regarded as a continuously acting timeless activity, we have, perhaps, the true conception of the Aristotelian active intellect, resembling the *intuitus originarius* of Kant. An opposite view is taken by A. E. Biedermann (*Christliche Dogmatik*^{2}, Berlin, 1884-85, §§ 698-717), who emphasizes the diametrical opposition in the relation of the Absolute and of the finite spirit to material existence. Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, i. prop. xvii. schol.

The mention of Kant's *intuitus originarius* brings before us another great problem in the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect which we have deferred till now. Is the intellect Divine or human? There are three views possible. (1) The active intellect, *νοῦς ποιητικός*, may be identified with the Deity and regarded as communicating itself to individual men, the passive intellect, *intellectus possibilis*, *νοῦς παθητικός*, belonging merely to the individual soul. This view was held by Alexander the Aphrodisian, and by Avicenna, who, however, substitutes for the Deity a lower intelligence that has proceeded by a series of emanations from Him (Stöckl, *Gesch. der Philos. des Mittelalters*, ii. 1. 42). (2) Averroes separates both the active and possible or material intellect from the individual soul, and regards it as one and the same intellect in all men, identifying it, however, not with the Deity Himself, but, like Avicenna, with an emanation from the Deity (*ib.* 113).[1] (3) Aquinas and the mediæval scholastics regard the intellect, active and passive, as a faculty of the individual human soul. The first of these interpretations is exposed to the difficulty that it separates the active and passive intellects so that they cannot act together (cf. Aquinas, *contra Gent.* II. clxxvi.). The second interpretation makes both the active intellect and the apprehension of the rational concept the act not of the human intellect, but of an intellect outside the individual human being, and one and the same in all men. Such a conception divorces intellect so completely from the individual soul that it is hard to conceive how any tie remains between them. The third interpretation is exposed to great difficulties. Unless conceived as a distinct faculty apart from the passive intellect, it becomes little more than a phase of the latter. It can only be regarded as illuminative of the Divine creative thought, already implicitly present in the phantasm. If the active intellect is conceived as something distinct from the passive—and Aquinas did so regard it—it is difficult to understand how a merely human faculty, acting instinctively or blindly, can be creative of an intelligible species which, nevertheless, has an ideal community or identity with the independently existing phantasm. Lastly, it seems impossible to understand how a human *intellectus agens* should be in perpetual activity, still more a speculative intellect that

[1] In mediæval philosophy the *intellectus possibilis* is, in general, identical with the passive intellect. They were distinguished by some of the Arabians, but, as in that case the passive intellect is identified with some of the interpretations already rejected, a bare mention of that fact is sufficient here.

combines both active and passive intellect (see Hicks' *de Anima*, note 430, a. 22).

A solution of these difficulties in Aristotle's doctrine may possibly be found if we view him as regarding νοῦς in its relation to the human soul as a Divine-human faculty or power—on the human side active and passive at once, on the Divine ever active, for the activity of intellect is life. This agrees with the language of the *Nic. Ethics* (x. 7), that νοῦς is 'something Divine'—'the true self.'

'Nor is it necessary, as the wiseacres have it, to think like a man because one is a man, or to think like a mortal because one is a mortal, but one ought to play the immortal, as far as in one lies, and leave nothing undone to live up to the highest part in one; for even if it be small in bulk, yet in power and preciousness it far surpasses all things' (Stock's tr., Oxford and London, 1886, p. 97).

The relation of the Aristotelian doctrine of intellect to the question of the immortality of the soul depends on the relation in which intellect and sense are conceived to stand to consciousness and memory. Hamilton (*Reid's Works*, p. 878) cites a passage from Aristotle (*Probl.* xi. 33) which he translates: 'To divorce Sensation from Understanding, is to reduce Sensation to an insensible process; wherefore it has been said—*Intellect sees, and Intellect hears.*' This would lead to a Platonic view, essentially identifying consciousness with the immaterial intellect. On the other hand, if the lower animals are not mere machines, their sensuous life implies some kind of consciousness. Balmes was consequently led to attribute to them an immaterial self and some sort of possible immortality (*Fundamental Philosophy*, bk. ii. ch. 2). That the mere animal soul is a simple immaterial substance, originating and perishing with the body, was held by S. Tongiorgi, and opposed by Stöckl, who held that matter was the substrate of the organic life of brutes (*Lehrbuch der Philos.*[2] ii. 168). Unless, therefore, intellect and sensibility can be regarded as still united in some common root, to use Kant's expression, the separability of intellect from the body seems to involve the division of consciousness itself. The doctrine of Aquinas regarding memory seems to involve a similar division of that faculty, the cognition of the past object in itself belonging to sense, and intellect preserving only the intelligible species, yet having, nevertheless, in relation to the act of intellect, though not to the object, a cognition of the past as such (*Summa*, I. qu. lxxix. art. 6). The real significance of Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect in its bearing on the immortality of the human soul has been disputed in every age. W. Archer Butler says:

'It it not sufficient to satisfy the demands of human anxiety on this subject, that an eternity should be pronounced essential to an active intellectual principle, which itself seems described as unable to exercise any conscious energies apart from the bodily structure; a quickening essence whose very existence retreats into nothingness when it is left nothing to quicken' (*Lectures*, p. 558).

The changed point of view from which intellect is regarded in modern philosophy appears in Spinoza. The intellect, whether finite or infinite, is regarded by him as only in actuality, not in potentiality; but then this intellect belongs, not to active but to passive nature, not to *natura naturans* but to *natura naturata* (*Ethics*, I. prop. xxxi.). Hence it does not represent a power standing over against nature, but one which is identical with nature. The same changed standpoint shows itself in Leibniz's addition to the scholastic formula, 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse.' Intellect or reason is conceived in Leibniz and Kant as possessing a content essentially related to the objects of nature.

We have already had occasion to mention the conception of intellect which we find in the Association school. This school makes feeling, sensation, the fundamental phenomenon of psychical and of rational life. Intellect, intelligence, is only the development of the most fundamental features of sensation. Similarity, discrimination, retention, beget by means of the continued action of association the cognitive apprehension of objects distinct, or apparently distinct, from sensations themselves. It is unnecessary to repeat the well-known criticisms to which this doctrine is exposed. The unity of consciousness, through which similarity and difference are recognized, and which imparts significance to retention, is unexplained. In general, Associationists put the cart before the horse. In the most important activities of mind, phenomena are associated because they are cognized as related, not cognized as related because certain psychical events are associated. The same applies to the Herbartian school. As Höffding says, 'Consciousness is not merely a platform on which ideas carry on their struggle for existence; it acts itself in and through the individual ideas' (*Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr., London, 1896, p. 144).

Owing perhaps to the influence of A. Schopenhauer and F. Nietzsche, a tendency has shown itself in recent philosophy, especially in Pragmatism, to regard intellect no longer as the refined product of Association, but as the creature and instrument of the will.

According to Schopenhauer, 'nature has produced the intellect for the service of an individual will: therefore it is destined only to know things so far as they furnish the motives of such a will but not to fathom them or apprehend their essence in itself' (*Werke*, ed. J. Frauenstädt, Leipzig, 1877, iii. 156). To Nietzsche 'Reason is only a tool' (*Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, do. 1896, p. 122).

The possibility of conceiving the force in nature as will, impulse, does not directly concern us here, but the possibility of so conceiving the fundamental principle in mind does. When it was thought that we had in the sense of effort an immediate consciousness of energy expended, it was not unreasonable to regard the consciousness of effort not only as determinative of many of our most intellectual perceptions, but even as affording a glimpse into the metaphysical nature of reality. But, now that the existence of such a feeling is generally rejected, it is difficult to conceive the stream of consciousness merely as such as presenting a conative aspect. According to G. F. Stout, the process of consciousness is *in part* self-determining. There is in it a current, a current which it feels, a tendency towards an end (*Manual of Psychology*[2], London, 1907, p. 64 f.). Through this conative tendency the presentations of consciousness acquire objective meaning, and in general through conative continuity the processes of consciousness acquire meaning and significance. This theory seems exposed to the same objections as the Association theory. Such consciousness of an end, however vague, implies the presence of an intellectual power which already differentiates such end from the current tending towards it. Only so can the current feel itself to be tending towards an end.

A much more decidedly voluntaristic explanation of intellect is involved in H. Münsterberg's 'Action Theory' (*Grundzüge der Psychologie*, Leipzig, 1900, i. 525). According to that theory, the liveliness of a sensation depends on the strength of the centrifugal excitation propagated from it. Sensory excitation is not in itself accompanied by psychical processes, whether the excitation proceed from the periphery or from associated centres. The afferent process is thus wholly unconscious; only in its passage into motor discharge does it give rise to consciousness. The cerebral cortex,

which is the seat of the psycho-physical processes, must, in order to produce movements, act on sub-cortical centres. Every sub-cortical centre stands always in connexion with an opposite centre, viz. the centre which carries out the diametrically opposite movement. This fact, according to Münsterberg, is the basis not only of all motor antagonistic functions, but also of all psychical oppositions, even such as are purely intellectual and logical. Opposition of beliefs is reducible to difference of attitude in regard to our activity in the world. Upon the spatial variations in the discharge depend the varying intellectual values of the sensations. This theory is exposed to serious physiological and psychological objections, and its application in detail has not yet been given by the author. It is necessary only to mention that, at the point of transition to motor discharge, the author seems to postulate the action of a spiritual principle which determines the path of discharge and the consequent attitude of the agent to the world. It is here that the author's relation to Fichte comes in, whose ethical idealism he claims to unite with the physiological psychology of our time. The voluntaristic theory must not be confused with the practical Reason of the Scholastics. The latter refers merely to the application of reason to the harmony of action with nature and its final end.

The voluntaristic conception of intellect appears in an interesting form in the writings of H. L. Bergson. To Bergson intellect is but a special instrument created by that *élan vital* which lies behind the whole process of evolution. This instrument reveals not truth, but utility. It acts not by unveiling the nature of things, but rather by limiting and falsifying the larger intuition of reality which flows through the vital impulse out of which consciousness itself issues. The falsification, however, works; it is useful for directing our activities, and is justified by its results. In fact, it is these activities which give us the forms of things. It is with inert matter, the solid, that our intelligence deals: the fluid in the real escapes it in part. Of the discontinuous and immobile alone can it form a clear idea. 'Intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life' (Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 174). Intellect and matter have progressively adapted themselves one to the other 'because it is the same inversion of the same movement which creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things' (*ib.* 217). It does not appear how such a movement, even if it existed, could explain the adaptation of intellect to the object. Thought may in determining its object be determined by it (Stokes, *Objectivity of Truth*, p. 58 f.), but, except in the individual, this reciprocal determination does not take place as a mere process in time.

But, just as much as the psychological theories we have considered, does Bergson's biological theory of the origin of intellect imply intellect itself as already existing. He postulates a consciousness or supra-consciousness lying behind intellect. The sympathetic insight by which we penetrate the mobility of things, the supra- and ultra-intellectual intuition by which there is a taking possession of the spirit by itself—these conceptions are but intellect itself, misconstrued and misunderstood. It is the problem of the *intellectus agens* once again. Philosophy here treads the same ground which the followers of Aristotle have trod, and meets the same difficulties.

Grant, however, that intellect is somehow evolved out of, and is grappling more or less successfully, if not with the mystery, at any rate with the practical working of things. What does this amount to? It means at least that the key fits the lock, and that the lock is fitted to the key. It means that nature in its working is relative, in large measure, to the concepts which intellect has framed; therefore, in still larger measure to the intelligence which has framed these concepts and will still frame others, by which nature itself will be better understood—a process which can be justified only on the presupposition, which is common alike to Aristotelian philosophy and Absolute Idealism, that nature is relative to intelligence, that *νοῦς* governs all.

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INTELLECTUALISM.—In its popular and most general sense, 'intellectualism' means the belief in the supremacy in human life of the intellect. More precise, technical meanings of the term appear in the theory of knowledge, in ethics, and in theology.

1. **In the theory of knowledge,** intellectualism is the doctrine which derives knowledge chiefly, or mainly, from the intellect, *i.e.* from pure reason. Intellectualism is here practically synonymous with rationalism (*q.v.*), and stands opposed to sensationalism (*q.v.*). Whereas intellectualism affirms that reason is the unique or the principal source of knowledge, and that knowledge so derived is independent of, and superior to, the impressions received from the outside world through the senses, sensationalism affirms that general ideas arise from sensations. In its extreme form, sensationalism maintains that independently of sensation the mind is a *tabula rasa*, that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the sense. One may also oppose to intellectualism the systems of thought represented by Schopenhauer's philosophy, in which the 'will' is given a dominant rôle in the determination of action and the discovery of knowledge. German philosophy has been dominantly of the intellectualistic type, while sensationalism has found its most numerous exponents in France (Condorcet, d'Alembert) and in England (Locke, Hume).

The method pursued in the search for knowledge will differ according to the conception formed of its source or sources. The pure intellectualist will rely altogether upon the *a priori*, deductive method, the pure sensationalist upon an empirical, inductive method, since knowledge comes, according to him, through sensory experience.

2. **In ethics,** the intellectualistic doctrine affirms that knowledge is in itself sufficient to determine action. Socrates is the first and the chief representative of ethical intellectualism. According to him, no one does wrong knowingly. Sin is error, *i.e.* ignorance; for no man purposely injures himself. This doctrine is opposed by the Stoics, on the ground that the will is not altogether determined by knowledge, but is, at least in some degree, self-determined. Aristotle differed from Socrates in that he held it possible for desires arising from insufficient knowledge to be stronger than those proceeding from full knowledge. He thought, therefore, that the practice of virtue required not

only right insight, but a training of the will, by which it became able to resist the stronger allurement of unenlightened desire and to follow the dictates of reason. Ethical intellectualism reappeared in the modern period, particularly in the English moralist, S. Clarke.

3. **In theology and in the philosophy of religion,** the intellectualistic tendency leads to a more or less complete neglect of feeling and of will, impulses, and desires, in favour of thought—this both in the problems of the origin and in those of the nature of religion. A consequence of this tendency is that certain ideas, or systems of ideas, necessary to religion are identified with religion, or are treated as if they constituted the whole of religion. Thus, religion is defined as 'a department of thought having for its object a self-conscious and intelligent Being' (G. J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, London, 1895, p. 41), or as 'an attempt to explain human experience by relating it to invisible existence' (G. T. Ladd, *Journ. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods*, i. [1904] 9). Martineau's definition also puts the emphasis upon a belief: 'belief in an ever living God, that is, in a Divine Mind and Will ruling the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind' (*A Study of Religion*, Oxford, 1888, i. 1).

In the solution of the problems of origin, intellectualism leads to an exclusive concern for the genesis of the ideas upon which the existence of religion depends, to the neglect of the other aspects of religious life, in particular of the emotions and of the ceremonial. Intellectualism is here opposed to affectivism and to voluntarism. The first emphasizes the feeling and the emotion; it looks upon some particular feeling as being the 'essence' or the 'vital part' of religion. Schleiermacher's standpoint is an affectivism mitigated by an explicit recognition that feeling and activity are inseparable, though distinct. For him the essence of religion consists in the feeling of an absolute dependence upon God. In voluntarism a more comprehensive point of view displaces both intellectualism and affectivism. It recognizes that religion is a mode of life, and that it involves necessarily—as does every pulse of life—ideas and feeling; and, in accordance with contemporary psychology, it insists that these exist only as a part of a conative act. There can be no thinking and no feeling without desire or intention. Religion comes, thus, to be looked upon as a particular type of activity, or mode of behaviour (J. H. Leuba, *A Psychological Study of Religion*, London, 1912, pp. 35–45).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned in this article, see the articles to which reference has been made, and the literature appended to them. J. H. LEUBA.

INTELLECTUALISM (Philosophical). — 1. **Historical survey.** — The term 'intellectualism' had originally nearly the same meaning as 'idealism,' and it is so used, *e.g.*, by Schelling. As the intellect was regarded as the proper representative of the human mind in its entirety, the word 'intellectualism' seemed to be the most fitting designation of the philosophical view that stands opposed to materialism. It is only within recent times that the word has acquired a derogatory sense, and has come to signify a theory which exalts the mere intellect at the expense of other elements of the mind, such as emotion and will.

Ever and again, in the course of historical development, there emerge periods in which the intellect—reflective thought—usurps the place of command, and these periods are always coincident with an advance in culture and a more conscious mode of life—conditions in which principles hitherto assumed to be self-evident begin to show themselves insecure. As a matter of fact, the intellect is originally by no means the decisive factor in all aspects of civilized life. The truth is, rather, that all primitive culture contains a non-rational and positive element. This is seen, *e.g.*, in the fact that the beginnings of human knowledge and action are at first traced to a divine source. Tillage, handicraft, measures, weights, art, language, moral laws, legal systems, and political constitutions are all believed to have been given by divine revelation, and anything like fundamental criticism of them is therefore debarred. Or ancestral custom and immemorial tradition continue to rule with an authority that seems self-evident. Then all at once the hitherto unchallenged is assailed by doubt. External conditions and the inner life have alike undergone a change. The question arises why any particular institution should be precisely as it is and not otherwise, and there springs up a desire for a rational vindication of things. The time has now come when the intellect asserts its independent power. In what had previously been received *simpliciter*, it now discovers defects, impossibilities, contradictions. Nothing shall count as authoritative that has not stood the scrutiny of the intellect. We have come to the stage exemplified in the Sophistic movement of Greek philosophy.

The beginning of the modern period shows a no less powerful advance of the intellectual factor. The unity of mediæval culture was broken up by the Renaissance and the Reformation. It is true that, although the Renaissance and the Reformation did not originate in purely intellectual considerations, they availed to liberate the intellect by setting up, alongside of the institutions of the Middle Ages, other institutions having equal claims. For, when rival forms of cultural life thus stand side by side, the questions arise which of them can give the best reasons for its existence, and whether some other form is not possible; and, when such questions arise, it is in reality the intellect that is called upon to give a decisive answer.

This is clearly shown with reference to the question regarding truth. To the mediæval mind truth was really tradition. The mediæval period was not one of rigid repose. It had its own spiritual movements and its own problems; witness the controversy between the Thomists and the Scotists. While Thomas Aquinas regards natural knowledge and the supernatural truth of revelation as combining to form the one vast and regularly graded kingdom of reason, Duns Scotus considers the truth of the Church's doctrine to be something totally irrational. But these antagonistic views are both at one in assuming that the truth is actually there; that it requires, not to be discovered, but simply to be handed on from one generation to another. The Church is in possession of the truth, and she is its guardian. The Renaissance and the Reformation brought about a change—though not, indeed, a radical one, inasmuch as the intellect as such was not yet invested with the function of discovering and safeguarding the truth. The Renaissance itself was partly involved in a tradition, though not so much in that of the Church as in that of classical antiquity, while for the Reformers the Bible, as the Word of God, came to rank as the foundation of all knowledge of the truth. But, when materially diverse truths, resting on different grounds, come into conflict with one another, the eventual result must be that the intellect acquires a larger measure of independence. The various truths must necessarily operate and dispute with the same principles of reason, and hence the conviction gradually gains ground that the credentials of truth are to be

found in the reason—in the intellect—and nowhere else.

But these movements give rise to great incertitude. All real, as apart from merely formal, truth is reduced to an unstable condition. In all things a new foundation must be laid, a new structure raised. The intellect finds itself face to face with a stupendous task. But it claims the right to believe that the solution of the difficulties is within its powers. For there is one kind of knowledge, viz. mathematics, upon which doubt has never been able to lay its hand. Now, mathematics is without question an affair of the reason; it does not rest upon divine revelation, or upon venerable tradition, but is entirely a product of the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect has succeeded so well in this sphere, why should it not prove equally successful elsewhere? Mathematics thus comes to be regarded as the pattern of knowledge, and a close alliance between it and philosophy is the result. The powerful influence of mathematics is clearly discernible in the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. In alliance with mathematics the intellect gains a secure standpoint and a robust self-confidence. It now undertakes the task of framing clear and distinct conceptions, and of exposing to view the ultimate grounds of existence. It claims that the essential nature of the world, the fundamental unifying principle of all things, and thus also the decisive laws that regulate the life, action, and conduct of human beings, must all yield their secrets to thought and its methodical procedure. Nor is the intellect content to assert its supremacy only in the sphere of scientific knowledge; it extends its claim of authority also to morality, law, religion, politics, economics, and art. Men are fully persuaded that by means of intellectual action in all departments of human life obvious principles of truth can actually be drawn from a state of affairs which has proved unsatisfactory and is incapable of justification, and thus there spring up a natural jurisprudence, a natural morality, a natural religion; political constitutions are drafted, rules are drawn up for economic life, laws are formulated for art. In addition to the philosophers specially noted above, this movement is associated with the names of Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Montesquieu, Lessing, Adam Smith, and many others.

The intellectualistic tendency was enormously reinforced by the rise of modern physical science and technical craftsmanship. As in mathematics, so also here, we find an indisputable contribution of the intellect. By means of observation, calculation, and skilfully devised experiments, the most amazing results have been achieved. Intellectualism continued to make steady advance from the 17th cent., and, notwithstanding the rise of opposing tendencies, it reached its culminating point in the 19th cent.—in the philosophy of Hegel.

Great as was the reliance placed upon the intellect, however, it had been noted that its special function was exercised in discovering and elucidating, not in creating. In all that it had achieved it had proceeded upon something which it had not itself produced, which confronted it as something given and already existing. Even mathematics and kinematics were seen to depend ultimately on space and time—on entities, that is to say, which the intellect could not evolve from itself, but must in some sense recognize as given to it. The fact was still more obvious in the sphere of physical science, where the intellect could not advance a single step except in contact with the objective facts of perception. But in other spheres as well—in ethics, law, religion, politics, economics, art—intellectual activity encountered ultimate elements, such as God, freedom, immortality, enlightened self-interest, the struggle of each against all, etc., which the intellect could not create from its own resources, but could only expose to view. In the light of such considerations, however, the entire work of the intellect might seem to become insecure. For the question as to the relation between thought and reality might be answered in such a way as to deny that the intellect was capable of comprehending the real at all. In point of fact the Kantian philosophy had restricted the function of the intellect to the logical articulation of phenomena. It was then surmised that the intellect could without dubiety apprehend the veritably real only if what had hitherto been regarded as given, as prior to experience, was itself in the last resort the creation of the intellect. To show that this was actually the case was the task undertaken by Hegel. On the Hegelian theory all reality whatever is an absolute process of thought, a self-unfolding of the absolute idea, the essential nature of which is logical; thought and existence are identical. Hegel describes how the absolute idea externalizes itself and so becomes nature—the world of space and time; how the finite spirit issues from the world, and how in the process of historical development it realizes itself in its essential identity with the absolute spirit. The entire development proceeds with logical necessity. In this system, accordingly, the intellect assumed the position of absolute sovereignty, and, although it did not hold that position long—the Hegelian philosophy being soon superseded—yet intellectualism was not thereby set aside. It still continues to exercise a powerful influence, as may be clearly seen, *e.g.*, in the system of H. Cohen, whose great work, *Die Logik der reinen Erkenntnis*, Berlin, 1906, is based upon the idea that thought and being are one, that the foundations of being are actually created by thought. Whole sections of this work are thoroughly Hegelian in tone, and, in fact, Hegel's mode of thought has in our own time experienced a revival both in Britain and in Germany. On the other hand, intellectualism has always encountered a good deal of opposition. In every definite theory of empiricism, as represented, *e.g.*, by Locke and Hume—in every system, that is to say, according to which the function of the intellect is one of mere passive receptivity—there subsists also an anti-intellectualistic spirit. Reference has already been made to Kant. When Fichte and Schelling exalt moral volition or artistic intuition above the intellect, their thought really moves on anti-intellectualistic lines. Schopenhauer finds the ultimate cosmic force in a mysterious will, and in this connexion mention should be made also of von Hartmann, in whose system, however, there is a Hegelian strand. But the authority of intellectualism has been challenged above all by modern psychology. Wundt has endeavoured in his great works to win recognition for the volitional element in all life, so that his philosophical theory may be appositely described as voluntarism. Heinrich Maier, in a notable work entitled *Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens*, has drawn attention to the fact that besides 'cognitive' thought there is also an 'emotional' thought, which, while it contains logical elements, is nevertheless guided by feeling and will. An extremely anti-intellectualistic position is taken also by pragmatism—a product of British and American thought—of which the leading representatives are W. James, J. Dewey, and F. C. S. Schiller. According to this theory, the intellect is *per se* incapable of deciding what truth is. Only that which justifies itself to living experience is to be accounted true, so that the intellect is here subordinated to life. Reference should also be

made in this connexion to Vaihinger and his significant work, *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*. On Vaihinger's theory the function of the intellect is not the discovery of truth, but the pre-calculation of occurrences which are to be designated as sensations (*Empfindungen*). The most delicate creations of the intellect—those which it produces for that purpose—are not reproductions of the real, but fictions.

To these psychological and philosophical movements a fresh anti-intellectual tendency has been added by the recent emergence of a new æsthetic culture. The inadequacy of purely intellectual attainments is increasingly being felt on all sides. The over-estimation of the intellect, with its tendency to reduce all to a uniform level, its indifference to individual qualities, and its elimination of the subjective factor, is blamed for the impoverishment of the inner life and the repression of all true individuality of character, while, on the other hand, it is felt that art, with its eager interest in the concrete, its sympathetic understanding of individual characteristics, and its creative force, should be the guide to a richer, deeper, and fuller life. These considerations have brought about a complete revolution, as, *e.g.*, in the educational sphere. Thus, while the views disseminated by Herbart—views designed above all things to secure intellectual lucidity in education—held until quite recently a position of almost unchallenged authority, they are now to a very great extent discarded. 'Art in child life' has become a widely recognized maxim in contemporary pedagogics.

Yet the intellect, in spite of all these counter-movements, and in spite of the active depreciation which it has had to encounter, still continues to assert its power and its indispensability. It is obvious that mere negation will not answer here, and that the question regarding the significance of the intellect requires further investigation. Of contemporary thinkers, Eucken, in particular, has submitted the problem to searching treatment. He, too, strives earnestly to transcend anything like mere intellectualism. It is a fundamental doctrine of his philosophy of the spiritual life that the spirit of man involves more than intellectual activity, that the spirit in its entirety is richer than the intellect, but also that the intellect belongs to the spirit, and that the proper development of the spirit is impossible without intellectual action. He certainly admits that the intellect cannot of itself alone evolve any complete reality. It can act only when it has something else—something that does not originate in itself—to act upon, as can be clearly seen in the sphere of natural science. Here the intellect, however far-reaching and comprehensive its activity, is forced to keep in touch from first to last with given facts, with the world of experience. And the like holds good in every other department of human life. Ethical laws and ideals, religious convictions, and æsthetic intuitions are not products of the purely intellectual function, but have their rise in deeper regions of the spirit. If the intellect relies upon itself alone, it moves in a realm of merely formal concepts; and if, nevertheless, it aspires to create a reality, yet this reality has, in point of fact, come to it from elsewhere—only the intellect does not itself realize this, or else the fact is screened from view. In such cases the sources from which the intellect has surreptitiously drawn are empirical and spiritual experience. This, however, does not exclude the recognition of the fact that, conversely, knowledge and life, whatsoever their nature may be, can make no proper progress without the co-operation of the intellect. The intellect sifts and combines; it clarifies and moulds. It is present in all experience, and its presence is unconditionally necessary if a completely articulated and ordered reality is to be attained at all. What could we make of sensations, which to-day are often held to be the truly real, if the intellect did not impart itself to them? They would be something inert, orderless, chaotic, and, in the last resort, absolutely null. Similarly, morality, religion, and art can never attain lucidity apart from the action of the intellect. Its critical action is, indeed, essential to the very possibility of their progressive development and refinement. In what a rudimentary condition would not art have been doomed to remain if the intellect had not taught it how to look at human life and the surrounding world? By such considerations does Eucken seek to maintain the rights of the intellect, yet without making it the sole authority in human life.

We arrive at results similar to those of Eucken by a consideration of the fundamental character of reality. That fundamental character stands in a peculiar relation to the tendencies of the intellect. The intellect strives to rationalize all reality, to bring it under calculation, to view it as necessary; and its ultimate aim is to construct a formula which will embrace all that occurs in the world, and which is capable of determining the actual condition of things at any particular moment. To a large extent, moreover, reality submits to this procedure of the intellect. But there is always a point at which all the efforts of the intellect must necessarily fail. The great instrument of the intellect is law—the formula. Law and formula, however, are necessarily general in character, and may be made to comprehend as many particular instances as desired. But they cannot determine what particular instance will actually emerge. Thus the formulæ of the law of gravitation would hold good precisely as they do even if there were more or fewer planets in the solar system. It does not follow from the law of gravity that its formulæ shall apply to that particular system, and no other. In a word, laws and formulæ are in their nature merely general, while the real is in all cases special and concrete, and accordingly reality refuses to be completely rationalized. The real might be described, indeed, as an intermixture of the rational and the irrational, or positive—an intermixture in which, however, the latter factor predominates over the former, since the rational can operate only in contact with a positively given object, apart from which it moves in a mere vacuum, and with all its efforts produces nothing.

This is true not merely of the reality which meets us in our external experience, but also of that which we call spiritual. In the moral sphere, for instance, we are confronted by various alternatives: there may be a morality of enlightened self-interest and one of self-denial; a morality which affirms and one which negates the world; a morality of rigid justice and one of benevolence; a morality of natural selection and one of religious ends. The intellect cannot claim to have produced any of these, nor can it demonstrate that any one of them is exclusively authoritative. It may certainly be employed in combating or defending any of them, but the individual's acceptance of a particular ethical tendency rests ultimately upon a personal decision which is incapable of logical explanation. Once the decision is taken, however, the intellect may render valuable service in illuminating, elucidating, and developing the theory chosen.

Every genuine work of art, again, is an absolutely individual and unique creation. To interpret a work of art as due to an application of unvarying universal rules is utterly to misunderstand it; thus Richard Wagner was undoubtedly

right in protesting against the notion of an absolute work of art, *i.e.* a work which would be simply the result of universal laws valid for all time and under all conditions. To desiderate such a work would involve the establishment of an absolute intellectualism in the sphere of art. As a matter of fact, the general laws of art are mere abstract deductions from existing works of art or from the achievements of a particular period, and a new creation or a new period will give rise to new laws. Such laws may serve as a means of comprehending and interpreting what already exists, but they have no creative power of their own. Thus in ethics and art, precisely as in science, mere intellectualism always works to the prejudice of reality, while, on the other hand, the action of the intellect is not only valuable, but indispensable.

2. Intellectualism in religion.—It is not necessary here to refer to the various forms of religion; it will suffice to elucidate the relevant facts as they appear in Christianity. Christianity in its original form made not the slightest claim to serve as a rational interpretation of the world; the love of God, the expiatory death and the resurrection of Christ, immortal life, and eternal salvation—all these come before us as something absolutely incomprehensible, something which no human reason can attain to, and no human understanding excogitate, which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has entered into the heart of man. That rational proofs are of no avail here was an emphatic conviction in the mind of St. Paul. Nevertheless, intellectualism very soon found its way into Christianity, and, indeed, by the time of the early apologists, Christianity had come to be regarded as the true philosophy. In Alexandria the endeavour of Clement and Origen to reconcile their religion with Greek philosophy served to further the process of rationalization. The fact that these theologians regard γνῶσις as the highest attainment possible to man, and that γνῶσις, as pertaining to the perfect, is considered to be unequivocally superior to πίστις, which is all that the ordinary member of the community can aspire to, simply implies that the Christian religion had opened the door to intellectualism. The conception of the Logos also played an important part in the rationalizing process. This conception, on the one hand, was in every respect a product of scientific thought; it signified the cosmic idea, and by means of it the world was to be made intelligible, to be rationalized, and interpreted, while, on the other hand, it is used in the Fourth Gospel to enunciate the eternal deity of Jesus Christ, and, although here the Logos is certainly brought into relation with the world, yet the conception is in no sense a scientific one, but purely religious, since the point in question is not the possibility of a rational interpretation of the world, but the dignity to be assigned to Christ. Nevertheless, the conception served in part to bring various types of thought into contact with one another, and even to fuse them together. Thus arose a disastrous intermingling of ideas, bringing great perplexities in its train. For one thing, correct knowledge was now considered to be the most important element in religion, and, on similar grounds, heresy was accounted the gravest of sins, while, again, this position was constantly disputed by the natural conviction that religion is concerned with something else—something more essential than mere knowledge. Religious knowledge, moreover, could not even attain to lucidity with regard to itself. On the one hand, it was regarded as being of the same nature as rational truth, *i.e.* the type of cogitation found in logic, metaphysics, and mathematics; on the other, the feeling that religion has essentially to do with an entirely different kind of truth, with a positive and non-rational truth, could never be wholly suppressed. A wavering between the two sides runs through the entire mediæval theology; and, while Christianity sought to defend itself against intellectualism, it was never able actually to free itself from its grasp.

The work of Luther, in virtue of which faith was once more invested with its proper prerogative, effected an emancipation of religion from intellectualism. Faith is now interpreted as trust in the grace of God manifested in Jesus Christ, and thus alike in its character and in its object is no mere matter of knowledge. Trust is never the outcome of purely intellectual reflexion, while the grace of God in Christ is something that transcends all rational credentials and intellectual demonstration. Nevertheless, intellectualism soon re-asserted its power in religious things, even in the Churches of the Reformation. Faith came to be identified with the recognition of true doctrine, and this intellectualistic interpretation proved most detrimental to religion, and long stood in the way of a better understanding of what religion really signifies. In orthodoxy, in the Illumination, in rationalism and supra-rationalism, intellectualism held unbroken sway. The substance of what was regarded as religious truth was certainly of a very heterogeneous character, but the essential interest was in all cases a kind of knowledge which is accessible to the intellect and upon which the intellect can arbitrate. The views of Bayle, who emphasized the non-rational character of religion, and those of Spinoza, as set forth in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, were of a different trend, but remained in great degree inoperative. Nor was the distinction which thinkers now began to make between religion and philosophy able as yet to deliver the former from the bonds of intellectualism, though it was certainly an earnest of better things.

It was in reality Kant who first succeeded in overthrowing the supremacy of intellectualism. By drawing a rigid distinction between theoretical and practical reason, by limiting the action of the former to the sphere of phenomena, and by denying its right to decide any question regarding religion or its object, Kant laid the foundation—we cannot, indeed, say more—of a truer understanding of religion. He himself did not attain to a well-grounded conception of the distinctive character of religion, inasmuch as, basing it upon morality, he virtually treated it as identical therewith. The first to see in religion a spiritual entity with a distinct character of its own was Schleiermacher, who maintained that the religious sense is *per se* neither knowledge nor action, but a condition of immediate self-consciousness—the feeling of absolute dependence upon God. Whether this definition is in all respects satisfactory is a question for separate discussion; but at all events the merit of having recognized the specific nature of religion, and thus of making it secure against the aggressions of intellectualism, is unquestionably to be ascribed to Schleiermacher.

A glance at the history of theology since Schleiermacher's day shows us, however, that the dangers of intellectualism were not removed all at once; on the contrary, we find everywhere a struggle between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. Another mighty wave of intellectualism passed over religion as a result of the Hegelian philosophy. The influence of Hegel operated powerfully upon many theologians, and here special mention should be made of F. C. Biedermann, who sought to express the essential elements of religion in abstract logical categories. Reference should also be made to O. Pfleiderer, of whom it may be said that he considered the proper content of religion to be ultimately a type of truth capable of philosophical

proof. This new endeavour to rationalize religion was challenged by the Erlangen theologians and by the school of Ritschl, of whom in particular W. Herrmann has fought against the harmful influences of intellectualism in the religious sphere.

On the whole, we may venture to say that the danger of an intellectual interpretation of religion is now much less than it was. This is due variously to the insistent appeal of Ritschl and his followers to the Gospel as the criterion of all Christian belief and doctrine, to the historical investigation of religion, with its discovery of a vast mass of material which defies all rational explanation, and, finally, to religious psychology, which serves to bring the unique character of religion into fuller relief. It is not thereby implied, of course, that the history and psychology of religion may not be used in the interests of intellectualism, as, *e.g.*, when religion is repudiated altogether. In that case religious history may simply be drawn upon for materials to illustrate the story of human error, while religious psychology really becomes a study of the disorders of the human soul. Quite recently an endeavour to preclude this application of religious psychology has been made by Wobbermin (see Lit.), who makes a sharp distinction between the psychology of religion proper and the psychology which is concerned with religious phenomena. The former, according to Wobbermin, presupposes the existence of religion in the investigator himself; the latter does not. It is only the former, however, that can arrive at a true understanding of religion, while the other, dealing with religious phenomena, is concerned merely with the externals of religion. Religious psychology in this special sense is antipathetic to mere intellectualism. We are therefore justified in asserting that in the sphere of religion powerful anti-intellectualistic forces are in operation at the present day.

3. The significance of the intellect in the religious sphere.—It is quite obvious that the intellect is not the most important factor in the religious view of things. A fundamental element in every religious conception of the world is the conviction that God infinitely transcends all human existence. This involves the inscrutability of God, and thus also negatives the claim of the intellect to be supreme. The intellect finds itself confronted here by an absolute limit, since the inscrutable cannot be brought within its capacities. The inscrutability of God is the indispensable pre-condition of religion; it is not something that might be surrendered without detriment to religion; on the contrary, religion stands or falls with it. God would not be God if He were not inscrutable. Nor is the inscrutableness of God merely one postulate of religion among others; it permeates everything embraced by religion. Thus, the fact that the central element of Christianity is the redeeming love of God is a blessed, but at the same time an incomprehensible, mystery. Of every genuine religious utterance it will be found to hold good that it breathes the conviction that God is inconceivable. In religion there is something before which the intellect must abase itself, and its every claim to autocratic authority is utterly silenced.

On the other hand, disparagement of the intellect finds no justification in religion. It would be an error to regard the intellect as alone, of all the functions of the human mind, hostile to religion, and to assume that the others are more intimately allied with it. Even morality, for instance, is in itself no more akin to the divine than is intellect. It is possible to have a morality which positively surpasses the intellect itself in its antagonism to God and religion. Religion, moreover, must insist upon the fact that the intellect too belongs to God; that it is a gift of God which may be used in His service, and indeed ought to be so used. Hence religion itself requires that a high value shall be set upon the intellect, which, nevertheless, must be satisfied with a position below the highest.

Here, however, the question arises whether in at least one particular reference the last word does not lie with the intellect. When we come to deal with the unavoidable problem regarding the truth of religion, is it not the intellect alone that must decide? To what other competent tribunal can we appeal for judgment? Self-evident as the answers to these questions may appear, it is nevertheless to be observed that the intellect would be able to maintain its sovereignty only on one of two conditions, viz. that it creates religion, or else abolishes it. Hegel undertook the task of evolving religion from the intellect, but any such deduction must inevitably founder upon the fact that religion has to do with the inscrutable. Were it on any possibility to succeed, it would bring religion itself to naught. To derive religion from the intellect would certainly be to do away with the inscrutable, and therefore with religion too. We should in that case have only the second alternative to consider, *i.e.* the abolition of religion by the intellect. And, indeed, that the intellect has a right to assert its power in this way seems actually to be conceded by religion itself—in the admission, namely, that all its affirmations resolve themselves into antinomies: God is immanent and transcendent; He acts from necessity and in freedom; He is inviolable justice and redeeming love, etc. Thus, as Vaihinger seeks to make out (*op. cit.*), all these affirmations must be regarded as fictions, in which case, again, they would be divested of all real truth, and religion itself would fall to the ground. This conclusion, however, assumes the unconditional validity of the proposition that whatever involves antinomies is fictitious and unreal. Yet even the reality given in sensation, which is the only kind of reality recognized by Vaihinger, is permeated by antinomies; thus every sensation is at once limited and unlimited; related to other perceptions and yet posited absolutely. On Vaihinger's theory, therefore, sensation itself, and in fact everything, would be illusory, and this would simply imply that the term 'fiction' or 'illusion' had lost all meaning whatever, since it is only as contrasted with the real that we can put any true construction upon the term at all. It follows from these considerations that the mere presence of antinomies does not enable us to decide whether we are working with fictions or not. Accordingly, the question whether the intellect can abolish religion is lifted out of the intellectualistic sphere altogether. The intellect cannot determine the matter merely on the ground of its having here discovered antinomies. Once more, therefore, we find that in religion, as in all other spheres of experience, the intellect encounters a reality which it has not evolved from itself, and that even in the question regarding the truth of religion it cannot lay claim to absolute authority. The decisive thing here is the spiritual force with which religion operates, for in its energetic action it transforms the antinomies of thought into evidences for its truth by showing that they constitute the most pertinent expression of its own peculiar nature, which, as we have seen, is permeated through and through by the inscrutable. If anywhere, then certainly in religion, it holds good that, as Kierkegaard has said (*Efterladte Papirer*, v. 269), it is not our reasons that support our convictions, but our convictions that support our reasons.

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INTELLIGENCE.—1. Use of the term.—Probably no term in psychology is used with so many different shades of meaning by different writers as the term 'intelligence.' In Thomas Aquinas, from whom most of the Renaissance and modern controversies directly or indirectly originate, intelligence is the act or function by which the soul acquires knowledge of the universal—it is the spiritual function of the soul as participating in the divine nature, as a direct creation of God, and, therefore, immortal. The universal is reached by an extreme process of abstraction, abstracting from all material conditions of objective existence. There is also a lower form of abstraction found in animals, in the faculty called *æstimativa*. This might be translated 'practical judgment,' the power to appreciate the significance of objects for the needs of life. It is an instinc-

is abstraction, but abstraction only from conditions of space and time, not from matter as such. Animals, therefore, have no knowledge of general principles, of causation, of the relation of means to end, etc. In the development of man's natural faculties, *æstimativa* becomes *cogitativa*, 'understanding,' particular or empirical reasoning, inference from particular to particular, or from a series of particulars to a new case of the same kind, still without any conception of general principles, or intuition of the universal and necessary. It is only when the intellect or reason comes into action that this further step is taken, and knowledge in the true sense of the word—'science'—begins (see A. D. Sertillanges, *S. Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris, 1910, vol. ii. bk. v. ch. iii. f.).

In the long and still unsettled controversy as to the relation between animal and human soul and intelligence, the question—theological dogma apart—has turned upon: (1) psychological analysis; is there a difference in kind between the functions referred to, as Aquinas supposes, or a difference only of degree or complexity? (2) observed facts and their interpretation; do animals give evidence of behaviour the same in kind as that which in ourselves we term intelligent? Philosophical and scientific as well as theological bias made sometimes the one, sometimes the other, view prevail; but at the present day there can be no doubt that a large majority of psychologists, and a still larger majority of students of animal behaviour, would decide for difference of degree, not of kind, between animal and human intelligence.

2. Instinct, intelligence, reason.—In the ordinary usage, an animal or a child is called 'intelligent' when it seems to appreciate what is wanting in a given situation or given circumstances, quickly adopts some method of supplying the want, and, where one method fails, attempts others. Where such a power, however, is shown to be present without any previous experience of similar situations, it is referred either to *instinct* or, it may be, to *reason*.

Instinctive action in an organism is the product of a special structure, provided at birth, practically independent of experience, adapted to a special class of situation, and to that only; the reaction is, therefore, adequate, if not always perfect, the first time of asking; examples are the different forms of nest-building and the care of the young, the pursuit, recognition, and method of capture of prey, the recognition and avoidance of enemies, etc. If failure occurs, it is absolute, except that there are occasionally alternative reactions provided for special forms of a situation. On the other hand, reason, it is said, may achieve the same efficiency as instinct, with the same immediacy, and without experience of similar situations, by the direct perception of the causal relations involved; it is a general power, adapted to any kind of situation, and not tied down, as an instinct is, to a single class. In most cases, however, when a new contingency arises, the actions of an animal are not immediately effective; it appears to act blindly, with many fruitless efforts, until, by accident, as it appears, the right action may be hit upon, after a longer or shorter series of trials or essays. If the animal is again placed in the same predicament, it does not at once adopt the method by which it previously succeeded, but acts somewhat less at random, and usually lights upon the correct action in a shorter time or with fewer trials; ultimately, all unnecessary and inappropriate acts are omitted, and the one effective action is immediately adopted. This has been termed the 'method of trial and error,' and under its formula all individual learning, in man as well as in animals, may be brought. Animal species, and individuals in the same species, differ in the time or number of trials required to learn the same action, in the number of different actions they may learn, in the complexity of situation they can meet, in the extent to which previous experience is applied in new contingencies, and the like. Man's reason is itself an extension of the same process, and there are close approximations to it in the apes and other higher animals. But, while there is no ground for distinguishing between reason and intelligence, instinct and intelligence must be regarded as different in kind. They are not alternatives to each other, or different ways of achieving the same end, or 'lower' and 'higher' forms of action, or the like. Instincts provide the material on which intelligence builds; the intelligence of an animal is always limited and conditioned by its structure and habits, *i.e.* its instincts; intelligence develops progressively as the instincts become more numerous and more complicated. On the other hand, there is probably no species of animal which has instinct only, without intelligence, *i.e.* without any capacity to learn by experience. The method of trial and error has been found, by Jennings and others, as low as the protozoa. In the development of the individual also, instinct and intelligence are concurrent from the beginning, but intelligence is progressive, while instinct is stationary: hence in the adult of the higher animal species, and especially in man, the primitive instincts are so buried beneath the accretions of intelligence that the dependence of the latter upon them is apt to be ignored.

3. Analysis of intelligence.—What are the mental qualities involved in learning by experience? If we take the classical instance of the burnt child dreading the fire, we have to distinguish between the first and the later experiences of the situation. In the first an object is perceived, which the child instinctively feels to be pleasing, and the instinctive reaction of grasping results; this is immediately followed in the supposed case by a strong sensation of pain, for which a reflex or instinctive withdrawal of the hand is provided. If there were no intelligence, the same series of impressions and acts would be repeated as often as the situation arose, with damaging results. How does any change take place through intelligence? The simplest assumption, that the child sees the fire to be the *cause* of the pain, and avoids it in

consequence, is ruled out for numberless instances of such learning, although it may occasionally hold for a given child or animal in a given case. Let us suppose, then, that on the second experience the sight of the fire leads as before to the stretching out of the hand, that this associatively calls up in memory the painful sensation of the burn, and this in turn the actual drawing back of hand and arm, the net result being that, if the association is rapid, the hand is drawn back almost before it begins to move. For this to be possible we require initial sensitiveness and mobility, retentiveness of the impression, and associative recall, but above all intensity and *unity* of attention: the experience must have been appreciated as a single whole, otherwise the associative current would not run from 'fire' to 'grasp,' from 'grasp' to 'pain,' etc., but might be turned off at 'grasp' to any other of the hundreds of grasping experiences. This comprehensiveness of attention is the essential thing in intelligence; on it depends the number of trials required in the trial and error method before success is achieved; on it depends also the transition from concrete to abstract imagery and thought. Abstraction is the power of neglecting the irrelevant and concentrating on the important features of a situation, whether in perception, in memory, or in thought, i.e. it is a process of attention. In its turn, attention depends on the degree of sensitiveness of the individual, his quickness of reaction, and, at higher levels, his retentiveness and the strength of his interests, instinctive or acquired. It may be said, in short, that the intelligence of an individual is the degree of his ability to learn, and to apply what he has learned, and that this depends on his whole mental endowment. It is, therefore, absurd to ask whether animals have 'intelligence.' If they have any form of mental experience—sensation, *e.g.*, and no one denies this even of the lowest—then they have also intelligence. The task of comparative psychology is to determine the conditions of intelligent adaptation in different animals and in the child, to reconstruct the scheme of mental evolution and development, parallel to the scheme of physical evolution and development which biology already has within its grasp.

4. **Special problems.**—How complex the nature of 'intelligence' is may be seen by a perusal of the literature, already extensive, on two very modern problems—that of 'formal discipline,' and that of 'tests of intelligence.' The former is the question whether intelligence is a *general* power, which can be turned at will from one subject to another; whether high ability in one sphere is or tends to be accompanied by high ability in other spheres; whether improvement in any kind of mental ability carries with it improvement in other and different mental abilities, etc.; the probability being that intelligence is almost as specialized as memory, that ability in one subject gives no ground for inferring ability even in a closely similar subject, and that improvement in one subject carries with it improved ability in others only so far as these others involve the same forms of perception, attention, etc. The second problem is that of finding a scientific and tractable substitute for the teacher's or doctor's rough classification (and rougher tests) of children in regard to their intelligence—'bright,' 'average,' 'poor,' 'dull,' 'backward,' 'defective,' 'feeble-minded,' etc. What is generally agreed upon is that the most objective classification of children is by a comparison of the 'mental' with the 'physical' age; that for this an average mental ability for each physical age must be determinable; that the tests used in fixing the average, and in proving each child, must be of several kinds for each age, and must be graded for different ages, more difficult as the age is higher. But sex, social rank of family, school training, race, country, and many other factors are found to interfere with the projected average or standard, and experimenters are still far from united in agreement upon the tests suitable for each age.

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INTEMPERANCE.—See DRUNKENNESS.

INTENTION (Theological).—

A sacrament involves some action of a minister, having a special significance; and, since the significance of a human action may depend in part upon the intention with which it is performed, it was inevitable that in the progress of theology a question should be raised whether a proper intention in the minister is requisite for the spiritual validity of a sacrament; if so, the nature of that intention would have to be considered.

In the Eastern Church this question has been generally avoided; a sacrament is regarded as an act of the Church at large; the *πρόθεσις* of which theologians speak is the purpose or spiritual meaning of the appointed rite, and the minister's only function is to exhibit that rite integrally. This applies even to the sacrament of marriage, in which, since it consists materially in the consent of the contracting parties, there is special room, because of the nature of a contract, for inquiry into their intention and the genuineness of their consent. Some systems of law will annul a marriage on the ground of defective consent, even when all formalities have been ostensibly fulfilled; but the Canon Law of the Eastern Church allows no such objection to be raised against a marriage publicly contracted with the blessing of the Church.

In the Western Church, however, a different theory and practice followed upon the final rejection of St. Cyprian's teaching about the baptism of heretics. When it was admitted that baptism administered by persons separated from the Church was possibly valid, the sacrament could no longer be regarded exclusively as a public act of the Church. It was then necessary to inquire whether a particular baptism was valid. The Easterns evade the difficulty by accepting such baptism *κατ' οἰκονομίαν*, in which case the consent of the Church is supposed to supply whatever may have been lacking; but the trend of Western theology and practice has always been to treat such baptism as absolutely valid if the necessary conditions are fulfilled, or otherwise as absolutely invalid. Inquiry into the conditions of validity was, therefore, necessary, and the practice of such inquiry spread from baptism to other sacraments.

In his *de Baptismo* (vii. 53), Augustine considers several questions about the *animus* with

which baptism is received as affecting the validity of the sacrament; and more incidentally, as though of less importance, he considers the *animus* of the minister: 'Quid enim prosit animus veraciter dantis fallaciter accipienti non video.' Taking the case where both alike 'fallaciter agunt in ipsa unitate catholica,' he asks: 'An plus valent ad confirmandum sacramentum illi veraces inter quos agitur, quam ad frustrandum illi fallaces a quibus agitur, et in quibus agitur?' In reply, he appeals to the practice of the Church: 'Si postea prodatur, nemo repetit, sed aut excommunicando punitur illa simulatio aut poenitendo sanatur.' His own opinion he was unwilling to give where there was no express conciliar decision; but in council he would be disposed to support the proposition: 'Habere eos baptismum qui ubicunque et a quibuscunque illud verbis evangelicis consecratum sine sua simulatione et cum aliqua fide accepissent.' This seems to exclude the notion that the *animus dantis* can affect the integrity of the sacrament; only the *simulatio* of the recipient or his complete lack of faith can mar it if administered in due form *verbis evangelicis*.

The general acceptance of this judgment is proved by the probably fictitious story of the actor Geneslus, baptized in mockery on the stage. Augustine (*loc. cit.*) glances at the currency of such stories, and shows a curious reluctance to give any opinion on the case 'ubi totum ludicre et mimice et joculariter ageretur.' The story told by Sozomen (ii. 17) of Athanasius baptizing boys in play is less to the point, since it is implied that the children, though in play, had a more or less serious intention of doing what they had seen done in the Church.

The judgment of Augustine long prevailed. Nicholas I. (858–67; *Resp. ad Bulg.* 104) ruled that persons reported to have been baptized by a Jew, 'si in nomine sanctae Trinitatis vel tantum in Christi nomine . . . baptizati sunt,' are validly baptized, no question being raised about the intention of the minister. It should be observed that he presses (cap. 3) the necessity of *consensus* for a valid marriage, but without any indication that he would allow the intention underlying a publicly expressed consent to be called in question. In the early scholastics of the 12th cent. a contrary opinion appears. Hugh of St. Victor (*Sumn. Sent.* v. 9) requires 'ut forma sacramenti servetur et intentio illud celebrandi habeatur.' Peter Lombard (iv. 6. 5) follows him, and the great vogue of the *Libri Sententiarum* made the doctrine dominant. The nature of the requisite intention, however, was not yet defined. William of Auxerre (*In iv. Sent.* iv. 7) seems to have been the first to adopt the phrase 'intentio faciendi quod facit ecclesia.' Albertus Magnus (*In iv. Sent.* iv. 6. 11) limited this by adding 'licet non credat hoc aliquid valere.' He held that the intention of performing the rite of the Church, indicated by the use of the ordinary form, is sufficient, even if the minister does not believe the rite to have any spiritual effect; and he used this to meet the objection that the minister might maliciously withhold his intention, and so invalidate the sacrament. Sinibaldo Fieschi, afterwards Innocent IV., in his commentary on the Decretals (iii. 42. 2), went further:

'Non est necesse quod baptizans . . . gerat in mente facere quod facit ecclesia, imo si contrarium gereret in mente, sc. non facere quod facit ecclesia, sed tamen facit quia formam servat, nihilominus baptizatus est, dummodo baptizare intendat . . . licet non credat ipsum posse aliquid operari.'

He denied that *specialis intentio* was necessary, and this was the intention to produce the *effect* of the sacrament, as the *Compend. theol. veritatis*, doubtfully attributed to Innocent V., has it (vi. 9): 'ut iste baptizandus mundetur.' Thomas Aquinas, however, stiffened the requirement, saying (*Opusc. iv. de Sacram.*): 'Si minister sacramenti non intendit sacramentum conficere, non perficitur sacramentum,' and strengthening the current formula into 'intentio conferendi et faciendi quod facit ecclesia.' Elsewhere he further defines the purport of the intention; Christ is the 'principal agent' in the sacramental action, and the minister must act as the representative of Christ; therefore 'requiritur eius intentio qua se subiiciat principali agenti, ut scilicet intendat facere quod facit Christus et ecclesia.' But to the objection that all certainty about the sacrament is thus destroyed, since no man's intention can be known, he replies:

'Minister sacramenti agit in persona totius ecclesiae, cuius est minister; in verbis autem, quae profert, exprimitur intentio ecclesiae, quae sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti, nisi contrarium exterius exprimatur ex parte ministri vel recipientis sacramentum' (*Summa Theol.* iii. 64. 8).

This seems to deprive of all importance what he calls *mentalis intentio*, and we are back at the position of Augustine, except that a *contrary* intention openly expressed by the minister would invalidate the sacrament. A merely *defective* intention would do no harm; it must be positive and avowed. A *iocosa intentio*, however, 'cum aliquis non intendit sacramentum conferre, sed derisorie aliquid agere,' makes no sacrament; he adds, 'praecipue quando suam intentionem exterius manifestat' (*ib.* 10). The case in view is clearly a mimic representation. These same conclusions, supported by the similar teaching of Bonaventura, became dominant in the schools until the 16th century.

In the meantime the Scholastic doctrine was finding its way into dogmatic decrees. In the profession of faith imposed by Innocent III. on converted Waldensians, it is said that for a valid Eucharist is required 'fidelis intentio proferentis' (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*[11], Freiburg, 1911, no. 424). In the dogmatic definition of the 4th Lateran, cap. i., where something of the kind might be expected, there is nothing. At the Council of Florence, Eugenius IV., in his *Decr. pro Armenis*, adopted the language of the *Opusc. iv.* of Thomas Aquinas almost intact, for this as for other matters.

Luther made a brief and contemptuous reference to the Scholastic doctrine in the treatise *de Bab. Capt.* (ch. 'de Sacr. Baptismi'), citing the 'exemplum de quodam mimo per iocum baptizato.' Maintaining the position that the sacraments operate as visible signs of the grace of God rousing faith in the recipient, so that 'non in conferentis tantum quantum in suscipientis fide vel usu sita est virtus baptismi,' he brushed aside the whole discussion about the intention of the minister. His bold treatment of *iocosa intentio* had a large place in subsequent controversy, but as used by adversaries rather than as developed by his followers. One of the propositions extracted from his writings for condemnation by Leo X. was: 'Si per impossibile confessus non esset contritus, aut sacerdos non serio, sed ioco absolveret; si tamen credat se absolutum, verissime est absolutus.' The silence on this head of the Augustana, and of the Saxon Confession presented to the Council of Trent, is significant. The *Conf. Helvetica* (ch. xix. sect. 11), however, expressly excludes from the conditions requisite for a valid sacrament administration 'a consecrato, et qui habeat intentionem consecrandi.' Calvin's austere conception of the operation of the sacraments as exclusively divine, and resting on the eternal decrees, left no room for any effect to flow from the intention of the minister.

Ambrosius Catharinus, in a treatise *de Int. Ministr. Sacr.*, re-stated the Scholastic doctrine with an important difference. Maintaining with Thomas Aquinas that the requisite intention is secured positively by the serious use of the external forms appointed in the Church, he denied that the minister could by any individual intention of his own, however contradictory, destroy the effect of those forms. Thus he excluded from validity only a mimic or derisory representation

of a sacrament; the only intention required of the minister is the intention seriously to use the appointed rite. Pallavicino (ix. 6) asserts that the Council of Trent did not repudiate this teaching, though the language of sess. xiv. 6, denying the effect of absolution, 'si . . . sacerdoti animus serio agendi *et vere absolvendi* desit,' seems to look that way. In sess. vii. can. 11, the Council condemned the opinion, 'non requiri intentionem saltem faciendi quod facit ecclesia,' without further specification. The opinion of Catharinus, however, carried little weight; the contrary opinion, exaggerated by controversy so as to lay additional stress on the internal intention of the minister, had more vogue, running at length to its extreme statement in the words of J. B. Franzelin (*de Sacr. in Gen.*, ed. 1888, p. 225):

'Minister *extrinsecus simulans etiam iocum*, adhibendo tamen legitimam materiam et formam *cum interna intentione*, sacramentum conficeret.'

Controversy turned chiefly on this point, it being said that the sacraments were thus robbed of all assurance. Jewel, in his Reply to Harding (Parker Soc., i. [Cambridge, 1845] 139), used a phrase which became classic:

'This is the very dungeon of uncertainty. The heart of man is unsearchable. If we stay upon the intention of a mortal man, we may stand in doubt of our own baptism.'

Hooker (v. 58) fell back upon the position of Thomas, quoting, however, by preference the canonist Lancelot:

'The known intent of the Church generally doth suffice, and, where the contrary is not manifest, we may presume that he which outwardly doth the work, hath inwardly the purpose of the Church of God.'

The peril indicated by Jewel compelled defenders of the doctrine to diminish their demands; and Bellarmine (*de Sacr. in Gen.* i. 27) said almost the last word on this side:

'Non est opus intendere quod facit ecclesia Romana, sed quod facit vera ecclesia, quaecumque illa sit, vel quod Christus instituit, vel quod faciunt Christiani.'

Towards the end of the 17th cent. the teaching of Catharinus was once more brought up. There were stories current of a priest who declared that he had habitually perverted his interior intention when baptizing, and of a bishop who had done the same when ordaining, and relief was sought from the implied consequences. This relief was denied by a decree of Alexander VIII. in 1690, condemning among others the proposition:

'Valet baptismus collatus a ministro, qui omnem ritum externum formamque baptizandi observat, intus vero in corde suo apud se resolvit: Non intendo quod facit ecclesia.'

This authoritative locking of the 'dungeon of uncertainty' was resisted by some Thomist theologians, notably by J. H. Serry (*Ambrosii Catharini Vindiciæ*, Patavium, 1727); but the more exigent teaching prevailed, chiefly through the influence of Benedict XIV. and the Jesuit schools, until recent times. Thomism revived under the encouragement of Leo XIII., and in his bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* that pontiff laid down a principle which in practical effect differs little from that of Catharinus:

'De mente vel intentione, utpote quae per se quiddam est interius, ecclesia non iudicat: at quatenus extra proditur, iudicare de ea debet. Iamvero cum quis ad sacramentum conficiendum et conferendum materiam formamque debitam serio ac rite adhibuit, eo ipso censetur id nimirum facere intendisse quod facit ecclesia.'

This seems to bring the authentic teaching of the Roman Church exactly into line with that of Hooker (see above), and the conclusion may be held judicious.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the article.

T. A. LACEY.

INTERCESSION.—1. Connotation of the term.—The word is now usually restricted in its application to (*a*) pleading for others, as when a favour is asked for another from a fellowman; (*b*) praying for others, as when blessings are sought for another from God. When it is used of the intercession of Christ, it has a wider significance, and expresses the more general idea of (*c*) acting for others.

On the varying connotation of 'intercession' light is cast by its derivation and by the history of the Greek and Hebrew words of which it is the translation.

(1) *Intercessio* (*inter*, 'between,' and *cedere*, 'to pass' or 'to go') denotes (*a*) a passing between, as, *e.g.*, an intervening period of time. Hence, in 16th and 17th cent. writers 'intercession' is equivalent to 'intercessation'—a meaning now obsolete. Latimer could write: 'We must call upon God without intercession' (*OED* v. 386); (*b*) a going between, as, *e.g.*, the intervention of a mediator who strives to reconcile those who are at variance. The functions of a go-between may, however, differ greatly. The right of veto acquired by the Roman tribunes of the people was known as *intercessio*. These tribunes could forbid the carrying out both of the resolutions of the *senatus*, or deliberative assembly, and of the decrees of the *comitia*, or legislative assembly. Referring to a statute which the senators could not oppose by argument, C. Merivale says: 'They gained one of the tribunes to intercede against it' (*Fall of the Roman Republic*, London, 1853, viii. 216). The connexion of thought must, therefore, determine whether the intervention is *for* or *against*. But it is in accord with the tendency to limit the meaning of 'intercession' to an appeal for a favour that in Ro 11^2 the RV reads 'how he [Elijah] pleadeth with God against Israel,' instead of 'how he maketh intercession,' etc. (AV).

(2) In the NT 'intercession' is once (1 Ti 2^1) the translation of ἔντευξις, which is also once (1 Ti 4^5) rendered 'prayer.' The corresponding verb (ἐντυγχάνειν, 'to fall in with,' 'to have an interview with') is four times translated 'to make intercession' (Ro $8^{26.\ 27.\ 34}$, He 7^{25}). In Ro 11^2 the rendering is 'to plead with,' and in Ac 25^{24} 'to make suit to.' In his note on the last cited passage, F. Field (*Notes on the Translation of the NT*, Cambridge, 1899, p. 140 f.) gives quotations from Greek writers which show that frequently the idea of a personal interview seems to be required. In 2 Mac 4^8 the RV 'at an audience' is an improvement upon the AV 'by intercession,' for the reference is to 'a confidential interview, face to face, between Jason and Antiochus' (cf. R. C. Trench, *Synonyms of the NT*[11], London, 1890, p. 190). The root idea of ἔντευξις is, therefore, not prayer for others, but familiar intercourse such as obtains when confidential relationships are established, as between parent and child. In 1 Ti 4^5 'prayer' is the only possible translation, but it should also be noted that in EV 'intercession' is found (Jer 27^{18} 36^{25}) when the petition has no reference to another's benefit. It is by a natural and suggestive transition of thought that ἔντευξις, which means prayer regarded as personal communion, familiar heart converse, should come to signify prayer regarded as supplication for others. The expression of this aspect of prayer is not, however, limited to this word; it is often represented by adding qualifying clauses to one or other of the synonyms for prayer.

(3) In the OT the subject of 'intercession' has great prominence, though the English word is of rare occurrence in EV. (*a*) The Hebrew verb פגע is translated 'to make intercession' in Jer 7^{16} 27^{18} 36^{25}, Is 53^{12}, and the corresponding noun is rendered 'intercessor' in Is 59^{16}. This verb is closely related in meaning to ἐντυγχάνειν and signifies 'to encounter,' hence 'to encounter with a request.' In two passages the context makes it plain that the meaning is 'to pray for others' (on Jer 27^{18} 36^{25}, cf. (2) above). In Jer 7^{16} 'pray not for this

people' is parallel to, and synonymous with, 'neither make intercession to me'; in Is 53[12] a defining clause is added: 'he made intercession for the transgressors.' (*b*) The Hebrew verb most frequently employed to express the idea of prayer for others is פָּגַע, 'to intervene.' Typical examples of its use are found in passages referring to the prayer of Abraham for Abimelech (Gn 20[7. 17]), of Moses for Aaron (Dt 9[20]), of Moses for the people (Dt 9[26]), and of Job for his friends (Job 42[8]). (*c*) Another verb which sometimes expresses the same idea is עָתַר. By most modern lexicographers it is connected with an Arabic root signifying 'to sacrifice,' and its earliest associations are with sacred rites. The usual rendering is 'to entreat,' and often the entreaty is for others. In Ex 8[8f. 28f.] 9[28] 10[17] this verb is six times used of the prayers of Moses and Aaron for Pharaoh; in Gn 25[21] it refers to Isaac's prayer for his wife, and in 2 S 24[25] to David's prayer for Israel.

2. Intercessory prayer.—When 'intercession' is defined as prayer for others, it is obvious that the objections raised against prayer in general apply to intercessory prayer. Indeed, the mystery which attaches to prayer of all kinds reaches its climax in prayer for another's blessing (cf. art. PRAYER). But the efficacy of intercession has been generally admitted by theists. Such controversy as existed in pre-Christian times was rather as to the nature of the gods than as to the propriety of invoking their aid.

'We may not say that the efficacy of prayer was admitted by *all* ancient Theists, but it does seem that this doctrine was not denied by any whose theology rendered its admission possible' (J. H. Jellett, *The Efficacy of Prayer* [Donnellan Lectures], Dublin, 1878, p. xxi).

It is held to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of Epicureanism that it rendered prayer nugatory (cf. Cicero, *de Nat. Deor.* i. 44). In Origen's treatise on Prayer (i. 186 ff., Benedictine ed.) the denial of the efficacy of prayer by later sceptics is represented as 'a necessary result of their fundamental principles.' In all ages men who have had knowledge of God have regarded it as a reasonable inference that to Him they might 'lift hands of prayer both for themselves and those who call them friend' (Tennyson, *Morte d'Arthur*). In this respect systems of religion agree, notwithstanding differences in many important particulars.

'Prayer is, and has ever been, an element of every system of Theism—of the polytheism of the Greeks and Romans, no less than of the monotheism of the Jews—of the religious systems of Zoroaster and of Mahomet no less than of the religion of Christ. The spirit of prayer breathes through the hymns to Indra and Varuna no less really than through the Psalms of David' (Jellett, 87 *f.*).

The conception of intercessory prayer, like the idea of prayer in general, presupposes not only a doctrine of God, but also a doctrine of man and of his relation to his fellowmen. That relation is best described by the word 'solidarity.' An intercessor is one with those for whom he pleads, and yet he differs from them in that he is nearer to God. The qualification for the work of intercession is twofold.

'The more eminent the great heroes of the Bible are for holiness of life, the more intensely do they realise their oneness with the people whose pastors and priests they are, and take upon themselves the burden of their nation's transgressions and sins' (Bersier, *Solidarity of Humanity*, quoted by D. W. Simon, *The Redemption of Man*[2], London, 1906, p. 334).

To make intercession for the nation was alike the duty and the privilege of the priests of Israel. Only once during a priest's lifetime could it fall to his lot to enter the holy place as intercessor for the people. The incense he offered there was the symbol of Israel's prayers presented with his own (Ex 40[27], Lk 1[9]; cf. Ps 141[1], Rev 5[8] 7[3f.]). Once a year also the high priest exercised the highest function of his office when he entered the Holy of Holies; having first made atonement for his own sins, he became the people's representative, and in him the entire nation had access to God (Lv 16[13]).

In the history of Israel it is the prophets who most frequently act as intercessors. Moses, Aaron, and Samuel are singled out as pre-eminent in this regard (Ps 99[6], Jer 15[1]). So intense was Samuel's sense of obligation that he described neglect of the duty of praying for others as 'sin against the Lord' (1 S 12[23]). 'Pray for us' was the request made to Jeremiah by Zedekiah (Jer 37[3]), and again by 'all the people' (Jer 42[2]).

'Practically all the intercessory prayers of the OT are offered either by prophets or by men such as Abraham and Job—whom later ages idealized as prophets.' As a rule their intercessions were for the nation they loved, but occasionally the petitions have a wider range. 'Jeremiah, for example, urges the exiles [Jer 29[7]] to pray to Jehovah for Babylon and to seek her welfare . . . and Darius, in his decree [Ezr 6[10]], desires the prayers of the Jews for himself and his dynasty' (J. E. McFadyen, *The Prayers of the Bible*, London, 1906, p. 58 ff.).

Intercessory prayer has the sanction of our Lord's example during His earthly ministry. He 'continued all night in prayer to God' before selecting the twelve Apostles (Lk 6[12]). That His prayer included intercessions is a reasonable inference, as well from His petitions for His disciples on the eve of His departure from the world as from His supplication for Peter in anticipation of the hour when that disciple's faith would be sifted (Lk 22[32]). At the grave of Lazarus His words of thanksgiving for prayer heard and answered, according to the Father's wont, point to a habit of intercession (Jn 11[41f.]), such as makes it natural for Him to use almost His latest breath in praying for His enemies (Lk 23[34]). The command, 'Pray for them that despitefully use you' (Lk 6[28]), falls from His lips with the authority of the teacher and Lord who could say of this grace, as of all others, 'I have given you an example that ye should do as I have done' (Jn 13[15]). The true spirit of intercession breathes in the pattern prayer (Mt 6[9ff.]). Our Lord teaches His disciples that they

'should not pray as atomistic individuals, not "singly," but as *members* of human society, of the believing Church, of the kingdom' (H. Martensen, *Christian Ethics*, i. [*Individual*], Edinburgh, 1881, p. 180).

T. von Haering rightly finds a sufficient warrant for intercession in the '*Our* Father' of the Lord's Prayer:

'"Our" and "us" instead of the natural "my" and "me" is for the Christian a really natural utterance. This faith in the Father cannot exist without love to the brethren, both to those who really are so and to those who may presently become so. . . . Love would not be Christian love if it were not true of it, "I am responsible in God's sight for my love." When intercessory prayer is taken in this obvious way, the objection need not arise . . . that intercession is an interference with our neighbours' freedom and with God's arrangements. The Christian idea of the Kingdom of God, which it is the purpose of its Creator and Builder to build by earthly means, transcends these objections. The task of each co-worker with God (1 Co 3[9]) is to be faithful in the exercise of his influence on others outside, and in his intercession as the motive power of his work for them. And both are done in humility' (*The Ethics of the Christian Life*, Eng. tr., London, 1909, p. 288).

St. Paul has the mind of Christ when he exhorts, 'first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, thanksgivings be made for all men' (1 Ti 2[1]). The obligation to pray for others does not, however, depend upon the single word 'intercessions.' If ἐντεύξεις be translated 'petitions,' the clause 'for all men' still qualifies the four synonyms for prayer. Manifold as are the kinds of prayer, all men are to have the benefit of them. The prayers of St. Paul for his converts are the fervent outpourings of a heart that longed to share with others the fullness of the blessings of the gospel of Christ. Surprise has been expressed at the absence from his Epistles of allusions to prayer for the heathen; the explanation is that

'Such prayers are really involved in his prayers for the success of the gospel and in his requests for the similar prayers of others' (McFadyen, p. 153).

But, if *laborare est orare*, then the entire life of this strenuous missionary was a continual prayer that all men might 'know the grace of God in truth' (Col 1^6).

As to the value of intercessory prayer there is little difference in theory amongst those who believe in the efficacy of prayer at all. But in practice many Christians fail to imitate the example of Christ and of the Apostolic Church. Nevertheless,

'the test of the purity of our petitionary prayers is whether they contain *intercession*. This shows if the individual be concerned about the whole kingdom of God. Without intercession, prayer becomes egoistic, the view and the heart narrow. When piety lacks expansion, it also lacks intensive force. And then our prayer is not prayer in the name of Jesus, our Head' (I. A. Dorner, *System of Christian Ethics*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1887, p. 147).

Gore addresses an irresistible appeal to Evangelicals, urging them to 'emphasize this priesthood of the whole body in its rich positive meaning' (in *Priesthood and Sacrifice*, ed. Sanday, London, 1900, p. 148). All who believe in the universal priesthood of believers should give intercession a prominent place in their private devotions and in public worship. Every member of the kingdom of priests should realize that on him rests a positive obligation to obtain for himself and for others in intercourse with God those blessings which, under the old dispensation, it was the purpose of the priest's intercession in the holy place to obtain for the people.

3. The intercession of Christ.—The NT teaches that Christ's intercession is not confined to His earthly life. 'Jesus Christ the righteous' is now our 'Advocate with the Father' (1 Jn 2^1; cf. art. ADVOCATE). The climax of St. Paul's argument before he triumphantly inquires, 'Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?' is the statement that He who has all power 'at the right hand of God' in His compassion 'also maketh intercession for us' (Ro 8^{34}f.). But the fullest exposition of this truth is in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Contrasting our great High Priest with the Levitical high priest, the writer of this Epistle declares that no defilement unfitted Christ for His sacred ministry. As a Son He was perfected for evermore, and had no need either to offer for His own sins or to repeat His sacrifice made once for all when He offered up Himself. B. F. Westcott shows that the fulfilment of the Levitical type by Christ takes three forms: (1) He intercedes for men as their present representative before God (He 7^{25}ff. 9^{24}); (2) He brings man's prayers to God (He 13^{15}); (3) He secures access for man to God (He 4^{16} 10^{19}ff.).

'The modern conception of Christ pleading in heaven His Passion, "offering His blood," on behalf of men has no foundation in the Epistle. His glorified humanity is the eternal pledge of the absolute efficacy of His accomplished work. He pleads, as older writers truly expressed the thought, by His Presence on the Father's Throne. Meanwhile men on earth in union with Him enjoy continually through His Blood what was before the privilege of one man on one day in the year' (B. F. Westcott, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, London, 1892, p. 230).

A. J. Tait discusses the subject fully in *The Heavenly Session of our Lord* (London, 1912), rightly insisting (p. ix) that

'it is as King that Christ is also Priest, it is as seated on the Throne that He intercedes.'

The Session of our Lord signifies the cessation of propitiatory offering, and therefore the intercession of Christ is not to be conceived as a continual process of propitiation.

'Propitiatory sacrifice and offering are alike over: the Intercession, consisting in the Presence of Christ on the Throne, is continual' (Tait, p. 151).

Discussion has arisen as to whether or not the intercession of the Son is to be understood as made through words. A. B. Davidson (*Handbooks for Bible Classes*, 'Hebrews,' Edinburgh, n.d., p. 142, note on He 7^{25}) takes the negative view; but he makes a suggestion which approximates to the positive view when he refers to the example of Christ (Jn 17):

'He interceded in human speech to God in the days of His flesh, and translating this into the modes of heavenly communion, so far as we can imagine them, we may form some conception of it.'

In our Lord's intercessory prayer it is important to note the significance of the simple past tenses which the RV substitutes for the perfect tenses of the AV. Our Lord is already in thought at the right hand of the Father when He says: 'I glorified thee on the earth,' etc.

'The words of the prayer belong at least in spirit to that upper sanctuary. They are the concentration of all the prayers of the heavenly Intercessor, as He bore on earth, as He bears now, and will bear for ever, the wants of His people before the Father, who is both able and willing to supply them' (W. Milligan, *The Ascension and Heavenly Priesthood of our Lord*[2], London, 1901, p. 156).

Milligan also gives expression to a needed caution when he reminds us that the intercession of Christ is not to be interpreted 'as if He were asking aid from an external source' (p. 153). If this be borne in mind, the idea of the intercession of Christ may be extended so as to include every way in which He acts for others (cf. art. MEDIATION).

4. The intercession of the Holy Spirit.—'Advocate' is a title of the Holy Spirit as well as of Christ, and to the Holy Spirit the work of intercession is ascribed. He is 'our Advocate within,' and, like Him who is our 'Advocate with the Father,' He is 'touched with the feeling of our infirmities.' St. Paul assures us that

'the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity: for we know not how to pray as we ought; but the Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered; and he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, that he maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God' (Ro 8^{26}f.).

The spirit of true prayer is identified with the voice of the Divine Spirit in man.

'There are times when we cannot pray in words, or pray as we ought; but our inarticulate longings for a better life are the Spirit's intercessions on our behalf, audible to God who searches all hearts, and intelligible and acceptable to Him since they are the voice of His Spirit, and it is according to His will that the Spirit should intercede for the members of His Son' (H. B. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the NT*, London, 1909, p. 221).

In the verses just quoted (Ro 8^{26}f., cf. v.[16]) the Spirit of God is distinguished from the spirit of man, even when in the mystery of prayer His relations with the human consciousness are most intimate. When the Christian is oppressed with the weight of 'this unintelligible world' (cf. v.[22]), when he longs for light to shine on its perplexities and for deliverance from its evils, when in his ignorance he fails to express his spirit's yearnings in words, even then he is not alone, for he has the sympathy of a Divine friend.

'Perhaps the best periphrasis of "Paraclete" for modern readers would be "*the Friend in Need*"' (E. A. Abbott, *Paradosis*, London, 1904, p. 188).

There is One whose intercessions are prompted by perfect knowledge of the blessing that is really desired; His inarticulate petitions are understood by the Searcher of hearts, for His 'mind' is ever in accord with the Father's will. It is the idea of 'representation' which is common to the intercession of Christ and the intercession of the Holy Spirit.

'Jesus glorified represents us before the Father's Throne; the Holy Spirit abiding with us represents in us Jesus gone to the Father.' The Holy Spirit 'brings the Redeemer in such a manner home into our hearts that, in the innermost depths of our nature, we see and judge and feel with Him; that His requests for us become our prayers for ourselves; and that the unity of Father, Son, and redeemed humanity is in Him completely realised' (Milligan, p. 159 *f.*).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works referred to in the art., F. Buhl, 'Gebet im Alten Testamente' in *PRE*[3] vi. 393 *f.*; E. von der Goltz, *Das Gebet in der ältesten Christenheit*, Leipzig, 1901; D. G. Monrad, *The World of Prayer*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1879; W. B. Pope, *The Prayers of St. Paul*, London, 1876; L. Andrewes, *Preces Privatæ*, tr. F. E. Brightman, do. 1903 (gives 'Reflections before Intercession' and 'Schemes of general and particular Intercession,' p. 263 ff.); A. J. Worl-

ledge, *Prayer*, do. 1902; D. Stone and D. C. Simpson, *Communion with God*, Edinburgh, 1911; J. G. James, *The Prayer Life, its Philosophy and Practice*, London, 1912; W. A. Cornaby, *Prayer and the Human Problem*, do. 1912; W. T. Davison, *The Indwelling Spirit*, do. 1911.

J. G. TASKER.

INTERCESSION (Liturgical).—The custom of offering intercessions at the Eucharist seems to have been universal, at any rate from the middle of the 2nd cent. onwards. It would doubtless be considered the best way of carrying out St. Paul's injunction to Timothy 'that supplications, prayers, intercessions, thanksgivings (δεήσεις, προσευχάς, ἐντεύξεις, εὐχαριστίας) be made for all men' (1 Ti 2[1]), whether the εὐχαριστίαι were interpreted as having any reference to the Eucharist or not. We accordingly find that intercessions formed part of the Eucharistic service at least from the time of Justin (*c.* A.D. 150), and that in the 4th and 5th centuries they were developed into three different forms, of which two still remain in all liturgies.

1. Second and third centuries.—We do not get much information on the subject from the *Didache*. If the prayers there given are those used for the Eucharist proper, the only approach to an intercession is in the prayer over the 'broken bread' (κλάσμα), and in the thanksgiving 'after being satisfied,' where there are clauses praying for the gathering in and protection of the Church (§ 9 f.). If, as is suggested in art. AGAPE, they are the Agape prayers, while those for the Eucharist proper were extemporaneous, we cannot tell how far the feature of intercession was introduced. Justin Martyr, however, is explicit. In describing the baptismal Eucharist (*Apol.* i. 65), he says that after the newly-baptized is brought 'to the place where those who are called brethren are assembled,' they offer 'hearty prayers in common (κοιναὶ εὐχαί) for themselves and the newly-baptized (illuminated) person, and for all others in every place.' Then follow the Kiss of Peace and the Offertory, bread and the mixed cup being brought to the president, who 'gives praise and glory . . . and offers thanks at considerable length.' Justin adds that, 'when [the president] has concluded the prayers and thanksgivings, all reply Amen'; and the administration by the deacons follows. So in the description of the Sunday Eucharist (*Apol.* i. 67) after the lections, at which the 'reader' officiates, the president preaches, and all 'rise together and pray'; then, 'when their prayer is ended,' bread and wine and water are brought and the president 'in like manner offers prayers and thanksgivings according to his ability,' the people answering 'Amen.' We are not here concerned with the rest of the description.

It would seem probable that the 'prayers and thanksgivings' of the president did not include intercessions, and this is borne out by the earliest 4th cent. evidence (see below, **2** (*c*)). The intercessions would be confined to the 'prayers in common,' at which all the people stood up. What this phrase means is not quite clear, but we may perhaps suppose it to signify that the minister (the deacon?) bade the prayers and that the people answered each petition responsorially, somewhat after the manner of an ectene or litany, though that, in the written form which it afterwards attained, was not yet invented (see below, **2** (*b*)). Thus Brightman remarks (*JThSt* xii. [1910–11] 322) that Justin's κοιναὶ εὐχαί must have been some inchoate form of a litany in order to be κοιναί at all. See also *JThSt* x. [1908–09] 505.

It is noteworthy, as J. Wordsworth points out (*Holy Com.*, Oxford, 1891, p. 64 ff.), that neither in Justin nor in the *Didache* is there a trace of intercession at the Eucharist for any one outside the Church. For Justin's words 'all others in every place' are shown by the context to mean 'all Christians'; and this custom of confining the liturgical 'offering' to those of the household of faith is found long after in Augustine's rule that it is wrong to 'offer' for any unbaptized:

'Who would offer the body of Christ except for those who are members of Christ? . . . For the non-baptized the sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ may not be offered' (*de Anima et ejus origine*, i. 10, 13; cf. ii. 15, 21, iii. 18; but for the interpretation of this see below, **2** (*b*)).

Thus we gather that both in the 2nd and in the 5th cent. there was some clear limit to the liturgical intercession. On the other hand, St. Paul emphatically orders prayers 'for all men,' including 'kings and all that are in high place'; indeed, he emphasizes prayer for those who are outside, that they may 'come to the knowledge of the truth' (1 Ti 2[1-4]). And Clement of Rome in the long prayer at the end of his epistle has a somewhat elaborate intercession, which includes 'our rulers and governors upon the earth' (*Cor.* 60 f.); there is, however, no evidence that this was offered at the Eucharist (for a discussion of the prayer see J. B. Lightfoot, *Clement*, London, 1890, i. 382 ff.). Tertullian says (*Apol.* 39) that 'we pray for Emperors, for their ministers, and for those in authority (*potestatibus*),' etc.; and (*ad Scap.* 2) that 'we sacrifice for the health (*salute*) of the Emperor, but to Him who is our God and his, but, as God commanded, in pure prayer'—probably an allusion to the Eucharist as opposed to animal sacrifices of the heathen.

Cyprian speaks of penitents when restored to communion having the privilege of being prayed for by name at the Eucharist (*Ep.* ix. [xvi.] 2, 'To the clergy'; the true reading seems to be 'offertur nomine [not nomen] eorum,' but this does not greatly alter the sense; if the Eucharist was offered in their name, they must have been named as the object of prayer). In *Ep.* lix. [lxii.], writing to the Numidian bishops, Cyprian asks them to present their captive brethren in their sacrifices and prayers, and subjoins the names of each of these and of others for whom he asks their intercessions.

The Eucharistic intercessions in the 3rd cent. included prayers for the faithful departed. These appear first in Africa. Tertullian (*de Cor.* 3) says: 'We make oblations for the departed.' Cyprian, writing to the Church at Furni (*Ep.* lxv. [i.] 2), says that, in the case of a certain offender,

'no offering is to be made for him, nor any sacrifice be celebrated for his repose (*dormitione*). For he does not deserve to be named at the altar of God in the prayer of the priests . . . no offering may be made by you for his repose, nor any prayer be made in the church in his name' (for the recital of names in Cyprian's time see W. C. Bishop in *JThSt* xiii. [1911–12] 268).

We may here anticipate a little, and give testimony of a somewhat later date for the custom. In the *Canons of Hippolytus* (probably, in their present form, of the 4th cent., though slightly added to at a later date), at the commemoration of the departed (which must not be on a Sunday) the people 'first partake of the mysteries' and 'after the oblation' receive the bread of exorcism and sit at an Agape (can. xxxiii.; ed. H. Achelis, *TU* vi. 4 [Leipzig, 1891], § 169 f.). In pseudo-Pionius's *Life of Polycarp* (probably of the 4th cent.) we read that the people took Bucolus's body to the cemetery at Smyrna, and 'when all was over they offered bread for Bucolus and the rest' (§ 20 [Lightfoot, *Ignatius*[2], London, 1889, iii. 452]). Of the other Church Orders, the *Testament of our Lord* (*c.* A.D. 350?, i. 23, 35), the *Arabic Didascalia* (*c.* A.D. 400?, § 38), and the *Apostolic Constitutions* (*c.* A.D. 375, viii. 13) may be mentioned as including prayers for the departed in their Eucharistic liturgies. For Sarapion and Cyril of Jerusalem see below, **2**.

2. Fourth century and later.—From the middle of the 4th cent. at least, the liturgical intercessions began to take written and fixed forms, and were developed in three lines: (*a*) the diptychs; (*b*) the Litany, or Ectene, or Synapte, or [Deacon's] Proclamation, and other forms of the 'people's prayers' before the Offertory; (*c*) the Great Intercession in the middle of the Anaphora. Technical names did

not at first arise, but all these three classes of intercession are found in the 4th century.

(*a*) *The diptychs and their predecessors.*—In the *Testament of our Lord* the priest, chief deacon, and readers, at some time not stated, sit in a special place to write down the

'names of the offerers of the oblations and of those for whom they have offered them, so that, when the holy things are offered by the bishop [i.e. at the Eucharist], the reader or chief deacon may name them by way of commemoration, which the priests and people offer for them with supplication' (i. 19).

In other words, the names of those who made offerings, and those for whom the prayers of the congregation were asked, were 'commemorated' at the Eucharist, though the point of the service at which this was done is uncertain (in this manual 'to commemorate' also means 'to say the Litany' [i. 35]). In the *Pilgrimage of Silvia* or *Etheria* (*c.* A.D. 380?, though some have suggested a later date) the bishop on certain occasions 'commemorates' the names of persons to be prayed for; but this is not at the Eucharist. In the middle of this century we find a recital of the names of the departed in the Liturgy of Sarapion (see below). At the end of the century Jerome says that the names of those who suffered for the Church were publicly read by the deacon (*in Jerem.* ii. 11, *in Ezech.* vi. 18).

Thus in the second half of the 4th cent. there is a regular recital of names; and even at the beginning of the century there is an allusion to the custom, at the Council of Elvira, in Spain (can. 28 f.); the bishop may not accept the oblation of a non-communicant, and the name of a demoniac is not to be recited at the altar 'cum oblatione,' *i.e.* as an offerer at the Eucharist. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence of a recital of names in Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348) nor in the *Apostolic Constitutions*; and it has been denied that there is any, except in the case of martyrs and deceased bishops, in Augustine (E. Bishop, in Connolly's *Lit. Hom. of Narsai*, p. 113 n.; Srawley, *Early Hist. of Liturgy*, pp. 147, 215; on the other side see W. C. Bishop, in *JThSt* xiii. 258 f.). In view of these facts we cannot affirm that the practice was *universal* in the 4th century.

In the 5th cent. the name 'diptychs' came into common use. It is derived from the fact that the names of the living and of the departed respectively were inscribed on two-leaved tablets, 'normally' made 'of ivory like the consular diptychs inscribed with the consul's portrait and name, distributed on his accession'; many of these were transferred to ecclesiastical use (Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, p. 575). The reading of the names of the dead became at this time a test of orthodoxy. The letters that passed between Cyril of Alexandria and Atticus, bishop of Constantinople, early in the century describe the controversy as to the insertion of St. Chrysostom's name, some enthusiastically demanding its recital, others as enthusiastically demanding its omission. The letters show that the living and the dead were at that time commemorated in two separate tables, the latter arranged in categories; and that the diptychs contained a list of the bishops of Constantinople from the first. The public recitation was an important and popular part of the service, and the inclusion or omission of a name might lead to a riot or at least to very serious disturbance among the congregation (Brightman, p. 485, n. 7; E. Bishop, p. 102 f.; *DCB* i. 208).

The diptychs now become universal. We find them inserted in the Arabic translation (date uncertain) of the *Test. of our Lord*; they were used *c.* A.D. 500 by the East Syrians, for the *Lit. Hom. of Narsai* (ed. Connolly, pp. 10, 112) attest the recital of the names of both the living and the dead, though the contemporary pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita mentions only the names of the dead. Edmund Bishop points out (*op. cit.* p. 101) that the evidence tends to show a divergence of usage in East and West; and that the recital of the names of the offerers was early abolished in the East, those of the departed being retained, while in the West the former were read and the latter not until a later period.[1] In Gaul and Spain we do not read of the names of the dead being recited till the 6th cent.; Innocent I. mentions (*Ep. to Decentius*, early 5th cent.) the reading of the names of the offerers, but not of the departed. The commemoration of names is explicitly mentioned in the oldest Gallican book, the *Missale Richenoviense*, thus: '*Post nomina.* Auditis nominibus offerentum,' etc. (C. E. Hammond, *Lit. East. and West.*, Oxford, 1878, p. lxxxiii). A similar phrase is found in many later Gallican books.

The place of the diptychs in the Eastern liturgies varies. In the Byzantine rite (Greek and Armen.), they come during or in connexion with the Great Intercession; and so in the Egyptian rite (Melkite, Coptic, and Ethiopic, including the Abyssinian *Anaphora of our Lord* derived from the *Testament*), and in the West Syrian (Greek) rite.[2] But in the East Syrian or Persian (Nestorian) rite they came during or before the Kiss of Peace, in connexion with the Offertory,[3] and similarly in the Gallican rite as given by Hammond (p. xxviii); and it is probable that this is the original position. The names were connected with the Offertory, as including those of the offerers. In the Greek St. Mark (Egyptian) rite there is, just after the Kiss of Peace and the Creed, a prayer for those who offer. In Narsai and in pseudo-Dionysius the diptychs are read during the Kiss of Peace or after the Offertory and the Creed. Thus there seems to be good reason for thinking that in the Byzantine and Egyptian rites the diptychs have been moved from the neighbourhood of the Offertory to that of the Great Intercession. On the other hand, in Sarapion's sacramentary (*c.* A.D. 350), the ὑποβολή (recitation of names) of the departed comes in the middle of the Great Intercession.

An elaborate Nestorian example of diptychs may be seen in Brightman, p. 275 ff; for those of Jerusalem see *ib.* p. 501 ff.; for those of the Stowe Missal see L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship*, Eng. tr.[4], London, 1912, p. 209 f.

(*b*) *The Litany.*—The intercessions before the Offertory took, at least in some places, the form of a written litany not later than the 4th cent.; but probably before that they were tending in this direction.

The technical names of this form of devotion seem to have been invented later. In Greek-speaking countries it was (and is) usually called the *Ectene*, which has been interpreted as 'the extended prayer' (Brightman, p. 590), or, perhaps more probably, as 'the fervent prayer' (Lightfoot, *Clement*, i. 385; note how Clement lays stress on the prayer and supplication being fervent, ἐκτενῆ [*Cor.* 59], and cf. *Ap. Const.* viii. 6–10, where the catechumens, the penitents, and the faithful after the dismissal of the others are repeatedly bidden to pray 'fervently,' ἐκτενῶς; see also Brightman, *loc. cit.*). Other names are the *Synapte*, or suffrages 'linked together,' and the *Eirenika* (Brightman, pp. 590, 602). In Syriac-speaking countries the litany is called the *Karūzūthā*, or 'Proclamation.'

We have two written litanies of the 4th cent. extant, as said before the Offertory in the liturgy, one in the *Test. of our Lord* and one in the *Apost. Const.*, both being of the same form; and this form has survived in the East with scarcely any alteration to the present day. The deacon asks the prayers of the people for various persons and objects; *e.g.*, 'For the exalted powers [the Emperor] let us beseech, that the Lord may grant them prudence and the fear of Him.' No response is given in either of these manuals; but probably, as in *Silvia* (above, (*a*)) and in the later forms, the people answered 'Kyrie eleison' to each petition. But in Augustine (if, indeed, he refers to a litany; see below) the answer is simply 'Amen'; and in the latter part of the daily litany of the East Syrians the people answer 'Amen' to each suffrage, not, as in the former part, 'Kyrie eleison' (Brightman, p. 265).

[1] See some curious facts bearing on this in E. G. C. F. Atchley's *Ordo Romanus Primus*, p. 100.

[2] In the West Syrian (Jacobite) rite the names are read both before the Kiss of Peace and at the Great Intercession (Brightman, pp. 83, 94).

[3] When a memorial is made of persons departed, their names are read at the Great Intercession (Brightman, p. 286 n.).

In the Appendix to the *Arabic Didascalia*, which contains a Church Order based on the *Testament of our Lord*, and which describes the liturgy, but does not give it in full (*c.* A.D. 400 ?), the lections read by the deacons follow the Offertory (?), and the deacons then pray for the sick and travellers, for those in necessity, concerning the weather and crops, for kings and those in authority, for the departed, for penitents, for benefactors of the Church, for catechumens, for the universal Church, for the bishop and clergy, and for the assembled congregation. Then the bishop 'makes the liturgy' within the veil (F. X. Funk, *Didascalia et Const. Ap.*, Paderborn, 1905, ii. 132; Brightman, p. 510). The place of the Offertory before the lections is very curious; but this may not be the exact meaning of the writer. He probably intends a litany by his description.

In the *Testament* and *Apost. Const.* the suffrages said by the deacon are concluded by an intercessory prayer said by the bishop, the text of the prayer being given in the latter but not in the former manual, where it was probably an extemporaneous utterance. In the *Apost. Const.* there are two other diaconal litanies (ii. 57, viii. 13), much shorter than that described above, but both concluded by the bishop. At first, as it would seem, the people stood throughout these intercessory devotions, as in Justin, the older *Didascalia* (Funk, i. 160), and probably in *Apost. Const.* ii. 57 (*ib.* p. 165); but in bk. viii., as in the *Testament*, the people knelt for the suffrages and stood for the concluding prayer.

The further development of the intercession on those lines, by which, and by its conjunction with the Penitential Procession, the modern Western litany arose, does not belong to this article; but it is noteworthy that the ancient place of the litany, just before the Offertory and after the lections, is preserved in the English Book of Common Prayer on one occasion only—at the consecration of a bishop. In the Roman Church it was said at the ordination of deacons just after the Epistle and Gradual (Atchley, *Ordo Rom. Prim.*, p. 37).

It has been doubted if there is other evidence for formal litanies in the 4th century. It seems probable, however, if *Silvia* was written at the end of that century, that at Jerusalem they were then in use, though perhaps not at the Eucharist. The description in *Silvia* might apply to a mere recital of names; but the authoress can hardly mean that the boys cried 'Kyrie eleison' after each name. If she refers to litanies, it follows that they were used, as at the present day among all Eastern Christians, at the daily morning and evening services; also that at Jerusalem, while the deacon said the evening litany, the bishop said the morning one.

In some other countries the Eucharistic intercessions before the Offertory perhaps did not take a litany-form so soon as the 4th century. No litany is given in any Egyptian document of that period, nor, indeed, are any fixed intercessory forms found. Cyril of Jerusalem mentions no intercessions before the Offertory (see below, (*c*), for his detailed intercession at a later stage). The Council of Laodicea in Phrygia (*c.* A.D. 380) says that after the dismissal of the catechumens and penitents three prayers for the faithful were said, one in silence and the others aloud, and that then the Kiss of Peace was given and the oblation offered (can. 19). This seems to exclude the litany, at any rate at this point in the service. It has been thought that in Augustine's writings also there is no trace of a litany. He calls, however, the intercession 'common prayer' (*communis oratio*), which, as in the case of Justin (above, 1), would seem to imply something of this nature. He speaks of the bishop (*antistes*) praying with a loud voice, and the 'common prayer' being repeated by the voice of the deacon (*Ep.* lv. 34, Ben. [cxix] *ad inquis. Januarii*). The priest prayed for the heathen: 'Thou hearest the priest of God at the altar exhorting the people of God to pray for the unbelievers that God may convert them to the faith' (*Ep.* ccxvii. 26, Ben. [cvii] *ad Vitalem*; the people's response is given as 'Amen'). Thus Augustine's rule about not 'offering' except for the faithful (above, 2) must be interpreted as meaning only that private individuals could not be prayed for by name at the Eucharist unless they were Christians. Augustine also mentions the prayer for the catechumens (*Ep.* ccxvii. 2), and for the faithful (*ib.* and *de Dono perseverantiae*, 63, Ben. [23], where again the response is given as 'Amen'). For a re-construction of the African liturgy from Augustine's writings see W. C. Bishop in *JThSt* xiii. 250, and Atchley, *Ord. Rom. Prim.*, App. iv. p. 182.

It is more remarkable that the Nestorian Narsai (*c.* A.D. 500) mentions no litany, though he refers to the deacon's exhortations. Brightman, indeed, says (*JThSt* xii. 325) that the omission is due only to Narsai's beginning his exposition at a point after that where the litany would occur. Yet the description includes the expulsion of the catechumens. The same omission is found in the Monophysite Jacob of Edessa (7th cent.), who describes the liturgy in his letter to the presbyter Thomas (Brightman, p. 490 ff.). After the Creed, which by that time had become part of the Eucharistic service, come three prayers of the faithful (cf. Laodicea above), and the deacon admonishes the people to stand in becoming order for the Kiss of Peace. Later on Jacob uses the word 'commemoration' for the Great Intercession, perhaps meaning that the diptychs were then said.

The conclusion from the evidence is that the formal litany was known in the 4th century, in Syria, as the *Apost. Const.* show (this Church Order probably does not emanate from Antioch itself [see A. J. Maclean, *Ancient Church Orders*, p. 150]), and in the country where the *Testament of our Lord* was written (perhaps Asia Minor). At least something of the nature of a litany was probably in use at the end of the century at Jerusalem and in North Africa. In some other countries its place seems to have been taken by continuous intercessory prayers (Phrygia and the farther East), but we must guard against the fallacy of supposing that absence of evidence of its use means evidence of its non-use. At a later period the formal litany in the Eucharistic service became universal.

(*c*) *The Great Intercession.*—The third form in which the prayers for all men developed belongs entirely to the 4th and later centuries, and was almost certainly not in use before that. This was the 'Great Intercession' in the liturgy, the 'Prayer for the whole state of Christ's Church.' This has exactly the same object as the Ecteno—to intercede for all who need the prayers of the faithful. But two noteworthy facts show that it came into existence after the rest of the central part of the Eucharistic service had assumed a written, as opposed to an extemporaneous, form. Firstly, the Great Intercession is remarkable for the variety of its position in the service; and, secondly, it is not found at all in the two earliest liturgies that we know, those of the Ethiopic Church Order (Brightman, p. 189), and of the *Verona Fragments of the Didascalia, etc.* (ed. Hauler, Leipzig, 1900, p. 107), and it is found only very slightly developed in the *Test. of our Lord* and in Sarapion. As described in Chrysostom's Antioch writings, it is much more elaborate, if Brightman's re-construction is right (p. 474, and notes 25, 26 on p. 480); and in the *Apost. Const.* (viii. 12) it is a long one.

Thus this feature of the service grew only gradually and slowly in the 4th century. There is, however, by way of exception, an instance of early development of the Great Intercession in Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348). This is one out of many instances in which Jerusalem led the way with regard to liturgical customs. In Cyril's description (*Cat.* xxiii.) the Great Intercession prays 'for the common peace of the Church, for the tranquillity of the world, for kings, soldiers, allies, the sick and afflicted and all who need succour; then we commemorate also those who have fallen asleep before us; first, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, that at their prayers and intervention God would receive our petition; afterwards also on behalf of the holy fathers and bishops who have fallen asleep before us, and, in a word, of all who in past years have fallen asleep among us, believing that it will be a very great advantage to the souls for whom the supplication is put up, while that holy and most awful sacrifice is presented.' This intercession is expressly said by Cyril to have come after the Invocation, and 'after the spiritual sacrifice is perfected.' But so elaborate an intercession in this part of the service must at that date have been exceptional.

The most ancient place of the Great Intercession would appear to have been after the Invocation. It is found there in the only 4th cent. liturgies where it occurs at all—those of the *Testament*, of

the *Apost. Const.*, and of Sarapion, and also in Cyril of Jerusalem's description. And this is its place also in the Byzantine (Greek and Armenian) and West Syrian rites. In the East Syrian rite, however, it comes between the Commemoration of Redemption and the Epiclesis, and this is the case as early as Narsai (c. A.D. 500). In the Egyptian rite (Greek, Coptic, Ethiopic) it precedes the Commemoration of Redemption; and so in the Abyssinian *Anaphora of our Lord* (see art. INVOCATION, [Liturgical], below, p. 411[b], note 1; for a translation see J. Cooper and A. J. Maclean, *Test. of our Lord*, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 245 ff.), where there is also a shorter intercession after the Invocation, as in the *Testament* from which it is derived.

In the Roman rite the Great Intercession is divided into two parts, that for the living, with a commemoration of saints, being said directly after the Sanctus, and that for the departed, with another commemoration of saints, following the prayer for Divine intervention *Supra quae* and *Supplices te* (see art. INVOCATION [Liturgical], § 6). The Ambrosian liturgy has the same feature. In the old Gallican and Mozarabic, the Great Intercession comes, with the names of the living and the dead, before the Kiss of Peace (Duchesne, p. 211). This custom was reprehended by Innocent I. in A.D. 416 (*PL* xx. 553 f.; see Atchley, *Ordo Rom. Prim.*, p. 99).

The main difference between the Great Intercession and the 'people's prayers' at the earlier part of the service is that the former was a prayer by the priest, the people answering 'Amen' at the end, while the latter were at least usually responsorial, the deacon addressing the people and bidding their prayers a clause at a time, and the people responding to each clause, usually with an ejaculation addressed to God. In the modern Coptic rite (Brightman, p. 165) the people respond 'Kyrie eleison' in the Great Intercession also, and the deacon interjects some short exhortations.

3. **Conclusion.**—To sum up the evidence: it appears that the liturgical intercessions have developed in three directions, into the diptychs, the Ectene, and the Great Intercession. These devotions seem not to have taken a fixed or written form quite so soon as the other central parts of the service. The development went on in parallel lines, the Ectene keeping the form of a dialogue and being said (as in Justin) before the central act; the Great Intercession growing into a long prayer of the celebrant; while the diptychs, which are in reality the essence of the whole intercession, became in time a mere list of somewhat meaningless names, and in most countries have fallen into complete desuetude.

LITERATURE.—**E. Bishop**, Appendix to R. H. Connolly's *Liturgical Homilies of Narsai*, Cambridge, 1909 (on the diptychs and litanies), and artt. in *JThSt* xii. [1910–11] 334, xiv. [1912–13] 23 ('Liturgical Comments and Memoranda'); **F. E. Brightman**, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Oxford, 1896, i., and art. in *JThSt* xii. 319 ('Chronicle: Liturgica'); **W. C. Bishop**, art. 'The African Rite,' in *JThSt* xiii. [1911–12] 250; **R. H. Connolly**, art. 'The Book of Life' in *JThSt* xiii. 580 (on the diptychs); **R. Sinker**, art. 'Diptychs' in *DCA* i. 560; **H. J. Hotham**, art. 'Litany' in *DCA* ii. 999 (for the later litanies); **E. G. C. F. Atchley**, *The People's Prayers*, London, 1906 (for the later period), and *Ordo Romanus Primus*, do. 1905; **A. J. Maclean**, *Ancient Church Orders*, Cambridge, 1910, ch. iv.; **J. H. Srawley**, *The Early History of the Liturgy*, do. 1913.

A. J. MACLEAN.

INTEREST.—See USURY.

INTERIM.—Three documents bearing the name of *Interim* figured in the Church history of the South of Germany during the troubled decade in the 16th cent. which contained the death of Martin Luther. They were drawn up as bases of reunion between the Roman Catholic and Reformed factions in the Empire. The unswerving policy of the Emperor Charles V. to keep the German Church one and in communion with Rome, though organized in a distinctive fashion of its own, sought a solution of the problem in the imposition of articles of compromise upon the recalcitrant Protestants and Roman Catholics alike. They were of an *interim* or provisional character, meant only to form an accommodation or *modus vivendi* until a free General Council of Western Christendom should determine a final settlement of the matters in doctrine, ritual, and government at issue within the Church. They represent, without any genuine constructive or reconstructive genius, the effort of the imperial authority, all but grown desperate, to heal in a hurry the fresh schism of Christendom and to close the Christian ranks against the menacing advance of Islām. Charles V., anxious though he was to check the power and claims of the papacy whenever it crossed his own imperial path of ambition, was resolved that no one else should thwart the bishop of Rome. Even when his own envoys were demanding that the Tridentine Council should be withdrawn from Bologna and from Italian or Roman dictation, and in his name (Jan. 18, 1548) declined to recognize its decrees until it had returned to Trent, he had no thought of undermining the papal authority. It was his fixed conviction that in the hopelessly divided and exhausted state of the forces of Protestant Reform a moderate Catholic Reform, which should allow play and scope for the German national genius, could be trusted to appeal in the long run to all parties. Already in 1540 and 1541 conferences had taken place at Hagenau, at Worms, and at Ratisbon (Regensburg), the last of which made some real progress towards a compromise. In May 1548, at the Imperial Diet which met at Augsburg, the principal Interim was enacted, and in December of the same year the Saxon Diet, met in Leipzig, passed a similar document for its own territory. There are thus three Interims, that of Ratisbon in 1541, that of Augsburg in 1548, and that of Leipzig in the same year. Of these it is the second which is familiar to history as 'the Interim.'

1. **Ratisbon Interim.**—The Conference at Ratisbon in 1541 could not vie with its immediate predecessor at Worms either in numbers or in talent. The earlier gathering included Melanchthon, Brenz, Capito, Bucer, and Calvin among the eleven who formed the Reformed side; Eck, Gropper, Malvenda, Granvelle, and the nuncio Morone among the eleven on the papal side. Its discussions gave little promise of an agreement in favour of traditional authority, and it was speedily terminated by adjournment till the Diet met in the Emperor's presence at Ratisbon. At Ratisbon, Granvelle, bishop of Arras, again presided, this time in association with Frederick the Count-Palatine, and over against Eck, Gropper, and Julius von Pflug were set Melanchthon, Bucer, and Pistorius, while the conciliatory Contarini represented the Vatican. With Melanchthon, Bucer, Pflug, and Contarini on the commission, progress was speedily made, for their desire to reach an understanding was sincere and intense. Bucer had been indefatigable in promoting communication and compromise, and had taken a considerable part in the preparation of the 23 articles which formed the *Regensburg Book*, the basis of discussion at the Conference. Melanchthon had proved the sincerity of his attachment to the cause of reconciliation four years earlier, when the Articles of Schmalkald were drawn up by Luther, at the request of the Elector of Saxony in view of the promise of Pope Paul III. to call a General Council to meet at Mantua in 1537. It was natural that articles which were to represent Protestant conviction in a far from sympathetic gathering should

be militant; but Melanchthon, who furnished them with an appendix on the papacy, did not hesitate to qualify his subscription to them with the clause:

'. . . in regard to the Pope, I hold that, if he would admit the Gospel, we might also permit him for the sake of peace and the common concord of Christendom to exercise by human right his present jurisdiction over the bishops who are now or may hereafter be under his authority.'

Agreement was reached on the first four subjects of discussion, which concerned man's original state, free will, and sin, and even on the doctrine of justification by faith, an inhering as well as imputed righteousness being affirmed on the strength of Christ's merit. But, when the subjects of the Church, the sacraments, and the papal authority were dealt with, it became clear that the two sides were irreconcilable. To concede the cup to the laity and marriage to the clergy of Germany was but to touch the fringe of the problem, and to concede primacy to Rome without delimitation of its prerogative was merely to postpone a settlement. Moreover, when the results of the discussion were submitted to the pope and to Luther, it was ascertained that each was profoundly dissatisfied. The Emperor made the most he could of the disappointing situation. Although the Roman Catholics would not allow themselves to be bound by the agreed articles, he imposed these upon the Protestants as the substance of the 'Ratisbon Interim.'

2. Augsburg Interim.—Despite the fact that the Ratisbon Colloquy thus virtually came to nothing, and the antagonistic interests were destined never again to come so near to a settlement of their differences, the Emperor clung to his project. Luther's death in 1546 removed one obstacle. The summoning of the Council of Trent in 1545 removed another, although Charles soon charged the pope with infringing its freedom, and thus defeating its purpose of promoting reunion. The Schmalkald League was broken up. The defeat and capture of the Saxon Elector John Frederick, last champion of the Protestant cause in arms, at Mühlberg in 1547 left the Emperor, for the time being, master of the political situation and gave a new opportunity to his great design. Despairing of successful action by the Council, he set himself, as Lindsay writes (*History of the Reformation*, i. 389 f.),

'to bring about what he conceived to be a reasonable compromise which would enable all Germany to remain within one National Church. He tried at first to induce the separate parties to work it out among themselves; and, when this was found to be hopeless, he, like a second Justinian, resolved to construct a creed and to impose it by force upon all, especially upon the Lutherans. To begin with, he had to defy the Pope and slight the General Council for which he had been mainly responsible. He formally demanded that the Council should return to German soil (it had been transferred to Bologna), and, when this was refused, he protested against its existence and, like the German Protestants he was coercing, declared that he would not submit to its decrees. He next selected three theologians, Michael Helding, Julius von Pflug, and Agricola—a mediævalist, an Erasmian, and a very conservative Lutheran—to construct what was called the *Augsburg Interim*.'

The Interim was enacted on May 15, 1548, and was put in force by the Emperor throughout the Empire, many Lutheran preachers and teachers, *e.g.* Brenz, Osiander, and Bucer, being sent into exile for refusing to submit. But it was vain to force it on Protestants while Roman Catholics declined it and had to be furnished with a *Formula Reformationis* for themselves. Where the preachers were banished the churches stood empty. In a short time the Interim was a spent force.

The document is an example of what Thomas Carlyle calls 'concoctive science.'

'Nothing that Charles ever undertook proved such a dismal failure as this patchwork creed made from snippets from two Confessions. . . . It is a hopeless task to construct creeds as a tailor shapes and stitches coats' (Lindsay, i. 390 f.).

Its propositions are cast in terms of studied ambiguity. To conciliate the party of reform it affirmed a doctrine of justification by faith, conceded the marriage of priests and the use of the sacramental cup by the laity, and revised the doctrine of the Mass. But the number of the sacraments, the retention of ceremonies, the worship and invocation of Mary and the saints, the doctrine of transubstantiation, and the sovereign authority of the pope were regularly maintained in favour of Rome.

3. Leipzig Interim.—In Saxony the Elector Maurice, assisted by Melanchthon, whose heart was set upon the restoration of his beloved University of Wittenberg after the war, and upon the speedy return of peace to his distracted country, imposed upon his subjects the Leipzig Interim, the counterpart of the Augsburg settlement. The policy of Melanchthon, for which he was never wholly forgiven by ardent Lutherans, was to yield to Rome and the Emperor well-nigh all that concerned ritual and usage so long as the essentials of the Reformed doctrine, in particular justification by faith, were conserved. Luther had remonstrated again and again with his scholar-colleague on this very point, but Melanchthon was content at this time of ebb in the fortunes of the Reformation to sacrifice ceremonies if doctrines were kept pure. Brenz, Bucer, and Calvin (see Schaff, *History of the Creeds of Christendom*[5], p. 301) all saw deeper into the perils of Melanchthon's 'adiaphorism,' and deplored his attitude. Not till the Formula of Concord took shape in 1577 did the controversy thus originated reach a termination. But the Interim which gave rise to it was set aside by the sudden change of front of the Elector Maurice, and the dramatic success of his bold stroke on behalf of the cause which he had betrayed, and by the establishment of the Peace of Augsburg, which authorized finally the profession of the Confession of Augsburg.

Cf. art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 848[a].

LITERATURE.—**T. M. Lindsay**, *History of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1906; Church Histories of **J. H. Kurtz**[3], London, 1894, and **J. C. L. Gieseler**, iv., New York, 1862 (for documents); *Cambridge Modern History*, ii., Cambridge, 1903, 'The Reformation'; **P. Schaff**, *History of the Creeds of Christendom*[5], New York, 1887; **S. Isslеib**, art. 'Interim,' and **T. Kolde**, art. 'Regensburger Religionsgespräch' in *PRE*[3] ix. 210 and xvi. 545 (both with very full bibliographies).

WILLIAM A. CURTIS.

INTERMEDIATE STATE.—See STATE OF THE DEAD.

INTERNATIONALITY.—The term 'internationality' may be used with reference to both law and morality in their international aspects. In its legal bearing, it can apply only to the relations existing between those States which are within the sphere of international law. This circle of States includes the Christian nations of Europe and their offshoots in America, the Ottoman Empire, and Japan—which had been admitted even before the Russo-Japanese War. China and Persia, too, have now a recognized international status of some kind. How the circle comes to be so restricted may be explained as follows. International law, according to a well-known authority (W. E. Hall, *International Law*[6], pt. i. ch. i.), primarily governs the relations of those States called independent States which voluntarily submit themselves to it, although to a limited extent it may also govern the relations of certain analogous communities. The marks of an independent State are: that the community constituting it is permanently established for a political end; that it possesses a definite territory; and that it is independent of external control. But, as international law is a product of the special civilization of modern Europe, and forms a more or less artificial system, such States only can be presumed to be subject to it as are inheritors of that

civilization. States which are outside European civilization must enter in a formal way into the circle of those governed by the law, although an express act of accession is not to be regarded as necessary. When a new State comes into existence, its position is determined by the same considerations; and its origin decides whether it is *presumed* to belong to the circle or not. Recently, however, the tendency has been for admitted States to conduct their relations with States which are outside the circle, so far as the case permits, in accordance with the legal standard which they have themselves set up. And so the spirit of international law is making itself felt all over the world.

There are some principles of State action which are, as it were, just over the borders of the law. For example, the State's duty to extradite criminals is said on good authority to be a moral and not a legal one. And such bordering rights and duties are supplemented by others more clearly moral, and by many duties in which the State's relationship is not so clearly extended to other States, but rather to masses of foreigners or to the world in general. Thus the duty of a State to permit intercourse with it to be maintained by foreign nations is said to be a moral duty, as opposed to a legal one. But, whether it is a moral or a legal one, it is subject to the limitation that the State may take what measures of precaution it considers needful to prevent the right of access and intercourse from being used to its own injury. And, when we come to consider the laws actually in force preventing the access of alien vagabonds, destitute persons, and so forth, the interest and importance of the subject lie primarily in its ethical and economic aspects, and not in its strictly international bearing.

Mention must also be made, more specifically, of uncivilized peoples. Obviously the principles by which a civilized State is to regulate its conduct towards the people of less highly developed races give rise to many burning questions, though in a legal sense such problems might be ruled out of discussion. A civilized country possesses in its army and navy instruments of the most powerful kind for assuming the offensive. In treating with a barbarous people, it probably knows the dangerous fact that, whatever be the soundness of its arguments, it has the power to enforce its wishes. And, when a civilized nation has acquired dominance over an uncivilized, its political and commercial organization must be employed with due regard for the inferior race. By the establishment of protectorates, States frequently acquire rights over countries the inhabitants of which are in an uncivilized condition; and the States are then expected to see that a reasonable measure of security is afforded both to their own subjects and to foreigners who are members of other States within the protectorate. The native inhabitants must, on their side, be protected from harm to a reasonable extent; and there must be some provision for the administration of justice between man and man. It is generally not possible to administer a European law with its systematic completeness, and the problem of justice must be solved according as the local circumstances dictate. Protectorates of this newer kind, it must be remembered, ought not to be classed with those of our Indian Empire. A 'sphere of influence,' again, is a looser and vaguer term than protectorate. The State here assumes a much less definite responsibility; but it is expected to exercise such influence as it possesses in the direction of good order.

LITERATURE.—W. E. Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*[6], Oxford, 1909; H. S. Maine, *International Law*, London, 1890; W. Wundt, *Ethics*, Eng. tr., do. 1901, pt. iv. ch. iv.; D. W. Forrest, *The Authority of Christ*, Edinburgh, 1906, p. 272 ff. (in international affairs); W. A. Watt, *A Study of Social Morality*, do. 1901, ch. iv.

W. A. WATT.

INTERPRETATION.—**1. Introduction.**—A sacred book, like a legal code, calls for interpretation, as a means of bridging the chasm which, in religion as in law, exists between the progressive development of life and the fixed letter. The book and the legal code do not supply all the information that may be required; to many questions they give no satisfactory answer; while, again, they contain much that can no longer be used, and much that to a more advanced stage of thought seems antiquated, erroneous, and objectionable. Interpretation thus comes to be a process partly of supplementing the original record, partly of giving it a new significance. It is a feature of all book-religions, and appears also among peoples who invest ancient poetry (*e.g.* the Vedas in India and the Homeric epics in Greece) with canonical prestige—with the authority of a Bible. Even prior to Buddha's time Indian scholars had compiled huge commentaries to the Vedas—the so-called *Brāhmaṇas*; while the Stoics built their philosophy very largely on the interpretation of Homer (Heraclitus of Pontus, *Quæstiones Homericæ* [ed. Leipzig, 1910]; Cornutus, *Theologiæ Græcæ compendium* [ed. C. Lang, do. 1881]).

This feature appears in its most definite form in later Judaism: the *Hălākhā* and *Haggādā* (see art. RABBINISM), the one practical, the other theoretical, were in reality such supplements to or re-interpretations of the OT; and this feature is equally marked in Christianity, which, by conjoining the OT, the religious document of the inferior dispensation, with the NT, was in a special way confronted with the problem of bringing its own religious convictions into harmony with the letter of Holy Scripture. It is true that the parables of Jesus speak in the same homely language to people of all ages, and that the Gospels tell clearly and plainly of the life which brought light to the world. But what was the Christian to make of the sacrificial legislation of the OT, and of what use was the history of Israel to him? The Prophets contain much that is obscure, and even in the Psalms there are many things that cannot but jar upon the Christian consciousness. What had become a customary procedure in the case of the OT was soon extended also to the NT, and all the more readily as the latter had difficulties of its own, and especially as it presented much that was repugnant, and omitted much that would have proved acceptable, to the Greek mind. Along with a sacred book, Christianity found current also a method of exegesis which merely needed to be developed in accordance with its own peculiar character. Greek, Jewish, and Christian exegesis differ from one another, not in method, but in purpose: they respectively seek to elicit philosophy, law, and Jesus Christ.

2. Development of exegetical theory.—The human mind endeavours to reduce such exegetical practice to rules, to a theory. Rabbi Hillel formulated seven rules of exegesis, which Rabbi Ishmael further extended to thirteen, and Rabbi Eliezer to thirty-two, most of them simply showing how to foist an extrinsic sense into the text by arbitrary and artificial devices. They include the argument *a minore ad maius*, the analogy, the combination of two passages, the *nōṭārīqōn* ('abbreviation') (e.g. *selāh*=סלה לעולם=*da capo*), *gᵉmaṭriā* ('numerical value of letters') (cf. Rev 13[18]), the *tᵉmūrāh* ('form,' 'shape') (e.g. *Sheshach*=Babylon [Jer 25[26]]). The Greeks went more deeply into the subject. What writers like Aristotle (in the *Organon*), pseudo-Demetrius of Phaleron,

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, etc., include in *περὶ ἑρμηνείας* was a subdivision of rhetoric, dealing with the formation of thought or judgment in word and sentence, *i.e.* the mode of expression in the choice and combination of words, diction in the grammatical sense, and, finally, style in the rhetorical sense (*elocutio*; Arist. *λέξις*). With this, again, was closely allied the analysis of this process of thought in a single writer; and, just as the terms *ἑρμηνεύειν* and *interpretari* were used to denote translation into another language (*transferre*), so they were also applied to the explanation of a sentence in itself obscure (*explicare*). The latter sense was also expressed by *ἐξηγεῖσθαι*, a word originally connected with the sacred mysteries.

In the exegesis of Holy Scripture, however, it was not merely the thoughts of the human writers that had to be taken into consideration; the idea of inspiration, along with the notion of an incomprehensible and mysterious God, required men to search for a more profound hidden meaning behind the natural sense. Hence Philo of Alexandria, the Jewish philosophical theologian, adopted the 'allegorical method' of the Stoics, and the Christian theologians followed his example. As he assumed that the Biblical history was not in the real sense history at all, but was rather eternal, unchanging truth under a historical veil, so they maintained that what was told in the OT about Joseph, David, or Solomon was in reality the story of Jesus. The tabernacle and its sacrificial worship stood for the Christian Church and its services. If the true sense was to be discovered, every detail must be read as implying something else, as in a pictorial enigma; or, to put it more precisely, the allegorical interpretation was something given in its entirety beforehand, and only required to be fitted into the text as a whole in such a way as to harmonize the greatest possible number of details. See, further, art. ALLEGORY.

But, besides the allegorical method, which was a product of the Greek spirit and had an inner link of connexion with Plato's theory of ideas, there was another method—more congenial to the Semitic mind, and also more just to the idea of historical development—viz. the method of 'typology,' which recognized the historicity of the narrative, but in its system of prediction and fulfilment postulated a kind of pre-established harmony between the OT and the NT history. Thus, *e.g.*, it is a historical fact that Abraham was ready to sacrifice Isaac, but the true significance of the incident is its being a prefiguration of God's sacrifice in Christ. Typology, no less than allegory, puts an extrinsic meaning into the text; but it looks at the relation between the literal and the added sense in a somewhat different way.

The allegory, after its excessive cultivation by the Gnostics, found a footing chiefly among the Platonizing theologians of Alexandria, while typology, to which Jewish Christians had resorted from the outset, was brought to its highest development in the so-called School of Antioch (cf. art. ANTIOCHENE THEOLOGY). There is no good reason for connecting the difference between the two with the antagonism between the Alexandrian and the Pergamenian schools of Hellenistic philology. It was believed by the ancient scholars that the two methods worked quite well side by side.

Of the Christian theologians, the first to formulate a theory of interpretation was Origen (*Περὶ ἀρχῶν*, bk. iv.); by the hypothesis of the manifold sense of Scripture (somatic, psychic, and pneumatic, *i.e.* verbal, moral, and mystical) he showed that the several modes of exegesis were all valid in their own place. This was expanded by the Greek theologians of the 4th cent. into the theory of the 'fourfold' sense of Scripture, which was in turn adopted in the West by Augustine, and then fixed and brought to maturity by the Scholastics.

Like the *κλεῖς* of Melito of Sardis, the treatise of Diodorus 'on the difference between theory and allegory' and that of Theodorus 'on allegory and history' are unfortunately lost; and the notes of Isidore of Pelusium (*Ep.* iv. 117, 203 [*PG* lxxviii. 1192 f., 1289–92]) and Nilus (*Ep.* i. 118–127, ii. 223, etc. [*PG* lxix. 133–137, 320]), as also the *Instituta regularia divinæ legis* of Junilius Africanus (A.D. 551 [*PL* lxviii. 15–42; also ed. H. Kihn, Freiburg, 1880]), which emanated from the school of Paul of Nisibis, make but a poor substitute for them. The most valuable contribution, here as elsewhere, was made by Augustine, who, in his *de Doctrina Christiana*, with the distinction between *res* and *signum* as his starting-point, arrived at an almost modern theory of interpretation, although, like all the exegetes of the ancient Church, he confined himself to the task of explaining difficult passages of Scripture.

The other extant manuals of hermeneutics—the *Liber regularum* of the Donatist Tychonius (ed. F. C. Burkitt, *TS* iii. 1 [1894]; its seven rules were adopted by Augustine, Isidore, Thomas Aquinas, etc.), the *Formulæ spiritalis intelligentiæ* and the *Instructiones* of Eucherius of Lyons (ed. K. Wotke, *CSEL* xxxi. [1894]), as well as the *Εἰσαγωγὴ εἰς τὰς θείας γραφάς* of the monk Adrianos (*c.* A.D. 500; *PG* xcviii. 1273–1312)—are simply practical directions for the allegoristic interpretation of Scripture, and treat of the OT and the NT in exactly the same way.

Scarcely any further advance was made by the mediæval writers Cassiodorus (who merely combined the last-named three with Augustine and Junilius), Isidore, Bede (*de Schematis et tropis sacræ scripturæ*), Notker Balbulus (*Notatio de interpretibus divinarum scripturarum*), Hugh of St. Victor (*Prænotatiunculæ de scripturis et scriptoribus sacris*), or the Scholastics. The allegorical method dominated all of them, and was systematized as the fourfold sense of Scripture. In the later mediæval period, however, a new feature, due to the independent thought of men like Roger Bacon, and also to a revived knowledge of Rabbinical interpretation, was introduced into the ecclesiastical exegesis, as seen in Nicolaus of Lyra (1270–1340) (*Prologus in moralitates bibliæ*), J. Gerson (1363–1429) (*Propositiones de sensu literali sanctæ scripturæ*), and others. Santes Pagninus of Lucca (1470–1541) reinstated the mystical sense in his *Isagoga* (Lyons, 1536), and Sixtus of Siena (1520–69), in his *Bibliotheca sacra* (Venice, 1566), collected with vast erudition all the learning of the past that was necessary for Biblical exegesis. The new and decisive impulse, however, came from a different quarter. Humanism revived the study of the ancient languages, and the Reformation made that study subservient to an exegesis that centred in the plain historical sense. But the real turning-point was that, whereas the entire ancient and mediæval theology had regarded Scripture as abstruse, as something that could and should be interpreted only by learned men with the help of allegory and under the control of the Church, it was now asserted, in virtue of the new evangelical ideas of a revealed God and the assurance of salvation, that Scripture was easy to understand (its *perspicuitas*): the devout reader of the Bible, once he was furnished with the necessary linguistic aids, would discover the meaning without difficulty. Hence, in addition to the philological *Ars critica* of G. Scioppius (1662), J. Clericus († 1736), and H. Valesius (Amsterdam, 1740), we have the *Clavis scripturæ sacræ* of Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1567) and the *Philologia sacra* of Salomo Glassius (1623–36), which are chiefly concerned with the lexical

and grammatical material required to bring out the verbal sense of the text.

It was Biblical exegesis, and not classical philology, that—as W. Dilthey (see Lit.) also holds—gave rise to modern hermeneutics. The term 'hermeneutics' (a reminiscence of Plato, *Epinomis*, 975 C?) first occurs in a work of J. C. Dannhauer (Strassburg, 1654), while others still spoke of the *ars interpretandi* (Rudorff, 1747; 'Auslegekunst,' G. F. Meyer, Halle, 1756). Through the renewed study of the ancient treatises Περὶ ἑρμηνείας a great many topics came in which belonged properly to rhetoric, and do not, strictly speaking, fall under hermeneutics in the modern sense. In the 18th cent. hermeneutics was a favourite study; scarcely a single year passed without the issue of a handbook on the subject. The outstanding theologians of all confessions added their quota, and of these J. A. Turretini of Geneva (1728), his friend S. Werenfels of Basel, and the semi-Pietistic, semi-Wolffian S. J. Baumgarten of Halle (1742) deserve special mention. The most influential of them all was J. A. Ernesti of Leipzig, whose *Institutio interpretis* (1762) is distinguished by its philological sobriety and lucidity.

The necessity of a purely historical mode of understanding the text, however, was not yet fully realized. In place of the ecclesiastical authority of the Roman Catholic exegesis, the orthodox theologians of the Reformed Churches, notwithstanding their maxim 'scriptura scripturæ interpres,' substituted the authority of their respective creeds. The Cartesians found the standard of Biblical interpretation in philosophy (L. Meyer, *Philosophia s. Scripturæ interpres*, Amsterdam, 1666; J. Amerpoel, *Cartesius Mosaizans*, Leovardiæ, 1669), and the champions of the Enlightenment, in their desire to keep their exposition of Scripture within the bounds of reason, did the same thing in their own fashion. The Pietists, on the other hand, like the mediæval mystics, wished to use the Scriptures only for edification, and were not concerned to understand them historically (A. H. Francke, *Manuductio ad lectionem Scripturæ Sacræ*, Halle, 1693, ²1700, *Prælectiones hermeneuticæ*, Halle, 1717); while Kant desired to have them expounded with a view to moral perfection. The infallibility of the divine revelation given in the Scriptures was assumed by all these writers, and they were thus impelled, unwittingly, to find extrinsic meanings in the text.

Apart from all the theologians of this period stands Baruch Spinoza, the Jewish philosopher, who, in his *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (1670), first ventured to question the fundamen[tal] of all previous theology and Biblical exegesis. What Luther had intuitively felt, but had not consistently carried out, viz. that the value of the Bible lies simply in its being a religious book, was made explicit by Spinoza, who thus prepared the way for a distinctively religious estimate of the contents of Scripture, and for a historical interpretation that should do justice to the different world-views of various lines.

The pioneer of a fresh movement was F. D. E. Schleiermacher, in whose hands hermeneutics (cf. 'Hermeneutik und Kritik, mit besonderer Beziehung auf das NT,' *Werke*, I. vii., ed. F. Lücke, Berlin, 1838), which had hitherto been an aggregation of knowledge and devices needed for exposition, became a philosophy of 'comprehension' ('Philosophie des Verstehens'). While Augustine had analyzed the materials to be understood, Schleiermacher deals with the process of understanding itself. For him there is no distinction between difficult and simple passages, and nothing is self-evident. The interpreter's task is to understand the religious personality of the writer as manifested in every single word, to look from the details to the whole, and from the standpoint of the whole to set the details in their true light. Accordingly, hermeneutics is one and the same for all literature, sacred or profane, and yet it assumes a special character for each individual writer, even within the Bible itself. Schleiermacher's views were maintained by his pupils F. Lücke (*Grundriss der NT Hermeneutik*, Göttingen, 1816) and H. N. Klausen [or Clausen] (*Hermeneutik*, Leipzig, 1841).

The rehabilitation of orthodoxy in the 19th cent., with its deepened Christian piety, revived the demand for an exegesis recognizing a twofold sense of Scripture (H. Olshausen, *Ein Wort über tieferen Schriftsinn*, Königsberg, 1824; R. E. Stier, *Andeutungen für gläubiges Schriftverständnis*, 1824), for a pneumatic exposition (J. T. Beck, *Zur theologischen Auslegung der Schrift*, 1838; J. L. S. Lutz, *Biblische Hermeneutik*, Pforzheim, 1849), and for a believing, *i.e.* a doctrinally correct, exegesis (E. W. Hengstenberg); on these, again, J. C. C. Hofmann's biblico-historical principle of exegesis (*Biblische Hermeneutik*, ed. W. Volck, Nördlingen, 1880) certainly marks a distinct advance. Exegetical theology, however, refusing to be led astray by these ventures, partly, indeed, in sharp conflict with them, and moving on various lines—from the dogmatic attitude of H. A. W. Meyer and his continuator B. Weiss of Berlin, through the so-called mediating theology of E. Reuss, F. Bleek, and others, to the Tübingen School of F. C. Baur—has, with constantly increasing emphasis on the historical element (H. J. Holtzmann, C. Weizsäcker, A. Jülicher), striven to the utmost to gain a grammatical and historical comprehension of Scripture. Nevertheless, it has failed to provide its ever-expanding industry with a proper rationale in a theoretic discussion of the hermeneutic problem. This failure is now beginning to bring its retribution, inasmuch as an art that does not reflect upon its own essential function readily degenerates into a mechanical routine.

3. The principles of exegesis.—(1) *Fundamental hermeneutics.*—Hermeneutics is not simply a congeries of practical rules, but a science built upon a theory of comprehension—just as logic is not a mere organon (Aristotle), but a canon (Galileo); it proposes to explain why a given work is to be understood in one way and not another. Thinking, speaking, and writing are three marvellous gifts which man possesses. They are acquisitions whose discovery we cannot associate with any human name, and are, as the ancients believed, gifts of the deity.

To these three productive capacities correspond three reproductive, viz.—to give them in the reverse order—silent reading, reading aloud, and interpreting. Knowledge of the script, whether the script be ideographic or phonetic, makes reading possible, and reading attains its full realization in reading aloud. Even silent reading involves an inward phonetic element, as, *e.g.*, in accentuation, grouping of words, etc., and the special difficulty in reading aloud is that the cadence of the spoken language is not indicated in the script; certain marks of punctuation are but a make-shift. Thus, ἐρευνᾶτε in the phrase ἐρευνᾶτε τὰς γραφάς (Jn 5[39]) may mean either 'you search,' or 'do you search?' or 'search,' and, moreover, the tone of the indicative form may imply approval or reproach. It is only when the separate signs in writing and speech, and also the thought as a whole, are fully understood—by interpretation—that reading to oneself or to others is brought to perfection. It is a long step from spelling out a text to reading fluently to others; interpretation is usually treated as something that comes of itself until experience has shown with how many possibilities of misconception it is attended.

When these operations are applied to an entire literary document, they become a process of comprehension and interpretation; *i.e.*, the thought expressed in word and script is, in virtue of the general laws of thinking, speaking, and writing, apprehended and reproduced by another mind (and may then be given once more in speech and writing). Modern psycho-physics has shown by observation and experiment what difficulties have to be overcome in the process, even under normal conditions, when the individual possesses the ability to hear, to see, to read, to think, etc.; the process demands an effort of the will, *i.e.* attention. Where there is congeniality of spirit, no doubt, this process often takes place spontaneously, like the sympathetic vibration of strings tuned alike. The task of skilfully understanding the text is a different matter; this proceeds by rules, and is conscious of both its method and its aim, though here also affinity of spirit and sympathetic intuition are necessary. The work of comprehending culminates in exposition—*i.e.* in making a thing comprehensible to others, in 'discovery and transmission of the sense' (G. Heinrici in *PRE*[3] vii. 718). The decisive proof of one's having understood is the ability to reproduce with clearness, although we must here guard against the intrusion of the practical and hortatory element. The psychological laws of association show—what was already noted by Augustine—how necessary a wide knowledge and how important a good memory is for the expositor, who, in order to grasp the peculiar significance of details, must assign them to their proper place in the whole, and compare them with as many similar facts as possible.

The final test of exposition is in the free reproduction of the thought expressed in the text—in translation and paraphrase. It is easy to repeat verbally what one has heard, but difficult to reproduce it in its true sense; and unless every detail is brought out by ample paraphrase,[1] something will usually be lost. The task of conveying the thought in another language presents special difficulties; a translation must not be slavishly literal, nor yet merely a free rendering of the sense, but must be in keeping as much with the genius of the original as with that of the foreign language.[2]

Exposition, however, is more than a mere reproduction of the thought. It is rightly required of the expositor that he shall be above his text, *i.e.* that he shall in a sense understand its thought better than the original writer, so that he is in a position to criticize the thought itself as well as its formulation. Just as in the interpretation of a law it is an acknowledged duty of the expositor to elicit and make good the intention of the lawgiver, as something in certain circumstances actually opposed to the letter of the law, so also in literature: what the author intended to say; how he ought to have said it; whether a particular thought is relevant to his general argument, and whether it is in itself a right thought; whether the form is artistic and the reasoning sound—all these questions must be considered by the exegete, so that the exposition really resolves itself into a criticism. Here again, no doubt, a strong subjective element emerges—certainly a source of danger for the exegete, yet an involuntary expression of his personal interest in the work he has to expound. From this point a path leads directly to the homily, which does not, however, belong to the proper function of the expositor, but for which the critical exposition is an indispensable preparation.

(2) *General hermeneutics.*—This science of comprehension forms the groundwork for the technique of exegesis proper, or general hermeneutics, which deals with the following topics. (*a*) The fixing of the true text.—There is often a difficulty even in reading an autograph, but it is specially difficult to re-construct a lost autograph from copies of various grades (Textual Criticism), as due consideration must be given not only to the genealogical relations of the derivative documents, but also to the psychological possibilities of error. (*b*) Words and sentences as the vehicles of formulated thought.—For the sense of the words mere etymology is of much less importance than statistics of linguistic usage (Concordance), variations of meaning (Lexicon), and comparison with similar words (Synonymics). Foreign words, poetical words, and archaisms require special treatment; the construction of sentences must be studied in connexion with historical grammar. (*c*) Restraints upon natural expression, *i.e.* forms of composition, and quotations.—This is of great importance; the non-literary man speaks and writes as he thinks, but the orator or author is under the necessity of making his productions conform to certain recognized forms of literature. Poetry differs in its structure from prose, having a peculiar metrical form conditioned by exigencies of rhythm, rhyme, etc.; and history is not composed in the same way as a speech. Even style in its modern sense, *i.e.* as denoting the mode of expression peculiar to an individual writer, involves a certain limitation. The exegete, moreover, must be specially careful in passages where his author has not himself framed the expression of his thought, but has borrowed it, as, *e.g.*, where there is imitation, use of sources, or quotation; here it will often be necessary to note three distinct things—the author's own thought, the original sense of the passage quoted, and the sense in which the author uses it. (*d*) The materials of thought—terms and ideas.—As a means of understanding the matter of the work before him, the exegete must be acquainted with the relevant archæology, history, geography, etc., while, in order to grasp the ideas and judgments, he must make himself familiar with the thinking of the age from which the document dates; here he must carefully guard against making unwarranted additions to, and putting false constructions upon, the original. (*e*) The motives of the utterance as determined by the general character of the work and the special purpose of the passage.—The exegete must endeavour to comprehend the composition in its entirety, taking account of every sentence in its relation to the whole, and tracing out the arrangement; hence the practical rule that, before entering upon a detailed exegesis, he should try to gain a general survey of the whole by a cursory reading; he must seek to understand the work from the position of the author, and must, above all, be cognizant of the latter's relations to his readers. (*f*) The personality of the writer.—It is of the utmost importance that the exegete should by painstaking psychological analysis gain an insight into the personality of his author. A literary work, like a work of art, is, in the highest sense, but the outward manifestation of a creative mind, and even the exegesis of details is conditioned by a knowledge of the personality behind them: 'si duo dicunt idem, non est idem.'

The fact that the proper understanding of details rests necessarily upon information which the original readers could supply for themselves, but which

[1] M. Kähler's reproductions of the thought in the Pauline Epistles (*Hebräerbrief*, Halle, 1880, *Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater*, do. 1884, and *Der sogenannte Epheserbrief*, do. 1894) are models of this kind of paraphrase.

[2] On the difficulties of translation cf. the *Prologus* to Sirach, and Iamblichus, *de Mysteriis*, vii. 5 (p. 257, Parthey), also Jerome, *Ep.* lvii. *ad Pammachium de optimo genere interpretandi* (*CSEL* liv. [1912] 503–526); Luther, 'Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen an Wenceslaus Linck,' 1530 (Erl. ed., 1850, lxv. 102–128); Schleiermacher, 'Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens,' *ABAW*, 1813; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Was ist Übersetzen?' in *Euripides' Hippolytos*, Berlin, 1891.

could subsequently be provided by exegesis only, justifies the time-honoured practice of prefacing a literary work with an Introduction.

(3) *Special hermeneutics.*—General hermeneutics, when applied to a special field, becomes special hermeneutics, *i.e.*, in the present case, Biblical hermeneutics. It is not thereby implied, however, that the Bible, as a book, is distinct from other books, and, in virtue of its inspiration, above the ordinary hermeneutical rules; but the particular conditions in which it took shape, its peculiar contents, and our special interest in them naturally require a specific application of the rules in question. To leave the Heb. text of the OT entirely out of account, it is not every classical philologist who can deal critically with the original text of the NT, who can rightly estimate the character of its Greek, or rightly judge the style of what is essentially a popular literature; while the explanation of the material calls for special knowledge, and the principle of congeniality demands a receptivity for religious thinking, though this, again, must not be used to support the claim for a peculiar theological or 'believing' exegesis.

(4) *Individual hermeneutics.*—The conception of special hermeneutics carries us still further. The Bible is not a literary unity, but an aggregation; and, just as the OT and the NT must, in the present position of exegesis, be dealt with separately, so for every single book of the Bible it is necessary to institute an individual hermeneutic, *i.e.* to determine the modifications undergone by the general rules of hermeneutics in consequence of the peculiar problems raised by the individual book. We cannot interpret the writings of the Synoptists, Paul, and John all in one and the same way, and it would be a crude error to transfer thoughts from Paul to the sayings of Jesus, or from the Epistle to the Hebrews to those of Paul or John; the word πατήρ as used by Jesus, Paul, and John has in each case a different meaning. The Apocalypse has a hermeneutic of its own. The exegesis of the Synoptic Gospels must have regard to the literary problem of the sources; that of Paul must consider the epistolatory style; that of Hebrews the rhetorical form. Everywhere in the NT the relation to the OT presents peculiar difficulties, and this is specially true as regards the quotations; moreover, the relation varies with each NT writer. Individual hermeneutics must also take into consideration the history of interpretation for every single book, or, at least, the exegetical development of the last hundred years.

4. The history of exegesis.—The exegesis of earlier times is now of almost no practical importance. As compared with the work of recent years, it proceeded upon entirely different principles and worked with very different means. It is nevertheless necessary, in the interests of science, to study the earlier work; we must know upon whose shoulders we stand, and what our predecessors had already attained. We distinguish here between (1) the history of exegetes and (2) the history of exegesis.

(1) The biography of exegetes forms part of the general history of Christian literature. It deals with many outstanding figures in the life of the Church who were engaged in practical work as well as in other kinds of literary work, and only one phase of whose work is to be considered here. It is also concerned with many whose names are all but forgotten, and whose writings have been lost, but who were of some importance in their own day, and had an influence upon later writers; such names appear in great numbers in Eusebius, *HE*, in Jerome, *de Viris illustribus* (copied largely from the *HE*), and in his continuators Gennadius, Isidore, and Ildefons. A considerable mass of material from these lost works is to be found in the *Catenæ*, and the first thing to be done is to disengage and restore it—a task which has been taken in hand by H. Lietzmann, J. Sickenberger, M. Faulhaber, and others. A great deal can be recovered from quotations in extant commentaries, and, while there is a difficulty in the fact that the Fathers in their polemical remarks seldom give the relevant names, careful observation enables us to assign not a little to the original writers; *e.g.*, portions of Apollinaris of Laodicea can be reconstructed from Chrysostom and Jerome. The history of exegesis would present a much more vivid picture of the learned discussions of the period if we could but endow these *anonymi* with distinct personalities. The Latin exegetes of that age depend as much upon the Greeks as Cicero and his contemporaries on Posidonius and others. Ambrose might almost be called the echo of Origen. From a Latin translation Swete has been able to re-construct a great commentary by Theodore of Mopsuestia (*Theodori episcopi Mopsuestini in epistolas beati Pauli commentarii*, Cambridge, 1880–82). How the work of the earlier Latin exegetes may be recovered from the later has been shown by A. Souter, A. L. Ramsay, and J. Haussleiter with regard to Pelagius, Beatus of Libana, and Primasius respectively. A thorough investigation of the Carlovingian commentaries would assuredly yield as rich materials as would that of the Greek *Catenæ*.

The individual exegetes must next be grouped in schools. The Gnostics (*e.g.* Heracleon) form a party of their own, while Hippolytus and Methodius stand apart from the main development. With Origen are associated, on the one hand, Eusebius of Cæsarea and the Cappadocians; on the other, the later Alexandrians, as, *e.g.*, Didymus the Blind, and also Cyril of Alexandria. To Lucian are attached the so-called Antiochenes (Theodore of Heraclea, Eusebius of Emesa, Diodore of Tarsus, John Chrysostom, Isidore of Pelusium, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodoret of Cyrus), and the Syrian Nestorians, *e.g.* Išo'dādh. Others, such as Apollinaris of Laodicea, Hesychius of Jerusalem († 433), and Severian of Gabala, must be more thoroughly examined before they can be classified. Of the later Byzantians, Aretas, Œcumenius, and Theophylact are mere compilers; Photius is more independent. There is no such close connexion among the Latin exegetes, though those of Africa (Tertullian, Cyprian, Tychonius, Augustine) and of Spain (Gregory of Elvira, Beatus of Libana, Isidore) had in each case a common tradition. The Roman Decimus Hilarianus Hilarius, the Roman convert Isaac ex Judæo (probably the so-called Ambrosiaster and at the same time the author of *Quæstiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti*, ed. A. Souter, *CSEL* l. [1908]), the British Pelagius, and the Arian *Opus imperfectum in Matthæum* (among the works of Chrysostom, *PG*, lvi. 611–946) merit special attention.

In the Middle Ages we have the Venerable Bede, with whom as leader a number of less independent Carlovingian theologians, such as Alcuin, Haymo, Hrabanus Maurus, Paschasius Radbertus, Angelomus of Luxeuil, Remigius of Auxerre, and —the most eminent of them all—Christian Druthmar of Stavelot, are associated. Walafrid Strabo with his *Glossa Ordinaria* laid a foundation for the succeeding period, in which Peter Lombard, Hugh of St. Caro, Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and Bonaventura composed their great scholastic commentaries; along with these we have the mystics, Rupert of Deutz, Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh and Richard of St. Victor, Herveus, etc. The 14th cent. saw the production of the comprehensive *Moralitates* (*Speculum morale*, etc.) of Vitalis a

Furno, Peter Berchorius, and Robert Holcott. A new beginning was made by Nicolas of Lyra († 1340) and his continuators Paul of Burgos and Matthias Doring. Of the Humanists, besides Erasmus, mention should be made of Faber Stapulensis, Cajetan; of the Reformers of various tendencies, Luther, Melanchthon, Bugenhagen, Justus Jonas; Zwingli, Oecolampadius, Pellican, Bullinger; Bucer, Capito; Calvin, Beza, Marlorat. The 17th century was, in the sphere of exegesis as elsewhere, the century of polemics. On the Roman Catholic side there were, in addition to Maldonat and Salmero, N. Serarius, Escobar, Cornelius a Lapide, J. Tirinus, and Menochius; on the Lutheran, N. Selnecker, D. Chytræus, Hunnius, Balduin, Erasmus Schmid, Dorsch, Calovius, and Sebastian Schmidt; on the Calvinistic, Piscator, Pareus, Amyraut, Gomarus, Heidegger; on the Socinian, Faustus Socinus, Crell, and others. Exegesis in the historical spirit begins with Hugo Grotius († 1645), J. Clericus († 1736), and J. J. Wetstein (1751). Valuable collections are [J. Pearson] *Critici sacri*, London, 1660; M. Poole, *Synopsis criticorum*, London, 1669–76; C. Starke, *Synopsis Bibliothecæ exegeticæ in Vetus et Novum Testamentum*, Leipzig, 1733–41 (²1763). The work of the 18th cent. is for the most part embedded in dissertations; but commentaries of a more general kind were written by J. L. von Mosheim († 1755), J. D. Michaelis (1769–1790), S. J. Baumgarten (1757), J. S. Semler (1769 ff.), and, somewhat later, by J. G. and E. F. C. Rosenmüller, and H. E. G. Paulus, of Heidelberg († 1851), the last eminent representative of rationalism. Of 19th cent. exegetes the following deserve special mention: Schleiermacher, F. Lücke, W. M. L. de Wette; A. W. Knobel, F. Hitzig, O. F. Fritzsche, L. J. Rückert, H. A. W. Meyer, E. Reuss, H. Ewald; F. C. Baur, K. C. J. Holsten; F. A. G. Tholuck, F. L. Godet, E. W. Hengstenberg, J. C. K. Hofmann, T. F. K. Keil, Franz Delitzsch, J. P. Lange, J. T. Beck; in the latter half of the century: A. Dillmann, F. Baethgen, C. Siegfried, O. Zöckler, H. Strack, J. Wellhausen, A. Merx; B. Weiss, W. Beyschlag, G. Haupt, T. Zahn, P. Ewald, H. J. Holtzmann, R. A. Lipsius, P. W. Schmiedel, H. von Soden; J. B. Lightfoot, B. F. Westcott, J. M. S. Baljon; of the present day: B. Duhm, H. Gunkel, K. Marti, W. Nowack, R. Kittel, C. Steuernagel, G. Heinrici, A. Jülicher, R. Knopf, F. Spitta, J. Weiss, W. Bousset, W. Heitmüller, H. Lietzmann, E. Klostermann, M. Dibelius, H. Windisch, E. Riggenbach; S. R. Driver, A. Plummer, W. Sanday, H. B. Swete, C. A. Briggs, G. A. Barton, W. R. Harper, G. F. Moore, H. P. Smith, B. W. Bacon, E. D. Burton, J. E. Frame, J. H. Ropes.

(2) The history of exegesis, in so far as it is separable from the history of exegetical theory, can deal only with the exegesis of single books and, more specifically, of single passages. Where it treats of single books, it falls most conveniently under the so-called individual hermeneutics (§ 3 (4)), while, where it is concerned with special passages, it is a study as interesting as it is profitable, guarding the exegete against many an error. If it often seems a mere labyrinth of aberrations, yet it frequently exhibits the various possible views more clearly than a purely argumentative analysis of the text would do. Further, it shows which views have already been refuted and may therefore be left out of account, and it thus brings the exegete to the point where he can begin to work afresh with a prospect of success. Many of the interpretations proposed from time to time in periodicals, etc., would never see the light if their proposers had a knowledge of the history of exegesis.

Thus, while J. G. B. Winer (*Pauli ad Galatas Epistola*, 1828, p. 125) speaks of some two hundred and fifty interpretations of Gal 3²⁰, the later history of exegesis shows us that the variations fall under two main types, and that the choice of the exegete must lie between these. It would not be right, however, to take account of modern exegetes only; in many cases the various possible theories are found from the very outset, and thus run parallel to one another throughout the entire history of exegesis. The Greek exegetes, slight as may be the value of their theoretical principles for us, had the immense advantage of a living knowledge of Greek (though we must certainly bear in mind the linguistic development that took place between the 1st and the 4th century, and the difference between the popular idiom of the Bible and the literary language of the Fathers), and the advantage also of an accurate knowledge of details. With reference to the fourth petition of the Lord's Prayer, we learn more from Origen's statement that ἐπιούσιος does not occur elsewhere than from all etymological attempts to explain it; the comparison of the ancient versions gives a synopsis of all possible renderings of the word; Augustine's classification in *de Sermone Domini in monte* (*PL* xxxiv. 1229) shows the three lines on which all subsequent exegesis of the passage proceeded—the natural, the spiritual, and the sacramental; while the history of exegesis since the Reformation shows that the last two have gradually been given up, so that the first alone is possible to-day. As regards the Lord's Supper, again, a truly historical exegesis of the narratives may be said to begin with L. J. Rückert (1853). All previous exegetes had started from the dogmatic question, 'What is the Holy Communion?' instead of asking, 'What actually took place at the last meal of Jesus?' It is true that here and there in the older exegesis, as in Chrysostom, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, we find glimpses into the historical aspect of the institution, and these the modern exegete must also take into account.

Exegesis is an art; and of exegesis, as of all art, it is true that its highest merit consists, not in originality, but in the sureness with which the right thing is seized; for, however often the right thing has been thought and said before, it still remains both true and new.

LITERATURE.—H. Steinthal, *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft*, Berlin, 1891; W. Dilthey, 'Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik' in *Philosophische Abhandl. Christoph Sigwart gewidmet*, Tübingen, 1900; A. Merx, *Eine Rede vom Auslegen insbesondere des AT*, Halle, 1879; H. J. Holtzmann, 'Das Problem der Gesch. der Auslegung' (*Heidelberger Festschrift*, 1886); E. Reuss, *Gesch. der heil. Schriften des NT*⁶, Brunswick, 1887, pp. 574–670; G. Heinrici, art. 'Hermeneutik' in *PRE*³ vii. 718–750; H. Vollmer, *Vom Lesen und Deuten heiliger Schriften* (*Religionsgeschichtl. Volksbücher*, iii. 9), Halle, 1907; G. H. Gilbert, *Interpretation of the Bible: a Short History*, New York, 1908.

E. v. DOBSCHÜTZ.

INTERPRETATION (Vedic and Avesta).—The history of the exegesis of the Rigveda is not without value in its implications for the interpretation of other sacred texts. This Veda possesses an elaborate commentary by Sāyaṇa, a South-Indian scholar (latter half of 14th cent. A.D.), and in the earliest stage of European study of the Veda it was believed that it would be sufficient to translate the text according to this commentary—a process which is actually exhibited in the version by H. H. Wilson (London, 1866–88). There is, however, an earlier source in the *Nirukta* of Yāska, who was eighteen centuries prior to Sāyaṇa, and who not merely diverges from him, but declares that his own predecessors, whose works are no longer extant, differed both from himself and from each other. In other words, the meaning of a large number of Vedic words and passages was lost in

India. This fact, together with the many contradictions found in Sāyaṇa's commentary, led R. Roth to urge that the Rigveda must be explained from itself, together with the assistance furnished by comparative philology and the closely cognate language of the Avesta (*q.v.*). The results of this method are admirably presented in the translation by H. Grassman (Leipzig, 1876–77). Yet, if the 'traditional' school inclined to one extreme, the 'linguistic' school went to the other. The result was a growing conviction that the golden mean should be followed, and on this basis A. Ludwig re-translated the Rigveda (Prague, 1876–88), not disregarding the native commentaries of Yāska and Sāyaṇa, and at the same time taking into account the data afforded by comparative philology, etc. Some scholars, however, have not been satisfied with this general principle, and have sought to interpret the Rigveda along other lines. Thus A. Bergaigne explained practically the entire text allegorically (cf. his *Religion védique*, Paris, 1878–83), and his pupil, P. Regnaud (*Le Rig-Véda*, Paris, 1892), endeavoured to prove that the whole Rigveda was composed for the sacrificial ritual. On the other hand, an 'Indian' school arose, headed by R. Pischel and K. Geldner, who, in their *Vedische Studien* (Stuttgart, 1889–1901), maintain that the Veda is to be interpreted from the India of the classical period, a round millennium later. Both the 'ritual' and the 'Indian' schools have a certain justification: some Vedic verses may well have been composed for the liturgy, and, even where this is not the case, the ritual use of Vedic passages may assist in casting light upon the meaning attributed to them (whether rightly or wrongly) in the early Brāhmaṇic period; and for the 'Indianists' it must be said that there would be—at least if the Rigveda had not been composed under very different circumstances and views of life from those which prevailed in the classical period—relatively little change in the course of a thousand years in the East. Curiously enough, comparative religion has thus far played little part in Vedic interpretation, though its importance has been recognized by H. Oldenberg (*Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 33–38), and has been sanely applied by L. von Schroeder in his *Mysterium und Mimus im Rigveda* (Leipzig, 1908). In some cases, moreover, it is by no means impossible that the religions of modern India may illuminate some of the problems of Vedic religion. The ideal translation of the Rigveda, which shall take into consideration native tradition and the sciences of comparative philology and comparative religion, the liturgy and classical Indian thought, is still to be done.

The process of development in the exegesis of the Avesta has not been dissimilar. The major portion of the Avesta possesses an elaborate gloss in Pahlavi, with a Sanskrit version by Neriosangh (fl. *c.* A.D. 1200). The first to attempt a translation of the Avesta, Anquetil du Perron (Paris, 1771), was naturally restricted to the native Parsi tradition, which was itself based, in his day, on an inadequate knowledge not merely of Avesta, but even of Pahlavi. But Roth on the Vedic side had a counterpart on the Avesta in E. Burnouf (*Commentaire sur le Yaçna*, Paris, 1833–35), and a savage controversy now broke out between the 'traditionalists' and the 'linguists.' The 'traditional' school was represented chiefly by F. Spiegel (*Avesta übersetzt*, Leipzig, 1852–63, *Commentar über das Avesta*, do. 1864–68) and F. Justi (*Handbuch der Zendsprache*, do. 1864), followed, with considerable reservation, by C. de Harlez (*Avesta traduit*[2], Paris, 1881), as well as by L. H. Mills (*Gathas*, Leipzig, 1894–1913), while the translation of the Avesta by J. Darmesteter (*SBE* iv.[2] [1895], xxiii. [1883], and especially *Le Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892–93) is little more than a reproduction of the Pahlavi version. The 'linguistic' school, inspired largely by Roth, found defenders in such scholars as H. Hübschmann, also J. and T. Baunack (*Studien auf dem Gebiete des Griech. und der arischen Sprachen*, i., Leipzig, 1886–88). As in Vedic exegesis, however, the best method has been found to be one of combination of 'traditional' and 'linguistic' methods. M. Haug, who began as a pronounced antagonist of traditionalism (*Fünf Gathas*, Leipzig, 1858–60), became almost a traditionalist himself after residence in Bombay (*Essays on . . . the Parsis*[4], London, 1907); and C. Bartholomae, who in his *Arische Forschungen* (Halle, 1882–87) was pronouncedly a 'linguist,' now gives full credit to the tradition, weighing both sides impartially, and deciding strictly according to the merits in each case (*Altiran. Wörterb.*, Strassburg, 1904, from which he has compiled his *Gatha's des Awesta*, do. 1905, and his pupil, F. Wolff, his *Avesta . . . übersetzt*, do. 1910). In the interpretation of the religion of the Avesta it is not impossible that a new stage has been inaugurated by the researches of J. H. Moulton (*Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913), who holds that much that has hitherto been believed to be Iranian is Magian, and that the Magi were neither Indogermanic nor Semitic (see art. MAGI). The 'higher criticism' of both Veda and Avesta is as yet only in its initial stages, though a beginning has been made by H. Oldenberg (*Die Hymnen des Rigveda*, i., Berlin, 1888) and E. V. Arnold (*Ved. Metre*, Cambridge, 1905) for the one, and by K. Geldner (*Über die Metrik des jüngeren Avesta*, Tübingen, 1877) for the other. For an account of the interpretation of the Qur'ān, see art. QUR'ĀN.

LITERATURE.—H. Oldenberg, *Vedaforschung*, Stuttgart, 1905; K. Geldner, *GIrP* ii. [1904] 40–53. LOUIS H. GRAY.

INTROSPECTION.—'Introspection,' briefly defined, is turning the mind inward upon itself, and is thus practically synonymous with self-consciousness to that extent. It is distinguished from both external and internal events considered as a mere stream of experiences that are not held in the field of attention as phenomena of self. External events may occur in a series, or be a stream of facts in a sequential or a causal order, but they are not aware of this fact, nor of themselves as individual events. They simply occur and do not know. Ordinary states of consciousness, such as sensations, memories, and thoughts, occur also more or less like outer events, but they also represent some kind of knowledge. In one's waking states one is continuously conscious, perhaps usually conscious only of what is going on about one. One may not be inspecting the states themselves. But, at any moment in which one may wish to look at these states as one's own, one may turn the mind's attention to these internal events and distinguish them as mind and not outer facts. This is an act of introspection. It is identical with self-consciousness in so far as it represents awareness of one's own states, but it also implies more persistency of attention than is necessary for an act of self-consciousness. Hence it has come to denote the habit of the reflective psychologist who studies or examines his own mental states and their laws, considered as such and apart from their causal relation to external events. We thus contemplate our own action and its relation to the 'self,' and become observers of our mental states as they pass, whether these states are the result of external stimuli or are the inner and spontaneous actions of the mind.

So far as we know assuredly, man is the only being that practises introspection, and it is cer-

tainly one of the most important incidents in his intellectual and moral development. It is the point at which the mind arrests its native tendency to let its thoughts take their own course, or to let the will express the passing impulses. Without this power and habit of introspection man would be a mere passive spectator of outer events, and would take no voluntary part in his own development, but would be the blind result of his environment. Introspection, however, shows his partial independence of this environment, and his capacity for controlling his own thoughts and interests.

Locke calls this power of introspection the 'internal sense,' and distinguishes it from sensation, which he regards as 'external sense.' As an 'internal sense' he names introspection 'reflexion,' and says that he 'would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding.' But he carries his discussion of it very little beyond that of definition, though he means to include in it all those functions which are related to the body of our subjective knowledge. Locke deliberately compares the function of internal sense to that of external sense, and so implies thereby that it receives its 'ideas' by impression, though, in the opinion of the present writer, he did not intend readers to suppose this. The falsity of the implication was no doubt the reason that later students of the question lay no stress on reflexion as a distinct faculty. Leibniz apparently does not mention it, save to accept it as a functional action of importance in knowledge. In Hamilton 'self-consciousness' is the term for this function, and he carefully admits that, as a function of knowledge, it does not determine the basis of any non-sensational philosophy. But he regards it as a presentative function of knowledge.

It is probable, however, that we too often forget what it is that makes this function an important one in the economy of intellectual and moral development. This is its relation to attention (*q.v.*). However else we may regard attention, it is the movable aspect of consciousness, so to speak, and enables the mind to arrest its interest in the panorama of events naturally passing before it, and in this arrest it discovers its own part in the drama itself. That consciousness is a variable function in the scene becomes thus a factor in the total product of observation, and the attention can seize this part in its progress and make it a part of our analyzed knowledge, as well as the phantasmagoria of external objects. Introspection is thus the means of arresting, through attention, the purely automatic or reflex course of events in the natural sensory life.

It has been customary on the part of a certain group of scientific philosophers, if 'scientific' can apply to them, to ridicule introspection as an organ of knowledge. Possibly this attitude of mind was due to the habit of the opposing school of trying to assert certain truths which were supposed to be unanalyzable and unamenable to scepticism. But, whatever the faults of a dogmatic method, it was easy to show that the very critic of introspection could not make any contention in his own favour without the use of introspective and analytic habits of thought and reflexion. Human intercourse is practically impossible without that examination of our own ideas and conceptions which enables us to ascertain and understand the mental processes in beings like ourselves, and some agreement must exist preliminary to all mutual intercourse in such matters. Introspection simply establishes the rationale on which rest all social relations, and makes possible the interchange of ideas and adjustment of our moralities.

LITERATURE.—**Locke**, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ch. i.; **W. Hamilton**, *Metaphysics*, Edinburgh and London, 1859, Lect. xxix.; **W. James**, *Principles of Psychology*, London, 1905–07, i. 185; **G. T. Ladd**, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, do. 1894, ch. ii.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

INTUITIONALISM.—1. Introductory.—The term 'intuition' (*intueri*, 'to look upon') symbolizes the conception that one among the sources of knowledge is the direct and immediate apprehension of truth. It opposes the notion that all wisdom is based, whether directly or indirectly, upon intellectual processes and reasoned judgments.

In the 18th and early 19th cent. the advocates of intuitionalism were engaged in combating the view of utilitarianism, which believed that the groundwork of moral judgments consists, in the last analysis, in the estimation of the greatest good to the greatest number, and that of hedonism, which claims that the source of moral judgments is and should be in the determination of that line of conduct which will bring, in the long run, the highest happiness. On the contrary, intuitionalism claimed that there is that within us which will, independently of any calculation of facts or expediencies, furnish an inviolable criterion of right and wrong, good and bad, true and false.

In the present state of the theory of knowledge, the chief contention of intuitionalism is against empiricism, which reduces all rational verities and moral and religious certainties back not simply to individual and tribal experiences, but to those also of the race which have been harvested throughout a long stretch of biological evolution in the form of instincts and the predisposition of the organism towards right behaviour.

Intuitionalism still tries to make the distinction, as Kant did in *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1783), that the necessary truths of morality and religion are not caused and produced by experience, but conditioned and called out by it. Apriorism has also antagonized the point of view of empiricism. Intuitionalism differs from apriorism in emphasizing usually the importance of affection rather than, or in preference to, cognition as being itself a direct source of knowledge. The unlikeness of the two is represented, *e.g.*, in the fondness of apriorism for the doctrine of innate ideas—a point of view with which intuitionalism has latterly little sympathy. The relationship between apriorism and intuitionalism is, however, often a friendly one, as, *e.g.*, in the intellectual intuitionalism of Plato and Fichte and in the claim of other students that, while affection is fundamental as a source of knowledge, it is essential that the content of the affective life be cognized and thus organized before it can constitute knowledge of an effective sort or consciousness of a high order.

2. Classification of intuitionalists.—It is customary to classify intuitionalists according to what they regard as the predominant source—within consciousness or outside of it—of moral and religious truth. The following view-points may be mentioned: (1) the mythical intuitionalists, who simply affirm that conscience and the love of righteousness are the voice of a Supreme Ruler who hovers about and dominates the personal life; (2) the juristic intuitionalists, who posit God as the Law-giver, who speaks to the heart through Church, creed, or revealed word; (3) the mystical intuitionalists, who have a sense of the *rapport* between the personal life and the higher personality who operates as indwelling spirit; (4) the rationalistic, or intellectual, intuitionalists (Chrysostom, Augustine, Cudworth, Clark, Calderwood), who believe that it is in the very nature of reason or the understanding to apprehend the unchangeable truths of moral life, and who sometimes appeal by way of analogy to the axioms of mathematics, which they

claim to be finished truths that could not have come through experience; (5) the emotional or æsthetic intuitionalists (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Rousseau, Herbart, Kant in his later years, and Schleiermacher), who discover finality in the feeling of the beauty or the rectitude of certain kinds of thought and conduct as opposed to other kinds; Herbart, *e.g.*, has used the analogy of our appreciation of consonant and dissonant notes which are universally appreciated as such without the necessity of training and without the need of description or analysis; the Hebrew religionists were predominantly of this type and were fond of appealing to the heart as the source of wisdom; (6) the perceptual intuitionalists (Butler, Martineau, W. E. H. Lecky, and Kant during his middle years), who claim that the perception of right and wrong, which is never mistaken by a normal mind, can be compared to the perception of colour by the eye, extension by the hand, or the relationship among discrete objects by the mind.

Such a classification, while convenient, is unsatisfactory. There are those like Locke and Paley, who, while claiming to be consistent empiricists, naively accept as ultimate the intuitions of the law of causality, of God, and of the axioms. Others, of whom Descartes is typical, make a show of extreme intellectualism and at the same time accept the non-rational intuition as a starting-point and constant criterion of truth (*Meditations II., et al.*). In like manner, Spinoza, a strict moral logician, posits 'a third kind of knowledge'—'scientific intuition'—which transcends the knowledge of the qualities and attributes of things given by reason and arrives at the apprehension of the essence of things (*Ethics*, Eng. tr.[2], London, 1894, pt. ii. prop. 40, scholium 2; pt. v. prop. 25, *et al.*).

We find, too, an unclassifiable type of intuitionalism in Plotinus and the Mystics, which might be termed negative intuitionalism. The reason is constantly defining truth *in order* to be able to transcend its formulations. The classifications usually suggested do violence to the facts, since so many of the writers cultivate a sort of eclecticism which would recognize the value of essentially all the sources of wisdom. Martineau, in letter and spirit, is as much an æsthetic as he is a perceptual intuitionalist. Price, Reid, Butler, and others of the 'common sense' school accept the ultimate theistic origin of the moral consciousness and at the same time find within it a rational principle of action alongside of the natural impulses, instincts, and appetites which, when normal, are useful.

A valuable instance of the refusal to accept a single faculty or function as the source of wisdom is that of Fichte (*The Science of Ethics*, tr. A. E. Kroeger, London and New York, 1897, p. 183): 'Conscience is *the immediate consciousness of our determined duty*. . . . The consciousness of a determined somewhat is never immediate, but can only be found through an act of thinking; and hence, so far as its material is concerned, our consciousness of duty is never immediate; but the consciousness *that* this determined somewhat is duty, is an immediate consciousness as soon as the determined is given. The consciousness of duty is *formaliter* immediate; and this formal part of consciousness is a mere feeling.'

3. History of theory.—The 19th cent., particularly the latter half of it, has witnessed the falling of intuitionalism into disrepute. 'Pure' intuitionalism, which assumes a final, though latent, form of ethical and religious consciousness, waiting only to be called out by experience, has had almost no advocates. The whole trend of thought has been inimical to such a view. Comparative ethics has shown that the moral standards among peoples in different parts of the earth are as diverse as are the social customs by which they are governed (*e.g.*, L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, London, 1906; E. Westermarck, *MI*, do. 1906). Developmental ethics has been able to trace out the laws of the evolution of morality from animal and tribal life to its higher types (H. R. Marshall, *Instinct and Reason*, New York, 1898; A. Sutherland, *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, London, 1898). The study of instincts and their evolution has seemed to account for the content of the moral and religious life in terms of the content of instinct (T. A. Ribot, *The Psychology of the Emotions*, London, 1897; W. McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, do. 1908). It has been easy to describe how the laws of imitation bind humanity together so closely that the 'sanctions' are supremely authoritative (G. Tarde, *Les Lois de l'imitation*, Paris, 1895; J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, London and New York, 1906). The laws of suggestion have been so well described that one can understand how social judgments can perpetuate themselves from generation to generation through 'social heredity,' and how they can become so authoritative that they assume the majesty of a transcendental authority; hence also the sifting of standards in the same tribe or people until there is such a unity, time-wise and space-wise, within the united group that the social judgments (*i.e.* moral precepts as felt within the individual) seem absolutely universal, necessary, and changeless. It has been understood, too, how in the lives of growing children all the commands of those in authority, all the precepts, and all the emotional appeals leave their traces or fringes until the mind is clothed finally with a moral 'atmosphere' that is irresistibly impelling. The effect of the environment on the child who is constantly submerged within the social complex is not unlike that of hypnotic suggestion, which can alone and of itself produce effects indistinguishable from moral impulses. Indeed, the person undergoing the suggestion will not believe his impulses other than of subjective origin, personal and original (cf. M. J. Guyau, *Education and Heredity*, London, 1891). If one combines in his thought the effect of all these influences upon the personal consciousness, and keeps well in mind the accumulated predispositions towards certain types of thought and sentiment which are passed on from generation to generation, it does not seem unreasonable to share the conviction of those who look upon conscience as a refined hereditary memory. It is not to be wondered at that, with the prevailing passion for the developmental explanation of all things, intuitionalism should have been well nigh swept away.

This irresistible evolutionary habit of thinking has recently found expression in the two widely accepted doctrines of radical empiricism and pragmatism. It would seem to the devotees of these schools that all the old landmarks of thought—time, space, causality, freedom, God, conscience, the axioms—had been swept from their base and swallowed up in the current of a changing order. To be sure, they re-establish themselves as postulates, perhaps necessary postulates, of thought. But, even so, the doctrine of intuitionalism has seemed to suffer a deluge of destruction, for it has been its genius to claim to base the unsteady thought and wavering faith of mankind upon foundations that are changeless and eternal.

What is there left, then, of intuitionalism? Very little, indeed, in its older form, except to those who still cling to a conception of a static as against a plastic and changing universe. It is a remarkable fact, however, that during the last two or three decades the tide has been turning in exactly the opposite direction. There has been a revival of a modified intuitionalism as lively as was the English ethical intuitionalism in the days of Hume. It is particularly noticeable among the recent students

of the origin, development, and meaning of religion. It has arisen not in spite of, but by reason of, the evolutionary conception of the world and of morals and religion. The point of departure of the newer intuitionalism is the study of instinct and feeling; its method of procedure is the description of the processes of consciousness in their genetic relations, and the analysis of the nature of thinking; and its culmination is the notion that intelligence and reason are not primary and controlling facts of consciousness, but secondary functions of a consciousness which is fundamentally of a pulsing, energistic kind, for the sake of aiding it in making finer and fuller adjustments. It looks as if the life of lower animals and plants is essentially dynamistic or voluntaristic. The first fact of organic life seems to be an impulse towards action, a want, a need. Probably in its early stages it does not cognize, much less rationalize, its behaviour; still it leads a relatively happy and successful career of delicately intuiting the situations it meets. If the lower and higher kinds, including the mind of man, belong to a single order, if nature makes no leaps, but each 'new' thing is but the variation upon and refinement of some old fact or function, then there is no difference in kind between the 'native reactions' of simpler organisms and the conscious behaviour of men, between the instinctive adjustments of animals and the logical judgments of a scientist. Genetic logic is approximating to a satisfactory description of the relationship between these apparent extremes. It is not uncommon for the students of the mental life to speak of the 'intellectual instinct.' Genetic psychology is making many advances towards discovering the kinship between the instinctive wisdom of animals and the refined intuitions of cultivated minds. They differ essentially in two respects: the ability of higher creatures to 'fix' more definitely, through cognition, ideation, and judgment, their states and processes; and the refinement, from within, of the 'values' that accompany conduct, which have flowered into the inner life of art, morality, and religion. If the direct source of the wisdom of these higher aspects of life is the 'wisdom' that is bound up in instinct, and if there has been an evolution, not simply of intelligence, but of the mechanism for the immediate, affective interpretation of experience as well, then we should seem to have a basis for a confidence in the worth of the higher intuitions. And such is the case—so that many students now believe that intuitionalism has gained a more substantial foundation in philosophy than it has ever enjoyed.

The history of intuitionalism has been, indeed, a record of the knocking out, one after another, of false bottoms in the theory of knowledge, each time accompanied, on the one hand, by the fear that this doctrine had permanently collapsed, and, on the other, by the hope that it had established itself more securely upon a permanent basis. When science, during the 15th and 16th centuries, was destroying the conception of an 'absentee' God who spoke and operated upon the heart, the only alternative seemed to be atheism. Rationalism, however, came to the rescue and promised to establish intuitionalism upon the surer foundation of truth, a copy of which is somehow reflected in the eternal verities of the understanding. Empiricism and associationism then dissolved the certainties of rationalism by showing that the axioms and conscience are built up out of experience. The impending consequence seemed to be pluralism and sensationalism; but the 'common sense' philosophers found in the experiences themselves the saving grace of truth, and thought that they had found a more substantial ground for morals and religion in the common experience of common men. Since latterly the dominant way of thinking about the mental life is in terms of evolutionary psychology, it seemed at first flush as if nothing were left but 'pure' experience, or even, in the last analysis, the facts and laws of physics and chemistry, until there set in the reaction already mentioned.

4. Criticism.—At every stage in the ebb and flow of the doctrine, important considerations have been overlooked. It is as if the mind could entertain but one impelling conception at a time. Atheism was failing to entertain a possibility of the divine immanence; associationism, a sort of 'mental chemistry,' was obtuse to the simple truth that the blending or fusion of 'pure' experiences would be the summation of nothings which could give only nothing as a resultant. This careless thinking has persisted through two centuries, and has begun to yield at last, as the outcome of more highly disciplined judgment and a more careful analysis of the facts of pathology and of logical and experimental psychology (consult, *e.g.*, two articles by J. Ward on 'Assimilation and Association' in *Mind*, new ser., ii. [1893] 347-362, and iii. [1894] 509-532). 'Association is wholly confined to ideas that, to begin with, are distinct and to the end are separable' (*ib.* iii. 531). Perhaps it is true, as Ladd, Baldwin, and other psychologists contend, that apperception is found in every sensation. The notion of pure sensation is an artificial abstraction. No less false is the abstraction of the 'pure experience' of evolution and the supposition of radical naturalism that consciousness can be built up out of 'organic memories,' the fusion of original chemical elements, and of 'behaviour' that is void of any ability to evaluate the quality or fitness of its reactions. Perhaps it is always impossible rightly to assume that something can come out of nothing. It may be true that an organism is always doing something to the environment at the same time that environment is forming consciousness. If so, it is wholly consistent to say that, while consciousness is constructed out of experiences, the very condition that they are experiences at all is that they are, at every step in the process, parts of a personal consciousness. Then there would be the elements of moral and religious insight resident somehow within all experiences. The only absurdity of such a belief would arise in the thought of one who holds still to a static and finished, as against a plastic and developing, truth. With this amendment the old question assumes a new meaning.

5. Modern statement of theory.—The central problem of the newer modified intuitionalism, however, is this: are the hereditary moral predispositions harvested up solely out of cognized experiences, or are there other of the higher affirmations of morality and religion than cognition, intellection, and judgment? There are several lines of evidence that the cognitive life is only one of the sources of such wisdom; that intuition is, in a certain sense, *sui generis*, our present intuitions having arisen not out of cognitions, but out of other intuitions; and that intuition is always more or less successful in guiding life into making 'wise' adjustments.

(1) It is clear from embryology, comparative anatomy, and genetic psychology that the intellectual processes are not primary in biological evolution, but are a later 'afterthought' or 'by-product,' a specialized mode of carrying out that which is fundamental—behaviour. Reason has arisen out of conduct, and exists for the sake of improving it. The original means of interpreting the fitness of conduct and of distinguishing right behaviour from wrong was through the affective life—immediate intuitions, we may say, of its fitness.

(2) There has been a progressive refinement of the mechanism of affection, which has kept pace with that of cognition. The latter has been refined through the agency of the cerebrum and the logical functions. The former has developed through the instrumentality of the sympathetic nervous system and its connexions with the special senses, the glands, intestines, and the circulatory system, as the mechanism for the immediate evaluation of higher experiences as wholesome or unwholesome, good or bad, right or wrong. As indicated by the generally accepted James-Lange theory of the emotions, the organic responses often, if not generally, precede the cognitive reactions, and do much towards determining their character. The higher instincts and sentiments are the direct outcome of the refinement of the coarser, simpler instincts.

(3) There is 'wisdom' in instinct. Judging by the behaviour of animals, this wisdom is more like intuition than cognition. Low organisms will 'learn' how to meet a novel situation successfully; a sea-anemone, *e.g.*, when tricked a few times into the vain attempt of assimilating filter-paper saturated with beef-juice, will soon refuse the tempting morsel. Every reaction of every animal seems to carry with it a tang or tone or flavour of its worth or value to the organism, and the ability to move in the direction of the accentuation of the valuable reactions and away from those which bode ill. This evaluating quality of consciousness is itself probably a primary instinct. Should one care to give it a name, it might be designated 'cosmæsthesia,' a feeling of relation, a sense of fitness. There is also in instinct the peculiarity, usually overlooked, of feeling after the consequences of a reaction before it has completed itself, a dim awareness of ends *about to be* attained. It might be useful to give this quality a name, as, for example, 'telæsthesia.' This prophetic quality of instinct has been observed by several recent writers.

C. S. Mayer, *e.g.*, says ('Instinct and Intelligence,' *British Journal of Psychology*, vol. iv. [1910] 210 f.): 'But there is even more than this "feeling of activity" at the very first performance of an instinct. There is another element which, so far as I am aware, has hitherto been completely ignored. To my mind it is certain that, on the occasion of the chick's first peck or the duckling's first swim, the bird is dimly, of course very dimly, conscious of the way it is about to act.' G. F. Stout agrees with this view, and adds: 'But the instinctive equipment will not, in my view, be sufficient to account for the animal's actual behaviour. . . . The animal will be on the alert to mark whatever new phases the developing situation brings with it. This will be so because it feels interested in the situation, and especially in the situation as having a future. It will, accordingly, show more or less initiative in watching or searching for coming experiences. It will, so to speak, go to meet them' (*ib.* p. 240 f.).

The developed equivalent of these two endowments of consciousness, cosmæsthesia and telæsthesia, which designate the essential nature of the wisdom of instinct, is the higher wisdom of the heart, much of which cannot be cognized.

(4) There is always operative the act of subconscious incubation, which presents to the field of clear consciousness new and unexpected results. These often arise from lines of conveyance among the instincts, impulses, and imperfect ideations, whose combined effect is a 'revelation' to the mind of that which before had been at most but dimly felt. The study of the subconscious, indeed, has robbed intelligence of the credit it had claimed for its control of life, and for our scientific, philosophical, and æsthetic heritage.

(5) The analysis of the processes involved in invention and discovery shows that something like intuition has played a most important rôle in this sphere, where clear consciousness is supposed to be at its point of highest efficiency and in complete control (consult E. Mach, 'The Part Played by Accident in Discovery and Invention,' *Popular Scientific Addresses*, Chicago, 1897).

(6) Clear concise judgments are often derived from the summation of imperceptible factors in experience. There is a vast array of evidence from psychological experimentation pointing in this direction, and much that proves the law conclusively.

A case in point is the work of A. Brückner upon touch sensations (*Zeitschr. für Physiol. und Psychol. der Sinnesorgane*, xxvi. [1901] 38 ff.). Two simultaneous tactual impressions, each of which is below the threshold of consciousness, will produce a definite perception if the sum of the two is above the threshold (see also G. M. Stratton, *Experimental Psychology and its Bearing upon Culture*, London, 1903, ch. iv. f.).

It amounts to a turning-point in the history of thought that the proof is forthcoming that even our clear conscious judgments are based upon evidences that must be felt out rather than cognized.

It is not strange that with the many conspiring lines of evidence, of which the above are only typical, of the fact of an intuitive source of knowledge, there should recently have arisen a predilection for belittling the value of intellection as compared with that of intuition (see W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1902, ness hinted above would tend to bring the two aspects of life into a satisfactory harmony. It would suggest the validity of the progressively enriching content of the moral, æsthetic, and religious life, drawn from the content of all the instincts, independently of conscious description, and mayhap often transcending it. It would assume, too, that reason and judgment are the articulated organized aspects of the entire stream of processes, not different in kind from the life of instinct and intuition. The intellect, being but a specialized expression of the rest of life in certain of its phases, preserves as its own content the inner life of the instincts. It does not furnish 'values' to life *because* of its formulations; on the contrary, its formulations are for the sake of describing, so far as possible, the values that consciousness already apprehends.

It is likely that most of life will remain below and above the reach of accurate description and formulation, and that mankind will continue to derive much of its truth or values from 'the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character,' which 'are the only places in the world in which we catch real facts in the making, and directly perceive how events happen and how work is actually done' (James, *op. cit.* p. 501 f.).

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INVESTITURE CONTROVERSY.—Investiture (from *vestire*, 'to put in possession') was the act of installation by which the vassal in the feudal period entered into possession of a property or an office, and acknowledged that he held it on condition of fulfilling certain duties to the suzerain who invested him. The formal acts which accompanied

investiture were symbolic of the new relation into which vassal and suzerain entered. The vassal did homage and tendered the oath of fealty to his liege-lord; thereupon the suzerain invested him by delivering over some object which was the symbol of his new rights. The object might be a clod of earth to symbolize his possession of the land, or a sword, which at once symbolized his power over those beneath him and the nature of the service he must render to his superior. Investiture, therefore, marked how, whenever a man entered into possession of office or land, he took his place in the feudal system, and enjoyed certain rights on condition of rendering certain service.

1. **In the Empire.** — The controversy which sprang up on the question between Church and Empire, and which bulks so largely in the mediæval period, was the natural result of the increased wealth and social importance of the clergy. So long as the Church was the communion of the faithful and was supported by their gifts, its clergy were elected by those who valued their services, and owned no allegiance save to the flock whom they served. They were chosen in view of their capacity to fulfil spiritual functions, and were invested with spiritual authority over all who owned themselves their subjects. The ring and crozier, which became the symbols of investiture of the higher clergy, were symbols of spiritual authority. The ring symbolized the marriage between the Churchman and his bishopric or monastery; the crozier stood for the cure of souls which was delivered into his charge. He held his office from the Church to serve the ends of the Church: he was the Church's 'man.'

But the Church came into possession of great donations of land, and, since the Church never died, it rarely surrendered any of this property. As holders of land, Churchmen became at once involved in the responsibilities which, according to the feudal tenure of all land, attached to such possessions. They became incorporated in the feudal system. Bishops and abbots became secular lords in virtue of their lands. As such, they held their property of secular lords on condition that they fulfilled their duty to their suzerain. They became responsible also for courts of justice among their own vassals, and required the secular service of their vassals. The king of France was vassal to one of his own bishops for his possessions in the Vexin. The bishop-counts held their temporal possessions as the king's men, even as their own vassals in turn held property as their men. The system, which gave Churchmen rights and privileges in connexion with their temporal possessions, could be safe only if the Churchmen fulfilled in turn the responsibilities to their superiors which the possessions implied. But, because the superior needed the service of the holder of an ecclesiastical property, he needed also some guarantee that a new holder was competent to fulfil that side of his duty. He interfered, therefore, in the election of bishops, not out of wantonness, but from the natural desire to have a loyal and capable vassal. Hence there was a tendency to construe the ecclesiastical benefice, not as a spiritual office, but as a feudal fief, which, like every other feudal fief, involved allegiance to a secular lord and conferred on him the right of investiture. The suzerain received homage and oath of fealty from the Churchman, and thereupon invested him with ring and crozier. While the claim was naturally most eagerly pressed in the case of the bishops, the situation was the same, though in an inferior degree, in connexion with the abbeys and the majority of ecclesiastical benefices. The suzerain could say that he only invested the beneficiary into the temporalities, but practically it was his fitness to hold the temporalities from the suzerain that determined the beneficiary's election.

The reasons which caused the controversy to break out in an acute form between the Empire and the Church were many. It is necessary to point out only the principal. On the one side, the sacrosanct character which attached itself in men's minds to the Holy Roman Empire had enabled the Emperors to go further than other rulers in claiming the right to invest Churchmen. The Emperor even claimed the right to appoint the pope; much more could he invest a bishop. Since, therefore, the Emperor had gone furthest in the claim to invest, the effect of the claim in secularizing the whole tone of the Church was most patent in the Empire. As has already been pointed out, the freedom of the electors, who stood for the faithful choosing a spiritual director, was overridden by the suzerain, who desired a competent vassal. Further, since during a vacancy the suzerain drew largely on the revenues of a see, it was in his interest, as it was in his power, to obstruct the efforts of the electors in choosing a bishop. But, above all, the suzerain's power stimulated simony. It is always easier to bribe one man than to bribe a court of electors, and to do it secretly; men bought their sees more readily when the court of electors had become an individual.

The chronicles and acts of synods during the 11th cent. prove how strong the custom had grown in the Church. In 1049, at a synod in Reims, the three bishops of Nevers, Coutances, and Nantes acknowledged that they had purchased their promotion. The bishop of Toulouse, at a synod held in the city in 1056, was accused of having paid 100,000 solidi for his see, and of having sold the holy vessels of his cathedral to buy a bishopric for his brother.

The increased wealth and power now attaching to Church offices were sure in themselves to tempt men to use any method of attaining them; but the fact that those who could confer office were more open to bribery increased the temptation. What added to the temptation was that the Church had not yet succeeded in carrying its absolute prohibition of clerical marriage. Churchmen had children, and were not yet so ashamed of them as to conceal the fact. They openly schemed to obtain their offices for their sons. Many abbeys and churches had been founded by men who stipulated that the right of appointing the holders of the benefices should be reserved to them and their heirs. Hence high dignities in the Church came to be regarded as the appanages of great families, and the means of providing for younger sons and bastards. Men who owed their appointment to such claims were likely to regard their offices as the natural property of their children.

The connexion of clerical marriage with the disappearance of the rights of electors who stood for the Christian people is seen in the synod of Pavia, 1018, which was largely concerned with the issue of decrees against Churchmen who, living with wives and children, diverted Church property to their relatives.

On the other hand, what forced the question to the front in the Empire was the rising tone of the Church itself. The Roman Church became more conscious of its spiritual functions, and at once began to claim the power to govern itself with the view of fulfilling its special functions. Laying weight on the office and duties of the clergy, it insisted that a spiritual function could be conferred only by spiritual men. Churchmen must be chosen by the Church with a view to their religious qualifications, and must be free to act as the Church's 'men,' owning only one allegiance. Naturally, the Church failed to recognize that such a change in the status of the clergy within mediæval society must bring with it their renunciation of functions which they had hitherto fulfilled and dignities which they had hitherto enjoyed. No kingdom dared allow the establishment in its midst of a body of men who enjoyed all the privileges, but

were not to be relied on to fulfil the duties, of their temporal possessions.

The rising claim for autonomy on the part of the Church found expression in the Lateran synod of 1059, which, in its sixth decree, forbade clerics to accept any spiritual office from lay hands; and the claim thus made in Italy was echoed by the synods of Vienne and Toulouse in the following year. It was not, however, until Hildebrand became Pope Gregory VII. that the battle was joined with increasing consciousness of all that was involved in the issue.

This was partly due to the uncompromising temper of the new pope, but still more was it due to the fact that he knew his own mind, and had no hesitation about uttering it. He saw, with the instinct of a born ruler, that the only justification for a government is that it should take the responsibility and the risks of governing. All Christendom recognized a certain privilege resting in Rome, but practically Christendom was going on in its several provinces as though Rome did not exist. Gregory grasped the reins and actually drove. He saw that the first aim to be sought was the Church's liberty to choose its servants. He reconstituted the College of Cardinals, with the sole right to elect a pope; the Church, not the Emperor, must choose its head. That carried with it the free choice of the bishops by their chapters and their confirmation by the pope; no archbishop could assume authority till he had received his pallium, the symbol of his authority, from Rome. He extended the practice of sending legates from Rome in order to bind the Church into unity with the head that it itself had chosen. His attack on simony and clerical marriage was meant to free the clergy from secular control.

The key to the situation lay in investiture. Who invested a Churchman with his authority? If the secular power, then he was chosen for his fitness to fulfil the ends of that power, and, as its 'man,' must take its orders in his duties. If the Church, then his qualification was a religious one, and he must throughout serve religious ends. Accordingly, in the famous Lenten synod of 1075, Gregory denounced the married clergy, excommunicated five of Henry IV.'s councillors because they had obtained their ecclesiastical offices by simony, and forbade every layman to grant investiture to an ecclesiastical dignity.

It was impossible for the Empire to submit to this decision *simpliciter*. So long as Churchmen held high office in the Empire and large fiefs in every kingdom in Europe, they must hold these under pledge to fulfil the duties to the secular authorities involved in their dignities; and the secular authorities must have some guarantee at their election that the beneficiaries were loyal subjects. The revived power of Rome only made more intolerable the position which Gregory claimed. So long as the practical government of the Church was lodged in each provincial Church, the secular ruler could acknowledge beneficiaries who were loyal to a Church over which the provincial government held some control. But, when Rome not only claimed but exercised power over every section of the Church, the admission of Gregory's claim meant the institution in every kingdom of a body of men, holding large secular authority, who were liable to remain free to follow the dictates of a foreign power. The only terms on which the newly formulated demands of the Church were admissible in their full scope were that the Churchmen should surrender their territorial power and secular dignities, and, since they claimed to be free to exercise spiritual authority, undertake to fulfil only spiritual duties. In the course of the struggle, many of the high dignitaries of the Church saw that this was involved in Gregory's demand, and were distinctly lukewarm in their support of the pope.

It is unnecessary to follow the course of the struggle between Gregory and the Emperor. It is enough to note that Henry's humiliation at Canossa in 1077 was followed in 1085 by Gregory's death in exile; and that the sudden and dramatic changes in the situation prove that the question in debate was not ripe for settlement. Church and Empire could alternately win; but no lasting settlement had been arrived at. The popes who followed Gregory were content to reiterate the claims of the Church, Victor III. at the synod of Benevento in 1087, Urban II. at the synod of Melfi in 1089. Paschal II., however, made a significant admission. At Sutri his legates in 1111 met Henry V. and offered, if the Emperor would grant freedom of election and the abolition of lay investiture, that Paschal was prepared to surrender all the temporalities which the clergy had received since the time of Charlemagne. But, when Henry arrived at Rome to be crowned on those terms, the bishops present entered a strong protest against what they accounted a surrender. The Church, apart from the pope, was not willing to pay the price of its liberty.

There followed more than ten years of confused debate and struggle. Paschal, whom Henry had taken prisoner after his abortive visit to Rome, was cowed or persuaded into a renunciation of the right of investiture. But a Lateran Council (1112) rejected the pope's submission on the ground that Paschal was not at liberty; and the synod of Vienne, with the consent of the pope, renewed the uncompromising claim of the Church. Many other factors entered to complicate the quarrel between the Church and the Empire, but the main principle which divided the two powers, in that period of antipopes and rival Emperors, was still the question of investiture.

A compromise between the conflicting principles was reached by Henry V. and Calixtus II. in the Worms Concordat (1122), to which the Church set its seal in the 8th and 9th canons of the Lateran Council (1123). The election of bishops and abbots was to take place in presence of imperial commissioners, and the elected dignitary was invested with his temporalities by the Emperor. The Church, however, retained the power of electing, though the elected must be accepted by the Empire, and the Church alone could confer ring and crozier, the emblems of spiritual authority. The worst abuse connected with lay investiture thus fell away at once, for the Emperor was unable to keep a benefice vacant, since he could not prevent the electors from meeting. Otherwise the Concordat is a compromise, and, as such, theoretically open to criticism. The Church safeguarded the claims of the electors to whom belonged the right of declaring who was a fitting person to fulfil an ecclesiastical office; it preserved the recognition of every church dignitary as the holder of a spiritual office, since he was invested with ring and crozier by the Church. The State retained the power to make its influence felt by the presence of its commissioners, and the Emperor was acknowledged as feudal suzerain over Church fiefs as over all fiefs. Both parties, in fact, owned that the situation needed delicate handling, and could not be determined by either side pressing its claims to their logical issue. The practical utility of the Concordat was proved by the fact that, though it did not and could not prevent encroachments on one side or the other, its principles regulated the tenure of church dignities in the Empire till its dissolution in 1806. Then the situation was wholly changed, since Christendom no longer owned only one Church;

the investiture question passed into the issue of Church and State.

2. **In France.**—The controversy arose in France, but there its course was different, because the Church was not dealing, as in the Empire, with one central authority. The settlement, for the same reason, was different. There could be no Concordat, since any decision at which the king arrived did not bind the great nobles. Hence, for a full statement of the struggle and its settlement, it would be necessary to review all the greater fiefs. It need only be noted that by the Pragmatic Sanction under Paschal II. the king abandoned all claim to homage from Churchmen and the right of investiture. He demanded, however, an oath of fealty before any beneficiary was allowed to enter on his temporalities, and thus retained suzerainty over church dignities, so far as they were fiefs. The agreement, though different in its terms, shows the same essential and inevitable features of compromise as the Worms Concordat. The arrangements, made by the feudal lords, varied according to their power and the condition of the Church in their territories. In the South of France, where the clergy were less amenable to the influence of Rome, homage was long exacted from bishops.

3. **In England.**—In England the controversy was clearly raised by Archbishop Anselm under Henry I. Anselm's conduct in the matter illustrates vividly the service which the monastic orders rendered to the Church in the long debate. Monks, who held high dignity, were indifferent, to a degree that the more secularized Churchmen were not, to the emoluments and dignities of office and were specially disciplined to obedience to the Church. Anselm, appealing to the decrees of Gregory and Urban, refused to do homage for his own see on Henry's accession (1100), or to consecrate bishops who had done such homage. The controversy which followed was sharp and decisive, as was to be expected from two men who were intelligent enough to respect each other's position. The compromise at which they arrived and which Paschal confirmed (1106) was practically the Worms Concordat. It came to be embodied in Magna Charta.

Cf., further, art. CONCORDAT.

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INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE.—The question as to how far ignorance in its various degrees affects the voluntary character of action calls for consideration in any ethical system which aims at completeness. Only in so far as it is voluntary is an action imputable. In the moral theology of the Roman Catholic Church a broad distinction is drawn between 'invincible' ignorance and 'vincible' ignorance. A man is said to be in a state of invincible ignorance if, when he acts, he is altogether unaware of the law or of the facts of the case, and hence is unconscious of the obligation of further inquiry on the point; or, again, if after reasonable effort he is unable to arrive at certain knowledge. Ignorance is vincible when a man is conscious of his lack of knowledge and of the duty of making some further inquiry, and nevertheless neglects to use his opportunities of so doing. Vincible ignorance presents several varieties. A man may actually foster his own ignorance for fear lest the obligation should become known to him (*ignorantia affectata*); or, while not deliberately fostering ignorance, he may neglect all means to acquire knowledge (*ignorantia crassa* or *supina*); or he may make some efforts, but such as are incommensurate with the gravity of the matter (*ignorantia pure vincibilis*). It will be noted that the terms 'invincible' and 'vincible' ignorance have reference to the state of mind in which a particular action (or series of actions) is performed. Invincible ignorance in no way signifies that the mind is incapable of further enlightenment on the subject. New information may transform it into clear knowledge. As regards the degree of effort to attain knowledge in default of which ignorance cannot be regarded as invincible, no hard and fast rule can be given. It varies with the gravity of the matter and with the circumstances of the individual. There are certain callings (*e.g.* that of a judge) which carry with them heavier obligations as regards the acquisition of professional knowledge than do others. In these, invincible ignorance cannot be pleaded as an explanation of errors due to want of such knowledge, unless considerable efforts have been made to attain it. All are bound to make very great efforts to escape ignorance in matters affecting the salvation of their own souls or those of others. Yet even here much will depend on the circumstances and capacity of the person concerned. What would be invincible ignorance in the case of the uneducated or of one much occupied with duties from which there was no escape would be vincible ignorance in those less unfavourably situated.

Invincible ignorance excuses from all culpability. An action committed in ignorance of the law prohibiting it, or of the facts of the case, is not a voluntary act. The true character of what he is doing is unknown to the agent. Such is the unanimous teaching of Roman Catholic moralists. This position was, however, traversed by the Reformers. According to Luther, invincible ignorance renders breaches of human law alone inculpable; it is otherwise as regards the law of God. For here our ignorance is due to original sin, and is itself sinful. It cannot, therefore, invincible though it be, be pleaded in excuse.

'In politicis negotiis potest esse locus invincibili ignorantiae . . . sed haec ad res sacras et conscientiae negotia transferenda non sunt. Sumus enim nati in caecitate peccati originalis: id malum invincibile est . . . sed non adeo excusabile est, sicut Scholastici invincibilem ignorantiam dixerunt excusabilem' (Comment. *in Gen.* xii. 17).

Calvin goes so far as to deny the possibility of invincible ignorance as regards the divine law. Our ignorance, he says, is always vincible ignorance of the crass or supine sort.

'Certum est ignorantiam nostram supinae crassaeque negligentiae semper esse comitem' (*in Lucam*, xii. 47).

Jansenius on this point followed the teaching of Luther (*de Stat. nat. laps.* ii. 6); and, even after the condemnation of the five propositions, his doctrine on this subject continued to be upheld by some of his adherents. In 1690, Pope Alexander VIII. authoritatively condemned the proposition:

'Even if there be such a thing as invincible ignorance as to the natural law, he who in the state of fallen nature acts out of such ignorance, is not thereby excused from formal sin' ('Tametsi detur ignorantia invincibilis iuris naturae, haec in statu naturae lapsae operantem ex ipsa non excusat a peccato formali,' Denzinger, no. 1292).

This thesis had been maintained by the Jansenist theologians Jean de Witte and Macaire Havermans (A. Vacant, *Dict. de théologie*, Paris, 1903, i. 752). The doctrine that invincible ignorance excuses from sin is, indeed, of great importance in Roman Catholic theology. It renders the seemingly rigorous doctrine of the Church, that communion with the See of Peter is by God's ordinance necessary to salvation, compatible with the confident hope that many who are outside all visible communion with the Roman Catholic Church will enter heaven. This point was clearly expressed by Pius IX. in his Encyclical to the bishops of Italy (10th Aug. 1863):

'It is known both to ourselves and to you (venerable brethren) that they who are in the state of invincible ignorance regarding our holy religion, and who carefully observe the natural law and its precepts written by God Himself on the hearts of all . . . can, through the action of God's light and grace, attain eternal life, since God . . . will by no means suffer any to perish who has not incurred the guilt of wilful sin' (Denzinger, no. 1677).

On the other hand, vincible ignorance regarding those matters which a man is under obligation to know is culpable. Here the want of knowledge is voluntary, either directly, as in *ignorantia affectata*, or indirectly, as in *ignorantia crassa* or *pure vincibilis*. And no man is justified in remaining voluntarily ignorant as to the duties of his state of life or as to the truths essential to his salvation. On this point Roman Catholic moralists find themselves at issue with the very prevalent opinion that speculative error can never be a breach of the Moral Law. Where the speculative error relates to vital matters of religion, and is due to negligence, such error, they hold, is gravely culpable. Further, since vincible ignorance is voluntary, the responsibility for the acts resulting from it remains with the agent. The guilt, however, of sin due to this cause is proportioned, not to the objective character of the thing done, but to the degree of culpable negligence to which it is due. Moreover, an act done through ignorance, even if that ignorance be crass or supine, is less culpable than an act done with clear knowledge; for it is less fully voluntary, and, therefore, less imputable. As regards the ignorance which is deliberately fostered, there is a divergence of opinion among moralists.

How far can invincible ignorance extend? It would seem that there are limits beyond which it is impossible. There are certain broad principles of the natural law which can never be altogether obscured. No one, *e.g.*, can be invincibly ignorant that he should not do to another what he would be unwilling to have done to himself. As soon, however, as we pass to derivative principles, invincible ignorance appears. To the Christian moralist it is evident that polygamy is contrary to the law of nature. Yet many a pagan and Muhammadan is certainly in invincible ignorance on this matter. Duelling provides a case in which invincible ignorance prevails in certain more civilized countries. A question of special interest in view of opinions now often maintained is whether it is possible for a man to be invincibly ignorant regarding the existence of God. The general reply of Roman Catholic theologians is that, even if such ignorance be possible, it is altogether abnormal and can last at most but a short time: the evidences for God's existence both in the created world and in the human conscience are so manifest and clear that it is impossible for ignorance on this point to remain long invincible (J. de Lugo, 'de Incarn.,' disp. v. n. 106, in *Opera*, Paris, 1868, ii. 351). It is plain that this view is incompatible with the admission that any one can continue long to be a conscientious agnostic. Agnosticism appears as vincible ignorance on a question as to which a man is under the gravest obligation to acquire certain knowledge and as to which such knowledge is easy of attainment.

LITERATURE.—**Thomas Aquinas**, *Summa theol.* II. i. qu. 6, art. 8, qu. 76; **F. Suarez**, *De Actibus Humanis*, tr. ii. disp. 4 (*Opera*, Venice, 1740-51, iv. 126); **C. R. Billuart**, *Cursus Theol.*, Paris, 1827-30, viii. 152-194; **A. Ballerini**, *Theologia Moralis*, Prato, 1889, tr. i. c. 3; **T. J. Bouquillon**, *Institutiones Theologiæ Moralis Fundamentalis*, Bruges, 1878, pp. 60-77; **V. Frins**, *De Actibus Humanis*, Freiburg, 1897, i. 321 ff.; **W. J. Walsh**, *De Actibus Humanis*, Dublin, 1880.

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INVISIBILITY.—The attribute of invisibility is one which is shared by gods, spirits, demons, the dead and the region of the dead, or the world of the gods, while the power of becoming invisible belongs to those beings as well as to certain mortals. Where invisibility was ascribed to gods or spirits, one simple reason probably was that in the case of most of them, apart from animal-gods or worshipful parts of nature, they were in fact unseen. When man begins to people his world with spirits, which, as many savages believe, swarm everywhere, so that one cannot move without striking against them, their quality of invisibility is obvious. In the case of the dead it was more a power which could be exercised by them or a property hiding them from bodily eyes, since they could be seen in dreams, and it was then considered that the soul of the dreamer had been with the dead. Gods or spirits are not always invisible; they have the power of becoming visible or invisible at will, assuming in some instances a bodily form for the former purpose. In the case of favoured mortals, the supposed power of invisibility was ascribed to or claimed by them because it was a desirable thing. What men wish for is often what they think they or others possess. Such a supposed power might easily then be reflected back upon supernatural beings, otherwise material and visible. It should be observed that medicine-men often claim the power of seeing invisible beings whom ordinary mortals cannot see. In some instances it is thought that, formerly, when gods and men dwelt together, the gods were visible; but, now that separation has taken place, they are no longer seen, except on occasion. Hence perhaps one reason of the wide-spread belief that it is dangerous to see a god or spirit, when he takes a visible form.

1. **Spirits and gods.**—The *Andamans* believe that their high god Puluga is nowadays invisible, even when he descends to earth. Ju-ru-win, the evil spirit of the sea, is also invisible, and so, too, are the soul and spirit of the dead.[1] In general the high gods of *Australian* blacks—Baiame, Daramulun, etc.—are invisible and unknown, though they may be heard.[2] Codrington writes of the *Melanesian nopitu* that they come invisibly and possess men. Should such spirits chance to be seen, they disappear at once. Some *vuis* are visible; others are not, being incorporeal. There is a belief that, if the latter could be seen, it would be as a grey indistinct something.[3] In *Polynesia*, gods generally were invisible, or visible only in so far as they became incarnate (though not always then) or embodied themselves in a visible shape. Such a god as Taaroa (Leeward Islands) had a body, but was invisible to mortals, and he sustained the world by his invisible power. Men lived in an invisible world of spirits and ghosts, which might occasionally, however, make themselves seen.[4]

Among the savage races of the *Malay peninsula* many of the gods (*e.g.*, the creator Pirman of the

[1] E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. [1883] 157 ff., 162.
[2] W. Ridley, *JAI* ii. [1873] 268 f.
[3] *JAI* x. [1881] 270, 275, 285.
[4] G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, pp. 18, 63, 69, 232, and *passim*; W. Ellis, *Polynes. Researches*, do. 1831, i. 325, 336, 406; Waitz-Gerland, *Anthrop. der Naturvölker*, vi. (Leipzig, 1871) 315.

savage Malays of Johor, who dwells in the sky), spirits, and demons are invisible, or, if seen, disappear at once.[1] The Dayaks believe that gods are invisible, even when (as with many gods of other races) they come to a house to feast. *Antus* (spirits) surround men invisibly, though they may assume various visible forms.[2] The *Araucanos* believe that supernatural beings can make themselves visible or invisible at will. The *pilli* ('other-self,' 'soul') of men can leave them invisibly in dreams, but they are visible to other wandering *pilli*, as are also the dead, though these are invisible to bodily eyes.[3] The Indians of *Guiana* believe in countless invisible beings surrounding them—a belief common to most savage peoples and others more advanced in civilization.[4]

The gods of *Babylon* 'constituted a countless multitude of visible and invisible beings,' their bodies of a more rarefied substance than that of mortals. The hosts of demons were invisible and impalpable, though possessed of some form, and could creep into houses through the narrowest possible openings.[5] In *Greece* the gods had powers of invisibility or they could surround themselves with a mist, but they could also make themselves visible to mortals in various forms. They would also enshroud their favourites in darkness or a mist to save them in time of danger.[6]

Early *Hindu* literature shows that the gods were invisible, yet could assume any visible form at will to favoured worshippers. They did not, however, possess a purely spiritual form. Such deities as Vāta, the wind, are naturally regarded as invisible: 'his sound is heard, but not his form.' Here also we find the belief in an earlier visible intercourse of gods with men, broken off because of men's solicitations which wearied the gods. Formerly they drank with men visibly; now they do so unseen.[7] Holy men formerly beheld the gods and the mighty *ṛṣis*. Hosts of spirits surrounded men invisibly.[8] In modern Hinduism, while invisibility is an attribute of gods, as well as of most spirits and demons which surround men, the decidedly anthropomorphic forms ascribed to them make the belief in their visible appearance possible, as does also the conception of visible incarnations. Thus Rudra 'by himself or by the numberless spirits whom he commands is omnipresent, but he manifests himself to neatherds and water-carriers.'[9]

The numerous gods of *Northern Buddhism* are invisible; *e.g.*, they are invited to attend the ceremonies and are believed to arrive unseen. Household gods occupy various parts of the house unseen, and these are religiously guarded while the god is in possession. The earthly Buddhas have ethereal and invisible counterparts in the formless worlds of meditation.[10] In *Shintoism* the invisibility of gods is explained 'by the theory that since the Age of the Gods they have removed further from the earth, so that they are now beyond the scope of human vision.'[11]

In *Celtic* belief similar views must have been entertained. The divine *sídh*-folk appeared or disappeared at will, often from or into a supernatural mist, and one of them is represented as saying, 'We behold and are not beheld.' They may be seen by favoured persons, but not by others present at the same time, and some of the gods possess objects which cause invisibility—*e.g.*, Manannan's magic cloak. Of him it is said that he makes the gods invisible and immortal.[1]

The narrative of Gn $3^{8ff.}$ shows that in early *Hebrew* belief the idea of a time when God visibly had intercourse with man was prevalent. In later times God is thought to be more withdrawn; and, though certain persons see Him or some part of Him or His glory,[2] or theophanies of the Angel of Jahweh are granted to certain persons,[3] or God is seen in visions,[4] or He appears in symbolic form, *e.g.* as fire, yet the idea is also strongly prevalent even in some of these instances that it is dangerous to see Him. Thus 'no man shall see me and live.'[5] The finest expression of God's invisibility is to be found in the words of Job.[6] That God is invisible is also a doctrine of the NT[7] and is finely stated by St. John.[8] God in Christ—the Incarnation—is the full manifestation of the invisible God. The idea of the danger of seeing God is found in the NT.[9] Angelic orders of beings are also invisible,[10] yet they appear occasionally to men.[11]

The *Christian* doctrine of God's invisibility is a natural correlate of the doctrine that God is spirit, but it does not mean that God does not manifest Himself as in the Incarnation and already in other ways—'the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.'[12] The vision of God of the mystics, Neo-Platonist and Christian, is entirely a spiritual experience, 'not with the eyes of the body, nor of the soul.'[13] But the vision of God is enjoyed by angels, and is the reward of the pure in heart.[14]

The invisibility of God is also a doctrine of *Islām*, and here, too, it is held that such supernatural beings as the *jinn* can become invisible 'by a rapid extension or rarefaction of the particles which compose them, or suddenly disappear in the earth or air or through a solid wall.' They can manifest themselves in any form which they please.[15]

In folk-belief fairies, elves, dwarfs, etc., are supposed to have the power of invisibility, often by wearing a hat or garment, or by means, *e.g.*, of fern-seed. They also confer their power on mortals. By a magical salve with which the eyes are anointed it is possible to see invisible elves.[16]

2. Invisibility of the dead.—That the spirits of the dead are invisible is a general belief among most peoples. This is obvious when we consider how, in so many instances, where they are supposed to haunt the grave, or their former abode, or some particular locality, they are not usually seen, but their presence is known or felt, or they make

[1] Skeat-Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 214, 245, 349.
[2] H. Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and Borneo*, London, 1896, i. 105, 173, 182 f., 189, 209.
[3] R. E. Latcham, *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 345.
[4] E. F. Im Thurn, *Among the Ind. of Guiana*, London, 1883, *passim*.
[5] G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, London, 1894, pp. 630, 633; M. Jastrow, *The Rel. of Bab. and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, pp. 260, 262, 265.
[6] Cf. Homer, *Il.* vi. 24, viii. 50, xv. 608, etc.
[7] *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, II. iii. 4. 4, III. vi. 2. 26.
[8] H. Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 39.
[9] J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1872, i.^{2} 147, v. 59, 303, and *passim*; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, do. 1882, pp. 162 f., 176; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, Boston, 1895, pp. 88 f., 187.
[10] M. Monier Williams, *Buddhism*, London, 1889, pp. 202, 319; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, do. 1895, p. 373.
[11] W. G. Aston, *Shinto*, London, 1905, p. 32.

[1] J. A. MacCulloch, *The Rel. of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, pp. 78, 89, 330.
[2] Gn 32^{30}, Ex 33^{11}, Nu $12^{6\text{-}8}$ (Jacob and Moses see God face to face); Ex $24^{10\text{f.}}$ (Moses, Aaron, Nadab, Abihu, and 70 elders see the God of Israel); Ex $33^{17\text{ff.}}$ (Moses sees the back of Jahweh).
[3] Gn 16^{13} etc. [4] Nu 24^{3}.
[5] Ex 33^{20}; cf. Gn 16^{13}, Ex 3^{6} 19^{21} 'Lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze, and many of them perish'; Jg $6^{22\text{ff.}}$ 13^{22} 'We shall surely die because we have seen God'; Is 6^{5}.
[6] $23^{8.9}$; cf. 9^{11}.
[7] Ro 1^{20}, Col $1^{15.16}$, 1 Ti 1^{17} 6^{16}, He 11^{27}.
[8] 1^{18} 'No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.'
[9] He $12^{19\text{ff.}}$, Rev 1^{17}. [10] Col 1^{16}.
[11] Cf. *Par. Lost*, iv. 677 f. [12] Ro 1^{20}.
[13] St. Teresa, *El Castillo interior*, Madrid, 1881, cap. 8.
[14] Lk 1^{19}, Mt 18^{10} 5^{8}; cf. 1 Co 13^{12}, 1 Jn 3^{2}; and Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* i. 4. 1, 'God, invisible saving only unto spirits that are pure.'
[15] E. W. Lane, *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages*, London, 1883, pp. 29, 35. For an example of the fear of unseen spirits by a Syrian, see G. A. Smith, *Early Poetry of Israel*, London, 1912, p. 32.
[16] See Grimm, *Teut. Myth.*, Eng. tr., London, 1882–88, p. 1418; art. FAIRY, in vol. v. p. 679^{b} and references there.

themselves heard, or, as in Manahiki, where certain grounds were occupied by ghosts, those spots were known by their repulsive odour.[1] On the other hand, they can be seen by the living—*e.g.*, in dreams or trances—or they manifest themselves as apparitions, more or less impalpable, or they can be seen or communicated with by wizards. In many instances to see a ghost is dangerous to the percipient, causing death, disease, or madness. A few instances will illustrate the general belief in the invisibility of ghosts.

According to the *Araucanos*, they are invisible, but may be seen by the *pilli*, i.e. the other selves of dreaming men.[2] The *Andaman Islanders* believe that the soul and spirit of the dead are invisible to human eyes, yet may be seen by dreamers with supernatural power (*ôka-pai-ad*), who can also see the invisible powers of good and evil.[3] Ghosts among the *Melanesians* 'do not appear in visible form, but if anything is seen of them it is as fire or flames.'[4] The *Semang* think that souls of the dead are visible to each other, but invisible to mortal eyes.[5] At the *Dayak* feast of the dead the spirits are present invisibly—an idea which is constantly found in connexion with all such feasts among savages and in folk-survivals.[6] In *Samoa*, where the soul is thought to have the same form as the body, it is dreaded by those who profess to see it after death.[7] Men lived in a world of invisible spirits of the dead surrounding them, but they might be seen at night.[8]

In most cases, as Crooke has said, 'the dead have joined an invisible army.'[9] This is illustrated by the story told by Procopius[10] of the fishermen on the coast opposite Brittia who were summoned by night to ferry across the shades of the dead, who were unseen by them.

3. Invisibility of the Other-world.—The Other-world, or the world of the gods, being a spiritual or quasi-spiritual region, is generally held to be invisible under ordinary circumstances. But, like the dead, it may be seen in dreams and visions, the soul being supposed to go thither, or actual visits are paid there by medicine-men or specially favoured mortals.[11] Examples of this belief are found in the *Polynesian* conception of Rohutu, the aerial paradise, invisible save to spirits;[12] in the idea of the *Duke of York Island* natives regarding the place of the dead, *matana nion*, that, 'if our eyes were turned so that what is inside the head were now outside, we would see that *matana nion* was very near to us and not far away at all';[13] in one of the *Celtic* conceptions of Elysium as a mysterious region on the same plane as this world or entered through a mist—a conception also entertained in later times regarding fairy-land;[14] and in the *Jewish* idea that the righteous dead 'will behold the world which is now invisible to them.'[15] The unseen nature of the Other-world is a fact of ordinary experience, but in all ages and all religions it has been visible to select persons on occasion.

4. Invisibility as a power.—Invisibility, like shape-shifting, is a power frequently claimed by medicine-men, wizards, and witches, or various recipes or charms exist by which other persons can become invisible, or invisibility is produced by some magical means. A native told Count de Cardi that the Ju-ju priests in W. Africa could make themselves invisible so quickly that one could not tell when they had done so.[16] Usually the means employed is a spell or potion. The *Sinhalese* think that a number of 'medicines' mixed and charmed in a grave less than seven days old and rubbed on the face near the eyes makes one invisible at night.[17] The *Hausa* priests make charms which give the wearer the power of invisibility.[1] In *Dahomey* the potion used was made from the body of a male infant pounded in a mortar.[2] In a *Kashmir* tale collyrium rubbed on the eyes causes invisibility.[3] In modern folk-survivals similar powers are ascribed to magic potions. According to a belief current in the *S. Sporades*, a snake should be killed on 1st May, and its head buried with a bean in its mouth. When the beans are grown, all should be gathered and placed one by one in the mouth before a mirror. As soon as a bean is found which makes the face invisible, this particular bean should be kept, and, when put in the mouth, will make one invisible.[4] Witches in *Long Island* take the ear of a black cat, boil it in the milk of a black cow, and wear it on the thumb to produce invisibility.[5] Fern-seed, gathered between 12 and 1 on Midsummer Eve, caused one to walk invisibly.[6] The ancient *Druids* were believed to possess the power of invisibility, either by means of a spell or by producing a magic mist. This spell, the *faeth fiadha*, was also used by *Christian saints*, and survives in one form as St. Patrick's *Lorica*, by which he and his companions were made invisible to their enemies, or changed into deer—probably a late corruption of the earlier story through a confusion of the name with *fiadh*, 'deer.' The charm *fith-fath* is still remembered in the W. Highlands.[7] The gods of *Greece* frequently made their favourites invisible by means of a magic mist when they were in danger (see above).

A cap of invisibility is often mentioned in *Märchen*—German, Greek, Italian, Kalmuk, etc.[8] This corresponds to the helmet of Orcus which made Athene invisible, the *tarnkappe* of Alberich and Siegfried—a hat or cloak, which is also a common property of elves and dwarfs, causing their invisibility, the *Hulithshjâlmr* of Norse tales, and the cap of Perseus.[9] Similar invisibility-producing articles are the ring of Gyges, Manannan's cloak, and many others mentioned in myth and legend. The cap or cloak of invisibility may have taken its origin from the disguises to which clothes lend themselves so easily, coupled with the natural desire of becoming invisible as a protection against danger.

In some myths of the *Mandæan* religion, Hibil Ziwa descends to the seven lower worlds, and remains invisibly in them for long periods, acquiring their mysteries.[10] *Gnostic* descriptions of the descent and return of the heavenly æon Christ through the spheres of the archons sometimes tell how it was accomplished invisibly to them, as in the Basilidean system, where He probably descended through His mystic name 'Calaeau.' Gnostic souls, ascending through these spheres, were invisible to their rulers, because of their baptism or initiation, or because they had mastered the Gnosis and knew the names and nature of the archons.[11]

The power of becoming invisible is still believed in sporadically, even by educated people, the process suggested being perhaps a kind of dematerialization of the body.[12]

5. Invisible weapons.—As sickness or death is usually ascribed by savages to invisible demons, so they are often supposed to effect the evil by invisible weapons.[13]

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes.

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1 Turner, 277. 2 *JAI* xxxix. 345. 3 *Ib.* xli. 97, 162.
4 *Ib.* x. 285. 5 Skeat-Blagden, ii. 218.
6 Ling Roth, i. 209; cf. A. Le Braz, *La Légende de la mort chez les Bretons armoricains*[2], Paris, 1902, ii. 115, and *passim*.
7 G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 219 f.
8 Ellis, i. 406. 9 *PR*[2], 1896, i. 201.
10 *De Bell. Goth.* vi. 20.
11 See artt. BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Ethnic); DESCENT TO HADES (Ethnic).
12 Ellis, i. 245, 397. 13 Brown, 192.
14 See BLEST, ABODE OF THE [Celtic], §§ 3, 4; FAIRY, § 11.
15 *Apoc. Bar.* 51[3].
16 M. H. Kingsley, *West Afr. Studies*, London, 1899, p. 499.
17 W. L. Hildburgh, *JAI* xxxviii. [1908] 164.

1 A. J. N. Tremearne, *Hausa Superstitions and Customs*, London, 1913, p. 171.
2 R. Burton, *Mission to Gelele*, London, 1864, ii. 71.
3 J. H. Knowles, *Folk-Tales of Kashmir*, London, 1888, p. 80.
4 *FL* x. [1899] 171. 5 See Hopkins, 158.
6 Grimm, 1210; *1 Henry IV.*, II. i. 90; Jonson, *New Inn*, I. 6.
7 MacCulloch, 310, 322; *FL* xxi. [1910] 442.
8 *CF*, pp. 216, 218, 222.
9 *Il.* v. 844 f.; Grimm, 462–463, 1418; B. Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, London, 1851–52, i. 217.
10 W. Brandt, *Mand. Schriften*, Göttingen, 1893, p. 138 ff.
11 Iren. i. 24. 4 f.; Hippolytus, v. 2; *Exc. ex Theod.* § 81.
12 See, *e.g.*, some curious instances in August Strindberg, *Legends*, London, 1912, pp. 56–58. For the invisible astral body of theosophy, see C. W. Leadbeater, *Man Visible and Invisible*, do. 1908; A. Besant, *The Riddle of Life*, do. 1911.
13 See instances referred to in art. FAIRY, § 6, and cf. *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 346.

INVOCATION (Liturgical). — Invocation or Epiclesis is the technical term for the prayer for Divine intervention, especially in the consecration of the Eucharist, but also, more rarely, at Confirmation.

1. The Eucharistic consecration conceived as effected by a prayer.—The universal practice of the Church in early times was to use a prayer for the consecration of the Eucharist, just as it was the practice to use a prayer rather than any declaratory formula for Ordination.[1] In both cases, however, we must make a distinction between what our Lord did and the manner in which the Church followed His example. It does not follow that, if our Lord used a declaratory form in consecrating the Eucharist, or in ordaining, the Church would think it right to do the same. In instituting the Eucharist, our Lord 'blessed' or 'gave thanks'—with what words we do not know—and then gave the sacrament to the disciples with a declaratory formula, 'This is my body,' etc. We remark that the 'blessing' (Mt 26^{26}, Mk 14^{22}) and 'giving thanks' (Mt 26^{27}, Mk 14^{23}, Lk $22^{17.\ 19}$) over the bread and wine are identical. St. Paul, who uses the latter phrase in 1 Co $11^{24f.}$, speaks in 1 Co 10^{16} of 'the cup of blessing which we *bless*'; and this explains why the form used in consecrating the Eucharist was in after ages called the 'Thanksgiving,' although it consisted of prayer as well as giving of thanks (cf. 1 Ti $4^{4f.}$ 'Every creature of God is good if it be received with thanksgiving, for it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer'; here prayer is part of thanksgiving). At a later time the question arose whether Jesus consecrated the Eucharist by this 'blessing' ('thanksgiving') or merely by declaring it to be His body and blood. The mediæval theologians seem generally to have taken the latter view (and so perhaps Tertullian; see below, 3); yet the Council of Trent apparently inclined the other way, for it says (sess. 13, cap. 1):

'Our Redeemer instituted this wonderful sacrament at the Last Supper, when, *after the blessing of the bread and wine*, He testified in express and clear words that He was giving them His own body and His blood.'

We have, however, to consider what the early Christians thought to be the essence of the consecration as celebrated by the Church, whether the invocation of Divine assistance, or the declaratory words, 'This is my body,' etc. It will appear from what follows that, though there was probably some difference of opinion in the early Church as to how our Lord consecrated the Eucharist at the Last Supper, yet all agreed that the Church could consecrate only by praying God that what was done then by Jesus might be done at each Christian Eucharist. To use a mere declaratory formula, whether in Holy Communion or at Ordination, would have appeared to the early Church as presumptuous and irreverent.

2. Early period. — No clear deduction can be made from the *Didache*, as it is uncertain whether the prayers there given were used for consecrating the Eucharist or not (see art. AGAPE). But Justin Martyr uses language which, however interpreted, shows that he conceived the consecration to be effected by a prayer. He says (*Apol.* i. 66):

'As Jesus Christ our Saviour, being incarnate by the Word of God [for the possible confusion here of the Word and the Spirit, see below, 3], took (*ἔσχεν*) both flesh and blood for our salvation, so we have been taught that *τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφήν . . .* are both the flesh and blood of that incarnate Jesus.' For our purpose the words left untranslated are the important ones; but they are very obscure. They might be rendered 'the food which has been given thanks over [eucharistized, consecrated] by the formula of prayer which comes from Him' (so Batiffol, *Etudes*, 2nd ser., p. 146). Similarly C. Gore renders *εὐχῆς λόγου* by 'word of prayer' (*Body of Christ*, London, 1901, pp. 7, 289 f.). Brightman thinks that 'the "word of prayer that is from Him" must be the liturgical thanksgiving derived from the *εὐχαριστήσας* of the Institution, which Justin proceeds to quote' (*JThSt* i. [1899–1900] 112). So Dods (in *Ante-Nic. Chr. Lib.* ii., Edinburgh, 1870, p. 64), who, however, translates 'prayer of His word.' The difficulty of these explanations is that there *is* no form of prayer derived from our Lord, and that they give an unusual order of the words. By others it has been proposed to translate this difficult phrase by 'prayer for the Word' (cf. Sarapion, below, 3). Swete (*JThSt* iii. 169 f.) takes the phrase to mean the Divine command called into operation by prayer; he paraphrases the sentence thus: 'As our Lord was made Flesh by the Divine Word, so the word which issues from Him, when invoked by the prayer of the Church, makes the Bread and Cup to be His Flesh and Blood.'

Now, whatever view be taken of Justin's language, it is clear that the change (*μεταβολή*) of which he speaks is thought of as effected by a prayer for Divine intervention, or, in other words, by an invocation. The nature of that invocation does not appear from his words. In the two descriptions of the Eucharist (*Apol.* i. 65, 67) the central action of the president is described as 'prayers and thanksgivings,' and the communion of the people is called a 'participation of the things over which thanks have been given.'

3. Second period.—When we come to Irenæus, the matter is clear. This Father tells us (*Haer.* I. xiii. 1, 2) that the Gnostics used an Epiclesis. Mark the Valentinian, who came from Asia to Gaul, used (apparently at his Eucharist) a cup full of wine and water which was at first clear, and continued 'the word of invocation' till (by some conjuring trick) it became dark purple. It was pretended that the æon 'Grace' mixed its blood with the wine in answer to the invocation. Here we see a parody of the Christian Eucharist. The Orthodox also used an Epiclesis. In *Haer.* IV. xviii. 5, Irenæus says:

'Bread from the earth receiving the Epiclesis (the *ἔκκλησις* of the printed editions seems to be a misprint [A. Harnack, *TU* v. 3, Leipzig, 1900, p. 56]) of God is no longer common bread, but Eucharist.' The bread and wine 'receive the word of God, and the Eucharist becomes the Body of Christ' (*Haer.* v. ii. 3).

Here the 'word of God' may be personal, as perhaps it is in Sarapion (see 8, below), but more probably it is impersonal; it may mean the prayer of consecration (so Batiffol, *Etudes*, 2nd ser., p. 159), or may have exactly the same force as Justin's phrase *δι' εὐχῆς λόγου*. Swete cautions us not to assume 'that any form of invocation existed in the time of Irenæus; the *εὐχή* was itself the *ἐπίκλησις τοῦ θεοῦ*' (*JThSt* iii. 171 n.).

In the Gnostic *Acts of Thomas* (2nd or 3rd cent.?) there is an invocation at the Eucharist. 'O Jesus Christ, Son of God, who didst vouchsafe to make us partakers of the Eucharist of thy holy body and precious blood, lo, we make bold to approach thy Eucharist and to invoke thy holy name; come now, make us partakers, . . . come, perfect compassion; come thou that knowest the mysteries of the chosen one; . . . come thou that discloseest secrets, and makest manifest things not to be spoken; the sacred dove which hath brought forth twin young; come thou secret mother,' etc. (§ 46, ed. M. Bonnet, Leipzig, 1903, p. 35 f.; *Ante-Nic. Chr. Lib.* xvi., Edinburgh, 1870, p. 416; for the Ethiopic *Acts*, of which the text differs somewhat from the above, see E. A. W. Budge, *Contendings of the Apostles*, London, 1901, ii. 453). This invocation is noteworthy as being addressed to our Lord; it shows also some approach to a prayer for the Spirit. The Syriac *Acts* (given in W. Wright, *Apocr. Acts of the Apostles*, London, 1871, i. 258, ii. 146 ff.) name the Holy Spirit in the invocation explicitly; but they may have been revised by an orthodox hand. The Gnostic *Acts of John* (§ 85, ed. Bonnet, 1898) has no Epiclesis; the work is earlier than the *Acts of Thomas*.

Tertullian approaches the matter from a somewhat different point of view. He says that the Eucharist is the body and blood of Christ, because our Lord distinctly called it so:

'Acceptum panem et distributum discipulis corpus illum suum fecit, Hoc est corpus meum dicendo, id est, figura corporis mei' (*adv. Marc.* iv. 40).

This passage does not, indeed, deny that Jesus used words of blessing or thanksgiving to consecrate the Eucharist at the Last Supper, and it need not mean more than that the words 'This is my body,' etc., were those by which our Lord made the change in the elements known to the disciples;

[1] In the Church Orders of the 4th (or possibly 5th) cent., bishops, priests, and deacons are ordained simply by a single prayer, with laying on of hands.

but it undoubtedly gives us a fresh point of view. Yet it tells us nothing of the usage of the African Church in Tertullian's time.

The usage of the Cappadocian Church in the 3rd cent. may indirectly be gathered from the words of Firmilian in a letter to Cyprian (Cypr. *Ep.* lxxiv. (=*Ep.* lxxv. in *PL* iv. 426] 10). He says that a prophetess in Cappadocia had arisen 22 years before, had administered the sacraments, and in consecrating the Eucharist had used 'no contemptible invocation.' Firmilian, though a Cappadocian bishop, shows no knowledge of Cyprian's usage being other than the Asiatic in this respect.

The Alexandrian usage of that time was, doubtless, the same, for Origen (*c. Cels.* viii. 33) speaks of the bread becoming 'a sacred body through the prayer,' and (*in Mt* 15[11]) of the Eucharist as 'sanctified by means of the Word of God and prayer.' In his comment on 1 Co 7 he speaks of the Eucharistic loaves 'over which the name of God and Christ and the Holy Ghost has been invoked' (ἐπικέκληται).

The *Pistis Sophia*, an Ophite work of Egyptian origin (early 3rd cent., perhaps based on an earlier work), describes a sort of Eucharist with bread and wine; when the invocation is pronounced, the wine on the right of the oblation (θυσία) is changed into water (Srawley, *Early Hist. of Liturgy*, p. 43).

The older *Didascalia*, a work of the 3rd cent., perhaps testifies to an invocation of the Holy Spirit; but the text is not quite certain (Srawley, p. 88 f.).

These quotations show that an invocation of some sort was in general use in the 2nd and 3rd centuries, but give us, except in the case of the Gnostics, very little idea as to its nature. The Eucharistic worship of that time was probably in the main extemporaneous; the invocatory prayer had no fixed form, and all that we learn is that a calling down of Divine power was, to all appearance, universal.

4. Period of development.—When we come to the 4th and 5th centuries, a great era of liturgy-making, we have quite clear evidence as to the Epiclesis. The *Hippolytean Canons*, which perhaps represent Egyptian usage in the 3rd cent., though in their present form (allowing for some slight additions of a later period) they are probably of the 4th cent. (Maclean, *Anc. Ch. Orders*, p. 156 ff.), when describing the Eucharistic service, say that the priest, after the Salutation and Sursum Corda, 'recites the prayer and finishes the Offering' (can. iii.; ed. H. Achelis, *TU* vi. 4, Leipzig, 1891, §§ 21–27). The *Egyptian Church Order* (early 4th cent.? [Maclean, p. 160 f.]) has almost exactly the same words. But, in addition to descriptions of the service, we now possess five 4th cent. liturgies, of which at least the central part is extant in full: those, namely, of the *Ethiopic Church Order*, the Latin *Verona Fragments of the Didascalia, etc.* (these two are almost the same, so far as they run parallel), the *Testament of our Lord*, and the *Apostolic Constitutions*, and that of Sarapion, bishop of Thmuis in the Nile Delta. In all these, after the Sursum Corda, there is (in some cases with the Sanctus added) a Eucharistic Thanksgiving, giving thanks for our redemption, among other blessings, and, in doing so, introducing the narrative of the Last Supper, mentioning more or less fully (see below) our Lord's words and actions at it. Then come the Offering of the elements to God and the Invocation, asking for the Divine intervention (see 8, below). These three elements—narrative with thanksgiving, offering of the elements, and prayer—will be found to be the essence of all later liturgies, whatever else may have been added.

Before dealing with the comments on the Eucharistic liturgy of this period, it will be convenient to consider the omission of our Lord's words in some authorities. Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348) describes the service at Jerusalem (*Cat. Lect.* xxiii. 6 f.); he deals fully with the 'preface' with its mention of the heaven, earth, sea, the angels and archangels, and the Sanctus, and yet he says nothing of the commemoration of redemption, or of our Lord's words, 'This is my body,' etc. Immediately after mentioning the Sanctus he says:

'*Then* we call upon God to send forth His Holy Spirit upon the gifts lying before Him, that He may make the bread the body of Christ and the wine the blood of Christ; for whatsoever the Holy Ghost has touched is sanctified and changed.'

This is what strikes him as the essential feature of the service. So in xxi. 3 he says that the bread of the Eucharist, after the invocation of the Holy Ghost, is no longer mere bread, but the body of Christ. There is no evidence of the existence of the Words of our Lord in the Jerusalem liturgy of the 4th cent., and Cyril's silence is significant as showing at least that they did not appear to him to be the principal act in the service. He comments on them elsewhere (xxii.) as used at the Last Supper, but not in connexion with the liturgy (Brightman, indeed, thinks that there is a liturgical reminiscence about this chapter, just as the phrase 'His undefiled hands and feet' in xx. 5 [*On Baptism*] has a parallel in the *Liturgy of St. James*, Greek and Syriac [*Lit. East. and West.*, p. 469, n. 11]). However this may be, half of the Words of our Lord—those over the cup—are omitted in the liturgy of the *Test. of our Lord*, which only alludes to them; and so in the Abyssinian *Anaphora of our Lord* (below, § 7), which is derived from the *Testament*, and which, though it has inserted several later features, leaves the narrative of the Last Supper in the same mutilated state. The East Syrian *Lit. of the Apostles Adai and Mari*, which in its essential features is probably to be dated before A.D. 431 (though it has received additions in course of time),[1] omits the words entirely. That this was not regarded, even at the beginning of the 7th cent., as an essential omission, however unusual, appears from the curious opinion of Gregory the Great, that

'it was the custom of the Apostles to consecrate the sacrificial oblation *solely* with [the Lord's] prayer' (*Ep.* ix. 12 [26]).

He contrasts the prayer in use in his day, 'composed by some scholar,' with our Lord's own words:

'Inconvenienes visum est ut precem quam scholasticus composuerit super oblatione diceremus, et ipsam traditionem quam Redemptor noster composuit super ejus corpus et sanguinem non diceremus.'

He appointed the Lord's Prayer to be said directly after the Canon for this reason. There is no question whether Gregory's opinion was right or wrong; but the fact that he held it shows that he did not consider the essence of the service to lie in the declaratory formula, but thought of the consecration as being effected by a prayer.

5. Patristic comment in this period.—Turning to the comments of the Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries, we find the same conception of the consecration by a prayer. Basil (*de Spir. Sanct.* xxvii. [66]) says:

'Which of the saints has left us in writing the words of invocation at the making (ἀναδείξει) of the bread of the Eucharist and the cup of blessing?'

This shows the absence of any fixed form. Athanasius (or pseudo-Athanasius?), in a sermon to the newly-baptized quoted by Eutychius of Constantinople in the 6th cent. (*de Paschate et de sacrosancta Euch.* 8 [Brightman, p. 533, n. 17; *PG* lxxxvi. 2401, fr. 7]), says:

[1] Connolly (*Liturgical Hom. of Narsai*, p. lxiv) more cautiously says that the extra-Anaphoral part, in so far as it is represented by Narsai's description of the Liturgy, is before A.D. 450. But we may probably go further than this.

'When the great prayers and holy supplications are pronounced (ἀναπεμφθῶσι), the Word descends on the bread and the cup, and [the bread] becomes His body' (καὶ γίνεται αὐτοῦ σῶμα: cf. Sarapion, below, 8).

Other Alexandrian writers speak of prayer for the *Spirit*. Thus, Athanasius's successor, Peter, says that at the altar 'we invoke the descent of the Holy Ghost' (Theodoret, *HE* iv. 19). Optatus, a Numidian bishop (*c.* A.D. 363) speaks (*c. Parmenianum*, vi. 1) of Almighty God being invoked, and the Holy Ghost being prayed for ('postulatus') and descending (cf. *c. Donat.* vi. 1).

Jerome (*Ep.* ci. [lxxiii. or cxlvi.] 'ad Evangelum') says: 'The body and blood of Christ is made ('conficitur') at the prayer of the priest.' Ambrose (*de Fide*, iv. 10 [125]) speaks of the 'sacrament which by the mystery of the sacred prayer is transfigured into the flesh and blood.' Elsewhere, if (as is probable) the *de Mysteriis* is his authentic work, Ambrose uses words which recall Tertullian:

'[In the consecration] the very words of the Lord, the Saviour, operate; for that sacrament which thou receivest is made by the word of Christ. . . . The Lord Jesus Himself proclaims, "This is my body." Before the blessing of the heavenly words another nature is spoken of, after the consecration the body is signified,' etc. (*de Myst.* ix. [52, 54]).

If these two passages are both by Ambrose, we must interpret the latter, in the light of the former, to mean that our Lord's command operates through the prayer of the priest (cf. Justin, above, 2). The *de Sacramentis*, which is almost certainly later than Ambrose (see below, 6), has a similar passage, but in more explicit terms (iv. 5).

Chrysostom's evidence goes both ways. He says that

'the priest stands, not bringing down fire [like Elijah; cf. § 173], but the Holy Spirit, and prays at length . . . that the grace falling on the sacrifice may through it inflame the souls of all' (*de Sacerdotio*, iii. 4 [179]); and that 'the priest stands before the table stretching forth his hands to heaven, calling on the Holy Ghost to come and touch the gifts set forth' (*Hom. de Coemet.* 3).

Yet elsewhere he says:

'It is not man who makes the gifts set forth to become the body and blood of Christ. . . . The priest stands filling a part (σχῆμα πληρῶν), uttering those words; but the power and grace are of God. "This is my body," saith he. This saying changes the gifts set forth; and as the word which said "Increase and multiply" . . . was uttered once, but gives actual power to our nature to beget offspring through all time, so this word once spoken makes the sacrifice perfect at every table' (*de Prod. Judae, Hom.* i. 6).

The last passage, like that quoted above from the *de Mysteriis*, recalls Tertullian, but it stands alone among Eastern writings. It certainly suggests that it was the custom of Chrysostom to recite the words of our Lord at the Eucharist; but that these words as uttered by the priest in the narrative form found in all liturgies are those which consecrate the Eucharist, he does not say; indeed, he would seem rather by implication to deny it. He thinks of our Lord as consecrating the bread and wine at the last Supper by this declaration, or at least as consummating the consecration thereby; but he says that that declaration, once made by Jesus at the Last Supper, consecrates the Eucharist for all time. Putting with this passage those quoted immediately before it, we may take Chrysostom as teaching that every Eucharist is consecrated by the priest praying that our Lord's declaration at the Last Supper may make effectual the particular act on which he and the people are then engaged. There is not in Chrysostom, or in any other ancient writer, any approach to the idea that, if a priest were merely to say over bread and wine the words 'This is my body' and 'This is my blood' with a proper intention, a valid Eucharist would result.

Augustine in one place (*Serm. ined.* vi.; *PL* xlvi. 835 f.) speaks of the 'Word' (*Verbum*) being added to the bread and wine and of their becoming thereby the body and blood of the Word:

'Accedente verbo fit corpus et sanguis Verbi . . . [the Salutation, 'Sursum Corda' and Thanksgiving mentioned] . . . et inde jam [succedunt] quae aguntur in precibus sanctis . . . ut accedente verbo fiat corpus et sanguis Christi . . . adde verbum et fiet Sacramentum.'

In *Serm.* 227, Ben. (*in die Paschae*, iv.), he says that the bread and cup are sanctified 'per verbum Dei.' What is the 'word' here? In *de Trin.* iii. 4 [10], Ben. (A.D. 396), Augustine speaks of the elements being consecrated by the 'mystic prayer,' and only by the invisible operation of the Spirit of God. This last passage seems, especially when taken with the teaching of his countrymen Optatus (see above) and Fulgentius (see below), to show that Augustine used an invocation of the Holy Ghost at the Eucharist, and this would suit also the first passage about 'adding the word'; the 'verbum Dei' in the second passage would suit better the Divine command at the Last Supper, and, if so, we have a conception very like that of Chrysostom. It should be added that Srawley thinks that at Hippo there was no invocation of the Holy Ghost in Augustine's time (*op. cit.* p. 150).

The Cappadocinn Fathers of the 4th cent. attest an invocation without stating its exact form. For Basil, see above. His brother Gregory of Nyssa speaks of the Eucharistic bread as sanctified by the Word of God and prayer (he interprets this Pauline phrase personally), and of the virtue of the benediction by which the change is accomplished (*Cat.* 37). So Gregory of Nazianzus begs Amphilochius to pray for him in his illness at the Eucharist and to 'draw down the Word by your word' (*Ep.* 171). On the usage of the Cappadocian Church in the 4th cent. see below, § 8.

That the Eucharist is consecrated by a prayer is an idea not confined to orthodox circles. Nestorius believed the same thing. In a fragment of his (F. A. Loofs, *Nestoriana*, Halle, 1905, p. 241) we read: 'Christ is typically crucified [in the Eucharist], being slain with the sword of the priestly prayer.' And we may add the comment of a distinguished Nestorian on the subject. The newly published *Liturgical Homilies of Narsai* gives us the nearest approach that we have in Eastern books at so early a date (*c.* A.D. 500) to the doctrine of what has by some writers been called 'the moment of consecration.' After saying that the chosen apostles have not made known to us what our Lord said, when 'He gave thanks and blessed' at the Last Supper, and after describing what is recorded in the Gospels, with a traditional comment of Theodore, Narsai adds that to this effect 'the priest gives thanks before God,' i.e. commemorates the Last Supper; then, after mentioning the Great Intercession which here, in East Syrian fashion, follows, he describes the Epiclesis: 'The priest . . . summons the Spirit to come down and dwell in the bread and wine and make them the Body and Blood of King Messiah. To the Spirit he calls, that He will also light down upon the assembled congregation, that by His gift it may be worthy to receive the Body and Blood. The Spirit descends upon the oblation without change (of place), and causes the power of His Godhead to dwell in the bread and wine, and completes the mystery of our Lord's resurrection from the dead. . . . The Spirit comes down at the request of the priest, be he never so great a sinner, and celebrates the Mysteries by the mediation of the priest whom He has consecrated. . . . Then the herald of the Church [the deacon] cries in that hour: "In silence and fear be ye standing: peace be with us. Let all the people be in fear at this moment in which the adorable Mysteries are being accomplished by the descent of the Spirit"' (ed. Connolly, pp. 16–22). It will be noticed that even here there is no cut-and-dried theory of a 'moment of consecration,' but only a statement that at the Epiclesis the consecration of the Eucharist by the power of the Spirit is completed. A similar proclamation by the deacon is still on some occasions used in this place by the East Syrians.

We may close this review of Patristic comment by two quotations from Fathers of the 6th cent., which tend in somewhat different directions. Fulgentius, bishop of Ruspe in North Africa, says (*c.* A.D. 507):

'The Holy Ghost is asked of the Father for the consecration of the sacrifice' (*ad Monimum*, ii. 7; cf. 10, 12); so the fragment of the same writer *c. Fabianum*, 25, 28.

Cæsarius of Arles in A.D. 502 writes:

'When the creatures that are to be blessed with the heavenly words are placed on the sacred altars, before they are consecrated by the invocation of the holy name, the substance of the bread and wine is there, but after the words of Christ, the body and blood of Christ' (*Hom.* v. *de Pasch.* [*PL* lxvii. 1066]). Cæsarius's thought seems to run on the same lines as Chrysostom's, as described above.

6. Place of the Invocation.—Taking first the 4th cent. liturgies of the Church Orders and of Sarapion, and the Great Liturgies of the four families designated by Brightman as Syrian, Egyptian, Persian (*i.e.* East Syrian or Nestorian), and Byzantine (this includes the Armenian), and omitting the Great Intercession, which varies in position (see art. INTERCESSION [Liturgical], **2** (*c*)), the order of the central part of the service in all (except the Egyptian in one detail) is as follows. After the Sursum Corda (which is prefaced by a benediction or salutation) comes the Eucharistic Thanksgiving, with a reference, in most cases, to the work of creation (cf. Irenæus, *Haer.* IV. xviii. 4, 6, where emphasis is laid on the oblations being God's creatures), and in all to that of redemption, introducing (except in some 4th cent. forms)[1] the Sanctus in reference to the angelic creation (which seems to be the reason of its occurrence here), and ending, except in the cases mentioned above (§ 4), with the recitation of our Lord's deeds and words at the Last Supper. Then comes the oblation of the elements, which usually takes up the words, 'Do this in remembrance of me,' and gives them as the reason for the act (hence this is often called the Anamnesis); and after it, in close conjunction, comes the Invocation. In this scheme the words of Jesus are introduced in the recital of what happened at the Last Supper as part of the Commemoration of Redemption.

Next let us take the *Roman rite*. It is not known for certain how the Eucharist was celebrated at Rome before the 5th century. Extemporaneous worship may have lingered there much longer than elsewhere, for in early ages it was Jerusalem that ordinarily led the way with regard to liturgical matters, and Rome showed the most conservative spirit. When we first meet with the Roman rite, there are two differences in detail from the scheme given above. (*a*) A prayer is found in the Eucharistic Thanksgiving *before* the Commemoration of Redemption, which in its earliest known form (in the *de Sacramentis*, iv. 5 f. [*PL* xvi. 463], a North-Italian work, probably written at a place where the Roman and Milanese uses were combined, *c.* A.D. 400; see Duchesne, *Chr. Worship*, p. 177) runs as follows:

'Make this oblation for us (nobis) established (ascriptam), valid, reasonable, acceptable, for it is the figure of the body and blood of Jesus Christ, who, in the day before He suffered, took bread,' etc.

This is slightly altered in the present Roman canon, which probably goes back, at least in its main features, as far as Gregory the Great (6th cent.), to the following:

'Which oblation do thou vouchsafe to make blessed, established, valid, reasonable, and acceptable, that it may become for our sakes (nobis . . . fiat) the body and blood of thy most beloved Son our Lord Jesus Christ, who in the day before,' etc. This prayer, the *Quam oblationem*, was developed by Cranmer in the First English Prayer-Book (1549), and afterwards in the Scottish Liturgy of 1637, into a more detailed Epiclesis, with an invocation of the Holy Ghost.

(*b*) After the Commemoration of Redemption and the oblation of the elements comes a prayer for the Divine intervention, as in the other liturgies described above. It is made up of two parts, the *Supra quae* and the *Supplices te*. But, instead of asking that the Holy Ghost may come down to the earthly altar, it asks that the elements may be taken up by God's holy angel to the heavenly altar. The two conceptions, though differing in form, are really one, and are both justified by NT usage.

A writer in *CQR* (xxix. [1890] 379) remarks that 'the same facts of grace are presented in two forms: we are said to be raised up with Christ and made to sit with Him and to be in the heavenly places (Eph $2^{6f.}$ 6^{12}): and on the other hand the Holy Ghost is sent forth into our hearts, and is in us, and we are strengthened by the Spirit so that Christ comes to dwell in our hearts (Gal 4^{6}, Jn 14^{17}, Eph $3^{16f.}$).'

The earliest form of the prayers *Supra quae* and *Supplices te* is found in the *de Sacramentis* (*loc. cit.*). After the narrative of the Last Supper in the liturgy described in that work comes the oblation of the elements, followed by the words:

'We ask and pray thee to take up this oblation on thy sublime altar by the hands of thy angels, as thou didst deign to take up the gift of thy servant just Abel and the sacrifice of our forefather Abraham and that which Melchizedek the high priest offered to thee.'

The present Roman canon has inverted these clauses, has changed 'angels' into 'angel,' and has made some additions; notably it expresses the purposes of the prayer:

'that all we who receive the holy body and blood of thy Son . . . may be filled with every heavenly benediction and grace.' For the meaning of these passages see below, 9. The idea of the heavenly altar is first found in Irenæus (*Haer.* IV. xviii. 6).

We may next take the *Gallican rite*. The peculiarity of this rite is that the central parts of the Eucharistic service vary with the day and season, instead of being fixed, as in other liturgies, Eastern and Western. In other words, the Mass for each day is a distinct liturgy. The only part which need detain us is that which corresponds to the Eastern Epiclesis, the 'Post pridie,' so called because it comes after the narrative of the Last Supper ('Qui pridie quam pateretur'). On some occasions the 'Post pridie' contains an explicit prayer for the Holy Ghost, on others it does not; but apparently it always or almost always asks for the Divine intervention in the mystery (see examples in Scudamore, *Not. Euch.*[2], 589, 594; Duchesne, p. 217 f.; Gummey, *Cons. of the Euch.*, 334 ff.). On some days, also, the 'Post Sanctus' (a prayer said after the Sanctus and before the Narrative of the Last Supper) contained an invocation, or an anticipation of the invocation (see the 'Post Sanctus' for Easter Even in the *Missale Gothicum* [Gummey, p. 337]). So in the *Mozarabic Missal* we find anticipatory invocations, sometimes mentioning the Holy Ghost and sometimes not, as well as invocations in the 'Post pridie' (Gummey, pp. 339, 350 f., 353, 358).

The *Egyptian rite* is noteworthy in this connexion as having an anticipatory Epiclesis before the Narrative of the Last Supper in addition to the normal one afterwards, though the anticipatory one is not usually very explicit. The words of Sarapion, 'Full is the heaven, full also is the earth of thy excellent glory; Lord of hosts, fill also this sacrifice with thy power and thy participation,' are taken up and amplified in the Greek *Liturgy of St. Mark* (Brightman, p. 132) and in the Coptic *St. Mark and St. Cyril* (p. 176). The latter amplifies the last sentence thus:

'Fill this also thy sacrifice, O Lord, with thy blessing that is from thee, through the descent upon it of thine Holy Spirit, and in blessing bless and in purifying purify these thy precious gifts which have been set before thy face, this bread and this cup.'

The most marked development of this invocation before the Narrative is in a newly-discovered fragment of an Egyptian Anaphora, perhaps of the 6th or 7th cent., which has:

'Fill us also with the glory that is with thee, and vouchsafe to send down thy Holy Ghost on these creatures, and make the bread the body of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and the cup the blood of the New Testament. For our Lord Jesus Christ himself, in the night in which He was betrayed [the narrative of the Institution follows] . . . ye announce my death and confess my resurrection. We announce thy death, we confess thy resurrection, and pray . . .'; here the fragment abruptly ends, and all the rest is wanting (P. de Puniet, *Report of the Nineteenth Euch. Congress* [1908], London, 1909, p. 382 f.; Cabrol, *DACL* ii. 1882 ff.).

There is no reason to suppose that an Anamnesis and Epiclesis did not follow, as in the other Egyptian Anaphoras which have an anticipatory invocation before the Narrative. There is no trace of

[1] In some Abyssinian Anaphoras the Sanctus is thrust in without any connexion with the context (Brightman, *JThSt* xii. [1910-11] 325). This may show that even later liturgies lacked this element.

any such anticipatory Epiclesis in the liturgies of the Church Orders, and from the evidence given above it is clear that the invocation in this fragment is a development (for we can see it in the process of growing) and not the survival of an antique feature. The development may have been due to an imitation of the Roman rite. A still more striking instance of an anticipatory Epiclesis may be seen in a prayer to the Son in the Coptic *St. Mark and St. Cyril* and in the present Ethiopic Liturgy (Brightman, pp. 148, 204; E. Renaudot, *Lit. Orient. Coll.*[2], Frankfort, 1847, i. 2); this is said when the elements have just been put on the altar, before the lections are read, and is called in the Coptic the 'prayer of (or over) the Prothesis' (see Renaudot's note, p. 168). It runs thus:

'O Master, Lord Jesus Christ, . . . make thy face to shine on this bread and on this cup which we have set on this thy priestly table: bless, sanctify, and hallow them, and change them that this bread may become indeed thy holy body, and that which is mixed in this cup indeed thy precious blood; and may they become to us all for participation and healing and salvation of our souls and bodies and spirits.'

On these anticipatory invocations it may be observed that, however puzzling they may be to the more logical Western mind, to the more subtle Eastern mind they would be natural enough. In Divine mysteries there is no such thing as time, just as there is no such thing as space.

7. The Person or Persons addressed in the Invocation.—In the most ancient authorities sometimes the Holy Trinity is addressed, sometimes the Son or the Holy Ghost, but more often the Father. Doubt occasionally arises because the phrase 'invocation *of* a Person' may mean a prayer for Him to come, or a prayer addressed to Him; but an 'invocation of the Holy Trinity' can only mean prayer addressed to the Holy Trinity. In the 2nd cent., Irenæus speaks of the invocation of God or of the Father, or of the Holy Ghost, or of the Holy Trinity. In the 4th cent., Cyril of Jerusalem speaks of invoking the Father in the Eucharist to send the Holy Ghost (*Cat. Lect.* xxiii. 7), and by 'invocation of the Holy Ghost' (xxi. 3) he probably means prayer *for* the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, in xix. 7 he speaks of the 'holy invocation of the adorable Trinity' to consecrate the Eucharist, and contrasts it with the 'invocation of unclean spirits.' This can only mean invocations addressed to the Holy Trinity and to unclean spirits respectively. Thus in Cyril's time it was perhaps the custom sometimes to address the Father, sometimes the Holy Trinity. In the liturgies of the *Ethiopic Church Order*, the *Verona Fragments*, the *Apostolic Constitutions*, and Sarapion, the Father is addressed. But the Oblation and Invocation (such as it is) in the *Testament of our Lord* are addressed to the Holy Trinity (i. 23):

'We offer to thee this thanksgiving, Eternal Trinity, O Lord Jesus Christ, O Lord the Father . . . O Lord the Holy Ghost; we have brought [this is the best reading] this drink and this food to [the MSS have 'of'] thy holiness; cause that it may be to us not for condemnation,' etc.

Just before this our Lord had been addressed:

'Remembering therefore *thy* death and resurrection, we offer to thee bread and the cup,' etc.

It was perhaps in view of such formulæ that the Council of Hippo in 393 (can. 21 [C. J. Hefele, *Councils*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1876, ii. 398]) forbade Eucharistic invocations to be addressed to any but the Father:

'In prayer no one shall address the Son instead of the Father, or the Father instead of the Son, except at the altar when prayer shall always be addressed to the Father. No one shall make use of strange forms of prayer without having first consulted well-instructed brethren.'

If this is aimed at books like the *Testament*, the language is not unsuitable, for the Prayers in that manual show considerable confusion in the Persons addressed. The Abyssinian *Anaphora of our Lord*, derived from the *Testament*, retains the peculiar features (as to the Oblation and Epiclesis) of its prototype; but before the address to the Holy Trinity (which it slightly modifies) it inserts an invocation of the more usual type, asking for the Holy Ghost, and addressed, as we see from its wording, to the Father, though from what had immediately preceded we should have thought that it was addressed to the Son. It is, in fact, a very clumsy insertion (this Anaphora is given in Cooper-Maclean, *Test. of our Lord*, p. 245 ff.).[1] In the Great Liturgies the Invocation is addressed to the Father.

8. The object of the Invocation.—We may group Invocations in three classes: (*a*) those which do not explicitly pray for the Holy Ghost; (*b*) those in which the intervention of the Holy Ghost is asked for, without any explicit mention of a change in the elements; and (*c*) those (the great majority) in which the intervention of the Holy Ghost is asked for that He may change the elements and make them to be our Lord's body and blood.

(*a*) The invocation in Sarapion's sacramentary (*c.* A.D. 350) exhibits some confusion between the Word and the Spirit, and prays that the Word may descend (for the Gr. text, with notes by Brightman, see *JThSt* i. 88 ff., 247 ff.; for an Eng. tr. see J. Wordsworth's ed., London, 1899). It runs thus:

'O God of truth, let thy holy Word come upon this bread, that the bread may become body of the Word, and upon this cup that the cup may become blood of the Truth, and make all who communicate to receive a medicine of life. . . . For we have invoked thee, the Uncreated, in [the] Holy Spirit.'

It is possible that λόγος is used in two senses here, the first time as the Divine command ('thy holy word'), and the second time, by a sort of paronomasia, as the Eternal Word. But probably there is merely a confusion of thought, of which we find some instances elsewhere in early times (*e.g.*, Tertullian, *adv. Prax.* 26, 'hic Spiritus Dei, idem erit Sermo'; cf. also Justin, *Apol.* i. 33, 66, Hermas, *Sim.* v. vi. 5 ff., ix. i. 1, ps.-Clem. *2 Cor.* ix. 5, xiv. 3, 5, and perhaps Aristides, *Apol.* 15). It may be permissible to conjecture that the reason of this confusion of language, such as it is, comes from the fact that all that the Eternal Word does for us is done through the Spirit. He is with us 'alway, even unto the end of the world' (Mt 28^{20}), but it is through the Comforter that He comes to us (Jn 16^{14}). Perhaps, therefore, before the Macedonian controversy arose, it seemed immaterial to some of the early Fathers whether they prayed for the Word or for the Spirit to come. It is probable that Athanasius's invocation prayed for the descent of the Word (above, 5); this was perhaps an Alexandrian peculiarity (for Origen see 3). After Sarapion the invocation of the Word disappears, though, as Swete remarks (*Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, London, 1912, p. 292), 'the thought of the Logos descending on the elements was not altogether abandoned' (see passage in Eutychius given above, 5). But, while we find the same thought in the Cappadocian Fathers (above, 5), whose literary affinities were Alexandrian, there is no evidence of a Logos-invocation in Cappadocia. Srawley (*op. cit.* p. 126) regards it as practically certain that the Holy Spirit was named in the invocation of that Church.

The most eminent example of the omission of the mention (or, at least, direct mention) of the Holy Ghost is the Roman liturgy. Neither the *Quam oblationem* nor the later prayer for the Divine intervention (*Supra quæ* and *Supplices te*) mentions the Holy Ghost; the latter asks that the

[1] It had been suggested by the present writer (*Test. of our Lord*, p. 167) that this curious Anaphora was a connecting link between the *Testament* and the modern Abyssinian liturgy. But E. Bishop (*JThSt* xii. [1911] p. 399) gives reasons for thinking that it is rather a version of the *Testament* liturgy enriched from the already existing Abyssinian rite.

elements may be taken up by 'the holy angel'[1] to the heavenly altar, as has already been described (above, 6).

(*b*) The implicit form is that found in the *Ethiopic Church Order* (Brightman, p. 190) and the *Verona Fragments* (ed. E. Hauler, Leipzig, 1900, p. 107):

'Send thy Holy Spirit on the oblation of this Church; give it together unto all them that partake [for] sanctification and [*Ver. Frag.* better: all saints who partake] for fulfilling with the Holy Ghost,' etc.

The liturgy used by St. Chrysostom at Antioch was probably similar in this respect (see the first two quotations from his writings given above, 5). The *Testament of our Lord* is even less explicit in its invocation; the Holy Ghost is not directly asked for, though He is named in the address to the Holy Trinity, and only the blessing to the communicants is explicitly mentioned (above, 7). The Nestorian or East Syrian *Lit. of Adai and Mari* (above, 4) has an invocation of this implicit form, though it has in addition a prayer for the blessing and hallowing of the oblation:

'May thy Holy Spirit, O my Lord, come and rest upon this oblation of thy servants, and may He bless and hallow it, and may it be to us, O my Lord, for pardon,' etc.

(*c*) The explicit form is found already in the 4th cent.; Cyril of Jerusalem has it (above, 4), as also have the *Apost. Constitutions* (viii. 12):

'We implore thee . . . to send down upon this sacrifice thy Holy Spirit . . . that He may show (ἀποφήνῃ[2]) this bread as the body of thy Christ, and this cup as the blood of thy Christ, that they who partake thereof may be strengthened in godliness,' etc.

Similar explicit invocations are found in the Abyssinian *Anaphora of our Lord* (above, 7), in the Egyptian Anaphora described in the *Sahidic Eccles. Canons*, § 66 (Brightman, p. 462), and in all the Great Liturgies (except *Adai and Mari*) if they have an express invocation of the Holy Ghost at all. Sarapion also has an explicit invocation, though it does not invoke the Holy Ghost.

It seems clear from the evidence here detailed that the implicit type of invocation is somewhat older than the explicit; and, indeed, it would be almost impossible for the former to be evolved out of the latter.

9. **Interpretation of the evidence.**—If we approach the evidence without any theory as to what are the words or the moment of the Eucharistic consecration—and to deal with evidence *after* we have made our theories is a fatal mistake—we shall be impressed by the fact that, however much different ages and different countries may have used divergent details in their Eucharistic worship, the general scheme of the service was one and the same throughout Christian antiquity. The Eucharist, at least from the 2nd cent., was consecrated by a prayer, whether the prayer asked for the Holy Ghost, or for the Word, or for neither explicitly. But how are we to regard the invocation of the Holy Ghost? It would appear that before the rise of the Macedonian controversy about the Holy Spirit, the Third Person was not even in the East always mentioned in the Eucharistic Epiclesis. Indeed (now that the Pfaffian fragments of Irenæus have been dismissed as modern forgeries [Harnack, *TU* v. 3]), there is no certain evidence of the Holy Spirit being mentioned in the invocations before the 4th cent.; the evidence is only consequential, and E. Bishop (App. to Connolly's *Lit. Hom. of Narsai*, p. 136 ff.) even treats the kind of Epiclesis which became universal in the East and common in the West (see the Gallican and African evidence, above, 5, 6) as an *invention* of the 4th century. He rightly calls attention to the fact that, in combating the Pneumatomachi, the Orthodox did not appeal to the work of the Holy Ghost in consecrating the Eucharist, while they did appeal to His work in baptism. But the argument from silence here, as so often, is precarious; for at the very time when the controversy arose, and when it is said that the silence of the Orthodox shows that they were not in the habit of using an Epiclesis of the Holy Ghost at the Eucharist, we find Cyril of Jerusalem (A.D. 348) and the liturgies of the *Ethiopic Church Order* and of the *Verona Fragments* (which, or their common original, must almost certainly be dated about then) attesting its use, and (what is important) betraying absolutely no idea that it was a novelty. It will be remembered that Cyril and Sarapion were contemporaries. Is it possible to explain the extraordinarily widespread—almost universal—use of the custom from that time forward, without a protest from any one, in most diverse countries, if it were an invention of that period? Is it not much more probable that the prayer for the Holy Ghost goes back to a much more remote time, although it was not the only form in use? It would seem that in this matter, as in others, the rise of heresy had indirectly a beneficial result; it forced the Church to think more clearly about the work of the Third Person. In the invocation of the Holy Ghost we have an instance of the experience of Christianity, after various trials, showing what were the forms most suitable for liturgical use.

Again, if we start with no pre-conceived theory, there seems to be no reason why the invocation should always be in the same place, or why there should not be more than one invocation in the same service. The Egyptian rite has a sort of invocation before the Narrative of the Last Supper, or even in the preliminary service, and a fuller one after the Narrative (see above, 6). The Roman rite has the same feature. But there is no reason for denying that both prayers are, in their own way, invocations. No doubt, if we start with a theory that the consecration takes place at a particular moment, as when it is said that at the word 'meum' in the phrase 'Hoc est enim corpus meum,' the bread is transubstantiated,[1] then we shall be obliged by the theory to hold that the *Supra quae* and the *Supplices te* in the Roman rite are merely petitions for a blessing on the communicants; but this is a very difficult position. It is, indeed, common ground that almost all known liturgies have, at the place where these prayers occur, a petition for the communicants; the Epiclesis states this as the reason for its petition for Divine intervention. But that is a very different thing from saying that the Roman prayers in question were designed by their author merely to pray for this blessing, and that the consecration was conceived as having already taken place. Several considerations make such a supposition improbable. In the *de Sacramentis* (iv. 6), where these prayers are first found, there is no prayer for a blessing on the communicants. And, if the prayers have only this meaning, why should the elements already consecrated be taken up by the angel to the heavenly altar? What would be the significance of the reference to the offerings of Abel and Melchizedek and the rest? Further, if a prayer for a blessing is all that is meant, it is unnecessary, as such a prayer already occurs in the *Quam oblationem* ('nobis fiat'). And the difference of nomenclature shows that these prayers were regarded as completing the consecration. After the narrative of the Institution the oblation is called bread (in the *Unde et memores*); but after

[1] An attractive theory identifies the angel with the Holy Spirit (see de Puniet, *op. cit.* p. 393); but the *de Sacramentis* has the plural 'angels.'

[2] Cf. Basil's use of ἀνάδειξις, above, 5. For other parallels see Srawley, p. 105 n.

[1] The theory that, in the Roman rite, by the time the Words of our Lord have been uttered the consecration is complete is not quite the same thing as this, inasmuch as it does not bind the holder of it to the idea that the consecration is effected only by a declaratory formula.

the *Supplices te* it is always called the body and blood of our Lord—*e.g.*, at the commixture (cf. Duchesne, p. 182). It appears, therefore, that the interpretation of writers of the school of Duchesne takes a view of the case which is more in accordance with the facts, namely, that the *Supra quae* and *Supplices te* exactly correspond to the Epiclesis after the Narrative of the Last Supper which is found in the Eastern and usually in the Gallican liturgies, and are intended to be at least a part of the words of consecration.

The devout Christian need not ask too particularly, nor can he expect to know, at what moment God consecrates the elements; it is enough for him to be assured that, when all has been said, the consecration has been completed.

10. Invocation at baptism and confirmation.—The prayer for the gifts of the Holy Ghost is also in some early authorities called an Epiclesis. The bishop, in normal cases, was present at the administration of baptism, though he did not usually himself baptize; and directly after the immersion the newly-baptized were brought to him, and he prayed for them (either before or at the laying on of hands) that the Holy Ghost might be given to them (cf. Ac $8^{15.17}$). Tertullian, who mentions the laying on of hands as an act distinct from the anointing, says:

'Having come out of the laver, we are anointed with the blessed unction. . . . After that, a hand is imposed, calling on (advocans) and inviting the Holy Spirit by a benediction' (*de Bapt.* 7 f.).

In the *Verona Fragments* (ed. Hauler, p. 111) the bishop, after the newly-baptized have been anointed by a presbyter and clothed and brought into the church, lays hands (or a hand) on them and 'invokes'; the prayer is given. In the *Testament of our Lord* the same thing is found; the prayer is expressly called 'the invocation of the Holy Ghost' which the bishop 'says and invokes over them' (ii. 9). In other Church Orders a similar prayer is given, but it is not expressly called an invocation. It may perhaps be added that in the Gnostic *Acts of Thomas* there is an invocation of Christ and of the Holy Spirit *before* the baptism, at the anointing (ed. Bonnet, p. 68; *Ante-Nic. Chr. Lib.* xvi. 404).

The invocation after the immersion has no connexion with the invoking of the Divine name at the immersion, of which we read in Justin (*Apol.* i. 61: 'the name of God, the Father of all, the Lord, is named upon him') and in the *Apost. Const.* (iii. 16: 'naming the Epiclesis of Father and Son and Holy Ghost, thou shalt baptize them in water'), for these refer only to the words used in baptizing. The same may be said of the allusions in Ac 15^{17} (from Am 9^{12}) and Ja 2^{7} ('the honourable name which was invoked [ἐπικληθέν] upon you'; cf. Nu 6^{27}).

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INVOCATION (Roman).—It was believed by the Romans that, if a prayer was to be truly effective, it must be directed specially to the deity within whose sphere of power its fulfilment lay, and that this deity must be invoked by his right name; so Arnobius, iii. 43:

'Usque adeo res exigit propriatim deos scire nec ambigere nec dubitare de unius cuiusque vi nominis, ne si alienis ritibus et appellationibus fuerint invocati, et aures habeant structas et placulis nos teneant inexplicabilibus obligatos.'

To know the right name of the competent deity was to possess a real power of compulsion over him (cf. A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*[2], Leipzig, 1910, p. 110 f.); hence the names of the specific tutelary deities of Rome were kept secret, in order that they might not be used for evil ends by the enemies of the State (Serv. *Æn.* ii. 351: 'iure pontificum cautum est ne suis nominibus dei Romani appellarentur, ne exaugurari possent'; cf. *Georg.* i. 498; Plin. *HN* xxviii. 18; Macr. *Sat.* iii. 9. 3). This explains also why it was regarded as of the utmost importance to invoke the gods in the proper form, and why every precaution was taken to avoid mistakes. If a suppliant was in doubt as to the right name of the deity he desired to address, he either uttered a variety of names for the deity to choose from (so Hor. *Sat.* ii. 6. 20: 'Matutine pater seu Iane libentius audis') or added some such formula as 'sive quo alio nomine fas est nominare' (Macr. *Sat.* iii. 9. 10; cf. Serv. *Æn.* ii. 351; Apul. *Metam.* xi. 2; *CIL* xi. 1823) or 'quisquis es' (*e.g.*, Verg. *Æn.* iv. 577, and the note of Servius: '"quisquis es" secundum pontificum morem, qui sic precantur: "Iuppiter omnipotens vel quo alio te nomine appellari volueris"'; cf. E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1913, p. 144 f.).

If, however, the suppliant did not know which deity was concerned with the matter in hand, a variety of expedients was open to him. He might omit the divine name altogether, and substitute for it a phrase like 'Genio urbis Romae sive mas sive femina' (Serv. *Æn.* ii. 351; cf. Macr. *Sat.* iii. 8. 3; Plut. *Quæst. Rom.* 61) or 'sive deo sive deæ in cuius tutela hic lucus locusve est' (so among the Arval Brothers [*CIL* vi. 2099, ii. 3; cf. G. Henzen, *Acta fratrum Arvalium*, Berlin, 1874, pp. 144–146]) —a *dubitationis exceptio* (Arnob. iii. 8; cf. Gell. ii. 28. 2 f.), of which we have numerous instances in extant formulæ of prayer alike in literature (Cato, *de Agric.* 139; Macr. *Sat.* iii. 9. 7) and in inscriptions on altars (*CIL* vi. 110 = 30701, 111; *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, v. 1043, ix. 608); on these cf. C. Pascal, in *Bull. archeol. comun.* xxii. [1894] 188 ff. = *Studi di antichità e mitologia*, Milan, 1896, p. 85 ff. In many cases, however, the worshipper simply applied a new name to the deity. It is certain that many of the recognized Roman deities derived their origin from the practice of invoking as divine things lying close at hand (*e.g.*, *ianus*, 'the door,' *vesta*, 'the hearth'), or of using the names of the evils which the prayer was designed to avert (*e.g.*, *febris*, 'fever,' *robigus*, 'mildew on grain'), or of the virtues and conditions prayed for (*e.g.*, *fides*, 'fidelity,' *concordia*, 'agreement') as the names of divine beings. In such cases it was of importance to define clearly the conception of the higher power thus invoked, and to express its connotation fully. Hence the gods frequently received double names, meant to indicate their character from two contrasted points of view, as, *e.g.*, Anna Perenna, who could grant a favourable year's beginning (*annare*) and year's end (*perannare*); Genita Mana, who presided over birth and death; Patulcius Clusivius, the god of the opening and shutting of doors or gates, etc. Again, the suppliant might break up the action for which he sought divine aid into its several component elements, and frame for each of these an appropriate divine name. Thus, while in the *sacrum Ceriale* the flamen offered the sacrifice to the goddesses Tellus and Ceres, he gave definite expression to what he asked of them by invoking

twelve names which covered the husbandman's work from the first ploughing to the delivery of the grain from the granary, viz. Vervactor, Redarator, Imporcitor, Insitor, Obarator, Occator, Sarritor, Subruncinator, Messor, Convector, Conditor, Promitor (Serv. *Georg.* i. 21), and, similarly, the Arval Brothers, by way of expiating the acts of bringing down, cutting, and burning a fig-tree that had grown on the roof of their temple, offered sacrifice to three newly created deities, viz. Deferunda, Commolenda, and Adolenda, while on another occasion of the same kind they sacrificed to Coinquenda and Adolenda (Henzen, *op. cit.* 147 f.). In the case of gods whose range of power was very wide, it was necessary to specify the particular matter in which their help was required; and from this arose the practice of dividing the personality of certain deities and investing the component elements with distinct epithets, of which quite a number might appear together in a single prayer. Thus, *e.g.*, the Arval Brothers, in the vow which they made for the triumphant return of Trajan from the Dacian campaign in A.D. 101 (*CIL* vi. 2074, i. 25 ff.), invoked not only Juppiter Optimus Maximus and Mars Pater, but also Juppiter Victor and Mars Victor. In the case of so multiform a deity as Fortuna, the suppliant was above all concerned to direct his prayer to the proper quarter, so that, if, *e.g.*, he prayed for the favourable issue of a battle, he appealed to 'Fortuna huiusce diei,' *i.e.* the particular Fortuna in whose hands lay the destiny of the day of battle (Wissowa, *Rel. und Kult. der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912, p. 262). Great care was also taken that no divine power who had a right to be invoked should be passed over. Hence, after all the deities specially concerned had been duly invoked in a prayer, it was customary to add a 'generalis invocatio' which should include all the others:

'Post specialem invocationem transit ad generalitatem, ne quod numen praetereat, more pontificum, per quos ritu veteri in omnibus sacris post speciales deos, quos ad ipsum sacrum quod fiebat necesse erat invocari, generaliter omnia numina invocabantur' (Serv. *Georg.* i. 21; cf. *Æn.* viii. 103, *Georg.* i. 10).

This practice finds parallels in Greek prayers (cf. O. Crusius, *Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 80***; R. Wünsch, in *ARW* vii. [1904] 100).

In forms of prayer that have come down to us, accordingly, the group of deities addressed is very frequently rounded off with some such formula as 'di deaeque omnes,' or, more definitely, 'di omnes coelestes vosque terrestres vosque inferni' (Livy, i. 32. 10), or 'di novensiles, di indigetes, di quibus est potestas nostrorum hostiumque' (*ib.* viii. 9. 6). With this custom is connected the requirement that in every prayer, no matter to what god it was addressed, Janus and Juppiter should be invoked first of all (Macr. *Sat.* i. 16. 25; cf. Cato, *de Agric.* 141 [see also 134]: 'Ianum Iovem vino praefamino'), and that the series of gods invoked should always begin with Janus and end with Vesta (Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* ii. 67, and other passages, as cited by Wissowa, *op. cit.* 103).

LITERATURE.—G. Appel, *De Romanorum precationibus* (*Religionsgeschichtl. Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, vii. 2), Giessen, 1909, p. 75 ff.; G. Wissowa, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur röm. Religions- und Stadtgesch.*, Munich, 1904, p. 327 ff.

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INWARD LIGHT.—See EXPERIENCE (Religious); FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF.

IONIC PHILOSOPHY.—The schools of philosophy that arose in Ionia, on the coast of Asia Minor, and among the adjacent islands, during the 6th cent. B.C., are above all remarkable for their originality and vigour. With them begins the great march of Greek philosophy, and even their fragments are stimulating to this day. It is hard to fix precisely the limits of the term 'Ionic.' In so active a period of thought, systems gave birth to other systems with astonishing rapidity, and Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Anaxagoras, all of them bred in Ionia, were deeply influenced by the speculations around them. All historians would agree, however, that Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, the earliest in time, form to some extent a class apart, and most would confine the distinctive name to these three and their immediate disciples. But Xenophanes seems to come nearer to them than to their great successors, and we may include him here, especially as he gives particular expression to the religious side of their views. Dominant in the four is the recognition of matter, motion, and physical causation—*i.e.* of objects extended in space, and orderly movements and changes in space—as being themselves manifestations of the Absolute Reality. There is a marked aversion to earlier anthropomorphic ideas, and to all such mythology as that in which a storm at sea would be explained simply as due to the incalculable wrath of a Poseidon. At the same time this 'matter' with which our philosophers are concerned does not appear to be conceived as anything apart from spirit. They shrink from imagining it in terms of mere mechanism, but do not ask themselves the precise distinction between mechanism and spirit, or the precise connexion between them—questions, certainly, that no one has answered yet. But, with the possible exception of Xenophanes, these early thinkers do not even raise such questions, at least not expressly: in Hegelian language, they do not ask how far space can be taken as an adequate manifestation of the Absolute; they are absorbed rather in the simple feeling that it is *a* manifestation. They feel that things do happen in the way of mechanical and physical 'causation,' one event in space and time being followed by another as its necessary 'effect'; that a cloud, *e.g.*, is formed and will be formed by an exhalation from the sea, not by the god choosing to send his messenger wrapped in a magic veil. At the same time, they insist that these physical processes are, in some profound sense which they do not determine, bound up with life, mind, and divinity. Thus they have been called 'hylozoists' (ὕλη='matter,' ζωή='life'), since they assert a union, though an undefined union, between the two; or, rather, they do not assert it, they assume it, for they have hardly reached the stage of distinguishing the two as two. Aristotle sees the danger of this indefiniteness, one result of which was to make extended things and movements in space *as such* appear to be the sole causes of all that existed, including the movements themselves and the glory and beauty of the universe (*Met.* A 3, 983[b] 6–984[b] 20). But no criticism can do justice to these pioneers that does not recognize the immense service done to thought by initiating research into the properties of space and the physical qualities of things, and connecting with this, rather than with mere mythological fancies, the search for the absolute truth about the universe and God. Science and mathematics are not in themselves metaphysics and theology, but there will never be a great metaphysic that does not take account of them, and never a great theology that does not take account of metaphysic.

1. **Thales.**—It is significant that Thales, the first of these thinkers, is said to have brought the elements of geometry to Greece, having studied the science in Egypt and made discoveries of his own (Ritter-Preller, *Hist. Phil. Græcæ*, 9 E and reff. there). But how far it was a true deductive science and not a mere collection of rules learnt empirically, it is difficult to say. Our direct information for Egypt is derived from a document written, probably about 1500 B.C., by the priest

Aahmes (on the Rhind papyrus now in the British Museum). Mathematicians who have studied this treatise state that it refers to a rule for 'determining the trigonometrical ratios of certain angles' (see W. Ball, *A Short History of Mathematics*, London, 1888, p. 8 ff.), but they are not sure whether this rule could not have been discovered by mere observation of special instances, without the general reason being known. On the other hand, the Greek Democritus, writing in the 5th cent. B.C., and boasting of his proficiency in mathematics, asserts that he has not found himself surpassed even by the Egyptians in the construction of diagrams 'accompanied by demonstration' (*μετὰ ἀποδείξιος* [Ritter-Preller, 188]). This at once suggests that, though by that time the Greeks had outstripped the Egyptians, they recognized that demonstration and deduction were present from the first in the foreign teaching. This agrees with Aristotle's remark that mathematics arose first in Egypt, because there the priests had leisure, and leisure is necessary for all the liberal studies that go beyond utility (*Met.* A 1, 981^{b} 20). Thus it seems quite possible that Proclus had good foundation for his opinion that there was a true 'general' element in the mathematics of Thales, *i.e.* a true element of deduction (Proclus, *in Euclid.* 19 [Ritter-Preller, 9 E]). Proclus is writing *c.* A.D. 450, but he quotes Eudemus (*c.* 325 B.C.), who undoubtedly thought that Thales must have grasped the general principle that a triangle is determined when the base and the angles at the base are given; for otherwise, Eudemus held, he could not have measured the distances of ships at sea, as he is said to have done (his base, apparently, 'being a tower, and the base angles being obtained by observation' [Ball, p. 14; Proclus, p. 352. 14]).

Thus we may see in Thales the first beginnings of that insight into the real importance of mathematics both for science and for metaphysics which so deeply influenced Greek thought, from the time when the Pythagoreans believed that the very essence of all things was to be found in number down to the days of Archimedes.

Herodotus tells us (i. 74) that Thales foretold the eclipse of the sun which took place in the sixth year of the war between the Lydians and the Medes. Incidentally this gives us a date for Thales' life, since astronomers calculate that an eclipse was visible in Asia Minor on May 28, 585 B.C. (Ritter-Preller, 8*b*). We cannot suppose, without authority, that Thales had discovered the true cause of eclipses, but we know from Assyrian records that the Babylonians watched for eclipses at fixed dates (Burnet, *Early Greek Phil.*[2] p. 42). Thales may have had access to this knowledge in his travels, possibly at the court of Crœsus, king of Lydia (Herod. i. 29). In any case we can understand how such knowledge, coupled with his mathematical studies, would stimulate his search after one universal physical cause for all the changes in the world. This, he held, was water. Aristotle, our nearest authority, suggests that he was led to this view by observing that the seed of all living things is moist, and also the nutriment of all things, 'and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it' (*Met.* A 3, 983^{b} 18). It is not clear whether the last passage refers to animal heat alone, as the context certainly suggests, or, as later writers thought, to the belief that the fire of the sun and the stars was fed by exhalation (Ritter-Preller, 12; Plut. *Plac. Phil.* i. 3; Diels, *Doxographi*, p. 276). It is quite possible that Thales had both in mind. Aristotle also states (*de Cœlo*, ii. 13, 294^{a} 28) that he believed the earth to float on water, as a piece of wood might float. This recalls the Semitic belief of the waters under the firmament.

How exactly Thales conceived the ordered universe to be evolved from this fundamental water is quite unknown to us. Diog. Laert. states (i. 22) that, according to some authorities, he left nothing written, and certainly no writings of his have come down to us. Aristotle, whenever he refers to his doctrines, speaks of them in a tone of conjecture. From a passage in the *Physics*, however (i. 4 *init.* 187^{a} 12), where Aristotle is dealing with those early thinkers who assumed one definite substance underlying all the forms that we see, it may be inferred that Thales believed in a process of rarefaction and condensation. Still, this is only an inference, and Simplicius seems to have held that Theophrastus (the pupil of Aristotle) considered Anaximenes the first to state such a theory (Ritter-Preller, 26*b*; Diels, p. 164^{5}). Perhaps Anaximenes was the first to state it fully.

Of greater interest is Aristotle's remark that Thales is reputed to have said that the magnet had a soul, because it could make iron move (*de Anima*, i. 2, 405^{a} 19 [Ritter-Preller, 13*a*]). As Aristotle saw, this suggests that Thales was not satisfied with mechanism as providing an ultimate explanation for the cause of movement, and held that in some fashion (cf. Plat. *Laws*, x. 899 B: *ὅπῃ τε καὶ ὅπως*) soul must be that cause, and must be present throughout the universe (*de Anima*, 411^{a} 7). This feeling, Aristotle thinks, may be the source of the saying ascribed to him that 'all things were full of gods' (*ib.*; also ascribed to Heraclitus [Ritter-Preller, 46*d*; Diog. Laert. ix. 7]).

It is plain, however, from Aristotle's criticisms, both here and in *Met.* A 3, that Thales did not attempt to work out any relation between soul and matter, or even definitely to state the two as distinct, if interconnected, principles. Hence we cannot trust a later writer, such as Stobæus, who attributes to him a fully-formed doctrine about the 'mind of the world' being God (*Ecl.* i. 56 [Ritter-Preller, 14; Diels, p. 301]).

Like all thinkers of Greece in the great period, Thales showed a deep interest in matters of State. He was classed with Solon among the Seven Sages (Diog. Laert. i. 42), and Herodotus recognizes the wisdom of the advice that he gave the Ionians, in view of their danger from Persia, to form a united confederation among themselves (i. 170). He was certainly a citizen of Miletus, and, according to Herodotus (*loc. cit.*), of Phœnician extraction, but the latter statement seems far from certain (see Burnet, p. 39 ff.).

2. Anaximander. — Anaximander, also a Milesian, and probably a pupil of Thales (Ritter-Preller, 15), astonishes us by the boldness and subtlety of his speculations. According to Aristotle, and also, apparently, to a tradition preserved in Simplicius (Arist. *Met.* Λ 2, 1069^{b} 18; Simpl. *Phys.* 24, 26 [Ritter-Preller, 16, 26]), he struck out the idea of one primitive substance, infinite in extent, but otherwise undetermined in character, something that was thus none of the things we know, but something that was capable of becoming all things and manifesting all qualities. That the primitive substance was thus conceived as indeterminate has been disputed (see Burnet, p. 57 ff.), chiefly on the ground that Aristotle may have read into his predecessor an approximation to his own theory of matter as something that is essentially potentiality, *i.e.* something with the power of receiving form and character, though not of generating it by its own force alone. But there is no real reason why Aristotle should have misrepresented his forerunner, whose book was in existence at the time, and, moreover, we must account for the tradition in Simplicius. If we accept Aristotle's account, we have a significant connexion between Anaximander and Heraclitus,

who found the very life of the world to lie in the incessant process of change, everything coming to be something which as yet it was not. It must be admitted, however, that the word ἄπειρον (which Anaximander uses to describe his substance) is not conclusive, meaning simply 'limitless'; and, though this certainly may imply 'indefinite in character' as well as 'infinite in extent,' we cannot be positive that it does. So far as we can follow Anaximander's development of his theory, we seem to notice, as with Thales, an uncritical union of mechanical and spiritual conceptions, vaguely grasped. This 'infinite-indefinite' is said to 'surround all things and govern all things,' to be divine, deathless, and indestructible (Arist. *Phys.* iii. 4, 203ᵇ 7 [Ritter-Preller, 17]). But, when we come to ask how this divine government brings the diversified world into being, we only learn that in some fashion *the opposites are separated out* from the primitive source (Arist. *Phys.* i. 4, 187ᵃ 12 [Ritter-Preller, 16c]). Now, this kind of statement can be taken in two ways, as Aristotle seems to suggest with regard to the later theory of Anaxagoras, who conceived a primitive state in which all physical substances were somehow mingled together so as to be indistinguishable, a conception which has interesting points of likeness to Anaximander's (*Met.* A 8, 989ᵃ *fin.*-989ᵇ *init.*). It is open to us to imagine 'the opposites'—*e.g.*, the hot element and the cold—as already there actually, fully developed, but divided into such small amounts that we do not perceive their presence. In this case the primitive substance is not really undefined in all its parts, and we must admit so much inconsistency in the theory. It then becomes natural to assume the 'separating out' as a merely mechanical process due to the sifting action of a perpetual motion, without any intrinsic qualitative change. Such an interpretation for Anaximander is suggested by a passage in Simplicius:

οὐκ ἀλλοιωμένου τοῦ στοιχείου τὴν γένεσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποκρινομένων τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τῆς ἀϊδίου κινήσεως (*Phys.* 24, 13 D [Ritter-Preller, 16]).

Or else—and this other interpretation seems more in harmony with the general drift both of Anaximander and of Anaxagoras—the primitive quality of the substance is throughout indeterminate, possessing no special characteristic anywhere at all: and then we are almost driven to seek some further cause, other than the substance itself and other than motion, to account for the growth of the various definite characters that do appear (cf. Theophr. *ap.* Simplicius, 154. 24 D, 27. 17 D [Ritter-Preller, 16c; Diels, p. 479]). Now, Anaxagoras, whatever his view of the process in detail, did definitely assert that mind (νοῦς) was the ultimate cause of this ordered variety—a step for which Aristotle puts him far in advance of his predecessors (*Met.* A 3, 984ᵇ 11-18). This step Anaximander certainly did not take, but the affinity between the two systems is real: each assumes a primitive matter that is unformed, either relatively or absolutely, possessing no characteristics that are discernible, but capable of changing, under the influence of *something*, into the ordered world which we know. Anaxagoras names that something, Anaximander does not, and perhaps he has a still nearer affinity to a modern such as Tyndall, who spoke of matter as endowed with 'the promise and potency of all life,' and left the subject there. Or it might not be fanciful to say that he conceives the world in the beginning as without form and void, and, though he thinks of the spirit of God as brooding on the face of the waters, he will not say so definitely.

Simplicius adds another important point, illustrated by a direct quotation (Ritter-Preller, 16). The generation of the various elements, as we know them, is followed by their dissolution into the primitive substance, and this re-absorption is felt to be right and seemly (κατὰ τὸ χρεών):

'At the appointed time they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice' (Burnet's tr., slightly altered).

Thus Anaximander seems to hold that the diversity and multiplicity of the world depend on a struggle of opposites (*e.g.*, of warmth against cold, of wet against dry), and that the definite emergence of one element is a wrong done to the other. Heraclitus carries on this idea of struggle, but rejoices in it and justifies it. Anaximander held also, it would appear, that this double process of generation and destruction was repeated incessantly: 'generation could never fail,' for the infinite fountain was always there (Arist. *Phys.* iii. 8, 208ᵃ 8 [Ritter-Preller, 16*a*]). Thus Anaximander may really have reached the idea, which later writers say he held, of innumerable universes, rising and passing away for ever (Ritter-Preller, 21). It is not clear whether they think he imagined many universes in existence at the same time, or meant that they followed singly, one after the other. But the latter is suggested by the coherent system which he conceived for the present universe, comprising all we know, earth and sun and stars, in one complete whole. He came very near to realizing that the earth was a globe: he conceived it, apparently, as shaped like a stumpy cylinder, with a convex lid, in dimensions three times as broad as it was deep, swinging free in the centre of the universe, and surrounded by hollow rings of compressed air (or vapour) which contained the fire of the different heavenly bodies, the rings with apertures in them through which the fire showed (Ritter-Preller, 19, 20; Burnet, pp. 70, 71). His biological speculations were equally bold, and in many ways acute. He anticipated the modern theory of hereditary connexion between all animals by his suggestions that the earliest living creatures were of the nature of fishes, and that man was developed from these, supporting his view by the sound observation that man now requires a longer period of nurture than any other creature, and considering that it was hard to imagine how he could have survived from the first if this had been always so (Ritter-Preller, 22).

3. Anaximenes.—Anaximenes, his successor, also a Milesian (*ib.* 23, 26), was a man of much tamer intellect. He fell back to the old idea of the earth as a flat disk, and to the simpler, clearer, but less profound and fruitful, conception of the primitive substance as one of the recognizable elements. This was air, infinite in extent, but definite in quality. Rarefied, air became fire; condensed, it appeared successively as wind, cloud, water, earth, and stones. Motion existed from all eternity and was the cause of change, but no explanation of motion itself was given (*ib.* 24, 26, 28). Soul, he said in so many words, was air:

'Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world' (tr. Burnet, p. 77; Ritter-Preller, 24).

We cannot say, however, whether he meant that the air encompassing the universe was conscious, as it is in man; he is said to have thought it 'divine' (Ritter-Preller, 28*a*), nor need we doubt that he did; but he is unlikely to have formulated the conception of divinity any more precisely than his predecessors. There is little new in his thought, but he too has a claim to what Hegel regards as the great merit of these thinkers—that they were the first to announce that the bewildering variety of the world could be explained as the manifestation of one principle, a principle that was indestructible (*Gesch. der Phil.*, i. 'Griech. Phil.' A 1 [Thales], p. 203). The theory of Anaximenes was revived a century later by Diogenes of Apol-

Ionia, whose system, however, shows the mark of other influences (Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Phil.*, i. 280 ff.).

4. **Xenophanes.**—In Xenophanes the mental enthusiasm of the time seems to blaze out into a sane and splendid religious fervour. The best introduction to him is still the brief sentence of Aristotle (*Met.* A, 986^b 21), that Xenophanes was the first to believe in the unity of all things (cf. Plat. *Soph.* 242 D: 'All that we call many is really one,' an Eleatic tenet derived 'from Xenophanes'). Not that Xenophanes made any clear statement, or distinguished what was one in matter from what was one in principle;

'he simply looked up at the whole heaven and said the One existed, and was God' (ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἓν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν. For ἀποβλέπων cf. Hipp. *Ref.* i. 1, ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τὸν οὐρανόν: Diels, *Dox.*, p. 555).

We may compare the famous passage in Sext. Emp. (*adv. Phys.* ix. 26 f.), which, no doubt, refers to Aristotle's opinion, telling how some have thought that the first conception of the providence of God came to man from the sight of the starry heavens:

'The men who first looked up at the sky (οἱ πρῶτον εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέψαντες) and gazed at the sun running his course from his rising to his setting, and watched the ordered dances of the stars, these men set themselves to discover the creator of so glorious a harmony, believing that it could not have arisen by chance, but through a mightier and immortal power, and that this power was God.'

Xenophanes made no clear statement (οὐδὲν διεσαφήνισεν), says Aristotle, cutting to the root of the matter in his trenchant way; as with Xenophanes' predecessors, so with himself, we are unable to discover any articulated theory of the relation between space and spirit, either in the universe or in man. But his fragments are instinct with the sense that these two conceptions are of ultimate importance, and must somehow be brought together. How to bring them together he does not know; one is tempted to say that he simply claps them together, but he has got hold of what neither philosophy nor religion must ever let go again. He will have nothing of the old anthropomorphic fancies by which the real grandeur and mystery of the physical universe are juggled out of sight:

'What men call Iris is a cloud, coloured purple and scarlet and green' (Ritter-Preller, 103).

But that does not make him write the rainbow 'in the dull catalogue of common things.'

If 'all things come from the earth and all things end in the earth' (*ib.* 103*a*), and if we ourselves and all living things are 'born from earth and water' (103), yet also everything that he sees leads him back 'to the One' (101*b*), everything is somehow in the charge of 'one God, mightiest among gods and men, not like mortals in shape or mind' (100). Not like them in mind—but that does not imply that He is without mind, rather He is the mind of which ours is but a faint reflex, He is νοερώτερον ἢ νόημα: 'more intelligent than intelligence' (102*a*). God's thought embraces every thing, 'without effort He rules all things by the thought of His mind' (108*b*). There is a striking enigmatic line, οὖλος ὁρᾷ, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ' ἀκούει (*ib.* 102), which may be translated variously: (1) 'He is all eye, all ear, all thought' (Zeller, Murray); (2) 'The whole sees, the whole hears, the whole thinks'; or (3) 'He sees all over, thinks all over, and hears all over' (Burnet).

We ask ourselves whether Xenophanes meant: (1) that in the divine there was nothing but sight and hearing and the activity of thought; or (2) that every scrap of matter was somehow linked up into a coherent system, which *as a whole*, though not otherwise, was instinct with the highest powers of perception and thought; or (3) that matter throughout the universe was somehow conscious in every part. The second interpretation seems most in harmony with his conception of 'the One,' but the third is supported by passages in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *de Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* (*Zenone*) (chs. 3, 4; Ritter-Preller, 108), and the line may express Xenophanes' belief in the omnipresence of the divine. In any case it is a good illustration at once of his suggestiveness and of his vagueness. The world conceived as a physical whole is, in his view, *somehow* a manifestation of one God whose influence is present in every part, and who has the attributes of reason and perception, but we do not understand *how* it is such a manifestation. Does he conceive it to stand to the mind of God as body to soul? Or is space the first appearance to us of something which, in its ultimate nature, is free from the limitations of space, as we know space? This seems perhaps too subtle a theory for so early a period, but there are accounts strongly suggesting something of the kind. For instance, Simplicius, on the authority of Theophrastus, the scholar of Aristotle, says that Xenophanes conceived the One, the Unity of all things that was God, as neither limited nor limitless, neither at motion nor at rest (οὔτε πεπερασμένον οὔτε ἄπειρον, κτλ. [Ritter-Preller, 106*a*, *init.*]; cf. *de Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* [*ib.* 109, 110], which *may*, however, only be derived from Theophrastus). Again, sometimes Xenophanes is said to have described the One as spherical in form and limited (πεπερασμένον δὲ καὶ σφαιροειδέτ [*ib.* 108, 108*b*]), and, on the other hand, we hear that he spoke of 'the limitless roots of the earth' (Arist. *de Cœlo*, ii. 13, 294^b 21; ἐπ' ἄπειρον αὐτὴν ἐρριζῶσθαι; Ritter-Preller, 103*b*)—all of which conflicting statements could be reconciled if we did suppose him to have thought that God could appear to us in one aspect as spatially limited, in another as spatially unlimited, but that in His ultimate nature He was something that was above either (cf. Ritter's interpretation of 'the sphere' as the self-limited, neither limitless nor externally limited, quoted by Zeller, *op. cit.* i. 548[2]). All this, however, is very doubtful, and perhaps we ought only to say that Xenophanes may have used spatial images to describe his God just because he was feeling after, but had not yet grasped, a conception in which God could be known to be as much the source of space as of mind and spirit. Certainly the desire for a vast monotheism which will somehow include both personality and impersonality seems to underlie his vivid satires on the current anthropomorphism of his day.

'The Ethiopians make their gods black-haired and flat-nosed, and the Thracians make theirs red-haired and blue-eyed' (Ritter-Preller, 100*b*). 'Yes, and if the beasts had hands and could paint and carve, the horses would make their gods like horses, and the oxen make theirs like oxen.' 'Men think the gods are begotten as they are, and dress as they do, and look and speak as they' (*ib.* 100).

His own God is unbegotten, uncreated, and everlasting (*ib.* 98), infinitely beyond the reach of the 'immoral' myths invented by the poets.

'Homer and Hesiod have credited the gods with every shame, thefts and adulteries and lies' (*ib.* 99).

It is very probable, as Murray points out, that the anthropomorphism of Homer is itself superimposed on an earlier, less personal, mythology of nature, and Xenophanes might almost be said to lead the reaction. Crude anthropomorphism is full of dangers, and not the least arise when symbols of the great generative forces in the world are turned into tales about 'a god of enormous procreative power and innumerable amours' (*Four Stages of Gr. Religion*, London, 1912, ch. ii. p. 89). Not that Xenophanes shows any wish to restore older mythologies, if such there were, any more than he shows sympathy for the transmigration fancies of the Pythagoreans. His way lies forward along the path of sober thought and inquiry. He is aware of our ignorance, and does not hope to dispel it entirely.

'No man has ever known, nor ever will know, the full truth about the gods. Though he should utter it, yet he himself cannot know that it is true' (Ritter-Preller, 104).

But this does not involve, for Xenophanes, a

sceptical despair; the possibility of advance towards knowledge still remains:

'The gods do not reveal all the truth at once; men must search, and at length they find the better' (*ib.* 104b).

The greater part of what we hear about his physical speculation is neither well attested nor of much interest. It was his revolt against a low mythology, and his conception that all things must somehow form a unity, that had the profound and far-reaching results. There is much in both Plato and Euripides that recalls his attacks on the 'Olympian' creed, and there can be little doubt that Parmenides, whose philosophy centres in the conception of the One, is in the direct line of succession from Xenophanes, who thus forms the link between the Ionian and Eleatic schools. Aristotle says in so many words that Parmenides was reported to have been his pupil (*ib.* 101), and it is quite possible that Xenophanes, in his long years of wandering, came to Elea in Italy, the city of Parmenides (*ib.* 97). His own native city was Colophon in Lydia, but it is natural to suppose that he left it when the Mede appeared (*ib.* 95). The date given by Diog. Laert. for his *floruit* is Ol. lx. (=540–536 B.C. [*ib.* 97]). Besides his religious writings we possess some charming fragments, half-lyrical, half-didactic. A very lovable nature appears in them, typically Greek in its union of sunny enjoyment with self-control, and high above all luxury, tyranny, and superstition. His picture of a drinking-feast is characteristic: the clean floor and the clean cups and the clean hands of the guests, the flowers and the flower-scented wine and the fresh cool water, the dance and the song and the drinking, but such drinking that a man needs no servant to help him home after it, the feast itself beginning with prayer to the gods 'for strength to do right,' and ending with songs that have no lies in them, no worn-out fancies about gods and Titans and giants, and no bitterness, no rancorous memories of party-strife (Bergk and Hiller, *Anthologia Lyrica*, 'Xenophanes,' 1 and 2).

LITERATURE.—H. Ritter and L. Preller, *Historia Philosophiæ Græcæ*[8], Gotha, 1898 (indispensable for a conspectus of the leading original authorities); H. Diels, *Doxographi Græci*, Berlin, 1879 (the standard work on the later Greek commentators); T. Bergk, *Anthologia Lyrica*, ed. E. Hiller[4], Leipzig, 1897 (for Xenophanes' poems); E. Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, tr. S. F. Alleyne, London, 1881; J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*[2], do. 1908; T. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., vol. i., do. 1901; J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, Edinburgh, 1908; G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesch. der Philosophie*, vol. i., Berlin, 1833–36, section on 'Philosophie der Ionier.'

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IRANIANS.—1. *Irān*, the modern name of Persia, comes from the adjective seen in Avestan *airyana*, used generally as an epithet of *vaējah* (of uncertain meaning) to describe the land from which the *airya* folk came; its identification has not been achieved. *Airya*, Old Pers. *ariya* (cf. Gr. Ἄριοι), is cognate with Skr. *ārya*; and it seems to have been the name by which the undivided Aryan people called themselves, a race of invaders from Europe,[1] who, perhaps about the middle of the 2nd millennium B.C., occupied Bactria and the neighbouring country, and imposed their form of Indo-European speech upon the inhabitants. This admittedly speculative reading of the facts of a dim pre-history seems to suit best the evidence at present at our disposal. Whether the term 'Aryan' may be accurately used of a wider unity, as in British popular phrase (cf. O. Schrader's art. ARYAN [*i.e.* Indo-European] RELIGION, vol. i. p. 11 ff.) need not be discussed here; for the purposes of the present article the term will be restricted to the Indo-Iranian branch of the family. The division of the branch took place relatively late, the ancestors of the Aryan Indians migrating into the Panjāb, where we find them in the Vedic period, and leaving the Iranians in possession of the wide belt of territory from Bactria to Media, down to the frontiers of India. The linguistic tests of Iranian as against Indian dialect are very simple, the two groups lying closer together than any other distinct languages in the Indo-European family; it is as close a connexion as that between French and Italian. In Avestan and Old Persian, for instance, *Hindu* is the name for India, answering to the Skr. *Sindhu*. This illustrates two characteristic Iranian developments—the prevocalic change of *s* to *h*, and the loss of the original aspirates. The application of a few phonetic laws enables us to transform the oldest extant Sanskrit into the corresponding Iranian of our early texts, and *vice versa*, with quite a small residuum of new developments to be allowed for. Apart from some linguistic complications, involving certain speculations on pre-historic movements described in the present writer's 'Notes on Iranian Ethnography,' our material enables us to reconstruct with considerable fullness the cultural conditions of the Aryan people before the Indian trek. We restrict ourselves here to matters affecting religion.

[1] It should be noted, however, that S. Feist (*Kultur, Ausbreitung und Herkunft der Indogermanen*, Berlin, 1913, p. 518 ff.) is strongly inclined, in part on the evidence of the recently discovered Tocharic language, to revert to the older view and seek the original home of the race in Asia, more specifically in Russian Turkestan. This is chronicled without suggesting that the writer finds himself shaken by this novel and able argument.

Our evidence is collected partly from the comparative treatment of words, names, and ideas occurring in the older Indian and Iranian literature, and partly from historical notices of Iranian tribes found in ancient writers, of whom Herodotus is the most important. It will be remembered that the term 'Iranian' properly connotes a language only; and there is no reason to presuppose racial affinity among the wild nomad tribes who spoke, or may have spoken, an Iranian dialect. It is, accordingly, unsafe to depend much upon customs or beliefs of Massagetæ or Scythians in framing our picture of proto-Iranian religion. It is at least as probable that such traits may be purely aboriginal.

2. Naturally the most certain elements in this reconstruction are those which we can prove to have been Aryan. The combination of Vedic evidence with that of Herodotus, in his description of the popular religion of Persia, presents us with a system which agrees closely with that of the later Avesta (excluding the later prose and the ritual parts). Now these Avestan texts represent apparently a counter-reformation, a relapse from the too drastic reform of Zarathushtra into the old Iranian nature-worship, conformed to Zarathushtra's most emphatic tenets, but mostly in phrase alone, and compounding for its abandonment of Zarathushtra's essential teaching by an apotheosis of the prophet himself. In language and thought alike we find the Rigveda closely paralleled by the Yashts, and even more closely by the 'Gāthā of Seven Chapters' (prose), which is actually composed in the archaic dialect of Zarathushtra's own verse Gāthās. So great is the difference in religious standpoint, that, if we omitted one line (*Ys.* xlii. 2, which offers adoration to Zarathushtra and Ahura in a breath), we might plausibly argue total ignorance of the reform. The religion resulting would be practically identical with that of the Rigveda, allowance being made for the small compass of the Gāthā. We should have to provide only for some innovations like the cult of Indra on the Vedic side, and that of Mazda and the Holy Immortals (*Amesha Spenta*, now first collectively named; see art. AMESHA SPENTAS) on the Iranian.

3. Leaving the reform of Zarathushtra and the dualism of the Magi to be described in special artt., we may delineate here the religion professed by the Iranian people when Zarathushtra arose. According to Herodotus (i. 131), the Persians sacrificed on mountain-tops to Zeus, 'calling the whole vault of the sky Zeus.' It is highly probable that the Greek

traveller records the native name, *Diyaus*, identical with Vedic *Dyaus*, Ζεύς, *Dies*(*piter*).[1] 'They sacrifice also,' he proceeds, 'to Sun, Moon, Earth, Fire, Water, and Winds.' All six divinities belong to the circle of the 'heavenly ones,' Indo-European **deivōs*, whose name declares them of the company of *Dyēus*, 'Heaven' or 'Sky.' While the name of their chief is not certainly found outside the South Indo-European tribes, the general term is universal in our speech area from India to the British Isles: the 'heavenly ones' disputed with the ancestor spirits the primacy in Indo-European religion. So far, accordingly, we have set down only what the Iranians still observed of a cultus common not to the Aryans alone, but to the whole of our family. We may add that they kept plentiful traces of the primitive ancestor-worship as well (see art. FRAVASHI). In Īrān the *manes* were wholly beneficent, and the darker side of the tendance of the dead separated itself entirely from association with them. Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* 46) tells us of Magian libations to 'Hades and Darkness,' offered in a sunless place with the blood of a wolf; and Herodotus (vii. 114) records the sacrifice of Amestris, wife of Xerxes, to the god who is said to dwell beneath the earth, when she buried alive fourteen children of high rank. Out of this primitive practice arose the Mithraist offering, *DEO ARIMANIO*. From the pre-Aryan period also may have come other elements of Iranian religion, as is suggested especially by comparisons with Roman divinities and cultus.

4. Aryan religion has by the side of the 'heavenly ones' (Skr. *devās*, Av. *daēva*) another term, *asura* (Av. *ahura*), which in Veda and Avesta, as A. A. Macdonell remarks (*Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 7), 'is applied to the highest gods, who in both are conceived as mighty kings, drawn through the air in their war chariots by swift steeds, and in character benevolent, almost entirely free from guile and immoral traits.' The similarity of these attributes to those given in the Avesta to the Fravashis, who are largely *manes*, suggests the otherwise probable inference that, if Aryan **daiva* meant an elemental deity, **asura* originally meant a 'hero' in the Greek sense. This fits very well the etymological connexion traced by Schrader (*ERE* ii. 15) between *asura* and the Germanic *anses*, 'semidei.' From the first, then, the two divine names denoted different classes of gods, whose ultimate rivalry was assured. The rivalry started largely, we may conjecture, in conditions differing with social status. Rude elemental powers were likely to be popular deities, adored by uncultured nomads who could not understand gods of shadowy and abstract character. The latter, especially if connected closely with the *manes*, would appeal to the nobles, prone everywhere to reverence ancestors from the very fact that they knew who they were, and therein showed their superiority to the common people. In some aristocracy of Eastern Īrān, it would seem, one *Ahura*—or rather **Asura*, for the weakening of the *s* had not yet set in—was elevated above other such powers by the epithet **Mazdās*, 'wise,' or 'wisdom.' Closely linked with him were some important *Sondergötter*, abstractions of the same type as the Roman *Salus* or *Fides*, and equally primitive in origin, or presiding over departments like the sacred fire, the cattle, or the plant world. So conspicuous did this cultus become, as early perhaps as the 15th cent. B.C., that Assyrians borrowed the name as *Assara Mazāš*, which is found in a catalogue of divinities during the reign of Aššur-bani-pal, associated with the Seven Igigi. This association shows that the conceptions were thoroughly assimilated, and with the very primitive form of the name proves that the date of its annexation by the Semites was centuries earlier than the time at which it is actually found. This discovery (for which see F. Hommel in *PSBA* xxi. [1899] 132) makes it necessary to date the name *Ahura Mazdāh* long before the days of Zarathushtra. The Reformer, in the writer's opinion, was a member of the aristocratic caste which worshipped this deity as 'god of the Aryans,' by which title he is known in one of the Behistan Inscriptions (Elamitic version, iii. 77, 79). 'Aryans' here will mean simply 'nobles.' The religious *milieu* already sketched will account excellently for the first hints which Zarathushtra improved so as to make the system underlying the Gathās.

5. Meanwhile the masses were worshipping the *daivās*, like their cousins who had migrated into India. Chief among them was the Light-god κατ' ἐξοχήν, Mithra. His later history, in Zoroastrianism and in Mithraism (*qq.v.*), involves us in some complex problems which may be left to the articles concerned. According to A. Meillet (*JA* x. x. [1907] 143 ff.), this Aryan deity originated in an ethical conception, that of the 'compact' (*miθra*, which occurs as a common noun in the Gathās). Mithra's Vedic companion, Varuna, is plausibly traced to a similar origin, his name being compared with Skr. *vrata*, 'ordinance,' Av. *urvata*, *urvaiti*, 'contract,' and *urvaθa*, 'friend.' The present writer thinks it probable that two independent conceptions have been united, perhaps by the aid of popular etymology, in the history of Mithra. A possible connexion with the 'waters that are above the firmament,' explaining his later association with the non-Aryan river-genius Anāhita[1] (*q.v.*), may have been taken over at a very early date from a Semitic source during a pre-historic contact. In any case, Mithra is essentially the firmament in the early Iranian period, and his title μεσίτης (Plutarch, *loc. cit.*) suits the physical conception of that which lies between high heaven and the earth—the διὸς αἰθήρ of Æschylus. From this elemental character came the development of the purely solar divinity who is at the centre of Mithraism. The total absence of Mithra from the Gāthās suggests that Zarathushtra knew him only on this elemental side. When he returns to prominence in the Yashts, he is conspicuously ethical, the god of compacts, combining the splendour of a god of the bright sky with the functions of a *Sondergott* of human intercourse in exactly the same way as the Roman *Dius Fidius*. Probably the elemental and the ethical conceptions predominated in different parts of Īrān, and the fusion seen in the later Avesta represents a compromise.

6. The cult of the naturo-powers in the list of Herodotus (above, § 3) calls for little further comment. Sun and Moon are objects of worship in the Vedas and (to a limited extent) in the later Avesta. For the popular cultus in Īrān, Herodotus's notices of what he saw in Persia are much better evidence than the Avesta. (We might cite one striking proof that the historian got his information among the people and not only in Court circles—his note [iii. 67] that the Magian usurper, pseudo-Smerdis, 'was lamented by all in Asia except the Persians themselves.') The worship of Earth, as spouse of the Sky, is seen in the Indian coupling of Dyaus and Prthivi, and on Iranian soil among the Scythians (Herod. iv. 59). The Aryan genius *Aramati* (Vedic; Av. *Ārmaiti*, scanned as a quadrisyllable) has the Earth as her province in the Avesta from the first; and on the evidence of the commentator Sāyana (on Rigveda VII. xxxvi. 8, VIII. xlii. 3) it is generally allowed that this was an Indian (and therefore proto-Aryan) association (see Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 10). Primarily, she is a *Sondergott* of piety, or proper tendance of

[1] See Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 391 f.

[1] Cf. Moulton, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 288.

the gods; and her connexion with the Earth is possibly another case of popular etymology. (The detachment of later Avestan thought from the primitive Iranian in this matter may be noted in the fact that Armaiti was daughter, not spouse, of the supreme deity.) The Waters—which term, except among the probably non-Aryan Magi, did not include the Sea—received adoration in Indian and Iranian tribes alike. So did Fire, which in Aryan cultus was the messenger that called the *daivās* to come down to the sacrifice. The special sanctity of the house-fire was inherited by the Iranians from Indo-European antiquity (cf., further, art. FIRE). The Indian tribes lost this naturally when they migrated into the tropics. It may be observed that the later Parsi manifestations of reverence for Earth, Fire, and Water were not Iranian, but due to the Magi. Burial certainly, cremation probably—among the Indian folk, from the earliest known period—were practised without any thought of outraging a sacred element. Indeed, Zarathushtra even connected the future resurrection with the committal of a body to the divine Earth-spirit (see Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, p. 163 f.). For the cult of Winds, the later Avesta sufficiently endorses Herodotus. Chief among *daivās* which the Greek writer does not mention is *Haoma* (Skr. *Soma*), who is indeed even excluded by the remark (Herod. i. 132) that in worship the Persians 'used no libation.' The statement is conjecturally explained (Moulton, *op. cit.* p. 72 f.) in connexion with the change of character apparent in Haoma when he returns in the later Avesta from a very palpable exile. Zarathushtra himself both knew and banned him as an 'intoxicant' bringing 'pollution' (*Ys.* xlviii. 10); the Gāthās have his fixed epithet, though not his name (*Ys.* xxxii. 14). He was, therefore, in Gāthic times still what he was in Vedic. But the Haoma of the later Avesta has no such traits: he is a magical drink, but seemingly harmless. It may be suggested that the (unknown) plant from the juice of whose crushed stalk the Aryan 'drink of immortality' was fermented—a literal *eau de vie*—had failed the Aryan tribes in their migrations. The Haoma in the country of the later Avesta would thus be a substitute, while in Persia no substitute for the lost drink was attempted (see further, art. HAOMA). Other presumable members of the primitive Iranian pantheon need not be catalogued here. The equation *vṛtraghna* (Skr.)=*vereθraghna* (later Av.), 'assault-repelling,' makes a *Sondergott* like *Νίκη* certain for the Aryan period. Of chthonian cult we have spoken already (§ 3); and for the two strains of ancestor-worship and external soul that meet in the *Fravashis* of the later Avesta reference may be made to the article on that subject.

7. For Iranian worship we can follow the *locus classicus* in Herodotus as closely as we followed its list of Iranian divinities. That it was strictly aniconic and without temples (in the Greek sense) is certain (cf. Schrader's account of Indo-European shrines in *ERE* ii. 44–47). The worship of the Sky upon the tops of mountains is there paralleled with Greek cults. When the Persians laid the strips of sacrificial flesh upon a 'carpet of tender grass' (Skr. *barhis*), and invited the gods by an incantation to come and partake of the spiritual essence of the food, they were doing what their Indian kin did in Vedic times. Probably the Yashts and Vendîdâd are quite primitive in the stress they lay on the tendance of fire. The Skr. word *hotar*, Gāthic *zaotar*, according to C. Bartholomae (*Altiran. Wörterbuch*, Strassburg, 1907, col. 1653), combines the ideas of two separate roots, one seen in Skr. *juhóti* (*χέω*), 'pour,' the other in *hávate*, 'invoke'—the latter supplying the passive participle that gives us the Germanic word 'God.' The sacred formula, which lies behind the important equation of Skr. *brahman* and Lat. *flāmen* (orig. neuter),[1] is thus included with the libation in the name of the conductor of the rite. There is no direct evidence on Iranian soil that such priests held hereditary office; but we may recall the combinations of Schrader to prove that traditional lore was handed down in certain families. The Magi succeeded to these sacerdotal functions in Persia, largely because of their influence over the non-Aryan population, which had more or less perfunctorily adopted the forms of Iranian worship and a few features of Zarathushtra's reform (on this subject see art. MAGI).

LITERATURE.—For evidence in favour of several statements briefly made above reference may be made to J. H. Moulton, 'Notes on Iranian Ethnography,' in *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, Cambridge, 1913, to his Hibbert Lectures on *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, and in small compass to the 'Cambridge Manual' on *Early Religious Poetry of Persia*, Cambridge, 1911. F. Spiegel, *Die arische Periode*, Leipzig, 1887, reconstructs features of the Aryan unity. Cf. also O. Schrader, *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, *passim*, and art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. pp. 11–57; A. V. W. Jackson, 'Iran. Religion,' in *GIrP* ii. [1904] 612 ff.; H. Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894.

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IRISH.—See CELTS.

IROQUOIS.—The name 'Iroquois' was given by the French settlers in Canada to the great confederation of the Five Nations—Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca, to which was added, after 1726, the Tuscarora, thus making the famous Six Nations. The most advanced of all American Indians in statecraft and political organization, they were the leading members of a linguistic family which ranged from the St. Lawrence River (the Saguenay on the north bank, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the south) through south Quebec and Ontario, the greater part of New York and Pennsylvania, and the north-eastern half of Ohio, with an exclave running south-west through portions of Virginia, Tennessee, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Alabama. Excepting the exclave, they were entirely surrounded by Indians of Algonquian stock. The name 'Iroquois' is itself Algonquian—*Irinakhoiw*, 'real adders' (with the French termination *-ois*).

The chief Iroquoian tribes were the Huron (*q.v.*); the Tionontati, or Tobacco People (the 'Nation du Petun' of the *Jesuit Relations*), who lived in Grey and Simcoe counties, Ont., and who combined with the Huron to form the modern Wyandot; the Attiwendaronk, or Neutrals (so called because they took no part in the wars between the Huron and the Iroquois), living north of Lake Erie; the Conestoga, along the Susquehanna River; the Erie, or Cat Nation (in allusion to the panther or wild-cat), south of the Neutrals; the Tuscarora in North Carolina; the Nottoway in South-East Virginia; the Meherrin, along the river of that name, on the border between Virginia and North Carolina; and the Cherokee (*q.v.*).

1. **Government.**—Iroquoian government was essentially a congeries of clans, each composed of a number of gentes or families, which might, in turn, consist of several firesides. The family (Mohawk *ohwachira*) was matriarchal, its members being the male and female offspring of a woman and her female descendants in the female line, together with such persons as had been adopted into the *ohwachira*. The head of an *ohwachira* was usually its oldest woman, and each of its members possessed the right of inheritance from deceased fellow-members, and of participation in its councils. In the process of development, *ohwachiras*, either actually or theoretically akin, tended to coalesce, in which case certain

[1] This equation is not, however, undisputed (see A. Walde, *Lat. etymolog. Wörterb.*[2], Heidelberg, 1910, p. 298).

ohwachiras gained the custody of the titles of chief and sub-chief, and the married women could, accordingly, take the initial steps not only in choosing, but also in deposing, a chief or sub-chief—in both cases subject to confirmation and installation (or deposition) by the tribal council. The strong matriarchate of the *ohwachira* also appears in the fact that all the land of a family was exclusively owned by women.[1] Each *ohwachira* possessed its own tutelary deities (*oyaron* or *ochinagenda*), normally in charge of certain wise women, specific songs and rites, the right to certain personal names, etc., and, of course, shared in the privileges and responsibilities inherent in membership in the tribe as a whole. The clans were to the *ohwachiras* what the latter were to the firesides (families in our sense of the term, except that they were matriarchal instead of patriarchal); and the clans were combined, in analogous fashion, into phratries, two of which normally constituted a tribe.[2] The clans composing a phratry were brothers and sisters to each other, and cousins (or progenitors) to the other phratry. Consequently, marriage within a phratry was originally forbidden, though later only the clans were exogamous.[3]

2. Family life and culture.—As would be self-evident in a matriarchal society, the power of women was in many respects paramount over men. Woman's right to land and her privilege of choosing the chiefs have already been noted. Being the source of life, she alone could independently adopt an alien (a man could do this only with the expressed or implied consent of his wife); she had the primary right to decide whether a captive should be put to death or adopted; and she might even forbid her sons to go on the warpath. Chieftainesses elected by the women provided the food for festivals, etc., watched over the treasury, and, when of extraordinary ability, might even, in case of need, act as substitute during the vacancy of a male chieftainship. The penalty for killing a woman was double that for the murder of a man (see art. BLOOD-FEUD [Primitive], vol. ii. p. 722[b]).

Yet, although a son belonged to his mother's clan, a husband retained his own clan, as the wife retained hers. Their offspring had, therefore, a relation to both clans; and the father's clan gave the son his tutelary (*oyaron*), supplied a prisoner or a scalp if he fell in battle or was murdered, and performed the sepulchral rites in case of death in his wife's clan.

The principle of adoption (*q.v.*) was one of prime importance in Iroquoian organization. As among the Huron (see *ERE*, vol. vi. p. 883 f.), a captive might be adopted to replace a fallen warrior, and, as Hewitt points out (*HAI* i. 15), to restore the *orenda* (on which see below) lost by the clan through the death of its member. Not only individuals, but entire tribes, might be adopted. This was notably the case when, about 1726, the Tuscarora were adopted by the Five Nations, through the successive stages of infant, boy, youth, man, assistant to the official women-cooks, warrior, and peer. The Tuscarora were Iroquoian; but Algonquins (Leni-lenape and Nanticoke) and Siouans (Saponi and Tutelo) were also adopted.

The general character of the Iroquoians has been described in art. HURON; but that their reputed savagery was not inherent in the race is shown by the gentleness of the Tuscarora, who suffered from the whites the cruellest wrongs, perhaps the least of which was the constant kidnapping of both men and women into slavery (Hewitt, *HAI* ii. 843 ff.).

The Iroquoian dwellings were the famous 'long houses,' often over 100 ft. in length, and correspondingly wide, the framework being of poles, which were covered with bark (as was also the roof), usually of the elm. Within, each fireside had its own apartment, curtained off, while through the centre ran a passage for general use (cf. *HAI* i. 555, ii. 61, 126, 128).[1] Among the Tuscarora, however, the round bark lodge was in use (*ib.* ii. 851). In war, body-armour of twined wooden rods or slats was used (W. Hough, in *Rep. U.S. Nat. Mus.* 1893, p. 648 f.), and, besides the ordinary Indian weapons, blow-guns were frequently employed, while, at least among the Erie, poisoned arrows were not unknown.

3. Religion.—The underlying concept of Iroquoian religion is *orenda*, a term which has passed into the vocabulary of comparative religion. *Orenda* is closely analogous to the Polynesian concept of *mana* (*q.v.*), and denotes

'the fictive force, principle, or magic power which was assumed by the inchoate reasoning of primitive man to be inherent in every body and being of nature and in every personified attribute, property, or activity, belonging to each of these and conceived to be the active cause or force, or dynamic energy, involved in every operation or phenomenon of nature, in any manner affecting or controlling the welfare of man. This hypothetic principle was conceived to be immaterial, occult, impersonal, mysterious in mode of action, limited in function and efficiency, and not at all omnipotent, local and not omnipresent, and ever embodied or immanent in some object, although it was believed that it could be transferred, attracted, acquired, increased, suppressed, or enthralled by the orenda of occult ritualistic formulas endowed with more potency' (Hewitt, *HAI* ii. 147).

The object of sacrifice is to secure the exercise, in behalf of the sacrificer, of the *orenda* possessed by worshipful beings; and the phenomena of nature are simply contests between different *orenda*. *Orenda* may be beneficent or maleficent; the beings who use *orenda* for injurious ends are called *otkon*. The chief defence of the individual against the *otkon* is the *oyaron*, or tutelaries, which were also possessed by tribes, clans, and families. The normal mode of acquiring one's *oyaron* is detailed in art. COMMUNION WITH DEITY (American). Like the *orenda*, the *oyaron* differed in potency and in character. Those possessed of powerful and beneficent *oyaron*, and hence controlling similar *orenda*, were the wise men and beneficent magicians, whose *oyaron*-revealed knowledge enabled them to foretell the future, divine remedies for disease, interpret dreams, and, if sufficiently potent, overcome evil *orenda*, *otkon*, and *oyaron*. Those whose *oyaron* were malignant were the evil wizards, who bore the significant name *agotkon* or *hotinatkon* ('he is an *otkon*'), whereas the benignant type was *arendiouanen* ('his *orenda* is powerful'), *saiotkatta* (Huron, 'one who examines another by seeing'), etc. The good will of the *oyaron* must be retained by feasts and sacrifices to keep it in health and strength, or it would turn against its possessor; neither could its dictates, as revealed in dreams, be denied without most serious consequences (for details see *ERE*, vol. vi. p. 885 f.). If the object manifested as the *oyaron* was an animal, its possessor's life was conditioned by that of the living creature in question; but in any case the material creature or object was not the *oyaron* itself, but merely

'its embodiment, the symbol or outward sign of the union subsisting between the soul and its tutelary or guardian genius, through the guidance and potency of which the soul must know and do everything' (Hewitt, *HAI* ii. 178).

[1] As in so many other cosmologies, the earth was female to the Iroquoians.

[2] Hewitt holds (*HAI* ii. 816 f.) that the number of the phratries was based on the dualism of natural sex.

[3] When, in the middle of the 16th cent., the Cayuga of Oneniote became greatly diminished through war with the Huron, they sent to the Mohawk for men to wed their women (W. M. Beauchamp, *HAI* ii. 128; for another explanation see Hewitt, *ib.* 123).

[1] A 'council-house' of the Iroquois is preserved at Portage, N.Y., but, if genuine, is a very recent development, being simply a log-cabin. A similar dilapidated structure exists at Conesus, N.Y., and is claimed to have been the home of an Indian family at the time of Sullivan's destructive invasion in 1779.

The personal *oyaron* was carefully carried by warriors, and thus served as a fetish. A symbol or representation of it was made by the father's clan at the New Year ceremony after the dream of the youth who was to bear it had been properly interpreted. In the *oyaron*-concept lies at least one of the bases of totemism (*q.v.*).

The chief deities of the Iroquois were Teharonhiawagon and Tawiskaron. They were twins, and antagonistic to each other, one being the creator and preserver of life and the other the deadly winter god. They were not, however, gods in the usual sense of the term, but 'man-beings' (*oñgwé'*), and their origin is inseparably connected with the cosmologic myth of the Iroquois.

According to this cosmology, there were three cosmic periods. In the first a race of man-beings—i.e. superior to man in every way, and uncreated and eternal, but in life and customs entirely like the men of earth - dwelt on the farther side of the visible sky. In course of time one of these man-beings died (an event hitherto unknown), and his posthumous daughter, Awĕn'hă'i' ('mature [fertile] flowers *or* earth'), continuing to converse with her dead father, was sent by him to the lodge of her future husband, the chief Haon'hwĕñdjiawă'gi' ('he holds the earth'). After performing an impossible task, her husband directed her to return home, speaking to no one who might address her, even as she had been silent on her way to him. At the bidding of her father, she went back to her husband's lodge. On her first visit she had become pregnant from Haon'hwĕñdjiawă'gi''s breath, but, not knowing this, he suspected her fidelity. She gave birth to a daughter, Gaĕñde'son''k ('gusts of wind'). Later, her husband fell ill of vexation, and, as a result of his dream-feast, the great tree (the only source of light at that time) beside his lodge was uprooted, leaving a vast abyss. Through this he thrust his wife, who fell toward the world, at that time only water. Earth was brought from the bottom of the water by the musk-rat and other animals and placed on the back of the Great Turtle, and water-fowl broke the fall of Awĕn'hă'i'. Her daughter, who had been re-incorporated with her during the fall, was re-born. In like manner, Corn, Tobacco, Deer, Beaver, and other man-beings transferred their kind to earth. Gaĕñde'son''k became pregnant by a man-being, who passed two arrows (one flint-pointed) over her body, and was delivered of twins, one—Teharonhiawagon—being born in the normal way, and the other—Tawiskaron—coming through his mother's armpit and killing her. After the twins grew up, the benevolent plans of Teharonhiawagon, counselled by his father, who had recovered and had set the tree back in place, were exposed to the machinations of his grandmother, who created the sun from Gaĕñde'son''k's head, her body becoming the moon; but they were fixed in position, and began to move only through Teharonhiawagon and his allies, the motive of Awĕn'hăi''s anger being Tawiskaron's false charge that Teharonhiawagon had killed his mother at his birth. Teharonhiawagon created all things for men, and each thing Tawiskaron and his grandmother sought to mar. Thus they imprisoned the beasts in a cave, and, though Teharonhiawagon released nearly all, some were re-imprisoned and became *otkon*. Only after all this did Teharonhiawagon form human beings.[1]

Among the most beneficent exploits of Teharonhiawagon for the welfare of mankind were his victory in the game of bowl and plum-pit (for which see S. Oulin, *21 RBEW* [1907], p. 105 ff.), by which he won the government over all living things, and his conquest of the deformed Hadu'i', the man-being of disease and death, who, to save his life, promised to cure the diseases arising from his infection of the earth, thus giving rise to the society of Mask-faces who, at the New Year ceremony, endeavour to exorcize and expel disease and death (see W. H. Dall, in *3 RBEW* [1884], p. 144 f.).

Among the other divine man-beings were Gaĕñde's (wind), Hodoñni'ă' (Aurora Borealis), Hadawinetha' (fire dragon of storm), Hi'no'' (thunder), Daga'shwine'dă' (spring wind), etc., as well as the man-beings of living creatures of every kind. Mention must also be made of a war-god Aireskoi (Mohawk *Aregwĕns'gwă'*, 'master of war'), to whom the Mohawk offered human sacrifice (cf. also *ERE*, vol. vi. p. 884 f.). Prisoners of war, after being tortured to death, were eaten, at least in part, by the Huron and other Iroquoians, and especially by the Mohawk, whose name (cognate with Narragansett *Mohowaiuck*, 'they eat [animate] things') expressly implies cannibalism, though they termed themselves *Kaniengehaga*, 'people of the flint place.'

In addition to human sacrifices, which might also be offered in honour of the dead—as when the Onondaga Aharihon sacrificed forty men to show his esteem for his brother—many other forms were practised. If war was unsuccessful, the Mohawk offered a bear to the war-god; but the most characteristic Iroquoian sacrifice was that of the white dog, which was the centre of an elaborate ritual performed at the New Year (late in January or early in February).

The object of the whole rite is to fulfil the dream-desire of Teharonhiawagon, and thus to recruit his vigour, that he may prove victorious over Tawiskaron, the god of winter.[1] Before the sacrifice proper, all old fires must be removed and the new fire must be lighted; next comes the 'asperging with ashes' (Huron *aoutaenhrohi*; cf. *ERE*, vol. vi. p. 885), when all pass through the fire to escape fevers and other maladies produced by the fire-god. After the fire-rites, which occupy three days, comes the dream-rite (mistakenly described in the *Jes. Rel.* under the name *ononharoia* [see *ERE*, vol. vi. p. 886ᵃ]), involving a number of minor rites (summarized by Hewitt, *HAI* ii. 942 f.), and also taking three days. The next rite is the strangling of a white dog (formerly partially burned and eaten), which is dressed, adorned, and painted to represent Teharonhiawagon, and, placed standing on the song bench, is addressed with prayer and sacrifice of tobacco. The man-being Teharonhiawagon accepts the victim and the tobacco, but rejects a proffered bow and arrow. Thus the dream-desire of Teharonhiawagon is satisfied. The four or five days following are taken up by the great Feather and Drum dances, the Personal clan chant, and Great Wager (ceremonial game of plum-pits).[2]

The other great Iroquoian festivals are the tapping of the maple tree, maple-gathering, maize-planting, strawberry-gathering, bean-gathering, green-maize feast, and maize-gathering. At the more important of these—White Dog, maize-planting, green-maize, and maize-gathering—confession of sins is one of the chief rites; and all festivals are accompanied by ceremonial games and dances.

Belief in immortality was strong among all Iroquoian peoples (cf. *ERE*, vol. vi. p. 886ᵇ); and they attributed to animals the same intelligence as to men, so that in hunting they killed all game that they could find, lest the survivors should warn their fellows that they were being pursued.

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LOUIS H. GRAY.

IRVING AND THE CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH.—1. Life of Irving.

—Edward Irving was born at Annan, Dumfriesshire, 4th Aug. 1792. His father, Gavin, was a tanner of mode-

[1] Huron cosmology presents a general similarity. For an early account of it see J. de Brébeuf, in P. Le Jeune, *Jes. Rel.* x. 127–129.

[1] The Iroquoian man-beings were subject to destiny, and, as was the case in Egypt, the divine stood in need of human aid (J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikan. Urreligionen*², Basel, 1867, p. 148 f.; Hewitt, *HAI* ii. 939 f.).

[2] The White Dog Sacrifice is of the scapegoat type (J. G. Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, pp. 209 f., 233).

rate substance and local influence; his mother, Mary Lowther, came of a family of 'bonnet lairds' in the adjacent parish of Dornock. He was baptized in the Established Church, which in the west of Scotland was much influenced by traditions of the Covenanters. His education was received at the Academy of his native town under Adam Hope, who also became schoolmaster to Thomas Carlyle, and at Edinburgh University, where he matriculated at the age of thirteen. He gave no early promise of his subsequent career; at school his only distinction was that of an athlete. At the University he graduated M.A. in 1809, and, still undistinguished, entered the Divinity Hall. Thereafter he followed the usual course preparatory to the ministry of the Church of Scotland, supporting himself meanwhile by teaching in the Mathematical School recently established in Haddington. With this work he combined the function of private tutor to the daughter of a medical practitioner in the town, Jane Welsh, the future wife of his friend Carlyle. Two years later, while his University studies were still incomplete, he was appointed to the mastership of another new Academy at Kirkcaldy, Fifeshire. In 1815 he became a Probationer of the Church of Scotland, being licensed to preach by the Presbytery of Kirkcaldy, and for the next three years combined this new office with the work of his school. In 1818 he resigned his mastership and returned to Edinburgh, where he remained until, in the following year, he was appointed assistant to Thomas Chalmers (*q.v.*) at St. John's, Glasgow. The fame of the latter was too great, and Irving's genius was too strongly contrasted with that of his chief, to allow much scope to the younger man, and his work during the next two years, though discharged with uninterrupted loyalty and sufficient credit, was not such as to command the enthusiastic appreciation either of the minister or of the congregation of St. John's, or to attract the notice of those who could further his interests. But his position as assistant to Chalmers was prominent enough to bring him under the notice of the Caledonian Church in Hatton Garden, London, a struggling outpost of the Church of Scotland, the pastorate of which had little to commend it to an ambitious man. In 1822, Irving was appointed to this charge, and at last in his thirtieth year he received ordination from his native Presbytery at Annan.

In less than twelve months his popularity was assured. The incident usually associated with the sudden outburst of the new preacher upon the big world of London was the visit of Canning to the National Scots Church at the instance of his colleague, Sir James Mackintosh, and a subsequent speech in the House of Commons, in the course of which the statesman alluded to the eloquence of the sermon then heard. From this moment Irving was provided with the opportunity best suited to his genius, and his permanent congregation, as it was swelled by the numbers drawn from every religious communion, not least from the Church of England, gradually lost its peculiarly Scottish complexion and took on the characteristics of its leader's expanding thought and feeling. In 1823, Irving issued his first publications, both of which were based on his pulpit discourses, and quickly passed through several editions. The *Orations* were at once recognized as affording examples of a new type of religious address (the title itself was ambitious, though justified by the contents), and exhibit the claim and intention of the author to present divine truth to the public mind in a form alike more comprehensive and more vital than the conventional echoes of a narrow and moribund evangelicalism to which the ear of the church-goer had become accustomed. The *Argument for Judgment to come* foreshadows that prophetical teaching which, together with the exercise of spiritual gifts, constitutes the popular conception of Irvingism. This was followed in two years by *Babylon and Infidelity Foredoomed of God*, a survey of contemporary history in the light of that millennial principle of interpreting Daniel and the Revelation which had begun to be revived among Protestant Christians in the early decades of the 19th cent., and of which Irving's mind proved readily receptive. Another influence, which approached him from a different quarter, was that of S. T. Coleridge, to whom he had been personally introduced in 1823.

The year 1826 is important as that of the first of the Conferences held at Albury Park, Surrey, by invitation of Henry Drummond, M.P., under the presidency of Hugh MacNeil, rector of the parish and subsequently dean of Ripon. Drummond had already been brought into contact with Irving, and, knowing his attitude towards the study of the prophets, offered him a seat at the Conference, in which his eminence soon gave him a leading place. As will be apparent, the Albury Conferences were not the product of Irving's ministry, nor was his London congregation directly concerned in them, though Drummond, by whom they were organized, afterwards became a prominent member of the body associated with his name. The movement represented by them is still active in evangelical circles, and in Irvingism it became a formative principle. The *Morning Watch*, a periodical inaugurated by the Conference, virtually became, before its discontinuance in 1833, the organ of the new community.

In 1827 the church in Regent Square was opened to accommodate the crowds for which the small chapel in Hatton Garden was totally inadequate. The building still stands, but no longer as the National Scots Church. The congregation, which continued to use it after Irving's extrusion, became identified in 1843 with the party of the Scottish Disruption, and is now in communion with the English Presbyterians. It was about this time that Irving became acquainted with John McLeod Campbell of Row, who was beginning to re-state the doctrine of the Atonement on lines similar to those which governed his own theory of the Incarnation. This was developed in three volumes of sermons and a book on the *Last Days*, published in 1828. It would be erroneous to say that the alleged heresies for which the two men were severally deposed from the ministry had a single source in the mind of either. They are to be regarded as parallel developments of a common tendency. It is significant that the General Assembly (1831) which condemned Campbell directed that any attempt on the part of Irving to exercise his ministry in Scotland should be met by the Presbytery concerned with an inquiry into his writings on the Incarnation. It was the sermons published in 1828 that contained the statements which first brought him under the suspicion of having asserted the sinfulness of Christ's humanity. Action had actually been taken the previous year (1830) by the Presbytery of London, from the consequences of which Irving escaped only by the doubtful expedient of claiming exemption from their jurisdiction, alleging that the trust-deeds of the National Scots Church required their minister to be ordained by a Presbytery in Scotland. His position, though anarchical, was practically tenable, because he was unanimously upheld by his own Kirk Session, who in a few months were themselves to invoke the authority of the same Presbytery, when on a grave matter of Church discipline

they found themselves irreconcilably opposed to the pastor whose orthodoxy they had stoutly maintained.

Meanwhile events had taken place in Scotland, destined to precipitate the crisis which in a few years severed Irving from the communion of his native Church. An old friendship existed between himself and Robert Story, minister of Roseneath, which on more than one occasion had brought him to preach on the Gareloch. Here he met Alexander Scott, who, coming to London in the first instance as Irving's assistant, received a call to the Scots congregation at Woolwich, and was in consequence involved before the London Presbytery in a charge of heretical teaching concerning our Lord's human nature. Sharing Irving's view of the Incarnation, he insisted that the exceptional *gifts* of the Spirit, manifested in the Apostolic Church, were a permanent endowment of the Body of Christ, restrained only by the faithlessness of later Christians. This teaching he disseminated, among other places, in his old home in the West of Scotland. At Fernicarry Farm, in Campbell's parish of Row, lived Mary Campbell, a young woman of exceptional piety and unusual personality, who in 1830, while apparently a hopeless invalid, became the subject of spiritual manifestations which her friends claimed as a reappearance of the tongues spoken of in the NT. Shortly afterwards the 'power,' as it came to be called, visited a shipbuilding family at Port Glasgow. James and Margaret Macdonald, brother and sister, spoke in an unknown tongue, and the latter was raised from sickness at the word of the former. James then proceeded to inform Mary Campbell by letter of what had occurred, exhorting her to a similar act of faith, whereupon she too rose from her bed, apparently fully restored to health. From that time she continued, like Margaret Macdonald, to speak with tongues, with which was associated what was claimed as the gift of prophecy. She married, and became a familiar figure among the friends of the new movement as Mrs. Caird. A sympathetic but not unquestioning account of these proceedings has been preserved in the *Memoirs* of Robert Story, published (Cambridge, 1862) by his son Herbert, sometime Principal of Glasgow University. Wide-spread interest in the phenomena arose throughout Scotland. They were investigated by Thomas Erskine of Linlathen, who appears to have acknowledged their genuineness. No money was made out of them, and there is no evidence of imposture. They may, perhaps, be classed and judged with similar manifestations in other parts of Christendom. Irving, predisposed alike by character and antecedents, at once accepted them as a baptism of the Holy Spirit and Fire.

In 1831 the *gifts* of tongues and prophecy appeared in Irving's congregation. Their advent was welcomed by many as a token of the speedy return of the Lord, and by others as a sign of the Spirit's presence and power. But, as in the Corinthian Church, they were also the occasion of disorder and confusion. Irving, who had no natural gift of tongues, was profoundly impressed by the manifestations, and, in spite of the opposition of many of his friends, encouraged the exercise of the gifts in his congregation. Some of the utterances were in languages unknown to the speakers, and were interpreted by others who had the gift of interpretation. Others were in the vernacular, and were addressed to the congregation or to individuals. Irving's own attitude was that of a learner, and he was ready to receive instruction from any member of his congregation who had been favoured with a revelation. Many of the utterances were of a trivial character, and many were tainted with error; but Irving was prepared to accept the bad with the good, and to regard the whole as a divine discipline. Unfortunately, the gifts were not always exercised in accordance with the apostolic rule that the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. Irving's own spirit was subject to the spirits of the prophets, and he was unable to control the disorderly manifestations which were the result. Many of the utterances were of a character which could not be submitted to the judgment of the congregation, and Irving's position was one of extreme difficulty. Many of the utterances were directed towards disease, strikingly allied to that which in later times has become characteristic of Christian Science, began to be assumed by 'the spiritual.' But, if disease was spoken of among them as sin, it was because the Spirit must uphold and consecrate, not negate and annihilate, the flesh. It was, however, the two former gifts that exercised a determining influence on the fortunes of Irving and his people, by being 'called into the church.' Irving claimed to have 'tried the spirits' of the prophets, in right of his ministerial commission as angel or pastor, and, finding them to be true spirits, made provision for the exercise of their function in the Scots Church. This involved scenes of excitement, which, as rumour swiftly spread and curious crowds assembled, degenerated into unseemly confusion. Remonstrance proved unavailing, and, acting on legal advice, the trustees, who as members of the Kirk Session had supported Irving in his repudiation of the London Presbytery, now appealed to it under the trust-deed of the Regent Square Church. The facts were undisputed. The case really turned upon the truth or falsity of the plenary inspiration claimed by the 'gifted,' but implicitly rejected alike by the prosecuting trustees and the Presbytery. The view of the latter was unexpectedly strengthened by the repudiation of their former testimony on the part of one or two of the prophets—notably Robert Baxter, who subsequently published his retractation in a *Narrative of Facts* (London, 1833). But Irving, supported by the majority of the prophets, women as well as men, maintained his conviction, and his defence became an arraignment of his judges. The result, however, was never really doubtful. Such evidence as they could offer was, from the point of view of the court, mere opinion; and no tribunal to which the matter could conceivably have been submitted could have decided that an offence had not been committed against the recognized order of the Church. Accordingly, by direction of the Presbytery, the doors were locked against the minister and the greater part of his miscellaneous congregation, which ultimately found shelter in Newman Street. These proceedings revived the charge of heresy which had already been levelled at Irving, and in 1833 he was formally indicted before the Presbytery of Annan, which had ordained him, and which now deposed him. Though Irving consented to defend his teaching before the Presbytery, he never appealed against the judgment, and accordingly in this year he passed out of the Church of Scotland.

2. The Catholic Apostolic Church.—Henceforward the personality of Irving ceases to be an important factor in the movement, which had already begun to crystallize into a religious society having little affinity with the Presbyterianism amid which it took its rise. Though a congregation of several hundred members or communicants, together with an indefinite number of adherents, migrated with their pastor from Regent Square, the minority that remained were the real representatives of those who had called him to London ten years before. The more influential members of what must now be called the new body were men and women collected from various quarters who had found in Irving a rallying point for association on the basis of millennial expectation and the exercise of spiritual gifts. From the moment that Irving acknowledged the utterances of the prophets as the authoritative voice of the Spirit, his function towards the society practically ceased. Making no claim to exceptional endowments on his own behalf, he became a follower rather than a leader. The new authority, which had begun to emerge in the person of two apostles, who had been appointed by prophecy, already claimed his submission. An alleged prophecy declared that, the Church of Scotland having withdrawn his commission, his position as pastor or angel of the congregation must remain in abeyance unless duly restored by the Spirit. When at length the prophetic voice proclaimed his reinstatement, he was allowed to resume his office only by ordination at the hands of the new apostolate. Soon afterwards another prophetic utterance sent him on a mission to Scotland, and, reaching Glasgow after a circuitous journey through England and Wales, he died in that city on 7th December 1834, and was buried in the crypt of its ancient cathedral.

The religious society thus brought into being still exists, but it has had little or no public

history. Popularly called Irvingite, a name only partially justified by facts, it is officially styled the Catholic Apostolic Church. The name is said to be due, not to arrogant assumption on the part of its members, but to the mistake of a census clerk, who abstracted it from a return, in which a London householder had described himself as belonging to a 'congregation of the Catholic and Apostolic Church worshipping in Newman Street.' Its organization was practically completed when the college of apostles was increased from two to twelve in obedience to a prophetic message. Prophets and evangelists being already in existence, the fourfold ministry was completed by the ordination of pastors and teachers—a local priesthood—consisting, in the case of each congregation, of the bishop or angel (cf. the 'angels of the churches' in the Apocalypse), or chief pastor, with the elders and deacons. The meeting-place in Newman Street has been replaced by a fine Gothic Church in Gordon Square, and there are churches in Edinburgh and other large cities, as well as at Albury. Outside Britain and Germany its extension has been limited. Its forms of worship have been assimilated to those of ancient Christendom, and its ritual is elaborate. It possesses a liturgy constructed for the most part on Eastern models. These changes, which were speedily introduced, may be traced partly to the study of the Apocalypse, partly to the eclecticism of its members. Its ministry has never been professional, being composed for the most part of persons engaged in ordinary occupations. Many of its members were, and still are, actively engaged in public affairs, and as individuals take a prominent part in works of general utility and philanthropy. But in its corporate capacity the community has lived apart, and, except for the sensation caused by the outbreak of the 'gifts,' has neither courted nor received a place in popular consideration. This is the natural consequence of the theory of its origin, which also accounts for its apathy in respect to missionary work. It is due, not to the cooling of its early zeal, but to its expectation of a returning Lord. The appearance of the gifts was regarded as a sign of the approach of the Son of Man. The apostolate was constituted for the 'ingathering of the nations.' Evangelists were at first sent out into the highways; apostolic journeys were undertaken in Europe and elsewhere; but their object was not to propagate the gospel in the spirit and on the method of the great missionary societies, but to bear final testimony before nations and kings to the coming of the Day of the Lord. The witnesses had no zeal for the extension of the Church, but for its preparation as a bride adorned for her husband. They had no special tenets to proclaim as contrasted with the received teaching of Christendom. Their exclusiveness was due not to what they conceived as the false teaching, but to the apathy, of the churches. If they were in a peculiar sense God's people, it was only because they were aroused, expectant, waiting for the final baptism. The new Apostolic ministry, as they conceived it, belonged to the whole Church. Its establishment was not the construction of a new organ of evangelical activity, but the final ordering of the household before the return of the Master. Their testimony given, they were content to wait in spiritual readiness for the rending of the heavens. They became a church within the Church, instituting a rite of 'sealing,' or laying on of hands, by which those who received the witness of the last times were set apart against the final Day of Redemption. But 'the sealed' were not necessarily required to withdraw from the communion of other Churches, and 'Irvingites' have always been found communicating and, it is said, even ministering in other religious bodies. A special affinity with those Churches which retained the order of bishops, successors of the 'angels' who presided over the apostolic churches, has always been recognized, in spite of the fact that Irving himself had been a Presbyterian minister, and that the connexion of his people with the Church of England was only through individuals who had abandoned its ministries. The last of the apostles is now dead, and the church is in process of readjustment to the new conditions created by the lapse of the college.

Difference of opinion regarding the apostolate has led to a division of the Irvingites and to the formation of the 'New Apostolic Church.' The latter body holds that the number of the apostles may be many more than twelve, and traces its origin to Germany, where Irvingism had been introduced in Bavaria by William Caird in 1841, centres being formed at Augsburg, Berlin, Königsberg, and Hamburg. The New Apostolic Church arose from the endeavour of the prophet of the Berlin congregation, Heinrich Geyer, to have new apostles chosen. Excommunicated in 1863, he joined Schwartz, the bishop at Hamburg, and formed the new organization. As in Holland under the direction of Schwartz, so in Germany the new body has discarded much of its elaborate ritual, and lays less stress on the expectation of the speedy Second Advent. Their main centre is Brunswick, where one of their number, F. Krebs, gradually rose to be the 'father of the apostles.' His successor, H. Niehaus, terms himself the 'Stammapostel,' and it is even believed that in the 'Stammapostel' as well as in the other apostles Christ is incarnate. Since the beginning of the new century the New Apostolic Church has suffered the secession of the 'Sceptre of Judah,' which differs little except that it lays still less emphasis on eschatological hopes.

Except for the United States, no exact statistics are available for the Irvingites. They are supposed to number about 5000 in Great Britain and about 20,000 in Germany and Switzerland; the New Apostolic branch estimated their adherents at 70,000 in Europe at the end of 1909. According to the last religious census of the United States (1906), the Catholic Apostolic Church reported 11 organizations, with a membership of 2907 and 14 ministers; the New Apostolic Church, 13 organizations, with a membership of 2020 and 10 ministers. Since the last previous religious census (1890) the Catholic Apostolic Church had increased by 1 organization and 1513 members; the New Apostolic Church was not reported in America in 1890. The main strength of both bodies is in the N. Atlantic States, especially in New York, which has 7 out of the total number of 24 organizations.

3. Criticism.—Our estimate of Irvingism as a religious phenomenon will vary according as we view it in regard to the particular community in which its principles are embodied or to the spiritual movement of the 19th cent., to which it is vitally related. The lancet window above the great preacher's grave has been filled with a figure of John the Baptist 'crying in the wilderness,' and it is probably as a similar voice that his true character is best judged. He is an arresting rather than a constructive power, prophetic of the needs of his time rather than himself supplying them. He was able to recognize, but not to focus and apply, the influences which were destined to recover a fuller Christianity for a widening age.

The limitations of Irving's personality and the isolation of his position will to a large extent explain the abortive character of the movement which bears his name. It cannot be said that its failure to command popular sympathy and to carry

with it the reason and judgment of his contemporaries is itself evidence of error, for this would be true of Christianity itself in its initial stages. But we are justified in pointing out the presumptions against a stable and progressive work which are to be found in the character of Irving's genius. His spiritual greatness varied almost in inverse proportion to his intellectual equipment. Unlike the Tractarians, he had no solid basis of learning upon which to ground his theology. He had a vision of great religious ideas rather than a comprehensive theology. This is the true criticism of his doctrine of the Incarnation. An adequate inheritance of theological thinking would have kept him from those clumsy statements of our Lord's human nature which exposed him to the assaults of a criticism equally ill-equipped. His philosophy was also at fault. While, therefore, he always maintained Christ's immunity from actual sin, he invariably insisted that the humanity which the Son of God assumed was sinful. By this he meant to assert that God became flesh under the conditions which sin had imposed, in order that He might redeem what He took. It is, therefore, the Spirit indwelling 'the creature' which lifts the Body of Christ and all its members above sin. The second proposition, which was the practical conclusion that Irving wished to reach, is genuine Nicene theology, and this a competent theological tribunal ought to have recognized. The imperfection of the first proposition, which really marked a return to a fuller doctrine of the Person of Christ than the formal evangelicalism of his contemporaries, lies in the false psychology, misled by the phrase 'sinful flesh,' which does not predicate sin solely of the will. But in so far as Irving's teaching was a strong assertion of the identification of Christ with human nature as sin has made it, not excluding its guilt, his doctrine cut deeper than that of his accusers. The further criticism, which attempts to find in Irving's error concerning the peccability of Christ's manhood the secret of his attitude towards the spiritual 'gifts,' and to discredit in consequence his whole system, is not consistent with facts. In so far as the expectation which led him to acknowledge claims disallowed by others sprang out of his theology, rather than out of his reading of the NT, it must be attributed to his strong identification of believers with Him who is their 'federal Head.' But this is no more than is involved in the statement of Athanasius, that 'God became Man in order that we might be made divine' (*de Incarn. Verbi*, liv. 3 [*PG* xxv. 192]). This language is admittedly hyperbolical, but it is intended to cover no more than the 'grace of unction,' a phrase by which Hooker, a writer with whom Irving acknowledged his own sympathy, expressed the supernatural powers which human nature received by union with the Godhead in Christ.

Again, the prophetic element in Irving's personality was allowed to dull his intellectual appreciation. He had the Johannine rather than the Pauline temper, but in the form which appears in the Apocalypse rather than in the Fourth Gospel. He was the mystic in fervent action, not in calm contemplation. The procession of events, and not the eternal silence, fascinated him. God was always coming forth out of His place rather than inhabiting eternity. His own impatience of spirit was manifested in his eager desire for speech, and in his readiness to welcome divine events from day to day. This injured his sense of proportion, and led him to give values to occurrences within his own circle which at once endowed them with significance in the march of history. This was the spirit of the ancient prophets with a difference. They saw in their immediate social experience types of God's judgments; Irving saw in the activities of Regent Square forces intimately connected with the shaking of worlds. This want of proportion in the Irvingite movement is one of the features that most readily offer themselves to the critic. If we may not deny that the Spirit manifests Himself in unexpected quarters, and pursues methods that are 'foolishness with men,' we are yet bound to judge a phenomenon in relation to its environment, and to estimate its value in some proportion to its effectiveness.

Closely connected with the foregoing must be noted Irving's lack of humour, which belongs also to the whole movement. He always takes himself very seriously. Every occasion is great, every speech an utterance. His style is stilted, often turgid, never delicate. The world is identified too readily with Babylon. There is none of that shrewd observation of the facts of society which makes the prophet caustic and the seer sympathetic. He does not really know life as he knows his Bible. It follows that he did not know men, still less women. He took every one at his own valuation, mistook cranks for persons of insight, and became the tool of minds smaller than his own. It is a mistake to charge him with conceit. The movement which revolved round him never made him its centre or took the impress of his personality. It claimed to be an outpouring of the Spirit, but never through the medium of himself. No one *e.g.*, has ever ventured to claim for him the position assigned to Montanus in the primitive schism with which Irvingism has often been compared. Irvingites resent being so named, not merely as unchristian, but as wrong in fact. The secondary position which their leader assumed without complaint after his deposition from the Scottish ministry witnesses alike to the sincerity of his aims and the humility of his character. His theology was his own, but the specific millennial expectation and the constructive work, of which the 'gifts' were the instrument, belonged to others. Drummond, Cardale, and their associates, not Irving, were the builders of the 'Catholic Apostolic Church.' Irving had no constructive genius.

His ecclesiastical isolation is another fact to which due weight must be given. In Scotland he could make no headway. With the standards of the Presbyterian Church he was not out of sympathy. On the contrary, his conception of the pastoral office and of sacramental grace conformed more closely to the ideals of the Confession than the theory and practice of most of his contemporaries. But the intellectualism of Scottish Christianity met with an imperfect response in him, and for all his fervour his undisciplined mysticism failed to impress his fellow-countrymen. London emphasized his lonely position. Such support as he might have secured from the fabric of his own national Church was withdrawn, and he was, of course, outside the life and traditions both of the English Church and of English Nonconformity. Thus he became emphatically a *vox clamantis*. What was, in any case, his true function had to be exercised outside the continuous life of an existing society. There was nothing for him to revivify and inspire. He could but make himself the rallying point for units drawn from other religious societies. In this he differed entirely from the Tractarians. Like them, he began with a complete distrust of the progressive liberalism of the 19th century. Like them, he made no attempt to capture the new forces or permeate the new society with Christian principles. But, while the Oxford men threw back their disciples upon the ancient deposit of Christian doctrine and the inherent powers of the Christian community,

Irving exhorted his hearers to prepare themselves for the imminent judgment which awaited the world, and the coming glory which was to descend upon the Church. For him history virtually disappeared, because past and future had alike lost their importance in view of the approaching end of the age. The eclectic Church order, worked out by the miscellaneous group which constituted his 'congregation' after the rupture with the Church of Scotland, made no pretence of continuity with the past, and did not, in one sense, claim to supersede existing ministries. They were not fashioning an instrument for the conversion of mankind; they were simply setting their house in order to wait for the coming King.

There is, however, one criticism often levelled at Irvingism which has no foundation in fact. It is accused of adding to the Christian faith, by supplementing it with a revelation of its own. This is not the case. It does not claim to add anything to the Catholic interpretation of the Person and Work of Christ. Believing themselves to be a part of the universal Church, its adherents claim that, as the Spirit spoke by prophecy in the churches of Antioch and Corinth, so He spoke in their congregation. As Barnabas and Saul were separated for the work of evangelization by the ministry of the prophets, so (they hold) a ministry was set apart for the sealing of believers in the latter day. Our attitude towards such a claim may involve rejection, but not on the ground that it adds to the deposit of faith.

Perhaps the greatest flaw in the movement was its unsympathetic attitude towards the progressive developments of the early 19th century. Its adherents had not the power of discrimination to distinguish between the true and the false elements in the liberalism of the day. They saw in it nothing but the final apostasy, a destructive effort of Satan. In the welter of change they failed to detect the operation of forces directed by the Spirit and prophetic of the Kingdom. In Glasgow, Irving had shown no sympathy with the social schemes of Chalmers, whose experiment was in full operation when he was assistant at St. John's. So far as he was a politician, it was an unbending, almost a reactionary, Toryism that commended itself to his mind and expressed itself in his personality. His leading followers in London were mainly of the same mould. There was no sense of the existence in society of problems with which Christianity was called upon to deal. The ethical, like the missionary, side of religion was insufficiently grasped. In this there is a close parallel to Tractarianism. Reaction was the characteristic of both movements; but Oxford had behind it a great, historic society, belief in which it set out to rekindle, and in consequence its limitations stood to be corrected by the work of other influences, like that of Maurice and Kingsley, and the reassertion of evangelical enthusiasms within the English Church, the whole mingling in a progressive stream, greater than any of its tributaries. Irving met the same situation not with a revival of church consciousness, but with the voice of prophecy, which, for want of the ethical element conspicuous in the Hebrew prophets, quickly degenerated into a narrow and almost mechanical apocalyptic. This may account for the air of inwardness and mystery which has always associated itself with Irvingism, its adherents living in the midst of affairs and directing their conduct according to the accepted standards of the hour, but retiring within the initiated circle to contemplate and interpret life by the aid of a method not intended for the profane eye.

The true significance of Irvingism, as a phenomenon capable of taking its place in the general history of religion, is best reached by regarding it not as a movement resulting in the formation of a little-known institution called the 'Catholic Apostolic Church,' which appears to exercise small influence upon contemporary life and to give no great promise for the future, but as part of those wider changes in religious thought which belong to the 19th century. Irving may be viewed as a pioneer of those developments in religion which were necessary to meet the requirements of the new age. Evangelicalism had become a sentiment and a survival. Its theology was formal and antiquated, its philosophy non-existent. Following on the French Revolution a fresh era of thought had begun for Europe, and Great Britain shared in the new ideas. Physical science was coming into its kingdom. Discovery and invention were introducing a world of new facts, to which men were occupied in readjusting their minds. Christianity, as then commonly understood, was not big enough to deal with the situation. The effective element in the religion of men like Chalmers, when first they went forward to meet the new conditions, was theistic rather than Christian. The reaction, which threw Irving back upon his religion, as though it were an alternative to the ideas of secular progress, was really forging the instrument by which the new synthesis was to be made. This was a larger and more vital conception of the Person of Christ, leading on to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and a more vivid apprehension of the corporate side of Christianity. Irving, who always saw great ideas 'looming through the mist,' taught this doctrine in a fragmentary and imperfect way, exposing himself to an indictment for heresy, but anticipating the work of those whose better theological equipment and securer historical position enabled them to guard and systematize their teaching. The Tractarian school, corrected by the more philosophic and liberal thought of Maurice, on the one hand, and the more scientific Biblical method of Lightfoot and Westcott, on the other, accomplished the work of which Irving's preaching was a premonitory signal. But Irving was also a witness to other sides of Christianity which have since been returning to their place in the scheme of religious thought. It need hardly be said that the formal and ecclesiastical side of the Oxford movement, with its antiquarian tendency and its rigidity of form, was absent from Irving's teaching. He was always evangelical, even if his gospel was more vital and less legal than that of his immediate predecessors. And, amid much that was fantastic in the methods of interpretation current among those millennial Christians to whose speculations Irving lent the authority of his name, he emphasized that expectation of the Second Coming which the study of apocalyptic literature among the scientific theologians and Biblical students of the 20th cent. shows to have been an integral element of apostolic and primitive Christianity, and the recognition of which as the ultimate hope of the Church is necessary to a true estimate of the task which confronts it, as the witness among all nations to a crucified, exalted, and returning Lord.

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containing about 70 works; and a collection of newspaper cuttings relating to Irving and the Catholic Apostolic Church, 1835-1905 (Brit. Mus.); *Bureau of the Census, Special Reports*, 'Religious Bodies, 1906,' Washington, 1910, ii. 179-183.

J. G. SIMPSON.

ISHTAR.—Ishtar was the Babylonian and Assyrian form of the divinity who was worshipped in Canaan as 'Ashtart ('Ashtoreth, Astarte), in Mesopotamia as 'Attar, in Moab as 'Ashtar, in South Arabia as 'Athtar, and in Abyssinia as Astar (see ABYSSINIA, ASHTART, ATARGATIS, SABÆANS).

I. *THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.*—The cult of Ishtar is now known from a multitude of original Bab. and Assyr. records: (1) historical inscriptions of the kings, (2) mythological texts, (3) hymns and prayers, (4) magical texts, (5) omens, (6) boundary stones, and (7) artistic representations in statues, reliefs, seals, etc. (see literature at end of art.).

II. *THE ORIGIN OF ISHTAR.*—In the art. ASHTART the reasons are given for thinking that this goddess was not a creation of the Sumerians, or of the Semitic Babylonians, but a primitive Semitic divinity. She was a personification of the force in nature that showed itself in the giving and the taking of life. As a glossator of Plautus has aptly expressed it (*Mercator*, IV. vi. 825 f.), she was 'Diva Astarte, hominum deorumque vis, vita, salus: rursus eadem quae est pernicies, mors, interitus.' This conception of her character, which is common to all the Semites, was brought into Babylonia by the first Semitic settlers, and formed the basis of the development of the goddess in that land.

III. *THE IDENTIFICATION OF ISHTAR WITH OTHER DIVINITIES.*—The Semites who entered Babylonia found on the ground a number of local goddesses of the aboriginal Sumerian population whom they proceeded to identify with their mother-goddess. These old goddesses eventually disappeared in Ishtar, leaving only their names as titles, and some of their functions as attributes. Some of these absorbed Sumerian goddesses are as follows.

1. **Innanna, or Ishtar of Erech.**—In Sumerian inscriptions of the Old Bab. period the most conspicuous goddess is the one whose name is written with an ideograph which the Assyrians sometimes reproduced as *RI* (R. Brünnow, *A Classified List of Ideographs*, Leyden, 1889, no. 2561), which, according to the syllabaries, is to be read Innanna, Inninna, Nanâ, or Ninni (P. Jensen, *KIB* iii. [1892] 1, 20). The chief seat of her worship was the temple called E-an-na at Erech (*Vorderasiatische Bibliothek*,[1] i. [1907] 1, 192 n.). For her cult in early times see *VAB* i. 1, 265, *s.v.* 'Ninni.' In bilingual texts, syllabaries, and historical inscriptions, Innanna is repeatedly equated with Ishtar (*e.g.*, *Cun. Texts*, xxiv. [1908] pl. 41, line 75; *PSBA* xxxi. [1909] 20, pl. iii. line 8; *Code of Hammurabi*, iv. 60-65). A large number of hymns originally addressed to Innanna are appropriated to Ishtar (*e.g.*, *PSBA* xxxi. 60). For this reason, Ishtar bears the titles 'Queen of Eanna,' 'Queen of the land of Erech' (*loc. cit.*).

2. **Ninâ, or Ishtar of Lagash and Nineveh.**—In the Old Bab. inscriptions the goddess mentioned most frequently after Innanna is the one whose name is written with the ideograph generally read Ninâ (Brünnow, 4800). This sign was used also for a district of Lagash and for the city of Ninâ, or Nineveh. Hence it is inferred that the sign for the goddess and the district of Lagash should also be read Ninâ. It is a plausible conjecture that Nineveh was founded by colonists from Lagash (cf. Gn 10^{11}), and that the patron-goddess of Nineveh was originally the same as the patron-goddess of the old city of Ninâ in Babylonia. In regard to her worship in the Old Bab. period see *VAB* i. 1, 262, *s.v.* 'Ninâ.' Eannatum (*c.* 3200 B.C.) distinguishes Innanna and Ninâ (*VAB* i. 1, 18, 5^{30-34}); so also Gudea (*c.* 2500 B.C. [*ib.* 104. 14^{21-27}]). Hammurabi, on the contrary, calls the goddess of Nineveh Innanna (*Code*, iv. 63), and the Assyrians always call her Ishtar. This shows that Ninâ was early identified with both Innanna and Ishtar (cf. Brünnow, 3050). The earliest Assyr. mention of Ishtar of Nineveh is in a prayer of Ashurnaṣirpal II. (*c.* 1100 B.C.; see literature). From that time onward she is frequently named in the royal inscriptions (see Barton, *Hebraica*, ix. [1892-93] 131-155). Her temple in Nineveh bore the name of E-mash-mash. Hence she is described as 'dwelling in E-mash-mash,' and Nineveh is called 'beloved of Ishtar.'

3. **Anunit, or Ishtar of Akkad.**—The chief goddess of the N. Bab. city called Agade, or Akkad, was Anunit. The name of her temple was E-ul-mash. For her worship in early times see *VAB* i. 1, 242, *s.v.* 'Anunitum'; *Code of Hammurabi*, iii. 54, iv. 47 f. There is no record that the Assyrian kings paid her any special attention, but she was a great favourite with the Neo-Bab. king Nabonidus, who honoured her above all goddesses, and rebuilt her ruined temple at Akkad (*VAB* iv. [1912] 300, *s.v.* 'Anunit'). For her identification with Ishtar see *KIB* iii. 1, 102^{11}; Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.* ii. 111; *PSBA* xxxi. 67; H. Zimmern, *Beiträge*, Leipzig, 1896-1901, p. 11; Barton, *Hebraica*, x. 26; *VAB* iv. 170^{5}, 246^{48}.

4. **Nin-lil, or Ishtar of Nippur.**—The chief god of the earliest Bab. pantheon was En-lil, 'master of the wind,' the patron-deity of Nippur. His consort was Nin-lil, 'mistress of the wind' (see BAAL, vol. ii. p. 295 ff.). She had a temple in Nippur known as E-shu-ib (*VAB* i. 1, 188). Numerous votive inscriptions in her honour from ancient Bab. rulers have been discovered (*ib.* 265, *s.v.* 'Nin-lil'; H. Winckler, *Untersuchungen*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 141).

One of the titles of Nin-lil was Nin-har-sag, 'mistress of the great mountain' (see *ERE* ii. 296). Under this name she was worshipped in the temple of E-me-te-ur-sag at Kish, and in Girsu, a district of Shirpurla (*VAB* i. 1, 264, *s.v.* 'Ninḫarsag'; *Code of Hammurabi*, ii. 59-65).

Still another title of Nin-lil was Nin-maḫ, 'exalted mistress,' or Maḫ, 'exalted' (*VAB* i. 1, 138, 19^{21}, 237 e; Brünnow, 1050, 11008). Under this name she had a temple at Babylon called E-maḫ (*KIB* iii. 1, 150^{45}; *VAB* iv., Index, *s.v.* 'Maḫ, Nin-maḫ'). For the Semitic settlers in Babylonia Nin-lil was the Nin, or 'Mistress,' *par excellence*; hence they called her Bêlit, 'Mistress,' just as they called her husband Bêl (see *ERE* ii. 296; Brünnow, 11046 ff.).

Eannatum (*c.* 3100 B.C.) carefully distinguishes Ninḫarsag, Innanna, and Ninâ (*VAB* i. 1, 18, 5^{48}); so also Ur-Bau (*c.* 2700 B.C. [*VAB* i. 1, 60, 3^{2}]); but Hammurabi (*c.* 1950 B.C.) calls the goddess of Kish Innanna (*Code*, ii. 59-65), and Kurigalzu I. (*c.* 1350 B.C.) gave to Nin-lil of Nippur a tablet that had originally been dedicated to Innanna, which shows that he identified the goddesses (H. V. Hilprecht, *Old Bab. Inscr.*, Philadelphia, 1893, i. 1, nos. 15, 43). The Assyr. kings frequently identify Nin-lil = Bêlit with Ishtar (Brünnow, 11046; *KIB* i. [1889] 28^{34}; Winckler, *Sargon*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 94, xiv. 84; *WAI* ii. [1866] 66, no. 2^{1}; cf. *KIB* ii. [1890] 230^{25-27}, 152^{1}, 220^{92}); and in one copy of a prayer of Ashurbanipal the goddess is called 'Nin-maḫ,' in another 'Ishtar of Babylon' (Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.* i. 418, n. 6).

5. **Zarpanit, or Ishtar of Babylon.**—The consort of Marduk, the chief god of Babylon, was Zarpanit, whose name in Sumer. seems to mean 'silver-shining,' but was popularly interpreted by the Semites as Zer-banit, 'seed-producing,' with allusion to the reproductive function of the goddess.

[1] Hereafter cited as *VAB*.

One of her titles was Erûa, 'pregnant' (C. F. Lehmann, *Shamashshumukin*, Leipzig, 1892, ii. 36). She had a chapel called Kaduglisug in Esagila, the great temple of Marduk (*VAB* iv. 72[45-49]). For references to her cult see L. W. King, *Hammurabi*, London, 1898–1900, no. 101, i. 41, iii. 12; *Code of Hammurabi*, xli. 43, 56; *KIB* iii. 138 f.; Winckler, *Sargon*, i. 180; *KIB* iv. [1896] 307, *s.v.* 'Zarpanit.' When, through the rise of the city of Babylon, Marduk became the chief god of Babylonia, he was identified with Enlil = Bêl, the ancient chief god (*ERE* ii. 296 f.). The logical procedure was then to identify Zarpanit, the wife of Marduk, with Ninlil = Bêlit, the wife of Enlil = Bêl (*VAB* iv. 282[39]; *KIB* ii. 220[26]; J. A. Craig, *Rel. Texts*, Leipzig, 1895, i. pl. 1, obv. 12–25; Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.* i. 536). Accordingly, when in later texts we read of 'Ishtar of Babylon,' we are to understand this of Zarpanit. Herodotus (i. 199) calls Zarpanit Aphrodite.

6. **Ishtar of Ashshur.**—At Ashshur, the capital of the early Assyr. monarchy, an Ishtar was worshipped who was distinguished by the name Ishtar Ashshuritu, or 'Ishtar of Ashshur' (*KIB* i. 4[12], 28[36], 38[35]; L. W. King and E. A. W. Budge, *Annals of the Kings of Assyria*, London, 1902, i. 159; *KIB* 158[68]; *Beitr. Assyr.* ii. [1894] 587, rev. 33–37). The primitive name of Ishtar of Ashshur and the peculiarities of her cult are unknown.

7. **Ishtar of Arbela.**—At Arbela still another Ishtar was worshipped in a temple called E-gashan-kalamma, 'house of the lady of the world' (*PSBA* xxxi. 68). In the inscriptions of the Assyr. kings, from Sennacherib onwards, Ishtar of Nineveh and Ishtar of Arbela are mentioned as though they were separate goddesses (*KIB* ii. 106[51], 124[7], 154[16]). An oracle to Esarhaddon (*WAI* iv. 68, col. iii. 15) begins: 'I am Ishtar of Arbela.' Ashurbanipal distinguished sharply between Ishtar of Nineveh and Ishtar of Arbela, and paid more honour to the latter (*KIB* ii. 178[4-10], 200[95-103], 248–255, 260). Several astrological reports from her temple are known (*WAI* iii. [1870] 51, no. 5 f.). Although she is not mentioned before Sennacherib, it is probable that she was an ancient local divinity of Arbela. The name of the city Arba-ilu suggests either that four divinities were united there or else that the original god was called Arba (cf. Kirjath-Arba' in Palestine). The Sumer. name of her temple E-gashan-kalamma suggests the high antiquity of her cult. The same conclusion is demanded by the words of Ashurbanipal in connexion with the re-building of her temple: 'Whose wall from of old (*ulla* = מִלְּפָנִים) was not built' (*KIB* ii. 260[3]).

8. **Other goddesses identified with Ishtar.**—The minor goddesses of the Old Bab. pantheon came also sooner or later to be identified with Ishtar.

Antu, the consort of Anu, is called Ishtar by Sargon (Winckler, *Sargon*, i. 94[83]), and is equated with Nin-shar and Ishtar by the lists (*Cun. Texts*, xxiv. pl. 1 and 20, lines 15 ff., 22 ff.; *PSBA* xxxi. 21). Damkina, the consort of Ea, is identified with Bêlit = Ishtar by Sargon (*loc. cit.* line 84). Nin-gal, the consort of Sîn, has the attributes of Ishtar in a hymn published by Craig (*Rel. Texts*, ii. pl. 1–2) and translated by Jastrow (*Rel. Bab.* i. 547). Â, the consort of Shamash, seems to have had a similar fate, inasmuch as she early ceased to have any independent importance. Bau was first identified with Gatumdug (*ib.* i. 58–60), then with Gula, and finally with Ishtar (i. 545); and Nin-tu, an ancient goddess of Shirpurla, is equated with Bêlit = Ishtar in *WAI* ii. 55, 16*a*.

Several goddesses are distinguished from Ishtar in the Gilgamesh Epic, but these also are subsequently identified with her. One of these is Nin-sun, the mother of Gilgamesh (*KIB* vi. 145). Sin-gashid of Erech says that she dwells in Eanna, *i.e.* is the same as Nanâ (*VAB* i. 1, 220. xxi). Another such goddess is Ishhara (*KIB* vi. 154). She is distinguished from Ishtar in the curses on the boundary stones (W. J. Hinke, *A New Boundary Stone of Nebuchadrezzar I.*, Philadelphia, 1907, p. 90 *f.*), but is equated with her in a number of later texts (*KAT*[2], 482). This form of Ishtar appears in Egyptian inscriptions as 'A-sa-kh-ira (Ward, *Seal Cylinders*, 258). Still another goddess of the Gilgamesh Epic is Irnini (*KIB* vi. 160). She also is identified with Ishtar in the hymn published by King (*Seven Tablets of Creation*, London, 1902, ii. pl. 75–84) and translated by Jastrow (*Rel. Bab.* ii. 66, 68, 70). In his quest for Eabani, Gilgamesh meets the goddess Siduri (*KIB* vi. 210). Siduri is defined in a vocabulary (*WAI* ii. 32, 27*c d*) as 'maiden,' a title of Ishtar. In an old Bab. fragment of the Gilgamesh Epic (*MVG* vii. [1902] 3) she appears as Sabitu, which Jensen (*KIB* vi. 578 f.) connects with Mt. Sabu or Lebanon. On this hypothesis, Siduri-Sabitu will be the Phœnician 'Ashtart of Gebal. In the magical text *Shurpu*, ii. 172 (Zimmern, *Beiträge*, p. 10), she is called 'Ishtar of wisdom.'

In the period of the first dynasty, when Babylonia was occupied by the Amorites, the West Semitic 'Ashtart became known in Babylonia. In a tablet published in *PSBA* xi. [1889] 174 ff. she is said to be the 'Ishtar of the West.' Her symbol, the *ashera*, or conventional tree, was treated also as a goddess. In a dedicatory inscription for Hammurabi (Winckler, *Forschungen*, Leipzig, 1893, i. 198), Ashratu receives the attributes of Ishtar, and in the Amarna letters the name of the Amorite chieftain Abd-Ashirti is occasionally written with the ideogram for Ishtar (*KAT*[3], 432 *f.*). In the time of the IIIrd dynasty Ishtar was identified with the Kassite goddess Mirizir (Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.* i. 180).

Other goddesses identified with Ishtar are Gushea, a goddess of vegetation (*ib.* i. 535, ii. 67), Mama, or Mami, a mother-goddess (*KAT*[3], 430), Aruru, another mother-goddess (*ib.*), Suh, Sherûa, and Gamlat (Jastrow, *Rel. Bab.* i. 247 *f.*), and Shâla (*ib.* ii. 410). A number of lists have come down to us that are devoted to nothing else than the names and titles of Ishtar. Such are *Cun. Texts*, xii. pl. ii.; xxiv. pl. 1, 20, 41; and the tablet K. 2109, published by Pinches (*PSBA* xxxi. 20 ff.). One of these (*Cun. Texts*, xxiv. pl. 41) reads: 'Zanaru is Ishtar of the lands, Karadun is Ishtar of the strong, Ulsiga is Ishtar of heaven and earth, Tiruru is Ishtar of . . ., Shunnusibi is Ishtar of images, Tibanumma is Ishtar of fetters, Menuannim is Ishtar of lamentation, Labatu is Ishtar of wailing, Alakalki is Ishtar of burning, Kashala is Ishtar of howling.' The other lists are similar, and give us many names of goddesses and temples that are otherwise unknown. The magical texts are fond of invoking Ishtar under a series of names, all of them doubtless once independent goddesses (*e.g.* Zimmern, *Beiträge*, 11). As early as the time of Hammurabi *ishtar* had become the equivalent of *iltu*, 'goddess.' So we read 'the gods and the ishtars,' 'his god and his ishtar,' showing how completely the minor goddesses were identified with the great mother.

9. **The male Ishtar.**—In some parts of the Semitic world, as society passed from the matriarchal to the patriarchal organization, 'Ashtar changed her sex (*ERE* ii. 115 *f.*). The beginnings of a movement in this direction are perhaps to be seen in Babylonia. In Sumer. the word for 'master' is *en* and for 'mistress' *nin*. Gods bear such names as En-lil, En-ki, En-zu, and goddesses such names as Nin-lil, Nin-mah, Nin-sun. Some male deities, however, are called *nin*—*e.g.*, Nin-Girsu, Nin-agal. This seems to indicate that in these instances primitive goddesses have been transformed into gods (*ERE* ii. 295). This tendency is seen in Nanâ, the goddess of Erech.

In an inscription of Lugaltarsi, king of Kish (*c.* 3150 B.C.), Nanâ is apparently addressed as 'king of the lands' (Barton, *JAOS* xxi. 185 ff.; for a different but less natural interpretation see *VAB* i. 1, 160. 3). One of the ancient *patesis* of Susa addresses Innana-erin, or Ishtar of the cedar forest = Irnini (see above, 8), by the title of 'king' (G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, New York and London, 1902, p. 184: *VAB* i. 1, 182*a*; see also A. H. Sayce, *Rel. Egypt and Bab.*, Edinburgh, 1903, p. 337). Whatever tendencies of this sort may have existed among the Sumerians, they exerted no influence upon the Semitic conception of Ishtar. For the Babylonians and Assyrians she remained exclusively feminine. The few passages in which she receives male attributes do not imply that she had changed her sex or was bisexual, but show only a sort of henotheism, in which for the moment she was regarded as the supreme divinity. Thus in the hymn published by Haupt (*Akkad. und sum. Keilschrifttexte*, 126–131; Prince, *JAOS* xxiv. [1903] 103 ff.) Ishtar says (obv. 22–24): 'I am En-lil and I am Nin-lil.' The astrological tablet (*WAI* iii. 53, col. ii.) contains the statement that 'Dilbat (the star of Ishtar) is a female at sunset and becomes a male at sunrise.' A hymn to Ishtar of Nineveh (Craig, *Rel. Texts*, i. pl. 76) reads: 'Like Ashur she is bearded with a beard.' This probably refers merely to the halo, or radiance, that surrounds her star (see Jastrow, *RA* xvii. [1911] 271–298).

IV. *THE CHARACTER OF ISHTAR.*—As a result of the syncretism that has just been described, Ishtar inherited the characteristics of many earlier goddesses; nevertheless, at the end of the process she retained all the traits of the primitive Semitic 'Ashtar.

1. **Water-goddess.**—In *ERE* ii. 116[b] it is shown that the primitive 'Ashtar was closely connected with springs as the source of life in the Arabian desert. This character she retained in Babylonia.

The sign for Ninâ, 'fish-house,' shows that she was originally a water-goddess; and her name Nin-â probably means 'mistress of water.' The same is indicated by the dedication of a spring to her (*VAB* i. 1, 104[19-22]), and a boat (*ib.* 92, 4[3], 104, 14[23]), and by the fact that she was the 'child of Eridu,' *i.e.* the daughter of Ea, the sea-god (*ib.* 110, 20[16]). Offerings of fish were made to her, as also to Innanna (*PSBA* xxvii. 71-79). Ishhara, another form of Ishtar, is often called 'Ishhara of the sea.' Archaic representations of Ninâ, or some other form of Ishtar, on seals show fish and other sea creatures beneath her throne (Ward, p. 155). Similarly fish were sacred to Atargatis, the Syrian 'Ashtar, and sea-water was brought for libations in her temple (*ERE* ii. 166 f.). In a hymn to Ninlil (*JAOS* xxiv. 114) the goddess says: 'At the mountain spring I fill the vessel, at the mountain spring of Dilmun I wash my head.' Ishtar is brought up from Sheol by sprinkling her with the water of life (*KIB* vi. 88[34]).

2. Giver of vegetation.—As the goddess of springs Ishtar was naturally connected with the verdure that they caused.

In a hymn (Reisner, *Hymnen*, no. 56, rev. 49 *f.*) she says: 'In the heavens I take my place and send rain, in the earth I take my place and cause the green to spring forth.' In another hymn (Craig, *Rel. Texts*, i. pl. 15-17) she is called 'Gushea who gives the growth of plants.' In a lament (Haupt, *Akkad. und sum. Keilschrifttexte*, p. 116 *f.*, obv. 6) she is called 'the one who causes verdure to spring forth.' In the Gilgamesh Epic she says to her father Anu: 'I have heaped up grain for mankind, and I have produced fodder for the cattle; if there shall be seven years of famine, I have gathered grain for mankind and have made the fodder great for the cattle.' In this capacity she is the wife, or mother, of Tammuz, the personification of vegetation, who dies in the summer heat and comes to life again with the winter rains (see TAMMUZ). In a lament for Tammuz (*WAI* iv. 30, no. 2, lines 36-38) we read: 'He has gone, he has gone to the bosom of the earth, and the dead are numerous in the land. . . . How long shall the springing of verdure be restrained? How long shall the putting forth of leaves be held back?' To bring him back to life Ishtar descends to Sheol (*KIB* vi. 80-91). Dumu-zi, or Tammuz, appears as the husband of Innanna in the earliest Bab. inscriptions (see *VAB* i. 1, 246, *s.v.*). As the goddess of verdure Ishtar bears the title Urkittu, which is probably derived from *urku*, 'green,' rather than from Uruk, 'Erech' (Jastrow, i. 443, n. 6). She is also called 'queen of the dust, mistress of the field.' The *ashera*, or post, that was sacred to Ishtar seems to have been a conventional representation of a living tree. According to Hommel, the sign for Nana-Ishtar (Brünnow, 148) in its archaic form was a picture of an *ashera* (*ExpT* xi. [1900] 190). On ancient seals a seated goddess is represented holding sheaves of grain (Ward, pp. 133-137). This represents one of the forms of Ishtar, perhaps Bau-Gula.

3. Creatress of animals.—In an amulet published in *Mitt. der deut. Orient-Gesellsch.*, no. 9 (1901), p. 13, and translated by Jastrow (i. 335 ff.), Ishtar is called 'creatress of the creatures.' In a hymn (Haupt, *Akkad. und sum. Keilschrifttexte*, p. 116 *f.*, obv. 8) she is termed 'creatress of all things.' This is doubtless the reason why in the park of Atargatis at Hierapolis all sorts of wild animals roamed freely (Lucian, *de Dea Syr.* 28 *f.*, 39 ff.).

In particular, Ishtar was the giver of the increase of the flocks and the herds. She promised Gilgamesh that, if he would love her, his sheep and his cattle should bear twins (*KIB* vi. 163[18]); cf. the Hebrew usage of calling the young of the flock *'ashtᵉrôth* (Dt 7[13] 28[4. 18. 51]). On account of this connexion with the herds Ishtar herself received the attributes of a cow. In Old Bab. art she is frequently represented with horns. As Ninharsag she has the same horned head-dress as the Egyptian cow-goddess Hathor (Ward, p. 404). On the boundary stones her symbol is the cow. When the early kings say that they are 'nourished with holy milk by Ninharsag,' this may refer to her character as a cow-goddess not less than as a mother-goddess (Boissier, *OLZ* xi. col. 235, 551). As late as the time of Ashurbanipal, Ishtar of Arbela says to the king: 'Of the four udders that are put to thy mouth two shall suckle thee, and with two thou shalt cover thy face' (Jastrow, i. 444). With this aspect of Ishtar should be compared the Palestinian 'Ashtaroth-Karnaim, or two-horned 'Ashtarts, and the horned 'Ashtarts on the plaques discovered in the mounds of Canaan (*ERE* iii. 182). A figure from the Merrill Collection in the Semitic Museum of Harvard University shows a naked woman with rays round her head and a crescent under her feet, with one foot like a fish's tail, and the other like the hoof of a cow or sheep (*BW* xvii. [1901] 447). Beneath it is the inscription in Greek: 'Divine producer of all.' It is doubtless one of the forms of the Palestinian 'Ashtart. Among birds the dove was specially sacred to her, probably on account of its erotic temperament. It is figured with her on seals (Ward, figs. 924, 926, 927). An image of a dove was also found in the temple of Ninmah at Babylon (*Mitt. der deut. Or.-Gesellsch.*, no. 5 [1900], p. 3). Similarly doves were sacred to Atargatis (*ERE* ii. 166 *f.*), and the swallow is mentioned as a sacred bird of Ishtar (*KAT*[3], 481).

4. Goddess of sexual love.—Ishtar herself was conceived as unrestrained in her passion for her lovers. In the Gilgamesh Epic, Gilgamesh reproaches her for her fickleness. First she loved Tammuz, then a bird, then a lion, then a horse, then a shepherd, then a gardener, and finally himself (*KIB* vi. 168-171).

In a hymn she is entitled 'the glad-eyed, goddess of desire, goddess of sighing' (*PSBA* xxxi. 22). In another hymn she is called 'amorous mother-goddess at whose side no god draweth near' (S. H. Langdon, *Psalms*, Paris, 1909, p. 257). In one hymn she says of herself: 'Beside the wine when I seat myself, the woman for the devoted man am I' (*AJSL* xxii. [1906] 149). In the same context she even calls herself 'a loving courtesan' and a 'temple-harlot' (*ib.* 149, 150). In this aspect she was depicted in art as a naked woman with emphasized sexual features (Ward, pp. 161 *f.*, 380), or as lifting her robe to disclose her charms (*ib.* pp. 206, 387). She was the awakener of sexual impulse in animals and in men. In a hymn she says: 'I turn the male to the female, I turn the female to the male; I am she who adorneth the male for the female, I am she who adorneth the female for the male' (*PSBA* xxxi. 84). She caused the union of male and female (*JAOS* xxiv. 115). When she descended to Sheol, copulation ceased in men and animals (*KIB* vi. 86 *f.*). For this reason prostitutes were attached to her temples. Such a woman was called *ishtaritu* after the goddess herself; or *qadishtu*, 'sacred,' the same as *qᵉdhêshâ* in the OT, apparently originally a title of the goddess herself; or *ḥarimtu* from the root *ḥaram*, 'devote'; or *shamḥatu*, 'joy-maiden'; or *kiritu*, 'harlot.' One of these from the temple in Erech was sent to ensnare Eabani (*KIB* vi. 122-127). After Gilgamesh had slain the heavenly bull, Ishtar gathered the harlots, the joy-maidens, and the *hierodouloi* to lament (*KIB* vi. 177). In the Ira myth Erech is called 'the dwelling of Anu and Ishtar, the city of harlots, joy-maidens, and hierodules' (*ib.* 62). An omen is interpreted as meaning: 'The divine mistress will cause to bear her maidens who have not become pregnant' (Jastrow, ii. 387). The *Code of Ḫammurabi* contains many provisions in regard to these women (see Lyon, 'The Consecrated Women of the Hammurabi Code,' in *Studies presented to C. H. Toy*, New York, 1912, pp. 341-360). For evidence of prostitution in her cult in later times see ASHTART, vol. ii. p. 116[a], and HIERODOULOI (Semitic and Egyptian), vol. vi. pp. 672-676.

5. Goddess of wedlock.—The ideograph *nin-dingir-ra* (Brünnow, 10999), or *bêlit-ilâni*, 'mistress of the gods,' is also used for *ḥirtu*, 'wife,' which shows that Ishtar was regarded as the 'wife' *par excellence*.

In a hymn she is called 'bride of Esagila and Ezida' (Jastrow, i. 533). In another hymn she is termed 'bride of the lands whose fulness is luxuriance' (*PSBA* xxxi. 68). Ishtar is called the bride, or the wife, of nearly every god of the Bab. pantheon. Still more strangely, the early kings designate themselves her husband—*e.g.*, Eannatum (*VAB* i. 1, 18), Ur-Ninib (*ib.* 204), Pur-Sin (*ib.* 204), Gimil-Sin (*ib.* 200). As a bride Ishtar is described in poetry and represented in art as veiled (cf. Gn 24[65]: Jeremias, *AT im Lichte des alt. Orients*[2], p. 108 *f.*; *KIB* vi. 210[8]). In this capacity she was prayed to bless wedded love. One such prayer has come down to us (*PSBA* xxxi. 66) in which a woman entreats Ishtar that her absent husband, or lover, may return safely, that he may continue to love her, and that she may bear children.

6. Goddess of maternity.—As Ninharsag, or Ninlil, she was the 'mother of the gods' (*VAB* i. 1, 60. 3[8], 150. 3[1]; and frequently in the later literature). She was also the 'mother of men.'

Gudea calls her 'mother of the children of the city' (*ib.* 66). Samsuiluna calls her 'the mother who bare me' (Winckler, *Untersuchungen*, p. 141). A personal name of the Ḥammurabi period is Ishtar-ummiya, 'Ishtar is my mother' (Jastrow, i. 160). As Aruru, Ishtar made Eabani of clay (*KIB* vi. 121), and created all men and animals (*ib.* 40). Sargon speaks of Bêlit-ilâni = Ishtar as the one 'who increases the offspring' (Jastrow, i. 246). In the hymns she is frequently described as 'creatress of mankind, who causeth all created things to flourish.' She is identified with Erôa, the goddess of pregnancy (*ib.* i. 116). In a prayer she is called 'she who loveth reproduction' (*PSBA* xxxi. 68). In a list of titles she is termed 'opener of the loins, framer of the fœtus' (*ib.* 21). Herodotus states (i. 199) that at Babylon she was called Mylitta, *i.e.* Mu'allidtu, 'she who causes to bear.' Under the name Mama, she caused the birth of second children (*JAOS* xxxii. 22). In art, Ishtar was most frequently represented as a mother suckling a child (Jeremias, *AT im Lichte*, p. 107; Ward, pp. 152-154, 375).

As a mother Ishtar was believed to love mankind and to grieve over their sorrows. At the deluge she cried like a woman in travail over the loath of the children that she had borne (*KIB* vi. 238). Several laments have been preserved in which she bewails the destruction of her city Erech by the Elamites (see literature). In a hymn she is described as 'she who loveth all men' (*PSBA* xxxi. 63). Another hymn says: 'Thou lookest mercifully upon the sinner, and thou correctest the wrong-doer daily' (Jastrow, ii. 67). Still another hymn calls her 'the mistress of heaven

and earth, who hears prayers, who listens to complaints, who receives petitions, the compassionate goddess, who loves righteousness' (*ib.* ii. 112).

7. Giver of earthly blessings.—On account of her mother-love for men she bestowed life, health, prosperity, and all other blessings upon them.

Gudea speaks of her 'life-giving glance' (*VAB* i. 1, 75). Kudur-mabuk says that she gave him a prosperous reign (*ib.* 220); Arad-Sin declares that she gave him long life (*ib.* 214). Sargon says that she caused the inhabitants of the land to prosper (Winckler, *Sargon*, i. 94[32]); and Nebuchadrezzar affirms that she gives him length of days (*VAB* iv. 170[6]). An old hymn to Nanâ that has been adapted to Ishtar says: 'She gives prosperity to the man with whom she is pleased (?), she guards his path. . . . The physician is skilful with whom she is pleased (?). Her hand is with the manservant and the maidservant. Who can do anything without her?' (Jastrow, i. 533). Another hymn calls her 'Ishtar, without whom none possesses peace and joy' (*ib.* i. 347).

She was regarded as the mistress of magical arts with which she counteracted the wiles of the demons (Zimmern, *Beiträge*, p. 33; *AJSL* xxiii. 151). Accordingly, she is constantly invoked as a helper in the magical exorcisms (Jastrow, i. 82, 290, 292, 300, 315, 321). Especially is she a helper against the demon Ti'u (*ib.* 347), and against 'the wicked seven' (*ib.* 361 ff.).

On account of her good-will and her power, prayers were addressed to her more frequently than to any other deity. Ashurbanipal prayed her for long life for himself and his brother (Lehmann, *Shamashshumukin*, pl. xxiii.–xxiv.). Nebuchadrezzar prayed Ishtar, or Ninmah, for long life, posterity, victory, and success. A large number of prayers and penitential psalms to Ishtar were found in the library of Ashurbanipal (see literature; Jastrow, ch. xvii. f.). These breathe a noble ethical and religious spirit, and are among the finest products of the Bab. religion. In one of them the poet expresses the joy of serving his goddess in the words: 'Her song is sweeter than honey and wine, sweeter than sprouts and herbs, superior indeed to pure cream' (cf. Ps 19[10]). In many of the prayers Ishtar is asked to intercede with her father Sin, or with some other god, on behalf of the suppliant.

8. Moral governor of men.—As the mother of men, who loved them and cared for their well-being, she was naturally concerned with the establishing of law and order.

She was 'queen of all dwelling-places,' 'imparting all laws, wearing the ruler's crown,' 'who executes judgment and decision,' 'leader of mankind' (King, *Seven Tablets*, i. 222 *f.*), 'mistress of mankind' (Jastrow, ii. 75), 'creatress of wisdom' (*KAT*[3], 426), 'opposed to all disorder' (Jastrow, ii. 112), 'mistress of justice' (*ib.* 201). In a hymn she says: 'In the dispute when I take part, the woman who understands *pîltum* am I. In the lawsuit when I take part, the woman who understands law am I' (*AJSL* xxiii. 140). Like Shamash, she was the judge of men (Jastrow, i. 535). As the ruler of the world, she appointed kings to execute justice. The Old Bab. kings all acknowledge that she has called them to the throne (*VAB* i. 1, 10. 5[24], 18. 5[50], 20. 2[5], 26g. 17, 66b. 2[11], 146. 17a; *Code of Hammurabi*, v. 13). Nebuchadrezzar says that 'Anunit called his name to the sovereignty of the land, and placed in his hand the sceptre over all peoples' (*VAB* iv. 248[25]).

9. Giver of revelations.—In her care for men, it became necessary for Ishtar at times to make special communications of her will. Gudea calls her 'the child of Eridu, who counsels what is best, queenly interpreter of the gods' (*VAB* i. 1, 90. 2[16]). He says also that 'she directed her attention to the oracles' (*ib.* 110. 20[16]). Rim-Sin calls her 'revealer of all decisions, who causes the oracles of the land to remain' (*ib.* 218e).

Through an association of ideas with verdure, green colour in liquids, green plants, insects, and birds were regarded as omens sent by her (Jastrow, ii. 722, 802). Many omens derived from the livers of victims were connected with her (*ib.* 236, 261, 287, 409 *f.*). She also inspired prophets to deliver her message. In a prayer of Ashurnasirpal (*ib.* 113) the king prays: 'Grant me a trustworthy oracle.' Similarly, Sennacherib asks Ishtar of Nineveh and Ishtar of Arbela for direction (*KIB* ii. 107). A series of responses of Ishtar of Arbela to Esarhaddon is known (Banks, *AJSL* xiv. [1898] 267–277), also a series of responses to Ashurbanipal (Craig, *Rel. Texts*, i. 26–27). She predicted to the latter the death of the king of Mannai (*KIB* ii. 178[6]). She sent a dream to encourage the troops who were afraid to cross a river (*ib.* 200[97-101]). She appeared in a vision to a seer promising victory over Elam (*ib.* 250[50-76]). She commanded Ashurbanipal through an oracle to bring back her image from Elam (*ib.* 210[113-118]). For a full discussion of this subject see Jastrow, ch. xix.

10. Destroyer of life.—In striking contrast to the life-giving beneficent character of the goddess that has been exhibited thus far stands her other aspect as a destroyer of life. From the earliest times it must have been observed that life and death were only two aspects of the same force, and that love was the frequent cause of jealousy, hatred, and strife.

For Tammuz, the lover of her youth, she appointed yearly death (*KIB* vi. 168). With him died the vegetation that she had called into life. On his account she herself had to descend into Sheol, and be afflicted there with all the diseases (*ib.* 80–91). Hammurabi (*Code*, ii. 26 ff.) says that he 'decked with green the sepulchre of Malkat (the queen) of Sippar.' The sufferings that she endured she also inflicted upon men. Eabani she smote with disease and death (*KIB* vi. 198). She sent the heavenly bull to destroy Gilgamesh (*ib.* 172). Men prayed to her as the cause of sickness and suffering. One lament says: 'In thy descent to the house of a man, thou art as the jackal which hath been caused to come to take the sheep, thou art the lion which constantly cometh into the midst' (*PSBA* xxxi. 59). When she was angry, she sent a wicked demon called Dibu or Ti'u to afflict men (Jastrow, i. 341 ff.). A configuration known as 'the hand of Ishtar' in a liver denoted the death of a son of the family (*ib.* ii. 400). A class of priests endured castration in her service, 'whose manhood, in order to terrify the people, Ishtar turned to womanhood' (*KIB* vi. 62[10]). These were evidently similar to the Galli of Atargatis (*ERE* ii. 166 *f.*) and to the *qedhâshîm* and *kelabhîm* of the OT.

11. Storm-goddess.—Either as a destroyer or as a sender of rain, Ishtar was occasionally described as a storm-goddess. She was 'the lofty one who causes the heavens to tremble, the earth to quake, the flaming fire, who causes the bird-like Zu (the storm cloud) to fly from the house, who casts down the mountains like dead bodies' (*AJSL* xxiii. [1907] 150 f., 164 f.). In her character as storm-goddess she waged war with the gods of the mountains (*JAOS* xxiv. 114). In art she was often represented holding a caduceus of two serpents (Ward, pp. 155, 405, 408). This is apparently a symbol of the lightning.

12. War-goddess.—The primitive Semitic mother was the leader of her clan in war, and therefore from the earliest times Ishtar was a war-goddess (*ERE* ii. 118[b]).

She promised Gilgamesh victory over all lands (*KIB* vi. 166[16]). She brought the Elamites upon her city of Erech (*ib.* 272). Ennatum speaks of casting the net of Ninharsag over the people of Gishbu (*VAB* i. 1, 14. 17[19]). Gudea dedicated weapon-bearers, warriors, to Innanna (*ib.* 104. 14[24-26]). Hammurabi says that he conquered with the powerful weapon that Nanâ entrusted to him (*Code*, xl. 24). In a votive tablet for Hammurabi it is said: 'Ishtar has given thee conflict and battle; what more canst thou hope?' (Jastrow, i. 398). Agumkakrime calls himself 'mighty hero of Ishtar, the warrior-goddess' (*KIB* iii. 135). Nebuchadrezzar i. says that 'at the command of Ishtar and Adad, the gods of war,' he defeated the Elamites (*ib.* 160[40]). In the inscriptions of the Assyr. kings, Ishtar appears chiefly as a war-goddess. Tiglath Pileser i. calls her 'the exalted among the gods, mistress of warfare, the arranger of battle' (*ib.* i. 10[13]). Ashurnasirpal ii. says that 'she set her heart upon the making of battle and war' (*ib.* i. 58[38]). He first applies to her the title 'Queen of Kitmuru,' *i.e.* 'Queen of Conflict' (Jastrow, i. 215, 243, 249). Shalmaneser ii. calls her 'the first born of heaven and earth, who is perfect in bravery, who establishes the fates, who enlarges my kingdom' (*KIB* i. 130[13]), 'queen of fight and battle' (*ib.* 152[5]). Sennacherib says: 'I prayed unto . . . Ishtar of Nineveh, Ishtar of Arbela, the gods whom I trust, for the capture of my mighty foes.' When menaced by the united forces of the Babylonians and Elamites, he prayed 'to Ishtar of Nineveh, Ishtar of Arbela, the gods whom I trust, for victory over the mighty enemy' (*ib.* ii. 106[59-64]). Esarhaddon says: 'in the help of . . . Ishtar of Nineveh, Ishtar of Arbela, the great goddesses, my mistresses, I ruled from the east to the west and found no rival' (*ib.* ii. 124[7-9]). For Ishtar's part in Ashurbanipal's campaigns see above under 9. All her oracles were given to assist him in his wars. When she appeared to his seer, she appeared full-armed in flame (*ib.* ii. 250[52-55]). Nabonidus calls her 'Anunit, the mistress of battle, who carries bow and quiver . . . who overwhelms the enemy, destroys the wicked' (*VAB* iv. 228[23-24]). The warlike character of Ishtar is greatly emphasized in the hymns. One meets such titles as 'warlike daughter of Sin,' 'leader in battle,' 'mistress of battle,' 'perfect in courage,' 'goddess of heroes,' 'sharp dagger,' 'destroyer of the land,' 'mistress of countries.' In one hymn she says: 'Beside my father in battle I take my place; beside Bêl in combat and

battle I stand. During battle thread I weave, with the spindle I spin. Into battle like a swallow I fly' (Reisner, *Hymnen*, no. 56, rev. 39 ff.). This reminds one of Atargatis at Hierapolis who carried a distaff (Lucian, *de Dea Syr.* 32?), and also of the Greek Parcæ. At the beginning of another hymn (Craig, *Rel. Texts*, i. pl. 54–55) she is described as marching to battle accompanied by musicians, who through their songs seek to win her favour. Because of her warlike character she is often compared to a lion, a jackal, an angry wild ox, and other animals. Ishtar as a war-goddess is identified in art by the relief of Anubanini, which shows her armed with clubs, leading prisoners by a cord passed through the lips (Ward, fig. 413). In Old Bab. art she is represented seated, armed with clubs and scimitars. In Assyr. art she is depicted standing, armed with bow, arrows, and quiver (Ward, ch. xxv.). Closely akin to the war-goddess was Ishtar's function as a goddess of hunting. The inscriptions *WAI* i. 7 = Delitzsch, *Assyr. Lesestücke*[3], p. 121, represent Ashurbanipal pouring libations over dead lions, and are accompanied with an ascription of praise to Ishtar.

13. **The planet Venus.**—Utterly unrelated to the characteristics that have been considered thus far was the identification of Ishtar with the planet Venus. There is no trace of this among the other Semites, except in late times and under evident Bab. influence (see *ERE* ii. 116). Even in Babylonia this astral character cannot be traced back into the Old Bab. period. It is improbable, therefore, that it was primitive Semitic (against D. Nielsen, *ZDMG* lxvi. 469–472). No certain evidence of the identification of Ishtar with the planet Venus is found before the time of Ḫammurabi.

Gudea (c. 2500 B.C.) says that he dedicated a disk to Innanna (*VAB* i. 1, 104. 142?), but it is not clear that this was a star-emblem; the usual star-emblems had rays. Kudurmabuk (c. 2000 B.C.) speaks of Nanâ, the mistress, who is like the sky in gleaming splendour (*ib.* 220 f.), but this also is not certainly astral. On boundary stones of the Cassite dynasty, as early as the middle of the 14th cent. B.C., the four- to eight-pointed star is the established emblem of Ishtar (Hinke, *Boundary Stone of Neb. I.*, 245). In seal-cylinders of the same period Ishtar is accompanied with a star (Ward, ch. xxv.). In one of these (Ward, fig. 412) she is represented with wings, rising above the mountains along with the sun. As early as the time of Ḫammurabi, Ishtar seems to have formed a triad with Sin, the moon, and Shamash, the sun—which implies her astral character (Jastrow, i. 153). The fact that Marduk, the chief god of Babylon, is identified with the planet Jupiter, and Nebo, the god of the adjacent Borsippa, with Mercury, indicates that the identification of the great gods with planets did not arise before the unification of Babylonia by Ḫammurabi. It was part of the system of religious syncretism by which this monarch sought to consolidate his empire. The arithmetical sign XV for Ishtar, which is connected with her astral character (the sign for Sin is XXX), makes its first appearance in the period of Ḫammurabi. As to the reason why Ishtar was identified with Venus, one can only conjecture that it may have been the beauty of the planet, or its alternation as morning and evening star, that suggested a connexion with the life-giving and destroying functions of the goddess. Possibly the fact that Ishtar was the daughter of Sin, the moon, as early as Arad-Sin, led to her identification with the planet.

The identity of Venus as morning star with Venus as evening star was known in the Assyr. period, and probably much earlier. There are numerous official reports of the astrologers that speak of Ishtar as morning and evening star (Jastrow, ii. 612). In a hymn she says: 'Ishtar, the goddess of the morning, and Ishtar, the goddess of the evening, am I' (*ib.* i. 531). Nabonidus calls her 'Anunit, who at sunrise and sunset gives me favourable signs' (*VAB* iv. 228[36], 229[38-42]). As the morning star she was called Dilbat, and as the evening star Zib (P. C. A. Jensen, *Kosmologie*, Strassburg, 1890, p. 117 f.). The difference of names shows that in early times the two aspects of the planet were supposed to be different stars, but the list *WAI* ii. 48, line 51*a b*, asserts 'Zib = Dilbat.'

These aspects of the planet gave rise to a variety of titles and identifications. Thus the list *WAI* iii. 53, col. ii. line 36 reads: 'Dilbat at sunrise is Ishtar of Agade, Dilbat at sunset is Ishtar of Erech, Dilbat at sunrise is Ishtar of the stars, Dilbat at sunset is Mistress of the Gods' (*i.e.* Ninlil). See also the list of names of Venus published by Pinches (*PSBA* xxxi. 25). There seems to be evidence also that the synodical period of Venus of 584 days was known in Babylonia and Elam (F. Bork, *Memnon*, iv. [1910] 83–105; E. Weidner, *ib.* v. [1911] 29–39; F. Hrozny, *ib.* v. 81–102).

The claim has often been made that in the clear atmosphere of Babylonia the phases of Venus, which resemble those of the moon, could be seen with the naked eye, and that this is the reason why she is called 'daughter of Sin,' is represented with horns in art, and in certain texts bears the epithet 'horned' (*PSBA* xxxi. 22–24). This is very doubtful.

At the time of greatest brilliancy Venus has a diameter of only 40″. Two points must be about 60″ apart to be recognized as distinct by the naked eye; and at least four such points are needed to perceive a crescent. It seems, therefore, physiologically impossible for the naked eye to detect the crescent form of Venus, and we have no evidence that the Babylonians possessed lenses. The horns of Ishtar are, accordingly, to be connected with her aspect as a cow-goddess rather than as a planet, and she is called the daughter of Sin because she appears in the sky with him, and not because she has similar phases.

In astrology, Ishtar plays an important part along with Shamash and Sin. The omens that have come down to us all date from a late period. A number of these are published by C. Virolleaud, *L'Astrologie chaldéenne*, Paris, 1903–12, 'Istar,' no. 13; R. C. Thompson, *Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers*, London, 1900, ii. p. lxix f.; Jastrow, ii. 612–638. They are of the following type: 'When Venus disappears at sunrise in Nisan from the first to the thirtieth day, there will be desolation.' 'When, in the month of Nisan, Venus has a beard, the inhabitants of the land will bear boys. In that year the market-price will be low.' In the magical texts also Ishtar is invoked under the name 'Ishtar of the stars.'

The astral character of the goddess finds frequent expression in the hymns. She is called 'the light of heaven and earth,' 'flaming torch of heaven and earth,' 'glory of the whole world,' 'queen of the stars,' 'queen of heaven,' 'the perfect, mighty light,' 'brilliant Ishtar who illumines the evening.' In a hymn published by Prince (*JAOS* xxx. [1909] 96) the poet says: 'With her gracious aspect Ninâ speaketh. In her gracious rising verily she shineth forth; where she waxeth full, her procreative power is mighty of aspect.' In another hymn published by Reisner (*Hymnen*, no. 53, pp. 96–99) and translated by M. I. Hussey (*AJSL* xxiii. [1907] 172 f.), Ishtar says: 'To give portents in fulness I stand, consummate I stand. Beside my father Sin, to give portents in fulness I stand, consummate I stand. Beside my brother Shamash, to give portents in fulness I stand, consummate I stand. As for me my father Nannaru (the moon) has established me . . . in the bright heavens. . . . Amid shouts of joy I, Ishtar, the goddess, take my exalted way. Ishtar, goddess of the evening, am I; Ishtar, goddess of the morning, am I; Ishtar who opens the lock of the bright heavens, that is my glory.'

14. **The star Sirius.**—Less frequently Ishtar is identified with the Bow-star, or Sirius (Jensen, *Kosmologie*, pp. 52 f., 149, 151). This is probably due to the fact that the Assyrians usually depicted Ishtar armed with a bow.

15. **The constellation Virgo.**—It is probable that Ishtar is occasionally identified with the zodiacal constellation Virgo (Zimmern, *KAT*[3], 427 f.). These different identifications show that her astral character is secondary, and rests upon late priestly speculation.

From the foregoing survey it appears that Ishtar was the most important divinity of the Assyr.-Bab. pantheon. She absorbed so many other goddesses, and exercised such a variety of functions, that she came near to being the supreme divinity. Many hymns addressed to her disclose a henotheism that approximates to monotheism.

V. *THE CULT OF ISHTAR.*—In regard to the rites that were practised in the worship of Ishtar our information is less complete than in regard to the conception of her character. We know that temples were built to her in all the important cities of Babylonia and Assyria. These contained images (King, *Ḫammurabi*, no. 101, col. i. 41; *KIB* iii. 138[9-22]; *ib.* ii. 209[107-134]). The costume worn by the goddess may be inferred from the artistic representations and from the articles of dress that she left behind when she went down to Sheol (*KIB* vi. 82–84): tiara, earrings, necklace, pectoral, girdle, bracelets, anklets, and tunic. Agumkakrime expended four talents of gold on

the robes of Marduk and Zarpanit (*KIB* iii. 140[28-34]). She had a throne (*VAB* i. 1, 227), a bed (*ib.* 230[12]), and a boat (*ib.* 92, 104, 229[4]). Her priests are often mentioned, and the hierodouloi have been referred to above (IV. 4).

Slaves were dedicated to her temples (*OLZ* xii. 110). The ancient kings record with special frequency that they made her offerings of lapis lazuli. Sargon states that he gave her cedar, and cypress wood, and aromatic herbs (Winckler, *Sargon*, i. 126[143]). Nebuchadrezzar gives a long list of the offerings of animals, birds, fish, vegetables, wine, and oil that he presented to Marduk and Zarpanit (*VAB* iv. 154[35-57]). For the offerings made by Esarhaddon see Jastrow, ii. 170, and for those of Ashurbanipal, *ib.* ii. 107 ff. In one psalm the offerer says: 'I have given to thee thy great gift, a *salla* (=*pudendum muliebre*) of lapis lazuli, and a *multi* (similar to the *salla*) of gold, the adornment of thy divinity' (*PSBA* xxxi. 63 f.). The hymn published by Craig (*Rel. Texts*, i. pl. 15, obv. 19 ff.) says: 'I prepared for thee a pure offering of milk, cakes, salted bread. I presented to thee a vessel for libations, hear me and be gracious. I slew for thee a pure lamb without blemish from the flock of the field. I presented a conserve for the shepherdess of the god Tammuz.' Sacrifice of infants, which was so common in the cult of 'Ashtart (*ERE* ii. 117[b]), is not yet proved in the cult of Ishtar. For supposed evidences of it see *KAT*[3], 599. E. J. Banks (*Bismya*, London, 1912, p. 380 f.) reports the discovery of brick stamps mentioning a temple of Ishtar, numerous small houses containing obscene figures, and beneath one of these eight clay coffins containing infant bones. These seem similar to the jar-burials of infants in the mounds of Palestine (*ERE* iii. 187[a]).

The fourth month, Tammuz (June–July), was celebrated by the annual wailing for Ishtar's lover, whose death coincided with the withering of vegetation in the summer heat. The fifth month, Ab (July–August), was sacred to Ishtar, and in it was celebrated her descent to Sheol to bring her lover back to life. Perhaps the heliacal rising of Sirius in this month may explain the connexion of this star with Ishtar (*KAT*[3], 426; Langdon, *Psalms*, xvi.). Ashurbanipal records: 'In the month of Ab, the month of the appearance of Sirius, the festival of the revered queen, the daughter of Bêl, I tarried in Arbela, her beloved city, to worship her great divinity' (*KIB* ii. 248[16-19]). Ashurbanipal speaks also of the 25th of Siwan as the day of the procession of the Bêlit of Babylon, the honoured among the great gods (*KIB* ii. 220[98]; cf. *VAB* iv. 282[20]).

VI. *Worship outside of Babylonia.*—Adherents of the Pan-Babylonian school of Winckler, Zimmern, Jensen, and Jeremias hold that the Bab. Ishtar was the original mother-goddess of western Asia, and that all the other local forms were derived from her. As remarked above, this theory is improbable; 'Ashtar must rather be regarded as a primitive Semitic divinity. Nevertheless, it is not improbable that at the time of the extension of Bab. civilization Ishtar exerted a modifying influence upon the other Semitic goddesses.

1. **In Elam and Persia.**—The worship of Innanna of Erech in ancient Elam is attested by the inscriptions of a number of ancient rulers of Susa (*VAB* i. 1, 178c, 180. 3, 182. 4). The Assyrian records show that it persisted down to the fall of the Assyr. Empire. After the conquest of Elam by the Indo-European Medes and Persians the old goddess was identified with Anâhita, and under this name enjoyed extensive homage (see ANÂHITA). Her ancient name, however, was not forgotten. In 2 Mac 1[12-16] we are told that Antiochus Epiphanes was killed in the temple of Nanaia in Persia.

2. **In Mesopotamia.**—Bab. and Assyr. influence was exerted in Mesopotamia from the earliest times, and the cult of Ishtar was established in all the important cities. The old Aramaic name 'Attar was little used except in the compound Atargatis (*ERE* ii. 165), and instead titles derived from the astral form of Ishtar were employed, such as Kokabta, 'star' (=Bab. *kakabu*), Kokabnugha, 'star of splendour,' or Nugha, 'splendour.' Even the Old Bab. name Nanai was used in Syriac for the planet Venus (*ZDMG* x. [1860] 459) along with the Sumer. name Dilbat (Jensen, *Kosmologie*, p. 118). Astara and Bêlti were names for Venus among the Mandæans (*ib.* p. 135). For survivals of Bab. myths concerning Ishtar in Mesopotamia see Baudissin, 'Tammuz bei den Harrânern,' *ZDMG* lxvi. 172 ff.

3. **In Arabia.**—In the South Arabian inscriptions 'Athtar, who is masculine, is represented by a star with eight points, and forms a triad with the sun and moon. It can hardly be doubted that this is due to direct Bab. influence. In North Arabia the original name of the goddess was displaced by titles such as al-Lât, 'the goddess,' or al-'Uzza, 'the strong' (J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentums*[2], Berlin, 1897, pp. 29–39). She was identified with the planet Venus and called al-Najm, 'the star,' *par excellence* (cf. the oath, *Qur'ân*, liii. 1: 'By the star when it setteth'; lxxxvi. 1 ff.). Isaac of Antioch (5th cent. A.D.), i. 210 (ed. G. Bickell, Giessen, 1873–77), identifies al-'Uzza with Bêltis and applies to her the Syriac name Kokabta, 'the star' (Wellhausen, pp. 40–45). This astral character of al-'Uzza is found only in late times in the regions that border on Syria and Mesopotamia; and the same names are used that are applied to Ishtar in Mesopotamia, namely, 'star,' 'star of splendour,' and 'splendour' (Nielsen, *ZDMG* lxvi. 472); it seems clear, therefore, that these traits are due to borrowing of Bab. ideas from Mesopotamia.

4. **In Syria and Palestine.**—In the Amarna letters the Canaanite 'Ashtart is equated with Ishtar, and Canaanite artistic representations often conform to the Bab. type (see *ERE* iii. 182[a], 183[b]). There is no clear evidence of Ishtar in the early writings of the OT. The efforts of P. C. A. Jensen (*Gilgamesch-Epos*, Strassburg, 1906) and of Jeremias (*AT im Lichte des alt. Orients*) to show that Sarah, Rebekah, Tamar, Pharaoh's daughter, Jephthah's daughter, and most of the other female characters of the OT are transformed Ishtar-myths cannot be pronounced successful. The first certain trace of Ishtar in the OT is in the neo-Bab. period in Jer 7[18] 44[17-19, 25], where she is called 'queen of heaven.' This is a specifically Bab. name for Ishtar in her astral aspect, and the *kawwân*, or 'cake,' that the Hebrew women baked for her is the same as the *kawânu* that was presented to Ishtar (*KAT*[3], 441 f.). The wailing for Tammuz mentioned in Ezk 8[14] is closely connected with Ishtar and is specifically Babylonian. At the time of the Bab. supremacy the cult of Ishtar must have been established in Jerusalem, or even earlier under Assyr. rule (2 K 21[3]). The name Esther is an Aramaic form of Ishtar, and the Book of Esther shows clear knowledge of Bab. Ishtar myths (see Paton, 'Esther' in *ICC*, Edinburgh, 1908, pp. 87–94). In Palmyra the Bab. Ishtar was worshipped under the name Bêlti (*ERE* ii. 204), and the rites of the Phœnician 'Ashtart at Gebal, as described by Lucian (*de Dea Syr.* 6, 8), were evidently coloured by the Bab. mourning for Tammuz. On the whole subject of the Tammuz cult in the West see Baudissin, *Adonis und Esmun*, Leipzig, 1911.

5. Among the Greeks and Romans.—During the period of Seleucid Greek rule the religions of the East and of the West were fused with extraordinary rapidity in Syria and in Egypt, and under the early Roman emperors Bab. astrology became the dominant religion of the day. The gods of Greece and of Rome were identified with the nearest Bab. counterparts, and thus came to take on astral characteristics. The equations that resulted were: Zeus = Juppiter = Bel-Marduk = the planet Juppiter; Hermes = Mercury = Nabu = the planet Mercury; Ares = Mars = Nergal = the planet Mars; Chronos = Saturn = Ninib = the planet Saturn; Aphrodite = Venus = Ishtar = the planet Venus. To these identifications are due the names of the planets in all modern European languages. Ishtar thus took the place of Aphrodite, and the mythology of the Bab. mother-goddess was grafted on to the myths of the ancient local Aphrodites and Astartes. Even the Sumer. name Dilbat for the planet Venus became known to the Greeks; Hesychius says: Δελέφατ· ὁ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀστὴρ ὑπὸ Χαλδαίων (see F. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, Paris, 1909 [Eng. tr., Chicago, 1911], ch. v., *Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and the Romans*, New York, 1912).

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ISIS.—A nature-goddess whose cult first sprang into prominence in Egypt under the New Empire (*c.* 1700–1100 B.C.), became universal in its native land, spread throughout Oriental, Greek, and Roman territory, and became one of the chief antagonists of Christianity. According to Egyptian mythology, she was the daughter of Seb, god of the earth, and Nut, goddess of the sky, the pair which, with sex reversed, corresponded to the Greek Kronos and Rhea. Other children of the union were a daughter, Nephthys, and three sons, Horus the Elder, Osiris, and Set. Isis was the wife, as well as the sister, of Osiris, to whom she had been wedded even before their birth, and by whom she afterwards became the mother of Horus, the sun-god in whom the Greeks saw a parallel to Apollo (Eduard Meyer, in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Isis'). Horus the Elder and Horus the Child (Harpocrates) are different conceptions of the same god (*ib. s.v.* 'Horus').

The Isis-Osiris myth in its main lines is as follows: Osiris (Serapis), known and loved for his benefactions to all mankind, is treacherously slain by his brother Set, who encloses him in a chest and throws him into the Nile, which bears him towards the sea. Isis, after much wandering, persecution, and sorrow, discovers the chest, and mourns over the body of her husband, accompanied by Nephthys, her sister, who is also the wife of Set; but Set again gets possession of the body, and disperses it about Egypt in fourteen parts. Meanwhile Isis gives birth to Horus, whom she secretly rears in the marshes of the Delta. After long searching, she succeeds in recovering and interring the members of Osiris, who, restored through the magic formulæ of Thoth, becomes a judge and god of the dead, and even visits the earth to appear to his son Horus. The latter takes vengeance upon Set for the slaying of his father, sparing his life, however, at the entreaty of Isis herself, with whom he is for this reason so angered that he strikes off her head-dress (or her head), which Thoth restores as a cow's-head helmet (or cow's head). Horus and Set then appear before the court of the great gods of Egypt, where Horus, through the support of Thoth, is victorious, receives the crown and throne of his father, and unites both parts of the land under him (Plutarch, *de Is. et Osir.*; Budge, *Egyptian Religion*, ch. II.).

Whether the Isis-Osiris myth is founded on a primitive attempt to explain the daily vicissitudes of the sun, or is the outgrowth of a local historical or religious legend which was grafted on to solar speculation, there is no doubt as to its having possessed a solar significance in the minds of those who reflected upon religion. Osiris was the Sun, born of Seb and Nut, Earth and Heaven; Set was Night; Isis, whose name signifies 'seat' or 'throne,' was a deity of the heavens, and especially of the dawn, who restored Osiris, the Sun, after his death at the hands of Night, and also gave birth to Horus, the Sun, who took vengeance on Set, the Night, and won back his father's throne; Nephthys, the Western Horizon, or Evening, sister of Isis, the Eastern Horizon, or Dawn, mourns with the latter at the bier of Osiris, and is also the mother, by him, of Anubis, god of the realm of darkness and the dead. Transferred to the realm of morals, the myth symbolized the warfare between good and evil. It also symbolized human destiny, the rebirth of man in his children; but its greatest significance in the minds of the ancients was spiritual—the immortality of the soul, the resurrection, the universal motherhood of Isis, and her other-world influence. The resurrection of Osiris through the efforts of Isis symbolized the rebirth of the soul, and it was this that made the Isis cult the greatest of Egyptian religions, though there is no evidence that it had attained to any importance, or was even in existence, before the New Empire. Through her mysteries the worshipper received the gift of immortality, which her magical powers enabled her to bestow. Her connexion with magic no doubt made her cult still more popular. In a papyrus of as early as 1553 B.C., a physician invokes her aid, beseeching her to employ in his interests the same arts by which she had healed the wounds of Set and Horus. She was called 'The Mighty in Magic.' By the time of the Saite and Greek periods (from 663 on) she had gradually developed into a universal nature-goddess, a beneficent, maternal deity whose hand was full of all manner of blessings, temporal and spiritual. She was 'The Great,' 'The Great Mother,' 'The Mother of the Gods'; local goddesses were invested with her characteristics, and she in turn took on theirs, until the distinction between them and her was little more than one of mere name. She became the great prototype of all goddesses. Her importance in the cult far overshadowed that of Osiris; she even had independent shrines, as, for example, the temple of the XXIst dynasty at Gizeh, called 'the temple of the Mistress of the Pyramids.' Her most important seats of worship in Egypt were at Memphis, and on the island of Philæ, at the southern extremity of the country, where her temple, first completed in the reign of Nectanebos (360–342), remained open until A.D. 560, when it was closed by order of Justinian (Meyer, *loc. cit.*).

Outside of Egypt, the Isis-Osiris cult rose to importance nowhere until the Hellenistic period (from 333 B.C. on), though it was known in Phœnicia in the 7th and 6th centuries before Christ, and was communicated thence to other parts of the world. Evidences of it are abundant, however, in every part of the Hellenistic and Roman world. The Greeks saw in Isis and her mysteries an analogue to Demeter and the Eleusinian mysteries, identified Osiris with Dionysus, Horus with Apollo, Seb and Nut with Kronos and Rhea. As early as 333 B.C., in spite of Greek prejudice against foreign cults, the erection of a temple at Peiræus was permitted, and under the Ptolemys the cult was received at Athens itself, and a temple erected at the foot of the Acropolis. The use of the word 'Isis' in the composition of citizens' names—Isidotos, Isidoros, etc.—and the numerous reliefs representing Greek ladies in the character of Isis afford evidence of the popularity of the cult. There were two temples in Corinth (Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, *s.v.* 'Isis, Histoire'; Drexler, in Roscher, *s.v.* 'Isis,' 373–391).

The success of the cult in the West was even more pronounced. Sardinia had received it before the Hellenistic period, probably through the Phœnicians; Malta, Sicily, and Southern Italy admitted it later. Puteoli was an important centre in Campania, while the cult was also strong at Pompeii, Herculaneum, and Stabiæ. The Pompeian temple of Isis, of which the remains are still to be seen, was founded between 200 and 80 B.C., was ruined by the earthquake of A.D. 63, and was the only temple in the city which had been restored when the final catastrophe occurred in 79 (H. Nissen, *Pompejan. Stud.*, Leipzig, 1877, pp. 671, 170 ff.). First introduced into the city of Rome in the time of Sulla, though probably it found a place in Ostia and the suburbs before this, it was the object of so much distrust on the part of the conservative citizenship of Rome that in 58 B.C. its altars on the Capitoline, and its chapels (to the number of fifty-three), were destroyed by order of the Senate. In 54, 50, and 48 similar events occurred; in 43 the triumvirs decreed a temple to Isis and Serapis, and the cult seemed about to gain the permanent support of the State; but in 28 Augustus excluded the worship from inside the Pomerium, or augural limit of the city, his policy of opposition to foreign cults having been stimulated by the war with Antony and Cleopatra; in 21 Agrippa forbade the erection of chapels within a radius of seven and a half stades from the limit; and Tiberius, in A.D. 19, as a result of certain scandals in connexion with the cult, destroyed its places of worship and banished its priests. Under Caligula, however, the cult seems to have been recognized by the State, though it was not yet in possession of the right to erect temples within the Pomerium, nor supported by the public funds. It grew, nevertheless, and abundant evidence of its strength is to be seen in the art and literature of the Empire. Under Caracalla the law was made null which had kept its temples outside the Pomerium, and henceforth it enjoyed perfect equality of rights with other cults. Its altars and shrines of minor size and importance had no doubt existed in the city from the first, and it had been strong in the support of the lower classes. Besides its lesser shrines and chapels, its greatest temples were that in the sixth region erected by Caracalla, that on the Cælian, east of the Coliseum, from which the third region took its name (*Isis et Serapis*), and the great temple in the Campus Martius, east of the Pantheon, which was voted in 43 B.C., but probably not erected until about A.D. 39, burned in 80, and restored by

Domitian, Alexander Severus, and Diocletian (S. B. Platner, *Topography and Monuments of Ancient Rome*, revised ed., Boston, 1911, pp. 62, 358). From the 2nd cent. onwards, it was one of the most bitter and effective antagonists of Christianity, and, when the final struggle occurred, numbered among its adherents many of the first families of Rome. Symmachus, Vettius Agorius Prætextatus and his wife, and Virius Nicomachus Flavianus were its ardent defenders. In the three months' revival of pagan religion at Rome in A.D. 394, when Nicomachus Flavianus espoused the cause of Eugenius against Theodosius, Isis, Mithra, and the Great Mother of the gods were in the foreground, as they were throughout the struggle with the new religion. The festival of Isis was celebrated with great pomp on this occasion (*Codex Parisinus*, 8084, lines 98–101). With the fall of Eugenius the cult passed out of history at Rome, though the worship persisted here and there in the Roman world until the middle of the 5th century (Wissowa, 'Religion und Kultus der Römer,'[2] Müller's *Handbuch*, v. 4, p. 95 ff.; Drexler, *loc. cit.* 394–409). The fall of the famous Serapeum of Alexandria occurred in 397, but the temple at Philæ was not closed until 560, when Justinian's general, Narses, took its priests captive and forbade the worship. The vigour and long life of the religion of Isis, as well as its rise and spread to all parts of the world, are to be explained on the ground of the universality of the character of the goddess, who included in herself the virtues of all other goddesses, by the attractiveness of her ceremonies, by the fascination of her mysteries, and, above all, by the rewards which she could offer the faithful initiate—purification, forgiveness, communion, regeneration, and immortality of soul; in short, the qualities to which it owed its success were the very same which existed in a fuller and less artificial form in Christianity itself. While the antagonism between the two religions may have been bitter, and reached a violent stage in many places, it is nevertheless true that the transition to Christianity was quite as much a process of blending as a violent displacement. Isis herself was identified with the Virgin Mary, Horus with Christ, and some of the legends of the Saints are traceable to legends of the Isis cult (Drexler, 426–548; Lafaye, 'Histoire du culte des divinités d'Alexandrie hors de l'Égypte,' pp. 167–170).

In art, Isis is represented as a matron, standing, draped in a long robe reaching to the ankles, mantle thrown over the shoulders and crossing the breast, where it is made into a large and very apparent knot, and often a veil, symbolic of secrecy. In her right hand is the sistrum, in her left a small ewer. Her hair is abundant, and on her forehead rises the lotus, emblem of the resurrection. Stars or crescent sometimes figured in the representation, in token of her astronomical significance; Sirius was her especial star, and she is sometimes figured sitting on the back of a dog representing it. As a deity of agriculture, like Demeter, she is figured with torches, heads of wheat and poppies, serpents, the mystic chest, or the horn of plenty. As queen of the lower world, she is represented in black marble or basalt. In her character as deity of the sea, she often appears on coins in a boat with sail raised, with symbols of the sea. As goddess of love and maternity, she is accompanied by the infant Horus, or Harpocrates, who is often clasped to her breast or being nursed. Sometimes Osiris completes the group, which forms a kind of holy family (Apuleius, *Metam.* xi. 3, 4; Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Isis, Attributions et images').

The practices of the Isis-Osiris cult in Roman times may be assumed to represent with more or less accuracy those of all lands in which the religion found favour. Its main festival occurred on the last day of October and the first three days of November (for the date see Wissowa, 'Religion und Kultus der Römer,'[2] p. 354), as follows: October 31, *Heuresis*; Isis, in company with Nephthys and Anubis, and with manifestations of deepest grief, in which priests and mystics participate, searches for the body of Osiris; November 1–3, the celebration of the finding, or resurrection, of Osiris, with unrestrained expressions of joy, November 2 being called *Ter Novena*, perhaps from a chorus consisting of three times nine participants, and November 3, *Hilaria*, from its character, which was like that of the corresponding festival of the Great Mother. Another annual festival was that called *Isidis Navigium*, which occurred on March 5, at the opening of navigation. A ship, richly equipped, and laden with spices, was sent to sea as an offering to the goddess. Apuleius (*Metam.* xi. 7–17) describes this festival as it took place at Cenchreai near Corinth. It may have had a parallel at Rome in a ceremony at the mouth of the Tiber. Two other festivals, *Sacrum Phariæ* and *Sarapia*, mentioned in the *Menologia Rustica*, the first on April 25 and the other somewhat earlier, were of less importance. The *Pelusia*, on March 20, was a festival whose motive was in the flooding of the Nile, and was introduced at Rome at a late date. *Fasti Philocali*, and Lydus, *de Mensibus*, iv. 40, are the first evidences of it (Wissowa, 'Religion und Kultus,'[2] p. 354 f.).

The conduct of the cult was in the hands of priests and priestesses, chosen by the cult associations for various terms. There seems to have been a high priest, *summus sacerdos*, *sacerdos maximus*, *primarius*, *præcipuus* (Apul. xi. 20, 17, 21, 22), who was perhaps the same as the *propheta primarius* (ii. 28). The *grammateus* was another priest. Each association was officered by a pater, a quæstor, or treasurer, and decurions, if the membership was large. Numerous names mentioned in inscriptions indicate that different associations performed special duties in the processions. There were the *pastophori*, who carried little shrines upon litters; *pausarii*, so named from their pauses at certain places along the route; *Anubiaci* and *Bubastiacæ*, who may have impersonated Anubis and Bubastis; etc. Those who fulfilled a priestly office were obliged to keep head and face clean shaven, to wear linen garments, and to abstain from certain things (Wissowa, 357 f.; Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Isis, Les associations, Le sacredoce').

According to Apuleius, there were three degrees —one of Isis, another of Isis and Osiris, and a third of actual priestly functions. Accurate knowledge of the observances through which the mystic passed in his rise from one degree to another is impossible because of the comparative strictness with which ancient writers keep the rule of secrecy.

The account of Apuleius, however (*Metam.* xi.), throws general light upon both the public and the private character of the cult, in spite of the author's reserve regarding the secret part of his experience. Lucius, the hero of the tale, in whose character Apuleius is narrating his own experience, determines to devote himself to Isis. The goddess herself has so directed him in a vision (xi. 5). The procession of the following day was that of *Isidis Navigium*. First came a line of masqueraders, strikingly costumed—a soldier, a hunter, a gladiator, etc. At the head of the procession proper marched women clad in white, with flowers in their hair and hands. Others followed bearing mirrors behind them, held up to the face of the advancing goddess, so that she might see the members of the procession coming, as it were, to meet her, and were followed by still others who carried ivory combs which they employed in the pantomime of dressing the deity's hair, and others who sprinkled the streets with balsam and unguent. Next came a great number of men and women with waxen tapers and other lights, and then musicians with pipes and flutes, in

whose train advanced a chorus of chosen youths clad in snowy white, chanting a hymn. More pipers followed, and heralds, after whom marched the train of mystics, men and women of all ages and conditions, luminous in pure white, the women with anointed hair covered with transparent veils, and the men with smooth-shaven shiny heads; and all were keeping up a shrill jingling with bronze, silver, and even golden sistra. Then came the chief ministers in shining linen, bearing insignia of the mightiest gods. The first carried a golden lamp; the second, models of altars; the third, a palm tree with golden leaves and a golden caduceus; the fourth, a left hand, the symbol of equity, and a golden vessel in the form of the female breast, from which he poured libations of milk on the ground; the fifth, a golden winnowing-fan with thick golden branches; and another, an amphora. The next feature of the procession was a number of men who represented various deities: Anubis, the messenger-deity, bearing in his left hand the caduceus and with his right shaking a green palm; a cow, erect, the symbol of the universal parent-goddess; etc. These were followed by one who bore a chest containing secret paraphernalia; another who bore the effigy of a great divinity which resembled neither beast nor bird, nor even man; and, finally, by a priest with sistrum and crown of roses. After the sending out of the sacred ship the mystics returned to the temple, deposited the holy symbols, were formally dismissed, and, after kissing the feet of the silver statue of the goddess on the temple steps, went home, carrying branches of olive, flowers, and herbs, and filled with joy (*ib.* 8–17). Lucius then took up his abode within the temple enclosure, and attended all the services of the priests, studying and meditating until the goddess announced in a dream that the time for his initiation was at hand. He was first bathed, or baptized, in public, then brought to the feet of the goddess to receive secret instruction, and ordered, before the world, to abstain for ten days from wine, the flesh of animals, and all abundance of food. At the end of this period the evening of his consecration arrived. Having been favoured, at sunset, with many presents from the multitude of assembled worshippers, he was left by the throng, and in the night conducted by the priest to the inner recess of the temple, where he was the recipient of revelations and the witness of sights such as he was not permitted to divulge to a greater extent than in the following suggestive description: 'I approached the confines of death, trod the threshold of Proserpina, and returned borne through all the elements; at midnight I saw the sun gleaming with bright light; the gods below and the gods above I approached face to face, and adored near by' (*ib.* 23). The next morning he appeared before the people dressed in twelve stoles, a beautifully coloured garment of linen, and a precious scarf which covered his back from neck to ankles, all of these articles being decorated with paintings of animals in various colours. With a burning taper in his hand and a chaplet of palm leaves on his head, he was suddenly revealed to the multitude by the drawing of the sanctuary curtains (*ib.* 24). He then, at the admonition of the goddess, spent a year in Rome, and at the end of that time was initiated into the mysteries of Osiris. A short time afterwards, he was for the third time directed in a vision to be further initiated. This he did, becoming also a member of the college of *Pastophorοi*, in which he held the office of Quinquennial Decurion (*ib.* 26, 30).

The regular services in a temple of Isis comprised two ceremonies each day. The first occurred at sunrise, when the priest opened the doors, 'waked the deity,' and after several moments of prayer, made the round of the altars, performing the sacred ceremonial and pouring libations at each, after which rites the worshippers loudly announced the first hour of the day (Apul. *op. cit.* 20). At the second ceremony, which took place in the afternoon, the priest held up before the worshippers a vase of consecrated water, which they venerated as the first principle of all things (Martial, x. 48. 1).

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ISLĀM.—Islām is the name peculiar to the religion founded by Muhammad, and embraces all the different sects which are now found among his followers. Thus, a Shī'ite and a Sunnite are both Muslims. *Islām* is the infinitive form of *aslama*, and means 'to resign oneself,' to profess Islām. It is sometimes looked upon by European writers as expressing complete resignation to the will of God in all matters of faith and duty; but this seems to be too wide an extension of the term, for Syed Amīr 'Alī says:

'The word does not imply, as is commonly supposed, absolute submission to God's will, but means, on the contrary, striving after righteousness' (*Spirit of Islam*, ed. 1891, p. 226).

But what is the idea of righteousness which the term 'Islām' expresses? It is given in the verse, 'Whoso is a Muslim, he seeketh after the right way' (*Qur.* lxxii. 14). Here, again, we need a definition of the words 'Muslim' and 'right way.' Muhammadan commentators explain them thus: the former means 'one who places his neck under the order of God,' 'one who comes under the order,' 'one who sincerely accepts the dogma of the Unity of God'; the other, the *rashād*, or 'right way,' is the 'finding of the reward of good works,' the 'desire of goodness.'

The term 'Islām' occurs twice in late Meccan *sūras*, but not in the earlier ones.

'That man's breast will be open to Islām' (vi. 125). Whose breast God has opened to Islām' (xxxix. 23).

In Medinite *sūras* it occurs in the following places:

'The true religion (*dīn*) with God is Islām' (iii. 17). 'Whoso desireth any other religion (*dīn*) than Islām, that religion shall not be accepted from him' (iii. 79). 'It is my pleasure that Islām be your religion' (v. 5). 'Who is more impious than he who, when called to Islām, deviseth a falsehood concerning God?' (lxi. 7). 'We profess Islām' (xlix. 14). 'They taunt thee with having embraced Islām' (xlix. 17).

Some parts of the verb express the sense of embracing Islām, but they are chiefly found in late *sūras*: xlix. 17, ix. 75, iii. 60, xii. 101, xxxiii. 35. It is very important to bear this fact in mind. In a few places a more general idea of resignation seems to be referred to, as:

'They who set their faces with resignation Godward (*man aslama wajhahu lillāhi*), and do that which is right, their reward is with their Lord' (ii. 106), and 'I resign myself to the Lord of the worlds' (*aslamtu lirabbi-l-'ālamīna*) (ii. 125).

But these have to be interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by Muslim commentators to the more definite ones.

Muhammadan theologians draw a sharp distinction between *īmān* ('faith') and Islām, and base it on the following verse:

'The Arabs say, "We believe." Say thou, "Ye believe not"; say rather, "We profess Islām (*aslamna*)," for the faith (*īmān*) hath not yet found its way into your hearts' (xlix. 14).

Belief with the heart is one thing; the profession of Islām is another. It is outward obedience to certain rules, and it is only when sincerity (*taṣdīq*) is joined to it, as shown in the belief in God, angels, divine books, prophets, predestination, and the last day, that a man becomes a true believer. Shahrastānī, in the *Milal wa'n-Niḥal* (ed. London, 1846, p. 27), draws a distinction between Islām, *īmān* ('faith'), and *iḥsān* ('devotion,' 'benevolence') in the following tradition:

Gabriel one day came in the form of an Arab and sat near the Prophet and said: 'O Messenger of God, what is Islām?' The Prophet replied: 'Islām is to believe in God and His Prophet, to say the prescribed prayers, to give alms, to observe the fast of Ramaḍān, and to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.' Gabriel replied that he had spoken truth, and then asked the Prophet what *īmān* was. He replied that it was to believe in God, angels, books, prophets, the last day, and predestination. Again, Gabriel admitted the correctness of the definition, and inquired what *iḥsān* meant. The Prophet replied: 'To worship God as if thou seest Him, for if thou seest Him not He sees thee.'

This is borne out by the meaning assigned in Persian commentaries to the term 'Muslim,' which is said to designate a man who is a *munqād* and a *hukmbardār*, words which mean 'submissive' or 'obedient to orders.' A Muslim, then, is one who carefully keeps the outward works of the law, but, when he adds to it *iḥsān*, or devotion, he is a *muḥsin*, a man who does good works as well as pays attention to ceremonial observances; when to these he adds sincerity of heart and exercises faith (*īmān*), he becomes a *mu'min*, or 'believer.'

'The true believers (*al-Mu'minūn*) are only those who believe in Allāh and His Apostle, and afterwards doubt not' (xlix. 15).

The term 'Islām' emphasizes the Rabbinical precept that it is not the 'study of the law which is most important, but the practice thereof,' and connotes the formal performance of certain outward duties. It is doubtful whether it ever had an

ethical meaning attached to it. The commentators seem to be unanimous in using it in a mechanical sense. That agrees with the omission of the term in the earlier *sūras*; for it was not till Muhammad formulated his religion at Medina that the *Arkān-ad-dīn* ('pillars of religion'), the five obligatory duties of religion, came to be a formal part therein. Earlier, the word Islām does not appear to have been in common use. Thus, Islām, when looked at from the Muhammadan standpoint, loses much of the beauty which has gathered round the ethical idea of complete submission to the will of God, and really emphasizes the external and legal side of religion.

For the religions of Islām see MUHAMMADANISM.

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EDWARD SELL.

ISOCRATES.—The place of Isocrates in the history of Greek oratory and the evolution of prose style is definitely described in Jebb's *Attic Orators* and his art. in *EBr*[11] xiv. 877. In ethics, Isocrates interests the student of to-day chiefly as a measure of the altitude by which Plato towers above the flats of the average moral sentiment of refined and educated Greeks of the 4th cent. B.C. But to Ascham, Milton, and the educators of the Renaissance generally, he was a still edifying expositor of the great commonplaces of morality and the conduct of life. Thomas Elyot says of him:

'Isocrates, concerning the lesson of orators, is everywhere wonderfull profitable, hauynge almost as many wyse sentences as he hath wordes: and with that is so swete and delectable to rede, that, after him, almost all other seme unsauery and tedious: and in persuadynge, as well a prince, as a priuate persone, to vertue, in two very litle and compendious warkes, whereof he made the one to kynge Nicocles, the other to his frende Demonicus, wolde be perfectly kanned, and had in continual memorie' (*The Boke named The Gouernour*, London, 1883, i. 74).

The (probably genuine) 'protreptic' or parænetic discourse to Demonicus here mentioned is the earliest extant specimen of a long literary succession which in modern English literature extends from Sir Henry Sidney's Letter to his 'little Philip at school at Shrewsbury,' Polonius's advice to Laertes, and Sir Thomas Browne's *Christian Morals*, through Lord Chesterfield's *Letters to his Son*, down to Hazlitt's *Advice to a School-boy*, Thackeray's *Mr. Brown's Letters to his Nephew*, and their numerous recent imitators. The Demonicus anticipates many famous sayings, from C. Tourneur's 'Your predecessors were your precedents' (*Atheist's Tragedy*, I. ii.) to 'How doth the little busy bee.' In its pages the appeal to the secret tribunal of conscience (i. 16) and the Golden Rule (i. 14), on which Isocrates twice stumbles elsewhere (iii. 62 and iv. 81) as a happy turn of Gorgian rhetoric, stand in naive juxtaposition with the Chesterfieldian recommendation to win the favour of men by speaking 'advantageously of them behind their backs in companies who, you have reason to believe, will tell them again' (i. 33).

The two discourses in this kind that bear the name of Nicocles contain further parænetic matter together with many special considerations concerning the duties of good kings and loyal subjects—the theme of the *βασιλικὸς λόγος* of post-Classical and Renaissance oratory. They also discuss the style of this kind of writing, which, Isocrates tells us, is appropriately disjointed and aphoristic, and its matter, which, he thinks, demands not so much originality as industry in the collection of the best things already said by Hesiod, Phocylides, Theognis, and other moral poets. Isocrates here (ii. 44) and elsewhere deplores the perversity of mankind, who prefer the pleasant to the useful and the fables of mythology to the profitable admonitions of the gnomic poets.

The *Areopagiticus*, which has only its title in common with Milton's famous tract, was also a favourite with Renaissance moralists because of its impressive development of the topics of the degeneracy of the age, the licence of democracy, and the need for a restoration of the salutary discipline of the good old times.

The main ethical interest of the other orations lies in their resemblance to, yet their contrast with, Plato. Isocrates' ethics is utilitarian, not in any speculative sense, but in its prevailing tone and temper. His preaching is exactly that of the excellent fathers of families whose prudential philosophy fails to satisfy Glaucon and Adimantus in the second book of Plato's *Republic*. He celebrates not the beauty, not the absolute worth and intrinsic sanctions, but the profitableness of virtue. Honesty is and ought to be spoken of as the best policy (xv. 283). Isocrates repeatedly enforces this lesson with illustrations drawn from Greek history, and more particularly from the ruinous effects of a selfish policy of imperialism on the true welfare and prosperity of Athens and Sparta (vi. 34, viii. 14, 25 ff., xiv. 40). But even this empirical coincidence of happiness and righteousness he will not affirm absolutely or undertake to demonstrate (xii. 185 f.; but cf. xiv. 25). It is true, 'for the most part,' he says in a phrase made technical by Aristotle, and the wise man will govern his conduct by probabilities and the general rule (viii. 35). To this he adds the interesting remark that the law is most certain of verification in the longer life of cities and States (viii. 120, vi. 34–38), and he maintains that we may attribute the few cases of its apparent violation to the neglect of the gods (xii. 187), an expression against which Plato would have protested. As Dryden more piously puts it:

'I have heard, indeed, of some virtuous persons who have ended unfortunately, but never of any virtuous nation: Providence is engaged too deeply, when the cause becomes so general' (Preface to *Annus Mirabilis*).

But, though Isocrates deprecates (xii. 118) or sneers at (x. 1, xv. 84) the subtleties and the paradoxes of absolute Platonic ethics, he seems to have been increasingly moved to emulation by the success and the moral fervour of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* (iii. 47, 59, ii. 29, vi. 59, viii. 28). Traces of this feeling appear in the passages already mentioned on the verification of moral law in history. It is still more apparent in certain edifying digressions on the true meaning of those ambiguous words, 'advantage' and 'gain' (*πλεονεξία*, iii. 2, viii. 7, 17, xv. 275, xii. 240; *κέρδος*, iii. 50). All men desire their own advantage, he repeatedly tells us, but they mistakenly seek it in taking wrongful advantage of others. All men desire gain, but they know not in what true gain consists.

In addition to this, Isocrates has many ethical or psychological observations that recall Plato or anticipate Aristotle. Though teaching alone will not make a good man of a bad one (xiii. 21), he is confident that 'virtue' can be taught (ii. 12 f.), as even the training of animals proves (xv. 213 f.). His list of virtues includes the Platonic four (ix. 22 f.) and incidentally others, as self-control and magnificence (ii. 19). 'Great-souled' is one of his terms of praise. He emphasizes the idea of moderation and the mean, and anticipates Aristotle in the remark that the virtuous mean is more akin to deficiency than to excess (ii. 33 f.), as also in the affirmation that virtue when won is the most stable of possessions (i. 5 f.; cf. iii. 47). The three motives of human action, he says, are gain, honour, and pleasure.

His conjectured influence upon Greek politics,

and the elements of political theory and terminology scattered through his writings, lie outside of our topic.

His religion is conventional and perfunctory, though he sometimes develops the Euripidean or anticipates the Platonic censure of the anthropomorphic mythology, which attributes human failings to the gods (xi. 41). References to the subject are sometimes introduced by the phrase: 'if I may properly speak of such ancient (or old-fashioned) things' (iii. 26, iv. 30). The gods, he tells us, govern mankind and apportion good and evil, not by direct intervention, but by the thoughts which they inspire in men (v. 150). In one passage he comes very near to the Ovidian 'expedit esse deos et ut expedit esse putemus' (xi. 24 f.). He alludes to the better hope of the righteous and of the initiated (ii. 20, iv. 28; cf. viii. 35), and he makes use of the conventional formula: 'if any perception remains to the dead' (xiv. 61). But the only immortality which he really expects is the subjective immortality of fame (xii. 260).

In ethics and religion, as in philosophy and eloquence, he cannot bear confrontation with his two supreme contemporaries; but, removed from the shadow of that comparison, he appears as a worthy citizen, an excellent teacher, and an estimable writer, whose works, if no longer valued for themselves, are indispensable to the understanding of the life and thought of the age of Plato and Demosthenes.

LITERATURE.—There is very little literature on the ethics of Isocrates. L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1882, may be mentioned. The philological literature is given in *EBr*[11] xiv. 881; R. C. Jebb, *Attic Orators*, London, 1893; F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*[2], Leipzig, 1887-98; and W. Christ, *Gesch. der griech. Lit.*[6], ed. O. Stählin and W. Schmid, Munich, 1912 ff.

PAUL SHOREY.

ISRAEL. — 1. Introduction. — An adequate treatment of the questions suggested by the name 'Israel' would require an encyclopædia to itself. All that is attempted is to trace the religious development which has given pre-eminence to Israel among the spiritual teachers of mankind. The religion of Israel cannot be satisfactorily studied apart from the external history of the race, but account will here be taken of the latter only in so far as it serves to elucidate the former. An inquiry into the historical value of the narrative of the Pentateuch is beyond the scope of the present article. Suffice it to say that by the name 'Israel' we understand that people which, though not originally homogeneous, had been formed into a single nation in Palestine about a millennium before the Christian era.

Of this nation the strictly Israelite element was of comparatively recent introduction, the Israelites before their conquest of the Canaanites and subsequent mingling with them having occupied the oases in the wilderness to the south of Palestine, where they had entered into close relation with the Kenites and other tribes of kindred stock as well as with the Midianites further east, from whom, perhaps, they learned to reverence Horeb, the holy mountain. They regarded themselves as closely akin to the Edomites, who seem to have gained a permanent settlement in the district south of the Dead Sea at a somewhat earlier date; and somewhat less closely to the Moabites and Ammonites on the east. The belief that their ancestors had been Aramæans and had once lived in N.W. Mesopotamia may not, perhaps, be of very ancient origin, and may be due to the fusion with Aramæan settlers which took place during the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. It was commonly believed among the Israelites that before the conquest of Palestine their ancestors had for some time sojourned in Egypt, where they had been compelled to do taskwork, from which they had been freed by Moses. It may be questioned whether all the tribes of Israel were ever in Egypt. The early legends which have come down to us had taken final shape at a time when stress was being laid on the national unity of Israel, and doubtless this unity has in many cases been wrongly ascribed to the past.[1]

2. Tribal division and conquest of Palestine.— The twelve tribes of which, in later times, Israel was considered to be composed fall into four groups, severally connected by descent from four women to whom they traced their ancestry. The Leah group included Reuben, Simeon, Levi, Judah, Issachar, and Zebulun; the Rachel group, Joseph (subdivided into Ephraim and Manasseh) and Benjamin. To Zilpah, said to be Leah's handmaid (whereby some dependence upon the Leah tribes seems to be indicated), were assigned Gad and Asher; to Bilhah, Rachel's handmaid, Dan and Naphtali.[2] We need not suppose that all the tribes finally incorporated in Israel had become confederated before the Exodus or even before the conquest of Palestine. For the Egyptian sojourn of the Rachel tribes at least we have the witness of Amos (2^{10} 3^{1}); for that of the Leah tribes we have no early evidence apart from the Pentateuch; but it would be difficult to explain the prominence of Moses, a Levite, in the traditions of the Exodus, if only the Rachel tribes had come out of Egypt. The tribes which are represented as descended from the concubines were probably of mixed origin, mainly Canaanite, and were incorporated in Israel only after the conquest of Palestine. In addition to these, in Judah at least, were other tribes, such as the Calebites, which, however, remained more or less distinct for a long time after their inclusion in Judah. It is probable that these clans entered upon their inheritance from the south; but, since Reuben, not Judah, is reckoned as the first-born son of Leah, by which priority of settlement is probably to be understood, and since Moses the Levite was buried in Reubenite territory east of the Jordan,[3] the Pentateuchal tradition, according to which the land between the Arnon and the Jabbok was first won by Israel, and W. Palestine was invaded from this region, may be accepted as correct for both the Leah and the Rachel tribes, though it is unlikely that these acted together. In the section Jg 1^{1-7} Simeon is associated with Judah, but the writer to whom we owe this section in its present form has probably modified an early tradition of Simeon's first invasion of Palestine to suit the fact that in later times Simeon was incorporated with Judah. Bezek, which is reasonably identified with the modern Ibzik, 14 miles N.E. of Shechem, seems to be beyond the sphere of Judah's operations; but a Simeonite war in this neighbourhood is perfectly consistent with the fact that in Gn 34 (cf. 49) Simeon is found with Levi in central Palestine. We do not know

[1] We must guard against the supposition that every statement in the Pentateuch and the historical books of the OT embodies a 'tradition.' Hebrew writers were as capable of drawing inferences as modern commentators, and in some cases they cannot have intended their statements to be taken literally. In the section Gn 25^{1-4} we have what appears to be a mere literary device to show in genealogical fashion the connexion of Israel with Midian and other tribes. It is conceivable that the section is now misplaced, and that it once followed the account of the birth of Ishmael; but it does not harmonize well with the tone of that story, and in any case the editor who gave it its present position can scarcely have failed to notice its incongruity, if taken literally, with its context. In the OT we are dealing with writings emanating from a people whose ideas of arrangement were based on oral rather than on literary methods.

[2] Although the grouping of the Leah and Rachel tribes is probably pre-Palestinian, the names Leah and Rachel may be somewhat later. On such points certainty is impossible.

[3] It is a significant fact that Gn $50^{10f.}$ evidently implies that the tomb of Israel was east of the Jordan. The burial at Machpelah belongs to the later and exclusively Judæan modification of tradition.

the extent of the area occupied by these tribes, but it is probable that, allowance being made for the many strongholds which remained in the hands of the Canaanites, the five Leah tribes west of the Jordan were originally contiguous, Judah being settled in the south, where the tribe came into contact with the friendly Calebites, and Issachar and Zebulun in the plain of Megiddo and the district to the north.

The permanent effect of this invasion of W. Palestine was not very great. Issachar and Zebulun were entirely dominated by the Canaanites; Simeon, which, next to Reuben, must have been originally the most important of the Leah tribes, was before long expelled from its first settlements, the survivors finding a refuge in the south;[1] at the same time Levi as a territorial tribe ceased to exist. Since, however, in view of Gn 34, 49, it can hardly be maintained that Levi was always merely a priestly caste, we may reasonably conclude that the tribe of Levi once had a settlement just where we should expect to find it, viz. between Simeon and Judah; and, if so, we may hazard the guess that Shiloh was the chief sanctuary of Levi, while the tribe still occupied territory in central Palestine.[2]

The Leah tribes' invasion was followed by a second, undertaken by the Rachel tribes under the leadership of Joshua. These crossed the Jordan near Jericho, which they took, advancing thence to Ai and Bethel, from which point they gradually extended their power over central Palestine.[3] For a long time many Canaanite fortresses remained unsubdued, but the tribes of Israel (Leah and Rachel) were able by degrees to consolidate their position and to exercise some sort of hegemony over tribes of mixed origin—the sons of the handmaids. The assignment of Gad to Leah's handmaid may be explained by the position of the tribe immediately to the north of Reuben—Asher, similarly assigned, being contiguous to Zebulun. Dan, assigned to Rachel's handmaid, lay immediately to the west of the Rachel tribes, and the similar assignment of Naphtali may perhaps be accounted for by its proximity to the northern Dan. Benjamin, which would appear to have been originally a subdivision of the Joseph tribes,[4] gained in importance sufficiently to be reckoned as a separate tribe, and colonists from Manasseh re-crossed the Jordan and settled in Bashan.

3. Union of the tribes.—It is impossible here to do more than indicate briefly the process by which the tribes of Israel were welded together. The cause of unity was the common danger which for several generations threatened the tribes, either from the original inhabitants of Canaan, whom they had sought to dispossess, or from other invaders, such as the Philistines, who, like Israel, were seeking to gain possession of the country. Thus the struggle against the king of Hazor (Jos 11, Jg 4) probably involved not only Naphtali, but also the neighbouring tribes; the power of Sisera and the fortified towns of the plains of Megiddo and Jezreel threatened both the Leah tribes, Issachar and Zebulun, and the Rachel tribes to the south of them. From time to time a military leader who had been successful in struggles of this kind would exercise authority as a king in the region which he had delivered. Thus Gideon was elected king[1] over some portion of Manasseh and Ephraim. Somewhat later, apparently towards the end of the 11th cent. B.C., the opposition of Philistine Ammonites and Amalekites demonstrated the need of concerted action, and for a time united the Rachel tribes with the Leah tribes farther south. The union was short-lived, and was broken in the reign of Rehoboam; but it gave to later ages an ideal of what Israel should be.

An exact history of the reigns of Saul and David is impossible. The longer accounts of these reigns —though they doubtless embody some true traditions—are inconsistent with the short summaries given in 1 S $14^{47f.}$ and in 2 S 8. These sections, which are certainly quite independent, show that in the circles in which they originated all that was definitely known of the reigns of Saul and David was that certain wars had been waged during this period, the exploits of the two kings not being clearly distinguished.[2]

4. Early religion of Israel.—Of the religion of the tribes of Israel proper at the time of the conquest of Palestine we have no direct information; all the stories relating to this period are written for the edification of later ages and are coloured by their circumstances. The most noteworthy passages which throw any light on the subject are Am 5^{25} and Jer 7^{22}. If in both the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. it could be asserted that Israel had not offered sacrifices and burnt-offerings during the sojourn in the wilderness, we cannot doubt that throughout the Monarchy there still existed in some circles traditions of a religion which must have been very different from what is presented to us, not only in the books of Judges, Samuel, and Kings, but even in the earlier documents of the Pentateuch. We need not go so far as to suppose that in the early days sacrifice was altogether unknown, but we shall scarcely do justice to the plain words of the prophets if we do not conclude that it was a comparatively infrequent rite, perhaps confined to the feast of the Passover. The statements of Amos and Jeremiah are also in harmony with the fact that the great feasts of Israel were mainly agricultural, and could not, therefore, have been celebrated by such people as the Rechabites (*q.v.*), who were loyal worshippers of the national God of Israel. It is not improbable that the Rechabites may be regarded as representative of the true Israelite, as distinct from the Canaanite, elements in Israel. Presumably before the conquest of Canaan the Israelites lived mainly on milk, as do the Bahima and the Todas in modern

[1] Whether the expulsion of Simeon was due to the Canaanites only, or, in some measure, to the Rachel tribes, cannot be determined. It is noteworthy that in Gn 34^{30} (cf. 49^{5-8}) Israel repudiates the action of Simeon and Levi, and in Gn 42^{24} Joseph imprisons Simeon. The later settlement of Simeonites in Judah proves nothing as to their earlier home. The migration of the Danites from their original settlement furnishes an exact analogy. It is, indeed, not impossible that those Simeonites who survived the Canaanite onslaught retained their original settlement as an *enclave* in the territory of the house of Joseph as long as the N. Israelite kingdom lasted, perhaps as late as the destruction of Shiloh, mentioned in Jer 7^{12-15}. The earliest evidence for Simeon's connexion with Judah is in Jg 1^{1-7}, which in its present form is not earlier than the Exile.

[2] The history of Shiloh presents a most difficult problem. The place appears to have possessed a sanctuary of great importance, which contained the Ark. It is generally supposed that Shiloh was destroyed by the Philistines, and that the surviving priests fled to Nob; but the only ground for connecting the priesthood of Shiloh with that of Nob is the awkward statement in 1 S 14^{3}. Moreover, Jeremiah (7^{12}) implies that the sanctuary of Shiloh had continued until fairly recent times (cf. Jg 21^{19}). Its destruction perhaps took place in the catastrophe referred to in Is 7^{8}, i.e. about 670 B.C. If the cult at Shiloh differed in important particulars from that of other sanctuaries of the Rachel tribes, we can understand why N. Israelite writers should ignore it. It is certainly hard to believe that the Ark (*q.v.*) was connected with the early religion of the Rachel tribes, for, had this been the case, a duplicate would probably have been made.

[3] Jos 8^{30-35} is based directly on Dt 27, and cannot be regarded as a 'tradition.'

[4] Cf. 2 S 19^{20}, Am 5^{6} 6^{6}.

[1] That Gideon, or Jerubbaal (if the two are really identical), was king is evident from Jg 9^{2}. The account of Gideon's refusal of the kingship (Jg 8^{23}) evidently proceeds from the same clerical school as 1 S 8 10^{17-19} 12.

[2] Definiteness is no proof of historicity. Many of the incidents recorded may be historical, though they are not necessarily ascribed to the right persons. There is no reason to doubt that Goliath was slain by somebody, but the otherwise unknown Elhanan (2 S 21^{19}; cf. 23^{24}) was probably the hero on that occasion, his exploit being ascribed, centuries afterwards, to the better known Bethlehemite David.

times, though the eating of game may also have been allowed. We may accordingly picture the primitive Israelites as a race of men cruel, fierce, and barbarous indeed, but preserved by their abstinence from agriculture from that crude nature-worship with which agriculture was connected. It may well be that the great prophetic reformers of the 8th and 7th centuries B.C. were not so much innovators as champions of an ancient Israelite tradition which the most genuine Israelite families had never wholly abandoned.

The provenance of the name of the national Israelite God, Jahweh (Jehovah),[1] is as yet uncertain. Ex 3^{14} (E) represents it as revealed to Moses at Horeb, whereas according to J the name was known to the antediluvian ancestors of Israel (Gn 4^{26}). Ex 3, as is shown below, reflects the circumstances of a later age, but it is noteworthy that Joshua bears a name compounded with the Tetragrammaton, and it is possible that the tribes of Israel were united in the worship of Jahweh before the conquest of Palestine.

Yet, if they gave to the God whom they worshipped the same name, they at all events represented Him by different symbols. The tribe of Levi, and probably all the Leah tribes, venerated a seraph, or winged serpent; the Rachel tribes, a bull. They seem to have practised circumcision—though the story in Ex 4^{24-26} might suggest that the rite had not been adopted by the primitive ancestors of Israel—but it was performed, at all events normally, not in infancy but in adolescence or manhood.[2] This fact and the use of flint knives (Jos $5^{2f.}$, Ex 4^{25}) show that the rite was of a barbarous character, as among the modern Zulus and other peoples. In the earliest times Jahweh would seem to have been regarded as a God of war, and we may conclude that the tabus to which we find warriors subject (cf. 1 S $21^{4f.}$ etc.) date from primitive times.

We cannot say whether other features of Israelite religion were brought by Israel into Palestine or were there acquired. We do not even know whether the observance of the new moon and the Sabbath goes back to the earliest period. Similarly, we have no exact information regarding the ethical ideas current in Israel in pre-Palestinian days. It is probable that then, as in later times, polygamy[3] prevailed, and that, though adultery was condemned, concubinage was freely allowed. Ideas of blood vengeance may also be ascribed to the earliest period.

5. Blending of Israelite and Canaanite religious ideas and traditions.—It was not long before the Israelite conquerors, with the exception, perhaps, of some families, such as the Rechabites, became thoroughly merged with the conquered Canaanites, adopting the customs and consequently, to a great extent, the religion of the latter. Canaanite sanctuaries continued to exist as sanctuaries of the mixed race resulting from the fusion of conquerors and conquered. At these sanctuaries Israel would acquire the traditions of the patriarchal heroes associated with them. Thus we may suppose that at Bethel Israel learned the traditions of Jacob, at Ramah of Rachel, at Shechem of Joseph, and so forth; and these, being now regarded as ancestors of the united people, would have deeds assigned to them which in pre-Israelite times had not been told of them. The transparently artificial character of some features in the genealogies has already been noticed, and we have only to suppose that this free treatment of the genealogical style was possible in early times to account for much in the patriarchal stories which is otherwise inexplicable. Probably Joseph was at first revered as the ancestor of the population in the district of Shechem, where was his reputed tomb; Jacob and Rachel would be similarly honoured in the districts of Ramah and Bethel, Abraham at Hebron, and so forth. With the growing sense of the unity of the nation, traditions originally local would obtain a wider currency, and thus, in course of time, the reputed ancestors of clans would be regarded as ancestors of great tribes, or even of the whole nation.[1]

Perhaps the only sanctuary during the period of the Judges which might be regarded as genuinely Israelite was Shiloh. It is noteworthy that no theophany is related in connexion with it; no patriarch is buried there; its foundation is associated with no great name; while, on the other hand, a tradition which, though perhaps considerably modified, cannot be very late ascribes to it the possession of the Ark, and Jeremiah states that Jahweh put His name there at the first. If Shiloh was Israelite rather than Canaanite, we can understand why, as the absence of prophetic references shows, it was not popular among the mixed population. Jeremiah ($7^{12ff.}$) certainly implies that Shiloh existed as a sanctuary long after the period of the Judges, and Jg 18^{31}, which is not at all early in its present form, is in harmony with the supposition. Jeremiah may have regarded Shiloh as the sanctuary which most nearly resembled Jerusalem.[2]

That the religion of Israel should be very greatly affected by that of Canaan was inevitable. Since in primitive times agriculture was bound up with religion, so that agricultural operations might almost be reckoned as ritual observances, a pastoral people in adopting agriculture would, almost of necessity, adopt the religion of the agriculturists. Hence Canaanite feasts became Israelite (see, further, art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Hebrew], vol. v. pp. 863-867), and the name *Baal* (*q.v.*), by which the Canaanites denoted their god, was applied to Jahweh.

Household gods appear to have been common (1 S $19^{13ff.}$, Gn $31^{19b.}$); here and there a chieftain or wealthy man, such as Gideon or Micah, would build a sanctuary for an idol which would be reverenced by the family or tribe.

Of the appearance of these idols we have no information. The implication that David's *teraphim* was in human form only proves that this form was common when the story took shape. It would seem that the idol at Shiloh was a bronze seraph,[3] and

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[1] There is no doubt that the pronunciation 'Jehovah' rests altogether on a misconception. At the same time the name, in this form, has so long been bound up with the religious ideas of English-speaking people that the author of this article thinks it might stand. But the form Jahweh, having been used throughout this Encyclopædia, is adopted in this article also.

[2] The proof of this assertion is to be found in the note in Jos 5^{4-7}. The writer seeks to excuse the non-circumcision of the people on their arrival at Gilgal on the ground that during the journey circumcision had been impossible. No one could have accepted such an excuse, if the circumcision of infants had been contemplated, but it might be accepted as valid in the case of adults. We may perhaps infer from the story of the vicarious circumcision of Moses that the rite was occasionally practised on infants, but we should probably infer from Jos 5 that down to the Exile the normal time was manhood (see, further, art. CIRCUMCISION [Semitic], vol. iii. p. 679 f.).

[3] On such points it is impossible to speak definitely. It cannot be maintained that polyandry is found in the OT, though some Hebrew customs may be supposed to have originated in such a state of things.

[1] We need not suppose that all the stories of the patriarchs can be explained from incidents of which we have precise knowledge. The traditions of the nation generally have been finally shaped in the south, and incidents true with regard to Judah, or to part of it, may have been referred to N. Israel, or *vice versa*. There may have been, at least for some of the tribes, other periods of bondage besides that in Egypt. Thus Hosea (12^{12}) seems to refer to a bondage among the Aramæans, resulting in an Aramæan marriage alliance.

[2] We need not suppose that the account of the abuses at Shiloh represents a genuine tradition. The motive of the story is to exalt the priesthood of Zadok, and the abuses described are probably those against which the Zadokites protested.

[3] For the evidence of this statement see art. ARK, vol. i. pp. 791-793.

that the image made by Micah and stolen by the Danites was in the form of a bull (see, further, art. IMAGES AND IDOLS [Hebrew and Canaanite], above, p. 138 ff.).

Doubtless some cults were always merely local. In the Moloch worship which called forth the denunciation of the 7th cent. prophets we may recognize an early Canaanite cult of which, perhaps, a faint trace remains in the story of Melchizedek, in which the first-born children were sacrificed to the king as the embodiment of the god.[1] High places with altars (see artt. HIGH PLACE, vol. vi. pp. 678–681, ALTAR [Semitic], vol. i. pp. 350–354) appear to have been numerous, and there were not a few larger sanctuaries with temples and idols. Whether a priest was always necessary for a sacrifice it is difficult to say (see art. SACRIFICE [Hebrew]). The victim could, apparently, be slain by the offerer; but it is difficult to decide whether it was competent for the layman to burn the fat and to pour out the blood on the altar. All the more important sanctuaries had organized priesthoods in which the priestly office, though not necessarily hereditary, would tend to become so. The priest was the repository of religious tradition, and where there was an idol to be kept he, or a subordinate, was the custodian (see, further, art. PRIEST [Hebrew]). Most important of all, he was acquainted with the proper way of obtaining an oracle by means of the sacred lot, and possessed the necessary paraphernalia. A decision thus reached would, in matters of dispute, become a precedent for the future, and the priests would gradually become the exponents of much of the common law. How far their functions ever coincided with those of the 'sacred men' (*k*ᵉ*dhēshîm*) cannot be determined. Underlying the story in 1 S 2[22] we may perhaps discern a state of things in which the priests acted as *k*ᵉ*dhēshîm*, but in many cases, at any rate, the office was distinct. These 'sacred men,' one of the greatest blots on the ancient religion of Israel, the existence of whom was the chief cause of the prophetic antagonism to the high places, appear to have been Canaanite in origin. They acted as the surrogates of the god in stimulating the reproductive powers of nature. It is doubtless to the ideas associated with them that we may ascribe that other great blot, the sacrifice of the first-born. Since the 'opening of the womb,' the fruitfulness of marriage, was ascribed to the union with the god acting in the person of the *k*ᵉ*dhēshîm*, the first-born would naturally be regarded as the property of the god (cf. also art. FIRST-BORN [Hebrew], vol. vi. p. 35 f.). The office of 'sacred women' (*k*ᵉ*dhēshôth*) may have been simply an extension of the principle implied in the *k*ᵉ*dhēshîm*, or may have been directly derived from Ashtoroth worship.[2]

In addition to the priests, who were definitely attached to certain sanctuaries, and who ascertained the divine will by casting lots in the presence of the idol with sacrifice and due formalities, there were also diviners (*k*ᵉ*sāmîm*), who would appear, like the priests, to have made use of some method of casting lots. They were not, however, attached to any sanctuary, and their divination required neither sanctuary nor sacrifice. The references in Is 3[2] and Mic 3[7] show that the diviner during the Monarchy was a prominent figure in Israelite society.[3]

Besides the priests and diviners who ascertained the divine will by mechanical means, there were some who professed to possess the same knowledge through intuition or inspiration. These fall into two main classes, represented respectively by the seer and the prophet (see, further, art. PROPHECY AND PROPHETS [Hebrew]). These were in their origin quite distinct, although they were finally regarded as identical. The function of the seer is best illustrated by the story of Saul's application to Samuel concerning his father's lost asses. The prophets, on the other hand, were originally enthusiasts banded together, whose activities appear to have been directed in early times chiefly towards the stirring up of the martial spirit in Israel. Certainly such men as Isaiah or Jeremiah would not in earlier days have been included among the prophets. But—perhaps with the coming of peace—the prophets, whose efforts had been directed originally to the setting forth of Jahweh's will in war, tended to become exponents of His will in other matters, and thus, to some extent, approximated to the seers. It would seem that the prophets proper lived in communities,[1] and were supported largely by the gifts of those to whom they prophesied. The Nazirites (*q.v.*), of whom we have a full account only in the later legislation, were merely persons who for a greater or less period were bound by certain tabus. The term seems originally to have included the consecrated warrior (cf. Am 2[11f.]).

Of the religious history of Israel under the Monarchy down to the middle of the 9th cent. B.C. we have little information. We hear of Saul's construction of altars (1 S 14[35]), of David's bringing of the Ark to Jerusalem and institution of a sanctuary on Mt. Sion, of Solomon's building of the Temple, and of the adoption of Bethel and Dan as the national sanctuaries of N. Israel and as a set-off against Jerusalem. But the motive of all these stories belongs to a much later period; even the extraordinarily graphic narratives of 2 Samuel can be shown by both literary and historical criticism to have no claim to be considered contemporary history. It is only here and there, in some cases perhaps through the inadvertence of later editors, that we have glimpses of the primitive type of early Israelite religion. The hacking to pieces of Agag 'before Jahweh' (1 S 15[32f.]), the conception of the Ark (evidently regarded as Jahweh's actual dwelling-place), the method of its removal in a new cart drawn by horned cattle (2 S 6[3ff.]),[2] David's dance before it (2 S 6[14ff.]), and the mention of *k*ᵉ*dhēshîm* in the reigns of Rehoboam, Asa, and Jehoshaphat are sufficient evidence that, for a parallel to the religion of the average Israelite during this period, we must look to modern Uganda or India rather than to modern Judaism. Doubtless there were exceptions to the rule; and some families, such as the Rechabites, though they remained barbarous and uncivilized, were uncontaminated by the grosser pollutions of Canaanite religion—the true salt of Israel, which never wholly lost its savour.

6. Introduction of Baal-worship.—Israelite religious history may be said to begin about the middle of the 9th cent. B.C., when a new danger for the religion of Jahweh had been brought about by Omri's alliance with the kingdom of Tyre and the marriage of his son Ahab with Jezebel. Hitherto Jahweh, at least in name, had been ac-

[1] Cf. J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*[2], London, 1907, ch. ii.

[2] For the whole subject see Frazer *op. cit.* iv. § 5, and cf. art. HIERODOULOI (Semitic and Egyptian), vol. vi. pp. 672–676.

[3] It is impossible here to take account of classes of soothsayers such as those who interpreted natural phenomena, or dreams, or of those who professed to be inspired by a familiar spirit or some influence other than that of the god (see, further, art. DIVINATION [Jewish], vol. iv. pp. 806–814).

[1] Although there is no reason for believing that any of the canonical prophets were members of such communities or, to use the OT phrase, 'the sons of the prophets,' they certainly in many cases surrounded themselves with bands of disciples, to whom we are indebted for the preservation of their teaching. The collections of prophetic sayings have had, in many cases, an origin similar to the collections of the sayings of our Lord which we have in the Gospels.

[2] That this method of carrying the Ark was not due to clerical slovenliness is abundantly clear from the fact that the Philistines, who were particularly anxious not to outrage Jahweh's holiness, are said to have adopted a similar method (1 S 6[7ff.]).

cepted as the sole God of the nation.[1] But now an attempt was made to introduce the worship of the Tyrian Baal—an attempt which was the more dangerous since many elements of the Canaanite religion had already passed over into that of Israel. The new movement, which set forth with Tyrian gorgeousness the ideas which the people had inherited from their Canaanite forbears, was naturally not unpopular. In some circles, however, it was fiercely resisted. The protagonist in the struggle was a Gileadite prophet, Elijah, who left to his successor, Elisha, the task of maintaining the cause of Jahweh against Baal. It seemed for some time a forlorn hope, for Omri and Ahab were great kings; but the party of Elisha, taking advantage of the indignation against the royal family caused by the judicial murder of Naboth, at last succeeded, with the aid of the unscrupulous adventurer Jehu, in overthrowing the dynasty of Omri, and in forcing on the nation the acceptance of the principle: 'No God but Jahweh in Jahweh's land.'

It was in N. Israel that the cult of the Tyrian Baal had been most prominent; but Judah was not unaffected. We know little of the S. kingdom during this period; but it is almost certain that under Omri, and probably from the time of Baasha, Judah had been tributary to N. Israel. The absence of any direct statement to this effect is, doubtless, due to the pride of the Judæan editors to whom we owe the OT in its present form, for the facts can scarcely be interpreted in any other way. That Judah remained a separate kingdom may be explained from the common practice of ancient Asiatic conquerors, whose sole object was to obtain tribute, and who were content to leave the collection of it to native rulers.

Whether the school of Elijah attempted any reforms in the worship ostensibly paid to Jahweh we cannot say. Certainly the times were not very propitious, for Israel was engaged in a death-grapple with the Aramæans of Damascus, which lasted for more than half a century; but it is probable that the requirements of the religion of Jahweh were now formally set forth in the ancient Decalogue, which can be distinguished in both of the earliest documents of the Pentateuch, and which was probably drawn up in N. Israel, and subsequently adopted in Judah during the reign of Joash. The original draft of this Decalogue was probably engraved on two stone tablets which were preserved at Bethel, and the Judæan copy on two similar tablets which, since they vindicated Jahweh's rights against any other god, might well be deposited in the Ark, which had probably been originally the portable shrine of Jahweh's image[2] (the bronze seraph), and which perhaps still contained it. In this way we may explain how it was that the Ark came to be called 'the Ark of the Covenant.'

This early Decalogue was apparently as follows:

'(I.) I am Jahweh thy God, thou shalt worship no other god. (II.) The feast of unleavened cakes thou shalt keep: seven days thou shalt eat unleavened cakes. (III.) All that openeth the womb is mine; and all thy cattle that is male, the firstlings of ox and sheep. (IV.) My sabbaths shalt thou keep; six days shalt thou work, but on the seventh day thou shalt rest. (V.) The feast of weeks thou shalt celebrate, even the first-fruits of wheat harvest. (VI.) The feast of in-gathering thou shalt celebrate at the end of the year. (VII.) Thou shalt not sacrifice my sacrificial blood upon leavened bread. (VIII.) The fat of my feast shall not remain all night until the morning. (IX.) The first of the first-fruits of thy ground thou shalt bring into the house of Jahweh thy God. (X.) Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk.'[3]

[1] The statements about Solomon's introduction of foreign worship (1 K 11[1-8. 33], 2 K 23[13]) are not corroborated by any early document.

[2] See art. ARK.

[3] Space forbids a fuller discussion here of this most important code of laws. For a fuller account see the present writer's essay, 'History of the Jewish Church from Nebuchadnezzar to Alexander,' in *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, London, 1909, pp. 95–99. The original order of the laws cannot be determined.

It speaks volumes for the thoroughness with which the reformation was carried out in the time of Jehu that, notwithstanding the influx of Aramæans into Israel during the 9th cent., the labours of the 8th cent. prophets, Amos and Hosea, appear to be directed not so much against Aramæan cults as against superstitions which went back to pre-Aramæan days. There is no evidence that in the middle of the 8th cent. B.C. there was any danger from Aramæan cults.[1]

7. Reforming movement among 8th cent. prophets of N. Israel.—The great forward movement in the religion of Israel dates from about the middle of the 8th cent. B.C. Outwardly things looked prosperous. The horror of the long Aramæan war was now over, and Jeroboam II. had been able to rectify the frontiers greatly to the advantage of Israel. There was now no doubt that Jahweh—whatever ideas were associated with the name—was the God of Israel, and to Him were ascribed Israel's victories. The people had experienced a 'day of Jahweh' in His activity manifested against the Aramæans, and thronged His temples in the hope of inducing Him by sacrifice and offerings to give yet further proof of His love for His own people and hatred of their enemies. In this religious fervour, ethical considerations were entirely ignored. The commerce which the dynasty of Omri had laboured to develop, and which had been checked by the Aramæan wars, had begun to flourish again, and, though it had produced an increase of wealth and culture, it had brought in its train all those disadvantages which must arise when there is a sudden growth in national wealth. The perverted sense of religion was shown in the fact that the very materials of the sacrificial feasts were frequently the outcome of extortion and robbery. There were some, however, who remained loyal to the old Israelite traditions. In their eyes, that which passed as culture and progress was altogether anathema. They argued that it would have been better to continue the old life of simplicity, better never to have 'eaten of the tree of knowledge,' than to be compelled to witness the shame and horror which so-called progress had brought with it.[2]

It has been stated above that it is unlikely that sacrifice was a prominent feature in the life of Israel before the conquest of Palestine, and it may perhaps have been limited to an annual offering of firstlings (Passover). In the 8th cent., however, it was an integral part of the religion of Jahweh as it was set forth at all the high places. In the pastoral days of Israel, when the people had subsisted chiefly on milk, only a very solemn occasion would have warranted the slaughter of one of the flock, and sacrifices must accordingly have been infrequent. But in the agricultural and commercial phase of Israelite life, there was no difficulty in procuring sacrificial victims, and the wealthy could gratify their gluttony at sacrificial feasts, while at the same time they flattered themselves that they were propitiating Jahweh.

It was to a people whose religious ideas were of

[1] Am 5[26] might appear to disprove this statement, since, if it is genuine, it must be understood as referring to cults which had come in through Aramæan influence. The verse is, however, an isolated fragment having no connexion with the context; and, since the cults mentioned appear to be Assyrian rather than Aramæan, it is more likely that we have a fragment of a 7th cent. prophecy.

[2] The teaching which the writer of Gn 3 seeks to set forth by the present, doubtless greatly modified, form of the very primitive story therein contained probably expresses to a great extent the feeling of the Rechabites and the prophets of the 8th cent.; but there is no reason for supposing that the story was already current in N. Israel at this time. A very good discussion of the subject will be found in 'The Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil,' by F. C. Eiselen, in *BW* xxxvi. [1910] 101 ff.

this type that Amos, the first of those prophets whose teaching is collected in separate books,[1] addressed himself. There is no need to question the statement that he was not brought up as a prophet, and was not attached to any school or gild of prophets. It was a common belief in ancient Israel, and gave tremendous force to much of the prophetic teaching, that calamity of any sort implied divine displeasure. The impending calamity which called forth the eloquence of Amos, and which was, strange to say, apparently unperceived by the majority of the nation, was the threatened subjugation of the Palestinian States by the growing power of Assyria. Assyria was not unknown, at least to the governing classes, for Jehu, the founder of the reigning dynasty, had sought to strengthen his position by judicious presents[2] to Shalmaneser II. Few people, however, perceived that the independence of Israel was seriously menaced, and that the crippling of the Aramæan States, while it removed one danger, must bring about another infinitely greater. By what means Amos arrived at so true a perception of the political situation it is hard to say. There is much likelihood in the suggestion that for the disposal of the wool which his flocks produced he must have attended great markets, where he would learn the news of the world. The greatness of the man is shown by the fact that, when he realized his people's danger, he gave up all,[3] that he might bring them to a sense of their position. We know that he preached in the sanctuary at Bethel, probably on more than one occasion, but we have no means of determining the length of his ministry.

At such a place as Bethel it was clear that, if sacrifice was what Jahweh chiefly required, there was little cause for His threatened displeasure. Amos, accordingly, regards sacrifice as a misdirection of energy. He maintains that Jahweh requires mercy and righteousness, and will have none of sacrifice. Israel's fathers worshipped without sacrifice; why, then, should it now be imagined that sacrifice is the one essential?

It is not surprising that the man who shifted the centre of gravity in religion should have developed a new religious language. In his insistence on the ethical rather than on the physical holiness of Jahweh, Amos naturally gave a fresh *nuance* to existing terms. 'The day of Jahweh,' i.e. the day of Jahweh's activity, which was commonly understood as referring to the divine activity against Israel's foes, was used by Amos to denote the period of Jahweh's activity manifested against all unrighteousness, and, therefore, the period of punishment.[4]

A short time after the appearance of Amos another prophet began his ministry in the N. kingdom, probably at Bethel, but possibly at Shechem or in some other district. The book of Hosea, the text of which is very corrupt, is fragmentary and disjointed, and the meaning of many passages is very uncertain; but it is evident that we have here a varying background, and it would seem that the prophet's ministry, which, like that of Amos, began before the great catastrophe, was prolonged into the time of horror which preceded the final ruin of Israel.[1] The book of Hosea, even in passages which may well be dated before the anarchy of the closing years of the Israelite Monarchy, presents to us a much darker picture of Israelite religion than is found in the book of Amos. In the latter, with the possible exception of one very doubtful clause (2[7]),[2] there is, strange to say, no attack on the religious prostitution practised at many, if not all, of the sanctuaries, which, being ostensibly carried on in Jahweh's name, degraded Him to the level of Baal. Hosea, however, taught, it would seem, by the sad experiences of his own domestic life, denounced this religious prostitution as subversive of all morality. Like Amos, he is convinced of the futility of sacrifice, but he shows more clearly than Amos that the sanctuaries are in themselves a cause of degradation to Israel. Covetousness and sensuality, lust and cruelty, are rife among the people, while at the same time they profess to base their hope on Jahweh who 'will have mercy, and not sacrifice.' In spite of the difficulty caused by the mutilation and corruption of the text, the prophet Hosea stands out as perhaps the most lovable of all the goodly fellowship. He had experienced the sorrow of finding that one whom he most tenderly loved was incapable of rising above degrading superstition;[3] and, feeling that Israel had behaved towards Jahweh as Gomer had behaved towards himself, he credited Jahweh with a tenderness towards Israel such as he himself felt towards his superstitious wife. He thus became the preacher not only of Jahweh's justice, but also of His love.

Hosea's opposition to the superstitions which had originated in nature-worship may have led him also to attack the reverence for the golden bull at Bethel, since the bull is a fertility-god. The present book of Amos contains no denunciation of the worship of idols, and it is probable that Hosea was the originator of the movement which, somewhat later, brought about the introduction into the law of Israel of a prohibition of image-worship.

Hosea's influence must have been great, for Jeremiah more than a century afterwards shows how deeply he has drunk of his teaching. But the times were unpropitious for religious reform, and the leaven of Hosea's spirituality was slow in leavening the lump of Israelite superstition. It was not long, however, before the prophet's predictions were vindicated by the course of events. In Tiglath-Pileser's campaign in 734 B.C. Israel felt the heavy hand of Assyria, and in 722 the kingdom of N. Israel came to an end.

8. Continuance of the worship of Jahweh in Samaria after 722 B.C.—It has been a too common mistake to treat the land of Israel north of the kingdom of Judah as virtually a vacuum after 722; but it is to the exigencies of this district that we must look for an explanation of the subsequent development of Israelite religion. Thousands of captives were deported by Tiglath-Pileser and Sargon, and probably by Esar-haddon;[4] and Esar-

[1] There is no more reason for supposing that Amos himself wrote down his prophecies than there is for believing that our Lord wrote down the Sermon on the Mount. It may well be doubted whether even Jeremiah actually dictated his prophecies. The author of Jer 36 has probably made Jeremiah's command to Baruch to collect his prophecies somewhat more definite than is warranted by an analytical study of the book.

[2] It is scarcely possible that this can have been tribute in the strict sense of the term. Statements of Assyrian kings must not always be accepted at their face value.

[3] The words, 'the Lord took me from following the flock' (Am 7[15]), imply the permanent giving up of the lucrative occupation of a sheep-farmer for the precarious livelihood of a prophet (cf. Ps 78[70]).

[4] The book of Amos has not come down to us in the form in which it was originally written. There is more than one *hiatus* in the book as it stands, which may be due to mutilation, and considerable additions and modifications have been made, in order to bring the teaching up to date. The strange absence of any direct mention of Assyria is, perhaps, not a primitive feature.

[1] We are unable to determine how long Hosea's ministry lasted. The minimum time is fixed by the account of the birth of the prophet's three children. Since Israelite women, like the Baganda, suckled their children for three years (cf. 2 Mac 7[27]), at least a period of some eight years must have elapsed between the birth of Jezreel (presumably at the beginning of the prophet's ministry) and that of Lo-ammi.

[2] There is no reason for understanding Am 2[8a] as a reference to religious prostitution; 4[4], according to the more correct translation, shows that worshippers came to the sanctuary the day before the sacrifice.

[3] It is probable that the fault of Gomer was not adultery in the ordinary sense, but that, like other Israelite women of her time, she considered union with the *ḳᵉdhēshīm* a religious act. The guess may be hazarded that the slavery from which the prophet finally redeemed her was at some sanctuary; in other words, that she had become a *ḳᵉdhēsha*.

[4] The gloss in Is 7[8], apparently written by some one possessing an accurate knowledge of the history, implies that about 65

haddon and his successor (Ezr $4^{2, 10}$) introduced in their stead a number of colonists from N.W. Mesopotamia and other parts of the Assyrian Empire. But the worship of Jahweh was not extinguished. Indeed, it is not improbable that, on the one hand, the vindication of Hosea's teaching against idolatry by the destruction of the N. Israelite sanctuaries in 722 and the carrying off of their idols strengthened the hands of the reformers, and resulted in the enlargement of the existing Decalogue by a law forbidding the worship of images (cf. Ex $20^{23ff.}$); and, on the other, the efforts on the part of the worshippers of Jahweh to win over the heathen settlers brought about a new and important development in religion.

9. Reforming movement in Judah during the latter half of the 8th cent. B.C.—Of the religious history of Judah we know practically nothing from the reformation under Joash till the reign of Ahaz. It must not be forgotten that the compiler of the book of Kings makes two assumptions which are of first importance for the criticism of the history which he relates. Writing from the standpoint of Deuteronomy, he concludes that those who have been worshippers at sanctuaries other than Jerusalem are thereby to be classified among those who 'have done evil in the sight of Jahweh'; and, believing that disaster is the chief proof of wickedness, he is apt to infer that those who have suffered disaster must have been sinners above other men. Having regard, then, to the fact that, so far as we are able to form an opinion from the scanty materials available, Judah down to the middle of the 8th cent. B.C. was in no respect in advance of N. Israel, and may perhaps have been inferior, it is precarious to argue that, because a particular superstition is not mentioned before a certain date, it must have originated later. We are certainly not justified in affirming that Ahaz introduced into Judah the sacrifice of the first-born simply because he is the first king of whom such a sacrifice is recorded. It may well be that an action which in the days of the earlier kings would have attracted no attention, because it was the universal practice, is specially mentioned in the case of Ahaz, because in his time it was done in defiance of the prophetic teaching. If more of Isaiah's discourses had come down to us, we should probably be in a position to understand the verdict passed on Ahaz by the writer of the book of Kings.

Isaiah's most important contributions to the religious thought of his people are to be found in his insistence on the incompatibility of Jahweh's majesty and holiness with the images by which He was represented, and in his declaration that the Assyrian has been the scourge in the hand of Jahweh to chastise Israel, and that, this being effected, Assyrian ambition and cruelty must be punished. Isaiah's attack on idolatry, which may perhaps have been inspired to some extent by the teaching of his older contemporary Hosea, dates from the very beginning of his ministry. In the allegory of extraordinary force and majesty in which he narrates his call (Is 6) Isaiah gave expression alike to a higher conception of Jahweh and to his conviction of the coming ruin of the national life of his people. He pictured Jahweh enthroned in His temple, not as a seraph,[1] but in human form, clad in a gorgeous robe of which the train covered the whole of the temple floor, so as to leave room for no other god. As though to show Jahweh's superiority to the popular conception of Him which found expression in the bronze seraph, Isaiah represented Him as ministered to by seraphim, whose form he modified, the more clearly to bring out their inferiority, thereby implying that Jahweh was as far above the popular views of Him as the great king is above the ministers who dare not lift their eyes to his face.

The course of events which led to Isaiah's prediction of Jahweh's judgment on the Assyrian oppressors is somewhat obscure. The prediction itself and the prophet's unwavering faith in Jahweh's protection of His people in the face of Sennacherib's menace[1] gave him a temporary influence in Judah which enabled him to induce the king, Hezekiah, to carry out a drastic reform. We have, indeed, no information as to the year of Hezekiah's reign when this was done, but there are indications that Isaiah met with not a little opposition during the greater part of his ministry, and it is, therefore, probable that a reform which must have been intensely distasteful to many people was not carried out till the prophet's influence had reached its climax. At the beginning of his activity as a prophet, Isaiah had attacked the crudity of thought which could accept the bronze seraph as the representation of Jahweh. His teaching was now carried into effect, and the venerable idol was destroyed (2 K 18^4). Probably at the same time the primitive Decalogue, which had been accepted in Judah since the time of Joash, was enlarged by the insertion of a prohibition of 'molten gods' (Ex 34^{17}).

The precise extent of Hezekiah's reform is uncertain. We are told that the *'ăshērāh* (on which see art. POLES [Hebrew]), in the Temple court—perhaps associated specially with the *k'dhēshim* and *k'dhēshōth*—was cut down, and some attempt may have been made to reform the high places.[2] We may wonder that a king who so dared to wound the religious feelings of many of his subjects should have kept his throne. Yet in the last years of Hezekiah's reign the political situation was such that there was little likelihood of revolt; for, since Sennacherib had taken from Judah and had annexed to the neighbouring States no fewer than forty-six fortified cities, the population of the remaining districts, cowed by the horrors of the Assyrian wars, may have felt compelled to accept the king's action.

10. Reaction against the reformers.—There can be no doubt that the reformers had gone beyond that which commended itself to the popular conscience. There were many to whom Hezekiah's iconoclasm would appear to be a sin crying aloud for vengeance, and it is not surprising that, when his death occurred a few years later, there was a violent reaction. Not only was there a recrudescence of the ancient superstitions, but new cults were introduced by Assyrian officials and settlers; so that the cause of a pure monotheism appeared, for the time, to be lost in Judah.

It must not, however, be supposed that Israelite religion gained nothing from foreign influences during this period. Worship even at Jerusalem had been very barbarous, and contact with more highly civilized and cultured people could not fail to introduce some much needed improvements in

years after 735 something happened to N. Israel which deprived it of any claim to be still considered a nation. It is quite likely that Egypt, for selfish ends, had induced Samaria to rebel, with the result that Esar-haddon crushed resistance once for all.

[1] It must not be forgotten that the image of Jahweh at Jerusalem at this time was a bronze seraph, *i.e.* a flying serpent (Nu 21^8, 2 K 18^4; cf. Dt 8^{15}, Is 14^{29} 30^6, and Herod. ii. 75 *f.*). The serpent form may already have been modified by the introduction of some human features.

[1] In the absence of any proof that the disaster to the Assyrian army happened during a later campaign, and having regard to the obscurity of certain details in Sennacherib's own account, the year 701 B.C. may still stand as the date of the great deliverance.

[2] In 2 K 18^4 there is, as J. Wellhausen has pointed out (art. 'Israel,' *EBr*^{9} xiii. 413), a combination of the general and the particular which is not very convincing. It is, needless to say, impossible to argue from 2 K 18^{22} that the reforms had preceded the Assyrian invasion. All that we can justly deduce from the speech put into the mouth of Rabshakeh is that it was written at a time when there was considerable indignation in Judah over the destruction of the high places.

this direction. It is noteworthy that the first meeting between the king of Judah and a king of Assyria resulted in an important innovation in the ritual at Jerusalem; for Ahaz, when he had been summoned to Damascus in 732, saw there a great stone altar more suitable for sacrifice on a large scale than the brazen altar which had hitherto been in use in the Temple, and had a copy of it erected (2 K $16^{10ff.}$), thereby inaugurating that increase of decency in sacrifice which made it possible for a rite so savage to continue for centuries longer the rallying-point of Israel.

11. Religion of Jahweh in Samaria during the 7th cent. B.C.—Though in Judah, with the accession of Manasseh, reform was crushed and the religion of Jahweh itself appeared to be in jeopardy, in the north the religious outlook was soon to become somewhat brighter. Since the fall of the city of Samaria, the old kingdom of N. Israel had been governed by Assyrian officials, and the name Samaria was now applied to that portion of it which lay south of the plain of Megiddo. In consequence of the deportation of Israelites and importation of colonists from other portions of the Assyrian Empire, there existed in the province of Samaria at the end of Esar-haddon's reign—perhaps earlier[1]—so large an admixture of Aramæan and other settlers that the religion of Jahweh which still survived was but one of many cults. The great sanctuary of Bethel[2] had been deprived of its priests, and for a time there seemed a possibility that not only the work of Amos and Hosea, but even that of Elijah and Elisha, might be undone. But there were still prophets in the land, and a plague of lions, doubtless occasioned by the long war and the partial depopulation of the country, gave them their opportunity. They declared the cause of the trouble to be the neglect of the cult of the God of the land, and so far convinced the new settlers that an appeal was made to the king of Assyria to allow the return of one of the Israelite priests, in order that he might teach the cult of Jahweh. The appeal was successful, and Bethel was reopened, by the express permission of a king of Assyria, as a sanctuary of Jahweh (2 K $17^{26ff.}$). It is probable that, if other sanctuaries had been closed, they were reopened at the same time; but Bethel was of particular importance, not only for its traditions, but also by reason of its proximity to the boundary between Samaria and Judah. We may well believe that some at least of the Judæan reformers who were persecuted by Manasseh would find an asylum at Bethel, and would add strength to the reforming ideas there existing. For the present, indeed, there was no thought of giving effect to the teaching of Amos and Hosea concerning sacrifice. The influx of heathen Aramæans and others had put the clock back. It would have been impossible to persuade them at the same time not only to forsake their gods, but also to worship their new God Jahweh in a way entirely strange to them, without sacrifice. The first thing to be done was to win them over to the religion of Jahweh, and, in order to do this, it was necessary, not to take away His high places and altars, but rather to encourage the building of them.[3] In one respect, indeed, Hosea's teaching had been vindicated. The golden bull of Bethel no longer existed, and worship without idols was accepted by the Bethelite priesthood,[1] who would presumably teach on the basis of the primitive Decalogue, now amplified by the insertion of a law forbidding the worship of images.

12. Codification of law for Samaria.—The newcomers in Samaria would require instruction not only in the Israelite law of worship, but in what may be described as the common law of Israel, which may perhaps in some details have been already modified by Assyrian influence. The old Decalogue was, therefore, now combined with a collection of laws relating to slavery, property, and the like, in order that the population of Samaria might be united by identity of customs.[2] This law, which, with some later modifications, is now found in Ex 20^{23}–23, was probably issued originally as a separate document.

No mere code of laws could make those whose traditions were entirely heathenish whole-hearted worshippers of the God of Israel. They required to be taught the traditions of Israel, and to learn what great things Jahweh had wrought for the ancestors of the nation in which they were now incorporated. Hence the traditions which had been current at the great sanctuaries were collected, and worked into a continuous narrative, which embraced legends of the patriarchs, the story of the deliverance from Egypt, the sojourn in the wilderness, and the giving of the Law by Moses, which was identified with the code described above. That this document, which we know as the work of the Elohist (E), was originally designed for people who had quite recently been heathen is evident not only from such a statement as that in Gn 35^{2-4}, but also from the fact that the proper name of the God of Israel is represented as not originally known to the nation as a whole, and as specially revealed to Moses. It may also be inferred that the story in Ex 3^{13-15} was intended for people of Aramæan stock, since the Tetragrammaton is explained as being identical with the Aramaic word meaning 'He will be.'[3] How long

[1] Is $9^{11.12}$ may refer to the rush of Philistines and Aramæans to take possession of the land of those who had been deported from N. Israel. For 'the adversaries of Rezin' we should probably read 'his adversaries.'

[2] It may be that the priests of other N. Israelite sanctuaries were deported at the same time. There was, however, a special reason for removing the Bethelite priests, since Bethel was 'the king's sanctuary' (Am 7^{13}), and its priests would consequently be more closely connected with the royal family.

[3] The religious exigencies of Samaria at this period will explain the presence of a law enjoining the making of altars 'in every place' specially consecrated to the worship of Jahweh (Ex $20^{24f.}$). A similar motive underlies the statements in 1 S 14^{35}, 1 K 18^{30} $19^{10.14}$.

[1] The account of Moses' destruction of the 'golden calf' (Ex 32^{20}) might be thought to be suggested by what had actually taken place in the desecration of Bethel. Idols of various sorts, however, must have remained at some sanctuaries for a considerable time, and the method of destruction ascribed to Moses may be based on what was actually done in some places.

[2] The phrase 'to come near unto God' (Ex $22^{8f.}$ 21^{6}) will naturally mean 'to come to the nearest sanctuary.' It doubtless arose when there were images, but does not necessarily presuppose them. There is no necessity to understand the term in 21^{6} to mean 'household gods.' The explanation of the rite is that, according to primitive thought, there can be no exemption from the common law (which in Israel forbade perpetual servitude) except for the gods. By being attached to the temple doorpost the slave was brought into perpetual servitude, theoretically, to Jahweh, but, since Jahweh did not claim his service, in reality to the master from whom he did not desire to be separated. An apparently contrary procedure, but based on precisely the same conception of the gods as exempted from common law, is found at Delphi and elsewhere, where a slave, in order to receive his freedom—the manumission of slaves being prohibited by the common law—was made over to the god, to whom theoretically he belonged, though he was not attached to the temple service (see Daremberg-Saglio, i. 302 ff.; C. Lécrivain in Daremberg-Saglio, iii. 1219; J. E. B. Mayor on Juv. i. 104 f.). This parallel is sufficient to disprove the argument based on Ex 21^{6} that we must ascribe the origin of these laws to a period when household gods were still recognized.

[3] The phrase 'I will be what I will be' (the translation 'I am,' in the sense of *eimi*, is impossible) is given in the first person, because Jahweh is represented as speaking. It is probable that in the latter part of v.[14] 'I will be' (EV 'I am') is a mistaken correction for an original Jahweh (יהוה). The original writer evidently supposed יהוה (Jahweh, Jehovah) to be related to אֶהְיֶה (*ehyeh*), 'I will be,' as the third person to the first. It must be remembered that, owing to the weakening which took place in the pronunciation of the vowels, the third person imperfect of the verb הוה, which, according to the Massoretic pronunciation, would, if it occurred, be pronounced יָהְוֶה (*yehewèh*), must in earlier times have been pronounced יִהְוֶה, and must, therefore, have been nearly, if not quite, identical with the proper name of the God of Israel.

the process of the collection and redaction of traditions lasted we do not know, but it was probably completed by the end of the 7th cent. B.C. It may have gone on at more than one centre, but we shall not be wrong in assuming that Bethel, the chief sanctuary of Samaria, was responsible for its final shape.

It would in itself be unlikely that the school of men who produced E would have ceased from their activity at its publication. We may suppose that, shortly afterwards, a beginning was made with the work of collecting the various traditions as to the conquest of Palestine by the tribes, and the exploits of the judges, kings, and prophets. This does not mean that E itself was continued down into the Monarchy, for it is very doubtful whether any parts of the existing books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel, or Kings ever formed one document with it, but merely that the writing of E provided the stimulus for the collection of other N. Israelite traditions. It must be remembered that the collectors had a practical purpose, and were not actuated by antiquarian interests. Thus, in the story of Elijah, Jahweh's protagonist against foreign cults, we have precisely the teaching which was necessary in Samaria in the 7th cent. B.C. As Ex 20^{24} encourages the building of altars in places consecrated to Jahweh, so Elijah is represented as repairing the altar of Jahweh that is broken down, while at the same time he has friendly relations with heathen outside Jahweh's land (1 K 19^{14} $17^{9ff.}$). Similarly in E itself it is noteworthy that Balaam comes from 'Aram . . . from the mountains of the East' (Nu 23^{7}). The story of an Aramæan prophet who was constrained to declare the superiority of Jahweh and Israel would have special force in Samaria in the 7th cent. B.C.

13. Prophetic activity under Josiah.—Meanwhile in Judah the violent reaction against reform which the accession of Manasseh had brought about was spending its force. Manasseh died about 641 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Amon, who died after a short reign of two years and was succeeded by his son Josiah, then only eight years old. We have no information about the early years of Josiah's reign, but it is evident from the subsequent course of events that the antagonism to the teaching of the school of Isaiah must have greatly moderated. For some time nothing occurred to give the necessary impetus to a popular reformation; but about the year 626 news of the havoc which the Scythians were working in the districts north of Palestine, and which menaced Judah itself, caused the prophets to preach repentance, in order that the threatened blow might be averted. Among these the most prominent, as he was undoubtedly the greatest, was Jeremiah, who for the next forty years or more exercised a profound influence on the religious development of his fellow-countrymen, though comparatively few were prepared to accept his teaching in its entirety. It is remarkable that Jeremiah shows few signs of direct dependence upon his great predecessor Isaiah, while he is evidently deeply imbued with the teaching of Hosea—a fact which may perhaps be explained on the hypothesis suggested above, viz. that during the persecution under Manasseh, Judæan reformers found an asylum in Samaria, especially at Bethel. The evils which Jeremiah believed to be calling forth the wrath of Jahweh are to a great extent those which the earlier prophets had denounced, but in addition to these there were some foreign cults of Aramæan and Assyrian origin, of which there had been an influx during the reign of Manasseh.

About five years after the beginning of Jeremiah's mission, during some building operations at the Temple[1] a book was found which, when read before the king, convinced him of the need of reform. There can be little doubt that the historian of 2 K 22 f., whose account, however, can scarcely be held to be contemporaneous with the events recorded,[2] identified this book with Deuteronomy. But this identification is beset with difficulties, even if the book read to Josiah be supposed to have included only chs. 12–26. If Deuteronomy be anterior to 621, it is hard to understand how, at a time when the province of Samaria was governed by an Assyrian official and Judah by a native king,[3] any man or school of men could have drawn up an entirely new code of law for all Israel. Men of average common sense do not legislate in the air for a situation which may conceivably arise nobody knows when, but for one which is actually present or imminent. Moreover, the ritual law of Deuteronomy with respect to the fat and the blood appears to be in substance later than that which is found in the Law of Holiness (Lv 17^{3-6}), and which may reasonably be supposed to represent the custom in Jerusalem at the time of the Exile (cf. Ezk 44^{7-15}). Further, Jeremiah's emphatic repudiation of the sacrificial law which, whenever he first uttered it, he reiterated as late as the fourth year of Jehoiakim is incompatible with the supposition that Deuteronomy became virtually canonical Scripture in 621.[4] There is, indeed, no need to call in question the main incidents of the finding of the book. It is true that, although in the Deuteronomic period the phrase, 'the book of *the* law' (*sēfer hat-tōrāh*), would naturally suggest Deuteronomy, the mere omission of the definite article would make a wider application possible. '*A* book of *tōrāh*' might be used of any collection of prophetic teaching (cf. Is 8^{16}), and the book read before Josiah may have been a roll containing sayings of Micah (cf. Jer 26^{18}), or of Isaiah, or, more probably, it may have been a collection of Hosea's prophecies which had been brought to Jerusalem from Bethel when the persecution under Manasseh had come to an end.

14. Reformation under Josiah.—It is evident that the king and his advisers felt the necessity of putting a stop to the superstitious rites practised at Judæan sanctuaries; but the accomplishment of this was by no means an easy matter, for the national welfare was popularly supposed to depend upon them. Mere legislation on the subject would have been futile, for there was no machinery to enforce such legislation. A solution of the difficulty was provided by what had hitherto appeared to be an unmitigated calamity, viz. Sennacherib's curtailment of Judæan territory eighty years before. No king, however absolute he may be in theory, can with safety shock the sensibilities of the overwhelming majority of his subjects, but,

[1] The description of the work (2 K $22^{5ff.}$) apparently implies nothing more than mere 'church restoration.' The Temple may have been injured in some attack on Jerusalem during the reign of Manasseh—for the account in 2 Ch $33^{11ff.}$ may have some basis in fact—or even in the early years of Josiah. We might in this way account for the disappearance of the Ark, which could not have taken place very long before the fourth year of Jehoiakim, if, indeed, Jer 3^{16} be as early as this. But possibly the Ark was taken away at the time of Jehoiachin's captivity (cf. 2 K 24^{13}).

[2] In an age when newspapers did not exist, events would not as a rule be recorded in writing immediately after their occurrence.

[3] It is true that the section 2 K 23^{15-20} (cf. 4^{b}) implies that Josiah had jurisdiction in Samaria, from which it might be inferred not only that the cities which Sennacherib had taken away had been restored, but also that the province of Samaria had been annexed to Judah. This section, however, is clearly a later insertion, for v.[8] describes the area of the reformation as extending from 'Geba to Beersheba' (cf. 2 K $23^{1-2.5.24}$). Moreover, both Isaiah and Jeremiah address Judah and Jerusalem; Gedaliah is governor over the cities of Judæa (Jer 40^{5}), and Zerubbabel is 'governor of Judah.'

[4] For a fuller discussion of the subject see R. H. Kennett, 'The Date of Deuteronomy,' in *JThSt* vii. [1906] 481–500.

thanks to Sennacherib, the kingdom of Judah had lost most of its important towns, and Josiah reigned over a little kingdom comprising country districts with small towns and villages, Jerusalem being the only city of first-rate importance.[1] We cannot be surprised that the king and his advisers shrank from causing mortal offence to Jerusalem; they probably considered, however, that, if a measure of reform could be introduced which could be accepted by Jerusalem, the opposition of the remaining portion of the kingdom would be a negligible quantity. Moreover, the Temple at Jerusalem was an annexe of the royal palace, and Josiah doubtless supposed that he would be able to exercise over it a supervision which would be impossible in the case of the country sanctuaries. With these principles in view, the king and his advisers carried out a sweeping reform. The country sanctuaries were destroyed utterly;[2] the *k*ᵉ*dhēshim*, who had quarters even in the Temple, were put to death; the foreign cults recently introduced were abolished. No change was made in regard to sacrifice, except that it could now be celebrated only at Jerusalem. Needless to say, a change so tremendous as the abolition of sanctuaries numerous enough to be described in the terms 'upon every high mountain and under every spreading tree' (Jer 2^{20} $3^{6.\ 13}$ 17^{2}; cf. Dt 12^{2}) for a time caused many difficulties. In the first place, it was necessary to make provision for the country priests, the Levites as they were called, who were now thrown out of employment, for the reformers would scarcely have dared, had they wished to do so, to treat them as they had treated the *k*ᵉ*dhēshim*. Josiah doubtless supposed that, since the number of worshippers at Jerusalem would now be increased, the Temple revenues would be able to support a more numerous priesthood, and he seems to have intended that the priests who had ministered at the country sanctuaries should now be allowed to become members of the gild of Zadok at Jerusalem. But he had not taken into account the opposition of the Zadokites to such a scheme, and in effect those country priests who managed to gain a footing in the Temple at all were placed by the Zadokites in an inferior position, so that henceforward the Jerusalem priests were of two ranks (cf. 2 K $23^{8.\ 9}$, Ezk $44^{10\text{-}14}$).

It is manifest that the discontent caused by the king's reforms in the country districts must have been intense. Even in Jerusalem the forbidden practices went on, if not in the Temple, at all events more or less openly. The country people had good cause for discontent, for, since no change had been made in the sacrificial law, and the domestic animals could be slain only at an altar, it had become illegal to hold a feast except at Jerusalem.[3] It would seem that some inhabitants of the more distant districts, having no altar near, dispensed with one altogether, so that it now became necessary to urge upon them the requirements of the sacrificial law. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that, although the original impetus to reform had been given by prophets who repudiated sacrifice altogether, a school of prophets arose who laid stress on the necessity of performing sacrificial ordinances. Against those who, because of their distance from Jerusalem, were inclined to drop sacrificial worship altogether, or to slaughter domestic animals without due ritual, the obligation of keeping the great feasts, which were, indeed, specially mentioned in the ancient Decalogue, was insisted on (Ex $34^{22f.}$), and old stories of the building of altars and of solemn sacrifice by the patriarchs were again told.[1] The result may be seen in the Jahvistic document of the Pentateuch (J), the idea of which may have been suggested by the similar document E, which was, perhaps, still taking shape in the province of Samaria. The population of Judah was homogeneous to a much greater extent than that of Samaria, and it was, accordingly, unnecessary to introduce any social legislation into this document; but the ancient Decalogue, which had probably been somewhat amplified in the closing years of Hezekiah's reign, and was perhaps already popularly ascribed to Moses, was enlarged by hortatory additions to suit the exigencies of the present situation.

The school to which we owe this document, and which may be considered as representative among the prophets of the State religion of the period, found no favour in the eyes of Jeremiah. It is highly significant that he is not mentioned in the account of Josiah's reforms given in 2 K 22 f. He remained unshaken in his conviction that sacrifice was unnecessary and displeasing to Jahweh. He gave an unqualified denial to the assertion that Moses had commanded it (Jer 7^{22}), and declared, perhaps of the Jahvistic document itself, that 'the lying pen of scribes had wrought falsely' (8^{8}).

It is stated (2 K 23^{3}) that Josiah's reformation was inaugurated by a solemn covenant to keep the law on the part of the king and the people. That there was some solemn publication of what was henceforth to be the law at some stage of the reformation is likely enough, but it is more probable that this did not take place at the beginning of the movement, but when it had made sufficient progress to ensure the absence of any very violent opposition. The present narrative has a strongly Deuteronomic colouring, and seems to have been modified since it was first written.[2] The code now contained in Ex 34 may well represent the basis of the 'covenant' determined upon by Josiah (note particularly v.^{27}), though the hortatory introduction is probably of somewhat later date.

Notwithstanding the deep cleavage between Jeremiah and those prophets who approved of Josiah's compromise, the influence of Jeremiah must have been great. He attacked unsparingly the superstitions which all Josiah's zeal had been unable to stamp out, as well as the moral evils from which even the reformed Temple was by no means free. It was doubtless in no small measure owing to him that, at the disillusionment caused by the troubles which followed the death of Josiah, there was not a far greater recrudescence of the superstitions which that king had put down.

The false hopes raised in Judah by the defeat of Pharaoh at the battle of Carchemish again

[1] The supposition that it was Isaiah's teaching that gave to Jerusalem the unique position afterwards assigned to it rests on the most flimsy basis. Scanty as are the fragments of Isaiah's teaching which have been preserved to us in their original form, it is clear that Isaiah took the same view of sacrifice as Amos, Hosea, and Jeremiah. Isaiah's contemporary, Micah, had even declared that Zion should be 'plowed as a field' (Mic 3^{12}, Jer 26^{18}).

[2] We have no knowledge of the exact limits of Josiah's kingdom. It is not improbable that some sanctuaries, which were originally Judæan, especially in the southern districts, were not at this time subject to the king of Judah, and thus temporarily escaped destruction.

[3] The words put into the mouth of Rabshakeh (2 K 18^{22}) probably reflect the discontent caused by Josiah's reforms.

[1] It is obvious that, after the limitation of sacrifice to the one altar at Jerusalem, a considerable time must have elapsed before it came to be recognized that the high places as such had always been displeasing to Jahweh.

[2] Thus, whereas according to 2 K 22 the book that is found is 'the book of the law' (*tôrâh*), in 23^{2} it suddenly becomes 'the book of the covenant' (*bᵉrîth*), though nothing has as yet been said about any covenant. In v.^{3} the English versions tacitly follow the LXX in rendering 'made a covenant,' and this probably represents the correct text, for the reading of the Massoretic text, 'made the covenant,' is scarcely possible. The words, 'to confirm the words of this covenant that were written in this book,' are probably an addition by a Deuteronomic editor, and this addition has caused the modification in the description of the newly found book in v.^{2}, and the consequent alteration of 'a covenant' into '*the* covenant' in v.^{3}.

called forth Jeremiah's activity. His earlier anticipations of Judah's ruin at the hands of a foe from the north had not been realized; for, though the Scythians had come very near, there is no evidence that they ever invaded Judah. But now there was a prospect of the domination of a far more powerful nation, viz. the Chaldæans, who in Judah would not unnaturally be regarded as coming from the north. Accordingly, in the fourth year of Jehoiakim (*c.* 604–603 B.C.), Jeremiah directed his disciple Baruch to write down a number of prophecies which he had composed since the beginning of his ministry in 626, with the object of showing that the judgment then threatened had been merely postponed and not averted.

15. End of the kingdom of Judah.—The ill-advised revolt of Jehoiakim, three years after he had taken an oath of allegiance to Nebuchadnezzar, brought against Jerusalem an army of Chaldæans which, after some time, was joined by Nebuchadnezzar in person. Jehoiakim appears to have died during the siege. He was succeeded by his son Jehoiachin, who, three months later, surrendered to Nebuchadnezzar. Jehoiachin and many of the royal family with the aristocracy of Judah, including many, if not most, of the Zadokite priests, were carried captive to Babylon,[1] Nebuchadnezzar appointing as king of Judah Mattaniah, the brother of Jehoiakim and uncle of Jehoiachin, who now assumed the name of Zedekiah.

But the new government proved no better than the old. The Palestinian States had not yet realized the full power of the Chaldæans, while Egypt continued the policy, which she had followed for more than a century, of fomenting revolts in Palestine, in order to avert the danger which threatened herself from the great W. Asiatic empire. In spite of Jeremiah's earnest warning, Zedekiah was induced to revolt, with the inevitable result. After a long siege, Jerusalem was taken in the year 586 B.C. King Zedekiah was made prisoner, blinded, and carried to Babylon; the Temple was first rifled and then, together with the king's palace and the better houses in Jerusalem, burnt; the city walls were broken down. For the second time a great number of the inhabitants, including those priests who had been left on the former occasion, were transported to Babylon.

The OT, as is but natural from the place and period of its composition, is for the most part written from an aristocratic point of view; and, accordingly, since the upper classes were taken into exile, it is not surprising that some passages give the impression that the whole population of Judah except the very poorest were transported. But, although the whole land had suffered greatly, it was Jerusalem only that had borne the brunt of Nebuchadnezzar's wrath, and a not inconsiderable population remained in the land, whose numbers were augmented, as soon as the Chaldæan army had gone, by the return of numerous refugees, many of whom were doubtless of good family, who had sought an asylum in the neighbouring countries. Nebuchadnezzar, although even his patience was exhausted as far as the house of David was concerned, adhered to his former policy of leaving the government of the country in the hands of a native, and appointed Gedaliah the son of Ahikam governor of Judah.

How long Gedaliah's governorship lasted cannot be determined with certainty. The year is not given in Jer 41^1 ‖ 2 K 25^{25}, and an interval of less than three months seems scarcely sufficient for the events recorded in 2 K 25. Since Jer 52^{30} mentions a third transportation of Jews to Babylon five years after the second, which, although it is dated in the eighteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar, must be the same as that which is described in 2 K 25^{11}, we may perhaps suppose that Gedaliah was governor for about five years, the last transportation being the result of his murder (2 K 25^{25}, Jer 41^2), which the Chaldæans regarded as an act of rebellion. Thenceforward Judah, like Samaria, appears to have been governed by a Babylonian official.

In the certainty that the Chaldæans, after the murder of Gedaliah, would send a punitive expedition to Judah, a number of the inhabitants fled to Egypt, which had probably been for a considerable period a place of refuge for the distressed inhabitants not only of Judah, but also of Samaria. There thus arose a number of Israelite communities in Egypt, which were destined in after times to have an important influence on Israel. The refugees would naturally be representative of the medley of cults which existed in Palestine in the 7th cent. B.C.; but the religion of Jahweh flourished among them, and in the time of Cambyses—apparently there had previously been opposition on the part of the Egyptian priests, perhaps on the ground of the choice of sacrificial animals—a temple for sacrifice was built to Jahweh at Elephantine.

Of the last years and death of Jeremiah, who, after the murder of Gedaliah, was compelled by the refugees to accompany them to Egypt, we have no information. There is no evidence that his presence exercised any permanent influence upon the community in Egypt. He may have returned to Jerusalem and died there.

It had been Jeremiah's sad office 'to pluck up and to break down, and to overthrow and to destroy,' and apparently it was not till the close of his ministry that it was perceived that he had also a mission 'to build and to plant' (Jer 31^{28}). Although he never wavered in his conviction of the futility of opposition to the Chaldæans, there can be little doubt that to those who believed his preaching he turned comforter. Perhaps the individualism which was beginning to make itself heard (cf. Jer $31^{29f.}$) may partly account for this phase, but it was probably due in the main to the conviction that Jahweh, who all through Israel's sin had remembered the love of her espousal (2^2), could not wholly cast her off. The prophecy in 2^{35-8}, which appears worked up again in $33^{10f.}$, though we do not possess it in its original setting, and perhaps not quite in its original form, may be dated with considerable likelihood in the period of the ruin of the kingdom after the capture of Zedekiah. The tree of David's dynasty had been cut down, but from the root[1] there would yet spring up a shoot (wrongly rendered 'branch' in EV) which would grow again into as goodly a tree. This restored monarchy, unlike Zedekiah, who had belied his name of 'Jahweh is righteousness,' would seek its 'righteousness,' *i.e.* wellbeing, only in Jahweh, and the restored community would enjoy a 'covenant' with Jahweh which would be permanent, inasmuch as His teaching (*tôrâh*) would be written on His people's hearts ($31^{31ff.}$).[2] The prophecy of the 'Shoot' is the car-

[1] The actual numbers carried off by Nebuchadnezzar are doubtful; but Jer 52^{28-30} is more trustworthy than 2 K 24, as is shown by its use of the more correct form of the name 'Nebuchadrezzar.'

[1] The term 'David' in 23^5 need not necessarily be understood to mean originally the actual family of David, but merely that Judæan royalty which had so long belonged to the dynasty of David. In 22^{30}, although, strictly interpreted, only Jehoiachin's actual descendants are excluded from reigning, Jeremiah seems to mean the royal family generally.

[2] Since the word rendered 'covenant' has a much wider range of meaning in Hebrew than the English rendering would imply, it is not quite certain what is here regarded as the former 'covenant.' The word may denote merely a *state of peace* such as that which exists between two parties who have entered into an agreement for mutual protection, and is so used, *e.g.*, in Hos 2^{18}, Job 5^{23}. If this sense be adopted here, the earlier covenant will be the loving relation between Jahweh and Israel described in Jer $2^{2f.}$.

liest prediction of future happiness to which we find subsequently definite reference in the OT (cf. Zec 3^8 6^{12}), and may be regarded as the starting-point of 'Messianic' prophecy.

16. Religion in Judah after the destruction of the Temple.—The deportation of the priests from Jerusalem and the burning of the Temple had not made sacrifice impossible, for the great stone altar originally erected by Ahaz probably remained, and in any case some sort of altar could have been continued on its site. But the absence of a priesthood must have occasioned many difficulties, for sacred and secular life were hardly distinguishable. In this respect Samaria was now better off than Judah, for Bethel[1] had been reopened by special permission of the king of Assyria, and probably Shechem and other sanctuaries were to some extent flourishing. The removal of the dynasty of David had taken away the old cause of jealousy between Samaria and Judah; and, since the similarity in their political situation would doubtless draw the two provinces together, there was now no reason why they should not combine for their mutual advantage. The priesthood at Bethel, which may reasonably be regarded as Aaronite,[2] represented in the main the ideas, not indeed of Jeremiah, but of the prophetic school which had drawn up the Jahvistic document (J); and it is probable that the proximity of Bethel to Jerusalem suggested the possibility of an arrangement by which the latter sanctuary should serve the needs of those who had hitherto worshipped at the former, Bethel for its part supplying the priesthood. That by some means, at some time, the province of Samaria was for religious purposes united with Judah is evident. The writer of Ezr 4^{10} believed that such a union had been effected before the time of Zerubbabel, and the story of the Samaritan schism and subsequent worship at Gerizim is inexplicable unless the Samaritans had previously accepted the principle of one sanctuary only. The combination of the N. Israelite and Judæan documents E and J also presupposes some such union, which may most easily be explained on the supposition of a voluntary agreement. We need not dismiss the account given in 2 K 23^{15-20} as altogether fictitious, for it is extremely unlikely that those who had worshipped at Bethel would be unanimously in favour of closing that sanctuary, and the majority may have perpetrated on the minority the horrors here described; but the writer can scarcely be correct in ascribing them to Josiah. Probably this beginning of reunion affected at first only Judah[3] and the district hitherto served by Bethel. There were, indeed, many problems to be solved before it could have a wider scope. In particular, there was the question of the law-books, or, in Hebrew phraseology, the 'covenant'-books, recognized respectively at Jerusalem and Samaria. The Elohistic document E was probably accepted not only at Bethel, but also at other sanctuaries in Samaria; while in Judah the Jahvistic document J, in spite of the opposition of Jeremiah, had probably acquired, except perhaps in Zadokite circles, a quasi-canonical acceptance. It was not to be expected that either community should abandon its Scriptures, and the difficulty was solved by the combination of J and E into JE, the code of J (Ex 34) being represented as given to replace the code of E, which had been broken up by Moses.

It must have been evident to those who cherished any nationalist aspirations that anything which tended towards centralization and union was of the greatest value, and it is not surprising that, when the compact between Bethel and Jerusalem had had time to prove its advantages, a further extension of the law of the One Sanctuary began to be mooted. But there were many difficulties in the way. The impossibility of slaughtering domestic animals except at Jerusalem had already been found a great burden in the more distant districts of Judah; it was futile to imagine that still more distant districts in N. Samaria or Galilee would tolerate such an inconvenience. Besides, even on the supposition that the rest of the country would be willing to accept Jerusalem as a place of sacrifice in lieu of other sanctuaries, there was the problem of the maintenance of the priests who had ministered at these, while a state of society in which the vendetta was recognized would naturally shrink from abolishing sanctuaries where an innocent homicide might find asylum. A further difficulty would be found in the fact that reforming ideas had in some respects made greater way in Judah. Thus, *e.g.*, whereas those who, after the introduction of heathen settlers, had laboured to maintain the religion of Jahweh as the national religion of Samaria had perhaps been compelled to content themselves with affirming Jahweh's exclusive right to worship, and, while insisting that to Him alone belonged the first-born, had apparently left the actual sacrifice of these still permissible (Ex 22^{29}),[1] Judah, perhaps in response to Jeremiah's vehement teaching on the subject, had made the sacrifice of the first-born illegal and their redemption compulsory (Ex 34^{20}).

Taught, perhaps, by the mistakes of the past, the 6th cent. reformers adopted a liberal policy. The sacrifice of the first-born was absolutely prohibited, but in connexion with the slaughter of domestic animals a bold and far-reaching innovation was accepted. The internal fat and the blood had hitherto been most holy, and it had been obligatory to burn the one and to pour out the other upon the altar. No concession was made with regard to the eating of either, but all that was now required in connexion with the blood was that it should be poured out upon the ground. This modification in ritual requirements removed the greatest obstacle to the adoption of the law of the One Sanctuary. In other respects also the reformers were equally liberal. Josiah's policy of throwing open the priesthood at the central sanctuary to the priests of the country sanctuaries, which the sons of Zadok had once successfully thwarted, was now adopted; and certain sanctuaries, although they ceased to be places of sacrifice, were allowed to keep their rights of asylum (Dt 19^{1-13} 4^{41-43}; cf. Jos 20).

The outcome of these and other reforms and concessions was the book of Deuteronomy, of which the legal code (chs. 12–26) is evidently the

We hear, however, of a solemn ratification of a covenant in the reign of Zedekiah (Jer $34^{8.\ 15.\ 18-20}$), though we are not told the circumstances which led up to it, and in v.[13] this covenant is assumed to be on the basis of an ordinance dating from the Exodus. But ch. 34, though it may embody some of Jeremiah's phrases, is not from the prophet's own hand, and cannot be held to prove that there existed in Judah at this time a law relating to the freeing of slaves which was ascribed to the period of the Exodus.

[1] It is inconceivable that the writer to whom we owe the account of Josiah's reforms in 2 K 23^{1-14}, if he had heard of the destruction of Bethel by Josiah, should have given the limits of the reform as 'from Geba to Beersheba' (v.[8]). Bethel lay outside Josiah's kingdom. 2 K 23^{15-20} is from the same hand as 1 K 13. It is significant that 2 K 17^{24-41}, which is post-Deuteronomic, and was written at least as late as the third generation from the time of Esar-haddon (cf. v.[41] and Ezr 4^2), ignores this alleged destruction of Bethel and of the high places of Samaria.

[2] For a fuller discussion of this point see Kennett, 'The Origin of the Aaronite Priesthood,' in *JThSt* vi. [1905] 161–186.

[3] The exact limits of Judah at this period are not known. It is possible that, when Judah ceased to be a kingdom and was made a province governed by a Babylonian official, its old limits were restored; but some districts which, as far as their population was concerned, were Judæan may even yet have remained distinct with their old sanctuaries.

[1] The utmost that can be maintained of the teaching of Gn 22 is that the sacrifice of the first-born is not insisted on. Cf. Jer 7^{31} 19^5. Ezekiel (20^{26}) recognizes that the sacrifice of the first-born has been legal in the past.

nucleus. In the forefront of this code is placed the law relating to sacrifice at the one altar,[1] specially framed in view of the extension of the law to all Israel. The code also contains rules relating to the celebration of the great feasts, the maintenance of the priests, and the like, as well as a number of enactments designed to put a stop to superstitious and heathenish practices, and ordinances dealing with matters of common life. These last, which are to some extent based upon the code of the Samaritan book E, appear to be intended more especially, though not exclusively, for the instruction of the non-Judæan districts of the land. This code of law, although it is directly at variance with Jeremiah (7[22]) in definitely requiring sacrifice—which it represents as commanded by Moses himself—indirectly did much to further Jeremiah's conception of religion. In time past the motive of sacrifice had frequently been 'to eat flesh'—a fact which had called forth the scathing sarcasm of Jeremiah (7[21]); but now those who desired to feast could do so at home, and thus sacrifice was at least lifted above such sordid considerations.

There was, indeed, the danger that the infrequency of ritual worship might bring about a forgetfulness of religion, but this was to a great extent guarded against by the Deuteronomic reformers, who based obedience to the common law of Israel on Israel's relation to Jahweh, and subsequently prefixed to the code of laws several prefaces cast into the form of hortatory addresses by Moses. Yet the difficulty must have been felt that the old Decalogue, which was regarded as the basis of Jahweh's 'covenant' with Israel, being chiefly concerned with ritual ordinances, had been repudiated by the school of Jeremiah, and that this school, which, indeed, had greatly leavened religious thought, would never accept as the basis of a divine 'covenant' a code which required sacrifice but did not insist on justice, mercy, and truth. Accordingly, since the tradition of the laws divinely given and graven upon two tables of stone had gained firm hold of the popular mind, the bold step was taken of providing a new Decalogue (Dt 5), keeping the first commandment and that relating to the observance of the Sabbath, as well as the more recently introduced prohibition of images, but otherwise based on the ethical teaching of the great prophets, especially Jeremiah (see, *e.g.*, Jer 7[5] 9[1-8] etc.).

One of the last of the great Samaritan sanctuaries to fall into line in the matter of the Deuteronomic law was that of Shechem, which claimed to be the burial-place of Joseph (Jos 24[32]), and which possessed near its altar some standing-stones supposed to have been placed there by Joshua (Dt 27[2-4], Jos 8[32]). It would have been strange if the inhabitants of Shechem had been willing to destroy that which had made their city so famous, while without Shechem the unity of Israel could not have been attained. A solemn compact, legalized by an appendix to the earlier law of Deuteronomy (cf. 27), was therefore made with the Shechemites, whereby the latter agreed to accept the law of the One Sanctuary. This compact was ratified with sacrifice upon the old altar of Shechem, which was allowed to remain on condition that it should not again be used for its original purpose, while the standing-stones were purged of any heathenish or schismatic associations by being plastered over and inscribed with the provisions of the new law.[2]

[1] This fact alone is sufficient to disprove the assertion that Jeremiah was acquainted with the book of Deuteronomy, and, indeed, deeply influenced by it. Sacrificial laws are at least as prominent in Deuteronomy as sacramental prayers and rubrics in the Book of Common Prayer; but who will maintain that the latter is not concerned with sacraments?

[2] Probably the story contained in Jos 22 had its origin in a similar concession with regard to some altar in the vicinity of the Jordan.

Advantage was taken of the gathering at Shechem to stimulate the national sentiment. Representatives of the twelve tribes were stationed, six on Ebal, on which stood the ancient sanctuary, and six on Gerizim, who responded respectively when the Levites pronounced curses on those who should transgress, and blessings on those who should obey, the new law.

The law of the One Sanctuary had thus become a rallying point for the national life of Israel,[1] Jerusalem being accepted as the only legitimate place of sacrifice by the whole land which had once formed the kingdom of David. No doubt there still remained some heathen communities in Samaria, and still more in Galilee and Gilead; but there was little cohesion between them, and such national sentiment as existed was Israelite. So greatly had the sense of Israelite unity been developed by the centralization of worship that the reformers had considered it desirable to incorporate in their new law-book legislation for a future king (Dt 17[14-20]). The provision that such a king must be of Israelite blood may possibly be aimed at the ambitious schemes of some governor appointed by the Chaldæans to get himself recognized as king of Palestine, or may be intended merely to ensure that a king of Israel should not be a man who had only recently accepted the religion of Jahweh, but one who was thoroughly imbued with Israelite tradition, while in the warning against Egypt and against horses we may see the fruits of the teaching of the great prophets. It is impossible to give a *terminus ad quem* for the adoption of the Deuteronomic law, but it may probably be dated before the appointment of Zerubbabel.

17. Development of religion among the Babylonian exiles.—Meanwhile a religious development of the utmost importance was going on among the Jewish community settled in Babylonia. It might have been supposed that these exiles, like their brethren who had taken refuge in Egypt, would have erected one or more temples to Jahweh, and would have continued the exercise of their own religion. But, whereas the refugees in Egypt had left their native land of their own free will, the exiles in Babylonia were for the most part violently nationalist, and less inclined to settle down in a foreign country; indeed, for some time it was difficult to persuade them that their exile would be of long duration (cf. Jer 28 f.).

The most important factor in shaping the religion of the exiles in Babylonia was the presence among them of the Zadokite priests, of whom the majority had been carried off with Jehoiachin in 597 B.C. An unforeseen result of Josiah's reforms was that these priests had been placed in a unique position; for, since they had refused to accept on an equality the priests who had ministered at the country sanctuaries (Ezk 44[10ff.]), they were compelled to maintain not only that there must be but one sanctuary, but also that that one sanctuary must be at Jerusalem. These men, therefore, could not have acceded to a demand for a temple in Babylonia—had such a demand been made—without stultifying their previous action.

Prominent among these priests was a certain Ezekiel, son of Buzi, a man thoroughly imbued with the traditions of the reformed Zadokite priesthood as they had taken shape after 621. Ezekiel felt himself called to be a prophet in the fifth year of Jehoiachin's captivity, and thenceforward for twenty-two years he exercised a powerful influence on his fellow-captives. It is vain to speculate why for four years Ezekiel was silent; but it is possible that for some time he, like his fellow-captives, did

[1] Notice especially Dt 27[9].

not realize that the exile was likely to be of long duration.

Like the other great prophets, Ezekiel was convinced that the disasters which had come upon his people were due to sins, but his priestly training largely modified his conception of what those sins had been. He was alive to the social evils, but, in his opinion, Israel's chief sin in the past had consisted in idolatry and idolatrous practices in the religion of Jahweh. Unlike Jeremiah, he considered sacrifice a divine institution, and his standpoint is throughout sacerdotal rather than prophetic. Himself a man of intensely strong convictions, he makes no allowance for the fact that his code of right is of very recent origin. Thus he condemns as some of the sins which have caused Israel's ruin the taking of a father's wives by his son (Ezk 22^{10}), as well as the marriage of a half-sister on the father's side (v.^{11}), though such practices had been, and perhaps in Palestine still were, the common custom in Israel (2 S 16^{20-23} 13^{13}; cf. Gn 20^{12}).

That Ezekiel, under the circumstances in which he found himself, should have developed an individualism was but natural. It was inevitable that some of the exiles should be merged in the heathenism of Babylonia; and the desire to keep the rest faithful to Jahweh must have called forth a care for individuals which had not been required of earlier prophets, so that Ezekiel became the prototype of the Christian minister. It is true that individualism of a sort was already 'in the air'; even before the disaster of 597, men had asked why, if the fathers had eaten sour grapes, the children's teeth should be set on edge (Jer 31^{29}). To a prophet who felt himself bound to care for individual souls such a question must of necessity present a problem which could not be ignored, and Ezekiel (ch. 18) attempted to grapple with it. The thought of the age was not sufficiently advanced to render a full discussion of the problem possible, and Ezekiel was hampered by the supposed necessity of coupling together sin and suffering as cause and effect; but in his efforts to vindicate Jahweh's justice he insisted on Jahweh's relation with the individual soul, and thus prepared the way for later and fuller teaching.

Ezekiel's great achievement was the forging of the weapon by which the religion of Israel was finally enabled to withstand the attacks of heathenism. Being fully convinced of the sole right of the Zadokites to the priesthood, as well as of a return to Jerusalem, Ezekiel set himself to commit to writing the priestly traditions of the Temple ritual, freely introducing, however, in characteristic fashion, modifications and innovations which he considered would be an improvement on the old state of things, and insisting on the permanent degradation to inferior offices in the Temple of those Levites who up to Josiah's reforms had ministered at the country sanctuaries. He claimed no ancient authority for this new 'ecclesiastical polity'; but the school which he founded not unnaturally concluded, in accordance with his teaching, that what he laid down ought to have been practised all along, and this in itself would tend to produce the impression that what the priestly scholars in Babylonia agreed to be right must have been enjoined at the Exodus. It is possible that the Zadokite priests, before they left Jerusalem, knew the Jahvistic document J in its original form, though it is unlikely that they would have accepted it as what we should call canonical; or perhaps, after the combination of J and E into JE, the latter document, or an account of it, may have reached them in Babylonia, and may thus have provided them with an example of a framework in which to place their legal traditions. The codification of priestly traditions was evidently spread over a considerable time. The nucleus of the collection, which bears a strong resemblance to Ezekiel's writings, is contained in the so-called Law of Holiness (Lv 17–26), and presents the remarkable feature that, in connexion with the slaughter of domestic animals, it requires the offering of the blood and fat at the central altar, so that it must be in substance anterior to Deuteronomy.

The victories of Cyrus and the threatened conquest of Babylonia caused grave disquiet not only to the exiles themselves, but also, on their behalf, to their brethren in Palestine. The situation in Babylonia called forth the eloquence of one of the most attractive of the canonical prophets, whose compositions, however, have come down to us only in a very fragmentary form, and modified and interwoven with prophecies of a later date. In the coming overthrow of Chaldæan rule he foresaw the release of his people from captivity, and hailed Cyrus as a deliverer. Whether his anticipations were justified by the event is very doubtful. The belief that Cyrus gave free permission to the Jews to return rests only on the statement of the Chronicler, whose trustworthiness in this connexion may be gauged by the fact that he represents (Ezr 1^{7-11}) Cyrus as restoring the vessels of the Temple, which, according to the more probable statement in 2 K 24^{13} (cf. Jer 52^{19}), Nebuchadnezzar had 'cut in pieces' forty-eight years before. The Cylinder Inscription of Cyrus does not prove that all the captive population of the Babylonian Empire were allowed to return to their homes, and there is no other confirmation of the Chronicler's statement. Neither Haggai nor Zechariah refers to any such return from captivity, and neither shows the least gratitude towards Persia. Probably during the reign of Cyrus the province of Judah continued to be governed by the Babylonian official whose name appears in Ezr 1^{8} as Sheshbazzar.

18. Zerubbabel appointed governor of Judah; rebuilding of the Temple.—Though there is good reason for doubting the Chronicler's statement as regards Cyrus, there is no doubt that in the second year of Darius (520–519 B.C.) a member of the old royal family of Judah, Zerubbabel the son of Shealtiel, had been appointed governor of Judah. We know nothing of the fortunes of the house of David in Babylonia beyond the fact that Jehoiachin had been treated with consideration by Evil-merodach. Zerubbabel may have commended himself to Darius in some such way as is described in 1 Es 3 f., or he may have been selected for the governorship of Judah because Darius, in the troubles which beset him at the beginning of his reign, wished to conciliate the inhabitants of that province. That there was any return of exiles on a large scale at the time of Zerubbabel's appointment is unlikely; but there is little doubt that he would be accompanied by a retinue of his own people, among whom there would be, in all probability, some Zadokite priests.

Hitherto little had been done at Jerusalem in the way of restoration. Sacrifices were offered at the altar (Hag 2^{14}); but the Temple had not been rebuilt, and, apparently, its ruins had not even been cleared away; the wall of Jerusalem was still broken down, and the community generally was poverty-stricken. The poverty, however, was not universal, and a certain number of people had built themselves houses which, in the opinion of the prophet Haggai, were unnecessarily luxurious. This prophet, of whose antecedents we know nothing,[1] took advantage of the enthusiasm evoked

[1] We are not in a position to decide whether Haggai and Zechariah had returned with Zerubbabel, or whether they had always lived in Judah. Zechariah's interest centres in Judah, from which it might be inferred that he belonged to the more exclusive Jews of Babylonia. On the other hand, the province

by Zerubbabel's appointment to urge the rebuilding of the Temple. On the new-moon festival (*c.* 1st Sept. 520 B.C.) he addressed the people on this subject with such success that, three weeks later (*c.* 24th Sept.), work, probably in the clearing of the site, was actually begun. A month later (*c.* 21st Oct.), the work was so far advanced that it was possible to lay the foundation-stone with solemn ceremony.[1] Haggai now encouraged those who were despondent because of the inferior character of the building just begun, by declaring that the outcome of the shaking of the world—referring probably to the numerous revolts which had broken out against Darius in various parts of the Persian Empire—would be that the wealth of all nations would flow into the Temple. Two months later (*c.* 24th Dec.), Haggai gave expression to what was, doubtless, a general hope—that in Zerubbabel would be seen the reversal of Jeremiah's judgment on Jehoiachin (Hag 2^{23}, Jer 22^{24}).

Haggai's hopes of the dissolution of the Persian Empire proved illusory, however, and it soon became evident that Darius would hold his own. The disappointment thus caused in Judah was combated by Zechariah, who endeavoured to keep alive the enthusiasm which had been called forth by the project of rebuilding the Temple. Zechariah's prophecies, of which those that have come down to us are, for the most part, in allegorical form, are of unique interest, but only two features of his work can here be mentioned. As the work at the Temple proceeded successfully, the idea was mooted, perhaps by Zerubbabel himself, of rebuilding the wall of Jerusalem. Zechariah, although he hoped and believed that Zerubbabel would one day actually be king of Judah, was fully alive to the danger of such an enterprise, and earnestly deprecated it (2^{1-5}). The prophet seems in this instance to have been unsuccessful, and the proposed fortification of Jerusalem naturally aroused the suspicion of the Samaritans, who imagined that Zerubbabel was aiming at making himself a second Solomon, and of exacting from them forced labour (Ezr 4^{4-5}).[2]

It was inevitable that there should be collision between those who had always been settled in Jerusalem and their brethren who had returned from the east. The chief priest at Jerusalem at this time was a certain Joshua, son of Jehozadak, whose genealogy is connected by the Chronicler (1 Ch 6^{12-14}) with the Zadokites probably by the mere combination of Jer 52^{24} with Hag 1^{1} etc., but who may have been descended from the Aaronite priests who had formerly ministered at Bethel. The Zadokite priests who accompanied Zerubbabel would naturally regard this man as unqualified and at best not superior to the country Levites who had been permanently degraded to an inferior position.[3] Joshua, however, found a staunch champion in Zechariah, who declared that so long as he should be loyal to Jahweh's law he should have the government of the Temple. Zerubbabel, Zechariah maintained, should be king upon his throne, and Joshua priest at his right hand,[4] and counsel of peace should be between the two of them. By his championship of Joshua, Zechariah decided that the right of the priesthood at Jerusalem belonged to the sons of Aaron. No doubt he was perfectly willing that, in accordance with the provision of the Deuteronomic law, the sons of Zadok should also be allowed to minister as priests, but the consequence of giving the chief position at the Temple to an Aaronite would be that any Zadokites who desired to minister as priests would be compelled to enrol themselves in the gild of Aaron. Accordingly, when the news reached Babylonia that Zerubbabel, whom the Jewish exiles regarded as their legitimate ruler, had recognized the gild of Aaron as legitimate priests at Jerusalem, the students of the priestly traditions in Babylonia would be compelled to accept this recognition as final, and to merge the Zadokites in the Aaronites. In this way we can explain the otherwise inexplicable fact that, whereas in Ezekiel the clergy are divided into Zadokites and Levites, in the Priestly Code we find Aaronites and Levites.

19. Samaritan jealousy of Judah.—Zechariah's championship of Joshua involved far greater consequences than the mere decision between Aaron and Zadok. The religious reunion of Samaria and Judah was still a very recent event, and, had there been a predominance of a Babylonian (and, therefore, exclusively Judæan) party at this time, the links which united the two provinces must have snapped, and the religion and national life of Samaria would have been developed on quite distinct lines, in which case we should probably have lost all history of the northern kingdom. As it was, the cleavage between those whom we may call the Zerubbabel party (*i.e.* those who had returned with Zerubbabel from Babylonia), who would naturally be strongest in Jerusalem itself, and the rest of the population was never entirely healed. The growing jealousy between Samaria and Judah, as well as the fact that Nehemiah, whose feelings were altogether anti-Samaritan, found a following in Jerusalem, is sufficient proof of this; but the jealousy appears to have been political rather than religious, and there may have been mingled with it the rival claims of the families of Saul and David, should the Monarchy be restored.[1]

Happily, these jealousies did not interfere with the idea of the essential unity of Israel. The work of collecting the ancient traditions, which had already produced the documents J and E, was still continued. Early stories of the conquest of Palestine by the various tribes and of the subsequent history of the country were collected, arranged, and modified, in order to insist on the unity of Israel. Moreover, since the influx of heathen into the land still continued, and the religion of Jahweh was but lightly held by many who professed it, a school of prophets, who had already produced the book of Deuteronomy, laboured unceasingly to eradicate idolatry, using as the basis of their teaching the stories now current of the past.[2] The methods of the ancient prophets who had taught by hymns which could be learnt by heart were still employed to convey warnings against idolatry (*e.g.*, Dt 32), and to set forth the blessings which might be expected as the result of obedience (*e.g.*, Dt 33). A collection of Jeremiah's prophecies had been in existence for some time, and probably also collec-

of Samaria was probably in a more flourishing condition, as it had had longer time to recover from the effects of the Assyrian invasions.

[1] The date in Hag 2^{18} is a mistaken insertion from v.[10]. The discourse in 2^{3-9} is evidently that which was delivered at the laying of the foundation-stone.

[2] The exact nature of the appeal to Darius is not stated, but it may be inferred from the subsequent appeal said to have been addressed to Artaxerxes (Ezr $4^{9\,10}$).

[3] That Joshua's misfortune—which Zechariah allegorically describes as an accusation by Satan (Zec $3^{1ff.}$)—was attempted deposition from the priesthood is clear from the fact that he is represented as clad in filthy garments, *i.e.* garments in which it would be impossible for a priest to minister.

[4] In Zec 6^{13} for 'on his throne' (the second time of the occurrence of the phrase) the LXX has 'at his right hand'; and, since there is a reference to two people in the following clause, it is evident that the name of Joshua has been omitted in this verse, while it has been wrongly written for that of Zerubbabel in v.[11].

[1] The prominence given in the existing books of Samuel to the rejection of Saul in favour of David would suggest that it was claimed by some in Samaria that a king who should reign over all Israel should not be of the house of David. There is no difficulty in the supposition that some members of Saul's family still remained at Gibeah.

[2] A good illustration of this is found in the words put into the mouth of Joshua (Jos 24). In mentioning the people who dwelt beyond the Euphrates and served other gods, the writer really has in view the immediate ancestors of many of those whom he is addressing.

tions of the sayings of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah, Zephaniah, Nahum, and Habakkuk.[1]

The ideals of those whom Zechariah had endeavoured to dissuade from attempting to fortify Jerusalem continued to be cherished by many in that city. The work of rebuilding the wall was probably begun in 515 B.C., and Tattenai and Shethar-bozenai appealed against it successfully to the Persian government. According to Ezr 4^6, an appeal was made to Xerxes (Ahasuerus) against the Jews about the year 485 B.C., from which it may be inferred that there was then another attempt to fortify Jerusalem. The work was yet again taken in hand in the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus, probably between 460 and 455.[2] On this occasion the wall appears to have been almost completed when Artaxerxes, in response to an earnest appeal from Rehum and Shimshai, who appear to have been respectively governors of Samaria and some other Palestinian province, allowed these men to raise troops in the country and to stop the work. A force composed of Samaritans, Ammonites, Moabites, and others thereupon attacked Jerusalem, demolished a considerable portion of the newly built wall, burned the gates, and carried off many captives.[3] The Edomites, of whom large numbers had for more than a century been pressing northwards and had become incorporated in Judah, may have been induced by the Samaritans to take part in this attack—an act of treachery which the Jerusalem party never forgave.

20. Appointment of Nehemiah; rebuilding of the wall of Jerusalem.—It was not long before the tables were turned on those who had attacked Jerusalem. In 448 B.C. the Syrian satrap Megabyzos revolted, and Samaria seems to have been involved in the rebellion. If this were so, the Jews would naturally hold aloof, and this fact might be adduced to convince Artaxerxes of their loyalty. But, whatever may be the explanation of the Persian king's change of policy, there can be no doubt that in April 445 B.C. a Jew named Nehemiah, an official at the court of Susa, who had some months previously received a report of the forlorn condition of Jerusalem, obtained leave from Artaxerxes to visit that city and to fortify it.

Upon his arrival at Jerusalem, Nehemiah, after making a secret survey of the wall, called a meeting of the citizens and communicated to them what he proposed to do. Perhaps the recent attack on Jerusalem had alienated from the Samaritans the sympathies of some who would not otherwise have been hostile to them. Nehemiah's proposal was enthusiastically adopted, and in fifty-two days the repair of the wall was completed. During this first visit to Jerusalem, however, Nehemiah appears to have accomplished little else. At every turn he must have realized how widely his own ideals, which were shared by the Jewish community in the east, differed from those of the people who in Palestine professed to be Israelite. The radical difference between the religion of the Jews in Babylonia and that of the heathen among whom they lived had made intermarriage almost an impossibility, and the Jews had remained a community apart. In Palestine, to Nehemiah's horror, there was no such sharp line of demarcation. Those who in Jerusalem were like-minded with Nehemiah were in a minority, and there seemed little likelihood of their being able, under the existing conditions, to indoctrinate their fellow-countrymen. Nehemiah came to the conclusion that the reforms which he desired could not be carried into practice unless the small minority who sympathized with him were reinforced by a mission from Babylonia. Upon his return to the east he obtained permission from Artaxerxes for the return to Jerusalem under the leadership of Ezra[1] of a number of Jews (probably carefully selected)[2] then living in the east.

21. Mission of Ezra; publication of the Law.—Upon their arrival an attempt was made to separate Jews from non-Jews, and to put a stop to mixed marriages. The attempt aroused intense opposition and little was effected. Ezra must indeed have felt himself powerless, inasmuch as among a people who possessed and reverenced Scriptures he had none to which he could appeal as authority for the work which he proposed to do. He determined, therefore, to publish in Jerusalem the law of the Zadokite lawyers in Babylonia; and, since it was impossible to expect that Palestine would give up its Scriptures, he decided to follow the precedent set when the Scriptures of Samaria and Judah had been combined into JE. Probably in order to carry out this work, Ezra returned to the east, but on this point we have no information. In 433, Nehemiah got Artaxerxes to appoint him governor of Jerusalem, and returned thither, perhaps accompanied by Ezra. As yet little had been accomplished in the matter of reform. So lax were the ideas about the sanctity of the Temple, on which Ezekiel had laid great stress, that the high priest had allowed Tobiah, the Ammonite governor, to have a room there (Neh $13^{4ff.}$). The singers and Levites—perhaps those who had but recently returned with Ezra—had not found a livelihood at the Temple, and had left to seek a living elsewhere (Neh 13^{10}).

'Realizing that no reform could be permanent which did not rest on a legal basis, Nehemiah took steps to secure the recognition of the law in the shape to which the labours of Ezra and his fellow-workers had brought it. He accordingly induced the leaders of the people to enter into a solemn compact to observe the law. A legal document was drawn up, and the leaders both of clergy and laity affixed to it their seals. The law, having been formally accepted by the leaders, was then promulgated at a general assembly of the people: whether by Nehemiah only, or by Nehemiah and Ezra together, can scarcely be determined with certainty, for Nehemiah viii. shows too many signs of the hand of a later editor to allow us to attach much importance to the names there given.'[3]

The Law published by Nehemiah and Ezra was probably the whole Pentateuch, that is to say, it consisted of the documents JE, Deuteronomy (D), and the Priestly Code (P), including the Law of Holiness (H); it must not, however, be supposed that it had as yet attained to its present form. Those who worked at the codification of the Priestly Code in Babylonia could not provide for all the contingencies which would arise when the Law had been put into force in Palestine, and many an amendment and addition must have been found necessary after 433.

22. Final breach with the Samaritans.—From the first Nehemiah had shown himself uncompromising in his Judæan and Zadokite prejudices. Having grown up as a member of a race which had perforce been separate from other races for several generations, he could not bring himself to look upon people of mixed nationality as truly Israelite. Although those who accompanied Ezra seem to have been chosen as representative of the twelve tribes, Nehemiah soon showed that, in his opinion,

[1] This must not be taken to mean that any of these collections have reached us in their original form. They have all been more or less modified to suit the exigencies of later ages.

[2] See *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, p. 117.

[3] The rendering of the English version in Neh 13^3, 'the remnant that are left of the captivity,' naturally suggests to English readers the Babylonian captivity, but the Hebrew is more naturally understood of the carrying off of those who had been recently captured in war.

[1] For this view of the relation of Nehemiah and Ezra see *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, p. 123 ff.

[2] At first there were no Levites among the returning exiles, and Ezra made a special point of procuring some (Ezr 8^{15-20}). It is probable that from the deportation of the Zadokites till the return of Ezra the clergy who ministered at Jerusalem had been all of one rank.

[3] *Cambridge Biblical Essays*, p. 125 f.; cf. also W. H. Kosters, art. 'Ezra-Nehemiah' in *EBi* ii. 1487, § 17 (c).

Judah alone was genuinely Israelite. The Samaritans he scorned and hated. Under these circumstances a breach sooner or later was inevitable, and we can scarcely wonder that, when Nehemiah dismissed the grandson of the high priest from office at the Temple on the ground that he had married the daughter of Sanballat, the governor of Samaria (Neh 13[28]), the last straw had been laid on the burden of Samaritan patience. Shechem still retained memories of its once famous sanctuary, and the dismissed priest, whose name, according to Josephus (*Ant.* XI. vii. 2, viii. 2, 4), was Manasseh, was soon installed there as priest in a new temple.[1] The cleavage seems to have followed political lines,[2] the boundary between the two provinces being also the boundary between the areas of the rival sanctuaries. By this schism, which was, indeed, the culmination of Nehemiah's whole policy, the Jews of Jerusalem and its vicinity became as completely separated from their neighbours in Palestine as their brethren in the east had been from the heathen population of Babylonia. The Jew became a man apart, and a century of isolation gave to the new Judaism sufficient strength to enable it to stand against the flood of new ideas which came in with Alexander the Great.

We do not know what effect the Samaritan schism had upon Galilee. The mention of Kedesh as a city of refuge (Jos 20[7]) implies that Galilee had, at least to some extent, accepted the law of the One Sanctuary, and in Maccabæan times there were not a few loyal Jews in the district (1 Mac 5[14-23]). It is impossible to say whether these had settled in the north since 332, or whether the Israelites of Galilee remained loyal throughout the Samaritan schism. The latter supposition is by no means impossible, for Galilee and Samaria formed different provinces, and the jealousy between Samaria and Judah was almost wholly political.

Since the deportation of Jews by Nebuchadnezzar, there had been a real danger that religion might develop on such different lines in the east and in the west as to cause a permanent cleavage in the religion of Israel. By the combination of the law of the east with that of the west, Nehemiah had averted this danger. In Egypt, however, the Israelite settlers appear to have known nothing of the development of the Law at home. It is very doubtful whether they possessed any portion of the Pentateuch. It is practically certain that they were unacquainted with Deuteronomy and the Priestly Code.

The drastic measures adopted by Nehemiah to get rid of those who would not accept the new Law, based as this was entirely on religious principles, inevitably transformed the population which did accept it into a church rather than a nation, and in such a state of things the priests were naturally all-important, and the high priest was regarded as the head of the State. It would seem, however, that the national spirit was not wholly dead, and that there were even proposals to elect a king—proposals which were vigorously opposed by the clerical aristocracy.[3]

[1] Josephus puts this schism a century later, but that Sanballat was governor in the 5th cent. B.C. is proved by the Elephantine papyri.

[2] The idea that the kingdom of N. Israel was composed of ten tribes probably arose very late. Since Simeon was absorbed in Judah, and Levi was not a territorial tribe, the number ten can be obtained only by counting Benjamin. In some passages Judah seems to denote the kingdom of Judah, *e.g.* Jg 1[19], 1 K 12[20], and is described as 'one tribe,' *e.g.* in 1 K 11[32. 36]. Later on, probably in consequence of the presence of powerful Benjamite families in the province of Judah, Judah was reckoned as two tribes, Judah and Benjamin, Simeon being ignored, and the number ten was obtained simply by subtracting two from twelve.

[3] No one can fail to be struck by the extraordinary statements put into the mouth of Samuel when the people demand a king, and by the arrogant way in which the prophet is represented as giving his orders to the king.

23. Institution of synagogues and rise of the scribes.—Nehemiah's efforts to enforce the Law produced one result of inestimable advantage for the development of spiritual religion—the institution of synagogues with the consequent rise of the scribes. Since a Law so complex as that contained in the Pentateuch could not have been learnt at one hearing, it must have been necessary to provide for regular instruction in it; and the informal meetings which in the past had taken place in the prophets' houses (cf. 2 K 4[23]) probably suggested a way in which this could be effected. Henceforth those who wished to know the will of Jahweh betook themselves, not to the prophets who had taught according to their own intuition, but to those who were duly instructed in the written Law. Professional prophets, indeed, long continued to exist, but they were men with whom prophecy was merely a livelihood. The nobler exponents of Jahweh's will found their inspiration for the most part in the Scriptures, though prophecy was by no means dead, if the word be understood not of the form, but of the substance of the message delivered.[1]

It was impossible that the Jews should live among so highly civilized a people as the Babylonians without acquiring a considerable amount of culture, and the connexion between Palestine and the east during the 6th and 5th centuries had probably brought much of this culture to Jerusalem. Doubtless a number of practices of which Ezra and Nehemiah would have disapproved lingered on or even found their way into Jewish religious life, and in some cases, such as the celebration of the Day of Atonement, were found to have taken so firm a hold upon the people that it became necessary to embody them in the Law. There can be little doubt, however, that, as a whole, the development in religion from the time of Nehemiah was in the direction of a higher spirituality. It is true that the priests whom Malachi had rebuked about the middle of the 5th cent., and who were then far from being spiritual leaders, do not appear to have been any better after Nehemiah's reforms, but happily the spirituality of Israel did not depend on the Temple.

From the Samaritan schism till the coming of Alexander the history of Judah is almost a blank. Josephus tells us (*Ant.* XI. vii. 1) of a quarrel between the high priest Johanan and his brother Jeshua, and of the murder of the latter, which was punished by Bagoas, who may reasonably be identified with the Bagohi who, according to the Elephantine papyri, was governor of Judah in 408. Perhaps the prophecy of Joel in its original form dates from the period between Nehemiah and Alexander, and doubtless the redaction of the historical books still continued.

24. Condition of Judaism, 332-198 B.C.—With the coming of Alexander the Great a new era dawned for Palestine and for Judaism. The Persians had been most unpopular rulers, and Alexander promised a large measure of freedom. But long isolation had produced, at least in the rank and file of Judaism, a shrinking from contact with heathenism, and it was perhaps for some time doubtful whether the little community of Jews in Jerusalem and the neighbouring districts of Judah would gain any advantage from the opening up of the world which had resulted from Alexander's conquests. It is probable that in the book of Jonah we have a rebuke of that contemptuous attitude towards the Gentiles which was endangering the

[1] This is doubtless the explanation of the development of the apocalyptic as distinct from the earlier prophetic style, which is especially characteristic of the 2nd cent. B.C. Prophetic methods were then discredited (Zec 13[2f.]). Exhortations had long before been put into the mouth of historical characters, but now descriptions of past events and of their still future outcome were together put into the mouth of some one in the past, thus teaching a philosophy of history.

very existence of the nation. The writer, who, like St. Paul, evidently contrasts 'Jews by nature' with 'sinners of the Gentiles,' maintains that Israel has a message for the world, and it was doubtless due to him, and to those who were like-minded, that Jews loyal to their religion now left the narrow district to which they had been restricted and settled not only further afield in Palestine, but also in more remote parts of Alexander's dominions.

It is not unlikely that the Jews had at first anticipated from the coming of Alexander greater freedom than was actually given them. They must have felt keenly their subjection to the Ptolemaic rule, although that rule was mild compared with Persian methods of government. A new trouble was, however, arising. With the advent of Hellenism the religion of Jahweh had to grapple with a more dangerous foe than it had as yet encountered. At first the danger was scarcely realized, but, as milder government made it increasingly possible for Jews to become wealthy, the attractions of Hellenism became more serious. In the book of Proverbs we have a picture of a fairly well-to-do community, and the warnings against foreign vices here given show the temptations to which the younger Jews especially were exposed.

25. Struggle between Judaism and Hellenism.—When Antiochus the Great became master of Palestine (198 B.C.), the condition of Judaism was outwardly more flourishing than had been the case for centuries. The work which Simon the son of Onias had been able to carry out at the Temple (Sir 50) about the end of the 3rd cent. is sufficient proof that there was a considerable amount of wealth among loyal Jews. Moreover, there had been a great expansion of Judaism, and Jewish communities were to be found not only in Jerusalem and the almost exclusively Jewish districts of Judæa, but also in Galilee and Gilead, as well as among the Ammonites, Moabites, Edomites, and Philistines. The poorer Jews, especially in the country districts, were loyal to the Law; but among the wealthier classes, particularly in Jerusalem, the social disadvantages of customs radically opposed to Hellenism were being keenly felt, and there were not a few people who were disposed to live in a way which, if it did not actually imply the abandonment of the Law, at least showed a dangerous inclination to coquette with Hellenism.

It is unnecessary to trace here in detail the widening of the breach between those who were loyal to the Law, the *Ḥăsîdîm*, as they came to be called, and those who were in favour of adopting Hellenism; or to describe the events which led to the attempt of Antiochus Epiphanes to make an end of Judaism. That attempt marks the greatest and most glorious development in the religion of Israel. Never before had the religion of Jahweh been subjected to so severe a trial; yet it not only stood the test, but emerged from it spiritualized and glorified. At first the resistance of the *Ḥăsîdîm* was passive; martyrdom followed martyrdom and massacre massacre. Hitherto it had been the received teaching that compensation for suffering would be given to the righteous before death, but now old theories of retribution, which had, perhaps, been quite recently attacked in the poem of Job, broke down utterly. The *Ḥăsîdîm* asked, 'Why standest thou so far off, O Jahweh?,' and from many a synagogue there went up the cry, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' Though for some time they found no answer, they were yet loyal. Hunted as they were from place to place, and treated as sheep for the slaughter, they nevertheless continued to meet, and to comfort one another. Lessons for the present distress were found in the words of the prophets whose utterances were now sometimes modified or amplified to suit the situation, sometimes imitated. Several passages in the prophetical books, especially Isaiah, as these have come down to us, show signs of having been composed or adapted during this period of storm and stress.

It is impossible here to tell the story of the Maccabæan struggle and of the successes achieved by the Jews, beginning with the re-dedication of the Temple on 25th Dec. 165 B.C. and culminating in the granting of autonomy to the Jews under Simon, who was accepted as high priest in 141. The tremendous importance of the religious development during this period has been overlooked, partly owing to preconceived ideas about the history of the Canon and the date of the Septuagint version, but largely owing to the quite correct feeling that the religion of the Psalms and the books of the Prophets is on a far higher plane than that which is found in the books of Maccabees. Yet, if it be remembered that the *Ḥăsîdîm* and the Maccabees were not identical, and that, whereas some of the latter—*e.g.* Jonathan and Simon—were, despite their personal bravery, stained with vice, of the former the Apostle writes, 'of whom the world was not worthy' (He 11^{38}), objections to a Maccabæan date on this score will have little force.

Happily, the Maccabees were dependent for a time on the help of the *Ḥăsîdîm*, and to this cause we may attribute the fact that, in the work of restoration under Simon, the *Ḥăsîdîm* appear to have had considerable influence. In Jerusalem and in many synagogues the Scriptures had been burnt, defaced, or defiled, and after the struggle it would probably be necessary to edit the prophetic writings from tattered and mutilated fragments, the original Scriptures and later compositions based upon them being in many cases indistinguishable. At the same time the synagogue collections of Psalms, which had now become an integral part of the religious life of the people, would be combined for the use of the Temple, and a beginning would thus be made of the last section of the Hebrew Canon.

In the Psalms and in the books of the Prophets, as they finally appear after the Maccabæan struggle, we see how great an evolution has taken place in Israel. The crude religion of Israel, as it had existed seven hundred years before, has been enriched and purified 'by divers portions and in divers manners.' The crudities often remain, but to a great extent they fail to obtrude themselves, because they too have been made to serve the purpose of a spiritual religion, and only the student of comparative religion recognizes their original nature.

The climax of OT revelation was achieved through the sufferings of the *Ḥăsîdîm*. Those sufferings, which had once tried the faith of the best men in Israel almost to breaking, were seen in the final issue not only to have preserved the national life of Israel, but to have established a Church which attracted the best elements of other nations. At last the meaning of martyrdom was made clear, and those who in their suffering for the right had proved themselves to be the true Israel were vindicated. To this Israel, His steadfast servant who had faith to discern His utterance, Jahweh had spoken in no uncertain voice:

'It is too light a thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth' (Is 49^{6}).

LITERATURE.—J. Wellhausen, *Israelitische und jüdische Geschichte*[6], Berlin, 1901; J. E. Carpenter and G. Harford-Battersby, *The Hexateuch*, London, 1902; S. R. Driver, *Introduction to the Literature of the OT*[9], Edinburgh, 1913; OT artt. in *EBi* and *HDB*.

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ITALY (ANCIENT).—1. Introductory.—The design of this article is limited to recording briefly such features in the religious belief and usage of Ancient Italy during the last six centuries B.C. as are independent, so far as can be ascertained, both of Etruscan and of Roman religion. The materials for such an account are, of course, scanty. They consist mainly of ancient inscriptions or archæological remains from the areas inhabited by tribes not speaking either Latin or Etruscan, combined with what meagre records survive, in Roman and Greek authors, of the customs of those tribes. This record is often still difficult to interpret; and there is always the danger that a particular cult in a particular district (say in the 3rd or later centuries B.C.), though wearing all the appearance of native usage, may really have been planted there by either Etruscan or Greek influence. Under these circumstances, the only useful method is to avoid general statements relating to the whole of the peninsula, and to present instead a brief outline of the salient features of each separate tribal area; so that, however limited our progress may be, there will be at least firm ground beneath our feet. By comparison of the details given here with the artt. ROMAN RELIGION and ETRUSCAN RELIGION, the reader will easily reach such general conclusions as may at present safely be drawn.

2. Chronology.—The period which is mostly represented by the statements that follow, when no more precise dates are given, is from 400–90 B.C. (or, more narrowly, from 350–150). After the latter year there were not many parts of Italy in which Latin was not commonly understood and spoken; and after 89 B.C., at the conclusion of the Social War, what remained of the local dialects rapidly died out. So soon as the conquering idiom has established itself in a locality, it becomes difficult to distinguish with certainty the surviving elements of local usage from the predominant influence of Roman custom. The beginning of the record is for most districts safely reckoned at 400 B.C., since (with the possible exception of a few Venetic inscriptions from Padua, and some interesting, but as yet mainly undeciphered and almost wholly untranslated, inscriptions from the Eastern coast, such as the inscriptions of Castrignano and Grecchio) there are no dialectal inscriptions which can be referred to any earlier date than 400 B.C., when the knowledge of the Græco-Etruscan alphabet first penetrated the mountain tribes of the centre, through their contact with the Greek colonies of the Western coast and with the Etruscans. Nevertheless, it will be found that some of the records come themselves provided with a considerable history, from the analysis of which we can glean not uninteresting particulars of the beliefs of the tribes at a period antecedent to the first Gallic invasion, though in no case earlier than the arrival of the Etruscans.

3. Tribal areas.—For a description of the geographical distribution of the different tribes of Ancient Italy, the reader must be referred to other sources—*e.g.*, the art. 'Italy' in *EBr*[11], sect. on 'Ancient Languages and Peoples.' It will suffice to enumerate here the following different tribes of whose religious beliefs we have some limited knowledge: (1) the Messapians in the South Eastern peninsula; (2) the Samnite tribes occupying roughly the southern half of the centre of the peninsula; (3) their kinsmen who settled in the Campanian plain between 440 and 400 B.C., over-running a partly Italic and partly Etruscan population, especially in the great city of Capua, which they held until it was destroyed in 211 B.C.; (4) their kinsmen to the North—a group of hardy mountaineers, of whom the Marsians and Paelignians were the most conspicuous; (5) the Sabines, the brothers of the Roman Patricians and the ancestors of the Samnites; (6) the ancient inhabitants of Latium, probably identical with the Plebeians at Rome; (7) the Volscians, a primitive tribe who occupied the marshes on the coast and some of the hills behind them, between the Latins and the Campanians; (8) the Umbrian inhabitants of Iguvium, the authors of the famous Iguvine Tables; (9) the Veneti in the plains of the North East. This leaves out of account the Bruttii in the extreme South Western peninsula, the Ligurians in the North West (see art. LIGURIAN RELIGION), and the Picentines in the East; no very substantial record of the religion of any of these at this period has been as yet discovered. For the usages of the Celtic invaders of Trans-Alpine Gaul, see art. CELTS.

(1) *Messapians.*—In the scanty and difficult inscriptions that survive from this people (the tribe from which the Latin poet Ennius sprang) no deities have been recognized except such as are familiar on Greek soil; and the only divine name that occurs frequently enough to be identified without hesitation is that of the goddess Aphrodite in a genuine Messapian form (Aprodita), which is fairly good evidence that her worship was established in the locality, though it is probable that the goddess Damater (Attic Demeter) was also not unknown. According to Festus (p. 181 [ed. C. O. Müller, Leipzig, 1839]), the Jupiter to whom the Messapian Salentini sacrificed a horse had the epithet Menzana—a name for which there is more than one possible but no certain etymology. Even Mommsen's careful collection (*Unterital. Dialekte*, pp. 85–98) of the evidence from ancient writers contains hardly anything that is of service to students of religion.

(2) *The Samnite tribes.*—The Samnite tribes were in origin identical with the Sabines,[1] and there is little doubt that, like them, they shared many of the beliefs and usages of the Roman official religion. There is no doubt, *e.g.*, that they practised the curious institution of the *ver sacrum*, by which, under pressure of some public calamity, all the creatures, human and others, born in a particular spring were devoted to the gods, and compelled at a certain age to leave the territory of the rest of the tribe and seek a home elsewhere. Such, according to a well-attested tradition, was the origin of the distinction between the Samnites proper and the Sabines (see, *e.g.*, Festus, p. 326 f., 106 [Müller]). In the intercourse between Romans and Samnites in the Samnite Wars they appear to have well understood the fetial ceremonies practised by the Romans (see Livy, ix. 1–12), and they certainly shared the body of early Italic custom which the Romans originally denoted by the term *ius gentium*. More definite information about their beliefs is afforded by a well preserved monument, which has hardly attracted as much notice as it deserves. It is a bronze tablet, now in the British Museum, inscribed on both sides, known as the *Tabula Agnonensis*, from the name of the modern village (Agnone) near which it was found, and which is near the site of the ancient Bovianum. This table enumerates the deities worshipped in a sacred grove or garden, and presents some details of their cult. The text of it is typical of the religion of the most powerful tribe of Italy, and worth quotation in full. A query in the translation indicates the points at which the meaning of the Oscan is still subject to doubt. It should be explained that the whole grove was sacred to a (presumably feminine) deity called Kerres, who certainly stands in some near relation to the Latin Ceres; and most of the various deities

[1] See (5) below.

have an epithet showing their subordination to or connexion with her.

'The following deities are placed in the Garden of Kerres. A statue to the goddess of Gestation (?); to the Good-Humoured god [Mercury]; to Kerres; to the Kerrean mother; to the goddess Midwife; to the Kerrean Wet-Nurse; to the Kerrean Streams; to the inmost-forest-revealing (?) goddess; to the Kerrean Rains; to the Kerrean Dawns; to Jove the Door-keeper (?); to Jove the Ruler; to the Kerrean Herculus; to the faithful goddess of Delivery; to the Divine Creatress.

On the altar for fire-sacrifice a sacred offering is decreed at every alternate festival.

At the garden the statues are dedicated to the following attendants of Flora. To the Kerrean Presentress [*i.e.* a goddess of Birth?]; to the Kerrean Wet-Nurse; to the Kerrean Flora; to Father Good-Humour [Mercury].

The following altars belong to the garden:'

[Then follows an enumeration of the deities whose statues have been already mentioned in which Jupiter the Ruler is also called Pius, 'dutiful' (as son or father?); then a repetition of the rule for the fire-sacrifice, and, finally, the statement that the garden 'is dedicated to the Decumanii' (deities of the sacred tithes?).]

It would be out of place to discuss the details of this interesting list; but it will be seen at once that there could hardly be a better illustration of the half-animistic stage which Warde Fowler has traced in his *Religious Experience of the Roman People* (London, 1911), p. 117. Side by side with fairly complete persons, such as Jupiter, Hercules, and Ceres, we have a number of shadowy figures representing different natural operations of importance to the worshipper in an agricultural community, and their connexion with the supreme creative force represented by Kerres is expressed with curious faithfulness by the continual repetition of the epithet 'Kerrean.'

This town, Bovianum, was the chief centre of the Samnites; but no Samnite inscriptions have survived connected with any buildings. An interesting characteristic, however, of a large temple which has been laid bare upon the site (modern Calcatello, near Pietrabbondante) is that the hill on which it stood slopes towards the E.; and, in order that the worshipper might not have to turn his back upon the E. in addressing the statue of the god, this was placed on the N. side wall of the Cella, similar arrangements being made with the altars outside. The temple presumably belonged to Apollo. One other deity who should be mentioned was called in Samnite form Anagtia, better known under her Marso-Latin title of Angitia (see below, § 4).

(3) *The Campanians.*—The inscriptions of the prosperous towns of Pompeii and Herculaneum, which were overwhelmed in A.D. 79, include many which go back to the Oscan period, and vouch for the worship of Apollo, Flora, Venus, and Hercules, under their Oscan titles of Apellu, Fluusa, Herentas, and Hercolus. To Hercolus, for instance, was dedicated a spacious temple on the confines of Nola and Abella, whose administration formed the subject of a solemn treaty between the two communities (R. S. Conway, *Italic Dialects*, no. 95).

On the leaden curses, of which several have been preserved, having been originally put into tombs in order to be conducted by the dead man (who had no connexion with the curse) to another world, we find the deity Kerres with an epithet *arentika* (supposed to mean 'avenging'); and also a euphemistic description of some punitive deities as 'the best of maidens' (*valaimas puklum*), who with Kerres are besought to punish the victim of the curse by depriving him of all capacity to undertake any operation of life, as well as by various species of torture (see the curse of Vibia [Conway, no. 130]). Kerres apparently has a 'legion' of other spirits under her command; and the object of the curse is to secure some concession, which, if made, will free the victim from it.

The most interesting phenomenon, however, in the religious documents of ancient Campania is the unique group of inscriptions which scholars have agreed to call Jovilæ (Osc. *iovilas*). These are coats of arms (generally, though not always, containing a pair of emblems) which appear to have been dedicated either at graves or in some temple or sacred grove, though the only deity clearly mentioned is 'Jupiter *Flagius'—to write his name in Latin form (the meaning and significance of the epithet are uncertain). The object of the erection of the Jovila was to secure the performance of some regular sacrifice, presumably in honour of the ancestors or tutelar deities of the families concerned, at regular dates in the year, such as the Ides of March. They are commonly cut from stone; but the later specimens were more cheaply made of terra-cotta, and a pair of these may be seen in the British Museum. They have been discovered hitherto only at Capua and Cumæ. The inscriptions regularly mention the name of a *gens*, and very often of two, such as the Tirentii Magii. Fuller details, with the scanty record of the nearest parallels to this usage known elsewhere in ancient Italy, such as the *Stultorum Feriæ* at Rome, and the crests of families at Heraclea, may be found in Conway, p. 101 ff. The fact that they appear nowhere but in or near a city so long under Etruscan influence raises the question how far we have here a genuine Italic usage; but the evidence, on the whole, points to its having been natural to Italian soil.

(4) *North Oscan tribes of the Abruzzi.*—The Pælignian town of Corfinium, though far from completely excavated, has yielded some interesting records of the local institutions. It is clear that the local dialect remained in full use in these mountain valleys until the time of Cicero. We have several epitaphs in honour of persons bearing the epithet Kerria, *i.e.* '(priestess) of Kerres'; and one longer and interesting inscription describes a lady connected with two noble *gentes* as 'shepherdess of the sacred flock' and 'priestess of two (masculine) gods of agriculture,' the *Cerfi semones*—to Latinize their names; she is said to have been buried 'by command of Urania' (commonly interpreted as Venus; but quite possibly denoting either Demeter or Juno), and the contents of the inscription show that she had been married. The goddesses Minerva and Angitia and the 'children of Jove,' presumably Castor and Pollux, were also worshipped in this district.

One other characteristic of these tribes is the comparative frequency of dedications to geographical deities, such as the River Avernus, Lake Fucinus, and Pater Albensis, probably a deity connected with the same lake near whose shores stood the town of Alba Fucens.

A goddess Vesūna Erinia is coupled with Erinus or Ero Pater on one inscription of the Marsi; and, as Vesūna is commonly identified with Vesta, her appearing here as one of a divine couple is noteworthy. The goddesses of good health and victory (Valetudo, Victoria) show the same abstract character that is familiar in many Roman deities; but their inscriptions are hardly earlier than 150 B.C.

A famous temple and grove belonging to the goddess Angitia stood on the shore of Lake Fucinus, and she was widely worshipped in this mountain region as the goddess of healing, with skill to cure by charms and herbs the bites of the serpents which abound in its limestone rocks. The name is commonly connected with the Latin *anguis*, 'snake'; the derivation is doubtful, though in the present state of our knowledge not altogether impossible. In one inscription the name appears in the plural, so that there were apparently sister deities. The Marsian district was famous for

[1] The epithet *liganakdikes* would be in Latin form **ligniadex*, and may conceivably mean 'that indicates the proper trees to be hewn.'

witches in classical times, and is still counted the home of witchcraft in Modern Italy (A. de Nino, *Usi e costumi abruzzesi*, Florence, 1891, *passim*, esp. vol. vi.).

(5) *The Sabines.*—To discuss the religion of the Sabines would be to examine the most lofty and austere elements of the religion of the primitive Patricians at Rome, a system whose foundation tradition ascribed to the Sabine king Numa. The Roman writers (like Horace, *Odes*, III. vi. 38) habitually associate with the Sabine element in the Roman stock the ideals of a simple if somewhat stern rustic life—piety, valour, industry in both sexes, in agriculture among the men, in housewifery and spinning among the women, and domestic purity; and there can be no doubt that the difference in feeling between the two orders at Rome was largely due to this more northern strain of ethics in the Sabine stock. The *patria potestas*, with the marked sacredness of the marriage tie, and the religious form of marriage known as *confarreatio*, were associated with the Patrician religion, whereas among the people of the plain of Latium akin to the Volscians there are many traces of kinship being counted only through the mother (*e.g.* Vergil, *Æn.* xi. 340 f.); and the other less sacred types of marriage, which have been plausibly ascribed to a non-Patrician origin, were based either on the primitive custom of purchase or on *usus*, *i.e.* on the mere fact of joint life. It must suffice here to indicate this important distinction, and the sources in which further account of the evidence can be found.

The artt. 'Rome' (sect. on 'Ancient History'), 'Sabini,' and 'Volsci' in *EBr*[11] give the considerable linguistic evidence. W. Ridgeway's 'Who were the Romans?' (*Proc. of the Brit. Acad.*, vol. iii. (1907)), collects the archæological data, which should be supplemented by the important criticism of Warde Fowler in his *Religious Experience* (ch. v.; and esp. pp. 112, 140), though his general standpoint (see p. 243) is not very far removed from Ridgeway's. The traces of descent through the female line in the Roman legends of the kings are collected by J. G. Frazer (*Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, London, 1905, lect. viii.). Julius Binder (*Die Plebs*, Leipzig, 1909) also maintains Schwegler's view of a racial distinction between the orders.

Beyond this there is little to say of Sabine religious cults, for the reason that they were practically amalgamated with the Romans at so early a period; the legends ascribe the fusion to the 8th cent. B.C. There have been preserved to us, however, a certain number of divine names and religious terms from the Sabine district, mainly by the Augustan scholar, Varro, who was himself a Sabine. These will be found enumerated in Conway, pp. 353–358.

To the Sabines are specifically assigned by Latin authorities the deities Juno, Quirinus, Mamers (Mars), Minerva, Vacuna, and other more shadowy figures, among which may be mentioned the picturesque name of Fērōnia, the goddess of wild creatures, who had also a great temple in Faliscan territory,[1] despoiled by Hannibal in 215 B.C.

The Faliscans, who were a half-Etruscanized Sabine community, especially worshipped the goddesses Juno and Minerva,[2] and to the Faliscans is attributed also the curious institution of fire-leaping priests (Hirpi).[3]

Mention should be made here of the sacredness of the oak-tree and its connexion in many places with the worship of Jupiter. The evidence for this is collected by A. B. Cook (*CR* xviii. [1904] 360 ff.); and of this wide use has been made by J. G. Frazer in his *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship* (especially in lect. vii.). But the criticism of Warde Fowler (*Religious Experience*, p. 143) is important.

[1] See Conway, pp. 353–358; and, *e.g.*, Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* v. 73 f.; Macrobius, I. ix. 16; Livy, XXVI. xi. 8 f.

[2] See Conway, p. 370 ff., and the authorities there cited.

[3] See Varro, quoted by Servius on *Æn.* xi. 787 and 785; also Pliny, VII. ii. 19.

There is no doubt that the oak had many religious associations in central Ancient Italy; but the first point to determine is whether this belief belonged to the Sabine (Patrician) or the Volscian (Latian or Plebeian) stock, or to both. This question is ignored by Frazer, who attributes it equally to the Latian centre of Aricia and to the Sabine Patricians. In one interesting passage which Cook cites (Livy, iii. 25), on Mount Algidus, on the confines of Volscian, Aequian, and Latian territory, there was a sacred oak by which oaths of great importance had to be taken, but which, it is clear from the story, was regarded with more reverence by the Roman than by the Aequian commander. The Aequians, it should be noted, belonged to the Volscian side of the tribal division. But there is no evidence in the passage that the oak was connected with any one particular god, and it is to be observed in the light of linguistic evidence which has accumulated since Cook's paper (see Ridgeway, 'Who were the Romans?' p. 43) that, if Cures and Quirinus are connected with the word meaning 'oak' (Lat. *quercus*), the names are more probably Latin rather than Sabine in origin. On Quirinus see, further, Wissowa, in Roscher.

(6) *Ancient Latium.*—To attempt to separate the religion of the Plebeian or Latian part or parts of the Roman stock is impossible within the limits of this article. The evidence for their distinction from the Sabines has been already cited; but mention should be made here of the famous cult of the Lake of Nemi near Aricia, which was an ancient centre of worship in Latium, and which in historical times was connected with Diana. Besides the Vestal Virgins by whom the worship was properly conducted, there was a curious and very ancient person called Rex Nemorensis, who is described by Strabo (v. iii. 12; see also Ovid, *Fasti*, iii. 271).

'He was a runaway slave, who succeeded to office by slaying his predecessor, and he held it only so long as he could make good his title in single combat against all assailants. Any fugitive slave who contrived to break a branch from a certain tree in the grove had the right to fight the priest, and if he killed him he reigned in his stead' (J. G. Frazer, *op. cit.* p. 16).

There seems no reason to doubt that this is a survival of a very primitive belief belonging to, or at least at home in, the Latian stock, and Frazer's collection of the evidence of the Roman and Greek elements which came in the end to be attached to the cult is of fascinating interest, although the political deductions which he would attach to his collection still need confirmation.

(7) *The Volscian district.*—In an inscription (Conway, no. 252) from the Volscian town of Velitræ (the birthplace of Augustus), dating from about 300 B.C., whose language shows remarkable affinities to the Umbrian of Iguvium, we have directions as to what is to be done in the case of any profanation of the temple of a deity called Declunus or Decluna; among them it is notable that, in order to repair any injury, the use of iron is specifically permitted, showing that in the ordinary course that metal would be tabu, as to the Flamen of Jupiter at Rome.

(8) *The Umbrians.*—The most famous monument of ancient Italian religion outside Rome is the Iguvine Tables (sometimes erroneously called Eugubine), which were found in the town of Gubbio in the 15th cent., and are still preserved in its Town Hall. They are seven tables of bronze of varying sizes; all but two are engraved on both sides. They are all written in what is generally called the Umbrian dialect, though in different periods of the language. In the earlier Tables, i–v, the Umbrian alphabet, which is a variety of the Etruscan, is used. The two later Tables, vi and vii, with the last paragraph of Table v, are written in the Latin alphabet of about 100 B.C. All but Tables iii and iv can now be interpreted with approximate completeness, and even of iii and iv the general sense is tolerably clear. The Tables contain the liturgy of a sacred brotherhood, the *frateer atiiedíur*, who in Latin shape would be called the Fratres Atiedii, together with some administrative resolutions of the same body. Tables vi and vii contain a later and greatly expanded version of the liturgical directions contained in Table i, both alike regulating the solemn lustration of the town

of Iguvium and an assembly of the people closely connected with the *lustrum*. The curse which they pronounce on the enemies of Iguvium denounces the Etruscans but not the Gauls, and must, therefore, have been first composed well before 400 B.C., when the Gauls appear in North Italy south of the Apennines in great numbers.

The chief item in the expansion is that the prayers which are to be recited by the priests, although it is directed that they are to be recited in a whisper [*taçez*, i.e. *tacitus*], are now written out in full (see below).

Table ii, which, on the whole, seems to have been engraved at the earliest date, contains regulations for a sacrifice, including the *lustrum*, which is absent from the later liturgy; for an optional sacrifice to some infernal deity known as Hontus Jovius (or Honta Jovia); and also for the sacrificial proceedings at a six-monthly assembly of deputies (*decuriæ*) from ten towns or clans, the deity worshipped in this case being none but Jupiter the Holy. Tables iii and iv, which (though the existing copy seems later than ii) contain, on the whole, the oldest matter of all of the seven, give directions for sacrifices to be offered in a particular month to a number of deities: (1) Jupiter; (2) Pomonus, with a doubtful epithet (Pupdike [dative]=*Pubidicus ['the decider, or creator, of sex']?), and (3) Vesūna, who is associated with Pomonus probably as consort, since offerings of a peculiarly feminine character are made to her. Three other deities also receive honour: Tursa, who seems to be a goddess of terror; and Purtupita and Hula (or Purtupitus and Hulus), who are dismissed somewhat briefly. Tursa occurs in one of the other Tables as an associate, or originally perhaps merely as a potency, of the masculine deity known as Cerfius Martius. Part of the ritual prescribed in Table iii seems to have been the carrying round of the victim in some sort of a cage, though the meaning of the lines (10–20) is by no means certain. If this view of the meaning is correct, it gives a welcome ground for assuming some historical connexion between the ritual of the Tables and the remarkable ceremony still practised in Gubbio every year on 15th May, the date of the Roman Ambarvalia. A full description of this modern and ancient rite with admirable photographs and a discussion of its connexion with the Tables will be found in H. M. Bower, *The Elevation and Procession of the Ceri at Gubbio* (=Publication xxxix. of Folk-Lore Society), London, 1897.

The following paragraph (*Tab. Iguv.* vi. b, 19–36), taken from the ceremonial to be observed at the Vehian Gates, will illustrate the style of the liturgy. The two deities invoked are (1) Grabovis, who is probably the same as the Roman Gradivus, with an epithet Vofio, which probably means 'Hearer of Vows'; and (2) Tefer Jovius, the first title being presumably connected with Gr. *τέφρα*, 'ashes,' and Oscan *tefúrúm*, 'burnt-sacrifice.' [For the sake of conciseness, the rendering that follows is given in the 2nd person; but the original is in the 3rd.]

'Before the Vehian Gate sacrifice three bulls with white foreheads to Grabovis, the Hearer of Vows, on behalf of the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium. Offer the inward parts (?) with the sacrificial knife [*or* upon the sacrificial dish]; make offering either with wine or vinegar; offer the corn, pray silently. Sprinkle the flat cake with salt, offer it with the round cake; then make announcement of the auguries as before the Trebulan Gate.

After passing the Vehian Gate, offer three lambs (?) to Tefer, Son (?) of Jove, on behalf of the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium. Make the offering seated, offer the meat [? *or* bury the remains]; offer the corn; offer the vinegar; pray silently. Over the severed portions present the sacred cakes of two shapes, then announce the auguries as at the Trebulan Gate. When you have made oblation of the lambs (?), then do you, the same priest, offer, at the right foot, libation and the image of a pig. Make a hollow for the sacred basin; hold it in the left hand until you have completed the libation. Set the sacred basin in its place and at the left foot offer the blood [*or* (?) the final oblation]. Then pray thus over the libation: "Thus I invoke thee, Tefer, Son of Jove, on behalf of the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium for the folk [? *or* name] of each; foster and be kind to the hill and to the city, to the folk [?] of each. I beseech thee, holy one, trusting in thy holiness; I beseech thee, Tefer, Son of Jove, by this thine own sacred purifying image of a pig, on behalf of the Fisian hill, the city of Iguvium, and the folk of each. O Tefer, Son of Jove, by the might of this offering, whatever fire has broken out [?] in the Fisian hill, whatever solemn rites have been neglected in the city of Iguvium, count it as not having happened. O Tefer, Son of Jove, whatever part of thy sacrifice has been forgotten, let slip, spoilt, stolen, or lost, whatsoever defect there be in thy sacrifice, seen or unseen, O Tefer, Son of Jove, in so far as it be lawful, let it be made pure by this sacred purifying image of a pig. O Tefer, Son of Jove, make pure the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium. O Tefer, Son of Jove, make pure the folk, the nobles, the sacred rites, the persons of men and cattle, and the fruits of the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium; make them pure, foster and be kind with thy peace towards the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium, and to the folk of each. O Tefer, Son of Jove, keep safe the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium. O Tefer, Son of Jove, keep safe the folk, the nobles, the sacred rites, the persons of men and cattle and the fruit of the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium. Keep them safe, foster and be kind with thy peace toward them. O Tefer, Son of Jove, thee with this thine own sacred purifying image of a pig on behalf of the Fisian hill and the city of Iguvium, for the folk of each, O Son of Jove, I beseech thee." In the middle of the prayer, dance.'

It should perhaps be mentioned here that Frazer (*op. cit.* p. 275) accepts without criticism a tradition recorded in a fragment of Nicolaus Damascenus (Stobæus, *Florileg.* x. 70 = *FHG* iii. 457) to the effect that among the Umbrians, whoever may be meant by that description, the ordeal by personal combat was regular. In view of (1) the looseness with which the name Umbrians is used by many Greek writers (see Conway, *op. cit.* p. 395), (2) the nearness of the Umbrians in North Italy to other nationalities, such as the Celts, and (3) the complete absence of any other evidence of such a practice among the Umbrians of Italy proper, the statement cannot be accepted without reserve.

(9) *The Veneti.*—Of the religion of the Veneti, a people speaking an Indo-European tongue which may be described as midway between Greek and Latin, and inhabiting the lower plain of the Po before and after the invasion of the Gauls, we learn most from the inscriptions, both Venetic and Latin, of the district. From the Latin inscriptions contained in *CIL*, vol. v., we find a god named Belenus, occasionally identified with Apollo (*e.g.*, 741). Under the Empire he is often called Augustus (*e.g.*, 2143 and 2144). He was extensively worshipped in the district, and, according to Tertullian (*Apol.* 24), he was of Norican origin (cf. G. Wissowa, *Rel. und Kultus der Römer*[2], p. 297). Another deity who should be mentioned is Bergimus, whose name must be connected with the modern town of Bergamo (*e.g.*, *CIL* 4200).

We find here also the same instinct as farther south, of worshipping geographical entities: an altar to Lacus Benacus [Lago di Garda] (3998); and to the *Nymphæ Augusti et Genius pagi* (3915). These remarks, of course, apply mainly to the Latin period, *i.e.* after the foundation of the Roman Colony in Aquileia in 184 B.C.

The most picturesque figure among the Venetic deities of whom we have knowledge is the goddess known as Rehtia, to whom belonged what must have been a popular temple in the ancient city of Ateste, the modern Este, where an admirable Museum contains the recently excavated traces of her cult (some account of these was given by the present writer to the British Academy, and reported in the *Times* of 25th July 1908). The name means 'goddess of straightness or rectitude'; but there can be little doubt that she enjoyed the attributes of a goddess of fortune, like the Tuscan Nortia. Among the most numerous votive objects in her temple are a number of long bronze nails of square shape, with inscriptions minutely incised along the sides. Attached to the head of some of the nails are small objects which are best explained as representing the wedges of necessity (*clavi trabales*), which Horace described as borne by the goddess of Fortune (*Odes*, I. xxxv. 17). The inscriptions are all of the common votive type, and all in the Venetic language, save that the specimens in which the workmanship of the nail is degraded show also

a mere make-believe inscription—a string of zig-zag lines and crosses, with an occasional letter taking the place of the old formula. Two other types of votive offering are common: (1) bronze images of race-horses, of which little is left except the heels of their hind feet embedded in the pedestal that bears the inscription, and (2) bronze alphabetic tablets, which, no doubt, served the same magical purposes as similar inscriptions found elsewhere in Greece and Italy (see ETRUSCAN RELIGION, § 28).

There is at present no complete edition of the remains of these people, though Carl Pauli in *Die Veneter* (Leipzig, 1894) gave the best account then possible of the inscriptions so far discovered. The present writer hopes to publish ere long a more complete collection.

LITERATURE.—**W. Warde Fowler**, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911; **T. Mommsen**, *Die unteritalischen Dialekte*, Leipzig, 1850; **C. Pauli**, *Die Venster*, do. 1894; **G. Wissowa**, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912; **R. S. Conway**, *The Italic Dialects*, Cambridge, 1897; **F. Bücheler**, *Oskische Bleitafel*, Frankfort, 1878, and *Umbrica*, Bonn, 1883; **H. M. Bower**, *Elevation and Procession of the Ceri*, London, 1897; **J. G. Frazer**, *The Early History of the Kingship*, do. 1905, and the sections relating to Italy in *GB*[3], where the evidence of ancient Italic usage needs to be carefully distinguished from the assumptions and interpretations with which the author combines them.

R. S. CONWAY.

ITIHĀSA.—The word *itihāsa*, formed from *iti ha āsa*, 'so in truth it was,' signifies etymologically a *purāvṛtta* (cf. *Amara-kośa*, I. vi. 4), an event of the past. In the later Skr. literature it simply means 'myth,' 'legend,' 'story,' and is frequently used in conjunction with, and as a synonym of, such common equivalents for 'story' as *ākhyāna*, *ākhyāyikā*, *kathā*, etc.[1] But, if we may accept a fuller definition, viz. 'an event of olden time, conjoined with a tale and provided with a demonstration of duty, profit, love, and final emancipation [the four objects of human existence] is termed *itihāsa*,'[2] the *itihāsa* bore under its narrative guise a didactic sense, and Skr. literature affords sufficient grounds for believing that this was really the case. According to *Āśv. Gṛ. S.* (IV. vi. 6), when a person dies, the friends should sit together, reciting the histories of famous men, while the salutary *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* are recited to them.[3] Kauṭilya regards the hearing of *itihāsas* as part of the daily task by means of which the prince should perfect his education (*Arthaś.* i. 5 [10. 14 f.]), while *itivṛtta* and *purāṇa* (which, as we shall see, are elements of the *itihāsa*) are recommended to the minister as the means whereby he may bring back the misguided king into the right way (*Arthaś.* v. 6 [255. 1]).[4]

The *Mahābhārata* is described as an *itihāsa mahāpuṇyaḥ* ('an *itihāsa* of great merit'; *e.g.*, in *Mahābh.* I. lxii. 16 [2298]), and reference is frequently made to its *puṇyāḥ kathāḥ* ('meritorious tales'). In the numerous *itihāsas* which the *Mahābhārata* usually quotes with the formula *atrāpy udāharantimam itihāsam purātanam* ('right here they begin this ancient *itihāsa*'; see below), the didactic element assumes such prominence that the historical drapery all but disappears. Such passages as *Mahābh.* XII. ccexli. 14 (13020): 'This doubt, O sage, is, like a dagger, implanted in my heart; tear it out by the recital of *itihāsas*—that is my supreme desire,' may also be recalled.[5]

Kauṭilya, in the first of the two passages already cited (*Arthaś.* i. 5. [10. 15]), regards *itihāsa* as a collective term comprehending the six groups, *purāṇa*, *itivṛtta*, *ākhyāyikā*, *udāharaṇa*, *dharmaśāstra*, and *arthaśāstra*—groups regarding which, it is true, fresh difficulties arise, in so far as we do not know precisely what he means by the several categories.

The present writer is inclined to believe, however, that Sauti's question to the Ṛṣis (*Mahābh.* i. i. 10): 'What, ye twice-born, shall I tell? The meritorious tales collected in the Purāṇas, filled with precepts of duty and profit, (or) the acts (*itivṛtta*) of princes of men and great-souled seers?' indicates an analogous conception of the *itihāsa*, as it refers to the *itihāsa*, the best among the *itihāsas*, *i.e.* the *Mahābhārata* (cf., *e.g.*, i. i. 19, 49, 259, ii. 36 [306], iii. 85 [648], lx. 23 [2229], lxii. 16 [2298], xcv. 88 [3840]), which, in point of fact, contains all the component elements of the *itihāsa* specified by Kauṭilya, *dharma-* and *arthaśāstra* included.[1] To the category of the *purāṇa* may be assigned in this connexion—here the present writer agrees with Jacobi—the legendary (cf. the definition in *Mahābh.* i. v. 2 [864]); to that of the *itivṛtta*, the historical (cf. the passage cited above, *Mahābh.* i. i. 10); to that of the *ākhyāyikā*, prose narratives corresponding to the later *ākhyāyika* and *kathā*;[2] and to that of the *udāharaṇa*, the moral instructions (cf. the *puṇyaḥ kathāḥ* [*Mahābh.* i. i. 10]), often introduced in the *Mahābhārata* with the verse already quoted, 'right here they begin,' etc. This collective sense of *itihāsa* probably also explains the variety of designations by which the same work is known, as *ākhyāna*, *upākhyāna*, etc.[3]

From what has been said it is clear that the *itihāsa* was at first but one of the various possible and actually occurring forms of literary composition. The *Mahābhārata* itself is described as the most excellent of the *itihāsas* (i. i. 266 [259], etc.). Moreover, there are positive grounds for believing that in ancient India there existed a collection of *itihāsas* under the title of *Itihāsa*, or *Itihāsaveda*.

In the *pāriplavam akhyānam*, a ten-days' cycle of ritual belonging to the *aśvamedha* (*q.v.*), and repeated throughout the entire year in which the sacrificial horse was permitted to roam at large,[4] every day a particular class of beings, together with their king, was scenically presented, and instructed by a recital performed by the *hotṛ*.[5] On the 1st day were represented Manu Vaivasvata as the king and human beings as his subjects, and a hymn from the *Ṛigveda* was recited; on the 2nd day there were given, in the respective parts, Yama Vaivasvata, the *pitaras*, and a chapter of the *Yajurveda*; on the 3rd day, Varuṇa Ādtya, the Gandharvas, and a *parvan* of the *Atharvaṇaḥ*; on the 4th day, Soma Vaiṣṇava, the Apsaras, and a *parvan* of the *Āṅgirasaḥ*; on the 5th day, Arbuda Kādraveya, the serpents (*sarpa*), and a *parvan* of the *Sarpavidyā* (or *Viṣavidyā*); on the 6th day, Kubera Vaiśravaṇa, the Rakṣas, and a *parvan* of the *Devajanavidyā* (or *Rakṣovidyā*, or *Piśāchavidyā*); on the 7th day, Asita Dhānva(na), the *asuras*, and a *māyā* (or *asuravidyā*); on the 8th day, Matsya Sāṇmada, aquatic beings, and an *itihāsa* of the *Itihāsaveda* (cf. Śāṅkh., the *itihāsa* only in *Śatap.* and *Śaṅkh.*; but the *Āśv.* with the same characters—gives a *purāṇa* of the *Purāṇavidyā*, assigning the *itihāsa* to the following day); on the 9th day, Tārkṣya Vaipaśyata, the birds, and a *purāṇa* of the *Purāṇaveda* (cf. Śāṅkh., the *purāṇa* only in *Śatap.* and *Śaṅkh.*; in the *Āśv.*, as noted, an *itihāsa*); on the 10th day, Dharma Indra, the gods, and a decade of the *Sāmaveda*.

Here, accordingly, we have the following series: *Ṛcaḥ*, *Yajūṃṣi*, *Atharvaṇaḥ*, *Aṅgirasaḥ*, *Sarpavidyā* (or *Viṣavidyā*), *Devajanavidyā* (or *Rakṣovidyā*, or *Piśāchavidyā*), *Māyā* (or *Asuravidyā*), *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa* (or these two in reverse order), and *Sāmani*. Similar lists are found elsewhere in Vedic texts[6]—*e.g.*, *Śatap.* XIV. v. 4. 10 (i.e. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II. iv. 10 = IV. i. 2), XI. v. 6; *Taitt. Ār.* ii. 9; *Āśv. Gṛ. S.* III. iii. 1; *Atharvaveda*, XV. vi. 3 f.

In these ancient lists *itihāsa* is always found side by side with *purāṇa*; sometimes, indeed, the two are joined together to form a *dvandva* (dual compound), and it is impossible, in view of the above remarks, to doubt their close relation and affinity. The present writer has, in fact, noted in Vedic texts only a single occurrence of each

[1] Cf. E. Sieg, *Sagenstoffe des Ṛgveda*, Stuttgart, 1902, i. 17 ff.

[2] V. S. Apte, *Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Poona, 1890, *s.v.* 'Itihāsa,' but without giving the source of the stanza.

[3] Cf. K. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1881-1901, i. 290, ii. 158, note 1; also the parallel passages in H. Lüders, *ZDMG* lviii. [1904] 707 ff.

[4] Cf. H. Jacobi, 'Kultur-, Sprach- u. Literarhistorisches aus dem Kauṭiliya' in *SBAW*, 1911, p. 969.

[5] Cf. also J. Dahlmann, *Das Mahābhārata als Epos u. Rechtsbuch*, Berlin, 1895, p. 282 f.

[1] Cf. Jacobi, *op. cit.*, p. 969.

[2] Stories about women, perhaps; cf. Sieg, i. 32.

[3] Cf. Sieg, i. 16 f., 22. Many of these terms may, of course, mean no more than 'story,' and this may be the case, in particular, with *akhyāna*; but with reference to the *Mahābhārata* it should be indicated that that work speaks of itself (*e.g.*, i. ii. 383 [645]) also as *arthaśāstra*, *dharmaśāstra*, and *kāmaśāstra*; in i. lxii. 16 (2298) it is called *uttamaṃ puruṣam* ('last or highest *purāṇa*').

[4] A. Weber, 'Episches im vedischen Ritual' in *SBAW*, 1891, p. 775.

[5] So at least the present writer interprets the description given in *Śatap. Br.* XIII. iv. 3. 2 ff., *Śaṅkh. Śr. S.* XVI. ii. 1 ff., and *Āśv. Śr. S.* X. vii. 1 ff.

[6] Cf. Sieg, i. 21.

unaccompanied by the other, viz. *itihāsa* in *Śatap.* XI. i. 6. 9, and *purāṇa* in *Atharvaveda*, XI. vii. 24. It is also of importance to note the position which the two terms occupy in the lists. It will be seen that in many cases they come immediately after the four Vedas, and it is, therefore, by no means surprising that in *Chānd. Up.* (VII. i. 2 and 4, ii. 1, vii. 1) the *Itihāsapurāṇa* is actually spoken of as the fifth Veda (*itihāsapurāṇaḥ pañchamo vedānām vedaḥ*).

To these indisputable evidences from Vedic texts, conclusively attesting the existence of a collection of *itihāsas*, or *purāṇas*, entitled *Itihāsa* or *Purāṇa* and reckoned among the Vedas, there has recently been added a most significant datum in the discovery of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, which shows that this *Itihāsaveda* was still extant about the beginning of the 3rd cent. B.C.[1]

The relevant passage is I. 3 (7. 9 ff.):[2] 'The triad Sāma, Rg, and Yajur Vedas, the Atharvaveda, and the Itihāsaveda (are) Vedas.' In this connexion we may call attention also to a passage in the introduction of the *Mahābhāṣya*, viz. I. 9. 21 ff. [ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay, 1892]: 'The four vedas with their ancillary literature and esoterism [*i.e.* the *Upaniṣads*], divided in many ways . . . "the dialogue," "the itihāsa," "the purāṇa," "the healing art,"—of such extent is the scope of application of word (sound)'; as also to the terms *aitihāsika* and *paurāṇika* applied respectively to those who knew or studied the *Itihāsa* or the *Purāṇa*.[3]

Curiously enough, we find that in the *Itihāsa-purāṇa par excellence*, *i.e.* the *Mahābhārata*, the title of the 'fifth Veda' is given to *Ākhyāna*, while the *Mahābhārata* itself becomes the representative of this fifth Veda;[4] cf., *e.g.*, III. lviii. 9 (2247): 'all four vedas, (and) *Ākhyāna* as the fifth,' and XII. cccxl. 21 (13027): 'the Vedas . . . the *Mahābhārata* as the fifth.' Nevertheless, we also find in the *Mahābhārata* numerous references to *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* as ancient works that were studied together with the Vedas.[5]

The number of such passages, which, of course, are far from having all the same historical value—the *Mahābhārata* in its present shape having been a growth of centuries—might easily be increased;[6] but they are quite sufficient to show that the ancient *Itihāsaveda* or *Itihāsapurāṇaveda* has left distinct traces of its existence in the great epic. The *Mahābhārata*, in fact, must very gradually have come to take the place of that 'fifth Veda,' and the process may quite readily be explained on the assumption that the *Itihāsapurāṇa* literature was to a large extent incorporated by degrees in the epic. The source of these stories is often shown by the terms *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *itihāsapurātana*, and the like.[7]

We must now ask what connexion exists between the extensive *Purāṇa* literature still extant and the ancient *Purāṇaveda*. We must obviously assume that the ancient *Purāṇa* was the precursor of the later literary group bearing the same name, and that much of its subject-matter has been preserved in the *Purāṇas* known to us. The latter assumption will be especially valid in the case of those passages in which the *Purāṇas* agree more or less verbally with one another, or with the *Mahābhārata*, and probably also of those in which the *lakṣaṇas* (characteristics) belonging, according to ancient tradition, to the *Purāṇa* find expression in the extant *Purāṇas*. This occurs very seldom, however, for the chief characteristic of these *Purāṇas* is their sectarian spirit, which was certainly absent from the ancient *Purāṇa*.[1]

The present writer is of opinion that remains of the ancient *Itihāsapurāṇa* can be traced elsewhere in Skr. literature. Materials derived from that collection must be recognized above all in the myths and legends of the *Brāhmaṇas*, especially in such as occur in the *Arthavāda* (explanatory) parts and are distinguished by form and matter alike from the general context; but they must be recognized also in the shorter mythological-historical additions of the *Brāhmaṇas* designed to explain them.[2]

From Yāska's *Nirukta* we learn that there was a Vedic school known as the Aitihāsikas—so named because its members made use of 'the *Itihāsa*' in expounding the *mantras*,[3] and to certain *mantras* (or *sūktas*) Yāska attaches short narrative supplements which he designates *itihāsa* or *ākhyāna*. Alike in their subject-matter and in the formulæ with which they are introduced, these remind us of the additions to the *Brāhmaṇas* just mentioned. Such *itihāsas* are found, further, in the *Bṛhad-devatā*, in the *Anukramaṇī* to the Rigveda, and in the mediæval commentaries—*e.g.*, those of Devarāja, Durga, Ṣadguruśiṣya, and especially Sāyaṇa.[4] Even these relatively modern texts may preserve, and, as the present writer believes, do really preserve, ancient traditions, for it was an established principle in the exegesis of the *mantras* that the *nidāna* (primal cause, basis)—if there was one—must be taught first in order to bring out the meaning, and that the usual verbal explanation could be entered upon only after that had been done.[5]

It is, however, quite another question whether the writers of the *Brāhmaṇas* and the exegetes of the Veda made a right use of the *itihāsas*, and whether, above all, they applied them at the proper places, in the exposition of *mantras*. The present writer is of opinion that the question can be answered only with reference to each individual case. He now holds the view that the ancient *Itihāsapurāṇa* was an independent collection of legends and stories not specially connected with any particular Veda. Even on the hypothesis that there was a general correspondence between *Itihāsa* and Veda with respect to mythological views and to mythical and legendary ideas, the sagas of the *Itihāsapurāṇa* might still differ very essentially in form from the same sagas in Vedic *mantras*, and in particular, therefore, from those in the Rigveda. In such cases the employment of an *itihāsa* in the exposition of the *mantras* could easily prove a dangerous procedure.

We may here refer, by way of illustration, to the two specially prominent cases. The story of Śunaḥśepa,[6] which the *hotṛ* had to relate to the king at the Rājasūya, is quite appropriately introduced into the *Brāhmaṇa* of the Rigveda, since it formed the *arthavāda* for the *aṅjaṣava* (rapid preparation of Soma) commonly used in the Rājasūya.[7] But the *Brāhmaṇa* writer certainly erred in interweaving this saga with all the songs of the Rigveda which are ascribed to Śunaḥśepa,

[1] Cf. Jacobi, p. 954 ff., and 'Über die Echtheit des Kauṭilīya' in *SBAW*, 1912, p. 832 ff.

[2] *Ib.* p. 968.

[3] *Vārtt.* to Pāṇini, IV. ii. 60; *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. Kielhorn, II. (1883) 284. 8 f.; Sieg, i. 30.

[4] Sieg, i. 22.

[5] Cf. *Mahābh.* I. ix. 3 (2210), XII. ccx. 19 (7660), cccxxv. 24 f. (12210 f.), ccxlii. 6 (13134), XIII. xxii. 12 (1542), XII. ccxlii. 8 f. (13136 f.), I. cix. 20 (4355), II. v. 2 (130). Note also such groups as *Mahābh.* VIII. xxxiv. 44 ff. (1496 ff.): *atharvāṅgirasau, ṛgvedaḥ sāmavedaś cha, purāṇaṃ cha, itihāsayajurvedau.*

[6] Sieg, i. 22.

[7] Sieg, i. 24; M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der ind. Litt.*, Leipzig, 1908 ff., i. 442.

[1] Winternitz, p. 443 f.; Sieg, i. 34.

[2] Sieg, i. 18 ff.

[3] Cf. the well-known verse in *Vāsiṣ. Dharm.* xxvii. 6, *Mahābh.* I. i. 267 (260), *Vāyu Pur.* i. 181: 'by *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* one should supplement the Veda; the Veda feareth a man with scanty [sacred] learning, lest "this may injure me"'; cf. Sieg, i. 13 ff.

[4] Sieg, i. 17 ff.

[5] Cf. Durga on *Nirukta*, I. 5 (II. 58. 21 ff.); Sieg, i. 36.

[6] *Śaunaḥśepaṃ ākhyānam*; nevertheless a genuine *itihāsa* according to Kauṭilya's definition; cf. *Ait. Br.* vii. 13–18, *Śāṅkh. Śr. S.* xv. 17–27.

[7] At the royal inaugural sacrifice the original victim had been a man, who, however, was released from the stake by the gods themselves; and the consecration was thereafter performed without a victim or any other sacrifice, *i.e.* the *aṅjaṣava* was resorted to. Cf. Sieg, i. 19, note 2. What is further said in the saga regarding the adoption of Śunaḥśepa by Viśvāmitra (a splendid example of one or more *Itihāsaśūktas* with connecting prose) was in all likelihood designed merely to show what became of the liberated victim.

since the story of Śunaḥśepa's being bound to and delivered from the sacrificial stake is only very briefly alluded to in the Rigveda (i. xxiv. 12–13, v. ii. 7).

The story of Purūravas and Urvaśī[1] is quite appropriately given in the *Brāhmaṇa* (cf. *Śatap.* xi. v. 1, *Kāṭh.* i. viii. 10, *Maitr.* i. vi. 12) as the *arthavāda* for the use of special fire-sticks in the Agnimanthana,[2] but the legend fits here only if the dialogue between the lovers has a conciliatory ending. According to the version of the story in the Rigveda (x. xcv.), the dialogue ended tragically, and here the *Brāhmaṇa* writer took the proper course of utilizing the Rigveda strophes only so far as they fitted in with his *itihāsa*, and discarding the rest.[3]

It may be observed, finally, that the connexion between the Vedic *sūkta* and the *itihāsa* is still a subject of dispute in Vedic philology. E. Windisch (*Verhandl. der dreiunddreissigsten Philologenversammlung in Gera*, 1879, p. 23) has advanced the conjecture that the song of Purūravas and Urvaśī (Rigv. X. xcxv.) is a poem detached from its original narrative context. This idea was further developed by H. Oldenberg,[4] who advocated the theory that a number of Rigveda hymns actually postulated a prose narrative as the connecting medium of the metrical parts, and that such must be recognized as a popular type of story in ancient India—the type in which verses were set in a prose framework in favourite passages of a work, and especially in passages containing speeches and the rejoinders to them. For the systematic transmission of such a narrative—Oldenberg calls it *ākhyāna*, on the example of the *Śaunaḥśepam ākhyānam*—it sufficed, he holds, to teach and learn the verse parts only, while the prose matrix, the language of which had never been fixed, suffered numberless changes at the hands of successive generations of narrators, or else was lost altogether.[5] In particular, the prose context which later tradition supplies for the *ākhyāna* hymns of the Rigveda is, according to Oldenberg, mere drivel—not genuine tradition at all, but at most worthless *quasi*-tradition. Oldenberg's theory of the *ākhyāna* has long enjoyed an all but universal acceptance. Pischel, Geldner, and the present writer have all expressed their agreement with it, except that, in contrast to Oldenberg, they have strongly insisted upon the value of the Indian *itihāsa* tradition for the Rigveda.

On the other hand, S. Lévi[6] asserts that the majority of the dialogue hymns in the Rigveda are so lucid in their verse that they cannot have required a story to link the single strophes together; the mere reading of them calls up some sort of dramatic scene. As a matter of fact, Max Müller had thought of a dramatic action in connexion with Rigv. i. 165.[7]

Independently of both, J. Hertel[8] has rejected the *ākhyāna* theory; he regards all the *saṃvāda* hymns of the Rigveda as dramatic responsive songs,[1] which were performed occasionally at sacrificial festivals, and he conjectures that we have in these the germs of the Indian drama. L. von Schroeder[2] takes the further step of explaining all these hymns as ritual dramas.

Winternitz[3] adopts a middle course between the two views, advocating the theory that the dialogue songs of the Rigveda are not all to be explained in the same way. Some of them, he holds, are ballads, in which everything is told in versified speeches, and for which a prose introduction was necessary only in certain cases; some are poetical fragments of narrative composed partly of verse and partly of a prose element that has not survived; while others are to be regarded as strophes belonging to ritual dramas.[4]

A. B. Keith argues that it is impossible to obtain really cogent evidence for either of the theories.[5] He says that in the ancient Vedic literature there is no trace whatever of the knowledge of such a prose-poetic *ākhyāna* as Oldenberg's theory requires,[6] but there is likewise no trace of a knowledge of dramatic responsive songs at sacrificial feasts, or of ritual dramas, though, were the hypotheses of Hertel and von Schroeder sound, both types would certainly occur in the ritual texts of the Vedas. Keith's conclusion, accordingly, is that no explanation yielding a solution in all respects satisfactory has as yet been discovered.

The last word on the subject, so far, has been spoken by K. F. Geldner,[7] who, thus coming near to Hertel's views, has tried to solve the problem by regarding the hymns in question as ballads in the wider sense in which Goethe has defined the ballad. These ballads require no connecting prose, but explain themselves, as the subject used by the poet is not a free invention, but is taken from some well-known myth. Geldner's hypothesis is most attractive, as it allows the explanation of the hymns without calling for connecting prose that, in fact, does not exist. Little, however, is changed by it as regards the chief interesting point in this connexion. For these ballads, like a great number of the Rigvedic *mantras*, are to be understood only by one who knows the old myths, *i.e.* the old *itihāsas*, from which their theme is taken.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the course of the article. E. SIEG.

I-TSING.—See under YUAN CHWANG.

JACOBITES.—See NESTORIANS.

JAGANNĀTH, vulg. JUGGERNAUT (H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*[2], 466 ff.; Skr. *Jagannātha*, 'lord of the world,' an epithet of Viṣṇu and Kṛṣṇa; the name 'is really nothing but a misapplied ancient epithet, the Pāli Lokanātha of the great thinker and reformer of India'

1 Cf. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, i. 243 ff.
2 Cf. *Vājasan. Saṃh.* v. 2, etc.
3 J. Hertel's proposal (*WZKM* xxiii. [1909] 346) to delete the strophe Rigv. x. xcv. 16 in *Śatap.* xi. v. 1. 10 as an interpolation seems to the present writer a happy solution.
4 See 'Das altindische Ākhyāna' in *ZDMG* xxxvii. [1883] 54 ff., 'Ākhyānahymnen im Rgveda,' *ib.* xxxix. [1885] 52 ff.; cf. also the same writer, *Die Literatur des alten Indien*, Stuttgart, 1903, p. 44 f., and *GGA*, 1909, p. 66 ff., 1911, p. 441 ff.
5 *GGA*, 1911, p. 441 f.
6 *Le Théâtre indien*, Paris, 1890, p. 301 ff.
7 *Hymns to the Maruts*, London, 1869, p. 172 f.
8 'Der Ursprung des indischen Dramas u. Epos' in *WZKM* xviii. [1904] 59 ff., 137 ff., 'Der Suparṇādhyāya, ein vedisches Mysterium,' *ib.* xxiii. [1909] 273 ff.

1 Hertel believes that he can also identify dramatic monologues.
2 *Mysterium und Mimus im Rigveda*, Leipzig, 1908; cf. also *WZKM* xxiii. [1909] 1 ff.
3 'Dialog, Akhyāna und Drama in der indischen Literatur,' in *WZKM* xxiii. [1909] 102 ff.
4 *Ib.* p. 136.
5 'The Vedic Ākhyāna and the Indian Drama' in *JRAS*, 1911, p. 979 ff., 'The Origin of Tragedy and the Ākhyāna,' *ib.* 1912, p. 411 ff., esp. 429 ff.
6 But see p. 462b, n. 7; the matter supplied by later texts for the explanation of the '*Ākhyāna* hymns' Keith is at one with Oldenberg in regarding as 'strange rubbish,' as 'bogus,' and of no real traditionary value (*JRAS*, 1911, p. 987, 1912, p. 433).
7 'Die indische Balladendichtung' in the *Festschrift der Universität Marburg für die Philologenversammlung, 1913*, Marburg, 1913, p. 93 ff.

[Buddha], T. W. Rhys Davids, *Origin and Growth of Rel. as illustrated by Ind. Buddhism* [*HL*, 1881], London, 1881, p. 33).—The most famous of the Indian temples and sacred places, situated in the town of Puri, in the modern provinces of Behār and Orissa, on the shores of the Bay of Bengal, lat. 19° 48′ N., long. 85° 49′ E.

The present temple was built about A.D. 1100 by Ananta Chodagangā (1076–1147), the most notable king of the E. Gangā dynasty of Kalinga (V. A. Smith, *Early Hist.*[2], Oxford, 1908, p. 428). It stands in a square enclosure, 652 ft. long by 630 ft. broad, the interior being carefully guarded from profane intrusion by a massive stone wall, 20 ft. high. Within the enclosure stand about 120 temples, including, besides those dedicated to Viṣṇu in his various forms, some 13 dedicated to Śiva, and several to his consort, thus illustrating the eclecticism of modern Hinduism. The conical tower of Jagannāth's temple rises to a height of 192 ft., and is surmounted by the mystic wheel (*chakra*) and flag (*dhvaja*) of Viṣṇu. It contains four chambers: a hall of offerings, where the bulkier oblations are made, only a small quantity of the choicest food being admitted into the inner shrine; a pillared hall for musicians and dancing-girls; a hall of audience, where pilgrims assemble to gaze upon the god; and, lastly, the sanctuary itself, which is surmounted by the tower. The image is in triple form, representing Jagannāth, beside whom sit his brother Balabhadra, or Balarāma, and his sister Subhadrā. The theory that this triple image is a perversion or adaptation of the Buddhist Triratna—Buddha, the Law (*Dharma*), and the Congregation (*Saṅgha*)—is due to A. Cunningham (*The Stūpa of Bharhut*, London, 1879, p. 112; cf. F. C. Maisey, *Sānchi and its Remains*, do. 1892, p. 26 n.). It has been connected by other authorities with the *triśūla*, or trident symbol (G. d'Alviella, *The Migration of Symbols*, Westminster, 1894, p. 254 f.). Waddell, however, remarks:

'"*The Three Holy Ones*" are seldom, if ever, concretely represented in Tibet by Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha; nor have I found such a triad figured in Indian Buddhism, though many writers have alleged the existence of them, without, however, bringing forward any proof' (*Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 346; but see H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, do. 1880, ii. 158 ff., with a drawing of the Triratna).

The legends indicate that, under Buddhist and Hindu influences, a rude local 'fetish' has been adapted to represent Viṣṇu. One Basu, a fowler, a servant of Jagannāth, is said to have found the god, in the form of a blue-stone image, at the foot of a banyan tree (W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, i. 89 f.). According to another account, the god appeared in a vision to King Indradyumna, and showed him his image in a block of timber thrown up on the seashore (cf. Farnell, *CGS* v. 189; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, 1909, vi. 129). The workmen failed to fashion the block into an image, till Viṣṇu appeared as an aged carpenter, whom the king shut up in the temple, intending to keep him there for one and twenty days. But his queen persuaded the king to open the temple doors before the appointed time, and the three images were found fashioned only from the waist upwards, and without hands or feet (W. Ward, *The Hindoos*, ii. 163). The king was much disconcerted, but prayed to Brahmā, and he promised to make the image famous in its present state—obviously an ætiological myth to explain the rudeness or incompleteness of the existing images. Another remarkable legend tells that

'when two new moons occur in Asśur [Āsāṛh] (part of June and July), which is said to happen about once in seventeen years, a new idol is always made. A Nim tree [*Melia azadirachta*] is sought for in the forest, on which no crow or carrion bird has ever perched. It is known to the initiated by certain signs. This is prepared into a proper form by common carpenters, and is then intrusted to certain priests who are protected from all intrusion; the process is a great mystery. One man is selected to take out of the idol a small box containing the spirit, which is conveyed inside the new; and the man who does this is always removed from the world before the end of the year' (Col. Phipps, *Mission Register*, Dec. 1824, quoted by A. Sterling, *Orissa*, 122).

According to another account, a boy is selected to take out of the breast of the idol a small box containing quicksilver, said to be the spirit, which he transfers to the new image; the boy always dies within a year (Brij Kishore Ghose, *The Hist. of Pooree*, Cuttack, 1848, p. 18). In another form of the legend the relics enclosed in the image are said to be the bones of Kṛṣṇa. They were found in the forest by some pious person, who was directed by Viṣṇu to form an image of Jagannāth, and to place the bones within it.

'Every third year they make a new image, when a Brahman removes the original bones of Krishna from the inside of the old image to that of the new one; on this occasion he covers his eyes, lest he should be struck dead for looking on such sacred relics. The Rajah of Burdwan expended twelve lākh of rupees in a journey to Jugunat'hu, including two lākh paid as a bribe to the Brahmans to permit him to see these bones; but he died six months after for his temerity' (F. Parkes, *Wanderings of a Pilgrim in Search of the Picturesque*, London, 1850, ii. 383 f.; cf. W. Ward, *op. cit.* ii. 163).

Needless to say, the introduction of human bones into a Vaiṣṇava image is opposed to the rules of that sect and to the usages of Brahmanical Hinduism. The stories are, in fact, a tradition from Buddhist times, when relics of the Teacher were collected in *stūpas* and other monuments.

'The pilgrimage, the image procession, the suspension of caste prejudices, everything in fact at Puri, is redolent of Buddhism, but of a Buddhism so degraded as hardly to be recognizable by those who know that faith only in its older and purer form' (J. Fergusson, *Ind. and East. Arch.*, London, 1899, p. 429).

'The name of Jagannāth still draws the faithful from a hundred provinces of India to the Puri sands,' says Hunter (i. 137). This is particularly the case since the abolition of the Pilgrim tax, the collection of which under the orders of a Christian Government aroused active controversy, until it was finally discontinued in A.D. 1840. Hunter gives a vivid picture of the touts who wander through the land collecting pilgrims, of the miseries of the journey before, under British rule, railways were built, sanitation was enforced, and medical treatment was provided. The same writer fully describes the twenty-four local festivals, of which the most important is the Rath Jātrā, which takes place in June or July, when the images are placed in cars and dragged to the country house of the deities. The religious suicides who flung themselves beneath the wheels of the idol chariots have made the name of Jagannāth famous in the Western world. The older narratives were distorted and exaggerated.

'In a closely-packed eager throng of a hundred thousand men and women, many of them unaccustomed to exposure or hard labour, and all of them tugging and straining to the utmost under the blazing tropical sun, deaths must occasionally occur. There have, doubtless, been instances of pilgrims throwing themselves under the wheels in a frenzy of religious excitement. But such instances have always been rare, and are now unknown. At one time several unhappy people were killed or injured every year, but they were almost invariably cases of accidental trampling. The few suicides that did occur were for the most part cases of diseased and miserable objects who took this means to put themselves out of pain. The official returns now place this beyond doubt. Indeed, nothing could be more opposed to the spirit of Vishnu-worship than self-immolation. Accidental death within the temple renders the whole place unclean. The ritual suddenly stops, and the polluted offerings are hurried away from the sight of the offended god' (Hunter, i. 133 f.).

Only the lowest and most impure castes are now excluded from the temple (*ib.* i. 135 f.). The customs regarding the consecrated food (*mahā-prasād*) are remarkable. This is properly the food cooked for deity or dedicated to the images. The local belief as recorded in the temple annals (*Khetra mahātmya*) is that it is prepared by the goddess, Mahā Lakṣmī, who gives prosperity.

'He who eats it is absolved from the four cardinal sins of the Hindu faith: killing a cow, killing a brahmin, drinking spirits, and committing adultery with a female of a Guru or spiritual

pastor. So great is its virtue that it cannot be polluted by the touch of the very lowest caste, and the leavings even of a dog are to be carefully taken up and used. The most tremendous and inexpiable of all crimes is to handle and eat the mahaprasad, without a proper feeling of reverence' (A. Sterling, *Orissa*, p. 121).

Hence there is at Purī a temporary suspension of the rigid tabu which controls the use of food which is not cooked in the regular way, and all castes can eat the sacred food with impunity. Nowadays the priests impress upon the pilgrims the impropriety of dressing food within the holy limits, and provide them from the temple kitchen. This is so sacred that none can be thrown away, and it is often consumed in a state of putrefaction, with the natural result that it causes danger to the public health. It has been suggested that the licence in the use of food at Purī, Pandharpur, and other holy places is due to the spirit-scaring power of the god and his holy place; but the fact of its dedication sufficiently explains the feeling regarding it (*BG* xx. [1884] 474). Even among a tribe like the Kāndhs (*q.v.*), friendship is sworn on the holy rice from Purī (Thurston, iii. 409).

In 1880 a remarkable attempt was made by a party of fanatics from Sambalpur, known as Kumbhpatiā, so called because they wear only ropes made of the leaves (*pāt*) of the *kumbhī* tree (*Cochlospermum gossypium*), to destroy the images. In the affray one of the fanatics was killed (L. L. S. O'Malley, *Sambalpur Gaz.*, Nagpur, 1909, i. 59 ff.).

LITERATURE.—The most recent and best account of the god, his temple, and worship is by W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872, i. 81 ff.; see also A. Sterling, *Orissa; its Geography, Statistics, History, Religion, and Antiquities*, do. 1846, p. 116 ff.; *Calcutta Review*, x. [1848] 204 ff.; L. Rousselet, *India and its Native Princes*, London, 1882, p. 600 ff., with drawings of the images and their car; W. Ward, *A View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos*, Serampore, 1815, ii. 163 f.; Abu'l-Fadl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, tr. H. Blochmann and H. S. Jarrett, Calcutta, 1873-94, ii. 127 ff.; for the cult of Jagannāth in Benares, M. A. Sherring, *The Sacred City of the Hindus*, London, 1868, p. 120 f.; many quotations from older writers in H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*[2], London, 1903, p. 466 ff.

W. CROOKE.

JAHWEH.—See ISRAEL.

JAINISM.—**1. Introductory.**—Jainism is a monastic religion which, like Buddhism, denies the authority of the Veda, and is therefore regarded by the Brahmans as heretical. The Jain church consists of the monastic order and the lay community. It is divided into two rival sections, the Śvetāmbaras, or 'White-robes,' and the Digambaras, or 'Sky-clad'; they are so called because the monks of the Śvetāmbaras wear white clothes, and those of the Digambaras originally went about stark naked, until the Muhammadans forced them to cover their privities. The dogmatic differences between the two sections are rather trivial (see art. DIGAMBARA); they differ more in conduct, as will be noticed in the course of the article.

The interest of Jainism to the student of religion consists in the fact that it goes back to a very early period, and to primitive currents of religious and metaphysical speculation, which gave rise also to the oldest Indian philosophies—Sāṅkhya and Yoga (*qq.v.*)—and to Buddhism. It shares in the theoretical pessimism of these systems, as also in their practical ideal—liberation. Life in the world, perpetuated by the transmigration of the soul, is essentially bad and painful; therefore it must be our aim to put an end to the Cycle of Births, and this end will be accomplished when we come into possession of right knowledge.[1] In this general principle Jainism agrees with Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Buddhism; but they differ in their methods of realizing it. In metaphysics there is some general likeness between Sāṅkhya and Yoga on the one hand, and Jainism on the other. For in all these systems a dualism of matter and soul is acknowledged; the souls are principally all alike substances (monads) characterized by intelligence, their actual difference being caused by their connexion with matter; matter is, according to Jains and Sāṅkhyas, of indefinite nature, a something that may become anything. These general metaphysical principles, however, are worked out on different lines by the Sāṅkhyas and Jains,[1] the difference being still more accentuated by the different origins of these systems. For the Sāṅkhyas, owing allegiance to the Brāhmans, have adopted Brāhmanical ideas and modes of thought,[2] while the Jains, being distinctly non-Brāhmanical, have worked upon popular notions of a more primitive and cruder character, *e.g.* animistic ideas. But the metaphysical principles of Buddhism are of an entirely different character, being moulded by the fundamental principle of Buddhism, viz. that there is no absolute and permanent Being, or, in other words, that all things are transitory.[3] Notwithstanding the radical difference in their philosophical notions, Jainism and Buddhism, being originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brāhmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, so that even Indian writers occasionally have confounded them. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jain literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism.[4] But it has since been proved beyond doubt that their theory is wrong, and that Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. For the canonical books of the Buddhists frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigaṇṭha (Skr. *Nirgrantha*, common Prakrit *Niggaṇṭha*) and their leader in Buddha's time, Nātaputta (Nāta- or Nātiputta being an epithet of the last prophet of the Jains, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra), and they name the place of the latter's death Pāvā, in agreement with Jain tradition. On the other hand, the canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahāvīra the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career, and one of the latter's rivals. Thus it is established that Mahavīra was a contemporary of Buddha, and probably somewhat older than the latter, who outlived his rival's decease at Pāvā.

Mahāvīra, however, unlike Buddha, was most probably not the founder of the sect which reveres him as their prophet, nor the author of their religion. According to the unanimous Buddhist tradition, Buddha had, under the Bodhi-tree, discovered by intuition the fundamental truths of his religion as it appears throughout his personal work; his first sermons are things ever to be remembered by his followers, as are the doctrines which he then preached. No such traditions are

[1] It may be added that, with the exception of Yoga, all these ancient systems are strictly atheistic, *i.e.* they do not admit an absolute Supreme God; even in Yoga, the Īśvara is not the first and only cause of everything existent.

[1] The Sāṅkhyas endeavour to explain, from their dualistic principles, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the development of the material world as well as that of living beings; the Jains, however, are almost exclusively concerned with the latter, and declare that the cause of the material world and of the structure of the universe is *lokasthiti*, 'primeval disposition' (*Tattvarthadhigama sūtra*, iii. 6 com.). Sāṅkhya, probably based on cosmogonic theories contained in the Upaniṣads, was intended as a philosophic system which in the course of time became the theoretical foundation of popular religion. But Jainism was, in the first place, a religion, and developed a philosophy of its own in order to make this religion a self-consistent system.

[2] *e.g.*, the Sāṅkhya principle *mahān* means *mahan ātmā*; the three *guṇas* are suggested by the *triṛtkaraṇa* of *Chhandogya Up.* vi. 3 f.; and *prakṛti* by the cosmical *brahmā* of the earlier Upaniṣad doctrine, wherefore in the *Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya* on *Kārikā* 22 *brahmā* is given as a synonym of *prakṛti*, etc.

[3] The fundamental theories of Jainism, *e.g.* the *syādvāda*, their division of living beings, especially the elementary lives, are not found in Buddhism.

[4] See *SBE* xlv. [1895] Introd., p. xviii ff.

preserved in the canonical books of the Jains about Mahāvīra. His becoming a monk, and, some 12 years later, his attainment of omniscience (*kevala*), are, of course, celebrated events. But tradition is silent about his motives for renouncing the world, and about the particular truths whose discovery led to his exalted position. At any rate, Mahāvīra is not described by tradition as having first become a disciple of teachers whose doctrines afterwards failed to satisfy him, as we are told of Buddha; he seems to have had no misgivings, and to have known where truth was to be had,[1] and thus he became a Jain monk. And again, when, after many years of austerities such as are practised by other ascetics of the Jains, he reached omniscience, we are not given to understand that he found any new truth, or a new revelation, as Buddha is said to have received; nor is any particular doctrine or philosophical principle mentioned the knowledge and insight of which then occurred to him for the first time. But he is represented as gaining, at his *kevala*, perfect knowledge of what he knew before only in part and imperfectly. Thus Mahāvīra appears in the tradition of his own sect as one who, from the beginning, had followed a religion established long ago; had he been more, had he been the founder of Jainism, tradition, ever eager to extol a prophet, would not have totally repressed his claims to reverence as such. Nor do Buddhistic traditions indicate that the Nigaṇṭhas owed their origin to Nāṭaputta; they simply speak of them as of a sect existing at the time of Buddha. We cannot, therefore, without doing violence to tradition, declare Mahāvīra to have been the founder of Jainism. But he is without doubt the last prophet of the Jains, the last Tīrthakara. His predecessor, Pārśva, the last Tīrthakara but one, seems to have better claims to the title of founder of Jainism. His death is placed at the reasonable interval of 250 years before that of Mahāvīra, while Pārśva's predecessor Ariṣṭanemi is stated to have died 84,000 years before Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa. Followers of Pārśva are mentioned in the canonical books; and a legend in the *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* xxiii. relates a meeting between a disciple of Pārśva and a disciple of Mahāvīra which brought about the union of the old branch of the Jain church and the new one.[2] This seems to indicate that Pārśva was a historical person; but in the absence of historical documents we cannot venture to go beyond a conjecture.

2. Jain view of their origin, etc.—According to the belief of the Jains themselves, Jain religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again, in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world, by innumerable Tīrthakaras. In the present *avasarpiṇī* period (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Indian], vol. i. p. 200f.) the first Tīrthakara was Ṛṣabha, and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamāna. The names, signs, and colours of the 24 Tīrthakaras were as follows:

(1) Ṛṣabha (or Vṛṣabha), bull, golden; (2) Ajita, elephant, golden; (3) Saṃbhava, horse, golden; (4) Abhinandana, ape, golden; (5) Sumati, heron, golden; (6) Padmaprabha, lotus-flower, red; (7) Supārśva, the *svastika*, golden; (8) Chandraprabha, moon, white; (9) Suvidhi (or Puṣpadanta), dolphin, white; (10) Śītala, the *śrīvatsa*, golden; (11) Śreyāṃsa (or (17) Kunthu, goat, golden; (18) Ara, the *nandyāvarta*, golden; (19) Malli, jar, blue; (20) Suvrata (or Munisuvrata), tortoise, black; (21) Nami, blue lotus, golden; (22) Nemi (or Ariṣṭanemi), conch shell, black; (23) Pārśva, snake, blue; (24) Vardhamāna, lion, golden. All Tīrthakaras were Kṣatriyas; Munisuvrata and Nemi belonged to the Harivaṃśa, the remaining 22 to the Ikṣvāku race. Malli was a woman, according to the Śvetāmbaras; but this the Digambaras deny, as, according to them, no female can reach liberation. The interval in years between Mahāvīra and the two last Tīrthakaras has been given above. Nami died 500,000 years before Nemi, Munisuvrata 1,100,000 years before Nami; the next intervals are 6,600,000, 10,000,000, or a krore; the following intervals cannot be expressed in definite numbers of years, but are given in *palyopamas* and *sāgaropamas*, the last interval being one krore of krores of *sāgaropamas*. The length of the life and the height of the Tīrthakaras are in proportion to the length of the interval (see art. AGES OF THE WORLD [Indian]). These particulars are here given according to the Śvetāmbaras.

In connexion with these items of the mythological history of the Jains, it may be added that they relate the legends of 12 universal monarchs (Chakravartins), of 9 Vāsudevas, 9 Baladevas, and 9 Prativāsudevas who lived within the period from the first to the 22nd Tīrthakara. Together with the 24 Tīrthakaras they are the 63 great personages of Jain history; the legends of their lives form the subject of a great epic work by Hemachandra—the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākapuruṣacharita*, which is based on older sources, probably the Vāsudevahiṇḍī (edited in Bhāvnagar, 1906–09, by the Jainadharmaprasārakasabhā).

All Tīrthakaras have reached Nirvāṇa at their death. Though, being released from the world, they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, they have nevertheless become the object of worship and are regarded as the 'gods' (*deva*) by the Jains (see art. ATHEISM [Jain], vol. ii. p. 186f.); temples are erected to them where their idols are worshipped.[1] The favourite Tīrthakaras are the first and the three last ones, but temples of the remaining ones are also met with. The worship of the idols of the Tīrthakaras is already mentioned in some canonical books, but no rules for their worship are given;[2] it was, however, already in full sway in the first centuries of our era, as evidenced by the Paümachariya, the oldest Prakrit *kāvya* of the Jains, and by the statues of Tīrthakaras found in ancient sites—*e.g.*, in the Kaṅkālī mound at Mathurā which belongs to this period.[3] Some sects, especially a rather recent section of the Śvetāmbaras, the Dhundhiā or Sthānakavāsins, reject this kind of worship altogether.[4]

It goes without saying that the Tīrthakaras, except the two last, belong to mythology rather than to history; the 22nd, Ariṣṭanemi, is connected with the legend of Kṛṣṇa as his relative. But the details of Mahāvīra's life as related in the canonical books may be regarded on the whole as historical facts.

He was a Kṣatriya of the Jñāta clan and a native of Kuṇḍagrāma, a suburb of the town Vaiśālī (the modern Basārh, some 27 miles north of Patna).[5] He was the second son of the Kṣatriya Siddhārtha and Triśalā, a highly connected lady. The Śvetāmbaras maintain, and thus it is stated in the *Acharāṅga sūtra*, the *Kalpasūtra*, etc., that the soul of the Tīrthakara first descended into the womb of the Brāhmaṇī Devānandā, and was, by the order of Indra, removed thence to the womb of Triśalā.[6] But the Digambaras reject this story. His parents,

[1] A. F. R. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, tr., p. 5 f., note (Calcutta, 1890), says that Mahāvīra, having been born in Kollāga, 'naturally, when he assumed the monk's vocation, retired (as related in *Kalpasutra* 115 f.) to the *cheiya* of his own clan, called Dūipalāsa and situated in the neighbourhood of Kollāga. Mahāvīra's parents (and with them probably their whole clan of Nāya Kṣattriyas) are said to have been followers of the tenets of Pārśvanātha (see *Āyāraṅga*, ii. 15, § 16). As such they would, no doubt, keep up a religious establishment (*cheiya*) for the accommodation of Pārśva, on his periodical visits, with his disciples, to Kuṇḍapura or Vesali. Mahāvira, on renouncing the world, would probably first join Pārśva's sect, in which, however, he soon became a reformer and chief himself.'

[2] *SBE* xlv. Introd. p. xxi f.

[1] For images and idols of the Jains see J. Burgess, 'Digambara Jain Iconography,' *IA* xxxii. [1903] 459 ff.; G. Buhler, 'Specimens of Jaina Sculptures from Mathura' in *Epigraphia Indica*, ii. [1894] 311 ff.; J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *Cave Temples*, London, 1880, p. 487 ff.

[2] Some kind of worship, however, seems to be implied for the oldest times by the mention of the various *cheiya* (*chaitya*), or shrines, in the sacred books. These shrines were situated in gardens in which Mahāvira resided during his visits to the towns to which they belonged. Cf. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, tr., p. 2, note 4.

[3] *Epigr. Ind.* ii. 311 f.

[4] See 'Notes on the non-Idolatrous Shwetambar Jains,' by 'Seeker,' 1911; and Margaret Stevenson, *Notes on Modern Jainism*, p. 13 f.

[5] Kuṇḍaggāma and Vāṇiyaggāma, both suburbs of Vesāli, have been identified by Hoernle (*loc. cit.* p. 4, note 8) with the modern villages Bāniyā and Basukuṇḍ.

[6] Cf. the transfer of the embryo of Baladeva from the womb of Rohiṇī to that of Devakī, whence he got the name Saṅkarṣaṇa, still retaining the metronymic Rauhiṇeya.

who were pious Jains and worshippers of Pārśva, gave him the name Vardhamāna (Vīra or Mahāvīra is an epithet used as a name; Arhat, Bhagavat, Jina, etc., are titles common to all Tīrthakaras). He married Yaśodā and by her had a daughter Aṇojjā. His parents died when he was 30 years old, and his elder brother Nandivardhana succeeded his father in whatever position he had held. With the permission of his brother and the other authorities, he carried out a long-cherished resolve and became a monk with the usual Jain rites. Then followed 12 years of self-mortification; Mahāvīra wandered about as a mendicant friar, bearing all kinds of hardships; after the first 13 months he even discarded clothes. At the end of this period dedicated to meditation, he reached the state of omniscience (*kevala*), corresponding to the Bodhi of the Buddhists. He lived for 42 years more, preaching the law and instructing his 11 disciples (*gaṇadhara*): Indrabhūti, Agnibhūti, Vāyubhūti, Ārya Vyakta, Ārya Sudharman, Maṇḍitaputra, Mauryaputra, Akampita, Achalabhrātṛ, Metārya, and Prabhāsa. In the 72nd year of his life he died at Pāvā and reached Nirvāṇa. This event took place, as stated above, some years before Buddha's death, and may, therefore, be placed about 480 B.C. The Śvetāmbaras, however, place the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra, which is the initial point of their era, 470 years before the beginning of the Vikrama era, or in 527 B.C.[1] The Digambaras place the same event 18 years later.

3. Canonical literature of the Śvetāmbaras.—The canonical books of the Śvetāmbaras (the Digambaras do not admit them to be genuine) are not works by Mahāvīra himself, but some of them claim to be discourses delivered by him to Indrabhūti, the Gautama, which his disciple, the *gaṇadhara* Sudharman, related to his own disciple Jambūsvāmin.

Before entering on details about the existing canon, it must be stated that, according to the Jains, there were originally, since the time of the first Tīrthakara, two kinds of sacred books, the 14 *pūrvas* and the 11 *aṅgas*; the 14 *pūrvas* were, however, reckoned to make up a 12th *aṅga* under the name of Dṛṣṭivāda. The knowledge of the 14 *pūrvas* continued only down to Sthūlabhadra, the 8th patriarch after Mahāvīra; the next 7 patriarchs down to Vajra knew only 10 *pūrvas*, and after that time the remaining *pūrvas* were gradually lost, until, at the time when the canon was written down in books (980 A.V.), all the *pūrvas* had disappeared, and consequently the 12th *aṅga* too. Such is the Śvetāmbara tradition regarding the *pūrvas*; that of the Digambaras is similar as regards the final loss of the *pūrvas*, differing, however, in most details; but they contend that the *aṅgas* also were lost after 9 more generations.[2]

The 11 *aṅgas* are the oldest part of the canon (*siddhānta*), which at present embraces 45 texts. Besides the 11 *aṅgas*, there are 12 *upāṅgas*, 10 *paiṇṇas* (*prakīrṇas*), 6 *chhedasūtras*, *Nāndī* and *Anuyogadvāra*, and 4 *mūlasūtras*. A list of these texts according to the usual enumeration follows.[3]

(1) 11 *aṅgas*: Ācāra, Sūtrakṛta, Sthāna, Samavāya, Bhagavatī, Jñātadharmakathās, Upāsakadaśās, Antakṛddaśās, Anuttaraupapātikadaśās, Praśnavyākaraṇa, Vipāka (Dṛṣṭivāda, no longer extant); (2) 12 *upāṅgas*: Aupapātika, Rājapraśniya, Jīvābhigama, Prajñāpanā, Jambudvīpaprajñapti, Chandraprajñapti, Sūryaprajñapti, Nirayāvali [or Kalpika], Kalpāvataṁsikā, Puṣpikā, Puṣpachulikā, Vṛṣṇidaśās; (3) 10 *paiṇṇas* (*prakīrṇas*): Chatuḥśaraṇa, Saṁstāra, Āturapratyākhyāna, Bhaktaparijñā, Taṇḍulavaiyāli, Chandāvijja, Devendrastava, Ganivija, Mahāpratyākhyāna, Virastava; (4) 6 *chhedasūtras*: Niśītha, Mahāniśītha, Vyavahāra, Daśāśrutaskandha, Bṛhatkalpa, Pañchakalpa; (5) 2 *sūtras* without a common name: Nāndi and Anuyogadvāra; (6) 4 *mūlasūtras*: Uttarādhyayana, Āvaśyaka, Daśavaikālika, and Piṇḍaniryukti. Most of the canonical books have been edited in India, some with commentaries. English translations have been published of the Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga, Upāsakadaśās, Antakṛddaśās, Anuttaraupapātikadaśās, Uttarādhyayana, and two Kalpasutras.

The redaction of the canon took place under Devarddhigaṇi in 980 after the Nirvāṇa (A.D. 454, according to the common reckoning, actually perhaps 60 years later); before that time the sacred texts were handed down without embodying them in written books. In the interval between the composition and the final redaction of the texts, and even afterwards, they have undergone many alterations—transposition of parts, additions, etc.—traces of which can still be pointed out.[1] Along with these alterations there seems to have gone on a gradual change of the language in which the texts were composed. The original language, according to the Jains, was Ardhamāgadhī, and they give that name, or Māgadhī, to the language of the present texts. But it has, most probably, been modernized during the process of oral transmission. The older parts of the canon contain many archaic forms for which in later texts distinct Māhārāṣṭrī idioms are substituted. It will be best to call the language of the sacred texts simply Jain Prākrit, and that of later works Jain Māhārāṣṭrī.

As the works belonging to the canon are of different origin and age, they differ greatly in character. Some are chiefly in prose, some in verse, some in mixed prose and verse. Frequently a work comprises distinctly disparate parts put together when the redaction of the canon took place. The older prose works are generally very diffuse and contain endless repetitions; some, however, contain succinct rules, some, besides lengthy descriptions, systematic expositions of various dogmatic questions; in others, again, the systematic tendency prevails throughout. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the more important texts.[2] Besides the sacred literature and the commentaries belonging to it, the Jains possess separate works, in close material agreement with the former, which contain systematic expositions of their faith, or parts of it, in Prākrit and Sanskrit. These works, which generally possess the advantage of accuracy and clearness, have in their turn become the object of learned labours of commentators. One of the oldest is Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, a Śvetāmbara work, which, however, is also claimed by the Digambaras.[3] A sort of encyclopedia of Jainism is the *Lokaprakāśa*[4] by Tejapala's son, Vinaya vijaya (1652). On these and similar works our sketch of the Jain faith is chiefly based.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular literature of their own, in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prākrit. Of peculiar interest are the numerous tales in Prākrit and Sanskrit with which authors used to illustrate dogmatical or moral problems. They have also attempted more extensive narratives, some in a more popular style, as Haribhadra's *Samarāichchakahā*, and Siddharṣi's great allegorical work *Upamitibhavaprapañcha kathā* (both edited in *Bibl. Ind.*, Calcutta, 1901-14), some in highly artificial Sanskrit, as Somadeva's *Yaśastilaka* and Dhanapāla's *Tilakamañjarī* (both published in the *Kāvyamālā*, Bombay, 1901-03, 1903). Their oldest Prākrit poem (perhaps of the 3rd cent. A.D.), the *Paümachariya*, is a Jain version of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Sanskrit poems, both in *purāṇa* and in *kāvya* style, and hymns in Prākrit and Sanskrit, are very numerous with the Śvetāmbaras as well as the Digambaras; there are likewise some Jain dramas. Jain authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branches—grammar, lexicography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc. (cf. art. HEMACHANDRA), vol. vi. p. 691.

4. The doctrines of Jainism.—Jain doctrines may be broadly divided into (i.) philosophical and (ii.) practical. Jain philosophy contains ontology, metaphysics, and psychology. The practical doctrines are concerned with ethics and asceticism, monasticism, and the life of the laity.

i. (*a*) *Philosophy.*—The Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads had maintained, or were believed to maintain, that Being is one, permanent, without beginning, change, or end. In opposition to this view, the Jains declare that Being is not of a persistent and unalterable nature: Being, they say, 'is joined to

[1] In the Preface to his ed. of the *Pariśiṣṭa Parvan* (*Bibl. Ind.*, Calcutta, 1891), p. 4 ff., the present writer criticizes the Śvetāmbara tradition, and, by combining the Jain date of Chandragupta's accession to the throne in 155 after the Nirvāṇa with the historical date of the same event in 321 or 322 B.C., arrives at 476 or 477 B.C. as the probable date of Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.

[2] For details see A. A. Guérinot, *Répertoire d'épigraphie jaina*, Paris, 1908, p. 30.

[3] For details see Weber, 'Sacred Literature of the Jainas, which first appeared (in German) in *Indische Studien*, xvi. [1883], and xvii. [1885], and was translated in *IA* xvii. [1888]-xxi. [1892].

[1] See Weber, *loc. cit.* 8.

[2] The development of this commenting literature has been studied by E. Leumann, *ZDMG* xlvi. [1892] 581 ff.

[3] The Skr. text with a German tr. and explanation has been published by the present writer in *ZDMG* lx. [1906] 287 ff., 512 ff.; text and *bhāṣya* are contained in the *Bibl. Ind.* edition (Calcutta, 1905).

[4] Edited by Hiralala Hansaraja, 3 vols., Jamnagar, 1910.

production, continuation, and destruction.'[1] This theory they call the theory of the 'Indefiniteness of Being' (*anekāntavāda*); it comes to this: existing things are permanent only as regards their substance, but their accidents or qualities originate and perish. To explain: any material thing continues for ever to exist as matter; this matter, however, may assume any shape and quality. Thus, clay as substance may be regarded as permanent, but the form of a jar of clay, or its colour, may come into existence and perish. It is clear that the Brāhmanical speculations are concerned with transcendental Being, while the Jain view deals with Being as given in common experience.

The doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being is upheld by a very strange dialectical method called *Syādvāda*, to which the Jains attach so much importance that this name frequently is used as a synonym for the Jain system itself. According to this doctrine of *Syādvāda*, there are 7 forms of metaphysical propositions, and all contain the word *syāt*, e.g. *syād asti sarvaṁ, syād nāsti sarvaṁ*. *Syāt* means 'may be,' and is explained by *kathaṁchit*, which in this connexion may be translated 'somehow.' The word *syāt* here qualifies the word *asti*, and indicates the Indefiniteness of Being (or *astitvam*). For example, we say a jar is somehow, *i.e.* it exists, if we mean thereby that it exists as a jar; but it does not exist somehow if we mean that it exists as a cloth or the like. The purpose of these seeming truisms is to guard against the assumption of the Vedāntins that Being is one without a second, the same in all things. Thus we have the correlative predicates 'is' (*asti*) and 'is not' (*nāsti*). A third predicate is 'inexpressible' (*avaktavya*); for existent and non-existent (*sat* and *asat*) belong to the same thing at the same time, and such a co-existence of mutually contradictory attributes cannot be expressed by any word in the language. The three predicates variously combined make up the 7 propositions, or *sapta bhaṅgas*, of the *Syādvāda*.

Supplementary to the doctrine of the *Syādvāda*, and, in a way, the logical complement to it, is the doctrine of the *nayas*.[2] The *nayas* are ways of expressing the nature of things: all these ways of judgment, according to the Jains, are one-sided, and they contain but a part of the truth. There are 7 *nayas*, 4 referring to concepts, and 3 to words. The reason for this variety of statement is that Being is not simple, as the Vedāntins contend, but is of a complicated nature; therefore every statement and every denotation of a thing is necessarily incomplete and one-sided; and, if we follow one way only of expression or of viewing things, we are bound to go astray. Hence it is usual in explaining notions to state what the thing under discussion is with reference to substance, place, time, and state of being.

(*b*) *Metaphysics.*—All things, *i.e.* substances (*dravya*), are divided into lifeless things (*ajīva-kāya*) and lives or souls (*jīva*). The former are again divided into (1) space (*ākāśa*); (2) and (3) two subtle substances called *dharma* and *adharma*, and (4) matter (*pudgala*). Space, *dharma*, and *adharma* are the necessary conditions for the subsistence of all other things, viz. souls and matter; space affords them room to subsist; *dharma* makes it possible for them to move or to be moved; and *adharma*, to rest. It will be seen that the function of space, as we conceive it, is by the Jains distributed among three different substances; this seems highly speculative, and rather hyperlogical. But the conception of the two cosmical substances *dharma* and *adharma*, which occur already, in the technical meaning just given, in canonical books, seems to be developed from a more primitive notion. For, as their names *dharma* and *adharma* indicate, they seem to have denoted, in primitive speculation, those invisible 'fluids' which by contact cause sin and merit. The Jains, using for the latter notions the terms *pāpa* and *puṇya*, were free to use the current names of those 'fluids' in a new sense not known to other Indian thinkers.

Space (*ākāśa*) is divided into that part of space which is occupied by the world of things (*lokākāśa*), and the space beyond it (*alokākāśa*), which is absolutely void and empty, an abyss of nothing. *Dharma* and *adharma* are co-extensive with the world; accordingly no soul nor any particle of matter can get beyond this world for want of the substrates of motion and rest. Time is recognized by some as a quasi-substance besides those enumerated.

Matter (*pudgala*) is eternal and consists of atoms; otherwise it is not determined in its nature, but, as is already implied by the doctrine of the Indefiniteness of Being, it is something that may become anything, as earth, water, fire, wind, etc. Two states of matter are distinguished: gross matter, of which the things which we perceive consist, and subtle matter, which is beyond the reach of our senses. Subtle matter, for instance, is that matter which is transformed into the different kinds of *karma* (see below). All material things are ultimately produced by the combination of atoms. Two atoms form a compound when the one is viscous and the other dry, or both are of different degrees either of viscousness or dryness. Such compounds combine with others, and so on. They are, however, not constant in their nature, but are subject to change or development (*pariṇāma*), which consists in the assumption of qualities (*guṇas*). In this way originate also the bodies and senses of living beings. The elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—are bodies of souls in the lowest stage of development, and are, therefore, spoken of as 'earth-bodies,' 'water-bodies,' etc. Here we meet with animistic ideas which, in this form, are peculiar to Jainism. They probably go back to a remote period, and must have prevailed in classes of Indian society which were not influenced by the more advanced ideas of the Brāhmans.

Different from matter and material things are the souls (*jīva*, lit. 'lives'). There is an infinite number of souls; the whole world is literally filled with them. The souls are substances, and as such eternal; but they are not of a definite size, since they contract or expand according to the dimensions of the body in which they are incorporated for the time being. Their characteristic mark is intelligence, which may be obscured by extrinsic causes, but never destroyed.

Souls are of two kinds: mundane (*saṁsārin*), and liberated (*mukta*). Mundane souls are the embodied souls of living beings in the world and still subject to the Cycle of Birth; liberated souls will be embodied no more; they have accomplished absolute purity; they dwell in the state of perfection at the top of the universe, and have no more to do with worldly affairs; they have reached *nirvāṇa* (*nirvṛti*, or *mukti*). Metaphysically the difference between the mundane and the liberated soul consists in this, that the former is entirely filled by subtle matter, as a bag is filled with sand, while the latter is absolutely pure and free from any material alloy.

The defilement of the soul takes place in the following way. Subtle matter ready to be transformed into *karma* pours into the soul; this is called 'influx' (*āsrava*). In the usual state of things a soul harbours passions (*kaṣāya*) which act like a viscous substance and retain the subtle

[1] See H. Jacobi, 'The Metaphysics and Ethics of the Jainas,' in *Trans. of the Congress for the Hist. of Religion*, Oxford, 1908, ii. 60.

[2] *Ib.* 61.

matter coming into contact with the soul; the subtle matter thus caught by the soul enters, as it were, into a chemical combination with it; this is called the binding (*bandha*) (of *karma*-matter). The subtle matter 'bound' or amalgamated by the soul is transformed into the 8 kinds of *karma*, and forms a kind of subtle body (*kārmaṇaśarīra*)[1] which clings to the soul in all its migrations and future births, and determines the individual state and lot of that particular soul. For, as each particular *karma* has been caused by some action, good, bad, or indifferent, of the individual being in question, so this *karma*, in its turn, produces certain painful, or pleasant, or indifferent conditions and events which the individual in question must undergo. Now, when a particular *karma* has produced its effect in the way described, it (*i.e.* the particular *karma*-matter) is discharged or purged from the soul. This process of 'purging off' is called *nirjarā*. When this process goes on without interruption, all *karma*-matter will, in the end, be discharged from the soul; and the latter, now freed from the weight which had kept it down before the time of its liberation (for matter is heavy, and *karma* is material), goes up in a straight line to the top of the universe where the liberated souls dwell. But in the usual course of things the purging and binding processes go on simultaneously, and thereby the soul is forced to continue its mundane existence. After the death of an individual, his soul, together with its *kārmaṇaśarīra*, goes, in a few moments, to the place of its new birth and there assumes a new body, expanding or contracting in accordance with the dimensions of the latter.

Embodied souls are living beings, the classification of which is a subject not only of theoretical but also of great practical interest to the Jains. As their highest duty (*parama dharma*) is not to kill any living beings (*ahiṁsā*), it becomes incumbent on them to know the various forms which life may assume. The Jains divide living beings according to the number of sense-organs which they possess: the highest (*pañchendriya*) possess all five organs, viz. those of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing, while the lowest (*ekendriya*) have only the organ of touch, and the remaining classes each one organ more than the preceding one in the order of organs given above; *e.g.* worms, etc., possess the organs of touch and taste; ants, etc., possess, in addition, smell; bees, etc., seeing. The vertebrates possess all five organs of sense; the higher animals, men, denizens of hell, and gods possess an internal organ or mind (*manas*), and are therefore called rational (*saṁjñin*), while the lower animals have no mind (*asaṁjñin*). The notions of the Jains about beings with only one organ are, in part, peculiar to themselves and call for a more detailed notice.

It has already been stated that the four elements are animated by souls; *i.e.*, particles of earth, etc., are the body of souls, called earth-lives, etc. These we may call elementary lives; they live and die and are born again, in the same or another elementary body. These elementary lives are either gross or subtle; in the latter case they are invisible. The last class of one-organed lives are plants; of some plants each is the body of one soul only, but of other plants each is an aggregation of embodied souls which have all functions of life, as respiration and nutrition, in common. That plants possess souls is an opinion shared by other Indian philosophers. But the Jains have developed this theory in a remarkable way. Plants in which only one soul is embodied are always gross; they exist in the habitable part of the world only. But those plants of which each is a colony of plant-lives may also be subtle, *i.e.* invisible, and in that case they are distributed all over the world. These subtle plants are called *nigoda*; they are composed of an infinite number of souls forming a very small cluster, have respiration and nutrition in common, and experience the most exquisite pains. Innumerable *nigodas* form a globule, and with them the whole space of the world is closely packed, like a box filled with powder. The *nigodas* furnish the supply of souls in place of those who have reached *nirvāṇa*. But an infinitesimally small fraction of one single *nigoda* has sufficed to replace the vacancy caused in the world by the *nirvāṇa* of all the souls that have been liberated from the beginningless past down to the present. Thus it is evident that the *saṁsāra* will never be empty of living beings (see *Lokaprakāśa*, vi. 31 ff.).

From another point of view mundane beings are divided into four grades: denizens of hell, animals, men, and gods; these are the four walks of life (*gati*), in which beings are born according to their merits or demerits. For details, see artt. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Jain), vol. iv. p. 608 ff., COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Indian), § 4, vol. iv. p. 160 f., and AGES OF THE WORLD (Indian), vol. i. p. 200.

We have seen that the cause of the soul's embodiment is the presence in it of *karma*-matter. The theory of *karma* is the key-stone of the Jain system; it is necessary, therefore, to explain this theory in more detail. The natural qualities of soul are perfect knowledge (*jñāna*), intuition or faith (*darśana*), highest bliss, and all sorts of perfections; but these inborn qualities of the soul are weakened or obscured, in mundane souls, by the presence of *karma*. From this point of view the division of *karma* will be understood. When *karma*-matter has penetrated the soul, it is transformed into 8 kinds (*prakṛti*) of *karma* singly or severally, which form the *kārmaṇaśarīra*, just as food is, by digestion, transformed into the various fluids necessary for the support and growth of the body. The 8 kinds of *karma* are as follows.

(1) *Jñānāvaraṇīya*, that which obscures the inborn right knowledge (*i.e.* omniscience) of the soul and thereby produces different degrees of knowledge and of ignorance;[1] (2) *darśanāvaraṇīya*, that which obscures right intuition, *e.g.* sleep; (3) *vedanīya*, that which obscures the bliss-nature of the soul and thereby produces pleasure and pain; (4) *mohanīya*, that which disturbs the right attitude of the soul with regard to faith, conduct, passions, and other emotions, and produces doubt, error, right or wrong conduct, passions, and various mental states. The following 4 kinds of *karma* concern more the individual status of a being: (5) *āyuṣka*, that which determines the length of life of an individual in one birth as hell-being, animal, man, or god; (6) *nāma*, that which produces the various circumstances or elements which collectively make up an individual existence, *e.g.* the peculiar body with its general and special qualities, faculties, etc.; (7) *gotra*, that which determines the nationality, caste, family, social standing, etc., of an individual; (8) *antarāya*, that which obstructs the inborn energy of the soul and thereby prevents the doing of a good action when there is a desire to do it.

Each kind of *karma* has its predestined limits in time within which it must take effect and thereby be purged off. Before we deal with the operation of *karma*, however, we must mention another doctrine which is connected with the *karma*-theory, viz. that of the six *leśyās*. The totality of *karma* amalgamated by a soul induces on it a transcendental colour, a kind of complexion, which cannot be perceived by our eyes; and this is called *leśyā*. There are six *leśyās*: black, blue, grey; yellow, red, and white. They have also, and prominently, a moral bearing; for the *leśyā* indicates the character of the individual who owns it. The first three belong to bad characters, the last three to good characters.[2]

[1] The Jains recognize 5 bodies which an individual may possess (though not all simultaneously), one gross and 4 subtle ones. Besides the *kārmaṇaśarīra*, which is the receptacle of *karma* and has no bodily functions, there are (1) the transmutation body (*vaikriyaśarīra*), producing the wonderful appearances which gods, magicians, etc., may assume; (2) the translocation body (*āhārakaśarīra*), which certain sages may assume for a short time in order to consult a Tirthakara at some distance; (3) the igneous body (*taijasaśarīra*), which in common beings causes the digestion of food, but in persons of merit gives effect to their curses (that they burn their objects) and to their benedictions (that they gladden as the rays of the moon), etc. This doctrine of the subtle bodies, in which, however, many details are subject to controversy, seems to be the outcome of very primitive ideas about magic, etc., which the Jains attempted to reduce to a rational theory. With the terms *vaikriya*- and *taijasaśarīra* may be compared the *vaikārika* and *taijasa ahaṁkāra* of the Sāṅkhyas.

[1] The Jains acknowledge five kinds of knowledge: (1) ordinary cognition (*mati*), (2) testimony (*śruta*), (3) supernatural cognition (*avadhi*), (4) direct knowledge of the thoughts of others (*manaḥparyaya*), (5) omniscience (*kevala*).

[2] The belief in colours of the soul seems to be very old and to go back to the time when expressions like 'a black soul,' 'a

The individual state of the soul is produced by its inborn nature and the *karma* with which it is vitiated; this is the developmental or *pāriṇāmika* state. But there are 4 other states which have reference only to the behaviour of the *karma*. In the common course of things *karma* takes effect and produces its proper results; then the soul is in the *audayika* state. By proper efforts *karma* may be prevented, for some time, from taking effect; it is neutralized (*upaśamita*), but it is still present, just like fire covered by ashes; then the soul is in the *aupaśamika* state. When *karma* is not only prevented from operating, but is annihilated altogether (*kṣapita*), then the soul is in the *kṣāyika* state, which is necessary for reaching *nirvāṇa*. There is a fourth state of the soul, *kṣāyopaśamika*, which partakes of the nature of the preceding ones; in this state some *karma* is annihilated, some is neutralized, and some is active. This is the state of ordinary good men, but the *kṣāyika* and *aupaśamika* states belong to holy men, especially the former. It will be easily understood that these distinctions have an important moral bearing; they are constantly referred to in the practical ethics of the Jains.

We shall now consider the application of the *karma*-theory to ethics. The highest goal is to get rid of all *karma* (*nirjarā*) and meanwhile to acquire no new *karma*—technically speaking, to stop the influx (*āsrava*) of *karma*, which is called *saṁvara*, or the covering of the channels through which *karma* finds entrance into the soul. All actions produce *karma*, and in the majority of cases entail on the doer continuance of worldly existence (*sāmparāyika*); but, when a man is free from passions and acts in strict compliance with the rules of right conduct, his actions produce *karma* which lasts but for a moment and is then annihilated (*iryapatha*). Therefore the whole apparatus of monastic conduct is required to prevent the formation of new *karma*; the same purpose is served by austerities (*tapas*), which, moreover, annihilate the old *karma* more speedily than would happen in the common course of things.

It is evident from the preceding remarks that the ethics and ascetics of the Jains are to be regarded as the logical consequence of the theory of *karma*. But from a historical point of view many of their ethical principles, monastic institutions, and ascetic practices have been inherited from older religious classes of Indian society, since Brāhmanical ascetics and Buddhists resemble them in many of their precepts and institutions (see *SBE* xxii. [1884] Introd., p. xxii ff.).

ii. Jain ethics has for its end the realization of *nirvāṇa*, or *mokṣa*. The necessary condition for reaching this end is the possession of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. These three excellences are metaphorically named the 'three jewels' (*triratna*), an expression used also by the Buddhist but in a different sense; they are not produced, but they are manifested on the removal of obstructing or obscuring species of *karma*. To effect this, the rules of conduct must be observed and corresponding virtues must be acquired. Of first importance are the five vows, the first four of which are also acknowledged by Brāhmans and Buddhists. The five vows (*vratas*) of the Jains are: (1) not to kill; (2) not to lie; (3) not to steal; (4) to abstain from sexual intercourse; (5) to renounce all interest in worldly things, especially to keep no property. These vows are to be strictly observed by monks, who take them on entering the Order, or, as it is commonly expressed, on taking *dīkṣā*. In their case the vows are called the five great vows (*mahāvrata*). Lay people, however, should observe these vows so far as their conditions admit; the five vows of the lay people are called the small vows (*aṇuvrata*). To explain: not to kill any living beings requires the greatest caution in all actions, considering that nearly everything is believed to be endowed with life. Endless rules have been laid down for monks which aim at preventing the destruction of the life of any living beings whatever. But if a layman were to observe these rules he could not go about his business; he is, therefore, obliged to refrain only from intentionally killing living beings, be it for food, pleasure, gain, or any such purpose. And so it is also with the remaining vows; their rigour is somewhat abated in the case of laymen. A layman, however, may, for a limited time, follow a more rigorous practice by taking one of the following particular vows or regulations of conduct (*śīlavrata*): (1) *digvirati*; he may limit the distance up to which he will go in this or that direction; (2) *anarthadaṇḍavirati*; he may abstain from engaging in anything that does not strictly concern him; (3) *upabhogaparibhogaparimāṇa*; he may set a measure to his food, drink, and the things he enjoys, avoiding besides gross enjoyments. (It may be mentioned in passing that certain articles of food, etc., are strictly forbidden to all, monks and laymen alike, *e.g.* roots, honey, and spirits; and likewise no food may be eaten at night.) The preceding three vows are called *guṇavrata*; the next four are the disciplinary vows (*śikṣāvrata*): (4) *deśavirata*, reducing the area in which one will move; (5) *sāmāyika*; by this vow the layman undertakes to give up, at stated times, all sinful actions by sitting down motionless and meditating on holy things; (6) *pauṣadhopavāsa*, to live as a monk on the 8th, 14th, or 15th day of the lunar fortnight, at least once a month: (7) *atithisaṁvibhāga*, lit. to give a share to guests, but it is understood in a less literal sense, viz. to provide the monks with what they want.

Most of these regulations of conduct for laymen are intended apparently to make them participate, in a measure and for some time, in the merits and benefits of monastic life without obliging them to renounce the world altogether. The rules for a voluntary death have a similar end in view (see art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Jain], vol. iv. p. 484 f.). It is evident that the lay part of the community were not regarded as outsiders, or only as friends and patrons of the Order, as seems to have been the case in early Buddhism; their position was, from the beginning, well defined by religious duties and privileges; the bond which united them to the Order of monks was an effective one. The state of a layman was one preliminary and, in many cases, preparatory to the state of a monk; in the latter respect, however, a change seems to have come about, in so far as now and for some time past the Order of monks is recruited chiefly from novices entering it at an early age, not from laymen in general. It cannot be doubted that this close union between laymen and monks brought about by the similarity of their religious duties, differing not in kind, but in degree, has enabled Jainism to avoid fundamental changes within, and to resist dangers from without for more than two thousand years, while Buddhism, being less exacting as regards the laymen, underwent the most extraordinary evolutions and finally disappeared altogether in the country of its origin.

A monk on entering the Order takes the five great vows stated above; if they are strictly kept, in the spirit of the five times five clauses, or *bhāvanās* (*SBE* xxii. 202 ff.), no new *karma* can form. But, to practise them effectually, more explicit regulations are required, and these constitute the discipline

bright soul,' were understood in a literal sense. Traces of a similar belief have also been found elsewhere (see *Mahābharata*, xii. 280. 33 f., 291. 4 ff.; cf. *Yogasūtra*, iv. 7).

of the monks. This discipline is described under seven heads.

(1) Since through the activity of body, speech, and mind, which is technically called *yoga* by the Jains, *karma*-matter pours into the soul (*āsrava*) and forms new *karma*, as explained above, it is necessary, in order to prevent the *āsrava* (or to effect *saṁvara*), to regulate those activities by keeping body, speech, and mind in strict control: these are the three *guptis* (*e.g.*, the *gupti* or guarding of the mind consists in not thinking or desiring anything bad; having only good thoughts, etc.). (2) Even in those actions which are inseparable from the duties of a monk, he may become guilty of sin by inadvertently transgressing the great vows (*e.g.*, killing living beings). To avoid such sins he must observe the five *samitis*, *i.e.* he must be cautious in walking, speaking, collecting alms, taking up or putting down things, and voiding the body; *e.g.*, a monk should in walking look before him for about six feet of ground to avoid killing or hurting any living being; he should, for the same reason, inspect and sweep the ground before he puts anything on it; he should be careful not to eat anything considered to possess life,[1] etc. (3) Passion being the cause of the amalgamation of *karma*-matter with the soul, the monk should acquire virtues. The 4 cardinal vices (*kaṣāya*) are anger, pride, illusion, and greed; their opposite virtues are forbearance, indulgence, straightforwardness, and purity. Adding to them the following 6 virtues, veracity, restraint, austerities, freedom from attachment to anything, poverty, and chastity, we have what is called the tenfold highest law of the monks (*uttamadharma*).[2] (4) Helpful for the realization of the sanctity of which an earnest searcher of the highest good stands in need are the 12 reflexions (*anuprekṣā* or *bhāvanā*) on the transitoriness of all things, on the helplessness of men, on the misery of the world, and similar topics, which form the subject of endless homilies inserted in their works by Jain authors. (5) Furthermore, it is necessary for a monk, in order to keep in the right path to perfection and to annihilate his *karma*, to bear cheerfully with all that may cause him trouble or annoyance. There are 22 such 'troubles' (*parīṣaha*) which a monk must endure without flinching, as hunger and thirst, cold and heat, all sorts of trying occurrences, illness, ill treatment, emotions, etc. If we consider that the conduct of the monk is regulated with the purpose of denying him every form of comfort and merely keeping him alive, without, however, the risk of hurting any living beings, it may be imagined to what practical consequences the endurance of the *parīṣahas* must lead. (6) Conduct (*chāritra*) consists in control and is of 5 degrees or phases. In the lowest phase all sinful activities are avoided, and the highest leads to the annihilation of all *karma*, preliminary to final liberation. (7) The last item is asceticism or austerities (*tapas*), which not only prevents the forming of new *karma* (*saṁvara*) but also purges off the old (*nirjarā*), provided that it be undertaken in the right way and with the right intention; for there are also the 'austerities of fools' (*bālatapas*) practised by other religious sects, through which temporary merits, such as supernatural powers, birth as a god, etc., can be accomplished but the highest good will never be attained. *Tapas* is, therefore, one of the most important institutions of Jainism. It is divided into (*a*) external and (*b*) internal *tapas*; the former comprises the austerities practised by the Jains, the latter their spiritual exercises. (*a*) Among austerities fasting is the most conspicuous; the Jains have developed it to a kind of art, and reach a remarkable proficiency in it. The usual way of fasting is to eat only one meal every second, third, fourth day, and so on down to half a year. Another form of fasting is starving oneself to death (*mārāṇāntiki saṁlekhanā*; see 'Voluntary death or euthanasia' in the art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD [Jain]). Other kinds of abstinence are distinguished from fasting properly so called: reduction of the quantity of the daily food; restrictions as regards the kind of food selected from what one has obtained by begging (for monks and nuns must, of course, beg their daily meal and must not eat what has been specially prepared for them); rejection of all attractive food. To the category of external austerities belong also sitting in secluded spots to meditate there and the postures taken up during meditation. The latter item Jain ascetics have in common with Brāhmanical Yoga. (*b*) Internal austerities embrace all that belongs to spiritual discipline, including contemplation—*e.g.*, confessing and repenting of sins. Transgressions of the rules of conduct are daily expiated by the ceremony of *pratikramaṇa*; greater sins must be confessed to a superior (*ālochanā*) and repented of. The usual penance in less serious cases is to stand erect in a certain position for a given time (*kāyotsarga*); but for graver transgressions the superior prescribes other penances—in the worst cases a new ordination of the guilty monk. Other kinds of internal austerities consist in modest behaviour, in doing services to other members of the Order or laymen, in the duty of studying, in overcoming all temptations. But the most important of all spiritual exercises is contemplation (*dhyāna*). Contemplation consists in the concentration of the mind on one object; it cannot be persevered in for longer than one *muhūrta* (48 minutes), and is permitted only to persons of a sound constitution. According to the object on which the thoughts are concentrated and the purpose for which this is done, contemplation may be bad or good, and will lead to corresponding results. We are here concerned only with good contemplation, which is either religious (*dharma*), or pure or bright (*śukla*). The former leads to the intuitive cognition of things hidden to common mortals, especially of religious truths. Indeed, it cannot be doubted that the pretended accuracy of information on all sorts of subjects, such as cosmography, astronomy, geography, spiritual processes, etc., which the sacred books and later treatises contain is in great part due to the intuition which the 'religious contemplation' is imagined to produce. Higher than the latter is the 'pure' contemplation, which leads through four stages to final emancipation: first, single objects are meditated upon, then only one object; then there is the stage when the activities of the body, speech, and mind continue, but only in a subtle form without relapse. At this stage, when the worldly existence rapidly draws towards its end, the remaining *karma* may be suddenly consumed by a kind of explosion called *samudghāta*. Then, in the last stage of contemplation, all *karma* being annihilated and all activities having ceased, the soul leaves the body and goes up to the top of the universe, where the liberated souls stay for ever. It must, however, be remarked that 'pure contemplation' is not by itself a means of reaching liberation, but that it is the last link of a long chain of preparatory exertions. Even its first two stages can be realized only by those in whom the passions (*kaṣāya*) are either neutralized or annihilated; and only *kevalins*, *i.e.* those who have already reached omniscience, can enter into the last two stages, which lead directly to liberation. On the other hand, the *nirvāṇa* is necessarily preceded by 12 years of

[1] The second part of the *Ācārāṅga sūtra* will give an idea of the cautions to be taken in this regard.

[2] Cf. Manu, vi. 92.

self-mortification of the flesh,[1] which should be the closing act of a monk's career, though it no longer leads to liberation, for Jambūsvāmin, the disciple of Mahāvīra's disciple Sudharman, was the last man who reached *kevala*, or omniscience, and was liberated on his death[2] (64 after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa); accordingly during the rest of the present Avasarpiṇī period nobody will be born who reaches *nirvāṇa* in the same existence. Nevertheless these speculations possess a great theoretical interest, because they afford us a deeper insight into the Jain system.

In this connexion we must notice a doctrine to which the Jains attach much importance, viz. the doctrine of the 14 *guṇasthānas*, *i.e.* the 14 steps which, by a gradual increase of good qualities and decrease of *karma*, lead from total ignorance and wrong belief to absolute purity of the soul and final liberation.

In the first stage (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) are all beings from the *nigodas* upwards to those men who do not know or do not believe in the truths revealed by the Tirthakaras; they are swayed by the two cardinal passions, love and hate (*rāga* and *dveṣa*), and are completely tied down by *karma*. In the following stages, as one advances by degrees in true knowledge, in firmness of belief, and in the control and repression of passions, different kinds of *karma* are got rid of and their effects cease, so that the being in question becomes purer and purer in each following stage. In all stages up to the 11th (that of a *upaśāntakaṣāya-vītarāgachchhadmastha*) a relapse may take place and a man may fall even down to the first stage. But as soon as he has reached the 12th stage, in which the first four kinds of *karma* are annihilated (that of a *kṣiṇakaṣāyavītarāgachchhadmastha*), he cannot but pass through the last two stages, in which omniscience is reached; in the 13th stage (that of a *sayogikevalin*) the man still belongs to the world, and may continue in it for a long period; he retains some activities of body, speech, and mind; but, when all his activities cease, he enters on the last stage (that of an *ayogikevalin*), which leads immediately to liberation, when the last remnant of *karma* has been annihilated.

A question must now be answered which will present itself to every critical reader, viz. Is the *karma*-theory as explained above an original and integral part of the Jain system? It seems so abstruse and highly artificial that one would readily believe it a later developed metaphysical doctrine which was grafted on an originally religious system based on animistic notions and intent on sparing all living beings. But such a hypothesis would be in conflict with the fact that this *karma*-theory, if not in all details, certainly in the main outlines, is acknowledged in the oldest parts of the canon and presupposed by many expressions and technical terms occurring in them. Nor can we assume that in this regard the canonical books represent a later dogmatic development for the following reason: the terms *āsrava*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, etc., can be understood only on the supposition that *karma* is a kind of subtle matter flowing or pouring into the soul (*āsrava*), that this influx can be stopped or its inlets covered (*saṁvara*), and that the *karma*-matter received into the soul is consumed or digested, as it were, by it (*nirjarā*). The Jains understand these terms in their literal meaning, and use them in explaining the way of salvation (the *saṁvara* of the *āsravas* and the *nirjarā* lead to *mokṣa*). Now these terms are as old as Jainism. For the Buddhists have borrowed from it the most significant term *āsrava*; they use it in very much the same sense as the Jains, but not in its literal meaning, since they do not regard the *karma* as subtle matter, and deny the existence of a soul into which the *karma* could have an 'influx.' Instead of *saṁvara* they say *āsavakkhaya* (*āsravakṣaya*), 'destruction of the *āsravas*,' and identify it with *magga* (*mārga*, 'path'). It is obvious that with them *āsrava* has lost its literal meaning, and that, therefore, they must have borrowed this term from a sect where it had retained its original significance, or, in other words, from the Jains. The Buddhists also use the term *saṁvara*, e.g. *sīlasaṁvara*, 'restraint under the moral law,' and the participle *saṁvuta*, 'controlled,' words which are not used in this sense by Brāhmanical writers, and therefore are most probably adopted from Jainism, where in their literal sense they adequately express the idea that they denote. Thus the same argument serves to prove at the same time that the *karma*-theory of the Jains is an original and integral part of their system, and that Jainism is considerably older than the origin of Buddhism.

[1] See DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Jain), vol. iv. p. 484.
[2] *Pariśiṣṭa Parvan*, iv. 50 ff.

5. Present state of Jainism.—The Jains, both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, number, according to the census of 1901, 1,334,140 members, *i.e.* even less than ½ per cent of the whole population of India.[1] On account of their wealth and education the Jains are of greater importance, however, than might be expected from their number. There are communities of Jains in most towns all over India. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India, in Maisūr and Kannaḍa, but also in the North, in the North-Western provinces, Eastern Rājputāna, and the Panjāb. The headquarters of the Śvetāmbaras are in Gujarāt (whence Gujarati has become the common language of the Śvetāmbaras, rather than Hindī) and Western Rājputāna, but they are to be found also all over Northern and Central India. Very much the same distribution of the Jains as at present seems, from the evidence of the inscriptions, to have prevailed ever since the 4th century.[2] Splendid temples bear testimony to the wealth and zeal of the sect, some of which rank among the architectural wonders of India, as those on the hills of Girnar and Satruñjaya, on Mount Ābū, in Ellora, and elsewhere.

The outfit of a monk is restricted to bare necessities, and these he must beg: clothes, a blanket, an almsbowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it. The nuns' outfit is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes and use peacocks' feathers instead of the broom. The monks shave the head, or remove the hair by plucking it out (*loḍha*). The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred and is necessary at particular times; it is peculiar to the Jains and is regarded by them as an essential rite.

Originally the monks had to lead a wandering life except during the monsoon, when they stayed in one place; compare the *vassa* of the Buddhist monks. Thus Mahāvīra in his wandering stayed for one day only in a village and five days in a town. But this habit has been somewhat changed by the introduction of convents (*upāśraya*), corresponding to the *vihāras* of the Buddhists.

The *upāśrayas* 'are separate buildings erected by each sect for their monks or nuns. An Upāśraya is a large bare hall without bath-rooms and cooking places, furnished only with wooden beds' (M. Stevenson, *Mod. Jainism*, p. 38).

The Śvetāmbaras, as a rule, go only to those places where there are such *upāśrayas*; and now they stay as long as a week in a village, in a town as long as a month. It is in the *upāśraya* that the monks preach or explain sacred texts to laymen who come to visit them. The daily duties of a monk are rather arduous if conscientiously performed; *e.g.*, he should sleep only three hours of the night. His duties consist in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), careful inspection of his clothes and other things for the removal of insects, for

[1] The small number of Jains is explained by the fact that Jainism is not a religion of the uncultivated masses, but rather of the upper classes.
[2] See Guérinot, *Répertoire d'épigraphie jaina*, p. 24.

cleaning them, etc. (for details see lect. xxvi. of the *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* [*SBE* xlv. 142 ff.]). There are various monastic degrees. First there is the novice (*śaikṣa*), who is not yet ordained. When he or any other man takes the vows (*vratādāna*), he renounces the world (*pravrajyā*) and is initiated or takes *dikṣā*. The most important ceremony at that time is the shaving or pulling out of the hair under a tree. From a common monk he may rise to the rank of a teacher and superior called *upādhyāya, ācārya, vāchaka, gaṇin*, etc., according to degrees and occupations.

The religious duties of the laity have, to some extent, been treated above. The ideal of conduct is that of the monk, which a layman, of course, cannot realize, but which he tries to approach by taking upon himself particular vows.[1] But in practical life also, apart from asceticism, the Jains possess a body of rules composed by monks which lay out a rational course of life for laymen and tend to improve their welfare and moral standard.[2] The monks have also to provide for the religious wants of the laity by explaining sacred texts or religious treatises and delivering sermons; this is done in the *upāśrayas* where the laymen visit them; similarly the nuns are visited by, or visit, the lay women. But the most conspicuous habit of the laity is attendance in temples, and worship of the Tīrthakaras and the deities associated with them.[3]

We must now advert to a peculiarity of the Jains which has struck all observers more than any other, viz. their extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being, a principle which is carried out to its very last consequences in monastic life, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even any insect, however troublesome; he will remove it carefully without hurting it. It goes without saying that the Jains are strict vegetarians. This principle of not hurting any living being bars them from some professions, *e.g.* agriculture, and 'has thrust them into commerce, and especially into its least elevating branch of money-lending. Most of the money-lending in Western India is in the hands of the Jains, and this accounts in a great measure both for their unpopularity and for their wealth.'[4] A remarkable institution of the Jains, due to their tender regard for animal life, is their asylums for old and diseased animals, the *panjarapolas*, where they are kept and fed till they die a natural death.

6. History of Jainism.—The history of the Jain church, in both the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara sections, is chiefly contained in their lists of patriarchs and teachers and in legends concerning them. The oldest list of patriarchs of the Śvetāmbaras is the *Sthavirāvalī* in the *Kalpasūtra*, which begins with Mahāvīra's disciple Sudharman and ends with the 33rd patriarch Śāṇḍilya or Skandila. Of most patriarchs only the names and the *gotra* are given; but there is also an expanded list from the 6th, Bhadrabāhu, down to the 14th, Vajrasena, which adds more details, viz. the names of the disciples of each patriarch and of the schools and branches (*gaṇa, kula*, and *śākhā*) founded by, or originating with, them. As some of these details are also mentioned in old Jain inscriptions of the 2nd cent. A.D. found at Mathurā,[1] this part at least of the Jain tradition is proved to be based on historical facts. Further, the more detailed list of patriarchs shows that after the 6th patriarch a great expansion of Jainism took place in the N. and N.W. of India.[2] Beyond the details mentioned, we have no historical records about the patriarchs; but such legends as were known about them down to Vajrasena have been combined in Hemachandra's *Pariśiṣṭa parvan* into a kind of continuous narrative.[3] For later times there are lists of teachers (*gurvāvali, paṭṭāvali*)[4] of separate schools, called *gachchha*, which give a summary account from Mahāvīra down to the founder of the *gachchha* in question, and then a more detailed one of the line of descent from the latter downward, with some particulars of subsequent heads of the *gachchha* called Śrīpūjya. The number of *gachchhas*, which usually differ only in minute details of conduct, is said to amount to 84, of which only 8 are represented in Gujarāt, the most important of them being the Kharatara Gachchha, which has split into many minor *gachchhas*, the Tapā, Añchala, and others. Separate mention is due to the Upakeśa Gachchha, whose members are known as the Oswāl Jains; they are remarkable for beginning their descent, not from Mahāvīra, but from his predecessor Pārśva. These lists of teachers seem, as a rule, to be reliable only in that part which comes after the founder of the school to which they belong; the preceding period down to about the 9th cent. A.D. is one of great uncertainty; there seems to be a chronological blank of three centuries somewhere.[5]

Records which allude to contemporaneous secular history are scant; such as we have in inscriptions and legends refer to kings who had favoured the Jains or were believed to have embraced Jainism. The first patron king of the Jains is said to have been Samprati, grandson of the great emperor Aśoka; but this is very doubtful history. A historical fact of the greatest importance for the history of Jainism was the conversion of Kumārapāla, king of Gujarāt, by Hemachandra (see art. HEMACHANDRA).

Finally, we must mention the schisms (*nihnava*) that have occurred in the Jain church. According to the Śvetāmbaras, there were eight schisms, of which the first was originated by Mahāvīra's son-in-law, Jamāli; and the eighth, occurring in 609 A.V. or A.D. 83, gave rise to the Digambara sect.[6] But the Digambaras seem to be ignorant of the earlier schisms; they say that under Bhadrabāhu rose the sect of Ardhaphālakas, which in A.D. 80 developed into the Śvetāmbara sect.[7] It is probable that the separation of the sections of the Jain church took place gradually, an individual development going on in both groups living at a great distance from one another, and that they became aware of their mutual difference about the end of the 1st cent. A.D. But the difference is small in articles of faith (see art. DIGAMBARA).

The sources for the history of the Digambaras are

[1] Mention should be made of the 11 *paḍimās* (Skr. *pratimā*), or standards of ascetic life, which a layman may take upon himself, especially when he intends to end his life by starving (cf. Hoernle, *Uvāsagadasāo*, tr., p. 45, n. 12 f., *IA* xxxiii. [1904] 330).

[2] E. Windisch, *Yogaśāstra*, Germ. tr., *ZDMG* xxviii. [1874]; L. Suali, *Yogabindu*, Ital. tr., *Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana*, xxi. [1908]; Warren, *Jainism*, p. 64 ff.

[3] For a description of the worship of the different sections of the Jains see Stevenson, *Mod. Jainism*, p. 85 ff., where there is also a short notice of the Jain festivals and fasts (p. 107 ff.; cf. also art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Jain], vol. v. p. 875 ff.).

[4] Stevenson, 41.

[1] See Bühler, *Epigr. Ind.* i. [1892] 371 ff., 393 ff.

[2] It is, however, curious that another tradition states: 'In India after the time of the Nanda kings the Law of the Jinas will become scarce' (*Pariśiṣṭaparvan*, lxxxix. 42). Perhaps this refers more specially to Magadha and the adjoining countries, where, under the reign of the Mauryas, Buddhism soon attained the position of a popular religion, and must have become a formidable rival of Jainism.

[3] See the contents of the work given in the Introduction to the text in the Bibl. Ind. edition.

[4] The oldest *gurvāvalī* known is that by Munisundara, A.D. 1410, ed. Benares, 1905.

[5] A full bibliography of this subject is contained in Guérinot, *Essai de bibliographie jaina*, p. 370 ff., and *Répertoire d'épigraphie jaina*, p. 59 ff.

[6] See E. Leumann, in *Ind. Studien*, xvii. [1885] 91 ff.

[7] See *ZDMG* xxxviii. [1884] 1 ff.

of a similar kind to those of the Śvetāmbaras, but later in date. The Digambara line of patriarchs is quite distinct from that of their rivals, except that they agree in the names of the first patriarch, Jambū, and the 6th, Bhadrabāhu, who, according to the Digambaras, emigrated at the head of the true monks towards the South. From Bhadrabāhu dates the gradual loss of their sacred literature, as stated above. The inscriptions furnish ample materials for a necessarily incomplete history of their ancient schools (*gaṇas*); but they do not quite agree in all details with the more modern tradition of the *paṭṭāvalis*. According to the latter, the main church (*mūla-saṅgha*) divided into four *gaṇas*, Nandi, Sena, Siṁha, and Deva, about the end of the 1st cent. A.D.

LITERATURE.—Some of the more important works and treatises have been cited in the art.; a full bibliography has been given by A. Guérinot, *Essai de bibliographie jaina*, Paris, 1907, to which the reader is referred for all questions of detail. Of new monographs on the subject (besides the old one by **G. Bühler**, *Über die indische Secte der Jainas*, Vienna, 1887, tr. J. Burgess, London, 1903) the following will be found useful: **Margaret Stevenson**, *Notes on Modern Jainism*, Oxford, 1910; **Herbert Warren**, *Jainism, in Western Garb, as a Solution to Life's great Problems*, Madras, 1912; H. L. Jhaveri, *The First Principles of the Jain Philosophy*, London, 1910. For translations of some of the principal texts see H. Jacobi, 'Jaina Sūtras,' *SBE* xxii., xlv. [1884, 1895]. HERMANN JACOBI.

JALĀL AL-DĪN RŪMĪ.—Muḥammad Jalāl al-dīn, commonly known as Maulānā ('our Master') Jalāl al-dīn Rūmī, was born at Balkh in eastern Persia in A.D. 1207 and died in 1273 at Qōniya (Iconium) in Rūm (Asia Minor); whence the epithet 'Rūmī,' which he sometimes employs as a *takhallus*, or pen-name, in his lyrical poems. When Jalāl was only a few years old, his father, Muḥammad ibn Ḥusain al-Khaṭībī al-Bakrī, generally called Bahā al-dīn Walad, was obliged to leave Balkh in consequence of a court intrigue which aroused against him the anger of the reigning sovereign, 'Alā al dīn Muḥammad Khwārizmshāh. The exiled family, after long wanderings, in the course of which they visited Nīshāpūr, Baghdād, and Mecca, arrived at Malaṭya (Melitene) on the upper Euphrates, and, having stayed there four years, moved farther westward to Lāranda (now Qarāmān) in Asia Minor. Finally, seven years later, Bahā al-dīn was invited by the Seljūk prince, 'Alā al-dīn Kaiqubād, to Qōniya. He died here in A.D. 1231. Jalāl had already married a lady named Gauhar Khātūn, daughter of Lālā Sharaf al-dīn of Samarkand, who bore him two sons. One of these, Sulṭān Walad, is the author of a mystical poem, the *Rabābnāma*, which, though written in Persian, contains 156 couplets in the Seljūk dialect of Turkish—the earliest important specimen of West Turkish poetry that we possess (see E. J. W. Gibb, *History of Ottoman Poetry*, i. 152).

After several years of study at Aleppo and Damascus, Jalāl returned to Qōniya, where he was appointed professor and gained a great reputation for learning. About this time he seems to have devoted himself to theosophy under the guidance of Burhān al-dīn of Tirmidh, one of his father's pupils; but the crisis of his spiritual life was his meeting with Shams al-dīn of Tabrīz, a wandering dervish who came to Qōniya in A.D. 1244 and vanished mysteriously—according to one legend, he was killed in a riot—in 1246. This illiterate God-intoxicated man exerted upon Jalāl an extraordinary personal influence almost amounting to possession, which was bitterly resented by his numerous disciples at Qōniya. To escape from their persecution Shams al-dīn left the city and returned only a short time before his death. During his absence Jalāl composed part of the enormous collection of mystical odes entitled *Dīwān-i Shams-i Tabrīz*; the rest belongs to a later period, but nearly the whole work is written in the name of his beloved teacher and friend. Jalāl founded—in memory, it is said, of Shams al-dīn—the Maulavī order of dervishes with their peculiar dress and whirling dance; and some of these hymns, first uttered in moments of ecstatic rapture, are still chanted by the Maulavīs, whose headquarters remain at Qōniya to the present day. In the *Dīwān* Jalāl's poetical genius is not hampered by didactic motives, and he sings out of the fullness of his heart; here he very often soars on the wings of pantheistic enthusiasm to heights that few Ṣūfī poets have been able to approach.

Probably about A.D. 1260, at the instigation of his favourite pupil, Ḥasan Ḥusām al-dīn, he began to compose the most celebrated of his works and perhaps the greatest mystical poem of any age, the *Mathnavī-i Ma'navī*, or 'Spiritual Couplets,' in six books containing altogether some 27,000 verses. The *Mathnavī* may be described as a medley of anecdotes, dialogues, allegories, and discursive theosophical speculations. Each book, however, forms an independent whole and has an inward, though not always obvious, unity of its own. Such difficulties as occur are generally due to the abstruse nature of the subject; the narrative portions are written in a plain style, singularly free from rhetorical conceits. Prolix, disconnected, and sometimes tedious though it be, the *Mathnavī* stands unrivalled as a comprehensive and thoroughly characteristic exposition of the religious philosophy of Persia—an exposition which is inspired by intense moral feeling and illuminated by many beautiful and profound thoughts.

While no attempt can be made to describe the author's doctrines in detail, a few salient points may be noticed. Jalāl al-dīn is a pantheist in the sense that he identifies all real being with God and regards the world of phenomena as a mere image of the divine ideas reflected from the darkness of not-being: the universe in itself is nothing, and God alone really exists. Every atom of the universe reflects some attribute of God, but man is the microcosm which reflects them all. In him light and darkness meet; he is compounded of awe and mercy, hell and heaven, and in virtue of this double nature, which God offered to him as a trust (*amānat*) and which he voluntarily accepted (*Qur'ān* xxxiii. 72), he is responsible for his actions and can choose good or evil. Admitting for practical purposes the existence of evil, the poet is careful to guard himself against dualism: he holds that evil is a negation of real being, or that, in so far as it has a positive character, it tends to good. He insists repeatedly on the supreme value of love as the unitive and purifying element in religion. Those who love God will discern the soul of goodness everywhere and will realize the unity underlying all differences of creed and ritual; not only will a moral transformation be wrought in them by grace of God, but they will pass utterly away from selfhood and individuality, which are the great obstacles to absorption in the divine life. Another noteworthy doctrine is that of the evolution of the soul through ascending grades of being—mineral, vegetable, animal, human, angelic—before its final return to the source whence it sprang. Besides the *Dīwān* and the *Mathnavī*, Jalāl al-dīn is the author of a prose treatise bearing the title *Fīhi mā fīhi*, several copies of which are preserved at Constantinople.

LITERATURE.—1. *Life and doctrine.*—The most authoritative Persian biography of Jalāl al-dīn is contained in the *Manāqib al-'ārifīn* by **Aflākī**, a pupil of the poet's grandson Chalabī 'Ārif, of which J. Redhouse has translated copious extracts (see below). Further information will be found in the translations of the *Mathnavī* and *Dīwān* and also in the following works:

E. G. Browne, *Literary History of Persia*, London, 1906, ii. 515–525; H. Ethé, *Morgenländische Studien*, Leipzig, 1870, pp. 95–124, and in *GIrP* ii. (1896-1904) 287–292; E. J. W. Gibb, *History of Ottoman Poetry*, London, 1900, i. 145–163.

ii. *Mathnawí.*—The *Mathnawí* has been frequently reprinted in the East with and without commentaries in Persian or Turkish. There are English versions of bk. i. by J. Redhouse, London, 1881, with biographical introduction translated from the work of Aflákí; and of bk. ii. by C. E. Wilson, London, 1910, with a full commentary. An abstract of the whole poem, together with an excellent account of the principal doctrines by E. H. Whinfield, was published in 1887 in Trübner's Oriental Series, and a second edition appeared in 1898.

iii. *Dívân-i Shams-i Tabríz.*—Complete edition in Persian, Lucknow, 1884; selected odes, Tabríz, 1868, and Lucknow, 1878. Translations: A. von Rosenzweig, *Auswahl aus den Diwanen Mewlana Dschelaleddin Rumi*, Persian text with German verse tr., Vienna, 1838; R. A. Nicholson, *Selected Poems from the Dívân-i Shamsi-i Tabríz*, Persian text with prose tr., introduction, and notes, Cambridge, 1898; W. Hastie, *The Festival of Spring, from the Divan of Jelâleddin*, rendered in English ghazels after Rückert's versions, Glasgow, 1903.

REYNOLD A. NICHOLSON.

JĀLANDHARA.—Jālandhara (Jullunder) is the name of a town (lat. 31° 20′ N., long. 75° 35′ E.), district, and division in the Panjāb. The 'division' includes the 'districts' of Jālandhar (Jullunder), Hoshyārpur, and Kāngrā. The ancient kingdom, called Trigarta by the Hindus and Jālandhara by the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang) in the 7th cent., included, like the modern 'division,' both the hill country of Kāngrā and the plain of Jālandhar. The latter is associated in Hindu mythology with an eponymous demon, on whose back the town is supposed to be built, and the neighbourhood is regarded as holy ground, pilgrimages to which are meritorious. The fort of Kāngrā (Nagarkōt), formerly considered one of the strongest places in India, possesses the famous Brāhmanical temple of Mātā Devī, or Vajreśvarī Devī, thrice desecrated by the Muhammadans, and mostly destroyed by the earthquake of 1905, as well as some Jain shrines and images, but no Jains now reside there. At Juālāmukhī ('flaming mouth'), about 20 miles S.E. of Kāngrā, a discharge of inflammable gas from a fissure at the base of a high range of hills is honoured with great veneration and much visited by pilgrims.

The Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsiang, twice visited Jālandhar in A.D. 634 and 643. The capital was then described as being 'the royal city of Northern India,' and the Rāja was specially selected by king Harṣa (Śīlāditya), the paramount sovereign, to escort the 'Master of the Law' when on his return journey to China. An earlier unnamed Rājā of uncertain date, who had become a convert to Buddhism, is said to have been given by the paramount power 'sole control of matters relating to Buddhism in all India,' and to have been vested, in his capacity of Protector of the Faith, with jurisdiction to reward and punish monks impartially without distinction of persons. The same prince was believed to have travelled all through India and to have erected *stūpas* (topes) and monasteries at the sacred sites; but no record confirming these statements of the pilgrim has been discovered. Although Buddhism was decadent in most parts of N. India during the 7th cent., it was still the dominant religion at Jālandhar, where the Buddhist monasteries, served by more than 2000 brethren, students of both 'vehicles,' exceeded fifty in number, while the Brāhmanical temples of the Śaiva sect of Paśupati were only three, with about 500 votaries. Probably the Buddhist worship survived until the Muhammadan conquest early in the 11th century. The armies of Islām could not endure the multitude of images displayed in Buddhist establishments, and made an end of monks and monasteries wherever they found them. The brethren at Jālandhar made a special study of the *Abhidharma*, or metaphysical, section of the canon, and Hiuen Tsiang studied an *Abhidharma* commentary for four months in 634 under the guidance of a teacher named Chandravarma. The compilation of such commentaries is recorded to have been the business of the Council assembled by the Kuṣān monarch Kaniṣka (*q.v.*), probably in or about A.D. 100. But in the opinion of the Japanese scholar, Takakusu,

'all arguments about the Council and its works will be valueless until the *Mahāvibhāṣā*—an encyclopædia of Buddhist philosophy—is translated into one of the European languages.' He holds that the Council was merely an assembly of the adherents of the Hīnayāna school of the Sarvāstivādins (*JRAS*, 1905, p. 415).

Hiuen Tsiang had no doubt that the Council met in Kashmīr, presumably at the capital, and his account of its proceedings forms part of his description of the valley. He tells us that king Kaniṣka proposed that the sittings should be held in the plains of Gandhāra, but that objection was taken to the heat and damp there. A suggestion to assemble at Rājagriha, the ancient capital of Magadha (Bihār) was also rejected, and ultimately it was decided to hold the Council in Kashmīr. The commentaries authorized by the assembly are said to have been engraved on copper-plates and deposited in a *stūpa*. It is possible that they may still exist among the now insignificant ruins of Pāndrethan, Aśoka's capital, which lie to the south-east of Śrīnagar, or Pravarasenapura, founded by a Rājā of Śaiva faith, perhaps during the 6th century. A rival tradition alleged that the Council was held at the Kuvana or Tamasavana monastery of Jālandhar, and the Tibetan historian of Buddhism, Tāranātha, writing in A.D. 1608, was of opinion that this tradition was supported by the weight of learned authority (Schiefner, *Tāranātha*, p. 60). But the precise testimony of Hiuen Tsiang, nearly a thousand years earlier in date, obviously is entitled to more credence, and the fact may be accepted that most of the sittings of the Council were held in Kashmīr. It is possible that the assembly may have met first in a monastery at or near Jālandhar, and may have adjourned to Kashmīr for the hot season. Paramārtha (499–569), the author of the *Life of Vasubandhu*, fully confirms the tradition that Kashmīr was the place of meeting of the Council (*JRAS*, 1905, pp. 38, 52).

LITERATURE.—A. Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India*, London, 1871, *Archæol. Surv. Rep.* v. (Calcutta, 1882); Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang), *Travels*, tr. S. Beal (Boston, 1885) and T. Watters (London, 1904–05); S. Beal, *The Life of Hiuen Tsiang*, do. 1888; *Rājatarangiṇī*, tr. M. A. Stein, Westminster, 1900; F. A. Schiefner, *Tāranātha's Gesch.*, St. Petersburg, 1869; *JRAS*, 1905; art. 'Jullunder District' in *IGI* xiv. [1908] 221–231.

VINCENT A. SMITH.

JAMBUKESWARAM (Skr. *Jambukeśvara*, a title of Śiva, 'Lord of the *jambu*, or rose-apple tree,' under an old specimen of which, much venerated, the symbol of the god is placed).—A famous Śaiva temple in Śrīrangam Island (*q.v.*) in the Trichinopoli District of the Madras Presidency. It rivals the more famous Vaiṣṇava temple at Śrīrangam in architectural beauty, interest, and possibly in antiquity. The *linga* which is the object of worship is one of the five known as 'elemental,' the 'element' being in this case water, by which it is surrounded (for the other 'elemental' *lingas* see *Madras Manual of Administration*, iii. [1893] 429 f.). According to Fergusson,

'the first gateway of the outer enclosure is not large, but it leads direct to the centre of a hall containing some 400 pillars. On the right these open to a tank fed by a perpetual spring which is one of the wonders of the place. The corresponding space on the left was intended to be occupied by the 600 columns requisite to make up the 1000, but was never completed. [There are, in reality, 796 columns, or, in all, 938, if the 142 round the little tank which adjoins the hall be added.] Between the two *gopuras* (entrance gates) of the second enclosure is a very beautiful portico of cruciform shape, leading to the door of the sanctuary, which, however, makes no show externally, and access to its interior is not vouchsafed to the profane' (*Hist. of Ind. and East. Arch.*, p. 365).

He fixes the date of the building about A.D. 1600; one inscription, however, is said to be dated A.D. 1480. Formerly, when sectarian jealousy was less intense, the image of Viṣṇu used to be brought for one day in the year into a coco-nut grove within the enclosure of the rival temple, but owing to sectarian disputes this practice has now been abandoned.

LITERATURE.—J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, London, 1876, p. 865; *IGI* xxiii. [1908] 109 *f.*

W. CROOKE.

JAMNOTRĪ (Skr. *Yamunā-avātāra-purī*, 'city of the appearance of the Jumnā').—A sacred place of the Hindus near the source of the river Jumnā; lat. 31° 1′ N.; long. 78° 28′ E.; in the State of Garhwāl, United Provinces, India. The river rises from the group of mountains known as Bandarpūñch, 'monkey's tail,' the height of which is 30,731 ft., at Jamnotrī, at an elevation of 10,549 ft. above sea level. Close to the source of the river from a glacier there is a hot spring.

'From a rock which projects from the snow a small rill descends during the day, about 3 feet wide and very shallow, being only the result of a shower of spray produced by the snow melting under the sun's rays. Below this the snow-bed is intersected with rifts and chasms, caused by the falling in of the snow as it is melted by the steam of the boiling spring beneath it. The rill finds its way through crevices formed in the snow-bed to the ground beneath, out of which gush numerous springs of water of nearly boiling heat [194·7° Fahr.]; and the steam from these melts the mass of ice and snow above them so as to form numerous excavations resembling vaulted roofs of marble, and further causes a copious shower, which affords the principal supply to the Jumna' (Atkinson, *Himalayan Gaz.* iii. 376).

The place is a resort of pilgrims, but is not so popular as Gangotrī (*q.v.*), the source of the Ganges.

LITERATURE.—E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, Allahabad, 1882–84, iii.; T. Skinner, *Excursions in India*, London, 1833, i. 296 ff.; *IGI* xiv. [1908] 51.

W. CROOKE.

JANSENISM.—Jansenism, a religious revival within the Church of Rome, originated in the 17th cent. and is hardly yet extinct. Although its history is connected chiefly with France, its first home was the Flemish University of Louvain; and it bears the name of its chief Flemish apostle, Cornelius Jansen, bishop of Ypres. Jansen (1585–1638) was born of humble parents at Accoy in the province of Utrecht, and educated at Louvain, where he formed a momentous friendship with a French fellow-student, Jean du Vergier de Hauranne (1581–1643), who presently introduced his ideas to France. Jansen rose to be tutor and professor at Louvain; in 1636 he was appointed bishop of Ypres, but died within two years of his elevation. In 1640 his executors published the work of his lifetime: *Augustinus, seu doctrina S. Augustini de humanæ naturæ ægritudine, sanitate et medicina adversus Pelagianos et Massilienses.* This bulky treatise is the chief monument of a controversy that had raged at Louvain ever since its great professor Baius, otherwise Michael de Bay (1513–89), had revolted against the traditional Scholasticism of the college lecture-rooms. Mediæval theology boasted itself a *fides quærens intellectum*, making clear to reason the dogmas that faith already accepted; and reason, to the mediæval mind, meant the categories of Aristotle. With their help, it was thought that all the mysteries of religion could be translated into clear, coherent language; and, in pursuance of this end, the Schoolmen raised a gigantic monument of subtle dialectic, wherein they claimed that every article in the creed found its precise metaphysical equivalent. As time went on, however, the world grew increasingly dissatisfied with their performance. Simple souls were bewildered. They felt that faith and grace and love, when arrayed in all the pomp of logical abstraction, were woefully unlike all that they mean to the unsophisticated human heart. Accordingly they accused the Church of having over-intellectualized religion; the Flemish Huguenots told King Philip II. that it had 'brouillé la sapience humaine parmy la sapience divine.' Their protest was in some degree supported by de Bay and other moderate Catholics, who were in favour of making all reasonable concessions to the Reformation. They felt that scholasticism, in its enthusiasm for logic, had let theology drift out of touch with Christian feeling and experience. 'Divines talk of sin,' wrote de Bay (Linsenmann, *Michael Baius*, p. 75), 'as though it were a clever puzzle invented by some visionary dreamer, which must be pondered over and believed, although nobody could feel or grasp it.' Under his leadership an anti-Scholastic tradition grew up at Louvain, of which Jansen became the great exponent. In the preface to his *Augustinus* he declares that the first great enemy of God is Aristotle, the arch-logician. His *pura, puta philosophia* may be well enough suited to the investigation of physical phenomena; it is utterly out of place in a discussion of spiritual things. It engenders a blind trust in argument; and argument transforms theology into a kind of dialectical tilting-match, where everything is open to question, and nothing is held sacred or assured. 'What is held probable to-day will be considered false to-morrow, and the certainty of yesterday becomes the paradox of to-day.' Thus was theology become 'a tower of Babel for confusion, and a Cimmerian region for obscurity.'

Where find a remedy for this state of things? Jansen appealed to Augustine—raised up by God's Providence to be the eternal and victorious foe of Aristotle. To follow him was to escape from the frosty intellectualism of the Schoolmen; for Augustine, although more than a match in logic for the doughtiest Aristotelian who ever lectured in the Schools, had never hesitated to appeal to the imagination and the feelings; his works owed even more to his 'charity' than to his brain. Again, to follow Augustine was to escape for ever from the instability of the theologians. He had always taught that faith and reason have nothing to do with each other. Divine truth in no way depends on the vagaries of the human mind; it is determined solely by prescriptions and traditions flowing straight from the Fountainhead. In other words, it is given by God—not made by the hand of man. And what is true of faith is also true of works. Left to ourselves, we can neither think nor act aright. All that is good in us is the fruit of grace implanted in the individual heart by the hand of God Himself. Jansen's three volumes are an interminable elaboration of this central thesis. The changes are incessantly rung on the absolute necessity of grace, on the blindness of the human intellect and the weakness of the human will, until commonplace Catholics began to rub their eyes, and ask whether the bishop of Ypres was anything better than a Calvinist in disguise. They were wrong. Strongly as Jansen held to the Augustinian doctrine of individual sanctification by the direct personal agency of God, he held quite as strongly to the other side of the Augustinian system—to the *Civitas Dei*, or Visible Church, wherein the Redeemer becomes perpetually re-incarnate, generation after generation. Thus communion with the Visible Church—acceptance of its dogmas, participation in its sacraments—was absolutely necessary for salvation. The Church, as it were, provided the dry bones of righteousness; the inward witness of the Spirit clothed the skeleton with flesh. Hence, during their long struggle with the Roman authorities, none of Jansen's followers dreamed of casting loose from Rome.

Moreover, all their surroundings indisposed them from any sympathy with the Reformation. Jansen

spent most of his life at Louvain, the frontier-citadel of Rome over against Presbyterian Holland; there he more than once crossed swords with the great Calvinist controversialist, Voetius, still remembered for his attacks on Descartes. And he probably owed his mitre to the favour with which the Spanish Viceroy at Brussels had received his *Mars Gallicus* (1635), a fiery political pamphlet attacking Louis XIII. of France for having allied himself with the heretical powers of Northern Europe during his long fight with Spain and Austria, traditional champions of the papacy. On the other hand, Jansen, like de Bay before him, may well have dreamed of beating the Protestants with their own weapons, and proving that—given a strong infusion of Augustinian doctrine—Rome could be as truly evangelical as Wittenberg or Geneva. Certainly this idea appealed much to his friend and fellow-labourer, du Vergier de Hauranne. He came of a wealthy family near Bayonne, and was educated at Louvain, where he made Jansen's acquaintance. After his ordination he spent some years as confidential secretary to the bishop of Poitiers; in 1620 the bishop made over to him the 'commendatory' (or sinecure) abbacy of Saint Cyran, a Benedictine monastery in central France. Thenceforward he was generally known as Monsieur de Saint Cyran. At Poitiers he was often brought in contact with the Huguenots; for Touraine was the centre of French Protestantism. And experience soon convinced him that their reconciliation with the Roman Church was impossible, until the Church set its affairs in order. Accordingly he settled in Paris, and there started on a vigorous campaign to bring the Church's disorders to an end.

The disorders in question were fruits of the Wars of Religion in the previous century. After thirty years' fighting about theology, most Frenchmen were sick of the very name of dogma. As the long struggle had ended with the conversion of Henry IV. to Rome, most of them were willing enough to call themselves Catholics, and 'perform the ancient ceremonies of their country with a decent moderation,' as one of their own great writers enjoins. But independent spirits were drifting away from Christianity altogether to a purely natural religion untainted by sectarian bickerings—a religion of noble self-respect and disinterested love of duty, learnt from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus. Such minds felt no need of grace or redemption: was not the wise man sufficient unto himself? As for the frivolous many, they were frankly weary of religion altogether; and the Church's only chance of luring them back within its fold was to pitch its standard of 'decent moderation' as low as possible. This view soon dawned on the Jesuits and the more worldly-wise among the clergy. They argued that severity in pulpit and confessional only scared sinners away altogether; thereby their money and influence were lost to the Church, and their souls robbed of the priceless benefit of priestly absolution. Accordingly, through their casuists—writers of official text-books on the management of the confessional—they entered on a vigorous campaign to force priests to be lax. The kind of question that a confessor might ask was rigorously defined. He must be satisfied with the merest show of repentance. He must always lean towards the most 'benign' interpretation of the law; and for his guidance the casuists ran many an ingenious coach-and-four through inconvenient enactments. Not that they went as far as some of their Protestant critics imagined. They did not legitimate grave sins; their object was to show that the Church's minimum standard was no higher than that of the average man or woman of the world. What did it matter if this level was miserably low? The less the casuists dared ask of the sinner, the more they trusted to the miraculous efficiency of sacramental grace. By hook or by crook get him to the confessional, and the magical words of absolution would make him a new man.

On both Jesuits and Neo-Stoics Saint Cyran waged a relentless war, for he held that both were infected by the same deadly error on the subject of grace. The Stoics ignored it altogether. Their theory set before man a high ideal, and left him to carry it out by himself as best he might; and Saint Cyran's criticisms of Stoic practice forestall the famous saying of Pascal that those who set out to be angels generally end among the beasts. The Jesuits certainly did not ignore the necessity of sacramental grace. But they said that, if a man wished for it, he must take the first step himself, and merit grace by coming to confession. For grace, on their principles, never took the lead; its business was to complement and continue what human nature had begun. That being so, they argued that it was unjust to ask men for more than they were fully capable of performing; God must perforce be satisfied with whatever the casuists thought it fair and reasonable of Him to expect. Saint Cyran brought all the batteries of Jansen's theology to bear on this position. He refused to ask what a man could do simply by himself; the question was how much he could do when borne up on the wings of grace. And whether he was so upborne depended in no way on himself; God did not ask His creatures to choose whether they would accept grace or refuse it. The mass of mankind He left to perish in their sins. On the few whom He elected to save grace descended like a whirlwind—irresistibly, unfailingly, victoriously. There were 'thunder-claps and visible upsets'—a sudden, often violent, awakening. 'In every true conversion,' wrote Saint Cyran in his *Spiritual Letters*, 'God speaks at least once to the soul as distinctly as on the road to Damascus He spoke to St. Paul, model of all penitents.' There followed a long course of internal repentance and external penitential discipline, carried out under expert guidance: was not St. Paul himself 'directed' by Ananias immediately after his conversion? At last the sinner emerged a new creature, living only for religion. To all other interests he was dead. Even the most innocent—art and literature, family ties, civic and professional duties—might prove dangerous rivals to the love of God, and were therefore better away. But for such a man the cloister is the only place, and of this Saint Cyran was well aware. As his first biographer says, he strove hard 'happily to depeople earth, and give new citizens to Heaven,' by driving most of his hearers into convents.

Hence it is scarcely surprising that his first celebrated disciple should have been a nun. This was Angélique Arnauld (1591–1661), abbess of Port Royal des Champs, a Cistercian convent near Versailles. She had early revolted against the spiritual deadness around her, and embarked on various schemes of reform. But all her efforts had been tentative and uncertain, until Saint Cyran appeared to give her the precise kind of guidance that she needed. In return, she furnished his doctrine with a local habitation and a name; within a very few years Port Royal became the headquarters of the Jansenist party. Angélique enlisted in its service her large and influential family—notably her brother, Antoine (1612–94), one of the most promising young divines in France. Her convent opened in the capital a daughter-house, known as Port Royal de Paris. At the abbey gates a little group of masculine adherents formed the 'hermits of Port Royal,' who lived an austere semi-monastic life, although bound together by no vow. Under the guidance of Antoine Arnauld, they poured forth an ever-increasing flood of devotional

literature remarkable for its literary style. Both nuns and hermits opened 'little schools' for the children of friends of the movement; Pascal's sister, Jacqueline, was a teacher in the one, and Racine a pupil in the other. So successful was the party that it soon excited the suspicions of Richelieu's police; in 1638 Saint Cyran was arrested as a disturber of ecclesiastical peace, and kept in prison till the Cardinal's death (December 1642). Then he was at once released; but his health had been broken by his confinement, and he died in October 1643.

The leadership of the Jansenist party at once devolved on Antoine Arnauld, who had just published (August 1643) a *Traité de la fréquente communion*, which for the first time set the Jansenist case before the general reader. The *Augustinus*, written in Latin, had been too learned; Saint Cyran's devotional works were at once too monastic and too inspirational—too full of 'thunderclaps and visible upsets.' Arnauld, scion of a family of lawyers, used the language of his country, and imported into theology all the hard-headed caution of his race. He dealt with the management of the confessional, a subject of interest to every one. And he dealt with it in a manner intelligible to every one. The casuistical party maintained that Catholics were the Chosen People—members of the One True Church—and that God showed His particular favour to them by giving them sacraments, which 'met their efforts half-way,' that is, made them holy with very little trouble on their part. Arnauld's *Traité* directly challenged this position. He denied that the mere fact of being a Catholic was any recommendation in God's sight. Religion did not consist in believing a particular opinion, or conforming to a particular mode of life; it meant conversion, becoming a new creature. But conversion was no affair of a moment; it was a slow and gradual process, involving a long course of discipline, internal and external. How absurd it was of the casuists to give absolution easily—'like footmen, rather than judges'—to all who chose to ask for it. How could a muttered absolution make a sinner a new man?

The casuistical party must needs take up so open a challenge. They could not discredit the *Traité* directly, for it had been very favourably received. So they concentrated their attacks on the weakest point in Arnauld's position, and accused the *Augustinus* of renewing the Predestinarian heresies of Calvin. The book had appeared in 1640, and was promptly censured by the Inquisition, on the ground that it was illegal to write controversial works on the subject of grace without special leave from Rome. This censure was confirmed by Urban VIII. in 1642. But various technical objections were raised to the legality of this condemnation, and a lively war of pamphlets ensued. In July 1649 seven propositions were denounced to the Sorbonne, or Divinity Faculty of Paris University. Two of these, taken from the *Fréquente communion*, were soon dropped; the other five made up what Bossuet called the soul of the *Augustinus*, though only the first proposition of the five was textually extracted from it. They run as follows:

(1) There are commandments which good men cannot obey, however hard they try. (2) In the state of fallen nature, internal grace is never resisted. (3) To make actions in the state of fallen nature meritorious or otherwise, it is not requisite that they should be free from internal necessity, but only from external constraint. (4) The Semi-Pelagian heresy consisted in teaching that men can choose whether they will accept grace or reject it. (5) It is a Semi-Pelagian error to say that Christ died for all men.

These five Propositions gave rise to heated debates in the Sorbonne, until Arnauld's supporters, finding themselves in a minority, appealed to the law-courts on a question of privilege, and the whole question was referred to the Assembly of the Clergy meeting in the following year. But the Assembly also was divided in opinion. In April 1651, eighty-five bishops wrote to Pope Innocent X., begging him to condemn the Propositions; eleven other bishops wrote deprecating the action of their colleagues. Innocent appointed a commission forthwith to examine into the whole question, with the help of advocates on both sides. Early in 1653 the commission reported; and on the strength of its findings Innocent declared all five Propositions heretical.

At first the Jansenists made light of his judgment. In the 17th cent. few Frenchmen believed in papal infallibility. Rome was looked on as a country whose diplomatic intrigue went for more than theological scholarship, and one pontificate might easily undo the work of another. The Jesuits might manage to hoodwink Innocent X.; Port Royal could afford to wait till he gave place to a pope less amenable to their influence. Accordingly Arnauld temporized. He began by denying that Jansen was touched by the censure at all. Only one of the five Propositions was a literal extract from the *Augustinus*; and that one, though liable to Calvinistic misconstruction, was also capable of being read in the orthodox Catholic sense given it by Augustine, Jansen's master. Hence, to condemn the disciple was to condemn the Doctor of grace. The bishops replied that Innocent had condemned the Propositions in the precise sense intended by Jansen; and their assertion was confirmed by Innocent's successor, Alexander VII., in October 1656. Arnauld had already been expelled from the Sorbonne, in spite of Pascal's *Provincial Letters* (Jan. 1656–March 1657), begun in an attempt to save him. Early in 1657 the Assembly of the Clergy imposed on every priest, monk, and nun in France a 'Formulary,' or declaration, that the Propositions really were in Jansen's book. For a while, however, the Formulary hung fire. Although in a small minority, the Jansenists had powerful backers among both bishops and judges. Public opinion was impressed by the *Provincial Letters*, and still more by the so-called 'miracle of the Holy Thorn' (March 24, 1656), when Pascal's little niece, Marguérite Périer, was suddenly cured of an ulcerated eye by touching a relic from the Crown of Thorns in the convent chapel at Port Royal. But the respite was short; for in 1660 a new and most powerful enemy entered the lists. Louis XIV. took the reins of government into his own hands; and this great fanatic for uniformity was the last man in the world to tolerate a handful of eccentric recluses who believed themselves to be in special touch with Heaven, and therefore might at any moment set their conscience up against the law. In 1661 he stirred up the bishops to enforce signature of the Formulary; and, when the Jansenists objected that mere bishops had no right to impose it, he got a new Formulary drafted by the pope (1664).

At last the Jansenists found themselves between two fires. Were they to sign, or were they not to sign? A few of the most consistent were for a blank refusal. Just before his death (1662) Pascal had declared that the *Augustinus* was absolutely in the right, and the pope absolutely in the wrong. Hence to sign the Formulary, without expressly excepting Jansen's name from censure of every kind, was to act in a way 'abominable before God, craven in the sight of man, and of no use whatsoever to those already marked out for destruction.' But the mass of the party followed Arnauld in his temporizing tactics. He said that the Formulary might be signed by any one who bore in mind the common distinction of law and fact. In abstract matters of dogma the Church was certainly infallible. But this infallibility ceased so soon as it

approached concrete cases of fact; and it knew no more than any one else what was in a particular author's mind when he wrote a certain passage in his book. Properly speaking, it had no right to pronounce on such questions at all; if it insisted on doing so, the most that its decisions could expect was the 'respectful silence' that involves external conformity, but no inward acquiescence. Tacitly connived at by many bishops, this position was openly accepted by four—those of Alet, Angers, Beauvais, and Pamiers. The pope and Louis were furious, and there was talk of bringing the offending prelates to trial. But all sorts of legal difficulties arose as to who should try them; for the Gallican Church was exceedingly jealous of any interference from Rome. While the question was still pending, Pope Alexander died. The peacemakers at once stepped in, and persuaded the four bishops to make a very ambiguous submission to Rome. With this the new and very pacific pope, Clement IX., declared himself satisfied (1669); and Louis's ministers, who were utterly weary of the whole quarrel, induced him to take this opportunity of admitting the Jansenists generally to grace. Public opinion followed his lead. The nuns of Port Royal suddenly found themselves national heroines; and Arnauld ended twenty years of hiding by a triumphant entry into Paris.

Jansenist writers treat this 'Peace of Clement IX.' as a victory; really it was the beginning of their downfall. They had set out to reform the Church; they ended by having to fight hard for a doubtful footing within it. And under Arnauld's leadership the party itself had gone down-hill; a controversial, argumentative impulse was shouldering out the evangelical. The world admired Arnauld's talents; but, in admiring, it agreed with Bossuet, who said that Arnauld was inexcusable for having wasted his great abilities in an attempt to show that Jansen had not been condemned. Besides, Louis never forgot, and never forgave; and an incident very soon occurred that fanned his wrath to a flame. For a long while a sullen contest had smouldered between the Government and the bishops over the *régale*—the royal prerogative of enjoying the temporalities of a vacant bishopric, which the Crown lawyers had gradually extended into a most vexatious burden. The explosion came in 1673, when Louis tried to enforce it on the few dioceses which had been hitherto exempt. Loud protests were raised by the bishops of Alet and Pamiers—both well known for their Jansenist sympathies, and both strong opponents of the Formulary. Their action raised a violent storm, and led directly to Louis's quarrel with Innocent XI. and the Gallican Declaration of 1682. It also determined Louis to make an end for ever of the obnoxious sect. He stayed his hand during the life of his cousin, Madame de Longueville—once the heroine of the *Fronde*, and now the great patron of Port Royal. On her death (1679) he at once proceeded to sharp measures. The nuns of Port Royal were again subjected to persecution; and Arnauld fled from France, never to return.

Still, to strike at the leaders was one thing; to crush their followers was quite another. What was known as 'mitigated Jansenism'—a doctrine that just managed to keep within the four corners of orthodoxy—found many adherents among the clergy. And in lay homes the spirit of Port Royal was kept alive by a book, which played in the later history of Jansenism almost as large a part as the *Augustinus* itself. This was *Le Nouveau Testament en français, avec des réflexions morales sur chaque verset, pour en rendre la lecture et la méditation plus faciles à ceux qui commencent à s'y appliquer*; it was popularly known as *Les Réflexions morales*, and was from the pen of the Oratorian, Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1719). In various forms and under various titles it went through a number of editions between 1668 and 1692, without incurring any official censure. Indeed, it was formally approved by Noailles, bishop of Châlons, afterwards Cardinal Archbishop of Paris, although Quesnel's opinions were well known. In 1685 he had gone to share Arnauld's exile in Brussels; and on Arnauld's death (1694) he succeeded to the leadership of the party. Meanwhile the sale of his *Réflexions morales* continued to increase, and it became the target of an ever-growing hail of Jesuit bullets. At last the more sanguine Jansenists determined to take the offensive themselves. In 1701 they consulted the Sorbonne as to whether it was not enough to receive the condemnation of Jansen in 'respectful silence.' The question stirred the fires of fifty years before; and soon ecclesiastical France was in a blaze. In 1703 Louis wrote to Clement XI., suggesting that they should take concerted action to put an end to Jansenism for ever. Clement replied with the bull *Vineam Domini*, condemning respectful silence outright (1705). The bull only whetted Louis's appetite. The older he grew, and the thicker the disasters of the War of Spanish Succession rained upon him, the more the ugly superstitious side of his character awoke. He became frenziedly anxious to propitiate his Maker, and save himself another Blenheim or Malplaquet by exterminating the enemies of the Church. As the few old ladies left at Port Royal refused to accept the *Vineam Domini*, their community was broken up (1709); their cemetery was violated, and the abbey-buildings destroyed. The king next proposed to Clement to condemn the *Réflexions morales* in the most solemn possible form. For some time Clement, a pacific diplomat, hung back; but at last he yielded, and put forth the bull *Unigenitus* (1713). This was a censure not only of all that Jansenism said, but of all that it had tried to say. Even Fénelon, although a warm admirer of the bull, admits that public opinion credited it with having condemned St. Augustine, St. Paul, and Jesus Christ Himself. It went altogether beyond the technical questions raised by the *Augustinus*—notably when it dealt a heavy blow at the practice of popular Bible-reading lately sprung up among French Catholics. Hence its appearance was the signal for a popular outcry; even about fifteen bishops supported Cardinal de Noailles in refusing to accept it. The next two years were spent by the Court in a feverish endeavour to thrust it down their throats; Noailles was saved from deposition only by the death of the king in 1715.

On the accession of the regent Orleans, bigotry at once gave place to cynical indifference. Orleans was a free-thinker, and all he cared for was to keep the clergy quiet; hence he always sided with the stronger party, in the hope of crushing out the weaker. As the bull was generally unpopular, he began by taking the side of its opponents, and appointed Noailles chief ecclesiastical adviser to the Court. But he soon found that he had underrated the strength of the *Constitutionnaires*—the thick-and-thin supporters of the bull. Besides, its opponents were divided among themselves. Some rejected the *Unigenitus* altogether; others were willing to accept it with various modifications. At last the stalwarts of the party lost patience with its trimmers. In 1717 four bishops those of Boulogne, Mirepoix, Montpellier, and Senez—appealed from the pope to a general Council; they were supported by Noailles and a number of others. The pope replied that any one who rejected the bull thereby cut himself off from communion with the Church of Christ (1718). The Court, foreseeing serious risk of a definite breach with Rome, called

in the services of a committee of moderate bishops, among them being Massillon of Clermont, the famous pulpit orator. The committee produced two documents. One—the *Corps de doctrine*—was a commentary on the bull, explaining away everything in its provisions that might stick in the gorge of an 'appellant.' The second document was a letter accepting the *Unigenitus* in the same sense as the pope—which, as the indignant Clement pointed out, was often very different from the sense laid down in the *Corps de doctrine*—and at the same time condemning some of the most extravagant utterances of the bull's extreme supporters. The two documents made up what was known as an *accommodement*, or compromise; and the Government decreed that any one who signed the compromise should be deemed to have accepted the bull, and be free from further molestation. After some wavering, Noailles and most of the appellant bishops accepted the Government's terms (1720); and Jansenism came to an end as an organized political force.

Not that it was by any means dead. The four original appellants refused the compromise, and 're-appealed' to a general Council. The tolerant Regent let them alone; but after his death (1723) power passed into the hands of Fleury, former tutor to the young king, and an ardent aspirant to a cardinal's hat. He determined to make an example of the most recalcitrant appellant, Bishop Soanen of Senez. This old man of over eighty was deposed from his bishopric, and exiled to a remote monastery in Auvergne. Noailles protested against his treatment; but shortly afterwards he died (1729), just after having made a humble submission to Rome. He was hardly in his grave before Jansenism burst out again in a new form. Persecution generally begets hysteria in its victims, more especially when they already accept a strong doctrine of conversion. Belief in material miracles goes hand in hand with belief in moral; and even in its great days Port Royal could furnish a long list of special providences and portents, like the miracle of the Holy Thorn. Now that the fortunes of the party were at their lowest ebb, these were multiplied a hundredfold. About 1728 the 'miracles of St. Médard' became the talk of Paris. These were a series of astonishing cures—mostly of nervous diseases—effected at the tomb of François de Pâris (1690–1727), a young Jansenist cleric of singularly holy life, and a perfervid opponent of the *Unigenitus*. In 1732 the Government closed the cemetery, and gave rise to the famous epigram:

> 'De par le Roi, défense à Dieu
> De faire miracle en ce lieu.'

From mere miracles it was but a step to apocalyptic prophecy and speaking with tongues. The so-called *Convulsionnaires* worked themselves up, by means of frightful self-torture, into a state of ecstasy, in which they prophesied and cured diseases. They were speedily disowned by the serious Jansenists, but they dragged on a disreputable existence for many years. In 1772 they were still important enough for Diderot to take the field against them. A curious law-suit revealed that they had a regular organization, with elective officers and a common treasury, known as the *boîte à Perrette* ('Perrette's money-box'), from the name of the old lady who was its original custodian.

Meanwhile Cardinal Fleury was having much ado to enforce the *Unigenitus* on the clergy generally. The French judges were enthusiastically Gallican; and they hated the bull, because it was a triumph of their hereditary enemies, the Jesuits and the pope. Hence they put every possible difficulty in the way of its execution. Under their fostering care, a belief sprang up that to call oneself a 'Jansenist,' and abuse the *Unigenitus*, was to show oneself a lover of civil and religious liberty. And, as the Jesuits grew more and more unpopular, the word 'Jansenist' came to mean everything that they were not; it stood for a sterling, upright character, and a manly hatred of double-dealing and shams. Thus the historian Sismondi, who was born in 1773, remembered an old gentleman who used to boast that he was an atheist, but one of the Jansenist sort. Men of this type had much to do with the eventual suppression of the Jesuits (1773), and not a little with the French Revolution. Here political Jansenism joined hands with religious in the remarkable figure of the Abbé Henri Grégoire (1750–1831), sometime constitutional bishop of Blois. For religious Jansenism was not dead. The old spirit of Port Royal still survived in many a country parsonage and convent, and led throughout the 18th cent. to chronic conflicts with authority. Often the causes of quarrel were trumpery enough; and Jansen's latter-day descendants did not always show themselves reasonable or broad-minded. Still, in their dim fashion they upheld the great principle of their school—that religion begins and ends as an inward 'touch of the Spirit,' and over the movements of that Spirit no Church has jurisdiction.

Outside France also during the 18th cent. much was heard of Jansenism, though the word was loosely used to cover a great number of different meanings. Any one who wished to reform abuses—more especially abuses profitable to the Court of Rome—was at once set down as a Jansenist. So was any priest in any country who tried to keep a strict hand over his flock. In Ireland, down to quite modern times, Jansenism meant little more than a conscientious objection to dancing on Sunday. Much the same is true of Italy, though here something of the true spirit of Port Royal inspired the efforts of Bishop Scipione de' Ricci (1741–1810), the leading spirit in the ill-fated synod of Pistoia (1786). But the most direct heir of Port Royal was Jansen's native country of Holland. Here, ever since Jansen's own day, Catholic ecclesiastical affairs had been in a great tangle. The Dutch priests clung to their ancient right of electing their own archbishop of Utrecht—or, rather, since the archbishopric had lapsed at the Reformation, they wished to choose their acting bishop, or vicar-general. Rome, on the other hand, wanted to assimilate Holland to other Protestant countries, where the chief ecclesiastical officer was a vicar-apostolic, chosen by the pope and directly under his orders. The question was all the more burning, since in Holland, as in the England of Elizabeth, there were bitter quarrels between the Jesuits and the secular parochial clergy. The Jesuits wanted a papal nominee; the seculars held tightly to their local independence. Jansen had entered the lists on behalf of the seculars, while he was still a professor at Louvain; Saint Cyran and Antoine Arnauld had followed him, and ever since Port Royal had been on the friendliest terms with Utrecht. The fact was not forgotten at Rome. In 1702 the Vicar-General Codde was deposed by the pope on a charge of Jansenism. A section of the Dutch parish priests refused to recognize his deposition, and were supported by a number of French 'appellant' refugees, who streamed into Holland after the promulgation of the *Unigenitus*. Codde himself acquiesced, under protest, in his deposition; but his supporters were not so meek as he, and eventually organized themselves into a separate community. In 1723 Cornelius Steenoven was consecrated archbishop of Utrecht by Dominique Varlet, a French missionary bishop, who had been deposed by Rome as a suspected Jansenist; and suffragan sees were afterwards founded at Haarlem and Deventer. Popularly the community has always been known

as the Jansenist Church of Utrecht; officially it rejects the name of Jansenist, and calls itself the Old Roman Catholic Church—'De Oud-roomsch-katholieke Kerk.' Necessarily, however, its theology wears a strongly Jansenist complexion. It regards Arnauld's interpretation of Jansen as perfectly orthodox; and it rejects the *Unigenitus* and the infallibility of the pope. In all other respects it adheres strictly to Catholic beliefs and practices—the practices of two hundred years ago; for it is rigidly conservative, and boasts that it does not move with the times. Of late years, however, it has shaken off something of its immobility. Since 1872 it has been in communion with the Old Catholics of Germany, although it by no means approves all their departures from established Catholic usage. More recently it has established a mission in Paris—the 'Église gallicane'—and has consecrated a bishop to supervise the Old Catholics of England. And, if there is any future for free Catholic Churches in Western Europe, Utrecht will undoubtedly be their natural starting-point and centre.

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ST. CYRES.

JAPAN.—The country of Japan (exclusive of Korea [*q.v.*]) consists of more than 40 islands and a great number of islets, lying between 50° 56′ and 21° 45′ N. and 156° 32′ and 122° 6′ E., and having an area of more than 173,786 sq. miles. Of these islands Honshū is the largest, containing nearly two-fifths of the total area; and it has been, and is likely to remain, the chief seat of national life. But Kyūshū, to the south-west of Honshū, is historically of far greater importance, having been for centuries one of the main channels through which Asiatic and European influences reached Japan.

A remarkable feature of Japan is the high ratio of coast-line to land area, this being estimated at 1 : 3½, whereas in Greece and Norway, which have the longest coast-lines in Europe, the ratio is 1 : 5. The south coast of Honshū and the west coast of Kyūshū have the greatest number of bays and inlets—which explains the historical fact that the civilization of Japan first began in those islands.

I. *ETHNOLOGY.*—What racial components entered into the making of the Japanese people properly so called cannot be determined with accuracy. It seems to be clear, however, that the Manchu-Korean, the Mongol, and the Malayan types predominate. This is the view propounded by E. Baelz, who made the most exhaustive study of the question, particularly on the physiological side (*Mitt. der deutschen Gesellsch. für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*, no. 28 [1883]). It is historically evident that great numbers of Koreans constantly migrated to Japan in ancient times; and the oldest annals of Japan seem to indicate that in the pre-historic ages there was between her islands and the Asiatic continent, particularly S. China, an almost constant passing to and fro of the peoples on both sides of the water. The Manchu-Korean characteristics in the physique of the Japanese are the tall, slender figure, somewhat narrow, oval face, with no special projection of cheek bones, a straight or aquiline nose, more or less slanting eyes, and small hands with long, delicate fingers. People of this type were probably the first settlers on the north coast of Honshū, the province then known by the name of Idzumo. Mongol characteristics are a broad face, prominent cheek bones, oblique eyes, and a flat nose. The Malayans are said to have contributed the most important elements to the Japanese race. Their physical characteristics are the square-built, well-developed body, generally short in stature, and the round face with a conspicuous tendency to prognathism. They are found in S. China, in the south-western parts of Korea, and in all the islands along the eastern coasts of the Asiatic continent; and it is probable that at the dawn of Japanese history they landed in Kyūshū and thence pushed their way north until they finally conquered the Manchu-Korean settlers in Idzumo. These three types are now so blended as to make it impossible to trace any single one distinctly and exclusively in the features of particular individuals. Every Japanese is a composite, each differing from the rest only in the matter of proportion.

There is, however, a group of people in Japan who have preserved their racial distinctness until this day. They are the Ainus, the people who now inhabit the islands north of the Tsugaru Strait. It still remains an unsolved question whether they were the aborigines of Japan. Some assert that a primitive people known as the 'Koropokgul' inhabited the Japanese islands previous to the intrusion of the Ainus. In any case, it is quite evident that the latter once occupied the whole land, but were gradually driven out of Kyūshū and the main island by later intruders from the Asiatic continent or the South Sea Islands. Historical records show that the Ainus were once fierce, brave fighters, making strong opposition to the central government, and not infrequently becoming a menace to its security. There was, however, a distinct portion of the Ainus who were called the *nic-yéso*, the 'naturalized' Ainus, in contrast to the *aru-yéso*, the 'wild' Ainus. This tends to show that Ainu blood is flowing in the veins of the Japanese. The Ainu people, unlike the Manchu-Koreans or the Mongols, have a very close resemblance to some Europeans in physical characteristics. They are rather short and thickly built; they have prominent foreheads with deep-set eyes, bushy eyebrows, often overhanging the eyes, and, unlike their Manchu-Korean neighbours, wavy hair with heavy beards, and, remarkably enough, long divergent eyelashes. There is, accordingly, good reason for J. Batchelor, probably the best authority upon the Ainus, to hold that they belong to the Caucasian race. He maintains also that the 'Ainu language is Aryan, with the marks common to the languages of the six great Aryan peoples' (cf. W. E. Griffis, *The Jap. Nation in Evolution*, p. 5; see, further, art. AINUS, vol. i. p. 239 ff.). B. H. Chamberlain is opposed to this view, principally on the ground that the flattening of the shin bone differentiates the Ainus from the Aryans (*The Language, Mythology, and Geographical Nomenclature of Japan viewed in the Light of Aino Studies*, London, 1895, p. 10 f.). This involves the question whether there is an Aryan element in the physical and mental constitution of the Japanese race.

J. J. Rein declares that 'Japanese society exhibits a surprisingly large variety and mutability in feature and complexion. The latter, though, generally speaking, much darker than among Caucasians, approximates in occasional instances to even the fair, clear complexion of the Germanic peoples. Not unfrequently the symmetry and the regularity of feature are so great and so discrepant from the prevailing Mongolian type that we imagine we are in the presence of a well formed European' (*Japan*, London, 1884, ch. on 'Ethnography'). It should, however, be added, that Rein thought the Japanese anything but beautiful.

More recently, Griffis (*op. cit.* pp. 3–47) has affirmed that he witnessed, to his surprise, many 'evidences,' including physical features and mental character-

istics, of the Japanese being descended from Iranian, Caucasian, or Aryan ancestry. It is a fact that in certain sections of the country—*e.g.*, in considerable portions of Kyūshū, Chūgoku, and Hokuriku—the inhabitants have at least physical excellencies both in form and strength that distinguish them from those of other parts of the empire. It is also to be noted that the Japanese, in spite of their having adopted the culture, and particularly the literature, of the Chinese, have preserved their language, which is radically different from that of their continental neighbours. On the other hand, this language is peculiarly isolated and no congener to it has as yet been discovered.

II. *RELIGIOUS HISTORY.*—It has been rightly said that Japanese culture takes its origin from above and from abroad. The genius of the people so far has been shown not so much in original creation as in adaptation. The religious history of Japan shows no exception; it depicts a continual influx of foreign influences and the constant adjustment of them to Japanese temperament and needs.

1. **Early period.**—The religion of ancient Japan presents no definitely systematized forms of worship or belief. It was animistic or spiritistic. The term *kami*, which signifies 'deity,' was applied indiscriminately to any object or natural phenomenon that might arouse the feelings of wonder, awe, or reverence. Men, beasts, birds, plants, seas, mountains, rivers, winds, and storms, in which the people believed some supernatural spirit dwelt, were worshipped (see, further, art. GOD [Japanese], vol. vi. p. 294 f.). Belief in divine and demoniacal possession was common. Divination and augury of various kinds were practised. Magic and charms were employed to avert evil. The introduction of Confucianism (see art. CONFUCIAN RELIGION, vol. iv. p. 12 ff.) in A.D. 285, and of Buddhism in A.D. 538, produced no change in these primitive practices, which it only refined outwardly.

The mythological accounts contained in the *Kojiki* (*Record of Ancient Events*, compiled A.D. 712) and the *Nihongi* (*Chronicle*, compiled A.D. 720), however, seem to represent those ancient beliefs and practices in the light of an age in which a more or less definite form of ancestor-worship had been developed (see, however, art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP [Japanese], vol. i. p. 455 ff.). The racial blending and political unification of the tribes inhabiting the islands, which took place at a time which cannot be precisely determined, must have brought about a type of religion which, in subsequent ages, took the name of Shintō (*q.v.*). The imperial thanksgiving festivals, such as the *Daijōé* (Great Rite of the First Rice), the *Shinjōé* (Annual Rite of the First Rice), and the *Kannamesai* (Thanksgiving Offering to the Ancestor-God), are generally regarded as having been handed down from time immemorial. All the mythological narratives contained in the ancient annals show the fundamental importance attached to the common ancestry of all the Japanese people; and this is also evident from the fact that the religious rites in which the ancestor-gods were invoked were regarded as a function of government, both rites and government having the same name, *matsurigoto*. In primitive Japan, a tax was levied to maintain those religious rites. A system of ancestor-worship implies a conviction of the immortality of the soul, and this belief was held by the ancient Japanese. Death was called 'disappearing,' 'going away,' or 'concealing one's person.' Distinction was made between the two kinds of soul existing in each distinguished person. The one was the *nigitama*, gentle, peaceful, and benevolent; the other the *aratama*, rough, strong, and brave. A medium known as *kamiko* ('child of the god') was on emergency called to discover the will of a departed ancestor. The idea of transmigration seems also to have been present. Closely connected with ancestor-worship are the rites of purification, which were of pre-eminent importance in Shintō ritual. There were two principal forms, one of which was *harai*, wind-purification (which often consisted in paying a penalty or fine), the other *misogi*, water-purification. To the mind of the ancient Japanese, cleanliness was next to godliness. Any defilement, sanitary, moral, or ritual, received the utmost care and attention. Prayers, called *norito*, are more of the nature of praise than of supplication.

2. **550–1200.**—Borne on the current of the continental civilization which brought various forms of art and culture to Japan, Buddhism came through Korea to the island-empire in the second quarter of the 6th century. This was the century of great Buddhist propaganda in China (cf. art. CHINA [Buddhism in], vol. iii. p. 552 ff.). Many of her immigrants, who were coming in great numbers, seem to have been devoted missionaries. In A.D. 538, through the agency of the king of Kudara in Korea, a royal gift, consisting of a statue of Buddha, *sūtras*, and banners, was presented to the Japanese Court, accompanied with the message that the Buddhist Dharma, the most excellent of all Laws, which would bring immeasurable benefit to its believers, had been accepted in all lands lying between India and Korea. The question whether the new faith should be accepted was taken up by two hostile Court parties struggling for political supremacy. The new religion was in the meantime being continually reinforced by the importation of missionaries, magicians, artisans, *sūtras*, and objects of ritual. It first received Court sanction when Prince Umayado or Shōtōku defeated the army of the anti-Buddhistic Mononobé family, and became regent to Empress Suikō in A.D. 593. He drew up Japan's first 'Constitution,' proclaiming the 'Triune Treasure,' *i.e.* the Buddha, the Law, and the Saṅgha, to be the ultimate object of faith, and single-hearted devotion to it the fundamental factor of an upright life. At the public expense he built Buddhist temples, pagodas, seminaries, hospitals, dispensaries, and asylums for the aged and the helpless. He sent students directly to China to study Buddhist doctrines. The new faith made headway among both the higher and the lower classes. In the year 624, less than 70 years after the first introduction of the *sūtras*, the temples numbered 46, the priests 816, and the nuns 569. From this time the influence of Buddhism continued almost without interruption to the close of the Tokugawa regime (1868). During the Nara period (708–794), successive Emperors fostered the faith. It became the religion of the Court, and the security of the crown and the peace of the land were thought to be dependent upon the continuous favour of Buddha and his saints. The cenobites, as his followers, were relieved from the public service required from all others. Under the Emperor Shōmu, a Buddhist temple was built in each province, and the Tōdai temple in Nara, the metropolis of that time, was the central shrine (741), dedicated to Vairochana (the universe personalized as Buddha), whose colossal bronze image, 53 ft. in height, was cast a few years later. The beautiful consort of Shōmu, Empress Komyō, who had great influence with him, was a zealous Buddhist. Shōmu and Komyō called themselves 'servants of the Triune Treasure,' and on one occasion prostrated themselves before Buddha's image. Under such circumstances it was but natural that the religion should become an instrument in the hands of ambitious politicians. In the time of Empress Kōken (749–769), the ecclesiastical body had grown into a political power which almost overshadowed the Imperial authority.

Yugé-no-Dōkyō, a notorious bonze, became Imperial abbot and prime minister, and would have usurped the Imperial throne but for the heroic opposition of Waké-no-Kiyomaro, a devoted royalist. At the same time a syncretistic movement was going on. Natural calamities and plagues, which frequently afflicted the people, disturbed their belief in Buddha's protection, and tended to drive them to the worship of the old *kami*, and the Emperors themselves had a dread that the forsaken deities might be avenging themselves. A religious compromise was arranged by the priest Gyōki, when the colossal image of Buddha, already mentioned, was cast after he had secured an oracle at the Shintō temple of Isé to the effect that Amatérasu, the ancestor-goddess, was a manifestation of Vairochana. This example of combining the worship of native deities with that of Buddha and his saints was followed in other parts of the country, to the advantage of Buddhism. This syncretistic movement was brought to completion by Kūkai, who appeared about fifty years later. Whatever may be said of the Buddhism of the Nara period, it made an unparalleled contribution to the advancement of religious arts.

The Heian period (beginning 794) is marked by the introduction of different divisions of Buddhism. The sect called *Tendai-shū* in Japan was inaugurated by Saichō (posthumously Dengyō, 767–822), a pre-eminent Buddhist of this period, who went to China and studied the doctrine of Tendai, which he rearranged and remoulded into something almost new. Saichō's doctrine is based upon the teaching known as the 'Lotus of the True Law.' Buddha, the historical revealer of truth, is here viewed as the full enlightenment. Realization of such Buddhahood in one's consciousness is the supreme object of all mysteries, virtues, and wisdom. Saichō's system combined different aspects of the Buddhist doctrine which received emphasis in different proportion at the hands of later Buddhists, and thus became the fountain-head of different branches of Japanese Buddhism. Breadth of learning and purity of character made Saichō influential with the Court, and he built a monastery on Mount Hiei (788), which was for several centuries one of the greatest centres of Buddhist learning as well as of ecclesiastical power.

Another division called *Shingon-shū* ('Sect of True Word') was introduced in the Nara period, and became a power under Kūkai (posthumously Kōbō, 774–835). He began his teaching by classifying various forms of religious life in ten grades of development, the last and highest being that of Shingon. It is the state in which full blessedness of Buddhahood is realized. According to Kūkai, the entire universe, including all spiritual existence, is made up of the six elements which again may be grouped as two, mental and material. The two are, however, inseparably blended. Matter contains mind, and mind incorporates itself in matter. The two are one, and the one is two. Every particle of matter is, therefore, pervaded by the divine presence of Buddhahood. The universe is but Buddha externalized. The Buddha within us may be called forth by practice of the 'mystery' in conduct, speech, and heart. This doctrine of Kūkai naturally lent support, especially on the theoretical side, to the syncretistic movement of Buddhism that had been inaugurated by Gyōki. The propagator of the Shingon sect thus became also the originator of Ryōbu, namely Buddhistic Shintō, proclaiming that the Imperial custom of *kami*-worship is, in reality, but disguised adoration of Buddha. Kūkai had far greater influence than any of his predecessors. His versatile genius, extending even to the work of engineering and the arts of writing and carving, his untiring energy, and his practical resourcefulness combined to make him a great power both in the Court circle and among the common people. He built a monastery on Mount Kōya, which became the headquarters of his denomination, and eventually overshadowed the influence of the hill-monastery on Hiei. We may here note a remarkable change that took place in the religious atmosphere. During the earlier part of this period, worldly blessings, such as health, good harvest, prosperity, and peace, were the reward sought in the worship of the *kami*, or Buddhist deities; and gorgeous rituals and the mystery practices pertaining to the Shingon sect made it attractive, especially in Court circles. Later, however, as the Fujiwara family declined and one civil war occurred after another, both the nobles and the common people felt the evanescence of this world; the yearning after supramundane bliss became imperative, while pessimism prevailed.

3. **1200–1600.**—For half a century or more previous to Yoritomo's founding of the Bakufu (military government) at Kamakura (1192), clan struggles involved the country in constant warfare. Bloody combat, exhaustion, death, and the treachery of fortune, all of which were but common occurrences, could not fail to produce a pessimistic temperament. Elaborate rituals and theological distinctions offered no attraction. The religion which could point out a haven of security, undisturbed by the storms of life, was in urgent demand. To meet such a need Hōnen (1133–1212) and Shinran (1173–1262) appeared.

(*a*) *Jōdo and Shin sects.*—Hōnen, formerly a student of the Tendai doctrine at the monastery-school on Hiei, renounced all its philosophy as effete, and disowned the mystery practices and the discipline of conduct as useless. He preached the doctrine of Sukhāvatī, the Japanese 'Jōdo,' or the 'Western Pure Land,' according to which any man, ignorant or wise, high or low, could be saved by faith in the boundless grace of Amitābha. Saintly character, profound piety, and sincere conviction, with his doctrine of the future redemption, made Hōnen the greatest religious influence with the Court and common people, until the jealousy of his religious rivals caused him to be exiled and some of his disciples to be put to death. The faith which he once preached, however, did not cease to be a powerful influence. Hōnen had many capable followers, the most eminent of whom was Shinran, who carried his master's teaching to its logical consequence. He unhesitatingly abandoned the repeated invocation of Amitābha's name which constituted an important part in Hōnen's doctrine, proclaiming a simple, undoubting trust in the Deliverer as the sole condition of salvation. With a bold stroke of genius, he abolished the prohibition of the marriage of bonzes, practically removing the distinction between the secular and the sacred. He was married himself, and he called himself the *gutoku*, the 'tonsured ignoramus,' putting himself on the same level as common people. Thus the Shin sect was founded by Shinran, whose doctrine and influence have survived all vicissitudes of time, and are perpetuated to this day in the Hongwanji, the two greatest shrines in Japan.

(*b*) *Zen sect.*—While religious revivals were thus going on among the mass of the people, a doctrine peculiarly adapted to the military class was introduced by Eisai (1141–1215) and Dōgen (1200–53), the respective founders of the Rinzai and Sōdo divisions of the Zen sect. The doctrine of *zen*, or *dhyāna*, maintains that the state of enlightenment attained by Buddha cannot be conveyed by any external means. All doctrinal learning and rituals, therefore, are useless, and meditation or a con-

centrated reflexion upon one's essential nature is the only way to realize Buddhahood in one's self. A complete disregard of the letter and of ritual pageantry made the Zen doctrine exceedingly popular among military men, who prided themselves upon extreme simplicity of life. The Dhyāna doctrine also helped them to cultivate the spirit of stoical indifference to hardship and the habit of resoluteness in conduct. Many Shōguns became adherents of this doctrine.

(*c*) *Nichiren sect.*—In the meantime there arose an extreme form of bibliolatry. Nichiren (1222–82), after the teaching of Saichō, based his teaching upon the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika* ('Lotus of the True Law'). His principal tenet consisted in adoration of Buddha's Truth by repeatedly uttering the title of that scripture in which alone, he held, the genuine and, indeed, the only true doctrines of Gautama are set forth. Persecuted, exiled, almost put to death, he ever grew bolder in his denunciation of the faithless age, holding to the firm conviction that he was the heaven-sent Bodhisattva (*q.v.*) whose coming in the 'latter age' had been predicted by Gautama.

The religious leaders whom we have just mentioned had in every case many able disciples, who perpetuated and developed the movements which their teachers had begun. Roughly speaking, the Tendai and Shingon sects held influence among the nobles; the Zen among the warrior class; Jōdō and Shinshū among the mass of the people. In the 15th and 16th centuries, an age again involved in wars and political disorder, these religious bodies often became militant, and interfered with politics. The Zen sect, being that of the military aristocrats, became influential through its monasteries in educational work and literary culture. It was an age of religious fermentation, and a great number of minor sects arose, finding more or less of a following.

(*d*) *Shintō.*—Shintō also awoke from the dogmatic slumber which it had enjoyed under the name of Ryōbu Shintō, and made an attempt to systematize itself. Kitabataké Chikafusa (1339) tried to show the divine descent of the Imperial sovereigns, and vindicate *kami*-worship as essential to the preservation of national order. In this teaching, he became a forerunner of the royal Shintōists of the 18th century. In the 15th cent. Yoshida Kanétomo, borrowing his method largely from the Tendai doctrine, proclaimed unitarian Shintō (Yuiitsu Shintō), which stood in contrast with Ryōbu (syncretistic Shintō). Shintō did not become a great social factor, however, until the 18th century.

(*e*) *Roman Catholics.*—In the 16th cent. the Jesuit missionaries began operations in Kyūshū and extended them to Kyōto, where their message was welcomed by Nobunaga, the ruling Shōgun, who, at their instance, opened a theological seminary at Azuchi, Ōmi, and also built a cathedral in the Imperial capital. Their propaganda, often accompanied with gifts of musical instruments, clocks, glasses, and even distribution of rice among the poor, found great success among both the populace and the feudal nobles, especially in Kyūshū and Nagato. Thirty years after the commencement of their work the number of converts is estimated to have been 300,000. Their influence began to fail after the assassination of Nobunaga (1582), and under Hidéyoshi and the Tokugawa Shōguns, patrons of Buddhism, the Roman Catholic faith was prohibited. The suppression of the insurgents at Shimabara, Kyūshū, in 1638 marks the downfall of the 'Kirishitan' as a political factor.

4. 1600–1868.—The Tokugawa government adopted a definitely centralizing policy, designed to prevent the rise of any political or social factor to unmanageable magnitude. Religions of any potency were, therefore, either paralyzed by generous patronage or put under proscription. The aggressive movement of the Roman Catholic Christians was completely checked in 1638; and the government tried to exterminate individual Christians by charging the Buddhist priests with the office of taking a religious census. The nation as a whole was compelled to be Buddhist, at least in outward form. At the same time, Buddhism under the Shōgun's patronage fell into spiritual decay, although to its credit is the fact that most of the Buddhist scriptures and literary productions were put into print. The doctrines and ecclesiastical policy of each of the Buddhist sects were systematized. Takuan († 1645), Hakuin († 1786), and Jiun († 1804) were among the most conspicuous priests of this age. The oppressive policy of the Shōgunate government caused, as we have seen, religious and spiritual lassitude on the one hand; but, on the other hand, it produced a strong reaction on the part of the adherents of those religions which the government had neglected and overlooked. Such was the case with the Shintōists. Since the time of Dengyō and Kūkai, Shintō had lost its pristine purity and preserved a merely nominal existence under the shadow of Buddhism. Now Hayashi Rasan († 1657), officially a Confucianist, made an attempt to free Shintō from the 'defilement' of Buddhism; but the Shintō taught was strongly tinged with Confucian philosophies.

It was Hirata Atsutané (1843) who claimed Shintō as the only true religion, asserting that Japan and her Imperial household, as standing in a right relation to the Creator and the Ruler of the universe, were the special objects of divine favour. All other religions he denounced as false or deteriorated. He had a large following, especially among the *samurai*, and contributed greatly to the Restoration of the Imperial government.

In the 19th cent. religious beliefs arose which claimed the name of Shintō, but which really had little connexion with the ancient system of that name. Probably the best known and most worthy leader was Kurozumi, who preached on the four themes of divine revelation, prayer, providence, and honesty. He proclaimed also that the goddess Amatérasu was the fountain-head of all life, and that man must be in constant communion with her. Many other systems, such as Konkō, Tenri, and Remmon, are but old superstitious practices under the guise of Shintō worship.

5. After 1868.—The Restoration of 1868 brought Shintō into prominence, at least temporarily, since it was regarded as representing the 'way' of the national gods or ancestors. The first act of the Jingi Jimukyoku ('Bureau of Ecclesiastical Affairs'), established in 1868, was to effect a complete separation of Shintō and Buddhism, the former of which had been practically absorbed in the latter ever since the time of Gyōgi († 822) and Kūkai († 835). Political leaders in the government, regarding Shintō as the foundation of national morality, instituted it as a sort of State religion, giving Shintō priests official rank, whereas Buddhism was subjected by them to iconoclastic measures. Buddhist images were destroyed, the temples dilapidated, and the bonzes advised to return to the 'right kind of life.' This continued until 1872, when the Kyōbushō ('Ecclesiastic Department') was established, and Buddhist and Shintō priests were equally recognized as Kyōdōshoku (official moral instructors). The Shintō revival subsided, and Buddhism continued in its inertness until Christianity quickened it into renewed activity.

Christianity, at first proscribed, and yet secretly and perseveringly working its way through all adversities since 1859, formed in the seventies several

centres of influence through the agency of mission workers and teachers, of whom G. H. F. Verbeck, David Thompson, W. S. Clark, S. R. Brown, W. E. Griffis, George Cochran, James Ballagh, Captain Janes, and D. C. Greene are the best known. Of the Japanese Christian leaders, Niishima († 1890) and Honda (Bishop of the Japan Methodist Church, † 1912) exercised wide influence. The mighty current of 'Europeanization' which

rapid progress.

was promulgated, and confirmed the right of the Christians to maintain their faith. Indeed, the placards prohibiting the Christian faith had been removed in 1875, but it had continued to be a proscribed religion. Early in the nineties an extreme counter-current of Nationalism set in. The problem of Treaty Revision had aroused anti-foreign feeling, and Christianity, being regarded as an 'alien faith,' suffered. The faith was attacked as detrimental to educational interests; the doors of the Government schools were closed against it, and Christian education became an impossibility. Moreover, the European culture which had flooded the nation brought with it some ideas that apparently were hostile to Christian doctrine as it was presented at that time. Not only Bentham and Mill, but also Spencer and Darwin, were welcomed. All this, however, presented no serious difficulty to progressive Christians.

The Buddhists now started a movement which they called the 'Royalistic Buddhist Union,' and stirred up all Japanese to join their anti-Christian campaign. The Shintōists combined with them once more. The Imperial Rescript on Education was promulgated in 1889, with the purpose of setting up a national standard of morality, and this document was employed by conservatives as a basis of argument against Christianity.

The war with China in 1894–95 had two opposite effects. On the one hand, it awoke the whole nation to a consciousness of her own resources, both material and spiritual, which led some to believe that Japan required no other religion than those which she had had from olden times. On the other hand, the very gratifying of a long-cherished political aspiration led the people to feel the need of a higher and deeper nature which mere material or political glory could not satisfy. Here and there, amidst the blaze of the national exultation, a dark, cold stream of pessimism flowed. From *hanmon* ('spiritual distress') not a few young men took refuge in suicide. Christianity, now more 'naturalized' or 'Japanized' and stronger after many years of struggle, renewed her activity. At the beginning of the new century, all Protestant denominations (22 in number), except a few extremely conservative ones, joined in an evangelizing campaign which was carried on at strategic points in the Empire. Buddhism also, perceiving the spiritual crisis now pressing upon the nation, made an attempt to promote religious interests instead of wasting its energy in attacking Christianity; and a body of Buddhist scholars, mostly of the Shin sect, started a pietistic movement called 'New Buddhism.' The old conflict between Christianity and other forms of religion passed. A new alternative of choice presented itself—religion or irreligion; and the craving for a new spiritual power became intense. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05 marked a short period of suspense in this general tendency. The victory gave the nationalists one more opportunity to emphasize the traditional principle of morality—loyalty to the Emperor and filial dutifulness. Yet the younger generation seems to crave something deeper and more fundamental. Eucken and Bergson are now claiming their attention, and Christianity and Buddhism are expected to develop newer and more exalted aspects of power than they have hitherto revealed.

III. *Ethical development.* — **1. Earliest period to the 6th century.**—The history of Japanese ethics reveals a composite character in the temperament of the people. We find in it, even from ancient times, a combination of what may be called Hellenic and Hebraic tendencies, varying only in proportion in different ages. Clear sky, crystal waters, pine-clad mountains, and the blue transparent seas surrounding the whole land all tended to develop a moral conception in which ideas fundamentally ethical blended with aesthetic ideas. In ancient times, good and bad desires were expressed in terms designating optical sensations, such as *akai* (red, clear), *kuroi* (dark, black), *kiyoi* (clear, clean) and *kitanai* (turbid, impure, unclean). Even to-day these terms, used in proper context, may convey a purely spiritual signification. To the Japanese ear *sekishin*, 'red heart' (*i.e.* single-heartedness), and *haraguroi*, 'black-abdomen' (*i.e.* black-heartedness), do not sound strange. The conception of *tsumi*, 'offence,' therefore, was not purely ethical. The idea is better expressed by the term 'evil,' or, more strictly, 'foulness.' Among *amatsu-tsumi* (offences against the heavenly gods), the 'sin' of flaying a beast, or that of defiling the court set apart for religious functions, received the same treatment as certain crimes that might be committed in an agricultural community. Among *kunitsu-tsumi* (offences among the aborigines), leprosy and similar skin-diseases are mentioned side by side with incest and manslaughter. The most characteristic way of correcting any 'offence,' therefore, consisted in purificatory rites (cf. above, p. 482[b]).

Patriarchal morality was the one dominating feature among the ancient Japanese which has, with some modifications, persisted to the present time. In early times, Japan consisted of numerous tribes, the bravest and the most intelligent of which prevailed over the rest. Trades and professions were all hereditary. The land and the people belonged to the tribal chief who happened to take possession of them. The Japanese community is simply the development and coalition of these various tribes. The national characteristics of the Japanese people, therefore, were developed through the welding of a great number of tribes or families into one united people through the pressure of political and social struggle. The account, in the *Nihongi*, of early Emperors invoking the heavenly gods on behalf of the people may be due to the influence of parallel records in Chinese history, but it is evident that there existed between the chief and his tribesmen a relationship similar to that between father and son. The spirit of loyalty, which played a great part in later ages, is but the development of filial obedience. The ritual in which the celestial gods or ancestors were invoked is the religious expression of the filial sentiment. Numerical growth frequently has a decentralizing effect, and this fact accounts for the clan struggles in later periods. Only by capable Emperors or military rulers was a national unification brought about. So far as the official record goes, the Confucian *Analects* were introduced in A.D. 285, and Prince Wakairatsuko studied the Chinese classics; but it is doubtful whether this event produced any remarkable change in the moral life of the Japanese.

2. 550–1200.—With the introduction of Buddhism in the 6th cent. Japan entered upon a new phase of culture and moral life. Prince Umayado or Shōtoku, the first to bring the new faith to prominence, drew up the celebrated 'Constitution,' consisting of 17 articles relative to the duties of rulers

and officials. He included many injunctions which were Buddhistic and Confucian in spirit, and, therefore, theoretically speaking, opposed to certain moral principles which arose under the patriarchal form of society. Loyal obedience to the sovereign, for instance, is enjoined, not because he is the family head of the Japanese people, but because he is so appointed by heaven, it being presupposed that the ruler's position may be occupied by any one best fitted for it. The general welfare of the community is regarded as of the utmost importance, while loyalty to the clan receives no attention whatever. Further, the emphasis placed upon the importance of adoring the 'Triune Treasure' may be interpreted as involving Buddhistic universalism, which is essentially subversive of patriarchal morality. All this, however, may be due to the effort of the Prince to check those evils which the ever growing clannism of that period had developed. In fact, the Taikwa Reformation (A.D. 645) followed the downfall of the Soga family. The ethical history of Japan may in one sense be regarded as a struggle between the patriarchal morality (family or clan morality) indigenous to the country and the universal morality introduced from abroad, a combination of which may be found in the late development of Bushidō (the spirit of the *samurai, i.e.* feudal retainers). The introduction of Buddhism awakened the humanitarian sentiment, particularly among the Court nobles and members of the Imperial household, as may be seen in the establishment of asylums for the poor, in the building of dispensaries, and in the laws prohibiting the destruction of animal life. It also encouraged an ascetic disposition, inducing some to withdraw from the world. In the sphere of practical morality, the Confucian system seems to have had greater and perhaps more salutary effects than Buddhism. In the Nara period (708–794), when the culture of the Tang dynasty in China was transferred bodily to the Japanese Imperial Court, the names of men and women were placarded, after the Chinese fashion, for their dutifulness to their parents, and those who committed the 'sin' of filial disobedience were exiled to distant provinces. Believing the practice of filial obedience to be the foundation of all virtues, the Empress Kōken (749–758), earnest Buddhist though she was, ordered each household to keep a copy of *Kōkyō* ('Doctrine of Filial Dutifulness'), a Confucian classic, and to study it closely. From the beginning of the Heian period (794) to the downfall of the Fujiwara family (the middle of the 11th cent.) there was a remarkable development of literary culture, and the classical revival under the Tang dynasty in China was reproduced in Japan. The State university and other institutions of learning were established at public expense, and poets and prose-writers arose in great numbers. Yet all these seem to have contributed nothing to the ethical culture of the nation; nor did Buddhism bring any perceptibly wholesome results. The deeper and more exalted aspects of the spiritual life were left untouched. The tendency was to encourage superstitious practices such as magic and incantation, rather than to elevate the moral tone. Unrestricted admission into monasteries often turned them into institutions which menaced the peace of the community. Confucianism also seems to have done little to deliver the populace from ignorance and superstition. Teachings of the *I-King* ('Book of Change') tended to encourage a fatalistic belief, which had, no doubt, a morally paralyzing effect. In the Court circle, particularly, luxury, effeminacy, and corruption stood in striking contrast to splendid achievements in literature.

3. 1200–1600.—The rise of the military class at the close of the 12th cent. had a purifying effect somewhat similar to the occupation of Europe by the Northern barbarians in the 5th century. The splendour and corruption of the Heian period were swept away with the fall of the Fujiwara family, and the establishment by Yoritomo of the military government became an occasion for the rise of a new type of morality, Bushidō (the way of the *samurai*). It was a moral spirit or temperament, prevalent among the *samurai*, characterized by austere simplicity of life, defiant endurance of hardship, love of truthfulness, and disinterested devotion to one's lord. It was a product peculiar to an age in which fighters were the preservers of social order. It included, therefore, physical and mental, as well as moral, training. Skill in military arts, adroitness of motion, capacity for endurance, quickness of perception, and mental alertness were essential parts of *samurai* education. Intellectual culture received little attention until the latter part of the Ashikaga period (the middle of the 15th cent.). Among moral virtues, valour naturally occupied the central position. It had value by itself irrespective of the results which it brought, and the verdict of cowardice was more hated than loss of life. Courage, however, had to be accompanied by a sense of propriety (*reigi*), even in the midst of fighting. Apart from the latter, valour itself was as worthless as the 'recklessness of a wild boar.' A custom was thus developed according to which hostile combatants declared their names and rank before they crossed swords. Again, truthfulness, especially fidelity to a promise, was emphasized equally with honour. 'The Bushi has no double tongue' and 'A gentleman never trifles with words' were sayings which became proverbial. The principle of 'fair play' became a maxim. The use of any base or cowardly means in war was despised and often involved destruction for its perpetrator. *Chūgi*, or the principle of loyalty, however, was the keystone in the arch of all military virtues. It was the organizing principle by which the *samurai* belonging to the same clan were united into one solid body which lived and died for the cause of its common master. As has already been observed (p. 484), Bushidō found a good ally in the Zen school of Buddhism which arose at the beginning of the period, and other branches of Buddhism also had some influence. Exposed to sudden changes of fortune in a warlike age, the *samurai* felt the need of some superhuman power upon which to rely. It became more or less a fashion among them, when they went to the front, to put a tiny Buddhist image in their tuft of hair, or a prayer-leaflet in the pocket of their armour. Their religious faith, however, sometimes differed from that of other classes in that they believed that the deities whom they worshipped favoured only the cause of the good and the righteous: 'If thy heart be upright, the gods will protect thee, though thou mayest not invoke them.' Compared with that of the Heian period, the religious faith of the *samurai* was more free from superstition. Towards the latter part of this period, Bushidō became more comprehensive, and took a form that might well serve as a moral code for the people in general. Some injunctions relative to economic and other practical lines of conduct, based upon Confucian teachings, were introduced in the written codes of certain feudal families. Popular education, so far as it existed, was in the hands of Buddhist priests. Text-books were compiled by them in which were expounded theories of filial duty and family morality, based on Confucian as well as Buddhist doctrines.

4. 1600–1868.—The Tokugawa policy of diverting the attention of the *daimyō* from political to literary pursuits introduced a period of marvellous culture. Classical scholars were elevated to the

rank of official instructors, and numerous schools and libraries were established, some of which remain to this day. In accordance with the general movement, the lord of the province of Bizen devoted one-third of his total revenue to the cause of education. Under such circumstances, Confucianism blossomed in full splendour, though Buddhism withered under the blighting shadow of the Shōgun's patronage. Philological and loyal historical interest caused a revival of Shintō. Bushidō, which drew its strength from all these systems, burst forth after some vicissitudes into a political movement which brought about the Restoration of 1868. Side by side with all this, the Shingakuha ('heart culture') movement arose for the moral instruction of the uneducated (see below, (*d*)).

(*a*) *Confucianism.*—Of the different divisions of Confucianism, that of the *Shushi School* (named after its Chinese founder, Chu-Hi) was the earliest to appear, and became the pioneer of learning in this period. Its most prominent representatives were Fujiwara Seikwa (1561–1619), Hayashi Rasan (1583–1657), Muro Kyūsō (1658–1743), Kaibara Ekiken (1630–1714), and, later, Satō Issai (1772–1859) and Rai Sanyō (1780–1832). Sanyō's historical work, *Nippon Gwaishi*, is said to have inspired the *samurai* to the political movement which resulted in the Restoration. The first two in the list became personal teachers of Iyéyasu; and of these Rasan, erudite, versatile, and scarcely equalled by his contemporaries in literary talent, took an active part in framing the legislative and administrative systems of the Shōgun's government. His office of instructor and counsellor was made hereditary, and assigned to his descendants until the close of the Shōgunate. The doctrine of the school became the orthodox and only authorized teaching. Indeed, towards the close of the 18th cent., an edict was issued prohibiting all contrary doctrines. According to this school, the *taikyoku*, infinite, eternal, and absolute Essence, is the *ri* (reason, or logos), and the source from which emanate the *in* and *yo* (passive and active, or negative and positive) principles, which together may be called the *ki* (spirit, temperament, or inclination). The manner in which the *ri* and the *ki* interact and thereby generate all things is called the *michi* (way or truth), which should be practically applied and observed. The *ri*, or reason, is the controlling and directing principle of the universe, and veritably dwells in man's original nature, from which spring the five cardinal virtues: benevolence, justice, propriety, wisdom, and truth. He who applies these virtues to his family and social relations is in accord with the 'way,' the Will of Heaven. The 'way' is not far from one, but is in the heart. This doctrine often led scholars to adopt a speculative method, yet the *Mito School*, which was founded by the lord of Mito for the purpose of compiling a political history of Japan, consisted of scholars of the Shushi School, and its influence became one of the most potent factors for the overthrow of the Shōgunate government.

In the middle of the 17th cent. there arose the *Yōmei School* (named after Wang-Yang-Ming, a Chinese scholar of the Ming dynasty), which, in opposition to the dualistic system of Chu-Hi, taught a distinctively monistic, idealistic doctrine. Its earliest Japanese exponent was Nakaé Tōju (1608–78), who declared the alleged difference between the *ri* and the *ki* to be only nominal, both being different phases of the same Being. All is One, One is All. The *ryōchi* (conscience in the broadest application of the term) is embedded in man's original nature, and is at the same time the real entity which constitutes the universe. The nature of man and the universe are at bottom one and the same, *i.e.* spiritual and personal. Here his standpoint may be called religious. Following Wang-Yang-Ming, he taught the identity of knowledge (or, more properly, moral perception) and conduct. True to the spirit of the school, he practised what he taught, and became the centre of great influence in the district where he lived. The people called him Ōmi-Seijin ('Sage of the Province of Ōmi'), and, after his death, dedicated a temple to his memory, which stands to this day. Of his pupils the most distinguished was Kumasawa Banzan, who combined a fine talent of statesmanship with scholarly genius. During his service to the lord of Bizen, he did much for the advancement of culture in that district. The celebrated scholar and revolutionist Ōshio Heihachirō (1793–1837) was also a member of this school.

In the latter half of the 17th cent. another school appeared which took the name of *Kogakuha*, or 'Classical School.' It denounced the scholars of the Shushi School as corrupting the original teaching of Confucius by introducing extraneous elements. Its central theme was the establishment of an unmediated connexion with the teaching as it came directly from Confucius. Yamaga Sokō (1622–85) was the founder of the school. Upon the publication of his *Seikyō-Yōroku* ('Compendium of Confucianism'), in which he boldly denounced the standpoint of the Shushi School, he was driven out of Yédo (Tōkyō), put under the custody of Asano, the *daimyō* of Akao in the province of Harima, and his work confiscated. But his influence with the retainers of Asano was powerful, one of the results being the celebrated deeds of loyalty on the part of the 'forty-seven *rōnins*.' His interest was practical, and he declared the principles of *jin* and *gi* (benevolence and justice) to be the essence of Confucianism. In fact, he rendered greater service in promoting the spirit of Bushidō than in any theoretical sphere. Working independently of Sokō, yet advocating essentially the same doctrine and appearing at the same time, Itō Jinsai opened a school in Kyōto. In opposition to the views of the Shushi School, he proclaimed the necessity of striving for a complete development of one's natural capacities, and for a realization of the virtue of benevolence inherent in one's original nature. His doctrine somewhat resembles that of the modern perfectionist. His exalted personality and profound learning drew some 3000 students from all over the country, and called forth expressions of praise from the lips of his theoretical opponents. Ogiū Sorai (1666–1728) is generally regarded as of the Classical School; but his interest was philological and etymological. He regarded Confucius as a sage whose virtue is entirely beyond human reach.

(*b*) *Shintō.*—This cult, which heretofore had never been an ethical factor of much influence, now appeared against a Confucian background. An expounder of the type of Shintō which was called *Suika-Ryū* was Yamasaki Ansai (1618–82), who took the doctrine of Chu-Hi almost bodily and interpreted it in Shintō terms. He held it man's supreme duty to maintain and cultivate the original purity of his nature, and to regulate his conduct in accordance with the principle of righteousness. Bodily purification, prayer, and meditation received strong emphasis in his system. Rigoristic as he was, he was criticized as narrow and exclusive; but his intense zeal and sincerity awakened among his contemporaries a patriotic, royalistic sentiment which contributed not a little to the accomplishment of the political transformation of 1868.

Shintō as a religious system, however, like its politically disinherited Imperial representative, absorbed and forgotten in prosperous Buddhism,

would never have regained its ascendancy but for the tidal wave of royalism which began to swell early in the 18th century. Kada Azumamaro (1660–1736), Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), and Hirata Atsutanè (1775–1843) appeared one after another and proclaimed Shintō as the only system original and indigenous to Japan, and, therefore, naturally adapted to her people. Shintō in its purity they held to be the *kamunagara-no-michi*, the 'way' ordained by Amè-no-Minakanushi, the supreme Deity, the 'way' developed among the ancestor-gods of Japan, the only way to be reverently and unreservedly followed. According to them, Confucian teaching is exotic, mechanical, and artificial; the Emperor, as descended directly from the goddess Amatérasu, is alone worthy of absolute respect; and the laws of the Japanese State, being the embodiment of the divine will, are to be observed with the utmost devotion. Of those Shintōists Hirata Atsutanè, though of broad learning, held extremely nationalistic views, which he based upon his cosmology. Japan he held to be the first created of all nations, guided by the constant presence of the spirit of the goddess Amatérasu, to be cherished and strengthened by all Japanese endowed with the divine spirit. His royalistic zeal was contagious, and greatly advanced the cause of the Restoration.

(*c*) *Bushidō.*—During the centuries of peace under the Shōgunate, the *samurai* gradually lost the rugged strength which had formerly characterized them, although, as we have seen, the *samurai* spirit, with its characteristic chivalry and its passionate devotion to personal honour and dignity, ever fearless of privation and death in any worthy cause, was cherished and nurtured by the various forms of Confucian and Shintō teaching until it burst forth in the political activity that resulted in the Restoration of the Imperial government. Interestingly enough, the requirement of periodical residence of the feudal lords and their retainers in Yédo, while it put an end to the existence of numerous *rōnins* (masterless *samurai*), occasioned, at the end of the 17th cent., the rise of a peculiar type of chivalry among the commoners resident in the metropolis, which was known by the name of *otokodaté* ('vindication of one's manhood'). There arose numerous communities consisting of these knights, who were characterized by a peculiar style of dress and coiffure, a bold, defiant attitude towards authority, and a passionate love for bravery, in which they often went too far.

(*d*) *Shingakuha.*—In the direction of extending moral culture to the masses of the people which had heretofore been excluded from that privilege, a movement called Shingakuha ('heart culture') arose in the first half of the 18th century. The leaders of the movement were Ishida Baigen and his followers. Their method was characterized by a free use of everyday language and humorous illustration, and, with a practical purpose in view, they derived their teaching from any source whatever, Confucian, Buddhist, or Shintōist, which seemed adapted to their use.

(*e*) *Buddhism.*—Reduced to a servile position under the Shōgunate, Buddhism in this period fell into slumber both in doctrine and in practice, although it did some service in carrying on popular education. Buddhists also included among their number men of eminent character and scholarship, such as Takuan, Hakuin, and Jiun. They were very practical, and showed a remarkable tendency towards compromise in their teachings. They did not hesitate to say, like some professed Confucianists, that *chu* ('loyalty') and *kō* ('filial fidelity') were the weightiest matters in life.

5. **The Meiji era.**—The Restoration of 1868, viewed from an ethical standpoint, was a reaffirmation in politics of the *samurai* spirit of loyalty, moved by an indomitable aspiration for a new order of things. The new era opened with the interplay of two opposing tendencies which were forced into united action by the pressure of political need, but which had to undergo radical transformation before they could be organically combined: the nationalistic, conservative, Bushidō spirit on the one hand, the progressive, Europeanizing tendency on the other. It was but natural, then, that the leading *samurai* of the Restoration, who had clamorously condemned the Shōgun's policy of opening the ports, eagerly sought, after the Restoration, to adopt European methods. The Restoration meant a revolution in the spiritual life of Japan. Under the new government Buddhism was deprived of its political prestige, and the bonzes became objects of unsparing taunt. Confucianism was consigned to the hands of classical exegetes. Shintō itself, now that it had achieved what it had long sought, was left to sink back into its old inertness. All moral doctrinists disappeared. Finally, Bushidō itself, the moving spirit of the Restoration, was rendered discorporate and temporarily effete when class-distinctions were abolished; but, charged with the best that all the past systems could impart, it continued to exert its influence, now expressed in the nationalistic movement, in co-operation with the progressive Westernizing tendency. The tendency of the time was represented by two personages entirely different in temperament and in ethical faith. One was Fukusawa Yukichi, founder of Keiō-gijiku, a pioneer importer of occidental learning. Standing upon utilitarian ground, which he adopted after serious investigation, he startled his contemporaries by pouring sarcasm upon the principle of royal fidelity. He held the establishment of one's self and the general welfare of the community to be the supreme objects to be pursued. Adopting the tenets of Rousseau, he declared that State sovereignty is simply a power delegated by the people, implicitly denying the doctrine of its divine origin. He rightly ascribed the spiritless and socially inefficient attitude of the commoners to the state of political dependence to which they had long been reduced. Thus he became a champion of democratic and individualistic principles of morality, which, he held, ought to take the place of the aristocratic and militaristic tendency of the time. Salutary as his influence was in that respect, his teaching tended to encourage the pursuit of material success at the expense of spiritual dignity.

The other was Niishima Jō. Born and bred a *samurai*, and, while in New England, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Puritanism, he combined the essence of Bushidō and Christianity. He was no theorist; but he was an embodiment of the moral power which makes a man glad to sacrifice himself for whatsoever means spiritual progress and the enhancement of personal worth. In this he represented the general disposition of leading Christians who, while holding to no particular system-bound ethical doctrines, aimed at the moral and spiritual transformation of the community. Having embraced the religion that had been tempered by Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon individualism, the Japanese Christians were fundamentally no less revolutionary than the disciples of Rousseau or Bentham. Their persecution by the nationalists, especially among government educationists, was not altogether unreasonable, at least from the nationalist standpoint. Indirectly, but none the less effectively, the Christians brought home a truth that was bound to undermine the traditional forms of politics and society. Significantly enough, a considerable number of the leading politicians who advocated the cause of representative govern-

ment were Christians. Equally interesting is the fact that, in the minds of many, Christians and Socialists, or men of 'dangerous ideas,' were associated. But profounder and more subtle in its effect than any other ethical system that ever impressed the Japanese, the Christian influence was, and is, felt in the secret recesses of the heart. Its social effectiveness is being shown in all virtues resulting from faith in the value and dignity of the individual, such as sexual purity, regularity in matrimonial relations, the elevation of women, business honesty, cleanliness of habit, temperance, etc.

A conservative, nationalistic reaction set in at the close of the nineties. The cry of 'Nipponism,' with its emphasis upon the importance of the nation's coming to a consciousness of its inborn privilege and power, was raised in a somewhat extravagant fashion. The movement was not altogether unwholesome, and it gave expression to a legitimate and noble aspiration. The Imperial Rescript on education, which was issued in 1889, expressed the broadest and most ideal aspect of that movement. It was clearly the nationalistic, patriotic energy embodied in the Rescript that conducted the nation safely through the critical movements of war in 1894–95 and 1904–05. The conservative, chauvinistic aspect fast subsided at the conclusion of the later war. The beginning of the new century brought the younger generation into contact with a spiritual atmosphere which was hitherto unknown in Japan. Nietzsche and Tolstoi have each found their ardent exponents. Ibsen, Shaw, and Strindberg have gained a considerable number of admirers. Even a sceptical, rebellious, momentaristic temper has not altogether been wanting. Yet this is simply an indication of the great spiritual struggle which new Japan is undergoing. From an ethical standpoint, Buddhism is ineffectual; but it still has immeasurable resources. Christianity is as yet insignificant in numerical and material respects, but it is ever growing and achieving. Which will be the commanding authority in the spiritual and ethical realm is as yet an open question; but that there will be one seems assured.

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K. ASHIDA.

JĀT (fem. Jāṭni; Panjābī *Jaṭṭ*, fem. *Jaṭṭi*).—The Jāṭs are found all over N.W. India, in the Panjāb, Sind, United Provinces, and the northern parts of Rājpūtāna, especially Bhartpur, but hardly in Kashmīr or the Himālayas to the east of that State. West of the Indus they are found in the N.W. Frontier Province, especially in its southern districts, but not in Afghānistān or in Balochistān, though they appear to have once occupied the latter territory. The Balochi term for a Jāṭ is Jagdāl or Jaghdal, and one of the Baloch tribes traces its descent from 'a Jaṭṭ, a Jagdhal, a nobody,' who on account of a woman, *i.e.* by marrying a Baloch bride, became a Baloch. The Jaṭoi tribe of the Baloch may also be of Jāṭ origin.

The term cannot, with any certainty, be regarded as ethnic, nor is it easy to draw any hard and fast line between the Jāṭs and Rājpūts in the N.W. Panjāb. The traditions of many Jāṭ tribes declare that they are by origin socially debased Rājpūts, whose fathers, by marrying Jāṭ wives or espousing widows, lost their Rājpūt rank and sank to the status of Jāṭs, or yeomen. Other Jāṭ tribes are of undoubted Brāhman origin. But, while many thus claim to be of gentle (Rājpūt) extraction or priestly (Brāhman) origin, few will admit that they have risen in the social scale. Nevertheless it is possible that the Sāṁsi tribe of the Jāṭs is akin to the criminal tribe of that name, though it produced the greatest of the Jāṭs in the person of Mahārāja Ranjīt Singh, the famous Sikh ruler of the Panjāb.

The earliest mention of the Jāṭs in history occurs in Ibn Khurdādba, before A.D. 912. He describes the Zaṭs (Jāṭs) as keeping watch over the country between Kirmān and Mansūra. The *Mujmil ut-Tawārīkh* observes that by the Arabs the Hindus are called Jāṭs; they and the Meds, a Sind tribe, are descendants of Ham. The Arabs appear to have found Jāṭs at Ghazni as well as in Sind, but the Muslims who later invaded the Panjāb cannot be said with certainty to have found them in that Province, and it is not until Tīmūr's invasion, in 1398, that we have any indubitable reference to Jāṭs as settled to the north of Delhi. While, then, it is credible that there is a Scythic element in the Jāṭs, it is impossible to regard them as identifiable with the 'wintry Getae,' the Massagetai, or the Goths.

That the Jāṭs are not a pure 'caste' or race is indeed apparent from the rules which they observe in marriage. While marriage within the caste, to use a convenient, but not a scientifically accurate or definable, term, is the rule, marriage with a woman of inferior caste is not invalid, though mixed unions are rare in a true Jāṭ country, such as that which centres round Rohtak near Delhi, and public opinion reprobates them.[1]

The popular derivation of the term Jāṭ is closely associated with its religious traditions. It is said to be derived from the hair (*jaṭ*) of the god Śiva, and the Mān, Her, and Bhullar, which are reputed to be the oldest Jāṭ tribes and to form a kind of nucleus of the caste, in particular claim this ancestry. In the S.E. Panjab the Jāṭs are divided into two endogamous groups—one, the Śivgotri, who say that their forefather was created from the matted hair of Śiva and so named Jāṭ Budhra, and the other, the Kāsabgotra, who claim connexion with the Rājpūts and are so named after Brahmā's son Kāsab. It may be permissible to regard the Śivgotri as autochthones, Śiva being the earth-god, and the Kāsabgotri as later accretions to the caste.

The Jāṭs cannot, however, be said to have any distinctive religion or code of ethics. In the Central Panjāb they are mainly Sikhs, but to the south-east they have retained their original Hinduism, and to the west the vast majority have embraced

[1] Risley's statement, however, that Rājpūts and Jāṭs occasionally intermarry even now, the Rājpūts taking wives from the Jāṭs but refusing to give their own maidens in return (*People of India*, Calcutta, 1908, p. 48), must not be taken as meaning that there is any regular hypergamous relation between the two groups, but merely that a Rājpūt may even nowadays espouse a Jāṭ wife, though such a union would be looked down upon.

Islām, whole tribes not only professing that faith but setting up pedigrees which would make them Arabs or Sayyids by descent. Indeed, the Muhammadan Tahīms are not impossibly Anṣārī Quraish by origin and descended from Tamīn, but it is much more likely that they are the Dahīma, some of whom became Brāhmans, and worshippers of the goddess Śrī Dadhīmatī Mātājī. Tod mentions the Dahima as an extinct Rājpūt race.

Another tribe, the Arbi, certainly appears to be Arab. But so many genealogies can be almost proved to have been invented on conversion that no reliance can be placed on etymologies corroborated by pedigrees.

The tribes of the Jāṭs probably number more than a thousand, and among the Hindus and Sikhs they are spoken of as *gots*, a corruption of the Skr. *gotra*. Some of these tribes bear names which suggest a totemistic origin. Such are the Jūn ('louse'), Gorāya ('blue-cow'), Roja, or Rojh (same meaning), Karīr ('the wild caper,' *Capparis aphylla*), Waihri ('heifer'), Bandar ('monkey'), Gidar ('jackal'), Piplā (from *pipal*, *Ficus religiosa*), Jaṇḍia (from *jaṇḍ*, *Prosopis spicigera*), Mor ('peacock'), Kohar ('hatchet'), and Gandāsia (from *gandasa*, 'axe'). But no reverence is paid to any of these things. The Pankhal tribe is so called because a Jāṭ girl married to a Rājpūt fell out with him, and so he massacred all its members save those who had placed 'peacock's feathers' on their heads. The Mors' ancestor was protected by a peacock from a snake. The Jaria (from *jora*, 'twins') is said to have five branches, or apparently subsepts, all named after parts of the *ber* tree (*Zizyphus jujuba*), viz. Rangi (from *raṅg*, 'bark'), Jaria (from *jar*, 'root'), Beria (from the plum or fruit), Jhāri ('seedling'), and Khichar ('bud'). It is also very common to find a tribe named from some event at an ancestor's birth. Thus the Garewāl is so called because its ancestress was suddenly confined near a 'hay-stack,' and the Sibi or Siwi tribe derives its name from *siwa*, a funeral pile, because its ancestress gave birth to a son when about to commit *satī*. But such tales are told of countless tribes which are not Jāṭs, and folk-etymology is probably responsible for most of them.

Though nominally adherents of the great orthodox religions, the Jāṭs are often devotees of some sect, or devotees of a tribal or personal cult, as well. Thus in Hissār, a District near Delhi, large numbers are Bishnois, a Vaiṣṇavite sect, while in Karnāl, a District on the Jamna, many of them are Sādhs, or 'Pure' saints, belonging to a sect, founded about 200 years ago, which affects great personal cleanliness, forbids smoking, and adores only the one God under the title of Sat, or the 'True One.' Other Jāṭs do not eat or marry with them. Another cult very popular among the Jāṭs is that of the 'generous' Sakhi Sarwar, the Sultān, the 'giver of *lākhs*' (Lākhdāta), 'he of Nigāha' (Nigāhia), the earth-god—probably Śiva—taken over by Islām and transformed into the cult of a Muhammadan saint (and his descendants) with Paphian elements. The fertility which is the object of the worship naturally appeals to a landed peasantry.

Thus a Jāṭ may be by birth and education a Hindu or Muslim, by choice or conviction a Sikh, a Sulṭānī, or a sectary who has thrown in his lot with one of the countless sects old and new to be found in India. He can even become a Christian. But under or alongside of his religion and his sect is a mass of usage partly social, partly religious, and wholly based on custom, not on belief, to which he clings with a tenacity all the greater because it is irrational. In the northern and central Districts of the Panjāb these usages centre round the worship of forefathers (*jaṭheras*), but in the S.W. of that Province they cluster round the godling of the village (*khera*) rather than the tribal ancestor. This change in the religious system is congruous with the evolution from the tribal system of the tracts towards the N.W. frontier to the 'village community' organization of the long-civilized territories round Delhi. The *jaṭhera* is usually styled Bāwā ('master') or Siddh ('perfect') and bears some conventional name which shows that his real name has been forgotten. His tomb is sometimes called *bakhūhān* (pl.), and consists of three or four pits with pillars formed of earth dug out of them. He is usually worshipped at marriage.

A typical Jāṭ wedding according to the rites in vogue in the sub-montane districts which lie under the Himālayas in the N. Panjāb is thus described:

About five days before the wedding a lump of coarse sugar is given to the barber (in his capacity of village go-between) and he brings in return a twig of the *jaṇḍ*.[1] This twig is placed in a heap of wheat weighing about 42 *sers* (84 lb.), and by it are put 21 *sers* of coarse sugar. A lamp is lit and placed on the ground; to it all the females of the family and the bridegroom do obeisance. The bridegroom cuts the twig with a knife or sword;[2] and the grain and sugar are divided, half going to the Brāhman and half to the *mirāsi* (genealogist). The latter then brings a ram (*chatra*, whence the name of the rite itself), cuts its ear, and with his thumb imprints a mark (*ṭikā*) of its blood on the youth's forehead, and on those of all present.[3] He gets the ram and a rupee as his vail. The youth then bathes, and boiled wheat is distributed. He is oiled, and a red tape is tied round his forehead. Thenceforward he must keep a knife or sword in his hand till the wedding day. On that day he bathes again, breaks earthen vessels, and dons new clothes. His kinsmen offer their presents, and the menials get their dues. The bride is then brought home, and the newly-wedded pair, with all the females of the family, go to the temple of Bāwā Manga, the progenitor of the tribe, offer him a double cloth and a cake (the priest's perquisite), and bow their heads in worship. This completes the wedding ceremony among the Bājwā Jāṭs, an important Jāṭ tribe akin to the Bajū Rājpūts of the Bajwāt. Bāwā Manga's shrine is at Pasrūr, a town of some antiquity, in Siālkot.

With some modifications similar rites are observed by other Jāṭ tribes of that part.

In one tribe—the Dhāriwāl—the pair circumambulate the Siddh's temple seven times. The Randhāwa tribe employs a Brāhman to fetch the twig, the ram's blood is smeared only on the foreheads of bachelors, and after the wedding, when the Siddh's temple is visited, the bride and other females take clay out of an adjacent pond. Very often the boy cuts a twig from the *jaṇḍ* tree himself, and a few tribes, *e.g.* the Ghummān, cut it from a *ber*, or plum, tree (*Zizyphus jujuba*), and that tribe offer two lumps of sugar, one to the saint Lākhdāta, the other to his priest the drummer (Bhaṛai), who is styled Shaikh, and appear to ignore its *jaṭhera* Siddh Dulchi. The ram is frequently replaced by a he-goat and often sacrificed, its flesh being distributed in various ways. The Wirk assemble, men and women, at a *ber* tree, wash the ram, and, if it shakes its head, regard this as a token that their ancestor is pleased. The Sarāi perform the *chatra* on the first Monday of the lunar month before the wedding. This rite is, however, unknown in the south-east of the Panjāb, as it involves animal sacrifice, and in the central districts the ram is never killed, though its ear may be cut.

In the south-east, when a new village is founded, before any house is built, a mound of earth is raised near the site proposed for the village and a *jaṇḍ* planted on it. Houses may then be built, and the first man to die in the village, whatever his caste may be, is burned or buried in this mound, and on it is built a masonry shrine named after him. He is thus deified as the Bhūmia, or Earth-god. Whatever ill befall, his shrine is the first place to which the Jāṭs resort in time of trouble. But a tribe may have a tribal Siddh as well as a Bhūmia in each village. The Bhūmia too is often called Khera, and some tribes even style their *jaṭhera* Khera-Bhūmia. Possibly the custom of deifying the first man to die in a new village is akin to the custom of killing a man and building him in when a new structure is raised (cf. FOUNDATION, vol. vi. p. 10)—he then becomes its *dwārapāla*, or 'gate-keeper.' The *jaṭhera*, how-

[1] Or *jaṇḍi*. The *Prosopis spicigera* is so called in the central Panjāb, but in Jhelum the name is applied to *Zizyphus nummularia* and in the Jullundur Doab to *Acacia leucophlœa*. Offerings are made to this tree by the relatives of Hindus suffering from smallpox.

[2] This is said to be a survival of an older rite in which the Hindu Triad, the nine planets, the four Vedas, Fire, Water, and the Pole-Star were all invoked as witnesses of the marriage-rite. The bridal pair walk four times round the *hawan*, into which leaves of the *jaṇḍ* used to be thrown, and these had to be cut by the bridegroom and carried to the bride's house for that purpose, as the *mantra* in debased Sanskrit, which is still recited, shows. The leaves are no longer thrown into the *hawan*, or sacrificial fire, but the tree continues to be cut.

[3] The *ṭikā* is also called *tilak*, though, strictly speaking, *ṭikā* is the mark, while *tilak* appears to be the act of marking. As a *mantra* in debased Sanskrit shows, it is done in order to propitiate ancestors, and in the hope that divine recognition, help, and protection will follow from it.

ever, does not appear to be thus chosen or regarded. He is often a martyr, or *shahīd*, who fell fighting with dacoits or in an affray with a neighbouring village. But he may be, it would seem, a Jogi, a Bairāgi, a Gosain, or a Nāga, though in such a case the priest regarded as the *jaṭhera* would appear to be a dim embodiment of the god Śiva or Viṣṇu. Rarely is *satī*-worship found among the Jāṭs, for the very obvious reason that they allow widow re-marriage, but the Dhindsa affect a *satī's* shrine called the *khāngāh*, or monastery, of Sataoti.

LITERATURE.—D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Punjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, is the classical authority. See also Maclagan, *Punjab Census Report*, 1892, H. A. Rose, *Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, Lahore, 1911, *s.v.* 'Jāṭ,' and W. Crooke, *TC* iii. 25, *s.v.* 'Jāṭ.' For the possible connexion of the Zaṭṭ or Zuṭṭ, an Arabized form of Jāṭ, with the Gypsies see Woolner, 'The Indian Origin of the Gypsies in Europe,' in *Journ. of Punjab Hist. Soc.* ii. fi. (1914).

H. A. ROSE.

JĀTAKA. — 1. Meaning of the word. — A *jātaka* (in Buddhist dogmatics and literature) is a story in which the Bodhisattva (*q.v.*), *i.e.* the Buddha in one of his former births, plays some part, either that of the hero or of some other character, or sometimes only that of a looker-on. Hence the word might be translated 'Bodhisattva story,' or 'story of a Bodhisattva.' But the current rendering of *jātaka* is '(Buddhist) birth story.'

'*Jātakam*, birth, nativity; a birth or existence in the Buddhist sense; a *jātaka*, or story of one of the former births of a Buddha' (R. C. Childers, *Dictionary of the Pali Language*, London, 1875, *s.v.*). This is the generally accepted explanation, the word being derived from Skr. *jata* in the sense of 'birth.' Another explanation of the word has been proposed by H. Kern (*Der Buddhismus*, Leipzig, 1882-84, i. 328), and adopted by J. S. Speyer (*Jātakamālā*, London, 1895 [=*SBB* i.], p. xxii), who derive the word from *jāta* in the sense of 'what has become, what has happened,' and would translate it by '*Geschichtchen*, tale, story.'

Jātaka originally means only a single 'birth story,' but it is also used as the title of the *Collection of Jātakas*, in the *Tipiṭaka*, and in the *Jātaka Commentary* (see below).

2. Origin and purpose of the jātakas.—We read in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarika*, v. (*SBE* xxi. [1884] 120), that the Buddha, knowing the differences in faculties and energy of his numerous hearers, preaches in many different ways, 'tells many tales, amusing, agreeable, both instructive and pleasant, tales by means of which all beings not only become pleased with the law in this present life, but also after death will reach happy states'; and in the same book it is stated (ii. 44 [*SBE* xxi. 44 f.]) that the Buddha teaches both by *sūtras* and stanzas and by legends and *jātakas*. It is, indeed, likely enough that Gautama Buddha himself made use of popular tales in preaching to the people. It is certain that the Buddhist monks and preachers did so. In fact, we know that the preachers of all religious sects in India always took advantage of the Hindu passion for story-hearing and story-telling, and made extensive use of stories in preaching to the people, much in the same way as Christian preachers in the Middle Ages introduced 'examples' into their sermons to attract the attention of their hearers.[1] They sometimes invented pious legends, but more frequently they took fables, fairy tales, and amusing anecdotes from the rich storehouse of popular tales or from secular literature, altering and adapting them for the purposes of religious propaganda.[2] The Bodhisattva dogma (see art. BODHISATTVA), in connexion with the doctrines of rebirth and *karma* (*q.v.*), was an excellent expedient for turning any popular or literary tale into a Buddhist legend. In his numerous existences, before he came to be born as Śākyamuni who was to be the Buddha, the Bodhisattva had been born, according to his *karma*, sometimes as a god, sometimes as a king, or a merchant, or a nobleman, or an out-caste, or an elephant, or some other man or animal (see *ERE* ii. 743, note §). It was thus only necessary to identify the hero or any character of a story with the Bodhisattva, in order to turn any tale, however secular or even frivolous, into a *jātaka*.

Hence the *jātakas* regularly begin with such words as: 'Once upon a time, when Brahmadatta was reigning in Benares, the Bodhisatta (Skr. Bodhisattva) was reborn in the womb of his chief queen'; or 'Once upon a time, when Brahmadatta was reigning in Benares, the Bodhisatta was reborn into the family of a forester'; or 'Once upon a time . . . the Bodhisatta was an ox called Mahālohita (the Big Red One)'; or 'Once upon a time . . . the Bodhisatta was reborn in the womb of a crow'; or 'Once upon a time . . . the Bodhisatta was Sakka, king of the gods,' etc. In many of his existences the Bodhisatta, according to the *jātakas*, was a god, a king, a Brāhmaṇa, a minister, an ascetic, a merchant, but he also was a gardener, a musician, a physician, a barber, a robber, a gambler, an elephant, a lion, an ape, a dog, a frog, some bird, etc. (see the list in A. Grunwedel, *Mythologie des Buddhismus*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 197 f.).

3. The jātakas in the Pāli Tipiṭaka.—Some of the stories which were afterwards turned into *jātakas* are told in the Suttas as simple tales, without any reference to the Bodhisatta.[1] On the other hand, there are some real *jātakas* included in the Suttas—*e.g.*, the *Kūṭadantasutta* and *Mahāsudassanasutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Mahādevasutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya*. That the *jātakas* form an essential part of the Buddhist canon is shown by the fact that they are included in the list of nine *aṅgas* (twelve *Dharmapravacanas* in the Sanskrit canon) into which the sacred books of the Buddhists were divided according to the subject-matter, as the 7th *aṅga* (the 9th *Dharmapravachana*).

The *Book of Jātakas*, however, is one of the fifteen collections of texts forming the *Khuddaka-nikāya* ('Collection of Smaller Texts') of the *Tipiṭaka*.[2] This *Jātaka Book* consists of *gāthās* or stanzas only, and is divided into 22 sections (*nipāta*), which are arranged according to the number of stanzas belonging to or forming a *jātaka*. The first section is supposed to contain 150 *jātakas*, each verse belonging to a separate story; the second, 100 *jātakas*, with two verses each; the third, 50 *jātakas*, with three verses each, and so on, each successive *nipāta* having a larger number of stanzas and a smaller number of *jātakas*. This *Book of Jātaka Gāthās* has not yet been published,[3] and MSS of it are rare. In many cases these *gāthās* are poetic tales, ballads, or epic poems; but very often, more especially in the first sections, they are quite unintelligible by themselves, and must be understood as belonging to some prose tale. Why these prose stories did not attain to canonical dignity we do not know. Probably they were supposed to be well known, and, therefore, left to the improvisation of the preachers. It is only in a more or less contaminated form that the prose parts of the *jātakas* have been preserved in the Commentary (see below) that was composed or compiled at some later period, after the final redaction of the canon.

J. Hertel (*ZDMG* lxiv. [1910] 58 ff., and *WZKM* xxiv. [1910] 121 ff.), pointing out that there are certain *Pañcatantra* and *Hitopadeśa* MSS containing only the verses, has advanced the hypothesis that the collection of *jātaka gāthas* in the *Tipiṭaka* is nothing but an extract from an older MS which contained both the verses and the prose parts of the *jātakas*. But the

[1] Cf. such works as the *Gesta Romanorum*, or A. Wesselski's *Mönchslatein*, Leipzig, 1909.

[2] In the *Jātaka Commentary* (see below) every *jātaka* is put into the mouth of the Buddha as a *dhammadesanā*, *i.e.* 'religious instruction' or 'sermon.' On the *jātakas* as homilies see also F. Max Müller, *SBB* i. [1895] p. xlii, and J. S. Speyer, *ib.* p. xxiv f.

[1] Cf. *Chullavagga*, vi. vi. 3, with the *Tittirijātaka* (no. 37); or *Mahāvagga*, x. ii. 3, with the *Dighiti-Kosalajātaka* (no. 371).

[2] It is worth mentioning that, according to the Sinhalese chronicle *Dipavaṁsa* (v. 37), there was a school of monks, the Mahāsaṅgītikās, who rejected some portions (we are unfortunately not told which) of the *Jātaka Book* as non-canonical. The Dharmaguptas had also a *Jātaka Book* in their canon (see M. Anesaki, 'The Four Buddhist Āgamas in Chinese,' *TASJ* xxxv. [1908] pt. iii. p. 8.

[3] It is not found in the King of Siam's edition of the *Tipiṭaka*.

relation between prose and verse in works like the *Pañchatantra* is quite different from that between the *jātaka gāthās* and the prose of the *Jātaka Commentary*. Besides, the *gāthās* differ from the prose in language also, and, above all, there are many *jātakas* that do not need any prose at all.

R. Otto Franke (*WZKM* xx. [1906] 318) says: 'Die Masse der Jātaka-Gāthās als ganzes betrachtet ist ein persönliches Erzeugnis eines einzigen Autors, d.h. dieser Autor hat sie nicht nur zusammengestellt, sondern viele selbst gedichtet und umgedichtet oder ausgeflickt und alles in allem ihrer Gesamtheit seinen persönlichen Stempel aufgedrückt. Er hat aber auf der anderen Seite vorhandene Gāthās in sein Werk mit eingebaut.' The very opposite is the case. The bulk of *jātaka gāthās* is the work of many, chiefly non-Buddhist, authors, though one editor or compiler (not 'author') may, in recasting the whole, have altered and even added verses here and there.

4. The Jātaka Commentary.—What has become known by the edition and translations to be mentioned below is not the canonical *Book of Jātaka Gāthās*, but a huge Prose Commentary in which the *gāthās* are embedded. This commentary, or *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā*, as it is called, is a recast of an older *Jātakaṭṭhakathā*. The latter had been translated into Sinhalese, only the verses being left in the original Pāli. Afterwards the Sinhalese version was retranslated, or rather recast,[1] into Pāli. In our *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā* every number[2] consists of the following parts: (1) the 'story of the present' (*pachchuppanna-vatthu*), in which some incident is related that prompted the Buddha to tell the *jātaka*; (2) the 'story of the past' (*atītavatthu*), which is the real *jātaka*; (3) the *gāthās*, or stanzas, forming, as a rule, part of the 'story of the past,' but sometimes also of the 'story of the present'; (4) the grammatical and lexicographical comment (*veyyākaraṇa*) on the *gāthās*; and (5) the 'joining together' (*samodhāna*) of the two stories by identifying the characters of the 'story of the past' with their rebirths at the time of the Buddha.

With the exception of the *gāthās*, which alone can claim canonical authority, the whole Commentary, including the 'stories of the present,' the 'stories of the past,' and the 'joining together,' must be regarded as the work of one author.[3] As to when this Commentary was compiled, translated, and retranslated, or recast, we have no means of deciding. There is a tradition[4] that makes the famous Buddhaghoṣa (*q.v.*) the author of the *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā*, but this is very doubtful.[5] It is just possible that the recasting of the Commentary may have taken place shortly after Buddhaghoṣa's time (5th cent.), but it may as well have been a century later. There can be no doubt, however, that, in spite of its late date, the Commentary has made use of very old materials. At any rate, it can be proved that already in the 3rd or 2nd cent. B.C. some of the *jātaka* stories were told just as we find them in our *Jātaka Commentary*. There are representations on the railings round the *stūpas* of Bhārhut and Sānchī of scenes from *jātakas*; and not only do they include scenes from the *gāthās*, but also some that are related only in the prose Commentary. And, as the titles of the *jātakas* are inscribed over some of the carvings, these famous bas-reliefs prove that these stories were in the 3rd or 2nd cent. B.C. termed '*jātakas*' and considered as sacred lore.

Up to the present 29 *jātakas* have been identified on the bas-reliefs of the *stūpa* of Bhārhut (see T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 209, and E. Hultzsch, *JRAS*, 1912, p. 406). The titles of the *jātakas* are taken from the hero of the story, from some other character, from some important incident, or from the first words of the first stanza. Hence one and the same *jātaka* may be called by different titles (see D. Andersen in *Jātaka*, ed. Fausböll, vol. vii. p. xv).

5. Place of the Jātaka Book in Indian literature.—Though it is no longer possible to say that the *Jātaka Book* (*i.e.* the *Jātaka Commentary*) 'is the oldest, most complete, and most important Collection of Folk-lore extant' (T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. iv), it remains true that it is a very old and highly important collection not only of folk-tales, but also of literary productions of the most varied kinds.

As regards 'the stories of the present,' they are of little value, being either very silly inventions of the commentator or borrowings from other texts, such as the *Vinayapiṭaka*, *Suttanipāta*, or *Apadāna*, or from other commentaries. But in the 'stories of the past' with the canonical *gāthās*, all kinds of literary productions are represented. As to their literary form, we may distinguish: (1) tales in prose in which only one or two or a few verses, containing the moral or the gist of the tale, are inserted (in these cases the Commentary has preserved good old prose traditions); (2) ballads in the form of (*a*) dialogues, or (*b*) a mixture of dialogue and narrative verses[1] (in these cases the prose of the Commentary is quite superfluous, often rather insipid, and sometimes even at variance with the *gāthās*); (3) long tales partly in prose, partly in verse[2] (here the prose Commentary is an expansion, often very diffuse, of the original prose text); (4) strings of moral maxims on some one topic; and (5) regular epics or epic fragments (in the last two cases the prose Commentary is superfluous).[3] The contents of the *jātakas* are: (1) fables, (2) *Märchen* (fairy tales, many of them tales of animals), (3) anecdotes and comic tales, (4) tales of adventure and romance, (5) moral tales, (6) moral maxims, and (7) legends. More than half of the *jātakas* are of non-Buddhist origin. Even the moral tales and legends belong partly to the general Hindu ascetic poetry, though most of them show a strong Buddhist tendency.

The *jātakas* vary also in length. We find short stories of hardly a page by the side of long romances or epic poems covering more than a hundred pages in our printed edition.

Many of the stories found in our *Jātaka Book* occur also in the *Pañchatantra*, *Kathāsaritsāgara*, and other Indian story books, and are important for the history of Indian fiction. Some of the tales have parallels in the *Mahābhārata* and in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, and many others in Jain literature.

A great many *jātakas* have also parallels in the literatures of the West. Thus, the fable of the peacock that lost his bride through his shameless dance (*Jātaka*, no. 32, represented on the *stūpa* of Bhārhut) was known to Herodotus (vi. 130), who tells us the story of Hippokleides. The stories of the grateful animals and the ungrateful man (*Jāt.*, no. 78, also 482 and 516), of the ungrateful wife (no. 193), and many others, are widespread in Eastern and Western literatures. A version of the Judgment of Solomon is found in the *Mahā-Ummagga-Jātaka* (no. 546), which is also important on account of its parallels to the stories of the wise Ahiçar (*q.v.*). See also T. Zachariæ, *WZKM* xxvi. [1912] 418 ff., and *Ummagga Jātaka* ('The Story of the Tunnel'), tr. from Sinhalese by T. B. Yatawara, London, 1912. Many *jātakas* are well known from their parallels in *Æsop's Fables* (*e.g.*, 'The Ass in the Lion's Skin' [see art. FABLE]), in La Fontaine's *Fables*, in the *Gesta Romanorum*, in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, and elsewhere. On supposed parallels of Christian legends in the *Jātaka Book* see R. Garbe, *Contributions of Buddhism to Christianity*, Chicago, 1911, pp. 13, 80 ff., and M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, ii. (Leipzig, 1913) 282, 106. Though in many cases

[1] It is said in the *Nidānakathā* (*Jātaka*, ed. V. Fausböll, i. 62) that other commentaries (*aṭṭhakathās*) were used for the *Jātakaṭṭhavaṇṇanā* besides the *Jātakaṭṭhakathā*.

[2] There are 546 numbers. As, however, some of these numbers include several stories, and, on the other hand, the same *jātakas* occur in different versions under several numbers, the actual number of stories may be somewhat more or less than 546. But this is by no means the complete number of *jātakas* extant. There are some *jātakas* in other Buddhist works, both Pāli and Sanskrit, which have not been included in the Pāli collection (see L. Feer in *JA* vii. v. [1875] 417 ff., vi. 244 ff.).

[3] Only the *Veyyākaraṇa* seems to be the work of a still later commentator; see R. O. Franke in *Bezzenbergers Beitr.* xxii. [1897] 289 ff.; E. Sénart in *JA* ix. xvii. [1901] 406.

[4] *Gandhavaṁsa*, ed. J. P. Minayeff, in *JPTS*, 1886, p. 59.

[5] See T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, p. lxiii ff.

[1] These narrative verses are called *Abhisambuddhagāthās*, *i.e.* stanzas told by Buddha (not as the Bodhisattva, but) after his enlightenment (see Sénart, *JA* ix. xvii. 385 ff.).

[2] This is a different type from the first, for here the verses are not inserted for any special purpose, but the tale itself is alternately related in prose and verse. See also art. FICTION, vol. vi. p. 2 f.

[3] Some kind of prose was, of course, always necessary to turn the ballad, etc., into a *jātaka*, and make it part of a homily.

it is probable that these stories migrated from India to the West, it is in other cases more probable that Western motives were brought to India.

The *Jātaka Book* is not only important for the history of Indian and, indeed, all literature, but it is also invaluable for the light which it throws on the social life and the manners and customs in ancient India.

The accounts of Indian civilization given by R. Fick, *Die sociale Gliederung im nordöstlichen Indien zu Buddha's Zeit*, Kiel, 1897, T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 201 ff., and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, 'Notes on Early Economic Conditions in Northern India,' *JRAS*, 1901, p. 859 ff., are chiefly based on the *jātakas*. Valuable as these accounts are, they cannot be taken (as these scholars thought) as pictures of life in India at the time of Gautama Buddha, for it must be borne in mind that the prose stories in the Commentary are as late as the 5th or 6th cent. A.D., though they may contain much earlier traditions.

LITERATURE.—The standard edition of the *Jātaka Book* is that of V. Fausbøll, *The Jātaka, together with its Commentary, being Tales of the Anterior Births of Gotama Buddha*, 7 vols. (vol. vii. containing the Index by Dines Andersen), London, 1877–97. Translations are: T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories; or Jātaka Tales*, London, 1880 (contains Jātakas 1–40 only); *The Jātaka, or Stories of the Buddha's Former Births*, tr. from the Pāli by various hands, ed. E. B. Cowell, vols. i.–vii., Cambridge, 1895–1913 (the translators are R. Chalmers, W. H. D. Rouse, H. T. Francis, R. A. Neil, and Cowell himself; the last vol. contains the Index); a German tr. by Julius Dutoit, Leipzig, 1908 ff., is still in progress. Selected *jātakas* have been translated by R. Morris in *FlnJ* ii. [1884] 304, 332, 370, iii. [1885] 56, 121, 242, 328, iv. [1886] 45, 168.

On the *Jātaka Book* see: Léon Feer, *JA* vii. v. [1875] 357 ff., vi. 243 ff., vii. xi. [1878] 360 ff., viii. xx. [1892] 185 ff., ix. v. [1895] 31 ff., 189 ff., ix. ix. [1897] 288 ff.; S. d'Oldenburg, *JRAS*, 1893, p. 801 ff.; R. O. Franke, in *Bezzenbergers Beiträge*, xxii. [1897] 289 ff., and *WZKM* xx. [1906] 317 ff.; H. Lüders, *Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*,' philol.-hist. Kl., 1897, p. 40 ff. and *ZDMG* lviii. [1904] 689 ff., lxi. [1907] 641 ff.; J. Hertel, *ZDMG* lx. [1906] 399 ff.; J. Charpentier, *ZDMG* lxii. [1908] 725 ff., lxiii. [1909] 171 ff., lxvii. [1912] 41 f., and *WZKM* xxvii. [1913] 94; A. Foucher, in *Mélanges d'indianisme offerts à M. Sylvain Lévi*, Paris, 1911, p. 231 ff.; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 189 ff., and in *Album Kern*, Leyden, 1903, p. 13 ff.; H. Oldenberg, *Literatur des alten Indien*, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1903, pp. 103–129, and *Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, philol.-hist. Kl., 1911, p. 441 ff., 1912, pp. 183 ff., 214 ff.; and M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, ii. 89–127.

6. The Chariyāpiṭaka.—This is the last book in the *Khuddakanikāya* of the *Tipiṭaka*, and it is a collection of 35 *jātakas* in verse. The purpose of the work is to show in which of his former births the Bodhisattva had attained the ten *pāramitās*, or 'perfections.' The first two *pāramitās*, generosity and goodness, are illustrated by ten stories each, while fifteen stories refer to the other eight 'perfections,' viz. renunciation, wisdom, energy, patience, truthfulness, resolution, kindness to all beings, and equanimity. The stories are put into the mouth of Gautama himself. They have no literary merit whatever, all stress being laid on the moral, while the story itself is given in bare outline.

A different redaction of the *Chariyāpiṭaka* from that found in the *Tipiṭaka* is included and commented on in the first section of the *Nidānakathā*. J. Charpentier has tried (*WZKM* xxiv. [1910] 851 ff.) to reconstruct an 'Ur-Chariyāpiṭaka' on the basis of these two redactions, compared with the Sanskrit *Jātakamālā* (see below), but his arguments are not convincing.

LITERATURE.—The *Chariyāpiṭaka* has been edited by R. Morris, London, *PTS*, 1882; see also M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, ii. 131–134, and T. W. Rhys Davids, in *JRAS*, 1913, p. 482 f.

7. The Nidānakathā.—From the orthodox Buddhist point of view, all the *jātakas* may be regarded as autobiographical accounts of Gautama Buddha himself. It is, therefore, not surprising that an account of Gautama's career in his last existence, the *Nidānakathā*, *i.e.* 'the story of the beginnings,' forms the introduction to the *Jātaka Commentary*. As the Pāli canon contains only incidental references to the most important events in the career of the Buddha, and no connected biography, the *Nidānakathā* is the first *Life of the Buddha* in Pāli literature. It consists of three sections: (1) the story of 'the beginnings in the distant past' (*dūrenidāna*), narrating the life of the future Buddha as Sumedha in the time of the Buddha Dīpaṅkara down to his rebirth in the heaven of the Tusita gods, this section being a kind of commentary on the *Buddhavaṁsa* and the *Chariyāpiṭaka*; (2) the story of 'the beginnings in the less distant past' (*avidūrenidāna*), beginning with the descent of the Buddha from the Tusita heaven, and ending with his attainment of the Bodhi (perfect enlightenment or Buddhaship); (3) the story 'of the beginnings in the proximate epoch' (*santikenidāna*), relating the incidents from the Bodhi down to the story of Anāthapiṇḍika's great gift of the Jetavana (see art. BUDDHA, vol. ii. p. 883).

LITERATURE.—The text of the *Nidānakathā* will be found in Fausbøll, *Jātaka*, i. 1–94, the translation in T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, pp. 1–133, the first two sections also in H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, pp. 5–83.

8. Jātakas in the non-canonical Pāli literature.—In the later books of the *Milindapañha* (which are missing in the Chinese translation, made between A.D. 317 and 420) the *jātakas* are frequently quoted. The author of bk. iv. makes no difference between the Bodhisatta of the *jātakas* and the Buddha. He, therefore, troubles himself to excuse the Bodhisatta from any transgressions that he may have committed in any of his previous births, as related in the *jātakas*; and he tries to solve all kinds of dilemmas that arise by comparing incidents in the *jātakas* with utterances of the Tathāgata in any of the canonical texts. Every word in the *jātaka gāthās*, even in mere folklore verses occurring in some fable or fairy tale, is treated as the authoritative 'word of Buddha' that as such must be true. In bk. vii. also the *jātaka gāthās* are quoted with great reverence. *Jātakas* occur also in the *Dhammapada Commentary*, a work that closely resembles the *Jātaka Commentary* and may almost be considered a supplement to it.

LITERATURE.—As to the Milindapañha see art. LITERATURE (Buddhist), and M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der ind. Litt.*, ii. 97 n., 142, 146. The author of bk. iv. differs in many points from our *Jataka Commentary*. See T. W. Rhys Davids, *SBE* xxxv. [1890] pp. xli f., 210, 241 f., 280 f., 284 ff., 293 n., 294 ff., 303 f., xxxvi. [1894] 6, 16 ff., 146, 201, 306, 310, 341, 344, 349. A dilemma of the *Sivi Jātaka* is discussed *ib.* xxxv. 179 ff.; discussions on the *Vessantara Jātaka*, *ib.* p. 170 ff., xxxvi. 114 ff. 'Repeaters of the Jātakas' are mentioned by the side of 'Repeaters' of other canonical texts in *Milinda*, v. 22 (*SBE* xxxvi. 231).

For the *Dhammapada Commentary* see E. W. Burlingame, 'Buddhaghosa's Dhammapada Commentary,' *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, vol. xlv. no. 20 [1910] p. 469.

9. Jātakas in Buddhist Sanskrit literature.—(*a*) Many *jātakas* occur in the *Mahāvastu* both in prose and in verse, in 'mixed Sanskrit.' Some of them are variants of the Pāli *jātakas*, others are not found in the Pāli collection.

(*b*) Closely related to the *jātakas* are the *avadānas* (see art. APADĀNA), which belong partly to the literature of the Sarvāstivādins (see art. SECTS [Buddhist]), partly to the Mahāyāna literature. *Avadānas* are edifying 'tales of glorious deeds' of saints, illustrating the law of *karma* (*q.v.*), *i.e.* showing that 'black deeds bear black fruits and white deeds white fruits.' The difference between *avadānas* and *jātakas* consists in this, that in a *jātaka* the Bodhisattva is always either the hero or one of the characters occurring in the story, while any saint may play a part in an *avadāna*. But there are many *avadānas* in which the Bodhisattva is the hero. These are called *Bodhisattvāvadānas*, and may as well be called *jātakas*. Many *jātakas* known from the Pāli collection are also found in the *Avadāna* collections (*Avadānaśataka*, *Divyavadāna*).

(*c*) *Bodhisattvāvadānamālā*, or 'Garland of Bodhisattva tales,' is another title of the work better known as *Jātakamālā*, a Sanskrit poem of

high poetical merit, composed by the poet Āryaśūra or Śūra. There have been several *Jātakamālās*, or 'Garlands of Jātakas,' *i.e.* poetical selections of *jātakas*, but Āryaśūra's work is best known. It is a florilegium of 34 *jātakas*, mostly known from the Pāli collection, but told in the flowery style of Sanskrit court poetry, elaborate prose alternating with verse. As in the *Chariyāpiṭaka* (see above), so also in the *Jātakamālā* the *jātakas* serve as illustrations of the *pāramitās*, especially those of generosity and kindness towards all creatures. Thus the first story (not occurring in the Pāli collection) is that of the Bodhisattva throwing himself before a starving tigress that is about to devour her offspring. Most stories occur also in the *Jātaka Book* and twelve in the *Chariyāpiṭaka*. Āryaśūra probably flourished in the 4th cent. A.D. Stanzas of the *Jātakamālā* are inscribed on frescoes found in the caves of Ajantā, and the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing mentions the *Jātakamālā* among the works that in his time were very popular in India.

(*d*) *Jātakas* and *avadānas* are also found in Aśvaghoṣa's *Sūtrālaṁkāra* (called *Alaṁkāra* in art. AŚVAGHOṢA), and in Kṣemendra's *Avadāna-kalpalatā*; and 50 *jātakas* are mentioned in the *Mahāyānasūtra Rāṣṭrapālapṛcchā*.

LITERATURE.—On (*a*) see **S. d'Oldenburg**, in *JRAS*, 1893, p. 335 ff.; **A. Barth**, in *Journal des Savants*, 1899, p. 625 ff.; **J. Charpentier**, *Paccekabuddhageschichten*, Upsala, 1908, pp. 2 ff., 12 ff., 25 ff., and *WZKM* xxvii. [1913] 94 f.; **M. Winternitz**, *Gesch. d. ind. Litt.*, ii. 190 ff.

(*b*) See **Léon Feer** in the Introd. to his tr. of the *Avadāna-śataka*, *AMG* xviii., Paris, 1891, and **J. S. Speyer** in his ed. of the same work (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, iii., St. Petersburg, 1902–09), vol. ii., preface, p. iv ff.; also **Winternitz**, *Gesch. der ind. Litt.*, ii. 215 ff.

(*c*) The *Jātakamālā* has been edited by **H. Kern** (Harvard Oriental Series, i., Cambridge, Mass., 1891) and translated by J. S. Speyer, *SBB* i., London, 1895. Āryaśūra has worked on the same (or a similar) collection of *gāthās* as we have in the *Tipiṭaka*; see Speyer's Synoptical Table in his tr., pp. 337–340. See also **Kern**, in *Festgruss an Otto von Böhtlingk*, Stuttgart, 1888, p. 50 f.; **S. d'Oldenburg**, in *JRAS*, 1893, p. 308 ff.; **A. Barth**, in *RHR* xxviii. [1893] 200; **K. Watanabe**, in *JPTS*, 1909, p. 263 ff.; **I-tsing**, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, p. 162 f.; **H. Lüders**, in *Nachrichten der konigl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, philol.-hist. Kl., 1902, p. 758 ff.; **F. W. Thomas**, in *Album Kern*, p. 405 ff.; and **Winternitz**, *Gesch. der ind. Litt.*, ii. 212–214. As to the Chinese tr. see **A. O. Ivanovski**, in *RHR* xlvii. [1903] 208 ff.

(*d*) See *Sūtrālaṁkāra*, Fr. tr. from the Chinese of Kumārajīva by E. Huber, Paris, 1908; **L. Finot**, 'Rāṣṭrapālapṛccha, Sūtra du Mahāyāna,' in *Bibl. Buddhica*, ii., St. Petersburg, 1901; and **Winternitz**, *Gesch. der ind. Litt.*, ii. 208 ff., 229, 246.

10. The jātakas and popular Buddhism.—The *jātakas* are highly important for the history of Buddhism, as they give us an insight into popular Buddhism. The whole system of relating *jātakas* is based on the most popular dogma of *karma*, and the ethical ideal of this religion is not the Arhat (*q.v.*) who has attained to *nirvāṇa*,[1] but the Bodhisattva who, in all his former existences, has shown one or more of the great virtues by which he prepared himself for becoming the future Buddha. However high or low he may have been born, in every *jātaka* he is either helpful, kind, and self-sacrificing, or brave, clever, and even possessing supernatural wisdom. *Jātakas* like those of King Sivi (no. 499), who gave away his eyes as a gift, or of Prince Vessantara (no. 547), who even gave away his own children as a gift to the wicked Brāhman, are standard texts for this ideal of ethics. It may easily be understood how the theory of the *pāramitās*, which has become important in the Mahāyāna Buddhism, though not mentioned in the *Jātaka Gāthās*, but only in the *Buddhavaṁsa*, *Chariyāpiṭaka*, and the *Jataka Commentary*, was already latent in the *jātaka* theory. It is no wonder that the *jātakas* belong as much to the Mahāyāna as to the Hīnayāna Buddhism. They are indeed the common property of all Buddhist sects in all Buddhist countries. They were the chief vehicle of Buddhist propaganda, and are the chief witnesses of popular Buddhism.

As to the popularity of the *jātakas*, it is sufficient to quote the words of R. Spence **Hardy**, *Manual of Budhism*[2], London, 1880, p. 103: 'The Singhalese will listen the night through to recitations from this work, without any apparent weariness; and a great number of the Jatakas are familiar even to the women.' On their popularity in Burma see **Mabel H. Bode**, *Pali Literature of Burma*, London, 1909, p. 81. The *Jātaka Book* was the source from which Buddhist poets in Burma drew their inspiration for centuries (*ib.* pp. 43 f., 53).

LITERATURE.—Numerous *jātakas* (and *avadānas*) have been translated into Tibetan and Chinese. See **A. Schiefner**, 'Indische Erzählungen,' *Mélanges asiatiques tirés du bulletin de l'académie impériale des sciences de St. Pétersbourg*, vii. and

W. R. S. Ralston, *Tibetan Tales derived from Indian Sources*, London, 1882; **W. W. Rockhill**, 'Tibetan Buddhist Birth Stories, Extracts and Translations from the Kandjur,' *JAOS* xviii. [1897] 1 ff.; **E. Chavannes**, *Cinq cents contes et apologues, extraits du tripitaka chinois et traduits en français*, i.–iii., Paris, 1910–11.

11. Jātakas in Buddhist art.—The enormous popularity of the *jātakas* is also proved by the fact that representations from these stories are among the earliest productions of Indian art, and they have remained the favourite topics for sculpture and paintings through all the centuries in all Buddhist countries. In the 3rd or 2nd cent. B.C. we find them in India in Bhārhut and Sāṅchi (see above), in the 2nd cent. A.D. in Amarāvatī, and later on in the caves of Ajanta. The Chinese pilgrim Fa-hian, when visiting Ceylon in A.D. 412, saw at Abhayagiri 'representations of the 500 bodily forms which the Bodhisatt a assumed during his successive births'; and Hiuen Tsiang mentions *stūpas* erected in honour of the Bodhisattvas whose leeds were related in *jātakas*. The famous temples of Boro-Budur in Java (9th cent. A.D.), of Pagan in Burma (13th cent. A.D.) and of Sukhodaya in Siam (14th cent. A.D.) are decorated with hundreds of bas-reliefs representing scenes from *jātakas*.

LITERATURE.—The bas-reliefs of Bhārhut have been described by **A. Cunningham**, *The Stūpa of Bhārhut*, London, 1879 (for the inscriptions see **E. Hultzsch** in *ZDMG* xl. [1886] 58 ff.; *IA* xxi. [1892] 225 ff.; and *JRAS*, 1912, p. 399 ff.). For the Sāṅchī reliefs see the plates in **F. C. Maisey**, *Sanchi and its Remains*, London, 1892. A list of all the *jātakas* represented in Bhārhut, Ajanta, and Boro-Budur is given by **S. d'Oldenburg** in *JRAS*, 1896, p. 623 ff., and *JAOS* xviii. [1897] 183 ff. See also **A. Grünwedel**, *Buddhistische Kunst in Indien*[2], Berlin, 1900, pp. 38 f., 59; **A. Foucher**, *L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra*, i., Paris, 1905, p. 270 ff., and *Bulletin de l'école française d'Extrême Orient*, ix. [1909] 1 ff.; **J. Griffiths**, *The Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta*, London, 1896–97; **C. Leemans**, *Bôrô-Boudour dans l'île de Java*, Leyden, 1874; **L. Fournereau**, *Le Siam ancien*, pt. 2, *AMG*, Paris, 1908. The bas-reliefs of the temple of Pagan have been described by **A. Grünwedel**, *Buddhistische Studien*, i. (*Veröffentlichungen aus dem königl. Museum für Völkerkunde*, v., Berlin, 1897), who also gives translations or abstracts of 55 *jātakas*.

M. WINTERNITZ.

JAUNPUR.—A city now the headquarters of the British District of the same name in the United Provinces of India; lat. 25° 45′ N.; long. 82° 41′ E. Muhammadans derive the name from Ulugh Khān Jūnān, afterwards Muḥammad Shāh II. ibn Tughlaq, whose name is said to have been given to the place by his cousin Firūz Shāh, the founder; Hindus derive it from Jamadagnipura, after the saint Jamadagni, or from Yavanapura, 'city of the Ionian Greeks or foreigners.' Before the city was founded by the Muhammadans, there was a local cult of Kerārbīr, a demon slain by the demi-god Rāma. He is now represented by a shapeless stone smeared with red lead and turmeric, probably representing the blood of a sacrifice. It stands near one of the bastions of the fort; and, when this was blown up by British engineers after the Mutiny, the stone escaped uninjured, a fact which greatly increased the respect paid to it (*NINQ* ii.

[1] This is true, though the commentator sometimes says that the Master delivered his sermon (*dhammadesanā*) in such a way as to lead up to Arhatship (*e.g.*, *Jātaka*, ed. Fausböll, i. 114, 276); but the moral taught in the *jātakas* has nothing to do with the monastic ideal.

[1892] 2; Cunningham, *Arch. Rep.* xi. 103 f.). The foundation of the present city was laid by Fīrūz Tughlaq on his return from an expedition into Bengal in A.D. 1360. Subsequently under Khwāja Jahān, who was viceroy of the Emperor Maḥmūd Tughlaq, in 1394 during the invasion of Tīmūr, it became independent; and for nearly a century the Sharqī, or eastern dynasty, continued powerful rivals of the Delhi kings, and formed one of the richest States in N. India. Finally they were overthrown by the Emperor Bahlūl Lodī in A.D. 1487. The religious buildings still in existence consist of mosques and tombs, the work of these Sharqī princes. They are the finest example of what has erroneously been called the 'Paṭhān' style, which is really Persian, but executed and modified by the native architects whom the conquerors were forced to employ. So beautiful was the city that it became known as the Shīrāz of India. The oldest of the mosques, that in the fort, dates from A.D. 1377. The three great mosques are in the city. The Aṭalā mosque, so called because it stands on the site of a temple dedicated to the Hindu goddess Aṭalā Devī, 'the permanently fixed one,' was the first erected by King Ibrāhīm Shāh (1401–40), and was finished in 1408. This is the most ornate and beautiful of the series, and Fergusson regarded the interior domes and roofs as superior to any other specimen of Muhammadan architecture of so early an age with which he was acquainted. The second, the Jāmi' Masjid, or Cathedral Mosque, of Ḥusain Shāh, is the largest in Jaunpur. It is distinguished by a majestic gate pyramid or propylon, of outline and mass almost Egyptian, supplying the place of a minaret, a feature as little known at the time in Jaunpur as it was in Delhi. It was completed in 1478. The third great city mosque, known as that of Bibi Rājī, or, as it is commonly called, Lāl Darwāzah, 'the red gate,' was founded by Bībī Rājī, queen of Maḥmūd Shāh (A.D. 1440–58).

'It is in the same style as the others, and its propylon displays not only the bold massiveness with which these mosques were erected, but shows also that strange mixture of Hindu and Mahomedan architecture which pervaded the style during the whole period of its continuance' (Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. and East. Arch.*, p. 520).

With the fall of the local rulers the religious history of Jaunpur came to an end.

LITERATURE.—A. Führer, *The Sharqi Architecture of Jaunpur*, Calcutta, 1889, and *Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions in the North-West Provinces*, Allahabad, 1891, p. 178 ff.; A. Cunningham, *Archæological Survey Reports*, xi. [1880] 102 ff.; J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, London, 1876, p. 520 ff.

W. CROOKE.

JAVA, BALI, AND SUMATRA (Buddhism in).[1]—The Indian name of Java, known to the geographer Ptolemy (VII. ii. 29) as Iabadiu (ὁ σημαίνει κριθῆς νῆσος), is a sufficient proof that the intercourse between India and the Indian Archipelago dates from before the 2nd cent. of our era. A passage in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (IV. xl. 30), mentioning 'Yava-dvīpa, adorned by seven kingdoms, the Gold and Silver Island, rich in gold mines,'[2] apparently points to the fact that the name had a wider application, embracing both Java proper and Sumatra, as in later times with the Arabs. It is certain that Indian civilization had made progress, at least in Java, before A.D. 400, for the Chinese Buddhist Fa-Hian, who stayed for five months in the country (A.D. 412), says that 'various forms of error and Brāhmanism are there flourishing, while Buddhism in it is not worth speaking of.'[3] As to Sumatra we are wholly left in the dark, and it is not until far in the 7th cent. that the writings of another Chinese traveller, I-tsing, enable us to get insight into the condition of Buddhism at Śrībhoja, the capital of the kingdom of Bhoja, or Malayu, and situated near the present city of Palembang.[4] I-tsing went twice (A.D. 671 and 688) to Śrībhoja, and stayed there some seven years (688 695), studying and translating Sanskrit sacred texts. He tells us that the king of Bhoja—whose name he does not mention—and the rulers of the neighbouring islands were adherents of Buddhism, and that the capital was a centre of learning, where more than 1000 priests investigated and studied all the subjects that were taught in India. The great majority of the Buddhists both in Bhoja and in other islands belonged to the sect of the Mūla-sarvāstivādins, though occasionally some had adopted the tenets of the Sammitīyas, whereas two other sects had newly been introduced. All these sects belonged to the great division known under the name of Hīnayāna. There were in Malayu only a few Mahāyānists.

It is a matter of evidence that Buddhism must have been introduced into Sumatra and adjacent isles long before the time of I-tsing, and that the first propagandists belonged to one or more sects of the Northern Hīnayāna. Yet we see that in his days Mahāyānists were already making their appearance in Malayu. There is a notice in Tāranātha's *History of Buddhism* that Dharmapāla, the celebrated Mahāyānist Professor in the College of Nālandā before Hiuen Tsiang was staying there, went to Suvarṇa-dvīpa in his old age.[2]

Whatever may be the exact value of I-tsing's statement about the prevalence of the Hīnayāna in his own days, it is certain that in the 8th cent. the Mahāyāna had acquired a firm footing in Java. A Sanskrit inscription found between Kalasan and Prambanan, not far from Yogyakarta, commemorates the erection of a statue and sanctuary of the goddess Āryā Tārā (the female counterpart or *Śakti* of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara), together with an abode for monks versed in the rules of discipline (*Vinaya*) of the Mahāyāna. The date of the inscription is 700 Śaka (A.D. 778); the donor is a king of the Śailendra dynasty, who, as a further mark of his favour to his spiritual teacher, who had moved him to his pious work, granted to the Saṅgha the village of Kālasa.[3] It is remarkable that the inscription shows a kind of writing usual in Northern India, whereas most of the other Sanskrit inscriptions in Java are in the common Old Javanese characters which have their origin in Southern India. The inscription of 700 Śaka is, therefore, a sufficient proof that the Mahayānists who enjoyed the king's favour came from Hindustān proper or the Western parts of Bengal. The remains of the sanctuary dedicated to Tārā have been recognized in what nowadays is known as Chandi Bening or Chandi Kalasan.[4]

All the splendid monuments of architecture and decorative art which arose in Java after the 8th cent. bear the unequivocal stamp of Mahāyānism, except, of course, those which are the works of Brāhmanists, more especially Śaivites. The Mahāyānistic character shows itself unmistakably in the images of the honoured Dhyānibuddhas or Jinas, as they are commonly called in Tibet and Java, and of the Bodhisattvas along with their *Śaktis*.

1 For the animistic religion see art. INDONESIANS.

2 See H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*[2], London, 1903, p. 455.

3 J. Legge, *A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, Oxford, 1886, p. 113.

1 *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, tr. J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896, pp. xl–xlvi.

2 Tāranātha, *Geschichte des Buddhismus*, tr. F. A. Schiefner, St. Petersburg, 1869, p. 161; cf. Max Muller, *India*, London, 1883, p. 310. I-tsing once calls Sumatra Chin-chou, 'Gold Isle,' a literal translation of Skr. Suvarṇa-dvīpa (tr. Takakusu, p. xli).

3 J. Brandes, 'Een Nāgarī-opschrift gevonden tusschen Kalasan en Prambanan,' *Tijdschr. voor Ind. taal-, land- en volkenkunde*, xxxi. [1886] 240.

4 Explored and described by J. W. Yzerman, *Beschrijving der oudheden nabij de grens der Residenties Soerakarta en Djogdjakarta*, The Hague, 1891.

The most renowned and best explored monuments and groups of religious buildings, besides the sanctuary at Kalasan, are the so-called Chandi Sari, Chandi Sewu, and Chandi Plaosan;[1] the gorgeous sanctuary of Boro-Budur;[2] the beautiful shrine at Mendut;[3] and Chandi Jago.[4]

There were in Java down to the end of the Middle Ages two, so to speak, recognized State religions: Śaivism and Mahāyānism. At all great solemnities—the inauguration of kings, royal princes, chief commanders of the army—both religious communities were represented by their priesthood, the Śaivas and Saugatas. The relation between the two confessions was marked by a spirit of tolerance and friendliness, so much so that in course of time there sprang up a kind of mixed religion, in which the objects of worship originally belonging to either sect found their place. It is a significant fact that we find mention made of a certain sacred building at Usana, the lower part of which was devoted to the cult of Śiva, the upper part being a Buddhist shrine, the former adorned with an image of the god Śiva, the latter with a statue of the Dhyānibuddha Akṣobhya. This building had been erected by the King Kṛtanagara, who, according to the testimony of the poet Prapañcha, was a pious Buddhist when living, but after his death (Śaka 1214) was known by the posthumous name of Śiva-Buddha. In the sepulchral shrine where his remains were interred stood a Buddha image with the traits of the deceased monarch, and another statue representing Ardhanārīśvara with the traits of the same and his queen.[5] In general it may be said that the Mahāyānists of Java, far from being exclusive in their religious views, showed a tendency to syncretism. A striking illustration of it is afforded by a passage in the poem *Sutasoma* by Tantular, where it is explicitly stated that Śiva and Buddha are essentially one and the same.[6] The subject-matter of the poem is taken from the *Sutasoma Jātaka*, well known from its Sanskrit and Pāli versions, but the manner of treatment and the spirit of the whole in the Old Javanese poem are quite different. Among the works of mediæval Javanese literature which have come down to us there are comparatively few treating of subjects connected with Buddhism. Yet Buddhist authors were not lacking in activity, contributing to the store of literature by composing poems on subjects taken from Brāhmanical lore. A thoroughly Mahāyānistic production is the legend of Kuñjarakarna.[7] A kind of compendium of the Mahāyana system in Old Javanese, interspersed with Sanskrit verses, is the *Kamahāyānikan*,[8] in which are treated the division of the Buddhas in past, present, and future Tathāgatas; the six Pāramitās: *dāna*, *śila*, etc., well known from other sources; and then the four Pāramitās: *maitrī*, *karuṇā*, *muditā*, and *upekṣā*, the first being called the essence (*tattva*) of Lochanā, the second of Māmakī, the third of Pāṇḍaravāsinī (more commonly called Pāṇḍarā), the fourth of Tārā. The compendium further treats of the five attachments (*yogas*); the four *bhāvanās*; the four *āryasatyāni*; then follows a description of the *mudrās* (attitudes of fingers) of Śākyamuni, and an enumeration of the five *skandhas*, which are brought into connexion with the five (Dhyāni) Tathāgatas. We also find an enumeration of the *śaktis* of those Tathāgatas, and, finally, precepts on the treatment of corpses.

The worship of the five Dhyānibuddhas and their female counterparts, or *śaktis*, as taught in the *Kamahāyānikan*, must have been very popular in Java, as is attested by the numerous images of those supernatural beings discovered in or near sacred buildings.

During the whole period in which Buddhism was flourishing in Java, it found favour with kings and royal families. The earliest document bearing witness to marked favour is the inscription of Kalasan mentioned above. We know also from a copper grant, dated 861 Śaka (A.D. 949–50), that the King Mpu Sindok, otherwise called by his title Śrī Īśāna Vijaya Dharmottuṅga Deva, confessed Buddhism.[1] His daughter, who reigned after him under the title of Śrī Isāna Tuṅga Vijayā, was likewise a pious votary of Buddhism.[2] The King Kṛtanagara, who reigned from 1194 to 1214 Śaka (A.D. 1272–92), is glorified by the court poet Prapañcha as being a most devout Saugata,[3] though his posthumous name of Śiva-Buddha would seem to point to his being a latitudinarian.[4] He calls himself, however, in a Sanskrit votive inscription an *upāsaka* of the Mahāyāna. The inscription, in more than one copy, has been discovered near Chandi Jago.[5] Kṛtanagara's granddaughter, Tribhuvanattuṅgadevī, who ruled as sovereign over the whole of Java during the minority of her son, the famous Hayam Wuruk, in the middle of the 14th cent. of our era, was of the same persuasion as her grandfather; likewise her consort, the Prince Kṛtavardhana of Singhasāri, her sister, and the consort of the latter.[6] The Queen Dowager of the King Kṛtarājeśa, the founder of Majapahit, is described as an energetic woman, and so earnestly devoted to the religion of Buddha that in her old age she became a nun.

Apart from all documentary evidence in writings, the remains of splendid buildings destined for the worship or use of Buddhists cannot fail to leave the impression that those architectural monuments must have been erected by the highest classes of society. The majority of the more gorgeous Chandis on Javanese soil are undoubtedly Buddhistic, whereas out of the whole mass of literature and inscriptions on stone or copper few have any connexion with Buddhism. To explain this fact it may be assumed that the great bulk of the population were Śaivites. It is quite certain that in the Middle Ages, before the irruption of Muhammadanism, Javanese society was based upon the caste system, just as in India, and that in civil and criminal law the Code of Manu was the chief authority. The present state of things in Bali, where such Javanese as remained faithful to their religion have found a refuge after the fall of Majapahit in the beginning of the 16th cent., tends to confirm the conclusion that numerically the Śaivites, or, more generally, the Brāhmanists, had the superiority. For the great majority of the Balinese confess Śaivism, with an admixture of practices surviving from an ancient animistic religion. It appears from a notice in the *Nāgarakṛtāgama*[7] that in the 14th cent. there were established two communities or sects of Buddhists

[1] Yzerman, *op. cit.*, and *Verslagen en Mededeelingen Kon. Ak. v. Wetenschappen*, III. iv. (1887); see for the literature R. D. M. Verbeek, *Oudheden van Java*, Batavia, 1891, pp. 177, 186.

[2] The chief work on it is by C. Leemans, *Boro-Boedoer op het eiland Java*, Leydon, 1874. A new description of the monument with a complete reproduction of the sculptures is in preparation. For the literature see Verbeek.

[3] H. Yule, *JASBe* xxxi. (1862); J. Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*[2], London, 1910; P. J. Veth, *Java*[2], Haarlem, 1896–1903. For literature see Verbeek.

[4] *Archæologisch Onderzoek op Java en Madura*, I. (1904).

[5] *Nāgarakṛtagama*, cantos xliii. and lvi.

[6] *Verslagen en Mededeelingen Kon. Ak. v. Wetenschappen*, III. v. [1887] 8 ff.

[7] Published in text and translation in *Verhandelingen Kon. Ak. v. Wetenschappen*, new ser. III. (1901).

[8] ed. J. Kats, under the title *Sanghyang Kamahāyānikan*, The Hague, 1910.

[1] *Kawi Oorkonden*, xxii. (1875).

[2] Insor. in *Bijdragen Kon. Instituut*, IV. x. [1885] 9.

[3] See above.

[4] *Nāgarakṛtāgama*, canto xlii.

[5] J. S. Speyer, 'Eene Buddhistische inscriptie,' *Versl. en Meded. Kon. Ak.* IV. vi. [1904] 138, 253.

[6] *Nāgarakṛtāgama*, cantos iii. and iv.

[7] Canto lxxx

in Bali, one consisting of followers of the Vinay *i.e.* the regular clergy, the other of the so-called Vajradharas, evidently identical with the Vajrāchāryas in Nepal and Tibet, and consequently Tantrists. There are sufficient proofs of Tantrism having had its votaries also in Java. Nowadays the number of Buddhists of any description in Bali is insignificant.

As to Sumatra, there is a blank in our knowledge of the conditions of Buddhism from the days of I-tsing down to the middle of the 14th cent., the time when the King Ādityavarman was ruler of Middle Sumatra. It is known from sundry inscriptions, ranging from 1265 to 1278 Śaka (A.D. 1342–56), that Ādityavarman was a staunch Mahāyānist,[1] and that he was the donor of a statue of the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī in a temple in Java, the queen of which island was a relative of his.[2] An inscription on the back of a statue of the Jina Amoghapāśa, discovered at Padang Chandi in Sumatra, informs us that it was dedicated by order of the same king.[3] As Amoghapāśa is a Tantric form of Avalokiteśvara, the inscription is an indication of Tantrism having its votaries in Sumatra. In an inscription on the tombstone of Ādityavarman he is glorified as an *avatāra* of Lokeśvara.[4] It may be remarked that the Sanskrit of the Sumatran inscriptions, contrary to what we find in Java, is most barbarous.

In the days of Ādityavarman the northern part of Sumatra had already been Islāmized, and it is highly probable that a short time after his reign Muhammadanism triumphantly spread in Middle Sumatra. Besides the inscriptions of Ādityavarman, the statue of Amoghapāśa, an image of the Bodhisattva Lokeśvara, and some architectural remains of a doubtful character, nothing now remains of Buddhism. Traces of Indian influence however, are not wanting: the religious notions of the Bataks and their astrological superstitions are largely tinged with Brāhmanistic or at least non-Buddhistic ideas and practices.

LITERATURE.—This is fully given in the footnotes.

H. KERN.

JEALOUSY.—See ENVY.

JEROME.—**1. Life.**—Jerome was born at Stridon, a town on the confines of Dalmatia and Pannonia (*de Vir. Illust.* 135). According to F. Bulić,[5] the ancient Stridon, which was demolished by the Goths in A.D. 378, may now be identified with the modern Grahovo Polje. The birth of Jerome is assigned by Prosper[6] to A.D. 331, but various statements from his own pen seem rather to point to a later date—somewhere between 340 and 350.[7] He was born of Christian parents; his father was named Eusebius, and was evidently well-to-do. He received his elementary education in his own home at Stridon, and then, together with his friend Bonosus, went to Rome in order to study grammar and the rhetorical philosophy. He became a pupil of the renowned grammarian Donatus,[8] and gained a thorough knowledge of the Latin classics, especially of Cicero and Vergil.[9] His teacher in rhetoric was not, as was formerly supposed, the veteran rhetorician C. Marius Victorinus.[1] He did not study Greek during his early residence in Rome, but presumably learned it later in Antioch.

He was baptized in his early manhood by Bishop Liberius († 366) in Rome (*Ep.* xv. 1). Notwithstanding this, he fell for a time into serious moral errors (*Ep.* iv. 2), but thereafter manifested once more an enthusiastic piety, visiting the graves of the apostles and martyrs in the Catacombs (*Comm. in Ezech.* xii. 40). From Rome he travelled, in the company of Bonosus, to Gaul, and stayed for a while in the still semi-barbaric district of the Rhine (*Ep.* iii. 5). While in Trèves he began to busy himself with theological work, copying, on behalf of his friend Rufinus, the *Commentary on the Psalms* and the *de Synodis* of Hilary of Poitiers (*Ep.* v.). He then went to Aquileia, where he connected himself with an earnest-minded group of men, including Chromatius, subsequently bishop of Aquileia, and his friend Rufinus, a native of the town. It was in Aquileia that he took a decisive step towards carrying out a resolution that he had already formed in Trèves, viz. to devote himself to the ascetic life. All at once, from reasons that we do not know, he set out with a few friends upon a journey to the East (A.D. 373). Having reached Antioch, he lingered there for some time, and attended the prelections of the celebrated Antiochene theologian Apollinaris of Laodicea (*Ep.* lxxxiv. 3). It was during this period of indecision as to whether he should become a hermit or not that he had the experience, known as his 'anti-Ciceronian vision' (*Ep.* xxii. 30), in which Christ appeared to him, asked him regarding his religious profession, and, in answer to Jerome's claim to be a Christian, said: 'Thou speakest falsely; thou art a Ciceronian, not a Christian; for where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.' For a considerable time afterwards Jerome renounced the study of the classics (*Comm. in Gal.* iii. præf.); but at a later date, in the monastery at Bethlehem, we find him engaged in instructing youths in Vergil and Cicero (Rufinus, *contra Hieron.* i. 28). Very soon after his vision he went to live in the wilderness of Chalcis as an eremite, and there, amid severe self-castigations, he began the study of Hebrew under a converted Jew (*Ep.* cxxv. 12), while he was also involved in the dogmatic conflicts that divided the Christians of Antioch into various parties. Being, as a native of the West, quite unable to decide between the older Nicæan and the younger Orthodox groups who were here at feud with each other, he appealed to Pope Damasus for advice as to which party he should join. Subsequently he attached himself to the anti-Meletian bishop, Paulinus of Antioch, by whom he was ordained a presbyter, though on the understanding that he might still remain a monk, *i.e.* that he should not be compelled to undertake the cure of souls (*contra Joh. Hierosolym.* 41).

Jerome then went to Constantinople, where he came into close touch with the great Cappadocian, Gregory of Nazianzen, at that time bishop of the Eastern capital. Gregory drew his attention to the theology of Origen. On the invitation of Damasus, Jerome returned in 382 to Rome, where a synod, called that year, was to meet for the purpose of settling the Antiochene schism (*Ep.* cxxvii. 7). Without any clearly defined function or any distinct charge,[2] but rather in a confidential position to which no responsibility attached, he

[1] *Bijdragen Kon. Instituut*, III. vii. [1871] 289, viii. [1872] 16, IV. i. [1877] 159.
[2] *Archæologisch Onderzoek op Java en Madura*, II. [1909] 101.
[3] *Tijdsch. Bat. Gen.* lxix. [1907] 159–170.
[4] *Bijdragen Kon. Instituut*, 1912, p. 401.
[5] 'Wo lag Stridon, die Heimat des heil. Hieronymus?' in *Festschr. für Otto Benndorf*, Vienna, 1898; the older literature is given very fully in this work.
[6] *Chronicon*, in T. Mommsen, *Chronica minora*, Berlin, 1891–98, I. ii. 451.
[7] Cf. G. Grützmacher, *Hieronymus*, I. 45–48.
[8] F. Lammert, *De Hieronymo, Donati discipulo*, Leipzig, 1912.
[9] A. Luebeck, *Hieronymus quos noverit scriptores et ex quibus hauserit*, Leipzig, 1872; C. Paucker, *De Latinitate beati Hieronymi observationes ad nominum verborumque usum pertinentes*[2], Berlin, 1880, 'Beiträge zur Latinität des Hieronymus' in *Zeitschr. für die österreich. Gymnasien*, xxxi. [1880], 'De particularum quarundam in Latinitate Hieronymi usu observationes,' in *Rhein. Mus.* xxxvii. [1882]; H. Goelzer, *Étude lexicographique et grammaticale de la latinité de S. Jérôme*, Paris, 1884.

[1] Cf. Grützmacher, I. 118.
[2] It was on this ground that later tradition made Jerome a cardinal; cf. Grutzmacher, I. 38 ff.

assisted the Roman bishop in the composition of official papers (*Ep.* cxxiii. 10). Moreover, during his residence at Rome (382–385) he was commissioned by Damasus to revise the Latin NT on the basis of the Greek text; and this, again, proved to be the initiative to his greatest literary achievement—his translation of the OT from the Hebrew. In Rome he gathered around him a band of women of high rank, to whom he expounded the Scriptures, and whom he inspired with enthusiasm for the ascetic ideal. The more eminent personalities in this group were Marcella and Paula, both widows, and the two daughters of the latter, Blaesilla and Eustochium. By his mordant criticisms of the Roman secular clergy he alienated the sympathies which at the outset he had won, and which, he ambitiously hoped, would secure for him at the death of Damasus (A.D. 384) the succession to the See (*Ep.* xlv. 3). In August 385 he left the ungrateful city in the company of his brother Paulinian and his friend Vincentius, in order that he might return from Babylon to Jerusalem (*Ep.* xlv. 6). Paula and her daughter Eustochium followed them shortly afterwards. In order to give no occasion for scandal, the two parties had arranged to make the journey separately, but they met again in Antioch. From this point they started on a pilgrimage through the Holy Land, visiting, first of all, Jerusalem and Bethlehem, then the South of Palestine, and, finally, the sacred sites of Galilee—Nazareth, Cana, Capernaum, and the Sea of Tiberias (*Ep.* cviii.). Somewhat later they proceeded to Egypt, and stayed a month in Alexandria, where Jerome attended the lectures of Didymus the Blind, the head of the long-renowned catechetical school (Rufinus, *contra Hieron.* ii. 12). Thence they visited also the Nitrian monastic colony—the 'city of the Lord,' as Jerome calls it—and then, in the late summer of 386, returned to Bethlehem, where they settled permanently. Here they had to be content with somewhat cramped quarters for three years—until, in fact, the monastic buildings for the lodgment of monks and nuns were quite complete. The monastic houses built at Paula's expense were four in number—one for monks, and three for nuns—while in addition to these a hospice was erected for the entertainment of pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem.

The period of Jerome's stay in the monastery at Bethlehem—the last thirty-four years of his life—was by far the most fertile in literary work. His manner of life at this time is described by Sulpicius Severus (*Dial.* i. 9) from information supplied by a monk named Postumianus, who had spent six months in Bethlehem:

'He is ever occupied with reading, with books; he takes no rest by day or night; he is always either reading or writing.'

Yet Jerome did not find in his cloister the peace he had come to seek. His passionate nature led him to take part in all the conflicts that were agitating the Church. In 392 his controversy with the Roman ascetic Jovinian brought him once more into touch with the capital. He was subsequently drawn into the Origenistic controversies—in conflict, first, with John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and then with his former friend, but now embittered enemy, Rufinus. Towards the close of his life we find him issuing biting pamphlets against the Spanish priest Vigilantius and the Pelagians. Among the events of the world-politics of the day, the sack of Rome at the hands of Alaric in 410 affected him profoundly (*Comm. in Jer.* vii. 2, *Ep.* cxxviii. 5). Paula had died in 404; in 410 Marcella also passed away (*Ep.* cxxvii.). In 416 the religious houses at Bethlehem were assailed by a band of Pelagians, and Jerome was able to save his life only by a hurried flight to a stronghold, his monastery being demolished (*Ep.* cxxxviii.). Then came the death of Eustochium, his most devoted adherent, and shortly afterwards, on the 30th of September 420, Jerome himself, now old, lonely, and weary of life, passed away at Bethlehem (Prosper, *Chronicon*, ed. Mommsen, *Chron. min.* i. 469).

2. Writings.—Jerome left behind him a large and varied mass of literary work, which may be classified as follows.

(1) *Letters.*—These form the most valuable source of information regarding his life.[1] They are unquestionably the most brilliant productions of his fertile brain, and furnish a richly detailed picture of contemporary life and culture. They reflect his personality in the most vivid way. They date variously from the interval between 373 (*Ep.* i.) and 420 (*Ep.* cxliv.), and their contents show a great variety, letters treating of matters of scholarship, and, in particular, of exegesis, appearing among purely personal communications. Jerome corresponded with most of the outstanding people of his time—*e.g.*, Pope Damasus (*Epp.* xv., xvi., xix., xxi., xxxvi.), Theophilus of Alexandria (*Epp.* lxiii., lxxxii., lxxxvi., lxxxviii., xcix., cxiv.), Augustine (*Epp.* cii., ciii., cv., cxii., cxv., cxxxiv., cxli.–cxliii., possibly the most interesting group of the whole series, exhibiting, as they do, the diverse characters of the two greatest Fathers of the Western Church[2]), Paulinus of Nola (*Epp.* liii., lviii.), and Pammachius, the Roman senator who became a monk (*Epp.* xlviii., xlix., lvii., lxvi.). He writes with unusual fullness when he seeks to instruct his correspondents in the rudiments of the ascetic life—*e.g.*, in *Ep.* xxii., to Eustochium, on the preservation of virgin chastity; *Ep.* xiv. to Heliodorus, on the glory of the hermit's life; *Ep.* cvii., to Laeta, on the training of her daughter; *Ep.* liv., to Furia, and cxxiii., to Ageruchia, on maintaining the condition of widowhood; *Ep.* lii., to Nepotianus, on the life of clergy and monks. Engaging portraits of his associates are given in his obituary notices of Nepotianus (*Ep.* lx.), Fabiola (lxxvii.), Paula (cviii.), and Marcella (cxxvii.).

Ep. xxxiii., to Paula, on the writings of Varro and Origen, which Vallarsi (see Lit.) was able to give only in a fragmentary form, was first published in full by F. G. Ritschl, *Die Schriftstellerei des M. Terentius Varro und die des Origenes, nach dem ungedruckten Kataloge des Hieronymus*, Bonn, 1847.[3] Quite recently D. de Bruyne published four unquestionably genuine letters of Jerome, from MSS in the Escurial, in the *Revue bénédictine*, xxvii. [1910] 1–11, viz. two to the presbyter Riparius (to whom were addressed nos. cix. and cxxxviii. of the traditional collection), one to Bishop Boniface, and one to a certain Donatus. These newly discovered letters date from 418 and 419, and all alike deal with the Pelagian controversy. Two letters included by Vallarsi, viz. cxlviii., 'ad Celantiam matronam,' and cxlix., 'de Sollemnitatibus Paschae,' are certainly spurious, while the present writer is of opinion that the authenticity of the two 'ad amicum aegrotum,'[4] and of that 'ad Praesidium de cereo paschali,'[5] has not been proved.

(2) *Theological polemics.*[6]—The earliest of these is the *Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi* (Vallarsi, ii. 171 ff.), which was formerly supposed[7] to have

[1] On the chronology of the letters cf. Grützmacher, i. 40–100.
[2] Grützmacher, iii. 114–137.
[3] Cf. also J. B. Pitra, *Spicileg. Solesmense*, iii., Paris, 1855; E. Klostermann, *SBAW*, 1897, pp. 855–870.
[4] See C. Paucker, *Zeitschr. für die österreich. Gymnasien*, xxxi. [1880] 881–895.
[5] G. Morin, 'Un Écrit méconnu de S. Jérôme' in *Rev. bénédictine*, viii. [1891] 20–27.
[6] Cf. J. Brochet, *S. Jérôme et ses ennemis*, Paris, 1906; T. Trzcinski, *Die dogmatische Schriften des hell. Hieronymus*, Posen, 1912.
[7] So still Trzcinski, p. 33 ff.

been written in Antioch in 379, but, as the present writer thinks,[1] falls rather within the years of Jerome's stay in Rome (382–385). In this work, which is in the form of a dialogue, he assails the opinions of those who followed Lucifer of Calaris, and especially their non-recognition of heretical baptism. To 382–384 must likewise be assigned the treatise *adv. Helvidium de perpetua virginitate B. Mariæ*, in which—in opposition to Helvidius, a resident in Rome—Jerome supports the doctrine of Mary's perpetual virginity, asserting that the Lord's brethren were in fact his cousins. The *adv. Jovinianum libri II.* was composed in Bethlehem (392–393). Jovinian, the Roman ascetic, had asserted that the state of celibacy was in no way superior to that of widowhood or marriage, that the regenerate were essentially without sin, that fasting was of no peculiar merit, and that all the regenerate would attain the heavenly reward in equal degree. Jerome assailed the positions of Jovinian with great acerbity, awaking a resentment that forced him to vindicate himself in *Ep.* xlviii., the *Apologeticus ad Pammachium pro libris contra Jovinianum*, in which he somewhat modified the severity of his strictures upon marriage in the *adv. Jovinianum*. In 399, amid the controversy regarding the orthodoxy of Origen, he wrote the unfinished work *contra Johannem Hierosolymitanum* (John, bishop of Jerusalem). In 402 he composed his *Apologia adv. Rufinum* in two books, to which he added a third in the following year. These, together with the *Apology* (two books) of Rufinus against Jerome, form our most valuable authorities for the Origenistic controversy, in the course of which Jerome renounced the heresies of Origen. The short but extremely bitter pamphlet against the Spanish presbyter Vigilantius, in which Jerome defends the worship of martyrs and relics, the keeping of vigils, and the monastic life, dates from 406. Finally, in 415, he wrote the *Dialogus adv. Pelagianos* in three books—a work in masterly form, in which he seeks to controvert the views of Pelagius from the standpoint of the Catholic doctrine current in his day.

(3) *Historical works.*—The most extensive historical work from Jerome's pen is the *Chronicon omnimodæ historiæ* (*de Vir. Illust.* 135), a translation of the second part, *i.e.* the chronological tables, of the *Chronicles* of Eusebius of Cæsarea.[2] He followed the original as far as it went (A.D. 325), making additional notes, and then wrote a supplement covering the period between 325 and 378. In spite of many errors and oversights, the work is a mine of information for that period.

We have from Jerome's hand also three biographies of monks. The *Vita Pauli eremitæ* was written between 374 and 379, and its matter was in all likelihood drawn from the monastic traditions of Egypt,[3] though fancy plays a large part in its composition. The *Vita Malchi monachi captivi*, based upon information given to him by the aged Malchus himself in the wilderness of Chalcis,[4] and the *Vita Hilarionis* (the founder of monasticism in Southern Palestine)[5] date from the early years of Jerome's residence in Bethlehem (c. 386–391). All three are characteristic examples of the monastic literary *genre*.

The most important of Jerome's historical writings, however, is his *de Viris Illustribus*.[1] This once highly extolled work has been shown to be a gross instance of his literary methods;[2] it is virtually taken piecemeal from Eusebius, *HE*. Nevertheless, we cannot deny Jerome the distinction of having in this work made the first attempt to compose a history of Christian literature—a task in which he had many successors. The little book was translated into Greek by his friend Sophronius.[3]

(4) *Exegetical works.*—(*a*) Under this head come, first of all, three works dating from 386–391, viz. *de Situ et nominibus locorum Hebraicorum*—in reality a translation of the *Onomasticon* of Eusebius of Cæsarea,[4] and for modern scholars a valuable contribution to the topography of Palestine; *Interpretationes hebraicorum nominum*,[5] a work based, according to the preface, upon a now lost treatise of Philo, which Origen extended by adding the NT proper names; and *Quæstiones hebraicæ in libro Geneseos*,[6] an aphoristic commentary on Genesis, the value of which lies in the interpretations derived from the Jewish Haggādā and communicated to Jerome by the Rabbis—interpretations such as he uses also in his other OT commentaries.[7]

(*b*) *The OT commentaries.*—In 389–390 Jerome composed his commentary on Ecclesiastes; in 392 those on the Minor Prophets Nahum, Micah, Zephaniah, Haggai, and Habakkuk; in 395–396, on Jonah and Obadiah; and in 398 on the ten visions of Isaiah 13–26. During the period between 392 and 402 he wrote his *Commentarioli in Psalmos*.[8] In 406 came his exposition of Hosea, Joel, Amos, Zechariah, and Malachi; between 406 and 408, that of Daniel; 408–410, Isaiah; 410–415, Ezekiel; between 415 and his death in 420, Jeremiah. Jerome's work on the last-named book was interrupted by his death, no more than the first thirty-two chapters having been dealt with. These commentaries show a certain vacillation between the historical and allegorical methods, and are specially valuable because of the Jewish exegesis which they have brought down to us. In the exposition of Daniel, Jerome makes concessions to Porphyry.

(*c*) *The NT commentaries.*—In 386–387 Jerome wrote expositions of Philemon, Galatians, Ephesians, and Titus, in all of which he was specially indebted to the now lost commentaries of Origen. In 398 he composed his commentary on Matthew—valuable by reason of its extracts from the Gospel to the Hebrews. His translations of that Gospel into Greek and Latin are lost. We are unable to determine the date of his exposition of Revelation, which is in no sense an independent work, but an adaptation of the commentary of Victorinus of Pettau († 303), and in which the chiliastic interpretation of Victorinus is superseded by a spiritualistic one.[9]

[1] 'Die Abfassungszeit der *Altercatio*' in *ZKG* xxii. [1901] 1–8.

[2] Ed. A. Schoene, *Eusebi chronicorum canonum quæ supersunt*, Berlin, 1867 (with the *Quæstiones Hieronymianæ* as a preface); see also the critical supplements in i.², Berlin, 1875; further, the same writer's *Die Weltchronik des Eusebius in ihrer Bearbeitung durch Hieronymus*, Berlin, 1900.

[3] Cf. C. Butler, 'The Lausiac History of Palladius' in *TS* vi. ii. (Cambridge, 1898) 231 ff.

[4] Paul van den Ven, *S. Jérôme et la vie du moine Malchus le captif*, Louvain, 1901, in opposition to J. Kunze, 'Marcus Eremita und Hieronymus' in *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, xix. [1898] 391–398.

[5] O. Zöckler, 'Hilarion von Gaza, eine Rettung der Geschichtlichkeit' in *Neue Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, iii. [1894] 146–178, in opposition to W. Israel, 'Die Vita S. Hilarionis des Hieronymus als Quelle für die Anfänge des Mönchtums kritisch untersucht' in *ZWT* xxiii. [1880] 129–165.

[1] Critical ed., C. A. Bernoulli, *Hieronymus und Gennadius, de viris illustribus*, Freiburg, 1895.

[2] S. von Sychowski, *Hieronymus als Litterarhistoriker*, Munster, 1894; C. A. Bernoulli, *Der Schriftstellerkatalog des Hieronymus*, Freiburg, 1895.

[3] G. Wentzel, 'Die griechische Übersetzung der viri illust. des Hieronymus,' *TU* xiii. 3 (Leipzig, 1895).

[4] Critical ed., P. de Lagarde, *Onomastica sacra*², Göttingen, 1887, pp. 117–190.

[5] Critical ed., *ib.* pp. 25–116.

[6] Critical ed., P. de Lagarde, Leipzig, 1868.

[7] Cf. M. Rahmer, *Die hebräischen Traditionen in den Werken des Hieronymus*, pt. i. (Breslau, 1861); pt. ii. in *MGWJ* xlv ff. (1865 ff.).

[8] Re-discovered in the pseudo-Hieronymian *Breviarium in Psalmos*, and published in the *Anecdota Maredsolana*, iii. 1, Maredsous, 1895, by G. Morin.

[9] J. Haussleiter, 'Die Kommentare des Victorinus, Tichonius und Hieronymus zur Apokalypse' in *ZKWL* vii. [1886]; also 'Der chiliastische Schlussabschnitt im echten Apokalypsen-

(5) *Translations.*—A number of the works mentioned above are in part more translations. But Jerome's renderings of Origen's *Homilies*—fourteen on Jeremiah, fourteen on Ezekiel, and nine on Isaiah—are translations pure and simple, and were finished between 379 and 381.[1] Between 382 and 384 he translated two *Homilies* of Origen on the Song of Songs; between 386 and 391 the *de Spiritu Sancto* of Didymus; between 388 and 391 thirty-nine *Homilies* of Origen on Luke; and in 404 the *Monastic Rules* of Pachomius, Theodore, and Orsisius, and also their *Letters* and their *Verba mystica* designed for Paula's monasteries. Of his literal translation of Origen's chief systematic work, *de Principiis*, which he executed (399) with the intention of crushing out the very incorrect version of Rufinus, only a few fragments remain in *Ep.* cxxiv., 'ad Avitum.'[2]

Jerome's most outstanding achievement in translation, however, is his version of the Bible, to which he devoted some twenty years of intense industry, and in which—in spite of many defects—he exercised an almost unique gift as a translator. In the NT his work is merely a revision of the Old Latin text. He worked at the four Gospels from 382 to 384, at the Pauline Epistles till 385, and at the remaining books till 398.[3] In the OT he began with a revision (384) of the Old Latin Psalter from the LXX version—the so-called *Psalterium Romanum*; and between 386 and 391 he made a second revision, from the Hexaplar (Theodotion's) version of the LXX—the *Psalterium Gallicanum*. He likewise revised the Latin text of other OT books from the Hexapla, but of these only his revision of Job[4] and his prefaces to the Solomonic books (Vallarsi, x. 435) and Chronicles (*ib.* 433) survive.

Jerome began his translation of the OT from Hebrew—the *veritas Hebraica*—into Latin before 392. He translated, first of all, the two books of Samuel and the two of Kings, but issued beforehand the famous *Prologus Galeatus* (Vallarsi, ix. 453 ff.), in which he accepts the Hebrew canon, enumerating twenty-two canonical books, and excluding the Apocrypha. By 393 he had completed the sixteen Prophets (including Daniel) and the Psalms,[5] Job followed in 393, Ezra and Nehemiah before 395, Chronicles in 396, the Solomonic Books in 398, the Pentateuch in 398–404, Esther in 404, and Joshua, Judges, and Ruth in 404–5. He likewise made a most perfunctory translation of the Apocryphal Books of Judith and Tobit from the Aramaic, but we are unable to fix the date of these versions. In spite of numerous errors, Jerome's translation of the Bible is a most praiseworthy achievement, inasmuch as, taken all in all, it maintains a sort of middle course between an extreme literality on one hand and an extreme freedom on the other.[6]

(6) Finally, a number of Jerome's *discourses* on texts from the Psalms, Mark, and other books of Scripture have come down to us. They were preached between 392 and 401 to the inmates of his monastery, and were afterwards committed to writing by them.[1]

3. Significance.—Jerome was no great creative spirit, as was Augustine, but he was certainly the most learned of the Latin Fathers. Not only was he equipped with an extensive knowledge of profane and sacred literature, but he surpassed all the Fathers in his mastery of Hebrew. His significance lies in the fact that he stands supreme among those who mediated the religious heritage of Hebrew and Greek antiquity to the Latin world. His personality was not of the most attractive kind, although the strictures passed upon him in this respect—*e.g.*, by Luther—are often unduly severe. He had the natural temperament of the scholar, but his work is frequently impaired by lack of thoroughness. He was passionate and sensuous, yet he was the champion of the most rigid asceticism. Full of petty vanity and learned rivalry, he was self-assertive and unjust towards his opponents; and, though destitute of the constructive theologian's gift, he liked to pose as a pillar of orthodoxy. By his translation of the Bible he exercised an immense influence upon the development of the Church and its theology in succeeding centuries, and in that work he produced what must be numbered among the supreme achievements of the Christian mind in any age.

LITERATURE.—Books dealing with special parts or aspects of Jerome's work have been fully referred to in the course of the article. Here we note further:—

i. COMPLETE EDD. OF HIS WORKS.—D. Erasmus, 9 vols., Basel, 1516–20; Marianus Victorius, Bishop of Rieti, 9 vols., Rome, 1565–72; J. Martianay and A. Pouget, 5 vols., Paris, 1693–1706; Dominicus Vallarsi, 11 vols., Verona, 1734–42, and 11 vols., Venice, 1766–72, the latter reprinted in Migne, *PL* xxii.–xxx.; *CSEL*, Vienna, containing so far *Ep.* i.–lxx. (vol. liv.), and *Ep.* lxxi.–cxx. (vol. lv.), ed. J. Hilbery, 1910 and 1912, and *In Hieremiam prophetam libri sex* (vol. lix.), ed. S. Reiter, 1913.

ii. BIOGRAPHIES.—S. L. de Tillemont, *Mémoires pour servir à l'hist. eccles.*, xii., Paris, 1707; D. Vallarsi, *Vita Hieronymi*, in *Opera*, xi., Verona, 1742; J. Stilting, in *AS*, Sept. viii. [1865] 418–688; L. Engelstoft, *Hieronymus Stridonensis interpres, criticus, exegeta, historicus, doctor, monachus*, Copenhagen, 1797; F. Z. Collombet, *Hist. de S. Jérôme*, 2 vols., Paris, 1844; O. Zöckler, *Hieronymus, sein Leben und Wirken aus seinen Schriften dargestellt*, Gotha, 1865; A. Thierry, *S. Jérôme, la société chrétienne à Rome et l'émigration romaine en Terre-Sainte*, 2 vols., Paris, 1867, ²1875; G. Grützmacher, *Hieronymus, eine biographische Studie zur alten Kirchengeschichte* 3 vols., Berlin, 1901–08.

G. GRÜTZMACHER.

JESUITS.—1. Origin.—The Jesuits, or members of the Society of Jesus, are technically an institute of 'Clerks Regular,' men devoted especially to the cure of souls and to the works of mercy spiritual and corporal, like the Theatines, *e.g.*, or the Barnabites (*q.v.*), both of which are slightly older in date. The Society is not a sect nor even a theological school, but simply a religious Order (that is to say, a body of men living under vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience), which, though differing in many respects from the old monastic ideal, has its recognized place in the organization of the Roman Catholic Church. In accordance with this, it is obvious that the term 'Jesuitism,' which, almost as much as the word 'Jesuitry,' originated with critics who attribute to the Order a certain distinctive spirit independent of, and more or less in conflict with, the teaching of the Church to which it belongs, would be deprecated by all who bear the name of Jesuits, in so far as it implies the existence of a doctrine, system, policy, or line of conduct peculiar to them. Let it be said at the outset that it was certainly not the object of the founder to create such a spirit. Nothing would have been more abhorrent to St. Ignatius Loyola than the erection of an *imperium*

kommentar des Bischofs Victorinus von Pettau' in *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, xvi. [1895] 193–199; cf. also Grützmacher, iii. 235–240.

[1] The authenticity of the version of the *Homilies* on Isaiah was questioned by Vallarsi, with whom O. Zöckler agrees. The present writer (i. 18) regards the translation as indubitably Jerome's.

[2] Vallarsi, i. 916–922.

[3] Critical ed., *Novum Testamentum . . . Latine secundum editionem S. Hieronymi. Ad codicum manuscriptorum fidem recensuit J. Wordsworth . . . adiunto H. J. White*, Oxford, 1889–98 (only the four Gospels published as yet).

[4] P. de Lagarde, 'Des Hieronymus Übertragung der griechischen Übersetzung des Hiob,' *Mitteilungen*, ii. [Göttingen, 1887] 189–237; C. P. Caspari, *Das Buch Hiob 1¹–38¹⁶ in Hieronymus' Übersetzung aus der alexandrinischen Version nach einer St. Gallener Handschrift sæc. viii.*, Christiania, 1893.

[5] P. de Lagarde, *Psalterium iuxta Hebræos Hieronymi*, Leipzig, 1874; H. Ehrensberger, *Psalterium vetus und die Psalterien des heil. Hieronymus*, Tauberbischofsheim, 1887.

[6] W. Nowack, *Die Bedeutung des Hieronymus für die alttest. Textkritik*, Göttingen, 1875; G. Hoberg, *De S. Hieronymi rations interpretandi*, Bonn, 1886.

[1] These sermons were re-discovered by G. Morin and published by him in the *Anecdota Maredsolana*, iii. 2 (1897), 3 (1900).

in imperio either in the domain of external discipline or in the domain of ideas. At a crisis when many were falling away, his one aim was to provide a company of devoted priests wholly subservient to the needs of the Church, ready for any form of service, and for greater expedition made immediately dependent upon the will of the sovereign pontiff. The spirit of his Society was to be exceptional only in this, that its members, as the result of a religious training unusually protracted and severe, were to be men formed upon the model of Jesus Christ Himself, full of zeal, detachment, and self-sacrifice, and of a virtue so highly tempered that they might safely be exposed to an extraordinary strain. This was the founder's conception, and it was realized by many of his followers, especially in his own lifetime and in the first century or two after his death. To admit that with the lapse of years some relaxation of these high ideals may have taken place in the Order is only to admit that the work of Ignatius was a human work and was carried out by human means.

Ignatius Loyola (*q.v.*), converted from a careless, if not a sinful, life during the long convalescence which followed a wound received in battle (1521), determined to fit himself for an apostolic vocation by the study of theology. Passing from Alcalà to Salamanca and from Salamanca to Paris, he there (1528–35) gathered a handful of companions around him, who in 1534 took vows of poverty and chastity together, and, placing themselves shortly afterwards at the disposal of the Holy See, were formally approved as a religious Order by Pope Paul III., 27 Sept. 1540. Although it may be said that Loyola felt his way only by degrees to the complete organization of the Society which he founded, one dominant idea is discernible in all his projects. From the first, as might be expected of an old soldier, his conception was a military one. The Spanish name of the Order, Compañía de Jesus, though it may be correctly translated 'Society of Jesus,' is at least patient of a military interpretation. It probably first conveyed the idea of a 'company,' *i.e.* a band commanded by a captain. The term Jesuit (Jesuita), let us note parenthetically, was not chosen by the founder. It appears first in 1544, and was then used by opponents as a nickname (see Astrain, *Hist.* i. 183), but eventually was tacitly acquiesced in even by members of the Order. The military conception is specially emphasized in the fundamental meditations of the 'Spiritual Exercises,' that manual of ascetical training devised by Loyola and communicated to his followers, to be used first of all in securing their own progress in virtue, and afterwards for the salvation of their neighbours. The characteristic meditations known as the 'Kingdom of Christ' and the 'Two Standards' are parables of human warfare. In the first Jesus Christ is set before us as a leader appealing for volunteers in a crusade against the infidel. In view of His promise that in all hardships He will share alike with His men and that they shall share with Him the fruits of victory, the conclusion is pressed home that no right-minded Christian who possesses a spark of knightly courage can remain deaf to such a call. In the 'Two Standards' the character of the spiritual campaign is more closely studied. It is pointed out that the tactics of the enemy Satan are to enchain mankind and drag them down by love of money, worldliness, and pride. From this the conclusion is drawn that the only effective combatant on the side of Christ is the man who has bound himself to a life of actual poverty and humiliation after the example of the leader Himself. It is plain that all this makes appeal to two of the strongest instincts of human nature, instincts deeply rooted in the Spaniards of Loyola's day, viz. loyalty to the feudal chieftain, and the spirit of generous fortitude.

Now, it is this military ideal which above all supplies justification for the 'blind' obedience which Ignatius desired to be the distinctive characteristic of his followers.

> 'More easily,' he wrote in his famous letter on obedience, 'may we suffer ourselves to be surpassed by other religious Orders in fasting, watching, and other austerities of diet and clothing which they practise according to their rule, but in true and perfect obedience and the abnegation of our will and judgment, I greatly desire, most dear brethren, that those who serve God in this Society should be conspicuous.'

Insubordination is the soldier's most unforgivable crime, discipline a virtue which, so far as great bodies of men are concerned, comes even before courage. Consequently, in the military organization of his Compañía, Ignatius insisted on obedience most of all. 'Theirs not to make reply, theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die,' must be the soldierly ideal as long as the world lasts. And this was especially true of such a force as the Spanish knight had conceived, a lightly equipped force ready to take the field at a moment's notice in any forlorn hope, whatever the nature of the service required of them. The blind obedience of the Jesuits has often been made a matter of reproach, but in point of fact it was never meant by the founder to be an entirely blind obedience. It was 'cacca *quaedam* obedientia' even to him, and in almost every context when speaking of obedience he limited its scope to things which were not sinful. For example, he says (*Summarium*, cap. 31) that his disciples

> 'must endeavour to be resigned interiorly . . . conforming their will and judgment wholly to the Superior's will and judgment in all things in which no sin is perceptible' ('in omnibus ubi peccatum non cerneretur').

The charge that St. Ignatius in the very text of his *Constitutions* (lib. vi. cap. 5) empowers a superior to bind his subjects to obedience even though compliance with the order involves the commission of a grievous sin—the famous *obligatio ad peccatum*—is based on a ridiculous misinterpretation of a formula well known to the earlier canonists (see Duhr, *Jesuiten-Fabeln*, p. 515 ff., and Monod's preface to Boehmer, *Les Jésuites*). Many writers, like L. von Ranke, John Addington Symonds, J. N. Figgis, and others, who have at first made this accusation upon inadequate evidence, have afterwards withdrawn it when they have given themselves time to consider the texts at leisure. Always regarding the priests of his Order as a *corps d'élite* likely to be called upon for special service, Loyola saw the necessity of, besides perfect obedience, equipment by an extremely severe training. Instead of a single year of noviceship, as in the older Orders, two years, abounding in tests of the most varied kind, were imposed upon every candidate before he was permitted to take vows. Even then the vows were 'simple,' not solemn. The recruit was bound to the Society, but not the Society to the recruit, and the Father General might still at any time dismiss him if he proved unsuitable. Practically speaking, a state of things soon resulted in which ordination to the priesthood could not be conferred much before the age of thirty, and the public vows, which finally marked a recruit's acceptance as a 'formed' member of the body, were even then permitted only after a sort of second noviceship, known as the 'third year of probation.' Thus, apart from a few exceptional cases, the fully fledged Jesuit was and is bound to be a man well over thirty, who for at least a dozen years has been going through a process of formation under strict control, a large part of the time having been spent in study, three years in purely spiritual discipline, and, ordinarily speaking, another long period in the teaching or moral supervision of youth. Such a system seems

well calculated in itself to produce a type of ecclesiastic fitted to cope with the difficulties and temptations of an apostolic life. It stands, at any rate, in acute contrast to the haste with which the earlier monastic and mendicant Orders often bound their members by solemn and irrevocable vows before they were well out of their teens. In its devotional aspects the training of the members of the Society is based entirely upon the book of 'Spiritual Exercises' compiled by their founder. Every year for eight days, and twice in early life for a period of a month continuously, each Jesuit, leaving all other occupations, devotes himself to 'making the Exercises,' thus to renew the memory of the principles upon which his choice of a vocation is founded. It was an extension of this practice in a modified form to select bodies of the clergy, students, sodalities, and whole parishes which first brought into vogue the system of retreats and missions which has found universal favour in the Church of Rome, and has of late years become prevalent among the more advanced type of Anglicans.

2. Organization.—As regards the organization of the Society of Jesus not much need be said. The *Constitutions*, by which the Order is still governed, were drawn up by Loyola himself, but tardily and with some reluctance. His first idea had been that too many rules would hamper that adaptability to every apostolic purpose which was what he most desired to see in the institute that he had founded. A brief outline of the conception and purpose of the new Order is incorporated in the first papal bull of approbation, *Regimini militantis ecclesiæ*, 27 Sept. 1540, but the *Constitutions* themselves were not compiled until towards the close of Ignatius's life, and were only approved by the General Congregation which met in 1558 after his death to elect his successor. Still, they were entirely the Saint's own work, as the facsimile edition of the Spanish text (Rome, 1908), corrected and annotated in his own handwriting, plainly shows. The story that Laynez, the second General, introduced important modifications is quite untrue. The military character of the Society appears in its very autocratic government. The bull of Gregory XIV., *Ecclesiae Catholicae*, approving the *Constitutions* in every detail, calls the government frankly 'monarchical and dependent on the will of a single superior.' The General is elected for life and his authority is supreme, though his power is in some measure controlled by an 'admonitor' and a small council of 'assistants' representing groups of 'provinces.' At present there are five assistancies—those of Italy, Spain, Germany, France, and the English-speaking countries. The organization of the whole Order in 'provinces,' each governed by a 'provincial,' is a matter of convenient administration, but every 'provincial' and 'rector,' the last being the title given to the superiors of the more important colleges and residences, is appointed by the General himself, not nominated by any intermediate official or elected by the votes of his subordinates. In a certain more strict sense only those who have taken their final public vows, viz. the 'professed fathers' and 'formed coadjutors,' are, properly speaking, members of the Order. The scholastics preparing for ordination, and also the novices, are indeed accounted as belonging to the body and share in its privileges, but their connexion with it is probationary and terminable. To the existence of these different categories (the technicalities of which, often borrowed from the older canonists, are not readily understood by the ordinary reader) is probably due the wide-spread fiction that there exist among the Jesuits various degrees of initiation like those of the Freemasons. This idea, as well as that of an organization of crypto-Jesuits and secret emissaries, has been largely fostered by romance writers of the type of Dumas *père* and still more seriously by the dissemination of the notorious *Monita Secreta*, a supposed Jesuit code of secret instructions, the apocryphal character of which is now universally recognized (on this see Duhr, *Jesuiten-Fabeln*, ch. 5; Brou, *Les Jésuites de la légende*, i. 275–301; and Monod's Introduction to Boehmer, *Les Jésuites*, pp. lxii–lxx). One circumstance which probably helped to render these and many similar fables more credible was the air of mystery which long enshrouded the *Constitutions*, the papal privileges, and even the 'Spiritual Exercises' of the Society. All such documents were duly submitted to and approved by the highest ecclesiastical authority (see, *e.g.*, the bulls *Quanto fructuosius* and *Ascendente Domino*, published by Gregory XIII. in 1583 and 1584). The text was also printed at an early date—that of the Exercises in 1548, the *Constitutions* in 1558–59 and repeatedly afterwards—but these copies were only for private use and were not sold to the public. Members of the Order were further distinctly forbidden to lend or show such documents to outsiders. Two reasons seem to have weighed with Ignatius in issuing this prohibition. First, the organization of the Society departed in many notable respects from the manner of life of the older religious Orders. He did not want uselessly to awaken attention, challenge criticism, and probably provoke jealousy by proclaiming these differences to all the world. They were, after all, of no concern to anybody but the members of the Order. Further, in many of these innovations, and particularly in the case of the 'Spiritual Exercises,' the written text, when taken apart from oral tradition, might easily be misinterpreted and misrepresented. The giving of the Exercises was held to be a special art. They formed, in fact, a spiritual pharmacopœia which, like the dispensing of bodily medicines, ought not to be committed to inexperienced hands. One thing at any rate is obvious. These same *Constitutions*, privileges, and secret instructions which the Society has been accused of guarding so jealously from profane eyes are now to be found in every public library.[1] On the many occasions when the Order has been expelled from the different cities and States of Europe, even apart from the general suppression of 1773, their books, MSS, and most secret papers have over and over again been seized. Many public collections contain hundreds of volumes of such impounded papers. The Jesuits must have been clever indeed, and their assailants the most bungling of police agents, if they always succeeded in destroying the evidence of the existence of an inner circle of initiates conspiring against the political and moral order of the world. The *Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten*, published by Döllinger and Reusch in 1888–89, is a work which is almost entirely based upon papers of the Jesuits seized at the time of the suppression of the Society; but, despite the strong anti-Jesuit feeling of the editors, those who go to this work in search of startling revelations of moral depravity will surely be much disappointed.

3. Criticisms.—Perhaps the charge which has most seriously weighed upon the Order, and which has at any rate entailed the most serious consequences in rendering them obnoxious to anti-clerical governments, is the accusation of teaching the lawfulness of tyrannicide. That Juan Mariana († 1624) and some of the earlier moralists of the Society did, though with many safeguards and

[1] *e.g.*, two copies of the first ed. of the *Constitutions*, 1558–59, are in the British Museum Library, as well as numerous other editions.

qualifications, admit the view may readily be granted, but in this they were simply echoing the doctrine of many highly respected mediæval moralists, beginning with John of Salisbury—a doctrine, moreover, cordially endorsed by not a few of the reformers, *e.g.* by John Ponet and John Knox. Attempts, of course, are repeatedly made to connect such outrages as the assassination of Henry III. and Henry IV. of France, of William the Silent, of Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, etc., or, again, the Gunpowder Plot, with the teaching and influence of the Jesuits. The weakness of the evidence on which such charges are based cannot be adequately illustrated here, but it may be pointed out that refutations have been published on the Jesuit side in such books as the *Jesuiten-Fabeln* of Duhr and the similar French work of Brou. Nor are there wanting independent writers (see, *e.g.*, A. Marks, *Who Killed Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey?*, London, 1905) who range themselves on the Jesuit side.

The much-abused casuistry of the Jesuits stands upon precisely the same footing as their alleged advocacy of tyrannicide. To begin with, they did not create this branch of theological study. The casuists of the Society from the first based their conclusions entirely upon the similar though less methodical speculations of the mediæval doctors and canonists, such men, *e.g.*, as St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Antoninus of Florence. The same reproaches which are usually levelled against Jesuit casuistry might be directed with equal justice, or lack of justice, against the casuistry of their contemporaries who were not Jesuits, and indeed against the moral teaching of the whole Catholic Church. The Jesuits have drawn the fire of opposing critics simply because their text-books were the most widely appealed to and most commonly used. No one really conversant with the subject will maintain that the Jesuits either now form or formed in the past a school of ethics marked off from that of the Dominicans, or that of St. Sulpice, or even that of the Redemptorists, by its disedifying laxity. The famous 'Probabilism' of the Society is based upon a very simple maxim, *lex dubia non obligat*, which in ordinary life is acted upon as the dictate of simple common sense (see the book *Quos ego*, by 'Pilatus' [Viktor Naumann], a non-Catholic writer, published in 1903 in answer to the attacks of von Hoensbroech). So, again, the principle that 'the end justifies the means,' while in certain texts it may obviously bear a quite innocent meaning, has always been repudiated by the Society in its absolute and immoral signification. (This charge has also been copiously dealt with by Duhr, Brou, and many other writers.) No doubt much of the disfavour which attaches to the casuistry of the Jesuits is due to the *Lettres provinciales* of Pascal. The Jansenist champion in these brilliant satires dealt a heavier blow than he foresaw or probably intended. He himself knew enough of the Jesuits to be aware that a sort of cynical indifference to right and wrong could not be laid to their charge. He also knew that the cultured audience whom he first addressed were equally far from believing that the religious brethren of St. François Régis, and such men as Maunoir, Binet, Suffren, and before long Bourdaloue, were so many Machiavellis. But both he and his readers found it most entertaining to see them cleverly travestied in that character. The humour of the letters was at first more that of a caricature than of a satire, and it is here probably that we shall find an excuse for the truncated and unfair quotations from Jesuit moralists that the letters contain. It was only at a later stage that Pascal pledged himself to the accuracy which would be expected in serious polemics. His work, published anonymously, was primarily a *jeu d'esprit*. But, as time went on, thanks partly to the bitterness of the Jansenist controversy, and partly to the pardonable indignation and recriminations in deadly earnest of the victims themselves, the attack was understood much more seriously, and it is now quite commonly treated as if it were a protest of outraged virtue against a corruption which threatened all the moral standards. In point of fact, these technicalities and extreme positions dealt with in the folios of the casuists debating hypothetical problems from their closets have as little influence upon general conduct as such constitutional maxims as 'the King can do no wrong,' etc., have upon practical politics. If the Jesuits were the unprincipled teachers of lax morality that their opponents contend they were, the laxity might be expected to show itself first in their own lives; but even the most prejudiced admit that the standard of personal conduct in the Society has been a high one.

4. Aims and development.—Although the development of the Jesuit Order and the work of the Counter-Reformation went hand in hand, it would be an error to suppose that Ignatius instituted his Compañía with the definite purpose of combating Protestantism. If its best energies were expended in this service, the fact was due to influence from outside. As already indicated, Loyola's conception of a troop highly trained and lightly equipped so as to be ready for any emergency, contemplated dispassionately every form of work which was 'ad majorem Dei gloriam.' For this reason the letters A.M.D.G. may be regarded as forming in some sense the badge of the Society. But in the very earliest draft of the institute three different fields of labour were singled out as especially proper to its members. These were to teach the young, to preach to the ignorant and the heathen, and to guide Christians to perfection. The last of those ends was to be attained by hearing confessions and giving the Exercises. The second was held of such importance that the professed Fathers, the *élite* of the Society, added to the three solemn vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience a fourth vow, pledging them to start upon any mission at home or abroad when desired by the sovereign pontiff, even at the risk of life, and even if they had to beg their way to their destination. The catechetical instruction of the ignorant, or, as it was commonly called, the teaching of the 'doctrina Christiana,' was closely related to this missionary idea. The founder insisted that such employments should be recognized as not beneath the dignity, but, on the contrary, as the proper work, of even the most learned members of the Order.

In the field of missionary enterprise the achievements of the Society have been remarkable. Beginning with the wonderful career of St. Francis Xavier in India and Japan (1541-52), we might pass to the labours, partly apostolic, partly scientific, of M. Ricci, J. A. Schall von Bell, and F. Verbiest in China (1600-89), or to the heroic courage shown by the French Fathers, *e.g.* J. de Brébeuf, C. Lalemant, I. Jogues, J. Marquette, etc., between 1632 and 1685 among the American Indians. See for all this the impartial testimony of F. Parkman in his *Jesuits in North America*[3], London, 1885. Even more famous were the 'reductions' established among the Indians of Paraguay; nor does the splendid work accomplished here fail to make itself felt even in such lively pages as those of R. B. Cunninghame Graham's *A Vanished Arcadia*, London, 1901. But there is hardly any part of the earth's surface in which the Jesuit missionaries have not laboured. Five Fathers went to the Congo at the instance of the king of Portugal as

early as 1547. Five sailed for Brazil in 1549, where the labours of Father Joseph Anchieta in particular were soon to make him known as the apostle of all that vast region. In 1559 ten Jesuits started for Abyssinia, founding a mission whose wonderful story is told in a long series of volumes now being published at the expense of the Italian government, by C. Beccari. In the same year, 1559, three other priests began to labour among the Kāfirs of South Africa, and a couple of years later two others reached Memphis in Upper Egypt. In 1568 a great missionary work was inaugurated by the arrival of Portillo and eight companions in Peru. Before fifty years had expired, the Peruvian Jesuits were divided into two separate 'provinces,' while a hardly less thriving centre had been established in Mexico, whither thirteen Jesuits sailed for the first time in 1572. In 1615, St. Peter Claver began his extraordinary apostolate among the Negro slaves of Carthagena (see M. D. Petre, *Æthiopum Servus*, London, 1895). A mission was sent to the Tatars of the Black Sea region in 1603. In 1624 A. de Rhodes opened up a new field of labour in Tongking, and in the same year Antonio de Andrade reached the heart of Tibet. But the record is endless. Of course there were many reverses. A Church which before long numbered over 300,000 converts had been founded by Xavier in Japan, but between 1600 and 1640 every missionary was killed or deported, and Christianity was exterminated by fire and sword (see M. Steichen, *The Christian Daimyos*, Tokyo, 1903). In most other countries, despite contradictions, and in particular the domestic troubles originated by the controversy over the lawfulness of the 'Chinese rites,' the missions maintained a vigorous growth until the suppression of the Society in 1773.

The third special work of the Order was the education of youth; and here also, as soon as the Jesuits began to set up colleges of their own, their success was remarkable. A more or less uniform method and arrangement of studies was contemplated from the first. But the rough draft *de Studiis Societatis Jesu*, outlined by Jerome Nadal between 1548 and 1552, reached its full development only after much discussion and experiment in the *Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum S.J.* of 1599. (Important collections of documents relating to the Society's educational methods and aims may be found in the four volumes contributed by G. M. Pachtler to the *Monumenta Germaniæ Pædagogica*, Berlin, 1887 ff., and in the volume of *Monumenta Pædagogica* published by the Madrid Fathers, Madrid, 1901.) Perhaps no more convincing tribute can be found to the educational success of the Jesuits than the fact that in 1605 Bacon in England could write of them as follows:

'Education: which excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in regard of their superstition I may say *Quo meliores, eo deteriores*, yet in regard of this, and some other points concerning human learning and moral matters, I may say, as Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, *Talis quum sis, utinam noster esses*' (*Advancement of Learning*, bk. i.).

In 1584 the Collegio Romano had 2108 students. At Rouen the attendance averaged 2000. For a great part of the 17th cent. the scholars at the college of Louis le Grand, Paris, varied from 1800 to 3000. In 1615 the Society had 373 colleges and seminaries under its direction. In 1706 the number of collegiate and university establishments had risen to 769. Schwickerath computes that, when the Order, towards the close of the 17th cent., was at the height of its educational fame, the number of students attending its classes at any one time must have amounted to a total of 200,000. As regards the growth of the Jesuit body itself we may note that, while at the death of St. Ignatius in 1556 there were 12 provinces and 1000 members of the Order all told, these numbers at the death of Laynez, the second General, nine years later, had increased to 18 provinces and 3500 Jesuits. In 1615, at the death of Acquaviva, the fifth General, there were 32 provinces and 13,112 members, and in 1770 just before the suppression 42 provinces and 23,000 members. No Jesuit has ever been elected pope, and comparatively few have been created cardinals or raised to high office in the Church, but it must be remembered that all professed Fathers take a vow to accept no ecclesiastical dignity, and from this vow they can be released only by the express command of the Holy See.

The Jesuit Order, in virtue of its monarchical government, its centralization, and its special vow of obedience to the pope, has always inclined to an extreme ultramontanism. This has constantly brought it into conflict with nationalist movements, while, on the other hand, its independence of episcopal control and its claims, whether justified or not, to figure as a *corps d'élite* have often made the secular clergy somewhat lukewarm in its defence. Add to this the bitter attacks and calumnies of its avowed enemies, the free-thinkers, Evangelicals, Jansenists, etc., and we have probably sufficient explanation, even apart from the prayer of the founder that persecution should be their lot, for the numerous decrees of banishment of which they have been the object. In the latter half of the 18th cent. the spread of infidelity and corruption of morals, especially in France, together with the political intrigues of the ministers of the Bourbon princes, led to a combined attack upon the very existence of the Society. Pretexts were naturally found in the indiscretions or alleged misconduct of some individual members of the Order—the bankruptcy of Father A. Lavalette in certain commercial transactions connected with the missions being the most serious of these. As a result the Jesuits were banished and their property was confiscated in Portugal (1759), France (1765), Spain and its dependencies (1767), and, finally, Naples (1767). A few years later the pressure brought to bear upon Pope Clement XIV. was so great that he yielded to the storm, and in 1773 published a brief suppressing the Society altogether. Strangely enough, in White Russia the autocrat Empress Catherine would not allow the decree of suppression to be promulgated, and a few Jesuits still held together. After the French Revolution, Pope Pius VII. approved their corporate existence and eventually, in 1814, restored the Society by the bull *Sollicitudo omnium ecclesiarum*. Since then the Order, though with many vicissitudes, has again established itself in all European countries, in N. and S. America, and in many of the old mission fields; it has resumed the work of education; and at present it numbers in all some 17,000 members.

LITERATURE.—The literature relating to the Jesuits is vast, and for a relatively complete bibliography the reader must be referred to some such work as that of Max Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der kathol. Kirche*[2], Paderborn, 1908, iii. 1–258, esp. 1–12, or to the art. 'Society of Jesus' in *CE* xiv. 81. The ten volumes of C. Sommervogel and A. de Backer, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*[3], Paris, 1890–1909, not only contain an enumeration of all the books and editions published by the Jesuits, but also, in vol. x., an elaborate classification of subjects—*e.g.*, on pp. 1010–1020 we have a list of apologetic works written by Jesuits in defence of the Society in reply to such assailants as Pascal and Quinet. Bibliographies compiled from a more or less antagonistic point of view may be found in *PRE*[3] viii. 742 ff., and in G. Monod and H. Boehmer, *Les Jésuites*, Paris, 1910, pp. 295–301.

The more important MS sources for the early history of the Order are all being critically edited by the Jesuits of Madrid in the series of *Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu*. These include a very complete edition of the letters of St. Ignatius as also of documents emanating from nearly all the companions of the founder, notably St. Francis Xavier, Laynez, Blessed Peter Faber, St. Francis Borgia, etc. Another remarkable collection

is that of O. Braunsberger, *Petri Canisii epistulæ et acta*, Freiburg, 1896 ff., of which six volumes have now appeared.

Many documents connected with the history of the Jesuits in France have been published by A. Carayon, *Documents inédits concernant la Compagnie de Jésus*, 23 vols., Poitiers, 1863–86, and J. M. Prat, *Recherches historiques*, 5 vols., Lyons, 1875–79. For Great Britain, Henry Foley has edited *Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus*, 7 vols., London, 1875–83, and John Morris, *The Troubles of our Catholic Forefathers*, 3 vols., do. 1872–77, as also *The Condition of Catholics under James I.*[2], do. 1872, and other works. Much original material concerning Scottish Jesuits may be found in W. Forbes Leith, *Narratives of Scottish Catholics*, do. 1885, and *Memoirs of Scottish Catholics*, 2 vols., do. 1909. With regard to the foreign missions, collections of letters from Japan, China, North America, etc., are too numerous to mention in detail, but prominence may be given to the great American undertaking of R. G. Thwaites, *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, 73 vols., Cleveland, 1896–1901, and to the *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses*, of which the first edition, prepared by C. Le Gobien and others, appeared in 34 vols. at Paris in 1702 ff.

Of general histories of the Jesuits the best known is that of J. Crétineau-Joly, *Histoire religieuse, politique et littéraire de la Compagnie de Jésus*[3], 6 vols., Paris, 1851. It has been translated into various languages, and an abridgment has been published in English by B. N[eave], *The Jesuits, their Foundation and History*, 2 vols., London, 1879. It is admitted by all, however, that Crétineau-Joly's work is uncritical and extravagantly eulogistic. On the other hand, most of the histories written professedly from a hostile standpoint—*e.g.*, those of T. Griesinger, *The Jesuits*[2], do. 1885; G. B. Nicolini, *Hist. of Jesuits*, do. 1854; W. H. Rule, *Celebrated Jesuits*, 2 vols., do. 1853, and even that published quite recently by J. McCabe (*A Candid History of the Jesuits*, do. 1913)—are mere caricatures and quite untrustworthy. More sober accounts are given by Steitz-Zöckler in *PRE*[3] viii. 742–784, and by Monod-Boehmer, *op. cit.*; but these are, of course, only summaries. A detailed Latin chronicle, *Historiæ Societatis Jesu*, of which the first volume, by N. Orlandini, was published in 1614, was carried on by F. Sacchino, J. Jouvancy, and J. C. Cordara, down to the year 1633. It occupies six folio volumes, but is never likely to be continued. In place of this a history on much more modern and scientific lines was organized by the late General of the Society, Louis Martin. According to this scheme, each 'Assistancy' is to publish its own history in its own language, and we have at present: A. Astrain, *Hist. de la Comp. de Jésus en la asistencia de España*, Madrid, 1902 ff.—so far 3 vols.; H. Fouqueray, *Hist. de la Comp. de Jésus en France*, Paris, 1909 ff.—so far 2 vols.; B. Duhr, *Gesch. der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge*, Freiburg, 1907 ff.—so far 2 vols.; P. Tacchi-Venturi, *Storia della Comp. di Gesù in Italia*, Rome, 1910—so far 1 vol.; T. Hughes, *History of the Society of Jesus in North America: Colonial and Federal*, London, 1908 ff.—so far 3 vols. The history of the English Assistancy, going back to the days of R. Parsons and E. Campion under Elizabeth, is being prepared by J. H. Pollen, who has already published valuable contributions in *The Month*, especially for 1902–03, and in the publications of the Catholic Record Society.

With regard to what may be called the 'Apologetic' of the Jesuits, we may number among the more serious assailants of the Order: P. von Hoensbroech, *Vierzehn Jahre Jesuit*, Leipzig, 1910 (Eng. tr. by H. Zimmern, London, 1911); J. Huber, *Der Jesuiten-Orden*, Berlin, 1873; H. Müller, *Les Origines de la Comp. de Jésus*, Paris, 1898; F. H. Reusch, *Beiträge zur Gesch. des Jesuitenordens*, Munich, 1894; J. J. I. Döllinger and F. H. Reusch, *Gesch. der Moralstreitigkeiten*, Leipzig, 1888–89; E. L. Taunton, *Hist. of the Jesuits in England, 1580–1773*, London, 1901; Walter Walsh, *The Jesuits in Great Britain*, do. 1903; E. Gothein, *Ignatius v. Loyola und die Gegenreformation*, Halle, 1895. Of works written in answer we may name among the more comprehensive: B. Duhr, *Jesuiten-Fabeln*[4], Freiburg, 1904; A. Brou, *Les Jésuites de la légende*, 2 vols., Paris, 1906; M. U. Maynard, *Les Provinciales et leur réfutation*, do. 1851–52; M. Reichmann, *Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel*, Freiburg, 1903; also the two books of 'Pilatus' (Viktor Naumann), *Quos ego*, Regensburg, 1904, and *Der Jesuitismus*, do. 1905, largely dealing with the attacks of von Hoensbroech. On the matter of education see R. Schwickerath, *Jesuit Education*, St. Louis, 1903; K. A. Schmid, *Gesch. der Erziehung*, vol. v. pt. ii., Stuttgart, 1901.

The official documents of the Society—Constitutions, Rules, Decrees of General Congregations, Spiritual Exercises, *Ratio Studiorum*, Bulls, etc.—will all be found collected in the various editions of the *Institutum Societatis Jesu*, especially in the last edition, Rome, 1869 ff. More critical editions of the Constitutions, Spiritual Exercises, *Ratio Studiorum*, etc., have been issued separately within the last few years.

HERBERT THURSTON.

JESUS CHRIST.

[W. DOUGLAS MACKENZIE.]

I. *THE PERSONAL FOUNDERS OF RELIGION.*—**1. Introductory.**—Jesus Christ is to be described in this article as the founder of Christianity. In doing this it must be remembered that Christianity is one phase of the religious history of mankind, and its founder is not the only one who has founded a religion. Whatever classification of the religions of the world we may adopt, the Christian religion must be described as positive, personal, and universal. In the possession of all three characteristics it can be compared only with Buddhism and Islām. One historic person is recognized in each of these great religions as its 'founder.' By his own experience, teaching, and deliberate policy he has formed a group of primary disciples and has established through his influence upon them its positive history, its peculiar characteristics, and its claims to universal authority. Höffding has said (*Philos. of Rel.*, Eng. tr., 1906, p. 119), in regard to the important differences which occur in the nature alike of religious faith and of religious feeling, that they are conditioned 'by differences of value and of motives of evaluation, by differences of knowledge of reality, and by differences in the energy with which value and reality are brought together and compared.' We may put the same thing in more familiar words by saying that three elements enter into the nature of every religion. The first is the sense of some human need, or the desire for some form of good, physical, moral, or spiritual; the second is the conception of some object, divine and superhuman, who satisfies this need; the third is the attitude and conduct of man, by means of which it is believed that the desire for good is met by the God who is conceived of as its possessor and dispenser. The influence of the personal founder of a religion must be measured in relation to each of these elements of the religious consciousness, if we would rightly grasp the place which he occupies in the history of religion and the place of his religion among the other religions of the world.

2. Brief comparison of three founded religions.—Any description of the nature of a founded religion must involve a statement of the work of its founder with respect to these essential elements. But it will be convenient in view of the peculiar nature of such a religion to consider the material in close relation to himself.

(1) *The human need to be satisfied or form of good to be bestowed.*—This may be viewed negatively, in relation to evil, as deliverance from suffering, sin, and death; and positively, in relation to good, as the attainment of a blessed and eternal life in union with God. Buddhism is seriously defective on both sides. It conceives of evil almost wholly in terms of suffering, and of deliverance as a process of individual moral and spiritual self-culture. The end is described as Nirvāna, which, whether it implies conscious immortality or not, is at any rate conceived of mainly in negative terms. Buddha, weary of Hindu abstractions and subtleties, was content with agnosticism in regard to the divine. Islām is also defective through an imperfect conception of sin and an unspiritual view of the realm of bliss, while its view of God as absolute, unconditioned Will, though marking a great advance upon Buddhism, prevents a joyous faith in Him as the Saviour and Friend even of His own people. Muhammad was obviously faulty in moral character and unable to proclaim a gospel of faith. Christianity even in the NT, but with great variety of expression and personal emphasis in different phases of its history, conceives of this whole matter with singular richness and fullness. Whether we call it salvation, or eternal life, or glory, or union with God and the mystical vision, this religion presents a view of sin and holiness, of deliverance and perfection, of man's present relation to nature and the life to come, which obviously surpasses the other two, correcting, supplementing, and sublimating them from point to point. It

is important to notice, what must be more fully considered later in this article in relation to the founder of Christianity, that the moral and spiritual history of each of the three personal founders threw peculiar light upon the field of need, so that his followers discovered or interpreted their needs through that history.

(2) *The special function or 'office' of the founder.*—Here three ideas must be recognized as essential. The personality must ultimately be viewed as exemplar, or prophet, or redeemer, or as a combination of two or three of these. Yet, when the central idea of each of these functions is thoroughly conceived, it will be found to involve the others. Buddhism in its first stages knew its founder primarily as exemplar of the process of enlightenment. His teaching function arose from and was based upon his personal experience of salvation. But later Buddhism showed powerful tendencies to enlarge his authority into that of a prophet and his experience into that of a redeemer. The founder of Islām was conceived of primarily as a prophet, inspired with definite and direct messages from God. As in Buddhism the prophetic, so here the exemplary, function of the founder was obscured. And yet, of course, the personal character and conduct of the Prophet has inevitably moulded the ethics of his religion. The 'imitation' of Muhammad is confined to the 'copying of external acts' (D. B. Macdonald, *Aspects of Islam*, New York, 1911, p. 103), but the influence of his spirit and personal life has gone deeper. Christianity views Jesus Christ as the perfect exemplar of the character of God the Father, as the full revealer of religious truth, and also as the redeemer, whose personal experience, interpreted as His 'work,' changed the moral relations of God and men.

(3) *The person of the founder.*—Though the Buddha himself, according to the tradition, assumed an agnostic position as to the Absolute Being, and was wholly concerned with a system of ethical culture for the attainment of deliverance, his followers in after generations came to think of him as an incarnation of the Supreme Spirit. So also some of the followers of Muhammad gradually worked out a doctrine of his person resembling the Arian doctrine of Christ, though this has not become a characteristic element of that faith. Christianity from the first viewed its founder as a superhuman being, as one who had become incarnate, who as thus an incarnate, divine personality exercised all the functions of exemplar, revealer, and redeemer, distinctly and with ideal completeness, and who met the fundamental needs of man for moral harmony with God, for victory over all evil, and for eternal life.

3. The field of practical decision.—It is obvious from this brief comparison that in certain matters a modified parallelism exists between the three great 'founded' religions. Hence their founders are often compared with one another or named together in current literature. And one result of this modern spirit is the energetic challenge as to why one should be accepted as final in preference to either of the others; *e.g.*, J. Estlin Carpenter, after comparing the 'exaltation' of Gautama with that of Jesus, addresses Christendom thus: 'In each case the belief is justified by an appeal to experience. Why is the one to be repudiated, while the other is allowed?' (in *Jesus or Christ?* London, 1909, p. 247). There can be no doubt that each of these great personalities has proved to be a most powerful dynamic in the history of man; each has contributed rich material to man's religious experience; each has exercised profound influence upon the ethical conceptions and the civilization of great masses of humanity; each personality has become more or less directly bound up with that interpretation of God and the world which on the whole is the distinguishing property of the religion and the form of civilization associated with his name. It is not the aim of this article to carry out the comparison any further. That comparison is being carried out in one way by this Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, and indeed by every scientific contribution to the history and science of religion. For every serious and extensive study of any religion raises the question whether a really universal and final religion is necessary or possible, and, if so, what that final religion may be. But the comparison is being carried out in another and still more potent way, to which indeed each scientific piece of work is subordinate, on every mission field where the heralds of the personal founders confront one another. There each system faces what is after all the final test of the final religion, namely, its adequacy to meet the deepest needs of the human soul.

II. *THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS CHRIST.*—i. THE RISE OF THE PROBLEM.—The investigation of the life of Christ in the 19th cent. and the whole trend of modern thought have combined to set in a new light the problem of His Person. One of the most vital elements in that problem is stated in the phrase 'the consciousness of Jesus.' As soon as the epoch-making *Leben Jesu* of Strauss began to be considered, this subject came to view. The change appeared at once on the orthodox side in Neander's *Leben Jesu* (Hamburg, 1837). It was also signalized in the successive editions of Ullmann's *Die Sündlosigkeit Jesu* (Eng. tr., *The Sinlessness of Jesus*). Strauss's method of attack compelled men to think more seriously even than he did himself of that which lay behind all the separate utterances of Jesus, namely that consciousness of Himself from which His whole attitude, action, purpose, and speech arose. Hence in that work of Neander we have the first earnest dealing with His consciousness and its historical development. Parallel with the development of the sense of history and contributing to the same result was the movement of thought which sprang mainly from Schleiermacher. His very definition of religion as 'the feeling of dependence' and his penetrating analysis of the religious consciousness compelled men to apply to the founder of Christianity the same tests of reality which they were learning to apply to the whole range of religious inquiry. From the days of Strauss and Neander the volume of inquiry grew steadily. The historians like Schenkel and Keim, Hase and Weiss, and a dogmatician like Gess (*Christi Person und Werk*, vol. i.) found this to be the central question—What was the form and content and history of the self-consciousness of Jesus? In English the first use of the phrase is to be found, perhaps, in John Young's *The Christ of History* (1857), in which we have a discussion of 'His own Idea of His Public Life' (bk. ii. pt. i.) and 'The Forms of His Consciousness' (bk. iii. pt. ii.). In H. P. Liddon's Bampton Lectures, *The Divinity of our Lord*, we find the Fourth Lecture entitled 'Our Lord's Divinity as witnessed by His Consciousness.' But it was only gradually that the subject won a large place in the theology of the English-speaking world, and that mainly through the writings of three men, A. B. Bruce (*The Training of the Twelve*, *The Humiliation of Christ* [Lect. vi.], *The Kingdom of God*), A. M. Fairbairn (*Studies in the Life of Christ*, *The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*), and C. Gore (Essay in *Lux Mundi*, *The Incarnation of the Son of God*, and *Dissertations*). It is important to remember that for a brief period strong objections were felt to the investigation of the consciousness of our Lord. For example, W. Sanday in his article on 'Jesus Christ' (Hastings' *DB* ii. 603) said: 'On

the Christian hypothesis, frankly held, any such grasp [*i.e.* 'of the consciousness to be investigated'] would seem to be excluded, and the attempt to reach it could hardly be made without irreverence.' The difference between that position and the bold speculations on this very topic by the same author in his *Christologies Ancient and Modern* marks the increasing range, confidence, and reverent courage with which this absolutely unique historical problem has been explored by English and American theologians during the last quarter of a century.

ii. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM.—There is still much uncertainty among those who discuss this subject as to the exact nature of the question before them. And the uncertainty leads to assumptions which limit the inquiry or determine its dogmatic conclusions in advance.

(1) *The Christian hypothesis.*—If Jesus is conceived of primarily and definitely as a prophet or as an abnormal religious enthusiast, or even as the sanest and deepest religious spirit in human history, the question of His consciousness will be classed wholly with the study of religious geniuses, or, at most, of inspired messengers of God. And then the phenomena of OT prophecy, of religious devotion and insight among religious leaders of various races and ages, will be relevant to the interpretation of His case. Through what stages and with what inheritance the normal human mind and will did attain such moral and spiritual preeminence as His will be the main matter of investigation. But on the Christian hypothesis we are here concerned with something more, something quite unique and raised beyond the level even of the highest religious experience known to history. The NT and the vast mass of Christian believers, as well as the main course of theology, present us with a new idea, namely that of a superhuman conscious will which has entered for definite moral ends into the conditions of human experience. It asserts that in Jesus Christ we have a unique type of personality. It is at once human because it is conscious will, and yet more than human because it has invaded the course of human life from a range of conscious being and life above the human. The neglect to take this matter seriously has led to such amazing confusions of thought and fact as infest, for example, so brilliant a work as that of Wernle (*Die Anfänge unserer Religion*). That author repeatedly insists that in the Messianic consciousness of Jesus we have something superhuman, and this he calls 'the mystery of the origin of Christianity.' And he then insists that this superhuman, more than prophetic, consciousness was capable of the most astounding blunders; *e.g.*, he asserts boldly that the choice by Jesus of the three titles, Messiah, Son of God, and Son of Man, 'from the first turned out to be the misfortune of the new religion' (p. 38 [2nd ed.]). A misfortune thus central to the history of the religion which He founded ought to be scarcely conceivable if we take the idea of the superhuman consciousness of Jesus seriously and thoroughly. Even Ritschl insists that 'beyond all doubt Jesus was conscious of a new and hitherto unknown relation to God, and said so to His disciples' (*Justification and Reconciliation*, Eng. tr., p. 386).

(2) *The word 'consciousness'.*—It is in the interests of sound thinking about this 'unique historic consciousness' to recall the fact that modern science and philosophy have combined to clear and also vastly to extend the use of that word 'consciousness.' We recognize now everywhere that there are various grades of consciousness. It exists in many kinds, between all of which there are definite unities as well as diversities. Thus so calm and careful a thinker as C. A. Strong (*Why the Mind has a Body*, New York, 1908) says that 'the origin of consciousness can be explained, if at all, only out of antecedent realities of the same order' (p. 268), and, again, 'consciousness has arisen out of simpler mental facts.' No one except a materialist believes that this world contains all the forms of conscious beings that exist. There may be many kinds and grades of consciousness *above*, as there are, in our own world, many *below* the human. Nor would it be quite 'modern' to hold dogmatically that the human consciousness is shut off from contact with all forms of consciousness except those that are alive at any one time upon this earth. Now the Christian hypothesis has hitherto been this, that in Jesus Christ a superhuman conscious will has taken its place in history, manifesting throughout all its ranges of expression at once its alliance with and its difference from the ordinary type of human consciousness. Upon that difference in unity the whole peculiar religious value of the history of Jesus Christ has been made to rest from the Apostolic days down to the world-wide promulgation of the Christian message in our own day.

(3) *Elements involved in the investigation.*—The investigation of the consciousness of the historic Christ must contain difficulties which are peculiar to that subject. As to its modes of action, its development, its content, its relation to the divine purpose with humanity, and its influence upon the meaning of human life and the destiny of the race, such a consciousness must present unique features to the student of history and religion. These peculiarities must have affected the course of His relations with the men about Him, their estimate of Him, their appreciation and their memory of His words and deeds. If the natural and inevitable confusion of mind is reflected in their records, if these records show that their estimate of Him varied and grew, and that their very memory of His earlier words and deeds became coloured by the fuller knowledge of later days—all this will add to the perplexity even of that historian who believes most profoundly that in Jesus Christ a more than human self manifested its conscious will, and who at the same time seeks accuracy of historical statement, and clearness in the psychological analysis of experience. And here we are facing the supreme problem. If Christ was divine and His history on earth was and is essential to the perfecting of mankind, then His consciousness in its self-manifestations was and is one of the basal facts of human existence. And consciousness has this wonderful property, that in it knowledge and being are made one. My existence is not dependent on my thought, nor my thought on my existence. The self-conscious thing exists only in being conscious and is conscious only in existing. Hence we do not merely argue from the words and acts of a human consciousness to a human being behind or above them. In those words and acts the self is revealed. The conscious will is the ultimate fact, the real and inmost nature of it.

iii. FACTORS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.—*A.* THE RELIGION OF JESUS.—Any study of the consciousness of Jesus must begin with the qualities of His own religious life. And there we must take note both (1) of what He inherited and retained in mature life from His Jewish ancestry and from the religious life of His environment, and (2) of what there was of difference between His personal outlook and that of the people among whom He lived.

1. **The mixed atmosphere of His day.**—It is not too much to say that among the Jews of His day religion was everything. The circles that were influenced by their conquerors during the Greek and Roman occupations, and strove to ape Roman fashions or pursue Greek culture, were disowned by

ple. The relation of Israel to God and the purpose of God with Israel remained as the supreme subjects of thought and discussion. In the synagogue Jesus heard the Law read and expounded from tender years. To the Temple He was taken in due course for the performance of His inherited duties there. His own reading of the Scriptures must have been deep, since His teaching is saturated by quotations and illuminated by fresh interpretations of nearly all parts of the OT, and especially of the Psalms, Isaiah, and Daniel. Important references to the Pentateuch occur, which He used and cited without question as to authorship or historicity. For Him the OT remained as the true revelation of God Himself. God is the creator and sustainer of nature and of man, the ruler of history. God is the Father of the people (Mk 7^{27}, Mt 15^{26}) and they are 'sons of the kingdom' (Mt 8^{12}). He has promulgated His law of righteousness through Moses (Mk 7^{8-10}), and has announced through the prophets the day of the Messiah when His Kingdom shall be established in the earth (Mt 5^{17}, Lk 4^{16-22}). These things He had been taught, and He held them true. And He takes for granted that His hearers know and believe them. But, as Baldensperger has pointed out (*Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*[3], p. 72 ff., 2nd ed., p. 54 ff.), there was felt at that time a deep pathetic uneasiness in regard to the Temple worship, and at the same time a strained and passionate concentration upon the application of the law to the details of daily conduct. God in His transcendent holiness seemed to have vanished from the sin-stained land. The voice of prophecy had long ceased, the Temple had been repeatedly defiled by Gentile conquerors, the holy city was under foreign rule. The sense of fellowship with Jahweh was broken. Yet His Law and promise were there in written form. In three directions relief was sought: first, by filling up the interspace between God and man with heavenly hierarchies; second, by the formation of quietist circles like the Essenes, who sought, away from the clash of the world's warfare, the lost secret of the ancient fellowship with Jahweh; and third, by the cherishing of apocalyptic dreams, in which the Day of the Lord was seen as the sheer and sudden act of God breaking in upon the course of history. Not with earthly armies but by supernatural agencies did many now look for the appearing of that hour when the ancient promises would be fulfilled, and Israel once more vindicated, justified, as the chosen and supreme people of God. In such a mixed atmosphere at once of stubborn faith and of spiritual bitterness, of national humiliation and legalistic pride, of religious fervour and moral blindness, of political defeat and apocalyptic hope, Jesus grew up. In some measure all these elements can be found in the men of His day, and in Him. But in Him appear new and distinctive characteristics.

2. Elements in the religious consciousness of Jesus.—Through what processes of experience and thought His youth and early manhood passed, we do not know. When He stands before us in the Gospels, He has already attained maturity. His self-consciousness is fully developed. All attempts to prove that after His baptism He obviously changed His mind, or received entirely new revelations of His office in the world, have as yet failed to win general consent. The utmost that has been done is to mark out more clearly the manner in which His central self-consciousness adapted itself to the conditions which were unfolded in the lives of those with whom He came in contact. His will was indeed conditioned by the wills of others in its progressive operation, and His method of dealing with them developed itself appropriately from stage to stage. Various fresh phases of His task no doubt did appear as these stages were passed through. But from first to last His own religious consciousness remained consistent and unchanged, and it implied from the beginning the fundamental elements of His work. Of His religious consciousness we shall here name four principal elements.

(*a*) *Secret of divine fellowship.*—He found the secret of fellowship with God in the condition of the heart. At one stroke He lays aside the burdens of the external law and their elaboration by tradition. Even the doctrine of righteousness, as an act and gift of grace at the advent of the Kingdom, is deeply modified. Righteousness before God, the 'blessedness' of the divine fellowship, rests on what a man *is* 'inwardly,' at the inmost sources of thought and volition. 'Out of the heart proceed' all evil things (Mk $7^{21ff.}$). In his 'heart' a man may commit the vilest sin, and there, before God, it is a completed deed (Mt 5^{28}). It is the pure in 'heart' that shall receive the vision of God at that day. This does not mean that the outer life has no significance. No one can insist more relentlessly upon full and literal obedience to the known will of God (Mt 12^{50} and ‖, Mt 7^{15-27}, Lk $6^{39ff.}$); there is no limit to the sacrifice which purity of heart demands (Mk 9^{43-48}); the slightest deeds that come from the intent of faith and love have infinite meaning for God (Mt 10^{42} $25^{31ff.}$); and the woes implied in the parables of judgment against unfaithful lives are unmitigated. For Jesus, the supreme law is love to God and love to man (Lk 10^{25-27}). But, as love to man is conditioned by the circumstances of men, so love to God is conditioned by its object. It manifests itself in faith, which should know no bounds, in obedience at all costs, and in prayer, which should be frank, confident, energetic, persistent, and unostentatious. These and other important features are not new when taken singly. Parallels can be found in many quarters. But in the teaching of Jesus they acquire unique significance from three facts: first, from their being unified in the thought of one mind, as they are nowhere else; second, from the exclusion of any alloy of formalism, worldliness, superstition, or mere ceremonialism; third, from the fact that they evidently express, and find their unity and power in, His own religious experience and moral character. He is not dealing with the results of abstract speculation or with the scattered 'insights' of a moral genius. He is describing what life is to Him, as He confronts man and walks with God. The Beatitudes, even though interpreted eschatologically, describe His own working ideal, His own confidence in the result, His own actual blessedness. Men feel as they read, they must have felt as they heard, these utterances that what He commanded and promised He Himself realized in His own soul.

(*b*) *Conception of God.*—This applies in the fullest manner to that which is the centre of the religious consciousness, its conception of God. And here it is not possible to exaggerate the change which Jesus wrought in human history. He assumed that God is holy and supreme. All man's awe of God, his sense of the majesty, wisdom, and purity of Jahweh of Israel is for Him indisputably justified. But Jesus with one word transmuted the whole. He taught men to think of God as the Father. Not one attribute of reverence was cancelled, but a new meaning was, as it were, shot through the whole true picture of God, and every attribute stood in a new relation to the others and all stood in a new light for man. It is true that, founding on Ex 4^{22}, Dt $32^{5.\ 11.\ 18.\ 19}$, Hos 11^{1} etc., the Jews spoke of God as the Father of Israel, and references to Him as Father of the individual Israelite are not unknown (see G. Dalman, *Die Worte Jesu*, Leipzig, 1898, p. 150 ff.); yet Jesus did make the name central and supreme in an entirely new way, while avoiding, except on rare occasions, other Jewish titles for God. He nowhere

speaks of God as the Father of mankind; rather do men need to become His sons (Mt 5^{45}, Lk 6^{35}; cf. Mt. 5^{9}). The pronouns which He uses are 'my Father,' 'your Father,' 'thy Father,' and once 'our Father' (in the Lord's Prayer), and occasionally He speaks of 'the Father.' His use of the word and the promises bound up with it always presuppose faith and obedience in those addressed. But, for them, 'the Father' who is 'in heaven' is the God of nature (Mt 5^{45} $6^{26.\ 30}$ 10^{29}), who cares for them with individual solicitude (Mt $6^{8.\ 11}$), who demands righteousness (Mt 5^{20} $6^{1.\ 33}$), hears prayer (Mt 6^{9}), forgives sin (Mt 6^{12}), and at last receives them to glory (Mt 13^{43}). There is then no lessening of awe or reverence before God in the use of this name. Rather it corresponds to that demand for 'inwardness' in the religious life of men. It is a searching, penetrating demand which He makes, that men shall treat God as their Father. Its correlative as He speaks of men is *βασιλεία*—the Kingship of God. The very power as well as love, the righteousness as well as mercy, of the Father combine to set up a moral standard the most searching and the most severe of which the world has heard. 'Your righteousness shall exceed'—the most exacting system of law known to history.

This teaching also came out of the inner consciousness of Jesus. As we shall see later, He knew Himself as Son of God in a unique Sonship. But its uniqueness neither removed it from analogy with that of believing men nor made the moral demand on Jesus less, but infinitely more, penetrating. His own Sonship raised questions of self-adaptation, of self-denial, demanded wisdom and grace, sympathetic insight and brooding patience, whose range and quality we can but faintly discern as we see Him training the twelve, dealing with His foes, moving to the Cross. It was out of the discipline as well as the joy, the surrender as well as the confidence, in His experience of God that His use of the word Father arose, which changed the face of God for the hearts of men.

(*c*) *The sinless conscience.*—We come to a point at which the religious consciousness of Jesus surpasses that of mankind always and everywhere in an incomparable manner. Whereas the whole religious history of the races assumes and proceeds from the sense of moral failure, that of Jesus was characterized by the continuous sense of moral harmony with the will of the Father. Put in the negative form, this means 'the sinlessness of Jesus.'

(*a*) The witness of His disciples ought not to be undervalued. Their evidence for the fact does not rest upon their inability to find and record definite moral or religious failures in His character. Their belief in the unheard of fact could arise only from two sources, viz. the impression made by His whole personal bearing, and the definite tasks which he undertook and accomplished. Hence we find that his sinlessness is not a deduction from, but a fundamental presupposition of, the essential Christian doctrines. It is as such referred to explicitly in a few passages (*e.g.*, 2 Co 5^{21}, Ro 1^{1-4}, He 4^{15} 7^{26-28}, 1 P 2^{22}, 1 Jn 2^{1} 3^{5}). But they are not needed. The whole apostolic conception of Jesus as Risen Saviour and Lord was utterly inconsistent with any thought of His own guilt and need of pardon or redemption. The Fourth Gospel is more definite on this, as on other elements of His consciousness. But even the words 'I have glorified thee,' 'I have manifested thy name' (Jn $17^{4.\ 6}$), do not surpass in their inner meaning the saying of Mt $11^{25ff.}$ (even when abbreviated by Harnack in his search for the original form of Q [*The Sayings of Jesus*, Eng. tr. London, 1908, Excursus 1]), nor the self-defence of Lk 15, where He openly represents Himself as acting for and revealing God in that very conduct which severe and superficial moralists condemned. That chapter practically says, 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.'

(*β*) It has been the custom to discover the quality of His moral consciousness from the way in which Jesus dealt with sin. He not only exposed and rebuked it with prophetic energy, but He even went the length of pronouncing the forgiveness of sin upon individuals (Mk $2^{5.\ 10}$, Lk 7^{40-50}), and that in a manner so authoritative that He was accused of blasphemy. Furthermore, He demands of all who would enter the Kingdom of God that they should pass through a great moral renewal (Mk $1^{14.\ 15}$, Mt $18^{1ff.}$, Jn 3^{3}). But, on the other hand, He departs from the method of all other moral leaders in that He nowhere manifests the consciousness that He Himself had passed or needed to pass through such a change of mind and heart and faith. He seems never to have repented or *become* as a little child or pleaded for pardon. As Harnack in a powerful passage has asserted: 'There lie behind the period of the public ministry of Jesus no powerful crises and tumults, no break with his past.' He carried no 'scars of a frightful struggle' (*Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 21). These facts, if we are to estimate their meaning aright, must be kept in close relation with what was said above about His doctrine of the nature of sin and the searching quality of His doctrine of God as Father. His penetrating and sensitive view of inward sin must have made any conscious flaw in His own moral character an intolerable agony. But His recorded agonies have a very different source.

(*γ*) But arguments like these are subordinate to those central facts which recent discussions of the eschatological element in His teaching have emphasized with fresh power. There can be no doubt now that Jesus, in calling Himself the Son of Man or the Man (see below), asserted that He was a superhuman being, and that as such He had appeared to act as King in the Kingdom of God, as the Suffering Servant (cf. Is 53) working redemption, and that He would Himself appear as Judge of the human race. These self-assertions were the result either of moral blindness or of a sinless consciousness. They were evidences either of a self-seeking spirit which His whole teaching ruthlessly rebukes or of a self-manifestation which was compatible only with frankness, humility, and utter purity of soul. It seems impossible to picture any combination of ideas under which He should be admitted to have undertaken the tasks of a personal Revealer of the Father, of a sacrificial Redeemer of men, of the real Head (*Prinzip*) of the new moral order, and yet to have carried in His bosom the sense of personal guilt. The sense of a personally needed redemption and the claim to be an atoning Redeemer or the supreme Judge of mankind are not to be conceived of as nurtured sincerely, intelligently, and piously in the same heart. The kind of vocation on which Jesus entered at His baptism presupposes the consciousness that He had 'fulfilled all righteousness,' even including that rite prescribed by fresh prophetic authority (Mt 3^{15}), and that the God whom He represented in His ministry was mirrored always in the placid, teeming depths of His own soul.

(*δ*) Objections to the doctrine of the perfect moral harmony of Jesus with the most searching will of the Father have been founded on certain incidents recorded in the Gospels:

(*a*) on His relations with human beings, alleged disobedience in boyhood (Lk 2^{41-50}), alleged unkindness to a woman (Mk $7^{27ff.}$), alleged impatience with disciples (Mk 9^{19}), alleged disloyalty to His mother (Mk 3^{31-35}; cf. Jn $2^{4ff.}$), alleged lawlessness as to the destruction of swine (Mk 5^{1-20}), alleged passionateness in the Temple (Mk 11^{15-17}), towards scribes and Pharisees, etc. (Mt 23); (*b*) on His relations with God, alleged sense of disharmony in Gethsemane (Mk 14^{32-42}), on the Cross (Mk 15^{34}), and in His famous treatment of the title 'good' (Mk $10^{17ff.}$).

In all these citations, it is sufficient to say that the guilt is not proved. Without suggesting that there are two standards of righteousness, it must be insisted on that there are many varieties of duty, and that the same act can be in one man tainted and in another man absolutely pure. In all such cases, especially when dealing with a spirit at once sincere and gifted with penetrating moral insight, the appeal must be to the conscience of the man himself and to the actual circle of his relations and responsibilities. 'The real and final answer is that He stood self-vindicated; that the memory of these incidents brought Him no tremor of regret in later hours' (D. W. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*[7], Edinb., 1914, pp. 31 f., 37). As to the passage concerning the 'good' man, which has been used to the utmost by deniers of the sinlessness of Jesus, it is well to note the varied cautious forms of statement. Strauss (*New Life of Jesus*, Eng. tr., i. 283; cf. 273) says that He 'disclaimed the predicate of good'; Martineau (*Seat of Authority*[8], London, 1891, p. 651) that 'his self-judgment felt hurt by the epithet'; Wernle (*Die Anfange*, etc., p. 113), more bluntly, that 'he did not allow himself to be called good.' The following points appear to be decisive:

(*a*) It is not well to suggest, as some have done on the conservative side, either that Jesus really claims here to be God or that 'what Jesus disclaims, rather, is *God's* perfect goodness' (H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 37), as if the young ruler had attributed that to Him; (*b*) this inquirer, while making a most earnest and moving appeal, had used the words 'good master' in a merely conventional manner. And Jesus makes that the occasion for giving him a deeper apprehension of what 'goodness'—which is essential to eternal life—really is; (*c*) Jesus elsewhere uses the word 'good' exactly in the conventional manner which He seems here to condemn in the utterance of the young ruler (Mt 5^{45} 12^{35} [Lk 6^{45}]; cf. Mt 20^{15} 25^{21}); (*d*) Jesus goes on to teach the young man that self-satisfied legalism is not enough; it is sacrifice, humility, and complete self-devotion which alone qualify for eternal life; (*e*) His disclaimer of 'good' is not direct, but deduced from His assertion that God alone is 'good,' which really implies that goodness is from Him alone; (*f*) the saying reveals, not His sense of sin, but the measure of His personal sense of direct and complete dependence upon God for character. And that is goodness, as He conceives of it. If His dependence, His faith, is completely realized, His goodness must be without flaw. That He does not disclaim.

(*e*) We are left to speculation when considering how this unstained moral consciousness conditioned the growth of His Messianic consciousness. It must have influenced very early the thought of one so meditative, so clearly aware of the deeper side of God's Kingship and the deeper meanings of prophecy. Could He repeat the 51st Psalm without a sense of difference? Could He listen in the synagogue service to the 32nd Psalm, and not be aware of a felicity in His own soul quite other than that of the man 'whose transgressions are pardoned'? Could He even as a youth hear the discussions of the Messianic hope and the traditional forms of desire for a 'warrior Christ,' or the current descriptions of a Son of Man from heaven, without criticism and re-interpretation? When did He begin to think of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah in connexion with Himself? To say that as boy and youth He could not have cherished these topics without conceit is sheer nonsense. A man of honour can distinguish himself from the habitual liar without putting a speck upon his own modesty. So could Jesus feel very early that His humble and modest yet absolute dependence on God, which is the real root of meekness and lowliness of heart, was not marred, but even deepened, by seeing the difference between that and the 'little faith' of those around Him. To say that His mind faced these problems only after the Baptism is psychologically incredible. The Temptation, distinctive as it was, cannot have been unprepared for. No such complete victory as He won in the wilderness could have been sudden, and unrelated to His brooding years at Nazareth. That crisis was the natural culmination of a long history, whose deepest elements were to be found in the opening of His mind, by prayer, obedience, and faith, to the meaning of this immeasurable difference between a moral consciousness which could not doubt the inner presence of the Father, or ask from Him the forgiveness of any sin, and the religious experience of all other souls. His very great love for man was born into an active, sacrificial passion out of those crowded hours of unshadowed communion with God, before His baptism.

This, then, is the religion of Jesus. He surpasses all others in His insistence upon man's dependence on the Father for all things, temporal and spiritual, raiment for the body and goodness for the will. This penetrating insight and faith applied to Himself discovered His perfect Sonship, His qualification for being the Saviour, Lord, and Judge of the human race. It was that religious consciousness of His which, though in such unity with ours, yet created and discovered those transcendent differences which have made the Christian consciousness possible.

B. JESUS AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD.—Even though the phrase 'Kingdom of God' seldom occurs in the NT Epistles, and its use has been exaggerated in some phases of modern theology, yet no true description of the consciousness of Jesus can fail to give it a place of fundamental importance. No less constant was the word 'kingdom' than the word 'Father' upon His lips.

1. Jahweh as King.—The phrase was not unknown in Jewish circles. The OT is pervaded by the idea that Jahweh is to Israel what kings are to other peoples. Even when Saul was made king, there was a sense, preserved in one tradition, of a new departure in religious as well as in political consciousness through that event. The successive dynasties of Israel were raised up and cast down, the successive kings accepted or rejected by Jahweh. The prophets were His spokesmen, exercising at times more than kingly power, just because they represented and interpreted the will of Israel's true King. In Daniel (see ch. 4) the conception of this Kingship comes to fullest expression, and that in close connexion with the perception that God, who is Creator and Lord of all, must control the history of all kingdoms towards the day when He shall reign directly, alone and for ever. And the apocalyptists, to whom it seemed as if God's power were in abeyance, and the powers of evil in possession of this world, pictured the day when suddenly the might of God would reveal its shattering power, when the present evil order would collapse and 'a new heaven and a new earth' would vindicate the doubted righteousness of God. But Jesus lifted the phrase into new and rich significance.

2. Jesus and the imminence of the Kingdom.—(*a*) *The eschatological problem.*—With extraordinary conviction and energy, from the beginning of His public career, He affirmed the imminence of that Kingdom (Mk $1^{14f.}$). Certain of His words, uttered at great crises of His work and experience, imply, and many think that He believed, that the literal and concrete fulfilment of apocalyptic hopes and pictures would take place immediately (Mt 10^{23}, Mk 9^{1} 14^{62}). The discussion of this subject in recent days bears upon the two subjects of form and time: What did Jesus really expect the Kingdom to be? How far was His language deliberately pictorial? In what sense and measure did He expect to see it established in that generation? According to the extremists in one direction, Jesus thought of the Kingdom of God as an inward spiritual and ethical state of man's mind and heart in which, by communion with God and the development of a holy character, he shall

fulfil the divine will, and embody the divine spirit in all his social relations. This ideal is being progressively approached as the spirit and teaching of Jesus win wider and deeper influence over the life of man. According to the extreme eschatologists, Jesus held the strict apocalyptic view. He expected outward miraculous and portentous physical events as the instruments of the vindication of God. The Son of Man would appear in the clouds, the order of nature would be convulsed, the rulers of this world would be overwhelmed. (J. Weiss [*Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes*[2], Göttingen, 1900, p. 123 f.] even attributes to Him a regard for the political side in the overthrow of Roman domination.) All this must happen in that generation, might happen any day or hour, though on that point He would not commit Himself to definite prophecy. This is not the place for a detailed reckoning with the merits and demerits of these hostile views. We must try in a brief statement to do justice to both elements in His sayings that we may grasp more fully His marvellous self-consciousness.

(*b*) *The phrase 'Kingdom of God'* (ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ).—This phrase does not primarily refer to the organized community over which God reigns, but to His 'Kingship' itself (Dalman, *Worte Jesu*[2], 75 ff.). It is the active, personal, effective reign of God over human life, displacing the present, active power of Satan, that is announced when His 'Kingship' is said to be 'at hand' or to have 'come upon' that generation (ἤγγικεν, Mt 10^{7}; ἔφθασεν, Mt 12^{28}). Jesus announces the establishment of this Kingship as an act of God. It is 'the kingdom of heaven,' probably so called by Him (for, whatever motives the other evangelists may have had for avoiding it, Matthew can hardly have used the phrase so consistently unless it had fallen from the lips of Jesus) because in heaven that Kingship is already complete, and from heaven the forces come which are to establish it on earth (Mt 6^{10}). In acts of overwhelming power and glory it shall appear and be seen of all men, for their weal or woe (Mk 9^{1}, Lk 17^{24}, Mk $13^{24ff.}$). Here Jesus uses language which echoes that of apocalypse from Daniel to 'Enoch,' though Daniel is the only one actually quoted by Him (Mk 14^{62} = Dn 7^{13}).

(*c*) *Transformation of current conceptions.*—The Jews of that day held certain eschatological ideas which Jesus did not openly attack, though the effect of His whole teaching and personal history changed them all as they passed into the Christian faith. They believed in what we may call certain 'existences': in Hades with its division into parts including Heaven and Hell, in evil spirits with Satan (apparently) in command, and in angels of various grades and functions in the service of God. They believed also in certain events: the coming of the Son of Man, the final and universal judgment and the allotment of rewards and punishments. The eschatological elements in the words of Jesus are concerned with all of these. But it is remarkable how these ideas are all rearranged and subordinated under the force of His own Person and His deeper conception of God and God's relations to the world. The difference of tone between His references to these ideas and the manner in which they are handled by others cannot be exaggerated. In the first place, His consciousness of a direct, personal, superhuman relation to all these matters changes everything. What is to be in the future is for Him very different from what it is for apocalyptic dreamers. They are dreaming of that which God may or shall do through others; He is speaking of what is being done and to be done through Himself. The 'eschatological' facts are present not merely to His pious imagination, but actually in His own effective will (cf. Lk $4^{17ff.}$ 17^{24}, Mk 1^{21-27} 4^{41} 8^{38} 14^{25}, Mt 10^{25} 11^{2-6} 12^{22-32} 20^{20-28} 25^{31} etc.). The act of God in the establishment of His Kingdom has for its fundamental and essential element the 'sending' of Jesus. In the second place, we must recognize the difficulty of separating between the pictorial and the literal elements in His words. The story of the Temptation and the references to the binding of the strong man (Mt 12^{29}–Lk $11^{21.\ 22}$) and to the lightning from heaven (Lk 10^{18}) cannot be taken literally, by any stretch of the historic imagination. These are proofs that, when He referred to the clouds of heaven (Mk 14^{62} etc.), He was again speaking pictorially and not describing what He literally expected on the physical side. That such utterances spring from an intense inward experience—which may conceivably have taken the form of a vision or physical hallucination (see J. Weiss, *Reich Gottes*[2], p. 92 f.)—is possible; that they are bound up inextricably both with His own religious consciousness and with the current conceptions of the universe is indubitable. But the undeniable presence of the pictorial element—so congenial to the Oriental, so confusing to the Western, mind—and the general elevation of His thought about God and the universe above all preceding conceptions make it unwise to say that the movement of His mind must be wholly confined within the 'world view' of the Jewish eschatology of His day.

(*d*) But there is also positive evidence, in spite of Schweitzer, 'that Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God had a double character, that the eschatological and spiritual elements were equally represented in it and mutually conditioned one another' (A. Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 234). The view that in His mind the Kingdom of God was as it were 'all or nothing,' that it could not yet be real on earth for Him or His disciples because it was not *fully* realized for all, that His Messiahship was a postponed function to be entered on only with the outward catastrophes of the 'last day' and knowing no stages of fulfilment, that this eschatological faith served for Him and His disciples as an illusion of faith to preserve confidence in His words until they should have taken permanent roots in a new soil, to spring up independently of eschatology, is a view which does violence at too many points to the method and words of Jesus. The evidence of the Synoptists proves that even for His own mind the Kingdom was not only future but present, not only imminent and rushing in but also hindered and tarrying.

(*a*) His own religious consciousness contained the sense of present fellowship with His Father. From this all His teaching flowed, and this He constantly revealed to His disciples as the supreme good. If this was not so, then the whole religious value even of His eschatological sayings disappears into mere unethical superstition. In fact it is His idea of God that must be used to discover His idea of the Kingdom of God, and not *vice versa*. His passionate call to repentance had its root not merely in a prophetic vision of doom for the impenitent, but in a vision of the present evil of sin and the present blessedness of faith and the supreme wonder of a present fellowship with the Father. His urgency about doing the will of God does not merely take the 'eschatological' form, 'as in heaven so in earth,' but a 'spiritual' form (Mk $3^{34f.}$, Mt $25^{31ff.}$). The argument against anxiety, in the Sermon on the Mount, is essentially a 'spiritual' argument, since it urges faith in the Father not as the Father at the end of time, but as the Father whose spirit and methods are seen now in nature and providence. It may be hard for certain modern types of mind to conceive of 'eschatological' ideas in unity with the 'spiritual,'

but they were both present with apparently equal force and value to the consciousness of Jesus.

(β) Further, it is clear indeed that Jesus views the establishment of the Kingdom as an act of grace, a miraculous and overwhelming revelation of God's power and glory, most certain and most real. Yet He also sees that God's act is not arbitrary, undetermined as to form and date by anything on the human side, a predestined event which is unrelated to man's conduct. On the contrary, Jesus views the coming of the Kingdom as *conditioned* by human historical events and acts.

(a) It is a central idea in the parables of growth that the 'consummation of the age' (cf. W. C. Allen on Mt 13[39]) presupposes the conditions of harvest. 'When the fruit is ripe,' the hour of the sickle has come. The meaning of the 'mustard seed' and the 'leaven' parables cannot be reasonably confined to the contrast between the small beginnings and the great result, with J. Weiss, or to 'the miraculous character of such occurrences,' with Schweitzer. When these are compared with the other parables of seed (Mt 13[18-23. 24-30], Mk 4[26-29]), the two elements of time and growth must be said to have occupied the mind of the Master in uttering them, as conditions of the result. (b) Jesus taught that the coming of the Kingdom must be preceded and conditioned by various events. Among these must be named the conquest of the powers of evil, on which He speaks rarely and with a reserve which distinguishes Him from His contemporaries. But the Kingdom's presence in the world is proved by the fact that by Himself, who has bound the strong one, the demons are cast out (cf. O. Pfleiderer, *Philos. and Development of Rel.*, Edinburgh, 1894, ii. 83–89). The establishment of that Kingdom is conditioned by the preaching of the gospel (Mt 11[5]) even in His own ministry. There is no good reason why the passages which refer to the universal scope of this work after His death should be treated as unauthentic (Mt 8[11], Mk 14[25] 13[27]). If we contrast this idea of a work which must occupy much time with the words of Mt 10[23], we face just that antinomy which penetrates all His teaching, and whose solution is not to be found in the annihilation of either statement, but in a conscious will for which each is essential truth because that will is directively dealing with a confused situation. (c) This preaching is to be accompanied by prayer, and Jesus does not look on prayer as a pious formality nor on repentance as a violent spasm, because the end is in sight (cf. J. Moffatt, *Theology of the Gospels*, London, 1912, p. 58 f.). His whole rich teaching about prayer in precept (*e.g.* Mt 9[37f.], Mk 11[24f.]) and parable (Lk 11[5-13] 18[1-8]) rests on the conviction that prayer, the expression of the human will, conditions the operation of the divine will. Behind prayer lies the principle of faith, which, for the first time in the history of religion, is made primary and fundamental to man's relations with God by Jesus. Can we imagine Jesus thinking of a Kingdom established by force, without faith? (d) Further, when He speaks of the Judgment which is to characterize that day, there is none of the uncertainty of sheer, abstract predestinarianism which later appeared in Muhammadanism. The judgment of God is a judgment and an estimate by a will which deals with facts; and the relevant facts are to be found in human character as it is revealed in conduct. (e) We must here note also that in His view His own death and resurrection must precede the advent of the Kingdom—a fact which must be remembered in the interpretation of Mt 10[23]. For, if, as we shall see later, His own death is considered by Him in the light of the Servant of Jahweh passages in Isaiah (especially Is 42 and 53), an element is introduced which must react upon the whole meaning of eschatology for His consciousness. The will that plans to redeem by vicarious suffering for humanity must view history otherwise than the apocalyptists. A moral element is introduced into history which, like a new chemical constituent, changes the whole. (f) In addition to the teaching which implies the immediacy of the Kingdom, there is another strain which suggests delay and urges men to be faithful in spite of it. The parable of the tares deals with the period of preparation for the Kingdom (W. C. Allen, *St. Matthew*, p. lxx); the conduct of the 'evil servant' (Mt 24[45-51]) was based on the fact that his lord tarried longer than was expected; in the parable of the talents (Mt 25[14ff.]) the point is that 'after a long time' the master returned. It is therefore not merely the uncertainty of the date of that coming of the Lord, but also the apparent continued procrastination that gives meaning and vehemence to the repeated command to 'watch' (Mk 13[28-37]). This appears very distinctly if we assume that Lk 18[1-8] rightly follows the preceding paragraph. It is not too much to say that nowhere does the 'art' of His teaching appear more wonderful than in that fusion of the 'eschatological' and the 'progressive' which characterizes the parables of the Kingdom. (g) Lastly, it must be remembered that Jesus explicitly disclaimed knowledge of the time of that consummation in the well-known words: 'But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father' (Mk 13[32]). This is not to be reconciled with the words reported in the same paragraph, 'Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, until all these things be accomplished' (Mk 13[30]), by the idea that He meant by 'that day or that hour' the literal day and even time of day (cf. J. Denney, *Jesus and the Gospel*, p. 355 n.). It is coming to be widely accepted that the reports of the eschatological sayings of Jesus in the Synoptics (Mt 24, Mk 13, Lk 21) have been confused by the inability of His disciples to grasp their meaning. The fact is that the consciousness of Jesus (containing within it the will of the Messiah, which superhumanly acts on history) dealt with the ordinary eschatological conceptions from a point of view above that of mere prophecy, and that only gradually could the minds of His greatest disciples realize that all things, even eschatology, had been made new by His presence in the world. The conscious creator of history must speak, if he would say anything of the future, in a manner which reflects at once the successive unfoldings of His 'programme' to Himself, and His effort to make it real to those in whose unique experience it must first take effect (cf. 'Son of Man,' below, p. 516).

3. **Conclusion.**—For Jesus the Kingdom of God, which means His active, direct rule of human life, on earth as in heaven, is to be established by acts of God which Jesus does not describe in current apocalyptic terms, except in His reference to the coming of the Son of Man in the clouds of heaven, and in the language of the discourse reported in Mk 13 (some parts of which may not be authentic). He avoids (cf. Lk 17[20ff.]) all attempts to involve Him in trivial disputes about the date of those events (cf. J. Weiss, *Reich Gottes*, p. 86 f.). This Kingdom is not 'spiritual' in the sense that it has nothing to do with the physical universe, nor is it 'eschatological' in the sense that it can be established merely by means of cosmic catastrophes. For His consciousness the physical and the spiritual are elements of one system, organized by the one will of God the Father, and His language describes events and processes in both elements. Hence the Kingdom appears in works of healing and the preaching of the gospel, in cosmic transactions and in moral judgments, in the conquest of Satan and in the forgiveness of sin, in warnings of the future day and in revelation of the Father for this day's faith and obedience. That gospel of the Kingdom is the declaration not merely of its imminence, but also of its nature and conditions. And for Jesus these conditions involve knowledge both of what God will do and of what man ought to do. The religious and the ethical are for Him as completely one as the physical and the spiritual. Conduct towards man and towards God is characterized by the same fundamental principles of love and trust. And yet after all it is astounding to remember that what God will do in the establishment of that Kingdom is never set forth by Him as an objective list of future acts. The future is absorbed in the consciousness of His own functions as the Messiah. In and through Himself the supreme acts of God are being performed, in which the coming of that Kingship is to be realized.

C. THE FUNCTIONS OF JESUS AS MESSIAH IN RELATION TO THE KINGDOM.—1. **The tone of supreme authority.**—We have already seen that there is a remarkable difference between Jesus' conception of the Kingdom and that of all others before and after Him. Even His forecasts of its coming, when He echoes the language of prophets before Him, contain significant changes and carry in them a tone which the greatest of His followers could not repeat. For others He prescribes repentance, watching, service of an absent lord, waiting for a dateless event, but He never associates Himself with His disciples in these experiences and spiritual efforts. He never speaks or acts as if He were, or expected to be, a subject in that coming Kingdom, a recipient of its mercy and glory. His consciousness is of another kind and rises out of a relation of a superhuman order, which we must now consider. And for this not merely His words, but His whole bearing and indeed His influence upon those who lived in the presence of that unique will, must be taken into account. A writer in *Christus* (ed. J. Huby, Paris, 1912, p. 704) has well said, 'S'il est un trait caractéristique de la physionomie du Christ, c'est qu'il s'impose.' His authority, His consciousness of something more than knowing the truth, namely, of the right to

declare and even to enforce the ultimate laws of human existence, is an ineradicable element of the gospel story. It is no less evident in the Synoptics than in the Fourth Gospel. In Mark's Gospel this pervasive tone is to be found from beginning to end. He exercises power or authority (ἐξουσία) in His teaching (1[22]), over unclean spirits (1[27]), to forgive sin (2[10]), even to communicate power to His disciples (3[15]). All great religious leaders have won a nameless spell over their followers, and their allegiance even unto death. But the range and quality of His authority are presented in the Synoptics as having peculiar elements.

2. Messiah-King.—He is dealing with the final fact—the Kingship of God—through which human nature is to reach its consummation. Yet it is He who has received 'Kingship' and can speak of 'my kingdom' (Lk 22[29f.]; cf. Mt 13[41], Mk 9[1]), or accept the tribute from others (Mt 20[21], where for 'kingdom' Mk 10[37] reads 'glory'—the substance is the same). In His mind and that of His followers the sovereignty of Jahweh over Israel was directed towards a great consummation, with which the prophets were much concerned. The end to which they looked forward is felt by Jesus to be attained in Himself (Mt 13[16f.]). But the end must surpass the stages which lead to it; hence He does not hesitate to set His mission above all the glories of the OT story and Himself over all predecessors. It would be enough to refer to the passages found in the document now known as Q which is embedded in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, to show that this feature of His consciousness profoundly impressed the minds of His disciples; *e.g.*, take 'more than' Jonah, or Solomon (Mt 12[41f.] ‖ Lk 11[31f.]). The same idea in an even more august form appears in the saying attributed to Him by Matthew (12[6]), 'Something greater than the temple is here.' It is now almost universally admitted that Jesus knew Himself as the Messiah, that personal representative of Jahweh for whom Israel waited and for the signs of whose appearing they searched heaven and earth. But opinions still differ widely as to the conditions under which Jesus discovered His Messiahship, interpreted the details of its task, and made it known to His disciples. The term does not occur in the OT as a personal name, but came to be used in Jewish times of that One through whom they hoped for deliverance from the foreign yoke, and imperial supremacy for the Israel of Jahweh. That He would be an invincible king and sum up in Himself the ideal qualities of royalty (cf. 2 S 7[12ff.], Ps 72, etc.), that He would be the Son of David, that He would usher in the Day of Jahweh, that He would be the Christ or Anointed One of Jahweh (Lk 2[26]), the Holy One of God (Mk 1[24]; cf. Mk 1[34], Lk 4[41])—all these ideas were found among the people who came in contact with Jesus. That the 'political' aspect was prominent is plain from the fact that, when He confessed Himself to be the 'Christ' at His trial, His enemies at once made that the basis of the accusation before Pilate that He claimed to be king, and that this title 'King of the Jews' was set upon His cross (see below). It is this fact that alone is sufficient to account for His avoidance of the title, His open acceptance of it from the disciples only after they had learned something of His transformation of its meaning. To have used that title promiscuously earlier would have been, in the atmosphere of His day, to misrepresent completely His interpretation of prophecy and His own consciousness of His functions. To have disowned it explicitly would have also been to misrepresent Himself and His mission. For He knew Himself to be the One in whom prophecy terminated, who had come to fulfil the best hopes of Israel, to establish over all mankind, 'beginning at Jerusalem,' the Kingship of God. It was His supremely delicate task to claim the substance and disown the popular form of Messiahship. Hence what we find Him doing is to fulfil the sublime functions of that office without formal announcement of His relation to it. The difficulty of His position is made plain by the misunderstandings of His disciples which are recorded with such astonishing faithfulness in the documents which are ultimately derived from themselves and their immediate friends and followers. So deeply were the old ideas engrained, so strange and superhuman was the new conception of the divine Kingship and its fundamental principles, that not even the Death and Resurrection of their accepted Messiah could at once reveal the new moral and spiritual universe to the minds of His disciples. It required the successive events described in the Acts and the appearing of Paul to interpret the Messiahship of Jesus to those disciples, as He fulfilled it.

3. Elements in His will as Messiah.—When we come to His own concrete interpretation and application of the idea of Messiah by Jesus, we find ourselves in the presence of a will greater than that which any prophet or saint of the OT had desired or foreseen. Their partial glimpses into human need and divine fullness are united and then surpassed in that which He essays to accomplish. His functions at once interpret and elevate, gather and reorganize, the scattered spiritual principles of OT religion.

(*a*) *Revealer of God.*—He acts as the Revealer of God. The OT had taught the Jews to hope for a full knowledge of Jahweh in the day of His appearing to judge the nations. But the nature and medium of that knowledge had been left vague. Jesus in the great passage, Mt 11[25ff.], asserts this as His function, to reveal the Father. There is undoubtedly a mystical element involved in this work of revelation, but no less clearly is there a natural and concrete element which is the only security for its historical permanence and continuous development. Thus His very words about God throw welcome light upon His will and spirit, and He uses the definite and vivid name of Father to describe Him. Further, He does not shrink, as we have seen, from assuming that His own conduct is a revelation of the character and will of God (Lk 15). This is carried to the extreme in those passages in which, while citing OT Messianic sayings, He sets Himself in the place of Jahweh—*e.g.*, Mt 11[10] = Is 35[3] 61[1], Lk 4[17] = Is 61[1f.]; Lk 7[27] Mal 3[1]. This whole matter is fully expounded in the Fourth Gospel, but cf. especially the striking language to Thomas and Philip (Jn 14[5-11]). (*b*) *Power over demons.*—The attitude of Jesus towards the world of evil spirits must be taken just as it is set forth, if we would understand the range of His conscious will. He has met and conquered the prince of demons (Mt 4[1-11] 12[7-29]), and hence has power over all lesser spirits of evil. He therefore accepts as true to fact the testimony of the evil spirits themselves (Mk 3[11f.]), as well as the recognition of this superhuman power by the people who saw His works. (*c*) *Miracles.*—The earlier rationalism strove to extrude from the story of Jesus all the miracles. They were either pure inventions or legendary growths arising from the desire to illustrate His teaching or defend His superhuman claims. The later rationalism draws a distinction between the miracles of healing for which analogies can be found elsewhere, and the 'nature miracles'—such as multiplying the loaves, raising the dead, walking on the sea, etc. The former, or some of them, are retained as well attested and historical; the latter are rejected. The dilemma is a peculiar one. For, on the one hand, the same records preserve both classes of

works with the same simplicity, directness, and relevance; on the other hand, the supposed distinction is not grounded on objective science, but has been created for the express purpose of dealing with the gospel story. Science has not yet drawn any such line as this imaginary one, and the theological writers who advocate it use only vague and unscientific language to suggest it (cf. E. A. Abbott, *The Kernel and the Husk*, London, 1886; P. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica*, do., 1899). In that central passage of Q (Mt 11^{4-6}, Lk 7^{22}) Jesus mentions the healing of lepers and the raising of the dead as works which He performed. His consciousness held Him in a relation to natural processes above that of other men. And this is necessary to the unity of that consciousness; it corresponds with other aspects of the range of that will. We must not confuse the issue by assuming that such a will is impossible. It is our simple scientific duty to discover whether such a consciousness moved in history, and whether its operation in the whole round of its life presents a consistent unity. For Jesus the distinction above referred to did not exist. He was conscious of power to direct the forces of nature as clearly as to reveal God, to announce the eternal conditions of blessedness, to conquer Satan, to forgive sins, to judge the race, and to rise from the dead. (*d*) *Lawgiver.*—While He has come to fulfil the Law and the prophets (Mt 5^{17}), He yet speaks as Himself the lawgiver of the Kingdom. The 'Sermon on the Mount' reflects this consciousness of supreme authority in the most impressive manner. For there He speaks in criticism of the noblest ethical code of antiquity, much of which He would acknowledge to have been announced by God through Moses. But, in passing behind those prescriptions to reveal the inner principles of human character, He deliberately and repeatedly uses the form 'I say unto you,' speaking as no prophet spoke, in His own name and authority. What appears formally in that place is in substance present throughout His teaching. He is everywhere laying down the laws of eternal righteousness for the citizens of the Kingdom of God. (*e*) *Administrator of law.*—He not only announces but administers those laws. It is significant that Judaism had not attained to the view that the Messiah would act as Judge (though that office is assigned to 'the Son of man' in the 'Similitudes' of Enoch), and the matter of forgiveness of sins was inevitably reserved for God Himself. Even if they could have conceived of such a judgeship, the scrutiny of conduct and the award of appropriate rewards and penalties as delegated by God to a representative, the question would still remain, 'Who can forgive sins but one, even God?' (Mk 2^{7}). But Jesus not only asserted that He would act as Judge of mankind; He even assumed the prerogative of forgiving sin (cf. C. W. Votaw, art. 'Sermon on the Mount' in *HDB*, vol. v. p. 29). This is Messianism of a type which men had not dared to fashion in their hearts. (*f*) *The will to die.*—Up to the time of Jesus, the Jews did not expect their Messiah to die. For them as for Peter (Mk $8^{32f.}$), that would have been almost a contradiction in terms. It was only in the Talmudic times that the idea was tolerated, and even then the Messiah's death was looked on as a dark and mysterious fate which He shared with His people. But with Jesus a new view has taken hold of history, viz. that His death is to be used as an instrument of salvation, a weapon of the divine Kingship. Whether He contemplated His death from the beginning of His ministry is much in dispute. Certain passages would seem to show that the will to offer Himself was in His mind from the time of the baptism. The words which He heard at the baptism, 'Thou art my Son, the Beloved, in whom I am well pleased' (Mt 3^{17}; cf. 12^{18-21}), contain phrases from Ps 2^{7} and Is 42^{1}, from which it is clear that He had in His mind the Isaianic picture of the Servant of Jahweh, and that He applied it to His own mission. The story of the Temptation shows that renunciation was from the first an essential feature of that mission. The sayings about persecution (Mt 5^{11} $10^{16.\ 21.\ 25}$) and the rejection of prophets (Mk 6^{4}, Lk 4^{24}, Mt 13^{57} 23^{37}) indicate that He expected relentless opposition which He could not avoid and others would not abate. Hence the saying about the Bridegroom is not out of keeping with His general outlook at that early period (Mt 9^{15}). Moreover, when He does speak more definitely of His death, He does not treat it as a new factor or as a surprise. It is the complete fulfilment of that service to which He stands committed from the beginning (Mk 10^{45}). He describes it as the fundamental principle of the Kingdom that a man should lose his life. Hence it would be an exaggeration to say with Baldensperger (*Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*[3]) that, after the crisis near Cæsarea Philippi, when His death becomes clear as an inevitable event, He passes through a 'Messianic re-birth.' But undoubtedly in the latter part of the ministry the will to die became more defined in relation to gathering circumstances, and hence occupied a central place in His teaching (Mk 8^{31} ‖ 9^{12} [Mt 17^{12}] 9^{30-32}, Mk 10^{32-34} ‖ $^{39.\ 45}$ $12^{1ff.}$ 14 *passim*).

From these passages we learn: (*a*) that His death was to be inflicted, and consummate His rejection by Israel; (*b*) that it was also the will of His Father (Mk 14^{36}); (*c*) that He looked on it in the light of Is 53, and therefore could call it a 'ransom for the many' (Mk 10^{45}, Is $53^{5.\ 6.\ 12}$), and as appropriate to the Son of Man who is supreme in authority over the Kingdom; He would suffer as Messiah not merely *with*, but *for* His own; (*d*) that He deliberately and solemnly set it forth at the Last Supper as a means of redemption, as the ratifying of new relations between God and man ('blood of the Covenant'); (*e*) that He faced this death with peculiar agony of soul, but endured its approach, its accompaniments, its outer shame and inner horror, with steadfast will as the sacrifice without which He could not establish the Kingship of God over 'the many.'

(*g*) *The expectation of death.*—This is not the place to discuss either the theory of the Atonement or the detailed and successive steps through which His consciousness passed. Suffice it on the latter point to say that the phenomena of the Gospels are best explained if we keep two sets of facts before us. (i.) A great mind can hold a great purpose in view and see its general outlines without allowing itself to be prematurely concerned with all the particulars. A great mind further can foresee and yet hold off the agony of a coming sorrow. The serenity which some people see in the earlier days of His ministry is a witness not to His ignorance that only death could win that Kingship, but to the greatness and soundness, amounting in His case to majesty, of self-direction, self-estimate, and self-control. To say that He could not have preserved a calm consciousness in view of that event is to belittle Him absurdly, below the standard of many brave men and women. 'For the joy that was set before him he endured' is not a psychological blunder of the writer to the Hebrews (12^{2}). (ii.) Much must be allowed for His 'paideutic' method. Not only did His task unfold itself to His own mind in successive steps, from great principles and a supreme purpose which was already formed and firmly held when He entered on His Messianic functions, but He had also to communicate these principles and their practical issues in like (but not always parallel) steps to His disciples. The sudden clear teaching that He must suffer and die (Mk 8^{31} and ‖) is undoubtedly made possible by their confession of His Messiahship. To announce His inevitable death before that would have hindered the growth of their insight, but after that insight had reached a certain clarity and steadfastness the shock of that other revelation must be given. And their whole bearing

justified His method. (*h*) *Resurrection.*—That Jesus spoke not only of His death, but also, though with significant reserve, of His resurrection, was at one time much questioned. But the frank acceptance of the eschatological elements of His teaching sets that dispute at an end. He who announced both His death and His coming in the clouds of heaven as 'Son of man' did foresee a resurrection of some kind. The Synoptics agree (with only a verbal variation [Mk 8^{31} 'after three days']) that He prophesied His resurrection as they afterwards record it, implying the idea of a physical resurrection. It may be taken as certain that Jesus carried in His consciousness something more than the human hope of a future life. It entered into His will, it modified the scope and method of His work, it qualified His whole conception both of the Kingdom as a future event and of His relation to it as its Ruler. No doubt, as Strauss saw with characteristic clearness, 'this (continuous) certainty must have been as supernatural as the event itself' (*New Life of Jesus*, Eng. tr., p. 45). But that need not trouble us nowadays. We are manifestly in the presence of a consciousness which contains elements that must be frankly conceded to be superhuman. One of these is a programme of personal influence which includes the life after death. It is not at all inappropriate to find in the Fourth Gospel this aspect of eternal life radiating from its wonderful picture of His historic consciousness. When He says to Martha, 'I am the resurrection and the life,' He utters in mystical phrase what is implied in the assertion that after death He will come in glory and receive the faithful to the rewards of the Kingdom.

4. His demands on the disciples.—It is a natural coefficient of all these forces in His consciousness that He as Messiah-King should make supreme demands of His subjects. (*a*) He imposes on them the law of faith, a faith in Himself which He nowhere discriminates from faith in God. It is this attitude of trust that produces His miracles of healing and His words of forgiveness. (*b*) He imposes the law of complete surrender even to death 'for my sake.' The varied Greek equivalents for ἕνεκεν ἐμοῦ may go back to one Aramaic form, but the freedom of translation and tradition is a witness to the frequency and the penetrating quality of the words of Jesus in this regard. This phrase, uttered in respect of persecution and of death, throws light upon such an incident as the command to the young ruler to sell his possessions and follow Jesus, and upon the completeness of that devotion which He demanded of the twelve. (*c*) He imposes a still more searching test—a test of character—when He speaks of those who are 'worthy' of Him. To be worthy of Him (cf. Mt $10^{34ff.}$, and Harnack's searching analysis [*Sayings of Jesus*, pp. 86–90]) is tacitly assumed to prove that a man belongs to the kingdom of righteousness. The idea must not be treated superficially, as if any distinguished leader might determine who are worthy followers. It must be connected with the other ideas in which Jesus seems to be constantly revealing Himself to His disciples as an object of religious regard. The worthiness here referred to must, therefore, be compared with the whole standard of personal worth which is presented in the Gospels. That standard has various phases and elements. It demands unlimited inward purity, unlimited outward devotion to the known will of God, love for God which absorbs the whole personality, and love for one's neighbour which is equivalent to the love of one's own life; it sets up the character of God as something known, in His righteousness and His love, and demands that men shall aim at that perfection; it lifts the whole problem from local, national, external tests to those which are universal, supreme, eternal, inevitable. It is in the heart of this system of ideas, even in the course of its unfolding, that the character, will, teaching, and very Person of Jesus emerge as an unexpected and yet essential part of it. We are not concerned with the question how the historical could thus be allied with the eternal, how one person in time could determine the moral standing of all others through their deliberate valuation of Him; that is a later question. The matter before us is one of fact. It would seem that, according to the earliest tradition, Jesus did without formality of claim, but constantly, on all sides of His self-expression, in word and act, draw to Himself the faith and obedience of His disciples and present Himself to them as the standard of moral worth—in fact, became to them the object of a religious regard. The effort to prove that this worship of Christ arose only after His death and is reflected into the story of His ministry has been prolonged, painstaking, and futile. The fact is too deeply and subtly involved in the whole presentation of His personality, even in the Synoptic Gospels, to have been added and merely reflected from later and baseless enthusiasm. The vast majority of modern scholars—even including many like Wernle and Harnack, who are reckoned to the so-called 'Liberal' position—admit that there are here in the Gospels indubitable proofs that the consciousness of Jesus contained elements not invented by the apostles, yet not native to the human mind as known everywhere else in history. These elements, as we have surveyed them thus far, appeared in the kind of things He undertook to do among men, in the manner of His self-expression. They go deep into the inmost workings of His mind, into the foundations of His character, into the substance of His purpose. Conceive them as possessed by a man—a son of the race—and they become a confusion and a folly. But the Church has conceived them as the supremely natural revealings of a superhuman conscious will, and they have been lifted into harmony and divine power (see, further, under III.).

D. THE SPECIAL TITLES.—**1. The Son of God.**—The NT contains material for tracing in part the remarkable development of the meaning of this great title. In view of the arbitrariness of his critical method, we shall assume that N. Schmidt (*EBi* iv. 4690 ff., and *The Prophet of Nazareth*) occupies an impossible position when he maintains 'that Jesus never called Himself "the Son of God," and never was addressed by that title' (*EBi* iv. 4701, where the last clause, strictly taken, may be true, but is irrelevant).

(*a*) *Two termini.*—The *terminus a quo* in NT usage is reflected not only in the Synoptic Gospels, but even in the Fourth, where we find in certain passages what appears to have been the current Jewish use of the phrase. Its history goes back to Ps 2^{7b}, where the twin ideas of Messiahship and Sonship are brought together. The well-known Hebrew way of conceiving of Israel as God's Son by making the deliverance from Egypt the birthday of the people (Ex 4^{22}, Hos 11^{1} etc.) was followed up by an equally careful avoidance of the idea that any King of Israel was His offspring. The idea of Sonship expressed in Nathan's words (2 S 7^{14}) is quite evidently religious and ethical, and that passage may have given rise to the language of Ps 2. In the Jewish period, outside the Gospels, no certain cases are found in which the Messiah is spoken of as 'Son of God.' But in the Gospels, though the evidence is confused, signs are not wanting that occasionally the phrase was employed as a honorific title for the anointed one; cf. Mk 3^{11} 5^{7} (Mt 8^{29}), Mt 14^{33} (wanting in Mk), Mt 16^{16} (different in Mk 8^{29}, Lk 9^{20}), Mt 26^{63} (different in Mk 14^{61}, Lk $22^{70b.}$), Mt 27^{40} (different in Lk 23^{35}, wanting in

Mk), Lk 4[41]. In the Fourth Gospel the words of Nathanael (1[49]) and Martha (11[27]) sound like faithful echoes of this early period when the Messiah was spoken of as Son of God in a manner similar to Israel, Ephraim, and David, who were uniquely loved, chosen, and endowed by God. The title as so used did not, of course, involve any reference either to the pre-existence or to the mode of birth of the Messiah. The *terminus ad quem* in the NT literature is seen in the Epistle to the Hebrews quite as clearly as in the Fourth Gospel. There the Son is conceived of as a divine being (He 1[1ff.]) who partook of human life by a sublime act of His own gracious will (2[14]).

(*b*) *The source of the later use.*—That which came historically between these extremes and made possible the passage from the earlier vague meaning of this title to the later exalted meaning was the consciousness and self-manifestation of Jesus. As we have seen, He spoke of God as His Father with a note which differentiated His relationship from that of all other men. He avoided the almost unavoidable phrase 'Our Father' except when He taught His disciples how they should pray. According to the Synoptics, He rather took this Sonship as a fundamental fact, not to be discussed, while the Fourth Gospel represents it as an open claim which caused much controversy between Him and the Jewish theologians and nearly brought Him to death (Jn 5[17f.] 10[29-33]). And it is of the utmost significance that John in these two passages represents this claim to a unique and divine Sonship to have been found by His enemies simply in His peculiar emphasis upon the words 'My Father.' If this is true to fact, then certain passages in the Synoptics must have conveyed the same idea to His disciples. In the Synoptics reference must be made to Mk 12[1-12] (Mt 21[33ff.], Lk 20[9ff.]), where He by implication describes Himself as 'Son' as compared with the prophets and others, who are 'servants,' to Mt 17[26] (see Dalman, *Worte Jesu*[2], p. 231), and to Mk 13[32], of which H. J. Holtzmann (*Die Synoptiker*[3], Tübingen, 1901, p. 170) says that it is the only place in which 'The Son of God' appears to have a metaphysical value. In the light of such passages, the repeated emphasis upon 'Son of God' in the story of the Temptation—especially if that story came from His own lips—must not be referred to the popular, but to His own characteristic, understanding of the term.

(*c*) *A central passage.*—One of the central passages is Mt 11[25-27], Lk 10[21f.] (from Q), concerning which it is clear: (i.) that He reveals a consciousness beyond that of all prophets and saints in a 'sonship' which is the basis of mutual knowledge between Himself and 'the Father'; (ii.) that He recognizes that 'all things' have been 'delivered' unto Him. Wellhausen (on Mt 11[25-30]) points out that all doctrine and knowledge is among the Jews παράδοσις. But 'the παράδοσις of Jesus springs immediately from God, not from men.' It is very common to restrict this phrase to matters of knowledge and teaching (so Harnack, Wellhausen, Denney). And yet, if we read the passage in its Matthæan context, it would seem that 'all things' must include at least the Messianic functions to which He refers in His reply to John's messengers (Mt 11[2f.]), and which ought to have brought to repentance the cities where His mighty works were done (Mt 11[20]). To some it still seems jejune and entirely untrue to the range of His consciousness and the type of His Messiahship to restrict the 'all things' to His 'doctrine' (see Harnack's argument in *Sayings of Jesus*, p. 297 ff.). The revelation to which He refers in the next clause, even though He does mention the σοφοί, must mean more than 'a revelation of a knowledge.' Was He not speaking with the σοφοί when they rejected His revelation of the Spirit of God by His works in Mt 12[26ff.]? Did He exclude that kind of revelation when He thought of the 'all things'? And further, if it is 'teaching' that constitutes the whole of His 'yoke' (Mt 11[29]), wherein does that differ from the 'burdens' which He deplores? If the paragraph is not to be interpreted in this setting, the best place to put it would be after the death of sacrifice had come fully into view. Then the true meaning of 'all things have been delivered unto me' would appear clearly as a reference to the functions of the Messiahship. The words can only express the consciousness that everything necessary for establishing the Kingship of God was now committed to His will, and that, as we know, included far more than teachings.

(*d*) *The origin of this Sonship.*—The idea that the term 'Son of God' was only equivalent to the term 'Messiah' having been discredited, some scholars tried to prove that Jesus first conceived of His Messiahship and from that passed on to His unique Sonship. That theory in turn seems to be doomed. It is clear that His Messiahship arose out of a religious background, but that religious background had nothing greater than the consciousness of 'the Father' in His relation to 'the Son.' But, if this filial relationship with God is the basis of His consciousness, and if it is unique, incommunicable save in a secondary though still glorious sense (Jn 1[12], Ro 8[3. 14-16], where the use of τέκνα for υἱοί is significant), is it also true that we get from Himself no hint as to its origin? That it is more than merely religio-ethical is evident (see Dalman, *Worte Jesu*[2], p. 235). He seems to have taken for granted that men would consider it to be supra-temporal and assume that He had 'come' or 'been sent' in a higher sense than can be used of the sending or coming of a prophet. Hence it is that we find in Matthew (5[17] 10[34. 40] 11[25-27]) a series of aorists which seem clearly to refer to pre-temporal acts of God. To these W. C. Allen would add, as significant of the same idea of pre-existence, Mt 5[17] 9[13] 11[19] 15[24] (see his *St. Matthew*, pp. 46, 122, 123). But that eternal Sonship which seems to be behind so many of His references to His mission, and which was for others an inference from His self-revelation, naturally became in their minds a pre-condition when they came to tell the story of His Messiahship. Then they accounted for His unique Sonship either by the unique birth (Lk 1[35]) or by His pre-existence as the Logos and His manifestation in the flesh (Jn 1[1. 18]).

2. The Son of Man.—(*a*) *Origin of the term.*—Controversy has long raged around this great title. Until about twenty years ago, it was generally accepted as a historical fact that Jesus used the phrase, and ingenuity was spent upon discovering what He meant by it and why He seems to have preferred it to any other. (For full accounts of the varieties of opinion see the summaries *sub voce* of S. R. Driver in *HDB*, and of N. Schmidt in *EBi.*) A sudden change was wrought when some German scholars, especially Lietzmann, Wellhausen, and Fiebig, raised the question, on purely philological grounds, whether Jesus could have used the phrase at all. Assuming that He spoke Aramaic, it was pointed out that the Aramaic equivalent of ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου could only be Barnāsh or Barnāshā, and that this was the ordinary Aramaic word for 'a man' in the indefinite sense, and had come to be used as an indefinite personal pronoun for 'one.' The conclusion was reached by some (Wellhausen, Schmidt, etc.) that a sheer misunderstanding of certain (authentic) sayings (especially Mk 2[10f. 27f.]), where Jesus spoke of 'man,' had led early Greek translators from the Aramaic to use the unnatural Greek phrase, and that by a natural process this was extended to other

authentic passages, and also to some new ones which theological conceptions of His Person led them to attribute to Jesus. The discussion of this problem must be left to the linguistic specialists. But a survey of the controversy yields the following points.

(1) Much depends on the date ascribed to the first documents in which it occurs. Now the authors of Matthew and Luke found this phrase in that document Q which gave them so many of the words of Jesus. If they independently got hold of Q in Greek, and if, as Harnack holds, it was composed before the Fall of Jerusalem, it must be dated in the lifetime of many of the first disciples of Jesus. This fact will go far to prove that 'Mark' found the phrase in his independent material, which also must have existed before A.D. 70. The double process of misunderstanding the Aramaic phrase and using it for theological ends, by which N. Schmidt accounts for its place in the Gospels, is then thrown back to the lifetime of the primary apostles. This seems incredible among people who spoke both Aramaic and Greek. (2) Those who believe that Jesus used some word to express this idea agree that He therein referred directly to Dn 7^{13}, and did so most distinctly at His trial (Mk 14^{62}). It seems difficult to believe that He could not have made this reference in that form, on the ground that, as Lietzmann insists, the title Son of Man 'did not, and for linguistic reasons could not, exist in Aramaic'—an extreme which Dalman refuses to accept (*Worte Jesu*[2], p. 193 f.). As a matter of fact, when the Greek Gospels were translated (in the lectionary known as the *Evangeliarium Hierosolymitanum*) into an Aramaic dialect which 'may, perhaps, bear a close resemblance to that in which Jesus spoke to His disciples' (E. Nestle, *Textual Criticism of the Greek NT*, Eng. tr., London, 1901, p. 103), two forms were used, clumsy as they were, as equivalents for the Greek for 'Son of Man' (N. Schmidt, *EBi* iv. 4714). The phrase is indeed, and admittedly, uncouth in any and every language. But its very strangeness may have lent it value for the purpose of Jesus. Those who believe with R. H. Charles that Jesus adopted the phrase from the 'Similitudes' of the Book of Enoch have less trouble, of course, with its presence in the Gospels, but throw the philological puzzle back to its origin in 'Enoch.' On the other hand, E. A. Abbott holds that Jesus derived the term from Ezekiel, where *vîd ἀνθρώπου* appears scores of times in LXX as a translation of the Hebrew *ben 'adhâm*. As to the Aramaic translation of the latter, which would be given in the synagogues, he points out that the Targum of Jonathan (2nd cent.) calls Ezekiel *bar'ādham*, and this may have been the phrase familiar to Jesus. If this were the phrase He used, which Abbott seems to hold as possible, the reference to Dn 7^{13} would not be excluded. His whole manner of revealing His consciousness involved the constant use of many OT ideas and passages, hitherto unharmonized or superficially interpreted. His consciousness extracted their inner unity as the reflexion of itself, and their variety as the prophetic voices of God. (3) The avoidance of the title by the authors of the Gospels, except when they attribute its use to Jesus, arose from their recognition of its strangeness, and their reverence for His purpose in its adoption. Moreover, the titles which they use are either religious or prophetic in their meaning, but 'Son of Man' does not immediately suggest a religious idea like 'the Lord,' nor link Him directly and openly with canonical prophecy like 'the Christ,' nor immediately with the Father, like 'Son of God.' It is colourless in these respects, and even in our own day is used only when men wish to emphasize one of the aspects of His Person, namely, His humanity. But that was not what the earliest disciples needed to emphasize by means of a title; and probably it was not what Jesus intended by it. Its avoidance in the Epistles is due obviously to the fact that to Gentiles it could have had no meaning at all. This makes it all the more significant that the Gentile Synoptic (Luke), who avoids so much that is peculiarly Jewish, retains it so freely in the words of Jesus, and preserves several instances of its use which are peculiar to his Gospel (see below). (4) It is not impossible that, when Jesus used the Aramaic form, His emphasis on it carried the meaning 'the Man,' but that, for reasons partially suggested by Dalman (*op. cit.*, p. 196 f.), the only Greek form free from embarrassment was not *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, but *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*. But it is by no means conclusively proved that Jesus could not, even in Aramaic, use a phrase, however peculiar, for which those Greek words were, in the minds of men who knew and read and wrote both languages, the best equivalent. Burkitt holds that 'the Son of Man' is a literal translation of the Aramaic for 'the human being,' 'the Man,' and that, when Jesus used it, the effect would be 'the Man—you know of whom I speak,' and that at His trial the reference to Dn 7^{13} became quite clear (*Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus*, p. 66).

(*b*) *Use of the term by Jesus.*—It must help us to understand His consciousness if we try to discover why and how He used this strange title.

(1) We must remember that the term 'Messiah' did not occur as a personal noun until Jewish times, and that the indiscriminate use of it by us as an equivalent for other terms may and does lead to inaccuracy. Some word must, indeed, be found to cover all the phenomena of the strange alluring hope which held the eyes of that race directed upon God and the future with passionate confidence; and Messiah' has become fixed for us in that usage. But we must not forget that many descriptions of their hope even in the OT contain no allusion to a personal Messiah. The word 'Messiah' in late Jewish literature—'mine (or 'the') anointed one'—is used most frequently where the mind of the seer is fixed upon the clash of nations, when he thinks of dynasty succeeding dynasty and empire overthrowing empire. Then he conceives of the Anointed One, generally as the 'Son of David,' as appearing to overcome all foes. From this it becomes plain that in the days of Jesus—whether false Messiahs had already appeared or not—the word Messiah would inevitably suggest a powerful historical king, a warrior, an army, a sudden and resistless revolution. But, if we take Enoch 37–70 to be pre-Christian, another conception of the great deliverance had arisen. Developing the central idea in Dn 7^{13}, the eye of faith saw one appear, who comes down upon the plane of history from above, wholly 'supernatural,' for whom a new name must be found. (He is very rarely called 'the Anointed.') He, 'the Son of Man,' shall execute judgment on men and angels alike. His sphere is evidently other than that usually associated with the picture of the anointed king, of David's lineage.

The difference between the ideals led to a difference in the effect of the names principally associated with each. This comes out in a startling way in the trial scene. When Jesus is asked whether He is 'the Christ,' He not only assents, but immediately, as if still avoiding a misunderstanding, makes the statement that they will see 'the Son of Man' at the right hand of power and in the clouds of heaven. Now, it was no blasphemy, as has often been pointed out, for a man to claim to be Messiah; but the claim to be 'the Son of Man,' uttered in the presence of so many witnesses, was taken as a blasphemous claim at once. Yet, strange to say, according to the Synoptics, the Jewish judges did not lay before Pilate the religious (Son of Man) but the political (Messiah) charge, that He claimed 'to be king' (Mk 15^{2}). Luke tells us (22^{70}) that it was the claim to be Son of Man that led to the further question, 'Art thou then the Son of God?'—where 'Son of God' cannot be a mere repetition of the original question, 'If thou art the Christ, tell us' (v.^{67}), but suggests that the term 'Son of Man' carried to their minds higher personal implications than 'Messiah.' Exactly the same succession of ideas appears in the Fourth Gospel, where Pilate is evidently first told that Jesus claimed to be king of the Jews (Jn 18^{33}; though, strangely enough, both here and in the Synoptics the exact language of the first accusation as reported from the Jewish judges to Pilate is not preserved). When Pilate seems unimpressed by that apparently foolish idea, they then pass to a new (religious) accusation (19^{7}) based on their Law, viz. 'he made himself the Son of God.' Such facts would seem to prove that the term Messiah carried with it too much of a 'political' meaning, and for that reason Jesus avoided its use or acceptance, except among the inner circle of disciples (Mt $16^{16ff.}$) or at the final trial, whereas the term Son of Man was so instinct, for those who understood it at all, with what we call 'supernatural' connotation that it suggested the attitude of expectant waiting upon God's mighty act rather than the readiness of a subject people for revolution. He therefore could feel secure that those who grasped anything of its meaning, and they may have been few, would not be as the dangerous zealots, while those who did not understand it would inquire (Jn 12^{34}).

(2) Jesus used this title from an early period in His ministry down to the very end, and in many connexions, in relation to His functions as the

founder of the Kingdom of God on earth. Some of these correspond with the functions assigned to the Son of Man in the Book of Enoch, but many are profoundly different.

(i.) Before the critical passage describing His appearance to His disciples near Cæsarea Philippi, He had already used it, according to the three Synoptic Gospels, twice (Mk 2^{10} 2^{28} and ||); according to Q, four times in Matthew's arrangement, and twice in Luke's arrangement (Mt 8^{20} 11^{19} $12^{32.\ 40}$ and ||); according to Luke alone, once more (6^{22}, where Mt 5^{11} reads 'for my sake'). Of these the most significant are that the Son of Man has power on earth to forgive sins and is Lord of the Sabbath. The latter is not a strange claim, as Wellhausen and others maintain, when we remember that the Sabbath was a Jewish institution, and that the saying is parallel, therefore, to His assumption of authority over other institutions, such as 'the Law' in the Sermon on the Mount, the Temple (Mt 12^{6}, cf. Mk $11^{15\text{-}18}$), and even the Covenant itself (Mk 14^{24}).

(ii.) He uses the title 'Son of Man' when He begins to teach His disciples about His death (Mk 8^{31} 9^{12}). And part of their distress and dismay must have been due to this most astonishing collocation of ideas. For, if He had already uttered the words of Mt 10^{22} 11^{19} $12^{8.\ 32}$ $13^{37.\ 41}$, He had suggested to them a personal power and authority with which death seemed utterly inconsistent. According to the Synoptics, the teaching about His death immediately followed the confession of Peter at Cæsarea. Now, it is essential to a conception of His method to see that Matthew is right in his interpretation of the meaning of our Lord's question, 'Who do men say that the Son of Man is?' (16^{13}; cf. Mk 8^{27}, Lk 9^{18}). He had already spoken of Himself as 'the Son of Man,' but that name of itself had for them no definiteness, and needed interpretation; so the problem was whether the disciples had yet 'placed' Him in their scheme of things. Hence the joy when He found that they saw in Him the Messiah. But this insight of theirs made it urgent that they should not be swept off their feet by earthly views of the Messiah. They must learn that the Son of Man is not only the Messiah of their familiar hopes, but also the 'Suffering Servant,' and must die. Hence this is the title which He uses when describing the purpose and effect of that death on the relations of man and God (Mk 10^{45} $14^{22\text{f.}}$). In and for His own consciousness, the union of 'the Son of Man' with the 'Suffering Servant of Jahweh' had already taken place. That which was incongruous for His disciples had long been central for Him. That which to them is a moral impossibility shines before Him even through lurid glory as the crown of the moral universe. In His blood the relations of God and man are re-constructed. He who serves the race unto death, if He be the Son of Man, *ipso facto* becomes the Lord of its destiny. But His Lordship is for His consciousness equivalent to the Kingship of God. Here then the new and transcendent fact is attained, first in His insight and will, and then in the experience of those upon whom the new relationship, the actual Kingship of the Father, takes effect. Not the fulfilment of the Law by the mass of the people, as their Rabbis taught, not even their repentance at the call of a prophet, like John the Baptist, not the abstract announcement by Jesus that God is the Father, nor even the exemplification of it in His treatment of the sinful and the suffering, opens the new era in the creative relations of God and man. The foundations of the world have been changed. That new era is produced by the will of the Son of Man to offer Himself as in some real sense a ransom, a sacrifice in death. But this death of the Son of Man is due ultimately to the will of God (see use of παραδίδωμι in Mk 9^{31} 10^{33} 14^{41}; cf. Jn 10^{18} $12^{27\text{f.}}$). It is intrinsic to the very nature of that process by which God is to establish the perfect Kingship of His holy love and holy will among men. This is perhaps the most startling feature of the re-interpretation (referred to above) of the functions of the deliverer, whether called Messiah or Son of Man. Historically, it is rooted in the Ebhed-Jahweh of Isaiah; actually it was present to the consciousness and will of Jesus as a living purpose; and its effect is seen in that new form of religious consciousness whose intelligible, not to say intelligent, history began when the primary apostles discovered that the Cross was the instrument of the Christ for their reconciliation with God. Almost all the NT literature finds there the secret of the Kingdom of God. It has been established in sacrifice, in a deed whose superhuman quality is seen in its transcendent moral beauty and power (1 Co $1^{18\text{f.}}$). St. Paul it was who saw so deeply that the death of Jesus secured that vindication of the righteousness of God which some of the greatest prophets and seers had foreseen as a necessary condition in the establishment of the Kingship of God.

(iii.) The title 'Son of Man' is used also and most frequently in the eschatological, including the apocalyptic, parts of the words of Jesus. He speaks to His disciples (according to Lk $17^{22.\ 24.\ 26.\ 30}$) of 'the days of the Son of Man,' which may have reminded them of the Jewish way of speaking of 'the days of the Messiah.' (The peculiarly Jewish colouring of this phrase shows that Luke, who avoids that kind of thing when he can, found it in some document not used by Matthew and Mark.) He will appear in power and glory (Mk 8^{38} 13^{26} 14^{62}) and will then enter upon the supreme task of judgment (Mk 8^{38} = Mt 16^{27}, Mt 25^{31}). That appearing will not be confined to Judæa, but have universal effect (Lk 17^{24} = Mt 24^{27}). In these and similar passages Jesus uses language which, while reminding His hearers of passages in Daniel, yet presents in its total effect an entirely new view of the consummation. It is not true to His consciousness to say, as recent 'eschatologists' have been insisting, that He shared in the crude catastrophic view of the last things. His consciousness has wrought a revolution for His disciples which their minds only gradually realized; and their confusion is reflected in the reports of His last discourses, and indeed in the rest of the NT. He speaks of the Son of Man coming with power and 'with' or 'on' the clouds of heaven. What that means *for Him* must be set beside the fact that He has already come. We cannot understand Him by supposing, as Schweitzer does, that Jesus expected to become Messiah and Son of Man only after death. Such a violent conception of a consciousness that only lives on what it is going to be and is not yet, is incredible. The Son of Man had already come. The miracle that is foretold must be compared with the miracle already done. His consciousness even as He speaks —so 'naturally'!—embraces the human and the superhuman, the conscious will that 'came' and the conscious will that shall 'come' again. It is as untrue to the nature of His consciousness to confine it wholly within the limits of the imagination of His disciples, as they looked forward to His coming, as it would be to insist that His mind held the successive details of that future already in their actual form. The essential difference, and the key to our further understanding of Him, lies in that consciousness that He, as the Son of Man, pre-existent and superhuman, had come and therefore must and would come again. We have already seen that the pictorial element is undoubtedly present in His eschatological sayings, and that will

add to the conviction that we must not attribute to Him the crude 'miraculism' that His disciples saw in the form of His sayings. On the other hand, we must not take refuge, with the timidity of the modern mind before the word 'miracle,' in the notion that He possessed and claimed no superhuman power over the forces of nature. The 'purely spiritual' view of His relation to history, whatever that may mean, was His as little as it was His disciples' view. It is the higher conception of evolution (not the naturalistic, mechanical) that gives to our day better than to His own or any other generation the means of interpreting His consciousness at these points. That view is that the history of our world has been carried upward and enriched by the appearance and operation of new factors. For it is a crude evolutionism which holds that the simple produced the complex or the lower caused the higher to exist. To say that the higher was in the lower, when there is no sign of its presence, does not enlighten us. It is best to say that, when the conditions were ready, life or thought appeared, whence we know not, and became a self-multiplying power in history. The new factors are 'from above,' they have 'come,' and they have laid hold of the material prepared for them, with a strange power and for ends whose nature the former things could not suggest. The Son of Man was conscious of being such a new factor in history, and hence of a relation to nature which was both human and more than human. He came eating and drinking, He had not where to lay His head, He had to face the conditions of human history even in temptation of the devil, in hostility and betrayal by those whom He loved, in death, because He was a son of man. But, being the Son of Man, He could do these mighty works among the forces of nature and even rise from the dead. And He would come, soon or late (His words leave room for both), with power and the clouds of heaven for a universal reign over the human race in the name of God.

(3) *In the Fourth Gospel.*—The use of the title 'Son of Man' in the Fourth Gospel, where it occurs 12 times, is characteristically different from, and yet fundamentally the same as, its use in the Synoptics. (*a*) The peculiar use of the 3rd pers. in connexion with this title is emphasized by the fact that in this Gospel He uses the 1st pers. so freely—'I am' light, bread, good shepherd, etc. Only at $9^{35f.}$ (if reading ἀνθρώπου for θεοῦ) does He seem to say, and that indirectly, 'I am the Son of Man.' (*b*) Further, we find that the title produces the same confusion in the minds of others as it does according to the Synoptics. His claim to be Messiah, and speculation whether He be the Messiah, are darkened by His deliberate association of that apocalyptic and less familiar title 'Son of Man' (if familiar at all to any but the *docti*) with death and with eating His flesh and drinking His blood (6^{53}). 'His disciples' are discouraged ($6^{60.\ 66}$) just as Peter was, according to the Synoptists. The Jews and the multitude likewise are perplexed (6^{52}), and ask, 'Who is this Son of Man?' (12^{34}). (*c*) It is in answer to a perplexed mind that in two cases Jesus uses the title in an apocalyptic connexion (3^{13} 6^{62}), where 'ascending' and 'descending' express His consciousness of superhuman relations with heaven and earth (cf. 1^{51}). (*d*) A

(crucifixion and ascension), whereas in the Synoptics it is always used in an ethical sense; and 'glorify' (δοξάζω) (12^{23} 13^{31}) is here used of His death in an ethical sense, whereas the idea is applied to the Son of Man in the Synoptists in a way which implies a glory apparent to the senses. (*e*) The essential identity of this consciousness with that described in the Synoptics is evident. The difference of colouring is not wholly explained by saying that with John 'the name . . . has reference not to the higher claims of Jesus, but to the fact of His manhood' (E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 184). Rather is it due to the constant effort in this Gospel to present the historic consciousness of Jesus as the perfect union of the supernatural with the natural. He who both wept at the grave and immediately raised the dead was not living in a double consciousness, now human and now divine; nor, for this author, was it primarily 'a human nature united with the divine' (*ib.* p. 186) for which the title was used. The emphasis in these passages is still on the divine which has become human, on the supernatural in the natural. Even in 5^{27}, if we translate '*a* son of man' (but cf. the anarthrous title in 10^{36} 19^{7} and Mt 14^{33}), the change from 'Son of God' in v.[25] involves a kind of 'play' upon the words 'Son of Man,' and means that He has authority *on earth* (Mk 2^{10}) to forgive sins, as being also 'a son of man.' It is the fact of incarnation, vast in its meaning, that contains *this* power. The power alike to reveal ($3^{12f.}$), to redeem (3^{14} $12^{32.\ 34}$), to nourish with divine life (6^{53}), and to judge (5^{27}) rests upon the fact that in history, as a man, He yet stands as Son of Man. And the context of these passages shows it to be no less true that, for the Johannine interpreter of His consciousness, these functions rest upon the fact that in history, as a man, He yet stands as Son of God, the Logos who became flesh.

III. *JESUS CHRIST AS CREATOR OF THE CHURCH.*—We have in the NT the record not merely of the conscious will of the historic Jesus, but of the effect which that will produced in the experience of man, in the rise of the Christian Church. Some account of that matter is herewith given in its two principal stages.

i. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE DISCIPLES BEFORE THE CRUCIFIXION.—The attention of students of the Gospels has been fastened mainly upon two subjects, viz. the teaching of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels, and the traces of later thought in those records, such as the apologetic purpose revealed in Matthew and John, or the personal views of His Person held by each of the four evangelists. There is another somewhat neglected field of study, viz. that change which Jesus wrought in the religious life of His disciples. This is in a sense only the reverse side of the whole fact of which the obverse has been presented in the description of His conscious will. But it must also be considered if we are to realize vividly the process by which He became the founder of Christianity. The neglect of this topic is one fruitful cause of the wide spread but superficial view that Jesus was a teacher, whose disciples *after His death* exaggerated Him into a Redeemer and a Divine Person.

1. **Jesus and Israel.**—The first disciples came to Jesus from those who had been arrested by the message of John the Baptist. His announcement of the approach of the Kingdom of heaven was bound up with the announcement that the King Himself would appear, through whom the Holy Spirit would enter into the life of the people (Mk 1^{2-8}, Mt 3^{1-12}, Lk 3^{1-20}, Jn 1^{19-27}). They understood, of course, that He would come to Israel and somehow assert His supreme authority over the people of God. But they did not and could not anticipate the entirely new manner in which that assertion would be made, the new type of kingship which He would establish. Even their prophets had not foreseen it (Mt 11^{1}).

(*a*) *His appeal to the Jews.*—Jesus did make His appeal steadily and unweariedly to Israel as the people of God. He preached throughout the

synagogues of Galilee (Mk 1^{39}). On each visit to Jerusalem He went to the Temple and dealt directly with the responsible heads of the Jewish religious community. And not only John but the Synoptists represent Him as aware that His rejection or acceptance by them determined the question whether 'His own' had received Him or not (*e.g.*, Jn 1^{11} $6^{52,\ 64,\ 66}$ 8^{48} 9^{41}, Mt 21^{23-46} 23^{37-39}). When He sent out His disciples to preach in His name (alike the twelve and the seventy), He commanded them to address 'the lost sheep of the house of Israel' (Mt 10^{6}) or to prepare the way for His own preaching among them (Lk 10^{1}). The last great struggle culminating in His death arose from His unbroken will to bring Israel to repentance *and into submission to Himself.*

(*b*) *The disciples and this appeal.*—His disciples accompanied Him through the whole series of events. They heard, and helped to extend, His call to repentance; and they knew that this alone had not caused His death, for the rulers feared to kill one popularly known to be a prophet (Mt 21^{26}). They heard His announcement of a higher code of morals; that did not cause His death. They heard Him accused of breaking the Sabbath; that also, though more grave, did not directly enter into His final condemnation. They knew that even the desire to be a revolutionary Messiah would not have procured His formal indictment and execution; patriotism would have kept his enemies silent, if not enthusiastic. On the other hand, they had watched his passionate desire to save His people in His own way and on His own terms. They had heard his patient arguments with the scribes and Pharisees, His protests against their accusation of Him as an emissary of Satan, His warnings against their rejection of Him as leading to their own downfall, His terrific denunciations when their hatred of Him revealed them, not as ignorant or sensual, but as hypocrites. They saw His very tears over Jerusalem, when He knew her decision to be made and her doom chosen out of hatred for the real Spirit of God and for the real Kingship of God as revealed in Himself (cf. Mt 11^{20} 12^{28-30} 23^{37-39}, Mk 12^{1-2}, Lk 13^{1-9}). Burkitt explains what he calls 'the quarrel' between Jesus and the authorities by the difference between 'erudition,' on which they depended, and 'intuition,' which was the supreme quality of His Spirit (*The Gospel History and its Transmission*, p. 174). The disciples have a deeper account of the matter than that, so much deeper that the word 'quarrel' is not the adequate term for it. It was in their view a warfare between the true King of Israel and the sons of the Kingdom. The resistance to one who claims regal authority is either rebellion or patriotic rectitude. The records show that even before His death His disciples had begun to understand it as rebellion.

(*c*) *Persistence of the appeal.*—Moreover, it is not correct to say that Jesus cut Himself off from Israel. His appeals never ceased. Even in the Johannine account of His controversy this element of grace never altogether fails. His urgency, His condemnation, His denunciation, are the weapons of His mercy (*e.g.*, 6^{33-35} 8^{12-32} $10^{27f.}$), and on the cross He prays for the pardon of those who have rejected His Kingship. To the very end He is seeking the lost, manifesting the Father's grace in His own attitude and action towards them.

2. The new Israel.—'The whole Jewish thought may be summed up in this, that as surely as there is only one God, so surely is there only one sacred community (Gemeinde)' (A. Schlatter, *NT Theologie*, Calw, 1909–10, i. 175). Nowhere is the majesty of the conscious will of Jesus more apparent than in this, that, as the people reject Him, He begins to create the new community of God. The disciples preserve this fact as fully and clearly as they do His words of an eschatological character. And their understanding of His self-estimate was rooted here, and not merely in His words of prophecy. The Gospels prove on every page that Jesus deliberately set Himself to establish the Church as the manifestation of the Kingdom of God. Whether He actually used the word 'Church' (Mt 18^{17}) or not is a minor matter; and it may be even irrelevant. The fact is that, as He found individuals responsive to His call, repenting of sin, as He saw repentant men (Lk 5^{8}) ready to rise up and follow Him at all costs, waiting upon His will as upon that of a king, He saw in them the members of the new community of God. He speaks of them as 'salt of the earth,' 'light of the world' (Mt $5^{13f.}$), and distinguishes their kind of righteousness from that of the Pharisees (5^{20}). He sees publicans and harlots, who repent and follow Him (as many of them had believed John the Baptist in his day), going into the Kingdom of God (Mt 21^{31}). He takes the faith of the centurion in Himself as the harbinger of that multitude of Gentiles who shall come from the east and the west while the sons of the Kingdom are cast out (Mt $8^{11f.}$). The idea that Jesus was primarily a teacher, and a personal revealer only so far as He went about doing good, just as He expected others to do, and for the rest pictured to Himself, and to others, certain transcendent acts of God lying yet for Him wholly in the future, through which the Kingdom would be established out of heaven, is one which leaves out the central fact in the Gospels. That central fact is that He created, consciously, deliberately, patiently, the new nation, the community in which God's Kingship was being realized. Harnack (*Neue Untersuchungen*, etc., p. 97) names it as one of the 'developments' in Matthew that Jesus is pictured as addressing a definite community ('eine geschlossene Gemeinde'). But, if we subtract a slight element of exaggeration in the phrase, the fact is not less true of Mark. In the latter His movements are affected by consideration of three groups—the multitude, the officials and their representatives, and the disciples. The last named, even when limited to the twelve (though not always so limited), form a definite community, which even in Mark is looked upon as the nucleus of the Kingdom of God ($1^{16,\ 17,\ 35-38}$ 2^{18-20} $3^{7,\ 13ff.}$ $4^{10,\ 34}$ $10^{29f.,\ 43-45}$ 12^{9} $13^{20-23,\ 27}$ [οἱ ἐκλεκτοί]).

What is the evidence in the Gospels that His disciples experienced the force of that creative will during His earthly ministry? On the outward side the answer is easy. For it is clear that Jesus, as we have seen, gathered His followers around Him, as individuals who became a more or less definite body, through their willingness to accept His teaching, obey His behests, and put their hope in His power. We do not know how large this body was. It appears indistinctly as varying in number, intelligence, and enthusiasm. That crowds followed Him so much as to endanger His work is made very clear in Mark's Gospel, where He is represented as repeatedly eluding them and their superficial and earthly desires. All the Gospels describe Him as selecting twelve men on whom He concentrated His attention (Mk 1^{16-20} = Mt 4^{18-22}; cf. Lk 5^{1-11}, Mk 3^{13-19} = Lk 6^{12-19}, Mt 10^{2-4}, Jn 1^{35-53} $6^{67,\ 70f.}$; see E. Haupt, *Zum Verständnis des Apostolats im NT*, Halle, 1896). As Mark shows Him escaping from the multitudes, Matthew most distinctly and repeatedly emphasizes the positive work of close and intimate instruction of the twelve (cf. Mt $16^{13,\ 21}$ $17^{1,\ 9,\ 19,\ 24,\ 25}$ $18^{1,\ 21}$ $19^{10,\ 23}$ 20^{17} $24^{1-25,\ 46}$ $26^{17f.}$).

3. The 'liberal view.'—It is usual and important to point out that Jesus, in giving to His disciples the secret of fellowship with God, did not teach

them any rules or provide them with institutional machinery. He has no technique of penitence, though He demands penitence. He has no external rules of worship, though He expects them to worship. He would have men pray, but teaches only one brief and general form. He insists relentlessly on doing the will of the Father, but He has no list of commandments. He makes love to God and man a universal fundamental law that must be obeyed by all men before and above all else, but where and how they shall begin He does not say. All the helps by way of rules, ceremonies, symbols, and creeds which other religious teachers and directors have used for the guidance of their followers are absent from the story of our Lord's dealings with His disciples. These facts raise in an urgent way the question, What then did Jesus do with His disciples that was sufficient to create the Church and open the Christian era? The answer to this question which the so-called 'liberal' theology has made familiar to this generation consists mainly in this, that Jesus, first by His teaching about God as Father and about the Kingdom as the re-organization of society on the basis of righteousness and love, further by His own example in which faith in the Father and love to man were so fully exemplified, awoke in His disciples' hearts a like faith in their own sonship towards God, and that 'enthusiasm for humanity' from which all effective reforms of society must spring. His primary message was about the Father and man's direct approach to Him, not about Himself as Mediator of that Father's love, not even about Himself as exemplar of the Father's spirit. It was the admiration and gratitude of the disciples that clothed Him with the categories of Messiah and Redeemer, drawn partly from Jewish and partly from Hellenistic life and thought, and in time added the remoter conceptions of pre-existence, deity, atoning sacrifice, and universal authority.

This position is capable of many modifications. There are those who reduce the personal function of Jesus to little more than that of a superlative teacher who was also a man of deep religious experience (*e.g.*, Bousset, *Jesus*; J. Weiss, *Christus*, Halle, 1909). There are those who recognize in His exemplary power a fact of transcendent value for all time, a form of religious experience which surpasses all others, and makes Him Leader and Master of all who would know the power of faith and realize in their hearts the love of God (*e.g.*, N. Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*). But there are those whom it is hard to classify, men who seem, under the spell of 'the modern mind,' to reduce His significance, and then, under a vision of His real place in the history of the Christian consciousness, to exalt Him to superhuman rank and authority. Such an one is Wernle (*Die Anfänge unserer Religion*; very clearly also in *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu*). But we may here take as our example Harnack, in whose various writings the two points of view (or the influence of these two impulses) appear repeatedly. For example, in *The Sayings of Jesus* he says that Q gives us 'that which formed the central theme of the message of our Lord—that is, the revelation of the knowledge of God, and the moral call to repent and to believe, to renounce the world and to gain heaven—this and nothing else' (p. 251). A few pages earlier, however (while dealing with the content of Q), he says, 'It is obvious that our Lord's consciousness of Sonship must have preceded in time His consciousness of Messiahship, must indeed have formed a stepping-stone to the latter' (p. 245 n.); again in an often quoted sentence in *Das Wesen des Christentums*, 'Not the Son, but only the Father is contained in the gospel as Jesus proclaimed it' (p. 91). Yet in the next paragraphs he goes on to show from the very words of Jesus that 'He leads them to God, not only through His word, but even more through that which He is and does and finally through that which He suffers,' and concludes by asserting 'that Jesus Himself became for His disciples the power of the Gospel' (p. 92). There is evidently a situation here which needs to be cleared up. It has been urged that Harnack in that sentence means to speak strictly as a historian when he says that the gospel as Jesus preached it contained only 'the Father and not the Son,' and that he does admit the right of the disciples afterwards to introduce Jesus Himself into their form of the gospel (so Schlatter). The question is partly whether Harnack is right in excluding from consideration the great passages (cited earlier in this article) in which the conscious will of Jesus is represented as determining the destiny of men. But it is not a question to be decided merely by quoting utterances which explicitly and formally put Him into the gospel as He preached it, or by refusing to accept them as authentic. The real question is whether we have proof that Jesus became to His disciples a 'religious object' during His earthly life, and whether their experience in that matter was the effect of His conscious will as He by teaching, miracle, example, and direct moulding of their life formed them into the nucleus of that community in which He intended the Kingship of God to be realized. Have we any right to limit 'His gospel' to His recorded words of formal teaching, addressed to the multitudes, if we find that the whole effect of His 'training of the twelve' was to replace their Jewish religion with a religious attitude towards God which depended upon their attitude towards Him?

4. The method of Jesus.—This, which is a purely historical as well as a vital religious inquiry, we must now deal with. It will be best to do so by considering the matter in relation to the three functions of personal founders described in the opening section of this article. The appearance of repetition, when the following statements are compared with the discussion of the consciousness of Jesus, will be lessened if it be remembered, as already explained, that we are here considering the other side of the central fact (the founding of the Christian religion), viz. the religious consciousness of the disciples of Jesus. We must see the experience through which the first disciples passed as the conscious will of Jesus took effect upon their relations with God, if we would understand the method of the founder.

(1) *The sense of need.*—Each personal founder has dealt with the human sense of need. He has interpreted it, intensified it, and sought to satisfy it. He has revealed what he saw to be the true and supreme values of human experience, glorified them, and sought to make them the actual possession of his followers. What did His disciples receive from Jesus in this way?

(*a*) They came to Him from a race for which, as a whole, the religious was the supreme view of life. Moreover, they came with minds and hearts aflame from the stern, passionate, convinced, and convincing preaching of John the Baptist. His announcement of the approaching Kingdom prepared them for the King. In Jesus they found another who, like John, was absorbed wholly in the thought of that supreme crisis, and He too announced the Kingdom. But they found many great differences in His method and outlook. These differences are not exhausted by speaking of His geniality, breadth, sympathy, social interest, and so forth. For He was also stern, definite, authoritative, exacting. His disciples found themselves involved by their discipleship in

new personal relations with the living, present, and insistent will of God. Jesus did not, like the Baptist, postpone that Kingship to an outer catastrophic event. He makes them feel that they have to do with God now, as He is dealing with them now. This lies at the heart even of the Lord's Prayer, every clause of which involves the idea of God's present action in our human life, even though it may have an eschatological background. The presence of God is involved in all that He says about prayer, against anxiety, concerning the Father's love, in the call to repentance, to faith, to self-sacrifice. In spite of the eschatological element in His sayings, through which He taught them to cherish the expectation of the future acts of God, we must see in these records their memory of the awe, the humility, the confidence towards God, the sense of His actual Kingship which Jesus awoke in their souls.

(*b*) Jesus also took up the Baptist's call to repentance. But His disciples found that with Him this meant a change more profound than any prophet had ever sought to effect, for no prophet had ever learned it as they did from the Messiah Himself (cf. Mt $13^{17f.}$). This repentance was something which He wrought in them by His whole continuous treatment of them as well as by an explicit preliminary call. They learned from Him the depth and subtlety of their sin. Apart altogether from lessons about outward sin, which He rather assumed that they already knew from the Law (Mk $10^{19f.}$), they were taught to see deadliest guilt in self-righteousness and self-seeking and unbelief. On these matters they received, and have preserved in these records, the most penetrating and heart-breaking experiences. For His words created the Christian world by first making history in their own souls. The teachings gathered together in the Sermon on the Mount were addressed to them as disciples, and cannot be understood if viewed as spoken to all and sundry —a drifting, excited crowd (Mt 5^{1}). Not only was Peter first encouraged to become a permanent follower in an hour of moral agony (Lk 5^{1-11}), but he was repeatedly compelled to deeper knowledge of the distance of his heart from the ideal of his Master (Mt 14^{31} 16^{23} 17^{20} $18^{21f.}$ 19^{25-29} $20^{24ff.}$ 26^{31-35} [cf. Lk $22^{31f.}$] $26^{37.\ 40}$). The story of continuous moral training revealed in that series of passages expressed only in part the effect which Jesus produced upon the disciples when He thus proved to them how searching is that spirit of penitence to which He summoned them. In the conversions of Levi the publican, of Zacchæus, of the woman that was a sinner, there must have been powerful emotional crises. And the disciples were witnesses of these, and learners from them. They saw and felt the extending effect of the personality of Jesus upon the moral consciousness of susceptible souls. On the positive side, we may note that He taught them to repent, and got them to repent, by demanding the attitude of a little child (Mt $18^{1ff.}$), by measuring their sin with the most terrible of all standards, the principle of absolute mercy (Mt $6^{14f.}$ 18^{15-35}), by insisting that the essential spirit of the Kingdom in which they now began to live was that of service, unshrinking, unselfish, and complete (Mt 20^{20-28}), which cannot be rendered except by the penitent. He confronted them with the call to love as God loves the unworthy and uncongenial (Mt 5^{43-48}). He even taught them that this inner moral revolution must be carried in upon the deepest impulses and apparently most natural and prevalent desires of human nature (Mt $19^{10-12.\ 24-28}$). It is impossible to measure the work of Jesus in founding the new and final religion unless we see in these mere excerpts from the wealth of material in all four Gospels, not the quiet, placid teaching of a Rabbi, but the active penetrating spirit, the conscious will, of their Lord bearing the idea of repentance persistently and insistently, deeper and deeper, into the heart, conscience, and will of the disciples. And they were thus actually taught, or the world could never have heard of them or Him. They learned from Him that the fundamental need of man is not primarily a God who can give His people the outward conditions of happiness, but this—a new moral relation with the holy will of the actual and living God. And Jesus made them feel that need while He was there in the flesh, or they could not have seen or felt His meaning and power when He came to them in the Spirit.

(2) *How the need was satisfied.* — The second matter of inquiry as to a personal founder is this —What function did He exercise in meeting the need which He revealed in so intense a light? Did He actually give them the new relation with God for which penitence is at once the preparation and the passionate outcry? It is plain from the Synoptics alone that they saw in Him a superhuman Man (see above on His consciousness). He was the Son of Man, He worked miracles of healing, He overcame the power of evil spirits, and even bound the strong man, the devil himself. He spoke on things human and divine with authority unmistakable, and announced the laws of the Kingdom of God. The religious results were not what they came to be after the Resurrection, but they were in kind the same. They found Him to be a fountain of the grace of God. No doubt the idea of saving the lost (Lk 19^{10} ‖ Mt 18^{11} [uncertain text]) may have eschatological implicates, as the word 'salvation' continues to have even in Paul's Epistles. But we cannot get rid of the fact that in the parables of the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the prodigal son Jesus described His own present conduct as He pursued and received those who became His disciples. The fact that the recorded words of explicit forgiveness were addressed to strangers (Mk $2^{5.\ 9}$ and ‖, Lk 7^{48-50}) must not obscure the underlying fact that all who became associated with Him entered into that state of forgiveness. It is true that He glowingly describes the willingness of the Father to receive, and the supreme joy in heaven over, the repentant. But His own disciples had that grace of heaven manifested to them in the will of Jesus towards them. He treated those as penitent who followed Him, and His followers He treated as under the Kingship of God, enjoying the love of the Father because they were under His own will and objects of His own love. This comes out more clearly if we recall, in its significance for their religious experience, the kind and extent of submission which He exacted and they yielded to Him. The very symbols and metaphors employed to describe their relations to Him and His functions towards them are significant. Thus He is the Shepherd and they His flock (Mt 10^{16} 25^{32}, Lk 15^{4} 12^{32}, Jn $10^{11.\ 14}$), and therein encourages them to remember the OT conception of Jahweh as Shepherd (Ps 23^{1} 80^{1}, Is 40^{11}, Ezk $34^{17.\ 20}$). He is the builder of the new temple, *i.e.* the community which shall take Israel's place (Mt 16^{18}, Jn 2^{19}), for He is 'more than the temple' (Mt 12^{6}). He is the sower, and the souls whom He gathers to Himself are the harvest of God (Mt $13^{3.\ 24}$; cf. $9^{37f.}$). In all these metaphors we must note the gulf between shepherd and sheep, builder and house, sower and grain, as if they must be made to feel that this difference lies between Him and them, and yet that it is His love, His wisdom, His powerful care and control, that is their supreme hope. He does for them what the moral insight of a true penitent would ask from God. Even more strikingly, He is the

Lord who appoints to every man his task, as a slave-owner deals with the slaves who are his property (Mt 19^{23} 24^{45-51} 25^{14}), who returns to judge them, and for whose return as the consummation of human destiny the disciples of Jesus must wait in eagerness, faithfulness, and faith. These metaphors are added to the positive fundamental assertions of Messiah-King, Son of Man, final Judge, mysterious Servant of Jahweh doomed to death, whose tremendous force is felt with increasing awe as they watch Him move along His strange and unexpected path to His death. But, while the latter group of ideas are present to their minds, now as startling enigmas and anon as more startling explanations of Jesus, the former group are those which describe His actual will as it takes effect upon their present experience. Therefore, they have given up all for His sake (Mt 19^{27}), are ready, as He assumed, to meet persecution and even death for His sake (Mt $5^{10f.}$ [cf. Gess, *Christi Person und Werk*, i. 15 *f.*], Mt 20^{23}). They learn to believe in Him as the Messiah-King (Mt $16^{16f.}$), and, when they reach this measure of insight, Jesus rejoices because He sees now the new community established through which the Kingdom of God is made actual on the earth. He sees in that confession of Him the work of God's grace ('my Father') in their hearts. Then it is that the deeper teaching not only about His death, but about their relation to Him, begins to find expression (Mk 8^{31-38}). (Much of the material in Mt 10 probably belongs to this later period.) Now it begins to appear that their devotion to Him is a matter of which even disciples may be tempted to be ashamed (Mk 8^{38}, Mt $10^{32f.}$ 11^{6} 26^{33}, Ro 1^{16}). Now there is a gospel which they may begin to preach even at the cost of life (Mk 8^{35}). Now Jesus begins to speak of a cross (Mk 8^{34}, Mt 16^{24}, Lk 9^{23}) which they may be called on to carry to their own execution. (It is obvious that this language cannot be reflexion from a later date, for then the minds of Christians were absorbed in another view of the cross and spoke of being 'crucified with' Christ [Gal 2^{20}], and of dying with Him, not of bearing each an independent cross.) And He is said to have spoken of His drawing the world to Himself by being 'lifted up' (Jn 12^{32}).

(3) *Their inchoate thought of His Person.*—We nowhere find in the Gospels an explicit statement regarding the personal religious experience of the disciples. All that fullness of the inner life which created the rest of the NT writings (and in a sense the Synoptic Gospels too) is absent from the story of their intercourse with Him in the days of His flesh. They have preserved the records of their unbelief, their quarrelling, their selfish ambition, their blindness to His meaning, their readiness to forsake or deny Him when the supreme stress came. But they do not speak of their joy or peace or hope. It is evident that those were transition days from the arid, hungering life of the Jewish world of that time to the exultant hearts that were later filled with the Spirit and presence of the Risen Christ and of God in Him. They do not make clear how they thought of the Father as Jesus taught them, nor what that dawn of forgiveness and peace was as they walked with eyes of trust and awe fastened upon this imperious yet tender Master of their souls. But certainly they had begun to feel a religious joy in His fellowship, a religious reverence for His mighty will displayed in deeds and words of superhuman power (Mt 11^{28-30} 12^{50} $13^{16f.}$, Lk $10^{23f.}$, Mk 9^{5}, Jn 1^{14} [cf. 1 Jn $1^{1ff.}$ 15^{12-16}]); and, as we have seen, we must assume that His continuous and ever deepening instruction in the nature of the penitent, consecrated, and faithful life did seize their wills and change their hearts. The story of Peter's contrition at the beginning and end of the record (Lk 5^{8}, Mk 14^{72}) presents one side. The words of Jesus (Mt 16^{17}) indicate that in His view the recognition of His Messiahship was a religious experience of the highest character, in which Peter had been brought into relation with the Father. It is quite certain that they entered into the new life of prayer, or we could never have received their record of His many teachings on that central matter. No less certain is it that, as they thus sought communion with the Father, the constant presence, the searching spirit, the authoritative commands (Mt 7^{24-29}), and the whole personal atmosphere of the Messiah and Son of God conditioned in the deepest way their thought of God and their endeavours after a realized fellowship with Him. The vagueness of the matter at this point is obviously natural on the orthodox view. For, if the gospel must, in Christ's own view, contain Himself as essential to it, it was inevitable that this should not become clear to His disciples, nor the form of religious experience which He alone could make possible become realized, until His relations with them had passed through all stages and reached that climax at which alone the full situation could come into view. It is those who hold that the personal religion of Jesus Himself was meant by Him to become the religion of every man, and that He did not think of entering into their religious consciousness except as an inspiring teacher and example, who cannot explain the absence from the Gospels of any proof that the disciples felt, then and there, the presence of the Kingdom, the full force of the new life and its joy. For this His martyr death was not necessary. That event could only add a glow of pathos—but why not of despair?—to a picture of perfect relations with God which life alone could reveal and death could only blot out.

ii. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE DISCIPLES AFTER THE RESURRECTION.—This is not the place to attempt a history of the apostolic Church. Our task is to set forth as briefly as possible some of those elements, described in the apostolic literature, which constituted the Church as a community, whose existence is founded on conscious reconciliation with God, conscious possession of His Spirit, and that through faith in Jesus as the Messiah, Son of God.

1. **The Resurrection faith.**—It is universally admitted that the inchoate community left by Jesus at His crucifixion had no basis in their brief intercourse with Jesus for continuance as a community. They were not organized for political action. Nor was their religious experience definite and strong enough to give them a distinct consciousness or place within the system of the Jewish Church. Their later conduct towards a universal gospel proves this. As an experience it was, as we have seen, real, but bound up with and dependent upon the presence of Jesus with them, and unreleased from Jewish bonds. When He lay dead, their faith was ready to die. They allowed outsiders to bury Him (Joseph of Arimathea [Mk 15^{42}]; Jn 19^{39} adds Nicodemus). The story of two of them, according to Lk 24^{18-24}, gives a vivid and realistic picture of their attitude of mind, as persons who retained a gracious memory of Jesus without hope. The grief which all the Gospels depict, the story of Thomas, the moral perplexity of Peter, the evident preparation for a permanent burial, combine to illustrate a situation which the whole history of human experience would compel us to expect as the only natural one. Moreover, there was a particular religious view of the situation which must have stained even the inevitable despair with shame and dismay. For an ancient law which was perfectly familiar to them, and which, indeed,

made all crucifixion a matter of peculiar horror to the Jewish imagination, asserted that a man who was executed, or exposed in death, on a cross was proved by that very event to have been accursed of God (Dt 21[23], Ac 5[30f.], Gal 3[13]; cf. 1 Co 1[24] 'a Messiah crucified!'). These facts are named here not for an apologetic purpose, but to account for the fact that practically all scholars, from Strauss onward, have held that the Christian Church could have risen only when the disciples came to have the Resurrection faith. What produced that faith is the matter in dispute, a discussion of which would involve critical details and a philosophy of miracle too prolonged for this article. But it was this sudden conviction that God had raised Jesus from the dead that thrilled the despairing disciples with new life.

2. The Holy Spirit.—Another event occurred in the experience of the community which is known as the Descent of the Holy Spirit. Whether the matter is accurately described in Ac 2 or not (cf. Jn 20[22]), something happened early in the history of the disciples which made the language of Paul about the Spirit intelligible; and the Book of Acts is pervaded by the atmosphere and psychological effects of it. The coming of the Spirit meant that the power of God had come upon them. This power was manifested in various ways, some of them now obscure. Miracles and other forms of endowment (*χαρίσματα*) were the result of His presence (see H. Gunkel, *Die Wirkungen des heil. Geistes*[2], Göttingen, 1909; I. F. Wood, *The Spirit of God in Bib. Lit.*, London, 1904). It was natural, and the records show it, that at first there should be much confusion of mind among the disciples on a subject so new and startling as the conscious indwelling of God in the hearts of a human community. But it rapidly became clear that this experience meant that Jesus Christ Himself was still in living contact with them. They were—to use William James's striking word—'co-conscious' with Him in this overwhelming suffusion of their hearts with a superhuman divine power.

3. Christ of history and of experience.—The disciples had no intellectual difficulty about the transition from 'the Christ of history to the Christ of experience,' with which modern thought has concerned itself so deeply. On the one hand, they believed that the same Jesus whom they had known in the flesh had appeared to them after His death, and that the experience of the Spirit's power was the fulfilment of His promise (Ac 1[8] 2[33], Jn 14[26] 16[7]), and therefore the proof in their own life that they were under control of the same conscious will that dominated them in His earthly days. Even Paul, when he defends his authority as an apostle, claims to have 'seen Jesus' (1 Co 9[1]; cf. 15[8]). For him this conscious will (God, the spirit of God, Christ, the spirit of Christ, Ro 8[1-11]) that rules him is the will of the historical personality whom they all knew as Jesus. But, on the other hand, they seem to have assumed that there was a continuity in the course and nature of their religious experience itself. It is a strange feature of the early addresses of Peter, and true to this view of the situation, that he does not represent the primary disciples, all of whom had been with Jesus (Ac 1[13-15, 21, 26]), as having now for the first time received the forgiveness of sins; and there is no record of their having been baptized at this time. Repentance, baptism, forgiveness, are proclaimed to others (Ac 2[38f.] 3[19, 26]), but are presupposed as already characteristics of 'the disciples.' This can only mean that they cannot deny or ignore the past blessings which they had enjoyed in His outward presence. What was obscure has been made clear, what was inchoate is fulfilled. The Messiahship of Jesus is now openly established by transcendent acts of God on Him and in them. It has been made a difficulty that the Kingdom of God of which Jesus spoke so much seems to disappear from their vocabulary. But the fact remains and is now reflected in their use of the term 'Lord' as applied to Jesus. His Lordship over them, so real and potent and glad, is the Kingship of God! In Paul's language the term 'salvation' takes the place of 'kingdom' (Ac 28[28], Ro 1[16])—or 'grace' (Ro 5[2]), or 'life,' 'eternal life' (Ro 5[17, 21]). The prevailing Johannine term is 'eternal life.' They are all used now in a presential and now in an eschatological sense.

4. The experience of union with God.—William James said:

> 'We have *in the fact that the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come*, a positive content of religious experience which, it seems to me, *is literally and objectively true as far as it goes*' (*The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1902, p. 515).

This may be set beside the still more penetrating statement of another American thinker:

> 'That which can happen only with the consciousness of God is an act of God' (W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, London, 1912, p. 440).

These assertions may be held true of religion at every grade of its development. But they receive their full illustration, and, indeed, have been made possible, only by their complete fulfilment in the experience of the community founded by Christ. It is, of course, impossible to distinguish the higher from the lower types of religious experiences by the mere intensity of subjective emotional experience. It is the historical setting and moral qualities of that experience that make one religion greater than another, and the religion of Christ the supreme fact which it is. The immeasurable force of the apostles' witness in the history of the world arises from the following among other facts.

(*a*) *The greatness of it.*—The 'wider Self' with whom the believers were in contact was conceived in terms which had not been attained before and have not been surpassed. The living God, Creator, Sustainer, Father, is described in a series of magnificent statements of Paul (Ac 17[25-28], Ro 1[19f.] 11[33-36], Col 1, Eph 1), and no less clearly though less elaborately by other writers (Jn 1[18], He 1[1f.]). Throughout the apostolic literature it is assumed that He is personal, holy, and righteous, whose hatred of sin is absolute (Ro 1–3[20]), and whose purpose with man is glorious. Those conceptions were not scientific or theological in form or origin. They were derived from the past life and thought of the Jewish people. They had been confirmed by the teaching of Jesus. But they were now driven deep into the human consciousness by the immeasurable power of the new range of experience. Every word and phrase by which they describe the new life is a witness to some new form of the divine action upon human nature, which transformed everything. Hence we hear of it as a new birth (Jn 3[3], 1 Jn 3[9]), as a new creation (2 Co 5[17], Gal 6[15]), as dying to the past life of sin, weakness, fear (Ro 6[2ff.], Col 3[1ff.], Gal 2[20] 6[14]), as entering into light after darkness (1 Jn 1[5] 2[11], Eph 5[8ff.]), liberty after bondage (Gal 4[3, 7] 5[1]), and so on. Thus the change is often described in terms which are used for the vital and fundamental conditions of human existence. Men who are convicted of sin are yet living in the conscious fellowship and peace of the living and personal God.

(*b*) *The divine power as conditioned.*—This new form of religious consciousness can be fully understood only in and through its ethical qualities. The mystical experience is there, indeed, for nowhere in religious literature is the emotional element more intense than in the NT. It is a divine power, it is divine life, it is the divine spirit, which has come upon them and swept them into

ecstasies of joy and rapture. There are signs that many of them (even Paul [2 Co 12$^{1ff.}$]) were carried into abnormal psychic conditions. The scenes said to have occurred at Pentecost (Ac 2), many of the incidents connected with demons (*e.g.*, Ac 19$^{18ff.}$), as well as Paul's discoursing of 'tongues' and other phenomena (1 Co 12^{14}), prove this abundantly enough. For these things many parallels can be found elsewhere in the history of religious experience. The new thing, or the excellent thing, in the NT religion is that the experience of the universal presence and power of God (the spirit of Christ, the spirit of God, Ro 8$^{1-11}$, Jn 14–16) is conditioned rationally, ethically, and historically. This was no mere inflow of inexplicable energy from an unknown source, no afflatus which breathes upon the soul from mystical 'caves of the winds.' Yet nothing is taken from its mystery, its seriousness, its intensity, its solemn awe. These qualities are simply relieved of their 'blindness,' their mere inscrutability, by the conditions under which the mystic union with God is realized. Mysticism is delivered from its sheer darkness and filled with real meaning. For the work of God in the soul is led up to by the word of the gospel which is addressed at once to the understanding, the conscience, and the heart. There is no demand for asceticism or for prolonged technical self-discipline, such as the mystery-religions, especially in the following century, demanded. It is assumed that all men must think, indeed, to become Christian; but the simplest man may think well enough to understand the personal relations into which a personal God is calling him. And then he will find, as Paul showed the untutored Galatians as well as the philosophers of the University of Athens, that the fundamental laws of righteousness and love, repentance and faith, are those under which the divine will deals with the human, and the human must deal with the divine. Hence we are not surprised to find that Paul speaks in Romans (3$^{21ff.}$) of the righteousness of God as an effective fact, a living force, in human experience; just as the same apostle no less than John (1 Jn 4$^{7ff.}$) speaks of love —for God, who is working in us and begetting His children among us, has commended His love towards us and has proved that He is love.

(*c*) *The historic Christ as related to these conditions.*—The whole effect of that word of the gospel is to teach men that it is God who is now invading the individual life, that the divine is pressing in a new way and under purely moral conditions upon the human. The gospel is an appeal to men, not to scale the heights of God, but to submit to the influence of God's grace which is His very spirit and presence, an experienced force, in the inner depths of the soul. But this new religious attitude and experience, constituting the substance of the new religion, has been intelligible, and therefore is possible as a programme of spiritual history, because it is organically connected with the fact that in Christ the divine has invaded man's history, personally, definitely. Every phase of the gospel of divine grace is linked with His name. It is the deeds of God in Him, in His historic consciousness and experience, that form at once the revelation of the quality of God's will and the moral ground of His new and supreme appeal to man's reason, conscience, and heart. For the primary disciples this sense of union with God could be explained only by the continuance of the power of Jesus, now exalted as Christ, to exert His supreme influence upon human nature. And the Church has never been content with any other explanation.

(*d*) *Universalism and Parousia.*—The religion of Jesus Christ, being of this nature, was inherently a universal religion. It required a great struggle in the primitive Church before the full meaning of this fact was grasped and its consequences were accepted. Into that story we need not enter here. Nor is it necessary to do more than point out in a few words that the eschatological view, which expected the speedy manifestation (Parousia) of Christ, did not prevent the development of the universalistic view of the gospel. The former was a view of the future, the latter was made an experience in the present. The old antinomy, which was, as we have seen, in the consciousness of Jesus Himself, was now present to the faith of His Church. It is easy to exaggerate the religious and ethical effect of the eager waiting for the return of Christ, the coming of the Man from heaven. Potent as that hope was, it did not destroy the diligence of a man like Paul or hinder (rather it greatly helped) the rapid spread of the new religion. Yet we see in Paul's later epistles (when his own death drew near) how a world programme seemed to open before him, whose outlines could not be filled in within a brief space of time (Christ the Head of the Church, 1 Co 12, Eph, Col). And the Fourth Gospel, as well as 1 John, represents an effort not to forsake that hope, but to see it through the medium of an experience which means that Christ is here and His people already live in Him. Just as, in the Gospels, He is confessed as Messiah, and accepts the confession as springing from God, yet was not declared as Messiah in fullness of power; just as He spoke also of the Son of Man as there where He forgave sins and sought the lost, yet announced that the Son of Man would be seen coming on the clouds of heaven; just as in some parables He spoke as if the kingdom were there, and in others as if it were *still to come*; so did His apostles afterwards struggle with the same double view, now raised to a higher plane of experience. Having seen Him after death, declared as Messiah, and having received ample proof that He was now in the spirit, the true Lord, the actual energy of their lives (Gal 2^{20}, Eph 3$^{16ff.}$), they yet still waited for His appearing (Ph 3^{20}); He was manifested and is yet to be manifested (1 Jn 1$^{1ff.}$ 3$^{1-8}$). Perhaps this principle is the only one on which the moral and spiritual evolution of the race could proceed.

IV. *JESUS CHRIST AND THE MORAL REGENERATION OF MAN.*—**1. The Christian Church as a moral agency.**—No one can reasonably dispute the statement that Christianity has proved itself the highest ethical force in the history of man. Other religions have exercised their own measure of noble influence, but their positive contributions have been less broad and pure and elevating, and they have adopted as inherent elements certain principles which have sadly limited their moral beneficence—*e.g.*, the pessimism of *karma* as retained by Buddhism and its insistence on unlimited asceticism as essential; also the absence of an assured faith in the mercy of God, and the fatalistic element, as well as the moral insufficiency of Muhammad's personal character, in Islām. These defects are alike fundamental and fatal to those systems. The Christian Church, as an organized historical institution, has failed to prove itself an ideally perfect moral agency. It has often been ruled by the earthly mind; it has often misinterpreted its moral task in the world; its officials have often adopted the methods of Satan for promoting the Kingdom of God. Yet it has done more than any other organization in history to hold before the conscience of mankind the ideal of human character and destiny. It has carried in its memory of Christ, in its very ritual of baptism and the Lord's Supper, in its permanent forms of worship, in its great and vital principle of an appeal through Scripture to the mind of Christ as revealed to and in the apostolic consciousness, the permanent motives and standards of self-criticism, con-

trition, and reformation. This means that Jesus Christ remains in the life of the Church not as a far-off memory growing more dim and less effective upon the conscience of the Church and mankind, as time flows, but as a living judge and unexhausted source of moral propulsion. Let us consider Him as the supreme personal force in the moral history of man.

2. The ethical teachings of Jesus.—The first appeal is naturally made to the teachings of Jesus, which have been explored with extraordinary minuteness to discover their personal and social application. Two things have gradually become clear which modify the nature of that appeal. (1) The first is that He abolished all dependence on outward ceremony as a means of salvation. Jesus revealed the ethical nature of man's religious relations. The same principles of faith and love unite men with one another and with God. Even worship of God is a moral act, and God's readiness to answer is compared with the attitude of good parents to their children (Mt $6^{14.\ 15.\ 25.\ 30.\ 33}$ 7^{11}; cf. Lk 11^{1-13} 18^{1-8}, Jn $4^{23f.}$). (2) The second is that Jesus did not, except for illustration, deal with the concrete details of life, and that He did not announce an organized system of laws. The only matter in which He approached the method of statutory legislation was that of marriage (Mk 10^{1-12}, Mt 19^{3-9})—a fact which is of the utmost significance for the fundamental nature of that institution in His community. His teachings are occasional, fragmentary. They penetrate to the fundamental principles of conduct, rather to the inner spirit, the secret self-determinations of man. For example, take His words about love (Mt 5^{43-48}, Mk 12^{28-31}, Mt 22^{34-40}), purity of motive (Mt $5^{8.\ 27-30}$ 25^{24-27}, Mk 7^{20-23}), service (Mk 10^{42-45}, Mt 25^{31-46}), forgiveness (Mt $6^{14f.}$ 18^{15-35}), faithfulness (Mt 24^{45-51} 25^{14-30}), sacrifice (Mk 8^{34-37} 9^{42-48} 10^{17-30}), etc. He uses proverbs, parables, paradoxes, or mere simple illustrations, as well as direct commands, to state these principles, to make them distinct and impressive, to startle His hearers from the moral somnolence induced by their traditional habits of thought and evasions of severe moral issues, to show His principles at work in concrete social relations. In all this we note a certain finality which makes His principles inevitable for the human conscience of all ages and circumstances, a certain urgency which makes them impressive, solemn; and He binds them as ethical statements to religion as their final explanation, justification, and sanction. He takes the great principle of reward and punishment to the heart of all His teaching. But He makes it appear that these are not accidental, external, and confusing to the conscience. The reward and penalty come from God and are part of the history of the Kingdom and of the individual soul. The moral order of the universe is at once established and revealed through them.

3. His personal character.—In addition to the teaching of Jesus we must take account of His personal character as a moral force. It is true that the direct appeals to that character in the ordinary relations of life in apostolic literature are few (cf. Ac 10^{38}, 2 Co 10^{1}, 1 P $2^{21ff.}$). But on every page we see its searching and inexpressible influence. The picture of that holy and merciful life is ever before their eyes and is cherished in their hearts. In the Gospels it is preserved for us simply, directly, with such unity of spirit in its apparently divergent or even contradictory elements that it has won for itself a position of majesty, a strange and irresistible authority over the imagination, if not yet over the will, of the human race. He stands before the world as harmonizing in His own will with the perfection of self-mastery—for He was tempted to the utmost, yet sinless—such contrasts as these: (1) the consciousness of high and even superhuman station united with the will to obey unto death, unresisting and unafraid; (2) the nobility and dignity of a great mind and powerful will united with simplicity and lowliness of life; (3) severity of the utmost in His purity, frankness of the least compromising in His truth, united with tenderness, pity, and comprehending sympathy; (4) the clear, relentless perception, exposure, and hatred of man's sin united with the unfaltering resolution to be Himself the Saviour of man. Such a character was itself a revelation of the ideal humanity, and has since these Gospels were written ruled the hearts of men with royal supremacy.

4. His character measured by His divinity.—But there was more than His teaching and more than His character as a perfect man. It might have seemed impossible that a character formed from such a consciousness as His should be of any avail for blind, selfish, earthly-minded, impulsive men. For His superhuman consciousness and His native sinlessness would open up a gulf between His achievement of moral glory and man's continuous and dismal failure which no man could cross, the very sight of which would crush all faith and hope with the weight of personal despair. But the picture of Christ's moral quality is set before us in the light of His Incarnation and His redeeming purpose in life and in death. Passages like 2 Co 8^{9} and Ph $2^{5ff.}$ show that the pre-existence of Christ was not for the apostles what certain Ritschlians have too often represented it to be—an empty and unethical idea. On the contrary, it is the eternal will of the Son of God, His 'grace,' His 'mind,' that are revealed in His self-emptying and impoverishment. It is not the limited though noble sacrifice of a man that is seen in Him by the faith of the Christian Church. It can only be measured by the movement of His will from the throne to the cross. When the Word became flesh, His glory was beheld, the glory of grace and truth (Jn 1^{14}), and, when He was seen and handled, it was the Word of life that stood revealed (1 Jn 1^{1-4}). When the author of Hebrews refers to the Incarnation (2^{11-18}), we cannot miss the effect of contemplating the Son of God as He chose to partake of the flesh and blood in which all the children share, and to become in all things like unto His brethren. When in 1 Peter we read of the lamb without blemish (1^{19}), of His patient endurance of shame and pain (2^{21-25}), of the purpose of His suffering once for all (3^{18}), we cannot but realize that the writer is thinking not of a man, but of the divine being who entered into human life in His own full and holy will of love. When in Paul's writings we read of Him 'who loved me and gave himself up for me' (Gal 2^{20}), of his own desire to know the fellowship of His sufferings (Ph 3^{10}), of Christ's love which constrained him (2 Co 5^{14}), from which no pang or shame can separate him (Ro 8^{35}), we realize all the time that this is the love of a divine being. The whole subsequent history of the Church shows that the inner secret of that spell which the name of Jesus Christ has cast upon man's heart lies in this view of His character as that of one whose eternal holiness and love became active among men and for men. Many good men have suffered for their fellow-men. Patriotism and friendship, stern devotion to duty and a certain royal self-respect, have produced their myriad martyrs of varied degrees of worth. But they are men entangled without their will in human relations, and rising worthily to their task. Here is the picture of one whose sinless life, whose love, whose will to serve and even to die, is more than human, and who is, of His own will, set into the entanglements of man's moral situation for man's deliverance. His very difference from us gives moral sublimity to His deliberate and merciful self-union with us.

5. The will of God revealed as the ultimate ground of moral ideals.—The ethical value and force of the story of Christ is not yet fully stated. Another element, the greatest and most potent of all, is involved in it.

(*a*) *A permanent problem in the history of morality.*—That we may estimate aright its true significance, let us recall one of the central problems of the higher ethical systems of different ages, which have often penetrated far into the heart of virtue and have tried to picture the perfect man. Aristotle did so, and discovered that the virtuous man is alone capable of true happiness. But he was apparently baffled by the fact that he cannot be pictured as attaining the ideal in our world because the environment proves hostile. There ought to be a relation of 'perfect virtue' and 'perfect life.' But the latter fails even the best of men, either through misfortune in life or through the close of life itself in death. The Stoics faced the same situation, and their very name means for us in English what it does because they girded themselves to meet it not merely in speculation but in practical life, by the discipline not merely of the mind but of the will. They sought their sure guide to virtue and peace in an appeal to the Reason which informs the universe as a whole. Yet, just because their vision of this Reason was won only by the severe labour of elect souls, and they had no objective ground, but only an inner and therefore indemonstrable conviction, their virtue lacked joy. It could not and did not become a social good, a wide and permanent force in history. In Kant, again, the same opposition between a very high conception of the good will and of duty and the actual situation of man appears. For he too saw—and more clearly, as the heir of Christian culture—that in the end virtue must find its justification in a universe made to harmonize with it. His solution lay in what from the metaphysician's point of view must always appear as a violent use of the idea of a *Deus ex machina*. God must be conceived of as somehow and somewhere creating the perfect environment for the good will, that the need of happiness may be enjoyed. Höffding, from a narrower vision and in the language of recent thought, puts the same problem when he says, 'the conservation of value is the characteristic axiom of religion,' and adds that, therefore, 'the religious problem also is concerned with the continuity of existence, although from a special point of view' (*Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1908, pp. 10, 13). The same principle or problem appears in the Hebrew Scriptures in the terms of practical religion. It created the drama of Job. It even produced the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. The Psalms ring with its passion and wail. For Israel was confronted with the fact that the man who was righteous, who was conscious of integrity before the will of Jahweh, was yet left to the mischances of life and the doom of the grave, just like the virtuous man of Aristotle. Man needs for his clear and sure grasp of the idea of goodness, and for its social fulfilment on a large scale, the assurance not only that the universe is ultimately in accord with it, but more definitely that the Will which rules history confirms and secures it finally and for ever.

(*b*) *Its solution in God's will concerning Christ.*—According to the NT and the continuous faith of the Church since then, this supreme problem was solved in the story of Jesus Christ. For the whole 'fact of Christ' is viewed steadily as an act of God (Jn 3^{16}, Gal 4^4, He 1^{1-3}). Outwardly this is depicted for us in the stories of His birth and His resurrection. Inwardly it is made certain (*a*) in His own consciousness of union with the will of God. That is not viewed either in the NT or in the faith of the Church, it was not viewed by Jesus Himself, as the product of a pure human will (Mk 10^{18}, Mt 11^{27}). It was the product in Him of the spirit of holiness, which became incarnate in Him (Ro $1^{3f.}$), of the Logos incarnate in Him (Jn 1^{14}), of the Son of God incarnate in Him (Ro 8^3) by the will of God. (*b*) In His sacrifice on the Cross. For that event is distinctly and repeatedly described as the will and deed of God. Jesus Himself so regarded it when He spoke of being 'delivered up into the hands of men' (Mk 9^{31}), of the Son of Man having come—being sent—to give His life as a ransom (Mk 10^{45} 9^{37}; cf. Ac 2^{23}), of His blood being shed to establish the new covenant of God with man (Mk 14^{24}), and in the Agony (Mk 14^{36}; cf. Jn 10^{18}). The apostolic literature is full of this fact (Ro 5^8 8^3, Gal 4^5, 2 Co 5^{21}, 1 Ph 2^8, 1 Jn 4^{10} etc.). The supreme passage is Ro $3^{21ff.}$, where God is described as having 'set forth Jesus Christ,' *i.e.* on the Cross, as a propitiation, whereby the righteousness of God became a realized and living force in history. (*c*) In His Resurrection, which is viewed always as the seal set by God Himself, in an act of transcendent power, upon the redeeming work of Christ, and as the revelation to all men of the destiny of the sons of God (Ac $2^{24ff.}$ $3^{13ff.}$ $10^{40ff.}$, Ro 1^4, 1 Co 15, Eph 1^{19-23}, 1 Ph $3^{10f.}$). The Risen Christ is the full revelation of the ideal man, of the predestined triumph of believing humanity (He 2^{5-10}, 1 Co 15^{45-47}). In the Book of Revelation the conception of the glory and power of Him who was dead and is alive for evermore fills the successive scenes with their apocalyptic splendour. All these events, in their meaning for Christian faith, have proved themselves to be charged with creative moral energy, and have entered deep into the ethical history of Christendom. In them the very character of the Creator of the universe stands revealed, and His will concerning man is seen in action. In all of them His holiness and what holiness means, His love and what love means, His mercy and its nature, His final purpose with man, are made known. The suggestions of nature, the premonitions of conscience, the yearnings of the spirit of man, have been insufficient guides. But the deeds of God in Christ have for a believing Church so revealed the righteousness and the love of God, *in action upon the believing man*, that the nature of righteousness and love stands clear, and the will of the Creator is proved to be concerned supremely with a realm of spiritual beings in whom these shall be completely realized. All the risks and sacrifices of the virtuous man, all his implicit faith in a moral universe, are confirmed by the work of God in Christ.

6. The moral foundations of the Church.—We have already seen that, in gathering His disciples into the nucleus of the new community of God upon earth, Jesus united them with Himself by the ethical bonds of penitence, trust, obedience, and hope. The apostolic communities grew up in various parts of the Roman Empire on the same foundation (Mt 16^{18}, 1 Co 3^{11}). These new social groups are filled with the consciousness of a divine indwelling (1 Co 3^{16}, Ac 2^{16-36}, Ro $8^{10f.}$, Col 1^{27}, Jn 14-16) which they describe under the three names of God, Christ, and Spirit. They live in new ethical relations with God, and accordingly all human relationships appear in a new light. A new form of moral consciousness has taken its place in human history. It was destined to pass through many outward phases, to wax and wane in alternate periods of clearness and confusion, of effective energy and feebleness. But, having the secret of renewal within its own nature and in its connexion with the history of its origin and type, which is God in Christ, it has proved itself an inexhaustible source of light and power for all periods of culture and all races of man. In proportion as the religious life

feeds itself directly upon the deeds of God in Christ, and upon Christ's character, word, and work, as the embodiment and manifestation of those deeds, it becomes aware again of its moral ideals and becomes charged afresh with faith and passion for their fulfilment. A few words only can be used here upon the social influence of the Church as a moral organism. As a social group its outward moral influence on the State and on all other social groups and institutions is based upon the principles of its own organization. Those principles are faith, love, obedience towards God, and mutual love and service towards one another. The Church as a distinct institution is created by these. The measure of the intensity with which they are practised by the Church has always been the measure of the Church's moral influence on society. Not its mere teachings, but its actual rules of combination and co-operation have proved to be the most potent revolutionary forces. The meaning of these rules, their inner logic, has not yet been all read off into the continual flux and change even of its own life. But the humanizing of man's heart, the democratizing of his governments, the socialization of his possessions and all 'values' are the laboured, slow, and never completed effort to translate the ideals or principles which give the Church its own being into the organization of the whole world. And that process is slow and laboured, because the Church, being composed of only partially enlightened human hearts, has found it so hard to understand itself, as well as because the 'kingdoms of this world' fight for the hostile principles on which they are so widely and firmly established (Mt $20^{20ff.}$, Ro 13^{1-7}). From this aspect we can see the ethical meaning of the fight of Paul for the universality of the gospel against the Judaizers. It was a movement of the Spirit by which the will of Jesus in relation to the Kingdom, and the moral value of God's deeds in Him, were translated into human action, and into the very organization of the Church. That all races, both sexes, every grade of social life, every quality of mind, should be baptized into Christ and become one body in Him, on the same ethical terms, was necessary to make the practice of righteousness and love, as He taught them (and, in His own work, fulfilled them), possible to the whole human family. The great idea of the brotherhood of man could arise, so as to become a historic force, only in communities which had begun to practise it across all these gulfs which cut the race into unsympathetic groups. The hope of the speedy return of Christ mercifully hid from the imagination of the first Christians the length and breadth and height and depth of the task of the Church as the embodiment and promulgator of the will of God in Christ for the re-organization of society. But they did their work no less effectively. It is not the possession of any theory as to the ideal form of general society, whether politically or economically considered, that has given the Church its power. Where it has attempted to dictate such a form it has always incurred disaster. Its supreme function and power have come from the possession of those deepest principles of control by which the ambitions, passions, appetites, and convictions of men—out of these the forms of government and society grow—are themselves regulated and directed within its own life. These principles of control lie in its continuous sense of responsibility to the living Christ and its continuous dependence upon the manifestation of His will in all the transactions of his earthly life.

7. Eschatology and morals.—The attempt of some recent eschatologists to prove that the teaching of Jesus contains an *Interimsethik*—a view of conduct dictated by the expectation of the speedy establishment of the Kingdom of God in which the whole conditions of life would undergo a catastrophic change—deserves a few words. There is no teaching of Jesus which relieves men from the regular duties of life. No reasonable man so interprets the words about hating one's family (Lk 14^{26}; cf. Mt 10^{37}), or applies to all men the demand made on the rich ruler (Mk 10^{21}), or understands that the forbidding of anxiety about clothing and food (Mt $6^{25ff.}$) is the bidding of idleness, even for a season. Jesus could not have seen less clearly than Paul did that dishonour lies in the refusal to work (2 Th 3^{6-13}). The deep moral and religious principles underlying the commands about the laying up of treasure (Mt $6^{19f.}$), the deceitfulness of riches (Mt 13^{22}), are frittered away by the idea that they were based upon an excited view of the imminence of the last day. The teaching about eunuchs (Mt 19^{10-12}) is likewise misunderstood and lowered in its tone if it is taken to mean that men should not marry because the day of heaven is near when there shall be no marrying or giving in marriage. On the contrary, our Lord assumes that men will have money to use for their almsgiving (Mt 5^{42} 6^{1-4} $25^{35f.}$, Lk 16^{1-13}), while such a passage as Lk $14^{12ff.}$ (with every mark of authenticity) assumes a condition of society in which money is still possessed by those whom He would instruct. His deepest teaching about love of enemies, service as the true ground of personal distinction and the basis of divine rewards, the nature of lust, superiority to the joys of mere wealth, are not intelligible if read in relation to an unimaginable state of life following the great catastrophe, and far surpass the purview of a mere emergency legislation. They presuppose, and are relevant to, a continuation of human nature and of its social foundations, as we have them now. On the other hand, we must take account of the fact that in a certain sense all Christian ethics must be *Interimsethik*. The pilgrim spirit is the life of the Church. The final facts (*τὰ ἔσχατα*) are always present to its consciousness. Death and judgment, the transitoriness of this world and the ideal life of complete holiness and blessedness for the race in the unseen universe, the brief life of the individual and his eternal destiny—these facts make all the possessions and relations of society on their earthly side temporary, limited in their positive value, dangerous in their misuse, good only in their subjection to the ends of the soul and the meaning of the Kingdom of God. The antinomy that lay in the consciousness of Jesus, as we have seen, concerning the advent of the Kingdom and His own relations to the events in time is reflected also in His ethical teaching concerning the duties and the spirit of His true disciples; and it has passed into the consciousness of the Church, which also must live as if the Lord were at hand, and yet face the fact of His tarrying. It is hard to see how the matter of the moral evolution of the race could be dealt with otherwise. For that evolution is inconceivable on the assumption either that the earthly life is all and to be pursued for its own sole sake or that the 'day of the Lord' is so near and so destructive of the present constitution of man and nation that the earthly life has no value at all. The element in the teaching of Jesus which looks like *Interimsethik* is not contradictory of the doctrine of evolution, as Schweitzer and others suppose, but actually essential to its application in the moral history of man. For the evolution of a rational moral will in humanity is possible only when the reality and imminence of the eternal fills him with a sense of solemn urgency and makes the joys of earth seem by comparison meagre and incomplete, and when, on the other hand, the reality and definiteness of the holy will and the

loving mercy of God, apprehended now and here, make the earthly task seem noble. Christ's own character, and even His work of redemption, was evolved from the appeal to His will of these two aspects of the human situation. And His disciples were taught by word and example, and His Church by His spirit, to cherish both the urgency and the calm, the dissatisfaction and the enthusiasm, the eager waiting for a Saviour and the determined devotion to the present opportunity, out of which the loftiest morality has arisen, and through which alone the perfect civilization can be evolved.

V. *APOSTOLIC CHRISTOLOGY.*—i. THE CHRISTOLOGY OF PAUL THE APOSTLE.—1. **His religious experience.**—All attempts to explain Paul's fundamental doctrine of the Person of Christ except through his contact with the primitive Christian community, and through his faith in the risen Christ, have utterly failed. A profound experience was the beginning of his Christology. Not merely in the Acts of the Apostles but in his own letters the evidence on this matter is as direct and conclusive as possible. Many writers from Baur onwards have treated him as primarily a speculative theologian whose opinions about Jesus have the value only of deductions from Jewish Messianism and of attempts to reconcile these with Alexandrian philosophy. But all such views fail to do justice to the central things in the self-revelation of his own letters.

(*a*) *As a Jew.*—It is abundantly proved, first, that his original and deepest interest was in practical religion. He was 'exceedingly zealous' for the traditional faith of his race (Gal $1^{13f.}$). It would seem that he had given years to the earnest study of the Jewish religious system, and that he had given himself with great energy to the practical side (Ph $3^{5f.}$). The intensity of his love for his race never abated, and proves that, while it was fired by a deeply contemplative habit of mind, it was no less active and practical in the demands which it made upon his will (2 Co $11^{24f.}$, Ro $3^{1f.}$ 9-11). His ardour for the fulfilment of the Law carried him apparently to all lengths. His contemporaries saw him 'advanced' beyond them all and 'excessive' in his zeal (Gal 1^{14}; cf. Ac 22^{3}); they found him 'blameless' (Ph 3^{6} ἄμεμπτος; cf. Lightfoot, *in loc.*) in the details of legal observance. According to Ac 26^{4} he could appeal before Agrippa to the reputation which he had won as a Jew for strictness in practical religion.

(*b*) *As a foe of Christianity.*—His intensely practical nature made him the bitter and most powerful enemy of the gospel. He refers to this period with shame (1 Co 15^{9}; cf. Eph 3^{7}, 1 Ti 1^{13}), in proof of his Jewish orthodoxy (Gal 1^{13}, Ph 3^{6}), and as proof also of the power of the free grace of God in Christ. The grounds of that fierce hatred of 'the Way,' and of Jesus, may be surmised to have included the usual prejudices of others, his fellow-persecutors. He led in the attack on Stephen, who was condemned for teaching the abolition of Temple-worship and the Law (Ac 6^{13}), and for blasphemy in ascribing a divine exaltation to Jesus the Crucified as 'Son of Man' (Ac $7^{55f.}$). It would seem that Paul must have felt a peculiar horror at the idea that the crucified and accursed Jesus should have been made the Messiah and Saviour of the world (Gal 3^{13}); and he ever after realized that this constituted a peculiar obstacle to all Jews (1 Co 1^{23}). It is accepted, therefore, by most scholars who are not exploiting some private method of approach that Paul before his conversion knew what the disciples believed Him to be, and that this was the origin of his hatred of them. To make them curse Jesus was for him a religious act, a service of Jahweh which he must render with his whole soul; and that implies at least a general knowledge of their claims concerning Jesus.

(*c*) *The grace of God.*—When this man became a believer in the gospel, he attributed the change not to the processes of his own mind, but to the gracious act of God (Gal $1^{15f.}$, Eph 3^{7} etc.). The revealing act was so direct, vivid, personal, objective, that he never after had a moment's doubt that he had seen Jesus even as the other apostles (1 Co 9^{1} 15^{8}, Gal 1^{16}). His heart was changed, and all his letters pulsate with the light and joy and love and power from the very spirit of God, which henceforth filled his consciousness. It is at this point that some writers, like Percy Gardner (*The Religious Experience of St. Paul*, London, 1911), pass too hastily to a supposed preparation of the Apostle's mind in his pre-Christian days for his distinctive Christology. Gardner not only attributes to him a reasoned Jewish conception of the Messiah, and knows its outlines, but credits him with a conception already illumined and expanded by Alexandrian philosophy (pp. 26, 86). Against this must be set two facts. First, the 'hints' of Paul's familiarity with Greek speculation before his conversion are obscure and precarious. The elements in his Christology which ally themselves with the Greek world are found in his later Epistles, after he had spent years in direct missionary work and controversy in Asia Minor and Achaia. Scores of modern missionaries can parallel this experience, even as late in life as he. Secondly, it is clear that the effect of his conversion was to make him receive Jesus as the primary apostles declared Him. The differences which developed later between some of that first group and himself were never concerned with the Person of Christ, but with the contrast between the act of faith on which the Church was founded and the act of circumcision on which the Jewish system was based, or with the work of divine grace in Christ as over against the principle of legalism. There is no sign that he had any controversy with the original group in the field of Christology.

2. **Three stages in his Christology.**—It was natural and inevitable that a mind so keen and powerful should seek to interpret the Person and Work of Jesus, and on this three distinct strata of thought are discernible in his letters.

(*a*) *Data from earlier believers.*—He received from the primitive Church, as confirmed in his own experience, the fact that Jesus must be called Messiah (Christ), Son of God, and Lord (Κύριος). Of course these are not mere titles of honour. They are so closely descriptive of His very being and of His functions in the salvation of men that they are used by Paul as proper names. Moreover, as proper names they are applied to that one historical Person who is known to him as Jesus, of whom Peter, standing up with the eleven, spoke in Jerusalem, and who is described in every paragraph of the Synoptic Gospels. Hence Paul is free to use these terms, whatever *status* he is thinking of. It was 'Christ' who existed eternally in the nature of God (Ph 2^{6}); it was 'Christ' who was crucified (1 Co $1^{17, 24}$, Gal 2^{20}), who died for our sins (1 Co 15^{3}), who was raised from the dead (1 Co 15^{12}), who is exalted and ever liveth (Ph 2^{11}, Ro 8^{34}), who is the final judge (2 Co 5^{10}). It was the 'Son of God' who was sent forth (Gal 4^{4}, Ro 8^{3}), who gave Himself up (Gal 2^{20}), whose nature as Son was definitely marked out in the Resurrection (Ro 1^{4}), in whom the universe has its origin, its order, and its meaning (Col 1^{16-18}). It was 'the Lord' whom men must see and confess in Jesus (Ro 10^{9}), who was betrayed (1 Co 11^{23}), who is received as the Spirit (2 Co $3^{17f.}$), who controls human experience (2 Co $12^{8f.}$). To confess Him as Lord absolutely is

not, like the worship of heathen gods, to detract from, but, on the contrary, it is to manifest and magnify, the very glory of God (Ph 2^{11}). And this Lordship extends over the created universe (Ro 14^{9}, Ph 2^{11}). All three original titles are brought together by Paul into one full-hearted and glorious description of this Person when he says: 'Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ' (2 Co 1^{3}, Eph $1^{3.\ 17}$).

(*b*) *Two elements from Jewish thought.*—At least two new elements appear in the Apostle's thought which indicate that he found himself compelled to consider the relations of Christ, the Redeemer from man's racial sin and the Lord of man's destiny, to mankind and to God respectively.

(*a*) *The man from heaven.*—In two passages of great difficulty Paul draws a parallel between the relation of Adam to the race and that of Christ. In Ro $5^{12ff.}$ he discusses the fact that sin and death entered into history through Adam, whereas righteousness and life have entered and shall yet 'reign' through Christ. In 1 Co $15^{21\text{-}23.\ 45\text{-}49}$ a like comparison appears again, without direct reference to the fact of sin, in presence, however, of the facts of death and resurrection. Some theologians have made much of these passages. (The fullest discussion in English is that of David Somerville, *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, Edinburgh, 1897.) It is asserted that Paul conceived of Christ primarily and definitely as 'the heavenly man,' 'the archetype of humanity,' and that we must connect with this, as his fundamental conception, the discussion of His redemptive work, His mystical union with humanity in the Church, and even His cosmic relations. There is some exaggeration here, though there can be no doubt that the Apostle's mind did strive to institute a certain parallelism between the 'natural' and the 'spiritual' heads of the race. For him the moral dualism in human (Christian) experience (Ro $5^{12ff.}$ $7^{7ff.}$) is fully explained only when a double 'law' operating in human life is related with two separate origins, viz. Adam and 'the one man, Jesus Christ,' and with two separate destinies, viz. death and eternal life. And Christ is called 'the last Adam' because 'at his coming' (1 Co $15^{23.\ 45.\ 47}$) the new and final order of humanity will be established, in which righteousness shall reign (Ro 5^{19}), and whose members shall be united with Christ as the 'life-making spirit,' and bear in their own perfected nature the image of Him in His Resurrection glory. So far as Paul refers in these passages to Christ as head of a new race, his mind is moving in the eschatological field. The Man '*from* heaven' (1 Co 15^{47}) is not the pre-incarnate Logos (the opposite view is taken by J. Weiss, *Christus*, p. 37 ff.), but Jesus Christ, in whom at His coming all shall be made alive (v.^{22}; cf. Ro 5^{17}) and receive 'the victory' (v.^{57}). The recognition of the eschatological atmosphere in these passages undermines much of the speculation regarding the central, organizing value of 'the heavenly Man' conception, and it gives more probability to the thought that Paul is here indebted to the title 'Son of Man' or 'the Man' as Jesus used it at His trial, and has simply (some would say, more correctly) translated it into '*the man* from heaven' (cf. Jn 3^{13}). It is less likely that reflexion upon the origin of sin (Ro 5) led to the idea of the Spiritual Man who is to found the new order at His appearing (1 Co 15) than that reflexion upon the latter idea, as given to him in the disciples' accounts of Jesus and His words, led him to carry the parallel back to the former. J. Weiss in his *Christus*, p. 42 f., traces Paul's conception to the influence of Ps 8, Dn 7^{13}, and the 'Similitudes' of Enoch without the mediation of the words of Jesus.

(*β*) *Relation to the Spirit of God.*—In the mind of Paul the supreme term for Christ is 'Son of God,' and the greatest and most complete name which he can give to God is 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.' But the relation of Christ to God is also stated in a very different way, through the use of the term 'Spirit.' Paul identifies this Spirit as an eternal element of the very being or life of God Himself (1 Co $2^{10ff.}$), and as the form under which God enters and operates in the heart of man. And the same Spirit is also spoken of in a distinctive way, as the Spirit of Christ. It is going too far perhaps to say with some that the Spirit is the essence or basis of His personality; even Ro 1^{4} (cf. 1 Co 15^{45}) will hardly carry us so far. The famous passage in 2 Co $3^{17f.}$ does indeed seem to carry the identification through to the end —'The Lord is the Spirit,' 'even as from the Lord the Spirit.' But this must be compared with the elaborate interchange of names in Ro $8^{1\text{-}11}$, where this identification is deliberately avoided. And yet a form of unity is even there implied which is supra-temporal. The Spirit of God is the Spirit of Christ, and the experienced presence of the Spirit in the believing man is at once the presence of God and of Christ.

The two main practical aspects of this conception for Paul are these:

(*a*) The Holy Spirit reproduces in men the divine relations and qualities of Christ Himself, especially sonship, holiness, and victory over death. The love of God for His Son, which is presupposed as the fountainhead of all grace (Col 1^{13}), is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit (Ro 5^{5}), and awakens in us the sense of divine sonship which He sets forth in divine majesty (Ro $8^{14\text{-}17}$). It is the spirit of life in Christ Jesus that gives men freedom (Ro $8^{2ff.}$), and becomes the principle or source of their life (vv.$^{5\text{-}9}$; cf. Eph $3^{16f.}$) and consummates His work by reproducing in them the supreme wonder of the Resurrection of Christ (Ro $8^{11.\ 17}$; cf. Ph 3^{21}). The Holy Spirit is then for the mind of Paul that principle or energy whose power in the Christian community has opened a new order of human experience (Gal $3^{2\text{-}5}$). Its operation is viewed by the Apostle in the most concrete and vivid way as a living force manifested in many forms, in χαρίσματα of many kinds (1 Co $12^{1\text{-}11}$).

(*b*) Here the second practical aspect appears. For the Holy Spirit, when viewed, not as a formless and unknown energy, but as the Spirit of Jesus Christ, becomes available as a true test of the soundness of those varied and sometimes dangerous workings which manifested themselves so profusely in the enthusiastic life of those days, as well as in corresponding crises in other days down to our own. The true fruit of the Spirit of God (Gal 5^{22}) is the reproduction in men of the moral qualities of Christ. All spiritual 'gifts' must be tested by the attitude of those who possess them towards Jesus (1 Co 12^{3}) and subjection of life to His Lordship. It is the Spirit which inhered in His character, as the 'Spirit of holiness' and as the miraculous energy through which He was raised from the dead, for which His disciples must pray and hope. As He cannot be fully conceived apart from the Spirit, so the Spirit cannot be experienced by us except as the manifestation of Him in our hearts. On the other hand, we must remember, this is the 'Spirit of God' no less truly essential henceforth to our conception of the Father than to that of the Son. Inherent in the very being of God, organ of the divine intelligence and power (1 Co $2^{1.\ 10.\ 11}$, Ro $8^{11.\ 27}$), He is yet spoken of as having a distinction, or form of reality, which must not be confused with or made merely subjective to the reality of the Father and of the Son. Inherent in the life of God and of Christ, the Spirit is yet a co-ordinate name with these, and must be specially named in a full statement of the God in whom Christians believe and whom they worship (2 Co 13^{14}).

(*γ*) *Anticipations of this doctrine.*—Once more we must be careful, while allowing for the originality and power of the Apostle's mind, to recognize that in this magnificent doctrine he bases himself upon the common experience of the Christian community. For the Holy Spirit is one of the supreme revelations of Christianity. All earlier references to that divine power, even in the OT, fall far short of the sudden, definite, dazzling conception which opens upon us in the NT, where the inbreaking of the divine life upon the human, as an abiding presence and experienced energy, is attributed by all writers to the Spirit of God. As Paul did not invent the idea of the Spirit of God, so also he was not the first to connect it with the Person of Christ. The Fourth Gospel explicitly traces the main features of the Pauline doctrine to the conscious-

ness of Jesus (Jn $1^{32f.}$ 14-16), who promised this supreme gift to His Church (cf. 20^{22}).

Even in the Synoptics we find that: (*a*) the Holy Spirit is described in the accounts of the Virgin Birth as the energy which caused the new being to live in the womb of His mother (Mt $1^{18, 20}$, Lk 1^{35}); (*b*) John the Baptist named the gift of the Spirit as a distinctive feature of the Messianic day (Mk 1^{8}, Mt 3^{11}, Lk 3^{16}; cf. Jn 1^{33}); (*c*) the four Gospels also name the baptism of Jesus as the hour of the coming upon Him of the Holy Spirit, for His anointing to the active work of Messiahship (Mk 1^{10}, Mt 3^{16}, Lk 3^{22}, Jn $1^{32f.}$; cf. Mt 12^{18}, Lk 4^{18}); (*d*) it is asserted in these Synoptic passages that He went to the desert to face His trial in the power of the Spirit; (*e*) Jesus claims that He does His works of wonder by the Spirit of God (Mt $12^{28, 31f.}$, Mk 3^{28-30}); (*f*) He asserts that His disciples will receive the Holy Spirit for their service of Him (Mk 13^{11}, Mt 10^{20}; cf. Lk 11^{13}).

The extraordinary fullness of reference to the presence and workings of the Spirit in the book of Acts can only be accounted for ultimately through some communal experience which was, in their minds, at once a manifestation of God's presence and power and also connected directly with Jesus and their past experience of Him. That whole situation is needed to explain the significant fact that Paul everywhere assumes that his readers must understand his references to the Spirit in relation to Christ and to the Church life. Here as throughout His central teachings, even as to what he calls 'my gospel,' he appeals steadily and even passionately, not to his speculative presuppositions as a theologian, but to the real and characteristic experience of every Christian community.

(*c*) *The influence of Greek thought.*—There is yet another range of Pauline thought concerning Christ, that, namely, which comes to expression in Colossians and Ephesians. There are evidences in nearly all his Epistles that Paul in his mission work strove to make sympathetic contact with the modes of thought peculiar to the people whom he taught (cf. Ac 17^{16-34}, and W. Ramsay, *Galatians*, London, 1899). Much controversy has been waged in recent years as to the extent and content of his indebtedness as a theologian to the mystery-religions, the Gnostic philosophy, and even the Stoic philosophy, which were popular at the great centres where his work lay. It has not been proved that anything essentially new was added to his Christology from any of these sources. But it has become very clear that he did set himself to make Christ intelligible to minds saturated with Gnostic interpretations of life and attractive to souls absorbed in practices of religious fervour. As it is ridiculous to argue from Ph $4^{11f.}$ (*μεμύημαι*) that he had personally passed through a form of mystic initiation or that his frequent use of the word *μυστήριον* confirms this notion, so it is an exaggeration to say that he learned to think of 'the cosmic Christ' from the Philonic doctrine of the Logos or some Asiatic reflexion of it. That he was compelled, as a missionary is often compelled nowadays, to relate the doctrine of Christ to the intellectual concepts of his field of labour, and that this led to the use of new terminologies, is obvious. But it is significant that, while the term 'Logos' occurs in the 'Pauline' Epistles about eighty times and occasionally in meanings verging on the technical philosophical use of it, there is not one occasion when he does use it in the Philonic sense. In the critical passage of this kind (Col. 1^{15-20}) he undoubtedly addresses men who have cherished some phase of what is generally known as the Logos doctrine. And the result is a setting forth of the eternal being and the pre-eminence of Christ which is more elaborate philosophically than we find in any other place, except Jn $1^{1f.}$ and He 1^{1-4}. But the exposition is intended deliberately to exclude all comparison of Christ with other angelic beings, or heavenly powers (v.^{16}), which Gnostic philosophers described as emanations from the absolute and controllers of the world. He does not borrow their categories to add some new and unthought of quality or dignity to the glory of Christ, but to reveal to them in their own language that which He is essentially for the Christian consciousness. The result is that Christology begins to speak in the language of the Greek world that which it has already uttered in the forms of Jewish thought. Thus (*α*) it is 'the Son of his love' who is 'the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation.' In Him the attributes of God are concentrated, and He has His being before 'all creation' (v.^{16}), 'before all things' (v.^{17}). (*β*) In spite of J. Weiss's argument for adoption of the idea that the clause 'in him were all things created' means that the universe had its existence 'in Him' before its actual objective creation (*Christus*, p. 46 f.), we must hold to the more common interpretation that *ἐκτίσθη*, when used of the actual elements of the universe, refers to their definite creation as such, and not to their existence 'in idea' in Him. The statement is repeated (with the perfect tense *ἕκτισται*) that all things have been created through Him (cf. 1 Co 8^{6}, Ro 11^{36}). (*γ*) The words *ἐν αὐτῷ* mean more than *δι' αὐτοῦ*, implying that He is not a mere instrument but a continuous, abiding, conditioning cause. This is made explicit in the further statement that all things 'stand together,' receive their organic unity, through their continuous dependence upon Him. (*δ*) In addition to origin and continuity, we have here applied to Christ the third great metaphysical conception of end or final cause. 'All things have been created . . . unto Him.' The idea is repeated by describing this *τέλος* in concrete terms. He is to be supreme over all things, as the head over the body, that the divine fullness (*τὸ πλήρωμα*) may dwell in Him, that all things may be gathered back from alienation to their pristine unity (*ἀρχή*) in Him.

Lest the simplicity of faith should seem to have been betrayed in this use of philosophical categories (are they not after all very human categories, the stuff of 'common sense,' and inherent in all rational life?), the Apostle keeps the reader's mind close to the fact that he is describing—the functions of an actual personal being. He probably avoided the use of the term Logos, for the reason that the conceptions named above are not found in that philosophy alone, though brought to exceptional clarity there. They are embedded even in the OT, as in Pr 8, which cannot have been absent from his mind. He may also have instinctively avoided the obvious accusation, now levelled at him by some modern scholars, that he derived his Christology primarily from the Logos speculations and clothed with them the 'pure-human' figure of Jesus, hiding His winsome Self in a cloud of abstractions. On the contrary, he takes extraordinary pains in this very passage to avoid this reproach. He is dealing from first to last with a personal being, who has appeared in history, who has shed His blood, in the body of His flesh (vv.$^{20, 22}$), been raised from the dead (v.^{18}), drawn the Church by His living personal force (vv.$^{17, 21}$) under His control. This is not abstract idealism of the Philonic or the Hegelian type. It is 'personal idealism' which assumes that personal, conscious will is the ultimate seat of reality, fountain of history, secret of destiny.

ii. CHRISTOLOGY IN JOHN AND THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.—It is now generally agreed that the Christology of the Johannine writings and of the Epistle to the Hebrews is in substance identical with that which we have found in the Pauline Epistles.

1. **Characteristics common to both.**—In the two great passages Jn $1^{1f.}$ and He 1^{1-4} a terminology is employed which is drawn from an atmosphere charged with the Logos doctrine. It must, however, be carefully noted that these writers move

with individual freedom in that atmosphere. They do not directly derive their thought any more than they draw their language from Paul's writings. Rather do they reveal a common necessity felt by all prominent Christian teachers when brought face to face with the culture of the Greek world. Each writer chooses his own language to describe the fundamental facts which faith in Jesus Christ as the Son of God presents to them all (cf. the difference in language in Jn 1^{1-5}, He 1^{3}, Col 1^{15-19}). Further, we must note the essential and fundamental feature common to all—that the one common term in all their descriptions is 'Son of God.' Their real unity is not to be found either in their philosophical terminology, which is very different in each case, or in a common metaphysical theory, supposed to be in the background but which we have no real means of discovering. Their unity is found in this, that they are describing the eternal and cosmic relations of a concrete personality, who is identical at once with Jesus of Nazareth and with this divine Spirit which fills the Church. But the significance of the matter is not seen until we emphasize again the one point which is most generally ignored in our day—that as a mere matter of fact these writers all feel that their whole view is based originally upon the consciousness of the historic Jesus, the Son of God.

2. The Fourth Gospel.—The entire meaning of the Fourth Gospel lies here. It is an effort to show the Logos, who is thoroughly conceived of in the prologue as an eternal, living, purposive, rational being, as He appeared in flesh, as He moved a man among men. It is a profound study of the consciousness of Jesus as the consciousness of the Son of God living under the conditions of human experience. Incidents and discourses are recalled, interpreted, re-stated, and recorded, as they reveal that 'glory' which shone through the veil of flesh into His disciples' hearts, full of grace and truth (Jn 1^{14}). There can be no doubt, whether the author be John the Apostle or some other mind working upon material which must be traced back to Jerusalem and the Lord's immediate disciples, that he believes he is describing the actual consciousness of the historic Jesus. He is not inventing; nor is he using what he knows to be the inventions of a Pauline group, but what he knows or believes to be a true account of what Jesus said and did. If, as seems certain, he had at least Mark and Luke before him, then it is impossible, without impugning his honesty in the most serious manner, to doubt that he held that Jesus knew Himself to be the Son of God. This it is that accounts most reasonably for the well-known and fundamental features which distinguish his few but penetrating words about the Logos from the doctrine of Philo. He has not as an independent metaphysician discovered the defects of Philo, and then clothed the name of Jesus with the eternal attributes. Rather has he begun with a magnificent grasp of the idea of divine Sonship and read that back into the philosopher's idea of the Logos. His work is therefore as truly a criticism of the inadequacy of the Logos doctrine as Paul's exposition of the same idea of Sonship in the same philosophic atmosphere (Col 1 as above), which was intended to be at once a condemnation and transcendence of the wisdom of the Greeks.

3. The Epistle to the Hebrews.—The same facts appear in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is true that in the great opening sentence the metaphysical terminology is more closely involved with the idea of the Son of God, as a definite and personal being, than appears to be the case in Jn 1^{1-5}. In literary manner it is more akin to Paul's passage in Col 1^{15-19}. But we must remember that John in later verses ($^{9-18}$) deliberately re-states in relation to Jesus the whole of the ideas which are set forth in vv.$^{1-3}$ in relation to the Logos. It is these later verses that are the true parallel to the passages in Colossians and Hebrews. In like manner, then, for the author of Hebrews, the Son of God is a supra-temporal personal being, who in His own nature realizes and reflects the attributes and shows the eternal powers of God. Yet not even the Fourth Gospel realizes with more clearness and vigour that it is the consciousness of the Son of God that appears in the consciousness, and receives the experience of mankind in the historical form, of Jesus. It was He who tasted death and is crowned with glory and honour (2^{9}), was made perfect through sufferings (2^{10} 5^{9}), He who, having partaken of flesh and blood (2^{14}), was tempted in His sufferings (2^{18}), and that most humanly (4^{15}), who struggled with the fact of death (5^{7}), and, sinless (4^{15} 7^{26} 9^{14}), offered Himself up to God (7^{26} $9^{14, 28}$) in death. But this author more fully than any other, though not more emphatically, insists that after death, in the unseen world, the same conscious will, the same heart of love and mercy, carries on a high and momentous ministry on behalf of men, in a priesthood unchangeable (7^{24} 13^{8}; cf. chs. 8–10, *passim*).

iii. CONCLUSION.—It is in the interest not of apologetics but of actual history that we may in presence of these facts agree with J. Moffatt:

'We cannot explain primitive Christianity either as the transformation of the Jesus of history into the Christ of faith, or as the evolution of a Jesus-cult out of a current series of christological doctrines' (*Theology of the Gospels*, London, 1912, p. 174 n.).

But the same historical interest must prevent us from using, as wholly true to these facts, a certain form of expression which is quite popular in our day of psychological approach to every problem of history. For example, we may take the following from J. Weiss:

'The total impression is that early Christianity has used current, ready-made forms and conceptions in order to express in generally understood language, and yet in an absolute and supreme manner, the overwhelming impression made by the Person of Christ. Men sought out predicates wherewith to announce that the Ideal and the highest religious values are in Him' (*Christus*, p. 87).

The imperfection of such a summary appears in the succeeding paragraphs, where it appears that these ancient predicates, even that of Deity ('Gottheit'), are for us 'strange and unfamiliar' (Wernle says 'strange and bizarre'). Hence our task must be, it is urged, to go back to the Person of Jesus and win from Him for ourselves that original impression and clothe it in the predicates of our own day. This task, to which we are eloquently and earnestly summoned, must, however, take account of the nature of that original impression. The historical fact which criticism has not destroyed is this, that the 'impression' made by Jesus, which created the whole joy and energy of the Church, was not produced by the contemplation of the serene and lofty fellowship of one supreme religious genius with God. It was produced by the conscious will, the authoritative energy, the deliberate self-revelation of Jesus as Messiah, Son of God, Son of Man. He gave them the 'predicates' and the 'impression' *together*. No historian describes the historical facts accurately who ignores this, the essential element in the religion of the NT. The apostles individually and as a community viewed their experience as the reflexion of His will, and His titles as well as His commands are operations of that will. They did not labour to interpret a blind impression by predicates of their own discovery. He revealed Himself to them, and in doing that changed their conscious relations with God; and all their thought, all their predicates, started with His own words, the outflashings of His consciousness. It is for the

apologist and the denier of the deity of Christ to war over the issue as to whether the will to wear these titles was madness or miracle, delusion or divinity. But these are the pre-conditions, the facts which constitute the field of battle.

VI. *CHRISTOLOGY IN THE EARLY CHURCH.*—i. INTRODUCTORY.—**1. Logic and community life.**—The necessity for a Christology lies in the nature of all human social organizations. All groups that are formed for definite ends are compelled to work out, not only those ends, but the principles of organization and methods of pursuit. This must be done actually, whether it is done formally or informally. The history of every social group in the world, from a private club to a national government, includes the working out of the logic of its inherent principles. Moreover, the group history is always more logical than the development of the individual members of it, for in the individual the emotions play upon the course of the will, confuse the logical powers, and make the individual's life an imperfect reflexion of the inner logic of the principles which he professes to have adopted. But, for the group life, private emotions are cancelled in the clash of wills and in the course of controversy as to the meaning of the ends, the principles, and the methods which inhere in the constitution of the group. For this reason it is that the history of a group, of an institution, of a government, of a political party, of a church, is often severely logical. It is the reading off into active life of the rational implicates of those principles on which it is founded. This process of unfolding the logic of its adopted rules is aided in every institution by the challenge of the environment. For each organized group lives in a world of institutions, and its own principles come into collision or co-operation with theirs. Controversy arises, and that is, in all important and continuing cases, pushed further and further, until the full inner meaning of each interpretation is revealed. Acceptance and rejection of the institution and its ends, the loosening or confirming of conviction, the desertion of an ineffective or untrue principle, the deeper unfolding of the power of the true principles, even the gradual death of an institution, are the consequences of this criticism without and this controversy within.

2. Christ inherent in the new community.—The theology of the Church in its technical form and including all its departments and phases of history is the natural and inevitable result of this process. As far as Christology is concerned, it is the gradual unfolding of the central fact that Jesus Christ is from the first accepted by the Church as the incarnate Son of God, the redeemer of man by the Cross, the ruler of our experience by His Spirit. The institution that was organized on that basis must work out to the very end all the implications, the inner logic, of the conviction which gave it being and power. It would be impossible to relate here the particular stages and various adventures of the human spirit in this great undertaking. We must be content to give a mere outline of the logical process by which the Church, through all natural confusions of controversy, sought to define and defend its faith and worship of Christ. For that faith and worship of Christ created the Church. It separated, not without pain and surprise and alarm, the primary disciples from the Jewish Church. It attracted by its meaning and power individuals from all classes and races as the message of redemption through Him and of control by Him was carried from place to place. The Person of Jesus Christ as revealer of God and redeemer of man was the foundation of the new community. This principle brought it at once into conflict with the monotheism of the Jews and the polytheism of the Gentiles. Among cultured classes it was confronted by the Gnostics with their confident speculations about the deity and His invisible hierarchies of creative agencies, and by the practical Agnosticism of vast numbers for whom neither idolatry, nor Gnosticism, nor mystery-religions contained any solution of life's enigma. Collision with those forces was felt from the beginning, as the NT proves. But, as time went on, the warfare became more definite and more keen, especially as the number of Christian adherents increased and varieties of culture, of intellectual equipment, of moral and spiritual insight and intensity, took their place within the growing host of the baptized.

ii. THE FIRST STAGE IN CHRISTOLOGY.- During the sub-Apostolic period, and through that of the apologists down to nearly the close of the 2nd cent., Christological inquiry had hardly begun on the Christian basis. Such cruder phases as are known by the names of Ebionism and Docetism started from conceptions of God and the world which themselves were anti-Christian. Thus Ebionism, obscure in its history and teaching, while it affirmed Jesus as Messiah, shrank from seeing in Him the actual presence of God. Jewish prejudice against believing that God could come into such close relations with the material world as are implied in the birth and crucifixion of the Son of God held that view in abhorrence. The Spirit came upon Him at baptism and made Him the supreme teacher; the death was an inscrutable horror, but He would come again in power and glory to make all things new. Docetism, on the other hand, rose from or was adopted by various phases of Gnosticism. Even Justin Martyr bears witness that many Gnostics were in the Church and must be reckoned as Christians. But the basis of their thought lay in non-Christian speculations about the nature of God and His remoteness from all contact with the evil inherent in the material universe. The best examples of this are to be found in such a mixture of dogmatic speculation on the origins of God and the universe with reverence for Jesus, as a member of the supernatural forms of existence from which the history of our universe has arisen, as was attributed to Basilides towards the middle of the 2nd cent.; and in such a union of Christian faith with purely mythological accounts of creation and salvation as proceeded from the poetic mind of Valentinus a little later. From such sources, in the main, arose the Docetic view of the Incarnation, according to which the divine element in Christ was the only real and permanent element, and it assumed, in this way or that, the *appearance* of a man, but did not partake of actual flesh and blood. (Logically it was inevitable that the Ebionite and Docetic positions should appear as barely possible, as at least conceivable, explanations of Christ, the one denying the reality of the divine, the other denying the reality of the human nature in Him. Actually these views made in their original and cruder forms less disturbance among the general mass of Christians and in the minds of the greater Christian teachers than other interpretations of His person which appeared later.) Throughout this period of the Apostolic Fathers, and the Apologists, the apostolic positions were maintained, often in their own language of concrete and positive affirmation, often by means of carefully chosen equivalents for their words and phrases. Thus Clement of Rome speaks of 'Our Lord Jesus Christ, the sceptre of the majesty of God' (*Cor.* 16). In another passage (ch. 2, whether or not with Lightfoot and Harnack we read 'God' instead of 'Christ' as subject of the clause 'His sufferings were before your eyes'), the dependence upon Christ as at once revealer of

truth, redeemer from sin, and living Lord is vividly and passionately expressed. In the *Epistle of Barnabas* He is spoken of repeatedly as the Son of God and Lord of the World. As Maker of the Sun before which our eyes quail, how much more glorious must He be; His Incarnation was the veiling of His dazzling radiance. For Polycarp, in his Epistle, Christ's work as redeemer is the fascinating centre of thought. He is Lord and Saviour (chs. 1, 6), Son of God (ch. 12), and His name is associated with that of God as supreme object of faith (chs. 5, 12) and the fountain of mercy (ch. 1). Ignatius is more full and varied in his forms of expression. He uses the so-called Trinitarian formula but naming Christ first, 'in the Son and in the Father and in the Spirit,' or 'to Christ and to the Father and to the Spirit' (*ad. Magn.* xiii. 1). He speaks of Christ outright as 'our God' and 'my God,' asserts His pre-existence (*ib.* vii., *ad fin.*), and uses the striking mystical expression 'Who is his word (λόγος) proceeding forth from Silence' (Σιγή) (*ib.* viii.). Echoes of controversy with Docetism appear in his repeated use of the adverb ἀληθῶς (*ad Eph.* xvii. 2) when referring to the Incarnation and Death. But the double being of Christ is stated in terms which were possible only before the rise of the great discussions of His Person; *e.g.*, he says in one place:

'He is at once flesh and spirit, begotten and unbegotten, God come in the flesh, the real life, both from Mary and from God, at first passible and then impassible' (*ad Eph.* vii. 2; cf. xviii. 2, *ad Smyrn.* i. 1, iii. 1).

By these and other such writers (*e.g.*, *Epistle to Diognetus*) we are kept in the atmosphere of apostolic language. The Church is still in the glow of its first enthusiasm, eager in its missionary labours, absorbed in the joy of fellowship with God through the risen Christ, that conqueror of death and giver of the Spirit, and concerned with the continuous fight against heathen vices and the inculcation of the new law of love and kindness and meek loyalty of soul. They were building on the foundation without inquiry as to its material and mode of construction.

iii. The second stage in Christology.—1. **The rise of Greek Christology.**—A new race of thinkers entered into the life of the Church with Justin Martyr, the race of men who before or after their conversion were saturated with Greek culture and yet avoided the dogmatic wildness of the Gnostics, men like Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, and many others. But whether or not they took Justin's motto, 'Whatever is rightly said among all men belongs to us Christians,' they began the long and delicate task of determining what was 'rightly said' by tests found within the Christian system itself. Thus opened the next stage in the unfolding of the nature of Christ. Given the reality of the pre-existent Son or Logos and the reality of the man Jesus, the double being of Christ, the question arose as to what was meant by and how much was contained in those respective realities. At this point it is that a modern powerful school of thought has found the chief disaster of Christianity (see A. Ritschl, *Die Entstehung der altkathol. Kirche*[2], Bonn, 1859; A. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.*, Eng. tr., *Hist. of Dogma*, London, 1894–99; E. Hatch, *Influence of Gr. Ideas and Usages upon the Chr. Church* [*HL*, 1888], London, 1890). For such writers it appears evident that the inquiry into the divine nature of Christ and especially the use of the Logos idea, with the resulting minute discussions about the *modus* of the Incarnation, diverted faith from its true object and the Christian religion from its true and only source of inspiration. For them the gospel lies simply and directly in the experience of God's Fatherhood by the soul of Jesus and the practical teaching which flows from that (cf. W. Herrmann, *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*[4], Stuttgart, 1903, Eng. tr., *Communion of the Christian with God*, London, 1906; A. Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums*[3], Leipzig, 1900, Eng. tr., *What is Christianity?*[3], London, 1904). The effort to treat His Person as a metaphysical and psychological problem led inevitably to the idea that salvation depends on the right solution of that problem, and so to the substitution of an orthodox creed for a historical and personal revelation of God as the true object of saving faith. A full discussion of this subject is out of place here, but, as the centre of the controversy has been the Person of the founder of Christianity, a few facts on the other side must be briefly stated. (1) From the beginning the Christian consciousness, as we have seen, has been determined in its form and content by a definite conception of Christ as superhuman Messiah and incarnate Son of God. This conception was not invented for Him, but given forth from His own consciousness and involved in His actual power and in the new consciousness of His Church in relation to God. (2) The results of thorough inquiry into the nature of His Person could have been avoided only by a universal consent not to investigate intellectually the ultimate facts of the religious life. (3) Given the right to think, the alleged disaster, attributed to gradual definition of orthodoxy, must be compared with the effects which would have been produced upon the religious consciousness *in that age* by the general acceptance of the opposite theories, if these were treated as essential to the existence of the Christian community, or if treated as of equal value to its life with any others, or even if treated as matters of indifference. History seems to prove that any intellectual definition of the Person of Christ, and of His Messianic function, if sincerely used, produces characteristic effects in the further spiritual and social life of the community which adopts it. There can be no doubt that the prevalence of the 'Liberal' picture of Jesus in our time has put its own colour upon wide circles of religious life. (4) The real and vital problem for the Church, in preserving its true relation to its divine founder, is as to the right use of its conclusions in any controversy about His Person. The ancient Church, especially under the power of the Emperor, turned its conclusions (δόγματα) into weapons of discipline wielded by a centralized authority. This the modern Church cannot do. It was at this point, and in this way, that disaster entered.

2. The first phase: the divine nature of Christ.—Assuming that in Christ the Son of God has appeared as a man, the problem arose as to what is meant by the Son of God or Logos. How is He related to God? This question was not forced by the metaphysical, but by a very practical, interest. For the worship of Christ was the life of the Church from the beginning, and it inevitably raised the retort from heathenism that Christians themselves had two or, counting the Spirit, three Gods. It was the effort to meet this condemnation that drove men to define how Christ, a man, could become an object of worship for avowed and sincere monotheists.

(*a*) *Monarchianism.*—The first answer came from those who are called Monarchians. They were of various kinds. Some evolved an easily refuted Unitarianism not unlike Ebionism. But those who made history took a higher road. Their chief representative was one Sabellius, who lived in the first half of the 3rd century. God in Himself was said to be without distinction (ἓν ὑποκείμενον), inscrutable, unknowable. As He acts outwards upon the universe, He assumes aspects (πρόσωπα) for which various names are needed. The three names

Father, Son, Spirit, are appropriate to describe Him as Creator of the universe, Redeemer (in Christ, from Birth to Ascension), and Life of the Church. But these names should be used only in relation to that phase of the divine action to which they exclusively refer. Much ingenuity was apparently used by Sabellius to emphasize and illustrate this inviolable unity of God. Thus He may be called *υἱοπάτωρ*, to abolish the idea that in Him any distinction exists, though we rightly name Him Father and Son, according to that aspect of His activity which we contemplate; and He is like the sun 'having three energies in one hypostasis,' as 'light-giver, heat and the very form of a circumference.' There was not much of distinctive statement in his writings, apparently, concerning the mode of the Incarnation. But the tendency of the school was inevitably towards Docetism, and Dorner says, 'No passage can be pointed out in which the Passion of Christ is made the subject of consideration' (*Person of Christ*, div. I. vol. ii. p. 167 f.). Monarchianism was not easily overcome. Through its emphasis upon the unity of God and the difficulty of defining the nature of the eternal distinctions within that unity, it tended to reappear in unexpected quarters. Various thinkers in our own day, especially those who are of the idealistic school in metaphysics, have been accused of succumbing to its subtle influence. Wherever the pantheistic view attracts, Monarchianism is at hand.

(*b*) *Arianism.*—At the opposite extreme from Monarchianism is the powerful movement known as Arianism. It represents in the 4th cent., and in many forms since, a reaction from the tendency to make Christ an abstract being, remote from human interest, and so to detract from the direct religious value of the human figure of Jesus. It involved, of course, a direct attack upon the contemporary theology. Monarchianism had endangered the reality of the revelation of God and made the very conception of Him vague and uncertain. Hence Arius insists strongly on what we moderns would call the Personality of God. He is the eternal, active, and rational Creator of all, for the Logos as *δύναμις* is immanent in Him. He became the Father in the creation of the Son, to whom He gave a share in that *δύναμις*. We cannot say that the Son was created in time, for He is the first of all creatures, and with Him time begins. But *ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*, 'there was when He was not'—in flat contradiction of Origen. Hence we must not ascribe to Him any attribute of deity itself. He is not the unbegotten as God is, nor is He a part of the unbegotten, nor did He arise from the essence of God. He is the first creature of the divine Will, only-begotten, fully divine (*πλήρης θεός*; cf. Jn 1^1), and the medium through whom the Creator henceforth produced and ruled His universe. But the inherent and fatal Agnosticism of Arius is revealed in the repeated statement that even the Son does not directly know God. He is known under many conceptions (*ἐπίνοια*), indicating His great glory. And yet 'God is ineffable to His Son,' for it is plain that it is impossible for that which hath a beginning to conceive how the *un*begun is, or to grasp the idea. The Son became incarnate in Jesus Christ in the simple and obvious sense of entering into a human body. There was no need for another human soul in that body, save the Son of God Himself. He is worthy to be worshipped both as the medium of Creation and as the glorified Christ. On the surface this view makes a fair show. It seems to avoid some dangers of Monarchianism, with its tendency to Patripassianism on the one hand and Pantheism on the other, and yet in its deepest principle Arianism is Monarchian. Over against the dominant Origenistic theology it escapes the difficult idea of 'eternal generation' and the tendency to make the earthly life of Jesus an unreal thing for imagination and faith. But Arianism as a religion was too close to heathenism and too far from the centre of Christian faith to live. In reducing mysteries it lost the supreme realities of revelation and redemption, for its God is too remote and abstract to be known or to appear in time. And, worse still, it made a distinct approximation to idolatry in its arguments for the worship of Christ as a creature whom the divine complacency summoned to divine honours. Its solution of the problem was too easy. The Christian view of Christ had always implied a closer and more mysterious relation of God Himself to the cradle and the cross. The awe and the joy of faith in Christ arose from the presence of God in Him and in His deeds of redemption. The Arian Christ, mighty as He could be depicted, was less than the Christ who was the personal manifestation of God, and in whose death the righteousness and love of God Himself were directly realized, and made effective in the actual history of man.

(*c*) *The Nicene Christology.*—The third possibility regarding the relation of the Son of God to the Father was that which won the day at Nicæa (A.D. 325). Constantine took the portentous step of summoning the Council, and, for spiritual religion, the baneful step of using the fleshly arm to enforce its conclusions. It must be remembered that these acts of Constantine introduced a new principle into the organized life of the Church, of so potent a character that it took long centuries to unfold its inner logic. Trust in the State and trust in the ruling Spirit of Christ are principles whose reconciliation is not yet achieved either at Rome or at Berlin. More than half a century of Arian strife and shameful confusions of statecraft stretched out before the unforeseeing Church after Nicæa. But in the conclave itself there were men of profound Christian conviction and powerful intellect who saw that in this controversy the apostolic faith itself was at stake, and the defensive creed which they formulated became a living force in the Church from that day to this.

(*a*) The Nicene theology, as such, really began with Origen († A.D. 254). Against Monarchianism he affirmed the Personality of God, teaching that He is the intelligent Spirit from whom all intelligences, and, for the use of tainted souls, the material universe, have arisen. He even decides that God is above substance, a position which must be considered by those who imagine that the category of substance was supreme in ancient theology (cf. W. Temple, in *Foundations*, London, 1912, p. 211 ff.). Origen platonizes very thoroughly, but seeks to preserve this conception of the living intelligent Will of God as the supreme source of all. And he lifts his conception high above Plato and Philo by insisting always on the ethical principle that this eternal Will is a Will of love. It is love in God that is the fountainhead of the created universe of souls. Further, the Son of God, who is also conceived of as a personal being, is derived from the Father. But, afraid of heathenism on the one hand, as of Monarchianism on the other, he propounds the great doctrine *ἀεὶ γεννᾷ ὁ πατὴρ τὸν υἱόν*. The Son is indeed subordinate to the Father, but not as a creature, for this 'begetting' is a process in the divine nature independent of time, an act of the eternal Will—*ἐκ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ πατρός*. The distinction of Father and Son is not that of separate individuals, for they partake of one essential being. And yet the Son is not an emanation of the Gnostic type. How then does He stand related to the Father? It is here that the idea of the Logos aids the imagination (well illustrated in Athan. *Orat.* iv. 1–5). For we can apprehend the unity of Logos

with the pure, personal Spirit, of which it is the self-expression, better than the unity of a Son with a Father, while we can apprehend the distinct *hypostasis* of each more easily through the latter terms than through the more abstract. Each set of terms is used to describe now the unity and now the difference, but always the eternal reality, of God the Father and the Son (on the danger of deriving the Son from the Will, and not from the essence, of the Father, see Athan. *de Syn.* 35 f.).

(*β*) In this substance of it the theology of Origen became that of the Nicene Creed. When the Arians and many even of the sincerely orthodox desired to be content with the assertion that the Son is of 'like substance' (ὁμοιούσιος), the course of debate disclosed the ambiguity of a word which contented Athanasius and Arius alike as the crucial point of the whole problem. When the orthodox pressed their understanding of the word as implying an eternal and unbroken inherence of the Son in the essence (οὐσία) of the Godhead, the Arians, it is said through Eusebius of Nicomedia, reproached them with teaching the doctrine of ὁμοουσία, or identity of being, which, though held by Origen, had been hitherto associated mainly with Monarchianism and treated therefore as dangerous by both parties. That very word, however, from that hour, and inevitably, became the touchstone of the difference between the parties and was embodied in the Creed. The Son is 'from the essence' (οὐσία) of the Father, and hence 'of the same substance.' But the term was admitted even by Athanasius unwillingly and under stress of the controversy; and, indeed, it was afterwards used by him sparingly, except when it was the direct subject of exposition and defence. He defended its use in part by showing that the Arians had used many un-Biblical terms to state their own positions. The fear of Monarchianism which it had suggested to many minds was allayed by the fact that the approach to the term was not made from the speculative, but from the religious, side. The whole discussion, as conducted by Athanasius, was concerned with Jesus Christ, the historical and personal being, whose permanent reality was assumed as essential to the very life of faith. To affirm of such a being the ὁμοουσία with God could not abolish the difference between the Father and the Son, while it secured their eternal and essential unity. It is not an outside matter of creation or adoption, but (so to speak) an organic relation inside that nature. The Father is no more God without the Son than the Son is God without the Father (see Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*[2]).

It is impossible to ignore the fact that both here and in later discussions of the Incarnation itself the category of substance, or rather 'essence' (οὐσία), had a powerful influence upon the course of thought. But two things must be observed in weighing the significance of that fact. In the first place, a word like 'substance' carried a varied content for the imagination and speculative thought of the ancient as well as the modern world. To pin it down to the idea of matter, or accuse them all of being ultimately materialists, is too gross a misrepresentation, though it is so common. To say even that they set it above the category of personality is not true to the facts. For, in the second place, the very discussions with which the Church was concerned drove its great minds like Origen, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and Apollinaris to be concerned with the nature of spiritual beings, and to face, not the impersonal, but the personal, as the supreme element in man and God. When Gregory of Nyssa deals with human nature he can be seen struggling to say that the essence of man, though distributed throughout his body, is not something 'spatial,' as we would so naturally put it. And, when he would state the difference between the divine and the human nature, he finds it to reside ultimately not in a difference of substance, but in this, that God is the Creator and man wholly dependent on Him (*On the Making of Man*, xvi. 12). There we are in the region of volition and ethics, and religious insight. The crass view of substance is subordinate to a higher view of spiritual nature. And we have already seen that for Origen the supreme facts in the being of God are will, intelligence, and love. The reluctance with which Athanasius and others engaged in the discussions which involved the use of οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, etc., is a witness to the fact that they were fully aware of the limitations of the human mind when applied to the mystery of God's nature. These terms were used in the Nicene Creed (in the 'Anathema') only that the dogmas of Arianism and Monarchianism might be denied, and that the substance of the Christian faith, which rests in the fact that God was in Christ and that Christ is 'eternally one with God,' 'might not perish from the earth.'

3. Second phase: the humanity of Christ.—The official victory of Trinitarianism, the affirmation of the proper deity of Christ, led naturally to the raising of the next problem, viz. the question of His humanity. The supreme emphasis of orthodoxy on the deity of Christ seemed to endanger the reality of His appearance in the flesh. Even in NT times this tendency was felt (cf. 1 Jn 1^{1} 2^{1-3}, He 2^{9-18}), and the reproach of Docetism has been uttered against many writers in the 2nd and 3rd centuries who were yet counted orthodox. Indeed, Harnack goes so far as to say that down to the beginning of the 4th cent. 'no single outstanding church teacher really accepted the humanity in a perfectly unqualified way' (*Hist. of Dogma*, iv. 129). Origen used his daring genius on the problem. Believing that all souls of men have pre-existence, and become incarnate because of evil taint, he held that the one unsullied soul became united with the divine Logos and then by an act of will, and love, became incarnate as the soul of Jesus. This theory did not deeply influence the history of the subject, though Arius owes something to it. It was Apollinaris who first dealt with it in a more sober and suggestive manner. That he was true to the doctrine of redemption is evident from such words as:

'He is both God and man: if Christ is only man he did not save the world, and if only God, he did not save through suffering. If Christ was only man, or if only God, he was not a mediator between man and God.'

But Apollinaris was equally clear that,

'if a perfect God were united with a perfect man, there would be two, one by nature Son of God, and the other by adoption' (Athanasius, *c. Apoll.* i. 2).

He solved the problem partly by falling back on the Aristotelian view of man's nature as tripartite and buttressing that with 1 Th 5^{23} ('May your spirit, soul, and body be preserved entire,' etc.). He finds the essential features of human nature in distinction from God to be body and soul, while in mind or spirit (νοῦς, ψυχὴ νοερά, πνεῦμα) man is of one type with the divine Logos. Hence in Jesus Christ the union of the two natures must be found in this, that the Logos became the νοῦς (or πνεῦμα) of the man Jesus by becoming united with the body and soul in the womb of His mother. Thus we have a mind in Jesus 'unaffected by psychical and fleshly experiences, and controlling the flesh and fleshly motives in a divine fashion, sinless, therefore, and not subject to death, but conquering death' (R. Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte*, i. 199). Apollinaris appealed to the Scriptures, of course, as at Jn 1^{14}, Ro 8^{3}, to show that they do not speak of His becoming a man, but 'becoming flesh.' He weakened his position by his free admission that his theory presented a new kind of being, something neither God

nor man; and his opponents have ever since made the most of that concession. The hostile arguments were based on the idea that this affirmed a mutilated humanity, and thus left it unredeemed at its highest point. For, while Apollinaris (Greg. Nyss. *adv. Apoll.* ii.) insisted that 'the death of man does not abolish death,' the opponents answered that the death of the divine Logos (if that were possible) would not redeem the *νοῦς* of man. What was required for redemption was a redeeming manhood in all the content of that conception, that body might redeem body, soul redeem soul, and mind redeem mind. What was not assumed was not redeemed. It was in vain that Apollinaris urged his two strongest positions, that only the divine can redeem the human, and that, since the *νοῦς* is the seat of personality, to conceive of Christ as possessed of all these human elements is to conceive of Him as a true human individual, and make the Incarnation inconceivable. He was not himself released from the realistic (some would say, magical) view of redemption, and could not rebut the strong argument made against him on that basis. The very conception of personality which his own speculations were helping to clarify was still so far confused with that of substance that his vision of the incarnate was held in alien bonds. That in God there is a human element; that the divine Logos and the human mind are of a type so that the former can act for or as the latter; that the seat of personality is here; that it is fatal to faith and reason alike to see in the incarnate Christ two distinct personalities with an indefinite form of unity—these are positions of great power, which account for the fact that 'Apollinarism' reappears persistently in later ages, and in our day is more wide-spread in principle than is often imagined. But he was himself hindered, by a meagre psychology and by the remainder in his mind of the tendency to define human nature in mutually exclusive 'parts,' from doing full justice to his primary assumption. Hence Apollinarism was explicitly condemned in the first canon of the Council of Constantinople (A.D. 381), at which the Nicene Creed was revised, developed, and reaffirmed. In the Decree of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) elaborate care was taken to rule it out completely. Christ is 'at once God truly and man truly of a reasonable soul and body' (*ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος*); He is 'of the same substance (*ὁμοούσιος*) with us according to his manhood.' The conclusion of the Church was therefore officially announced in the doctrine that 'perfect manhood,' in the sense of all the parts of an individual man, must be ascribed to Jesus Christ.

iv. THE THIRD STAGE IN CHRISTOLOGY.—The third stage in the development of Christology was now reached. With its insistence upon the full deity of the Logos (Son of God) and the full humanity of Jesus, the Church was driven to consider more deeply the mode of the union of the divine and human in one life. The matter had not been ignored indeed. Origen, as we have seen, confronted the problem from the speculative side; Athanasius had dealt with it in close adherence to Scripture. The latter held that the Logos in assuming human nature did not merely unite Himself with an individual man, but became the true subject of the human life of Jesus. At the same time He retained His functions as Lord of the universe. He did, indeed, as man experience growth (Lk 2), and even confessed ignorance (Mk 13), but in such aspects of His incarnate life the Logos restrained His powers. This double consciousness is the very mystery of the Incarnation. For our sakes the same subject now shows His divine glory and now veils it, in the limits of a man's mind and body. But the chief difficulty with this position is the uncertainty, the apparent discontinuity, of the subject in the self-expressions of the incarnate state. The doctrine of a continuous self-limitation was not yet attained. The Cappadocian theologians likewise, with their intense hostility to Apollinarism, while holding the unity of the Person, yet insisted very strongly also that each 'nature' was perfect; the union was effected by an indescribable 'commingling.' Apollinaris had, however, raised the question to new distinctness and importance, and these uncertain views were subjected to fresh and closer scrutiny.

(*a*) *First phase: Nestorianism.*—On the one hand arose the so-called Nestorians, who were prepared for by the famous school of Antioch among whom the name of Theodore of Mopsuestia stood out as a brilliant expounder of the Scriptures. With a keen sense of the historical, he approached the problem as one who was filled with the reality and power of the life of Jesus. But he was also a vigorous defender of the Nicene Creed and as vigorous an opponent of the Apollinarian Christology, and therefore faced the problem of the *nexus* between a complete divine nature and a complete human nature. This he found in the Will of God the Word, who, Himself begotten from the Father, united the man Jesus Christ with Himself. Hence Christ is rightly called 'Son,' because beyond all men He possessed the adoption of a Son through that union (Com. on Gal 4^5). But it was Nestorius who carried this doctrine to its full issues in the controversy which led up through the third ecumenical Council at Ephesus (A.D. 431) to the fourth Council at Chalcedon (A.D. 451). Rejecting the use of the term *θεοτόκος* ('Mother of God') as applied to Mary the Virgin (which was defended with great energy by Cyril of Alexandria), he also, like Theodore, set the union of the human nature of Jesus Christ with the Logos in the region of will. It was the grace of God that bound this sinless man in an ineffable oneness with Himself as Logos. The general term *συνάφεια* ('moral union') was used as over against the *ἕνωσις φυσική* ('real union') with which Cyril of Alexandria sought to express the higher view. In a series of mutual 'anathematisms' these two protagonists defined their hostile positions, which lay in a region that philosophy was only beginning to explore. Nestorius insisted that, as Jesus possessed a 'rational soul,' He was a complete human individual, while Cyril maintained the reality of the 'rational soul' but insisted that 'the Word having personally united to himself flesh animated by a rational soul,' the result was a true union in 'one Christ and one Son.' Cyril, that is to say, maintained that the Word did not unite Himself with a human individual, but united the two natures in one (*εἷς*). For the result, for the basis of their oneness, he could find no technical term.

Φύσις (*natura*) and *ὑπόστασις* (*substantia*, 'substance') were still applied as a rule to the total content of the human and divine elements in their respective and distinct reality, and Cyril's use of *πρόσωπον* in the so-called Creed of Union (A.D. 433) is not as yet distinct enough to define their basis of unity. But this school came near Docetism in maintaining that the Logos *appeared*, for our sakes, to be ignorant, weary, etc., but that these cannot be ascribed as real experiences to the Logos incarnate. Nevertheless, Cyril and his party, in spite of their own difficulties of construction, made it clear that the Nestorian position excluded a real Incarnation. A union which consisted only in complete sympathy, in co-operant wills, in a moral harmony, between two natures which are conceived of as distinct and complete must always appear incidental because not organic, insecure because not grounded in an objective and indissoluble fact. On the other hand, if Cyril, even in

his carefully drawn anathematisms, failed, it is because in his fear of Apollinarism (of which, however, he was accused) he shrank from taking the full consequences of making the Logos the personal basis of the Incarnate One. Striving to maintain the completeness of the humanity for soteriological reasons—and this with great earnestness and insight—he yet failed to define, so as to satisfy the Nestorians, how the human can remain human if it has for its basis, not indeed the divine 'nature,' but the divine Logos. Nestorius had a curious trick in his anathematisms of describing his opponents' language about the incarnate Christ, in His unity, as if they applied it to the one 'nature' or the other as Nestorius conceived of these; *e.g.*, in the eleventh he accuses them of maintaining 'that the flesh which is united with God the Word is by the power of its own nature life-giving'—an incredible misrepresentation, and possible only because Nestorius was so possessed of his own vision of the facts that he could not read the words of others as they meant them. He could not see their vision.

(*b*) *Second phase: Eutychianism.*—From this strong insistence by the orthodox party upon the Logos as the true basis of the one Christ logical experimentation pursued its natural course. If Nestorianism failed when starting from the integrity of the human, as though that were primary in their interest, how would it be if the start were made from the integrity of the divine in the Incarnate One? Eutyches dared this task and fell over the over-narrowing edge of definitions into another 'heresy.' For him it was clear that the Incarnate One had but one nature, as indeed Cyril insisted. But Eutyches urged that in that case the body itself must have been changed in its very substance by union with deity. The humanity is absorbed into the divinity (cf. Origen's approach to this view, *c. Cels.* iii. 4). This was condemned, of course, as docetic in its ultimate effect, and as 'confusing' (*σύγχυσις*) the natures.

(*c*) *The Decree of Chalcedon.*—At Chalcedon the matter was brought to a conclusion. Subsequent councils dealing with further developments of the matter (Monophysitism and Monothelitism) could only insist on rigid maintenance of the Decree of Chalcedon. Theological speculation had passed beyond the attainments of metaphysics and psychology in that age, and could only be restrained by repeating the formulæ which marked the utmost boundary of knowledge and safe reasoning. This famous Decree, which is generally held to be the high-water mark of ancient Christology, has in recent times become the object of serious criticism. Theologians pour contempt upon it as a mere assertion of logical contradictions. Historians (Harnack especially, who does less than justice to Cyril) strive to prove that its terms were a miserable compromise which, to satisfy the ambitions of the West (led by Pope Leo, author of the famous letter to Flavian known as 'Leo's Tome,' on which the Decree was founded), obscured the real issues by asserting the 'two natures in one person,' and made impossible the true development of the Athanasian Christology, which sought to assert that the result of the Incarnation was 'the One incarnate nature of the Logos.' In spite of Harnack's vehement pages, the view will probably continue to prevail that the Decree actually saved the fundamental Athanasian position. Moreover, a protest should be entered against the frequent yet absurd suggestion that the 'two-nature hypothesis' first arose at or just before Chalcedon. The very idea of an incarnation involves that of two natures somehow made into one life. The idea dates back to the NT, to the combination of 'Son of God' and 'Son of Man,' of 'existing in the form of God' and 'found in fashion as a man.' And the entire course of Christological speculation presupposed this hypothesis from the beginning. There is, however, much difference of opinion as to the real effect of the Decree at the critical point. The following are its main points for our purpose: (1) each nature, the humanity and the Godhead of 'our Lord Jesus Christ,' is 'perfect'; (2) He is consubstantial (*ὁμοούσιος*) with the Father and consubstantial 'with us'; (3) the 'property' (*ἰδιότης* = *proprietas*) of each nature is retained and concurs in one person (*πρόσωπον* = *persona*) and one substance (*ὑπόστασις* = *substantia*); (4) the famous four adverbs (without confusion, change, division, separation) condemn Eutychianism, Apollinarism, and Nestorianism. The main difficulty about the interpretation arises from the fact that the crucial clause starts with the different natures, defining each in its distinctness and completeness, and then speaks indefinitely of 'the property of each nature' as 'being preserved and concurring in one person and substance.' This is not the way of Scripture or of the Apologists or of Greek theology as a whole, which was to view the Incarnation steadily downwards, as it were, from the side of the Glory of God as a living and personal act of condescension. Hence it has led some (Dorner especially) to maintain that, according to the Decree, the 'Person or substance' is the resultant of the union of the two natures, and *not* that the Person or substance of the Son of God, having already a divine nature as the instrument of action, assumed also a human nature as a parallel and distinct means of action. Harnack seems to agree with this:

> 'In Leo's view the "Person" is no longer entirely the one subject with two "properties," but the union of two hypostatic natures' (*Hist. of Dogma*, iv. 205 f.).

But this interpretation is not borne out by Leo's Tome itself. In the very sentence of that famous letter from which this clause in the Decree is taken, the pope says: 'Lowliness was assumed by majesty,' etc. Leo even uses the Apollinaristic phrase 'which (the flesh) he (Logos) animated with the Spirit of rational life.' And again he speaks of the unity of Person in the two natures, and of the one Person of God and man.

If that clause, which has curiously absorbed attention to its method, as over against the method of earlier clauses, is read from the point of view which tends to proceed, as it were, from differences to their unity, Dorner's interpretation may result; but, if read from another point of view which moves from unity to difference, and in the light of the earlier clauses, it must be held that the *form* of the statement (in that clause), being dictated by current controversies, does not represent truly the real inner meaning of the Decree as a whole. For after all it must be not the two concurrent natures but the Logos with whom the Incarnation begins, and who, as eternal *ὑπόστασις*, adds to His possession of the Godhead, or divine 'nature,' a manhood or human 'nature.' There is no use of proving, as some have done, that the technical terms (esp. *φύσις* and *ὑπόστασις*) mean elsewhere something which makes nonsense of them as used here. These ancient terms were developed in these very controversies, and their occurrence here actually marks a new stage in their history. (1) A new difference is drawn between *φύσις* and *πρόσωπον* (and *ὑπόστασις*). (2) The last two terms are not merely interchangeable. The one (*πρόσωπον*) is beginning to assume the meaning of personality, and the other (*ὑπόστασις*) preserves the idea of indefeasible substantiality. But the imperfections of the Decree are found in the fact that it did not end controversy. Its outward form, especially in the crucial clause beginning with and insisting on the distinct and complete natures, gave power and

victory to orthodoxy against the persistent teachers of Monophysitism and Monothelitism; but its inner and real meaning, that the Logos became the Ego of the human nature, encouraged persistent speculation as to how much is included in a conscious Ego (now = *πρόσωπον*), and in what sense human nature retains all its 'parts,' when it is said to be assumed by the Son of God. It is that question which has dominated modern Christology.

It is clear from this brief survey that Christological speculation in the early Church tended towards mere intellectualism, that the problems grew more and more remote from the field of experience, and that the great living figure of Jesus Christ, the Founder and Lord of Christianity, was in danger of being evaporated in technicalities and metaphysical abstractions. And, indeed, it is almost an offence to faith to follow the details of some of these controversies. All the more necessary is it, in trying to grasp the permanent significance of Jesus Christ for the Christian religion, to recall the fact that in the very midst of such controversies the Church was carrying on against tremendous difficulties its missionary, philanthropic, and sanctifying work. Many of the greatest Christological theologians were men of supreme devotion to His Person, profound believers in the redemption which He had brought, men of prayer and of saintly life. The ardour of their love for Him, and their profound grasp upon the idea that in Him the destiny of the individual and the race is determined, were the main forces which sustained their undying and even passionate engagement in these prolonged and laborious discussions of the mystery of His divine Person. Nevertheless, nothing is more remarkable than the fact that thus early, and still more in the Middle Ages, a split took place between the intellectual interest in the primary Christian facts and their spiritual, practical valuation and use by pious souls.

VII. *CHRISTOLOGY IN THE MODERN CHURCH.*—i. INTRODUCTORY: THE MODERN MIND.—**1. The reformation of religion.**—The history of Christology in modern times is bound up exclusively with the development of Protestantism; and here mere ecclesiasticism has played but a minor part. The broken condition of the Protestant communions has prevented anything like the calling of General Councils, the action of individual denominations having authority only for themselves. Hence such terms as 'heresiarch' are applied only by a certain limited class of historians to certain thinkers of the ancient Church. It is universally thought to be inappropriate under modern circumstances to use such a term of any modern theologian. Modern Christology is more intimately connected with the modern religious and intellectual life as a whole than with that of the ancient world, for in the civilization which we call Græco-Roman it appeared as in many respects an exotic. But modern civilization is deeply moulded by Christian principles, and its defects are to be corrected only by a fuller measure of the Christian spirit. Indeed, some of the ideas which have seemed most hostile to the Faith have been nourished and ultimately sustained by her own supreme teachings. With the Reformation came a new conception of the Christian life. Martin Luther was not so much the discoverer as the chief exemplar of this phase of religious experience. His power, and indeed that of the whole movement, is due not only to the nature of his experience, but to the fact that it can prove itself identical in its fundamental elements with that of the primitive Church as revealed in the NT. Luther discovered that the grace of God is a living force which has entered history in Christ and which lays hold of the individual directly without any essential human mediation save that of the preached word, the gospel. On the human side it is penitence and faith that apprehend the grace of God and are the means through which that grace apprehends the human soul. Luther and the other great reformers maintained that they were loyal to the Councils of the early Church. The Decree of Chalcedon stood forth for them all as the supreme Christological utterance of the Church. But this loyalty to the Councils was conditioned by the idea that the Councils simply explained Scripture, and were authoritative only in so far as Scripture supported them. The reformers completely disowned the notion that the official Church had power to develop and enforce an authoritative theology. The central fact for the reformers is that the Christian faith is a living experience, made possible by the full revelation of God in the historic Christ. Apart from Him there is no saving knowledge of God. Through varying phases this characteristic evangelical view of Christianity has persisted in the reformed Churches. In periods when emphasis was placed upon doctrinal definition rather than upon personal experience, and a new intellectual formalism arose instead of the appeal to conscience, the Protestant communions have felt an arrest upon their spiritual life and their world influence. Every fresh spiritual movement—such as that known in Germany as the Pietist movement, or the Puritan movement in England, or the Moravian and Wesleyan movements both in Europe and in America—has always arisen from a fresh insight into the fundamental nature of 'reformed' and apostolic Christianity. In the 19th cent. the extraordinary expansion of Christianity through the foreign missionary movement has borne an ampler and more impressive witness to the reality and power of the Christian faith as thus re-apprehended and proclaimed. It must be observed that in Christianity thus defined and thus operative the Person of Christ always stands forth as unique, supreme, divine, redemptive, and directive. 'Ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia.' And no less true is it that, where Christ is, the presence of the living, eternal God is immediately realized. The historic founder is believed, and His followers insist that He is irresistibly proved, to be the invisible, spiritual, divine power or will which is directing man to his true goal.

2. Modern thought.—(*a*) *The trend of philosophy.*—Europe experienced an amazing revival of intellectual life in the same general period in which the rejuvenescence of Christianity took place. In part this renaissance of the mind was due to fresh contact with the literature of the ancients, but it had its roots also in the long labours and deep intellectual influences of the Christian Church. For example, even in its darkest days that Church bore in upon the mind of Europe the conception that there is but one living God, who has created the entire universe for ends worthy of His own character. This great conception consecrated nature and abolished the crude ancient dualism. Modern science has arisen from, and still depends upon, certain principles which Christianity first enforced upon the human mind, especially those of the unity and order and sanctity of the natural universe. Hence the investigation of nature must now be considered as a religious act, though the officials of the Church learned this with difficulty and dismay. Modern philosophy began, it is agreed, with Descartes. From his day onwards there has been a deepening investigation of the rich and complicated process of knowledge, and into the nature of the human consciousness, which has come to be conceived of as a living organism. Mankind began by thinking of the outer physical world as

the basis of all reality. Only gradually has this conception been transcended. But now for all heirs of Christian civilization the universe of consciousness and conscious beings has come into view as the true source and seat of reality. Through this mighty process of change certain facts have emerged which must be briefly stated. And in stating them we may assume that for Christian thought the purely mechanistic view of the universe must be held as false. First we must note the emergence of personality as the ideal centre of consciousness. In personality the conscious intelligent will is recognized as the supreme fact. As yet the human mind can conceive of nothing higher which can be named as the ultimate form of reality. If it is ultimate, it must be also fontal, and every other form of the actual must proceed from and depend upon it. Next, there is the emergence of the idea of experience as the most general term which can be applied to all that which exists for personality. The material universe seems to be undergoing, not merely through philosophical reasoning, but through scientific investigation, a complete transformation, in virtue of which all its elements are seen to be symbols and instruments of a spiritual universe. Hence ancient words like 'nature,' 'substance,' 'body,' 'essence,' even 'humanity' and 'parts of humanity,' require to be thought through afresh. Much of what they meant in the Christological controversies of the early Church has simply fallen away from them for the modern mind.

(*b*) *The spirit of science.*—Further, we must note the emergence of the modern scientific spirit. It has learned through long and painful processes of discipline that truth concerning the natural universe and the history of man can be discovered only by patient and disinterested investigation of fact. A new conscience has arisen in reference to the acquirement of knowledge and the interpretation of life. For, if nature and history be together a divine process, the seeker after truth must seek it there; and to find it there he must wait upon nature and history with a spirit of utter sincerity and patience, and with the calmness of trust in his methods of investigation and their sure result. Through the labours of science and philosophy combined there has emerged the great conception of evolution. The very idea is itself undergoing a process of development. We have seen it in two generations pass from the cruder forms promulgated in the name of science by such men as Spencer and Darwin to the more spiritual conceptions which begin to guide the thought of our day. But common to them all is the idea that there is a unity in the history of nature and of men, and that this vast unified process must be read in terms of reason and of will.

(*c*) *Certain assumptions of Christian thought.*—In the main, it may be said without much risk that the following constitute some of the fundamental elements of prevalent modern thought. (*a*) What reason can explain is rational: what is rational must be derived from reason. (*β*) What exists in relation to consciousness exists for a conscious being or beings; and what exists for conscious beings, having its *raison d'être* there, must be derived from a conscious source. (*γ*) If there is a universe of life and of conscious beings, they may or must exist in various grades as to structure, power, and meaning. (*δ*) If there is a universe of rational, conscious beings, they must be capable of mutual intercourse, and such intercourse may depend upon the existence of media through which they become aware of and act upon each other. (*ε*) These media of intercommunication constitute the world or universe of nature, which must be also conceived of as an ultimately unified system of facts. The trend of philosophy in all its chief forms to-day is controlled by the varying influences allowed by different classes of thinkers to these and such-like fundamental conceptions. With the gradual extinction of mere materialism these have emerged as in some way the common property of the main groups of thinkers. Even natural science, through its physics, biology, and psychology, is gradually approaching a statement of its actual discoveries and provisional inferences regarding material substance, life, and mind, which is bringing it into close correspondence with these general assumptions of philosophy. Over the whole field of knowledge and its processes, of philosophy and its assumptions, one can see the irresistible pressure of the fundamental and characteristic Christian doctrines concerning God as Creator and Lord of All, concerning man as primarily a moral and spiritual being, concerning the spiritual universe as at once the source, explanation, and end of human history. For the Christian Church the conviction remains that for these ideas, however reason may strive to support and illumine and systematize them, the one indefeasible guarantee of their truth, in the field of objective reality, is to be found in the historic consciousness and the permanent spiritual presence and power of Jesus Christ.

As Troeltsch has put the matter: '. . . the image of Jesus will always remain inseparable from all efficacious Christian belief in God. A Christian mysticism . . . will always remain the central point of true and genuine Christianity as long as it exists. Without this, the personalistic belief in God would itself pine away and die' (*Report of Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity*, London, 1910, p. 238 f.).

Modern Christology, with a longer history of the Church behind it and a wider if not a deeper religious experience to correct or confirm it, is the inevitable effort of the modern Christian mind to verify afresh for itself the conception of the founder of Christianity as the personal self-revelation of God, the personal interpreter of human nature, the personal director of human destiny.

ii. First phase: Absolute Idealism.—Christology received its greatest modern developments in the 19th cent., and most of these arose in the midst of the unparalleled intellectual life of the German universities. There philosophy and historical research combined to produce a complete re-casting of the Christian system of doctrine by concentrating attention upon two supreme subjects—the idea of God in relation to the universe, and the place of Christ in history. The giants of philosophy from Kant to Hegel endeavoured to do justice to both features of the Christian religion. Out of that period, whether by direct derivation or by reaction against the prevalent philosophies, arose three main views of Christianity, and hence three main forms of Christology.

1. **Hegel's Christology.**—In the first place Absolute Idealism must be reckoned with. It has made the modern mind familiar with the theory that God is an immanent principle, generating the history of the entire universe. But, as Hegel works the subject out on his vast canvas, God must not be conceived of as above or before the process. He is the Idea realizing itself in the two successive forms of nature (object) and man (subject, spirit), and coming to consciousness only in the latter. God became personal in humanity. At some point in human history the Spirit which has struggled to free itself from the bonds of nature, and to rest in a perfected self-consciousness, must come to the full realization of that climax. That full incarnation of the Idea in the form of conscious Spirit was achieved in the Person of Christ, who is the supreme appearance 'in the sensuous form appropriate to history' of the unity of man with God. But in Christ the Spirit appeared in fullness, that from Him the whole of humanity might be set free

and made conscious of itself as the dwelling-place of the divine. In spite of its vivid insight into some deeper meanings of Christianity, Hegelianism remains abstract, elusive. Its conception of God, as it has been said, appears as an ingenious apotheosis of Hegel's own dialectic. Again, in spite of its emphasis on the idea of the Trinity and many illuminating expositions of it, it gives no real grip of the facts to his Christology. For his Christ is not true to the picture in the Gospels nor to the faith of the Church. His early studies in the Life of Christ (see Günther, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, p. 97 ff.) had not brought Hegel close to the fact that Jesus knew Himself distinctively as Son of God, and that God is a Being with whom men must deal in the lofty regions of personal relationship. Sin is for him a stage in the process of man's movement towards the divine self-consciousness; and grace therefore is not the mercy that forgives, but the sense of unity with the immanent God achieved in Christ.

2. **Its influence.**—Nevertheless the marvellous energy of Hegel's expositions and the vast sweep of his system, its sublime confidence in the power of reason to unlock the ultimate secrets of being, and its complete subordination of the physical to the meanings of the spiritual universe have had a permanent and deep effect upon the whole course of modern theology. The exaggerated emphasis upon the doctrine of the divine immanence in more recent popular Christology in England and America is due to him. That theological phase sometimes called the 'New Theology' has appealed to natural science as teaching the unity of all things in its doctrine of evolution, and to idealism as teaching the indwelling of God in the entire process of time. From these two positions it has drawn its doctrine that in all men the divine is in some measure inherent, while in Christ manhood has been filled with the divine to its utmost capacity. These are, sometimes distant and unconscious, inheritances from Hegel. In Germany the Hegelian influence showed itself in many ways. It gave Baur his method of conceiving the development of Christian dogma amidst the conflicts of the early Church. For a time it seemed to give Strauss a resting-place for his faith after the destructive work done upon the story of the Gospels. It gave the clue by which men like Biedermann, for whom likewise the supernatural (in the old sense) had fallen from Christianity, sought to secure the permanent essence of that faith while its historical setting was discarded, as the husk of mere circumstance is removed from the kernel of truth. But everywhere it failed to satisfy the Christian consciousness. That consciousness cannot deduce history from ideas, but rather derives its ideas from history. It cannot persuade itself of man's power to see God through reason, and then prove that what it has seen independently was also discovered in the Christ of history. Hence, as Fairbairn (*The Place of Christ in Mod. Theol.*, London, 1893, p. 213 ff.) insisted with such force, Hegel's view of Christ endeavoured to translate into his own terminology what the Church has held; but the whole reality and value of the Church's faith consisted in the fact that the human mind had come to think and to believe in this way and thus found its unity with God. 'The remarkable thing is the relation of the faith to the Person rather than the Person to the faith' (p. 221). The reality of Christ's personal consciousness of union with God as the objective and real object and ground of faith is not present to his mind. This element in the Hegelian method, which is not peculiar to this stage in his system, has pervaded modern thought very deeply, as we shall see.

iii. SECOND PHASE: ROMANTICISM.—1. **The man who 'rejuvenated theology.'**—The second great movement was that which sprang from the remarkable personal gifts, the spiritual life, and the distinctive theological method of Schleiermacher. Many elements which seem to his critics, and even to his admirers, utterly inconsistent with one another had their unity for him through his deep mystical type of religious life, his poetic and daring imagination, and his great gift of analytic thought. This remarkable combination carried him in distaste away from the abstract and unreal dogmatism of Absolute Idealism. It carried him through the strong and powerful temptations of his period of surrender to the Romanticism dominant in Berlin society, without delivering him from the intellectual influence of that spirit. His vast reading made him sensitive to the realities of history and to the supreme significance of a fellowship like that of the Christian Church. He therefore set forth with convincing and almost revolutionary power the absoluteness of religion. It has its seat in experience, *i.e.* in the living, feeling consciousness of man. In that consciousness man finds himself dependent on the Infinite, on God, for his very being and for all the true meanings of his existence. Religion, which rises out of the fundamental fact of dependence, and also nourishes it as a feeling which has infinite worth, is for that reason independent of any philosophic system, and, on the other hand, must not be restrained as a mere department of social ethics. The poor starveling which Kant knew as religion, an *adjutorium legis*, is repulsive to the richer soul of Schleiermacher.

2. **His idea of God.**—In his conception of God, Schleiermacher, while defining Christianity as 'a teleological monotheism,' yet fails to get rid of the pantheistic trend inherent in the 'romantic' view of the universe. The sense of its unity, its vast life, its mystery, its moral beauty, made it unnatural for him to insist on the personality of God and hard to defend or define that conception. God is immediately given in the universal, persistent, and supreme feeling of our absolute dependence on the Infinite. It can be accounted for only by that which is also its very essence, viz. that it is a feeling produced by God. He and not the self is its 'Whence' ('das Woher'). Similarly the fact of sin is not to be distinguished from the consciousness of sin, and that appears in the universal experiences of failure, of incompleteness, and self-reproach. We are guilty because we feel guilty. As God is not to be proved by reasons which lie outside the God-consciousness, so sin must not be traced to any source outside the universal human feeling that 'there is something wrong.'

3. **His view of Christ.**—It will always seem an intellectual inconsistency that Schleiermacher, in spite of this view of God and man, affirmed with unconquerable conviction that in one historic consciousness, that of Jesus Christ, we find a new departure in human history. Christ was and is the redeemer of mankind. This fact is found by us in the continuous existence of the Church, as that body of human fellowship which, in spite of all imperfection, possesses the sense of the grace of God, the feeling that dependence on Him extends even to the moral issues and the destiny of man. The Church sprang from Christ and depends on Christ, and holds in its own spirit and life the future of man's religious history. And 'there is no other way of having part in the Christian fellowship than through faith in Jesus as Redeemer' ('Erlöser'). Schleiermacher, though he worked directly on the Gospels, did not go into a close examination of the consciousness of Christ in the construction of his theological system. It was enough for him that in Christ, through the faith of His original community in Him, we have an

assurance of God's perfect union with a human life. In Him that union was a new, original act of God, inscrutable but indubitable. He is the archetype of the new life of which He is the fountainhead. But He is not to be interpreted through any doctrine of pre-existence, or miraculous birth, or even of the Resurrection. These are reflexions of that divine impression of unique and perfect union with God which He made upon His disciples, and through which He welded them into a communion animated by His own life and henceforth controlled by His Spirit, which is the Spirit of God. The conclusions of the ancient Councils he lays on one side. Their whole aim was irrelevant. The idea of two natures in one Person is illogical. God has no 'nature,' and the inherence of a divine Person in human nature must inevitably annul the essential characteristics of the latter. Yet God was uniquely in Christ, constituting Him the object of universal faith and the permanent life of His Church. In sanctification others may go far towards the heights of peace and holiness, but only and always in their confessed dependence upon Him and the nourishing qualities of the Church which He created. To lose faith in Him would mean the collapse of the Church and the return of man to the unrelieved consciousness of guilt.

4. **Criticism.**—In this brief sketch of some of the main positions of Schleiermacher, certain facts are clear in reference to the subject of this article. (*a*) Schleiermacher, by his bold appeal to experience of the heart as the seat of religion, sought to destroy the sense of dependence on either metaphysical or theological dogmas as the sources and defences of faith. His passionate appeal to the human consciousness itself in its feelings of dependence, sin, and reconciliation revealed the depth, power, and reality of that consciousness in its religious, and above all in its Christian, manifestation. Yet he failed even in his acute analysis of the process of consciousness to find the personality which is conscious. His account of experience on both the objective (Godward) and the subjective (manward) side is left as a stream with no containing banks, a system of real and beautiful clouds with no sense of solidity or guarantee of continuance. (*b*) His welcome emphasis on the uniqueness of Christ and on the fact that His image and spirit are preserved for us in the abiding faith and life of the Church, gave rise to the whole movement which in Germany blossomed at last into Ritschlianism in its various phases. It is Christ-in-His-value-for-faith, in His total impression on His followers, that constitutes Christianity. Again the problem of personality is avoided. His consciousness as a reflexion in the hearts of others, not as the seat and definite manifestation of His own will and thought about Himself, is the object of faith. (*c*) By this subtle and persuasive method of winning man to a sense of the divine power of Christ, attention was diverted from all questions about His origin and His miracles. The miracles may have helped the first disciples, but they are remote from our experience. The mystery of His being is lost where the mystery of our own disappears, not to be discovered by metaphysics, in the origin of all things.

As J. Kaftan urges, 'his formula is ambiguous ('missverständlich') since it does not clearly enough assert that it is concerned with a gift from above, and not with the outworking merely of something implanted once for all in the creation (*Dogmatik*[4], Tübingen, 1901, p. 450).

The breath of Pantheism (for Schleiermacher was an intense admirer of Spinoza), with its strange obliteration of the fundamental *realia*, lies over all his thought. But many of his successors and debtors have not that reason for assuming his attitude towards the metaphysical and the miraculous.

iv. THIRD PHASE: AGNOSTIC PHILOSOPHY AND POSITIVIST THEOLOGY.—**1. Ritschl's Christology.**—(*a*) *His connexions.*—Albrecht Ritschl, though not so powerful a personality as Schleiermacher, founded a school or 'movement' in theology whose members have been identified with much of the best work done in Germany during the last thirty years. Ritschl owes what is most valuable in his thought to the earlier thinker, but he set it forth in a more definite manner, and in a generation prepared by prolonged discussion of the history of early Christianity to welcome a system which made it seem possible to worship Jesus Christ while saturated with scepticism as to the supernatural on the one hand, and despair as to the historical on the other. He justified the scepticism by accepting the Kantian theory of knowledge, as it was reinterpreted by his colleague at Göttingen, Hermann Lotze. Of that which is above the phenomena of experience we can have no real knowledge. Hence it is vain to investigate the problem of the Trinity, or to attempt a Christology in the sense of the early Church. Our experience is built up of judgments of fact and judgments of value. The former deal with the material of the senses, and form the field of natural science. The latter deal with the moral and spiritual elements of experience. All religious conceptions are in their essence value judgments. They arise out of our view of the world in relation to our human, moral, spiritual interests. The conception of God had thus taken form in the mind of man through his felt need of superhuman spiritual powers to supplement his own in his unequal struggle with the natural world. The existence of God is unquestionable, 'for the activity of God becomes to us a matter of conviction through the attitude we take up to the world as religious men' (*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Bonn, 1870–74, Eng. tr., *Justification and Reconciliation*, Edinburgh, 1900, p. 218).

(*b*) *His view of Christ.*—For the Christian Church God, thus assumed to exist, has been actually revealed in Jesus Christ. Christ founded the community in which this revelation was first realized, and through which it is perceived as the perfect form of religious conviction and life. Jesus Christ became aware of His vocation as the bearer of this revelation through His own perfect religious knowledge of the Father, which included the assurance of God's purpose to found the Kingdom of God through Him. This task He undertook with flawless devotion. He made known the Father by word and deed and by the majesty of His unshakable faith in face of sin, hostility, and death. So completely did He absorb the divine will and the end of God's governance of the world in the interest of His Kingdom, that in Him, His faith, His obedience, His love, we see the love, the grace, of God towards us. Thus Christ, in the famous phrase, has for us 'the value of God.' In the mind of God and in our faith, Christ, as the Son of God, is the founder or source of the organization of men according to God's idea of their destiny. His end with them is made known in the Person of Christ, and Christ is the type after which they are to be conformed. The doctrine of His actual Godhead is translated into this eternal purpose of God concerning man which was ever bound up with the Son 'as object of the divine Mind and Will,' and 'sharer of God's attribute as end of creation.' Concerning His actual pre-existence we can say nothing. It lies as completely beyond the range of our knowledge as His post-existence, and is unnecessary to our faith in Him. Nor can we conceive of His exaltation otherwise than as the experience of the abiding influence of His historical manifestation. Of His origin it is impossible to say anything. All we need and all we are given is the assurance that in His holy will, in His limitless love, and in His invincible faith we see the

purpose of God and His love for the community which Jesus took to His heart and in whose service He died. However, 'the right appreciation of the completeness of the revelation of God through Christ is assured by the predicate of His Godhood.'

(*c*) *His influence.*—This Christology has held sway over many powerful minds. Its virtues are negative and positive. On the negative side it has seemed to give the Christian faith a position where the terrors of natural science could not assail it. Miracle is not an inherent element in this view of Christ. The supernatural is limited to the sphere of moral influences and spiritual cognitions which the categories of the scientific understanding cannot penetrate. Also, as especially with Herrmann, it has seemed to make faith independent of the results of historical criticism of the Gospels. Enough is given when we have insight into the invincible assurance of Jesus Himself concerning the love of God His Father, and His complete surrender to the divine will and the divine ends. But some have gone further even than that. They are so sure that the ideas of God's Fatherhood and His gracious promise of life eternal are confirmed in the long and deep experience of the Church that, they surmise, Christianity will survive even though Jesus fade from among the facts of history. And with them the *reductio ad absurdum* of this subjective view of reality is attained. On the positive side the Ritschlian position has gained through its valuable insistence upon the 'fact of Christ' as the essential object of any living and communal faith in God. If the doctrine of knowledge, which like all Agnosticism is in essence sceptical, leaves us in the dark as to the foundations of the phenomena of all history, yet within that history and among its undeniable influences it places Christ as supreme. This very view drove Ritschl's followers into the deeper study of the consciousness of Christ, some of whose results we have already considered above.

2. **Herrmann's Christology.**—(*a*) *Contents of the Christian consciousness.*—Like all great movements, the Ritschlian has broken into several directions. One is represented more completely by W. Herrmann than by any one else. He separates even more trenchantly than Ritschl between metaphysics and religion, and holds that in religious experience we move in a sphere which no use of the logical understanding can construct into an objective universe. Nor can we reconcile the universe which science investigates, and which metaphysics tries to interpret as 'one,' with the moral and spiritual contents of the Christian consciousness. The following points may be taken as summarizing Herrmann's view of these contents. (*α*) We are, as human beings, conscious of our dependence on an infinite power. (*β*) We are as Christians conscious of moral reconciliation with God when we understand 'the personal life of Jesus.' For it is in the historical Christ Himself that we see God revealed as Father. This positive vision of God in Christ awakens in us the moral impulse to deny self, and in that we find ourselves released from the tyranny of the world. We must not so define Christ as a mediator that we may seem to get past Him to God, or find a greater good in God than in Him. That is the way to reduce Christianity to a merely relative and perhaps vanishing form of religion. 'It is true to say that we find in God Himself nothing but Christ.' On the other hand, we know nothing of God except as He becomes revealed in Christ. (*γ*) Hence we must not make true faith depend on a theory of His Person, or a system of doctrines about Him and His work. True faith arises only when the individual heart faces Jesus for itself and yields itself to the vision of God in Him. Hence Herrmann has the daring to say, 'We must get past the old dogma of the Deity of Christ and to the 'Creation-' a fresh conception of Christ' (*Der Verkehr des Chri* obvious *Gott*, Eng. tr., *Communion of the Christian* with *God*, p. 34). The higher conception of which he speaks is not a higher metaphysical theory, but a higher *working* conception, one which consists in realizing that there is no way of knowing God apart from, or beyond, or above the historical Christ. How Christ knew God and lived in Him is His secret. All that we can know is the redemption of Christ which brings us into right relation with God. We cannot deal with God except in Jesus. (*δ*) Herrmann insists further that we must not seek to image for ourselves a living Christ of to-day with whom we can get into personal contact. That image will again abolish the historical Jesus and seem to make us independent of Him. The supreme secret of Christianity is this linking of the past with the present, this perennial flow of living water from the heart of the historical Jesus. When we turn our eyes away from Him to a theory of His Person, or to a picture of His present exaltation, we depart from the real faith of Christianity. It is only as we gaze upon Him in His, however far off, historical reality and see God disclosed in Him that we enter into a sense that God is here with us. Yet even in that instant recognition of His presence and power in us we dare not separate Him from the vision of Him in that historic Jesus. (*ε*) It is true that we must have many and great conceptions of Christ. But they do not precede faith or produce faith. They are themselves the fruits of faith ('Glaubensgedanken'). The resurrection, exaltation, and mediation of Christ are conclusions drawn from faith, and in which it delights, but they are not faith's presuppositions, and cannot create the saving attitude of trust. Herrmann discusses with unwearied care the difference, which seems to him immense, between the view that the deity of Christ must be taught in a dogmatic form in order that men may come to put their trust in Him, and so find God in Him, and the view that men must come straight to Him in history and receive from Him that overwhelming impression ('Eindruck') of the redeeming grace of God which compels them to see the very presence of God in His personality and so to confess His deity.

(*b*) *Estimate.*—There is no better witness to the intellectual perplexities of the Christian theologian to-day than the appearance of such a view as Herrmann's. His writings have from the first revealed a most earnest and most Christian spirit. There can be no doubt that in his own heart he has had an experience, intense and vital, which he has spent his life in making as real as possible to others. But our minds stubbornly demand that a man shall be placed in our intellectual map. And Herrmann seems to elude us. He seems a mystic, but denounces mysticism. He seems a subjective idealist, and argues for an objective ground of faith. He is not a romanticist, closely as he adheres to part of Schleiermacher's position, nor a pantheist, for he will utter no word that does not speak of God as a personal Father. His Christology, with its mingling of deep loyalty to the deity of Christ as given in experience, with a stern refusal to define His Person or even His work, except in passionate repetitions of the redeeming power of His historic personality, is possible only in an age when the war of philosophic systems has created in certain minds a deep 'philosophic doubt,' and when the triumphs of science have seemed for a while to imprison the imagination in a physical universe, closed and impervious, for our intellect, to the spiritual. The refuge of such minds throughout the 19th cent. was in the great fact of the religious consciousness of mankind. There we find a con-

tinuous and universal human experience which has its own rights and its unquestionable reality (see H. Schultz, *Christliche Apologetik*, Göttingen, 1894). There faith, the soul's organ for sight into the spiritual and moral universe, reigns beyond the assaults of science or metaphysics. And human faith, in the historic Jesus, reached such heights of power, such intensity of moral and spiritual illumination for other souls, that it has ever since produced faith in Him and in that grace of God which, concentrated with infinite force in Him, breaks out from Him as the very glory of God's own face upon all susceptible souls. This has proved itself to be a refuge and fortress for many individual minds. But it has not been fruitful, either practically or theologically. Its psychology is faulty when it deals with the relation of dogma to individual experience, and again when it attempts to picture the Church, living and growing, conquering and thinking, over wider horizons of human experience, without making its explanation of the objects of its faith credible, verifiable, and authoritative for its own life and in its appeals to the world.

3. **Kaftan.**—The Ritschlian movement, while carried to this extreme in so noble a way by Herrmann, has in another direction tended towards a closer affiliation with historic theology. In Kaftan (*Dogmatik*[4], 1901) we find a less strict use of the epistemology espoused by Ritschl. While the latter *seemed*, at any rate, to say that the religious view of the world consisted only in value-judgments, Kaftan holds that it consists much rather in judgments of facts ('Seinsurteile') which are reached through judgments of value. It is real knowledge (*e.g.*, that God is and what God is), although it does not arise from our scientific knowledge of the order of the natural world. But Kaftan, no less than Ritschl and Herrmann, carries on the magnificent emphasis of the whole movement upon the nature and royal significance of faith. He holds that the 'two-nature theory' which underlies the whole Christology of the early Church, was due to the conception of salvation which was then held. The reformed Church, and that in the life of the whole modern world, has another view of salvation, which consists neither in the magical communication of life (as in the early Church) nor in the transactional soteriology which arose with Anselm. We have in Jesus Christ, in His coming into our world, His historical character and work, His triumph and exaltation as the Risen Lord of the Church's faith, an act of God through which His forgiveness is assured to us, and we are made partakers of His Spirit and life. The Church thinks of Him first and directly as the exalted Lord, and as such the Head of the Church. But that exalted Lord cannot be conceived except by reference to the historical Jesus. It is the spiritual content of His Person on which we depend, and that is known to us only in the story of His life in the flesh, for there the central fact is that the development of His self-consciousness as a man proceeds from His consciousness of oneness with God. That unique and supreme historical self shared in the divine attribute of omnipotence in its ethical aspect. This omnipotence is no mere logical inference from abstract speculative premisses. It appears in His actual life, His independence of the world, His complete control of all things and relations ('alle Dinge und Verhältnisse') for the fulfilment of His task. But this fact of moral omnipotence proves that the human life in which it was manifested had a unique origin, arose from a special, unparalleled, and unrepeatable act of God. Kaftan agrees with Schleiermacher that God prepared human nature for the great event of His own manifestation in and through it, but refuses to consider this event only in terms of an immanential process. There is in it a definite impartation from God. Christ therefore, while wholly and truly man, is also the manifestation under human conditions of God Himself. The Church therefore will and must always consider Jesus Christ as eternal. He is more than a divine ideal (as Harnack and others before him have maintained). But Kaftan will only say 'Yes and No' to the pre-existence hypothesis. The definition of that pre-existence through such a conception as the Logos meant and means the introduction of a speculative and really unknown factor which disturbs the concrete object of Christian faith. All that we can properly assert is that 'the coming of Jesus into the world ('das Werden Jesu in der Welt') absolutely surpasses the conditions of ordinary human development. God sent and God gave Him.'

4. **Other representatives.** — Among those who are reckoned as of the Ritschlian school, Harnack must be mentioned, not as having made any remarkable contribution to Christology, but as one whose historical investigations have done so much to refresh interest in the long history of its controversies. We have seen above (p. 521) that he seems to utter inconsistent ideas concerning the place of Christ in the gospel. Perhaps the real cause of this is that within the vigour of the scientific historian he carries the spirit of the romanticist, who makes 'feeling and inner vivacity the measure of truth' (see a keen estimate of Harnack's position by J. Baumann, *Grundfrage der Religion*, Stuttgart, 1895, pp. 23–41, which is still applicable). G. Wobbermin, while serving himself heir to the Ritschlian doctrine, modifies it even further than Kaftan. He warns us that we must not confuse metaphysical realities with the metaphysical method. That we can know metaphysical realities Kaftan admits, and Ritschl ought to have admitted, for without that the whole groundwork of religion disappears in a mere succession of feelings. But we must not set these metaphysical realities before us as discoveries of the rational understanding and objects of *a priori* speculation. Our knowledge of them is limited to and by the very means and conditions through which we become certain of their existence and of some aspect of their nature (cf. G. Wobbermin, *Theologie und Metaphysik*, Berlin, 1901, pp. 26–40, and *Der christliche Gottesglaube*, do. 1902). The school of Ritschl includes a large number of the leading theologians of the past and present generation in Germany. A full account would have to include the names of Hermann Schultz, H. H. Wendt, J. Häring, W. Bornemann, and M. Reischle. None of these has made any distinctive contribution to the problem. They differ mainly in their emphasis upon the essential relation of the historical Jesus to the gospel, upon the form of the presence of God in Him, upon the distinctness with which He is to be conceived of as the exalted Lord in living relation with the Church. They are all characterized by the effort to disown any adhesion to the doctrine of His two natures, with its Trinitarian background and its permanent puzzle regarding the presence of the divine subject in the conscious life of the man Jesus. They all insist on the faith of the first disciples ('die Gemeinde') in Jesus as the Christ, as forming the original source and type of the conception which must permanently rule the mind of the Church.

v. FOURTH PHASE: THE KENOTIC CHRISTOLOGY.—1. **Its origins.**—Parallel with the movement which arose with Schleiermacher and continued through Ritschl, there ran in the 19th cent. another known as the Kenotic Christology (from the phrase ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, Ph 2[7]). This

theory avoids the pantheistic tendencies of Absolute Idealism or of such a man as Schleiermacher. On the other hand, it rejects the philosophical Agnosticism which rules the movements derived from Kant. However closely it may approach any of these, it holds true to the idea of a Personal God, and as a rule develops a definite doctrine of the Trinity. It had various roots in the thought world of Germany, connecting it with the Lutheran doctrine of the *Communicatio idiomatum* and its emphasis on the majesty of the pre-existent Christ, and with the Reformed doctrine of the exinanition with its emphasis on the reality of the human nature and experience of the incarnate Son of God. Its formulation was hastened in the ecclesiastical sphere by the efforts to bring about the union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. On the side of religion it was connected with Pietism and the interest in Evangelism, which have always been most intense where the personal participation of God in human experience, for revelation and redemption, has been most vividly realized.

'It seemed as if dogma and piety, dogma and gospel, were again united more closely than ever' (Günther, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, p. 101).

Further, it was the direct fruit of the modern emphasis upon consciousness and will as the seat of reality, which has undermined the ancient conceptions of matter, substance, and nature as objective and independent realities. Accepting the 'two-nature' view of the Incarnation, on which the ancient Christology was founded, the Kenoticists have set themselves to translate its terms, and also to analyze as a living process that act by which the 'one person or substance' united with Himself the human nature and therein lived as the Gospels depict Him. Günther (*op. cit.* §§ 22-28) has traced the various stages by which the first full statement of the idea by Thomasius was prepared for.

2. Its full statement.—(*a*) *G. Thomasius.*—In this theologian the theory received its first complete and systematic exposition (*Christi Person und Werk*, Erlangen, 1853 ff.). According to Thomasius, the Incarnation is an act by which the Logos, Son of God, laid aside the so-called 'relative' attributes of omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience, whose exercise was inconsistent with the limits of human nature. The essential ethical attributes of love and holiness He retained in His assumption of that nature. Thus the Son of God is the only subject, the Ego, of this personal life of Jesus Christ, in whom we see human nature assumed by the Son of God, and the Son of God limiting Himself to human conditions through that very act. To say that such an act is impossible is to limit the power of God's will. Given the possibility of this act of infinite love, we see its fruits in the story of Jesus Christ. Thoroughly human in the forms of His consciousness, He yet manifests the essential qualities of God in His perfect love and sinless life. Though we must call Him 'the man who is God,' we must recognize the reality of His human consciousness. Hence He is the image of God, and as such the perfect ideal of human nature. Other theologians, like Luthardt and Ebrard, adopted the Kenotic theory with variations of their own.

(*b*) *Gess.*—But it was W. F. Gess (*Christi Person und Werk*, Basel, 1870) who made the most important stage in its development. The first volume of his work deals directly with the consciousness ('Selbstzeugniss') of Jesus, as it is set forth in the NT. In his constructive theory he shrinks from no implication of the idea of a 'self-emptying' of the Son of God. By a supreme act of will He deprived Himself even of His self-consciousness as Logos. He entered into that night of unconsciousness in which our life begins. Adopting the 'Creationist' hypothesis that each human soul is a fresh creation of God, Gess found in that an obvious way of accounting for the union of the Logos with the human body of Jesus. In the earthly life the Logos gradually attained knowledge of Himself through the ordinary principles of human development. But we may well suppose that in His unique case there would be operative a deep instinct (the 'instinct of kind') by which His mind would be guided, so that He would recognize through the teachings of the OT His own kinship with the Father. Gess allows us to suppose that at times there would be outflashes, 'uprushes,' of His true essence into the field of consciousness—a thought curiously suggestive of certain passages in W. Sanday's interesting speculation concerning the subconscious as the *locus* of the Incarnation. The recovery of His divine self-consciousness, which reached higher stages in His baptism and in the course of His active ministry, was conditioned ethically by His faith and His love. It was love that released the slumbering consciousness of superhuman power when distress and disease made their appeal to His sympathy. At and after the Resurrection the full divine self-consciousness was assumed. Gess weakened the force of his theory when, for the sake of completeness, he allowed himself to speculate regarding the change wrought by the Kenosis in the Trinity both during the Incarnation and as the result of carrying the human glorified body of the Risen Christ into the life of God.

Criticisms of the Kenotic theory as thus presented by its German expounder have covered three main points: (1) (speculative) it endangers the doctrine, held to be fundamental, of the unchangeableness of God (Dorner); (2) it is, says Ritschl, 'pure mythology' (*op. cit.* p. 411); it describes events and processes in the eternal life of God for which we have no ground or proof but the same imagination that produced all the ancient pictures of transactions among divine beings; (3) the 'Kenotic' Christ is neither the genuinely human being of the Gospels nor the frankly supernatural being of the ancient Christology. All that He says and does is to be accounted for within the limits of the humanity He has assumed. The flesh, in conditioning the Logos so completely, quenches any special significance which is attributed to it through the vague and occult inherence of an inoperative divine self.

(*c*) *Godet and some British Kenoticists.*—In the English-speaking world the Kenotic theory has had more vogue in the last twenty-five years than on the Continent. In Great Britain it was first made widely known by the important work of A. B. Bruce (*The Humiliation of Christ*, 1876), and more directly by translations of the works of H. Martensen (*Christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1856, Eng. tr., *Christian Dogmatics*, Edinburgh, 1866) and F. Godet.

Godet's best account of his theory is not in his *Comm. on St. John* (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1876-77), but in his *Biblical Studies* (Oxford 1875), where he gives a characteristically brilliant exposition. His two chief presuppositions are 'the absolute freedom of God' and 'the absolute perfectibility of man' (p. 136). 'If this miracle is not possible, God is not free' (p. 139). His account of the self-discovery of Jesus has some interesting points. 'That which he felt to be behind Him, when He searched into the profound depths of His being, was not, as it is with us, the vacuum of pre-existence, but the plenitude of Divine Life' (p. 129). That this is not mere rhetoric is clear from the manner in which that 'search' is described. Jesus recognized His moral and religious differences

from other men, as He read in the OT the Messianic prophecies and faced the question of His own life-work. He could not but be forced to ask, 'Who am I?' The persistent enigmas of His consciousness are answered at His baptism, 'Thou art my Son.' Another interesting statement of the Kenotic view was given by J. B. Heard in *Old and New Theology* (London, 1884), ch. vi. 'The Person of Christ.'

But the leading champion was A. M. Fairbairn (*Place of Christ in Mod. Theol.*, London, 1893), who boldly went back to the Thomasian distinction between the external or physical attributes of God—omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence—and the internal or ethical—truth and love. The former are 'under the command of the internal.' The Son surrendered the physical attributes which are 'the less' in order to realize in human conditions 'the more Godlike qualities.' Fairbairn made the suggestive statement that the problem of the union of God with human nature is only a part or phase of the wider question how God can be related to a universe which is not identical with Himself. C. Gore (*The Incarnation of the Son of God*, London, 1891, *Dissertations*, do. 1895) deliberately leaves some of the chief difficulties as insoluble, while accepting a modified form of the Kenotic theory. He, like Fairbairn, deals directly with the historical material. It is in the Gospel records that we find both the divine and the human in one consciousness, and that manifested consciousness is characterized by such holiness and love as can only be the working of a divine Will. He finds in Augustine a recognition of God's self-limitation in the act of creating a universe under law. The Incarnation is a further step in this process of self-humiliation, and it was prompted wholly by grace. Therein both the Father and the Son made a 'real surrender.' We do not know *a priori* what of the divine attributes could be retained in exercise or abandoned; 'but the record seems to assure us that our Lord in His mortal life was not habitually living in the exercise of omniscience.' Nor can we decide anything as to how this self-emptying affected 'the cosmic functions of the Son.' Among all the British Kenoticists (D. W. Forrest, W. L. Walker, P. T. Forsyth, etc.) the same points appear with varying emphasis and thoroughness of treatment: (α) they see in the Incarnation a deeper form of the same divine self-limitation which was evident in the creation; (β) it is an act springing from the love of God for humanity—with redemption as its end; (γ) they all exercise a certain reserve in reference both to the metaphysical (Trinitarian) and the psychological aspects of the conception.

A singularly wise review of the movement is given by H. R. Mackintosh (*The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, Edinburgh, 1912), who is in sympathy with it. He admits that the difficulties are 'very grave,' but adds that 'they are such as no bold construction can avoid.' There are four positions which he says are 'implicit in the completely Christian view of Jesus' (p. 469 f.).

These are: (1) 'Christ is now Divine, as being the object of faith and worship.' (2) 'In some personal sense His Divinity is eternal, not the fruit of time, . . . His pre-mundane being is real, not ideal merely.' (3) 'His life on earth was unequivocally human.' (4) 'We cannot predicate of Him two consciousnesses or two wills. . . . The unity of His personal life is axiomatic.' 'It has never yet been proved . . . that there are two streams' of consciousness in the personality of Jesus.

The effect of all this is that we must throw the ethical back more vividly into the life of God than the Agnostic position makes possible. In God's holy love the pre-conditions lie for all His cosmic relations, and these find their consummation in His complete self-relation with personal human experience in a human being. Mackintosh rejects both the division of the attributes of Thomasius and the complete self-renunciation propounded by Gess. He suggests, agreeing with Forsyth, what he calls the 'transposition of attributes,' which must result from the change of the consciousness in the sphere of its action. The intelligence that in the eternal state is 'intuitive and complete' must, if it submits to the conditions of time, become 'discursive and progressive.' So omniscience becomes in the temporal state a sure exercise of 'perfect human faculty.' Mackintosh sturdily rejects the scorn of Ritschl for the Kenotic theory, and insists that, on this theory, Jesus did not become God, nor was the significance of the divine in Him quenched by assumption of the flesh. There is all through the earthly life of Jesus a 'potentiality,' which does not mean that the divine was not in action, but that it was in subdued action. In His consciousness of the Father, and 'Spiritual omniscience' in relation to Him, we have the proof of the divine self active in Him.

Mackintosh confesses warm sympathy with the very powerful setting which this point of view has received in P. T. Forsyth's work (*The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*, London, 1909). The pre-existence of Christ is a necessary postulate of Christology, because it is a necessary implication of the Church's faith in its Lord, who is not only Reconciler and Redeemer, but also Sanctifier. For sanctification is creative work and possible only to a divine being. Our faith implies the eternal reality of both Father and Son—'both being equally personal and divine.' The possibility of the Kenosis is found in the 'infinitude' which some suppose to preclude it. 'If the infinite God was so constituted that He could not live also as a finite man, then He was not infinite' (p. 315). The fact of the Incarnation sprang from the holy love which is of the very essence of God, 'the object for which all God's omnipotence exists.' The limitation of His power was 'His intenset concentration' on 'His fixed purpose with the world' (p. 316). Implicit in the *kenosis*, or self-emptying, is a *plerosis*, or self-fulfilment, of Christ. The one process is the means to the other; and the second, as the fulfilment of God's ideal of self-relation with human nature, involves His winning of the humanity He has redeemed into ideal union with Him in the Spirit.

Strenuous opposition to the Kenotic theology has come mainly from Anglican theologians. The exegetical basis has been examined by E. H. Gifford. Criticism from a stubborn though intelligent adherence to the ancient creeds is given by F. J. Hall (*The Kenotic Theory*, New York, 1898), and H. C. Powell (*The Principle of the Incarnation*, London, 1896) gives a thorough examination of the theory's psychological as well as Trinitarian implications. But his own statement of the ancient position, where the ego is treated as operating within two minds, is not argued out in the light of modern psychology.

See also art. KENOSIS.

vi. THE PRESENT SITUATION.—It is possible only to say a few things, in concluding this article, regarding the principal features of the Christological problem at the present hour. The situation is full of perplexity and difficulty for all minds which lay themselves open to the forces of their own day. And no one can write without prejudice on a question which at every point is connected with the nature of the spiritual life and with the ever passionate, ever sensitive, ever varied and complex life of the Church.

1. **The 'Life of Christ' movement.**—Albrecht Schweitzer has not exaggerated when he says, and that with emphatic reiterations, in his now famous book, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* (Eng. tr., *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, 1910):

'It is impossible to over-estimate the value of what German research upon the Life of Jesus has accomplished. It is a uniquely great expression of sincerity, one of the most significant events in the whole mental and spiritual life of humanity' (Eng. tr., p. 397).

(*a*) *The logic of a 'circle.'*—We have more than once referred to the logic that characterizes the course of an intelligent community life. Such a community, informal and of varying boundaries, has existed in the theologians of the German universities. They are, for good or ill, a class by themselves. Within that class more or less clearly defined circles have been formed, whose members are extremely sensitive to each other's influence, whose eyes are mainly directed upon the work of those who are like-minded with themselves. Through the means of inter-communication which they have created, they lead a life of unsurpassed intellectual intensity (see on this J. T. Merz, *History of European Thought in the 19th Century*, Edinburgh, 1896–1912, vol. i. ch. ii.), and are conscious of spending it, though separated geographically, as in each other's presence. Any principles which are adopted, as points of mutual understanding and common interest, in one of these circles (in science or history, philosophy or theology) must have their inner logic worked out to the end in the process of time.

(*b*) *Schweitzer's history of it.*—In relation to the Life of Christ, Schweitzer's book is a brilliant exposition of this process. A powerful circle has existed within the theological faculties for a hundred years, whose untiring and minute and amazingly resourceful researches into that subject have proceeded from two negative principles, viz. that the proper deity of Jesus Christ and the occurrence of miracles are impossible. With the exclusion of these two features of the NT picture of the Lord, the problem before this quasi-community of ardent intellectual life has been, on the one hand, to recover an exact picture of the actual historical Jesus, and, on the other, to measure His religious value. Schweitzer gives scant notice of the men, sometimes of equally great erudition, who have written Lives of Jesus from which the two elements named above are not violently excluded. They have not made the history of the circle which he is describing, and their names and works, for the most part, constitute a pathetic streamlet at the foot of his pages.

(*c*) *The 'liberal' Jesus.*—Through the process of exhaustive intellectual experimentation there gradually emerged before the circle of 'liberal' theologians the figure of Jesus as a prophet and reformer, who made no divine claims, whose words were confusedly preserved in tradition and recorded in successive documents out of which at last the present Gospels were fashioned. Jesus used the current Jewish religious conceptions, but shaped them to be instruments of His own clear insight into the Fatherhood of God and His strong grasp on the true moral principles which must guide men in religious and social conduct. This has come to be known as the 'liberal conception of Jesus.' It varies from one scholar to another in many features. Some would assign more of religious supremacy to Him than others. Some, like Wernle, would confess that He possessed a superhuman consciousness, but decline to define it further, and hold that its presence was not inconsistent with grave errors. But others, like N. Schmidt (*The Prophet of Nazareth*, and artt. 'Son of God' and 'Son of Man' in *EBi*), would know Him only as a prophet whose character of pure self-sacrifice and faith in God has proved to be the highest source of inspiration down to this day (cf. also G. B. Foster, *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, London, 1906, who writes as if J. Weiss, Wernle, Bousset, and others had said the last word on NT criticism, on whose scientific certainty all further thought must rest). It has become quite clear, however, that the Jesus whom the 'liberals' depict never existed. Few, says F. C. Burkitt, in his Preface to Schweitzer's *Quest*, except professed students know what a protean and kaleidoscopic figure this 'Jesus of History' is. The stubborn facts remain that Jesus knew Himself as Messiah, as unique Son of God and head of the Kingdom of God, and that the Christian Church sprang from the disciples who by His own self-manifestation in these superhuman relations passed into a new range of experience in a new consciousness of the power of God.

But another conclusion has been drawn from the fact that the 'liberal picture' of Jesus is untrue to history. With the help of the *religionsgeschichtliche Methode* men have sought to prove that Christianity arose as a syncretistic religion (Gunkel). This again has been pushed to the extreme of maintaining that Jesus never existed as a historical person, that the gospel stories arose to illustrate and justify the faith in an ideal Christ as the revelation of God (cf. Drews and W. B. Smith). (In addition to Schweitzer's exposé of the failure of the 'liberal' Lives of Jesus [*op. cit.*, ch. xiv.], see the hostile and severe but not unjust pamphlet by R. H. Grützmacher, *Ist das liberale Jesusbild modern?*, Grosslichterfelde, 1907.)

(*d*) *The eschatological Jesus.*—The reaction from the radical and destructive view has been powerfully aided by the rise of the eschatological view. It had been held inconsistent with the two primary assumptions of the learned 'circle' that the historical Jesus should have taught a strictly supernatural view of the Kingdom of God. What He held must have been the view that the Kingship of God the Father over human souls is to be conceived and realized wholly within the conditions of this life. If He spoke any words about a future life, He must have spoken as all human beings speak of that matter, in terms of faith and hope, without any peculiar authority arising from a superhuman consciousness. But the eschatologists (led by J. Weiss in the work often cited above) proved beyond a doubt that the eschatological sayings of Jesus are of assured authenticity. Moreover, they are not occasional utterances peculiar to ecstatic moments and really foreign to His main principles. Rather can it be proved that they underlie the whole course of His consciousness and penetrate His whole view of the Kingdom. Hence even His ethics flows from a mind which sees all human conditions and conduct in the light of eschatological events and superhuman forces (*Interimsethik*). When He conceives of Himself as Messiah and Son of Man, of the Kingdom of God as near at hand, He is thinking of a catastrophic, supernatural act of God, in which He will share as its supreme organ and controller, by which the natural life of man will be submerged and a new universe be established. The eschatologists to whom we refer do not even yet break away from their 'circle.' Their primary negative presuppositions hold them still eagerly experimenting with new ways of accounting for this as an illusionary element in the consciousness of Jesus, and yet as one through which a divine spirit has seized upon the course of human history and given men the assurance of God's love. The noblest proof of the reality and sincerity with which men may give themselves to this as a compelling religious force is to be found in the fact that Schweitzer (at the behest of his Master, as he believes and says) has diverted his own career from that of a distinguished and brilliant German scholar to that of a humble medical missionary in West Africa. The radical school has put forth no higher proof that the grace of God is within reach of its view of Jesus.

2. The special influence of the sciences.—There are signs that the two great sciences which deal with the highest forms of phenomenal history, viz. biology and psychology, will yet exert powerful influence on Christology as well as on other sides of theology.

(*a*) *Biology.*—At present biology is itself embarrassed by two phases of discussion—that concerning the nature of life (energism—vitalism) and that concerning the process of evolution (mechanical, teleological). It is only as the meaning of vitalism, and of teleological evolution, becomes clear to their advocates that ethics and theology can be enriched with new aids to the interpretation of their own fields. But some earnest efforts have already been made by British theologians to use these biological discussions in Christology (*e.g.*, D. W. Simon, *Reconciliation by Incarnation*, London, 1898; W. L. Walker, *The Spirit and the Incarnation*, Edinburgh, 1901, and other works; W. D. McLaren, *Our Growing Creed*, do. 1912; A. Morris Stewart, *The Crown of Science*, London, 1902). Such writers usually adopt some phase of Kenoticism.

(*b*) *Psychology.*—Psychology has proved more fruitful of suggestion already. That science is in the full flush of early and enthusiastic manhood, and many of its fruits are most valuable, especially in relation to religious experience. Its influence on our present subject is seen, partly in the more careful and thoughtful work of the Kenoticists, partly in the firmness with which the Ritschlians describe the conditions under which they view the consciousness of Christ (cf. T. Häring, *Der christliche Glaube*, Calw and Stuttgart, 1906, Eng. tr., *The Christian Faith*, London, 1913). But chiefly its influence is seen in the 'Voluntarism' of men like R. Seeberg (*Die Grundwahrheiten der christlichen Religion*[4], Leipzig, 1906, Eng. tr., *The Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion*[4], London, 1908) and A. Schlatter (*Das christliche Dogma*, Calw and Stuttgart, 1911). W. Temple in *Foundations* may also be named here. The position of Seeberg (*op. cit.* p. 222 ff.) is stated as follows: 'The God-will that guides the history of mankind to salvation entered into history in Jesus, became man in Him, and worked after the method of human history in His words and deeds.' By this 'personal God-will,' Seeberg, who has disowned the conclusions of ancient theology, does not mean a mere operative force such as proceeds from God actively elsewhere, but the divine Person Himself. For 'a person is nothing else than conscious will.' Hence this divine Person worked in the human life of Jesus so that 'He could not look upon His thoughts otherwise than as God's thoughts. He could not will, without the consciousness that God willed.' 'His divine personal will or His divine personality was for His own consciousness the eternal Son of the Father in heaven.' Schlatter (*op. cit.* § 87, 'Die Ewigkeit Jesu') goes further in his estimate of the eternal nature of Jesus. The words of Jesus and the Epistles do not set His deity and humanity beside each other as two static objects ('ruhende Dinge'), but speak of a volitional bond ('Willensverband'). He approaches the biological point of view when he says further: 'In that the Word became flesh the humanity of Jesus was begotten ('erzeugt') through the Divine word and serves, therefore, as its seat and organ' (p. 362). Hence the Incarnation is not to be viewed merely as a process (as with Dorner in his famous exposition, *System of Christian Doctrine*, Edinburgh, 1882, vol. iii.) but as an act of God which underlay the whole process of growth. This appeal to the idea of will is not, however, completely worked out by any Christologist. The fact is that neither for ethics nor for Christology have the psychological data of our day been thoroughly explored. The whole meaning of the word 'consciousness' is undergoing a portentous change. The very question of the subconscious, a region shadowy and unexplored, to which Sanday (*Christologies Ancient and Modern*) has gone for help, is complicated by the almost terrifying phenomena of dissociated personalities (see Morton Prince, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, New York, 1906). There we have a demonstration of the most astounding kind as to the complex nature of the human consciousness. It has its various centres and its intricate interplay among these. Even though the actual phenomena and hidden processes come to light only in abnormal conditions, they prove that in the normal consciousness something has power over them to reduce them to unity and harmony. But all this is cited here not as giving us any sure clue, but to prove that, when henceforth we speak of the consciousness of Jesus as carrying with it the divine and the human, and as manifesting a range and richness of power above that of our ordinary human life, modern investigation of our consciousness encourages us to believe that we are not speaking in mere contradictions. The idea that consciousness means a stream or series of events is dead, and the other idea that a will can operate at only one 'centre of consciousness' must die too.

In view of these facts as to our confused situation, it may seem more than daring that any one should offer a direct and constructive statement on the Christological problem. But it would be inconclusive not to sum up various suggestions made in the course of this article in a brief and practical manner. The present writer believes that the 'double-aspect' theory—to use a psychological *terminus technicus*—of the Ritschlians is only an inadequate piece of homage to the perplexities of the hour. The Church has always held that its Christ is a divine being who entered the conditions of man's experience, and as the mediator between God and man. 'God was in Christ reconciling the world' is a word which cannot be excluded from the gospel. The realistic, as opposed to the Romanticist, Agnostic, or Monistic view, is the one with which Christianity arose, and by which alone, it would seem, it can move and win the world's conscience and heart to God.

vii. A POSITIVE STATEMENT.—**1. A double presupposition.**—We assume that we must conceive of God in terms of personality as self-conscious Will. We cannot believe in the possibility of an absolute personality unless we see that the finite personal nature of man contains elements which act only, even within our limits, in virtue of their capacity for, or tendency towards, an infinite content. Reason, feeling, and will have each their infinite or absolute side. It was the supreme gift of Kant to modern thought to make this clear through his three *Critiques*. It is in this fact that the speculative ground for an Incarnation must once for all be laid.

2. The historic consciousness.—(*a*) *A unique form of consciousness.*—That which we find in the Person of the historic Christ is neither a consciousness working wholly within human limits, nor a consciousness possessed of actually infinite knowledge and power (or of the sense of actual achievement and victory), nor a life in which there is a constant oscillation between the finitude of the human and the infinitude of the divine, as if they were mutually exclusive. It is a type of conscious will which is apparently consistent with itself, and able to enter into real relations with us, 'full of grace and truth,' possessed at once of human and superhuman knowledge, purity, and power. The Christian consciousness has never rested itself on His mere and complete identity with us. For mankind has had

many geniuses, many saints, many prophets, and they are all dead. It is the infinite difference of Christ from us that has made an infinite difference for us. It is what is more than human in Him, even in His sympathy, that has transformed the meaning of life from despair to a glorious hope in God. But the 'more than human' is human. And this must be possible if God and man are spiritual, conscious beings.

(*b*) *The superhuman 'aspect' or 'element.'*—That which we see is a consciousness which is fundamentally of the same type as the human, and yet working in a range more than human. Human it is in that (1) He *grew* in knowledge, knew what it is to face the coming task and wrestle with actual problems of His own life; (2) He depended on God, found Himself, as all men do, resting on the invisible Controller of all; (3) He was open to all the physical experiences of mankind. Superhuman it is in that (1) He possesses direct superhuman knowlege of God, and that not by prophetic inspiration but in virtue of a Sonship relation, whatever that may be (Mt $11^{25ff.}$); (2) He is conscious of the flawless will—of perfect moral harmony with God; (3) He reveals Himself as in a unique, supreme, redemptive relation with the whole race of mankind; (4) He, in claiming Messiahship and universal Lordship, was conscious of a future relationship to mankind, *i.e.* of the continuation of his control of history after His own death, and of His supremacy over nature.

(*c*) *The problem of every human birth and this problem.*—In solving the problem of this Person it is much more important than theologians realize to remember that we have not yet explained the ordinary human individual. How does the new human individual arise? By what process is, not only the physical, but the physico-spiritual, nature constituted? Is there a universe of life distinct from the physical, as O. Lodge supposes? Is there a universe and an evolution of mental facts or natures distinct again from impersonal life as well as from the physical? Is there a unity of the universe of mental or spiritual facts such that *there* the facts which become fulfilled as human personalities are already of various grades within that unity? If, out of that non-physical universe of mental living facts, one of a unique kind, but identical in type with the human, should enter into the stream of human life, evidently the history of the resulting individual must manifest at least some of the very characteristics which we have enumerated above. If, then, the question is asked how this self-conscious fact is related to that of the parents (or parent), we must answer that no discussion of that is possible till we know how the self-conscious fact in the ordinary human babe is related to the self-conscious nature of the father and mother respectively. What is it, if anything, that enters from the mental structure of the parents into that of their child? What is evident in the case of Jesus is that through the processes of human birth an individual has arisen whose self-conscious nature manifests itself as of a new type. The basis of His being as a Man must have some difference in it, to account for the difference in His active consciousness.

(*d*) *A new kind of historic self.*—The question of the ancient Church, whether this new individual has all the 'parts' of human nature, such as body or soul or spirit, is entirely irrelevant here and for us. And we shall make no headway till we see that irrelevancy. Human nature is not composed of 'parts' peculiar to itself (in that ancient sense); *e.g.*, it shares its physical history and nature with the lower animals. It shares its mental and spiritual nature, perhaps, with innumerable orders of beings, whether below or above its own peculiar structure and capacity, which are at any rate different in their present sphere and mode of action. This individual, Jesus, is not just 'humanity,' whatever that is, *plus* some element that is not human. This is not a human personality of the ordinary type with another non-human personality tied to him by some inconceivable *nexus*, any more than it is simply a man of unusual mystical piety living close to God. This is a new type of personality which has arisen within the processes of human life. It is human, yet more than human, somewhat as man is truly animal and more than animal, yet not a 'monster.' This new type of personality manifests all the fundamental traits of human nature. Dependence and growth, instinct, intuition and reasoning, moral insight and love, are all manifested in the life of Jesus. His life employs the fundamental categories of the human understanding. Yet there is a strange quality and intensity, and a range, in his use of those powers which the Christian Church, even from the first group of disciples, always recognized as more than merely human. The absence of sin alone reveals the inhabitant of another moral universe than ours. The sense of authority over all men for time and eternity puts Him in a different relation with time and eternity. And this, we may assume now, is no mere exaggeration of human ambitions or wildness of apostolic devotion. It is the very revelation of the meaning and purpose and reality of the will of God. And yet again it is just because that which is superhuman in this new and wondrous type of personality is so human that it breaks and makes again our broken hearts. It is the vision of the capacity and tendency of our human personality as fulfilled in this unique personality that at once rebukes and inspires our conscience and our will. It is not a man raised to the degree of a Christ, but another mind and will than ours, and yet ours in type, that has entered into all the fundamental conditions and processes of our human life, for love of man and with the heart of a redeemer beating in His breast. The vice of Apollinarism was not that it sought to discover a deeper and organic basis for the unity of the divine and human in Christ, but that, after asserting the essential identity in type of the divine and human, it then set them over against one another in its analysis of human nature into three 'parts' and its subtraction of one of them to make place for the Logos.

3. **Three questions.**—But we must now approach the matter from the other side and ask ourselves (*a*) What or who was this self-conscious mental being or fact? (*b*) How did He enter into this new relation with human life? (*c*) What difference did this new relation make to Him?

(*a*) In answer to the first question, we must note the following facts. (*a*) Theology does not say without careful discrimination that God became man. The Johannine thought distinguishes the Logos as an element in the being of God, and the Logos is a form of conscious will, for He is the eternal Son. 'He became flesh.' The Pauline conception likewise distinguishes the Son from the Father and speaks of God 'sending His Son,' of Christ 'emptying Himself' of the 'form of God' in which He existed.

(*β*) We must never conceive of this union of God and man in Christ either so as to make it merely mechanical or, at the other extreme, so as to reduce it to a piece of human sentimental idealism. It is God through His Son, or the Logos in the name of and for the whole nature of God, entering into the conditions of human life. Hence we must carry through the fundamental idea of Apollinaris more vigorously than he did, and so escape his fatal error. For the NT and indeed the mind of

the ordinary, healthy-minded, non-theological believer have always assumed that the mind and will of Jesus were more than human, just as they have always assumed that the mind and will of God are *mind* and *will*, and therefore of one type with mind and will in us. The self-conscious being, the pre-existent Christ, the Son of God, entered as an individual, vital, and mental organism into the process of physical, organic history in the womb of His earthly mother, and grew up among men as a new type of human personality. To nickname the resultant person a 'monster,' 'neither God nor man,' etc., would be in our day and in our richer and more complicated universe a mere outrage of careless thought. The principal point is that there must be some analogy between the manner of this supreme Incarnation and the manner of that other kind of incarnation which takes place in the case of every self-conscious personality that is born into our world. But we cannot identify or discuss that analogy until natural science and psychology have combined to tell us the manner in which the ordinary being is fashioned in one person out of spirit, or living mind, and flesh.

(*b*) In answer to the second question, we must make the following observations. (*a*) This is not a completely new problem for theology. In principle the same problem is presented by the very fact of creation, and of creation in all its grades, and of these grades in all the stages of their evolution or co-ordination in the process of time. How is God inwardly and actively related to anything that is not God? This is the battle-ground of pantheism and theism. How is His mind related to any other mind? That is the battle-ground of idealism and its doctrine of knowledge. How is His will related to the freedom of the human will? That is the battle-ground of determinism and the doctrine of moral responsibility. Now this great problem, how the divine and eternal One could clothe Himself with the forms and conditions of human experience, so far even as to 'taste death' Himself, is as a problem the climax of all the preceding problems. They, as it were, lead up to it. The question, How does the divine mind work in relation to any process in time and space? is simply the vestibule of this grander problem—how the divine mind, which must have its distinctive experience of time and space, clothed itself in the conditions of human, temporal, and spatial experience in the Person of Jesus Christ.

(*β*) The answer must be found in either of two forms of statement, if we once decline to rest either in the unreasoned but not unreasonable positivism of communal faith or in the reasoned positivism of the agnostic.

(1) The Son of God did by a supreme act of will as it were withdraw the range of action of His powers, and by the same act did enter through a human birth into the organic physical conditions and thus into the relations of a dependent being in the midst of human society.

(2) The Son of God did by an act of His divine will add to the relations or range of action of His will and mind the historic experience of a human being. While active ever in all other directions, He resolved in one direction, *i.e.* in His conscious relations with mankind, as it were, to bind the organic process of man's life in a new relation to Himself, *i.e.* to quicken into organic action, in the womb of Mary, the principle of life and consciousness which ripened into the man Jesus, so that through that definite and restricted, or rather definite and newly opened, channel of communication with the inner side of man's life he should receive into His eternal conscious self the very experience of a human being (this view is partially worked out by Frank Weston, *The One Christ*, London, 1907). The difficulty that this suggests two centres of consciousness in the life of the Son of God is not so heavy nowadays. The modern view of the complexity, the varied centres and elements, of our own human consciousness is making us less confident that two or more centres of consciousness are inconceivable. And Sanday's suggestion concerning the subconscious as the *locus* of the Incarnation, when more thoroughly worked out, may prove valuable to this theory.

(*c*) **This has led up to the third question: For** what did the Incarnation take place? Can we dare to say what difference this new relation of God and man made for God? It seems obvious that, if it has made an infinite difference for man, that result must rest upon a corresponding difference it has made for God (doctrine of Atonement). The essential thing regarding the general idea or form of that difference may be presented in this way. (*a*) The idea of the identity of original type between the divine and human natures must not make us imagine that the gulf between the Creator and the creation is abolished, or bridged, or even lessened. Still the separation of the creation from the Creator is infinite both in idea and fundamental fact. (*β*) Now there must be a meaning to that difference on each side of the gulf—which is peculiar to that side. It is quite evident that man can never come to experience the reality of that self-dependence which belongs and can belong alone to God. Man's effort to taste it is the root in each man's life of his most dismal and destructive sin. He cannot cross the gulf and feel and act as God. But does the same restriction apply to God? All else in His creation lies open perfectly to His mind and will. There is no secret in the nature or action of matter, in the insensate life of the plants, or in the blind impulse of the animal, which does not lie completely open to His mind. There is nothing there to experience. In these facts a finite content unfolds itself fully and in all its beauty to the divine mind which willed it all.

But in man is it so? Here all the reality of creaturehood is gathered up with the infinitude of a subjective, rational, moral, conscious experience; dependence—or creaturehood—is felt, thought, realized through all the range of human activity in a unique and supreme manner. There is something here that not even a divine observer possesses or realizes by observing. His sympathy is wondrous, but yet it is sympathy across the gulf. His deep, infinitely deep, observation of man's experience can never be a substitute or full equivalent for that experience. To see and understand dependence is not the same as to live by its virtue; to create, trace, and watch growth is not the same as to grow; to measure the sorrow of that other creaturely heart even to the last quiver of its subtlest and deepest thrill of pain is yet not to know it as the subject of it. Even to taste God's pain is different from tasting man's. Now the Incarnation means that there is this one final fact in His universe with which God would completely identify Himself, one fact not yet made His own which could become His own only in one way. Can He cross the gulf? Can He, the eternal divine Will, who has tasted what it is to be a Creator, and to rule, and inform, and bear the conscious burden of all the universe of dependent beings, can He yet put our own peculiar cup to His lips and taste even that human dependence itself—on the human side—in its very essence? The Babe at Bethlehem, the tired Physician in Galilee, the praying Servant of Jahweh, the Man on the Cross with the broken heart—what if all that means that *He* has tasted what it is to be a man? And, in love.

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W. Douglas Mackenzie.

JESUS CHRIST IN JUDAISM.—The relations between Judaism and Christianity have seldom been friendly. The early Church soon discarded its Jewish element; and, in the centuries during which Christianity had the power to persecute, the Jewish people were thought of, not as the natural kindred of Jesus, but as those who had rejected and killed Him. There was seldom a good word for the Jews, except from those who were not Christians. Jews, on their side, had no reason to love the Christians, or to say any good of them. The coming of Christ into the world had perhaps brought blessing to the Gentiles; but to Israel it was the herald of suffering, more severe and more prolonged than any which had been endured in the earlier ages.

It would not be unreasonable to expect that the Jews, in their literature, should be most bitter against the founder of the Christian religion, as being the primary source of all their misery; yet that is not the case. The remarkable fact about the Jewish literature, whether of the Talmudic period, or of the Middle Ages, or of our own day, is the infrequency of any reference to Christ Himself. There is plenty of polemic against Christians mainly in regard to doctrine. The Jews were never at a loss to defend their religion, in all its length and breadth, against Christian attack; but they said very little about Jesus. The main reason was that they had very little to say. No doubt, the knowledge that anything that they might say about Him would be unfavourably judged made them reticent in times when persecution was to be feared. But, apart from that, they really knew very little about Him, and had no interest in knowing more. Only in recent times has there been, on the part of the Jewish writers, a real desire for fuller knowledge of the historical facts concerning Him, and a recognition that there was something to be learned which Israel would be the better for knowing.

The period covered by the Talmud includes the birth of Jesus and the rise of the Christian Church. In the Talmud, accordingly, and the cognate literature will be found whatever the Judaism of the first five centuries after Christ has to say about Him. Something is said; but the amount is extremely small, and the statements are seldom of any importance. There is enough to show that the person mentioned in the tradition of the schools under the names of Ben Pandîrâ, Ben Ṣtadâ, and Jeshû-ha-Nôṣrî, was certainly the historical Jesus; but the tradition about Him is very scanty, and adds nothing to what is known from the Gospels.

When collected together, the references to Jesus in the Rabbinical literature may seem not inconsiderable in quantity and contents, and the reader may get the impression that they form a more important element in that literature than they do. It is, however, a complete mistake to suppose that in that literature there is an undercurrent of hostility to Christianity or to its founder. The Rabbis were thinking of their own religion, not of any other; and when, in a passing allusion, a chance remark here and there, they did refer to Jesus, it was only by way of a marginal note, so to speak, illustrating their argument; it was not for any intrinsic importance of the subject. There does not seem to have been, in the mind of any of the Talmudic Rabbis, a recognition of the greatness of Jesus. He was remembered, so far as He was remembered at all, as the man who had chiefly brought dissension to Israel, and the nearest approach to a defined opinion about Him in the Talmud is the statement (Bab. *Sanh.* 107*b*) that 'he practised magic and deceived and led astray Israel.' Round that statement there gradually gathered stray bits of gossip about Him, coarse allusions to His birth, reminiscences of His trial, and the like, having sufficient resemblance to the gospel narrative to show who is referred to, but not enough precision to be of any value as independent evidence. It is more likely that they were based on what was learned from intercourse with Christians than that the Rabbis themselves read the Gospels. But the point at present is that Jesus was of very small account in the range of ideas expressed in the Rabbinical literature of the first five centuries. He belonged to Christianity; and Judaism went its own way, caring nothing for Him or for the religion that He founded.

The Talmudic period was one of much hardship for Israel, but not specially on account of Christian oppression. Indeed, the Talmud does not seem to mention Christian oppression of the Jews. It does refer to the adoption of Christianity as the religion of the empire, but does not connect therewith any especial display of hostility towards Israel. In the Middle Ages, on the other hand, the Christians sought to oppress the Jews, and the attitude of the latter towards Christianity and its founder naturally underwent a change. They were put on their

defence when charged with holding false doctrine, and especially with speaking blasphemy against Jesus. Converted Jews were able to tell their Christian brethren of the unseemly passages in the Talmud which referred to Him, and the Christian controversialists eagerly caught up the weapon. What use they made of it may be seen in the *Pugio Fidei* of Raymundus Martinus (13th cent.; ed. Paris, 1651). The defenders of Judaism met the attack, so far as it related to Jesus, by asserting that the person referred to in the abusive passages of the Talmud was not the Jesus who founded Christianity, but another Jesus, who had lived nearly a century earlier; and a good deal of attention was given by mediæval Jewish writers to the chronological argument by which this assertion was supported.[1]

But the attack was directed not against the Talmud alone. The book just mentioned, the *Pugio Fidei*, reproduced the whole (so far as known to the writer) of an anonymous lampoon upon Jesus, bearing the title of *Tôl'dôth Y'shū'* (ed., *e.g.*, E. Bischoff, Leipzig, 1895). Traces of this book can be found as early as the 9th cent., and it was probably of German origin. It is a connected story, based on the Talmudic references to Jesus, and amplified in a manner which was, no doubt, intended to be witty, but is now very dull. The coarse allusions in the Talmud are made the most of; and the whole book is disagreeable. Editions of it are still published in our own day, but it would be unjust to say that it is representative of Jewish thought about Jesus. It represents the miserable revenge of the persecuted Jew of the baser sort for the sufferings which he endured at the hand of Christians; but it has never been acknowledged by the leaders of Judaism as anything more than an unseemly satire. Judaism has borne its martyrdom in a nobler spirit than that which produced the *Tôl'dôth*; and the attitude of mediæval Jews is defined with far greater accuracy in the polemic which disclaimed any intention of discourtesy towards Him than in the petty malice which made a burlesque of Him. In other words, the Jews of the Middle Ages would have left Him alone, if they had not been compelled to speak of Him in self-defence.

Coming to modern times, we find a change in the attitude of Jews towards Jesus, not indeed shown by all Jews, but exemplified in some of their most eminent writers. Probably it is true of the great mass of Jews, whose circumstances have kept away from them the influences of modern thought, that they have no idea about Jesus at all, except as of one who did harm to Israel long ago; but, where increasing security and liberty allowed Jewish scholarship to profit by modern methods of research, there has been a breaking away from the old position of silent hostility to, or unwilling mention of, Jesus. The first to lead the way in this new direction was I. M. Jost, who wrote with warm indignation of the way in which the saint and martyr of Nazareth was treated (*Gesch. des Judentums*, Leipzig, 1857-59, i. 398-409).

The line thus opened up by Jost was followed by Graetz, whose *History of the Jews* (*Gesch. der Juden*, ed. 1863, iii. 222-252) would be memorable for its treatment of Christianity, if for nothing else. Graetz boldly expressed his admiration for Jesus, whom he regarded as an Essene, misrepresented no less by the flattery of his followers than by the malice of his enemies. The sketch of Jesus given by Graetz is no doubt open to much criticism; but the point is that it was seriously meant as a portrait, and was an attempt to do justice to Jesus from the side of Judaism. Naturally, the Jewish historian does not see in Him what most Christians see. He describes a purely human Jesus, and does not admit into his portrait by any means all that Christians would include in the humanity of Jesus. But, with all its shortcomings, Graetz's account of Jesus is far above anything that Judaism had ever said on the subject up till then.

Neither Graetz nor Jost wavered in the slightest degree in his loyalty to Judaism, but both showed themselves able to rise high above the barriers of religious difference, and to express as well as to feel a real admiration for the founder of that religion which had wrought such evil for Israel. The example of Graetz and Jost has made it impossible for Jewish writers, even of more conservative tendencies, to revert to the former attitude towards Jesus. I. H. Weiss is one of the more conservative scholars; but in his *Dor Dor we-Dorshaw* (5 vols., Vienna, 1871-91), i. 232-234, he writes of Jesus with respect, though not with enthusiasm.

The *JE* contains a long article on Jesus, besides many incidental references to Him in other articles; and in all of these, notably in that especially concerned with Him, there is a free and candid recognition of the nobility of character of Jesus. Naturally, the writers press the likeness between His teaching and that of the Rabbis of the Talmudic period, and are somewhat unwilling to admit His originality; but they frankly own that He must have been a great man, raised up by God for the work that He did. A Jew could hardly be expected to go further than that.

The extreme limit hitherto reached in Jewish appreciation of Jesus is seen in the writings of C. G. Montefiore, notably in his *Synoptic Gospels* (London, 1909). That a Jew should write such a book at all would have been thought impossible only a few years ago, and perhaps Montefiore is the only one who could do so even now. The treatment of the subject is quite different from that which a Christian would apply; there is a frankness of criticism in regard to Jesus from which most Christians would shrink, or for which they would see no necessity. But there is also a whole-hearted admiration and even reverence for Jesus which is all the more striking because it is entirely free from theological convention. Judaism can scarcely get nearer to Jesus without ceasing to be Judaism. Be that as it may, it is from the side of Judaism that there has come this latest and fullest recognition of the greatness of Jesus, as seen by other than Christian eyes. And, in giving it, Judaism has made a noble return for what has been done to her in the name and by the professed followers of Christ.

LITERATURE.—H. Laible, *Jesus Christus im Thalmud*, Leipzig, 1891; S. Krauss, *Das Leben Jesu nach jüd. Quellen*, Berlin, 1902; R. T. Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, London, 1903; J. Jacobs, *As Others saw Him*, do. 1895; H. L. Strack, *Jesus, die Häretiker und die Christen*, Leipzig, 1910.

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JESUS CHRIST IN MUHAMMADANISM.—

See QUR'ĀN.

JESUS CHRIST IN ZOROASTRIANISM.

—Christianity attained to considerable importance in Sasanian Persia (cf. J. Labourt, *Christianisme dans l'empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide*, Paris, 1904), and, though it is true that the Christians never reached a high proportional number, their religion became of sufficient significance to warrant Zoroastrian theologians in attacking it. In their polemic the figure of the founder

[1] The theory is worked out by David Gans, *Zemaḥ Dawid*, ed. 1785, pt. ii. p. 12b; Abarbanel, *Majane Jeshua*, Ferrara, 1551, p. 67a; Salman Zebi, *Jüdischer Theriak* (cited by J. A. Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judentum*, abridged ed., Dresden, 1892-93, i. 231); Abraham Perissol, *Magyen Abraham*, pt. ii. ch. 59 (cited by Eisenmenger, i. 250 f.).

of Christianity was not spared, especially in *Dāṭistān-ī-Dīnīk*, xxxvii. 90–92, and *Śikand-gūmānīk Vijār*, xv., both documents dating from the latter half of the 9th century. The former passage, in condemning 'the compiled sayings of the Abraham of the Christians, which are the word of him who is also called their Messiah,' criticizes the declaration that Christ has died and yet is not dead.

The important passage is the second. This begins by assailing the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, which is declared to rest merely on the assertion of a woman 'who was known for incapacity' (a term which the Skr. version takes to mean 'misconduct'). If Christ is the Son of God, He, 'through sonship to the sacred being, is not otherwise than the meaner creatures which the sacred being produced and created'; and, if He was born, He must die like all other creatures. To the author, Martānfarux, it was incredible that, if Christ was identical with God, God would descend 'into the womb of a woman who was a Jew,' and, finally, be put to an ignominious death. The Crucifixion is attacked for two reasons: if it were to demonstrate the fact of the resurrection of the dead, it might have been proved in some other way unless the divine knowledge is finite; if it were 'accepted by him, as a yoke of a new description, through his own will,' the executioners should not have been cursed by Christ (based on a distorted reminiscence of Mt $23^{29.\ 34-36}$, Lk 11^{47-50}).

The doctrine of the Trinity is also assailed. Assuming the truth of the Christian statement:

'that the father and son and pure spirit are three names which are not separate one from the other, nor is one foremost, and this, too, that, though a son, he is not less than the father, but in every knowledge equal to the father, why now is one to call him by a different name?' (*Sik.-gūm. Vij.* xv. 46).

Again, the equality of the Persons in the Trinity is assailed, and it is alleged, on the basis of Mk $13^{4.\ 32}$, that the Son cannot be equal to the Father in knowledge. It is further argued that the Jews slew Christ at the will of the Father, whence, with an allusion to Mt 10^{29}, ground is sought for an attack upon the tenet of the freedom of the will; and attention is called to the fact that, whereas Christ declared that He came not to destroy, but to fulfil, the law and the prophets (Mt 5^{17}), 'all his sayings and commands were those that are dissipaters and afflictive for the rules and laws of Moses.'

Perhaps the most noteworthy philosophical argument advanced, in view of the strongly dualistic trend of later Zoroastrianism (see art. DUALISM [Iranian], vol. v. p. 111 f.), is that the author of the 'Doubt-Dispelling Explanation' assumes throughout his polemic that Christianity holds that God is the sole Creator, and, therefore, must have been the source of evil as well as of good, whereas the NT plainly shows a belief in a separate power of evil (cf. §§ 18–24, 63–70, 77–89, 97–151).

The precise source from which the polemist drew is yet to be discovered, but, as one of the proper names occurring elsewhere in the treatise betrays a Syriac origin (West, *SBE* xxiv. p. xxviii), it was probably derived from faulty reading of a Syriac version—or a translation from a Syriac text—combined with reminiscences of Christian doctrine current in Persia.

LITERATURE.—**E. W. West**, *SBE* xviii. [1882] 107 *f.*, xxiv. [1885] 229–243.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

JESUS, SOCIETY OF.—See JESUITS.

JEWEL (Buddhist).—The 'jewel' (Pāli *ratana*, Skr. *ratna*, also *maṇi*) plays a prominent part in the cult and terminology of Buddhism, throughout all sections of that religion. This conspicuousness of its symbolism in practical Buddhism is, we shall show, owing to the fact, not hitherto recognized, that this symbolism incorporates the deeply rooted archaic belief in the magical efficacy of the fabulous wish-granting gem as the means of procuring long life and immortality. Our inquiry into the source of this symbolism sheds much new interesting and important light upon the question of Buddhist origins.

1. Prevalence.—The epithet of 'jewel' is applied to Buddha not only as the first member of the 'Buddhist Triad' or 'Three Jewels' (*Tri-ratna*) in whom every professing Buddhist must take his or her 'refuge' (*śaraṇam*), but also independently. For that saint is described in the earliest Pāli canon[1] as the possessor of 'the seven jewels' (*saptaratna*), which are essentially the attributes of the highest Brāhmanical deity as 'monarch of the universe' (Chakravartin [*q.v.*]; see also below), and are, we find, traceable to remote pre-Vedic antiquity. The sacred texts expressing this 'jewel' symbolism are in universal use, throughout Buddhistdom, both 'north' and 'south,' as prayers and luck-compelling magical spells.

2. Origin of the symbolism.—In attempting to trace the origin of the 'jewel' symbolism of Buddhism, we find that originally the term *ratna* in the Vedic age (*c.* 1200–400 B.C.), including Buddha's day, denoted a 'treasure' rather than a 'jewel,' such as it came to mean in post-Vedic India;[2] so that it embraced living personages as well as gems (properly *maṇi*). In two early hymns of the Rigveda (V. i. 5, and VI. lxxiv. 1 f.) the deity who is henotheistically the supreme god of the universe, in the form respectively of Agni (Fire) and Soma-Rudra,[3] is the possessor of 'the seven treasures' (*saptaratna*). He is invoked in both cases with the identical words (put into the mouth of the mythical fire-priest Atri, in the first instance):

'Bestow the seven treasures on every house, be a blessing to our two-footed, and a blessing to our four-footed [creatures]!'[4]

Upon the number 'seven' in this stanza Macdonell writes[5] that 'the *sapta* has probably no specific significance here; but is simply a vague expression equivalent to "all," as so often it is in the Rigveda in connection with many other words besides *ratna*.' However this may have been at the period when these hymns were composed (*c.* 1000 B.C.), it is certain that at the time of the Vedic commentary, the *Bṛhad-Devatā* (*c.* 400 B.C.),[6] the expression had become literally restricted to the number 'seven' and formed a definite category. For that commentary explains this particular verse as referring to 'the seven treasures of all Chakravartins,' and it specifies them as 'the wheel, car (*ratha*), jewel, wife (*bhāryā* = espoused wife), territory (*bhumi*), horse, and elephant.'[7] The evidence of this early commentator is against the view that terrestrial treasure, such as gold, silver, etc., was intended.[8] This appears to be the first detailed list of the divine treasures; and it must take precedence over the list in the Buddhist Pāli canon, which, by its mythology, indicates for its compilation a date not earlier than the 1st cent. B.C.[9] The reference in the same extract to multiple

[1] *Digha-Nikaya; Mahapadhana Suttanta*, 31, etc.

[2] A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, London, 1912, ii. 109.

[3] 'Rudra,' also called the great god, 'Mahādeva,' is in the Vedas a form of Agni (Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 75 f.).

[4] *Dame-dame sapta ratnā dadhāna*
śaṁ no bhūtam dvipade śaṁ chatuṣpade

(Rigveda v. i. 5, vi. lxxiv. 2). The translation is kindly supplied by Macdonell.

[5] In a letter to the author.

[6] Macdonell, *Bṛhad-Devatā*, Cambridge, Mass., 1904, Introd. p. xxiii.

[7] *Ib.*, text, p. 59; tr. p. 198.

[8] There is a category of seven precious minerals also called *saptaratna*, though post-Vedic in date, namely gold, silver, pearl, beryl (*vaiḍūrya*), diamond or crystal, coral, emerald (cf. R. C. Childers, *Dict. of the Pāli Lang.*[4], London, 1875, p. 402; E. J. Eitel, *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*[2], Hongkong, 1888, p. 148).

[9] L. A. Waddell, 'Evolution of the Buddhist Cult,' *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, xxxiii. [1912] 140 ff.

Chakravartins, or 'universal monarchs,' does not necessarily imply that those personages were yet considered to be human, as they become in later Buddhist and Brāhmanical literature—for the references to human Chakravartins in the *Mahābhārata* are also probably later intrusions, as they occur in the composite episodes exhibiting the characters of the *Purāṇas* and presumably of no earlier date than the latter (*c.* 1st cent. A.D.). These multiple Chakravartins are probably the subdivided forms into which the supreme creator was considered in the later Vedic period to resolve himself, the series of active creators, *Prajāpati*, or *Puruṣa*.

3. Assyrian (?) source of 'the seven treasures.'—The detailed list in the *Bṛhad-Devatā* and Buddhist texts indicates the important fact, apparently not hitherto recognized, that these seven treasures were the famous divine treasures of life and immortality won by the gods of light in their great struggle against the powers of darkness and the deep, in the contest termed by the Indians 'the churning of the ocean'[1] (an appropriate metaphor for a pastoral people whose staple food was largely obtained by churning). This conflict, forming a chief episode in the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* epics, whilst incorporating a rude version of the cosmic struggle of Nature's forces in evolving the universe from chaos, marks also, in the view of the present writer, the final breaking away of the Indo-Aryans from the Assyrian gods which their Aryan ancestors had borrowed from their western neighbours when in Iran.[2] For it is the Asuras who seize the great serpent of the deep by the hood and thus stir up from the ocean the treasures of immortality. Now, the great Asura of the Rigveda is the serpent-hooded god of the sky, Varuṇa, the Ouranos of the Greeks, who is now admitted to be identical with the supreme god Ahura (*i.e.* Asura) of the Zoroastrians,[3] and further traced by the present writer to the 'Assur' of the Assyrians.[4] The epics relate that the Asuras who had gained the ambrosia and other treasures of divinity were then deprived of them by stratagem and put to flight. Thus the pre-Vedic, non-Indian, and presumably Assyrian origin of these 'Indian' and 'Buddhist' treasures is now probable.

The order in which the treasures emerged from the deep during this conflict was, according to *Mahābhārata*, i. 18 (*c.* 500–400 B.C.),[5] as follows (the corresponding number in the *Bṛhad-Devatā* is added within curved brackets and in the Buddhist list within square brackets):

1. 'The mild moon of a thousand rays' (1) [1].
2. *Śrī* (the goddess of Good Fortune) (4) [5].
3. Surā the goddess (5) [7].
4. 'The white steed fleet as thought' (6) [3].
5. 'The celestial gem *Kaustubha* which graces the breast of Nārāyaṇa' (3) [4].
6. 'The divine *Dhanvantari* (celestial physician) with the white cup of ambrosia in hand' (2) [6].
7. '*Airāvaṇa*, the great Nāga taken by the Thunderbolt-holder' (7) [2].

The next and last object to issue from the waters at this 'churning' was the world-destroying poison *Kālakūṭa*, which cannot be considered one of the 'treasures,' but rather their antitype. Here the positive identity of five out of the seven in all three lists reveals the essential unity of the tradition. Of the remaining two, namely nos. 3 and 6, '*Surā* the goddess,' and 'the divine *Dhanvantari*,' the present writer finds, for reasons which cannot be detailed here, that the former Surā is Uṣas, the Dawn, Eos of Greek mythology. Uṣas in the Rigveda 'leads [*i.e.* precedes] the white horse, the Sun' (VII. lxxvii. 3), as in the Churned treasures, where the one immediately following her is 'the white horse,' which the present writer has identified with the Sun. She is, moreover, armed with beams of light, 'wards off evil spirits' (VII. lxxv. 1), 'wakens the five tribes' (I. cxxiv. 2), 'never loses her directions' (V. lxxx. 4), and 'renders good service to the gods.' She thus represents the 'general' of the Buddhist list (no. 7), whilst no. 6, Dhanvantari, the messenger of the gods, the present writer identifies with the car-symbol.

With this Brāhmanical list may be compared the Buddhist, in the order in which the items are cited in the Pāli canon,[1] which is the usual sequence.

	Pāli.	Skr.
1. 'Wheel of a thousand rays or spokes'	*chakka-ratana*	*chakra-ratna*
2. Elephant . . .	*hatthi-ratana*	*hasti-ratna*
3. Horse	*assa-ratana*	*aśva-ratna*
4. Gem	*maṇi-ratana*	*maṇi-ratna*
5. Wife	*itthi-ratana*	*stri-ratna*
6. Household chief .	*gaha-pati-ratana*	*gṛiha-ratna*
7. General . . .	*pari-nāyaka-ratana*	*pariṇāyaka* or *senāpati-ratna*

4. The wheel, or 'chakra,' of the Chakravartin as the moon.—On comparing these two lists, an important fact transpires. The first item in both, it will be noticed, is the luminary disk or 'wheel.' But, whilst this disk is invariably conjectured by Western writers to be the sun in the case of the Buddhist series, we find, on the other hand, that it is most explicitly stated in the Brāhmanical series to be the moon, and this is confirmed by the version of the 'churning' in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*.[2] So also it seems to have been in early Buddhism; for in the *Mahāsudassana Suttanta* it is expressly stated that 'the heavenly treasure of the wheel with its nave, tire, and all its thousand spokes' appeared to that king 'on the day of *the full moon*.'[3] And we have seen that the seven treasures (of the Chakravartin) are in the Rigveda the attributes of Soma-Rudra, that is, the dual divinity of the moon with the storm-god of the sky.

The great significance of this discovery, that the 'wheel' of the seven treasures symbolizes the moon and not the sun, is that it postulates for those symbols an extremely remote and Western antiquity, long before the Indo-Iranian period. In giving this pre-eminence to the moon, they presumably belong to that early pre-historic period when the moon was regarded as the parent of the sun, as is found in the earliest Assyrian and Egyptian myths. In that pristine cosmic myth of the evolution of light from the darkness of chaos, the moon was conceived as the luminary most intimately associated with darkness, and as traversing not only the sky, but 'the waters of the deep under the earth'; and the daily changes in its form led to its being regarded as taking a more active part in the workings of Nature than the unaltering sun. Vestiges of this primitive myth survive also in the early Vedas, and account for

[1] E. Senart remarked that several of the Chakravartins' treasures are 'analogous or identical' with the treasures produced at the 'churning of the ocean' (*Légende de Buddha*, Paris, 1882, p. 44 f.)—an observation overlooked by subsequent writers; but he does not suggest any causal connexion between the two series.

[2] Cf. Waddell, 'Buddha's Diadem,' *Ostasiatische Zeitschrift*, ii. (Berlin, 1913–14).

[3] Macdonell, *Ved. Myth.*, p. 20; H. Oldenberg, *JRAS*, 1909, p. 1097.

[4] Waddell, 'Buddha's Diadem,' *loc. cit.*

[5] *Mahābh.*, Calcutta ed., i. 1143 *f.*; cf. Roy's tr., Calcutta, 1893–96, i. 80–81; also V. Fausböll, *Ind. Mythology*, London, 1902, p. 23. In later versions, e.g. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (H. H. Wilson, London, 1864–77, i. 146 f.), the number is increased as the legend is expanded.

[1] *Dīgha-Nikāya*, xiv.; *Mahāpadāna Sutt.* xvii. 31; *Mahāsudassana Sutt.* 10–48 (*SBB* ii. [1899] 13, 202–208; *SBE* xi. [1900] 250–259); *Dharma Saṅgraha* (K. Kasawara and M. Müller, Oxford, 1885), p. 60.

[2] J. Dowson, *Class. Dict. of Hindu Mythology*[3], London, 1888, p. 13.

[3] *Dīgha-Nikāya*, xvii. 7 (*SBB* iii. [1910] 202).

the great prominence given throughout the Vedas to Soma,[1] which has the dual character of 'ambrosial elixir' and the 'moon'; for in the Rigveda 'when drunk [?eaten] by Indra-Soma . . . Soma produced the sun in the waters' (Macdonell, *Ved. Myth.*, p. 109 f.), and the conception of Soma is extended in the Rigveda to that of a being of universal dominion and 'lord of the quarters' (*ib.*).

5. Original lord of the wheel and Chakravartin: Varuṇa.—It is to be noted that it is Varuṇa, the great Asura ('Assur'), who alone of all the early Vedic gods is expressly the 'universal monarch' (*sam-rāj*; Macdonell, p. 24); and Soma is positively identified and associated with Varuṇa in several of the aspects of the latter (Rigveda, IX. lxxvii. 5, xcv. 4; cf. lxxiii. 3, 9; Macdonell, p. 110); and Soma is the only other god who, like Varuṇa, dispels sin from the heart (Macdonell, p. 109), punishes (slays) the wicked (*ib.* 110), confers the celestial world (*ib.* 114), and is sometimes called a 'treasure' (*rayi*; *ib.* 110). It was, on the other hand, Varuṇa who not only placed the sun in the sky, but also placed Soma on the rock; and it is 'by Varuṇa's ordinances [that] the moon shining brightly moves at night' (*ib.* 25). This express association of the moon with Varuṇa does not necessarily imply, as Oldenberg thinks,[2] that, although Varuṇa was primarily the moon, he remained so, as this would entail the rejection of the identity of Varuṇa with Ouranos. For Varuṇa is the Vedic god of the entire sky, including the luminaries which traverse it; and, lord of light both by day and by night, his eye is the sun (Macdonell, pp. 25, 23). The inference seems rather to be that the moon is one of the chief, as it is also the earliest, of the treasures of this great Asura, the supreme god Varuṇa. This god is brought into relation with the owners of the seven treasures, namely, Soma-Rudra, who are invoked 'to free from the fetters of Varuṇa' (*ib.* 129), thus implying that they were his agents, and presuming that the seven treasures are primarily those of Varuṇa himself as the original Chakravartin of the universe. Varuṇa, indeed, in the Rigveda possesses the 'wheel' (*chakra*) of which the nave is *trita*, 'the Soma-presser,' apparently personified lightning (*ib.* 68 f.); and the present writer has shown, firstly, that in the Bhārhut sculptures of the 3rd cent. B.C. Varuṇa is figured as the 'King of the Golden Swans' (*i.e.* the winged sun conceived as a bird, as in the ancient Assyrian and Egyptian sculptures of the sun-god) and actually bears the inscribed title of Chakkavāka (*i.e.* Chakravāka, literally, 'wheel-crane,' a title of the golden goose, or 'swan,' as sun-bird);[3] and, secondly, that Buddha was deified in his chief modes as a god (Purusa in the Pāli canon and Amitābha in the Mahāyāna) upon the model of the god Varuṇa-Chakravāka,[4] the manifest prototype of the Chakravartin with whom Buddha was early identified.

6. The 'maṇi' gem symbolism.—Of the seven treasures other than the first, or 'wheel,' whence the Chakravartin derives his title, the most popular is the jewel proper or 'wishing-gem,' the *maṇiratna* (or *chintāmaṇi*). This popularity is doubtless owing to its being essentially of the nature of a primitive magical amulet of the animistic period. In the Atharvaveda (*c.* 600 B.C.) the *maṇi* is ordinarily an amulet against all kinds of evil, and many sorts are mentioned.[5] In its special hymn to the *maṇi* (viii. 5) the amulet hanging from the neck is called the 'lucky repelling jewel' (*ayaṁ prati-saro maṇiḥ*). Buddha himself refers in his *Kevaddha Sutta*[1] to the use in his day of the 'jewel-charm,' called *maṇikā rijja*,[2] which, he says, was used for 'making manifest the heart and feelings, the reasonings and thought of other beings,' enabling its possessor to say, 'So and so is in your mind; you are thinking of so and so; thus and thus are your emotions.'

Besides its use as an amulet, the *maṇi* is identified with the thunderbolt in the Atharvaveda (VIII. v. 3), which positively says that 'it was with the *maṇi* (jewel) that Indra struck Vṛtra, that he has vanquished the Asuras, conquered the sky, earth, the two worlds, and the four regions of the atmosphere.'[3] In this sense of thunderbolt it is employed also in the *Lalita Vistara* (*c.* 1st cent. B.C., pp. 457, 466), and, it seems to us, in the Pāli canon[4] descriptive of the birth of Buddha in the *hīramaṇe* underneath the white umbrella which miraculously appeared over the infant, *hīra*, 'diamond,' being an ordinary title of Indra's thunderbolt.

On the other hand, the *maṇi* is interpreted by the commentator of the Atharvaveda as the 'sunstone' (*ādityamaṇi*),[5] and the probability that it represents the sun has something in its favour. It is described in the Pāli canon[6] as 'the beryl [like?] jewel,[7] bright, with eight facets, clear, transparent . . . its radiance penetrates a day's march (*yojana*) on every side . . . *turning night into day*.' The magic jewel in *Jātaka*, 531, which was given by Indra to Buddha in his former birth, was called 'the ever-shining' (*virochana*), an ordinary epithet of the sun; and Virochana is the title of Buddha in the *Jātaka* bearing that name (no. 143), in which Buddha was habitually saluted with 'Shine forth in thy might, Lord';[8] it also occurs in the longer lotus-jewel formula: '*Oṁ! Amogha Vairochana mahāmudra Maṇi padma jvala-pravarthtaya Hūṁ.*'[9]

7. 'Oṁ maṇi' formula.—The hitherto unknown origin of this famous Buddhist lotus-jewel formula *Oṁ maṇi padme Hūṁ* we shall here trace back to its Brāhmanical source. The *maṇi* is specially invoked in the Atharvaveda hymn cited above, and in the Brahmanical invocations the incantatory *Oṁ* was extensively employed already in the earliest Rigveda, even in those hymns which are not of an obviously magical character. This syllable is stated in the early *Brāhmaṇas* (*c.* 800 B.C.) to be the divine counterpart of *tathā*,[10] *i.e.* 'so be it,' implying an asseveration of certainty and thus equivalent to 'Amen'; and *Hūṁ* has a somewhat similar value—this was the early Brāhmanist explanation of these cabalistic terms, the original meaning of which, if there was any other, had already become lost in the Vedic period. It was especially addressed to Vāch (or Vāka), the goddess of speech, but also to Indra, 'the most high' (Parameṣṭhin, son of Prajāpati, the creator), to gods in general, and to magic personified (*brahman*).[11] In the later *Pūrva Brāhmaṇa* (*c.* 500–400 B.C.) it had come to express 'the function and virtue of the entire Atharvaveda,' including the potential creative power of the newly-

[1] A. Hillebrandt, *Vedische Mythologie*, Breslau, 1891–1902, i. 309; Macdonell, *Ved. Myth.*, p. 118.
[2] *Die Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 49, 190–194, 287; Hillebrandt, iii. 3–52, also maintains that Varuṇa is the moon.
[3] Waddell, 'Evol. Budd. Cult,' p. 139 ff.
[4] *Ib.* 158, also 'Buddha's Diadem,' *loc. cit.*
[5] *Atharva-Veda Saṁhitā*, tr. W. D. Whitney (and C. R. Lanman), 2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1905.

[1] *Digha-Nikāya* (*SBB* iii. 278).
[2] It is identified by the 5th cent. A.D. commentator Buddhaghosa as the '*Chintāmaṇi vijjā*' (*SBB* ii. 278), which probably contained a written spell.
[3] Cf. Whitney, *op. cit.* p. 491; Senart, *op. cit.* p. 31.
[4] *Mahāpadhāna Sutt.* in *Digha-Nikāya*, xiv. 29: *setamhi chatte anu hiramaṇe.*
[5] Macdonell and Keith, ii. 119.
[6] *Digha-Nikāya*, xvii. 14 (*SBB* iii. 205, 14); and in almost identical words in *Lalita Vistara*, tr. Rajendralala Mitra, Calcutta, 1881 ff., iii. 35.
[7] *Maṇi-veḷuriya* = Skr. *vaiḍūrya.*
[8] *The Jātaka*, tr. E. B. Cowell, Cambridge, 1895–1913, i. 300.
[9] Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 149.
[10] Macdonell and Keith, ii. 280.
[11] *Bṛhad-Devatā*, ii. 125, tr. Macdonell, p. 66.

evolved anthropomorphic Brahmā before he created the universe.[1] From the *Oṁ* the *Praṇava-Upaniṣad* (c. 500 B.C.)[2] derives the entire creation.

The neuter personified magic, or *brahma*, creates the anthropomorphic masculine personal Brahmā upon a lotus-leaf; then this solitary monad Brahmā by means of penance perceives the syllable *Oṁ* of two letters. With the first letter, *O*, he perceives (*i.e.* creates) the waters; with the second, *m*, the light and luminaries (sun, moon, stars); with the vowel triplicated, the triads—the earth (*bhūr*), atmosphere (*bhuvaḥ*), and heaven (*svaḥ*), also fire (with plants and trees), wind, and sun(-shine); with the consonants triplicated, water, moon, etc., and the rest of a cosmogony, also the ritual for the Brāhman priest who by the utterance of *Oṁ* before and after sacrifice remedies all defects in the latter. *Oṁ* is 'the oldest son of Brahmā . . . no holy text shall be chanted without it . . . *Oṁ* recited 1000 times grants all wishes.'[3]

Here we have revealed, in this Brāhmanized ritual prevalent in India about 500 B.C., the manifest origin of two out of the three elements of the famous lotus-jewel formula, whilst the third element, *maṇi*, is invoked as *Oṁ maṇi* still earlier with a similar connexion; also there is enforced therein the magical efficacy of repeated reiteration of the mystic syllable. The lotus element in this Brāhmanical symbolism of creation has probably a sexual significance, denoting the union of *prakṛti*, or productive female energy, with the masculine *puruṣa*; for already in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (c. 800 B.C.) 'the lotus-leaf is the womb.'[4]

The Buddhist monks of the Mahāyāna school in India manifestly borrowed this Brāhmanical symbolism of Brahmā (possibly about the 2nd cent. B.C.) for their counterpart of Brahmā, namely the 'Buddha of meditation,' Amitābha, who, like Brahmā himself, was evolved, as we have seen, on the model of the ancient primordial god Varuṇa. This Amitābha-Buddha, seated, like Brahmā, impassively in abstract meditation, performed his benevolent and creative functions through the medium of his active sons, corresponding to the creator-sons (Prajāpati) of Brahmā; and the greatest of Amitābha's sons was Avalokita, to whom this lotus-jewel formula is solely addressed. On this Brāhmanical analogy, therefore, the *Oṁ* would represent Avalokita, the active proximate creator 'elder' son of Amitābha-Buddha, seated as a hermaphrodite upon the fertile lotus of his father, the remote creator latterly called Ādibuddha (*q.v.*). The *maṇi*, or jewel, as well as the lotus is an especial attribute of Avalokita, who is frequently figured in ancient Indian images as holding both the jewel[5] and the lotus, and bearing the epithet of 'holder of the jewel' (*maṇidhara*).[6] In this regard it is to be noted that the Brāhmanical homologue of Avalokita, namely Viṣṇu in his later Brāhmanized and non-Vedic form of Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, several of whose attributes were borrowed by the Buddhist monks for Avalokita, is called the 'jewel-waisted' (*ratnanābha*)[7], and in his form as creator Viṣṇu is figured with the lotus of creation springing from the jewel at his waist (or navel). Here we have all the three elements of the lotus-jewel formula united in Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa as creator, that is *Oṁ*, the son of Brahmā as Viṣṇu himself, while, issuing from the jewel at his navel, the lotus gives birth to the Brāhmanical triad. The *Oṁ maṇi* formula of Avalokita, therefore, like the Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa figure in Brāhmanism, presumably symbolizes the creative cosmic action by self-generative power.

In the later Tantrik period, from about the 5th cent. A.D. onwards, when Indian Buddhism, following as hitherto the fresh developments in contemporary Brāhmanism, gave greater prominence to the cult of female energies, the symbolism was given a more decided sexual meaning. This was all the easier in view of the hermaphrodite character of Avalokita's prototype, which to some extent may explain the confusion which exists in Chinese Buddhism between the male and female forms of Avalokita. The female counterpart of Avalokita, the goddess Tārā, personifying *prakṛti*,[1] was termed the 'Lotus,' and by a mysticism she was at the same time the thunderbolt (*maṇi*?) as well. This is expressed in the *Uṣṇīṣa Sitātapatra Dhāraṇī*, where Tārā is invoked as 'with thunderbolt-navel, a beauteous damsel is she. . . . Her outward mark of the lotus is the mark of the thunderbolt!'[2] It has been suggested[3] that *maṇi-padme*, which is considered to be one word, is a feminine vocative, and that the formula refers to Tārā; this possibility is, however, ruled out by the universal restriction of the formula in Buddhist literature and practice to Avalokita exclusively.

The literal meaning of the formula thus would be: 'So be it! O lotus-jewel! Amen!' This is essentially the form of a wishing-gem spell, a luck-compelling talisman.

The earliest reference to this formula in a Buddhist text appears to be in the *Divyāvadāna*[4] (c. 1st cent. A.D.), where it is ascribed to Śākyamuni. The first occurrence under its usual title of the 'six-syllabled magic-spell,' or *Ṣaḍakṣara Vidyā mantra*,[5] that we can find is in the translation made from the Sanskrit into Chinese in A.D. 317-420 in seven leaves, with an exposition of the alleged circumstances under which it was recited.[6] Its universal currency throughout Tibet at the present day is well known; it is less common in China; and in Japan it is used nowadays only by the mystic section of Buddhists called Shingon.[7] *Maṇi* is a title given to the mystical hermits (*siddhi*) who have recited this *Oṁ maṇi* spell 100,000 times or more.[8]

8. The three jewels or treasures, 'the Buddhist triad.'—This triad, the *tri-ratna*, consists of (1) the Buddha, (2) his Word or Law (*Dharma*), and (3) his Order of monks (*Saṅgha*). As it is the stereotyped conventional formula found in the earliest Pāli canon for admission into the Order and for a layman's belief in Buddhism,[9] it was doubtless coined by Buddha himself. In arriving at this nomenclature, the title of 'treasure' (*ratna*) was obviously, in view of the above facts, borrowed by Buddha from the Brāhmanical treasures of immortality of the divine Chakravartins, a form of the supreme Vedic god Varuṇa, with whose entire septad of treasures we find Buddha already clothed in the Pāli canon. The number three was a favourite in Vedic Brāhmanism, as in the still earlier faiths. There are the threefold division of the universe, the three worlds, three classes of gods,[10]

[1] M. Bloomfield, *The Atharvaveda* (=*GIAP* II. i. 1 B), Strassburg, 1899, p. 107.
[2] *Ib.* 108 f. [3] *Ib.* 109.
[4] VI. iv. 1, 7 (*SBE* xli. [1894] 215).
[5] Waddell, 'Indian Buddhist Cult of Avalokita,' *JRAS*, 1894, pp. 59, 81, no. 18,
[6] *Ib.*, p. 77, no. 7.
[7] *Mahābhārata*, XII. cxlix. 98; O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth, *Skr. Wörterbuch*, St. Petersburg, 1855-75, vi. 250; *nābha* is literally and properly 'navel.'

[1] Cf. *ERE* ii. 259, footnote ¶.
[2] Waddell, tr. in *IA* xliii. [1914] 51 ff. The usual Sanskrit word for navel is *tunda*; the Tibetans have translated it by *mch'u*, 'beak,' evidently misreading *tunda* as *tuṇḍa*, 'beak.'
[3] By F. W. Thomas in *JRAS*, 1906, p. 464.
[4] Cf. *ERE* ii. 259, footnote ¶. Poussin considers that this is the formula referred to, though Cowell, who edited the text, expressly stated in the preface that 'there is no mention of Avalokiteśvara or the *Oṁ maṇi padme hūṁ*.'
[5] Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 139, 148-150, 386, where the mystic value of each syllable is described.
[6] Bunyiu Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Trans. of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*, Oxford, 1883, no. 340; other recensions of this text are nos. 331, 341, translated A.D. 693 and 502-557 respectively. The following texts also contain the formula (see Senshō Fujii in *Hanser Zasshi*, Tokyo, 1893, pp. 64-66): nos. 782, 1477, and 1478 of Nanjio's *Catalogue*, entitled *Mahāvidyā Dhāraṇī*, translated 980-1001, 960-1127.
[7] Senshō Fujii, *loc. cit.* 64.
[8] W. Wassiliew, *Le Bouddhisme*, Fr. tr., Paris, 1865, p. 198.
[9] See art. INITIATION (Buddhist), 2.
[10] Macdonell, *Ved. Myth.* 9, 130.

the three Vedas, or revealed scriptures of Manu, and the tripartite god Trita, who is the preparer of *soma*, the draught of immortality, and the nave in the wheel of Varuṇa.[1] The latter god Varuṇa, indeed, is expressly related to several triads as well as to the 'law'; 'the three heavens and the three earths are deposited within him . . . he is a great lord of the laws of nature.'[2] Here the term for 'law' is *ṛta*, or 'fixed law,' which has the same value as *dharma*, the pre-Buddhist term in Manu and elsewhere for laws and ordinances, in the same sense in which the early Buddhists used it for Buddha's word or dogma.[3] Buddha as the first member of this triad is termed the first of the treasures; but besides this he is independently referred to as a treasure-jewel (*ratnamaṇi*) or likened to one. In the *Dīgha-Nikāya* he is likened on his incarnation to this and to the beryl-jewel,[4] and also in the *Lalita Vistara*,[5] which, further, refers to that event thus: 'the beautiful treasure (*ratna*) will shortly be manifested in the three regions,'[6] and 'the jewel-victor (*jina-ratna*) from the mine of religion will be manifested in the continent of Jambu (India).'[7] Now, the latter epithet of Buddha is at the present day the ordinary formal title of him who professes to be Buddha's representative and successor, viz. the Dalai Lama of Lhasa; his designation of *Gyal-wa-rin-po-ch'e*,[8] the literal translation of *jina-ratna* into Tibetan, is thus seen to have its origin (hitherto unknown) manifestly in this appellative of Buddha in the *Lalita Vistara*.

The central member of the triad personifying the fixed ordinances and speech of Śākyamuni was probably suggested to that saint by the personified Speech of Brāhmanism, the goddess Vāch (or Vāka), who is one of the earliest of the Vedic goddesses, and was made the wife of Brahmā about the time of Buddha, when the new eponymous god Brahmā was being invested with the functions of the supreme god Prajāpati, Puruṣa-Nārāyaṇa, the transition form of Varuṇa (Chakravāka). Vāch in the Rigveda is called 'the queen of the gods,' and her original abode was the sea[9] (suggestive of relationship to Varuṇa and her original identity with Śrī, the wife in the seven treasures); and, while she has a triad nature (terrestrial, middle, and celestial), she especially occupies the middle region of the atmosphere,[10] and thus may have suggested the middle location for speech in the Buddhist triad. For the more closely we examine the mythology, idioms, and terminology of the Pāli canon, the more manifest is the indebtedness of Buddhism to its parent religion, Brāhmanism. The third member of the triad is the 'Order of Buddha's monks'—it is erroneous to translate this as the 'church' or 'congregation,' as is often done; for the laity, both men and women, are excluded from the *Saṅgha*.

9. The treasure as a spell.—The fact that spells have been in universal use by all sections of Buddhism from the earliest times, and even by Buddha himself, has been established by the present writer.[11] Among the southern Buddhists, of Burma, Siam, and Ceylon, one of the commonest of the protective spells, or *paritta*, is the 'Jewel (or Treasure) Sermon' (*Ratana Sutta*). This discourse, ascribed to Buddha in the Pāli canon,[1] is an invocation to demons to grant prosperity, and it is couched in the orthodox form of Buddhist spells, namely, as an 'act of asseveration' (*sachcha-kiriyā*; Skr. *satyakriyā*)[2] which is virtually an incantation.

The *Ratana Sutta* begins: 'O! all ye demons who are assembled, terrestrial or celestial, may you all possess happiness! Listen attentively to the things spoken! Therefore ye demons attend! Be friendly to the race of man and unremittingly protect those who by day or night propitiate you by offerings! Whatever wealth there may be in this or in other worlds, or whatever superior gem in the heavens, these cannot be compared with Buddha. This gem-like Buddha is superlatively excellent. By this truth let there be prosperity!' and so on for the other two members of the triad, treasures, etc., in fifteen stanzas, the closing sentence of each being, 'By this truth let there be prosperity!'

This is one of a large series of demonistic and theistic texts ascribed to Buddha in the orthodox Pāli canon,[3] and belongs to a phase of Buddhism which, although usually overlooked by writers on southern Buddhism, yet forms a very conspicuous and important part of southern Buddhism as a practical religion. Its contents and form indicate that it must have been originally composed expressly for use as a luck-compelling charm, based upon the supposed magical efficacy of the prehistoric wishing-gem or amulet.

The 'jewels' and 'treasures' in Indian Buddhist symbolism and cult are thus seen to be of non-Indian, pre-Vedic, and pre-Iranian archaic origin, and possibly borrowed from Assyrian and prehistoric mythology.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the footnotes.

L. A. WADDELL.

JEWS.—See ISRAEL, JUDAISM.

JEWS IN CHINA.—See CHINA, JEWS IN.

JEWS IN COCHIN (MALABAR).—1. History.—The earliest known history of this community connects it with the now extinct city of Cranganore, the deserted site of which is situated some 20 miles north of the present port and town of Cochin. Spelt Kranganur, it is the more easily seen to be the Portuguese form of Koḍuṅgalūr, the name of a village which still exists close by. It is almost certainly to be identified with the ancient port of Mouziris (Μουζῖρις), known to Pliny,[4] Ptolemy, and the author of the *Periplus Maris Erythræi*, where, according to the Peutingerian Tables, the Romans, up to at least A.D. 226, kept a force of two cohorts to protect their spice-trade. Another name in frequent use for the same spot in the Middle Ages is Shinkali.[5]

The origin of the settlement is shrouded in obscurity. We may pass over possible deductions to be drawn as to a Palestino-Indian trade from well-known foreign words in the Biblical account of the merchandise of King Solomon, suggesting an Indian, to some a S. Indian or Dravidian, origin;[6] the traditions of the Cochin Jews themselves, embodied in a supposed record-book (*Dibre Hayamim*), represent their ancestors as arriving in Malabar immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus (A.D. 70).[7] Certainty cannot,

[1] Macdonell, *Ved. Myth.* 68. [2] *Ib.* 24.

[3] Any statement made, or supposed to have been made, by Buddha was at once accepted as a fixed and unalterable law.

[4] *Mahāpadhāna Sutt.* i. 21, 27.

[5] ed. S. Lefmann, Halle, 1902, p. 13; cf. R. L. Mitra's tr. 25.

[6] Lefmann, 108. [7] *Ib.* 109.

[8] Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 29, 228, *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, London, 1905, p. 28.

[9] Macdonell, *Ved. Myth.*, p. 124.

[10] *Ib.* As thunder is called 'the voice of the middle region' (*mādhyamikā vāch*), it seems to indicate a physical source for the divinity of speech.

[11] Waddell, 'Dhāraṇī Cult in Buddhism,' *Ostasiat. Zeitschr.* i. [1912–13] 157–195.

[1] *Chūlavagga*, 1st Sutta, tr. V. Fausböll, *SBE* x.[2] [1898] ii. 36; Childers, *JRAS*, 1869, p. 314; and D. J. Gogerly, *Ceylon Buddhism*, Colombo and London, 1908, ii. 344–347.

[2] Cf. Childers, *Pali Dict.*, p. 408.

[3] See Gogerly, *Ceylon Buddhism*, ii. 327–393, for translations of several of them.

[4] 'Muziris primum emporium Indiae' (*HN* vi. xxiii. 26).

[5] See Yule and Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, artt. 'Cranganore' and 'Shinkali'; J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, London, 1885, p. 51; R. Caldwell, *Dravidian Grammar*[2], do. 1875, quoted in McCrindle, *Periplus Maris Erythræi*, p. 13; also Burnell in *IA* iii. [1874] 331, as to the origin of the confusion often met with in India owing to various names for the same site.

[6] 1 K 10[22], 2 Ch 9[21] (cf. Milne Rae, *Syrian Church in India*, p. 185 f.).

[7] See Buchanan, *Christian Researches*[11], p. 222.

however, be attached to this document, which bears signs of interpolation, and of which more than one version exists, and which may even have been wholly rewritten from memory after destruction from various causes. The first really reliable and explicit record in relation to the Jews of Cochin presents itself in the form of an ancient royal charter (*śāsanam*), engraved on plates of copper, whereby a piece of territory, named Anjuvannam, is conveyed by Bhāskara Ravi Varma, the reigning monarch of Malabar, residing at his palace in Mūyirikodu,[1] to one Joseph Rabban, headman of the Jewish community, and to his heirs in perpetuity, with the annexation to it of various privileges of nobility and rights of revenue. The charter is attested by the signatures of six subordinate princes, whose rank Joseph Rabban may be assumed to have been called to share. Buchanan in 1806 caused a facsimile of this charter to be executed in brass, and deposited it in the Library at Cambridge. A description of it by Burnell, entitled 'The Original Settlement Deed of the Jewish Colony at Cochin,' with reproductions of the plates, may be found in *IA* iii. [1874] 333 f. Burnell shows that this document, which is inscribed in archaic Tamil, in the Vaṭṭeluttu character, must be ascribed to some time in the 8th cent., perhaps as early as A.D. 700. It reveals the Jews in an already affluent and organized condition in Malabar, bespeaking an arrival considerably anterior to its date; and it was presumably conferred by the king in return for important State services rendered by the community. After the light afforded by this charter, obscurity again descends for upwards of a thousand years upon the history of the Jews in Malabar, covering perhaps a period generally prosperous. When it lifts, it is to disclose the setting in of a time of adversity and overthrow. About 1565 the sack of Cranganore by the Muhammadan Zamorin of Calicut, who previously had invaded the place in 1524 and massacred many, accompanied by the incoming of the Portuguese, involved the ruin of the small Jewish State, and resulted in the final desertion of Cranganore as a place of abode. Reduced in numbers, and with largely shattered fortunes, the main body of the dispossessed Jews migrated to Cochin, and built their present Jews Town in its immediate vicinity. Certain of their number, however, continued to linger in the neighbourhood of the old Cranganore, at places named Chennamangalam, North Parur, and Māla, where their successors are still to be found; and some have settled at Ernākulam, the native capital of the Cochin State, situated a few miles eastwards from Cochin, across the Malabar Backwater.

2. 'White' and 'Black' Jews. — A singular feature of the Cochin Jewish community in the eyes of foreign observers has always been its division into 'White' and 'Black' Jews. As early as 1655, Manasseh Ben Israel,[2] addressing Cromwell, describes them as consisting one part 'of a white colour and three of a *tawny*.' Buchanan and a succession of later writers have not failed to call attention to the same distinction of colour. Some writers have even seen their way to discriminate a third, or Brown, section. It is probably correct to regard the so-called Black Jews as comprising two classes, characterized by themselves as *M'yukhāsim* (those of lineage) and *enam-M'yukhāsim* (non-*M'yukhāsim*), the latter embracing *M'shukhārarim* (manumitted slaves). Regarded thus, the *M'yukhāsim* among the Black Jews consider themselves to be the representatives of an original stock, older than the present White Jews, and look upon the *enam-M'yukhāsim* as a class made up of the offspring of mixed unions with female slaves, afterwards manumitted, and increased by the descendants of purely Gentile slaves converted to Judaism. All religious disqualifications have, however, long ago been removed from all concerned by the reception of the prescribed rabbinical *T'bhilah* (lavation, or baptism); and a certificate to that effect was lately given by the Chief Rabbi Phanizal of Jerusalem (variously styled the Rabbi R'shon l'Zion, or the *hākhām bāshi*). The decision of the latter was based largely on a much older adjudication, of great interest, made by a Rabbi of Alexandria, known as Mahārikash,[1] who died in 1610. In the case as submitted to Mahārikash, the original stock of the Malabar Jews is represented as consisting of the descendants of Jewish merchants from Togarmah (Turkey), Aden, Sheiman (Teman, or Arabia), and Al-ajam (Persia), no mention being made of any from Spain or other European countries. These merchants are represented as having become the progenitors of a numerous offspring through female slaves, who, mingled with purely Indian converts to Judaism, had grown into a large mixed multitude, there being 800 houses of the latter to only 100 houses of the *M'yukhāsim*, or those of pure stock; and great confusion had occurred, it not being known who of the mixed class had been ritually admitted within the circle of pure Israelites, and who had not. Mahārikash in his *responsum* provides for the treatment of the doubtful cases, and for the habilitation of all in the rights and privileges of Jews. Although the religious question may be said to have been thus set at rest, the controversy, as a social one, continues to exist, and at times has become a burning one, the White Jews, on social grounds, holding aloof from marriage with the Black Jews, and the two worshipping almost entirely apart. The present White Jews, although their ancestors may have been superinduced upon the earlier immigrant stock, entitling the present ones to be regarded to a certain extent as the legitimate successors of former foreign Jews of pure descent, cannot be regarded as the lineal descendants of the first settlers. Their ancestral names mark them as a group by themselves, largely consisting of Spanish or Portuguese Jews, mingled, however, with some from Persia, Egypt, and elsewhere. According to investigations set on foot by the Dutch Jews of Amsterdam in 1685,[2] the first Spanish Jews arrived in Cochin in 1511, and it is expressly stated that the Black Jews had preceded them. With this view there agrees a custom found to have prevailed in State revenue receipts and *shectorams* (royal writs) of frequently styling the White Jews as *Pardesis* (foreigners), and their synagogue as the *Pardesis'* synagogue. The synagogue of the White Jews is in date the last of those in Cochin, and is built on a site specially carved out for it from the adjoining Palace garden, testifying to its being a belated suitor. Joseph Rabban, a recipient of the copperplate grant, is by common consent held to have come from Yemen in Arabia, and, according to this, he was not a White Jew. It would seem, then, that some modern writers who have accepted the ready-to-hand conclusion that the present White Jews of Cochin are the descen-

[1] It is from the 'Mūyiri' in this name, elsewhere shown to be identical with Cranganore, that the classical name Μουζιρις is believed to have been formed.

[2] See *Life and Labours of Manasseh Ben Israel*, in A. Löwy's *Miscellany of Hebrew Literature*, ii., 2nd ser., London, 1877.

[1] Mahārikash is an acrostic abbreviation for Moharur Rabbi Jacob de Castro (מה"ר יעקב קשטרו). The decision is to be found in a Hebrew work of his entitled אהלי יעקב (*Tents of Jacob*), published at Leghorn in 1783. Mahārikash gave decisions, or *responsa*, on questions of ritual and casuistry propounded to him. An Eng. tr. of the passage in relation to the Cochin Jews, from the pen of 'A Cochin Jew,' may be found in the *Jewish Chronicle*, Oct. 5, 1906.

[2] The report of this Commission was published at Amsterdam in 1687, under the title of *Notisias dos Judeos de Cochim*, by Pereyra de Paiva (see *JE*, artt. 'Cochin' and 'India').

dants of the original settlers, and that the Black Jews are an entirely mixed class, resulting from unions between the former and their Indian slaves, have been the victims of too sweeping generalizations. Wolff, having propounded such a view in 1839, promptly met with an indignant rejoinder from the Black Jews, repudiating the theory.[1] The fact, on the other hand, that the royal copper-plate charter is found at present in the keeping of the White, and not of the Black, Jews would seem to point to some position of consensual priority which the White Jews must have occupied in the bygone days of unbroken friendly intercourse between the two sections of the community. A White Jew, of the existing house of Halegua, held in old times a high position as Mudaliär, or hereditary headman of the community, recognized by the Raja—an honour now abolished.[2]

The present numbers of the Cochin Jewish community are small, and are slowly diminishing, as judged by the percentages of several past decades. By the census of 1911, the total number of Jews amounted to 1248. Of these, 73 are located in a patch of the Travancore State, which here curiously overlaps that of Cochin, and takes in the town of North Parur. Of the 1248 Jews mentioned, 1056 are Black Jews, and 192 White. Distributed according to residence in towns, there may be said to be 428 Jews at Jews Town, Cochin; 488 at Ernäkulam; 147 at Chennamangalam; 110 at Mäla; 73 at North Parur; and 2 at Trichür. The so-called Black Jews are to be found in all the above places, the White Jews almost exclusively in Jews Town, or in the neighbouring European town of Cochin, about two miles north of it. Jews Town itself consists of a single narrow street, running N. and S. Its northernmost end is occupied by the synagogue of the White Jews, paved with handsome 'Dutch' (but in fact Chinese) tiles, and flanked by a conspicuous clock-tower, furnished with a Dutch clock. About the middle of the street is situated the Thekombagom synagogue, and near the southernmost end the Kadavambagom synagogue, both of the Black Jews. Eastwards, across the Backwater, at Ernäkulam, the capital of the Cochin State, situated on ground granted them for a settlement by the Raja in 1711, the Black Jews possess two more synagogues, also known by the names of Thekombagom and Kadavambagom. These designations, meaning 'south-side' and 'river-side' respectively, bear no relation to the present locations of the synagogues in either place, but are derived from the positions originally occupied by the corresponding synagogues in Cranganore. Internally, the synagogues conform to the pattern of those in other parts of the world, except that peculiarities of native art enter into the structure of their fittings. Externally, after the manner of the country, the buildings are generally approached by a sort of prolonged porch or corridor. The Black Jews possess also a synagogue at each of the three places North Parur, Chennamangalam, and Mäla. Disused sites and ruins of discarded synagogues are to be met with, as at Tirtur and Palur, and an old synagogue known as the 'Cochin Angadi' is situated near Jews Town.

[1] See the *Oriental Christian Spectator*, September, 1839. Buchanan, John Wilson, R. De Beth Hillel, and A. Asher are examples of writers who have held the view that the Black Jews are the earlier comers.

[2] While designated the 'White' and the 'Black,' it is by no means the case that the White are always fair, or that, *vice versa*, the Black are invariably dark. Especially was the present writer himself struck by the fairness of many of the Jews at North Parur, where there are only members of the Black community. Elkan Adler, a recent visitor to the Jews of Cochin, has remarked on the same fact as the result of his own observations, in artt. contributed to the *Jewish Chronicle* of May 6th and 11th, 1906.

3. Ritual.—In their synagogue ritual the Jews of Cochin do not differ appreciably from Jews in other parts of the world. They follow the Sephardi rite, like most of the Jews of the East. Immediately after the Dutch conquest, they established communications with the Jews at Amsterdam, and obtained from them printed copies of their Hebrew ritual. This was done to a certain extent by the White and Black Jews separately; and hereby is revealed another incidental token of the independence of the latter. A religious song-book published in Amsterdam in 1668 is described on its title-page as prepared for 'the several Holy Congregations of the Assembly of Jeshuran of Shingali,' while another, published in the same city for the White Jews within five or six years of the other book, describes itself, differently, as intended for the 'Kahal Kogin' (Congregation of Cochin). The two books, though to some extent alike, differ characteristically as to their contents.

4. Organization and occupations.—As to communal organization, the Black Jews formed till lately a confederation of seven synagogue communities, or *yogams*, embracing the two in Ernäkulam, the two in Jews Town, and one each at North Parur, Chennamangalam, and Mala. The symmetry of this arrangement has been broken in recent years by the secession of the Kadavambagom synagogue at Jews Town to the jurisdiction of the White Jews, on account of a quarrel.

In respect of their occupations, the Cochin Jews are engaged mainly in trade and merchandise, though not to the extent prevailing in the days of their forefathers. The Black Jews deal fairly largely in rice, fish, and especially poultry, and some are handicraftsmen. Education is making way among both classes, although the recent census shows barely more than a quarter of their number to be as yet literate in the most elementary sense. A few are aspiring to clerkships in the employ of the State, and some are landholders. Hebrew is well studied by some, and the knowledge of it in the community generally is far greater than among the Bene-Israel (*q.v.*) of the Bombay Presidency, among whom some of the Black Jews are in request as synagogue-readers, but with whom they would seem to be otherwise entirely unconnected as to their antecedents and origin on Indian shores.

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JEWS IN INDIA.—See BENE ISRAEL.

JEWS IN ISLĀM.—The attitude of the Muhammadans towards the Jews and the consequent position occupied by the latter in the lands of Islām must be traced ultimately to the directions regarding them promulgated by Muhammad, and especially to the ordinances of the khalīf Omar. Muhammad's attitude was at first one of sympathetic tolerance, for he hoped to range behind him, in support of the faith which he was establishing, the whole of the force of the powerful Jewish tribes of Arabia. It was not long, however, before he discovered that the absorption of Judaism into the new faith was unattainable; the Jews were thereupon denounced as enemies of the faith, and a bitter war of extermination was waged against them. The khalīf Omar, who reigned from A.D. 634 to 644, was the first to regularize and legalize the attitude of Islām towards the Jews, and, as it was under his khalifate that Persia, Egypt, and Syria, all lands with considerable Jewish populations, first came under Arabian influence, his Ordinances had immediately a considerable influence on Jewry. By these Ordinances Jews were not allowed to build new synagogues or to restore those which were in ruins; they were to conduct their services in subdued tones, and to pay heavy and exceptional taxes; they were not to hinder their co-religionists from accepting Islām; they were debarred from holding public office or from obtaining a verdict against a Muhammadan in a court of law; they were forbidden to ride on horses or to wear signet rings—both marks of distinction; and they were compelled to wear a distinctive dress. A Muhammadan was free to enter a synagogue at any time, but no Jew was in any circumstances admitted into a mosque. Even in death Jews laboured under a disability, for they were allowed only flat tombstones as monuments. These Ordinances are still the law in all countries in which the Muhammadans hold sway, although they are not always enforced. They were not invariably acted upon even while Omar still reigned, and it is probable that, although the Ordinances all bear his name, the Code in its accepted form came into existence gradually during a period which extended beyond the date of his assassination. To Omar, however, was undoubtedly due one definite piece of persecution. Determined that Arabia should henceforth know no infidel, he ruthlessly exiled the depressed remnant of Jews who still survived in the peninsula in a state of semi-slavery.

Outside of Arabia the rule of the Muhammadans did not at first come to the Jews as a scourge. Under the later Persian kings they had suffered persecution. The advent of the conquerors was consequently welcomed, and the Jews, settled in Mesopotamia, aided materially in the conquest of that region. The Muhammadans, on their part, treated their allies with tolerance, and an era of relative happiness dawned for the Jewish communities of Babylonia. To the Jews of Syria and of Egypt also the Muhammadans came as deliverers from the yoke of oppression. In Arabia, however, the first home of Muhammadanism, the Jews have always been subject to persecution. There, if anywhere, the Ordinances of Omar have had their full effect. As late as last century, the Jews of Yemen or S. Arabia were forbidden to wear new or good clothes, to ride on an ass or a mule, or to engage in commerce. With hardly an exception they were until recent times confined to menial trades. Of late an emigration from Yemen has set in, and many of the former Jewish inhabitants are now settled in Jerusalem and in the modern Jewish settlements in Palestine, where they ply the trades which they learned in their former homes. There are at present about 25,000 Jews in Arabia.

In Persia, Jewish communities have existed since the period of the Arab conquest. The disorders which filled the centuries that immediately succeeded that event reacted unfavourably upon the fortunes of the Jewish population, whose condition from that day to this has almost always been a pitiable one. The 30,000 Jews who are to be found in Persia to-day are for the most part settled in the more important towns of Hamadān, Iṣfahān, Kirmānshāh, Shīrāz, Ṭeherān, and Mashad. They are, with few exceptions, confined to their own quarters of these towns, marked off from their neighbours by occupation, dress, and customs. As a rule they are engaged in retail trade or follow callings for which little respect is felt. Another serious disability under which they labour is the law or custom whereby a Jew converted to Islām inherits all the property of his relatives to the exclusion of the next of kin. The *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, a society founded in 1860 for the protection and improvement of the Jews in general, and now concentrating its attention on educational works in Muhammadan lands, has schools for boys and girls at Ṭeherān.

Egypt had a considerable and important Jewish population at the time of the Arab invasion, and throughout the period of Muhammadan domination, except for a few short periods, the Jews were both prosperous and contented. The khalīf al-Ḥākim (996–1020), after a period of toleration, suddenly began to enforce the Ordinances of Omar. He even exceeded their rigour. He compelled the Jews to wear bells and to carry in public the wooden image of a calf. On the pretext that they mocked him, al-Ḥākim burned the whole of the Jewish quarter. But his treatment was quite exceptional; moreover, he was not held responsible for his actions. Under other rulers individual Jews held high office in the State. Some of them—notably Maimonides, the greatest Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages—were physicians to the khalīf. Until the middle of the 16th cent. the Jewish communities in Egypt were presided over by a *nāgîd*, whose rule was co-extensive with the Egyptian dominions. He had full civil and criminal jurisdiction over his co-religionists as well as power to punish by fine and imprisonment. The appointment of Rabbis rested with him, as well as the responsibility for seeing that the civil law was observed within the limits of his jurisdiction. The *nāgîd* was appointed by the khalīf, and his installation was attended by much ceremonial. The Jewish population of Egypt is at present estimated at 50,000.

In the other districts of N. Africa the conditions were much the same. Although there were times of persecution, for the greater part of the period of Muhammadan domination the political condition of the Jews was a tolerably easy one. The pre-Muhammadan conditions of Arabia were reproduced to some extent, and Jewish semi-independent tribes roved about the interior of N. Africa for centuries after the Diaspora, and some have persisted to the present day. In Tunis, towards the end of the 8th cent., there was a persecution by the Imām Idrīs, but his reign did not last long. The accession of the Almohad dynasty led to a longer period of tribulation. The first of the Almohads, 'Abd-ul Mu'min, was responsible for forcible conversions of Jews and Christians on a wholesale scale. This policy was pursued by his successors. At length the number of converts had become so large, and, in view of the circumstances of the conversions, their sincerity was so doubtful, that a distinctive dress was allotted to them. Under the Ḥafṣite dynasty, which commenced in

1236, the condition of the Jews improved greatly. But even in the relatively comfortable period the Jews suffered from many disabilities, notably special taxation and restriction of residence. They, however, furnished the government with a succession of high officials, in particular the receiver of taxes who was also the *qā'id* of the Jews, and as such had supreme authority over them. Even in the 19th cent. there were changes of fortune. For instance, in 1855 many of the indignities imposed upon them were abolished, but they continued to suffer some persecution until the grant of a constitution by Muhammad Bey, by which their liberties were secured. Tunis has since 1881 been a dependency of France. Its Jewish population at present numbers about 66,000. In Algeria the conditions were identical with those in Tunis until the fall of the Almohads. Subsequent to that event the vicissitudes of the Jewish population were similar to those in the neighbouring State. Under the Turks in both regions the Jews, so long as they accepted with resignation the disabilities inherent in the Turkish system of government which were imposed upon them, found their condition one of relative comfort, much envied by most of their co-religionists settled in Christian lands. They were granted self-government under a *muqaddam*; they were confined in quarters set apart for them; a distinctive dress was allotted to them; they were forbidden to ride on horses or use riding saddles; and they were subjected to special taxation. To-day, after ninety years of French rule, the Jewish population of the Province numbers 65,000.

In Morocco the rule of the Muhammadans lasted until our own day and still exists *nominally*. In this, the westernmost of the lands of N. Africa, the history of the Jews until the severance of the country from dependence on Baghdād in 788, is the same as in the lands farther east. Idrīs, the conqueror of that year, was successful, by means of persuasion aided by force, in inducing the Jewish tribes of the west to join his standard, and with their assistance he was able to consolidate his power. In the end, however, dissensions arose between the conqueror and the Jews, in consequence of which the latter suffered many indignities. For the following two centuries and a half their condition remained one of tolerable comfort. The advent, however, of the Almohads in 1146 brought upon them, here as elsewhere, all the rigours of persecution. The rule of the Almohads meant forced conversions to Islām and the expulsion of those who objected. Even the new Muhammadans were not allowed to live in peace. To mark them out from their neighbours they were compelled to wear a distinguishing badge. When the rule of the Almohads passed, their position improved somewhat, but always remained precarious. Mulai Arshīd and his brother Mulai Ismāil, who reigned at the end of the 17th cent., were especially severe, and the latter plundered the Jews without mercy. During the subsequent reigns the Jews very often suffered cruel persecution; but, on the other hand, there were periods of quietude. Whenever civil war broke out, as so frequently happened, the Jews in the disturbed region were among the first to suffer, both in person and in property. The Sultan, however, even during the periods of persecution, frequently had a Jewish favourite or adviser; but the elevation to power of individual Jews had little, if any, effect on the position of the Jews as a body. These periodical massacres continued practically until the day on which the French took over the protectorate of the country. They were not always engineered by the party in power. More frequently they were part of a movement against the government. To the Jew, however, whether he was murdered or plundered by a supporter of the reigning Sultan, or of one desirous of taking his place, was not a matter of consequence. The Jewish population of Morocco to-day is estimated to number about 110,000.

The tolerant conditions under which the Jews of N. Africa were living, coupled with the harsh measures of the Visigothic kings in Spain, led the Jews of the Peninsula to welcome the Moorish invasion which culminated in a permanent settlement at the beginning of the 8th century. For a long time the position of the Jews, as subjects of the Moors in Spain, was as favourable as that in the most tolerant period in N. Africa. The first persecution of the Jews of the Peninsula by the followers of Islām occurred in 1066, when 1500 families in Granada were massacred and the remainder of the race in that city driven into exile. The accession to power of the Almoravids, a couple of decades later, led to further excesses, and the position of the Jews was rendered even worse, after the lapse of a further quarter of a century, by the rise of the Almohads, whose policy towards them has been described above.

To the Jews of the Byzantine empire the conquests by the Turks came as a relief from oppression. Under Turkish rule their position was raised so much that no precedent approaching to it could be found throughout Christendom. They were allowed to live and move in the Turkish dominions with perfect freedom. In occupation and dress they were without restrictions. They were even admitted into the army. Many rose to high positions in the State, and became the trusted advisers of successive Sultans. To the Jews of the lands of oppression Turkey became the land of promise. In the 15th cent. those of Hungary and Germany were invited to settle there, and many did so. Later, at the end of the same century, the expulsion from Spain led to a considerable further Jewish immigration into Turkey. The refugees were everywhere welcomed by the Turkish government and people. The immigrants brought many valuable industries to Turkey, with great advantage to their new country as well as to themselves. They concentrated for the most part in the larger cities. In Salonica they settled in such numbers as almost to make it a Jewish city, and even to this day the Jewish is the largest element in the population of the port.

The Sultans not only granted absolute freedom to their Jewish subjects, and utilized with advantage all their services; they also, on occasions, intervened on behalf of foreign Jews who were suffering at the hands of other governments. Notable instances of such action were the representations made at Venice on behalf of Donna Gracia Mendes which led to her release, and the protests sent to the pope against the treatment of Jewish prisoners at Ancona. The office of *hākham bāshī*, or chief Rabbi, was instituted in the reign of Muhammad the Conquerer (1451–81). He was, and still is, the official representative of the Jews in civil affairs. The *hākham bāshi* was a member of the State council. He had considerable powers over the Jews of the empire. He arranged their taxation, appointed Rabbis, and was, in fact, under the Sultan, the ruler of the Jews of Turkey. The first *hākham bāshi*, Moses Capsali, was appointed by the Sultan. His successors were appointed subject to the Sultan's approval. The Golden Age of the Jews of Turkey lasted for about two centuries. But, as in all despotic States, the conditions under which they lived had no surety of permanence. Their rights and privileges depended on the whims of the rulers, and, when a Sultan such as Murād III. arose, they found even their lives in danger. It was by this Sultan that restrictions on the dress of the Jews were introduced. In the 18th cent., which was, moreover, one of greater misfortunes for the Jews of Turkey, further restric-

tions were introduced. During the 19th cent. their condition improved little, if at all. The misery prevalent among them was, however, due to economic and social causes rather than to political ones. The revolution of 1908 swept away all political differences between Jews and Muhammadans, and at present their relative position is one of absolute equality. In Palestine, however, foreign Jews are in theory not permitted to settle or to acquire land.

Previous to the outbreak of the Balkan war of 1911–12, the Jewish population of Turkey in Europe was estimated at 180,000, of whom 65,000 were in Constantinople. Turkey in Asia, apart from Arabia, has about 250,000 Jews.

LITERATURE.—For the general subject **H. Graetz**, *History of the Jews*, London, 1891-92, and artt. in *JE* which deal with the relative countries, and also those on 'Islām,' 'Mohammed,' and 'Yemen,' should be consulted. For the conditions during the last half century the successive annual reports of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* and of the *Anglo-Jewish Association* give much information. For Arabia see **R. Leszynsky**, *Die Juden in Arabien zur Zeit Mohammeds*, Berlin, 1910; **H. Hirschfeld**, 'Essai sur l'histoire des Juifs de Médine,' in *REJ* vii. [1883] 167, and x. [1885] 10; for Persia see **E. N. Adler**, *Jews in many Lands*, London, 1905; for N. Africa see **J. E. Budgett Meakin**, 'The Jews of Morocco,' in *JQR* iv. [1892] 309; **L. Addison**, *The Present State of the Jews . . . in Barbary*, London, 1675; **M. Wahl**, *L'Algerie*[2], Paris, 1889; **L. Reynier**, *De l'Économie publique et rurale des Arabes et des Juifs*, Geneva, 1820; **J. C. Frégier**, *Les Juifs algériens, leur passé, leur présent, leur avenir juridique*, Paris, 1865; **D. Cazès**, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de Tunisie*, do. 1889; for Turkey see **M. Franco**, *Essai sur l'histoire des Israélites de l'empire ottoman*, do. 1897; **L. A. Frankl**, *The Jews in the East*, London, 1859, and **I. Loeb**, *La Situation des Israélites en Turquie*, Paris, 1877.

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JEWS IN ZOROASTRIANISM.—The account of the Jewish Exile and the fortunes of the Jews under the Achæmenian dynasty are too familiar to require recapitulation here; suffice it to say that the history of Mordecai and Esther proves that exile and Jewish birth were no bars to the attainment of high rank even at the king's court. Soon after the death of Alexander the Great the Jews began to proselytize, and the Babylonian Talmud itself was written in the Persian dominion, while such cities as Nehardea were centres of Jewish culture. The only convert of real note was the petty king of Adiabene, Izates (35–59; Jos. *Ant.* XX. ii. 3), whose name (=Avesta *Yazata*, 'angel'), like that of his father Monobazos (cf. Armenian *Manuaz*), is Iranian.

When the last Parthian monarch, Artabanos IV., fell in battle in A.D. 226, the Jews lamented his death and feared the accession of the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, Artašīr Papakān, who, in fact, imposed certain minor restrictions upon them and forbade them to bury their dead. On the other hand, the heads of the Jewish schools were honoured not only at the court of this very king, but also at that of Šāpūr I. (241–272). The great friend of the Jews was Yazdagird I. (399–420), who married Šošān-dōxt, or Gāsyān-dūxt,[1] the daughter of the Jewish exilarch (שושן גלותא),[2] probably Kahana I., and who became by her the father of the famous Bahrām Gōr (420–438). This queen established colonies of her co-religionists in Šōš (Shushan), Šōštar (Shuster), and Gai (Ispahān), while Xwārizm (Khiva) is said to have been founded either by a certain 'Narses of the Jews' (who would probably be the younger brother of Bahrām Gōr) or (according to a less likely decipherment of the Pahlavi text) by 'the exilarch of the Jews.'[3] Another Jew in high favour with Yazdagird was Huna bar Nathan, who was never exilarch, as has often been supposed, but was probably a cousin of Šošān-dōxt[1]—a fact which may account for the special affection manifested for him by the king.

Under more orthodox Zoroastrian rulers, the Jews fared worse, and persecutions are recorded during the reigns of Bahrām Gōr's son, Yazdagird II. (438–457), Pērōz (Fīrūz) (459–484), and Qubād I. (488–531), while there is some evidence that their condition was unfavourable late in the 6th cent., since they supported the rebellion of Bahrām Cūbīn against Ormazd IV. in 589 (Theophylactus, v. 7). In 343 the Jewish physicians of a Persian queen are mentioned as calumniating the Christian St. Tarbula (or Pherboutha) and her companions;[2] and, when St. Giwargīs was martyred on 14th Jan. 615, his executioners were Jews.[3]

The literature of the Middle Persian period, which is the product of the revival of Zoroastrian orthodoxy, is distinctly hostile to Judaism. According to the *Šāyast lā-Šāyast*, vi. 7, Zandiks, Jews, and Christians are 'of a vile law,' and the *Dīnkart* (ed. and tr. Peshotan Behramji Sanjana, Bombay, 1874 ff., pp. 24, 257, 310, 456) declares that Judaism, Christianity, and Manichæism are degraded in spirit and dangerous to Zoroastrianism, and that the evils of the worst age of the world are due to the 'sinful dispositions of all men, derived from the Yahudi religion,' whose laws and tenets are liable to ruin the earth. The Torah is 'the words of devils and unworthy of belief,' and the Hebrew Scriptures were composed by Azi Dahāka, the dragon who dwelt in Babylon (possibly an allusion to the Talmudic schools of Sura, Pumbeditha, and Nehardea in Babylonia), who deposited them in the 'fortress of Jerusalem,' and made mankind submit to Judaism on three separate occasions (perhaps referring to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; less probably to Abraham, Moses, and Elijah—or Enoch—as precursors of the Messiah; pp. 604 f., 372 f., 379). The same evil being was the author of ten 'universally noxious precepts':

(1) The Almighty is the injurer of the universe; (2) demons are to be worshipped as the source of all earthly prosperity; (3) injustice should be performed rather than justice; (4) unrighteousness and disgracefulness are to rule in everything; (5) greedy and selfish lives must be led; (6) children must receive no training for noble fatherhood; (7) no protection may be given to the poor; (8) goats must be killed before reaching maturity; (9) pious men must be offered to the demons; (10) men must be cruel, revengeful, and murderous.

The eighth and ninth of these 'precepts' mention the Jews, and may be based on Lv 4^{29} and on distorted reminiscences of condemnation of human sacrifice, as in 2 Ch 28^{3}, Ps $106^{37f.}$, Is 57^{5}, Jer $19^{5f.}$ 32^{35}, Ezk $16^{20f.}$ $23^{37.\ 39}$.

There is a possibility that the Talmud is mentioned in the *Dīnkart*, if the reading *Gyēmara* (גמרא) in v. i. 2 f. is correct (see E. W. West, *SBE* xlvii. [1897] 119 f. and Introd. p. xiii f.), and a knowledge of the Talmud is plainly shown in the 9th cent. *Šikand-gūmānīk-Vijār*,[4] which, in its polemic against Judaism (xiii.–xiv.; tr. West, *SBE* xxiv. [1885] 208 229), also quotes from the OT (in $1^{26.}$ $2^{16f.}$ $3^{9.\ 11\text{-}16.\ 18f.}$ 6^{6}, Ex 20^{5}, Dt 29^{4} 32^{35}, Ps 95^{10}, Is $30^{27f.}$ 42^{19}).[5]

The quotations are paraphrases rather than translations. Thus, Gn $2^{16f.}$ is rendered: 'The Lord, who is the sacred being himself, commanded Adam thus: "Eat of every tree which is

[1] Cf. Lazarus, p. 110 f.; M. Seligsohn, 'Huna b. Nathan,' *JE* vi. [1904] 493 f.

[2] *AS*, Apr. iii. [1806] 21 (=Sozomen, *HE* ii. 12), and p. 1 ff.

[3] G. Hoffmann, *Auszüge aus syr. Akten pers. Märtyrer*, Leipzig, 1880, p. 111 f.

[4] Contracted in this art. to *ŠgV*.

[5] A Persian translation of the Bible is mentioned by Theodoret (5th cent.; *Græcarum Affectionum curatio*, v. [*PG* lxxxiii. 948]); cf. also L. Blau, *Zur Einleit. in die heil. Schrift*, Strassburg, 1894, pp. 95–98; A. Kohut, *Krit. Beleuchtung der pers. Pentateuch-Uebersetz. des Jacob b. Joseph Tavus*, Leipzig, 1871, p. 6; R. Gottheil, *JE* iii. [1902] 190; W. Bacher, *ib.* vii. [1904] 317.

[1] **J. Darmesteter**, 'La Reine Shasyân Dôkht,' in *Actes du VIIIme cong. internat. des orientalistes*, ii. (Leyden, 1893) 193–198.

[2] On the relations of the exilarchs with the Sasanian monarchs see **F. Lazarus**, *Die Häupter der Vertriebenen*, Frankfort, 1890, pp. 131–156.

[3] *Šatroihā-ī Ērān*, ed. and tr. E. Blochet, *RTAP* xvii. [1895] 165–176, tr. J. J. Modi, *Aiyādgār-i-Zarīrān*, etc., Bombay, 1899, chs. xlvi. f., liv., x.

in this garden, except of that tree of knowledge; because when you eat thereof you die"' in one passage (xiii. 18–20), and 'The sacred being commanded Adam thus: "Thou shalt not eat of this one tree which is in paradise. . . . When you eat of this tree you die"' (xi. 352, xiii. 143; cf. the variants of Gn 3[11] in xiii. 33 as compared with xiii. 139). It is suggested by West (*SBE* xxiv. 22[5], note 4, and p. xxviii) that the Pazand form *Asinna* (Skr. *Asiṅaka*), 'Isaac,' in *ŠgV* xiv. 42 is a faulty transcription of the Pahlavi characters for *Aisok* = Syr. *'Is'hoq*, and that, accordingly, the ultimate source from which the Zoroastrian polemists drew was a Syriac version of the Bible.[1] In Gn 1[2] there is a curious variant, 'darkness was upon the face of the deep' being rendered in *ŠgV* xiii. 6 f., 'darkness and black water.' With this 'black water' we may perhaps compare the 'black water' (מ׳א מ׳אתמ׳) which, in Mandæan cosmogony, lies at the bottom of the abyss and forms the home of all evil (A. J. H. W. Brandt, *Mandäische Religion*, Leipzig, 1889, pp. 43, 60, 63–65, 70). This is also termed מ׳א תאתמ׳א, 'turbid water,' מאתמ׳א being developed by metathesis from ⲥⲙⲟⲩ, probably under the influence of ⲁⲃⲩⲥⲥⲟⲥ, ἄβυσσος, 'abyss,' in Gn 1[2] (Brandt, p. 131; cf. T. Nöldeke, *Mandäische Grammatik*, Halle, 1875, p. 66; cf. K. Kessler, *PRE*[3] xii. [1903] 166 f., 169).

The influence of the Targum of the pseudo-Jonathan (7th cent.) probably affected the rendering of Ex 20[5] in *ŠgV* xiv. 4–7. When, in translating Gn 3[14], the *ŠgV* (xiii. 43) makes God say to the serpent, 'For thee also there shall be no feet,' this may be derived either from the same Targum or from *Bereshith Rabbah*, the oldest of the Midrashim (probably c. 4th cent.), which contains (xix. 1, xx. 5) the following Haggādā, known already to Josephus (*Ant.* I. i. 4):

'According to the opinion of Hoshaiah the Great [3rd cent.], the serpent had two feet, and stood erect, like a reed. . . . "Upon thy belly shalt thou go." At the instant God spake thus, the ministering angels descended, and took away from the serpent his hands and his feet' (A. Wünsche, *Der Midrasch Bereschit Rabba*, Leipzig, 1881, pp. 82, 89).

Talmudic stories appear four times in the *Šikand-gūmānik-Vijār*.

In *ŠgV* xiv. 36, God is said to prepare daily, with His own hand, 90,000 worshippers, whom He dismisses, at night, 'through a fiery river, to hell.' With this is to be compared the tradition attributed to Joshua b. Ḥananiah, that no portion of the heavenly host serves God for more than a day, and that at the end of that time they are dismissed to the stream of fire from which they were created (cf. Dn 7[10], Ps 104[4]), another company of angels taking their places.[2] According to *ŠgV* xiv. 40–50, when the Lord visited Abraham to console him in old age and affliction, His host sent Isaac to fetch wine from paradise, but God would drink it only when Abraham had convinced Him of the purity of its origin. This seems to be a confusion of Gn 18[16], and 27[25], for, according to the Targum of the pseudo-Jonathan, *ad loc.*, and Yalqut (Gen. 115), the wine which Jacob brought his father Isaac was made from grapes formed at the creation of the world, and carried from paradise to Jacob by the archangel Michael.[3] The story is told in *ŠgV* xiv. 58–70 of how a righteous man in dire poverty prayed for divine aid; but the angel who appeared told him that the sum total of joy and sorrow may not be altered. Since, however, the righteous man already had prepared for him in paradise a throne with jewelled feet, he might have the benefit of one of these on earth. After consulting with his wife, the man decided that he would not diminish celestial bliss to gain comfort in this world. This is the Jewish story of Ḥanina b. Dosa, who, under like circumstances, received a golden table-leg from paradise, but who, after his wife had had a vision in which she saw her husband feasting in heaven at a two-legged table, while all the other righteous had three-legged tables, besought that the gift might be withdrawn.[4] The last story is of less certain origin. According to *ŠgV* xiv. 75–78, God boasted of killing 'in one day an assemblage of sinners, as well as innumerable innocents. And, when the angels talked much of the unreasonable performance, He then spoke of it thus: "I am the Lord, the ruler of wills, superintending, unrivalled, and doing my own will, and no one assists or is to utter a murmur about me."' This may possibly be a distorted reminiscence of some such passage as Job 9[22.12], Ezk 21[3-5], or Dn 4[35]. C. H. Toy suggests to the writer that a closer parallel is the legend of the journey of Moses with al-Khiḍr (*Qur'ān*, xviii. 64 ff.), who staves in a boat belonging to poor fishermen, slays an apparently harmless youth, and repairs the wall of persons who had refused hospitality to Moses and his companion—the reasons being that a piratical king was about to seize the boat, the young man was an infidel who would bring grief upon his pious parents, and under the wall was a treasure belonging to two orphans, who would recover their wealth on reaching maturity. The lesson is reproof of man's unseemly inquisitiveness into the ways of God. The story in the *Qur'ān* is of Jewish origin (G. Weil, *Biblische Legenden der Muselmänner*, Frankfort, 1845, pp. 178–181), and recurs in the Haggadic account of the journey of Asmodæus to Solomon (L. Ginzberg, *JE* ii. [1902] 218; cf. also H. Oesterley, *Gesta Romanorum*, Berlin, 1872, pp. 80, 724 f., J. C. Dunlop, *Hist. of Fiction*, ed. H. Wilson, London, 1896, ii. 263–269, and art. KHIḌR).

[1] Cf. the fragments of a Soghdian version of the NT, ed. F. W. K. Müller, 'Soghdische Texte, I.,' *AbAW*, 1912; it may be suggested that this Soghdian version, which is closely dependent on the Syriac, dates from the 9th or 10th cent. (L. H. Gray, *ExpT* xxv. [1913] 59–61).

[2] *Bereshith Rabbah*, lxxvii. 1 (on Gn 32[26]); see Wünsche, 379; also *Ekah Rabbati* on La 3[23] (A. Wünsche, *Der Midrasch Echa Rabbati*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 126); cf. W. Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*[2], Strassburg, 1903, i. 172; L. Blau, *JE* i. [1901] 586.

[3] See I. Lévi, cited by J. Darmesteter, *REJ* xix. [1889] 14 note 1.

[4] Lévi, 15, note 2; S. Mendelsohn, *JE* vi. 215.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references already given, *Šikand-gūmānik-Vijar*, ed. Hoshang Jamaspji Jamasp-Asana and E. W. West, Bombay, 1887, tr. E. W. West, *SBE* xxiv. [1885] 117 ff.; J. Darmesteter, 'Textes pehlvis relatifs au Judaisme,' *REJ* xviii. [1889] 1–15, xix. [1889] 41–56; L. H. Gray, 'Pahlavi Literature, Jews in,' *JE* ix. [1905] 462–465, expanded as 'Jews in Pahlavi Literature,' *Actes du xiv^me congr. internat. des orientalistes*, i. [Paris, 1905] 177–192; F. Spiegel, *Eränische Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1871–78, iii. 717 f.; H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, ii. 508 ff., iii. 1 ff.; artt. 'Artaban,' 'Bahram Tshubin,' 'Chosroes,' 'Persia,' etc., in *JE*.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

JHINWAR, DHIMAR, DHINWAR (Skr. *dhivara*, 'fisherman').—The term applied in the Panjāb to the carrier, waterman, fisherman, and basket-maker castes of the E. districts and Kashmīr. The caste numbered, according to the Census of 1911, 375,694, of whom 61 per cent were Hindus and the remainder Muhammadans, with a small Sikh minority. It has a low place in the Hindu caste system, and, as with the allied castes, its Hindu or Muhammadan beliefs are only a slight veneer over Animism. Its members worship chiefly the deities or spirits connected with their occupation, and the divinities of the great rivers, Ganges, Jumna, and Indus; and they make offerings to the boats, nets, and other implements of their craft.

One remarkable rite is almost peculiar to them.

In the Panjāb on the 8th day before the Divālī, or feast of lights, which is celebrated at the new moon of Kārttik (Oct.–Nov.), the Hoi or Hui festival is held, at which the Jhīwarni, or female water-carrier, of the household is given the first place, and is petted by the ladies of the family, who act as her tire-women. After the house has been purified by being smeared with cow-dung, figures of a litter and its bearers are drawn on the wall in four or five colours, and to it offerings, accompanied by the usual worship (*pujā*) with incense, lights, and flowers, are made, consisting of radishes, sweet potatoes, and other roots of the season. The legend tells that at the beginning of the Kaliyuga, or present evil age, death, murrain, and famine devastated the world. The Brāhmans prayed and practised austerities, but in vain. They were in despair, when a woman of the Jhīwar tribe sat in their midst and encouraged them to further efforts, as the result of which the goddess Kalika or Chāmuṇḍā appeared, carrying her head in her hands, and announced that the prevailing calamities were due to immorality and want of religious faith, and that, if the world was to be saved, she must in future be honoured with this annual feast and fast. The reward of the Jhīwar woman was to be exalted to a place of honour at the solemnity. Another story tells that Hoi was a Brāhman maid who escaped defilement at the hands of the Musalmans by taking refuge in the hut of a Jhīwar. When her pursuers overtook her, she disappeared into the earth, and was deified by her caste and other Hindus.

It is difficult to explain the meaning of the rite, but it probably points to a primitive cult of the earth- or mother-goddess which was specialized by the Jhīwar caste, one of their women, as we know to be the case in other Panjāb cults of Devī, impersonating the goddess (H. A. Rose, *Panjab and N.W. Frontier Province Census Rep.*, 1901, i. 126).

LITERATURE.—D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Panjab Ethnography*, Calcutta, 1883, p. 325 f.; *PNQ* ii. (1885) 148; H. A. Rose, *Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Panjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, ii. (Lahore, 1911) 381 ff.

W. CROOKE.

JINN.—See DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Muhammadan).

JIVANMUKTA.—The word *jīvanmukta* means 'delivered while yet on earth.' By 'deliverance' we must understand the end of existence or of transmigration, either the return to Brahman or the entry into *nirvāṇa* (Buddhism). The 'delivered on earth' is the saint who has realized all the con-

ditions of deliverance and is living his last existence. Since he has exhausted desire and illusion, which are the food of individual existence (Brahmanism), the food of existence (Buddhism), he has passed from the 'mundane' (*laukika*) plane, where thoughts and actions move, to a higher plane, 'supramundane' (*lokottara*), from which thought and action are, properly speaking, excluded. He continues to live, because the physical forces which sustain life are not yet dead, just as the potter's wheel continues to turn by the force which it has acquired; because the acts, for which this life is the payment, have not been entirely paid for. But such acts, recent or ancient, which ought to be paid for in a new rebirth, are either suppressed and 'skipped over' or 'transferred' to this life. No new act can be imputed to the *jīvanmukta*, for an act can be imputed to a person only when it is 'redolent of desire.'

The origin of this definition of sanctity is to be found, on the one hand, in the speculations concerning the ascetic, aloof from all human interest and clothed with and fed on air, in whom, as it would appear, there is no longer anything human; on the other hand, in the doctrines relating to the identity of the *ātman* and the *brahman*, and to *nirvāṇa*.

All the Indian sects have adopted the idea of the *jīvanmukta*, and they have all had to study the various complicated problems which it raises. Can the *jīvanmukta* fall from sanctity? Is he sinless? May he do whatever he pleases, since sin no longer exists for him? Is he necessarily inactive? Is he incapable of suffering? Is he exempt from mundane thoughts? We have a great deal of literature relating to these problems, especially in Buddhism (*jīvanmukta* = *arhat*). It is one of the characteristics of Hindu theologians that they have always tried, with much loyalty, sagacity, and subtlety, to 'organize' mystical ideas which cannot easily be reconciled with morality and experience.

Within the limits of this article we cannot even touch upon the problem that is here presented.

LITERATURE.—P. Oltramare, *Histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, Paris, 1906, i. 214; A. Barth, *Religions of India*, London, 1891, pp. 79, 210; artt. ARHAT, KARMA, NIRVĀṆA.

LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

JÑĀNA-MĀRGA.—The term *jñāna-mārga*, 'the pathway of knowledge' (to salvation, *mokṣa*, *mukti*), or *jñāna-kāṇḍa*, 'department of knowledge,' covers what are known as the 'systems of Indian philosophy.' The term is opposed to *karma-mārga* (*q.v.*), *karma-kāṇḍa*, salvation by works. The literature of the Vedic period is characterized by a joy of life which forms a striking contrast to the pessimistic attitude that dominates Indian thought throughout the later periods. The Vedas themselves are chiefly concerned with the attainment of happiness in this world and its continuance in the next by means of sacrifices and other good works (*karmāṇi*) pleasing to the gods. At an early period we find objections raised to the purely selfish character of this attitude; some of the earlier *Upaniṣads* reject works altogether as being utterly inadequate, if not useless, for the attainment of salvation, and because they aim at worldly happiness only. This opposition to Vedic ritual gradually disappears in the *Upaniṣads*, and ultimately the philosophy of the *Upaniṣads* becomes the Vedānta, and the saving knowledge that they teach is called the Vedānta (end of the Veda).

1. Upaniṣads.—The general attitude of the *Upaniṣads* to works is that sacrifice and good works may procure happiness to a limited extent, but are on the whole a hindrance rather than a help in the attainment of real salvation, which is to be obtained through knowledge alone. To have any merit, works must not be performed with a view to a particular reward; if performed in a proper spirit, they contribute to originate a desire for knowledge. In order that knowledge may arise, the effects of evil works must be obliterated, and this may be effected by performing acts of piety not aiming at any immediate reward; when the mind has been purified in this way, there arises a desire for knowledge, and ignorance comes to an end. Works, however, although useless by themselves, are sometimes even said to be essential:

'Only he who knows both knowledge and not-knowledge (works) can be saved, because by good works he overcomes death and by knowledge he obtains the immortal.'[1]

At a very early period we find two new ideas, which were destined to influence profoundly all future Indian thought, making their appearance with striking suddenness—the doctrines of metempsychosis (*saṁsāra*) and of the influence of actions in a previous existence (*karma*). No satisfactory explanation has yet been given of the origin of the former of these beliefs, on which the latter depends (see, further, art. METEMPSYCHOSIS [Hindu]). The second idea is based on the belief that no good or evil deed can go unrewarded or unpunished; happiness in this life is the reward of good deeds in a previous existence, while misery, often apparently unmerited, is readily explained as the result of evil deeds in a previous existence (see, further, art. KARMA). What is true of the previous existence must hold also of the one prior to that, and so on. The cycle of existence has no beginning, and similarly has no end; for in each existence there must be a certain balance of unrewarded good or unexpiated evil to carry the individual on to a new existence. Every action unfailingly brings its own reward or punishment; the cause of action is desire, and desire is due to ignorance, which mistakes the real nature of things (cf. art. DESIRE [Buddhist]); it is this ignorance that is the cause of the cycle of re-births (cf. art. MĀYĀ). The result of this doctrine is a firm conviction of the misery of mundane existence, which contrasts with the passionate love of life of the earliest period, and the belief that real happiness is to be obtained only by release from the *saṁsāra*. This release is to be obtained only by destroying the ignorance which is the root of the cycle of existence; the object of the various philosophies is to teach that knowledge which brings salvation from mundane existence to the happy few.

Vedic and allied knowledge, and indeed all existing knowledge, was early recognized as insufficient for the attainment of salvation.

Thus, for example, we find[2] Nārada lamenting that, though he has studied the Vedas, the epics, grammar, etc., and is learned in the scriptures, yet he is not learned in the *ātman*; and beseeching to be taught the *ātman* that overcomes sorrow, and to be led to the 'shore that lies beyond sorrow.' Similarly, Śvetaketu, having completed his education under his father Aruṇi, and failing to answer questions put to him, upbraids his father for declaring his education perfect.[3] Mere learning and book-knowledge then are not sufficient: 'The *ātman* is not attained by learning . . . and much knowledge of books.'[4]

True knowledge in the *Upaniṣads* is a knowledge of *brahman* or the *ātman* (*qq.v.*). This knowledge was recognized as being different in its nature from what is commonly understood by the term 'knowledge'; for it is possible to know all branches of human knowledge and yet be ignorant of the saving knowledge of the *ātman*; this state of ignorance of true knowledge is called *avidyā* ('not-knowledge'); this term gradually lost the meaning of simple ignorance, and came to be applied to that false knowledge which impedes a knowledge of *brahman*, by preventing us from seeing things as they really are, and is based on illusion (*māyā*) due to the limitations of the human intellect.

[1] *Īśā Upan.* 11. [2] *Chhānd. Upan.* vii. 10.
[3] *Bṛhad. Ār. Upan.* vi. 2. [4] *Kaṭh. Upan.* i. ii. 23.

Ignorance, then, is the knowledge derived from the experience of the senses, while true knowledge is of *brahman* or the *ātman*.

There are two fundamental ideas in the *Upaniṣads*—*brahman* and the *ātman*, which came to be used synonymously. *Brahman* is the first principle of the universe, the Eternal One, the all-pervading power; *ātman* is first the vital principle, the Self, then the All-soul, the One, and thus comes to be identical with *brahman*. Saving knowledge consists in the recognition of the unity of *brahman* and the *ātman* of the individual soul with the world-soul, and the object of the *Upaniṣads* is to teach a knowledge of *brahman*. The doctrine of the identity of *brahman* and the *ātman* is summed up in such phrases as *tat tvam asi* ('thou art That') and *aham brahmāsmi* ('I am *brahman*'). The veil of ignorance, through which we see a plurality of objects when in reality *brahman* alone exists, is lifted when the underlying *brahman* of the object is recognized in the *ātman* of the knower. Mundane objects are not realities, and are of no value for their own sake, but exist only through the *ātman*, which alone exists and is the entire universe. Yājñavalkya compares the phenomena of the world to the notes of a lute or conch-shell: the notes cannot be seized; only when the instrument or the player is seized can they be seized; in the same way it is only when the *ātman* is known that all else is known. He who has comprehended the *ātman* knows the whole universe.[1] When it is recognized that there is only one being, the self or *ātman*, eternal and unchanging, the illusions resulting from the limitations of the intellect disappear, and release is obtained from this world of ignorance.

2. Vedānta.—The Brāhmanic speculations of the *Upaniṣads* are developed in the philosophical system usually called Vedanta, properly the Uttara-mīmāṁsā, or 'Second inquiry' (concerning *brahman*; it is also called Brahma-mīmāṁsa); the founder of the system, Bādarāyaṇa, flourished about the beginning of the Christian era, and his great expositor Śaṅkara eight centuries later. The fundamental notion in the system, which is still the most influential in India, is the identity of the *ātman*, or self, with the *brahman*. *Brahman* is the One, the Unique, the Self-existent, everlasting and unchanging, and cannot therefore be subject to division into parts. The self of each individual must therefore be identical with the self of *brahman*, instead of being a part of it; the self in each individual is therefore the whole undivided *brahman*. Nothing exists but *brahman* (*advaita-vāda*, doctrine of non-duality). The apparent objections to this, which arise out of mundane experience, are due to ignorance, which prevents the self from recognizing that all else is illusion; the phenomena of the *saṁsāra* and the material universe are illusions, just as the idea of separate souls is. The Vedānta does not inquire into the origin of this ignorance, whether due to desire, etc., or not, but teaches that it may be destroyed by the saving knowledge that all that is not soul is illusion, and that the soul is *brahman*. When this truth is known, the fetters that bind the soul to the cycle of existence are broken, and release is obtained (see, further, art. VEDĀNTA). We may here mention the Viśiṣṭādvaita ('modified monism') school of the Vedānta founded by Rāmānuja, one of the most important commentators on the *Brahmasūtras*, who flourished in the 12th cent. A.D. and belonged to the Bhāgavata sect. He expounds the Vedānta system according to the tenets of this monotheistic sect in a way which differs in important points from the outline just given; according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitas, the individual souls are not identical with *brahman* or God, but are elements of him and not separate from him; the individual souls are involved in the miseries of mundane existence, not entirely by ignorance, but by unbelief. The true means of salvation is therefore found, not in some means of cognition, but in devout love of God (*bhakti*) and belief.

3. Sāṅkhya.—The Saṅkhya school, which has been called the oldest real system of Indian philosophy, is as much impressed by the infinite variety of the universe as the Vedānta is with its unity. The system, the traditional founder of which was Kapila, is essentially dualistic; two principles are admitted whose interworkings produce the universe —*prakṛti* (matter) and *puruṣa* (soul or spirit); the latter is not one all-pervading spirit like the *brahman* of the Vedānta, but rather an infinite number of individual spirits each independent, and thus the variety of the universe is explained. These two are entirely distinct, and have existed side by side from all eternity. Mental processes are mechanical actions of physical organs, *i.e.* of *prakṛti*; *prakṛti*, however, would remain unconscious if it were not acted upon by *puruṣa*; *puruṣa*, or soul, has no volition of its own, but the subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*), the inner organs and senses which surround it, has. Through this body the soul becomes involved in the *saṁsāra*, and thus has to suffer the miseries of mundane existence. The aim of the Sāṅkhya is to teach that *puruṣa* is absolutely distinct from *prakṛti* in the most subtle organs. A knowledge that these two are absolutely distinct, and have been so from the beginning, delivers the soul from the cycle of existence; it then realizes that the connexion between soul and matter, on which the miseries of the world depend, is only an apparent one, and, when this is realized, the sufferings of *prakṛti* are no longer the sufferings of *puruṣa*, while the sufferings of the former are no longer experienced, since they are no longer 'illuminated' by *puruṣa* (see, further, art. SAṄKHYA).

The philosophical basis of Buddhism is considerably influenced by the Sāṅkhya (for a different view see above, p. 211[b]). It assumes that mundane existence is nothing but suffering, and that the cause of this suffering is the desire to enjoy the apparent delights of the world. The cause of this attachment is ignorance; this ignorance and all that follows it will be dissipated when attachment to the world is renounced.

4. Yoga.—The Yoga system, founded by Patañjali, who, if not identical with the celebrated grammarian of that name, likewise flourished in the 2nd cent. B.C., is closely connected with the Sāṅkhya. The philosophical basis of the Yoga is that of the Sāṅkhya with the addition of the notions of a Personal God (*īśvara*) and of the occult powers to be derived from Yoga practices. Its characteristic feature is the influence laid on asceticism and mental concentration (*yoga*=contemplation, concentration, union).

Asceticism and contemplation have always been practised in India as means of acquiring merit. Patañjali developed a formal system the methodical practice of which, in addition to giving occult powers, is regarded by him as one of the surest ways of gaining saving knowledge. The aim of Yoga was at first that of the Saṅkhya, namely, the separation (*kaivalya*) of soul and matter; but, with the addition of the idea of a Personal God (*īśvara*) or Universal Soul, the ultimate aim comes to be union of the individual soul with God. The mind is to be deliberately and artificially withdrawn from the external world and concentrated upon itself; it is then enabled to throw off one by one the material fetters that bind it to the *saṁsāra*,

[1] *Bṛhad. Ār. Upan.* II. iv. 5.

and to awaken to a knowledge of truth, and the individual soul gains freedom and absorption in the World-Soul (see, further, art. YOGA).

5. **Minor systems.**—Of the minor systems that teach the way of escape from the *saṁsāra* the most important is the Vaiśeṣika founded by Kaṇāda (the name, however, may be a nickname, 'atom-eater') at quite an early date. Deliverance, according to Kaṇāda, is to be obtained only by a knowledge of the real nature of soul and the unreality of matter, and this depends upon a knowledge of the 'six categories' (*padārtha*), under which everything that exists can be classed; these are substance, quality, action, generality, individuality, and inherence or inseparability. These are narrowly defined and subdivided; it is from the fifth that the system takes its name (*viśeṣa* = atomic individuality); all substances (defined in the first category as earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul [*ātman*], mind [*manas*]) consist of invisible atoms, from the combination of which all mental and physical phenomena arise. Freedom is obtained when the Vaiśeṣika doctrines have been comprehended (see, further, art. VAIŚEṢIKA).

The Nyāya system of Gautama is usually coupled with the Vaiśeṣika, from which it is developed. It is really a system of logic and the means of knowledge. Truth is to be attained by the application of sixteen categories, or logical notions, and salvation depends on a correct knowledge of their nature. It is only when the student has thoroughly mastered the system that he is capable of ascertaining truth (see, further, art. NYĀYA).

The aim of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā ('first inquiry'), which is usually coupled with the Vedānta, is, like that of the other systems, the attainment of liberation from the world, but, as the other name (Karma-mīmāṁsā) of the system shows, the means that it teaches is the observance of orthodox rites and ceremonies, and not saving knowledge. It is particularly concerned with the study and interpretation of the Vedas (see, further, art. MIMĀṀSĀ).

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J. ALLAN.

JOACHIMITES.—As a sect in the Christian Church the Joachimites exercised a remarkable influence in the 13th cent., and, as we shall see, some of their tenets passed over into the motive-doctrines of the Reformation. The sect derived their name from Joachim of Floris, who seems to have been born in 1145 and to have died in 1202. He was, therefore, an older contemporary of Francis of Assisi (1182–1226), with whose followers the Joachimites were in vigorous sympathy. It is difficult to disentangle the personality or the work of Joachim from the mass of tradition which has gathered about his name, and it is equally difficult to discover what Joachim himself actually taught. He was certainly a creative personality, and works have been attributed to him which are really the fruit of the school which called itself by his name. In these works, more particularly the commentaries on Isaiah and Jeremiah, the germs of thought which are due to Joachim have been expanded and developed by the school which he founded. As to the genuineness of the works attributed to Joachim, there is not a great measure of agreement among scholars, but there is no doubt that he was one of the strongest churchmen of the 12th century. His influence on contemporaries and his place in the sect which called itself by his name entitle him to a position among the leading men of the century.

1. **Life of Joachim.**—The facts of his life, so far as they can be disentangled (*AS*, May 29), may be briefly stated. He was certainly a Calabrian—first, head of a Cistercian monastery at Corazzo, and afterwards abbot of a stricter sect at Floris, with which place his name is generally associated. His work at Corazzo and Floris was fostered by contemporary popes, and he appears also to have had a remarkable influence on Richard of England and Philip of France. When his writings were submitted to the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, the only point condemned was his doctrine of the Trinity, in which he had parted from Peter Lombard (Denzinger[11], nos. 431–433). The place which Joachim held in the regard of his time may be further gathered from the reference to him in Dante (*Paradiso*, xii. 139–141).

2. **His views.**—If we regard the genuine works of Joachim as (*a*) *Concordia Veteris et Novi Testamenti* (Venice, 1519), (*b*) *Psalterium Decem Chordarum* (do. 1527), and (*c*) *Expositio apocalypsis* (do. 1527), then the following may be described as his views and the germs which were afterwards developed by his school of thought.

(1) Like the visionaries who preceded him, such as Hildegard and Elizabeth of Schönau, he vigorously attacked the corruptions of the Church, and particularly its secularization. He held that the spirituality of the Church and the usefulness of its work in the world were being vitiated by the secularizing atmosphere in which it was enveloped. (2) He looked for deliverance from secularization in an Age of the Spirit, operating through a purified monasticism, which in turn should foster the life of contemplation. (3) Behind all his teaching lay a philosophy of religious history which had caught the Montanistic spirit. Montanus had already taught the doctrine of Three Ages or States: first, an OT revelation; secondly, a NT revelation; thirdly, the culminating age of Montanus and his prophets who should realize a Church of the Holy Spirit (see art. MONTANISM). The disciples of Montanus were, therefore, the *spirituales*, and it must not be forgotten that of these Tertullian was one. This doctrine of the Three Ages or States was developed by Joachim. The first age was that of the Father, closing with Zacharias, father of John the Baptist; the second age was that of the Son, reaching to the year 1260; after 1260 began the third age, that of the Holy Spirit. Though these ages overlapped to some extent, they were distinct in Joachim's thinking. Each age was divided artificially; each had its special characteristic and atmosphere. Joachim's teaching dealt mainly with the third of these ages. Here he showed himself a prophet and a visionary. The third age was to be the Age of the Spirit. Men were not then to be fettered by the letter. It was to be the age of the Eternal Gospel. It was not to be an age of ecclesiastical machinery. Rather was it to be an age of pure contemplation and of a perfected monasticism. Joachim's vision, in truth, was that of the imminent Age of the Holy Spirit, which, in an artificial way, he said was to open in the year 1260. Cf. art. AGES OF THE WORLD (Christian), vol. i. p. 191[a].

3. **His influence.**—The views thus expressed by Joachim were eagerly caught up and developed by his followers, and the fullest expression of them is to be found in the commentaries on Isaiah and Jeremiah, which go under Joachim's name. The stricter Franciscans also found them peculiarly congenial, and the idea of a spiritual Christianity and an imminent Age of the Spirit was at once

assimilated by them. Their criticism of the secularized Roman Church had been exceptionally vigorous. To them the Church of Rome was the house of the courtesan, and the Church in its alliance with the world and in its greed of gain, shown in its many and dubious methods for securing gain, had been unfaithful to its true mission, the saving of the world for Christ. The Church ought to have trusted in the strength of God, not in the sword. In allying itself with the power of the sword, it had been unfaithful. In common with the stricter Franciscans, the Joachimites looked forward to a purified Church and a spiritual Christianity. In such a Church the monks would remain as the organ of the Spiritual Gospel. Outward authority must disappear in the Age of the Spirit. The later Joachimite teaching was peculiarly stringent in its anti-Romanism. One of the fruits of this school of thought was the famous *Liber Introductorius in Evangelium æternum*, written probably in 1254 by the Franciscan, Gerardus of Borgo San Donnino. In its teaching the *Introductorius* drew largely from the writings of Joachim, whom it regarded as an inspired prophet. The book was condemned by Alexander IV. in 1255; but the apocalyptic ideas which it boldly taught lived on among the Franciscans and the followers of Joachim. From the chronicle of Salimbene of Parma, who belonged to a generation after Joachim, we can gather how influential and central was the place of Joachim in the esteem of his immediate followers, and we can see how the Joachimites were agitated by such questions as the controversy between the papacy and the monarchy, and the approaching last time.

Though much of the teaching of Joachim and his followers was highly visionary and artificial, it is apparent that there was behind it a genuine religious experience. They made their protest against the secularization of the Church and formed their vision of the future out of the fullness of this experience. So far as their distinctive teaching was concerned, parts of it had been already before the Church's mind. The doctrine of the Three Ages had been anticipated by Montanism, while the teaching of the Eternal Gospel may be found in Origen. But the religious experience of Joachim and his followers was a real contribution to the thought of the 13th century. Nor was it teaching which passed away. In one form or another the ideals of the Joachimites passed over into the thought of the Reformation, influencing more especially such early Reformers as Wyclif and Hus.

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JOSAPHAT, BARLAAM AND.—The history of Barlaam and Josaphat, as it has become known through numerous translations in the West, is derived from the Buddhist collection of stories known as the *Jātaka*, the 'Birth-Stories,' records of the words and acts of the Buddha in the course of his former existences upon earth.[1] Of the stories themselves the date and origin are various. None, however, has attained to so great popularity or passed through so many transformations and vicissitudes as that of Barlaam and Josaphat. All are of the nature of folk-lore, parable, or fable, derived from Indian sources or collections of tales, which in the first instance were for the most part non-Buddhist, but were adapted to the purposes of Buddhist propaganda and made to serve ethical and didactic ends. Gautama himself becomes in them all the protagonist, and expounds or illustrates the moral which the story is intended to enforce. In the regions of the West, however, in which not a few of these narratives have found a home and become popular, the Buddhist element thus introduced is again excluded and is replaced by Christian terminology and teaching. Interpolation and adaptation have frequently so changed the 'atmosphere' of the story and the definite point of the moral that it is only historically and by tracing the course of development that its Indian origin can be recognized.

Of the original form of the story, as it was compiled in India or adapted from more ancient existing materials, nothing is directly known. Incidents or parables contained in it have been traced in the Buddhist *Avadāna*, the *Mahābhārata*, and elsewhere. From the Buddhist original, which, it may be assumed, was composed in Magadhi, or in an early form of some Prākrit dialect, a Pahlavi rendering was made in or about the time of the reign of Chosroes the Great of Persia (A.D. 531–579). This version also is no longer extant. There is, however, a curious and certainly not accidental resemblance between the life and history of this king and the character of Abenner, the Indian ruler and the father of Josaphat, as presented in the Buddhist story. To this Pahlavi rendering, which would seem to have been already deprived of its distinctive Buddhist features and teaching, all the numerous versions of the West owe their origin. The earliest Greek translation is derived from a Syriac version of the Pahlavi, and is attributed to the beginning of the 6th cent., partly on the ground that in an enumeration of the great religions of the world no reference is made to Muhammadanism. The Greek text is printed among the works of John of Damascus,[1] to whom it was ascribed by a mistaken identification with a 'John, Monk of the Convent of St. Saba,' to whom the work was assigned in the colophon of early Greek MSS. There are also three early Arabic versions, the original of which bore the title of *Kitāb Bilauhar wa Budāsaf*; and a mediæval Jewish translation into Hebrew, attributed to Abraham ibn Chisdai in the 13th century.[2] From these Oriental renderings all the later versions, numbering more than sixty, are ultimately descended. The first Latin translation was made from the Greek by Anastasius, the papal librarian in the latter part of the 9th cent., and became the parent of most of the modern European versions, including the English. The Greek was again independently translated into Latin a few centuries later by J. Billius, Abbot of St. Michel in Brittany;[3] and both renderings are printed among the works of John of Damascus. The earliest English version was produced by W. Caxton in A.D. 1483.[4] There are also extant four later versions or paraphrases in English, three of which are in verse. The verse renderings have been reprinted more than once,[5] but the prose version is rare.

[1] On the *Jātaka* see M. Winternitz, *Gesch. der ind. Litt.*, Leipzig, 1908 ff., ii. i. 89–127; *The Jātaka, or Stories of the Buddha's Former Births*, tr. from the Pāli by various hands, 6 vols., Cambridge, 1895–1907; art. JATAKA.

[1] *PG* xcvi. 857 ff.

[2] The Arabic text has been reprinted recently at Cairo for the benefit of the Coptic Christians, under the title of *Sutrah Barlām wa Yuāsaf* (*Egyp. Explor. Fund Arch. Report*, 1911–12, p. 68).

[3] J. Jacobs, *Barlaam and Josaphat*, p. xciii.

[4] Reprinted by J. Jacobs, London, 1896; and also as an appendix to the same author's *Barlaam and Josaphat*.

[5] *e.g.* by J. Jacobs, *op. cit.*; K. S. Macdonald, *Story of Barlaam and Josaphat*, 'The Hystorye of the Hermyte Balaam' (sic), from Caxton's *Golden Legend*. In an appendix Macdonald prints three variant forms of the story from as many MSS.

Essentially the legend is as follows. Variations in detail, however, are numerous in the different versions.

Antecedently to the reign of a powerful Indian ruler named Abenner, Christian teaching had found its way to the East; and many converts had been made within his dominions. The king himself, however, was strongly opposed to the foreign religion, and issued an edict against it. Among others an intimate friend and minister of the king embraced Christianity, and, renouncing the world, adopted the life of an anchorite in the desert. Having been by the direction of the king brought back to the royal court, he there delivered a brief appeal and apology, by which Abenner was further incensed against the Christians. He dismissed his former friend in anger, forbidding him ever to return to his presence.

A son is afterwards born to the king, who hitherto had been childless, of faultless form and beauty, to whom is given the name of Josaphat (in the Greek 'Ιωάσαφ). At a birthday feast Chaldæan astrologers who are present prophesy of his future greatness and wisdom. In some forms of the story the horoscope of the child is represented as foretelling also that he will abandon the religion of his fathers, and will turn to the true faith. At this the father is greatly distressed, and in order to avert the fulfilment of the prophecy builds for his son a beautiful palace, where the prince is confined in the midst of all that is attractive and beautiful, that he may not come into contact with misery or death.

In the event, however, when the prince reaches man's estate, he seeks release from constraint, and with his father's reluctant consent goes forth from the palace, and gains his first experience of the external world. He encounters in succession a blind man, a leper, a man aged and infirm, and a corpse; and in answer to his troubled inquiry is told that misfortunes and miseries such as these are the common lot of men. He is deeply moved, and learns further that the secret of deliverance from these woes is known only to the holy hermits who have withdrawn from the world; and he expresses accordingly the desire to see them and to hear from their own lips the true knowledge. His wish cannot be granted, because by the decree of his father the hermits have all been expelled from the country.

Under the guise of a jewel merchant, however, an anchorite who bears a high reputation for wisdom and purity of life comes to the court, and in successive interviews with the prince convinces him of the truth, whereupon the latter expresses his determination to become the anchorite's disciple. The anchorite's name is Barlaam. To convey his teaching he employs a series of apologues or parables, which set forth the true doctrine and illustrate the vanity and fruitlessness of worldly things. In the number and arrangement of these parables the versions again present considerable variations. The king is naturally moved to grief and wrath on hearing of his son's conversion, and endeavours by threats and argument to change his purpose.

He also issues orders for the arrest of Barlaam. The hermit, however, has left the city, and the attempt fails. Arrangements are then made for the holding of a public discussion before the prince, in which a stranger, Nachor, is to play the part of advocate of the new doctrine, to present the Christian argument, and to be defeated in debate. Thus it is hoped to discredit the faith in the eyes of Josaphat, and to induce him to abandon his resolve to follow Barlaam. In a secret interview with Nachor, however, the prince threatens him with death if he does not vindicate the truth. He urges his case therefore with eloquence and success, and offers before the king a powerful and convincing apology for the faith, by which his opponents are put to silence. Nachor himself then withdraws into the wilderness. A further attempt is made to lead the prince astray by means of worldly and sensual temptations, in which the agency of Theudas, a magician, is employed. This also meets with no success; and Theudas himself is converted by means of a parable which Josaphat relates to him. Finally, the prince forsakes his home and the royal court, and, with Barlaam as his companion and friend, gives himself over to the life of an anchorite in the wilderness.

Some forms of the legend are in their details more strikingly reminiscent of the life history of Gautama Buddha than is the above, which in substance represents the Greek. Thus in an Arabic version the Bo-tree appears, with miraculous fruit. Josaphat flees on horseback from the city by night in company with his vizier, whom he sends back, together with his horse and all his possessions, when he arrives in the wilderness. After his conversion he is carried up into heaven, and on his return devotes himself with much success to preaching the doctrine. He dies, as in the Buddhist record, reclining with his head to the west, and with a final blessing on his disciple Ananda.

The distinctively Christian features of the narrative are interpolations introduced to further a polemic interest, when the story was utilized for Christian edification and adapted to the purposes of Christian apologetic. The older Oriental versions, as the Arabic above, more evidently betray their Indian and Buddhist origin. Both Barlaam and Josaphat have a formal place on the roll of Christian saints, and special days in the calendar are set apart to their memory. In the Menology of the Greek Church, August 26 is the commemoration of St. Josaphat;[1] and, in the sister Church of Rome, Nov. 27 is dedicated to the joint service of the two saints. There are said to be relics of St. Josaphat, in the form of a bone and part of the spine, preserved in a church at Antwerp. A monastery in Thessaly bears the name of St. Barlaam; and elsewhere also churches have been consecrated in their honour.

Not the least remarkable of the many strange features of the story is that the names of the two principal characters are both ultimately derived from one and the same source, and denote the Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist faith. The characters, therefore, are really doublets of a common original. The Greek 'Ιωάσαφ is a transformed and corrupted form of the title *Bodhisattva*, which through the Pahlavi found its way into Arabic as Būdāsaf, and then by a confusion of *b* and *y*, letters which differ only by the diacritical point, became Yudāsāf or Yodāsāf, and ultimately Yoasaf. Balauvar, the original form of the name which through the Syriac has become Barlaam, is the well-known title of the Buddha, *Bhagavān*, 'the Lord,' the pairs of letters *q* and *l*, *n* and *r* being similar and easily confused in the Pahlavi alphabet. Thus the great Indian religious teacher reappears in a double form in the West as a venerated Christian saint. Other names also in the story seem to be derived from the Indian legends. Thus Zardan, the nobleman entrusted with the guardianship of the young prince, has been identified with Chandaka, Gautama's charioteer and the companion of his flight from his father's palace.

The Latin version of Barlaam and Josaphat was printed as early as 1539 at Basel; but the Greek text not until three centuries later, at Paris in the year 1832. In the latter the history is described as 'a profitable story brought . . . from the further part of Ethiopia, called India, by John the Monk . . . of the Monastery of St. Saba or Sabas.' John the Monk is believed to be identical with a well known John, a member of an early fraternity on Mt. Sinai, who lived about two centuries before John of Damascus († A.D. 756). It was not, however, until the discovery in 1889, in the monastery of St. Catherine, of the Syriac text of the *Apology of Aristides*[2] that it became evident that the defence of the faith offered by Nachor in the story was not original, but borrowed from the Christian author. According to Eusebius (*HE* iv. 3), Aristides addressed his *Apology* to the Emperor Hadrian (A.D. 117–138), but in the judgment of Rendel Harris the work belongs more probably to the early years of his successor, Antoninus Pius (138–161). It was long believed to have been lost. With the publication of the Syriac text its practical identity with the Greek which forms part of the story of Barlaam and Josaphat was at once recognized. In its Syriac form the text of the *Apology* is expanded by a number of characteristic repetitions and additions, which add considerably to its length. The Greek is believed to represent more faithfully the original. In the early Christian centuries the *Apology of Aristides* enjoyed much popularity, and was regarded as an effective and complete defence of the faith. It was adopted accordingly by the Greek translator of the

[1] *μνήμη τοῦ ὁσίου Ἰωάσαφ υἱοῦ Ἀβενὴρ τοῦ βασιλέως* (J. Jacobs, *op. cit.* p. xvi).

[2] Published with an Eng. tr. by J. Rendel Harris in *TS* i. 1, Cambridge, 1891.

Indian legend and placed in the mouth of Nachor as the convincing exposition of the Christian faith which should refute the arguments of his heathen opponents. The attribution of the text to John of Damascus rests upon a comparatively late tradition. It will be found printed in all complete editions of his works.

In all versions of the story the means by which the conversion of the prince is effected is the narration to him by Barlaam, the anchorite disguised as jewel-merchant, of a series of tales or parables conveying moral instruction and warning. The number and order of these parables vary considerably in the different versions. More than thirty altogether are contained in the several earlier translations, but of these only nine are common to all, and sixteen find a place in only one form or version of the story.[1] The Hebrew text is remarkable for the number of parables that it records which are not found elsewhere. Two of the stories possess an individual interest. That of the Sower follows so closely the lines of the narrative in the Synoptic Gospels that its source can hardly be in doubt. It is found, moreover, in the earliest versions, Arabic and Hebrew, as well as in the Greek, and therefore must have been inserted in the legend at an early date. The details are entirely Christian. Similar moral teaching derived from the processes of ploughing and sowing is contained in an early Buddhist story, which there is no reason to believe has come under Christian influence.[2] The likeness between the two is not striking. Perhaps it justifies the suggestion that the Christian form of the parable has replaced a Buddhist original of similar import.

Stories similar to that of the three caskets in Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice* are distributed more widely. They are found in the Talmud as well as in Buddhist sources, and in mediæval Europe seem to have been well known and popular. In the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat the king sets before his attendants four caskets, two of which are overlaid with gold and precious stones, and two covered with rough clay. The gold-encrusted caskets, however, contain only dry bones, the others are filled with pearls and jewels. The courtiers are then summoned before the king, and required to estimate the value of the several caskets. Their judgment is, of course, at fault; and the king enforces the moral that a fair outside often conceals an evil heart, while the clay-covered vessels he likens to the hermits in mean outward raiment, but within full of noble and elevating thoughts. Whether the English poet was familiar with the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat it is impossible to determine; but the ultimate source of the story which he has adopted and immortalized is Buddhist and Indian. That it was contained in the original form of the Indian legend is proved by the fact that it finds a place in the earliest versions.

LITERATURE.—J. Jacobs, *Barlaam and Josaphat, English Lives of Buddha*, London, 1896 (the most complete discussion of the legend and its historical relations, where also numerous references will be found to earlier works); **Max Müller**, 'Migration of Fables,' in *Selected Essays*, London, 1881, i. 533 ff.; **K. S. Macdonald**, *Story of Barlaam and Josaphat*, Calcutta, 1896; **H. Zotenberg**, *Notice sur le livre de Barlaam et Joasaph, accompagnée d'extraits du texte grec et des versions arabe et éthiopienne*, Paris, 1886; **F. Heuckenkamp**, *Die provenzalische Prosa-Redaktion des geistlichen Romans von Barlaam und Josaphat*, Halle, 1912; **J. Rendel Harris**, *Apology of Aristides*, Cambridge, 1891; **S. d'Oldenburg**, 'Persidskii izvodŭ povĕsti o Varlaamĕ i Iosafĕ,' *Zapiski vostoč. otdĕl. imp. russ. archaeolog. obščestva*, iv. [1890] 229-265. The Greek text was published separately for the first time by **J. F. Boissonade** in his *Anecdota Græca*, iv., Paris, 1832. It is reprinted, *e.g.*, by **J. Armitage Robinson** in *TS* i. 1, Cambridge, 1891. Further bibliographical material is given by **K. Krumbacher**, *Gesch. der byzant. Lit.*[2], Munich, 1897, pp. 886-891.

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[1] J. Jacobs, *op. cit.* p. lix.

[2] *Sutta Nipāta*, i. 4 (*SBH* x.[2] [1898], pt. ii. pp. 11-15).

JOSEPHUS.—The correct form of the name of Josephus (or, according to his adopted Roman name, *Flavius Josephus*), the Jewish historian, was Ἰώσηπος, written also Ἰώσηππος or Ἰώσιππος; Latin *Joscpus*, *Joseppus*, or *Josippos*. The forms Ἰώσηφος, *Josephus*, first came into use during the Middle Ages, on the analogy of the Biblical Ἰωσήφ.[1]

1. **Life.**—As Josephus left behind him an autobiography, and often speaks about himself in his other writings, we possess a relatively large amount of information regarding him. He was born in the first year of the Emperor Gaius, *i.e.* A.D. 37–38, and was a scion of one of the most eminent priestly families among the Jews. His father's name was Matthias, while his mother was of princely blood, being a descendant of the Hasmonæan leader Jonathan. Being intended for the priesthood, he was introduced to the study of Jewish law and literature at an early age; and at the age of sixteen he attended successively the schools of the three leading sects of Judaism—Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes—in order to acquire the intimate knowledge of each requisite for an eventual choice among them. He afterwards attached himself to a hermit, called Banûn, who dwelt in the desert, even living for a time as an ascetic. At the age of nineteen he resolved to embrace the doctrine of the Pharisees, and began to take part in the political life of Jerusalem. He first came into public notice in A.D. 63 or 64, when he was sent, probably with others, as an ambassador to Rome, to treat for the release of certain Jews whom the procurator Felix had sent in custody to the capital. His mission was attended with complete success, and he was sent home laden with gifts (*Vit.* 16 ff.).

On his return to Palestine, Josephus found everything in a state of ferment and unrest, and the revolt of the Jews broke out shortly afterwards (Aug. A.D. 66), spreading to Galilee and the surrounding district after the defeat of Cestius Gallus near Jerusalem. Leaders were now elected in Jerusalem for the various insurgent territories, and to Josephus, associated, at the outset at least, with two assessors, of whose counsels he was bound to take cognizance (*Vit.* 29, 73, 77), fell a most important post—the chief command in the two divisions of Galilee, including Gamala (*BJ* ii. 568). He subsequently maintained that, along with others who shared his views, he had tried every possible means to prevent the outbreak, but that the course of events had forced him to embrace the popular cause; he alleges, indeed, that he accepted the Galilæan command not as a step towards war, but with a view to its prevention (*Vit.* 20 f., 28 f.). As it fell to him to sustain the first assault of the legions, he fortified the most important points, such as Tiberias, Tarichææ, and Jotapata, and collected an army, the nucleus of which, formed of 4500 mercenaries, was supplemented by the Galilæan levy of nominally 60,000 infantry and 350 horse (*BJ* ii. 569 ff.). His mobilization was interrupted by the attacks of the imperial forces stationed at Ptolemais and the troops of Agrippa II., as also by disputes with the cities of Tiberias and Sepphoris, the latter of which, favouring the cause of Rome, was not to be relied upon. Josephus now fell into bitter personal antagonism with John of Gischala, an implacable foe of Rome, who was urging on the insurrection, and whose machinations were so far successful that the Government sent a commission to Galilee for the purpose of superseding Josephus. The latter, however, was able to maintain his

[1] In this article the works of Josephus will be cited under the following abbreviated forms: *BJ* = *Bellum Judaicum*, *AJ* = *Antiquitates Judaicæ*, *Vit.* = *Vita*, *CA* = *Contra Apionem*; and the accompanying numbers refer to the paragraphs of the present writer's edition.

authority, and to thwart the designs of his enemy, mainly because of the loyal support accorded him by the people of Galilee.

We do not know the gravamen of the charge preferred against Josephus. In Galilee, John denounced him as a traitor to the national cause (*BJ* ii. 594), while in Jerusalem the same accuser contended that he had the ambitions of a tyrant, and that he ought to be dismissed from office before he became too powerful, as otherwise there was a danger of his coming to Jerusalem and setting up a despotic government (*BJ* ii. 626; *Vit.* 103)—an entirely different accusation, and one which practically means nothing. But, as Josephus is far from impartial in his narrative, it is highly probable that other and more serious grievances were brought against him. It would appear that he was no very enterprising or successful general, and showed dilatoriness in many things. He was specially at fault in allowing Sepphoris, one of his commanding positions, to fall into the hands of the enemy (*BJ* ii. 574, 646), and probably in other ways laid himself open to criticism. Whatever the truth may have been in these matters, it is clear that the dissensions with John of Gischala and others were anything but favourable to the preparations and defences being made by the Galilæans in view of the imminent attack of the Romans.

In the spring of A.D. 67, immediately after Sepphoris had been occupied and the surrounding country devastated by an advance guard of the Roman army under Placidus, Vespasian, the legate of Nero, pressed forwards from Ptolemais with a large force. Josephus fell back upon Tiberias, and from there sent couriers to Jerusalem, demanding either that effective reinforcements should be granted him or that peace should be concluded. He seems to have felt that his position in Tiberias was insecure, for, when he heard of Vespasian's advance against Jotapata, he marched thither, and gained admission before the investment was complete (8th June, A.D. 67). But he had little hope, as he says (*BJ* iii. 193 f.), of making a stand here, and accordingly made up his mind to escape from the besieged town together with some of his more eminent colleagues. The inhabitants, however, forced him to remain, so that he continued to direct the defence until the place succumbed to a night attack, 20th July, A.D. 67. While the Romans were putting all to the sword, Josephus, along with forty others, men and women, saved himself by hiding in a cavern difficult of access. This place of concealment having been discovered, Vespasian, acting through the tribune Nicanor, with whom Josephus was personally acquainted, offered him the privilege of asking mercy, and after some consideration, he consented.

His companions, however, would not hear of submitting to Rome, and gave Josephus the choice of committing suicide or dying at their hands; but at his suggestion they determined to kill one another in a certain order determined by lot, and the cast of fortune left as the last survivors Josephus and another, whom he had little difficulty in persuading to join him in accepting the Roman clemency. We may venture to assert that the transaction cannot have been quite as he describes it, for among those whom he claims to have outwitted were persons by no means so simple as his narrative implies (*BJ* iii. 342).

After this act of submission, Josephus was brought before Vespasian, who had him put in irons, with a view to his being sent to Nero at Rome. The prisoner now asked for a special interview with the commander, at which he announced to Vespasian that the imperial throne would shortly be his. Vespasian was at first inclined to deprecate such language, but, having learned that Josephus had previously shown himself something of a prophet, he took a different attitude. The captive still remained in bonds, indeed, but he was well treated, and at all events nothing more was said about his being sent to Rome.

Suetonius has a statement not unlike this, though differing in details, namely that Josephus firmly maintained, when put in durance, that Vespasian would soon liberate him again, but as the Emperor (Sueton. *Vespas.* 5; Dio Cass. lxvi. 1). The prediction of Josephus must, therefore, have been known to other historians of the period. In point of fact, premonitions and prophecies were at that time fully credited and seriously regarded among all classes, and it is by no means unlikely that Josephus in his precarious situation should have ventured to make such a prediction—hazardous though it was. He vaunts his prophetic gift, and seems to have believed that God had specially favoured him and revealed the future to him (*BJ* iii. 351 f., 405 f., *Vit.* 208). In any case, the special favour shown to him by Vespasian seems to prove that the Emperor felt in some sense indebted to him.

Vespasian was proclaimed Emperor in Alexandria on the 1st, then at Cæsarea on the 3rd, of July, A.D. 69, and Josephus was at once set free (*BJ* iv. 623 ff.). He accompanied the Emperor to Egypt, and in the spring of A.D. 70 joined Titus in his march towards Jerusalem. He was present during the whole siege, acting at the headquarters of Titus as interpreter and commissioner, knowing both the land and the language, and thus taking service with the Romans against his own countrymen (*CA* i. 48 f.). More than once, as he tells us, he unsuccessfully advised his people to abandon their futile resistance (*BJ* v. 114, 261, 361 ff., vi. 94 ff., 118 f., 365); on one occasion, indeed, a stone was hurled at him and he was severely injured (*BJ* v. 541), for the insurgents regarded him as a renegade and a traitor (*BJ* iii. 438). When the city fell, he was able to save a number of prisoners, including his own brother, and to rescue some sacred writings (*Vit.* 417 f.), and he then accompanied Titus to Rome and took part in the Jewish Triumph. Thereafter he permanently resided in the capital. Vespasian allowed him to occupy his own previous dwelling, and granted him a pension and the right of citizenship. He now took the name Flavius Josephus. This gracious treatment was continued by Titus, as also by Domitian and the Empress Domitia. Josephus likewise enjoyed the friendship of Agrippa II. and his household (*Vit.* 364), and it is probable that he kept in touch with eminent Jews in Alexandria and other places, as well as with the Adiabenian chiefs who lived in Rome (*BJ* vi. 356, vii. 147).

His wealth must have been considerable, for his depreciated lands near Jerusalem had been taken by Titus in exchange for better situated properties, and Vespasian supplemented his annual allowance by the gift of another estate in Judæa, which, again, was exempted from taxes by Domitian. He was several times married; his first wife had remained in Jerusalem, and was among the besieged (*BJ* v. 419). Vespasian subsequently gave him a girl-captive, who, however, deserted him in Egypt; thereupon he married a third wife at Alexandria, and by her had three children, one of whom, a son named Hyrcanus, was still living in A.D. 94. Josephus had this marriage annulled in Rome, and then took to wife one of his own race, a woman of good family belonging to Crete, who bore him two children, Justus and Simonides (*Vit.* 414 f., 426 f.). The latter, who had the surname Agrippa, is believed by K. Zangemeister to be the M. Flavius Agrippa mentioned in an inscription found in Cæsarea (*ZDPV* xiii. [1890] 25).

The outward circumstances of Josephus were thus fairly propitious. True, his good fortune was not altogether unbroken. He was hated, and more than once legally indicted, by his countrymen, notably by a certain Jonathan, who had raised some disturbance in Cyrene, and who, having been brought to Rome, denounced Josephus and other leading Jews as the instigators and abettors of the rebellion. Similar things occurred under Titus and Domitian (*BJ* vii. 448 f.; *Vit.* 423 f., 429). But Josephus was always able to clear himself, and retained the favour of the three Flavian Emperors to the last. Among his patrons was also the Emperor's freedman, Epaphroditus, to whom he dedicated his later writings.

The identity of this Epaphroditus is a disputed point. Some scholars, among whom is E. Schürer, identify him with the grammarian of the same name mentioned by Suidas (*s.v.* Ἐπαφρόδιτος)—an opinion with which the present writer cannot agree. Josephus eulogizes his friend as one who administered affairs of the utmost importance, and who had experienced numerous changes of fortune: *ἅτε δὴ μεγάλοις μὲν αὐτὸς ὁμιλήσας πράγμασι καὶ τύχαις πολυτρόποις, ἐν ἅπασι δὲ θαυμαστὴν φύσεως ἐπιδειξάμενος ἰσχὺν καὶ προαίρεσιν ἀρετῆς ἀμετακίνητον* (*AJ* i. 8)—statements which apply, not to the grammarian and scholar, but rather to the freedman, who had previously been

in the service of Nero, and who, under Domitian, acted as chief of the high and powerful royal office *ab epistulis*. He was dismissed in A.D. 95, and executed shortly afterwards (Suetonius, *Domit.* 14; Dio Cass. lxvii. 14). The identification of Epaphroditus is a matter of importance for the chronology of the writings of Josephus (cf. *Prosopographia Imper. Rom.*, Berlin, 1897–98, ii. 36).

We cannot say when Josephus died. For us his life comes to an end with his writings, and these do not carry us beyond the reign of Domitian. We may surmise, if we care, with H. Dodwell (*Dissertationes in Irenæum*, Oxford, 1689, p. 468), that he did not survive Domitian, and that he was involved in the fall of his patron Epaphroditus, or fell a victim to the suspicion manifested by the Emperor in his last days.

2. Works.—We have seen that Josephus spent the later portion of his life, from A.D. 71, in Rome, and it was here that presently he entered upon his literary career. His object was to give the Greeks —a term which probably also covers the educated classes among the Romans—a more thorough knowledge of his own people, and especially of their history and their religion. He accordingly wrote in Greek, which he had doubtless learned while in his native country, and, as he tells us himself (*CA* i. 50; *AJ* xx. 263), he guarded against defects in style by consulting writers of experience. It is certain that he also had some knowledge of Latin, and in one passage he quotes Livy (*AJ* xiv. 68; cf. xix. 270).

(*a*) His first work was the *History of the Jewish War* (Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἰουδαϊκοῦ πολέμου, *de Bello Judaico*)—to give the title which he himself chose, though the MSS show a preference for περὶ ἁλώσεως (*de Captivitate*), which also appears quite early in Christian literature, and is, indeed, used by Origen (*Selecta in Threnos*, iv. 14 [*PG* xiii. 656]). In this work Josephus tells the story of the Jewish insurrection in which he had taken part, first on the national, then on the imperial, side. The book was written after the dedication of the temple of Pax (A.D. 75), and a little before the death of Vespasian (A.D. 79) (*BJ* vii. 158 f.; *Vit.* 361; *CA* i. 50). As Josephus says in his preface, however, he was not the first to write a history of the war.

An account of it had been given immediately after its termination in connexion with the domestic wars which followed the death of Nero; it had also been the subject of more than one monograph, and it engaged the attention of historians subsequent to Josephus. One of the earlier narratives was composed by a certain Antonius Julianus, who likewise took part in the war, and was for a time procurator of Judæa (Minuc. Felix, *Octavius*, xxxiii. 4; *BJ* vi. 238). Josephus himself had previously written an Aramaic account (now lost) of the war for the use of his own people in the East, and it was only after the completion of this that he resolved to make his candid narrative accessible also to the Romans and the Greeks (*BJ* i. 1 ff.). No part of this Aramaic record has come down to us, and we are, therefore, not in a position to fix its relation to the extant Greek narrative. The latter was probably a complete recast, constructed on a more comprehensive plan. A Syriac version of bk. vi. of the *BJ* is preserved in the Peshiṭṭā, the Syriac OT (ed. A. M. Ceriani, Milan, 1876–80). This is not, however, as some have supposed, a survival of the original Aramaic work, but rather a translation from our present Greek text, as is clearly proved by its erroneous renderings (*Fl. Josephi Opera*, ed. Niese, vi. p. xxi).

In his preface to the *BJ*, Josephus proposes, by means of a true and straightforward chronicle, to bring his readers to a better understanding of the Jewish people and of the insurrection.

He then proceeds to give a brief abstract of the work, and opens his narrative (i. 31) with an account of the Maccabæan rising. The first third of the book is entirely devoted to the period between that event and the outbreak of the revolt against Rome (A.D. 66). Then comes the revolt itself: first, its beginnings (ii. 270); then the campaigns of Vespasian in A.D. 67–69 (iii. and iv.); the investment and capture of Jerusalem (v. and vi.); and, lastly (vii.), the final passages of the conflict, down to the taking of Masada (A.D. 72), and the Jewish disturbances in Egypt and Cyrene. His tone is naturally that of a practised in the later Hasmonæan period, from which all the neighbouring peoples suffered so much (Strabo, pp. 761, 763; Diodorus, xl. 2; Justin, xl. ii. 4).

As regards the war itself, Josephus is chiefly concerned to show that the Jewish people, and the aristocracy in particular, were in no wise to blame for it, and that its real instigators were certain fanatical zealots, who tyrannized over the people and coerced them into mutiny. Some degree of blame, no doubt, rested upon Cestius Gallus, the commissioner for Syria, who might have stamped out the rebellion at the outset had he only adopted vigorous measures and not weakly given way (ii. 533 ff.). Nevertheless, the truly guilty parties were the zealots, who remained irreconcilable to the last, and repeatedly rejected the generous terms of peace proposed by Titus. These intransigents were no longer to be counted Jews at all: they had despised the Law and outraged all righteousness; they had desecrated the Temple, with the result that God was not on their side, but vouchsafed His presence to the Roman armies, whose vengeance He permitted to be fully wreaked upon His own people (*BJ* iii. 293, v. 444, 562, vii. 327 f.).

We must conclude, from Josephus's own account, that this presentation is one-sided and unjust, for a large proportion of the Jewish people were heart and soul in favour of rebellion; we see in his perversion of the facts, however, the real explanation of his attitude and of his defection to Rome. He admires the Romans, particularly their martial virtues, their military organization, and their learning (*BJ* ii. 577 ff., iii. 70 ff., 115 ff., v. 47 ff.). His personal situation naturally leads him to accord special praise to Vespasian and his house. He tells us (*Vit.* 361) that he submitted his narrative to Titus, and that the latter impressed his seal upon it and gave orders that it should be published and placed in the public library. It would be a mistake, however, to regard the work as being on that account an official chronicle. Josephus certainly had no Government commission for his task, but wrote entirely on his own initiative. He occasionally alters or distorts his facts to suit his royal patrons. A significant instance of this appears in his narrative regarding the destruction of the Temple.

He informs us that Titus was in no way to blame for the firing of the building, as that prince had decreed in a council of war that it should be spared; but the order was forgotten amidst the exasperation and vehemence of the soldiery, and the sanctuary was given to the flames (*BJ* vi. 236 ff.). Another report, probably traceable to Tacitus, tells a very different story, viz. that Titus gave express orders that the sanctuary should be destroyed (Sulpicius Severus, *Chron.* ii. xxx. 6; Orosius, vii. ix. 6; cf. J. Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandl.*, Berlin, 1885, ii. 159)—a statement to which unquestionably the preference must be given. Similarly, in comparison with a still extant narrative in which Tacitus (*Hist.* ii. 74 f.) tells of Vespasian's elevation to the throne, the account of the same event given by Josephus (*BJ* iv. 588 ff.) is very unsatisfactory, both from its excessive adulation of the Emperor and from its suppression of important facts.

Josephus likewise knows how to mingle self-approbation with his laudations of the Emperor and his family. In particular, he seeks to place his own martial performances in the best light.

He gives a full description of the way in which he so cleverly brought to naught the schemes of his opponents in Galilee (ii. 599 ff., 623 ff.), and of the various stratagems and means of defence which he employed against the Romans in their beleaguerment of Jotapata (iii. 171 ff.), and speaks of the high esteem and admiration which these things evoked among the Romans (*BJ* iii. 319, 348, 393).

Further, the delineation is steeped in rhetoric, in accordance with the style then in vogue in the writing of history, and decked with every ornament and artifice of eloquence. Reports in the direct oration are very copious and sometimes run to a great length: we listen to Herod (*BJ* i. 373 ff.), Annas the high priest, Jesus, Simon the Idumæan (iv. 163, 238, 271), Titus several times (*e.g.* iii. 472), Josephus himself (iii. 362, v. 362 ff., vi. 96 f.), and, finally, Eleazar, in a memorable speech in Masada (vii. 322 ff.). The longest and most finished speech of all is that of King Agrippa II., delivered in Jerusalem just before the outbreak of the revolt (ii. 345). Moreover, the historian has grafted upon his narrative tales and anecdotes of all sorts, such as the story of Judas the Essene (i. 78 f.); he also recounts various,

and occasionally amazing, exploits of war, performed by individuals, both Romans and Jews; he tells of remarkable natural phenomena, such as the river Belos (ii. 189), the Sabbatic river (the Sambation of Rabbinical Judaism; see *JE* x. [1905] 681–683) that flows only every seventh day (vii. 96), and the root Baaras (vii. 180 f.); and, finally, he specifies the various omens which heralded various events (vi. 288). Considerable space is devoted to description—*e.g.*, of the land of Judæa, the Dead Sea, the city of Jerusalem, and the Temple (*BJ* iii. 35, iv. 476 ff., v. 136 ff.). He explicitly states that he has no wish to practise the restraint which in other circumstances is appropriate to the historian (*BJ* i. 11 f., v. 19 f.), and he frequently gives eloquent expression to his feelings—his sorrow over the fall of the Holy City and the Temple, his horror at the enormities of the zealots, and his sympathy with his besieged compatriots. Rhetoric of this type, moreover, readily lends itself to exaggeration, in which Josephus is quite at home. We instance his description of the famine in the besieged city (bks. v. and vi.), which reaches its climax in the well-known story of the woman who kills and eats her own child (vi. 193 ff.). Another example is found in iii. 245, where he relates that a certain Jew had his head struck off by a projectile and carried to a distance of 1800 feet. Josephus affects large numbers, and makes no claim to accuracy in regard to them. Of the numerous instances that might be given we content ourselves with the following: he puts the number of those who perished during the siege at 1,100,000 (vi. 420; cf. v. 567), while, according to Tacitus, the entire multitude of the besieged numbered 600,000 at most (*Hist.* v. 13).

As to the sources from which Josephus drew his materials, we are left to mere conjecture, as he gives us no information on the subject. For the main portion of his work, the history of the rebellion, he could draw upon his own experience, and sometimes even upon what he had actually witnessed. He may also have been, and probably was, indebted to some of the earlier accounts noted above—an inference suggested by the occasional similarity between his work and that of Tacitus (Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 6 f. ‖ *BJ* iv. 476, ii. 189; *Hist.* v. 13 ‖ *BJ* vi. 288 ff., 312 f.). As, however, these earlier accounts have almost entirely disappeared, we can say no more on the matter. Josephus afterwards states (*CA* i. 49) that he kept a record of events during the siege of Jerusalem, but this does not seem very credible. His narrative of the war has been manifestly drawn up chiefly from the Roman point of view. Of the insurgent side he knows very little; *e.g.*, his knowledge of events in Jerusalem before the siege does not go beyond what might have been learned among the Romans themselves.

It is of interest to note that the chronological references are given, not according to the Roman, but according to a Syro-Macedonian calendar, which had been adjusted to the Julian reckoning, and exactly corresponds with the calendar of Tyre known to us from the *Hemerologia*. We might perhaps infer from this that the dates given by Josephus were obtained from a Syrian Greek soldier in the Roman camp; or it is possible that he transferred them from his original Aramaic narrative.

For the first part of the *BJ*, embracing the earlier history of the Jews, he must have been dependent upon older works; but, as, apart from the books of the Maccabees, which he appears not to have used here, a native Jewish chronicle can hardly have existed, Josephus probably excerpted from works in general history such passages as related to his own nation. In this connexion the name of Nicolaus of Damascus is the first to suggest itself—the writer whose chronicle extends till about the close of Herod's reign; but, as Josephus occasionally diverges from him, he must have drawn upon other sources as well. The history of Herod in the *BJ* gives us the impression of being a special composition, and reads almost like an encomium. It was doubtless composed by Josephus himself with a view to its insertion in his work. For the following period, till the beginning of the insurrection, he must have relied mainly upon extant Roman historical works, though he made many additions of his own, such as the description of the three Jewish sects (ii. 119 ff.).

(*b*) The second outstanding work of Josephus is the *Antiquities* (Ἀρχαιολογία Ἰουδαϊκή, *Antiquitates Judaicæ*), which embraces in its twenty books the whole history of his people from the creation of the world to the beginning of the revolt (A.D. 66), and which was completed and published in the 13th year of Domitian, *i.e.* A.D. 93–94 (*AJ* xx. 267)—a number of years after the *BJ*. He tells us that long before, while engaged with the *BJ*, he had entertained the idea of writing such a book; but this statement is belied by the preface to the *BJ*, in which it is expressly said that a work of that kind is now a superfluity, as other writers had been in the field (*AJ* i. 6; *BJ* i. 17). The project of writing the *AJ* must, therefore, have been a later inspiration.

As in the *BJ*, so in the *AJ*, the object of Josephus is to furnish the Hellenes with an accurate delineation of Israelitic and Jewish history, in place of the misrepresentations of unfriendly or malevolent chroniclers.

It must be admitted that the knowledge possessed by educated people of the day in regard to the remoter past of the Jews was as meagre as it was inaccurate (cf. T. Reinach, *Textes d'auteurs grecs et romains relatifs au judaïsme*, Paris, 1895). The interest of the Greeks was practically confined to Moses, the Laws, and the Temple, and at best their ideas of the history of Israel in its entirety were of the vaguest. Current tales about the Jews, some of which, such as that given by Tacitus, *Hist.* v. 6, were altogether fabulous, had mostly passed through Egyptian hands. In Egypt, as is well known, there was from an early period a large Jewish population, and it was in Egypt that investigators first began to interest themselves in the past history of the Jews, although in an altogether hostile spirit. The conflict between Jews and Greeks was not confined to Egypt, but spread to the adjacent country of Cyrene. Similarly in Syria, from Maccabæan times at least, the two peoples were constantly at feud, and this mutual hostility diffused itself through almost every region where Jew and Greek dwelt together, their respective material interests often contributing largely to the strife. The Greek antagonism to the Jews found expression also in literature, leading to vehement attacks upon both their personal characteristics and their national history. In these circumstances Josephus thought it incumbent upon him to give a faithful account of his people's history, in order to disabuse the minds of men, and especially of the Greeks, for here again it is the Greeks for whom he writes (*AJ* i. 5 f., xvi. 174, xx. 262).

Josephus was not the first Jew to undertake the task of systematizing OT history. To say nothing of the Septuagint, other works of a similar kind had already appeared in the field of Alexandrian scholarship. Some of these were known to Josephus, and of their authors he names Demetrius, Eupolemus, and the elder Philo (*CA* i. 218; cf. *BJ* i. 17).

It would appear that the Alexandrian works referred to had not met with much acceptance among the Greeks, their uninviting form being in part responsible. Moreover, none of them had gone beyond the period covered by the canonical Scriptures, while Josephus carries his narrative down to his own time—to the beginning of the rebellion, in fact. His work, accordingly, was much more complete, and harmonized with the taste of his time. The result was that it drove its predecessors from the field, so that, save for a few fragments, they have utterly perished.

He acquaints us with the purpose of his book in the preface (*AJ* i. 1 ff.). In regard to the earlier period, he proposes to relate faithfully the history of the Jews as given in the Scriptures, and these he follows stage by stage from Genesis to Esther. He was admittedly the first to note the constituent elements of the Scriptures, *i.e.* the OT canon, which, according to him, embraces twenty-two books, viz. the five books of Moses, thirteen books from the following epoch terminating with the reign of Artaxerxes I., and four books of Songs and Proverbs (*CA* i. 39 f.). Naturally, he avails himself mainly of the historical books, but he supplements these from the prophets Nahum, Jonah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel. He makes explicit mention likewise of the poetical writings of David and Solomon as well as Haggai and Zechariah (*AJ* vii. 305, viii. 44, ix. 206 ff., 239, x. 32 f., 78 f., 264 ff., xi. 96). He is silent regarding Job, though it does not follow that he did not know of that work. We may assume, in fact, that his OT was, in its component parts, the same as we have it to-day.

To judge from what is said in the introduction and from other passages, he used the original Hebrew, and himself translated this into Greek, being acquainted with, and having recourse to, the Septuagint version of the Pentateuch alone; at all events he makes no mention of a Greek translation of any other portion (*AJ* i. 7 ff., x. 218; *CA* i. 55). It is an interesting but difficult problem to determine which text he used. His work is in a sense our earliest authority in this field, and is of no little value for the history of the OT text. It sometimes happens, as in *AJ* vi. 16, that he alone has preserved the genuine tradition.

It was recognized long ago, however, that Josephus in most cases follows the Septuagint rather than the Hebrew text. He

resorts not only to its phraseology, but also to its explanations and interpretations. Thus, his reckoning of the time that elapsed between the Creation and the Flood, viz. 2262 years, approximates closely to that of the Greek text, but differs widely from that of the Hebrew (*AJ* i. 82); he follows the Septuagint, not the original, in computing the period of Israel's residence in Egypt at 215 years (ii. 318), though he is not always consistent on this point (i. 185); while, again, he repeats the strange mistake of the Septuagint in 1 S (1 K) 25[3], where, confusing the proper name Kâlêb with Kelôb, 'a dog,' it makes Nabal the Calebite a Cynic (vi. 296). He relates the history of Ezra according to the recent Greek version known as 1 Esdras, and the Esther which he used contained the additions found only in the Greek. According to the investigations of Mez (*Die Bibel des Josephus*) in regard to Judges and Samuel, the text he used was that of the so-called Lucianic recension, to which he is, therefore, the earliest witness. Nevertheless, he occasionally, as in *AJ* i. 151. 224, resorts to the Hebrew, where he adopts the place-names Ur in Chaldæa and Mount Moriah; he follows the original also throughout Joshua (*AJ* v.). All this prompts the inquiry whether Josephus really knew Hebrew, as some believe, though it is also denied. The present writer is of opinion that we have not sufficient evidence finally to decide this question, though, as Josephus plumes himself on being one of the most learned men among the Jews (*AJ* xx. 263), we need hardly hesitate to credit him with some knowledge of the ancient tongue. At the same time it should be observed that he makes no distinction between Hebrew and the Aramaic vernacular of his day, and it is at least conceivable that on occasion he read the Scriptures through the medium of an Aramaic paraphrase, *i.e.* a Targum. Special mention is also due to his readings of proper names, in which he often differs widely from the Septuagint, and sometimes approximates to the Massoretic pronunciation; *e.g.*, he writes, not Νῶε or Νώεος, but Νῶχος; not Γοθολία, but Ὀθλία; not Σεδεκίας, but Σαχχίας. It is clear that Josephus represents a pronunciation which differs materially from that generally in use.

Josephus's rendering of the Scripture narrative is, on his own showing, anything but a mere paraphrase, without supplement or abridgment. He threads his recital with the additions and explanations which had been grafted by the exegetes, and especially the Hellenistic interpreters of Alexandria, upon both the historical and the legislative portions. He has thus used the Haggâda as well as the Halâkhâ. The latter appears mainly in his description of the Mosaic legislation (*AJ* iv. 199 ff.), while Haggadic elements, legends, etc., occur with special frequency in bk. i., as the patriarchal tradition given there readily lent itself to such supplementary or explanatory matter.

As an instance of this we may refer to the table of nations given in Gn 10, which Josephus harmonized with the geographical ideas of his day (*AJ* i. 122 ff.). A legendary addition is found in i. 69 f., where, in conformity with Bab. traditions, he tells us that the descendants of Seth erected two memorial pillars just before the Flood, in order that the sciences and inventions of the day might remain on record for future generations. Perhaps the most remarkable insertion of all is that narrating the campaign which Moses, as an Egyptian prince, conducted against the Ethiopians, and which was brought to a close by his marriage with the daughter of the Ethiopian king (*AJ* ii. 238 ff.; for Jewish midrashim cf. *JE* ix. [1905] 48). This is really an attempt to solve the difficulty of the Cushite wife of Moses mentioned in Nu 12[1].

We cannot always identify the sources from which he drew such things, but he certainly reveals a close affinity with noted Hellenists, such as Demetrius and Eupolemus. Philo the Younger, the most celebrated of all Hellenistic writers, was likewise not unknown to Josephus, who, however, does not quote from him, but merely mentions him as the spokesman of the Jewish deputation to the Emperor Gaius (*AJ* xviii. 259). He applies, in common with Philo, the allegorical method of interpretation — *e.g.*, in his description of the Tabernacle and other institutions of the Jewish cultus (*AJ* iii. 180 ff.; cf. Philo, ed. T. Mangey, London, 1742, ii. 150); according to *AJ* i. 24, Moses himself in some cases wrote allegorically. A similar correspondence appears in the narrative of Balaam, as given in *AJ* iv. 126 ff., and Philo, ii. 127 f., respectively.

In many other matters, however, Josephus and Philo differ widely: the history of Moses, for instance, is reproduced by Josephus in a form quite unlike that given by Philo. Some would trace back the Ethiopian campaign just mentioned to Artapanus; but, while that writer does tell (*ap.* Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* ix. 27) of a war waged by Moses against the Ethiopians, he has in mind a different event altogether, so that the theory of Josephus having borrowed from him is out of the question. In brief, the enlargements and importations of Josephus cannot be definitely assigned to their respective sources. In all probability he had at command a substantial quantity of exegetic materials, including oral traditions, and chose what suited his purpose. It would appear as if in many of his sources text and tradition had already been fused together.

His chronology of the Old Testament period presents considerable difficulties. He expanded the chronological references of the Scriptures into a system. Thus *BJ* contains calculations running back from the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus to the days of Abraham (vi. 268, 435 ff.), and in the *AJ* the system is recast and carried out in its several parts (i. 82 ff., 148 f., ii. 318, vii. 65, 68, viii. 61 f., ix. 280, x. 143, 147, xi. 112, xx. 230 ff.). In this he is probably following the example of Hellenistic experts, two of whom, Demotrius and Eupolemus, had won some repute as chronologists.

The details of his system are often inconsistent with each other. Such discrepancies have been explained on the theory that Josephus, using a variety of documents, followed now one and now another, without calculating for himself. Objections have been brought against this view by Destinon, who shows that Josephus obtained some, at least, of his results by computations based upon his own narrative; but, even so, his discrepancies are not all removed. Further, while we must certainly bear in mind that the MSS themselves manifest considerable variation in regard to chronology, and that many of the apparent inconsistencies may be due to copyists' errors, and may be eliminated by conjecture, this expedient should be adopted only with the greatest care, and, when all is done, difficulties still remain. On the whole it seems impossible to deduce from Josephus a consistent system of chronology, or even to show that he had one, and in this respect his work is of a somewhat careless kind.

The personal standpoint of Josephus is fixed by his religion and his position in life; he is a Jew, a priest, and a Pharisee. History teaches, in his opinion, that prosperity attends those who fear God, while the godless and the disobedient are duly punished (*AJ* i. 14, 20, xx. 48, 89). He is convinced that the world is ordered by divine providence; in a noteworthy passage (*AJ* x. 277 f.) he denounces the Epicureans, whom he puts on a level with the Sadducees, while the Pharisees correspond to the Stoics (*Vit.* 12). His views regarding God, destiny, and the human soul are in line with Pharisaic teaching, as appears also from the *BJ* (v. 376 ff., vi. 267, 310, iii. 374, vii. 341), although he occasionally dilutes his Judaism with the conceptions of Greek philosophy, even showing some inclination towards pantheism (*AJ* vi. 230, viii. 107). Nor is this to be wondered at, for Josephus is no logical theologian or philosopher, but is concerned, above all, to make Jewish history and Jewish character intelligible to the Greeks, and at the same time to present these things in the most favourable light. He accordingly takes pains to remove or to palliate the more sinister or repulsive elements, to bring the marvellous within the bounds of credibility, and to overlay the OT history with a Hellenic gloss.

Abraham appears as a reformer of religion and science, as the founder of monotheism, and even as the pioneer of astronomy and arithmetic in Egypt (*AJ* i. 154 f., 166 f.). Josephus speaks of the Psalms of King David very much as if they were the productions of a Greek lyrical poet (vii. 305). The terebinth at Mamre he hellenizes as Ὀγυγία δρῦς, the Ogygian oak (i. 180), and, similarly, the altar which Moses set up after his victory over the Amalekites is said to have been dedicated to the God of Victory, θεὸς νικαῖος (iii. 60)—an idea of which there is no trace in Ex 17[15]. When Josephus ascribes to Moses two works, viz. *Politeia* and *Nomoi* (iv. 194, 196, 302), it is manifest that he has in his mind the two great works of Plato bearing these names—the law-giver being the precursor of the philosopher. It is likewise from Plato (*Legg.* iii. 676 ff.) that Josephus borrows the account of men's descent from the hills to the plains after the Flood (*AJ* i. 109); and the patriarchal history in bk. i. affords, on the whole, the most numerous and the clearest instances of his hellenizing and modernizing methods. He makes no mention of the worship of the golden calf; he transforms into statues the golden tumours offered by the Philistines to their idols (vi. 10; cf. 1 S [1 K] 6[4]), and the 100 *præputia* of the Philistines which David was required to bring to Saul into 600 heads (vi. 201; cf. 1 S [1 K]

18[25]), seeking in this way to modify or expunge the specifically Jewish features of the narrative. Closely connected herewith is his attempt to meet the attacks and aspersions commonly made upon the Jews, or upon Moses and his laws (i. 10, ii. 177, iii. 179, 265, vii. 116 ff. ; cf. xiv. 187).

In order to invest the Mosaic legislation with a character of extraordinary humaneness and clemency, Josephus does not scruple to supplement the traditional text with enlargements of his own (iv. 207, 234); and to win the suffrages of Hellenism he intersperses the confirmatory testimonies of secular historians. Of these the most outstanding are Herodotus (*AJ* viii. 157, 253, 260), the Annals of Tyre (viii. 144 ff., 324, ix. 283 f.), Berossus (i. 93, 107, 158, x. 20, 34, 219), the Sibylline Oracles (i. 118), Alexander Polyhistor (i. 240), and Nicolaus of Damascus (i. 94, 108, 159 ff., vii. 101 ff.), all noted and distinguished names.

With the book of Esther and the period of Artaxerxes, Josephus reaches the end of the OT narrative (xi. 296), and this marks the beginning of the second section of the *AJ*. At the very outset a lacuna occurs in the tradition, which extends to the time of the Maccabæan revolt. For this interval of three centuries, embracing the reigns of Alexander, the early Ptolemys, and the Seleucidæ, Josephus had only disconnected legends of later Alexandrian origin.

There is, first of all, the visit of Alexander to Jerusalem, with all that preceded and followed it (xi. 297 ff.), for the account of which Josephus is indebted to an apocryphal work which was of later date, at all events, than the Book of Daniel (xi. 337). For the narrative of the Seventy and their translation of the Mosaic law-books (xii. 11–118) his authority was the still extant Letter of Aristeas, while the sections which follow, embracing the semi-legendary narratives of Antiochus the Great and the Jews Josephus and Hyrcanus (xii. 137 ff., 155 ff.), appear to have had a similar source.

The beginning of a new era for the Jews is really marked by the Maccabæan rising: it was then that they took their place in universal history, and came within the range of Greek writers, so that we have firm historical ground beneath our feet. The basis of the Maccabæan history as given by Josephus is 1 Mac. (*AJ* xii. 242–xiii. 212), for the existence of which work he is our earliest authority; he is of no small importance also for its textual criticism; but his use of it extends only to the death of Jonathan, the later portion (13[30ff.]) apparently being of no service to him as a source.

Various explanations of this fact may be offered. Destinon puts forward the theory that the 1 Mac. used by Josephus was different from ours, and that the final section, embracing the period of Simon, had not as yet been added. To the present writer, however, it seems more probable that Josephus discarded 1 Mac. at the point where it narrates the death of Jonathan because he now wished to work upon the basis of his own earlier account in the *BJ* ; for there are facts to show that, while he did not use the concluding part of 1 Mac., he was certainly acquainted with it. Of 2 Mac. he seems to have had no knowledge; but it is, nevertheless, probable that he was indebted directly or indirectly to its source, viz. Jason of Cyrene, for some of his materials. *AJ* xii. 257 ff., *e.g.*, has no corresponding passage in 1 Mac., but it has points of contact with 2 Mac. 6[2], and, therefore, probably emanates from Jason. Another such insertion is found in xiii. 62—an account of the temple of Onias in Egypt. Further, in the narrative of 1 Mac., Josephus has made some alterations of his own: thus, to take a special instance, he asserts that Judas Maccabæus was high priest—a statement that carries other changes in its train. He has also transferred some materials from his own previous work, the *BJ*, so that, taken all in all, his divergencies from 1 Mac. are by no means inconsiderable. Finally, mention must be made of another characteristic of the *AJ*, viz. hostility to the Samaritans—a feature not found in the older writings, and first brought into relief by Josephus. This attitude is not confined to his record of the Maccabæan period, but manifests itself as far back as ix. 290 f., giving occasion for manifold enlargements of greater or less extent. The last passage of this class is xiii. 74 ff., which narrates the conflict between Jews and Samaritans in Egypt under Ptolemy Philometor. We may venture to infer from this that in the days of Josephus the antagonism between the orthodox Jews and the Samaritans was more pronounced than usual.

For the period beginning with Simon the high priest (xiii. 213), Josephus took the *BJ*, in revised and enlarged form, as his groundwork in the *AJ*. The two narratives are often quite identical, though verbal reproduction in passages of any length (with the exception of *AJ* xiv. 480 f. = *BJ* i. 352 f.) is avoided. This agreement was formerly explained on the hypothesis that both works were drawn from a common source; the present writer once shared this opinion, but now regards it as erroneous, believing that Josephus simply incorporated in his later work a revised transcript of his earlier. As a matter of fact, the *BJ* is a work of unique character, composed according to the writer's own special design, and it is scarcely conceivable that any work capable of serving as a common source was previously in existence. Corroboration of the theory that the *AJ* is an expansion of the *BJ* is provided also by the inconsistencies and dislocations found in the former, as these would naturally occur where new material was imperfectly grafted upon the pre-existing text; a palpable instance of this appears in the account of Pompey (*AJ* xiv. 37–44 ; cf. *BJ* i. 131).

Upon this older substructure Josephus superimposed a great deal—so much, in fact, that his additions, especially in the later books, greatly exceed the original in point of quantity. They are of many kinds; first of all may be mentioned the testimonies of various historians, such as Strabo, Timagenes, Nicolaus, Livy; and to these we may add Agatharchides and Polybius, whom he had already quoted (xii. 5 f., 135 f.). Then there are the more or less extensive enlargements upon the earlier work which appear in the last third of the *AJ*. Josephus has not divulged his authorities for these enlargements, and we must, therefore, depend upon conjectures which, in the present state of our knowledge, are most uncertain.

It is very unlikely that he directly availed himself of the Commentaries of King Herod, which he mentions once (xv. 174), and the most natural suggestion is that he relied upon the historians whom he now and again quotes (*e.g.*, Strabo and Nicolaus of Damascus. There is no doubt that the latter in particular was largely drawn upon by Josephus (as was suggested above in regard to the *BJ*), more especially, though not exclusively, for the time of Herod; for Nicolaus, as is well known, was a friend of Herod, and was likewise acquainted with Jewish history from the earliest times. As, however, he is not only quoted in the *AJ*, but also criticized and corrected (xiv. 8 f., xvi. 183 f.), Josephus must have had other sources of information as well; nor must we forget his own redaction, for he was anything but a verbal plagiarist. As regards the post-Augustan period, he must have depended upon later writers. In this section he inserts several fairly long supplements, such as the account of Agrippa I. (xviii. 127 ff., xix. 292 ff.), of the Babylonian Jews (xviii. 310 ff.), and of the Adiabenian princes who had embraced Judaism (xx. 17 ff.). He would, no doubt, derive a good deal of information from his personal intercourse with the house of Agrippa, and with his own more eminent co-religionists, including the Adiabenians. Moreover, he must have availed himself of works dealing with Roman imperial history (cf. xx. 154); and from these he sometimes takes facts and incidents having little or no connexion with the Jews—*e.g.*, the embroilments with Parthia under Tiberius (xviii. 30 ff., 96 ff.). An account of the death of the Emperor Gaius, the bitter enemy of the Jews, is given with great diffuseness (xix. 1–211), and is adapted, T. Mommsen conjectures (*Hermes*, iv. [1869] 329), from the historian Cluvius Rufus, though it may quite well have come from some other source.

Besides his classical authorities, however, Josephus also made use of native Jewish traditions. From the latter come the history of the Temple, and the annals of the successive high priests from bk. xi. onwards, while the whole work is brought to a conclusion by a second historical sketch of the high priesthood (xx. 224 ff.), quite independent of the earlier, as appears from the fact that it omits—rightly—the name of Judas Maccabæus from the list. To these native contributions belong likewise the numerous, and sometimes very extraordinary, Jewish legends, a number of which reappear in the Talmudic writings—*e.g.*, what is told of Hyrcanus I., and of his relations with the Pharisees and the Sadducees (xiii. 288 ff.), and the story of Onias the Just (xiv. 21 f.); but there are many more, and their historical value is of the slightest (cf. xiv. 106 f., xv. 319 ff., 367 ff., xvi. 1 ff.).

Special notice is due to the documents and letters here and there inserted by Josephus. Some of these are simply transferred from their sources, where they already form part of the narrative, and are still to be found in Ezra and Esther, in 1 Mac. and the Letter of Aristeas. To this class in all likelihood belong also the Edicts of Antiochus III. (xii.

138–153), the genuineness of which is not unreasonably doubted.

A different judgment must be passed upon the fairly numerous Roman edicts or decrees of the Senate: the *plebiscita* enacted in favour of the Jews by Greek communities, mainly in Asia Minor; and certain official deeds dating from the reign of Claudius (xiii. 259 ff., xiv. 144 ff., 186 ff., 304 ff., xvi. 160 ff., xix. 280 ff., 303 ff., xx. 11 ff.). These have no bearing whatever upon the narrative, or practically none; thus, to give a salient instance, there is found in xiv. 186 ff. a quite promiscuous collection of records emanating from the most various periods. But their genuineness is past dispute, and is admitted by all. Most of them, and especially those massed together at xiv. 186 ff., were presumably brought together by Nicolaus of Damascus for use in the process against the cities of Asia Minor which the Jews brought before Marcus Agrippa—King Herod being also in attendance—in 16 B.C. It was Nicolaus who conducted this case for the Jews, and he seems to have inserted his speech, together with the relevant documents, into his histories, so that Josephus had but to transfer them to his own work (xii. 125 ff., xvi. 27 ff.). The deeds of later date had, of course, a different origin. The three edicts of xix. 280 ff. go hand in hand; the first two, as appears from xix. 310, were articulated with the third.

We note, finally, that from the earliest possible point, viz. the Persian period (xi.), chronological references were inserted by Josephus at the appropriate places. For this purpose he availed himself of the chronological schemes then to hand, and took the Graeco-Roman reckoning as his standard, thus bringing Jewish history within the range of universal chronology. The task was not without its difficulties, and at one point, indeed, a violation of the text was necessary; the Artaxerxes who, according to 1 Es 2, reigned between Cyrus and Darius I. had to give place to Cambyses (xi. 21 f.).

In the *AJ*, as in the *BJ*, Josephus took great pains with the form of his narration. He introduces several fairly long speeches—*e.g.*, ii. 140 ff., xv. 127 ff., xvi. 31 ff., xix. 167 ff.—and he exerts himself throughout to write with vigour and elegance. Good examples of his style will be found in iv. 11 ff., vi. 327 ff., xviii. 310 ff., xix. 1 ff. In this work, however, he puts more restraint upon himself than in the *BJ*, the diction of the *AJ* showing a change in the direction of simplicity. The contrast in style is best seen in passages which are substantially the same in both works. Thus Herod's address to his soldiers as reported in *AJ* xv. 127 ff. is quite different from what appears in *BJ* i. 373 ff. In general, Josephus endeavours in the later work to fill out his earlier delineation. An example of this is provided by the section dealing with the Jewish parties, which is inserted at the same point in both narratives (*AJ* xviii. 11 ff.; *BJ* ii. 119 ff.). Great interest attaches to his relation to Thucydides, whom he specially chose as his model for the *AJ*, more particularly in bks. xvi.–xix., where he even employs forms of the old Attic dialect, as he does nowhere else, and is manifestly at pains to emulate the great historian in his form of expression, his massive sentence-construction, and his fullness of thought. Nor can it be denied, finally, that in the *AJ* Josephus has changed his views with respect to many things and persons discussed in the *BJ*, and utters a different verdict regarding them. An instance of this is found in *AJ* xx. 198 ff. (cf. *Vit.* 193 ff.), which treats of the high priest Ananos the younger, and from which we derive an entirely different impression of the man from that gained from the story, and especially the characterization, of the corresponding passage in the *BJ* (iv. 318 ff.).

(*c*) *The Autobiography of Josephus* (Βίος Ἰωσήπου) forms a sequel to the *AJ*. It is appended to the latter without break or introduction, and at the close is distinctly spoken of as belonging to the larger work (*Vit.* 430; cf. *AJ* xx. 266). It is likewise dedicated to Epaphroditus, and was composed, as is indicated in the last chapter, in the reign of Domitian, being published, of course, at the same time as the *AJ*, *i.e.* A.D. 93–94.

We emphasize this point, as other writers, including E. Schürer, are of opinion that the book was written after A.D. 100, in the reign of Trajan. It is true that, according to *Vit.* 359, Agrippa II. was dead at the time of composition, and Photius, *Bibl. Cod.* 33 (p. 6b, 31, ed. I. Bekker, Berlin, 1824–25), states that he died in the 3rd year of Trajan, *i.e.* A.D. 100. Photius, however, must have made an error here. The concluding words of the *Vita* put it absolutely beyond doubt that the work was composed while Domitian was still alive. The death of Agrippa, moreover, is actually presupposed in a passage of the *AJ* (xvii. 28), and must, accordingly, have taken place in the reign of Domitian.

In this smaller work the primary object of Josephus is to vindicate his line of action during his tenure of the chief command in Galilee, and he accordingly treats with special fullness of his relations with the cities of Tiberias and Sepphoris, as also with John of Gischala, thus providing a supplement to the *BJ*, with prelude and epilogue narrating his earlier and his later life respectively. The book was written by way of a rejoinder to the charges of his countryman, Justus of Tiberias, who likewise had played a part in the rebellion, but had latterly taken service with Agrippa II., and had, shortly before, published a history of the Jewish revolt, in which he challenged Josephus and his account of the war, arraigning him as leading instigator of the rebellion, and exhibiting his conduct, especially in his relations with the Romans and Agrippa, in a most unfavourable light. In his *Autobiography*, Josephus seeks to rebut these charges, and from his self-defence we can deduce approximately the strictures of his assailant. When he comes to discuss his relations with John of Gischala, with whom he had dealt in the *BJ*, he gives once more no very flattering picture. Josephus tries to show that it has been his own constant endeavour to maintain peace, and to protect the interests of the Romans and of Agrippa. In reading his book we must use the greatest care and vigilance—all the more so as it frequently conflicts with the *BJ*, both in substance and in the order of events, and sometimes without any assignable reason. Besides his main motive of self-justification, Josephus seems to have been influenced by a desire to compose a fresh and interesting narrative, and one that would make the most of his courage and his shrewdness.

(*d*) The last, and perhaps the most interesting, work of Josephus consists of the two books *Against Apion*.

This is the usual title of the book, but it can hardly have come from Josephus himself. It makes its first appearance in Eusebius, *HE* III. ix. 4, and is repeated by Jerome (*de Vir. Illust.* 13), thence finding its way into the editions of Josephus and into current usage. It is appropriate, however, only to the second book, as Apion is not even mentioned in the first. There are other two titles with good traditional authority in their favour, viz. (1) *Of the Antiquity of the Jews* (περὶ ἀρχαιότητος Ἰουδαίων), which, again, is pertinent only to the first book; and (2) *Against the Greeks* (πρὸς Ἕλληνας), which is somewhat too general, and can scarcely be attributed to the author. In view of these differences in the tradition, we may perhaps assume that the two books originally bore some name implying their controversial character *ἀντιρρητικοί* or *ἀντιρρητικοὶ λόγοι*.

Like the *AJ*, the *CA* is dedicated to Epaphroditus, who died, as has already been noted, in A.D. 95, and it must, therefore, have been written some time anterior to that date, *i.e.* very shortly after the *AJ*. It is a defence of the Jews against the imputations made by Greek writers, which Josephus had, on occasion, tried to ward off in the *AJ*. But his arguments had not carried conviction; the voice of calumny was not silenced; and he felt that he must have recourse to his pen once more, in order to furnish a thoroughgoing and final refutation of the charges, which had at length, it appears, been massed together by Apion, the well-known grammarian of Alexandria. This Apion was the leader of an Alexandrian deputation to Rome in connexion with the conflicts between the Jews and his fellow-citizens which occurred in the

reign of Gaius, and he took occasion at this juncture to draw up an indictment against the hated race—a theme upon which he had previously touched in his *Aegyptiaca*.

Josephus first of all impugns the assertion that the Jews were a people of recent origin—an assertion made on the ground that none of the great Hellenic historians had mentioned them. The Hellenes, he maintained, were entirely without warrant in claiming that they alone were in possession of the most ancient historical learning, when, as a matter of fact, their records were quite modern, and their early history was unreliable. The Oriental peoples generally had memorials going back to a much more remote era, while the Jews had for ages preserved their archives with the greatest care. The silence of the classical Greek historians was due simply to the geographical position of the Jews. Josephus then sets forth the testimonies of Egyptian, Babylonian, and Phœnician historians, in order to prove that the Hebrew people had a far more ancient history than the Greeks (*CA* i. 73–160); he proceeds to show that even Greek authors of considerable antiquity were acquainted with the Jews, and had spoken of them with respect (i. 161–214); and he comes at length to the tales of Manetho, Chairemon, and others regarding the exodus from Egypt, subjecting them to careful examination, and showing them to be unworthy of credit. In bk. ii. Josephus joins issue with Apion, and refutes the strictures passed by the latter upon the person of Moses, the claim of the Jews to the free citizenship of Alexandria, and the Jewish religion (ii. 1–124). Finally, by way of rebutting the accusations made against the religious practices of the Jews, Josephus once more summarizes the salient elements of the Mosaic Law, and contrasts the God-fearing character of the Jews with the religious indifference and the immoral mythology of heathendom (ii. 145–296).

The work is composed with considerable skill. The criticism of the various stories about the exodus of the Jews from Egypt is altogether to the point, their inconsistencies and other defects being most appositely exposed. Josephus himself is of opinion that the Jews were one with the Hyksos, and uses this identification to fix the date of the exodus. His arguments are not seldom defective, as, *e.g.*, in his attempt to compute the date of Solomon's reign according to the Tyrian annals (i. 116 ff.); he suppresses or distorts many things, the clearest instances of which are connected with the Jewish right of citizenship in Alexandria. The assertion that this right was granted by Alexander the Great or Ptolemy I. is unquestionably a fabrication. Among the authors cited by him, moreover, names are found which are open to suspicion or simply forged, though he has, in this connexion, preserved most valuable passages from the ancient historical literature, and especially from the annals of Egypt, Babylonia, and Tyre. Some of these had already been given in the *AJ*. It is no easy matter to identify the sources from which he drew all this lore. He may possibly have borrowed a good deal of it from Apion himself. In Rome, which was at that time a great emporium for Greek literature and scholarship, he would find no difficulty in securing the learned equipment requisite for his polemics.

A question may be raised as to the specific occasion of the booklet. This can scarcely have been the indictment framed by Apion, for at the time when Josephus wrote, *i.e.* A.D. 94 or 95, the pamphlet of Apion and the whole controversy which it had evoked were fifty years old. It is conjectured by A. von Gutschmid that the revolt of the Jews had been the means of producing a fresh crop of anti-Jewish writings, and that it was these that moved Josephus to take up the challenge once more. His own words seem to imply that the campaign of defamation had been quite recently renewed—just after the publication of the *AJ*, in fact (*CA* i. 2)—and this would bring us to the closing years of Domitian's reign. About this time several persons were by the Emperor's orders put to death on account of their leanings to Judaism—a procedure which tended to revive the old charge of atheism (Dio Cass. lxvii. 14). In many respects the pamphlet is a continuation and expansion of the *AJ*; it was written with the same object in view, it followed immediately upon the larger work, and its contents had for the most part been outlined in the *AJ* (cf. *AJ* i. 16–82, ii. 177, iii. 179, 265). Josephus must, therefore, have taken it in hand immediately after the latter.

(*c*) In addition to his extant works, Josephus had other literary projects in view, which in all probability, however, were never carried out.

Already in the *BJ* (v. 237, 247) he had announced a book which was to deal with Jerusalem, the Temple, the sacrifices, and the worship, but this must have remained an aspiration only, as otherwise he would assuredly have mentioned it, or quoted from it, in his subsequent writings. At a later period, again, he meditated a theological work of a similar kind, for at the end of the *AJ* (xx. 268) he announces four books upon God, His nature, and the grounds of the mandates and prohibitions of the Mosaic Laws, and, as he refers several times to this projected work (*e.g.*, *AJ* i. 25, 29, iii. 223, iv. 198, 302, *CA* i. 92), he must have drafted some definite plan for it. It was to be a kind of aetiology of the Laws, probably with explanations in the style of the rationalizing allegories of Philo. Whether the work was ever actually written we do not know; certainly not a single trace of it survives. Further, according to *AJ* xx. 267, Josephus intended to write another historical volume which should deal once more with the Jewish war, and follow the fortunes of the Jews till the date of writing. He more than once alludes to this forthcoming narrative (*e.g.*, *AJ* xvii. 28, xix. 366), but it must remain open to question whether it was ever given to the public.

Finally, in numerous passages of the *AJ* we meet with references (indicated by the phrase *καθὼς ἐν ἄλλοις δεδηλώκαμεν* or *δεδήλωται*) to an earlier work, which have caused much perplexity among expositors, and given rise to various conjectures. These references bear upon events in general history, and they punctuate the narrative from Philip and Alexander the Great (xi. 305) to the battle of Philippi (xiv. 301), appearing again in the passage dealing with the reign of Tiberius (xviii. 54). They suggest the thought that Josephus had produced still another historical composition.

A. von Gutschmid and H. Druner suppose that this work was an unpublished first draft of the *AJ*; others, that it was a commentary on Daniel—for, according to Jerome *in Iesai.* 11 (ed. Vallarsi, iv. 451 [*PL* xxiv. 377]), Josephus had occupied himself with the interpretation of the year-weeks of Daniel. As Josephus himself makes no mention of any such work either in connexion with the prophecies of Daniel (*AJ* x. 269 ff.) or elsewhere, both conjectures are equally improbable. Further, Jerome cannot be speaking here from his own knowledge, but must have borrowed the annotation from Porphyry, and repeated it inaccurately. It is, therefore, conjectured by Destinon that Josephus, in mere carelessness, took over even the quotation-phrase from the source which he was using; but this also is an unlikely theory, and gives no satisfactory explanation of the facts. On the whole, therefore, the references form an unsolved riddle. They may mean nothing more than that Josephus had a liking for a well-sounding phrase; and it is to be borne in mind that similar untraceable references are found also in the *BJ* vii. 215, 244, and in the first half of the *AJ*—*e.g.*, vi. 322, vii. 89, x. 30. It is obvious that in this matter Josephus was not particularly scrupulous.

3. **Value and significance.**—Josephus was assuredly no historian of the first rank, no conscientious or unbiased inquirer, seeking truth alone, but a writer whose supreme object was to produce a certain impression. Like other historians, he is not unwilling to afford his readers pleasure as well as instruction (*AJ* i. 13, xviii. 128 f.), but the leading motive of all that he writes is that of the apologist. Though he did not overlook the needs of his countrymen (*AJ* iv. 197), yet it was preeminently the Greeks—the Romans being included under that term—that he had in view (*AJ* i. 5 ff., xvi. 174). It is his ambition to dissipate the prejudice against the Jews, to repel the imputations cast upon them, and to mitigate the antagonism between Jew and Greek. With such objects in view he endeavours to present the history of his nation in the most favourable light. His apologetic purpose reveals itself also in the selection of his documents, for he quotes with the intention of showing the favour in which the Jews had been held by the great monarchs, as well as by the Romans themselves (*AJ* xiv. 186, xvi. 174 ff.). Truth is sacrificed to tendency; for, though he asserts that he will set down nothing but the truth, and the whole truth (*AJ* x. 218, xiv. 1), he does not keep his promise. He omits and he adds; he very frequently quotes from his authorities in very casual fashion; and, accordingly, the Biblical narratives sometimes receive from his hands an entirely new complexion. He also availed himself of all the resources which the art of rhetoric then provided, in order that he might render his narrative forcible and attractive. In spite of these defects, however, we cannot afford to disparage him. When we remember the rarity of

literary culture and ability among the Jews of that day, and their meagre interest even in their own history (*AJ* xx. 264), we must allow that Josephus compares very favourably with his compatriots. He attained to a highly creditable standard of historical knowledge and literary proficiency, with the result that his writings are a perfect mine of most valuable historical material. He has produced a very remarkable body of work, often showing a high degree of skill; and these things we must still place to his credit even if we assume his partial dependence upon literary auxiliaries. His craftsmanship displays itself in all his writings, principally and most unmistakably in the *AJ*, and particularly in the second half, where he had to combine a great mass of materials from different sources. He was in no sense a mere copyist, stringing authorities together in mechanical fashion, but had the faculty of combining them into a genuine unity; for example, at the beginning of bk. xii. he welded Aristeas's account of the Seventy with what precedes, and filled up the lacunæ between the two passages. Sometimes, of course, he is less successful: his documents are often combined in quite a superficial way; one considerable section (*AJ* xiv. 213 ff.) is simply a disordered heap, quite unrelated to the tenor of the narrative. At the same time, we must concede that it would have taxed any historian to bring these documents into an articulate and organic unity, and we may congratulate ourselves that he preserved them at all. Our knowledge of the history of later Judaism is in the main derived from him. Beneath all his partisanship and his rhetorical language lies a goodly nucleus of important information. His defects are by no means peculiar to him, but are shared by many other historians, and they may at least serve to give us a better idea of the literary methods and style in vogue at that day. Even the speeches, though not authentic, but composed by Josephus himself, are not without value. They are of interest in relation to the technique of the art of rhetoric, and sometimes contain valuable material; *e.g.*, the great speech of Agrippa (*BJ* ii. 357 ff.) gives us a survey of the various Roman provinces, and of the distribution of the imperial forces, which is signally interesting and must have cost the writer considerable labour.

The work of Josephus at all events fell in with the taste of his readers, and won him approval and renown in after generations. It is recorded that he was honoured in Rome with a statue, and his writings were placed in the library of Rome (Eusebius, *HE* III. ix. 2; Jerome, *de Vir. Illust.* 13). He became the classical historian of the Jewish people, and it is safe to say that he was counted among the most celebrated authors of antiquity. This estimate was due not only to the substance, but also in great degree to the form, of his writings; for the rhetorical and highly embellished style of description, which so soon palls upon the modern reader, was regarded in ancient times as a merit, or even as an indispensable quality in historical composition. The style of Josephus, therefore, evoked both admiration and imitation; we need only refer to the numerous testimonies compiled by Hudson and Haverkamp in their respective editions. It was among his own countrymen that his works were read least of all. They looked upon him as a deserter and a traitor; and, their interest in history being of the slightest, he exercised no perceptible influence upon their literature. The affinities which exist between his works and the later Talmudic literature are usually, and perhaps rightly, explained by the theory of a common dependence upon oral tradition. All the more did he find readers among the Greeks, and perhaps also among the Romans. That Tacitus made use of his works, as many believe, remains very doubtful, and certainly cannot be proved. Nor does Suetonius, who mentions his name (*Vespas.* 5), seem to have read him. One of the first to quote him is the Neo-Platonist Porphyry. It was in Christian circles that his repute was highest. An author like Josephus, who stood upon the ground of the OT and the Law, and who had, nevertheless, wrought himself free from the narrow limits of Judaism as it then was, and who interpreted the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple as a penalty inflicted by God, had so much in common with Christian writers that they could look upon him almost as one of themselves. We must regard the evangelist Luke as being the first to make use of his works, not a few well-attested indications of such dependence being found alike in the third Gospel and in the Acts of the Apostles.

4. Relation to Christ.—The problem of the attitude of Josephus to Christ and Christianity is of considerable importance. We find in *AJ* xviii. 63 f., appended to an account of the administration of Pontius Pilate, a short chapter about Christ, which has a place in all our MSS, and which was quoted by Eusebius and many others after him. What is said here about Christ, however, does not take the form of a narrative, such as we should expect from a historian, but is, in the main, a eulogy, and of a kind that only a Christian could have written. But, as Josephus, alike in feeling and in utterance, is always a Jew, and, indeed, a Jewish priest, never manifesting the slightest hint of the Christian standpoint, the general consensus of investigators has long ago decided that the passage is spurious. Some regard the whole passage as an interpolation; others, such as A. von Gutschmid and T. Reinach (*REJ* xxxv. [1897] 1–18), try to rescue a portion of it, supposing that a genuine paragraph has been supplemented and re-cast from a Christian point of view, and seeking to restore it to its original form. This view appears to the present writer untenable; the whole chapter forms so obviously an indivisible unity that, if any part of it is a fabrication, the whole of it must be so, and ought to be removed from the text altogether. If objection be alleged to this conclusion on the ground that Josephus could not have completely ignored Jesus, it may be replied that he records only such events in Jewish history as attracted the attention of foreigners by disturbances or otherwise, and led to the intervention of Rome—conditions which apply neither to the work of Jesus nor to His death, so that the silence of Josephus provides no difficulty. Further, if in reality he had written some account of Jesus, this would have been found in the *BJ*, for the Jewish history found in the *AJ*, so far as it relates to Jerusalem and Judæa, is essentially a reproduction of the earlier narrative. Since, then, he makes no mention of Christ in the *BJ*, his silence regarding Him in the *AJ* is precisely what we might expect. Finally, it should be noted that Origen (*in Matth.* x. 17; *c. Cels.* i. 47 [*PG* xiii. 877, xi. 745, 748]) is not aware of the testimony of Josephus to Christ; hence the passage in dispute was probably interpolated after his time, though before the time of Eusebius.

The motive of the interpolation is no mystery: it was desirable that there should be some mention of Jesus in the works of Josephus, some note in harmony with the Christian view, and, naturally enough, this was inserted in connexion with the governorship of Pilate. But the course of the narrative is thereby deranged, and even now we can see plainly that the passage did not originally belong to the text.

An incidental reference to Jesus is found in a later passage (*AJ* xx. 200), where the James who had been beheaded is spoken of as His brother (τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου Χριστοῦ, Ἰάκωβος ὄνομα αὐτῷ). This passage is altogether beyond sus-

picion, and we are unable to agree with the scholars who regard it likewise as an interpolation. The manner in which Jesus is here mentioned coincides exactly with what we should expect from Josephus. Thus, while Josephus had doubtless heard of Jesus, he did not deal with Him in his history, and the passage in *AJ* xviii. which we have discussed must be pronounced spurious.

The well-intentioned forgery must have helped to make Josephus still more acceptable to the Christians. They pored over his works, and from them, more particularly the two books against Apion, they borrowed a goodly portion of their equipment for their controversial writings. The earliest apologists—Theophilus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, and Minucius Felix—refer to him by name and make use of him. The chronologists, in particular—Julius Africanus, Hippolytus, Eusebius, and their successors—availed themselves of his help. In another sphere Eusebius also is indebted to him, especially in the *HE* and the *Præp. Evang.*, while the later ecclesiastical writers are all acquainted with him. Throughout the entire mediæval epoch he ranks as one of the great authors, alike in East and West.

[The current view that *AJ* xviii. 63 *f.* is spurious has been controverted, since the death of Niese, by F. C. Burkitt (*ThT* xlvii. [1913] 135–144), A. Harnack (*Internat. Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik*, vii. [1913] 1037–68), and W. E. Barnes (*CR* cv. [1914] 57–68). It is maintained that, in view of the mention of John the Baptist and James the Just by Josephus (*AJ* xviii. 116–119, xx. 200), we should naturally expect him to refer to Christ, who, despite what has been said above, did attract the attention of foreigners, as is conclusively shown by the famous reference in Tacitus (*Ann.* xv. 44; cf. also Sueton. *Claudius*, xxv., *Nero*, xvi.), a reference which, as Whiston had already suggested, was probably borrowed from Josephus. Burkitt finds a note of insincerity in the passage of Josephus, as well as a 'cool and patronising' tone which a Christian would not have employed, any more than he would have spoken of the Christians as a 'tribe' (φῦλον) or used ἡδονή[1] in the way in which it occurs in the passage under consideration. Neither would a Christian, Harnack urges, have been so ignorant of the life of Christ as to say that 'He drew over to Him both many of the Jews *and many of the Greeks*,' since His activity was restricted to the non-Hellenic world. The passage 'this was [the?] Christ' (ὁ Χριστὸς οὗτος ἦν), etc., is, it is suggested, an implication that, in the opinion of Josephus, the Messiah had actually appeared and been put to death, so that the Jews would no longer be a political peril to the Romans. Even the appearance of Christ to His disciples after the Resurrection may, Burkitt thinks, have been entirely credible to Josephus (cf. *AJ* vi. 327 ff., ix. 183), and the accounts of the Resurrection would, moreover, afford a welcome Jewish parallel to the stories told concerning Apollonius of Tyana (*q.v.*) and others. Harnack says that, in describing Jesus as 'the Christ,' Josephus was in no danger of being taken for a Christian (cf. *AJ* xx. 200, 'Jesus, who was called Christ,' Ἰησοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου Χριστοῦ); besides, his phraseology intentionally betrays the love of sensationalism which is frequently visible in his writings. It must also be remembered, in judging the attitude of Josephus as a whole, that, although a Jew, he was free from Zealot prejudices, and that he was further liberalized not merely by his admiration for Hellenic culture and for Roman power, but also by the influences which surrounded him. Nor must it be forgotten that he wrote under the patronage of Domitian, whose own household included the Christians Titus Flavius Clemens and his wife Domitilla. As a diplomatic historian of the Jews, writing in detail for foreigners, Josephus would have been unlikely to omit mention of an event which affected—however slightly in his day—the fortunes of his nation; it is evident, from his allusions to Christ, that he regarded Him as a sage and a noble Rabbi, and from that very fact he would not pass over in silence one of his own countrymen of whom he could say, with the patriotic pride which distinguishes him, that He was 'a teacher of men who receive true words (τἀληθῆ, not, with Whiston, 'truth') with pleasure,' so that Jews, as well as Greeks, could boast of their wise man (σοφὸς ἀνήρ);[2] thus the interests of courtier, historian, and patriot would meet in an objective and non-committal reference to Christ. From a somewhat different point of view, Barnes defends and amplifies a suggestion of Whiston, holding that the phrase 'this was [the] Christ' was added merely to identify the Jesus of whom Josephus wrote in this passage with the Jesus whom the Christians 'loved' (not, as a Christian probably would have written, 'in whom they believed'), and to differentiate Him from others of the same name, especially as He was already known to the Græco-Roman world under the name of Christ.

Barnes notes, further, that, if the passage be assumed to be a Christian interpolation, there is a strange absence of Christian terminology, as, *e.g.*, in the words ἐφάνη γὰρ αὐτοῖς τρίτην ἔχων ἡμέραν πάλιν ζῶν. The passage reads, to him, very like a non-committal report, by an orthodox Jew, of beliefs held by Christians. Respect is manifest for the character of Christ, who was 'a wise man, since it is befitting to call Him a man' (σοφὸς ἀνήρ, εἴγε ἄνδρα αὐτὸν λέγειν χρή, not, as Whiston renders, 'if it be lawful to call Him a man'). He was a 'doer of strange things' (παραδόξων ἔργων ποιητής), a tribute that was paid Him by other Jews who did not believe in Him (Lk 5[26]). The coldness of the statement that 'even until now, the tribe of the Christians named after this person (ἀπὸ τοῦδε ὠνομασμένον) has not become extinct (οὐκ ἐπέλιπε)'—without the slightest reference to the wide spread of early Christianity—reveals to Barnes 'again the observer from the outside who is speaking. He is interested in the continuance of a Jewish sect, but his position is detached.' Equally bald and cold is Josephus's bare statement, without comment on either side, that 'Pilate, on the information of the chief men amongst us, condemned Him to the cross'; while Harnack urges that the implied thesis of Josephus, that Christ suffered death because He claimed to be the Messiah—construed as a political figure, a 'King of the Jews'—as well as his manifest surprise that Christianity survived the crucifixion of its founder, is precisely what we should expect from the Hellenized Jewish historian. On the other hand, there is even a touch of irony in Josephus's allusion to the NT argument from prophecy, which narrated 'both these things and ten thousand other marvels (ἄλλα μύρια . . . θαυμάσια) concerning Him'; indeed, with the downfall of the Jewish State, Josephus might well feel sceptical regarding the truthfulness of any prophecy. Finally, even the context is against the theory of Christian interpolation, for the passage under consideration is immediately followed by an account of the scandalous connivance of the priests of Isis in the betrayal of a Roman matron; and at such a juxtaposition a Christian would have revolted.

Putting aside the possibility that Origen, who quotes Josephus on James the Just, referred to his 'testimony' to Christ in some work now lost (*e.g.*, in those sections *in Matth.* which are no longer extant in Greek), and the question whether—although he mentions the *AJ* a few times—he had actually read it, it is significant that what interests the modern reader in the passage may not have been what attracted the early student (cf. Origen, *c. Cels.* i. 47, with *AJ* xviii. 116–119, and the comments of Eusebius, *Demonst. Evang.* iii. 108, on *AJ* xviii. 63 *f.*); and, had Origen quoted Josephus on Christ at all, he may have done so quite as Eusebius did, as an incidental addition to the sufficient statements of the Gospels, and, 'as it were, of superfluity' (οἷον ἐκ περιουσίας).

It may also be suggested that the fact that Christ is not mentioned in the *BJ* does not necessarily cast suspicion on the passage in *AJ*, for in the interval of from 15 to 20 years between the writing of the two works the spread of Christianity especially in Rome—would render very explicable the incorporation of some reference to a Jewish religious leader in a general and detailed treatise on 'the Antiquities of the Jews' such as had not been necessary in the more compact and less exhaustive 'Jewish War.'

The great objections to the passage have had their basis in a failure to read it with due appreciation of the circumstances of the time and the character of its author; it has been interpreted too exclusively from the point of view of modern Christianity. When closely examined, the difficulties in the way of the hypothesis of Christian forgery are far greater than those which beset the theory that the passage is genuine. After all, as Barnes pertinently says (p. 63), 'what, indeed, does it prove? It shows that a Jewish historian, who was born and bred in Palestine, who was twenty-six years old when Felix was Governor of Judæa, was acquainted with an outline of the life of our Lord, which agrees with that accepted by Christians. Such a passage has become of serious evidential value only since Strauss started the mythical theory; it is a "Testimony" to-day only because Arthur Drews and others are again writing about the *Christus-mythus*.'

LOUIS H. GRAY.]

[1] The sole parallel which Harnack is able to adduce for the use of φῦλον is the description of the Christians as 'latebrosa et lucifuga natio' by a pagan speaker in Minucius Felix (viii.); and for ἡδονή, as used in a good sense by a Christian writer, he can cite only II Clem. xv.

[2] Ἀνήρ = 'man of character or prominence,' as distinguished from the ordinary man (ἄνθρωπος); cf. the antithesis between the ἀνήρ Christ and the truth-seeking ἄνθρωποι in this passage, and also the reference to τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν = the chief priests, etc.

5. Early versions and suppositious works.—The writings of Josephus were translated into Latin at an early date.

There are two Latin versions of the *BJ*. The older of these consists of a fairly free rendering, into which portions of the *AJ* and other works have been inserted. According to the perfectly credible, and unwarrantably disputed, witness of the ancient MSS, its translator was Ambrose of Milan. It is commonly known as the work of Hegesippus or Egesippus—a name which is probably a corruption of *Josippus*. The other Latin version is a literal one, and its author is unknown; it was conjecturally, though without warrant, ascribed to

Jerome or Rufinus (Cassiodorus, *de Instit. Div. Litt.* 17 [*PL* lxx. 1133]).

About the middle of the 6th cent. the *AJ* (not including the *Vit.*, however) and the *CA* were, at the order of Cassiodorus, reproduced in a very inferior type of Latin (*ib.*). The 6th bk. of the *BJ*, which treats of the destruction of Jerusalem, had been previously translated into Syriac, and incorporated with the Syriac OT (Peshiṭṭā) as the 5th bk. of Maccabees. Subsequently there appeared a Slavic translation or paraphrase, which is extant in several recensions, and there exists also a rendering into modern Greek (in the Barberini Library [cod. Gr. n. 228, 229], Rome), besides fragments of an Armenian version (F. C. Conybeare, *JThSt* ix. [1908] 577–583). The many translations into European languages which appeared shortly after the invention of printing all go to show how assiduously Josephus was read.

In view of this almost canonical prestige enjoyed by the writings of Josephus, we need not be surprised to find that he was credited with other works, of unknown or disputed authorship, such as the following: (1) The so-called *Fourth Book of Maccabees*, an address entitled *περὶ αὐτοκράτορος λογισμοῦ, i.e.* 'the lordship of divine reason over human desire,' and illustrated by references to the seven brothers who, according to 2 Mac., suffered martyrdom under Antiochus Epiphanes. The first, so far as we know, to ascribe it to Josephus was Eusebius (*HE* III. x. 6); others, such as Jerome (*de Vir. Illust.* 13), followed suit, while many MSS name Josephus as the author. In the oldest MSS the work is anonymous, and its ascription to Josephus, as is rightly observed in the ancient scholium to the *Canon. apost.* 76 (85) (J. B. Cotelerius, *Patr. Apostol.*, Paris, 1672, i. 452), is a quite unwarranted conjecture. He had no connexion with the book; in the *AJ* he knows nothing of the seven martyred brethren; and the whole address, alike in form and contents, is alien to the manner of Josephus.

(2) The work known as *Concerning the All*, or *The Being of the All* (*περὶ τοῦ παντός*, or *περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίας* or *αἰτίας*), a polemical treatise against Platonism, in two books, our knowledge of which, apart from a few sentences still in existence, is derived from a note of Photius (*Bibl. Cod.* 48, p. 11^b, 14, ed. Bekker). That Josephus was its author is a mere surmise, suggested perhaps by the fact that, like the two books against Apion, it dealt with the antiquity of the Jewish nation; it may also have borrowed from Josephus. Its ascription to Josephus was already impugned by the ancients, who attributed the work variously to the Presbyter Gaius, Justin Martyr, and Irenæus. Present-day scholarship ascribes it to Hippolytus, who was certainly credited with a work called *περὶ τοῦ παντός* and directed against Plato.

(3) A third work, still extant, bearing the name of Josephus, viz. *Ἰωσήππου ὑπομνηστικὸν βιβλίον* (see J. A. Fabricius, *Cod. pseudepigr. Vet. Test.*^{2}, Hamburg, 1722–23, ii.; *PG* cvi. 16 ff.), is a *liber memoriatis* after the classical pattern; it is a concise résumé in tabular form of the most outstanding events in the OT and NT and in Church History. Among other things it contains a list of the various Christian sects and their respective doctrines, and also of the persecutions.

(4) *The Chronicle of Josephus Ben-Gorion*, composed in the Middle Ages, and preserved in various Hebrew and Arabic recensions. Its nucleus is the *BJ*, in the so-called Latin version of Hegesippus, and it is from this that its writer took the name 'Josephus, son of Gorion' (cf. Hegesipp. III. iii. 2, and see, further, M. Schloessinger, in *JE* vii. [1904] 259 f.).

6. Manuscript transmission and editions.—The wide circulation and popularity of the works of Josephus are indicated in the history of their transmission. The MSS were, and still are, very numerous, and the textual tradition branches out in manifold ways. Each work, again, had its own peculiar fortunes. Thus, the most comprehensive, the *AJ*, was first of all divided into four parts, then into two, and each of these, again, took its own particular path. It was only at the close of the mediæval period that the *AJ* was put together in a single volume, the *BJ* also being included; scholarly readers endeavoured to amend and elucidate the text, and not a few MSS still show traces of a thoroughgoing revision.

The works of Josephus were first printed in their Latin form: *AJ* and *BJ* by J. Schüsaler (Augsburg, 1470); *CA* by P. Maufer (Verona, 1480). These impressions were subsequently often reproduced; the last serviceable complete issue of Josephus in Latin is the Basel edition of 1524. The first printed Greek text, revised by Arnold Peraxylus Arlenius, was published by Froben (Basel, 1544). This issue was several times reprinted, and formed until recently the basis of all our editions. Among the later of these special mention should be made of the meritorious but unfinished work of E. Bernard, who published the first parts of the *AJ* and the *BJ* with an exhaustive commentary (Oxford, 1687–1700); also of the edition of J. Hudson (2 vols., do. 1720), based upon Bernard's studies; and, finally, of the great edition of S. Haverkamp (2 vols., Leyden, 1726), who assimilated the labours of all his predecessors. In all these, however, little was done for the text, which remained largely as it was. It is true that E. Cardwell, in his edition of the *BJ* (2 vols., Oxford, 1837), noted the various readings of several reliable MSS, but he made no use of them in the text. Similarly the more recent editions of the text in current use, viz. those of W. Dindorf (Paris, 1845) and I. Bekker (Leipzig, 1855), provide little of any consequence, save a few conjectures, for the emendation of the very incorrect Greek tradition. An adequate groundwork for the text was supplied for the first time by the present writer's edition, now complete in seven volumes (Berlin, 1885–95); in the *BJ* (vol. vi.) he had the collaboration of J. Destinon. As supplementary to this may be regarded the writer's edition of the *Epitome* (Berlin and Marburg, 1896) and Carl Boysen's revision of the Latin version —of which only the 6th vol. has appeared (*CSEL* xxxvii. 6 [1898]). It need hardly be said that the work of textual criticism is still far from complete; it is only now, in fact, that it can really begin. S. A. Naber's revised issue of Bekker (Leipzig, 1888–96) naturally approximates more to the older text.

LITERATURE.—General.—J. A. Fabricius, *Bibliotheca græca*, ed. G. C. Harless, Hamburg, 1790–1809, v. 1 ff.; E. Schürer, *GJV* 1.^{3}, Leipzig, 1901, p. 74 ff.; G. H. A. v. Ewald, *GVI*, Göttingen, 1848–59, vii. 89 ff.; A. v. Gutschmid, *Klein. Schriften*, Leipzig, 1889–94, iv. 330 ff.; B. Niese, *Sybels histor. Zeitschrift*, new ser., xl. (Munich, 1876) 193 ff.; S. A. Naber, *Mnemosyne*, new ser., xiii. (Leyden, 1885) 263 ff.; M. Friedländer, *Gesch. der jüd. Apologetik*, Zurich, 1903; Paul Krüger, *Philo und Josephus als Apologeten des Judentums*, Leipzig, 1906; M. Krenkel, *Josephus und Lucas*, Leipzig, 1894.

Sources.—H. Bloch, *Die Quellen des Flavius Josephus in seiner Archäologie*, Leipzig, 1879; I. G. Scharfenberg, *De Iosephi et versionis Alexandrinæ consensu*, Leipzig, 1780; J. Freudenthal, *Hellenist. Studien*, Breslau, 1875–79, i. 46, 218; A. Mez, *Die Bibel des Josephus untersucht für Buch v.–vii. des Archäol.*, Basel, 1895; B. Niese, *Hermes*, xi. [1876] 468 ff., xxxv. [1900] 513 ff.; J. Destinon, *Die Quellen des Flavius Josephus*, Kiel, 1882, *Untersuchungen zu Flavius Josephus*, do. 1904; H. Drüner, *Untersuchungen über Josephus* (diss.), Marburg, 1896; G. Hölscher, *Die Quellen des Josephus* (diss.), Leipzig, 1904; E. Täubler, *Die Parthernachrichten bei Josephus*, Berlin, 1904.

Theology.—C. G. Brotschneider, *Capita theologiæ Judæorum dogmaticæ e Flavii Josephi scriptis collecta*, Wittenberg, 1812.

Chronology.—Destinon, *Die Chronologie des Josephus*, Kiel, 1880; Niese, *Hermes*, xxviii. [1893] 194 ff.; G. Unger, *SMA*, philos.-philol.-histor. Classe, 1892, ii. 453.

Documents.—L. Mendelssohn, *Acta societatis philologæ Lipsiensis*, ed. F. Ritschl, v. [1875] 87 ff.; Niese, *Hermes*, xi. 466 ff.; P. Viereck, *Sermo græcus quo senatus populusque romanus*, etc., Gottingen, 1888; Unger, *op. cit.*, 1895, p. 551 ff., 1896, pp. 357–383, 1897, p. 189 ff.

Testimony to Christ.—Schürer, 1.^{3} 644; A. Seitz, *Christus-Zeugnisse aus dem klass. Altertum*, Cologne, 1906; K. Linck, *De antiquissimis veterum quæ ad Jesum Nazarenum spectant testimoniis*, Giessen, 1913.

Transmission and history of the text.—*F. Josephi opera*, ed. Niese, i. iii. v. vi. prefatio; *F. Josephi Antiquitatum Judaicarum Epitoma*, ed. Niese, do. 1896, p. i ff.; *F. Josephi opera ex versione Lat. antiqua*, ed. C. Boysen (*CSEL* xxxvii. 6), Vienna, 1898.

On the Slavic translation.—A. Harnack, *Gesch. der altchristlichen Litteratur*, i. (Leipzig, 1893) 917; A. Berendts, in *TU* xxix. [1904] 3.

Additional literature is given by Fabricius and Schürer (1.^{3} 100 ff.) in the works already cited.

BENEDICTUS NIESE.

JUĀLĀMUKHĪ, JWĀLĀMUKHĪ (Skr. *jvālāmukhī*, 'flame-mouthed').—An ancient place of pilgrimage, famous as the site of a shrine dedicated to the Hindu Mother-goddess under the title of Devī Bajreśvarī (Skr. *Vajreśvarī*, 'goddess of the thunderbolt'), situated lat. 31° 52′ N., long. 77° 20′ E., in the Bhavan suburb of the town Kāngṛā, Nagarkoṭ, or Koṭ Kāngṛā, in the Kāngṛā District of the Panjāb. It was ruined in the earthquake of 1905 (*Panjāb Census Rep.*, 1912, i. 44). It is one of the centres of Hindu fire-worship. Numerous instances of this and similar cults are collected by J. G. Frazer, *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*^{3}, London, 1914, i. 188 ff. It was visited by Maḥmūd of Ghaznī and Fīrūz Tughlaq, when they attacked Nagarkoṭ or Kāngṛā in A.D. 1009 and 1360. In his account of the latter campaign the historian Shams-i Sirāj Afīf, who objected to such unorthodox practices, protests against the belief that Fīrūz Tughlaq honoured the goddess:

'Some of the infidels have reported that Sulṭān Fīrūz went specially to see this idol and held a golden umbrella over its head . . . the infidels slandered the Sulṭān, who was a religious,

god-fearing man. . . . Other infidels have said that Sulṭān Muhammad Shāh bin Tughlaq Shāh held an umbrella over the same idol; but this is a lie, and good Muhammadans should pay no heed to such statements' (H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India*, London, 1867–77, ii. 34, 445, iii. 318).

These protests by an orthodox Muhammadan betray an uneasy suspicion that the cult was recognized even by Musalmāns, many of whom were deeply influenced by Indian animistic beliefs. Abū'l Faḍl, the historiographer of the Emperor Akbar, describes the shrine under the name of Mahāmāyā, 'great illusion':

'Pilgrims from distant parts visit it and obtain their desires. Strange it is that in order that their prayers may be favourably heard, they cut out their tongues: with some it grows again on the spot, with others after one or two days. Although the medical faculty allow the possibility of growth in the tongue, yet in so short a space of time it is sufficiently amazing' (*Ain-i-Akbari*, tr. H. S. Jarrett, ii. [Calcutta, 1891] 312 ff.). On such mutilations of the tongue, which fanatics sometimes offer to Kāli, see *NINQ* iv. 312; *PNQ* iv. 65; N. Chevers, *Manual of Medical Jurisprudence for India*, Calcutta, 1870, p. 492 *f.*

Abū'l Faḍl also refers to the legend, traced by E. B. Cowell in the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, which tells that the belief in the sanctity of the place arose from the quarrel between Śiva and his father-in-law Dakṣa, when the latter was refused admission to a sacrifice. The spouse of Śiva, the goddess Umā or Satī, offended at the insult, committed suicide, and Viṣṇu cut up her body, of which the tongue is said to have fallen at this place (H. H. Wilson, *Vishnu Purana*, London, 1864–77, iv. 261 f.; J. Dowson, *Classical Dict.*, do. 1879, p. 76 ff.). The account in the *Vāyu Purāṇa*, that 'about the mountains of Subakṣa and Sikhiśaila is a level country about a hundred *yojanas* in extent, and that there the ground emits flames,' doubtless refers to Juālāmukhī (E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gaz.*, Allahabad, 1884, ii. 295). The place, again, is connected with the story of the Sikh Guru Angad, who on arriving there reprobated the idolatrous character of the rites (M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, ii. 3).

The best modern account is that of C. Hügel (*Travels in Kashmir and the Panjab*, p. 42 ff.). No idol represented the goddess; but in the centre of the forecourt of the temple there is a pit with seats at either end on which he found *faqīrs* resting. A perpetual flame rose from this pit, and from two places in the smooth rock similar flames were seen bursting out to a height of about 8 inches. The worshippers, on entering the sanctuary, delivered their gifts, usually flowers, into the hands of one of the *faqirs*, who first held them over the flame and then cast them into the temple. Close by is a shrine of the saint Gorakhnāth.

'On descending a good many steps I saw flames issuing from two places in the perpendicular wall; and, on examining more attentively, I perceived, where the fire was burning, little cavities in the smooth stones, with just the same appearance as when a burning-glass is made to consume wood; the flame issuing, not from any aperture, but from those minute cavities, emits a scent like alcohol, burning with an aromatic and most agreeable mixture, which I could by no means identify. Under each of these flames stood a pot of water, of the same temperature as the atmosphere; the condensed residue of the gas thus deposited takes fire on the application of a light, and burns for more than a minute. Altogether this is one of the most extraordinary phenomena I ever recollect to have witnessed; and no doubt in distant ages was one of the spots most thronged by fire-worshippers. The sight of this flame rising out of the earth, perhaps long before any building was near it, would doubtless add much to the influence of this superstition on the minds of the attendant worshippers; for this seems still to be the case, although much of the marvellous is lost by confining the flames within the walls of a temple.'

The same traveller suggests that the place was an early seat of Buddhism; and J. Wilson believes that this is the explanation of the low esteem in which the Brāhman officiants are regarded (*Indian Caste*, Bombay, 1877, ii. 133). The high-priest is known as the *bhojaki pūjārī*, that is to say, 'the officiant who eats the offerings,' the term *bhojaki* being usually applied to those degraded Brāhmans whose only function is that of being fed vicariously by pilgrims in the hope that the food thus consumed may be transmitted to the deceased ancestors of the worshipper. They are said not to be genuine Brāhmans, but descendants of a servile class of agriculturists, who from their connexion with the temples have professed to be Brāhmans (see H. A. Rose, *Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1911, ii. 107 f.). The facts regarding fire-worship in N. India have been collected by Elliot, *Hist. of India*, v. (1873) 559 ff. The cult of Juālāmukhī Devī extends into Bengal and the Deccan, and the aboriginal Kharwārs have a shrine dedicated to the holy fire which they call by the same name (Risley, *TC*, 1891, ii. 204; Crooke, *TC*, 1896, ii. 247; *BG* xii. [1880] 63).

LITERATURE.—C. Hügel, *Travels in Kashmir and the Panjab*, tr. T. B. Jervis, London, 1845; A. Cunningham, *Reports Archæol. Survey*, v. (1876) 155 ff.; *IGI* xiv. (1908) 397 *f.*; MS notes received from H. A. Rose, Superintendent Ethnographical Survey, Panjāb.

W. CROOKE.

JUANG, PATTUA (the latter name meaning 'leaf-wearers' [Hind. *paṭṭā*, Skr. *patra*, 'a leaf']).—A non-Aryan tribe found in the Kaṭak Tributary States of Dhenkānāl and Keonjhar, being most numerous in the latter. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 12,845, of whom the vast majority recorded their religion as animistic. They are interesting as being the last tribe in N. India which retained the archaic custom of wearing leaves as clothing. According to the tribal tradition, they were formerly fond of dress and were accustomed to lay it aside when doing foul work, and to wear suits of leaves. The goddess (Ṭhakurānī, or as some say, Sītā) reproved them for their vanity, and condemned them to wear leaves in future, threatening them that if they disobeyed they would be eaten by tigers. Similar legends are told by other leaf-wearing tribes in S. India (E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, 1909, vii. 20). The classical account of the tribe is that of E. T. Dalton (*Descr. Ethnol. of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 152 ff.), who gives the following summary of their beliefs:

'The Juāngs appear to be free from the belief in witchcraft, which is the bane of the Kols, and perniciously influences nearly all other classes in the Jungle and Tributary Mahāls. They have not, like the Kharias, the reputation of being deeply skilled in sorcery. They have in their own language no terms for "God," for "heaven," or "hell," and, so far as I can learn, no idea of a future state. They offer fowls to the sun when in distress, and to the earth to give them its fruits in due season. On these occasions an old man officiates as priest; he is called Nāgam. The even tenor of their lives is unbroken by any obligatory religious ceremonies.'

If this account, in itself improbable, be accepted, they stand in a much lower stage of religious belief than the neighbouring Dravidian tribes (see DRAVIDIANS [North India]). But Risley (*TC*, 1891, i. 353) disputes Dalton's conclusions, asserting that the tribe in Keonjhar worship a forest deity called Barām, who stands at the head of their system, and is regarded with great veneration. Next to him come Thānapatī, the patron deity of the village site, Māsimuli, Kālāpāt, Bāsulī, and Basumatī, or Mother Earth.

'Buffaloes, goats, fowls, milk, and sugar are offered to all of these, and are afterwards partaken of by the worshippers. No regular days seem to be set apart for sacrifice, but offerings are made at seedtime and harvest, and the forest gods are carefully propitiated when a plot of land is cleared from jungle and prepared for the plough. In addition to these elemental or animistic deities, the Hindu gods are beginning to be recognized, in a scanty and infrequent fashion, by the tribe. Brāhmans have as yet not been introduced, and all religious functions are discharged by the *dehari* or village priest. . . . Juāngs burn their dead, laying the corpse on the pyre with the head to the south. The ashes are left at the place of cremation or are cast into a running stream. A few days after death a meagre propitiatory ceremony is performed, at which the maternal uncle of the deceased officiates as priest. Offerings to departed ancestors are also made in October, when the autumn rice crop is harvested.'

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the article.

W. CROOKE.

JUBILEE.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew).

JUDAISM.—I. *DEFINITION.*—Judaism[1] may be defined as the strictest form of monotheistic belief. But it is something more than a bare mental belief. It is the effect which such a belief, with all its logical consequences, exerts on life, that is to say, on thought and conduct. It is the religion which was first preached by Abraham, and symbolized by the covenant of circumcision (cf. art. CIRCUMCISION [Semitic]), and it is still practised by his descendants. It is the oldest existing religion, the parent of two mighty faiths that have spread over the major portion of the globe. They have diffused the principles of Judaism in a modified form, but the kernel of their teaching is Jewish, in spite of accretions and losses, and Judaism does not, in consequence, repudiate these religions or class them as idolatrous and false. A formal and precise definition of Judaism is a matter of some difficulty, because it raises the question, What is the absolute and irreducible minimum of conformity? (see art. CREED [Jewish]). On the other hand, it may be said, more widely, that the foundation of Judaism rests on two principles—the unity of God and the choice of Israel. Judaism denounces idolatry and polytheism. It believes in a universal God, but it is not exclusive. It believes that this world is good, and that man is capable of perfection. He possesses free will and is responsible for his actions. Judaism rejects any Mediator and any cosmic force for evil. Man is free; he is not subject to Satan; nor are the material gifts of life inherently bad; wealth may be a blessing as well as a curse. Man is made in the image of God; therefore he is noble, like the rest of the divine works. For this reason all men are equally brothers. Just as they were united in the beginning, so will they be drawn together again at the end of time. They will be brought near to the Kingdom of Heaven by the aid of Israel. This is the function of Judaism—to spread peace and goodwill throughout the world.

'Judaism by its idea of a divine kingdom of truth and righteousness to be built on earth gave to mankind a hope and to history a goal for which to live and strive through the centuries. Other nations beheld in the world's process a continual decline from a golden age of happiness to an iron age of toil, until in a great catastrophe of conflagration and ruin the end of all things, of men and gods, is to be reached: Judaism points forward to a state of human perfection and bliss to be brought about by the complete unfolding of the divine in man or the revelation of God's full glory as the goal of history. And herein lies its great distinction also from Christianity. Judaism's scope lies not in the world beyond, the world of the spirit, of which man on earth can have no conception. Both the hope of resurrection and that of immortality, in some form or other familiar and indispensable to all tribes and creeds, seem evidently to have come to the Jews from without—the one from Persia or Babylonia, the other from Greece.[2] Judaism itself rests on neither. Its sole aim and purpose is to render the world that now is a divine kingdom of truth and righteousness; and this gives it its eminently rational, ethical, and practical character' (K. Kohler, in *JE* vii. [1904] 363b).

This aim is pursued by the insistence on the belief in the Unity and on the practice of the Commandments. Judaism lays more stress on works than on faith, though the former are of no avail without the latter.

'It is not a creed or a system of beliefs upon the acceptance of which redemption or future salvation depends. It is a system of human conduct, a law of righteousness which man should follow in order to live thereby' (Kohler, 364a).

Yet Judaism does not lack a doctrine of faith; it is very doubtful whether an atheist who kept the Torah, or the Jewish ideals of righteousness, could be called a Jew (cf. art. ATHEISM [Jewish], vol. ii. p. 187 f.). There is no doubt that he would be 'saved,' in the Christian sense, because Judaism teaches that every righteous man, irrespective of his beliefs, has a share in the world to come.[1] But, just because Judaism believes that every good man is 'saved,' it follows that to be a good Jew must include something more, and must be ethically higher, than being a good man.

While Judaism, on the one hand, opens the door to proselytes, it is inevitable, from the fact of its demanding self-sacrifice, that it must long remain the religion of a minority. The function of Judaism is to keep the great ideals, unsullied and intact, before the eyes of the world. Jews must be prepared to defend their standard at the cost of their lives, as in the past, and to sacrifice, not only their lives, but their material prosperity—often a harder task. Many a potential martyr becomes indifferent, through prosperity, to the ideals for which he would offer his life in time of persecution. The world has need of a minority of idealists. For, although Judaism recognizes the truth taught by Christianity and Islâm, it believes at the same time that there are other elements contained in these faiths which are not in complete harmony with the primitive source of truth. Judaism, then, has not to compete with the more popular expositions of religion; its *raison d'être* is not to rival the successful missionary activity of its daughters, the Church and the Mosque; it claims, not to be the only form of truth, but to be the purest. While Christianity and Islâm are permeating the world with their teachings, Judaism awaits the day when it will, as originally, exert its influence over both of them, and so over all mankind. How this will take place, under what guise this universal worship of the One God will be, it does not seek to define.[2] This 'despised faith,' which holds itself to be in reality the Remnant or essence of righteousness, is safeguarded from extinction or contamination by the fence of the *miṣwôth* ('Commandments'). It has developed and grown, but ever in unbroken continuity, from the simple declaration of monotheism to a complete and comprehensive scheme of life. From Abraham to the present day the story has been written, and the pen has not yet been laid aside.

II. *GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT.*—1. **To the end of the Restoration period.**—The Exile marked a new stage in the religion of Israel. It was the beginning of internal consolidation and external expansion. The patriarchs, the lawgiver, and the prophets represent successive degrees of progress in religious thought: monotheism, the Law, idealism. The faith of Abraham was moulded into the religion of a people, to become, ultimately, the source of ideals for a world; monotheism, purity, righteousness, and justice had developed under the impetus of lawgiver, priest, and prophet until the time of trial arrived. Exile and persecution were to test the reality of these lessons, to show that the work of the teachers was sound and the faith of the pupils unshaken. The touchstone of misfortune clearly demonstrated this; the seed had indeed been skilfully sown on fertile soil. The teachings of Isaiah had not been in vain; the exhortations of his contemporaries and predecessors succeeded in creating a compact remnant to carry on the truth and hand it over unimpaired to posterity. The Ten Tribes were lost, while the Remnant, the southern kingdom, endured.

[1] The present art. on Judaism is avowedly written from the orthodox standpoint. For the liberal attitude see art. LIBERAL JUDAISM; but it will be observed that, apart from the outstanding contention, viz. the principle of the Oral Law, the differences between the two presentations are but small and insignificant in comparison with the elements shared by both in common.

[2] This point is discussed below; it is doubtful whether orthodox Judaism can accept this entirely.

[1] Even Elisha ben Abuya is ultimately pardoned after the death of R. Me'ir (see Bab. *Ḥagiga*, 15b).

[2] The immutability of the Ceremonial Law in the coming time was a matter on which divergence of opinion prevailed; see, *e.g.*, *Niddah*, 61b, and Midrash Tillim, Ps. 146, לעתיד לבא הוא מתיר את כל מה שאסר, line 8, outer col., f. 57b, ed. Bomberg, Venice, 1546, and, on the other hand, the 9th Creed of Maimonides (S. Singer, *Authorised Daily Prayer-Book*[9], London, 1912, p. 90) (the pagination is identical in all editions).

It is a matter of no small difficulty to attempt a sketch of the religious beliefs of the exiles. Jewish tradition (which ascribes much to a Mosaic origin [*hălākhāh lᵉ Môshē mis-Sinai*]) and modern critical views differ in many points. It will be more convenient, after some preliminary remarks, to trace the career of Judaism from the Restoration, from a point when most schools of thought agree as to the prevalence of the Pentateuch. For with regard to the religion of the two kingdoms little can be said with certainty, and every statement is liable to be rejected or modified according to the views held by the reader on Biblical criticism. There are certain general facts, however, that few will deny. On the one hand, no scholar on the critical side will maintain that the Pentateuchal legislation was the complete invention of the age of Ezra and his followers; a large mass of usages and beliefs must have been in existence for generations. Whether the code in which they were embodied was the Pentateuch or not is, for present purposes, a matter of indifference. It is the beliefs and usages themselves, and their effect on the people, that have to be considered, not their external form.

The foundation of all religion rests on the supreme fact of the worship of one deity, a heritage from dim antiquity; and this great idea did not stand alone. Religion must have involved something more positive than an intellectual Credo, or the tenacity of its persistence is inexplicable. The Sabbaths and festivals, sacrifice, worship, homely ritual, pious faith, and thanksgiving for the gifts of nature must have been the chief characteristics of the simple and innocent life of the God-fearing Israelite or Judæan, sanctified by the high moral lessons which his prophets taught him. How far the beliefs, ceremonies, and observances differed in the two kingdoms, what was the nature of the difference, if any, and whether the Mosaic tradition flourished more firmly in one than in the other are questions to which it is impossible to offer a definite reply. The answer must be framed according to the attitude adopted towards criticism, and will, of necessity, be controversial. But, whatever view be taken, there must have been something more powerful than unadorned dogma, some definitely practical elements, some religious functions linked to high ideals and appealing more to the heart than to the brain, affecting the life and moulding the conviction; otherwise the religion of Judah would have been no more enduring than that of the sister kingdom. Extreme criticism would relegate too much, if not everything, to a later age, while orthodox Judaism has a tendency, perhaps, to take too little account of moral and spiritual development. On the other hand, orthodox Judaism, with full Biblical authority, admits the break in continuity and accepts the disappearance of the Law until the reign of Josiah; if this disappearance is considered in its true setting and value, many difficulties can be solved. Orthodox Judaism takes its stand on the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch; moderate criticism (*i.e.* that which does not reject a Mosaic tradition *in toto*) lays more emphasis on the lengthy periods of conquests, settlements, and civil conflicts. As a result of political convulsions such as these, it is easy to understand how, in a non-literary age and land, amid a people recently emerged from bondage, copies of a legal code, in any case few in number, would tend to perish. This is not entirely denied by the less extreme upholders of the orthodox view; in fact, the difference between the moderate elements of the two parties is slight, being one of degree rather than of principle. Yet, whether the code existed or not, memories, more or less vivid, must have lingered, though the extent to which popular belief and practice were influenced is hard to determine. The observance of Sabbaths and New Moons (1 S 20^{18}, 2 K 4^{23}, Is 1^{14}), coupled with the neglect of the Passover all the days of the Judges until the time of Hezekiah and Josiah (2 K 23^{22}, but see Kimḥi, *in loc.*; 2 Ch $30^{21.26}$), and of the Feast of Tabernacles (cf. art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS [Jewish], vol. v. pp. 879–881) since the days of Joshua (Neh 8^{17}), is difficult to explain. Meanwhile the discovery of the Assuan papyri introduces much useful evidence as to the state of Judaism outside Palestine. But the problems raised by the papyri are complex. The present writer has endeavoured to show[1] that the Jews of Assuan were descendants of Israelite exiles or emigrants from the northern kingdom. It is hard to resist the conclusion that they possessed some knowledge of the Pentateuchal ideas; in any case they cannot have regarded themselves as schismatics from catholic Jewry. As Samaria fell in 721 B.C., and the publication of the Law by Josiah did not take place till 618 B.C., the northern kingdom would seem not to have been entirely unaware of the code, or at least of its traditions, unless the Assuan Jews derived their knowledge after 618, when they were already in Egypt.

During the Exile and the Restoration, perhaps even earlier, Judaism spread far beyond the confines of Palestine. Of what character was this Judaism? The belief in the one and only God had long been an inalienable possession handed down from the remotest ages. The periods during which the true worship was obscured by that of other deities were mere temporary interruptions that had no lasting consequences. Baal-worship, destroyed in Israel by Jehu and in Judah by Josiah, never reappeared after the Captivity. No tendency to idolatry survived the Exile. In many cases of pre-Exilic apostasy, the prophets denounce not so much the adoration of strange gods as the introduction of heathen rites and barbarous cults into the service of the God of Israel. 'Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression?' was the temptation that assailed many an Israelite who would have scorned to be known as a worshipper of Milcom or Astarte. Not only did he refuse these deities allegiance; he denied their existence. The teaching of the prophets was directed no less strongly against henotheism. Idols had no actuality; the very term *ĕlîlîm*, usually connected with a root *'all*, 'to be feeble or insufficient,' should more probably be regarded as a contemptuous diminutive of אֵל (cf. art. IMAGES AND IDOLS [Hebrew and Canaanite], above, p. 138 ff.). Although passages are cited (Ps 82, Dt 32^{7-12} [reading בני האלהים for בני ישראל in v.^{8}; LXX, *κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων θεοῦ*]) to show that a belief in the God of Israel was not incompatible with a recognition of the validity of other gods for other nations, yet no authoritative argument can be found in prose; theology cannot be deduced from poetical imagery, and, even if the emendation in Dt 32^{8} is correct, the conclusion of v.^{12} is an overwhelming denial of the henotheistic idea. There were, doubtless, in earlier times, cases where syncretism and henotheism sullied the purity of the true faith, but in the religious beliefs of the leaders, from the Patriarchs downwards, no adequate confirmation for such elements can be produced. Abraham, Moses, and Elijah were all equally zealous monotheists, and in none of their successors was there any retrogression from the highest and purest form of unitarian belief.

The polytheism prevalent in Babylon was vigorously attacked in the later chapters of Isaiah; more seductive to the Jews was the Persian dualism (see art. DUALISM [Iranian], vol. v. p. 111 f., also the 'Jewish' section of the same art., *ib.* 112–114), but it was none the less sternly reprobated

[1] *Jew. Lit. Annual*, London, 1908, pp. 146–148.

by the prophet. After the Return, no more is heard of temptations or lapses in this direction. The spark kindled and fostered by the prophets had spread into a mighty flame. From the day of the Return, as far as the Jews were concerned, 'the Lord was one, and His name was one.'

The belief, then, of the returned exiles in a supreme God, supreme not only for Israel but for the whole world, was unshaken and permanent. Linked to this belief was the corollary that God was good and His service obligatory on mankind, to each one of whom he was accessible as a father to his children. The insistence on the compassionate element of the divine being—that element which was later called the *middath hărahămîm*—resulted in reflexions on the nature and origin of evil, sin, and suffering. These speculations produced a repugnance to ascribe to the Deity the authorship of any actions which seemed incompatible with His attribute of a merciful Father. Hence the exiles of Babylonia were somewhat allured by the Persian dualistic theory, which seemed to offer a more satisfactory solution of the riddle of the universe. It was not a desire for idolatry, not a negation of the Unity, nor the attractions and superior status of a dominant religion that led Jews to regard the contrast of Ahura Mazda and Ahriman with approval. Their attitude arose from mistaken motives of piety, and from earnest strivings after the essential truth. Again and again Judaism has witnessed a recrudescence of the desire for a dualistic explanation of the problem of evil. Answers were not wanting from the prophets and teachers, yet new generations repeatedly felt the old difficulty in a newer and keener form. The book of Job and the Lamentations of Jeremiah declared vehemently for the Unity, and did not shrink from attributing evil to the Godhead. The unnamed prophet of the Exile states explicitly (Is 45[7]): 'I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things'; and this clear definition of God's activity left no escape from attributing to His omnipotence that which man considered evil. Yet a later age again felt repelled by this outspoken avowal and sought to mitigate its seeming harshness.

To the present time, the Jewish liturgy, in the daily morning service (see Singer, p. 37), contains this passage as an introduction to the most important section, the *shĕma'* (Dt 6[4]), but it is apparently divested of the very principle to which it owes its insertion. For the passage now runs, 'who formest light and createst darkness, who makest peace and createst *all things*.' This alteration is, of course, merely external, since 'all things' include 'evil,' yet the change is significant, and marks, no doubt, a revival of the hesitation to ascribe evil to God.

Closely allied to the problem of evil was the question of the prosperity of the wicked and the sufferings of the righteous, dealt with frequently in the later Psalms and in Job. In this, as in all the great problems, considerable fluctuation may be observed. The unity of God was a sheet anchor to which all held fast. His existence and divine providence presupposed a true solution to man's perplexities; if man could but succeed in finding the key, he would be able to unravel the mysteries. The certainty and dogmatism of later ages seem lacking during the Exile and in the two following centuries. From the Apocrypha it can clearly be seen how much the minds of men were exercised and how little they were satisfied by the answers which they possessed. The Apocrypha, taken as a whole, is at least two centuries younger than the Return, and it is only fair to assume that the earlier age evolved no solution of which the later was ignorant. While taking care, then, not to read into the former period the progress and development of the latter, we may at least infer that none of the philosophical ideas of the former escaped the notice of the later generations, and, therefore, of our own time. Our knowledge of the period immediately succeeding the Return is very scanty, but, as the centuries advance towards the period of Apocrypha, Mishna (see TALMUD), and Midrash (*q.v.*), our material becomes more abundant, and it is practically certain that no great idea, no supreme solution of any of those questions which agitate and perplex the mind of man in all ages, would have disappeared from the intellectual heritage that our ancestors bequeathed to us. From the 2nd cent. before the Christian era and onward such a supposition is almost unthinkable.

The solutions of the problems of evil and suffering ran on two lines, in a way closely allied. Man was incapable of understanding the inscrutable ways of Providence. The prosperity of the wicked was unstable or unreal even in this world; how much more in the world to come? It was only a superficial judgment that would convict the Almighty of injustice, by measuring His actions with an imperfect human norm. This line of argument, that of Job, Ps 73, etc., combines two thoughts—the insufficiency of human reason and the belief in the future world to redress the inequalities of this life. Ps 49 is difficult to interpret. On the one hand, v.[16] [v.[15] EV] seems a clear indication of a future life, yet the last verse seems a pessimistic summary of the fate of humanity, couched in terms of despondency almost recalling the language of Lucretius.

The corollary of the future world was not always employed.

It was sometimes argued (*e.g.* Ps 129) that the fall of the wicked and the triumph of the righteous would be manifest even in this world; or that, as God had saved His people in the past, so would He deliver them from present troubles; the appeal to history is common in the post-Exilic prophets. Coupled with this (*e.g.* Neh 9) is faith in God's mercy, which will save the Jews and frustrate their enemies, though the latter seem successful and the Jews doomed to failure.

The different treatment of the problem offered by Ecclesiastes will be discussed when dealing with the Apocrypha.

Closely allied to the problem of sin and suffering is the question of a future life (see, in general, art. ESCHATOLOGY, § 10, vol. v. pp. 376–381). At the early age of the Return, it is difficult to state precisely how this question was regarded. Judaism has usually refrained from defining with precision the details and circumstances of the future world, contenting itself with a belief in its reality. This belief is, however, firm and uncompromising. The difficulty felt in later times was to deduce this belief from the Pentateuch. There can be little doubt, though direct evidence as to the antiquity of the idea is not plentiful, that the post-Exilic Jews believed in a world to come; whether they believed in a resurrection of the body or of the soul is a difficult point to determine (see art. RESURRECTION [Jewish]). With the future life was bound up a belief in future reward and punishment; it is hard, in the first instance at any rate, to conceive of a future state which will not differ from the present. If this world is to be one of trial and testing, the life beyond the grave must surely bear some relation to it, depending on the success or failure achieved during the preliminary stage. The hereafter must be correlated to the present. The sin of mankind, if not expiated now, must surely be visited at a later time; and, if the sin, so also the merit.

The famous 53rd chapter of Isaiah was formerly taken as the authority for a belief in vicarious atonement. The special Christological interpretation has always been repudiated by Judaism; the general principle has scarcely, if indeed at all, been conceded (see S. R. Driver and A. D. Neubauer, *The Fifty-Third Chapter of Isaiah according to the Jewish Interpreters*, Oxford, 1877). Thus Ibn Ezra (*q.v.*; † 1167) refers the expression 'my servant' to all those God-fearing Jews who were in exile; Sa'adya (*q.v.*; 892–942) to the prophet Jeremiah. Both of these commentators reflect traditional exegesis; their views do not merely represent contemporary opinion. The suffering of the Servant was regarded by the nations as an expiation

for their sin; but this opinion, put into the mouths of the Gentile kings, was erroneous, and the outcome of their amazement at the persistence of the Servant under such unparalleled persecution. The impossibility of a vicarious atonement is clearly stated by the refusal of God to allow Moses to become a substitute for the sins of Israel. 'Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book' (Ex $32^{33ff.}$).

Similarly, although inherited punishment might be deduced from the Decalogue, the post-Exilic Jews relied on the teachings of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, which maintain emphatically the doctrine of individual responsibility (Jer $31^{29f.}$, Ezk 18). The problem of free will (*q.v.*) developed more fully in later ages. In Deuteronomy the free will of man is distinctly stated, and it is not felt to be an encroachment on the divine prerogative of omnipotence (Dt $11^{26ff.}$ $30^{15ff.}$). Man is free, and God is all-powerful. The dilemma does not seem to have troubled the post-Exilic Jews.

One of the most important elements in Jewish theology was the idea of cause and effect. The books of Kings, which were compiled after, or at least at the end of, the Exile, show very clearly that the writers were prone to link together events between which there was not, of necessity, any connexion, to find some religious motive in all affairs, and to account for history by the aid of theology. Thus the disaster to the village children who were eaten by she-bears is narrated after the mocking of the prophet (2 K $2^{23f.}$). To the writer it was obvious that the former incident was directly caused by the latter: *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. The Exilic or post-Exilic Jews seem to have had no notion of secondary causes: 'the division of causes into material, formal, efficient, and final belongs to the later age of Aristotle. Consequently, their ideas as to divine agency were somewhat primitive, and influenced their estimates of persons and events.

Thus the compiler of the books of Chronicles, who must have lived at least in the age of Alexander, cares little for political history, which he subordinates to that of religion, and to a less extent this is true of the writer of Kings.[1] If the early theory of causation be kept in mind, many difficulties, such as Hos 1, can be satisfactorily solved. The influence of this theory on theology was great.

Both in Babylon and after the Return the Jews held tenaciously to the belief in their divine election (*q.v.*). Countless texts and teachings reminded them of the fact that God had chosen them to be His people, His witnesses, a kingdom of priests, a beacon of light and truth to the nations of the earth. However much they might have fallen short of their duty, however much they might have neglected not only to teach others, but even themselves to remain faithful to their sacred task, God had not deposed them for ever from the office to which He had appointed them and their ancestors. Although the Jews had at times misinterpreted their position to mean a freedom to sin with immunity from punishment—a view strongly opposed by the prophets (*e.g.* Am 2-3)—yet they never felt themselves to have been superseded. Their mission was not taken from them. How deeply they realized their responsibility and at what personal cost they were willing to fulfil their obligation may be seen from the great domestic sacrifice which Ezra exacted from a willing people (Ezr 9 f.).

It was no light matter to separate from beloved wives and children, yet it was obvious that, if the mission of Israel were not to end in failure, the sacrifice must be brought. The repudiation of the foreign wives has been wrongly attributed to the Jews as an act of reproach and as evidence of callousness; it was in reality an instance of their devotion and their unswerving fidelity to the idea for which they had been called to be a nation of teachers, to spread the Word of God to the uttermost ends of the earth.

At this point it becomes necessary to examine the relation in which the Jews considered themselves to be placed with regard to Gentiles. Did they regard themselves as a separate nation among other nations? This question acquires fresh importance in later and in modern[1] times, and seems to have been regarded differently at different epochs. It must be remembered that the Jews, being Semites (*q.v.*), must, in consequence, be regarded from the Semitic and not from the modern ethnological point of view. The modern idea of a unifying element is consanguinity; the Semitic bond was community of worship. From the earliest times the principle of divine selection has been religious and not racial; otherwise there is no reason why distinctions should have been made between members of the same family; *e.g.*, Abraham, not his father Terah nor his brother Haran; Isaac, not Ishmael; Jacob, not Esau. The twin brothers have the same parents and the same racial conditions, but even the primogeniture is ignored, and the spiritual heritage is given to the younger brother. A Moabite is one who worships Chemosh, an Ammonite one who worships Milcom, and an Israelite one who worships Adonai. It was not the possession of a territory, for nomads have no settled territory. It was not the ties of blood, for the descendants of Esau, though called the brothers of Israel, are yet no true sharers of Israel's Abrahamic heritage. The strife of ideals is graphically portrayed as originating in the womb (cf. Gn $25^{22ff.}$, and see Rashi's remark on the allegory). The link between Semites was solely that of a common worship. At times this might acquire a racial sense, for inter-marriage with non-Jews, involving almost necessarily an abandonment of Judaism in the home and among the offspring, was prohibited. This prohibition, however, arose from a fear that religion would be affected, not from a sense of superiority of blood. The book of Ruth is an object-lesson in the consequences of pushing this tendency too far; the proselyte can be as worthy as the native, and from the Moabite woman David himself was descended. For the same reason a distinction was observed between the seven nations of Canaan, who were irreclaimably steeped in wickedness (a fact borne out by archæology), and others, who, coming to sojourn under the wings of the Shekhinah, would develop into true sons of the Covenant.

The effect of the Exile upon the Jewish community is summarized as follows by W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box (*Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*[2], London, 1911, p. 3 f.):

'To a large extent it denationalized religion by demonstrating that the religion of Israel could survive the dissolution of the State, and was, therefore, independent of a national centre. It is true that the elements of a national organization and life still existed in the Jewish communities, long after the Babylonian exile, and even later asserted themselves in new national forms. The connexion between race and religion, though modified, was not destroyed. Judaism, in fact, has never given up altogether its racial basis. In this, as in other respects, it has ever been inconsistent. When the ideal of a community, organized for purely religious purposes and recognizing no distinctions of race, has attempted to translate itself into action from within organized Judaism, a reaction back to the national idea has inevitably followed. And it was after every outward sign and vestige of separate nationality had been swept away by Hadrian (A.D. 135) that national feeling and sense of racial solidarity became most intense. But all the same, it remains true that ever since, the widely sundered and (in all other respects) distinct communities of Jews which are scattered over the world find their one link of continuity and unity in a common religion.

It has been pointed out, justly,[2] that, in principle, the separation between the State and the Church had already been effected in the Book of Deuteronomy. But in practice Deuteronomic principles met at the outset with serious obstacles in the way of their realization. The last of these disappeared with the destruction of the State. . . .

The first to seize and enforce the lessons of the Exile was the

[1] Cf. W. E. Barnes, *The Two Books of the Kings*, Cambridge, 1908, p. xxix.

[1] See below, p. 607.

[2] *e.g.*, by C. H. Cornill, *Der israel. Prophetismus*[4], Strassburg, 1906, p. 83 ff.

prophet Ezekiel, "the first dogmatist of the Old Testament." He laid the theological foundations of the structure which Ezra reared.'[1]

To translate the words *'am* and *gôi* by 'nation' is to beg the question and to presuppose an idea of 'nationality' akin to that which the word now conveys. The term *'am* implied an essentially religious kinship, because in primitive times the god was of the same kin as his servants (see W. R. Smith, *Religion of the Semites*[2], London, 1894, p. 35 ff.). A separation of religion and nationality was impossible; the idea of religion included much that is implied by the latter. An Israelite worshipping Chemosh became a Moabite, *ipso facto*; an 'atheist Jew' was inconceivable. 'It was impossible for an individual to change his religion without changing his nationality' (*ib.* 37). In course of time the Semites developed many national characteristics and adopted national features of life and government. Intercourse with their neighbours tended more and more to bring into the minds of the Jews a craving for a separate national entity, for a king, for an army, for territorial expansion. All these desires are regarded by the religious teachers as a falling away from righteousness, as signs of rebellion against God. Israel is a theocracy, to be governed by judges and officers (Dt 16^{18}), by councils of elders (Ex $18^{25f.}$), deriving their authority from the priests and ultimately from the Deity. If, dissatisfied with this form of government, the Israelites clamour for a king, 'like all the nations which are round about,' the desire might be granted (Dt 17^{14}). But the king is not to collect cavalry, nor is he to set his heart on Egyptian alliances. He is to spurn all the prerogatives of nationality and monarchy, and to reign in accordance with the Word of God. Samuel (1 S 8) feels a great repugnance to the institution of
king is a re
Israel 'shall
among the nations' (Nu 23^{9}). Her safety is to be in rest and tranquillity, not in diplomatic duels with Assyria and Babylon, not in political and national alliances, not in seeking for territorial expansion or military prowess. All these are the very signs of nationality that are so sternly reprobated by Isaiah and, later, by Jeremiah. Israel's destiny is comprised in the doctrine of the 'Remnant,' the small minority of true believers, who, oblivious of the narrow and confining bonds of nationality, are to spread over the earth and make it fruitful.

The ideal of Zion is to be not an impregnable fortress, but the source of the Torah, the fountain-spring of righteousness. The people who pinned their hope on the inviolability of Jerusalem were confounded, just as those who cried out, 'The Temple of God,' and trusted in it to save them, were mistaken. The idea of a temporal nationality with strong military power and a position of influence in foreign politics was never preached by Isaiah as the destiny of Judah. But the reliance on nationality and the boastful vaunt of being 'God's invincible nation' became stronger as the king, nobles, and people grew more faithless to the Word of God, more heedless of the admonitions of the prophet. They could not conceive that Assyria should be allowed to overcome Israel, God's own nation, strengthened by alliances, falsely encouraged by lying teachers, boastful of its military prowess and efficiency. But Isaiah saw more clearly: a faithless nation would inevitably be abandoned by God, for it was not for their nationality that He chose them, not because they were better or more distinguished by inherent virtue, but because of His love (Dt 7[7]) for them and in order that they should be His servants. Assyria was to be God's rod of punishment. The unthinkable would come about, and the false ideals of nationality were to be shattered by the hand of the heathen empire. The Lord of Hosts was to be supreme. His power was to sweep over the universe as waters cover the sea, sweeping away the puny artificial boundaries erected by man, 'removing the limits of nations and overwhelming the settlements like a mighty hero' (Is 10^{13}). When God had finished His work on Mount Zion and purified it from false ideals, when nations would no longer learn warfare, then would nationality be finally

[1] Cf. the ch. referring to Ezekiel in Cornill, p. 117 ff.

This universalistic consummation was regarded by all the prophets as the purpose for which the Deity was working. This must not be taken to imply that Israel was to lose its particularization. Zion is constantly exalted to a position of spiritual leadership, and this position is contrasted with the Oriental despotic court, which the kings and nobles created. At certain times, traces of a nationalist spirit may be observed, especially in exile or in persecution. By the waters of Babylon the Jews were, so to speak, driven into nationality because they felt themselves to stand apart from the empire wherein they dwelt. But it was, in reality, the contrast between the two religions, not a sense of nationality, that sundered the Jews from their conquerors. The Northern Kingdom was essentially more nationalist in proportion as it was less religious in spirit than Judah. Destruction and expatriation fell upon both kingdoms alike; but Judah survived, Samaria perished. During the Maccabæan persecutions the contrast between Jew and Greek acquired something of a national tinge. In Babylon and after the Return, the religion alone seems to have been the essential characteristic.

The dispersal of Israel began before the Exile; it continued after the Return. Emigration, stimulated by trade and other motives, as well as exile, had removed many Jews from the land of their fathers. They were to be found in Assyria, in Egypt, in Hamath, in the coastlands of the Mediterranean, and even in remote and mysterious 'Sinim' (Is 11^{11} 49^{12}). The presence of Jews in Gentile surroundings, differing from their neighbours in so many ways, must have stimulated, on both sides, introspection. The Jews were driven back on themselves, and they studied their own religion the more carefully. They would naturally look outside their own camp as well, and contrast the forms of worship and the beliefs that existed without. At a very early stage the influence of the Jewish Diaspora, as a missionary agency, began to be felt. Judaism became more and more universalistic. Cuneiform inscriptions reveal an intense Jewish life in Mesopotamia; socially and religiously the Jews played no small part in the land of their conquerors. The other world power, Egypt, was also the home of a solid Jewish community. Doubtless many other colonies existed, for silence must not be construed as an argument. Until the appearance of the Assuan papyri, we had no evidence for Jewish life in Egypt at the time of the Return; we now, by one single discovery, are able largely to re-construct the history of the Jews of Yeb (Elephantinē). The favour of the Persian governors protected them; they prospered commercially, engaging in various trades and holding property. They seem to have had a temple of their own, at least an altar with incense. They felt themselves in spiritual communion with Palestine, corresponding with political and religious officials. Their names are mostly Biblical, and they seem to have clung to their ancestral faith. It is unfortunate that most of the documents are of a business nature; more positive details as to religious life and thought would have been welcome. Doubtless the activity of the Jews prevailed in many other places, of which, at present, we have no knowledge. We can safely assume that, wherever they settled, a centre was established whence Judaism was diffused not only from Jew to Jew, but also to Gentile. Already Jeremiah, from the womb (Jer 1^{5}), had been designated as a prophet to the Gentiles, to preach a belief in God and the tenets of righteousness to the wide world.

The Temple and its sacrifices (see SACRIFICE [Jewish]) filled as large a part of Judaism after the Return as before the first destruction. It is often urged that the prophets deprecated the sacrificial

system and were not over-zealous for the Temple itself. This view is scarcely correct. The prophets frequently decry sacrifices, when brought in a wrong spirit or regarded as licences to sin. It is extremely doubtful whether they rejected sacrifices *qua* sacrifices. Similarly Jeremiah denounces those who make the existence of the Temple and the Ark of the Lord an excuse for sin. Jeremiah $3^{16f.}$ is definitely clear: it cannot be regarded as otherwise than a denunciation of those who felt that the Temple was inviolate, and that its inviolability would safeguard them from the effect of their wrong-doing. The prophets of the Return favour the sacrifices. Malachi, speaking not merely of the present but even of the Messianic age, looks forward to a time when the *minḥāh* of Judah and Jerusalem shall again be pleasing to the Lord as in days of old (3^4). Haggai and Zechariah, so far from deprecating the Temple idea, reproach the people for being lukewarm in the work of rebuilding. There would have been no possibility for those admonitions had the idea of Temple and sacrifices been superseded. The rebukes are directed against those who are despondent or those who are apathetic. The first Return was followed by a certain amount of disorganization. Not until the advent of Ezra was the religious life firmly established. For this reason Malachi attacks a spirit of parsimony among the tithe-payers and those who would defraud God of the sacrifices due to His Temple. There is no indication anywhere that the Temple and the sacrifices were to be relegated to the past.

The Messianic idea seems, to some extent, dormant at the beginning of the Restoration. The term 'Messiah,' of course, occurs in early passages of Scripture, but in a purely literal sense of 'anointed,' *i.e.* king, or one appointed to fill a certain office (cf. art. MESSIAH, MESSIANISM). 'The word "Messiah" (anointed one) is never used in the Old Testament in the special sense to which it has been consecrated by Jewish and Christian usage' (J. Skinner, *Book of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapters i.-xxxix.*, Cambridge, 1896, p. lviii). During the Exile the term is even applied to Cyrus, a Gentile ruler, because he has been chosen to be a divine instrument in Israel's release. What may be termed the Messianic idea is to be found under two heads: (*a*) the redemption of Israel, from the first Exile; (*b*) eschatological prophecies of a Golden Age of universal peace and brotherhood. Under the influence of the Restoration, when the people and prophets alike were animated by optimistic hopes for the present and the more immediate future, the Messianic idea was not so strongly dominant. The settlement of the people and the restitution and spread of divine worship in its former home occupied general attention. The age of the Apocrypha saw a renewal of eschatological speculation and a development and perhaps an extension of the Messianic idea.[1]

Prayer was naturally associated with the Temple ritual, and the phrase *Mō'adhē Ēl* (Ps 74^8) has been taken to denote assemblies for worship, synagogues. Set prayers are recorded in Chronicles and Ezra, and Jewish tradition assigns to this period the institution of the *'Amīdāh* prayer (Singer, p. 44 ff.; see, further, art. PRAYER [Jewish]).[2] So little can be said definitely with regard to ceremonial and liturgy during the period succeeding the Return that it will be more satisfactory to leave the consideration of this question to a later stage.

2. The Maccabæan period.—After the Return the thoughts of the restored exiles were primarily devoted to religion, to the rebuilding of the Temple, and to the exposition of the Law. Considerable time elapsed before the idea of nationality asserted itself. At the outset the Jews were governed by Persian officials, whose autocratic power was in ratio to their distance from the Court. Such a policy of decentralization was ill-adapted to consolidate a vast and unwieldy empire. In the great political convulsions occasioned by the conquests of Alexander and the strife between the Diadochoi, the evil consequences of such a system of administration became manifest. There was neither a national idea nor an imperial spirit to foster a sense of unity or attachment. Unity would, in any case, be well-nigh unattainable in such a heterogeneous collection of subjects, although patriotism might perhaps have been aroused by a strong personality at the head of the State. The local governor, not the remote and unknown 'King of kings,' represented to the country folk their actual master; with his overlord they had no concern. The feuds of cities would often result in raiding and warfare, owing to the weakness of the central government; these internal conflicts affected the provincials, not the great battles of the Empire. The Jews felt themselves at first neither citizens of the Empire nor Palestinian nationalists. The Empire was too large and Jewish Palestine was too small.

'The Jewish people had not the extension which is shown us in the days of Christ. If we had gone in the fifth century B.C. through Galilee—through all those sacred places so familiar to us, Nazareth, Cana, Bethsaida, Capernaum—we should have been among heathens. The name Galilee is the short for Galilee of the Gentiles, that is, the *region* of the Gentiles; the name clung to those uplands between Gennesaret and the sea, even after they had become predominantly Jewish. We should have been not only among heathens, but among barbarians, a population in which the original basis of Syrian peasants, tillers of the soil, had been crossed with the wilder Arab blood which came in by infiltration from the desert. The people of the Jews we should have found only in Jerusalem and in the fields and villages around Jerusalem to a radius of some ten to fifteen miles' (E. R. Bevan, *Jerusalem under the High-Priests*, London, 1904, p. 11).

Nationality was produced, among the Jews, by purely political causes. The overthrow of Darius and his Empire at the hands of Alexander did not at first react on them. For nearly a century they were under the dominion of the Ptolemys, and the change in their position seems to have been slight. It was not until Palestine was transferred to the Seleucids that a new era really began. To the spread of Hellenism and to the fostering by the Seleucids of Hellenic institutions and customs the growth of Jewish nationality is due. Antioch was a much more zealous disseminator of Greek culture than Alexandria, but the Hellenic spirit of Antioch, more intense and aggressive, was correspondingly debased in quality. The Jews of Alexandria were not offended by Egyptian Hellenism, but the Syrian Hellenism of Antioch stirred up strife through the whole land.

The attempt of Antiochus IV. to suppress Judaism and substitute the worship of Olympian Zeus roused intense opposition. The Maccabees were supported with devotion by the *Ḥăsīdim* (see art. HASIDÆANS, HASIDISM, vol. vi. p. 526), and their victory secured the permanence of Judaism. The beginning of the conflict was a fight for religious liberty; the end resolved itself into a struggle for nationality. When once the triumph of religion was assured, the Hasmonæan leaders, in continuing the struggle for the sake of national expansion, lost the support of the Ḥăsīdim, who became their undisguised opponents. No circumstance is more

[1] For a detailed survey of this idea in its earlier forms see Skinner, p. lvi ff.

[2] ואם ש"ץ שתקנו חכמים הראשונים (*Sifrē*, § 343, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1864, f. 142*b*, l. 2; ed. Bomberg, Venice, 1546, col. 238). See also *Meg.* 17*b*, where *ש"ץ* is attributed to the Great Synagogue. The kernel is probably old, but has been redacted. Ezra instituted the public reading of the Law on certain occasions.

instructive in the annals of Maccabæan history than the secession of the 'Pious' party, as soon as the aims of the Hasmonæan princes became material. It is not difficult to discover the cause of this divergence. The gulf between Judaism and Hellenism was great, for not only religious beliefs but social practices were involved. Judaism, like Islām and other Semitic faiths, includes under 'religion' many elements which elsewhere would fall under a different classification. This point, so important to remember, will be dealt with again in considering *Halākhā*. The Ḥăsīdīm could not tolerate many things, harmless in themselves, which would have been allowed to pass unchecked had religion not been at stake. The Greek dress and athletics would not have inspired such detestation under other conditions. In Alexandria, Jews adopted Greek speech and, most probably, Greek costume, without being considered traitors to Judaism. In Palestine, under Antiochus Epiphanes, all contact with the heathen became impossible. Things innocent by nature became actively noxious. The gap was complete, and could not be bridged. With this utter loathing for all things Greek, there came an insistence on all things Jewish; the antagonism revealed antitheses before overlooked or non-existent. There was no national feeling before; it was this bitter religious antagonism that created it, perhaps on purpose to oppose Greek nationalism. The aim of Alexander was Hellenization, and this included a strong national feeling; Antiochus and his party, unworthy heirs of a great ideal, and boastful of their national superiority, produced by their excessive fanaticism a corresponding national feeling on the Jewish side.

It was not among the pious Ḥăsīdīm that this spirit was strongest; it was chiefly evident in Judas and the leaders. The Ḥăsīdīm were concerned with one object and one object only—freedom of worship. Beyond this they cared for nothing. Judas believed that there could be no security from a repetition of the persecutions unless Judaism possessed a State as well as a religion. Hence he favoured all institutions that tended to arouse national feeling. Here he parted company with the Ḥăsīdīm, hitherto his staunchest adherents. When Demetrius sent Bacchides to instal Alcimus, an opponent of the Hasmonæans, as high priest, the Ḥăsīdīm were ready to accept him, and this was the beginning of the breach. Hereafter the fight was for national and dynastic ambition (Bevan, p. 117). In exactly the same way Jonathan and John Hyrcanus lost the support of the Pharisees, the spiritual successors of the Ḥăsīdīm, because they combined the offices of high priest and king (see Pss.-Sol. 17^{5-8}). The Ḥăsīdīm and the Pharisees despised all worldly elements. They cared not who ruled them or to what nation they belonged if only they could have freedom to worship God. The tendency may be often paralleled in Semitic history. The Khawārij, in A.D. 657, deserted the cause of 'Alī, the fourth Khalīf, and made their battle-cry, 'No judgment save that of God!'

After the Restoration the government was, in the main, theocratic—that is to say, the priests and the exponents of the Law enjoyed considerable power; the book of Ezra mentions four branches of secular rulers ($10^{8.}$ [8])—princes, elders, rulers, and nobles.

The functions of these classes are not clear, nor is it possible to state with certainty that these different names imply different classes of officials. Among the aristocracy thus constituted—for, as Bevan remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 6), 'the Community at Jerusalem was no democracy'—the priests were included, the high priest gradually acquiring more and more power, until, in the time of Jonathan and John Hyrcanus, the high priest was the head of the State as well as of the religious community. He was the president of the Assembly later known as the Sanhedrin.[1] The Sanhedrin, composed of both Rabbis and nobles, possessed, up to the Roman period, the power of life and death. Even Herod, in the height of his career, was summoned to appear before them; and from this it will be seen that the authority and influence of the religious element were exceedingly strong in the Jewish State. The priests, in accordance with the provisions of the Pentateuch, were maintained by the people. They received the tithes and firstfruits as their salaries, and were regarded with reverence on account of their sacred calling. They and the Rabbis were treated with considerably more respect than the secular officials by all classes of the population.

On the first day of Tishri, 444 B.C., Ezra the scribe and Nehemiah brought out to the people the Law of Moses (Neh 8^{1}), and read its contents to the assembled multitude. From now onwards, under the influence of Ezra, priest as well as scribe, the study and observance of the Law were prosecuted with ardour. From his days the scribes, or interpreters of the Law, came into existence. The canon of the whole Bible was most probably formed later (but see, further, p. 594[b]), in the time of 'Akiba († A.D. 135; on 'Akiba himself see art. AKIBA BEN JOSEPH, vol. i. pp. 274-276). The Pentateuchal legislation permeated the people and moulded their lives. As the Torah spread, the influence of the scribes increased in proportion. Not only in Palestine, but wherever the Jews had settled, the zeal for the Law accompanied them. In Syria they made many proselytes (see Josephus, *BJ* VII. iii. 3). In Egypt by about 260 B.C. the Septuagint translators began their work, and the Bible was made accessible to the Gentiles in their own tongue. The various Aramaic versions, known as Targumim (see art. TARGUMS), are of later date and were made for Jewish use. The Septuagint seems to have been intended, according to the account of Aristeas, for non-Jews. The Samaritan community accepted Judaism and received the Pentateuch about 430 B.C. Their recension differs in certain respects from the Jewish or Massoretic text (see, further, art. SAMARITANS).

All these facts show how the knowledge of the Torah was becoming diffused. It is safe to assume that many of the other Scriptural books circulated freely, as well as the Law. For the intense devotion to the Law and to Judaism the scribes and priests, the successors of the prophets, are largely responsible. The strength of the religious spirit appeared in various guises, not always uniform. Sects began to arise. As the Jews were brought face to face with the fascinations of Greek culture, a Hellenizing party grew up. Originally, no doubt, this party desired to adopt all that was good in foreign culture while remaining steadfast in loyalty to their faith. In course of time, partly by compulsion and partly by choice, the Hellenizers succumbed to the allurements of their Greek friends and made jettison of their religion to save their material prosperity (1 Mac 1^{43}). There were not wanting, doubtless, among them those who did not prove utterly faithless, but the real resistance came from the uncompromising opponents of Hellenism. From these the party of the Ḥăsīdīm developed, men zealous for religion and for religion only. These were the mainstay of the forces led by Judas; they were pioneers of martyrdom, ready to die not merely for the broad principles of their faith, but for the absolute observance of the Law. They were, at first, prepared to suffer death rather than defend themselves if attacked on the Sabbath. After their breach with Judas, the Ḥăsīdīm pass away. The term disappeared, but the spirit survived, to reappear under the guise of the Pharisees.

After the fixing of the text of the Law, the functions of the scribes centred on the exposition of the precepts and commandments and the preservation and teaching of the traditions. These traditions, called the Oral Law (*Tōrāh shebe'al peh*), are believed by orthodox Jews to have accompanied

[1] See *JE* vi. [1904] 393[a].

the Written Law (*Tôrāh shebbikt'thābh*), and a tradition of Mosaic authority is called *Hălākhā l' Môshĕ mis-Sinai* (see, further, art. LAW [Jewish]). The Written Law had to be supplemented in many cases by tradition, because the prescriptions were sometimes vague and presupposed existing knowledge. The rite of circumcision and the wearing of phylacteries, *e.g.*, are ordained in the Bible, but the details are not prescribed (cf. above, vol. iii. p. 440[a]). The object of the scribes (*q.v.*) was to teach the people how tradition required the Law to be carried out. The absence of such scribal teaching had been the cause of the neglect of the Law and of idolatry in earlier times; the work of the scribes consolidated Judaism and gave it stability and endurance through the later ages.[1] The name 'Pharisees' (*Pĕrîshayyā*, 'separatists') was adopted by or applied to those who were careful to observe the Written and the Oral Law (see, further, art. PHARISEES).

Attempts are frequently made to belittle the work of the scribes and Pharisees. The enormous moral and spiritual effect of their work is often overlooked, and attention is focused on their so-called 'hair-splittings.'

(1) This mistaken attitude is due to ignorance of the true perspective.

(*a*) Judaism includes many civil elements under the head of religion; consequently many discussions and prescriptions referring to civil matters had to be dealt with by the religious teachers. Similar legal arguments are to be found in every system of law worthy of the name. Every system must of necessity contain some elements of formal expediency, if it is based on logic, since principles cannot always be pushed to their logical conclusion. Moreover, a legal fiction was often designed to preserve the memory of a principle, while alleviating the strict requirements of a law, especially if the fulfilment had become too difficult for the community (*t'khāyĕl*). It must be remembered that the scribe or Rabbi had a twofold, if not a manifold, personality; he was a civil judge as well as a religious teacher. It is not fair to confuse the two functions and ignore the different attitudes necessary for such a double position. It is sometimes not easy to draw a line of demarcation. Further, the duty of the scribe was to specify clearly what was required of the people, to secure homogeneity of practice. It is obvious that the vague prohibition of work on the Sabbath would lead to public scandal and Sabbath-breaking, if the interpretation of 'work' were left to individuals. It was by specification and precision that a spiritual rest was achieved. The Sabbath was not merely a day of 'Don'ts.' As a matter of fact, the circumscribing of activities in the material sphere impelled a high sense of rest and consecration. This statement is capable of simple proof. On the whole, in the course of time, the Sabbath laws have not been relaxed. The tendency has been in the opposite direction (*t'khaḍḍĕnîm*). Consequently the observance of the Sabbath must be more rigid to-day than in the days of the early scribes. But no orthodox Jew feels the Sabbath to be anything but a day of true delight, awaited with eagerness and welcomed as a 'bride.'[2] And this delight can be realized only from within. No non-Jew is competent to describe it, for this experience is one which he can never have enjoyed. The Sabbath is to the Jew a day of ecstasy and good cheer, not of restraint; it has a positive, not a negative, character. Only when the Sabbath spirit is lost does the day become irksome. When, for example, in order to indulge in some amusement or to perform some act which is modern, and, consequently, falls under no prohibition exactly specified by the codes, but which is, nevertheless, obviously out of keeping with the Sabbatical spirit, the prohibitions are circumvented and are observed in the letter and not in the spirit, then the restrictions are felt to be irksome. But the fault lies with the Sabbath evaders, not with the scribes. The result is that the breach of the letter soon follows that of the spirit, and the observance of the Sabbath is finally abandoned. Those who keep the Sabbath do not suffer a penitential gloom,[3] as is often falsely imagined: those who see only the restrictions, and not the underlying spirit, tend, in process of time, to lose the Sabbath altogether. It is therefore those who do not keep the Sabbath that find it a burden.

(*b*) Many arguments are theoretical, being of the nature of exercises in logic and dialectic in which every hypothetical possibility has to be considered. Reuben and Simeon often correspond to John Doe and Richard Roe.

(2) The work of the Pharisees and scribes is attacked by writers who desire to belittle Judaism, in order to exalt the daughter faith. There are some who, conceiving nothing positive about Christianity, would make the *raison d'être* of that religion the failure of Judaism. This tendency leads to perversions of fact, not always due to ignorance. Attention is deliberately focused on the 'mountains suspended by a hair,' and the Pharisaic Rabbis are represented as casuists and hypocrites, their vast spiritual activity being purposely concealed. According to the writers of this class, Judaism is effete. It is not enough to say that the Law is no longer obligatory on Christians because of the coming of Jesus. Judaism itself must be stamped as corrupt and therefore superseded.

The influence of the Pharisees was immense. They were men of extreme piety and devotion, and their aim was to sanctify every phase of daily life. The Jew was to think of God in every act, at every moment. Not only must the command itself be observed; it must be safeguarded by a 'fence' (*s'yāgh*). Naturally among so great a party there were those who fell short of the high ideal that was set them. Alexander Jannæus warned his wife to beware of the 'false' Pharisee. In the famous passages of the Talmud (Jer. *Ber.* ix. 5 [8], ed. princ., fol. 13*a*, outer col., ed. Jitomir, 1858–64, p. 119; M. Schwab, French tr., Paris, 1871, p. 171, or Eng. ed., 1886, p. 168; Bab. *Soṭa*, 22*b*; see also *Âbôth de R. Nathan*, perek xxxvii., ed. S. Schechter, Vienna, 1887, p. 109=55*a*; see note 4 of Schechter) seven classes of Pharisees are mentioned: he who accepts the Law as a burden; he who acts from interested motives; he who counter-balances; he who is sparing ostentatiously; he who asks to be shown a good action, that he may do it; he who acts through fear; and he who is inspired by love.

The apparently sweeping condemnation of the Pharisees in the Gospels is perhaps due to the fact that the rebukes were originally directed against the hypocritical Pharisees, who had disappeared in the time when the Gospels were compiled or copied. To the Christian scribe, after the destruction of the Temple, these distinctions were unknown. Discrimination was, therefore, meaningless to him, and was consequently omitted. The result has been that the special condemnation of a small minority has been made to include a large and God-fearing class of men. The presence of upright and noble Pharisees receives recognition in the NT in the account of Nicodemus, who was also 'a ruler of the Jews' (Jn 3[1ff.] 7[50-52] 19[39]).

The greatest achievement of the Pharisees was the advance which they taught in the doctrine of the future life. On this point, as also on the question of angels, they differed from the Sadducees. The name of this party has been derived from *ṣaddîq*, 'righteous,' or, with more probability, from *Ṣādôq*, Zadok, the famous priest from whom, it is said, they claimed descent. As opposed to the Pharisees, who were largely democratic, the Sadducees were aristocratic. The Sadducees did not accept the Pharisaic *Hălākhā*. They maintained the principle of 'eye for eye' literally; the Pharisees had long commuted the penalty (see Funk, p. 47; Judah Halevi, *Kitâb al-Khazarî*, ed. Hirschfeld, pt. iii. § 46, p. 175). They interpreted 'the day after the Sabbath' (Lv 23[11]) literally, not, as their opponents, the 'day after the festival.' Their rejection of the doctrine of immortality was based on ethical principles. The founder, Antigonus of Socho, a disciple of Simon the Just, made his motto, 'Be not as servants that serve the master for the sake of gaining a reward, but be like servants who serve not for the sake of gaining a reward, and let the fear of Heaven be upon you' (*Âbôth*, i. 3; Singer, p. 184; R. T. Herford, in R. H. Charles, *Apoc. and Pseudepigr. of OT*, Oxford, 1913, ii. 691; see, further, art. SADDUCEES).

It must be observed that, when the Rabbis contrast two ways of serving God, 'from love' (*mĕ'ahăbhāh*) and 'from fear' (*miyyirāh*), and extol the former, they are practically in unconscious agreement with this saying, because 'love' here implies disinterested service, performed for its own sake. According to Antigonus, there was to be no reward in a life beyond the grave. The Sadducean doctrine of doing good for its own sake is perhaps ethically higher than that of the Pharisees, but it is the doctrine for a saint and recluse, and is impracticable as a popular creed; hence, if for no other reason, the Pharisaic party and form of belief were the more popular.

The two parties, according to Josephus, differed also on the question of free will. The Pharisees held that man's freedom of action was limited. They 'ascribe all to providence and to

[1] Of all the comprehensive verdicts on this important class, the most impartial and scientific may be found in an ordination sermon by Foakes Jackson, called 'Our Lord and the Pharisees,' published in the *Peterborough Diocesan Magazine*, Jan. 1910, with which every orthodox Jew will be in agreement. Of larger scope, and equally praiseworthy, is R. T. Herford's *Pharisaism* (London, 1912).

[2] This is well shown by Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul*, p. 32 f.

[3] See G. H. Box, *Spiritual Teaching of the Jewish Pr. Book* [*Judaism and Christianity*; *Short Studies*], London, 1906, p. 13.

God, and yet allow that to act as is right, or the contrary, is principally in the power of men; although fate does co-operate in every action. . . . But the Sadducees take away fate entirely and suppose that God is not concerned in our doing or not doing what is evil; and that to act as is good or as is evil is at men's own choice, and each man attaches himself to the one or the other at will' (Josephus, *BJ* II. viii. 14).

It would be wrong to imagine that the whole code of life, especially the laws of ritual purity, prescribed by the Pharisees was intended by them to be incumbent on all alike. The *'am hā'āreṣ* (*q.v.*), or multitude, was free from most of these provisions, which were observed only by the *ḥ*ᵃ*bhērîm*, or 'associates.' This has been conclusively shown by A. Büchler (*Der galiläische 'Am-ha 'Areṣ*, Vienna, 1906). Nor was the antagonism of Pharisee and *'am hā'āreṣ* general, as is often thought. Had that been the case, the Sadducees would have been more influential and popular.

A third sect existed among the Jews, the Essenes (*q.v.*), whose name is as inexplicable as the sect itself. Josephus (*BJ* II. viii. 2 ff.) gives a long account of their manner of life and forms of belief.

They were communistic ascetics. They rejected pleasure as evil, owned property in common, and recruited their numbers more by the adoption of children and the accession of proselytes than by marriage, which, however, they did not entirely avoid. Their piety was extraordinary, and they indulged in ritual lustrations. They were noted for their fidelity; 'whatsoever they say is firmer than an oath.' They devoted themselves to researches in ancient writings and to the study of natural medicine. They believed in the corruptibility of the body and the immortality of the soul. They believed in reward and punishment as an incentive to right conduct. Many of their customs give evidence of some foreign connexion, and it has been suggested that they derived some of their ideas from Gnostic, Pythagorean, and other sources. It is clear, however, that they formed but an isolated section, and that they cannot have entered very deeply into the life of the people. Their indifference to the Temple ritual was a sufficient cause for separation, without their ascetic practices, which would not appeal to a multitude. The most important feature in connexion with the Essenes is their mysticism. For their influence on the Kabbālā see art. KABBĀLĀ.

The oldest Jewish schismatics were, of course, the Samaritans (*q.v.*). After the fall of Samaria, the king of Assyria introduced immigrants from Babylon, Cuthah, Ava, Hamath, and Sepharvaim to replace the deported Israelites (2 K 17[24ff.]).

These settlers partially adopted Judaism, serving the God of Israel, but not entirely abandoning idolatry. In 432 B.C. they were joined by Jewish exiles from Jerusalem who had quarrelled with Nehemiah (Neh 13[28]; Josephus, *Ant.* XI. vii. 2, viii. 7). The dispute turned upon the question of intermarriage. Being excluded from worship at Jerusalem, they desired a temple of their own. One of the refugees, Manasseh, a brother of Jaddua the high priest, had married a daughter of Sanballat, the governor of Samaria. For this he was disqualified from officiating at Jerusalem, and he therefore urged his father-in-law to cause an altar to be erected in Shechem. This was done, and the existence of a rival temple on Mount Gerizim further embittered the relations between the Jews and the Samaritans. During the Maccabæan wars the Samaritans sided with Antiochus (Josephus, *Ant.* XII. v. 5). Later, John Hyrcanus destroyed their temple. They possessed the Pentateuch in a somewhat different recension, which they wrote in their own characters, resembling the ancient Semitic script, but none of the Prophets, whose inspiration they did not recognize.

In addition to the books of Daniel, Chronicles (in part), and Ecclesiastes, and the works of the historian Josephus, other sources are available for information about this period. The Apocryphal writings, in most cases contemporary, furnish abundant material, especially for a study of thought and religion.

In using evidence from the Apocrypha, it must be borne in mind that we cannot be definitely certain that we have before us an illustration of general Jewish thought. One of the reasons that prevented the reception of the Apocrypha into the canon was, no doubt, its divergence, in some cases, from orthodoxy. It does not always follow that orthodoxy changed between the compilation of the various Apocryphal writings and the formation of the canon. In some cases, books, once orthodox, have become Apocryphal, at least from the Jewish point of view, by reason of Christian or sectarian interpolations. Consequently care must be exercised in accepting statements from the Apocrypha as descriptive of Judaism generally.

In the main, however, the Apocrypha furnishes a most valuable link between the OT and the NT. The beliefs of the Pharisees are very largely inspired and reflected by it. The doctrine of immortality is strongly developed in Daniel (12[2]). In Wisdom (3[1ff.]) it is associated with reward and punishment after death.

'The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and no torment shall touch them. In the eyes of the foolish they seemed to have died . . . but they are in peace. For even if in the sight of men they be punished, their hope is full of immortality . . . the Lord shall reign over them for evermore . . . and the faithful shall abide with him in love.' 'God created man for incorruption, and made him an image of his own everlastingness' (2[23]).

On the other hand, Ecclesiasticus has no clear belief in immortality, but, if anything, inclines to a Sadducean rejection of the idea. Ben Sirach's philosophy was that punishment overtook the sinner in this life. If the righteous died unrewarded, his recompense lay in the good name which he left behind him (see Bevan, p. 58 ff.). The canonical book of Ecclesiastes definitely breaks with the idea, if, as is held by some scholars, the last chapter, especially v.[7], be an orthodox addition to obtain the inclusion of the book in the authoritative Scriptures. The writer of 2 Maccabees, who derived his history from Jason of Cyrene, is emphatic in his belief in a future life, even in the resurrection of the body as well. That the latter idea seems also to have been held by Jesus may be deduced from Mk 9[43-48], unless the words were intended purely metaphorically. The second book of Maccabees contains many verses which might be cited to instance the author's unshaken belief in a future life.

'Thou, miscreant, dost release us out of this present life, but the King of the world shall raise up us, who have died for his laws, unto an eternal renewal of life' (7[9]). 'For these our brethren, having endured a short pain that bringeth everlasting life . . .' (v.[36]). Perhaps the most suggestive passage in the book is 12[44], 'For if he were not expecting that they that had fallen would rise again, it were superfluous and idle to pray for the dead.'

The date of 2 Maccabees has been placed within the period 60–1 B.C.; slightly earlier were the so-called Psalms of Solomon (70–40 B.C.), a collection of distinctly Pharisaic poems. In these the Sadducees are attacked and seem marked out for eternal damnation, unless, indeed, repentance is considered to commute punishment. The doctrine of immortality is very strongly taught (H. E. Ryle and M. R. James, *Psalms of the Pharisees*, Cambridge, 1891, p. li; see 3[16] 13[9] 14[7] 15[13]).

In Judith there is no reference to a future state; but this is probably accidental, and no argument can be drawn from this silence. Enough has been cited from the Apocryphal writings to prove that the doctrine of immortality was now firmly established in Judaism.

The question of reward and punishment is associated with the questions of immortality, evil, and free will. It has been doubted by some authorities (*e.g.*, Ryle and James, p. 1 (d)) whether the statement of Josephus, relative to the difference between the Sadducees and Pharisees on free will, is accurate. The ninth Psalm of Solomon upholds man's freedom and responsibility:

'Our works are subject to our own choice and power to do right or wrong in the works of our hands' (v. 7).

Several Apocryphal works deal with the problem of evil. There is not much advance in thought, but it must be remembered that, in the solution of this enigma, the progress of philosophy since Job has not been great. The chief source, in the Apocrypha, is 2 Esdras. To the writer it is inexplicable that Israel should have been punished for its sins, while the enemies of Israel have been allowed to go free. The answer is to be found in a combination of the existing solutions. The ways of God cannot be understood by man, and in time to come He will send retribution and recompense. Baruch and Enoch also deal with the problem. About this time the idea of original sin grew up; but, as

Judaism has never adopted this idea, care must be exercised in studying those early allusions, and in accepting their testimony as typical (but see the theory of S. Levy, *The Doctrine of Original Virtue*, London, 1907).

The existence of an active power or powers for evil also comes into prominence, especially, though not exclusively, in the Apocalyptic writings (cf. art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Jewish], vol. iv. p. 612 ff.). Not only such books as Enoch, which are full of demonology and angelology, but even Wisdom (2^{24}), contain such allusions: 'By the envy of the devil death entered into the world, and they that are of his portion make trial thereof.' Perhaps this recrudescence of demonology is due to the old repugnance to ascribe evil to the Deity. Thus, Jubilees, in describing the temptation of Abraham, makes the agent not the Deity, but an evil spirit, Mastêmâ ($17^{16ff.}$). The later *Chronicles of Jerahmeel* omit the incident entirely. Tobit also contains references to the devil (6^{17} 8^{3}) and to demons.

The pessimism of Ecclesiastes represents one trend of thought, probably Sadducean; Wisdom ($1^{13f.}$) another:

'God made not death; neither delighteth he when the living perish: for he created all things that they might have being: and the generative powers of the world are healthsome, and there is no poison of destruction in them: nor hath Hades royal dominion upon earth.'

The Pharisaic teaching was predominantly optimistic, and the Rabbinic writings are full of the sentiment that this world is good: the observance of the Law was a joy in itself.[1] It was good because it was the handiwork of the Creator, who saw 'that it was good.' Probably the pessimism of the Essenes, as much as anything else, contributed to their disappearance. The fatherhood of God was one of the keystones of Rabbinic teaching. 'The latter end of the righteous he calleth happy; and he vaunteth that God is his father' (Wis 2^{16}). The immanence was always upheld, and the transcendental nature of the Deity was held to correspond with, not to contradict, His nearness to man.[2] The divine fatherhood was one of the answers to the problem of suffering and a protection against the assaults of evil.

Two books of the Apocrypha, Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom, belong to the category of didactic literature, devoted to the praise of wisdom. They are the counterpart of the OT Wisdom literature. With the Rabbis wisdom was often lauded, and its great powers are often enumerated, but it is synonymous with the Torah and connotes religion, whereas in the Apocrypha 'wisdom' implies knowledge in a wider sense. While 'the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,' general secular learning is sometimes meant. Hellenizing and perhaps Gnostic influences may be held responsible, to some extent, for the growth and spread of these ideas.

Wisdom, as in the OT, is personified. She saves Adam after the Fall, Lot from Sodom, Jacob from Esau, Joseph and Israel from Egypt; in fact, she is God's instrument (Wis $10^{1ff.}$). 'By thy wisdom thou formedst man' (9²); Wisdom is 'the artificer of all things' (7^{22}). Wisdom is associated ($9^{1ff.}$) with the 'Word of God,' though the Logos theory is not developed very far.

Perhaps the personification of wisdom, which, of course, can be paralleled in Proverbs, as in 8^{22} 9^{1}, may be regarded as the first stage in the growth of angelology. Except in the definitely Apocalyptic books, angels seem to have been used as poetical images, and regarded from a figurative point of view. In Jubilees, however, and in the Ascension of Isaiah, very advanced angelology—*e.g.*, division into groups and grades—occurs. Both of these books are later in date, and the references belong to Christian rather than to Jewish Apocrypha.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature in the Psalms of Solomon is the central position occupied by eschatological and Messianic ideas. In no portion of the Apocrypha is a clearer view presented or a more spiritual hero portrayed. The title *χριστός* is here, perhaps for the first time, used in the sense of Messiah. Pss.-Sol. 17^{23-end} and 18 deal particularly with the future deliverer. The time of his coming is concealed from human knowledge; it will be heralded by great disasters. These were later known as the 'birth-pangs of the Messiah' (*ḥebhlê Mâshîaḥ*). The deliverer was to be descended, but not supernaturally, from the house of David, the Davidic relation being a link with the Messiah of the prophets. He will be supreme on earth, but under God; he will be king and priest; he will destroy 'proud sinners' and break up the rule of the Gentiles, *i.e.* the Romans. He will restore the kingdom and gather in the outcasts of Israel. He will rule the nations and peoples in holiness and wisdom, and he will be known for his justice. The era of universal peace and brotherhood is not so clearly indicated as by Isaiah. There are, however, distinct allusions to it: 'There shall be no unrighteousness in his days,' nor will he reign by means of war (Pss.-Sol. $17^{36f.}$); 'Blessed shall they be that shall be in those days, in that they shall see the goodness of the Lord which He shall perform for the generation that is to come' (18^{7}). The blessings are not to be restricted to Israel; the converted Gentiles shall share them. There is no reference to judgment, resurrection, or immortality.

Ryle and James (p. lvi) quote an earlier parallel from the Alexandrine Sibylline Oracles, in the last quarter of the 2nd cent. B.C. Here (*Orac. Sibyll.* iii. 652–656) the Messiah (called 'King') is sent by God to make war to cease from the whole world, punishing and rewarding, not in virtue of his own power, but by the authority of God.

The views as to the Messiah were various and by no means uniform. Material deliverers were expected by some, spiritual by others. In such a complex situation it is difficult to get a synoptic view. In 2 Maccabees the Messianic element is meagre; in 2 Esdras, on the other hand, the length of his dominion is specified as 400 years. Enoch associates the Messiah with the future life and reward and punishment (chs. 48–51, 90, Charles, ii. 216 ff., 259 ff.), and in the later Apocryphal books the idea is developed. Ecclesiasticus, with its disbelief in a future life ($17^{27, 30}$), has no place for a Messianic personage. The absence of this idea is a distinctive mark of Sadducean origin.

The Sadducees were probably not lacking in devotion to the Torah; their observance was perhaps less extensive, but not less fervent. They rejected the *s'yāgh*, or fence, which the Pharisees erected. They did not insist so strongly and frequently as the Pharisees on the necessity for observing the Law, because this was taken for granted.

The Sadducees had 'their traditions as to the way the Law should be carried out in practice, but they refused to make the authority of the Scribes absolute. It is sometimes said that the Sadducees were analogous to the modern rationalists. The comparison is not a happy one . . . it would rather be to those in the eighteenth century who adhered to the church of the fashionable classes, resenting any religious claim upon them outside the routine of conventional decencies, and bitterly opposed the fantastic "enthusiasm," as they called it, of the followers of Wesley' (Bevan, p. 125).

A 'stern judgment' is threatened, 'awfully and swiftly,' upon those in 'high place' who have not kept the Law (Wis $6^{4ff.}$). The aim of the book of Judith, the composition of which has been assigned either to the age of the Maccabees or to the period following Pompey's attack on Jerusalem in 63 B.C., is to extol the Law. The Sabbaths and festivals are mentioned (8^{6} 10^{2}), firstfruits and tithes (11^{13}), and circumcision (14^{10}). Tobit is similar to Judith in enjoining strict adherence to the Law; the dietary laws, firstfruits, charity,

[1] See C. G. Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul*, p. 28 ff.
[2] J. Abelson, *Immanence of God in Rabbinical Lit.*, Introd.

prayer, and repentance are specially emphasized. Baruch, Jubilees, and the Psalms of Solomon all 'magnify the Law and make it honourable.' In Ecclesiasticus, on the other hand, the function of the scribe is that of a philosopher rather than a religious instructor (39[1]); he is an expounder of ancient lore, of sententious doctrine, rather than of statutes and ordinances. This does not mean that the Law is lightly esteemed; it was a self-evident truth that the Commandments were to be carried out; and the maxims and wisdom of Ecclesiasticus were intended, doubtless, as a complement to the more essentially practical teaching of the other books.

The attitude towards the Law may be paralleled by that adopted towards the Temple and sacrifices. No finer tribute to the ecclesiastical system can be found than the magnificent eulogy of Simon, the son of Onias, the great high priest, the type of the *Kôhēn Ṣedeḳ*, in Sir 50. Great as was his well-deserved popularity, one feels that some, at least, of the praises are intended for the office rather than for the personality of the occupant. Significant is his[1] motto, 'Upon three things the world is based: upon the Torah, upon the Temple service, and upon the practice of charity' (*Ābôth*, i. 2; Singer, p. 184; Charles, ii. 691). His disciple, Antigonus of Socho, the founder of the Sadducees, is hardly likely to have inculcated a dislike of Temple ritual, having been the pupil of so distinguished a high priest. Ecclesiasticus, like Ecclesiastes, makes no great point of the sacrificial system; like the Law, it was taken as a matter of course (see also Jth 16[16]).

Finally, reference should be made to an appreciation of natural phenomena,[2] just as in the Psalms and in Job the poetical genius was impressed by the beauty of the world. It is re-echoed in such stirring passages as Sir 42 f.

Little has been said hitherto as to the domestic practices[3] and personal religion of the Jews. These subjects can be dealt with more conveniently in the next epoch.

3. To the completion of the Gemārā.—Isaiah had warned his countrymen against appeals to foreign powers for aid. The unreal glamour of such alliances scarcely concealed the silken but effective fetters of vassalage. Judah, flattered at the idea of being an equal ally of a mighty monarch, was, in point of fact, reduced to a dependent subject State. Exactly the same political error was committed by the Hasmonæans, in seeking the aid of Rome. Wherever the eagles once set foot, the country ultimately fell under Roman rule and was deprived of every vestige of independence. It may be argued that, in any case, Judæa could not have remained unnoticed, but must inevitably be drawn into contact with the great world power. This is true; but, had Judas not broken with the Ḥăsīdīm, it is possible that dissolution of the Jewish State might have been accomplished more peaceably. The pious party—whether Ḥăsīdīm or Pharisees—were supremely indifferent to the personality of their civil rulers and the political system by which they were governed. So long as freedom of worship was secured, they were ready 'to render unto Cæsar' his due. The Maccabæan princes and the Sadducees, being eager for national and political independence, could not fail to precipitate a conflict which their opponents might have avoided or at least mitigated.

The influence of Roman government on Judaism was manifest in three ways: (1) the functions of the Rabbis became more exclusively religious than civil or political; (2) the unity of the Roman Empire stimulated the growth of the Diaspora; (3) the Roman period witnessed perhaps the most fruitful epoch of internal religious expansion and constructive development in Judaism. To begin with, the civil authority of the Rabbis was diminished by curtailing the jurisdiction and sanction of the Jewish courts. The right of giving decisions in questions involving finance was abrogated in the time of R. Simon b. Shetaḥ, during the reign of Alexander Jannæus; the power of inflicting the death penalty was suspended forty years before the fall of the Temple (Jer. *Sanh.* 18*a*, inner col., line 24 of first perek, ed. Krotoschin, 1866; Schwab's tr., Paris, 1888, p. 228; see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Jewish), vol. iv. pp. 288-290). This limitation of the powers of the Rabbis served to intensify the ill-feeling between the Jews and the Romans, but it did not cause the disappearance of the Jewish laws in those spheres where they were no longer operative. The attention of the schools was centred on the discussion of civil and social enactments and prescriptions, even though their practical application was, at the time, impossible. The debates and decisions, being incorporated in the Gemārā, have preserved faithfully a detailed record of these laws. The tendency of the Rabbis was, henceforward, to become religious teachers rather than civil officials. In the time of the Sepphoris academies, there were bitter feuds between the Jewish civil and religious officials. This, however, must not be taken to imply the rise of a new class of professional Rabbis. A new class of Jewish civil servants arose, called Parnāsīm,[1] etc., who were often in antagonism to the Rabbis. They were tax-gatherers and administrators, and are reproached for many evil practices (see A. Büchler, *Pol. and Soc. Leaders of Jew. Comm. of Sepphoris*, London, 1909). But the Rabbis remained, as before, private individuals. In general, they were accustomed to earn their living, not by teaching, but by some occupation or handicraft.

R. Gamaliel III. (first third of 1st cent. A.D.), the son of R. Judah the Prince, said: 'All study of the Torah without work must in the end be futile and become the cause of sin' (*Ābôth*, ii. 2; Singer, p. 187; Herford, in Charles, ii. 695). R. Zadok (1st cent. A.D.) used to say: 'Make not of the Torah a crown wherewith to aggrandise thyself, nor a spade wherewith to dig'; quoting Hillel's motto, 'He who makes a worldly use of the crown of the Torah shall waste away,' he deduces that 'whosoever derives a profit for himself from the words of the Torah is helping on his own destruction (*ib.* iv. 7; Singer, p. 196; Herford, p. 704).

The share of the Roman Empire in the growth of the Diaspora is almost incalculable. Jewish settlements arose in many distant lands and cities. Many causes stimulated the spirit of travel and colonization among the Jews. The peacefulness of life in a Roman province, as compared with the turbulent conditions prevailing in Palestine, must have induced many Jews to settle abroad. Commerce and deportation were other factors. Life in Palestine was considered superior to foreign residence (see Judah Halevi's *Kitāb al-Khazari*, tr. Hirschfeld, pt. ii. §§ 22, p. 98; *Gittîn*, 8*a*, etc.; *Ābôth de R. Nathan*, 2nd text, perek xxxix., ed. Schechter, p. 54*a* [=107]; *Keth.* 110*b* and 111*a*; cf. *JE* ix. [1905] 503 f.), especially as many laws could be fulfilled only in the Holy Land. But the Jews outside were not forgetful of their religious duties. Of this there is abundant evidence. In earlier days, the Egyptian Jews at Syene, as may be seen from the papyri, observed the Passover, and used

[1] There is considerable doubt whether Sir 50 refers to Simon I., son of Onias I. (310-291 B.C.), or to Simon II., son of Onias II. (190-170 B.C.), or to Simon Maccabæus (143-137 B.C.), the words 'Son of Onias' being then a gloss. See Taylor, *Sayings of the Jew. Fathers*[2], Cambridge, 1897, p. 12; H. T. Andrews, *The Apocryphal Books*, London, 1908, p. 33; G. H. Box and W. O. E. Oesterley, in R. H. Charles, i. 293, 507, decide in favour of Simon II.

[2] See Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul*, p. 46.

[3] See also art. FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Jewish), vol. v. pp. 879 881.

[1] On the functions of these officials see *JE* ix. [1905] 541 f.

the Jewish formula of marriage, 'Thou shalt be my wife,' not the customary Egyptian declaration, 'Thou shalt be my husband.' Philo (*de Vita Moysis*, ii. 157 [Mangey]; ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland, Berlin, 1902, iv. 204 f.; tr. Cohn, Breslau, 1909, i. 302) bears testimony to the strictness with which their descendants kept the Sabbath, abstaining from all manner of work, neither kindling fires nor carrying burdens, nor in any way violating the Pharisaic *s'yāgh*. In Syria, too, Judaism flourished and spread (see Josephus, *BJ* VII. iii. 3). From the Babylonian business documents of the great commercial house of Murashu and Sons, in which documents many Jewish names occur, Samuel Daiches has shown how great was the zeal for Judaism existing among the Jews in Mesopotamia (*The Jews in Babylonia in the Time of Ezra*, London, 1910).

Judaism had also planted itself firmly and extensively within the Roman Empire. The allusions of the classical writers are instructive. Already before the time of Pompey's conquests, Jews were to be found in the Italian cities (H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891–92, ii. 67). Jewish captives, brought to Rome as slaves, were freed by their co-religionists and added strength to the Jewish community. The hostile, or at all events contemptuous, attitude of Horace, Tacitus, and Juvenal was due to the inveterate Roman pride of race rather than to knowledge; it reflects a superficial popular verdict, not a judgment of matured reflexion. But such phrases as 'in qua te quaero proseucha' (Juvenal, iii. 296) are illuminating for the history of Judaism. They show that Jews brought their worship with them in their wanderings, and that their synagogues were numerous and well known. Cæsar, like Alexander and Napoleon, favoured the Jews, who greatly mourned his death (Suetonius, *Cæsar*, 84). He supported and freed Aristobulus, and his influence was a valuable protection, for he allowed the Jews to perform their worship in Rome.[1] Augustus decreed the inviolability of synagogues, and exempted Jews from appearing in the law-courts on the Sabbath and on Friday after the ninth hour.[2] Judaism was indeed a missionary religion. The disgust at the hollowness of the old faith was causing many cultured Romans to waver in their allegiance to the gods of the Capitol, and a desire for the truth was making itself felt. The Jews were keen missionaries. They 'compassed sea and land' (Mt 23[15]) to make one proselyte; they strove not to win lukewarm adherents, but to implant a fervent belief in Judaism, and to make the newcomer twice as zealous as themselves (see also Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* vii. 15 [*PG* ix. 524 f.]).

Apart from religious ties and the common bond of the Hebrew language, one of the strongest links that united Jews scattered in different lands was the tax of a third of a shekel, to be applied to the Temple. This was ordained by Nehemiah (10[32f.]) as a voluntary contribution, and it was loyally collected and forwarded from all parts. One of Cicero's orations, *pro Flacco*, was delivered in defence of a certain prætor of that name, who had seized two hundred pounds of gold which the Jews of Apamea, Laodicea, Adramyttium, and Pergamos had prepared to send to Jerusalem. Cicero pretends to be in fear of the Jewish members of the audience—an argument which, if not purely rhetorical, would show to what influence Jews had attained in public life. Under Severus, Judaism became a *religio licita*. Proselytes to Judaism were numerous, in high circles as well as among the populace, both in Rome and in Asia Minor. Their position was sufficiently important to require a special treatise of the Gemārā, containing laws, etc., affecting them. This treatise is *Mass. Gērîm* part of the Torah, that is to say, the 'Seven Noachian Precepts' (for which see *ERE* iv. 245[a]), are distinguished from the *gērē ṣedeḳ*, or full proselytes, for whom a blessing was added to the *'Āmīdāh* (see Singer, p. 48). The translations of the Bible into Greek, by Aquila, and into Aramaic (the Targum *Onḳelos hag-gēr*), are ascribed to proselytes. Queen Helena of Adiabene, her son Izates, and King Monobazus adopted Judaism before the time of Claudius (Josephus, *Ant.* XX. ii.); Flavius Clemens, the cousin of Domitian, died a martyr for his adopted Judaism in A.D 95, his wife and fellow-convert, Flavia Domitilla, being exiled to Pandataria (see Dio Cassius, lxvii. 14; and art. PROSELYTES).

As a rule, Rome did not persecute for religious motives, preferring to overlook nonconformity wherever possible; but with the spread of Judaism and of Christianity the refusal to sacrifice to the Emperor or to look on him as a deity was regarded as treason, and punished with death. The private and public life of Rome was so closely associated with idolatry that intercourse between Jew and Roman was very restricted. Every civic or social act or custom was allied to idolatrous worship or the pouring of libations to heathen deities. The refusal to participate caused the Jews, and the Christians too, to be regarded as atheists[1] and as unsociable haters of mankind. The problem of regulating this intercourse was serious. On the one hand, Jews had to be kept entirely free from participation in idolatry; on the other hand, the Rabbis were anxious to enable the Jews to mix with their neighbours, as far as was consistent with a strict observance of Judaism, for social and commercial purposes, so that the lot of the orthodox Jew should not be too rigorous. Hence the treatise *'Āḇōḏā Zārā* and the enactments of Tertullian (see the Introd. in W. A. L. Elmslie's ed. of *'Āḇōḏā Zārā* in *TS* viii. 2 [1911]). Of the 316 differences between the schools of Hillel and Shammai, 18 are connected with intercourse with pagans and the use of pagan articles of food. The discussion of these differences, in the house of Ananias b. Hezekiah b. Garon, became very acrimonious, and, it is said, finally led to blows. It was afterwards regarded as a day of black misfortune to Israel, no less disastrous than the day on which the Golden Calf was set up (see *Mishna Shabb.*, i. 4 ff.; Bab. *Shabb.* 13*a*, 17*a*, etc.; Tos. *Shabb.* i. 16=M. S. Zuckermandel, Pasewalk, 1880–82, p. 111, l. 2). This is, doubtless, a verdict of posterity on the consequences of interdicting intercourse with heathen so strictly. The Jews adopted much from the Romans. The Haggādā for Passover, or order of domestic ceremonies, with which this festival is observed, is saturated with customs copied from Roman etiquette.

The menu 'ab ovo usque ad mala' is represented by the hard-boiled eggs, eaten just before the meal, and the *ḥarōseth* (apples soaked in wine and spices); the piece of unleavened bread, *afiqōmān* (ἀπὸ κώμης, κώμου, 'after the feast,' or perhaps 'ἐπὶ κῶμον, 'during the meal'), takes the place of the usual dessert of apples for a special reason on this night. The method of 'leaning' at the meal is that of the *triclinium*; the prescription of four glasses, reminiscent of the *propinatio* or fixing of the number of glasses and proportion of wine by the *arbiter* or *dictatrix bibendi* (see Hor. *Odes* III. xix.; Plautus, *Pers.* v. i. 19 ff.), is most instructive; the number of glasses usually corresponded to the number of letters in the name of the chief guest. Four would obviously represent the Tetragrammaton. This and

[1] Jos. *Ant.* XIV. vii. 4, x. 8; Dio Cassius, xli. 18.

[2] Jos. *Ant.* XVI. vi. 1–7.

[1] ἐπηρέχθη δὲ . . . ἔγκλημα ἀθεότητος, ὑφ' ἧς καὶ ἄλλοι ἐς τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἤθη ἐξοκέλλοντες πολλοὶ κατεδικάσθησαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπέθανον, οἱ δὲ τῶν γοὖν οὐσιῶν ἐστερήθησαν (Dio Cassius, xvii. 4).

the 'mixing of the wine,' the 'dipping,' etc., are all instances which show how the ritual of Judaism has preserved innocent manners and customs borrowed from Roman dinner tables.

In another way, too, the Diaspora was affected by the shifting of the schools. Galilee was a barbarous district before the Rabbinical academies were transferred to Usha, Sepphoris, and Tiberias. Mesopotamia, on the other hand, was a more fruitful soil and actually 'lent' learning to Palestine, so that Hillel 'brought' Babylonian wisdom to the land of Israel.[1] As in the case of Christianity, the growth of the Diaspora was not entirely a source of strength. When Judaism spread abroad, sects arose within.

A contrast has often been drawn between the Jews of Egypt and those of Mesopotamia. On the whole, the latter country was more favourable to the growth of the spirit of Judaism. Babylon is the birthplace of the larger Talmud, undying in its influence on Judaism; Egypt is the home of the Septuagint, which was superseded by Aquila's version and became the heritage of the Greek Church, as well as of Philo Judæus (*q.v.*), whose philosophy, though important in its day, cannot for a moment be compared with the teachings of the Babylonian Rabbis in its importance for Judaism. The Jewish communities of Egypt seem to have fluctuated and disappeared periodically, at all times. Thus, when the Arab general, 'Amr ibn al-'Âṣ, conquered the country (A.D. 640–642), no mention is made of the Jews among the religions enumerated in the treaty of peace with the Mukaukis. The Jews of Egypt and of Mesopotamia were mostly orthodox; but sects, more or less heretical, manifested themselves in Palestine at an early date. Justin Martyr enumerates (*Dial. cum Tryph.* 80 [*PG* vi. 665]), besides the Sadducees and Pharisees, the Gonistæ, Meristæ, Galilei, Helleniani, and Baptistæ.[2] Clement of Alexandria also mentions (*Strom.* vii. 15 [*PG* ix. 524]) the existence of Jewish sects.[3] Against the sectaries, or *Mînîm*—a term which at certain periods included Jewish Christians—a special commination, drawn up by Samuel the Younger (early part of 2nd cent.) at the request of Gamaliel, was added to the Eighteen Benedictions.[4] The Boethusians,[5] a Sadducean sect, were descended from Simon b. Boethus of Alexandria. The Cairo Genizah has recently furnished documents of an unknown group of sectaries. These have been edited by S. Schechter (*Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, i., Cambridge, 1910), who attributes them to a Zadokite sect at Damascus founded in Maccabæan times.

This hypothesis has been disputed, however, by many of the scholars who have devoted themselves to the book. See Israel Lévi (*REJ* lxi. [1911] 161–205); M. J. Lagrange (*RB*, new ser., ix. [1912] 213–240, 321–360); W. Bacher (*Zeitschr. für hebr. Bibl.*, vol. xv. [1911], no. 1, pp. 13–25); G. Margoliouth (*Athenæum*, 26 Nov. 1911, *Exp*, viii. ii. [1911] 499–517, iii. [1912] 213–235), who believes that the Zadokites regarded John the Baptist as the Messiah and Jesus as the teacher of righteousness; R. H. Charles (ii. 785 ff.), who regards the book as the composition of a party (not a sect) originating among the Sadducees, but closely related to the Pharisees, and writ between 18 and 8 B.C.; and A. Büchler (*JQR*, new ser., [1912–13] 429–485), who regards the book as coming from the period preceding the Karaite schism. At all events, this sect agrees with the Zadokites of Kirkisânî, mentioned in the *Kitâb al-Anwâr* ('Book of Lights'), in opposing Rabbinic ordinances in several particulars, notably divorce and the regulation of the calendar.

[1] See last line of *Sukka*, 44*a*, and Rashi, *in loc.*

[2] These sects were known to Eusebius (*HE* iv. xxii. 6) from the work of an older author, Hegesippus; and Epiphanius (*Hær.* xvii. [*PG* xli. 256]) mentions as a Jewish sect the Hemerobaptistæ, who are the טובלי שחרית (Bab. *Ber.* 22*a*; Jer. *Ber.* iii. 6, c), not to be confused with the Essenes.

[3] On the various patristic references cited above see S. Krauss, 'The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers,' *JQR* v. [1892–93] 122–157, vi. [1893–94] 82–99, 225–261.

[4] See *JE* viii. [1904] 595, xi. [1905] 281.

[5] *Inter alia*, they were strict Sabbatarians and did not believe that חבוש ערבה רוקח את־השעה (*Sukka*, 43*b*).

Another Sadducean sect was that of the Dositheans (see art. 'Dositheus' in *JE* iv. [1903] 643 f.). The Ophites and Naasenes, serpent-worshippers, were Gnostic sects that scarcely come within the confines of Judaism (see Graetz, ii. 378, and cf. *ERE* vi. 238 f.). Within orthodox Judaism dissent was not wanting. In addition to the schisms caused by pseudo-Messiahs, such as Theudas and Judas (Ac 5[36f.]), in general, there was a great gap of thought between Palestine and Galilee in particular. The North was, for a long time, ignorant and superstitious, and especially in such points as demonology differences may be seen between Palestine and Galilee (see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Jewish], vol. iv. p. 612 f.). Further, the ill-feeling was great between the Rabbis and the Jewish ruling classes in Sepphoris during the 2nd and 3rd centuries. It was not so strong, on the other hand, between the educated classes and those known as *'am hā'-āreṣ*, as is often maintained (*e.g.* in art. 'AM HA-ARES, vol. i. p. 385 f.).[1]

Christianity was, of course, the most important and enduring of all the sects. A general consideration of Christianity and of its relation to Judaism must be reserved till the end of the article. For the moment it will suffice to mention the circumstances that close affinity existed between the teaching of its founder and that of the Essenes; that Christianity, like Judaism, spread rapidly in the Roman Empire, chiefly where Judaism had fructified the soil by its teachings; and that Christianity, like Judaism, soon developed sects and dissensions.

The three great prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel, arose at national crises when their aid was most needed. All of them preached the doctrine of the survival of the Remnant, but in none of them was this Isaianic principle so strongly marked as in their great successor, R. Johanan ben Zakkai. This great teacher saw, like Jeremiah, that Judaism could indeed survive the loss of a temple, that it was universal, not national, and that it could flourish as well in foreign lands as at home. He saw, like Isaiah, that the great mass of the people were irreclaimable, and that the hope of Israel lay in the survival of a loyal Remnant. For this reason he managed to escape from the siege of Jerusalem, and, presenting himself to Titus, craved a boon. This was granted, and he received permission to found a school at Jamnia (Jabne, between Jaffa and Ashdod). This school proved the salvation of Judaism. After the fall of the Temple, when despair was universal, it was from this school that new hope went forth and a new epoch developed in the history of Judaism. Now indeed Judaism became essentially a religion of a book, but it was a living book, the pages of which were loyal human hearts. As the Return from Babylon resulted in the dissemination of the Written Law, so this 'Return,' or revival, resulted in the elucidation and ultimate codification of the Oral Law; it laid the foundation of the Talmud.

The name of 'scribes' (*Sôfᵉrîm*) was given to the earlier Pharisaic Rabbis, the last of whom was Simon the Just. The Soferim formed the mysterious body known as 'the Great Synagogue' (כנסת הגדולה [*Âbôth*, i. 2]). Whether this was an actual assembly or a name given to certain Rabbis is a much disputed point.

On the one hand, S. Funk writes (*Entst. des Talmuds*, p. 38): 'Die Grosse Versammlung war zunächst eine politische Oberbehörde und als solche eine gesetzgebende Körperschaft. Da aber ein grosser Teil derselben, zunächst die Priester und Leviten,

[1] Cf. A. Büchler's pamphlet, cited above (p. 591ᵇ): 'The abbis reciprocated the feeling [of hatred], but it found expression only in burlesque exaggerations (*e.g.* those quoted in art. 'AM HA-ARES) addressed to scholars, which betrayed their incapacity of doing harm, and, I think, the insincerity of their hatred' (p. 58).

den hohen und höchsten Kultusbehörden vorstanden, ist es selbstverständlich, dass auch religiöse Anordnungen durch diese Versammlung getroffen wurden. Was die Soferim in den Schulen gelehrt, wurde durch diese zum Gesetze erhoben.' On the other hand, H. E. Ryle (*The Canon of the OT*, London, 1892, Excursus A, where all the evidence is given) says (p. 270): 'The evidence is quite insufficient to justify us in regarding the "Great Synagogue" as an institution which ever played a real part in the history of the Jews . . . it was, we believe, a dream of the Jewish Doctors' (see also Taylor, p. 110; and, for Herford's theory, his *Pharisaism*, p. 21).

The successors of the Soferim were called *Tannāīm* (from Aram. *tenā* = Heb. *shānā*, 'to repeat'). Their teaching is, in consequence, called the Mishna (on which see art. TALMUD). The Soferim formulated; the Tannaim repeated. The Tannaite period was less constructive than conservative. This teaching was naturally not uniform. It was preserved verbally, under various forms, until collected by R. Judah the Prince (150–210), who made the recension of R. Meir authoritative. Other versions were 'external' (*Boraithā*; see annotated ed. of *The Authorised Daily Prayer-Book*, by I. Abrahams, p. xxv), or 'additions' (*Tôseftā*). All legal matter was called *Halākhā*, from הָלַךְ, 'to walk,' *i.e.* a course of conduct. Homiletical and allegorical matter was termed *Haggādā* (or *Aggādā* in Aramaic), from the hiph'îl הִגִּיד, 'to declare, tell, relate') of נָגַד, 'to be conspicuous.' Midrash (*q.v.*), or exposition, was the Halākhic or Haggādic exposition of the Scriptures.

It was noted for the use of the parable, which, though found in the OT, was revived and popularized by Jesus, if the theory is correct which is advanced by H. P. Chajes, who maintains that the word 'authority' (ἐξουσία), in the phrase 'he taught as one having authority' (Mt 7[29]), should be 'parable,' the Heb. root מָשָׁל meaning both 'rule' and 'proverb.'

After the Bar Kokhba war the schools were transferred to Galilee and, ultimately, to Babylon. In these schools the Mishna was debated by later Rabbis, known as *'Amôrāīm*, and their discussions, in Palestine and Babylon, are called the Palestinian and Babylonian Gemārā respectively. The word *Gemārā* means 'completion.' Mishna and Gemārā together are called Talmud. Neither the Mishna nor the Gemārā was written down at first. They were preserved orally.

Great care must be taken in citing these works. It must be remembered that they embody information extending over centuries, and that they frequently give individual thoughts and expressions. Evidence must be carefully weighed and used with discrimination. The date, the place, and the author must be accurately noted. Evidence for Palestine is not always applicable to Galilee or Babylon. Similarly, chronological unity must be maintained. Further, the private circumstances of a speaker and the politics of his age must be remembered. Thus, a Rabbi who lived in an age of persecution will scarcely have known the meaning of tolerance. One who lived in the midst of wicked and immoral non-Jews would hardly have recommended his pupils or his flock to mix with heathen. Haphazard citations are inaccurate and misleading.

The Talmud is a *corpus juris* rather than a code. The reduction of all the legal matter to an orderly code was the work of later generations, and the arrangement of the Talmud was calculated to help the memory by the association of ideas, by the use of mnemonic aids, and by *memoria technica*. The whole life of man is regulated, and every act of daily life is considered. Not only matters essentially religious are dealt with, but also civil matters, hygiene, archæology, folklore, medicine, science, and table etiquette; indeed, the most heterogeneous subjects occur, so that of a truth the motto of the Talmud might be 'quicquid agunt homines nostri farrago libelli.' It must be remembered that the Talmud gives verbatim reports; consequently, it must be judged not as an encyclopædia or as a code of Justinian, but as a Hansard. Many cases are hypothetical or ideal; many 'hair-splitting' arguments are, in point of fact, exercises in logic and mental analysis (see above, p. 588[a]). Hillel, who flourished about 100 B.C., and who introduced Babylonian learning to Palestine, perfected seven measures of argument (see Tos. *Sanh.* vii. 11. = Zuckermandel, p. 427, l. 4; see also Schechter's note, no. 12, on p. 110 = 55*b* of *Âbôth de R. Nathan*, Text A, perek xxxvii., ed. Schechter), later developed by R. Ishmael to thirteen (see Singer, p. 13). Hillel was the advocate of leniency (*mēqll*), his rival Shammai, of rigour (*maḥmir*). Hillel's example of leniency was followed by his grandson Gamaliel I., son of Simon, who 'lightened' the Law by his decisions. This Gamaliel greatly opposed violence in repressing heresy, and it was he who advocated the release of Paul (Ac 5[34-39]). He is also known for legislation for the protection of women and his regulation of the calendar. For a detailed account of the Talmudic legislation see art. TALMUD.

[1] *Markus-Studien*, Berlin, 1899, p. 11.

It was probably due to the rise of Christianity that the Canon[1] of the Bible was formed. The famous passage in *Baba bathra*, 14*b*, etc. (which may be consulted in Ryle, *op. cit.*, Excursus B), embodies the traditions of the selection of the Scriptures. Owing to the diffusion of heretical books (*ḥîṣônîm*, a term which may indicate either secular books or prohibited heretical scriptures, and, probably, the Gospels), measures had to be taken to protect the people from ascribing inspiration to documents that had no claim to such authority.

'Apocryphal books are called 'Genûzim, "hidden away," books preserved as ancient but not adapted for public reading . . . (books) whose canonicity was disputed . . . different, in spite of the similarity in the derivation of the word, from Apocrypha. The name denotes doubt rather than final rejection' (Ryle, p. 187).

It is said that the fiercest fight raged about the inclusion of Canticles and Ecclesiastes, the former because the allegorical interpretation was not universally adopted, the latter because of its Sadducean tendencies. The strength of 'Akiba was excited in their favour, and the books received the stamp of canonicity, *i.e.* they were said 'to defile the hands.' This expression is indicative of the care for books inculcated by the Rabbis. In order to ensure safety and to preserve the scrolls from careless handling, they were declared to be 'unclean' (see the Mishna, treatise *Yādayim*).

The Jews, at the fall of the Temple, may be divided into three groups, each of which may be typified by a representative hero. (1) There was the party of extreme nationalism, the party of the zealots, who utterly repudiated Rome. An example of this class was 'Akiba, who supported the revolt of Bar Kokhba against Hadrian. The greatness of 'Akiba's work as a Halākhist was nearly lost through the terrible persecutions and wholesale exterminations that followed the suppression of the revolt which he had encouraged as a nationalist. 'Akiba stood for nationalism, but he stood for the Halākhā as well, and in this respect he differs from the zealots and from Bar Kokhba, whose aims were almost wholly political (see, further, art. AKIBA BEN JOSEPH, vol. i. pp. 274–276). (2) At the other extreme stood Johanan ben Zakkai, who represents the old Ḥasidæan idea in its purest form. He and his followers concentrated on the Halākhā, and were indifferent to politics. Johanan, like Jeremiah, was denounced as a traitor, because, like Jeremiah, he realized the hopelessness of resistance, and saw that hope lay only in submission and in strict attention to the Law. He was subjected to persecution as Jeremiah was, and had to escape from Jerusalem in a coffin. (3) The third party may be typified by Josephus (*q.v.*), who, though equally eager for the Law and zealous for Judaism, believed in friendship with Rome. In this, but in this alone, he is reminiscent of the Hellenizers under the Maccabæans and the Sad-

[1] Quite a different view as to the origin of the Canon is taken by M. Gaster, *The Biblical Lessons*, London, 1913 (reprinted from *Jew. Rev.* iii. [1912–13] 104, 202, 427); cf. also *RHR*, vol. ii. p. 568 f.

ducees. As regards nationalism he stands at the opposite extreme to 'Akiba, Johanan being perhaps midway between the two, though nearer to Josephus. Admiration for what was laudable in Roman institutions was not confined to the Sadducees. Paul boasts with pride of his Roman citizenship, and, almost in the same breath, of being a keen Pharisee. Even if Paul be regarded as a heretic, Josephus, no less conscious of the pride of Roman citizenship, was faithful to the Law.

The fall of the Temple made the Jews wanderers, with a book for their portable fatherland and a code for their nationality. But the yearning to return to Zion showed itself to be deep and real. The liturgy contains many allusions to and prayers for a restoration, but the restoration which is described as the Return to Zion and the rebuilding of Jerusalem meant something more than a merely physical return and rebuilding. It was associated with the reign of universal peace and the coming of the Messiah. Under the overpowering influence of the catastrophe, such aspirations could not have been expressed in other phraseology. In the course of time the ideas became separated. It is significant that the rebuilding and the Return are not included in the Thirteen Creeds, based on Maimonides (see Abrahams, *Annotated Prayer-Book*, p. cii; *ERE* iv. 246[a]), although the coming of the Messiah is mentioned as an article of faith. Judaism has no dogmatic precision as to eschatology. The Return may be exclusively physical in form, but not necessarily so. So, too, the restoration of the sacrifices. The verse of Hosea (14[2]), 'Let us make up for the sacrifices with our lips' (see Kimhi and also Abrahams, p. xxiv), was taken to indicate the supersession of sacrifice by prayer. The allusions to sacrifices in the liturgy are, for the most part, reminiscences, designed to preserve alive the memory of the Temple, as is the *Abodah*, or Temple service, of the high priest, in the *Musaf* of the Day of Atonement. The belief in the restoration of the sacrifices is not clear, and many citations could be adduced on both sides (cf. O. J. Simon, 'Authority and Dogma in Judaism,' *JQR* v. 231–243, and the counter-statement of M. Hyamson, *ib.* 469–482).

This spiritualization has its counterpart in the homilies of the Midrash and the allegorization of Philo. It was also one of the points of difference between Sadducees and Pharisees. As an instance it may be remarked that the Sadducean sect of Boethus (*Meg. Ta'anith*, iv.) rejected the old traditional interpretation of the *lex talionis*,[1] adopted by the Pharisees, in which 'the *value* of an eye' was to be given for 'an eye.' The Sadducees claimed that the apparently literal explanation was correct and upheld severity. The Pharisees, on the other hand, pointed out that the injured party did not, in fact, receive compensation by this means. In this, as in other matters, the tendency to spiritualize and allegorize had been long existent.

For the growth of angelology, see art. DEMONS AND SPIRITS (Jewish). The effect of Gnostic learning and the continued influence of Greek philosophy made themselves felt even on Rabbis. It is said (Tos. *Hagiga*, ii., ed. Zuckermandel, p. 234, l. 7) that four Rabbis entered Paradise, *i.e.* indulged in the study of speculative philosophy. Ben Zoma lost his reason; Ben Azzai died young; Elisha ben Abuya 'cut down the little plants' (corrupted young students) and became an apostate; 'Akiba alone emerged in safety. It was feared that many who were unfitted might be led to undertake metaphysical research, and the Rabbis accordingly ordained that certain portions (*i.e.* עריות, incest, etc.) of the Scriptures should not be taught publicly; that is to say, they might be imparted to two students but not to a greater number at one time; other portions, *e.g.* בראשית, 'cosmology, genesis,' should not be taught except to one student, in private. The most mystical of all chapters was not taught at all, but was reserved for individual study in mature age.

The chapter thus prescribed was Ezk 1, known as מעשה המרכבה, the 'work of the chariot,' on account of the speculations as to the nature of the Deity which would be aroused. For this reason, cosmology was not much encouraged (see 'Jewish' sections of artt. AGES OF THE WORLD and COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY). 'Ask,' it was cited, 'concerning the early days which were before thee, from (לְקָצֶה) the day when God created man upon the earth, from one extremity (ולְקָצֶה) of the heaven to the other' (Dt 4[32]; note the force of the accumulated prepositions). This was explained as follows: 'Ask as to the beginning of the formation of matter (*i.e. Bereshith*), but not about the period before, about the creation of matter' (for all this cf. the whole of Tos. *Hag.* ii., cited above).

During this period the development of the liturgy was marked. It is very probable that, in early times, the form of the prayers varied on each occasion. It was held that a fixed formula of prayer was mechanical, hence useless.

R. Simeon b. Nathaniel, a pupil of R. Johanan ben Zakkai, said: 'Be careful to read the Shema' and to say the 'Amidah, and when thou prayest, regard not thy prayer as a fixed mechanical task (*qebha'*), but as an appeal for mercy and grace before the All-present' (*Aboth*, ii. 17 = Singer, p. 189 f.; Charles, ii. 607). The word *qebha'* is also used in the sense of a fixed time for devotions (see *Mishna Berakhoth*, iv. 1), but in the passage cited it has a bad sense. The proper feeling was *kawwanah*,[1] or an attuned spirit; without this feeling of attention, the prayer was nugatory (see the formula of self-dedication, before performing a commandment, which begins הִנְנִי מְכֻוָּן [Singer, pp. 14, 15, 218, 232, etc.]). The early Hasidim used to wait an hour (שָׁעָה) before prayer, in order to induce this frame of mind. 'We do not rise for prayer unless imbued with deep seriousness' (קַלּוּת רֹאשׁ, lit. 'heaviness of head,' opposed to כֹּבֶד רֹאשׁ, 'lightness of head, levity,' [*Aboth*, iii. 17 = Singer, 193; Charles, ii. 701]). 'Even if the king greet a man, he should not reply; even if a serpent be wound round his heel, he should not pause' (*Mishna Berakhoth*, v. 1). R. Eli'ezer says, 'Whoso maketh his prayer a fixed burden (*qebha'*), his prayers are not appeals' (*ib.* iv. 4). Similar citations could be freely adduced. Prayer was to be not merely heartfelt, but also fluent (שְׁגוּרָה בְּפִיו [*ib.* iv. 3, v. 5]).

Further, it is known that originally it was prohibited to write down a formula of blessing. 'Those who write down בְּרָכוֹת (*v.l.* הֲלָכוֹת) are like those who burn the Torah' (*Shabb.* 115*b*). It is doubtful whether this does not simply mean, as Rashi suggests, that written blessings are not to be rescued from a fire on the Sabbath. In any case, however, ברכות were not generally written down. The reader knew or received instructions as to the subjects of his prayer and the order in which they were to be arranged. Frequently certain phrases were specified, but the general framework was left to the taste and inspiration of the שְׁלִיחַ צִבּוּר, or precentor. In the course of time, owing either to ignorance on the part of officials or to a desire to ensure uniformity, the prayers were written down, but the improvisation and composition of original prayers survived in the *piyyut*, or poetical hymns, of later times.

The central portion of the morning and evening service was, of course, the recital of the *shema'* (see Singer, p. 40; Abrahams, p. l; cf. also Taylor, Excursus iv., p. 116) with the blessings appropriate to it. This is fully discussed in the opening chapters of *Berakhoth*. The 'Amidah was formulated by R. Gamaliel, who 'introduced the usage of set prayers' (Graetz, ii. 366); the kernel of the prayer is much older, and very probably goes back to the early Soferim.

'It is well known that tradition has ascribed to Moses and Ezra many institutions, whose origin, dating back to ancient times, was already forgotten. To Ezra especially is attributed all that pertains to the reading of the Law and the arrangement of the Liturgy' (A. Büchler, *JQR* v. 423).

Many Psalms and Scriptural extracts were included in the services, and many touching prayers

[1] See above, p. 588.

[1] See H. G. Enelow, in *Studies in Jewish Lit. issued in Honour of K. Kohler*, pp. 82–107.

of the Tannaitic age have been preserved. The Lord's Prayer has been shown by Taylor[1] to be composed of phrases taken from contemporary Rabbinic prayers, some of which may be seen in Singer (p. 7, יהי רצון; Abrahams, p. xix; see also M. Gaster, *Book of Prayer . . . acc. to the Custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews*, i. 3).

The reading of the Law and of selected prophetical passages took place on Sabbaths, festivals, and fasts; the Law alone was read on Saturday afternoons, Monday and Thursday mornings (market days), and on other occasions, such as the New Moon. The reading from the prophets was called *Haftārā* (from the root *pāṭar*, 'to be free or finished'); this name, as also the alternative שַׁלְמָא, seems to be due to the fact of its following the *Sidrā*, or Pentateuchal lesson (see Abrahams, p. clvi). When, therefore, the *Mūsāf*, or additional service, was read after an interval, and not immediately following *shaḥārîth* (morning), the conclusion of the Haftārā would mark almost the end of the service. The Law was read, in Babylon, in an annual cycle of consecutive sections. In Palestine, a triennial cycle existed (see A. Büchler, *JQR* v. 420 ff., but cf. M. Gaster, i. 77). It is possible that the selection of the Haftārā was, to a certain extent, in the hands of the reader (Lk 4^{16}), but it was intended to have some point of contact with the Pentateuchal portion of the day. Both Sidrā and Haftārā were translated by the *m'tûrgᵉmān* ('interpreter'), verse by verse. In the case of the Haftārā, the version was more homiletical, and greater sections were rendered at a time. The Targum was greatly esteemed (see art. TARGUMS). A man was to study the Sidrā twice in Hebrew and once in the Targum. To this day the Targum is universally studied among Jews, privately, all over the world. The Yemenites also have an Arabic Targum; the Sephardim, a Spanish Targum, which is read publicly verse by verse on the ninth of Ab; the Ashkenazic Yiddish versions are not generally used in service.

The Eighteen Benedictions contain paragraphs relating to the Messiah and to the Resurrection.[2] The latter subject is introduced at the beginning, after the mention of the patriarchs; and this collocation seems, perhaps, to imply that the proof of immortality employed by Jesus ('God of Abraham . . . not the God of the dead, but of the living,' Mt 22^{32}, Mk $12^{26f.}$, Lk $20^{37f.}$) was Rabbinic. Whatever vagueness may have existed before, there can be no doubt that this age held firmly to the belief, in broad terms, in immortality and in resurrection. The expansion or philosophical analysis belongs to the early mediæval period. The belief of the Tannaitic age in immortality and in resurrection, the result of the Pharisaic victory over the Sadducees, was unshaken. The tendency of Tannaitic religious thought, in the Haggādā especially, was optimistic, and these two ideas are the outcome of optimism. The range of Haggādā extended over every sphere of daily life and tinged everything with bright and pleasant hues. The Haggādā reflects the spirit of the Halākhā, and, consequently, the conceptions of the next world, as well as of this, were given an optimistic turn. The Messianic ideal in the Haggādā is based on the prophetical reign of peace. The troubles or 'birth pangs' that were to precede the advent of the divine Saviour were naturally identified by many of the people with the hardships and persecutions connected with the Roman occupation. Hence the thought arose that the Messiah would first of all deliver Israel from the power of the heathen, and thus the temporal Messiah, of the type of Judas and Theudas (Ac $5^{36f.}$) and of Bar Kokhba, gained popular support. Yet it was taught that no supernatural deliverer was to be expected, nor a successful general. 'The only difference between the present and the coming ages will be in the (absence of) Gentile domination' (see *Berakhoth* 34*b*, 12*b*, 13*a*). In the Eighteen Blessings, the paragraph dealing with the Messiah (cf. above, p. 586[a]) is placed immediately after the prayer for the rebuilding of Jerusalem. Naturally, the ideas as to the Messiah varied according to the political circumstances, especially with regard to the relation of the Messiah to the Gentiles (see J. Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*, London, 1877, p. 331). This relation was sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, according to the morality of the non-Jews and their treatment of the Jews in the experience of the speaker.

While the Jewish attitude to the problem of evil remained unchanged, in that evil was subordinate to the Deity and controlled and created by Him, sin, according to Jewish belief, was in man's own choice, the evil inclination (*yēṣer ha-ra'*) being parallel to the *yēṣer ṭôbh*. The doctrine of original virtue, or the hereditary grace of the patriarchs, was the Jewish counterpart to original sin (see S. Levy, *Doctrine of Original Virtue*, and 'Jewish Conceptions of Original Sin,' in *Jews' College Jubilee Volume*, London, 1906, p. 211 ff.; cf. also Porter's *Essay*, cited below, p. 607). Man was as much bound to give thanks for evil as for good (*Berakhoth*, ix. 5); and, on hearing evil tidings, God's name must be praised and a pronouncement of resignation to the divine decree must be uttered (see Singer, pp. 292 and 318 [עזיז חיין]; Abrahams, p. ccxxvi; cf. also the *Ḳaddîsh* [on which see *ERE* i. 459 f.], p. 75). It is difficult to trace the beginnings of a set creed, in the sense in which the term is used by the Christian Church.

Undoubtedly Isaiah 56 embodies three different codes of life or creeds, required of three different classes, viz. the ordinary Jew, the proselyte, and the eunuch. All three are enjoined to observe justice and righteousness and to believe in the redemption. (1) The first class, in addition, must keep the Sabbath and refrain from all wrong. (2) The eunuchs are to keep the Sabbath, observe the covenant, and do what is pleasing to God. (3) The proselytes, 'that join themselves to the Lord, to serve him, and to love the name of the Lord,' are to keep the Sabbath and the covenant. The 'Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah' (on which see *ERE* iv. 245[a], and art. 'Laws, Noachian,' in *JE* vii. [1904] 648–650) can scarcely be regarded as a Jewish creed; they were the signs by which civilization was recognized and divided from barbarism, fundamental laws of intercourse common to civilized humanity. It has been shown that the so-called creed of Ten Articles, quoted by Aphraates, who lived about A.D. 345, is in reality an old Jewish creed converted into Christian use by the omission of one letter (ܝ for ܕ), which alters the future tense to the past, in the 10th art., 'and he has sent his Messiah into the world.' This theory of H. L. Pass (*JThSt* ix. [1907–08] 267–284; the creed is also conveniently given by J. Gwynn, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd ser., xiii. [Oxford, 1898] 345) can be supported by a comparison with the *Ḳaddîsh* in the Sephardic form (see M. Gaster, *Book of Prayer*, i. 14, 25, 50, 55; especially the forms used on the New Year [*ib.* ii. 27], ninth of Ab, and at funerals); in the ordinary Ashkenazic version, even in that used at funerals, the Messianic clauses וְיַצְמַח פֻּרְקָנֵהּ וִיקָרֵב מְשִׁיחֵהּ are omitted (see D. Pool, *The Old Jewish-Aramaic Prayer The Kaddish*, Leipsig, 1909). Pass also quotes the confession of faith of the Jew Ananias in the Apocryphal Acts of the Apostles (p. 272 f.), and suggests a symbolic use of Scriptural references. The number ten, used by Aphraates, suggests analogy with the Decalogue, the daily recital of which was discontinued because of the cavillings of the *Mînîm*, perhaps Christians (see Taylor, Excursus iv. 119). Undoubtedly the *sh'ma'* was the vital Jewish 'creed,' and the liturgical paragraph, אֱמֶת וְיַצִּיב, by which it is followed, seems to show that it was so intended.

4. To Maimonides.—In the period now under consideration, Jewish history has to deal far more with the history of the Jews than with Judaism. The Diaspora developed rapidly, and the Jews spread abroad to the remotest lands of East and West, to Malabar and to France. During this

[1] *Op. cit.* 124; see also Herford, pp. 118, 124 ff., where Weber is cited.

[2] On these see Abrahams, p. lv, and E. G. Hirsch, art. 'Shemoneh 'Esreh,' in *JE* xi. [1905] 270–282.

dispersion, in proportion as the personal history of the Jews becomes of interest, owing to their varied fortunes, the course of Judaism seems uneventful. Judaism was, in fact, recuperating after the creative energy of the preceding centuries. Evolution moves in stages, not in a path of gradual and imperceptible progress. The schools of Palestine, both in Judæa and in Galilee, had been creative; so, too, had been the Babylonian academies in their time. But the ages of the later Amoraim and Saboraim collected and formulated. The chief centres of intellectual activity in Babylon were Sura (also known as Mata Mahasya), Neharde a, Maḥuza, and Pumbeditha. Abba-Arika, known as Rabh (A.D. 175–247), was instrumental in raising the importance of the Babylonian schools.[1] He was educated at Tiberias, under Judah I., and, after his return to Babylon, he founded his school about 220 and gathered a large number of pupils. Babylonia now began to attain a higher renown than Palestine and Galilee for scholarship and Rabbinic authority. Ammi and Assi, the leaders in Judæa, acknowledged the supremacy of Rabh's successors in Babylon (*e.g.*, Bab. *Shebu'oth*, 47*a*). The growth of the schools was followed by a rise in the morality of the inhabitants of Babylon, which had hitherto been of a low standard. The fine ethical sayings of Rabh deserve special notice (see W. Bacher, *Agada der bab. Amoräer*, Strassburg, 1878, pp. 1–33). His teaching was universalistic, and inculcated love for all humanity. The influence of Rabh was especially great in restoring the old Jewish ideal of the sanctity of marriage, for decay had set in. He is said to be the author of *Mûsâf* for the New Year (see Singer, p. 245), and of אמת יהגע רני עולם (Singer, p. 259; Abrahams, p. cci) for the Day of Atonement. He devoted much attention to the liturgy. The great opponent of Rabh was Mar Samuel (also called Arioḳh [*Shabb.* 53*a*]), head of the academy of Nehardea (*c.* 165–257). The rivalry of these two teachers may, in some respects perhaps, be compared to the contests of Hillel and Shammai. Yet Rabh, though inclining to severity in his judgments, was not unlike Hillel in disposition (see Bab. *Bek.* 49*b*). Samuel inclined to the Persian sages; Rabh strenuously opposed any non-Jewish influence and teaching.

'Rab, entirely taken up with the affairs of his own nation, refused to allow the customs of the Persians to exert any influence on those of the Jews, and even forbade these latter to adopt any practice, however innocent, from the Magi: "He who learns a single thing of the Magi merits death." Samuel, on the other hand, learnt many things of the Persian sages . . . None of his decrees, however, were possessed of such important results as the one by which he declared the law of the land to be just as binding on the Jews as their own law (דינא דמלכותא דינא) . . . Jeremiah had given to the families which were exiled to Babylon, the following urgent exhortation as to their conduct in a foreign land: "Seek the peace of the city whither ye have been carried away captives." Samuel had transformed this exhortation into a religious precept: "The law of the State is a binding law." To Jeremiah and Mar-Samuel Judaism owes the possibility of existence in a foreign country' (Graetz, ii. 526, 524, 525). Another of Samuel's claims to fame is his regulation of the calendar, based on his knowledge of astronomy, which he had acquired from Magian instructors. He said of himself that he knew his way as accurately among the paths of the heavens as in the streets of Nehardea, but that he could not explain the courses of the comets (*Ber.* 58*b*). His other name, Jarḥinâ'ah, was derived from his facility in fixing the calendar months (*yerah*).

Among the later principals of Pumbeditha was R. Joseph, regarded by Hai Gaon as the author of the Targum to the Prophets (cf. *JE* xii. [1906] 61[b]).

He is said to have translated those portions of the Prophets which had hitherto not existed in an Aramaic version. His object was probably to supersede the Peshiṭta, just as Aquila superseded the Septuagint. Although the Peshiṭta version of the canonical books was the work of Jewish translators, certain of the Prophets—*e.g.*, Isaiah—were revised by Christians and amended from the Greek text. The NT was revised by Rabbula, bishop of Edessa (411–435), and the unrevised text still exists in the Curetonian MS and the Sinai Palimpsest. The Old Syriac version goes back probably to the 2nd cent.; as regards the OT Peshiṭta, it was certainly used by Aphraates (A.D. 345; cf. J. Parisot, in *Patrologia Syriaca*, i. i. [Paris, 1894] p. xliii), a contemporary of R. Joseph. It is, therefore, very likely that Joseph undertook a Targum in order to provide the Jews with a version of their own.

The great achievement of the schools in Mesopotamia was the Babylonian Gemârâ. When the creative power of the teachers of Halâkhâ began to diminish, the time arrived to 'seal up tradition.' R. Ashi, the son of Simai (352–427), a teacher of the Sura school, which he rebuilt and raised to an eminent position, was one of the greatest exponents of his time, and he was known by the honorific title of Rabbânâ, 'our master.' Ashi began the collection and arrangement of the Talmud, although this must not be taken to imply the production of a written text. He devoted his labours, which extended over fifty years, to the comparison of materials and placing in order of all the decisions, corollaries, and facts of Haggâdâ and Halâkhâ which had accrued through the ages. The text was preserved orally for some considerable time to come. Ashi's work[1] was continued and completed by Rabina and Sura and Jose of Pumbeditha. In 499, when Rabina died, the Talmud of Babylon was finished. The Jerusalem Talmud had been concluded, it is generally held, about a century and a half previously. Our knowledge of Judæa is so scanty for this period that nothing can be said with certainty, but it is generally assumed that the place of compilation was Tiberias. The Talmud was in no sense a popular work. It was taught and studied in the schools by the Geonim, the successors of the Saboraim. As a code it was unwieldy and could not be easily consulted by private persons. Consequently, in course of time there grew up other arrangements which were shorter and more accessible. The Talmud has, however, always remained the ultimate source of learning. Its decisions have been modified and its contents arranged and re-arranged repeatedly; but no book, after the Bible, has exerted so much influence on Judaism. Code succeeded code, commentary followed upon commentary; finally, the Talmud became a field of learning, more or less abstract, while for practical questions reference would be made, in the first instance, to the code of the day (see, further, art. TALMUD). Between the Talmud and the *Shûlḥân 'Ârûkh* of Joseph Qaro (1564–65), which is almost universally accepted to-day as the exposition of orthodox Judaism, many other codes intervene. With these the development of Judaism is vitally concerned (see S. Daiches, 'Jewish Codes and Codifiers,' *Jew. Chron.*, Jan. 1, 1909, p. 24 f., Jan. 8, p. 28 f., Jan. 15, p. 25 f., also reprinted in pamphlet form).

The first three codes emanated from Babylon. The Gaon Jehudai b. Naḥman, at Sura, is said to have written the *Halâkhôth Pesûqôth*, about 770. The *Halâkhôth Gedhôlôth*, or *Rishônôth* of R. Simon Kayyâra, who was, according to Abraham ibn Daud, a Rabbi of Pumbeditha about 750, are thought, in reality, to be of later date, about the beginning of the 9th century. They could not have been the model for Jehudai. The Cairo Genizah has preserved part of this work, which probably existed in the form of loose letters. Gaon Aḥai wrote his *She'eltôth*, a book of responsa, constituting a Halâkhic exposition of the weekly Sidrâ, or Pentateuchal lesson. As a practical hand-book, the pupils of Gaon Jehudai formulated הלכות ראו, 'Laws of "Refer!",' in which laws and questions of the day were treated.[2]

[1] See W. Bacher, 'Abba Arika,' in *JE* i. [1901] 29 f.; and for Rabh's rival, Mar Samuel, J. Z. Lauterbach, 'Samuel Yarḥina'ah,' *ib.* xi. [1906] 29–31.

[1] See, further, W. Bacher, 'Ashi,' in *JE* ii. [1902] 187 f.

[2] See M. Schloessinger, 'Yehudai ben Naḥman,' *JE* xii. [1906] 590 f.; and 'Kayyara, Simeon,' *ib.* vii. [1904] 461 f.; L. Ginzberg, 'Aḥa (Aḥai) of Shabḥa,' *ib.* i. [1901] 278 f.; the differentiation of these various codes is a matter of some dispute.

The triumph of Christianity and its adoption by Constantine meant the humiliation of the Jews. Numerous repressive acts of legislation were passed against their religion, and outbursts of persecution were frequent. Jews were prohibited from entering Jerusalem, and their lives were burdened with hardships and oppressive restrictions. Prelates of the Church, such as John Chrysostom of Antioch, Ambrose of Milan, and Cyril of Alexandria, were among their bitterest persecutors, and the Emperors, when friendly, or at least not ill-disposed, to the Jews, were frequently persuaded by their priests to change their attitude. Even Jerome, who, like Ambrose, owed his knowledge of Hebrew to Jewish teachers, publicly declared his hatred of them. Yet the popes themselves and the Roman bishops were often exceptions to this rule, and they not infrequently stood forth as the champions and protectors of the Jews. The Arians, as a rule, were more tolerant than the Athanasians. The reign of Julian, who abandoned Christianity, was a brief interval of light for the Jews amid their sorrows. But on Judaism itself the domination of Christianity had little influence. In the same way, little effect was experienced from the rise of the Sasanian Dynasty (224–651), founded by Ardashīr Pāpakān, which brought into greater prominence the worship of fire. The Jews themselves suffered at first from the extreme sternness with which the profane use of fire was prevented, but by the time of the first Shāpūr (242–271) the relations between the two religions were amicably readjusted.

Mention must be made of a false Messiah (see art. MESSIAHS, PSEUDO-) who arose in Crete during the time of Ashi, *i.e.* before 427. About this time hopes of the millennium were spreading, and the long-awaited deliverer was expected. This was, to some extent, due to an ancient Sibylline oracle (see Graetz, ii. 617), which placed the advent of the Messiah in the 85th jubilee, between A.D. 440 and 470. In proportion as persecution became stronger, these hopes grew more vigorous. The *Chronicles of Jerahmeel*, composed, according to Gaster, during the first centuries of the common era (M. Gaster, *Chron. of Jer.*, London, 1899, p. xxxix), contain such eschatological calculations. These Messianic ideas were strongly discouraged by Ashi, and this event had no permanent influence on Judaism.

It has been mentioned that the successors to the Amoraim were called *Sabôrāim*. The name is connected with the Aramaic and Syriac words for gospels, evangelist (*sbarthā*, *sbarānā*), etc., and probably implied a teacher or expounder. The Saboraim had little share in the redaction of the Talmud, although some small Saboraic element has been preserved; practically, it was completed by their predecessors. The age of the Saboraim is reckoned from the final redaction of the Talmud until the first of the Geonim, Mar Rab Mar, in 609. The word *Gāôn* (pl. *Gᵉônîm*) literally signifies 'pride, majesty' (Pr 16^{18}, in a bad sense; Am 8^{7}, Is 60^{15}, in a good sense), and is said to be derived from Ps 47^{5} [EV ^{4}]. The chief of the Sura academy was the Gaon, the teachers of Pumbeditha being more frequently, though not exclusively, called Rabbanim. The Gaon of Sura usually took precedence. The Gaon was the academic and spiritual chief, the *Rēsh Gālūthā* ('Head of the Diaspora') being the civil head of the Jews, recognized, if not actually appointed, by the Persian court. It is thought that Gaon is an instance of mnemonics, for the numerical equivalent of its letters (3 + 1 + 6 + 50 = 60) is the same as the number of treatises of the Talmud. More probably, Gaon is a translation of 'clarissimus' or 'illustris,' a title employed by the Roman Emperors in writing to provincial governors. Strictly speaking, there were thirty-seven Geonim of Sura, from Mar R. Mar to Samuel b. Ḥofni, and fifty of Pumbeditha, from Mar b. R. Ḥanan to R. Ḥai, but the term has also been used, in a wider sense, for other teachers. The age of the Gaonate was about 150 years and included several great men. It is remarkable for the growth of studies that were not strictly Talmudic: history, grammar, liturgy, and letters.

Thus, Sherira Gaon, father of Ḥai, wrote a famous epistle or responsum in 987 to the Jews of Kairowan on the growth and evolution of the Talmud and Gaonate. It is the chief source of information on the subject. Amram, in 870 and Sa'adya (892–942) drew up and arranged liturgies; Ḥai is said to be the author of the earliest known Hebrew rhyme, the hymn for the Eve of Atonement שמע קולי (see Gaster, *Book of Prayer*, iii. [1904] 12). The Geonim established a *Minhāg* (or 'Use') of prayers, which was widely adopted (see Gaster, i. p. xiii). Sa'adya compiled a dictionary (*Igrôn*), and Şemaḥ (about 870) a Talmudic lexicon, or *'Arūkh*. Reference has already been made to the work of the Geonim in composing Halakhic codes. Perhaps their greatest activity was expended in responsa, *i.e.* answers to practical ritual questions, addressed to them by distant congregations.[1]

With the spread of Judaism, Jewish learning had also developed in other lands. Babylon was no longer the only source of knowledge. North Africa and Southern Europe were rising in importance. From Egypt came the famous Sa'adya (*q.v.*) to be Gaon at Sura. But the most forcible influences on Judaism were Islām and Ḳaraism, the former external, the latter internal. The Ḳaraite schism was due largely, if not entirely, to political circumstances. In 761 the Exilarch Solomon died, leaving no sons. His nephew, Anan b. David, of whom very little is known, attempted to succeed his uncle, but was opposed by the Geonim Judah and Dudai, sons of Naḥman. Dissensions arose, and Anan, at first successful by the aid of the Khalif, was finally forced to emigrate to Palestine. At what stage his hostility to the Gaonate developed into an attack on the Rabbinic position, and to what extent this opposition had already been anticipated, is unknown. Anan and his followers soon cut themselves off completely from the Talmudists, accusing them of having changed the Law by their general teaching. In ten specific points they differed from the Rabbinite Jews, in contradistinction to whom they adopted the name of *Bᵉnê Miqrā*, or 'Sons of the Scripture.' They claimed, just as the Ḥanîf party before the foundation of Islām, to return to the primitive religion.

The ten points of difference can be seen from an examination of the *Kitāb al-Faḍā'iḥ* ('Book of Shameful Things') by Ibn Saqawaihi, one of the earliest Ḳaraite writers. His work is divided into ten sections, but begins with a general attack on the Mishna: (1) the unity of God; the Ḳaraites loaned to the doctrines of the Mu'tazilites, who opposed divine omnipotence as a creative force, in favour of almost absolute free will; (2) the use of fire on the Sabbath; the Ḳaraites permitted neither fire nor lights on Sabbath, as they interpreted Ex 35^{3} literally;[2] (3) irrigation on the Sabbath; (4) the manner of fixing the New Moon; (5) the postponement of certain festivals by means of the calendar rule (לא אד"ו ראש; for which see *ERE* iii. 120ᵇ); (6) the leap year; (7) the forbidden fat; the Ḳaraites will not eat the fat of the tail, which was allowed by the Rabbis; (8) incest; (9) *niddā*; (10) *qeri* (impurity). For the differences between Rabbinites and Ḳaraites see *Khazarī*, iii. § 35, tr. Hirschfeld, p. 166.

The Ḳaraites produced a large number of able writers[3] who contributed appreciably to Jewish literature: Ḳirḳisānī, author of the *Kitāb al-Anwār* ('Book of Lights'), Ibn al-Hiti, Yefeth ibn 'Ali, David al-Fasi, Sahl ibn Maṣliaḥ, Benjamin Nahawendi, Samuel b. Moses al-Maghribi, and others. The effect on Judaism was visible. Opposition stimulated learning and, by putting the Rabbinites on their defence, produced a positive statement of the orthodox position. The chief exponent of the Talmudic case was Sa'adya, or, more properly, Sa'id ibn Yūsuf al-Fayyūmī

[1] See, further, art. 'Gaon,' *JE* v. [1903] 567–572.

[2] Cf. Sa'adya's commentary on this verse and his refutation of the Ḳaraites; this has been recently recovered from the Genizah and published, with translation, by H. Hirschfeld in *JQR* xvii. [1905–06] 600–613. See also 'Saadyana' by Schechter and others in *JQR* xiv. [1902].

[3] Anan's *Book of Commandments* has been edited by S. Schechter, *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, ii.

(892–942), who met the Karaite attacks first of all by translating the Bible into Arabic, and secondly by replying directly to the enemy. Sa'adya's great work was the *Kitāb al-Amānātw'al I'tiqādāt* (Heb. *'Emūnōth W'dhē'ōth*, and other titles), or 'Faith and Philosophy,' which was the first attempt to bring revealed religion into harmony with Greek philosophy.

'No Jew, said Saadiah, should discard the Bible, and form his opinions solely by his own reasoning. But he might safely endeavour to prove, independently of revelation, the truths which revelation had given. Faith, said Saadiah again, is the soul's absorption of the essence of a truth, which thus becomes part of itself, and will be the motive of conduct whenever the occasion arises. Thus Saadiah identified reason with faith. He ridiculed the fear that philosophy leads to scepticism. You might as well, he argued, identify astronomy with superstition, because some deluded people believe that an eclipse of the moon is caused by a dragon's making a meal of it' (I. Abrahams, *Short Hist. of Jew. Lit.*, London, 1906, p. 56). Many lost portions of Sa'adya's anti-Karaite writings have been published by H. Hirschfeld, from the Cairo Genizah, in *JQR*. Thus of his *Kitāb al-Radd 'alt al-Mutaḥāmil* ('Refutation of the Unfair Aggressor') two leaves exist (*JQR* xviii. 113–119). In these Sa'adya maintains the Jewish tradition of *dehiyyāh*, or postponement of festivals. The fragment is probably a reply to Ibn Saqawaihi. There is also one leaf of a treatise on usury (*ib.* 119 f.). In *JQR* xvii. [1904–05] 712–725 Hirschfeld has published four leaves from his treatise on forbidden marriages, and two on traditional laws. Sa'adya saw that the way in which the Karaites used the Kalām in their attacks could be counteracted only by adopting the Kalām itself for the defence of the orthodox position. He thus became the first of the Jewish Mutakallimūn or, literally translated, *Medhabbertm*, who sought to reconcile a belief in the divine creation with the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of matter (Hirschfeld, *Khazari*, p. 4).[1]

Judaism was not modified by Karaism, except in so far as the study of philology was stimulated and the impetus to philosophy created. The latter would have inevitably followed contact with Islām. The Karaites were never very numerous, and now probably do not number more than 12,000. In the eyes of the Muslims there was never much question that the Rabbinites and Karaites were both equally Jews. Interesting light is thrown on this point of the controversy by the decisions of the four Imāms, recorded in B.M.MS. Or. 2538, fol. 73–83, headed 'Story of the Europeans who adopted the Laws of the Karaites,' published by Hirschfeld (see *Jews' Coll. Jub. Vol.*, p. 88). Yet, on account of their dietary customs and law of incest, intermarriage with Jews is very rare.

In spite of Muḥammad's treatment of the Jews of Arabia, the relations between the two faiths were intimate and not unfriendly. Islām had far more influence on Judaism than Christianity, because it was more tolerant. The theological status of Jews and Christians was recognized. They were *'Ahl al-Kitāb*, people possessing a legitimate scripture, as opposed to idolaters and to the Magi and Manichæans, whose revelation was not regarded as authentic (*man lāhu shubhatu-l-kitāb*).

It is necessary to emphasize the correct use of the phrase *'Ahl al-Kitāb*, first, because it is so frequently misinterpreted and applied to the Jews only, who are said to have been called *the* people of the book.[2] Even writers like Graetz have made this mistake (see Graetz, iii. 59; but, on the other hand, see pp. 82 and 89, where the term is correctly used). Secondly, it is a clear indication of the attitude of Islām to the sister faiths; it did not claim a monopoly of salvation. In consequence, Jews and Muslims were able to study and discuss theology and science together with far greater intimacy than was possible between Jews and Christians.

The love of learning prevalent in Muslim lands was not confined to the Muslims; it was shared by all classes of the population. Consequently, when, after and as a result of the introduction of Greek philosophy, the Arabs began to turn their attention to speculative theology, Judaism was very closely affected, and the impetus given to philosophical study created a Jewish religious philosophy.[3] Hitherto, Jewish theology had been occupied either with questions of practical Halākhā or, in refutation of Karaism, with a defence of the Talmudical system of legislation. Isḥāq ibn Sulaimān, better known as Isaac Israili of Kairowan, who died about 932, was well known as a scientific philosopher and physician (see W. Engelkemper, *Religions-philosophische Lehre Saadja Gaon's*, Münster, 1903, p. 2, note 2). His title to fame rests purely on his scientific work, not on his theology. Jews took up these studies with avidity, and a series of famous writers arose who sought to harmonize Judaism with the thought of the age, and who thus developed its philosophy of religion. Baḥya b. Joseph ibn Pakudah, who lived at Saragossa at the beginning of the 11th cent., was one of the first of Jewish authors to expound a system of ethics in his Arabic *Al-Hidāya 'ila Farāid al-Qulūb* (1040) ('Guide to the Duties of the Heart'), which was translated into Hebrew by Judah ibn Tibbon under the title of *Ḥobhōth hal-lebhābhōth*.

Baḥya attempts to show that 'Jewish faith is a great spiritual truth founded on Reason, Revelation, and Traditions, all stress being at the same time laid on the willingness and the joyful readiness of the God-loving heart to perform life's duties.' He was largely influenced by Sa'adya and by Ibn Gabirol, and leaned to Neo-Platonic philosophy. Faith must be intellectual, not blind and unreasoning. He proves the necessity and unity of a Creator by teleological arguments. The divine attributes are twofold, negative and active. The former, but not the latter, are within the power of human knowledge. God's existence is knowable from the circumstance that non-existent beings cannot create existent beings. His Unity and Eternity are also comprehensible, since the Supreme Cause must of necessity be indivisible and permanent. The other divine attributes are anthropomorphic metaphors, an indispensable medium for thought and speech, but, in reality, symbols and not realities. From these postulates Baḥya deduced his system of ethics. He maintained that immortality was to be reserved for mature speculations; hence the comparative paucity of Biblical allusions to it. Baḥya was essentially a mystic, but at the same time practical in his system of the religious life. Asceticism, as a discipline of abstinence and self-purification, is advocated, but not for general adoption.[1]

Baḥya was a Spaniard, and one of the many Jewish scholars who arose in the Iberian peninsula during the Muslim domination. The light of Jewish learning was first kindled by Moses b. Enoch († 965), from Babylon, who founded an academy at Cordova which soon eclipsed Sura. Among the great Jews of Spain were Ḥasdai ibn Shaprut, poet, physician, and politician (915–990), Menaḥem b. Saruḳ, Dunash ibn Labraṭ, Judah Ḥayyuj, Abu-l-Walīd Merwān ibn Janāḥ, who founded and developed the science of Hebrew Grammar, and Samuel the Nāgīd (993–1055), the vizier of Ḥabus, king of Granada, who wrote an introduction to the Talmud and many liturgical hymns.

The religious philosophy of Judaism owes much to Solomon b. Judah ibn Gabirol, commonly known as Avicebron (see art. IBN GABIROL, above, p. 69). His greatness, both as poet and as philosopher, is mirrored in his *Kether Malkhūth*, or 'Royal Crown,' the text and translation of which may be seen conveniently in Gaster (iii. 47); and his *Aṣlāḥ al-Akhlāq*, or 'Improvement of the Moral Qualities' (ed. and tr. S. S. Wise, New York, 1901), is a summary of ethics for popular use.

In this the virtues and the vices are arranged, correlatively, in connexion with the senses on which they depend. He distinguishes the physical from the psychical perceptions. The senses are indications of the disposition of the soul, that is to say, the 'animal soul, not the divine soul within man.' His quotations are in most cases drawn from the Bible, not from Rabbinic writings, a fact which may account for his great influence and popularity among non-Jews. In his *Fons Vitæ*

[1] See, further, on the sect as a whole, art. KARAITES.

[2] The term is used of Christians as opposed to Jews in Bukhāri, ed. Cairo, A.H. 1304, p. 11, line 10 (30th Bab of the *Kitāb el Īmān*).

[3] The influence was not confined to Judaism. 'Jewish scholars held an honourable place in transmitting the Arabian commentators to the schoolmen. It was amongst them, especially in Maimonides, that Aristotelianism found refuge after the light of philosophy was extinguished in Islām; and the Jewish family of the Ben-Tibbon were mainly instrumental in making Averroes known to southern France' (W. Wallace and G. W. Thatcher, in *EBr*[11] ii. 282).

[1] See, further, I. Broydé and K. Kohler, 'Baḥya ben Joseph,' *JE* ii. [1902] 447–454.

neither Bible nor Rabbinic authorities are cited at all. This work, written in the form of a dialogue, reduced everything that exists to three categories: (1) God, the first substance; (2) the world, matter and form; and (3) the will, as intermediary. His teaching is based on Neo-Platonism, and, owing to the growth of Aristotelianism, exercised slight influence on Jewish thought. There is a difference between the pantheistic emanations of Neo-Platonism and the Jewish conception of creation. 'Moreover, the Neoplatonic doctrine that the Godhead is unknowable naturally appealed to a Jewish rationalist, who, while positing the existence of God, studiously refrained from ascribing definite qualities or positive attributes to Him. . . . Gabirol, unlike other medieval Jewish philosophers who regarded philosophy as the "handmaid of theology," pursued his philosophical studies regardless of the claims of religion' (S. S. Wise, in *JE* vi. [1904] 528b).

While Gabirol leaned towards Neo-Platonism, Judah Halevi, born in Toledo (*c.* 1085 – *c.* 1143), whose poetry, secular and sacred, furnishes some of the most inspired examples of the later Hebrew Muse, vehemently attacks the doctrine of emanation as well as the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of matter. As Hirschfeld says (*Khazarî*, p. 6), his doctrine, like that of the Muslim al-Ghazâlî, may be summed up in one sentence as a philosophic scepticism in favour of *a priori* belief. His most famous philosophical work was the *Cosri*, or *Kuzarî*, properly *Kitâb al-Khazarî*.

In this book he sets forth Jewish belief in a popular form, under the guise of a dialogue between a Rabbi and a king of the Khazars. This king, dissatisfied with his religion, consults Muslims and Christians in turn, and, finally, a Rabbi, whose faith he adopts. The short-comings of both creeds, as well as of Karaism, are discussed, and, in a more positive form, the beliefs and practices of Judaism are enumerated. The pivot of his belief in God is the fact of direct revelation and the preservation of this revelation by uninterrupted tradition (*Khazari*, i. § 25; Hirschfeld, p. 46). Aristotle failed through the fact that 'he exerted his mind because he had no tradition from any reliable source at his disposal. He meditated on the beginning and end of the world, but found as much difficulty in the theory of a beginning as in that of eternity. Finally, the abstract speculations which made for eternity prevailed, and he found no reason to inquire into the chronology or derivation of those who lived before him. Had he lived among a people with well authenticated traditions he would . . . have established the theory of creation, however difficult, instead of eternity, which . . . is more difficult to accept' (*ib.* § 65, p. 53). The testimony of Moses is to Judah Halevi an established fact, recognized by all three religions as historical, and handed down by unbroken tradition; the Bible cannot contradict truth or reason. Truth does not depend on the Bible, but is supported by it. Thus the Creation is supported by the testimony of Moses, *i.e.* it harmonizes with the Scriptural account. Even if a believing Jew were to hold the doctrine of the eternity of matter, it would not clash with his belief, according to the Bible, in the creation of this particular world (§ 67, p. 54). The soul, being part of the divine essence, must be undying, and a belief in immortality—of the soul, not of the body—is essential to religion (§ 103, p. 73). He upheld the Ptolemaic cosmology without hesitation. He opposed the determinism of the Jabariyya (those who believe that God compels man to disobey Him, since all actions come from God, not from man) without going as far as the Mu'tazilites (who believed in free will unlimited), and he attained this end by a modification of the theory of causation. He instituted intermediary causes between the Prime Cause and the ultimate end and established six axioms: (1) recognition of the Prime Cause; (2) belief in intermediary causes; (3) God gives the best possible form to every substance; (4) there is a graduation among organic beings as well as among mankind; (5) if the hearers of reproof pause to consider, they are near repentance; (6) man has power to do or avoid evil in matters under his control. It is, however, best to refer more important events in life to direct intervention of God (p. 21). The vindication (iii. §§ 25–27, p. 164) of the Massoretic text, in the cases where manuscripts differ, is interesting as being a germ of critical Biblical research, not so far developed as by Ibn Ezra. An enumeration of Karaite differences serves to prove the essential nature of the Rabbinic element in Judaism, and demonstrates the logical impossibility of interpreting the Bible and observing the Commandments without its aid. The influence of the *Kitâb al-Khazarî* was great at the time. Two Hebrew translations soon appeared and were widely circulated. To a large extent it was superseded by the *Guide* of Maimonides, chiefly owing to the fact that the latter work was Aristotelian, that is to say, it reconciled Aristotelianism and Judaism. Yet the *Khazari* has in many ways survived the *Guide*, because it is read for its own sake, and not as an antidote. Throughout the Middle Ages it was studied; indeed many modern thinkers, such as Herder, have found in it a source of inspiration. The style is concise and clear, and the dialogue is so vigorous and real that it lacks the air of artificiality frequent in fictitious conversations. The *Khazari* covers so much ground in relatively such small compass that it was bound to achieve popularity, merely by reason of convenience, even apart from superior intrinsic claims (see, further, art. HALEVI, vol. vi. pp. 478–480).

Mention must also be made of the Ibn Ezra family (see art. IBN EZRA, above, p. 67 f.). Moses ibn Ezra (*c.* 1070–1138), a prolific writer of *Selîhôth* ('penitential prayers'), was famous for his versatility. He was a philosopher and a linguist as well as a poet of very considerable gifts. His chief philosophical work, *'Arûghath hab-Bôsem*, as it was called in the Hebrew version, only a portion of which is extant, was not, however, very popular, being eclipsed by his poems, the *Tarshîsh* and the *Diwân*. In this book Ibn Ezra discusses the unity of God, the inapplicability of attributes and definitions of God, motion, nature, and intellect. The greatness of Moses ibn Ezra as a poet prevented posterity from according him due recognition as a philosopher. His relative, Abraham ibn Ezra (*c.* 1092–1167), was equally active in various branches of learning, notably as a Bible exegete, grammarian, and mathematician. He also entered the domain of philosophy, and compiled, in 1158, a book on the Commandments, called *Y'sôdh Môrâ*. He was to some extent a follower of the Neo-Platonist School, and Moses ibn Ezra calls him a Mutakallim.

His works were originally written in Hebrew, not in Arabic, though his contemporaries usually preferred the latter tongue. This is due in a degree to Ibn Ezra's subject-matter, which was intended more for Jews than for Muslims. His Bible Commentaries have been used by Christian students for many generations. He is noteworthy also for being, in a way, the father of Biblical criticism. Thus he hints, as plainly as he feels able to do, at the Deutero-Isaiah, and mentions as critical difficulties such verses as Gn 12[6] (see A. T. Chapman, *Introd. to Pent.*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 26). The solutions which he suggests are veiled under the phrase *ham-maskîl yâvîn*, 'the intelligent will perceive.'

From the great families of Ibn Ezra and Ḳimḥi, Jewish philosophy, grammar, and science received valuable support. Their contributions to learning were incalculable. France and Germany were the home of Talmudic and Biblical exegesis, Spain being more strongly devoted to philosophy.

The outstanding figure among Jewish mediæval scholars is Moses Maimonides, also known as Rambam (1135–1204), of whom it was said, 'From Moses unto Moses there arose not one like Moses.' His fame rests on several foundations, but for the present it must suffice to refer to the great influence which he exercised on Judaism, first as a philosopher, then as an exponent of Halâkhâ. His famous *Guide* was intended for

'religious persons who, adhering to the Torah, have studied philosophy and are embarrassed by the contradictions between the teachings of philosophy and the literal sense of the Torah.'

He taught the harmony of reason and revealed truths. He believed in a lost oral tradition of a philosophical nature, going back to the Prophets; and it was owing to the loss of this tradition and the lack of due understanding that the seeming opposition between religion and philosophy had arisen. Misinterpretation of anthropomorphisms had given rise to much perplexity and error. Maimonides went further in his attitude towards anthropomorphic terms than his predecessors, who had regarded them as metaphors. He devoted much more attention to explaining them one by one, and laid far greater stress on the incorporeality of God. Further, he subjected the divine attributes to a searching analysis. He rejected the teaching of the Mutakallimîn, and based his philosophy entirely on Aristotle, for whom he had a profound admiration.

He adduces twenty-six propositions to prove the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God (*Guide*, pt. ii. ch. i., tr. M. Friedländer, London, 1910, p. 145). His proofs of the existence of God are based on the theory of motion. Motion requires an agent to produce it, the number of intermediate causes being finite. Some things receive motion and impart it; others receive but do not impart; consequently, there must be a primitive agency of motion that impels other objects, being itself unaffected. The unity of God is demonstrated in two ways: '(1) Two gods can not be assumed, for they would

necessarily have one element in common by virtue of which they would be gods, and another element by which they would be distinguished from each other; further, neither of them could have an independent existence, but both would themselves have to be created. (2) The whole existing world is "one" organic body, the parts of which are interdependent. The sublunary world is dependent upon the forces proceeding from the spheres, so that the whole universe is a macrocosm, and thus the effect must be due to one cause' (pt. ii. ch. l., tr., p. 153; cited from *JE* ix. [1905] 76).

The chief point in which Maimonides differed from Aristotle was the eternity of matter, although he maintained that the Greek philosopher was fully aware that he had not established his thesis. Maimonides believed in the *creatio ex nihilo*, and he held that this was in harmony with the teaching of Aristotle. The spheres and intelligences were not, as Aristotle taught, co-existent with the Prime Cause, but created by it. Evil does not proceed from God, because, being negative, it has no actuality. It is a negation, the absence of a capacity for good. He asserts human free will, somewhat at the expense of divine omniscience. This omniscience is incomprehensible to man, with his limited knowledge, but it is, none the less, supreme. The fact of God's foreknowing which of several possibilities will occur does not abrogate the freedom of choice. God foresees the result of a choice, having conceded full liberty of action at the outset.

Maimonides was entirely optimistic in his outlook. The ultimate aim of existence is happiness, and the object of the Commandments is to secure this end. He was the exponent of pure reason, and maintained the unassailed supremacy of the intellect. It is most typical of him that he did not believe in the *creatio ex nihilo* because of the Bible. He declared that, had his reason prompted him to adopt the Aristotelian eternity of matter, he would have had no difficulty in reconciling it with the Scriptures. Maimonides has been styled the first pragmatist. His breadth of mind and his attitude towards other faiths are remarkable. He recognized the validity, to a certain extent, of Islām and Christianity, and maintained that the adherents of these religions must not be regarded as idolaters. Salvation is not confined to Jews. 'The righteous of all nations have a share in the world to come' (*Hil. Tesh.* iii. § 11; see also references in I. Abrahams and D. Yellin, *Maimonides*, London, 1903, p. 94, etc.).

Maimonides, in his famous commentary on the *Mishna Helek*, regards immortality as intellectual. The wise man—*i.e.* the truly virtuous—will pursue good for its own sake. The child has to be encouraged to study by the offer of prizes. As man grows, his desires become greater, and the prizes have to be increased. So too, in mental and spiritual development, the hope of reward is the inducement to the masses to live virtuous lives. The saint requires no inducement. His reward is in the raising of his soul to the level of the divine essence. His motto must be, like that of Antigonus of Socho, to serve the Master not for the sake of a reward. In the Thirteen Articles of Faith which are formulated in the 10th perek of Helek (which is quoted, in part, in Singer, p. 184, before ch. l.; see also *ERE* iv. 246[a]), Maimonides includes a belief in the Resurrection.

As a codifier, not less than as a philosopher, Maimonides exerted great influence on Judaism. Mention has already been made of the growth of codification, a necessary consequence to the nature and method of the Talmud. It was found desirable to compile more convenient hand-books or large digests, in which the laws could be more readily consulted; some of these were for the learned, others for the people. Laws had to be interpreted in accordance with the needs of the day and of local conditions, occasioned by the scattering of the Jews.

R. Isaac b. Jacob of Fez (1013–1103), called Alfāsi, a pupil of R. Nissim and of R. Hananeel of Kairowan, wrote a Compendium, which is practically the Babylonian—sometimes the Jerusalem—Talmud denuded of Haggādā and of all opinions which were not regarded as authoritative. Where the Geonim had modified the Talmud, their modification was adopted by Alfāsi. Isaac ibn Ghayyat (1030–1089) and Isaac b. Reuben (1043–1103) compiled books of laws, the former concerning festivals and fasts, the latter about oaths.[1]

All these were eclipsed, however, by the brilliance of the *Mishneh Torah*, or 'second Torah,' of Maimonides, which contains more than the Mishna, because it 'includes the fundamental doctrines of the Jewish religion . . . it represents a system of the whole of Judaism, ethical and ceremonial' (S. Daiches, 'Jewish Codes and Codifiers,' *Jew. Chron.*, Jan. 1909, pp. 1, 8, 15, 22). Maimonides did not, like the other codifiers, follow the order of the Talmud, but introduced new divisions and groupings. His style is concise and he cites no authorities—a practice for which he was blamed by his foes.

The Mishna Torah, also called *Yād hā-Ḥāzāqā* ('Strong Hand'), was written in Hebrew, because it was for general use. The *Guide*, being intended for students of Arabic philosophy, was composed in that language. Maimonides, in his letter to his pupil Aḳnin, states that he did not intend the *Hand* to supersede the Talmud as a study, but to provide a convenient work of reference, and to prevent students from going astray in practical laws.

By reason of his originality, and, especially, of his free attitude towards faith and reason, Maimonides was vehemently attacked, Abraham b. David of Posquières being a keen though sincere opponent.[2] His works were even committed to the flames, and the controversy was not softened for some considerable time; it continued long after his death. Maimonides omitted from his code anything of the nature of superstition or demonology which had crept into the Talmud. His description of the liturgy is very important for the reconstruction of the rite of Egypt and for a study of the development of the Prayer Book.

The influence of Maimonides is too great to be estimated briefly. He saved Judaism from being controlled by Aristotelianism, and, in consequence, from collapsing with the fall of that system. He vindicated the claims of reason while strengthening the right of authority. He brought harmony and unity into law and practice. Through his influence Judaism was delivered from the grasp of mysticism, which was already beginning to assert itself. He taught tolerance to those without, and breadth of mind to those within. His intellect shrank from no investigation, and yet his loyalty to Judaism was unswerving. Great men have the faculty of reacting even on their opponents, and in the case of Maimonides this was especially true. His Jewish adversaries were unconsciously affected by him. The influence of Maimonides continues to exert itself over Judaism to-day, and he is perhaps more frequently cited now than in the last few centuries. His fame must inevitably be bound up with that of Judaism for all time, and with him the mediæval period of Judaism closes.

5. To the present day.—Maimonides had arisen in Judaism as the exponent of pure reason and the defender of Aristotelianism. Shortly after his death, during, and, to some degree, in consequence of, the controversy which attached itself to his system, the mystic movement gained great foothold in Judaism. It is not altogether easy to trace its growth or its connexion with earlier and kindred manifestations (see artt. MYSTICISM [Jewish] and ḲABBĀLĀ). The mysticism of the Gnostics was re-echoed in the Haggādā; it slumbered while the minds of men were occupied with Ḳaraism, the Kalām, Aristotelianism, and Neo-Platonism. It must be remembered that the Jews of Germany were almost entirely limited to the Talmud in their studies. In Spain, where persecution had not restricted intellectual liberty as well as personal freedom, the Jews were allowed to devote themselves to science. Their natural inclination and

[1] On these three scholars see *JE* i. [1901] 375–377, vi. [1904] 583, 629.

[2] Cf. L. Ginzberg, *JE* i. 103–105.

aptitude for learning needed no encouragement; as soon as hindrances were removed, they applied themselves zealously to liberal culture. Many of their co-religionists in other lands, however, being prevented from enjoying these advantages, did not entirely appreciate the work of the Spanish Rabbis. They were rather repelled by the cold reason of Maimonides, and they also disagreed with his Halākhā. Hence a mystic reaction had every chance of success. Several distinguished scholars were attracted by the cult of the mysterious and lent it support. This new teaching, which was called *Ḳabbālā*, or tradition, spread from Gerona all over Spain, and also northwards. It was a revolt against logic, and sought to unite the divine element in man with the world spirit (*shekhel happō'el*), by striving to attain perfection and self-purification. It inculcated the recognition of a harmony in all things. The microcosm is a counterpart of the macrocosm. The doctrine of the *Sefirōth* ('spheres'), the agencies of the *En-Sōf* ('Infinite'), and the emanations and revelations of the Creator, the grades and functions of spirits and angels, and the relation between the material and the ideal were all worked out with mathematical precision (see, further, art. ḲABBĀLĀ). Metempsychosis[1] had already been taught by Isaac b. Abraham of Posquières, the Blind (fl. 1190–1210).[2] Life was surrounded with countless customs and acts having a mystical origin. In every secular deed, in every word of prayer, in every *miṣwāh*, man was to be brought to think of a new connexion with the spiritual world, and thus to induce the desired communion with it. The divine name was a mystery which overshadowed and influenced everything, and the letters of the name had a mystical power (see, further, art. TETRAGRAMMATON).

All kinds of devices were invented or employed to interpret the Scriptures in accordance with Ḳabbalistic notions. Examples of such ingenuities were *sērūf*, *nōṭārīḳōn*, and *gēmaṭriā*, or permutations, the use of letters according to their numerical value and transposition. Various systems of substitution prevailed—e.g., *atbash* (. . . בש, את), in which the first letter of the alphabet was equated to the last, the second to the last but one, and so on (see, further, art. NUMBERS [Jewish]).

The Abulafias, Isaac ibn Laṭif, Joseph Jiḳatilla, and Moses de Leon, the pioneers of Ḳabbālā,[3] were Spaniards. The most distinguished adherent was Moses b. Naḥman (Naḥmanides or Ramban), 1195–1270, who was known at an early age for his saintliness and learning.

His influence on Judaism was very great, because he was regarded rather as an orthodox Rabbi tinged with mysticism than as an absolute Ḳabbalist, for he believed in a *creatio ex nihilo*. If Maimonides be selected as the exponent of reason, Naḥmanides was the defender of authority. The former adopted a rationalistic attitude towards the Biblical miracles, ignoring those of the Talmud. To the latter the Biblical miracles were the object of veneration and implicit belief. Although his respect for authority was not limited to the Talmud, but extended to the Geonim and rendered sacred in his eyes even the utterances of his contemporaries, Naḥmanides did not hesitate to declare, at the great disputation of 1263, that a belief in Haggādā is not incumbent on the Jew. Naḥmanides' chief activity lay in the Talmud. His philosophical theories, though based on logic, in reality rest on authority. He made miracles the foundation of his system, rejecting Maimonides and Aristotle. 'For Nachmani, on the other hand, the belief in miracles was the foundation of Judaism, on which the three pillars of his structure rested: the creation from nothing, the omniscience of God, and the divine providence. . . . Maimuni assumed, with the philosophers, that the sensual instincts are a disgrace to man, since he is destined to a spiritual life. Nachmani was a strenuous opponent of this view. Since God, who is perfect, has created the earthly world, . . . nothing in it should be regarded as . . . hateful. . . . If Judaism was for Maimuni a cult of the intellect, for Nachmani it was a religion of the feelings' (Graetz, iii. 550 f.). Thus Maimonides insisted on the power of the intellect to solve the mysteries of religion, while Naḥmanides regarded the divine secrets as a sanctuary not to be profaned by any attempt at penetration. Demons and angels were rejected as heathenish by Maimonides; they are part of the system of Naḥmanides. The Ḳabbālā, laying great emphasis on miracles and authority, fitted admirably with his view of life, and the approval of so famous a Rabbi was of great value to Ḳabbalism.

The Ḳabbalistic scriptures achieved their fame very largely by the fact that they were pseudepigrapha. The most famous book was the *Zōhar* (*q.v.*), composed by Moses b. Shem Ṭob de Leon (1250–1305) after 1285. This work he attributed to Simon b. Joḥai; it was written in Aramaic, and its preservation was accounted for in a miraculous way. Its aim was to show that the Bible was never intended to be understood in a literal sense. In spite of its extravagances, the book exercised enormous influence for a long time. The *Bāhir* was composed by Azriel, one of the pupils of Isaac the Blind, and was attributed to Neḥunya b. haḳ-Ḳana.[1] Contemporary Rabbis, however, refused to acknowledge it, and Meir b. Simon of Narbonne (second half of 13th cent.) ordered it to be burned.

The Ḳabbalistic controversy lasted for many years. Its failure to capture Judaism completely was largely due to the firm bulwark in defence of reason erected by Maimonides; yet it saved Judaism from being reduced to a mere system of logic. It produced many saints, even though it created some fantastic enthusiasts. In the persecuted it stimulated hope and encouraged piety, and by emphasizing the inner underlying ideas it prevented observances from losing their spiritual meaning. The fault of Ḳabbālā lay in the fact that it was unfitted for the populace. In the case of a scholar or recluse, mysticism produced devotion and ecstasy; in ignorant minds it generated superstition. Gradually the Ḳabbalists drifted to Palestine. Safed became a centre where its devotees gathered, and Joseph Qaro, Isaac ben Solomon Luria, and Alḳabeṣ settled in the Holy Land. Their saintly lives are fine examples of the higher side of the movement.[2] So strong was its influence that the *Zōhar* was studied by many Christian scholars, who attempted to find in it proofs for the Trinity and Christianity. The famous Pico della Mirandola, the disciple of Elias Delmedigo, translated several Ḳabbalistic works into Latin, and introduced the Ḳabbālā to the notice of the Medicis in Tuscany. Pope Sixtus IV. (pope from 1471 to 1484) procured translations, and ordered them to be disseminated as evidences of Christianity (Graetz, iv. 314).

The influence of the Ḳabbālā on Christianity was not wide or permanent, and, similarly, Judaism was to no great extent influenced by Christianity during the Middle Ages. It was as persecutors and as slaughterers that Jews had knowledge of the Gentiles among whom they dwelt.[3] It is scarcely a source of wonder, therefore, that Judaism was so little affected by contact with Christianity. The followers of either religion knew and cared nothing for the thoughts and beliefs of the other. In the disputations between champions of the two faiths—*e.g.*, Paris (1240), Barcelona (1263), Burgos and Avila (1375), and Tortosa (1413)—the Christians desired simply to convert the Jews, and the Jews, who had no desire for controversy, were forced to argue. The attacks on the Talmud, the persecutions incidental to the Crusades, the Black Death, the charges of poisoning wells, the blood accusation, the whole-

[1] Adopted by the Muslims from Pythagoras, the conception of metempsychosis was borrowed by the Karaites and denounced by Sa'adya, Abraham ibn Daud, and Ḥasdai Crescas. Rabbinic Judaism was unaffected by Karaism in this respect, and the idea remained unknown till introduced by the Ḳabbalists. See art. METEMPSYCHOSIS (Jewish).

[2] Baḥya b. Asher calls him 'the father of the Ḳabbālā,' and this opinion is also that of Joseph Jiḳatilla, Recanati, and others (see *JE* vi. [1901] 620).

[3] See *JE* i. 141–144, vi. 536, v. 665 *f.*, viii. 7.

[1] It is now believed, however, to have been the work of Isaac himself. On the book see I. Broydé in *JE* ii. [1902] 442 *f.*; on Azriel and Neḥunya see *ib.* ii. 373 *f.*, ix. 212.

[2] For Luria and Alḳabeṣ see *JE* viii. 210–212, i. 401 *f.*, and Schechter's essay on Safed in *Studies in Judaism*, 2nd ser.

[3] See I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896, ch. xxiii.

sale massacre of entire communities, the tortures of the Inquisition, the *auto da fé*, and the expulsions and sequestrations all combined to stigmatize Christianity in the eyes of the Jews as a religion of hate and blood. Consequently their own religion was unaffected by any attempt at contrast. Marranos and others, forced to change their creed often, seized the earliest opportunity of recanting their feigned conversion, even if their abjuration meant death.

The Renaissance and the Reformation brought some amelioration. Erasmus and Reuchlin were champions of freedom in thought, far in advance of their age. Luther, at first favourable to tolerance, ultimately changed his views. His pamphlet 'Concerning the Jews and their Lies' was full of bitterness; he detested the Jews themselves as much as he hated their religion, and his invective against both was boundless. The study of Hebrew by Christians was too strictly confined to a few learned men to influence the masses or even the ruling classes. Only in the case of Reuchlin did Hebrew learning among Christians prove of advantage to Jews, and it is not certain that even Reuchlin would have championed the cause of the Talmud had his hand not been forced by his Dominican opponents. Perhaps the most important event in which the influence of Christianity on Judaism may be observed is the expulsion from Spain, in 1492, by which the Jews were dispersed. Learning was spread abroad generally; in particular, a nucleus was formed in the East.

Towards the end of the 13th cent. a controversy arose in Judaism as to the study of science. The period when the *Zôhar* began to circulate was intellectually poor. There were no outstanding personalities who could have suppressed the extravagant fancies of Ḳabbalism and restored a due sense of proportion. Men had lost their feeling for the simple and were involved in intricacies. Biblical exegesis and preaching became tinged with obscurity, allegorization, and pseudo-philosophy. Their activity was frequently devoted not to thoughts and ideas, but to outward signs and the twisting of words. The chief of this school, Levi b. Abraham of Villefranche, near Perpignan (1240–1315), a follower of Maimonides, became the leader of the friends of science. Perpignan itself was the seat of this sort of false learning; the allegorization, *e.g.*, by Levi, of Biblical characters (thus, Abraham and Sarah were regarded by him as types of matter and intellect) provoked the antagonism of the orthodox and of those who favoured the literal exegesis. A conflict arose in 1303 which resolved itself into the question, Is the study of science opposed to Judaism, and should it be suppressed? The leader of the obscurantists was Abba Mari b. Moses of Montpellier, who, from the outset, opposed Levi of Villefranche, who stood for freedom of thought. The Rabbi of Perpignan, Don Vidal Menahem b. Solomon Me'îrî (1249–1306), was a very different type of scholar from his contemporaries. Of unimpeachable orthodoxy, he loved science and philosophy, and refused to be captured by Abba Mari; he became a champion of science, but declared that it ought to be studied only after the Talmud was thoroughly mastered. Abba Mari, however, managed to involve the Rabbi of Barcelona, Solomon Ben Adrat, in the quarrel, and secured his support. The lovers of science were led by Jacob b. Makhir Tibbon, a mathematician and astronomer, and the famous Tibbon family were naturally all on the liberal side, gaining many adherents to their cause by accusing their adversaries of being anti-Maimonists. While the strife was raging, there came from the Rhineland, where he had been driven by persecution, the distinguished Asher b. Jehiel (1250–1327),[1] a pupil of the famous Meir of Rothenburg. Asher wandered from his native country to escape the massacres of Rindfleisch, which were destroying whole communities, and, in 1305, he was made Rabbi of Toledo. He was a great Talmudist and the compiler of a famous abstract of the Talmud, but he was a bitter enemy of secular scholarship. Naturally he joined the side of Abba Mari and proposed to convoke a synod in which science was to be condemned and utterly banished from the Jewish curriculum. Finally, on 26th July 1305, a solemn ban, to remain valid for fifty years, was pronounced against all secular study and also against the works of Maimonides. Any person under the age of twenty-five reading a scientific work was to be excommunicated. The organization of the Jewish communities was such that the ban affected only the town under the jurisdiction of the particular Rabbi who issued it—in this case Barcelona. Attempts were made to have the decree recognized elsewhere, but meanwhile the other side were not idle, and issued a counter-ban from Montpellier by which excommunication was pronounced against all who should prevent their sons or other persons from studying science, in whatsoever language the text-book was written, against those who abused Maimonides, and against those who attacked religious teachers because of their scientific or philosophical thoughts. The cause of the enlightened party prospered and gained much from the famous circular letter (*'iggereth hithnaṣṣelûth*) which Jedaya Bedaresi (on whom see *JE* ii. 625–627) wrote in 1306 to Ben Adrat and his party in defence of science and Maimonides. After the French expulsions, partisans of the two parties settled in Perpignan, and the controversy continued; but the liberal views gained the day in the end, and Judaism as a whole asserted itself in favour of science.

Perpignan had been the centre of the obscurantists, but scholarship was not killed there. From this town came forth a worthy successor of Maimonides, who went even further than that scholar himself in his daring attitude towards reason and learning. This great man was Levi b. Gershon (*q.v.*), called Gersonides, Ralbag (from his initials), Leon de Bagnols (from his birthplace), or Magister Leo Hebræus (1288–1344). The ban against science had no effect on his education. Before his thirtieth year he began his famous philosophical work, *Milḥâmôth 'Adhônâi* ('Wars of the Lord'). Of his numerous other works, his Talmudic knowledge, and his scientific and medical attainments it is impossible to write here; his influence on Judaism can be measured by his philosophic attitude in the work mentioned above.

He stood forth as a convinced Aristotelian, to a much greater degree than Maimonides, so that he sometimes does not scruple to follow Aristotle when he disagrees with Jewish doctrine, even where Maimonides threw the Greek philosopher over. He denied that the Torah required blind faith or belief in anything opposed to truth and reason. The 'Wars' deals with the six questions on which Maimonides deserted Aristotle or to which he gave no clear reply, these points being: (1) immortality; (2) prophecy; (3) divine omniscience; (4) divine providence; (5) the nature of the spheres; and (6) the eternity of matter. Ralbag defines the intellect born in man as a faculty which is operated by the universal intellect; man cannot think apart from the object of his thought. He derives immortality from the doctrine of the realists. He maintains the freedom of the human will in spite of the divine omniscience. He differs from Maimonides on the position assigned to the function of the imagination in prophecy, Maimonides holding that it should be encouraged, Ralbag that it should be subordinated to reason. Further, 'for Maimonides the special will of God is the sine qua non for prophecy; for Levi moral and intellectual perfections are quite sufficient' (I. Broydé, in *JE* viii. 30a). Ralbag demonstrated that this world had a beginning and was not the outcome of a previous world, but that it has no end. The *tôhu wa-bôhu* (Gn 1[2]) existed from all time, but was formed by God at the

[1] On these scholars see *JE* viii. 22–24, 441, i. 33*f.*, 212 f., vi. 544, ii. 182 f.

Creation. As regards miracles he was extremely rationalistic, and he formulated three conditions by which they were to be judged: (1) miracles are transitory; their effect does not endure; (2) they are not self-contradictory; nothing can be black and white simultaneously; (3) they cannot take place in the celestial spheres. Miracles are not supernatural, but are natural results—though rare—of laws governing the universe. In Jos 10^{12}, the miracle was not the standing still of the sun, but the rapidity with which the Israelite victory was achieved. So also in the case of Hezekiah (2 K 20^{9-11}), it was the shadow, not the sun, that went backwards.

Naturally the theories of Ralbag did not pass unchallenged. His ideas were not popular with the masses, but retained their hold over learned minds for generations. Pope Clement VI. ordered his astronomical works to be translated into Latin, and Spinoza adopted Ralbag's treatment of miracles (see Graetz, iv. 101). A contemporary of Ralbag was Moses b. Joshua of Narbonne (Vidal Narboni), who was born at Perpignan. He died after 1362. In his case, too, the ban was ineffectual, for he began the study of philosophy at the age of thirteen.

He was a follower of Maimonides and Ibn Rushd (Averroes; see art. AVERROES, AVERROISM, vol. ii. pp. 262–266). In spite of a chequered life, he was a productive author, and his works exerted considerable influence. He 'conceived Judaism as a disciplined guide which led to the attainment of the highest degree of theoretical moral truths; the Torah had a double meaning, the one simple, made easy for the thoughtless mob, and the other of a deeper metaphysical nature for the class of thinkers. This was a common opinion in those times, from which Gersonides alone demurred. Narboni also gave expression to heretical views, that is, such as were contrary to the ordinarily accepted understanding of Judaism, but not with the freedom and openness of Levi ben Gerson. He also rejected the belief in miracles, and attempted to explain them away altogether. He defended man's freedom of will by philosophical arguments' (Graetz, iv. 102).[1]

Ralbag was a staunch Aristotelian, but the Jewish philosophers were not confined to this school of thought. Ḥasdai b. Abraham Crescas (1340–1410), born in Barcelona, sought to free Judaism completely from Aristotelianism, and was thus at variance both with Ralbag and with Rambam. His second work was a *Tratado* written in Spanish in 1398, a refutation of Christianity, designed less as an apologetic for Judaism than as an attack on the apostates. His third work, *Ôr 'Ádhônâi*, is a masterpiece of reasoning and style.

Crescas declared that the teachings of Ralbag and Rambam were contrary to orthodoxy, mainly because they were based on Aristotle, but he differed from the other opponents of these teachers in that he came forward with argument, not with appeals to authority or threats of excommunication. Maimonides had accepted the twenty-six propositions of Aristotle. Crescas rejected them. He held that philosophy was inadequate to demonstrate the unity of God. Although philosophy might show that the First Cause was simple and not compound, yet there might still be deities subservient to the Supreme God. Therefore revelation and religion are necessary. God's essence was not knowledge, but love. Crescas also admitted attributes. He rejected the thirteen articles of the creed of Maimonides as being either too few or too many, and based Judaism on six essentials: God's omniscience, providence, and omnipotence; prophecy, free will; and the belief that the world was created for a purpose. Man's will is free because he feels it to be free; though in reality God's omnipotence predetermines, yet man's will is sufficiently free to admit reward and punishment. The world was created, and would pass away, while the heavens would endure. The purpose of the world was human happiness, to be brought about by love, both here and in the hereafter. Knowledge is apart from the soul.

It will thus be seen that the gulf between Crescas and his predecessors was very great. Crescas, when not actually attacked, was strangely ignored by his contemporaries. His teaching was diffused largely by the works of his pupil Joseph Albo, chiefly through the *Iqqârîm* ('Roots'), in which there is little originality, the matter being almost entirely derived from Crescas.[2]

The appearance of David Reubeni (*c.* 1490–1535) and Solomon Molko (*c.* 1500–32) kindled great hopes in the hearts of the Jews and Marranos. Their extraordinary adventures gained them many followers, and the honour with which they were received in Rome and Portugal deluded many into the belief that their Messianic claims were valid. Their failure caused bitter disappointment, though the heroic constancy of Molko at his martyrdom (1532) encouraged many who were doomed to a similar fate. Their importance to Judaism lies in the fact that the failure of one pseudo-Messiah did not prevent his successor from receiving credence.[1] Only 130 years later, Judaism was rent by the schism produced by another claimant, Shabbethai Zebi, whose followers were numbered by thousands (see below, p. 605[b]).[2] Ḳabbalism was largely responsible for these eschatological ideas. Already in 1284, Abraham Abulafia declared himself to be the Messiah, and fixed the millennium for 1290. Two of his disciples, Joseph Jikatilla and Samuel, from Medina Celi, alleged themselves to be prophets and harbingers of the Messiah, and Messianic hopes were largely predominant in the minds of the later Ḳabbalists at Safed.

It has already been pointed out that Christian persecution was driving the Jews into Muslim countries. Little by little, Turkey and Palestine were receiving a large Jewish population; Safed, in particular, became the home of many distinguished Rabbis. Among these Rabbis there grew up the desire to re-establish the old Rabbinic supremacy of Palestine. They desired to institute once more the *s'mikhâh*, or ordination, and thus ordain a Sanhedrin which would be recognized throughout the world. In 1538, Jacob Berab[3] began to ordain in Safed; but his plans were frustrated by Levi b. Jacob Ḥabib, the chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, and his colleague, Moses de Castro. Berab failed and was forced to emigrate, but before doing so he ordained four disciples, one of whom was Joseph Qaro. Had Berab succeeded, a great step in the direction of Jewish ecclesiastical unity would have been accomplished. It is significant that he failed. Judaism has never liked centralization of authority, certainly not since the Diaspora, and it has flourished perhaps by reason of its local autonomy in religious spheres. Had a single authority been able to control Jewish thought and belief during such controversies as raged over Ḳaraism, Maimonides, the study of science, and the Arab and Greek philosophy, the result would have been the growth of sects, from which Judaism is so remarkably free. Had the central authority, during any of these conflicts, taken sides, Judaism would have been crippled. Freedom of thought, the result of local autonomy and independence, alone has preserved it from disintegration.

The convocation of synods, however, is not an unknown event in post-Talmudic Judaism, but the feature of these synods has usually been their temporary character and their convocation for a particular purpose. Thus, the *'âsîfôth*, or assemblies, of R. Tam, in the middle of the 12th cent., met at Troyes and Rheims to determine many cases, generally those arising out of the intercourse of Jews and Christians. Perhaps the most famous synod was that summoned about 1000 by R. Gershom (960–1040), which (1) prohibited polygamy, (2) maintained the principle of mutual consent in divorce, (3) ordained leniency for forced converts, and (4) prohibited the opening of other persons' letters. Assemblies were also held at Mainz (1223 and 1381), of the Spanish Jews (1354), and at Bologna (1416), Forli (1418), Jerusalem (1552), and Lublin (1650), while Napoleon (1806) and Alexander I. (1804) summoned synods. In 1903 a synod of 50 Rabbis was held at Cracow, under the leadership of R. Elijahu Ḥazzan, chief Rabbi of Alexandria, which repudiated the blood accusation and

[1] See, further, I. Broydé, 'Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne,' in *JE* ix. 71 f.

[2] See, further, E. G. Hirsch, *JE* iv. 350–353.

[1] See, further, J. Jacobs, 'Reubeni, David,' in *JE* x. 388 f., and P. Bloch, 'Molko, Solomon,' *ib.* viii. 651.

[2] Also the followers of David Alroy (*c.* 1160) formed a sect called the Menahemists (cf. M. Adler, in *JE* i. 454 f.).

[3] See L. Ginzberg, 'Berab, Jacob,' in *JE* iii. 45–47.

denounced Nihilism. In America and Germany synods have frequently been summoned in modern times, chiefly by the Reform party. The synod of Lublin, in 1650, was of a permanent character, and the famous *Wa'aulh 'arbā' 'dṟāṣōth*, or 'Council of the Four Countries' (usually Great Poland, Little Poland, Polish Russia, and Volhynia), sat regularly during two centuries. But all these synods were, in effect, local. They did not pretend to legislate beyond their own jurisdiction, though their rulings were, in many cases, voluntarily accepted elsewhere. The theory of the Rabbis has always been mutual equality; there has been no official *primus inter pares*. At the present day in England, various Sefardic and Ashkenazic communities exist side by side, in friendship and mutual recognition; their position may be compared to adjacent dioceses of the same Church, without a primate.

Judaism maintains the individual freedom of every Rabbi, and his right to give ordination (*s'mikhah*) to suitable disciples. The validity of this ordination must be recognized by all Jewry, though no Rabbi may exercise his functions within the jurisdiction of another. In practice, the Ḥakham of Bevis Marks and the chief Rabbi of Duke's Place are the highest court of appeal for the Sefardim and Ashkenazim not only of the Empire, but often, it would almost be safe to add, of the world. On the Continent local Rabbinic supremacy is well-nigh universal.

The great Halākhic work of Maimonides did not check the compilation of codes. Many teachers devoted themselves to the task, either for popular use or for the elucidation of the principles of Halākhā. Eli'ezer b. Nathan of Mainz (Raban) was the author of the *'Ebhen hā-Ēzer*. Moses of Coucy wrote the *Semaq*, or *Sēfer Miṣwōth Gādhōl*, and Isaac of Corbeil composed the *Semaḳ*, or *Sēfer Miṣwōth Ḳāṭōn*, a smaller work. El'azar of Worms (1176–1238), a prolific and vigorous writer, was the author of ritual and Ḳabbalistic works. His fame rests chiefly on the *Rōḳēaḥ*, an ethical-Halākhic work in 497 paragraphs. His Kabbalism tinged his views very deeply, but the *Rōḳēaḥ* is a valuable contribution to Judaism. Solomon b. Adrat of Barcelona wrote a comprehensive scheme of laws, covering all the practical needs of Jewish life. In distinction to Maimonides, he gives in this work, *Tōrath hab-bayith*, the sources and proofs of his rulings. Perhaps the most famous of the post-Maimonidian codes was the *'Arbā' Ṭūrīm* of Jacob b. Asher (1280–1340), a son of Asher b. Jeḥiēl.[1] Its influence on Judaism was greater than that of any other code, and it became a household word. Joseph Qaro, when he thought it necessary to compose the *Shulḥan 'Arūkh*, practically revised and brought up to date the work of Jacob b. Asher. Qaro was a mystic and devoted to Ḳabbālā. His life and those of the Safed Ḳabbalists have been well portrayed by S. Schechter in his *Studies in Judaism* (London, 1896). Their influence pervaded Jewish life and ceremonial, and many a touch of spirituality, a high association, an ethical hint, is due to their teaching. They introduced a spirit of consecration, a sanctification of religious practice, devotion, and self-sacrifice.

Excess of their teaching would have made Judaism unreal and superficial; in due proportion it gave life and light. Protected and fortified by Maimonides and the philosophers, Judaism was safe from the dangers of an exaggerated mysticism. On the other hand, the entire absence of the mystic element would have reduced it to a collection of intellectual dogmas, lacking warmth and vitality. Its stability is due to the heterogeneous nature of its component elements and to the proportion and moderation with which each one had fulfilled its appointed function.

Poland was pre-eminently the home of Talmudic study. The Polish synods had given an impetus to this learning, and the practical jurisdiction of the Rabbinical tribunals forced judges as well as litigants to master the code by which judgment would be given. Fast as the printing presses worked, the output of copies of the Talmud was speedily sold out. In forty years, three large editions were exhausted (Cracow, 1602–05, 1616–20; Lublin, 1617–39). So great was the devotion and so numerous were the Rabbis and pupils that the supremacy of Poland was everywhere recognized. The dispersion of the Polish Jews, due to the terrible atrocities in 1648 of Chmielnicki (1595–1675), had scarcely any effect on their attachment to the Talmud. They carried their love with them into exile and clung to it more firmly in distress. This enthusiasm carried with it one great disadvantage, for every other study, Jewish and secular, was abandoned, and the Polish Jews immured themselves in an intellectual ghetto, the confines of which were as narrow and crushing as those of the physical pale. There began a period of darkness and ignorance, which was ended only by the light of the Mendelssohnian movement. It is incorrect to attribute this misfortune to the nature of the Talmud. It was not concentration on the Talmud, but the exclusion of everything else, that was responsible for this retrograde tendency. The devotion of the Polish Jews to the Talmud is largely maintained to-day, but other influences are at work, and, while they no longer shut out general knowledge from their curriculum, their zeal for Halākhā is not abated.

In the 17th cent. three different influences exerted themselves upon Judaism. The Talmudic influence, alluded to above, became more powerful with the diffusion of the Polish Jews over Europe. Secondly, a strong wave of Ḳabbāla infected Jewish communities in every land, East and West. This naturally was followed, in reaction, by a strong spirit of opposition. This phase of Ḳabbālā had nothing in its favour. The earlier sublimity of the mystic idea was gone; it degenerated into senseless tricks and juggling. Isaac Luria and his pupils, in spite of their piety, were the teachers of an unworthy superstition. They claimed to work miracles, and deluded the ignorant by their visions and alleged wonders. They preached metempsychosis, the union and redemption of souls, and practical magic, often by means of the ineffable name. Ḥayyim Vital Calabrese, his brother Moses, and his son Samuel lived in Palestine (Jerusalem, Safed, and Damascus being strongholds of Ḳabbalism); Israel Saruk,[1] a pupil of Luria, and Menahem Azaria da Fano, in Italy. The teaching of these men and their numerous followers prepared the way for the pseudo-Messiah Shabbethai Zebi.

This wonderful impostor succeeded in winning over thousands; not merely the ignorant multitude but learned and earnest Rabbis followed him. All over the world preparations were made for the Messianic Age, which he fixed for the Annus Mirabilis, 1666. London and Amsterdam vied with Smyrna in eagerness, and few kept their heads during this convulsion. So strong was his personality that, in spite of his ludicrous failure, multitudes believed in him. A rumour arose about Shabbethai similar to the Docetic theory of the Crucifixion, which maintained that a substitute had intervened and saved Jesus from the Cross. It was said that another had apostatized, and that the real Shabbethai had withdrawn for a while and would reappear in glory. The belief in him has remained to the present day, and a separate sect of Turkish Jews, called the *Dönmeh* (on whom see R. J. H. Gottheil, *JE* iv. 639), await his second coming. When the majority of his misguided admirers recovered their senses, every reminiscence of the false prophet was banned. Thus it is said that the *Ma'ărābhth* for the second day of Pentecost (אל אדיר דבר by Raban) is omitted from the usual Ashkenazic *Maḥzōr* because of some supposed association with Shabbethai. The Messianic spirit had in earlier times made itself felt in Holland. It was re-echoed by the English Puritans, and to no small extent facilitated the return of the Jews to England.

The excesses of Talmudism and Ḳabbalism produced an intellectual revolt, the last of the three tendencies to which allusion has been made. For the first time Judaism had to deal with calculated and philosophical scepticism. This new trend of thought was first manifested in three contemporaries, Uriel da Costa (1590–1647; see art. ACOSTA,

[1] For sketches of these writers see *JE* v. 118 f., ix. 68–70, vi. 623, v. 100 f., i. 212 f., vii. 27 f.

[1] For these see *JE* viii. 210–212, xii. 442 f., xi. 64.

vol. i. p. 74 f.), Leo of Modena (1571–1648), and Joseph Delmedigo (1591–1655).[1] There were many points of difference between the triad. Da Costa was a Marrano who, dissatisfied with Roman Catholicism, renounced it for his ancestral faith. He was, however, disappointed with Judaism. He made no secret of his views, and was twice excommunicated for heresy. After doing penance and being reconciled, he shot himself.

Da Costa maintained that the Talmud had intervened between the Bible and Judaism. He was a deist, and believed in a religion of nature to be found in every human conscience, an ethical form of creed in which Judaism as well as other faiths had a share in common, and from which all had, in various degrees, deviated. It is doubtful whether he considered himself to have abandoned Judaism. Certain it is that he was regarded by his contemporaries as an apostate; but the point at issue was precisely this, whether the Judaism of the day was the faith in its true form or whether Talmudism had been substituted for it. The Jews who had settled in Holland had suffered so severely for their religion that they would not bear any attacks on that for which they had jeopardized their lives. Persecution had made them intolerant, yet they must not be blamed too sharply, for the age was not ready for unrestrained freedom of thought. Absolute liberty would most probably have degenerated into a decay of all moral and ethical bonds.

Leo of Modena remained a Rabbi to the day of his death. His intellectual powers were of a higher order than those of Da Costa, while his frame of mind affords a curious psychological study.

Although his teaching was in favour of religion, he was himself assailed by doubt. He could attack Judaism and defend it with equal sincerity and conviction. His vacillation was due, on the one hand, to instability of character; on the other, to bitter misfortune, both in his family life and financially. In his *Bēth Yĕhūdāh* he upholds the legal right of the Rabbis to modify Talmudic legislation, and he regards the Haggādā unfavourably. In his *Ḳōl Sākhāl* (or *Ḥ'ḥinath haḳ-Ḳabbala*; J. A. Benjacob, *Ozar Ha-Sepharim, Bibliog. der hebr. Lit.*, Wilna, 1880, p. 69, no. 283) he attacked traditional Judaism;[2] in his *Sha'agath 'Aryēh*, he defended it. The *'Ārī Nōḥēm* refutes Kabbālā and proves the late origin of the *Zōhar*. Yet he believed in astrology. His literary activity was great. On account of his official position, his influence was far greater than that of Da Costa, but he did not go to the same length, and he remained orthodox in practice. In a way, Leo was the father of the modern Reform movement, but through his inconsistency and his avoidance of conflict he achieved no practical result.

Joseph Delmedigo differed from Leo of Modena and from Da Costa in that he cannot be acquitted of insincerity. He had a wide education in liberal culture and science as well as in Jewish subjects.

He was active as a writer, and in spite of his wandering life he managed to compose a number of works. He had intimate associations with the Karaites, and one of his best known books, *Ēlim* (in allusion to Ex 15[27]), is a reply to twelve questions addressed to him by Zerah b. Nathan, a Karaite. Delmedigo officiated for a time as Rabbi in Hamburg. He never ventured to proclaim his real views, but covered them with a veneer of orthodoxy. On this account he was highly esteemed by many, who did not see him in his true light, or who regarded merely his erudition. As a sceptic his influence on Judaism was small; he merely illustrates, as another type, the growth of the movement.

Of a different character was Baruch Spinoza (*q.v.*) (1632–1677). He could not conform, either through fear or from motives of personal advantage, to what he believed to be untrue. Delmedigo might become a Rabbi, Descartes, whose teaching Spinoza followed, might vow a pilgrimage to Loreto, but to Spinoza external adherence was impossible.

He believed that Judaism was bound up with the Jewish State and ought to have ended with the destruction of the first Temple. For this reason, he regarded opposition to the State religion as unjustifiable, and resistance to the Inquisition as futile. Owing to his excommunication and persecution, he regarded Christianity more favourably than Judaism, but he had no serious thoughts of adopting it. It is a question whether his conception of the universe as a part of God, of the Deity as a self-producing Creator of all things, and of man as entirely controlled by causes reaching far back into universal natural laws could ever have been reconciled to Judaism, for Spinoza definitely rejected a personal God, Providence, and immortality. Yet, in his day, Maimonides was equally zealous in his search for truth and did not leave the fold. The influence of Spinoza on Judaism came later; his influence extended to individual Jews rather than to corporate Jewish belief.

Far more important to Jewish development was Moses Mendelssohn (*q.v.*) (1729–86). No less brilliant than Spinoza, no less erudite, and similarly endowed with a capacity for philosophy, he was a tower of strength to Judaism. To him is due the great revival which aroused thought, stimulated culture, and once more brought Judaism into contact with external learning. Without Mendelssohn it would have sunk more deeply into the clutches of ignorance and remained an easy prey to the attacks of atheism.

Mendelssohn had to contend with opposition on account of his translation of and commentary on the Bible, but his teaching was enormously diffused and gave vast numbers of young men an insight into modern thought, without destroying their faith. Like Maimonides, he was one of those intellectual giants that give another turn to the wheel of Jewish ethics and intellect. His effect was all the more potent since it almost coincided with the break up of the ghetto. The Jews emerged into more intimate contact with their surroundings and, dazzled by the sudden light, found help in his guidance. His preference for German over jargon was in itself epoch-making. He taught fidelity to Judaism and respect for the belief of others. His friendship with Lessing helped to make the cause of Judaism known outside and may be counted as a stage in the progress of Jewish emancipation.

Mendelssohn and Naphtali Hirz Wessely were the founders of a Jewish Renaissance, and their work was continued by Naḥman Krochmal (1785–1840) and Samuel David Luzzatto (1800–65).[1] The large array of Jewish scholars of the 19th cent. all owed their inspiration ultimately—in whatever branch they were engaged—to the Mendelssohn revival.

Wessely, in his *Dibhrē Shālōm we-Emeth* (Germ. tr. by D. Friedländer, *Worte der Wahrheit und des Friedens*, Berlin, 1798), had outlined a scheme of education in which science and Talmud should both find a place; nevertheless, he was not regarded with cordiality by many Polish Rabbis, some of whom were genuinely frightened at the combination, though not hostile to it, while others were merely obscurantist. The result of the rejuvenescence was, it is true, that a certain number became estranged, but many were fortified in their belief. At the same time a curious development had arisen in Poland, a revival of Essenism and mysticism, the followers of which called themselves by the old name Ḥăsīdīm. The founders of the new movement were Israel b. Eliezer, called Ba'al Shem-Tob (Besht) (1698–1759), and Baer of Meseritz (1710–72).[2] The extraordinary piety of these men was re-echoed in their followers. Prayer was a vital force, and was the means of union and fusion with the Godhead. In spite of the attempts at miracles and predicting the future, and of a few unworthy practices, the sect was, and remains to the present day, a band of devotional enthusiasts, giving themselves entirely to introspection and prayer. The quaint religious exercises of the Ḥăsīdīm and their partial antagonism to the Talmud brought them into conflict with the Rabbis, and they were denounced by Elijah Wilna (1720–97),[3] while in 1781 they were declared to be heretics. Their antagonists, the *Mithnagedim* ('opponents'), rightly perceived that Judaism has no liking for extremes. The excesses of the Ḥăsīdīm were becoming intolerable; and, as their numbers grew, their eccentricities developed. It is estimated that at one time they numbered 100,000, although this is perhaps too large a figure. With the political emancipation of the Jews, a new era in Judaism began, although this emancipation is still incomplete in many lands. The effects can scarcely yet be estimated. Russia, the home of the greater number of the Jews, is still pursuing a policy of repression which affects not only the Russian Jews, but those of other

[1] See *JE* viii. 5–7, iv. 508 f.

[2] See 2nd treatise, ch. iv. = p. 28, ed. Isaac Reggio, Göritz, 1852, and also 3rd treatise. He urged very sweeping changes and modifications.

[1] On these three see *JE* xii. 506 f., vii. 576 f., viii. 224–226.

[2] For the difference between the teachings of Luria and Besht, *i.e.* Kabbālā and Ḥasidism, see *JE*, *s.v.* 'Ba'al Shem-Tob, Israel b. Eliezer' and 'Baer (Dob) of Meseritz,' ii. 383–386, 430–433.

[3] See M. Seligsohn, 'Elijah ben Solomon,' in *JE* v. 133–135.

countries to which fugitives go. Emancipation brings many problems in its train; for, so soon as a community begins to solve some of the difficulties and readjust itself to new conditions, an influx of Russians renews the process. Education is in many respects the solution. A proper curriculum, in which religious and secular knowledge shall each have a proper place, is being gradually and variously evolved. In Russia, the Haskalah movement has usually been sterile, because the tendency of the Maskilim and their children is almost invariably towards assimilation.[1] This is in reality due to economic conditions. The oppressive restrictions imposed by the Government on schools and learning prevent the rise of a carefully planned scheme of education. Thus modern knowledge must be acquired, almost entirely, either surreptitiously or from anti-religious sources. For the Zionistic movement in modern Judaism see art. ZIONISM.

III. *JUDAISM AT THE PRESENT DAY.*—The future of orthodox Judaism and its relations with Christianity, on the one hand, and Zionism and liberal Judaism on the other, may be briefly summarized. It is unnecessary to dwell on the origin of Christianity. Graetz (ii. ch. xiv.) has traced the steps by which the breach between the two faiths was finally consummated. Judaism does not admit that Jesus was the promised Messiah. It cannot accept such distinctively Christian doctrines as the miraculous birth of Jesus, His divinity and relation to the Father, the Trinity, the Atonement, the Resurrection, the idea of mediation, the conception of sin.[2] Further, Judaism differs from Christianity with regard to the Law, neither admitting the possibility of its abrogation nor regarding it as burdensome. The Commandments are given to man 'that he may do them and live by them' (Lv 18^5). Judaism has a more optimistic view of life than Christianity; it does not hold the Essene doctrine that wealth is a bad thing under all circumstances (Lk 6^{24} $18^{24\text{-}25}$, Ja 1^{10}, Mt 19^{23}) and that marriage is evil. No Rabbi may be a celibate. Marriage is the first commandment of the Bible (Gn 1^{28}). The *Yēṣerhā-rā'* is from God (see F. C. Porter, *Yale Bicentenary Bib. and Sem. Studies*, London, 1901, p. 122); it is called טוב מאד (*Gen. Rab.* p. 71 foot, of Theodor's ed., Berlin, 1903; see his note), and God instituted it 'for his glory' (see second blessing of Jewish Marriage Service, Singer, p. 299; cf. Book of Common Prayer, The Form of Solemnization of Matrimony: 'Matrimony, which is an honourable estate instituted of God . . .'; but cf. 'It was ordained for a remedy against sin and to avoid fornication'). Judaism does not regard family ties as an impediment to man's whole-hearted service of God (cf. 1 K 19^{20} with Lk 14^{26}; see also Mt 10^{35}, and Rashi on Lv 19^3), nor does it approve of asceticism.[3] The Nazirite had to bring a sin-offering (see *Bab. Taanith*, 11*a*=Goldschmidt, iii. 441, כל הישב בתענית נקרא חוטא; in Babylon only the ninth of Ab was observed). Finally, Judaism does not declare that belief in any dogma is necessary to salvation. It teaches that 'the righteous of all nations have a share in the world to come' (Maimonides, *Hilkhōth Teshūbhā*, iii. § ii.), that 'the teachings of him of Nazareth and of the man of Ishmael . . . serve to bring to perfection all mankind, so that they may serve God . . .' (Maimonides, ed. D. Yellin and I. Abrahams, London, 1903, p. 94 ff.), that 'the good actions of any man, to whichever people he may belong, will be rewarded by God. But the priority belongs to people who are near God during their life, and we estimate the rank they occupy near God after death accordingly' (*Khazarī*, i. § 111 = Hirschfeld, p. 78; see also *Exodus Rabba*, p. 49, and, for other references, D. Wasserzug, *The Messianic Idea*, p. 22). The function of Judaism is to fulfil the Isaianic ideal of a missionary 'Remnant.' Though it recognizes the general truths of Christianity and Islām, and the religious validity of these systems, it cannot concede that its own destiny is accomplished, as long as the differences outlined above remain in existence. While rejecting ecclesiasticism, Judaism can fully appreciate the life of the founder of Christianity; and, in estimating the practical value of that faith, it pays regard to the noble lives fostered by its ideals rather than to the persecutors that have proved false to its teaching.

Judaism is to be the religion of a Remnant; from the material sacrifices demanded of its adherents, resulting from an environment preponderatingly non-Jewish, it is inevitable that Judaism, under present conditions, must be limited to a minority. This circumstance constitutes its strength. It must never be forgotten that the minority influences the majority, not *vice versa*, for good. All great movements spring from the few; when they have permeated to the many, it is more often a sign that they have failed, and that there is need for a new growth, than that they have accomplished their purpose. Nearly every ideal degenerates with popularity. When the masses are stronger than their leaders, chaos results.

> 'In a great population animated by democratic notions, recognizing no external authority in matters of faith or taste, with a growing passion for equality and a greedy desire to handle the good things of this world, as recommended by the modes and methods of life of the wealthy and luxurious, it would be irrational to expect to discover any general refinement or delicacy of thought or feeling. . . . To expect too much of the human race is the ancient error of moralists and the sin of the satirist. In his lecture on "Numbers," delivered in the United States, Mr. Matthew Arnold illustrated by quotations from Plato and Isaiah the truth *that it is always the remnant that saves a nation or a race*, and the advantage of a big country and a great population is that the remnant has at least a chance of being a good large one' (Augustine Birrell, 'Modern Conditions of Literary Production,' *EBr*[10] xxx. [1902] p. ix).

The losses sustained by Judaism through perversion and by the oppression of the Jews in Russia and Rumania, together with the more subtle but no less severe persecution prevalent in some other countries, have produced Zionism, for the Zionists regard a minority as doomed to failure. Originally this movement was purely economic and philanthropic in scope; Herzl's Zionism was bound up in the Basel programme, 'to secure a *legally assured* home in Syria and Palestine' for persecuted Jews. The words 'legally assured' differentiated Zionism from the other colonizing enterprises. Since the death of Herzl, who said, 'Der Weg zum Judenlande führt durch das Judentum,' Zionism has developed into nationalism, which asserts a Jewish nationality independent of religion. The division of certain sentiments into 'national' and 'religious' is arbitrary; it is a Latin or European conception, as the language of the terms indicates.[1] The antithesis is not Semitic; for, while religion to a Semite—Jew or Muslim—includes, as has been shown (above, p. 584 ff.), much more than is now ordinarily understood by the word, a kinship on the basis of blood or language or any other but a religious tie is conceivable neither to the prophets of old nor to the Semitic ethnologist or historian of to-day. Monotheism, not some physiological inheritance, is the *raison d'être* of Judaism (see C. G. Montefiore, 'Nation or Religious Community?,' *JQR* xii. [1899-1900] 177-194; see also *ib.* xvii. [1904-05] 1-25, 397-425; *Jewish Chronicle Correspondence*, 1909, Jan. 1, 15, March 12, April 9, 16, 23, 30, May 21, June 25; on the

[1] See, further, artt. 'Haskalah,' 'Maskil,' in *JE* vi. 250-258, viii. 364.

[2] See 'Sin as Rebellion,' etc., in S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabb. Theol.*, p. 219 ff.

[3] See 'Law of the Nazirite,' in *Jew. Chron.*, June 5, 1914, p. 17 f.

[1] See what has been said above on nationality, p. 584 ff.

question of a Jewish race see R. N. Salamon, in *Journal of Genetics*, i. [1910-11] 273 ff., where a complete bibliography is given).

Every recrudescence of nationalism has brought misfortune to the Jews and to Judaism. It was the cause of the catastrophe of 587 B.C., of the fall of the Maccabees, of the decay of the Sadducees, of the destruction by Titus, and of the desolation of Judæa in 136. In every case the disasters caused by the nationalists have been mitigated by their opponents. Johanan b. Zakkai built up what the zealots overthrew, and the breaches resulting from Bar Kokhba's declaration of nationality were healed by the Rabbis. A Jewish centre is not an essential to enable the genius of Judaism to assert itself. There was neither a physical nor a spiritual ghetto in Spain, yet the Spanish period is perhaps the brightest in the history of Judaism. Nor is the circumstance that the Jewish liturgy prays for a 'return' an argument for Zionism; the 'return' to which Judaism looks forward is always associated with religion. 'And let our eyes behold *Thy* return in mercy to Zion, and there we will worship Thee in awe as in the days of old' (Adler and Davis, *Service of Syn.* [*Tabernacles*], p. 140). The true character of Zionism, as an alternative to religion, may be seen from such pronouncements as those of J. Hochman (*Jewish Review*, iv. [1913] 217–242), who regards it as a salvation for those 'who do not share the faith of the orthodox universalist in the divine origin of the Law . . . who do not find a satisfactory sphere of activity in the life of Mitzwoth . . . to-day we have no one centre of Jewish loyalty, and the life of Mitzwoth is losing its hold.' Such Zionism would save the Jews at the cost of Judaism.

Finally, liberal Judaism has arisen as a missionary movement in order to rescue those Jews who have become indifferent to their faith. Liberal Judaism stands much nearer to orthodox Judaism than Zionism does. The differences between the two forms are internal and small in comparison with their points of contact; to the outside world both are united, although there may be a great gulf between individuals on both sides.

For membership of a liberal synagogue does not necessarily imply the repudiation of something not definitely taught from its pulpit. Liberal Judaism denies the necessity of certain practices, but it does not require their abandonment. It is thus in nature not Karaitic, but it asserts the continuation of Rabbinic tradition as a living force. Refusing to regard the *Shulḥan 'Arūkh* as the sealing up of Halākhā, liberal Judaism maintains that its religious teachers and individual members to-day have the power to bind and loose as of old. In this respect it is something positive, not a mere negation of orthodoxy. The latter, on the other hand, cannot accept any development unless sanctioned by a Rabbi with *Hattārath Hōrā'ā* (*facultas docendi*), and permits a synod to decree changes only if its authority is recognized as equal to that of its predecessors. Liberal Judaism seeks to win back the lapsed, even at the cost of modifications; orthodoxy, however, maintains that the preservation of the ideal is more important than the salvation of the individual, for Judaism must be handed down unimpaired, even though by a minority. In theory the two bodies are in agreement; no one would impute to liberal Judaism a sacrificing of its ideals; it is on the definition of the essential principles that the controversy turns. Orthodox Judaism foresees a danger of liberal Judaism, by not laying sufficient stress on the Law and on ceremonial, drifting into a colourless belief of universalist monotheism.

Since 1842, when the controversy reached an acute stage in England, orthodox Judaism has changed its attitude to the Reformers. Already in 1864 the Sefardim removed the ban which had been imposed, and to-day, while acknowledging that there are differences between the two points of view, the orthodox co-operate with the liberals in harmony and tolerance. Judaism has always striven to secure union and avoid sectarianism. To the credit of Zionism it must be urged that it has brought back many outcasts to the fold; that, even if nationalism, at best, is a mere modification of Judaism, the children of the nationalists may become orthodox Jews (כל המקים נפש אחת מישראל כאילו קים עולם מלא).

In the case of liberal Judaism, many Jews, previously lacking all feelings of spirituality and loyalty, have been taught to love God, to keep His commandments, to attend worship, and to observe the festivals. Their methods are not entirely those of orthodox Judaism, but of the sincerity of their purpose there can be no doubt. How much more then can there be applied to them the saying, 'Always let a man busy himself with a Miṣwā, even though it be not for the purpose of the Miṣwā, for by practice he will come to do the Miṣwā for the proper purpose' (Bab. *Pes.* 50*b*); since the purpose of liberal Judaism is to promote the sanctification of God and rouse the apathetic to a sense of duty, the choice of method, unpleasing though it be to the orthodox, must be left to the conscience and judgment of the liberals themselves. Hence Judaism, orthodox and reformed, and Zionism can look forward with confidence to a future, one and indivisible.

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JUDAIZING.—1. Derivation and scope of the term.—The use of this term and its cognate forms 'Judaize,' 'Judaizer,' 'Judaist,' and, sometimes, 'Judaism' may be traced to Est 8[17] 'many became Jews' (מִתְיַהֲדִים, LXX περιετέμνοντο καὶ Ἰουδάϊζον). A wider currency for the word arises from Gal 2[14] 'I [Paul] said unto Peter before them all, If thou, being a Jew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, why compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews (*ἰουδαΐζειν*)?'

In English usage the scope of the term varies. It may describe a tendency or type of mind, as when a 'prophetic' is contrasted with a 'Judaic' spirit. It describes habits—*e.g.*, 'Usurers . . . doe Judaize' (Bacon, *Essays*, London, 1891, 'On Usury,' p. 75); or the verb may be transitive—*e.g.*, 'Error . . . had miserably judaiz'd the Church' (Milton, 'Hirelings,' in *Prose Works*, London, 1848, iii. 15; cf. *OED*, *s.v.*).

The early Church had certain members who desired to maintain the permanent obligation of the Mosaic Law. There were two views about this obligation: the one held that only Christians who were of Jewish descent required to keep the Law; the other, that Gentile converts were equally liable. This section of the Church membership was called the Judaizers. Their origin, activity, and disappearance are here the subject of inquiry.

2. The Judaism which Judaizers could not leave.—Pharisaic Judaism, from which the Judaizers were but half-hearted seceders, was firmly established at the advent of the gospel. The sacrificial worship of the Temple, as prescribed by the Priests' Code in the Pentateuch, was carried on daily with glad devotion. The services were beautiful and significant; men felt that they were ordained by the express command of God. Race, religion, and patriotism were concerned in the honour and dignity of the Temple; the Roman eagle or the statue of Claudius could not be tolerated near it; Saul was ready to hale men and women from Damascus for doubting its sacred claims; in the last siege men would starve rather than stint the daily sacrifice. As Mecca has been sacred and inviolate for Islām, so were the Temple and its cult for Judaism at home and abroad. Any change would seem unthinkable.

Throughout the Diaspora the synagogue had been for some two centuries the refuge of Jewish communities. Prayer and instruction based on the Law and the Prophets were its chief purpose. The formation of a liturgy (*Shemoneh 'Esreh*), the interpretation of Hebrew Scripture in Aramaic or in Greek, the use of the Psalms, the hearing of visitors (Lk 4[16], Ac 13[15]), and the observance of Sabbath and Festivals made the synagogue the focus of Jewish thought and life. Gentiles were attracted and admitted, evidently in considerable numbers (Mt 23[15]; Horace, *Sat.* I. iv. 142 f.; Josephus, *c. Apion.* ii. 40). Contact with Gentiles made Jews more hospitable to new ideas; but contempt and ill-treatment attached them more closely to their own laws and customs.

'No Jew can go so far from his own country, nor be so affrighted at the severest despot, as not to be more affrighted at the Law than at him' (Jos. *c. Apion.* ii. 39).

The Judaism from which Christianity arose had a theism which Jews could not easily abandon; it had its code of 613 rules and regulations for a correct life; it held its members with a firm grasp through Temple and synagogue; it was displacing decadent Gentile creeds, and was not a system to be lightly forsaken.

3. The Christianity they could not adopt.—The teaching of Jesus offended Pharisaic Judaism by its unanswerable criticism of the traditions of the elders (the Oral Law), by its want of deference to the hierarchy, and by exalting the end of religion (love to God and man) and consequently depreciating the current estimate of Temple, sacrifice, Sabbath, dietary rules, and 'the hedge about the Law' generally. Moreover, He claimed an authority which shocked the scribes. Not by vision, or by dreams, or by prophetic inspiration, not by writing a Pseudepigraphon, but in His own name He re-stated the Mosaic Law; He spoke as the Judge of the whole religious past of the nation, and prescribed for the future a mission of world-wide benevolence. He had kindled a new spirit in a few disciples; and this religion of the spirit would seek to save that which Judaism considered to be lost. He thus claimed the Messianic rank; and the hierarchy induced Pilate to consent to the Crucifixion.

The company of disciples, animated by the spirit of the Risen Christ, 'continued stedfastly in the apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers' (Ac 2[42]). They were conscious of being called to preach the gospel, and they chose Matthias in place of Judas. They showed no hatred to the 'chief priests and scribes' who had procured the death of Jesus; what had happened was part of a divine purpose foretold by the prophets. As yet the disciples were not cast out from Temple or synagogue, nor did they consider Pharisees as ineligible to the incipient Church. The believers continued to frequent the Temple (Ac 2[46] 3[1] 5[12. 20. 42]); they increased rapidly in numbers and were joined by 'a great company of the priests.' A new interpretation of Israel's history and mission was proclaimed by Stephen, which seemed to the authorities to be 'blasphemous words against Moses and against God' (Ac 6[11]). The stoning of Stephen and the active measures of Saul mark the end of toleration for the followers of Christ—the Galilæans, or Nazarenes, or Minîm, as the Jewish authorities began to call them.

4. Appearance of 'Judaizers.'—Persecuted in Jerusalem, the Church made converts among the Samaritans, who did not profess the Oral Law. The Good Samaritan of the parable was not forbidden, like the priest and the Levite under the Oral Law, to help a wounded stranger. The apostles Peter and John had no hesitation in accepting Samaritan converts (Ac 8[17]). Philip admits the Ethiopian, who could not have been more than a גֵּר תּוֹשָׁב (Dt 23[1]). Other converts are admitted, in Damascus (Ac 9[19]), Lydda (9[32]), and Joppa (9[42]); but the mission is directed to Jews only, or to proselytes attached to the synagogue (11[19]), at Salamis (13[5]), at Antioch in Pisidia (13[14]), at Iconium (14[1]), at Thessalonica (17[1]), at Berea (17[10]), at Ephesus (18[19] 19[8]; cf. 19[9]), and at Rome (28[17]). Thus for some fifteen years after the Crucifixion the Church included only Jews or Gentiles who had become proselytes to Judaism. The admission of the Roman Cornelius was felt to be an innovation requiring the highest sanction; and St. Peter, on returning to Jerusalem, did not escape criticism, the opposition to his act marking the first appearance of the 'Judaizers.'

At Antioch Greeks were admitted to the Church by the missionaries; and the name 'Christians' was first applied to the new brotherhood. The Church at Jerusalem at once sent Barnabas to inquire into this proceeding; and, after getting Paul to assist him for a year in Antioch, Barnabas with his new companion returned to Jerusalem, bringing gifts for the relief of the brethren in Judæa during a famine. From Antioch, Paul and

Barnabas set forth on their missionary journeys. While in the Pisidian Antioch, they definitely announced their intention of appealing to the Gentiles, and on their return to Antioch they rehearsed their work and the reception of the Gentiles. Certain Judaizers from Jerusalem maintained that 'it was needful to circumcise them, and to command them to keep the Law of Moses' (15[5]), and this led to the Council of the apostles in Jerusalem, which gave the most important decision on the subject of Judaizing.

5. The Council of Jerusalem.—The accuracy of the account in Ac 15 has been questioned; but, if we take A.D. 62 as the date of St. Luke's composition of the Acts and *c.* A.D. 50 for the Council, the time limit is against serious error. One MS (D, Codex Bezæ) omits *καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ*, and is followed by Irenæus, Cyprian, Tertullian, and Jerome. The Decree thus prohibits the use of flesh offered to idols, murder, and fornication—being 'a summary of Jewish ethical catechetics' (Harnack, *Acts of the Apostles*, p. 250). The Textus Receptus reads, 'That they abstain from pollutions of idols, and from fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood' (Ac 15[20]). Despite the argument of Harnack, reinforced by E. H. Eckel and S. A. Devan (*Expositor*, 8th ser., vi. [1913] 66–82), it may be held that the TR is preferable. Idolatry and fornication are specified because they were considered venial among Gentiles. Lambs or bullocks killed by a non-Jewish butcher could not be eaten by a Jew by birth; it is fairly certain that St. Paul, for all the freedom that he claimed, would never relish swine's flesh or unbled mutton. Unless this regulation were observed, there could be no common social banquets between Jewish and Gentile Christians. Higher hygienic reasons may have been instinctively present; the motive for instituting abstinence from blood in Gn 9[4] was to diminish the ferocity that had filled the earth with violence. It would cause little trouble to teach the Gentile Christians the method of slaughter. 'For Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every sabbath day' (Ac 15[21]). In every such place there was a *shoḥet*, and the use of his services might help the Christians to go forth 'as lambs among wolves.' It may seem strange that the universal religion should include the menu of a Palestinian party; yet the matter of eating and drinking was regarded with concern. The Paternoster asks for 'daily bread'; Islām commands abstinence from wine. St. Paul felt the incongruity when he wrote: 'The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but righteousness and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost' (Ro 14[17]). The Apostolic Decree assumed that Gentile Christians honoured the Sacraments, and had received the Holy Spirit and the evangelic temperament; it would be insulting to ask them to abstain from murder, as this interpretation of Codex Bezæ proposes to do. The intention of the Council was that Christendom should use *kosher* meat; but St. Paul's theoretical abolition of law, Jewish and Gentile, resulted in the survival of custom, Jewish and Gentile, in the preparation of animal food.

It is worthy of note that the Decree does not require Gentiles to abstain from eating 'of the sinew which shrank, which is upon the hollow of the thigh' (Gn 32[32]), although this regulation is assumed as binding in the Mishna (*Ḥullin*, 7). When strictly enforced, it meant that the hindquarters of sheep and oxen were disallowed to Jews, and had to be sold at any price to neighbours. The practice is still continued among Oriental Jews, though it entails loss for no visible gain.

'The hind quarter (like blood and fat) is avoided as food on account of the narrative in Genesis' (Rosenau, *Jewish Ceremonial Institutions and Customs*, p. 185, speaking for America).

The long-lost Jews in China had forgotten the Hebrew language and the Law, but retained this strange abstinence, and were known among the Chinese as 'the people of the sinew.' The *τὸ πνικτόν* could hardly refer to the sinew; it is a special class of foods referred to as with *αἷμα*, and would denote such things as chickens, geese, or game killed in the Gentile manner. The idea that bloodshed was forbidden, in the sense that a Christian could not become a soldier, is excluded by the case of Cornelius.

6. Judaizing opposition to St. Paul. — The Apostolic Decree thus established a rule of guidance for Jewish and Gentile Christians. Many matters required regulation. Were Jewish Christians to circumcise their boys on the eighth day? Were they to keep the Sabbath, or the first day of the week? Were Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles to be kept with the old associations? Was the pilgrimage to Jerusalem obligatory? Were they to intermarry with Gentiles, to maintain the dietary rules, to eat unleavened bread for a week in spring-time, to wear phylacteries, to repeat the prayers of the Jewish liturgy, and to read the Law and the Prophets with the same uncritical deference? Heathen converts such as Trophimus (Ac 21[29]) or Epaphras (Col 4[12]) would easily accept the Decree; proselytes—of the gate or of righteousness—would also welcome it; the liberal Hebrew Christians who carried the Decree might continue the old customs, while refusing to impose them upon Gentiles; but the minority of Judaizers refused all laxity, and hampered the work of St. Paul in most of his mission field.

The activity of the Judaizers is indicated in the account of the work and correspondence of St. Paul, and has to be kept distinct from the open antagonism of unconverted Hebrews. The Judaizers had sought to persuade the Galatian Church to observe days and months and times and years, and to require circumcision. They questioned Paul's authority, and may have cited the example of Peter. Paul's defence is to point to the presence and the fruits of the Spirit. If observance of Law is sufficient to give life, then the advent of Christ is a negligible accident. Peter's desire to conform to Jewish scruples is condemned as dissimulation; and Paul's acceptance of Titus, a Greek, without circumcision is mentioned as sanctioned by the Church at Jerusalem. Again, at Colossæ the Christians seemed likely to be spoiled by 'a shew of wisdom in will-worship, and humility, and severity to the body' (Col 2[23]). Here the legalism was tinged with theosophy, which interfered with 'meat or drink, or a feast day, or a new moon, or a Sabbath day' (Col 2[16]). The Epistle shows the danger of losing freedom and universalism, and insists on the need of conscious communion with a living Spirit. The Christian is under a Spirit whose voice was the true law. At Corinth the Church consisted mainly of Gentiles who had not passed through the synagogue (1 Co 12[2]), but included Jews (1 Co 7[18]); and it may be inferred from 2 Co 3 that teaching of a Judaistic type had been addressed to the Corinthians. To the Philippians, Paul has to write 'Beware of the concision. For we are the circumcision, which worship God in the Spirit' (Ph 3[2f.]). The Epistle to the Romans warns that Church against 'them which cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine which ye have learned' (16[17]). These were probably Judaizers; the argument of the Epistle is St. Paul's greatest effort to answer them. All old laws and customs, Jewish and Gentile, have ceased to be important because 'the love of

God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us' (Ro 5^5). Paul's exposition of righteousness through faith, of freedom, and of universalism has served to overshadow his important reservation for Israel according to the flesh. The Jew in Paul yielded to the Judaizer in these particulars:

'In allowing that Israel κατὰ σάρκα, because of the promises, held a privileged position within the Israel κατὰ πνεῦμα; that only Christians who were Jews by birth were the good olive tree, while the Gentile Christians were only grafts from the wild olive tree; that thus the whole Hope is the Hope of Israel; that the Gentile Christians have material obligations towards the Jewish Christians; and that the Jewish Christians should, and indeed must, still observe the Law of Moses, though it is now abolished!' (Harnack, *Date of the Acts*, p. 60, footnote).

If we except the imperative 'must' in the last sentence, this summary fairly describes the attitude of St. Paul, and this attitude explains his conduct as described by St. Luke. He has Timothy circumcised (Ac 16^3); he has his own head shorn in Cenchreæ, for he had a vow (18^{18}); at his last visit to Jerusalem he is ready to show his conformity to the Law by purifying himself with the four men who had a vow on them (21^{24}). It explains his words (1 Co 9^{20}), 'unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews.' The contribution from the Gentile Church to the poor at Jerusalem may have been considered as a kind of tribute. It thus appears that St. Paul as well as St. Peter found it difficult to transcend the limits of Judaism; and that the universal element in Christianity is really due to Jesus, who knew the best that was in the past, and rose above it, and appointed the whole world as the field for the good seed.

The power of the Judaizers is seen at its greatest during St. Paul's last visit to Jerusalem. They numbered many thousands of Jews, who were believers and all zealous for the Law (Ac 21^{20}). They were indignant with St. Paul, maintaining that he taught all the Jews who were among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, 'saying that they ought not to circumcise their children, neither to walk after the customs' (21^{21}). No doubt this was the effect though not the intention of St. Paul's teaching and example, but the antagonism of the real Jews saved the Judaizers from further trouble in prosecuting the Apostle.

7. Later references to Judaizers.—(*a*) *In Christian records.*—After the death of St. Paul, the Church moved away from Judaizing tenets. The Epistle to the Hebrews demonstrates the right of Christians to abandon sacrifice, and the destruction of the Temple confirmed the argument. In the Fourth Gospel, Judaism within the Church has ceased to be of any account; the antithesis is the Jews. Christians are to follow a Light, but they have a new law in Christ's commandments. The religion of the Spirit, as proclaimed by St. Paul, has permeated the evangelic tradition in the Synoptists. The convert has much to learn, and his teacher is the Church. Christ is his Lawgiver, and has entrusted a power of legislation to the Church.

The Judaizers, who kept themselves distinct from Gentile Christianity, appear later as Ebionites and Nazarenes. The Ebionites admitted only a Gospel according to St. Matthew, rejected St. Paul as an apostate, and denied the divinity of Christ. The Nazarenes acknowledged the obligation of the whole Mosaic Law for Christians of Jewish descent, but allowed Gentile Christians, as proselytes of the gate, to omit these observances. See artt. EBIONISM, ELKESAITES.

(*b*) *In Jewish records.*—Rabbinical literature has few and obscure references to the Judaizers, for Judaism was firmly resolved to ignore the Christianity which had come into being. It set itself after the Fall of Jerusalem to define the canon of Holy Scripture, rejecting the Apocrypha and apocalyptic Pseudepigrapha, which seemed to give prophetic colour to the new religion, and expurgating the Greek Bible by the versions of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. Within its own fold discipline became more stern.

'A Noahite who has become a proselyte, and been circumcised and baptized, and afterwards wishes to return from after the Lord, and to be only a sojourning proselyte as he was before, is not to be listened to—on the contrary, either let him be as Israelite in everything, or let him be put to death' (*Hilchoth Melachim*, ch. x. 3, tr. in A. MacCaul, *Old Paths*, London, 1846, p. 58).

By the end of the first Christian century the standard Jewish prayer included a formula, 'May there be no hope for the sectaries' (מִינִים, afterwards changed to מַלְשִׁינִים, 'the slanderers'). One of the signs of Messiah's coming will be that the Kingdom (the Roman Empire) will be turned to the heresy of the Mînîm (Mish. *Soṭah*, ix. 15). The growth of Christianity in the Roman Empire and the indignation of Jews at the claim of Christians to inherit the promises of the OT are seen in Jerus. *Nedar.* 38a:

'Esau the wicked will put on his tallith and sit with the righteous in Paradise in time to come; and the Holy One will drag him and cast him forth from thence.'

By the 4th cent. Judaism regards the Mînîm with disdain rather than fear. Tosefta *Sanh.* xiii. 4. 5 imposes grave punishment on 'the Mînîm (Jewish Christians), the Mᵉshûmmâdhîm (apostates), Mᵉsôrôth (informers), and Âpîqôrsîn (free-thinkers),' and a Jewish comment on Ex 19^4 says that circumcision will not avail to save the Mînîm from Gehinnom (*Shemoth Rabba*, 36*a*). This implies that Jewish Christians in Palestine still practised circumcision in the 4th century. Talmud and Midrash confirm Jerome in considering the Nazarenes (Mînîm, Jewish Christians) an insignificant body.

'They had no share in the vitality either of Judaism or Christianity' (Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, p. 394).

Jerome's words in a letter to Augustine (*Ep.* lxxxix. 13 [*PL* xxii. 924]) are:

'To this day in all the synagogues of the East there is among the Jews a sect called Minæi (Minim), which is condemned by the Pharisees. They are commonly spoken of as Nazarenes, and believe in Christ the Son of God, born of the Virgin Mary, the same who, they say, suffered under Pontius Pilate and rose again. In Whom we, too, believe; but while this sect desires to be both Jews and Christians, they are neither the one nor the other.'

8. Recrudescent forms.—About 1725 John Glas, minister of Tealing, founded a small sect, which refrained from things strangled and from blood, and his son-in-law Sandeman gave his name to the adherents in England (see art. GLASITES). The Seventh Day Adventists and Seventh Day Baptists Judaize in their observance of Saturday.

[A Judaizing sect arose in Russia about the middle of the 15th cent., their chief centres being Novgorod and Pleskau, whence they spread to Moscow and other cities. They denied the Trinity and the Sonship and Messiahship of Christ, and rejected the invocation of the Virgin and the saints, the veneration of icons, the doctrines of original sin and redemption, the Church, and the Sacraments, while they gave greater honour to the Old than to the New Testament. 'Sabbatarians' are mentioned in the early 18th cent., and Uklein, the founder of the sect of Molokani, adopted for himself certain Jewish dietary laws, while his pupil, Sundukov, regarded Christ as infinitely inferior to Moses, observed the Jewish Sabbath, and finally submitted to the Mosaic rite. Sundukov established the modern sect of Subbotniki ('Sabbatarians'), who are scarcely distinguishable from real Jews. They are divided into a number of sub-sects, the most important being: (*a*) Gers (Heb. גֵּר), who worship in Hebrew under the leadership of regular Jewish Rabbis and are practically

Talmudic Jews; (*b*) Subbotniki proper, differing from the less numerous Gers only in the use of Russian Bibles and Prayer Books and in the abrogation of some of the Talmudic rules for the Sabbath and food; (*c*) Karaimites or Karimi ('Karaitizers'), who, like the Karaites (*q.v.*), recognize only the Pentateuch and reject the Talmud, but who do not observe all the Pentateuchal laws, *e.g.* that regarding circumcision; and (*d*) the waning Transcaucasian Nazirœans, who deny the resurrection of the dead. Mention may likewise be made of the 'Jehovists,' founded by Nikolai Ilyin in 1846, in an effort to establish an OT Christianity or NT Judaism, although the rather fantastic sect was only short-lived.

Two minor American sects may also be classed as Judaizing. The first of these is the Christian Israelite, founded by John Wroe at Ashton, England, in 1822, to gather the twelve tribes of Israel, the doctrinal basis being the re-establishment of the Mosaic Law, and the condition of membership subscription to 'the four books of Moses and the four books of the Gospel.' Members do not cut their hair or beard (cf. Lv 19^{27}), and object to all images and pictures (cf. Ex 20^{4}, Dt 5^{8}). Both the Jewish and the Christian Sabbaths are observed. The second of these sects is the negro Church of God and Saints of Christ, established by William Crowdy in 1896. Believing that the negroes are the descendants of the lost Ten Tribes, this sect observes the Jewish calendar and festivals, especially the Sabbath, but insists on baptism by immersion, confession of faith in Christ, the Lord's Supper, and feet-washing. LOUIS H. GRAY.]

LITERATURE.—R. T. Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, London, 1903; C. Bigg, *The Origins of Christianity*, do. 1909; W. Rosenau, *Jewish Ceremonial Institutions and Customs*, Baltimore, 1903; A. Harnack, *The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, *The Acts of the Apostles*, Eng. tr., do. 1909; E. Schürer, *Hist. of the Jewish People*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1886-90; J. Hamburger, *Realencyclopädie für Bibel und Talmud*, i., Neustrelitz, 1870; F. J. Foakes Jackson, *The Parting of the Roads*, London, 1912; *Exp.*, 8th ser., vi. [1913]; K. K. Grass, 'Russische Sekten,' § 7, in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, v. [1913–14] 80 f.; L. Zscharnack, 'Sabbatharier,' *ib.* 118 f.; H. Rosenthal, 'Judaizing Heresy' in *JE* vii. [1904] 369 f.; S. Hurwitz, 'Subbotniki,' *ib.* xi. [1905] 577 f.; *Bureau of the Census, Special Reports*, 'Religious Bodies, 1906,' ii. [Washington, 1910] 187 f., 202 f.

D. M. KAY.

JUDGMENT (Logical).—**1. Introductory.**—'The only use which the understanding can make of concepts is to form judgments by them,' while 'the understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging' (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Eng. tr., London, 1881, pt. ii. bk. i. ch. i. § 1). Concepts are the predicates of possible judgments. Inference is the derivation of new judgments out of old. Method is the disposition of concepts and judgments in a system. Thus judgment becomes a centre of reference for the defining of the other logical entities, and, if the task of definition is to be undertaken philosophically, it involves all the considerations which contribute to mark out the logical consciousness in general; the labour of precision in the use of such conceptions as idea, belief, truth, reality, fact; and studied limits between the levels of abstraction proper to psychological, metaphysical, and logical science respectively.

It would not serve the specific motives of logical doctrine if we followed exclusively either of the alternatives prescribed by Mill: 'an enquiry into the nature of propositions must have one of two objects: to analyse the state of mind called Belief, or to analyse what is believed' (*A System of Logic*[8], London, 1872, bk. i. ch. v. § 1); or, indeed, if we followed too precisely a combination of the two. He himself in his *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*[5] (London, 1878) relies chiefly on the reference to belief, while in his *Logic* he insists that 'intelligent assertion refers to external facts,' and that the import of propositions consists in connexion between facts. In pursuing the latter analysis, after resolving facts, with metaphysical precision, into states of consciousness and relations between them, he allows himself in his substantive doctrine to replace these ultimate references by more popular conceptions such as 'things,' 'phenomena,' and 'attributes.' Similarly Ueberweg defines judgment as 'the consciousness of the objective validity of a subjective union of conceptions,' without definitely undertaking to resolve the contrast or mediate the correspondence between the two worlds; a mere 'reference to existence' gives the judgment 'its character as a logical function' (*System of Logic and History of Logical Doctrines*, Eng. tr., London, 1871, § 67).

A more scrupulous orientation of logical consciousness with regard to the psychological and the objective is attempted in some doctrines now current. The judgment is defined as identifying the content of ideas with reality, and the nature and possibility of such an achievement are explained by resolving reality into a system of tendencies sustained by judgment itself. Each single act of identification enters constitutively into an ever-expanding structure which in its totality is self-sufficient and all-controlling.

'Our knowledge, or our world in knowledge, exists for us as a judgment, that is, as an affirmation in which our present perception is amplified by an ideal interpretation which is identified with it. This interpretation or enlargement claims necessity or universality, and is therefore objective as our world, *i.e.* is what we are *obliged* to think, and what we are *all* obliged to think. The whole system in process of construction, viz. our present perception as extended by interpretation, is what we mean by reality, only with a reservation in favour of forms of experience which are not intellectual at all' (B. Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic*, London, 1895, p. 32).

If we might assume as already understood and approved a definite epistemology such as Kant's, we might escape both uncritical references to psychology and popular physics and the intricacies of a metaphysical analysis. Kant himself defines judgment as 'the conception of the unity of the consciousness of different representations, or of their relation so far as they make up one notion' (*Logic*, § 17), while in the background of this description lies his more definite epistemological characterization, 'the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of the apperception' (Ueberweg, *Logic*, Eng. tr., London, 1871, § 67). By the objective unity, Ueberweg explains, is meant 'the mutual connexion of cognitions according to those categories which the Ego evolves from itself by its own spontaneity'; and it carries with it throughout its applications the implied subjectivity of which he complains as peculiar to the whole Kantian philosophy.

Yet, unless we throw back upon the doctrine of the concept the burden that it carried under the older conceptualism, of taking the initiative in orientating the logical consciousness generally, we can give precision to a definition of judgment only on the basis of an epistemology. The motives of logical doctrine do not, however, imperatively call for this formal precision. It is sufficient that, by suggestions borrowed from psychology, popular physics, or discriminative reflexion on our spiritual nature as a whole, our specifically logical consciousness may be aroused apart from either introspective or external observation; and a clue to the recognition of the act of judgment may then be supplied from the detail of its conscious functions and specific ideals, over and above the ideals of the concept. In the plan of our spiritual nature there must be a faculty which commits the detailed activities of intelligence to a resultant imposed by external nature and history, while the concept provides bounds for each commitment amid the measureless possibilities. The faculty of judg-

ment, consequently, follows special constitutive ideals, which may be entitled, with some technical adaptation and departure from the common usage of the words, necessity, universality, and synthetic unity.

2. Constitutive ideals.—(*a*) *Necessity.*—Necessity is akin to the inevitableness of fact and the absoluteness of natural law. It is described by Sigwart thus:

'Besides the necessity of psychological causality, there is another which springs entirely from the *content* and *object* of Thought itself, which is therefore grounded, not upon the variable subjective states of the individual, but upon the nature of the object thought of, and which may so far be called objective' (*Logic*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, § 1. 6).

It is an ultimate constraint upon intellectual spontaneity, and finds incidental expression in such phrases as 'I am obliged to think,' 'I cannot but believe' (Bosanquet, *Essentials*, p. 24). It is recognized in current psychology as 'objective control of ideational processes' (G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology*[3], London, 1913, bk. iv. ch. viii. § 1). It is described with varieties of logical suggestion, such as the 'inherence of truth or falsehood' (Aristotle), the 'truth-value of a relation between ideas' (Windelband), the 'claim to be true' (Bosanquet). It may be contrasted with the freedom of the concept, which Mill considers a 'mere creation of the mind' (*Exam. of Hamilton*[5], p. 419), and which is certainly differently related to personality.

Following a general, though ill-defined, logical tradition, we may distinguish three modes in which necessity confronts our ideas. It may be conveyed by the contents of the concepts which we employ independently of their origin. If we choose to conceive a three-sided figure, we must believe it to have three angles and these equal to two right angles. If we think of an organism in growth and decay, we must expect it to die; if we think of a perfect nature, we must, according to Descartes, predicate existence. The necessity may, however, be conveyed through the activity of other faculties than the conceptual—perception, introspection, memory, feeling, even respect for authority: 'Some swans are white'; 'Napoleon died at St. Helena'; 'I am of all men most miserable.' And a necessity, though conveyed neither through concepts alone nor through the more directly presentative faculties alone, may yet through the union and co-operation of these media commit our ideational activities to at least an anticipation of a final surrender to concepts or to perceptions: 'Rain may fall to-morrow'; 'Cancer may be incurable.' A judgment which is fringed with the consciousness of the medium of its own necessity may be entitled a 'modal' judgment: 'It must be so; it is so; it may be so.' Kant defines modality as a relation of the judgment to our complete faculty of cognition, or as the value of a judgment for our thought in general, and distinguishes it as apodeictic, assertoric, or problematic (*Critique*, pt. ii. bk. i. ch. i. § 4).

(*b*) *Universality.*—Constraint on the spontaneity of our personality is common to the world of persons; what *we* are obliged to think is what we are *all* obliged to think (Bosanquet, *Essentials*, p. 32), conditionally, of course, on our being subjected to the same medium of necessity. It has already been noted (see art. CONCEPT [Logical]) that it is because of a logical solicitude for universal validity as the hall-mark of necessity that the freedom of the concept ought, by means of conventions in the use of language, to be deliberately harmonized with the intellectual outlook of mankind in general. Through common concepts we reach common media of necessity in judgment, and can then share, and co-operate in creating, a common 'inheritance of science and civilization.'

But the harmonization of concepts is ultimately dependent on a common identification of particular things. And a logical system which, like the Aristotelian, has specially in view to promote co-operative thought, must give fundamental significance to differences in the extent to which judgments presume the common identification of things. Judgment may be defined as the identification of a denotation, along with discrimination as to connotations or conceptual intensions (cf. E. E. C. Jones, *New Law of Thought*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 1 ff.). And, for purposes of common discourse or debate, judgments must be classified according to 'quantity'—as singular or general, where one thing or a collection of things is identifiable by all thinkers; or as particular, where the identity is only so far open to all that for each person it lies within the limits of a common totality of identifiable things: 'Alexander died'; 'All men die'; 'Some men die willingly.'

(*c*) *Synthetic unity.*—All the authoritative descriptions of the act of judgment, while varying much in their suggestiveness as to the sources of constraint and the significance of universality, agree in requiring that synthesis, combination, or construction shall be shown in the product. It is owing to this uniform achievement of judgment that in psychical sequence concepts originate with it, and that in much recent logic the function assigned to judgment largely absorbs that more proper to the concept. Judgment is an enunciation after a complex manner (Aristotle), discloses a relation between two things (Avicenna), connects together or separates from each other two notions (Wolff), connects many possible cognitions into one (Kant), connects the attributes connoted by terms (Mill), connects subject and predicate in definite form (Lotze).

Obviously a function of our spiritual nature which adjusts its reactions to the complexities of the world must be connective. In each act of judgment the constraint from reality and the stress of intellectual responsibility fall where they can meet with two conditions: a definite interest has selected a delimitation within the immeasurable area of possible truth, and again a definite concept is available for reaction on it.

'Although the ultimate subject [*i.e.* reality in general] extends beyond the content of the judgment, yet in every judgment there is a starting-point or point of contact with the ultimate subject; and the starting-point or point of contact with reality is present in a rudimentary form in the simplest perceptive judgment, as it is explicitly in the later and more elaborate types' (Bosanquet, *Logic*, Oxford, 1888, bk. i. ch. i. p. 82).

Thus the synthesis special to each pulsation of the faculty links a predicate with a subject. And, although the whole construct becomes a unity and feels a necessity and universality dominant throughout, and the attendant psychical complex may present to introspection either simultaneity or a variable sequence, yet functionally judgment, following its own principle, duality, 'divides no less than it binds together ideas that are mutually associated,' in order that it may 'connect subject and predicate in definite form' (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1885, ii. 4, § 4, and *Outlines of Logic*, Boston, 1892, § 21).

Our logical consciousness must find synthesis in denial as well as in affirmation, notwithstanding such an antithesis between them as is in the description of judgment quoted above from Wolff, and notwithstanding that affirmation introduces character, while negation introduces only contrast, into the expanding system of timeless truth.

3. Grades of synthetic relation.—The delimitation of interest, or the point of contact with reality, may be given either in presentation, or by the conceptual faculty, or through reflexion on determinations of complete judgment itself.

(*a*) *Presentational.*—There are 'impersonal' judgments, in which the selection of subject is as indefinite as is possible in view of a proposed predicate—*e.g.*, 'It rains'; and 'demonstrative' judgments, where only the position in space or time is definite—'This is the forest primeval.' Aristotle spoke of 'terms' which can neither be predicated of a subject nor inhere in a subject, but can only *be* a subject (*Categories*, v. 10); and this implies that the synthetic relation is between thing merely presented and concept.

(*b*) *Conceptual.*—The presentational faculties may receive aid from the concept in various ways and degrees: 'The first man was a living soul,' a 'singular' judgment; 'Our fathers have told us,' an 'enumerative' judgment; 'Man is few of days,' a 'concrete general' judgment; 'Love is the fulfilling of the law,' an 'abstract' judgment. There is now a synthetic relation between two concepts, superadded to that between thing and concept.

(*c*) *Reflective.*—The starting-point of a judgment may be given directly neither by presentation nor by conception, but by the faculty of reflecting on judgments, actual or possible, whose starting-point is so given: 'If I had standing ground, I could move the world'; 'If we are sons, then heirs'; 'Either there is a resurrection or mankind is irrational.' Mill describes such a judgment as dealing with the logical inferability of propositions: 'That we are heirs is inferable from our being sons'; other writers, as the relating of 'condition' to 'consequent': 'Sonship is the condition of heirship.' They are entitled hypothetical, and the specially composite form in which 'condition' and 'consequent' are found by negating any one of the members is entitled disjunctive: 'If there is not a resurrection, mankind is irrational,' while, 'If mankind is not irrational, there is a resurrection.'

LITERATURE.—See the various systems of Logic; and especially, in addition to the authorities quoted above, the recent ones mentioned as representative under art. CONCEPT (Logical), or as important or frequently referred to on the nature of inference under art. INFERENCE. There are numerous monographs, especially on the psychological and epistemological implications of judgment, and among the more recent and relevant to logic may be mentioned A. Wolf, *Studies in Logic*, Cambridge, 1905; P. Janet and G. Séailles, *Hist. de la philosophie*, Paris, 1887, pt. i. problem 3, ch. iv.; F. Hillebrand, *Die neuen Theorien der kategor. Schlüsse*, Vienna, 1891; W. Jerusalem, *Die Urtheilsfunction*, do. 1895; A. Meinong, *Über Annahmen*[2], Leipzig, 1910; J. M. Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, ii., London, 1908.

J. BROUGH.

JUGGERNAUT.—See JAGANNĀTH.

JUMNĀ (Skr. Yamunā personified as Yamī, twin sister of Yama, the god of death).—One of the great rivers of N. India, rising in the Himālaya near Jamnotrī (*q.v.*), and finally joining the Ganges at Prayāga, 'the place of sacrifice' *par excellence*, now known as Allāhābād (*q.v.*). In the Rigveda it occupies a position lower even than that of the Ganges, the Aryans having reached its banks only at a later period when they migrated eastward from their original settlements in the Panjāb. When it is addressed it is only in connexion with other rivers, Gaṅgā, Sarasvatī, Śutudrī, Paruṣṇī, and others, twenty-one in all (*Rigveda*, x. lxxv. 5; cf. v. lii. 17, vii. xviii. 19, and see J. Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, ii.[2] [1874] 346 f.; A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 86). In the later literature the geographical outlook widens, and it is called 'the great river Yamunā,' and is described as one of the three children of the Sun by Sanjñā, daughter of Viśvakarman, architect of the universe (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, tr. H. H. Wilson, London, 1864–77, iii. 20, v. 82). Another legend describes the river as both sister and wife of Yama, god of death; and the story of their incest curiously resembles a tale which Plutarch (*de Fluv.* iv.), doubtless from Indian sources, attributes to the Ganges. Naturally, as the river flows past Mathurā, the scene of the Kṛṣṇa cultus, it has been included in this complex series of myths. Balarāma, in a state of intoxication, ordered the river to approach him, as he desired to bathe.

'The river, disregarding the words of a drunken man, came not (at his bidding). On which, Rāma, in a rage, took up his ploughshare, which he plunged into her bank, and dragged her to him, calling out: "Will you not come, you jade? Will you not come? Now go where you please (if you can)." Thus saying, he compelled the dark river to quit its ordinary course, and follow him whithersoever he wandered through the wood. Assuming a mortal figure, the Yamunā, with distracted looks, approached Balabhadra, and entreated him to pardon her, and let her go. But he replied: "I will drag you with my ploughshare, in a thousand directions, since you contemn my prowess and strength." At last, however, appeased by her reiterated prayers, he let her go, after she had watered all the country' (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, v. 67 f.).

Wilson interprets this legend as referring to the excavation of ancient irrigation channels from the river; but F. S. Growse (*Mathurā*[3], Allāhābād, 1883, p. 184 f.) holds that there are no signs of ancient canals in the neighbourhood, and that the existing involution of the river sufficiently explains the myth. When the classical writers gained knowledge of the river, it was known by Ptolemy (VII. i. 29, 42) under the name Diamouna (J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, London, 1885, p. 98 ff.), by Arrian (*Indika*, viii.) as Jobares, by Pliny (*HN* vi. 19) as Jomanes.

The legend of incest connected with the Jumnā, the fact that it is supposed never to have been cleansed by the marriage ceremony, the only rite of purification in which the Hindu woman shares, and the supposed resultant indigestibility of the water are some of the causes which have contributed to render it a less sacred river than the Ganges. Its source at Jamnotrī is much less frequented by pilgrims than Gaṅgotrī (*q.v.*). Though it flows through a country sanctified in the upper part of its course by many legends of gods and heroes (E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, Allāhābād, 1882–84 ii. ch. iii. *passim*), thence past Delhī (*q.v.*), the ancient Indraprastha, an early Indo-Aryan settlement, Mathurā, the seat of the Kṛṣṇa cultus, and Agra (*q.v.*), the Mughal capital, still, except Mathurā (*q.v.*) and in a less degree Baṭesar (*q.v.*), there is no great place of pilgrimage on its banks, and it does not acquire full sanctity until it unites with the Ganges at the holy place known as Triveṇī, or 'the triple braid,' where the Ganges and Jumnā are supposed to receive by means of an underground channel the waters of the Sarasvatī. Here the stream of the Jumnā is clear and blue, in striking contrast to the mud-laden waters of the Ganges.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are quoted in the article. For the geography see *IGI* xiv. [1908] 232 *f.*

W. CROOKE.

JUNNAR (said to be a corruption of *Junānagara*, 'old city,' and wrongly identified with the *Tagara* of Greek writers and Hindu tradition, which is really *Ter* in the Nizām's Dominions [*JRAS*, 1901, p. 537 ff.]).—A town in the Poona District of the Bombay Presidency; lat. 19° 12′ N.; long. 73° 53′ E. Its importance depends on its command of the Nānā pass, which leads to the W. coast. The town is surrounded by hills containing Buddhist caves nearly equally distributed in five different localities, including fifty-seven separate excavations. These caves are devoid of figure ornament or imagery, in this respect strongly contrasting with those of later date, such as Ellora (*q.v.*) and Ajanta (*q.v.*).

'Although none of these caves can compare either in magnificence or interest with the Chaityas of Bhājā or Kārlē, or the Vihāras of Nāsik, their forms are still full of instruction to the student of cave architecture. The group comprises specimens of almost every variety of rock-cut temples, and several forms not found elsewhere, and though plainer than

most of those executed afterwards, are still not devoid of ornament. They form, in fact, an intermediate step between the puritanical plainness of the Kāthiāwār groups and those of the age which succeeded them' (Fergusson-Burgess, *Cave Temples*, p. 249).

They certainly belong to the first great division of Buddhist caves. Some of the earliest may be dated 100 or 150 B.C.; and between this and A.D. 100 or 150 the whole series may be placed. The place was successively occupied by Hindus and Muhammadans, and the latter have left one important building known as Saudāgar Gumbaz, 'The Merchant's Dome.'

LITERATURE.—J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, p. 248 ff.; Pandit Bhagvānlāl Indraji, in *IG* xviii. (1885) pt. iii. 163 ff. The place was visited by J. Fryer in 1675; see his *New Account of East India and Persia* (Hakluyt Society), London, 1909, i. 323 ff. W. CROOKE.

JUSTICE.—See RIGHTEOUSNESS, LAW.

JUSTIFICATION.—The verb δικαιόω, which 'justify' represents, means 'account righteous.' It is used both in the LXX and in the NT, and is juridical in idea, though forensic associations are not necessarily present to the mind of the writer, whenever the word occurs. It implies an acquittal or declaration of righteousness, whether the facts of the case correspond with the pronouncement or not. The situation to which it refers is the result of past action, not the cause of future activities. It describes the acquirement of a status, not the production of a state. It has reference to personal relations, not to psychological conditions. The only instance in the LXX that might seem to contradict this statement, Ps 72 (AV 73)[13]—ἄρα ματαίως ἐδικαίωσα τὴν καρδίαν μου—not improbably implies an act of self-justification before God rather than a process of self-cleansing. In every other case when the word occurs, it is proof of righteousness that is implied. In view of Ro 4[5] the words of Ex 23[7]—οὐ δικαιώσεις τὸν ἀσεβῆ—should be noted (cf. Is 5[23]). Thus the verb becomes equivalent to 'absolve'—*e.g.*, Sir 26[29] etc. In the NT the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican shows the word as involving the sense both of self-justification and of absolution (Lk 18[14]; cf. 10[29] 16[15]). The Epistle of James, in the spirit of Christ's words in Mt 12[37], regards Abraham's obedience and Rahab's loyalty as 'justifying' them, because their actions are stamped by the OT as winning the Divine approval (2[14-26]). It shows no sign of appreciating the deeper ethical sense which attaches to the word in the parable cited above.

But it is from St. Paul's use of the verb in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians that the term 'justification' has achieved its permanent place in Christian theology. The idea first appears in connexion with the controversy between Paul and Cephas at Antioch (Gal 2[11-21]), when the latter, having lived 'as do the Gentiles,' separated himself together with other Hebrew Christians, fearing 'certain *who* came from James.' St. Paul represents himself as having contended that the recognition of Jesus as Messiah meant an acknowledgment that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but 'through faith in Jesus Christ' (v.[16]). The old antithesis between those who were 'Jews by nature' and 'sinners of the Gentiles' (v.[15]) had become little more than a convention. Justification was applied to a human being as such (v.[16] ἄνθρωπος), that henceforth living whether 'as do the Jews' or 'as do the Gentiles' (v.[14]) he might 'live unto God' (v.[19]). This was the life 'in Christ,' which in its relation to God is spoken of as 'justification in Christ' (v.[17]). On its Godward side it depended upon the death of Christ, which was 'gratuitous' (v.[21] δωρεάν), if righteousness were attained 'through the law,' *i.e.* by outward compliance with its ordinances, and not 'in faith of the Son of God' (v.[20]). In the following chapter the idea is still further expanded. St. Paul appeals to the bestowal of 'the Spirit' (3[2]), which was an actual experience of the Galatian converts. As a result of 'hearing the gospel' (*ib.*) an effect had actually taken place which was in itself the witness of a right relation between God and the members of the Christian community. The delivery of the message had been met by, or, rather, had produced, 'faith' in those who heard (see Ro 10[17]; cf. He 4[2]). They had been enabled to trust God and so become recipients of His grace. This leads the Apostle to introduce two pivot passages from the OT, one from the Law and the other from the Prophets, which express the principles that reach their consummation in Christ. 'Abraham believed God and it was reckoned unto him for righteousness' (Gn 15[6], cited v.[6]). 'The righteous shall live as a result of faith' (Hab 2[4], cited v.[11]). The book of Genesis presents as an initial act what Habakkuk represents as a continuing condition. The purpose of salvation begins with Abraham, though the promise reaches its fruition in Christ. His surrender to this purpose was an act of faith which the OT had rightly described as 'reckoned for righteousness' because it enabled God to establish those relations with him which, viewed from the manward side, constitute 'righteousness.' And it can be carried forward to its consummation in the full 'vision' (Hab 2[3]) or revelation only if the attitude of faith is permanently maintained.

The real scope of St. Paul's argument cannot be understood unless it is seen that he undercuts the whole controversy in which he had been involved. 'Neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision' (Gal 5[6] 6[15]; cf. 1 Co 7[19]). The self-condemned action of Peter in separating himself from the Gentiles (2[11]) and the subsequent defection of the Galatian Church under stress of the demand that they should submit to circumcision and its practical implications (4[10] 6[12]) had emphasized those precepts of the Mosaic system which were occupied with ceremonial rather than with conduct. It was, in fact, ceremonial observance, and not the keeping of the Moral Law, that was endangering the freedom of the gospel. This fact, though even in Galatians the conception of law is not wholly confined to these provisions, enabled St. Paul to perceive that moral actions have only the value of ritual acts if regarded simply as conformity with law. Law, therefore, is a system of regulations and has the value of discipline (3[24] παιδαγωγός). That particular form of it which was immediately in question, viz. the Mosaic Code, could only have been meant to prepare those whose faith had already responded to the promise for the fuller response which its fulfilment in Christ would demand. The Law was until Christ (*ib.* εἰς Χριστόν). Those who are living under the Law (ἐν νόμῳ), if they are justified at all, are justified, as Abraham was, by trusting in God. Their obedience would be a 'fruit of the Spirit' (5[22]) in so far as the life unto God was granted in anticipation of the fulfilment of the promise in Christ. All this is implied, if not implicitly stated, in the argument concerning the faith of Abraham (3[6-29]). In principle, God's dealings with mankind have always been the same. His purpose has always been to draw men into those relations with Himself which confer the status of sonship, the gift of the Spirit, and the possession of life, in Christ. The historical work of Jesus is only the sending forth of the Son in the fullness of the time (4[4]), *i.e.* at the appropriate moment in the education of the human race. The gospel was preached beforehand to Abraham, who received the promise (3[8]), as afterwards to Christian disciples, who have received 'the promise of the Spirit through faith' (v.[14]). The Cross of Christ

stands in living relation to both. All alike were loved by the Son of God, who gave Himself for them (2[20]). All alike must acknowledge, at least implicitly, that the life that they now live in the flesh they live through faith in Him (*ib.*).

It must be observed that St. Paul uses the phrase 'justified in Christ' (2[17]). Here he combines in one sentence two lines of teaching, which many modern interpreters have found it difficult to correlate. It has been asserted that the deepest and most vital thought of the Apostle is expressed in the phrase 'in Christ,' and that the whole argument concerning justification by faith is only a controversial device to account for the apparent paradox of abandoning the Jewish system while acknowledging Jesus as the fulfiller of the Messianic expectation. The Epistle to the Galatians is too obviously a vehement attempt to express the personal experience manifested in its autobiographic passages to make such a conclusion probable, and the fuller elaboration of the soteriological doctrine in Romans, which has no immediate reference to controversy, renders it practically impossible. The personal history of St. Paul himself, if any other point of contact were wanting, would in itself be sufficient to hold together justification by faith and the life in Christ as representing two equally important aspects of the one Christian experience. But at the very outset the Apostle has himself welded them together in this conception of justification in Christ, which may in turn be interpreted by the phrase used in Ro 5[18]—'justification of life.' Condemnation, not a formal sentence but an attitude of God towards transgressors, rests upon all those who 'in Adam' sin (Ro 5[16]). So justification, *i.e.* the act of God whereby He accepts mankind for the sake of what Christ has done, of which the issue is life, rests upon all those who as a consequence live in Christ. What we have to recognize is that to the mind of the Apostle justification is a Divine act, and only figuratively a declaration. The metaphor is forensic, but the fact is such only so far as all forgiveness may be said to partake of this quality. Being the act of the living God, it is dynamic, and as such necessarily involves the infusion of the Spirit. Consequently it brings with it love, joy, peace, etc., which are the fruit of the Spirit, and the presence of which is part of the essential experience of the life in Christ. But (1) inasmuch as by baptism we 'put on Christ' (Gal 3[27]), it is manifest that active faith is involved in the complex result. It is, therefore, all one whether we say that we live the new life 'in Christ' or 'through faith in Christ.' St. Paul's doctrine is not one of a mystical union *ex opere operato*. It is reached through a conscious act of appropriation. And (2) the sending forth into our hearts of the Spirit of the Son (4[6]), though it issues in the reproduction of Christ in us (v.[19]), an ethical as well as spiritual transformation, is primarily the medium through which we are enabled to call upon God as Father (v.[6]). This involves a dogmatic, which is not given in experience, but to which experience testifies, viz. that we are no longer bondservants but sons and heirs of God (*ib.*). The fundamental fact, therefore, lies in the realm of absolute, theological truth. To recognize Christ as Redeemer is to acknowledge Him as the Messiah, in whom the Kingdom is established, in which a new status is conferred on every disciple expressed under the figure of 'adoption' (v.[5]). Compare the Epistle to the Ephesians, which takes up the language of the earlier Epistles—'by grace have ye been saved through faith' (Eph 2[8])—and interprets it to mean the translation of sinners, through forgiveness by the blood of the Cross, into the predetermined Kingdom of Christ (Eph. *passim*). It is clear that St. Paul accepted in general outline the dogmatic belief of the primitive community concerning the Kingdom of the righteous, which had been brought in by the exaltation of Jesus, which was already present to faith in the life of the ecclesia, and whose final revelation was anticipated in the sacraments. 'We through the Spirit by faith wait for the hope of righteousness' (Gal 5[5]), being delivered by Him who gave Himself for our sins out of this present evil world (1[4]). There is, therefore, an eschatological element in the idea of justification. It is initial to the Christian life in the sense of inaugurating those relations with God which issue in the experience of the Spirit. It is final in so far as it is only ultimately reached with that judgment which at the end will establish the Kingdom. What St. Paul criticized in the Pharisaism of his contemporaries was not the passion for ethical righteousness, which he shared, but the spiritual blindness which did not perceive the need of a new creation, of the uplifting of human life, whether Jewish or Gentile, on to a new level, the 'Jerusalem that is above' (4[26]), into which men must be reborn by a Divine act. This act is forgiveness (3[6]; cf. Ro 4[6]), to which justification is therefore equivalent.

The Epistle to the Romans presents the teaching of justification in a less controversial and more philosophic spirit. First of all, it affirms the ethical proposition that 'not the hearers of a law are just before God, but the doers of a law shall be justified' (2[13]). This principle is universal in its application, and holds good of Gentiles who, not having a law divinely expressed in a revealed code, yet 'shew the work of the law written in their hearts' (v.[15]), *i.e.* in so far as they are obedient to the dictates of conscience. Here it is clear that ceremonial observance passes into the background. Law means a moral ideal, as expressed, *e.g.*, in the Ten Words. But it is precisely here that the difficulty arises. The condition of the world generally makes it abundantly clear that mankind at large are under 'the wrath of God' (1[18-27]) manifestly revealed in abominable lusts and passions, to which they are enslaved. The experience of those who have endeavoured 'to establish their own righteousness' (10[3]) by attempting to make their actions correspond to a known standard of righteousness, such as the ethical code of the Hebrews, only serves to convict them of innumerable transgressions, and of falling short of the glory of God (3[23]). Ideally the commandment which is holy, righteous, and good is ordained unto life, because it is a measure of just conduct, but in effect it is 'found to be unto death' (7[10.12]), because, as the measure of our own shortcomings, it brings 'the knowledge of sin' (3[20]). St. Paul is here universalizing his own experience, which is the ultimate basis of his argument. He has been made aware of 'a law in the members' warring against 'the law of the mind,' the standard which reason and conscience approve, and bringing him into captivity under the law, or rule of sin, which has provoked a cry for deliverance (7[23. 24]). As in Galatians, there is a dogmatic world-view lying behind the testimony of experience, which is the pledge of an 'eschatological' condemnation 'in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, according to my gospel, by Jesus Christ' (2[16]). This dogmatic governs the form of statement. The desire to escape the stings of conscience is the immediate, to stand as 'righteous' in the day of judgment the ultimate, yearning of the sinner. The greater includes the less.

The sad experience of the Apostle drives him to the conclusion that the law is weak (8[3]), because it cannot effect what it demands. But against it he is able to set his experience as a Christian. 'I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord' (7[25]). So from the outset he proclaims his gospel as 'the power of God unto salvation to every one that be-

lieveth' (1^{16}). To accept this message, to obey this gospel, to be 'in Christ Jesus' (see above) is 'to walk after the spirit' (8^4) and to escape from sin in present experience, and so to have the assurance that there is 'no condemnation' (v.[1]) here or hereafter. The 'righteousness of God,' a living, active force disclosed in Christ, is contrasted with a man's 'own righteousness,' which the revealed law shows to have no existence in fact. This Divine righteousness is 'by faith unto faith' (1^{17}). Faith contemplates the manifestation of that righteousness in the Person and Work of Christ ($1^{1-4.16.17}$), the trustful acceptance of which as the gift of God leads to that faith by which, abandoning self-sufficiency, we become obedient, surrender ourselves, to it. First of all there is the experience of 'newness of life' (6^4), an identification with Christ so complete that St. Paul can use the expressions 'buried with Christ in baptism,' 'crucified with Christ,' 'risen with him' (6^{1-6}). In proportion as this faith is active in us, we henceforth cease to serve sin (v.[6]), we are liberated from 'the law of sin and death' (8^2), and no longer find sin reigning in our mortal bodies (6^{12}). 'The first-fruits of the Spirit' (8^{23}) become manifest in the mortifying of the deeds of the body. The love of Christ—the love of God in Christ—became, as the Apostle had himself proved, an influence so powerful that he could speak of Christ, or the Spirit of Christ (the two expressions are practically indistinguishable [$8^{9.10}$]), inhabiting his personality, the source of holiness and of good works. But, as in Galatians, this is clearly no *unio mystica*, transforming the character *ex opere operato*, but a conscious fellowship based upon loyalty and trust. As it is expressed in Ephesians, he had yielded himself to the Redeemer, that Christ might dwell in his heart by faith (Eph 3^{17-19}).

But, if this were all, the Death and Resurrection of Christ would remain unexplained; the relation of these facts to the reproduction of the life of Christ in the believer would be undefined. Once again, therefore, the ethical result is taken as the pledge of that altered relationship to God which was dogmatically expressed in the theology of the primitive community as the covering effect of the work of Christ on our behalf. 'The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God' (Ro 8^{16}). The actual, realized effects wrought in those who were admitted to the fellowship of disciples, the fulfilling of the ordinances of the law in those who were walking not after the flesh but after the spirit, are the immediate and subjective pledge of an ultimate and objective relationship between the members of the community reconciled in Christ on the one hand and Him who is God and Father on the other. Viewed from the side of God's action, which is all along spontaneous, paramount, and free, this condition is brought about by grace or free favour. On man's side it results from faith, which is not a meritorious and independent act, but is itself a Divine gift, the reflex in human experience of free grace.

That the Pauline doctrine is forensic in form rather than in fact should be clear from the following considerations. The Apostle necessarily contrasted the freedom and joy of his experience as a Christian, and the altered relationship to God, to which it testified, with his former experience as a Pharisee. He had believed that as a circumcised Hebrew he had been admitted to a community in which the strenuous observance of the Mosaic Law both on the ceremonial and on the moral side afforded a meritorious ground for the final sentence of the Divine Lawgiver and would procure his acceptance. What he had once hoped to attain by a process of legal compliance had now been reached by the establishment of relations which were not legal at all, viz. by the free exercise of God's fatherly love towards him in Christ, which had awakened a responsive trust. This is the essential Christian experience, however it be expressed. Its note is the restoration through forgiveness of personal relations with a Father, not the satisfaction of the claim of a Lawgiver. Thus the term 'justification,' as used to express what the NT elsewhere calls 'salvation,' is forensic in what it denies rather than in what it affirms. But, inasmuch as Pharisaism arises out of that stage in the education of man in which he learns to recognize the holy love of God through the disciplinary revelation of His character in the precepts of a formal law, the conception of salvation is not adequately expressed unless it is seen in relation to what 'the law could not do in that it was weak.' Nor must we fail to perceive that faith is not an antecedent condition, but is involved in the idea of justification, so that the method cannot be separated from the fact. What the gospel means by 'thy faith hath saved thee' St. Paul expresses by saying that we are justified through faith. The correlatives which together are the keynote of justification are grace and faith, the former being the activity of God's personality towards man as realized and expressed in the historical work of Christ, the latter being the activity of man's personality towards God who thus manifests Himself as Redeemer. They are indeed two ways of expressing the same relation viewed from opposite sides. It is logic, not experience, that separates them, and that requires a third term like justification to express the resultant of both. But it is faith that is the norm of the Pauline theology. And justification must always be interpreted in the light of the experience implicit in the Apostle's obedience to the heavenly vision (Ac 26^{19}), and summed up in the declaration: 'The life that I now live in the flesh I live in faith, faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me' (Gal 2^{20}).

The connexion between justification and baptism, though St. Paul does not himself explicitly adjust the terms, arises out of the fact that 'we are justified in Christ'; *i.e.* Christ is the sphere in which justification takes place. The Son of God is revealed not merely to, but in, the believer (Gal 1^{16}), and this because he is 'created in Christ Jesus' (Eph 2^{10}). The purpose of God was 'to sum up all things in Christ' (1^{10}). The mystery of the Divine will was 'the one body,' in which all believers are reconciled to the Father through the Cross (2^{15-18}). Thus 'we are members one of another,' which for St. Paul is the reason and motive of the ethical life (4^{25} Ro 12^5, 1 Co 12^{27}). St. Paul's doctrine of the body of Christ, or the *ecclesia*, is the counterpart in his theology of the Kingdom to which in the Gospels the forgiveness of sins stands in a constant relation. Similarly, to be 'justified in Christ' is *ipso facto* to be placed in relation to the body in which is realized the fellowship of the one Spirit. And baptism is the act of initiation into the Christian fellowship (1 Co 12^{13}), wherein justifying faith perfects itself and thus becomes the starting-point of the new life in Christ. In this rite the believer washes away his sins (Ac 22^{16}) and puts on Christ (Gal 3^{27}), not because he cannot achieve these results by faith, but because he can 'appropriate the forgiveness of sins by faith only when he unites in his faith at once trust in God and Christ, and the intention to connect himself with the community of believers' (Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii. § 20, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1900, p. 111). In view of recent theories, according to which St. Paul is declared to have held that baptism confers the Spirit *ex opere operato* (see, *e.g.*, Kirsopp Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*,

London, 1911, pp. 233n., 383–391, and A. Schweitzer, *Geschichte der paulin. Forschung*, Tübingen, 1911, Eng. tr., *Paul and His Interpreters*, London, 1912, p. 213, etc.), it is important to bring out the essential unity between the doctrine of justification by faith and the Pauline conception of the Christian community. Baptism consummates the Divine grace and completes the act of faith. It is the guarantee of the common and corporate character of justification, not the operation of a second and different principle of salvation.

If the term 'justification' is used to express reconciliation between God and the sinner, it is clear that it implies a personal status or relationship, and not a subjective experience. But it is equally clear that for St. Paul the recognition of it implied and depended upon an experience, which ought to repeat itself in all believers. That experience was the assurance of a salvation already attained (Ro 5^1 15^{13}; cf. Eph 2^{18} 3^{12}), which stood in marked contrast to the fear and uncertainty which had accompanied the effort to attain it by legal righteousness, the peace and joy in the Holy Spirit which succeeded to the doubt and restlessness which had preceded the revelation of Jesus as Redeemer. This must not be confounded with an assurance which supersedes further effort. St. Paul was fully aware that he had not yet attained (1 Co 9^{27}, Ph 3^{12}). But it was only lapse of faith that would render the final issue doubtful. It is faith in which Christians stand (Ro 11^{20}, 1 Co 15^1, 2 Co 1^{24}). The only fear is lest they fall from a grace (Gal 5^4) already fully theirs, not lest, continuing in faith, they should fail finally to attain it.

While the doctrine of justification is in its formal outline peculiar to St. Paul, there is no opposition in principle between it and other NT methods of expressing the meaning of salvation. The Petrine teaching, though in the later development of the First Epistle it is influenced by the Pauline theology, remains less technical and less fully formulated. The disagreement at an earlier stage between the two Apostles, so far as it was determined by intellectual causes, may be traced to this fact, and not to any fundamental contradiction, like that which determined the attitude of St. Paul's Judaistic antagonists, who failed to recognize in Jesus the Messiah a spiritual, and therefore a Divine, Redeemer. The Johannine conception of salvation, though not ignoring faith (Jn 3^{18} 5^{24}, *εἰς κρίσιν οὐκ ἔρχεται*), is expressed in other categories, and the early rise of Gnosticism, with its imperfect attempt to explain how God became man, tended to fix the interest of religious thinkers upon the doctrine of the Person of Christ as the fundamental problem of Christian theology. Though the greatest fathers of the Church (*e.g.*, Athanasius) perceived that Christology must ultimately be determined by the satisfaction which Jesus gives to the religious need of redemption, the exigencies of repeated controversies tended to supplant the idea of faith, which sees in it an attitude of trustful self-committal to the reconciling will of God expressed in Jesus Christ, by another and a narrower conception, which represents it as assent, whether intelligent or not, to the doctrine of the Person of Christ as formulated in creeds and their corollaries. The growth of the Church system, reinforced by the natural tendency of the majority of mankind to be content with conformity to established and traditional institutions as a sufficient discharge of the Divine claims upon them, converted organized Christianity into a 'New Law.' When the hunger for salvation, which the Mosaic system had failed to allay in the case of St. Paul, began to reassert itself in the Western Church, St. Augustine partially reaffirmed the Pauline position, but without rising to its characteristic and essential principle. Interpreting justification by a false appeal to its etymology (=*justum facere*), he recovered the conception of salvation as a free gift of God (*gratia* is that which is bestowed *gratis*), but failed adequately to realize that it involved the re-establishment of personal relations with the Father through Christ. Grace was represented as a supernatural life infused into human nature through sacramental channels and gradually built up into a righteousness which was not meritorious only because it was imparted rather than achieved. Thus his teaching was a more or less materialized form of the Pauline doctrine of sanctification, *i.e.* the process by which God transforms into the image of Christ those whom He has already accepted for His children through faith in Jesus. The initial action, which alone is covered by the NT view of justification, was entirely omitted by Augustinianism, which became the accepted mould of the mediæval theology, the standard expression of which is found in the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thus in *Summ. Theol.* ii. 1, qu. 100, he asserts that *gratia justificans* is *quiddam reale et positivum* in the soul, a supernatural quality, infused like the virtues—faith, hope, and love—of which it is the cause. In conformity with this view is his doctrine of faith. Though involving the obedience of the will, at least when formed by love (*fides formata per caritatem*), it is primarily intellectual assent and has reference to symbols or creeds rather than to the redemptive personality of God, and is a preliminary condition of justification rather than its channel. In its imperfect stage (*fides informis*) it is scarcely distinguished from the forced assent to truth which is wrung even from devils, who 'believe and tremble' (*Summ. Theol.* ii. 2, qu. 1–10). These ideas were stereotyped by the Council of Trent, after being disputed by Humanists and Reformers, in the 'Decr. de Justificatione,' which published an anathema against those who declare that men are justified either by imputation of Christ's righteousness alone, or by remission of sins alone, excluding the grace which becomes inherent in them, or who say that the grace by which we are justified is only the favour of God (*Conc. Trid.*, sess. vi., 'Decr. de Justif.' can. xi.). The point of this position is not the objection offered to the phrase 'imputation of Christ's righteousness,' which is admittedly not scriptural, but the identification of grace with an imparted gift and the consequent description of justification as a gradually realized psychological condition. This, as we have seen, is the point where St. Augustine's system parted company with Paulinism, and opened the way to the re-establishment of salvation by merit, which was characteristic of the formal teaching of the mediæval Church. For a supernatural gift, if it be transmuted through use of the prescribed sacramental means into virtues inherent in human character, becomes the achievement of the possessor, precisely as the results of labour, though not obtained without the employment of material, are acquired by the worker. Thus Aquinas, in opposition to the spirit of St. Paul, allows that *fides est meritorium*. It is easy, therefore, to see how a compromise was effected with the party that had most keenly opposed the Augustinian view of grace to produce that combination of sacramental mysticism and ecclesiastical legalism which represents the view of salvation current in the Middle Ages. Emphasis was laid, on the one hand, upon the hierarchical machinery, which culminated in the system of indulgences, and, on the other, upon the mediation through sacraments of Divine influences. The personal, ethical relation to God, of which faith, as expounded in the Pauline Epistles, is the pledge, and justification, as similarly set forth, the expression, had no place in official theology.

The 16th cent. saw the rediscovery of the NT doctrine of justification. This was rendered possible in the first instance by the Revival of Learning, which threw men back upon the original Greek, promoted textual exegesis, and prepared the way for Biblical as distinguished from scholastic theology. But the renewed knowledge of Greek was not the only key to a living interpretation of the NT. The awakening of personality, the meaning of which had been only imperfectly understood whether by the classical, the patristic, or the mediæval mind, quickened those religious needs which only an experience akin to that which produced the Pauline theology could adequately satisfy. The story of Luther, laboriously climbing the Santa Scala at Rome, till the words of Habakkuk twice cited by St. Paul in his crucial arguments —'the just shall live by faith'—sent him incontinently down the steps with a revolution in his soul, is typical of the Reformation. For Luther, as for St. Paul, the vision of God in Christ brought trust in His fatherly love as manifested in the Person and Work of the Redeemer, with the consequent assurance of free forgiveness and a personal share in the purpose of salvation. This is the essential Christian experience, and though, as Hooker affirms in his sermon on 'Justification,' there have doubtless been in all ages thousands who have been the subjects of it (*Serm.* ii. § 8 f.), it is difficult to find room for it in the official theology of mediæval Catholicism. Confidence in God became the mark alike of Luther's own teaching and of Reformation theology, and confidence is nothing else but faith aware of itself. It is the subjective aspect of the restored personal relations, or reconciliation with God, by which it is inspired, and which constitute what Protestants have always meant by justification.

Neither the general outlines of the teaching of the Reformation nor the particular theories of individual writers correspond in every detail with the Pauline statement. These last do not, of course, agree one with another, either in terminology, in scope, or in adjustment to other balancing principles. Further, it must be borne in mind not only that the phraseology of St. Paul is to be interpreted in relation to the NT generally, but also that his Epistles do not present us with systematic theology. The upheaval of religious thought in the 16th cent. followed upon a long dogmatic history, in relation to which its theology was re-constructed. While, therefore, St. Paul speaks of faith being reckoned for righteousness, Protestant divines used 'the imputation of righteousness' as a technical term defined in respect to a general body of doctrine, and justification by faith becomes justification by faith only. The deviation in the latter case is due not to an exaggeration of St. Paul's teaching, but to the conditions of the later controversy. The Reformers did not deny that hope and love no less than faith were necessarily present in those who are justified. What they saw was that to connect those virtues with justification itself was to shift the meaning of the term from the Biblical to the mediæval sense. Whether 'imputation of righteousness' is to be regarded as a Biblical idea depends upon whether such a phrase as 'the righteousness which is of God' (Ph 3^9) has a positive content, and means, *e.g.*, the merits of Christ, or whether it is simply equivalent to the status of those to whom faith is reckoned for righteousness. But what is really involved here is not so much the meaning of justification as the validity of certain theories of the Atonement. This is true also of Ritschl's contention, that the community of believers is primarily the object of justification (*op. cit.* iii. § 20, etc.). For the question really is whether the Church is part of the revelation of God in Christ or not, and justification is still equivalent to the forgiveness of sins in either case. Whether the Cross is a satisfaction for sin, whether the work of Christ possesses a substitutionary character, whether the sacramental Church is part of the Divine scheme of redemption, are questions affecting the revelation of God in Christ rather than the status of those who through faith become the objects of reconciliation. The parting of the ways in respect of justification depends on the relation which exists between forgiveness and the infusion of holiness. The latter is not denied by Protestants. But it is conceived as resulting from the communication of the Spirit, which necessarily springs from the Divine act of pardon and acceptance. Roman theology, on the other hand, regards forgiveness as consequent upon the transmission of holiness, which it calls righteousness, the normal channels of this process being the sacraments. The distinction is not merely a matter of terms, but has an important bearing upon the Christian character. The provision of aids, however powerful, for the attainment of justification must have an entirely different effect upon the daily life of the believer from the assurance of a reconciliation already fully won.

LITERATURE.—It is difficult to make a selection from the abundant literature dealing with St. Paul and Paulinism. But the student may consult art. 'Justification' in *HDB* ii. 836 (D. W. Simon), and in *DCG* i. 917 (R. S. Franks), and A. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*[3], Freiburg, 1894, Eng. tr. *History of Dogma*, 7 vols., London, 1894-99. To these should be added A. Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, Bonn, 1874; Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*; H. Martensen, *Die christliche Dogmatik*, Berlin, 1856, Eng. tr. *Christian Dogmatics*, Edinburgh, 1866, §§ 228-231; J. H. Newman, *Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification*[3], London, 1874; and the Commentaries of J. B. Lightfoot on *Galatians*, and Sanday-Headlam on *Romans*.

J. G. SIMPSON.

JUVENILE CRIMINALS.—By 'criminals' we mean those offenders of whom the criminal law of the particular State takes cognizance by way of punishment, not those wrongdoers, against the wrongdoer's family or others, whom the State refuses to prosecute and punish. By 'juvenile,' in the expression 'juvenile criminals,' we primarily mean offenders who have reached the minimum age at which the State prosecutes for crime, but who are under the age at which full legal responsibility is held to begin. In a secondary sense, we include as juvenile criminals those young persons who, although they have not actually committed crime, are in imminent danger of becoming criminals. It is, in many cases, an accident whether a boy or a girl is in the one class or the other. State or voluntary action to prevent the manufacture of criminals may be as necessary in the one case as in the other.

This delimitation of our subject is convenient; but it does not in all cases square with the facts. There are exceptional children, under the age of possible prosecution, who might be held responsible for their wrongful acts, because they are as conscious of the nature, probable results, wrongful character, and legal consequences of these acts as those who are above that age. On the other hand, there are many adult criminals—some authorities say twenty-five, others seventy-five, per cent—whose mental and moral development is so stunted that they are not fully conscious, when they commit crime, of the conditions inferring legal responsibility.

Although the modern State will not prosecute and punish persons below the age at which it considers legal responsibility to begin, it holds itself entitled, in certain circumstances, to interfere with the liberty of these persons, and with the natural rights of their parents, and to take such steps as it thinks fit to prevent their becoming criminals.

This is the principle of 'prevention better than cure,' on which the Industrial School and, to a lesser extent, the Reformatory School of the United Kingdom, and similar institutions in other countries, are founded.

In theory, the law of all countries used to treat juveniles (above the age at which the particular State held full legal responsibility to begin) and adults as equally liable to punishment, although, in practice, the obvious distinctions between the two cases were more or less acted upon, at least by the more humane administrators of the law. Children were sentenced to be transported or hanged; but these sentences were modified in their case more frequently than in the case of adults.

In modern times, by criminologists of all countries, increasing stress has been laid on the view suggested by the words: 'Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord' (Ro 12^{19}). Torture, mutilation, branding, starvation, and transportation had each their sturdy advocates, who honestly believed that, on their abolition, discipline inside the prison and the safety of the lieges outside would become impossible. Yet these worse than useless horrors have all disappeared with the pillory and the stocks, the treadmill and the crank, never to return; and flogging and lengthened solitary confinement have been reduced to a minimum, and, with the silent system, will, for similar reasons, soon be things of the past. It has been sharply questioned whether, except as an incident of the reformation of the individual or in order to secure the safety of the community, the State, as such, has any right to punish offenders, whether by fine, imprisonment, or death. But it is generally agreed that, whether the idea of punishment pure and simple is or is not admissible in the case of adults, it has no place (except in very exceptional circumstances, as an adjunct of reformation) in dealing with juveniles. It was only in 1908, by clauses 102 and 103 of The Children Act of that year, that it was made impossible in the United Kingdom to send to penal servitude, or to hang, a boy or girl under 16. The efficacy of rewards rather than punishments, the power of sympathy rather than coercion, in the interests both of discipline and of reformation, are not yet fully recognized in prisons, in schools, or in families.

Modern methods of dealing with juvenile criminals have proceeded on similar lines in Great Britain and its Colonies, the United States, and the Continent of Europe. They have been based on two considerations: (1) the conviction that the crimes of juveniles, and the risks of their falling into crime, are in most cases the result, not of their own wilful wrongdoing or deliberate choice, but of heredity polluted by want, drink, and disease, of physical hardships (due in large measure to the periodic unemployment and the insufficient wages of parents), of defective religious and secular education, of want of parental supervision and control, and of vicious associations; and (2) the general agreement, founded on experience, that juveniles, when withdrawn from their vicious surroundings (the earlier the better), will respond to firm, kindly, intelligent reformative influences more readily and more permanently than adults.

The movement in Europe, the United States, and the British Colonies for a radical change in the treatment of potential and actual juvenile criminals was the result of a quickened sense in the State, and in the Church, of the supreme value of the rising generation as the hope of the nation, and of national as well as parental responsibility for all the children in the community, whether they are normal or defective physically, mentally, or morally. In Great Britain it was, like many other movements for the welfare of children, partly at least the consequence of the Ragged School movement, begun by John Pounds, the Portsmouth cobbler, early in the 19th cent., and subsequently extended all over Great Britain and Ireland, under the inspiration of such men and women as Shaftesbury and Mary Carpenter in England, and Thomas Guthrie and Sheriff Watson in Scotland. It was not till Ragged School methods had been proved, in Britain and elsewhere, to be successful in arresting the flow of juvenile crime that the State in Great Britain took any share in the work, which results in benefit to the whole community, and is, therefore, suitable for State recognition and support. In later years, the State's action in Great Britain has been accelerated by the success of similar preservative and regenerative institutions in the United States and in the British Colonies, and by the splendid volunteer work done by such agencies, independent of State aid, as those of the Ragged School Union and Barnardo and Müller in England, Quarrier in Scotland, and the Salvation Army in different parts of the world.

Modern legislation dealing with juvenile crime has been mainly directed (1) to exclude juveniles from prison; (2) to provide institutions for the preservation of those who are in danger of falling into crime, and for the reform of those who have been convicted of crime; and (3) to secure for any who may be in prison such treatment, in confinement and on release, as will at least make it possible for them to redeem their past, and live honest and useful lives, keeping in view the saddening statement, or, rather, understatement, made by the Departmental Committee of 1895: 'Few inmates leave prison better than when they came in.' It is not possible in a short article to exhaust the application of these views in different countries. The matter may be illustrated by stating the position in the United Kingdom, where the law relating to juvenile crime is to be found in parts iv. and v. of The Children Act, 1908 (8 Edward VII., ch. 67), entitled 'An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the protection of children and young persons, Reformatory and Industrial Schools, and Juvenile Offenders, and otherwise to amend the law with respect to children and young persons.' The First Offenders Act, 1887, The Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1904, and The Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, should be read along with The Children Act, 1908.

By section 58, magistrates may send to Industrial Schools (1) children who are found begging, (2) children found wandering, and without visible means of subsistence, (3) destitute children, and those whose parents (or surviving parent) are in prison, (4) children of criminal or drunken parents, unfit to have the care of them, (5) children living in grossly immoral surroundings, (6) children who are refractory and beyond the control of parents or guardians, or, if in a workhouse, of the managers, and (7), in exceptional circumstances, children not older than 13 charged with crime. All boys and girls sent to Reformatories (with the exception of refractory children sent from Industrial Schools) must have been convicted of crime.

The body of legislation which culminated in The Children Act, 1908, has, in conjunction with voluntary effort, resulted in the establishment, in different parts of the United Kingdom, of two institutions designed to preserve children from that prison brand which, once affixed, is rarely effaced, and to fit them, convicted or unconvicted, for a new career: (1) Certified Industrial Schools for children not older, at entry, than 14, who are in imminent danger, from their destitute and neglected condition, from their immoral surroundings, or from their refractory habits, of falling into crime, or who have been convicted of minor

offences; they may be committed for any period, but cannot remain in an Industrial School beyond 16; (2) Reformatory Schools for children over 12 years and under 16 at entry, who have committed more serious offences, or who may be beyond the Industrial School age of 14; they are committed for not less than three, and not more than five, years, but cannot remain in a Reformatory School beyond the age of 19.

(1) *Industrial Schools certified and subsidized by Government.*—The State has interfered in favour of Industrial Schools in four ways: (1) by certifying those of whose management and methods it approves as fit places for the detention of the boys and girls for whose benefit the Acts already mentioned were passed; (2) by conferring powers on magistrates to send boys and girls to these schools under detention orders for a fixed period; (3) by paying a proportion of the cost of the boys and girls so committed under magistrates' orders; and (4) by providing Government inspection of certified Industrial Schools.

Government recognition and subsidy were not obtained for Industrial Schools without opposition. It was said that these schools were merely doing the work which the parents ought to do; that to support them was to pauperize both parents and children, and to set free the children's money to feed the vicious indulgences of the parents. If there were parents, who, although able, were not willing to do their duty by their children, why did not the criminal law compel them? These arguments, although specious, were inapplicable to orphans, deserted children, and children of long sentence prisoners. Even where they had a basis in fact—*e.g.*, the common case of parents spending on drink what truly belonged to their children—it was proved that it would be of advantage to the State to save the children from joining the criminal ranks, even at the cost in some cases of pauperizing the parents and feeding their vices.

The opponents of Government interference relied on another great principle, viz. the inalienable rights of parents in their children. But, while this principle could have no application in the case of orphan children, it had only a technical application even in the case of those deserted or neglected children who, although one or both parents might be alive, were worse than orphans.

(2) *Reformatory Schools.*—As in the case of Industrial Schools, voluntary effort had proved the success of Reformatory Schools for youthful offenders before the system was adopted by Government. In the preamble of the first Reformatory Statute (passed in 1854, 7 and 8 Victoria, ch. 86) there is a recital of the establishment, by voluntary contributions, of Reformatory Schools in various parts of Great Britain.

Dealing with both Reformatory and Industrial Schools, the 1908 Act makes careful provision, in the choice of a school, for respect being paid to the religion in which the child has been brought up. It also provides for the parents of the children, wherever possible, being compelled to contribute to the cost of their maintenance and education. In the case of Industrial Schools, the children may, when the managers of the school think the case a suitable one, be boarded out instead of being kept in the school; and they may be licensed out, from both Industrial and Reformatory Schools, before the expiry of the period for which they were sent to the school. The statute does not contain any provision for emigration; but it is the practice, especially when the home is an exceptionally bad one, to send a certain number to the Colonies. There is no difficulty in finding employment for the children, the girls as domestic servants, and the boys in all kinds of skilled trades and in the army and navy. After leaving school, the children remain under the supervision of the managers—Industrial School children till 18, Reformatory School children till 19. The cost of these schools is not met entirely by the Treasury or by local authorities. Voluntary contributions cover a proportion of the cost; but, as in all cases when Government aid is available, the directors of these institutions find it increasingly difficult to maintain voluntary subscriptions. Government has wisely left the administration of the schools to voluntary committees of non-official men and women specially interested and specially skilled.

Naturally, looking to the ages and careers of the inmates, the discipline in Reformatories is more severe than in Industrial Schools, and, for the same reason, the percentage who do well after their time is up may not be so high. But, whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the best methods of dealing with juvenile crime or as to the precise percentage of satisfactory cases, it is universally admitted that the State has got many times more than full value for all the public money spent on Reformatories and Industrial Schools.

(3) *The Borstal system.*—In addition to Certified Industrial Schools and Reformatories, there are State institutions in England and Scotland on what is known as the Borstal system, for offenders, from 16 to 21, too old for Reformatories, but whose habits have not yet matured beyond redemption, although they may have been convicted several times. The success already achieved in these institutions—the first was founded in 1902—makes it certain that the test of age will be abandoned, and that, sooner or later, all prisoners will be treated as capable of reformation, save only those professional criminals who have shown by a lengthened career in crime that, for the safety of the community, they must be confined for life. See, further, art. CRIMINOLOGY.

(4) *Truant Schools.*—The position of Day Industrial Schools in Scotland, established under the Day Industrial Schools (Scotland) Act, 1893, in relation to Certified Industrial Schools appears from clause 83 of The Children Act, 1908. In the United States remarkable results have been achieved in an establishment called 'The George Junior Republic,' founded in 1895, in which the inmates are put upon their honour and trusted with administration and discipline to an extent unknown until 1913 in any institution, public or private, for similar purposes in Great Britain. An institution on similar lines, called 'The Little Commonwealth,' was started in 1913 in Dorsetshire, the success or failure of which may have important results on the whole method of dealing with juvenile criminals. Mention must also be made of the work carried on by the Ragged School Union and other associations, which prefer to work without State aid that they may be independent of State control.

The tendency is increasing to eliminate both the appearance and the reality of prison life from the institutions mentioned above. This does not proceed from any pseudo-humanitarianism, but from experience that thereby the children are better braced for the battle of life when they leave school. The Reformatory Act of 1854 enacted that every young person sent to a Reformatory must first be imprisoned for not less than 14 days, and it was not till 1899, 45 years thereafter, that this most objectionable condition was abolished. Experience proved that even this short experience was sufficient in many cases to rob the prison of its terrors, and to affix an indelible prison-brand. The discipline is firm, and temporary causes and difficulties may make it, at times, severe. Few, if any, boys or girls go voluntarily into Reformatories,

or even Industrial Schools; and few, if any, remain of their own free choice. The food, although ample, is plain. The children, consistently with the preservation of robust health, work hard, both in the school-room and at industrial work. Yet every school has abundant testimony from former pupils, many of them occupying positions of trust at home and abroad, that they owe everything to these institutions.

There is another provision in The Children Act (first put into practice in the United States in 1869) which cannot be passed over, viz. that for the establishment of Children's Courts, separate from the ordinary Police Courts, and to which none but those directly interested, including the Press, are admitted. Reference may also be made to clause 62 (2), in which it is contemplated that Industrial Schools will provide a department for children suffering from mental or physical defect. It is a sad feature of almost all effort, State and voluntary, in connexion with juvenile criminals, actual or anticipated, that the institutions for their benefit are open only to children mentally and physically normal, or nearly normal, and that no effort is made to segregate the defective, who are thus allowed, by the production of children, weak physically, morally, and mentally, to maintain the supply of the criminal class. The Mental Deficiency Act of 1913 is, however, evidence that this aspect of the question is at last to be seriously faced.

The 1908 Act recognizes by clause 60, dealing with probation of offenders (a system, like so many others, adopted from successful experience in the United States), how essential it is that the child, when he or she leaves the Industrial or Reformatory School, shall be provided with a suitable situation, and shall be supervised in his or her earlier years of freedom. In reference to juvenile criminals who have been sent to prison, we may merely mention the noble work done for them, during confinement and on release, by Prison Visitors, Discharged Prisoners Aid Societies, the Churches, and the Salvation Army, working in conjunction with the Prison Commissioners and the prison officials.

The advocates and managers of the great reformative institutions and agencies above described have always been keenly alive to the drawbacks and deficiencies of all such establishments, however well managed, compared with home life as it ought to be. While doing what we can to safeguard the tempted and to reform the fallen in our own generation, we must look forward to the day when the conditions of life of the working classes—their religious, moral, and intellectual opportunities, the regularity of their employment, their wages, their housing, their means of innocent and health-giving recreation, and their resultant law-abiding character—will be such that there will be no need for any of these institutions, and when the subject of juvenile criminals will have only an historical and antiquarian interest.

LITERATURE.—C. E. B. Russell and L. M. Rigby, *The Making of the Criminal*, London, 1906; M. G. Barnett, *Young Delinquents*, do., 1913; the monthly *Seeking and Saving* and *Certified Schools Gazette*, published by the Reformatory and Refuge Union, and by the Society of Superintendents of Reformatory and Industrial Schools respectively, and pamphlets issued by the former society.

CHARLES J. GUTHRIE.

K

KA.—See DOUBLES, EGYPTIAN RELIGION.

KA'BA.—See MECCA.

ḲABBĀLĀ.—1. History.—Ḳabbālā (קַבָּלָה, from קבל, 'he received') was a term used originally to denote the Prophets and Hagiographa as opposed to the Pentateuch, *e.g.*, T. B. *Rōsh hash-shāna*, 19*a* (see C. Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*², Cambridge, 1897, p. 114). The prophetical teaching was 'received' or 'traditional.' In the course of time, however, the meaning of Ḳabbālā underwent a change; it was applied to hidden and mysterious doctrines, dealing with the nature of the Deity and His relation to the world. This secret mysticism was no late growth. Difficult though it is to prove the date and origin of this system of philosophy and the influences and causes which produced it, we can be fairly certain that its roots stretch back very far, and that the mediæval and Geonic Ḳabbālā was the culmination and not the inception of Jewish esoteric mysticism.

Already in the days of the Mishna, it was felt that speculations concerning the origin of the world (see art. COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Jewish]) should be restricted to those of mature intellect, and the same tractate (*Ḥagiga*, ii. 1 and T. B. *Ḥagiga*, 13*a*; see A. W. Streane, *Chagigah*, Cambridge, 1891, p. 55) associates theosophy (מַעֲשֵׂה מֶרְכָּבָה [Ezk 1]) with cosmology (מַעֲשֵׂה בְרֵאשִׁית [Gn 1]). These two sciences are subject to the same restrictions and are regarded as interdependent. The famous admonition of Sirach, not to seek 'that which is too wonderful for thee' (Sir 3[21] f.; see Taylor, 'The Wisdom of Ben Sira,' *JQR* xv. [1902-03] 442), repeated in *Bereshith Rabba* (viii., ed. J. Theodor, Berlin, 1903, p. 58) and in *Ḥagiga*, 13*a*, shows not only that these speculations were rife in the 2nd cent. B.C., but that in pursuing them caution was deemed necessary. It is superfluous to cite further evidence, since this statement is now generally accepted.

One of the etymologies of the name Essene (Ἐσσαῖος; cf. ESSENES, vol. v. p. 400b) is 'secret' (Heb. חִשּׁוּא). This is based on Josephus (*BJ* II. viii. 5), who says of the sect τοῖς ἔξωθεν ὡς μυστήριόν τι φρικτὸν ἡ τῶν ἔνδον σιωπὴ καταφαίνεται. This would seem to imply a tendency to esoteric doctrines on the part of the Essenes (see Taylor, *Sayings*, p. 79, note). The name of the Elkesaites, a Gnostic sect (A.D. 100-400), would furnish a parallel to this etymology, according to the derivation given by Epiphanius (see ELKESAITES, vol. v. p. 262), viz. חִל כֹּסְיָא, 'hidden strength.'

The Apocryphal writings, especially Enoch and Jubilees, mark a considerable development in the history of Ḳabbālā. Gnosticism and dualism played a great part in influencing its growth, and contributed towards the body of ideas that found expression in the *Sēfer Y'ṣîra* and the later *Zôhar*. Ḳabbalism denies the *creatio ex nihilo* and the possibility of knowing God. Hence it taught the doctrine of negative attributes, by which expedient the Godhead might be described. Ḳabbalism, further, represents the insistence on the divine immanence; it is a reaction against excessive emphasis on the transcendence. It has often been held that Judaism is a purely formal religion, in which the warmth of mysticism has no place. Such an opinion, in any case erroneous, is entirely untenable

if attention be paid to the history of the Ḳabbālā. For centuries it has coursed through the veins of Judaism in a fiery flood, raising man to God and bringing God to man, cheering him with hopes of a speedy Messianic advent, and comforting him in times of persecution, by the aid of an eschatology which draws the remote future, with its promise of peace, into the immediate present with its clouds and sorrows. It has filled the lives of the poor and humble with the overpowering nearness of God, and with the assurance of His interest in their daily concerns, and has made them feel at every moment that they should and could 'imitate' Him. There is no lack in the Ḳabbālā of the fantastic, the childish, or the grotesque, or sometimes even the blasphemous, but the proportion of the dross to the gold is insignificant, though not infrequently misrepresented and exaggerated. Nor is it altogether correct to regard the Ḳabbālā as the antithesis of the ceremonial Law. There have been mystics, notably among the later Russian Ḥasidîm, who laid more stress on study of the Torah and on abstract principles than on the Talmud and Codes, but, on the other hand, many have striven to combine mysticism with the inviolate observance of the Dîn. The very author of the *Shulḥān 'Ārūkh* was a Ḳabbalist.[1] Every act and every prayer in the life of the Ḳabbalist has been surrounded with a mystic halo, given a new vigour and meaning, and preceded by a formula of self-consecration. Thus the tendency of Ḳabbalism, in general, has been largely to strengthen the ceremonial Law, not to destroy it.

From the time of Graetz it has been the fashion to decry Ḳabbālā and to regard it as a later incrustation, as something of which Judaism had reason to be ashamed. In reality this judgment goes back much further; it rests ultimately on the authority of Moses Maimonides, to whom reason was the foundation of Judaism, and the imaginative faculty abhorrent. The weight of his influence was sufficient to prejudice the majority of scholars against the Ḳabbālā. Further, the Ḳabbalists claimed extreme antiquity for their doctrines. The *Zôhar*, *e.g.*, was attributed to Simeon bar Joḥai, a Galilæan Rabbi of the 2nd cent.; it is, in point of fact, a Spanish work, more than eleven hundred years later. In consequence of the critical analysis to which modern historians have subjected the Ḳabbālā and by means of which falsities, such as the traditional date of the *Zôhar*, have been exposed, reaction has pushed too far to the other extreme. The recent tendency requires adjustment. The Ḳabbālā, though later in form than is claimed by its adherents, is far older in material than is allowed by its detractors. It is not entirely a collection of fantasy; it is poetry, spirituality, and idealism as well. Nor has the excess of imagery and anthropomorphism been suffered to spread too far. Simeon bar Joḥai, a pillar of mysticism, declared a ban on those who expounded Gn 6[1-4] as a personification of the Deity which would have been unseemly (*Bereshith Rabba*, xxvi., Theodor, p. 247). Ḳabbalism is a complement to mediæval Rabbinic Judaism, not an excrescence. It has contributed to the formation of modern Judaism, for, without the influence of the Ḳabbālā, Judaism to-day might have been one-sided, lacking in warmth and imagination. Indeed, so deeply has it penetrated into the body of the faith that many ideas and prayers are now immovably rooted in the general body of orthodox doctrine and practice. This element has not only become incorporated, but it has fixed its hold on the affections of the Jew and cannot be eradicated. Consequently it is false to regard the Ḳabbālā as something apart from Judaism. Its extremists and some of its exaggerations are outside, but a large proportion is within, and the extent of its permeation must be adequately recognized.

From the earliest times mystic ideas were at work in Judaism. Externally assisted by Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, Neo-Platonism, and other movements, these ideas grew and developed, drawing internal support as well. Hellenistic no less than Rabbinic Judaism had its share of mysticism. In Philo as well as in the Midrash it may be seen, not spasmodically or vaguely, but as a firm and well-constituted element of religion. Alexandria, the intellectual mart and meeting-ground of East and West, by bringing together all the most different and distant elements, fostered mysticism. (For the 'Hermes Books' [ספרי הרמס, not המרום, 'Homeros'] and the Greek Gnostic poems [שי וזר] see K. Kohler in *JQR* v. [1893] 415 and *JE* iii. 459; the mysticism of Philo's Logos conception is treated by J. Abelson, *Jewish Mysticism*, London, 1913, ch. iii.) Philo's angelology and cosmology are, in the main, Platonic and Stoic teachings brought into line with Rabbinic modes of Biblical interpretation. Regarding matter as evil, he evolved the Logoi as divine agencies between the world and an external God (Abelson, p. 54 f.). Both in Egypt and in Babylonia the mystic movement grew on parallel lines, which, however, were by no means completely independent of each other. The gap in our knowledge of the history of the Jews of Egypt between the Alexandrian and Muslim epochs prevents any definite line of continuity from being traced. But it is certain that the Jews of Egypt, in the Arab period, preserved a strong partiality for mysticism. Sa'adya (892-942), the great philosopher and Bible translator of the Fayyûm, did not think it beneath him to compose a commentary on the *Sêfer Yeṣîra*. It was about this time that the Ḳabbālā spread to Europe. According to Eleazar of Worms, Aaron b. Samuel brought it from Babylonia to Italy. A. Neubauer, in his edition of the *Chronicle of Aḥimaaz* (see *JQR* iv. [1891-92] 615 and *Mediæval Jewish Chronicles* [Anecdota Oxoniensia], Oxford, 1895), a work composed in 1054, has proved the historicity of Aaron—a fact previously contested. From this source it appears that Aaron was the son of an Ab Beth Din in Babylonia, and that he travelled to Italy. He lived in Benevento and Oria, and his activity in Italy lasted at least till 870. Whether he returned to Babylon is doubtful. His influence was very great. To him are ascribed, not altogether with certainty, two Ḳabbalistic works, called *Nikḳûd* and *Pardês*. He is said to have worked miracles by the use of the Divine Name. The doctrines which he taught found ready acceptance, and through him the seed soon bore fruit in Europe. But at this time little was written down. Mysticism was transmitted by word of mouth, so that it is not easy to say exactly what was taught and believed by those who first spread the Ḳabbala through Italy into other countries. Angelology and permutation of the alphabet are of frequent occurrence in the Geonic writings, which are probably responsible for the French, German, and Spanish Ḳabbala. The German Ḳabbālā, brought from Italy by the Kalonymides, centres in Judah ben Samuel (surnamed the Pious), who died in 1217, his pupil Eleazar of Worms, and Abraham Abulafia. Judah, whose ancestors were noted Ḳabbalists of Oriental origin, founded the great seminary at Regensburg. He gathered round him a band of famous disciples, and his influence was great. Miracles are attributed to him, and his teaching was largely mystic in character. His fame was not confined to Jewish circles, but he was respected and consulted by the bishop of Salzburg and other Church

[1] On the opposition to this work see *JE* iii. [1902] 586.

dignitaries. The authenticity of much of his written work is doubtful because he wrote down but little, his disciples being the repositories of his teaching. If the *Songs of Unity* and *Song of Glory* are, in fact, his composition, his mystic leanings can be clearly judged. At any rate, whether composed by Judah, by his father Samuel, or by any of his contemporaries, they reflect the current mysticism. In these mystic songs, which may be conveniently seen in any volume of the *Service of the Synagogue* (A. H. Davis and H. M. Adler, London, 1909, etc.), or, in part, in the *Authorised Daily Prayer-Book* of S. Singer (London, 1890, etc., pp. 78, 171; see annotated ed., p. xc), many Ḳabbalistic and philosophical ideas occur; they deal, in general, with the divine nature, either from the transcendental or from the immanent side.

'Thou encompassest all and fillest all; and since Thou art the All, Thou art in all. . . .
Colour and shape cannot be applied to Thy Oneness, nor body to the essence of Thy Unity. . . .
Neither is anything separate from Thee in the midst: nor is the smallest place void of Thee.
Accident and change do not exist in Thee, nor time, nor discord, nor any imperfection'
('Hymn for the Third Day').

'We may not class Him with matter or substance, or ascribe to Him accident or attribute.
All things that are seen or conceived or known are included in the ten categories; there are seven kinds of quantity and six kinds of motion, three modes of predication, three times, and three dimensions. Lo! in the Creator not one of them exists, for He created them all together' ('Fifth Day').

'I have not seen Thee, yet I tell Thy praise,
Nor known Thee, yet I image forth Thy ways.
For by Thy seers' and servants' mystic speech
Thou didst Thy sov'ran splendour darkly teach.
And from the grandeur of Thy work they drew
The measure of Thy inner greatness, too.
They told of Thee, but not as Thou must be,
Since from Thy work they tried to body Thee'
(*Hymn of Glory*).

In addition to other liturgical works, Judah's mysticism was expounded in a commentary to the Pentateuch and in an ethical will, but chiefly in the *Sēfer Ḥăsīdim*, a collection of mystical and ethical sentences. Probably Judah had no more than a share in the last-named work. His fame, however, rests not on his personal writings, but on the impetus which he gave to the German Ḳabbālā. This impetus will best be measured not by his books, but by the number of pupils and associates who carried his ideas and influence far and wide. Of his disciples Eleazar [ben Judah ben Kalonymus] of Worms (1176–1238) was the most distinguished both as a Ḳabbalist and as a writer of ethics. Though his title to fame rests chiefly on the *Rōḳĕaḥ*, which is devoted to ethics and Halākhā, his mystic writings were numerous and important. Eleazar was given to asceticism.

'In his cabalistic works he developed and gave a new impulse to the mysticism associated with the letters of the alphabet. The philosophical Cabala of the school of Isaac the Blind is replaced by arithmetical speculations. By the gematria and notarikon systems of interpretation found in the Talmud, Eleazar invented new combinations by which miracles could be performed. The haggadic anthropomorphism which he had combated in his earlier works ("Ha-Roḳeaḥ," "Sha'are ha-Sod weha-Yiḥud) occupied later the foremost place in his cabalistic writings' (I. Broydé, *JE* v. 101).

The Ḳabbālā of the Arabic-speaking Jews was in the meantime undergoing modification. The Arabs and Jews were growing more and more familiar with Greek philosophy, and their own was thereby affected. The influence of the 'Brothers of Purity' in Baṣra, whose writings were directed to the promotion of an ethical revival, was felt in Jewry; notably Baḥya ibn Paḳuda shows traces of their movement. In the treatise *Men and Animals* their philosophy is expounded with special reference to cosmogony, angelology, the soul, the Godhead, and the relation of man to God. It was chiefly their theory of emanation (see F. Dieterici, *Thier und Mensch vor dem Könige der Genien*[2], Leipzig, 1881, p. 60, line 1, etc. = *Der Streit zwischen Mensch und Thier*, Berlin, 1858, p. 97, foot, etc.; see also p. 169 for the disquisition about angels) and of the nine numbers that found favour with and adaptation by the Jewish Ḳabbalists. Already in the 13th cent. signs begin to appear of an opposition between Talmud and mysticism. Prayer and the study of the Halākhā tended to become antitheses in Germany, while the German and Spanish Ḳabbālā differed in many important points. The Spanish school tended to become more purely mystic and visionary, while Germany devoted more thought to speculative Ḳabbālā and to permutations. The details of the spread of the Ḳabbālā into Provence are obscure. Isaac the Blind cannot be the founder of the movement here, as was formerly held. In him Ḳabbalā is already so far developed as to make it certain that he must have had predecessors. The advent of philosophy to Provence produced a mystic reaction, and thus Ḳabbālā, which had hitherto remained obscure, came forward as a protest against the coldness of rationalism.

A new stage in the growth of the Ḳabbālā was marked by the appearance of the *Zōhar* (see below), which became the mystic Bible. This pseudepigraphical work probably dates from the 14th century. It paved the way for the last stage of mysticism, which has continued till the present day. This stage is associated with Isaac Luria (1533–72), known as Ari, and Ḥayyim Vital. They and their followers combined spirituality and permutations. Their piety was of an extremely high order, but coupled with it was their use of charms and amulets. In the Orient, Galicia, and Poland their influence is strong; their precepts have sometimes been misunderstood and, in ignorant hands, have degenerated into superstition. In Russia the Ḥasidim have incorporated the Ḳabbālā, laying special emphasis on prayer and mysticism. But the lower elements have not been wanting; hence the Ḥasidic movement has met with strenuous opposition on the part of the Rabbis.

2. Chief theories and doctrines of Ḳabbālā.—The complete Ḳabbalistic system consists of two main subdivisions — theoretical, *'Iyyūnīth*, and practical, *Ma'ăsīth*. It is impossible to deal exhaustively with the individual points in each branch, and it is difficult to make a rigid line of division between them. It will be convenient to consider briefly the chief ideas and principles.

(*a*) *The use of numbers and letters.*—The permutations and combinations of numbers and letters are not entirely of Pythagorean origin. Hebrew has no numerical symbols, and the use of the alphabet for numerals goes back to Maccabæan times. This practice is, no doubt, responsible for the later *gematria* or *grammateia*, by which the numerical equivalents of letters and words were made a means of interpretation. An interesting example is cited in art. EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Jewish), vol. v. p. 662, § 3. Unlucky numbers are known in the Talmud (T. B. *Pesaḥim*, 110*a*: שִׁתָּה קַפָּלַיִם רָמוּ בְּרֹאשׁוֹ, 'even numbers are to be avoided in drinking'). Owing to the principle of association by ideas, things were often grouped by number. Many examples can be seen in the *Ethics of the Fathers* (*e.g.*, ch. v.; Taylor, *Sayings*, p. 78 ff.). From this passive observation of seeing a connexion between groups already existing, it was felt that a more active employment of numbers might be possible, and that he who held the secret of the mystic chain might force nature and attain fuller power. In earlier times seven, and in later times ten, was regarded as the important number. The permutation of letters and numbers is called צִירוּף. As perfected in the *Sēfer Yĕṣīra*, which is arranged according to the letters of the alphabet, it is doubt-

less Pythagorean, but the Jews cannot have borrowed it altogether; the knowledge of the science was ascribed to Bezalel (T. B. *Berakhoth*, 55*a*).

(*b*) *Classes of angels and demiurges.*—The belief in the transcendence of the Deity produced a reaction in favour of mediating powers, and of this reaction Gnosticism may be regarded as the origin to no small extent. There is, of course, much angelology in the Apocrypha, and the heavenly beings are arranged in orders and ranks. While in the Prophets angels are merely figurative and poetic ideals, they are frequently found, both in the Apocrypha and in the Talmud, as intercessors and active agents. But they had no share in the work of creation. *Bereshith Rabba* (iii., Theodor, p. 24) strongly repudiates such an idea; it was certainly heretical, and probably Gnostic. The Midrash shows that the order and method of creation are expressly devised to show the falsity of the belief in a divine assistant. This mediator is usually known as Meṭatron (*μετὰ θρόνον*, or *metator*, 'guide,' or *μητάτωρ*, 'the measurer' of the heavens; cf. *ib.* v., Theodor, p. 37, קולו של הקב"ה נעשה ממטרון על הסים; A. Kohut [*Aruch*, Vienna, 1878–92, *s.v.*] suggests that the name is to be derived from Mithra). Elisha b. Abuya, who became a heretic, believed in Meṭatron as one of the two creative powers (T. B. *Ḥagiga*, 15*a*, ed. Goldschmidt, Berlin, 1899, p. 834, see note; *Sanhedrin*, 38*b*). Meṭatron appears in a praiseworthy capacity in his relations with Moses. Thus Moses asks for Meṭatron's intercession with God to avert his death (Tanḥ. ואתחנן, 6, ed. S. Buber, Wilna, 1885, p. 13, § 53); Meṭatron shows the promised land (*Sifrê*, האזינו, *Pisḳ*, 338, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1864, p. 141), and, with other angels, buried Moses (so Targ. Onḳ. to Dt 34[6]). Michael and Meṭatron are sometimes interchanged. On the whole it seems that the belief in a Meṭatron became popular until checked by such direct repudiations as in *Bereshith Rabba* (for the main references to Meṭatron see A. Jellinek, *Beth-Hamidrash*, Leipzig, 1853–78; see also T. B. *Ḥullin*, 60*a*, and J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God*, London, 1912, p. 172).

The function of all these angelic beings was to facilitate man's access to the Deity. The multiplication of these agents led to their differentiation; some became good, others evil. Hence the connexion of the Ḳabbālā with other systems is clear.

Man being made in the image of God, it was possible to conceive of the divine nature by analogy. Hence the Deity and the demiurge or Meṭatron are pictured in anthropomorphisms which are sometimes highly fantastic and even indelicate. Thus the *Shi'ûr Ḳômā*, a Ḳabbalistic work of early date, attempts to give the dimensions of the Deity and to describe His members. But such hyperbole is repudiated in no uncertain language.

(*c*) *The ḳ'lîphôth*, '*scales*' *or* '*shells*,' belong to the dualistic system which assigns to the universe a 'right side' and a 'left side,' with which light or purity and darkness or impurity are associated respectively. The *ḳ'lîphôth* are also closely associated with emanations.

(*d*) *The syzygies, or pairs* (סוד הלשת), are a variation of dualism, and imply the harmony of nature. Everything possesses a mate. This idea is known in the Talmud and Midrash; it is used to demonstrate the perfection of the universe.

(*e*) *The* '*chariot*' (מרכבה) of Ezk 1 was the vehicle on which the pious ('riders on the chariot') could ascend to God. The goal of the chariot was the 'Halls' (היכלות). By mysteries, prayers, the help of angels, magic, permutation, and sometimes by asceticism, this end could be attained, and the human soul could be so uplifted as to effect union with the divine world-soul. Just as the angels ride on the chariot in the Apocalypses, so can man, if pure, find a place with them. He must overcome his temptation, which will appear as malevolent spirits, striving to dislodge him. These he can vanquish by formulas and prayers.

(*f*) *The emanations* (השפעה and אצילות [either אצילות, on the analogy of Jer 38[12], 'arm-joints,' or, more probably, אצילות; cf. Ex 24[11], Is 41[9]; see Nu 11[17]) are a link between the Godhead and the world. By means of them the pious can even react on the Deity. The doctrine of emanation is, of course, pantheistic. God was said to be in all, and nothing existed apart from Him. By outpourings from the Godhead all created beings were formed. They are, therefore, directly connected with it. The Arabic philosophers gave this Neo-Platonic theory to the Jews, by whom it was first accepted (*e.g.*, by Baḥya) and then rejected (by Judah Halevi and Maimonides). Already in the 4th cent. the emanation theory existed in a modified form. In Midr. *Ex. Rabb.* xv. (see A. Epstein in *REJ* xxix. [1894] 77), three primal elements, water, air, and fire, produce three others, darkness, light, and wisdom; these six combine to produce the world. Light is, however, often regarded as an emanation direct from the Deity, God's garment, on the basis of Ps 104[2], being called 'Light.' When Jewish philosophers repudiated emanation, it was adopted by the Ḳabbalists. The *Massekheth Aṣîlûth*, according to general opinion, dates from the 12th cent., and it holds to the emanation doctrine. The Ḳabbalists found that emanation suited the theory of the *s'fîrôth*, and for this reason they favoured it. Emanation, being a voluntary act on the part of God, permits the possibility of His creating the world without any change in His personality resulting from the act; it surmounts the difficulty of a *creatio ex nihilo*, and also the difficulty of attributing a finite creation to an infinite Creator.

(*g*) *Limitation* (צמצום) or concentration, is the act of God's self-withdrawal in order that the universe might be created, and is explained in *Genesis Rabba* (iv., Theodor, p. 27) by an illustration of the power of concave and convex mirrors to transform the outward appearance of an unchanged object. This theory precludes the identification of the substance with the Creator, who is the 'Endless' or 'Infinite.'

(*h*) *The* '*Endless*,' *or* '*Infinite*' (אין סוף).—This negative attribute is applied by Azriel b. Menahem to the Deity because He is unknowable, and positive attributes are inapplicable. He is immutable, and the act of creation would imply a change. Hence the doctrine of limitation is necessary, and the first concentration leads to others, which result in the ten *s'fîrôth*.

(*i*) *The ten s'fîrôth, or spheres.*—Three etymologies are given for this term: (1) from the root *sâfar*, 'to count,' (2) from *sappîr*, 'bright,' 'brilliance,' and (3) from *σφαῖρα*; the last is considered to be the most probable. The doctrine of the *s'fîrôth* is a development of emanation. It reconciles a belief in the *creatio ex nihilo* with the exclusion of the Creator from thought and action in creating, which exclusion was maintained by the Neo-Platonists. The Ḳabbalists, in adopting the emanations, made the *s'fîrôth*, or qualities, stand for the Neo-Platonic grades of wisdom. The *Ên Sôf*, or infinite light or 'point' (נקודה), produced three groups of *s'fîrôth*, intellectual, spiritual, and material, each containing three members. The *s'fîrôth* thus number ten (for pictures and charts see *JE* iii. 474 ff.).

From the *Ên Sôf* came, in the following order: (1) the Crown (כתר), the 'principle of principles' and the first emanation after the Ên Sôf. It is the first contact of the infinite with the finite, and is known by many designations. (2) Wisdom (חכמה) and (3) Intelligence (בינה) are derived from the Crown. They form a syzygy, being regarded as Father (Wisdom) and Mother (Intelligence). Hence they are parallel, and their pro-

duct is Reason (דַּעַת), but this is not a separate emanation. These constitute the first group. The second consists of (4) Mercy (חֶסֶד), a father, and (5) Justice (דִּין), a mother, which produce (6) Beauty (תִּפְאֶרֶת). Mercy and Justice are both qualities of the divine nature which check one another and produce a harmonious mean. The third group consists of (7) Victory (נֵצַח), (8) Glory (הוֹד), and (9) Foundation (יְסוֹד). Victory and Glory, again, are regarded as parents that produce Foundation as their offspring. The last of the *sefirôth*, (10) Sovereignty (מַלְכוּת), has no clear connexion with the rest.

The *sefirôth* are often known by different names—*e.g.*, גְּבוּרָה = דִּין, and פַּחַד = חֶסֶד. Abelson's chapter on the *sefirôth* (*Jewish Mysticism*, p. 136) should be carefully studied. According to some Ḳabbalists, the *sefirôth* bear a direct relation to the corporeal members of Ādām Ḳadmôn.

(*j*) *Ādām Ḳadmôn, or primordial man.*—This idea, originally held by the Gnostics, of an incorruptible primitive man, fashioned in the image of God, is also known to Philo and the Midrash. This being is sexless or bisexual (see *Genesis Rabba*, viii., Theodor, p. 55). St. Paul's idea of a heavenly and an earthly Adam (1 Co 15^{45-50}) is, no doubt, based on the Midrash. The various portions of the body of Ādām Ḳadmôn are correlated to the *sefirôth* (see *JE* i. 181 and xi. 155). From the heavenly man the earthly man is sprung. The Ādām Ḳadmôn is held by some to occupy a position between the *Ên Sôf* and the *sefirôth*.

(*k*) *Metempsychosis* (גִּלְגּוּלִים) was rejected with uncompromising severity by Jewish philosophers, but was adopted by the Ḳabbalists. It is taught in the *Zôhar* (ii. 99*b*, tr. Jean de Pauly, Paris, 1908, iii. 400), and was regarded as an answer of the problem of the prosperity of the wicked. Luria believed that all souls were created at the same time as the different parts of Adam's body; hence the quality of the souls varies according to the particular member of Adam's body to which they are related. His successors taught that souls could wander on earth to fulfil duties neglected by a man in his lifetime or to assist others to perform their duties. The term דִּבּוּק was used to express the act of junction of a soul with a living man.

(*l*) *Evil.*—According to the Ḳabbalists, evil is essentially finite, as opposed to the divine good. It is the left side in the syzygy. Evil is an appearance, not a substance, and man's sin consists of his separation from the Divine Being. This separation, or 'Fall,' gave man the potentiality of sin, which he previously lacked. By penitence and asceticism man can join the 'Riders of the Merkābhā' and attain union with perfection.

(*m*) *The idea of the microcosm*, or a comparison of man's frame and members with the parts of the universe (macrocosm) and nature, came from the Greek philosophers to the Jews through Neo-Platonism. It was much favoured by the Ḳabbalists, and is mentioned in the *Zôhar*. Of the many Ḳabbalistic devices and practices, notice must here be limited to three.

(*n*) *Amulets* (קְמִיעוֹת, also קְטוֹלוֹת or רְשׁוּמוֹת), private charms and prophylactic devices, were much in vogue. In spite of the fact that Maimonides and other teachers emphatically opposed the use of amulets and denied their efficacy, the Ḳabbalists were not strong enough to resist the attractions of this superstition. Amulets were regarded as potent charms to ward off sickness and evil, to help women in labour, and generally to assist the wearer to attain his desire. The charms were usually written on parchment or engraved on a precious metal. The so-called shield of David, the open hand, and the circle were popular forms. The word שַׁדַּי usually figured, in addition to permutations of the Divine Name or the *sefirôth*. Very frequently the prayer attributed to Neḥunya ha-Ḳāna (1st cent. A.D.) was used, or its initials (for the prayer cf. Singer, p. 273, last par.). The initials of the first line (א"נ בְּכֹחַ יְ"ה) and of the second line (which form the words קְרַע שָׂטָן, 'Rend Satan') occur in most amulets. (Reference should be made to M. Gaster, *Sword of Moses*, London, 1896, where many amulets are cited and explained; a Moroccan charm against scorpions is reproduced in *JE* ix. 24; cf. also art. CHARMS AND AMULETS [Jewish].) It must be remembered that in many cases people who used amulets did so from spiritual and not material motives. The constant recitation of Scriptural verses and prayers was intended to relieve the mind and calm the soul, not directly to act on the body; hence not all amulets were put to superstitious use.

(*o*) *The casting of lots*, an old Biblical and Talmudic custom, for which many motives may be traced, was also adopted by Ḳabbalists and practised in various forms, chiefly as a means of divination. Methods similar to the *sortes vergilianæ* were in vogue.

(*p*) *Change of name* (שִׁנּוּי הַשֵּׁם) was a Ḳabbalistic device, no doubt based on the ideas of penitence and regeneration, employed in case of serious illness as a life-saving expedient (see M. Gaster, *Book of Prayer*, i. 195). Frequently the new name chosen was Ḥayyim, 'Life,' or some variant, such as Vital.

3. The chief Ḳabbalists and their works.—The following lists are by no means exhaustive, but they contain the principal exponents of Ḳabbalist doctrines and the most important books on which the Ḳabbālā is based, and are intended to serve the reader as a guide for further investigation.

(*a*) *Ḳabbalists.*—(1) *Aaron b. Samuel* († after 870) is important as having carried the Ḳabbālā to Europe from Babylon. He lived in Italy. Until modern times he was regarded as a mythical personage, but his historicity has been proved by Neubauer (see above, p. 623).

(2) *Solomon ibn Gabirol* (1021–58), a Spanish philosopher, though scarcely to be included among the ranks of the Ḳabbalists, must be noted in relation to the Ḳabbālā, because he introduced Neo-Platonism among the Jews. He is, therefore, responsible for the theory of emanations. See, further, art. IBN GABIROL.

(3) *Judah b. Samuel* of Regensburg (the Pious, חָסִיד, † 1217) was the founder of a school of noted Ḳabbalists (see above, p. 623).

(4) *Eleazar b. Judah b. Ḳalonymus* of Worms (1176–1238) was a pupil of Judah the Pious. He was not only a Ḳabbalist, but a famous Talmudical scholar and a scientist. His most important work is the *Rôḳeaḥ*. In his *Sha'arē has-Sōdh* he opposed anthropomorphism.

(5) *Moses b. Naḥman* (Naḥmanides, Ramban), the famous Spanish Rabbi (1194–1270), though hardly a Ḳabbalist, since he repudiated several fundamental doctrines (*e.g.*, he held a *creatio ex nihilo*), supported Ḳabbalistic teaching in many ways. In his Pentateuchal commentary the influence of the Ḳabbālā is marked.

(6) *Abraham b. Samuel Abulafia* (born 1240 at Saragossa, † after 1291) was one of the founders of Spanish Ḳabbālā. He was an ascetic and practised all kinds of permutations, but did not attempt to work miracles. He travelled in Palestine and made a special journey to Rome in order to convert the pope (1280). In Sicily he gave himself out to be the Messiah, but was discredited by Solomon b. Adret. He was a voluminous writer, but was responsible for much unworthy juggling and *gemaṭria*. This influenced the later Ḳabbālā. Perhaps the most important feature of his teaching was his desire to convert Islām and Christianity to his views. In this desire to unite the three faiths he was, in a way, the forerunner of Elie

Benamozegh, Rabbi of Leghorn, whose life work was directed to the same end (see E. Benamozegh, *Israël et l'humanité*).

(7) *Joseph b. Abraham Jiḳatilla* (1248–1305), a Spanish Ḳabbalist, was, unlike his teacher Abraham Abulafia, a thaumaturgist. He tried to reconcile philosophy and Ḳabbālā. He belonged to the mystic school, but made a large use of *gematria*. His works were many, chief among them being *Ginnath 'Egóz* and *Shá'arē Ṣedeḳ*. His commentary on the Haggādā for Passover, מגיד מישרים, was very popular.

(8) *Isaac ibn Laṭif*, a Spanish physician († 1290), attempted to combine philosophy and Ḳabbālā. Much Ḳabbalistic terminology is due to his efforts to secure precision in reasoning and the exact use of names and qualities.

(9) *Azriel b. Menaḥem* was also known as Ezra; in fact, the two names gave rise to the belief that Ezra and Azriel were brothers. Azriel, the author of several works (born in Gerona in 1160, † in 1238), was a pupil of Isaac the Blind. He taught the theory of negative attributes, emanations, and the *sefiróth*, on which he wrote a commentary, and denied the *creatio ex nihilo*. He was greatly influenced by Gabirol.

(10) *Isaac the Blind* of Posquières was regarded as the link between the mysticism of the Geonim and the Ḳabbalists; but, as he is said to have lived in the 13th cent., this is unlikely. Yet the Ḳabbalists held him in high esteem. Parts of the *Bāhir* may be attributed to him.

(11) *Baḥya b. Asher* of Saragossa († 1340) must be noted as one of the first Bible exegetes to employ Ḳabbalistic methods for Bible interpretation. Himself a literalist and rationalist, he uses Ḳabbālā with care and judgment. Among his other works, his *Discourses* (*Kad haḳ-Ḳemaḥ*) is the most important.

(12) *Isaac b. Moses Arama* (1420–94) was more of a philosopher than a Ḳabbalist. He belongs to the Spanish school, but can scarcely be said to have added much to Ḳabbālā.

(13) *Menaḥem b. Benjamin Recanati* was a prominent Italian Ḳabbalist of the late 13th century. He is noteworthy for his mystic commentaries on the Bible, one of which was translated into Latin by Pico di Mirandola.

(14) *Isaac* (*b. Solomon Ashkenazi*) *Luria* (Ari) (1534–72) was the most important of the later Ḳabbalists. He lived in Palestine, and to him the whole of the modern Ḳabbalā may be traced. He was a hermit for some time, and had ecstatic visions. His chief disciples were Cordovero, el-Ḳabiz, Joseph Qaro, Ḥagiz, and Vital. The system and practices which he founded are still operative in the East. Most of his teaching was written down by his disciples, chiefly by Ḥayyim Vital. His system is far too wide to be summarized, but he is most important for (1) his teaching of metempsychosis or 'impregnation,' and (2) his introduction of the Ḳabbālā into daily life. Every Oriental Prayer Book bears traces of his ordinances and recommendations. He even promulgated a new code, *Shulḥān 'Ārūkh Shel 'Ārī*, which his followers adopted and diffused. So great was the esteem in which he was held that his followers almost 'canonized' him. His teaching called forth opposition from the anti-Ḳabbalists, but his piety and holiness were his most effectual answer to attack.

(15) *Ḥayyim Vital* (1543–1620) was a pupil of Luria, to whose position he succeeded. He was a visionary and an alchemist; he also believed himself to be the Messiah for some time. Vital is important because he edited most of Luria's works, which the latter rarely committed to writing; but he also wrote works of his own.

(16) *Israel Saruḳ*, a pupil of Luria, is noteworthy for having spread in Italy and Germany the new Ḳabbalistic teaching of Luria. He had great influence with Menaḥem Azarya of Fano, who became an adherent of Luria's school and spent large sums on buying his MSS.

(17) *Leo of Modena* (1571–1648; see art. JUDAISM, p. 606[a]), whose curious anomalies make him one of the most perplexing characters in Jewish history, attacked the Ḳabbālā in his *'Ari Nōḥēm*. He shows that as a system it is unscientific and that the *Zōhar* is a late work. For this he is important in the history of Ḳabbalā.

(18) *Ḥayyim Joseph David Azulai* (1724–1807), author of the *Shēm haǧ-Gᵉdhōlim*, a most prolific and versatile writer, carried the Ḳabbālā of Luria to extremes. His credulity and superstition are all the more remarkable when his scholarship is examined. His works are full of numerical permutations, etc.

(19) *Israel b. Eliezer, Ba'al Shem Ṭob* (Besht) (1700–1760), was the founder of the Ḥasidīm, a sect which marks the latest stage in the history of Ḳabbalā and which developed from the school of Luria, to which it was finally in opposition. Besht, though poor, exercised unbounded influence in Poland and Galicia. Little is known of his life, and his doctrines can be studied only from his followers, for he wrote no books. Besht was a pantheist and rejected emanation. Further, he preached joy and ecstasy as opposed to asceticism. He raised the position of the Ṣaddiḳ to a very high level of authority. The breach between Talmudism and Ḥasidism did not take place till after his death.

(20) *Baer* (*Dob*) of Meseritz (1710–72) was one of the earliest and most important teachers of the Ḥasidic movement. He was an ascetic and an enthusiastic adherent of the school of Luria until he became acquainted with Besht, whom he succeeded as leader of the Ḥasidīm. Baer fought their battle against the Talmudists until his death. Like his master, he left no written works.

(*b*) *Works.*—(1) The *Sefer Yᵉṣirā* is the oldest Ḳabbalistic book. It was attributed to Abraham and also to 'Aḳiba, but belongs in all probability to the 6th century. It deals with permutations of numbers and letters, and is the first source of the emanations and *sefiróth*. The *Yᵉṣirā* was so widely read that Sa'adya wrote a commentary to it. It is the basis of the *Zōhar*, and hence perhaps the most important of all works for the study of the Ḳabbālā (see Abelson, *Jewish Mysticism*, p. 98, etc.).

(2) *Sēfer haḇ-Bāhir*, a mystic commentary on the first chapters of Genesis, was originally attributed to Neḥunya haḳ-Ḳāna. It is now regarded as the work of Isaac the Blind, with later additions. The *Bāhir* believes in the eternity of matter; it knows the *sefiróth*. It is important as a precursor and type of the *Zōhar*.

(3) The *Hēkhalóth* (or 'Halls'), Greater and Less, are Geonic mystic writings, bearing relation to the book of Enoch. They are attributed to Solomon b. Elisha. The works deal with the Merkābhā, and, finally, with the seven heavenly 'Halls.' The *Hēkhālóth* influenced the liturgy, chiefly the Ḳᵉdhushshāh.

(4) The *Zōhar* is the most important of all Ḳabbalistic works. It was circulated by Moses b. Shem Ṭob de Leon and attributed by him to Simeon b. Joḥai; the forgery was discovered after his death. Many Ḳabbalists still continued to believe in its authenticity, which was finally disproved by Elijah Delmedigo and also by Leo of Modena. It is now agreed that the *Zōhar* was not composed by one person. It is written in Aramaic and contains various appendices. In form it is a mystic and allegorical commentary on the Pentateuch. No book, except the Bible and the Talmud, has

been so widely read by Jews. It is the centre of the Ḳabbālā, and innumerable works and commentaries have been written round it. Christians as well as Jews have studied it (see art. ZOHAR).

(5) *The Book of Raziel*, said to have been taught to Adam by the angel Raziel, and also to Noah, is a compilation, probably by various writers. It has affinities to the *Shi'ūr Ḳômā* and *Sword of Moses*. According to Zunz, *Raziel* was the work of Eleazar of Worms. It describes the celestial organization, and gives directions for the preparation of amulets.

(6) *Shi'ūr Ḳômā* deals with the dimensions and members of the Deity. It is usually included in *Raziel*. The book was known to Solomon b. Jeroham (b. 886). Gaster (*Monatsschrift*, xxxvii. [1893] 224 ff.) shows that it goes back as far as the last pre-Christian century.

(7) *Gilgūlim* is the name given to lists of transmigrations of souls. Many of these works were composed by the school of Luria.

LITERATURE.—*GENERAL.*—The art. 'Cabala' in *JE* iii. 456ff. (with the subsidiary artt.) should be carefully read, with its bibliography. See also J. Abelson, *Jewish Mysticism*, London, 1913; A. E. Waite, *The Doctrine and Literature of the Kabalah*, do. 1902, *Secret Doctrine in Israel*, do. 1913; A. Franck, *La Kabbale*[2], Paris, 1889; I. Abrahams, *A Short History of Jewish Literature*, London, 1906, ch. xvii.; C. D. Ginsburg, *The Kabbalah*, do. 1865; H. Sperling, 'Jewish Mysticism,' *Aspects of the Hebrew Genius*, ed. L. Simon, do. 1910, pp. 145-176; Isaac Myer, *The Qabbalah*, Philadelphia, 1888.

SHEKHINAH.—J. Abelson, *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*, London, 1912.

THE YESHA.—The text, with commentary of Dunash b. Tamim, has recently been published by M. Grossberg, London, 1902; parts are translated by W. W. Westcott, do. 1893.

THE ZOHAR.—A French tr. by Jean de Pauly has been published by 'Eliphas Lévi' (pseudonym), *Le Livre des splendeurs*, Paris, 1894; S. L. MacGregor Mathers, *The Kabbala Unveiled*, London, 1887, contains parts of the *Zôhar* translated (both of these books must be used with caution); see also A. Jounet, *La Clef du Zohar*, Paris, 1909.

EMANATION AND SEFIROTH.—M. Ehrenpreis, *Die Entwicklung der Emanationslehre in der Kabbala des xiii. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfort, 1895. Many references to the *sefiróth* will be found in the Sephardic *Hosha'anoth for Hosha'ana Rabba*; this service may be conveniently seen, with tr., in M. Gaster, *Book of Prayer*, London, 1901 ff.; L. Tritel, 'Die alexandrinische Lehre von den Mittelwesen,' *Judaica (Cohen's Festschrift)*, Berlin, 1912, pp. 177-185.

NEO-PLATONISM.—F. Dieterici's tr. of *Man and Beast* cited above (p. 624). In connexion with this, reference should be made to Baḥya b. Paḳuda, whose *Guide* has been edited by A. S. Yahuda, Leyden, 1912; C. Elsee, *Neoplatonism in Relation to Christianity*, Cambridge, 1908.

LATER HISTORY OF KABBALA.—E. Benamozegh, *Israël et l'humanité*, Paris, 1914; S. Schechter, *The Chassidim*, London, 1887, first essay in *Studies in Judaism*, do. 1896, pp. 1-55, the essays on 'Saints' and 'Safed' in the 2nd ser. of *Studies in Judaism*, do. 1908, pp. 148-181 and 202-285; see also his 'God and the World' (pp. 21-45) and other essays in *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, do. 1909, and 'Asceticism, the Law of the Nazirite,' in *Jew. Chron.*, 5th June 1914, p. 17.

H. LOEWE.

KABEIROI.—The elucidation of the Kabeiroi-mysteries is one of the most perplexing problems of old Mediterranean religion; nor can it yet be said that modern research has thrown full light upon them. The literary record is partly Greek and partly Latin; but the Latin is derived mainly from Greek sources. It does not begin before the 5th cent. B.C., by which time the mysteries had long been in vogue and had already spread from Samothrace to other centres, such as Lemnos and Thebes; it cannot therefore speak with authority concerning the earliest period. Even the 5th cent. writers are vague and confused, and the later writers contradict each other at several important points. The record is sufficient, however, to establish two facts: that the original home of the mysteries was Samothrace, and that they were the institution of a non-Hellenic people. As regards the latter point, the statement of Diodorus Siculus is of interest and importance that the aboriginal natives of Samothrace 'possessed an ancient dialect of their own, much of which is still preserved down to the present day in their religious rites.'[1] He is not likely to be speaking at random here. The word 'Kabeiroi' itself has never been satisfactorily explained on any theory of Hellenic derivation;[2] and the personal names of the Samothracian divinities that have been recorded by Mnaseas of Patrai[3]—Axieros, Axiokersos, and Axiokersa—though the forms have been semi-Hellenized, betray an alien speech.

Now nearly every writer starts with the fact, and constructs on it a theory of the origin of the cult, that the word Kabeiroi must be equated with the Semitic גִּבֹּרִים, meaning 'the mighty ones'; the almost exact equivalence of the two sounds could hardly have been accidental, especially in view of the term *θεοὶ μεγάλοι*, the constant Hellenic synonym of the Kabeiroi. It appears also that every one who accepts this origin of the word has regarded as inevitable the corollary that the Kabeiroi-mysteries were an importation from Phœnicia, the nearest or most likely centre whence Semitic influence could reach Samothrace. Hence certain scholars have been led to interpret them in the light of the knowledge that can be gathered of Phœnician and Semitic religion.[4] But upon reflexion the necessity of that corollary is by no means obvious. Phœnician traders may have found an aboriginal mystery-cult in this remote and inaccessible island; they may have attached their own descriptive title 'Kabeirim,' 'the mighty ones,' to the divinities that they found in the island, because this corresponded to some local divine appellative that the later Greeks translated by the phrase *οἱ μεγάλοι θεοί*; then, through the spread of Phœnician trade, the Semitic name for the island-deities acquired permanent vogue.

This hypothesis avoids the difficulties that beset the theory of the Phœnician origin of the rites, which is attested by no ancient writer of any authority, for Herodotus definitely pronounces them Pelasgic,[5] while other writers of the 5th cent. and later periods trace them to Phrygia or Crete.[6] The names attached to the Samothracian deities by Mnaseas are non-Semitic. Nor is there anything in what is revealed to us of the ritual or the divine personalities that points clearly to Phœnicia. Finally, there is no evidence yet forthcoming that the Phœnicians ever attached the appellative 'Kabeirim' to any group of their own divinities.

The legends, beginning in the 5th cent., that associate the rites with Crete and Phrygia may be of some value for religious history, but contribute nothing to the question of ultimate origin. Certain general considerations and certain coincidences seem rather to point to Thrace as their source. The Thracian coast lies nearest to Samothrace, and the aboriginal settlers in the island could most easily have come over thence. We have fair evidence that the ministers of the mysteries were called 'Saoi' or 'Saioi,' and Strabo mentions a Thracian tribe of that name, while the name Saon is applied by Lykophron to some settlement of the Korybantes located by the scholiast in Thrace.[7] Also, when we look closely at the evidence we may discern certain features in the Samothracian religion which would accord with the theory of its Thracian origin.

We must begin with certain monumental evidence which is earlier than the literary. The

[1] v. 47.

[2] See, *e.g.*, D. M. Robinson's attempts in *Amer. Journ. Archæol.* xvii. [1913] 363.

[3] *FHG* iii. 154, frag. 27.

[4] See esp. T. Friedrich, *Kabiren und Keilinschriften*, Leipzig, 1894.

[5] ii. 51. [6] See Strabo, p. 472.

[7] Serv. ad Verg. *Æn.* ii. 325; Strabo, p. 457; Festus, p. 474; Lyk. *Kass.* 78, schol. *ib.* (the sacerdotal title Σαοί might be connected with the Phrygo-Thracian Σάβοι).

explorations conducted in the island by A. Conze[1] in 1873 revealed the foundations of the original shrine that was constructed in the 6th cent. B.C.; and a central point in these was a deep sacrificial pit into which offerings were let down. The same nether chamber has been found in the Kabeirion near Thebes, which also belonged to the 6th cent. and to which more particular reference will be made below. We discern the architectural provision for a chthonian cult; and we discover something more definite and certain than all that the later literature can teach us concerning the nature of the divinities worshipped: that they were powers of the under world, having fructifying functions, no doubt, and probably associated with the ideas of birth and death and with the world of ghosts. For this reason alone the cult would be fenced with a mystery, as chthonian ritual would be too dangerous to be openly approached.[2] It is to be surmised that these Samothracian powers might originally have been spirits rather than definite and individualized *θεοί*, and that something of the vagueness and indefiniteness of the ghost-world might attach to them; this would account for the vague collective name applied to them, 'the mighty ones,' and also for the bewilderment of the later Greeks concerning the equation of them to their own clear-shaped divinities.

Other archæological evidence of importance is forthcoming from the excavations undertaken by Dörpfeld and the German School of Archæology on the site of the Kabeirion near Thebes in 1887. The architectural remains pointed to three periods of the shrine, the earliest building being assigned by Dörpfeld to the 6th or 5th cent. B.C., which would accord with a record in Pausanias[3] that the shrine was violated in the time of the Persian invasion; and some of the objects of religious art found within or near the precincts, bronze-dedications and fragments of vases, are dated to the earlier half of the 5th century.[4] We must suppose, then, a migration of the cult from Samothrace or Lemnos into Bœotia in the 6th cent. B.C. or even earlier;[5] and we cannot assign its introduction to any known fact in the history of colonization and tribal movements. What concerns us chiefly is the question how much light is thrown on the original Samothracian religion by the discoveries on the site of the Theban Kabeirion. In one point at least the ritual of the transplanted cult remained true to the tradition of its home; behind the cellar was dug a double sacrificial pit into which offerings were thrown, the chthonian ritual proper to the powers of the lower world.[6] As regards the personality and form of the divinities, we must turn to the inscriptions and the works of art. Among the latter the most important and striking is a broken vase of the 4th cent., on which appears a group with five inscribed figures;[7] on the right reclines a stately bearded person, half-clad in *ἱμάτιον* and holding out a cup, his name 'Kabiros' appearing above his head; in front of him stands a boy inscribed Παῖς, turning his back on the elder god and drawing wine from a *κρατήρ*; before him, also fronting to the left, is an ugly little dwarf figure clasping his hands below his chin, and preserved only as far as the middle of the body; he bears the singular name of Πρατόλαος, as if he stood for the earliest generation of men on the earth; he is gazing in excited wonder on a group that forms the left extremity of the scene, a male and female personage—only the upper parts of the body are preserved—in loving union and converse, she designated as Κρατεία, he by the enigmatical name Μίτος. All these are ideal beings of the Kabeiros-circle, not represented, however, directly as objects of worship; on the contrary, the spirit of caricature is marked in the last three. But we might imagine that the vase-painter would keep in touch with the popular belief and the tradition of the rites. His chief figure is Kabeiros *par excellence*, whom he closely assimilates to Dionysos; this would be natural at Thebes, and all the more inevitable if there was lingering a tradition of a Thracian origin of the Samothracian mysteries. The Παῖς represents the boy-minister, the young god whom Mnaseas calls Κάσμιλος, and who was an important and essential figure in the cult, though here he appears in a trivial character; for the numerous inscriptions that have been found, in which the individual worshippers commemorated their association with the shrine, contain the mention of no other divinities save those of Kabeiros and 'the Son.'[1] This evidence outweighs all other; we must assume that in the Bœotian Kabeirion these, the elder and the younger god, were the predominating personages of the religion; and, as no local reason can be discovered for this, we must suppose it to be part of the Samothracian tradition, which we shall find preserved also in the later literary records. But the vase-painter has added two other figures that have the air of divinities, 'Krateia' and 'Mitos.' Naming the goddess 'the mighty one,' he probably intended her for the female counterpart of Kabeiros, the earth-goddess who in Greek lands was individualized and idealized as Demeter-Kore; her figure has something in it of the Kore-type, and her name Krateia reminds us of Πασικράτεια, 'the almighty one,' a *sobriquet* of Kore at Selinus.[2] As to 'Mitos,' the only clue to his name and significance has been found in a passage of Clement of Alexandria, who on good authority mentions *μίτος* as a hieratic word of the Orphic sacred books, meaning 'seed.'[3] We are tempted, then, to interpret this mysterious figure as the divine nourisher of all life, possibly the procreative god of the earth; but we should be embarrassed in fixing his true relation to the other elder god Kabeiros. As the vase-painter appears to have been a frivolous person with a smattering of Orphic lore, he is not a trusty exponent of genuine Samothracian religion. But his quaint little figure, 'Pratolaos,' may have been suggested by real Kabeiric legend, since, according to a passage in Hippolytus,[4] part of which may be derived from a lost ode of Pindar, it was claimed in both Samothrace and Lemnos that Kabeiros was 'the first man Adam'; it is therefore not unlikely that the mystery teaching included some dogma concerning the origin of man.

Turning now to the literary record, we find it confusing and often contradictory, as we should expect from writers trying to define and Hellenize what was indefinite and alien. For certain historic reasons, especially owing to the relations of Athens to Lemnos, the Lemnian Kabeiroi-rites appear earlier in literature than the Samothracian, having attracted the attention of Æschylus, Pherekydes, and Akousilaos. As the chief god of Lemnos was Hephaistos, we find, as we should expect, that the two last-mentioned historians make much of Hephaistos in their genealogical account of the

[1] *Archäologische Untersuchungen auf Samothrake*, i. 20, ii. 21.

[2] It has been pointed out that Greek mysteries generally are consecrated to 'chthonian' divinities; cf. *CGS* iii. 132 f.

[3] IX. xxv. 6.

[4] *Athen. Mitth.* xii. [1887] 270.

[5] Pausanias, in his perverse account of the Kabeirion of Thebes, carries it back to pre-historic days (IX. xxv. 7 f.).

[6] *Athen. Mitth.* xiii. [1888] 91, 95.

[7] Figured in *Athen. Mitth.* xiii. [1888], Taf. ix., and Roscher, ii. 2538. See specially O. Kern's art. 'Die böotischen Kabiren,' in *Hermes*, xxiii. [1890] 1-16.

[1] *CIG* (*Sept.*) i. 2458, 2467, etc.

[2] Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, ii.[2], Leipzig, 1901, p. 734 (cf. *CGS* iii. 126).

[3] *Strom.* v. 244 B (E. Abel, *Orphica*, Leipzig, 1885, frag. 253).

[4] *Philosoph.* v. 7, 8 (*PG* xvi. 3127, 3142).

Kabeiroi,[1] and their authority may have influenced Herodotus's view[2] and some later genealogical fictions. Yet, outside Lemnos, the Hellenic smith-god had no affinity with this divine group, though in the later art the Kabeiroi may have borrowed their hammer from him. We cannot, therefore, deduce anything concerning their aboriginal nature from their local *rapprochement* to the Lemnian god. From the literary tangle one fact of some importance for our view of these divine personalities emerges: the more trustworthy records present the Kabeiroi not as a vague plurality like the Korybantes, but either as a trinity or as a duality. The latter view of them is in accord with the evidence of the inscriptions from the Theban Kabeirion, with the later identification of them with the Dioskouroi, and with the statement of Hippolytus[3]—mainly confirmed by Varro—concerning the two ithyphallic statues that stood in the Samothracian shrine uplifting their hands towards heaven; and the scholiast on Apollonius Rhodius, who summarizes Hellenistic learning on the subject, mentions a current view that the Kabeiroi were originally a group of two—an elder and a younger god whom the learned Hellenist might call Zeus and Dionysos.[4] We may believe that this aspect of them is original; it could not have been a later Hellenic fiction, for it clashed with the prevalent craving to identify them with the Hellenic Twin-brethren, a youthful and coeval couple. The old earth-deities of Samothrace must have been so far clothed with individual personality before entering on their Hellenic career. But those older and later authorities who attest a Samothracian trinity were probably justified; for it is most probable that the earth-power there as in all other Ægean lands had developed a female personality; and the Hellenes, who would in any case have imposed a goddess, probably found one, at least in embryo, already there in the island mystery-cult when they came to know it. We cannot lightly reject the statement of Mnaseas of Patrai (or Patara), an antiquarian of the latter part of the 3rd cent. B.C., merely because this writer appears to have been usually reckless and futile; for, maintaining that the Kabeiroi were a trinity, he actually gives us their names, as above mentioned—Axieros, Axiokersos, and Axiokersa—the last being evidently feminine, the other two being appellatives of the elder and younger god.[5] He would have had no reasonable motive for forging this statement, nor is it likely that he would have forged so well. These names ring genuine, belonging not to Hellenic speech but to some language akin to it, such as Thracian. Another Samothracian cult-name, applied like Axieros or Axiokersos to the young god of the trio, was Κάδμιλος or Κάσμιλος, meaning apparently 'the minister'; and this name alone is sufficient to explain how the story of the wandering Kadmos and Harmonia came to be engrafted on the hieratic legend of the island.

But, if the existence of the female earth-spirit, conceived as earth-mother or earth-bride, within the original Samothracian trio can be accepted as proved, she would seem to have been subordinate to the male principle of divinity. The later historians and antiquarians may have tried to assign to the Phrygian Rhea-Cybele or the Hellenic Demeter a prominent place in the mysteries;[6] but there is no sign that these alien goddesses were able to unseat the old 'mighty ones' who were predominantly male, and who were therefore capable, on this ground at least, of being fused with the Dioskouroi. This comparative subordination of the female power is of importance for our judgment concerning the ethnic origin of the religion. It makes against any theory that would regard this religion as aboriginally Ægean, or derived from pre-Aryan Phrygia or Crete.

The history of the mysteries is part of the secular history of the Mediterranean. We do not know at what early period they had spread offshoots of themselves in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Troad.[1] Towards the close of the maritime empire of Athens, it was becoming not unusual for Athenians to be initiated.[2] Macedonia, perhaps owing to its enthusiasm for Dionysiac worship, was deeply interested in them; and the establishment of Macedonian supremacy gave them a leading position in the Mediterranean. Their connexion with the Troad brought them into relation with the Korybantes and the Phrygian mother at least as early as the 5th cent. B.C.,[3] and, later, evoked the interest and devotion of Rome; the learning of Pergamon, Rome's ally and from of old a 'Kabeiric' region,[4] may have helped to propagate the fiction that the Roman Penates were deities taken originally from Samothrace to Troy by Dardanos and from Troy to Rome. With such patronage the mysteries were able to survive and even flourish throughout the latter days of paganism, and in the 4th cent. A.D. Libanios refers to them as still existing.[5] In the course of so long a period, how much they absorbed of alien elements, what transformation of ritual and what contamination of divine legend they experienced, we cannot determine with detailed precision. At the time of their chief expansion in the 4th cent. B.C., we may be sure that they borrowed much in the way of organization and even of doctrine from the greater mysteries of Eleusis; and it was probably due to Eleusinian influences that the female divinity of the Kabeiroi-group was frequently interpreted as Demeter, who was specially termed Kabeiria in Bœotia.[6]

Less natural and appropriate was the Hellenization of the two male Kabeiroi as the Dioskouroi, an interpretation which ignored the important difference of age between the elder and the younger Samothracian god, and in no way harmonized with their aboriginal chthonian character. There is no proof that it came into vogue before the 3rd cent. B.C.;[7] and it probably arose from the coincidence that the Hellenic Dioskouroi were also called Σωτῆρες in their own right, and from the fact that the ancient visitors to Samothrace, who would be often thankful enough to effect a safe landing on that harbourless island, had come to regard the Kabeiroi no longer as chthonian deities of vegetation, but pre-eminently as saviours from the perils of sea; and this was exactly the function of the Dioskouroi. The 'Samothracian saviours' was a name of divine power for the Ægean mariner;[8] but the later writers of the Roman learned world tended to identify the Kabeiroi-trinity with Jupiter, Minerva, and Mercury;[9] and, in accord with a later trend of philosophic-religious exegesis, to interpret the chief male and female deities as Cœlum and Terra, 'Heaven' and 'Earth.'[10]

1 *FHG* i. 71 (Pherekydes, frag. 6). 2 iii. 37.

3 *Philosoph.* v. 8 (*PG* xvi. 3142); cf. Serv. ad Verg. *Æn.* iii. 12: 'Varro et alii complures Magnos deos adfirmant simulacra duo virilia, Castoris et Pollucis in Samothracia ante portum sita.'

4 Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 917.

5 Frag. 27 (*FHG* iii. 154); schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 917.

6 Dion. Hal. i. 61; Lucian, *de Dea Syr.* xv.; Strabo, p. 198; *CGS* iii. 367, 384.

1 Strabo, p. 473. 2 Aristoph. *Pax*, 278.

3 *e.g.*, Pherekydes, frag. 6.

4 Paus. I. iv. 6: ἣν νεμονται οἱ Περγαμηνοί, Καβείρων ἱερὰν φασιν εἶναι τὸ ἀρχαῖον; cf. Aristides, ii. p. 709 (Dindorf).

5 *Pro Aristoph.* (R. Foerster, Leipzig, 1903, ii. 110).

6 Paus. IX. xxv. 5.

7 The earliest evidence is the coin-types of Hephaistia and Syros.

8 We find a κοινὸν Σαμοθρακιαστῶν Σωτηριαστῶν in Rhodes (*Athen. Mitth.* xviii. [1893] 389).

9 Serv. ad Verg. *Æn.* iii. 264. 10 *Ib.* iii. 12.

The indefiniteness of the Kabeiroi-trinity opened the way to this confusion in the interpretation and exposed them to the caprices of the later fashion of the *θεοκρασία*.

It remains to be seen what we can gather concerning the purport and ritual of the mysteries. To consider the latter first—the inscriptions and the architectural remains in Samothrace and the vicinity of Thebes supplement the meagre literary evidence. The sacrifice must have been an essential, if not the central, part of the whole rite. And, as has been pointed out, the sacrifice was chthonian; the victim's head may have been held over the pit and its blood shed into it where the powers of the earth would receive it; or the animal may have been thrown alive into the pit; both these forms of service being Hellenic and not specially Kabeiric. As regards the animal chosen, we find on a vase-fragment from the Theban Kabeirion a bull standing near the reclining Kabeiros with worshippers approaching;[1] but this animal might have been suggested by the fusion of Kabeiros with the Theban Dionysos to whom it properly belongs. In the great mysteries of Andania consecrated to Demeter and Kore, where the Kabeiroi under the name of *μεγάλοι θεοί* had gained a footing, young sows were offered to the latter.[2] Finally, a ram-sacrifice of a peculiar and mystic type may have been part of the Samothracian tradition.[3] But we do not know that the idea of the god's incarnation in the victim, which might transform the sacrificial meal into a sacramental communion, was vividly present in the Samothracian ritual. Nor can we discover there any clear indication of that other idea, sometimes linked with the sacramental and so momentous in the mystery-cults of the Mediterranean area, of the periodic death and resurrection of the deity. Lenormant has indeed drawn this conclusion from certain late and doubtful records and still more doubtful monuments.[4] Clement of Alexandria[5] narrates the legend of the murder of one of the Korybantes by his brethren, and seems to assert that this story was transferred to the Kabeiroi, which is not improbable in view of the general confusion in later literature between Kabeiroi, Korybantes, and Kouretes (see art. KOURETES AND KORYBANTES); but Clement does not clearly state that it ever entered as a motive into the sacred drama of the *Καβειρικὴ τελετή*. The other authority is Firmicus Maternus,[6] who also narrates the murder of Korybas, and then adds: 'This is the Kabeiros to whom the men of Thessalonike used to offer prayers with blood-stained hands.' If there is anything real behind this, we may surmise that the worship of Kabeiros, which we know was prevalent in this Macedonian State, had attracted to itself the actual legend of the murdered and dismembered Dionysos, which was rife in those regions. It would be hazardous to assert that this was an original Kabeiric myth; the old Samothracian religion, being less personal and anthropomorphic than the Hellenic, may not have evolved any mythology of its own.

But the sacramental idea might have been expressed in the Samothracian ritual in other forms than communion with the blood of the divinity. In the Eleusinian mystery the administration of the *κυκεών*—the cereal drink sanctified by the goddess herself and offered by the priest to each of the *μύσται*—may be called a sacrament; and the Eleusinian service must have influenced the later Samothracian at many points. An inscription in Bucharest referring to the Kabeiroi-mysteries, if we accept an attractive restoration, may indicate the mystic ritual of the administration of holy bread and drink to the *μύσται* by the priest; enough at least is preserved to reveal the importance of the sacramental cup.[1]

Such rites of power always enhance the mystic *ἔκλειτ* of the priesthood; and it is not improbable that the priests themselves took the names of the 'great gods' and were called Kabeiroi; for this would explain the inconsequent opinion that prevailed in some learned circles of later antiquity that the Kabeiroi, although the name obviously designated high gods, were only *πρόπολοι*, the ministers of these, like the Korybantes or the Kouretes.[2] One of the most important functions of the priest was the scrutiny of the catechumens, so as to decide if they were ceremonially 'pure' and therefore suitable for admission. In the ancient ritual-code the gravest impurity was bloodshed; and we hear of a Kabeiric official called *Κοίης* or *Κόης*, whose function was the purification of homicides.[3] A text of Livy[4] reveals to us a temple-council or synod, in which the chief magistrate was called *βασιλεύς*, who tried cases of homicide to decide whether the pollution was too great for the temple to offer them asylum; for the rights of asylum were rigidly respected in Samothrace and might be abused. The powers of the lower world, to whom the *μύσται* were consecrated by wearing a purple band round their waists[5]—purple being a 'chthonian' colour—were specially sensitive about bloodshed.

A special form of purification, unrecorded elsewhere in the ancient Mediterranean world but in vogue in Samothrace, is the confessional; and the record that attests it contains also the first reprobation of it by the spirit of Protestantism: the haughty Lysander refused to confess to mortal man, when the priest of the Kabeiroi asked him what was the greatest sin that he had committed.[6]

As regards the actual *δρώμενα*, or sacred action whereby the initiation was consummated, we have less evidence about the Samothracian than we have concerning the Eleusinian mysteries. There was a distinction here, as at Eleusis, between the catechumens and the fully initiate, the latter being called *μύσται εὐσεβεῖς*, as possessing a peculiar piety, or, as at Eleusis, *ἐπόπται*,[7] and this term implies that the central act of the mystery was the revelation of certain sacred things or shows to their eyes. The show might have included a solemn dance; for we have a literary reference to the religious dancing of the 'pious Samothracians,'[8] and a relief found by Conze near the sanctuary showed a dance of nymphs.[9] The dancing may have been dramatic or mimetic; if so, it is useless to try to guess at its purport; we have no records that the most credulous could believe, nor can we point to any hieratic legend that is genuinely Samothracian; we know far less about Samothrace, which was perhaps never wholly Hellenized, than about Eleusis, and it is merely futile to recount the various legends, Cretan, Phrygian, Theban, that the later learning of the Hellenistic

[1] *Athen. Mitth.* xiii. [1888] 421. [2] *CGS* iii. 208, ref. 246.

[3] The evidence consists of certain monuments of which the religious interpretation is doubtful (cf. G. Rodenwaldt, *Jahrb. des arch. Inst.* xxviii. [1913] 327), and a Pergamene inscription mentioning a *κριοβολία*, which may have some connexion with the initiation of the *ἔφηβοι* in the mysteries of the *μεγάλοι θεοὶ Κάβειροι* mentioned earlier in the inscription (*Athen. Mitth.* xxix. [1904] 152).

[4] Daremberg-Saglio, i. 770 *f.*

[5] *Protrept.* ii. (*PG* viii. 81). [6] *de Errore*, 11.

[1] *Arch. Ep. Mitth.* vi. [1882] 8, no. 14: [Ἀπατουρ]ιῶνος ἐβδόμῃ παρ[έξει τὸ πέμμ]α σχίξας καὶ ἐγχέει [τὸ ποτὸν ταῖ]ς μύσταις (Hirschfeld's restoration).

[2] Strabo, p. 472 f.

[3] Hesych. *s.v.* Κοίης: ἱερεὺς Καβείρων, ὁ καθαίρων φονέας. Robinson (*Arch. Inst. Amer.* xvii. [1913] 363) compares the *καύεις*, the priestess mentioned in the newly discovered inscription of Sardis.

[4] xlv. 5. [5] Schol. Apoll. Rhod. i. 917.

[6] Plut. *Apophtheg. Lacon.*, p. 229 D–E.

[7] Kern, in *Athen. Mitth.* xviii. [1893] 363–365; Conze, *Untersuchungen*, Taf. lxxi.

[8] Statius, *Achill.* i. ii. 157. [9] *Op. cit.* xii. 1, 2.

world tried to implant on this mysterious island. Only one record deserves some passing attention. The scholiast on Euripides, quoting from Ephoros, after giving the useless story that Kadmos carried off Harmonia from Samothrace, adds words of greater importance: 'and even now in their festivals (*ἐν ταῖς ἑορταῖς*) in Samothrace they make search for Harmonia.'[1] We know that the quest for the vanished deity of vegetation was part of an agrarian ritual in Greece; and Ephoros might have been referring to some purely country-pageant of the island, whether Hellenic or autochthonous. But, if we regard it as more probable that his vague phrases refer to the sacred drama of the mysteries themselves—the probability being strong *a priori* that they had one—then we can draw some interesting conclusions: Harmonia was a Hellenic divine name attracted to Samothrace, because she was attached to Kadmos, and Kadmos was attracted there because Thebes had ancient communication with the island, and the native Kasmilos or Kadmilos was identified with their Kadmos. Now, if Kasmilos in the mysteries carried off the earth-goddess, if there was the semblance of an abduction followed by a sorrowful search for the lost one, the Greek *μύσται*, misled by the name Kadmilos, would interpret the Samothracian earth-bride as Harmonia, and the story of Kadmos carrying off his bride from Samothrace would be explained. If all this were certain, we should not feel convinced that this holy drama was autochthonous Samothracian; it is so like to what happened and was performed at Eleusis that we might naturally ascribe it to the reorganization under Eleusinian influences that the Kabeiroi-mysteries underwent at the time when they were becoming pan-Hellenic.

On the same analogies we must suppose that besides a sacred drama there was some *ἱερὸς λόγος* in them, some exegesis, accompanied probably with exhortation. And on *a priori* grounds we should believe that this would be connected with the doctrine of a future life and the promise of future happiness; for we could hardly understand how the Samothracian could compete so successfully throughout the later period of paganism with the other influential mystery-initiations, such as the Eleusinian, the Bacchic, the Phrygian, and the Egyptian, if it proffered to its *μύσται* no such message of posthumous salvation as the others proclaimed. Moreover, the Kabeiroi, like the Eleusinian deities, were powers of the shadowy world, the ghost-realm; and the Greek mind would be sure to conclude that mystic communion with them would affect the lot of the departed spirit. Hence we may explain the growth of the legend that it was Demeter herself, the goddess who held the key of the Eleusinian Paradise, who instituted the Kabeiric rites. The belief in posthumous rewards and punishments may have a moralizing effect on conduct; and it is specially attested of the Samothracian mysteries, and of these alone, that 'those who had partaken in these mysteries became more pious and more just, and in every respect better than their past selves.'[2]

A more intimate and more certain knowledge about these rites and the genuine Samothracian religion will perhaps never be attained. The evidence which has been used above is mainly indirect, incomplete, and vague. The Greeks themselves were confused in their view of these divinities, who for the meagreness of their legend and the dimness of their personality resemble more the Roman *numina*, such as the Penates, than the clear Olympian figures of Hellas.

LITERATURE.—C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, ii. 1109–1348 (collection and criticism of literary records); Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Cabiri' (F. Lenormant, often untrustworthy); L. Bloch, art. 'Megaloi Theoi,' in Roscher, ii. 2522 ff.; O. Rubensohn, *Die Mysterienheiligtümer in Eleusis und Samothrake*, Berlin, 1892; A. Conze, *Archäologische Untersuchungen auf Samothrake*, Vienna, 1875; L. Preller and C. Robert, *Griechische Mythologie*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 847–864.

LEWIS R. FARNELL.

KABĪR, KABĪRPANTHĪS.—1. Life of Kabīr.

—Kabīr, an Indian teacher and religious reformer, flourished in N. India about A.D. 1440 to 1518. His origin is uncertain, and is the subject of various legends current among his followers. According to one account, his mother was a virgin widow, the daughter of a Brāhman. She accompanied her father, who was a follower of Rāmānand, the great teacher of S. India, on a visit to the spiritual guide. Rāmānand, while blessing her, offered her the usual wish that she might conceive a son, not knowing her state of widowhood. The sequel is variously reported. It was impossible to recall the blessing; but, while one version states that the mother abandoned the child to escape disgrace, another relates that Rāmānand contrived that the child should be miraculously born from his mother's hand. All stories agree that the child was brought up by a weaver named Nirū and his wife Nīmā. The Kabīrpanthīs, or followers of Kabīr, assert that the infant was an incarnation found by Nīmā floating on a lotus in a tank near Benares. Similar legends are current regarding Kabīr's wife (Loī), son (Kamāl), and daughter (Kamāliya), all of whom are said to have had a miraculous birth. Throughout his life Kabīr preached and worked as a weaver in the neighbourhood of Benares. Owing to his teachings he was an object of dislike both to Hindus and to Muhammadans, and it is said that he was denounced to Sikandar Lodī, king of Delhi, as laying claim to divine attributes, but escaped by his ready tongue. The Brāhmans decried him as an associate with a woman of ill-fame and with Rae Dās, another religious teacher who was a Chamār, or leather-worker, despised for his low position. Kabīr died at Maghar near Gorakhpur, and a dispute at once arose as to the disposal of his remains, which were claimed by both Hindus and Muhammadans, the former desiring to cremate and the latter to bury them. While they wrangled, Kabīr himself appeared and bade them raise the cloth which covered the corpse. When this was done, it was found that the body had vanished, but a heap of flowers occupied its place. Half of these were burnt after the Hindu custom at a spot now known as Kabīr Chaura in Benares, and the rest were buried at Maghar, which became the headquarters of the Muhammadan portion of the sect. A tomb was built there which was subsequently repaired about 1567 by a Muhammadan officer of the Mughal army.

2. Influence and doctrine.—In the religious history of India, Kabīr occupies a place of great importance. He was almost certainly a disciple of Rāmānand, and thus belongs to the Vaiṣṇava school of thought. His teaching was the first important introduction of these tenets in N. India. But he was also conspicuous as the earliest thinker who tried to affect both Hindus and Muhammadans. And, while his followers are still numerous,[1] the effects of his teaching are rendered still more important by the fact that it was one of the main sources drawn on by Nānak Shāh, the founder of the Sikh religion. In explanation of Kabīr's constant references to Islām, J. Malcolm (*Asiat. Researches*, xi. [1810] 267) described him as a Muhammadan and a Ṣūfī—statements which were hotly contested by H. H. Wilson (*Religious Sects*

[1] *Phœniss.* 7.

[2] Diod. Sic. v. 49.

[1] At the census of 1901 the number returned was 843,171 in the Central Provinces, United Provinces, Central India, and Bombay. The number is certainly understated.

of the Hindus, London, 1861, p. 69, note). G. H. Westcott of Lucknow, the most recent writer on the sect, is of opinion that Kabīr was certainly a Muhammadan, and that he had at least some knowledge of Ṣūfī teaching (*Kabir and the Kabir Panth*, p. 37). Kabīr rejected entirely all the outward signs of Hinduism, as has been done in so many movements of reform. He acknowledged no caste distinctions, saw no virtue in asceticism, fasting, and almsgiving, and despised the six schools of Hindu philosophy. As an unlettered man of low origin, he probably had no deep acquaintance with the last. The Hindu theogony was ruthlessly condemned. Belief in a Supreme Being is the foundation of the teaching; but, although the name of Rām is used, it is clear throughout that the incarnation of Viṣṇu is not meant. Salvation is to be gained, not by acquisition of knowledge or by good works, but by faith (*bhakti* [cf. art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA]).

In its essence the teaching is thus another instance of the revolt of simple minds against the deadening weight of ritual, mystery, and confusing complications of thought with which Brāhmanism and Islām are overlaid. If God had desired circumcision, He would have sent men circumcised into the world. If by circumcision a man becomes a Muhammadan, what is to happen to women? Of what benefit is cleaning your mouth, counting your beads, performing ablution, and bowing in temples, when, while you mutter your prayers, or journey to Mecca and Medina, deceitfulness is in your heart? If by wearing a sacred thread a man becomes a Brāhman, what do women wear? The God of all religions is the same. To 'Alī and Rām we owe our existence, and should therefore show similar tenderness to all that live. The city of Hara (another name of Rām) is to the east, and that of 'Alī to the west; but explore your own hearts, for there are both Rām and Karīm (a name of God). The worship of many gods is wrong. *Māyā* ('delusion'; see art. MĀYĀ) created them, and, as they have sprung from sin, so are they the cause of sin in others. In the search for God a guide is necessary, who has himself learned to know God. And a teacher should not be accepted, as the Brāhman is by the Hindu, without being tested. When the master is blind, what is to become of the scholar? When the blind leads the blind, both will fall into the well. Yet the master is helpless when the scholar is unapt. It is blowing through a bamboo to teach wisdom to the dull. The scriptures are of value, but must not be rated too highly.

Most important in the positive doctrines of Kabīr is that of *Śabda*, the Word, and this teaching is one of the most striking of the many parallels between Christianity and the preaching of Kabīr. In orthodox Hindu thought knowledge can be attained by perception and inference. The Vaiṣṇava teachers added *Śabda*, which includes both divine inspiration and the word of the teacher. There are many words, and there is a great difference between them. Accept the true Word. If man wishes to know the truth, let him investigate the Word. Without finding the gateway of the Word, man will ever be astray. Without the Word the *Śāstras* are blind. There are many words, but take the pith of them. Kabīr says, 'I am a lover of the Word which has shown me the unseen (God).' It would appear probable that Kabīr did not recognize a distinct heaven and hell, but regarded these names as symbolic of happiness and misery in this world. Transmigration was certainly a feature in his doctrine. Modern Kabīrpanthīs, however, believe that the soul enters heaven or hell between successive periods of rebirth.

Kabīr's teaching was purely oral, and throughout N. India thousands of rhyming couplets are current which are ascribed to him. In addition, he and his successors are responsible for a large number of hymns, odes, and doctrinal or argumentative poems. These have been collected, and a few have been published. Wilson gives a list of 20 works included in the *Khās Grantha*, or Book *par excellence*, at Kabīr Chaura, but Westcott has obtained references to 82 in addition to eight of those mentioned by Wilson. The great majority are still in manuscript only. It is probable that the first collection of Kabīr's sayings was not compiled earlier than 50 years after his death. Of most authority is the *Bījak* (literally 'invoice- or account-book'), which has been printed with commentaries. It was compiled by Bhago Dās, one of Kabīr's immediate disciples, and contains specimens of the various classes of poems referred to above. A number of sayings attributed to Kabīr are included in the *Ādi Granth* of the Sikhs (tr. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vi. 142–316).

3. The Kabīrpanthīs.—The community has not escaped sectarian division. As already mentioned, Maghar is the headquarters of the Muhammadan followers of Kabīr, who keep aloof from the Hindus. The latter recognize two main divisions. The Hindu shrine at Maghar is only a branch of the main establishment at Benares, and one version dates the appointment of the first Hindu *mahant* ('religious superior') at Maghar in 1764. But a second establishment exists in Chattīsgarh in the Central Provinces, founded by Dharm Dās, a Bania who is said to have been rebuked for idolatry by Kabīr himself. As in the case of so many reforming movements in Hinduism, there is a tendency to relapse into ritualism and exclusiveness. Though Kabīr preached against caste, the modern Kabīrpanthīs prefer that members of the unclean castes should join other sects, and should not wear the rosary of wooden beads which marks their own members. Members of the twice-born castes in addition wear the *janeo*, or sacred thread, of the Hindus. A woman may also wear the rosary, but not before marriage, and she may not become a disciple of her husband's spiritual guide, for disciples of the same teacher are regarded as brother and sister. An elaborate ceremony of initiation is performed, which includes the consumption of water used for washing the feet of the head *mahant*, representing the master, and a betel leaf. On the latter the secret name of God is inscribed with dew. It is called the *parwāṇa*, or passport, and is said to represent the body of Kabīr. An important feature in the ceremony is the communication of a secret *mantra*, or text. In the Dharm Dās section there are several *mantras*, and the ceremonies of initiation differ in a number of details. Every Sunday and on the last day of the lunar month a fast is observed, followed in the evening by a religious meal, at which a service is read, and an address delivered by a *mahant*, while hymns are also sung. A later ceremony follows, of even greater solemnity, and resembling the Communion service in Christianity. When *in extremis*, the dying receive the holy water and betel leaf described in connexion with initiations. Monastic life is encouraged, and women may be admitted to the order, if found qualified, after a probation of two years. They are usually widows or the wives of men who have joined the order. Branches of the community are ministered to by *mahants* who receive authority from the head *mahant*. As a rule, at present the *mahants* are not men of great learning, though some are acquainted with Tulasi Dās's *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Bhāgavadgītā*.

LITERATURE.—The best account of the sect is contained in G. H. Westcott, *Kabir and the Kabir Panth*, Cawnpore, 1907, which includes a bibliography. A curious comparison between the teaching of Kabir and Christianity was made by Pandit Wālji Bechar, a pastor of the Irish Presbyterian Church in the Kaira district, Gujarāt. His conclusions were published in a book called *Kabīr Charitra* (Gujarāti), Surat, 1881. Reference must also be made to H. H. Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1801, i. 68-98, and especially to M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, vi. 122-316. For a brief summary, see also R. G. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism*, etc. (*GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, pp. 67-73.

R. BURN.

KACHARIS.—See BODOS.

KĀCHHĪ.—An important agricultural tribe in N. India, an offshoot of the Kurmī. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 1,304,296, the majority of whom are found in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, Central India, and the Central Provinces. Their name is usually derived from Skr. *kakṣa*, 'flank,' 'enclosure,' or *karṣa*, 'furrow'; but they claim connexion with the Kachhwāhā sept of Rājputs, who assert totemic association with the tortoise (*kachchhapa*). The Kāchhī are among the best agriculturists in N. India, specially devoting themselves to the growth of the more valuable crops, such as vegetables, sugar-cane, and opium. Practically all are Hindus; and, if they can be said to belong to any sect, they prefer the Śākta, and worship the goddess Durgā Devī, more especially in her form as Sītalā, the smallpox goddess, whom they propitiate in March–April and June–July with offerings of cakes, sweetmeats, and money, which are received by the *kumhār*, or potter-priest, who attends her shrine. Except when they make pilgrimages to the shrines of the greater gods, they pay little regard to the orthodox deities of the Hindu pantheon, and devote themselves to the cult of the group of minor local gods, who are supposed to protect them from trouble and cause the increase of their crops. Such in the United Provinces are Nāgarsen, one of the deities controlling disease; Chāmar, who, if he be not propitiated with gifts of sweetmeats, incense, and red lead at the Holī and Divālī festivals, stops the milk of cows and buffaloes; Lāl Maṇi, 'red jewel,' the household god, to whom cakes and sweetmeats are dedicated and subsequently eaten by the worshipper and his family; and Bhūmiya, god of the soil, who is patron of the village and its people, the male partner of Dhartī Mātā, Mother Earth. The malevolent deity most feared is Bisārī, 'the poisonous one' (Skr. *viṣa*, 'poison'), who brings ophthalmia on those who neglect her worship. It is believed that her priest can bring this disease on sinners by lighting a fire and throwing hot coals on her image. When a person is afflicted in this way, he lays aside seven cowrie-shells, a piece of turmeric, and some charcoal, as a mark of his vow to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of the goddess at Sankisa in the Farrukhābād District, United Provinces. The presentation of a silver coin here ensures immunity from the disease. People who are too poor to undertake this journey endeavour to appease the angry goddess by going a mile or so in the direction of her temple, and making an offering in a field which must be beyond the boundary of the village in which they live. With this cult of the minor gods is combined that of local Muhammadan saints like Madār Sāḥib of Makanpur, or that at the tomb of some martyr of the faith, as Shahīd or Sayyid Mard. Among the Kāchhī of the Deccan there are indications of a form of totemism in the regard paid at marriages to the guardian (*devak*) of the union, which usually consists of an axe and leaves of four species of the sacred fig-tree and mango, which are tied to a post in the marriage halls at the houses of both bride and bridegroom.

LITERATURE.—For the United Provinces: W. Crooke, *TC*, 1896, iii. 81; for the Devak of the Deccan: *BG* xviii. (1885) pt. i. p. 283; J. M. Campbell, *Notes on the Spirit Basis of Belief and Custom*, Bombay, 1885, p. 8 ff.; J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, ii. 276 ff.

W. CROOKE.

KACHINS.—See BURMA.

KAFIRS.—See BANTU.

KĀFIRISTĀN.—Kāfiristān, or 'the land of the infidel,' almost certainly is no longer correctly described by that epithet. Since it was visited by the present writer, who left the country in 1891, the Amir of Kabul is believed effectually to have conquered every one of its numerous tribes who were continuously engaged in internecine fighting. No doubt among the old people the ancient gods are worshipped secretly still; but the former picturesque ceremonial, the dancing, the feasting, the oratorical invocation of favourite deities, must have given place now to the austere rites of the religion of Islām, the self-righteousness, and the dignified authority of its priests. Fanaticism will be prevalent among the younger men, taken away, many of them, as boys to Kabul and returned as zealots of the new faith, and also among the ordinary rank and file of the converts, for naturally it is among the most recent recruits of any religion that, on the average, the highest enthusiasm prevails. There is little probability that the Kāfirs will ever lapse back to paganism. Muhammadanism has a singular attraction for Orientals, and, once accepted by a people, it rarely seems to lose its hold upon their consciences or its insistent influence upon their outlook upon life, their manners, and their ways of thought.

This country, Kāfiristān, is pressed in between Afghanistān and Chitrāl, Badakhshan and the Kunar Valley. More exactly it is situated between latitude 34° 30′ and latitude 36°, and from about longitude 70° to longitude 71° 30′. It is one of the most difficult and intricate mountain places of the world, harsh, inhospitable, and full of peril, both from the physical dangers of crag, precipice, and howling torrent, and because of its superfluity of lurking-places for robbers and assassins, in the great sombre forests or the menacing defiles; every big rock, wall, bush, and ruin has to be watched suspiciously by the traveller and approached with wariness. The total extent of this isolated country, for long centuries an impregnable island of paganism, washed on all sides by an implacable sea of Muhammadanism, is probably not more than 5000 square miles. Nothing authoritatively definite is known about the history of the inhabitants. Obviously they are the descendants of many broken peoples. Probably the upper and better featured classes represent, in the main, certain ancient colonists of Eastern Afghanistān, tinctured very likely with Greek blood, who, refusing to accept Islām in the 10th cent., were hurtled out by the fervid missionary swordsmen from pleasant cultivated lands into the blank and hopeless mountain country, where they fell upon more or less aboriginal folk, still represented, it would seem, in at least one desolate high valley, whom they conquered and slew or enslaved.

Qualitative analysis of the Kāfir tribes, especially of those of the border valleys, is out of the question; fine-shaped heads, fair skins, wise brows, are found almost exclusively among the chief and most powerful families of sept or tribe, but often even here there are to be found also the sloping forehead, the restless eye, the coarse features, the dark colouring of the slave, or, again, the strange bird-like profile of the wild and fierce nondescript degenerate. Sometimes in the same family in the

Bashgul Valley one perceives the oddest differences between the children—a result no doubt of the indifferent selection of polygamous wives and the prevailing moral sexual laxity. The slow and heavy-featured clansmen of a remote valley, particularly difficult of access, seem curiously like one another in form and feature; that, however, may be merely the common illusion of a hurried traveller, who is apt to identify the type while ignoring its variations. Usually the chief men and the priests are Aryan-looking, sometimes remarkably so; and it may be added, with something approaching to certainty, that such a type never reveals itself among the poorer tribesmen or among the artisan, the field, or the domestic slaves. Difficult as it is to generalize concerning a congeries of peoples such as constitute the Kāfirs of to-day, especially those living near the Eastern borders of the country, it may be stated broadly that in character they all display a curious lack of simplicity. With remarkable powers of secrecy and tenacity, they can persevere remorselessly in an intrigue or a plot decided upon many years previously. Possibly their most prominent general peculiarities are an inordinate cupidity, an easily aroused fierceness of jealousy, and a capacity for bitter, suicidal, inter-tribal hatred. They are ever ready to starve themselves for the sake of hoarding. Blackmailing they look upon as a virtue: it shows ability and forcefulness. A belief in the value of vague or pointed threats is deeply engrained in their nature. A head-man, whose little son lay very ill, once declared with a menacing gesture against heaven that, if the child died, he would turn Musalmān. No one dreamt of accusing him of blasphemy; he was applauded for his wisdom and energy. Kāfirs are untruthful. A plausible lie passes as the proof of a sagacious intellectual man. Obviously they hold the belief, common to so many wild people, that the truth merely because it is the truth must be harmful to a man. They are boastful and fond of admiration, which, added to a justifiable fear of the physical power of majorities, gives a remarkable sanction to public opinion. Kāfirs have no fear of dying, although they cannot comprehend anyone committing suicide. Melancholy is unknown. They have a really wonderful sense of personal dignity; at all the religious festivals and sacrifices they strike the observer as equally cheerful and self-respecting. In his own way a Kāfir is a model of politeness. At once and gracefully he yields precedence to a superior and unaffectedly takes his own proper position. In spite of his avarice, which at times amounts almost to a disease, he is very hospitable. However grudgingly he may be so, he dare not disobey the unalterable laws on this subject. Family affection is not very strong. Some of the tribes are in the habit of selling little girls, sometimes even children nearly related to them, but as a rule it is the female offspring of their slaves that they dispose of in this way. Boys are rarely, if ever, thus treated. Nevertheless, Kāfirs are kindly in family relationship. A man is fond of his old parents; his delight in a son is remarkable. They are never rough or cruel to animals. There is no special fondness shown for dogs, which are employed mainly for hunting and as house-guards. Goats are treated as domestic pets; but no reluctance is ever shown to kill them for food. Bulls and cows, accustomed to be handled gently, do not require to be bound when sacrificed. One man takes the animal by the horns, gently depressing the head, while a second, with the stroke of an axe, divides the cervical spine. Kāfirs are wonderfully brave. In little parties of two or three they penetrate stealthily into hostile villages many miles beyond their own frontier. They stab the victims right and left as they sleep, and cut off ears as trophies and as certificates of actual deeds; then they race back to their own deep forests with a hue and cry of the whole countryside after them. They are splendidly loyal to one another, and habitually perform high acts of self-sacrifice for comrades in war. They are intensely quarrelsome among themselves. It is a sign of virility to take up a quarrel at the instant. But, if quarrelling is a manly virtue, peace-making is very sacred. Men, boys, and even dogs are separated at the first indication of a probable fight. Any one who will not help in stopping a village row at any moment is looked upon as unworthy. Nothing resembling religious intolerance exists. The men are extremely sociable, many possessing a sense of quiet humour. Their badinage with women is, of course, obscene to our way of thinking, and their jokes have much of the same nature, but they are highly amused at ironical remarks, and also at even the mildest attempt at repartee. It is as natural for a Kafir to thieve as it is for him to watch his flocks and herds. It is, in short, the business of his life. Little children are trained and encouraged to steal. The killing of an individual, merely as a human being, is looked upon as a trivial affair except as the basis for boasting and vainglory, unless indeed the slain man happened to belong to the slayer's tribe, when grave trouble, heavy compensation, or even the driving out of the murderer into an outcasts' village of refuge would certainly follow. In the case also of the victim being a member of a neighbouring tribe, friendly at the time, serious complications and difficulties would follow. In the opinion of an average tribesman, a fine, manly character, essentially a 'good' man, must be a successful homicide. He must also be an active hill climber, one always ready to take up a quarrel, and known to be of an amorous disposition. If, besides possessing these popular qualities, he is an agile and untiring dancer at religious festivals, a sure shot with bow and arrows or with the matchlock, and a sound quoit player, he combines most of the characteristics of a really admirable person; but even with all these advantages he will possess no real influence in his tribe unless he either is wealthy himself or belongs to a family rich in flocks or herds.

The Kāfir religion is a debased form of idolatry, with a certain admixture of ancestor-worship and perhaps traces of fire-worship also. Gods and goddesses are many in number, and in different villages and among different tribes hold varying positions in local estimation. Imra, the Creator, Moni (commonly spoken of as 'the Prophet'), Gish (the war-god), Bagisht, Dizane, Krumai, and Nirmali are highly esteemed and popular everywhere. It is nearly certain that the same god, goddess, or inferior deity is called by a different name by different tribes, but, even allowing for this, there are many of the godlings who must be entirely disregarded except in particular villages. The difficulty in getting information from the Kāfirs about their beliefs is extreme, although they are more inclined to open their hearts on such subjects to a Christian than to a Muhammadan, for they consider that a Christian is in some sense a relation because he also is always called opprobriously a Kāfir by the Musalmān priests. A further difficulty is this—the people know seemingly little with anything like precision about their own theology. An inquirer is constantly referred from one old man to another without final benefit. When it does not bore him, cross-examination, if at all prolonged or minute, puts a Kafir to sleep, or he jumps up and not infrequently rushes from his questioner. Prob-

ably as a result of mixing on the frontiers of their country with their Musalmān neighbours, when at peace, and hearing their religion scorned, the Kāfirs, at any rate the younger portion, are inclined to treat it cynically and with scepticism. Frequently two or three waggish youths will burlesque the ceremonies of their faith. But everywhere the war-god Gish is popular and respected, and in his worship at least there is remarkable sincerity, even among the light-hearted younger men. The older people, though undoubtedly devout, seem to abandon their faith without very poignant regret. In the inner valleys of Presungel the atmosphere is more distinctly religious. Devils' villages are continually met with. Old watercourses, long fallen to ruin, are universally believed to have been constructed by god or goddess. Deep imprints of divine or dæmonic hands are shown on many a rock face. There, jealously guarded, is an iron pillar thrust in the ground by Imra himself, and likewise a sacred hole to look down which is certain death. Fertile lands consecrated to the Creator lie untouched by the plough, and the most famous temple in Kāfiristān, also dedicated to Imra, is to be found in this valley.

In Kāfir theology there is both a heaven and a hell. The universe is divided into Urdesh, the upper world, the abode of the gods, Michdesh, the earth, and Yurdesh, the region under the earth; but both heaven and hell are in Yurdesh, which is reached through a great pit guarded at its mouth by Maranmalik, a custodian created for that purpose by Imra. Once passed into Yurdesh, no one ever returns to the upper world. At death a man's breath, his soul—the word *shon* has the double meaning—enters and becomes at once a vague shadowy form, such as we see in dreams. The elect wander about as shades in a paradise in Yurdesh termed Bisht, while the wicked are always burning in fire. Worship consists in behaving in a dignified and cheerful manner at the sacrifices of animals, looked upon obviously as an entertainment, in dancing, in the singing of hymns, and in invocations to the gods. Fairies as well as deities have to be propitiated by offerings. The most common form of profane swearing is 'May the curse of Imra strike you!' Besides gods and goddesses and inferior godlings, one hears much of demons, the chief of whom is Yūsh. The high priest of one of the Eastern tribes gave the present writer the following information:

Imra is the Creator of all things in heaven and earth. By the breath of his mouth he endowed with life his 'prophets' Moni, Gish, Sataram, and the rest; but Dizane (a goddess) sprang into existence from his right breast. Bagisht alone among them all was born after the manner of men. In addition, Imra also created seven daughters whose special province it is to watch over agriculture. As the time for sowing approaches goats are sacrificed in their honour. The fairies and the demons were created by Imra, but the latter gave so much trouble to the whole world that Moni with divine permission nearly exterminated them.

Most of the religious stories, told by this high authority and others, were bald, lengthy, and inconsequential, and of interest merely as showing the mental position at which the Kāfirs had arrived—horses with swords concealed in their ears, women created out of golden goatskin churns, the removal of the sun and the moon from the sky and their concealment for a time in the interior of a mountain, and so on. There were narratives of a sacred tree whose branches were seven families of brothers, each seven in number, while the trunk was Dizane and the roots Nirmali, another goddess. And there were narratives of Bābā Ādam and his wife, who with their forty children once upon a time in Kashmir were all sleeping in pairs, and when they awoke in the morning no single couple understood the language of any other couple. Imra then ordered them to set forth and populate the whole world. With unfeigned reluctance, since everybody loves the country of Kashmir, they obeyed the divine order. Monstrous snakes, it seems, once existed: they were attacked and slain by a mighty god; the blood of one of these fabulous reptiles forms a tarn pointed out to the traveller to the present day. Imra is sacrificed to frequently, but not more so than several other gods. At the religious festivals and funeral dances he receives three rounds of stamping and shuffling by the quaintly dressed performers, but without any of the enthusiasm which is infused into the exercises in honour of Gish, or the comicality of step and posturing which is necessary to please the goddess Krumai. Every village has its temples. These are also to be found on the roadside far away from any dwelling-houses. Usually these temples or shrines are small, mostly about 5 ft. square, and perhaps 6 ft. high. The lower two-thirds consist of rubble masonry built between frames of axe-squared timbers. The top is almost entirely of wood with small windows in front, through which the idol or sacred stone can be seen. They are very often ornamented with poles at the corners, upon which are hung fragments of iron resembling tongueless bells, iron scull-pieces, and other trophies placed there in memory of some successful raid. Occasionally a shrine is elaborately and prettily carved. Gish, the war-god, is the most devoutly admired of all the pantheon. To liken a Kāfir to Gish is to pay him the highest possible compliment, while nothing can be in better taste than to call a woman 'Gish Istri,' *i.e.* 'the wife of Gish.' Gish killed fabulous numbers of enemies—Hazrat 'Alī, Hasan and Husain, in short, every famous Musalmān the Kāfirs ever heard of. Some Kāfirs even say that Gish's earthly name was Yazīd. The most popular of the goddesses is Dizane. Any one having a son born to him in the preceding year offers a goat in sacrifice on the goddess's annual festival day. Dizane protects the growing wheat crop; Nirmali, the Kāfir Lucina, takes care of lying-in women and watches over children. The special retreats for women are under her peculiar protection. Krumai is a popular goddess; she lives high up on the great snow mountains, but is chiefly remarkable by reason of the comical dance in her honour, which invariably ends the performances at the regular ceremonies after each of the chief gods has been danced to in turn.

LITERATURE.—H. W. Bellew, *Afghanistan and the Afghans*, London, 1879; A. H. MacMahon, *The Southern Borders of Afghanistan*, do. 1897; G. S. Robertson, *The Kāfirs of the Hindu-Kush*, do. 1896; C. E. Tate, *Northern Afghanistan*, Edinburgh, 1888. GEORGE SCOTT ROBERTSON.

KAHĀR (Skr. *skandhakāra*, 'one who carries loads on his shoulders').—A tribe of litter-bearers, cultivators, and labourers. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 1,838,698. In Bengal those who profess to be orthodox Hindus generally worship Siva and the *śakti*, or female element, the proportion of Vaiṣṇavas being very small.

'Members of the Rawāni sub-caste observe a peculiar worship in honour of Ganesa on the seventh day of the waxing moon of Kārtik (October-November), when, accompanied by Brahmans, they proceed to a wood and make offerings of vegetables, fruits, and sweetmeats under an *āmlā* tree (*Phyllanthus emblica*), but never sacrifice any animal. A feast is then given to the Brahmans, after which the Kahārs dine and drink spirits to excess. The entertainment of Brahmans on this day is accounted as meritorious as the gift of five cows on any other occasion. In addition to Dāk, Kartā, Bandi, Goraiya, Dharam Rāj, Sokhā, Sambhunāth, and Rām Thākur, whose worship is common throughout Behar, the caste pay special reverence to a deified Kahār called Dāmubir, before whose effigy, rudely daubed in red and black paint, goats are sacrificed and betel leaves, sweetmeats, and various kinds of cakes offered at marriages, during harvest time and when illness or disaster threatens the household. As a rule these rites are performed only by the members of the family, who share the offerings among themselves. In Bhagalpur, however, the Maithil or Kanaujiā Brahmans, who

serve the caste as priests of the greater gods, are called in to sacrifice to Dámubír, and receive half of the offerings as their perquisite. Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays are the days set apart for the worship of Dámubír' (Risley, *TC*, i. 372).

In the United Provinces they are generally orthodox Hindus, but are seldom initiated into any special sect. They offer to Bhairon, an impersonation of the male partner of the Earth-goddess, a goat, pulse cakes, and spirits; to Mahábír or Hanumán, the monkey-god, clothes, Brahmanical cords, and garlands of flowers; to the Páñchoñ Pír (see PACHPIRIYAS) the offering is a kid and spirits. In Jhansi there is a curious combination of Hindu and Musalmán usage. When a person worships Devi, a Muhammadan and a butcher accompany him to the shrine. The Muhammadan pronounces the invocation (*kalima*), and plunges the knife into the throat of the victim, and the butcher cleans the carcass, which the worshipper and his friends cook and eat. They cultivate the water nut (*Trapa bispinosa*) and melons. When planting the former, they worship a local deity Siloman Bábá and his brother Mádho Bábá; when sowing melons, they add to these a third godling, Ghaṭauriyá Bábá. All these deities have platforms erected on the banks of rivers and tanks, and are supposed to protect crops sown near such places. When they go out fishing or start carrying a litter, they invoke Kálú Kahár, a deceased worthy of the tribe. In the Deccan they are known as Bhoí and in Madras as Besthá.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Risley, *TC*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 370 ff.; W. Crooke, *TC*, do. 1896, iii. 92 ff.; *NINQ* ii. 85, 87; *BG* xvii. [1884] 153 ff.; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, Madras, 1909, i. 218 ff.

W. CROOKE.

KAILÁS, KAILÁSA (the name is probably of Tibetan origin).—A mountain in Tibet, lying N. of the sacred lake Mánasarowar, and rising to an altitude of 21,830 ft.—less than that of Gurlá Mandhátá (25,860 ft.), the peak which flanks the lake region on the south. It is generally identified by Hindus with Mount Meru, which by others is supposed to be one of the group of mountains N. and W. of Kaśmír. The legends connected with this world-mountain cannot be given in detail.

'On the summit of Meru,' according to Atkinson (*Himalayan Gazetteer*, ii. [1884] 291 f., quoting the Puránas), 'is the city of Brahmá, and, like filaments from the root of the lotus, numerous mountains project from its base. Within, Meru is adorned with the self-moving cars of the gods, like heaven; in its petals, I say, they dwell with their consorts. There resides Brahma, god of gods, with four faces; the greatest of those who know the Vedas; the greatest of the great gods, also of the inferior ones. There is the court of Brahmá, consisting of the whole earth, of all those who grant the object of one's wishes; thousands of great gods are in this beautiful court; there also dwell the Brahmarişis.'

Kailása is especially the abode of Śiva and his consort. Its shape is roughly like that of a Hindu temple, with a part of the conical summit removed; this, with its resemblance to the phallic symbol (*liṅga*), possibly was the cause of its sanctity. It is a famous place of Hindu pilgrimage, the route of which is prescribed in the Hindu scriptures (Sherring, *Western Tibet*, p. 49 f.). Hitherto the difficulty of the journey has prevented the assembly of large bodies of pilgrims; but, now that under the treaty of Lhása western Tibet is being opened up to the people of India, it will probably be more largely frequented (*ib.* p. 144). It is equally sacred to Buddhists. Followers of both religions march solemnly round it, the length of the actual circuit being about 25 miles and the journey occupying on an average three days. At one point is the Gaurí-kuṇḍ, the lake sacred to Gaurí, 'the yellow, brilliant one,' the consort of Śiva. This remains perpetually frozen.

'As some persons measure their length on the ground for the entire distance, and others are aged and accompanied by women, and others again linger on the road, either for contemplation or to bathe in the icy waters of the Gauri-kuṇḍ (though the ordinary pilgrim merely breaks the ice and puts a little of the water on his head), it is easy to see that the time occupied by the journey varies very greatly. One and all condemn the record-breaker, who hurries round in as short a time as possible, and they apply to him the opprobrious epithet of *khi-kor*, the man who runs round like a dog' (*ib.* p. 279 f.).

LITERATURE.—The most recent account, with photographs, is that of C. A. Sherring, *Western Tibet and the British Borderland*, London, 1906. For the Hindu legends of Meru see E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, ii. (Allahabad, 1881) 284, 289 ff., 806. The Tibetan Buddhist version is given by L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 77 ff.

W. CROOKE.

KALÁM.—*Kalám* (lit. 'conversation') is apparently a translation of the Greek διαλεκτική, used by Plato in a sense approaching that in which 'metaphysics' is ordinarily used, and contrasted with ἐριστική, of which the Arabic rendering is *jadal*, occasionally employed as a synonym of *kalám*. The two are sometimes coupled with *falsafah*, the Arabized form of the Greek φιλοσοφία. The *kalám* is sometimes paraphrased as 'Fundamentals of Religion' (*uṣúl al-dín*), *i.e.* the study of the ultimate concepts which religion involves. That study, according to a manual of general information compiled in the 4th Islámic cent. (*Mafátíḥ al-'ulúm*), deals with seven subjects: metaphysical technicalities; the founders and dogmas of Islámic sects; Christian technicalities and sects; Jewish technicalities and sects; the opinions of the philosophic schools; paganism; and the list of metaphysical questions. It is clear from this statement that the matter included in the *kalám* is mainly theological controversy—between Muslims and members of other religious communities, philosophers and atheists, but also between Muslims of different sects.

Before the end of the Prophet's life he had discovered that religious controversies could be best settled by the sword; but during the Meccan period and the first years of the migration he had to argue with opponents, and certain fundamental questions had been posed. One of these concerned the freedom of the will, to which he could give only an evasive answer (*Qur'án*, vi. 149). According to the tradition, he discouraged inquiries on such subjects among his followers, and the Qur'án deprecates controversy with unbelievers. The arrangement, however, whereby he permitted the maintenance of certain non-Muslim cults rendered a certain amount of controversy unavoidable, though in the treaties with tolerated communities a clause was inserted forbidding their members to say anything against the Muslim faith. On the other hand, sectarianism in Islám was an inevitable consequence of the civil wars which broke out a quarter of a century after the Prophet's death; when persons of acknowledged sanctity took opposing sides in these campaigns and compassed each other's death, the relation between faith and works was forced to the front, and inquiry into this matter brought with it closer scrutiny of the import to be assigned to other religious notions. Thus, before the end of the 1st cent. A.H. the Muslims had split into a number of mutually hostile sects.

For the first century and a half of Islám the *kalám* actually took the form of public controversy, theories being put forward by lecturers who formed circles in the mosques, where they were compelled to answer objectors; at times the public debate may have been supplemented by controversial correspondence, of which we have what may be a genuine example in the letters of Najdah and Náfi', leaders of Khárijite sects, preserved in the *Kámil* of Mubarrad. The public discussion continued long after the practice of composing books had become popular; so we read of the historian Ṭabarí (towards the end of the 3rd cent.) publicly disputing with the founder of the Ẓáhirite school, and taking to the pen only because of

the personalities in which his opponent indulged. Reports of such discussions have, in one or two cases, reached us—*e.g.*, in the treatise *Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth* (Cairo, 1326) of Ibn Qutaibah († 276 A.H.). This author complains of the tenacity with which disputants adhered to their opinions, even when they had been decidedly nonplussed, excusing themselves on the ground that, if they allowed themselves to be convinced, they would have to be changing their views many times a day. As early as 125 A.H. we hear of a heresiarch being summoned to defend his theses in the presence of the Umayyad Khalif Hishām; he was nonplussed by the theologian employed to oppose him, and barbarously executed by the Khalif's order.

According to some authorities, the standard author on *kalām*, who had provided the material for all later writers, was Abu'l-Hudhail al-'Allāf of Baṣra († 226 A.H.; see Yāqūt, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, London, 1913, vi. 74). His chief work was called 'The Five Fundamentals,' and dealt with justice, monotheism, the promise, the threat, and the intermediate state; the first refers to the freedom of the will, without which the punishment of unbelievers, etc., would be unjust; the second, to the creation of the Qur'ān and of the divine attributes, since, if these were uncreate, there would be more than one God; the third and fourth, to the doctrine that the ultimate fate earned by man cannot be altered; the fifth, to a theory that the Muslim criminal was something between a believer and an unbeliever. These doctrines certainly embraced most of the matter in controversy between Muslims, since, if a man earned his fate, there would be no intercession, and the Judgment Day, etc., would become superfluous. Though those who accepted these views or modifications of them (the Mu'tazilites) were only spasmodically in the ascendant, they had the reputation of being the ablest controversialists. Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī († *c.* 324 A.H.), who is supposed to have won the case for orthodoxy, commenced as a Mu'tazilite, but (according to his biographer) was miraculously converted, and told to use the controversial ability which he had acquired to refute the doctrines of the Mu'tazilites, whom the orthodox had been allowing to gain the victory through unwillingness to debate or even 'share a carpet' with them (see art. AL-ASH'ARĪ, vol. ii. p. 111f.).

The list of subjects treated by Abu'l-Hudhail keeps clear of politics, and indeed the name *Mu'tazil* means 'neutral,' possibly with this reference; but most of the Islāmic sects were political, whence the discussion of the lawful sovereignty could not easily be avoided; hence the question, 'Who is the best of mankind after Muḥammad?' usually figures in the lists of *kalām* questions. Moreover, fresh theories on this subject were constantly being formulated, and in consequence new chapters of *kalām* introduced. Although it was rarely safe under Islāmic rule for any member of the dominant community to question such fundamental notions as the two which form the Islāmic creed and the infallibility of the Qur'ān, there were sects which, unless misrepresented by our informants, went a long way in this direction. It was, therefore, desirable that there should be some recognized method of meeting those who suggested doubts on these subjects. Further, though paganism had been extinguished in Arabia, the spread of Muslim conquest brought the followers of the Prophet into fresh contact with it, and in India it was even found necessary to grant it the toleration which the code elsewhere excluded. Conditions both internal and external thus combined to keep religious controversy alive, and encouraged speculation on those very subjects from which the Prophet and his chief companions are likely to have kept clear.

Of controversies with Jews, Christians, and Magians we have echoes rather than reports in the *Zoology* of Jāḥiẓ († 255 A.H.) and other works. For the reason mentioned above such controversy was not unaccompanied with danger, and the 'unorthodox' appear to have been no more open-minded in these debates than the orthodox.

A story is told of Abu'l-Hudhail which illustrates this. He heard that a Jew of Baṣra had defeated the Muslim controversialists by getting them, on the authority of the Qur'ān, to admit the mission of Moses, and then by virtue of this admission refuting the pretensions of Muḥammad. Abu'l-Hudhail evaded this argument by accepting the mission of Moses only so far as he confirmed the claims of Muḥammad. The Jew (according to the story) endeavoured to provoke Abu'l-Hudhail into a personal assault, in order to win the sympathy of the audience; we may well believe that he was actually assaulted by the audience and compelled to leave Baṣra (Abu'l-Faraj Ibn al-Jauzī [† 597 A.H.], *Kitāb al-Adhkiyā*, Cairo, 1306, p. 98).

Nevertheless, the possibility of such controversy caused many Muslim theologians to study, at any rate to a slight extent, the theology of the other communities, whence in the lists of works by leading Mutakallimūn ('Dialecticians') we find 'Refutations' of Christians, Jews, and pagans, or accounts of these systems. Thus among the works of Abū Zaid of Balkh († 322 A.H.) there was a treatise on 'Religious Codes,' and a 'Refutation of the Worshippers of Idols.' Jāḥiẓ of Baṣra, sometimes called the Chief of the Dialecticians, composed a 'Book of Idols' and a 'Refutation of the Christians.' Much of his *Zoology* is occupied with refutation of the Magians.

The same lists ordinarily contain works dealing with the tenets of various Islāmic sects; among the works of Jāḥiẓ we find a 'Refutation of the Anthropomorphists,' accounts of the dogmas of the various branches of the Zaidīs, 'Refutation of the 'Othmānīs,' and a treatise on the difference between the Zaidīs and the Rāfiḍah; some of these treatises seem to have been objective in character. The familiar treatise by Shahrastānī († 548 A.H.) on 'Sects and Religious Opinions' gives an almost entirely objective account of the opinions ascribed to the chief sects and philosophers known to the author, whose statements have to be received with great caution. The treatise on the same subject by Ibn Ḥazm, about a century earlier, is, on the other hand, vehemently controversial.

In the manual of the 4th cent. to which reference has been made there is a list of *kalām* questions, which the author declares exhaustive, so far as the main subjects are concerned; other questions are merely subsidiary or derivative. It runs as follows:

(1) Proof that bodies had a beginning, and refutation of the atheists, who maintain the eternity of the world. (2) Proof that the world has a creator, viz. Almighty God, and refutation of those who deny the divine attributes; and that He is eternal, knowing, able, living, and that He is one; refutation of the Magians and Zindīks, who maintain two powers, and of the Christians, who maintain a Trinity, and of others who assert a plurality of creators; proof that He does not resemble things, with refutation of the Jews and other anthropomorphists; proof that He is not a body, as some of the Muslim anthropomorphists assert; proof that He is essentially knowing, able, living. (3) Question whether God will or will not be seen. (4) Question whether His will is eternal or produced. (5) Question whether His word is create or uncreate. (6) Question whether the actions of men are created, *i.e.* produced by God or by themselves. (7) Question whether capability is prior to action or simultaneous with it. (8) Question whether God wills immorality or not. (9) Question whether the unrepentant criminal is to remain in hell for ever, or whether he may be pitied and pardoned and taken to paradise. (10) Proof of the reality of prophecy, against the Brāhmans and others who deny it. (11) Proof of the mission of Muḥammad. (12) Theory of the sovereignty, and to whom it properly belongs.

In the unpublished treatise of Shahrastānī called *Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī 'ilm al-Kalām* a list is given of twenty subjects which form the material of the *kalām*:

(1) Proof that the world had a beginning. (2) Proof that all things that exist had a beginning. (3) The unity of God. (4)

Refutation of anthropomorphism. (5) Refutation of those who deny the divine attributes. (6) On states (*i.e.* conditions of things). (7) Question whether the non-existent is or is not 'a thing'; on matter, and refutation of those who assert the existence of matter without form. (8) Proof that the propositions connected with the divine attributes can be known. (9) Proof of the same with regard to the eternal attributes. (10) On the eternal knowledge in particular. (11) On the divine will. (12) Proof that the Creator speaks with an eternal speech. (13) Proof that the speech of the Creator is one. (14) Reality of human speech and psychic utterance. (15) Proof that the Creator is 'hearing seeing.' (16) Proof of the intellectual admissibility and the scriptural attestation of the visibility of the Creator. (17) Meaning of the terms 'commendable' and 'culpable'; proof that the reason makes nothing incumbent on the Creator or on man before the revelation of a code. (18) Proof that the acts of the Creator are without purpose or cause; refutation of the doctrine of utility (as applied to those acts); meaning of various terms, such as 'divine guidance,' 'favour.' (19) Proof of the reality of the prophetic office, of the genuineness of miracles, and the infallibility of prophets. (20) of the mission of Muhammad.

It will be found that these two lists cover nearly, though not quite, the same ground. Some of the questions were suggested by the civil wars (as we have seen) and their bearing on the interpretation of the Qur'ān. Others may have arisen in the course of studying the Qur'ān and endeavouring to reconcile its various utterances. It is noticeable that the chief sects of Islām arose before the end of the 1st cent. and so before the philosophy of Aristotle can have had much direct influence on Islāmic speculation; since, however, much of the thought of the philosopher had long before become the common property of the educated world, his indirect influence may have been considerable. Indeed, where in the Qur'ān itself (vii. 10 f., xv. 26–33, xxxviii. 71–77) Iblīs (Satan) declines to bow down to Adam because Adam had been created of clay, whereas he (Iblīs) had been created of fire, the underlying proposition that fire is more honourable than earth is drawn from the Aristotelian hierarchy of the elements, though by no means directly from the *de Cœlo*. There is, however, no doubt that, when under the early Abbāsids the works of the philosopher began to be translated into Arabic, they found many earnest readers; and Ibn Qutaibah charges one sectarian, Muhammad b. al-Jahm al-Barmakī, with making Aristotle's *de Generatione et Corruptione* serve as his Qur'ān. Jāḥiẓ, a contemporary of this personage, refers to the 'author of the Logic' as a well-known writer, and speaks of persons who rely on the *Meteorology*, though he warns them against mistranslations and corruption of the text. The probability is that the decidedly Aristotelian clothing of some of the questions (*e.g.* (7) in Shahrastānī's list) is due to their having been suggested to the Muslim thinkers by the study of the philosopher's works; and, as those works became better known, the scope of the *kalām* had a tendency to enlarge, while ever increasing subtlety was displayed by the disputants. In some treatises most of the subjects dealt with in the Aristotelian *Physics* and *Metaphysics* are treated as *kalām* (*e.g.*, the theories of time, space, and motion), and some even define the word *kalām*, in the style of the *Metaphysics*, as 'the science of Being *qua* Being.'

The extent to which the Muslim *kalām* was influenced by Christian theological speculation cannot be easily determined. One question which at one time provided the shibboleth for the chief sects, whether the Qur'ān was or was not created, appears most easily explicable as an echo of the Christian controversy about the Spirit 'neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding'; and, since the teachers of Greek philosophy were chiefly Christians, it is probable that Islām owes Christianity both the general idea of basing itself on the philosophy of Aristotle and some of the applications of that philosophy. It is, however, clear from the epitomes which have come down to us of the Islāmic heresies that original speculation was carried on with considerable hardihood. Very few dialecticians ventured to abandon the Qur'ān altogether; but almost any doctrine could be read into it.

The attitude adopted towards these studies by Islāmic rulers varied very greatly. The early Abbāsids, especially Hārūn al-Rashīd and Ma'mūn, encouraged them both by organizing translations of philosophical works into Arabic and by inviting to their court persons who had acquired fame as theologians. But in 279 A.H., after the Islāmic world had been rent by the controversy between the orthodox and the Mu'tazilites, the Khalīf Mu'tamid forbade the sale in Baghdad of works dealing with *kalām*, eristic, or philosophy. Since it was impossible to refute a heresy without stating it in some form and repeating the arguments whereby it was defended, probably this was the surest mode of preventing the spread of heresy; and this motive was dominant when Maḥmūd of Ghaznah († 421 A.H.) ordered all works dealing with *kalām* in the library at Rai to be burned. An author of the same period complains that his library (containing works on *kalām*) had been burned by a prince who was not ashamed to keep the works of Aristotle in his own (Yāqūt, ii. 296, 315). The historians notice other holocausts of this sort; in 555 a philosophical library was burned in Baghdad by public order; it contained among other works the *Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā* and the *Shifā* of Avicenna, both of them authorities on metaphysical theology. On the other hand, some eminent rulers held 'eristic assemblies' (*majālis jadal*), wherein theological questions were freely discussed.

LITERATURE.—The wilful destruction to which allusion has been made accounts for the disappearance of much of this literature, which at one time existed in vast masses. Thus Abu'l-Ḥusain Rāwandī († 245 A.H.) composed 114 works, and other Mutakallimūn were little less voluminous. Probably the earliest work extant directly bearing on the subject is the *Ibānah* of Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (Hyderabad, 1321), which is mainly refutation of the Mu'tazilites. Though the views of this author ultimately won the day, they experienced some setbacks, and for a time in the 5th cent. of Islām his name was publicly cursed from the pulpits. Some contributions to metaphysical theology continued to be made even by persons who in the main accepted his opinions; the names of Abū Ḥāmid Asfarā'inī († 406 A.H.) and 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwainī († 478 A.H.), called 'the Imam of the two sanctuaries,' often meet us in works on this subject, which it became the fashion for Muslim jurists to epitomize. Al-Ghazālī († 505 A.H.) prefixes to his *Arba'ūn* (Cairo, 1328) a very brief epitome of the subject, which he had treated in a book of 115 pages called *al-Iqtiṣād fi'l-I'tiqād* (printed in Cairo c. A.D. 1910); this is about the length also of the *Baḥr al-Kalām* ('Sea of Kalām,' Cairo, 1329) by Abu'l-Mu'īn al-Nasafī († 508 A.H.). A far better summary is the treatise of Shahrastānī mentioned above. Another unpublished work, the *Arba'ūn* of Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī († 606), is also highly instructive; this author has a great name as a Muslim theologian (see I. Goldziher, 'Die Theologie des Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī' in *Der Islam*, iii. [1912] 212–247). Great popularity was acquired by the *Ṭawāli' al-Anwār* of Baiḍāwī († 690), famous as a commentator on the Qur'ān; and still more by the *Mawāqif* of 'Aḍud al-dīn al-Ījī († 756), which may be regarded as the standard treatise. The *Muqaddamāt* of Sanūsī († 895 A.H.), translated into French by J. D. Luciani (Algiers, 1908), forms a good introduction to the subject. A more modern work, the *'Alam Shāmikh* of Ṣāliḥ b. Mahdī al-Muqbalī († 1108), is noticeable as attacking all the Mutakallimūn of former times with impartiality; the positive parts of the work (published Cairo, 1328) seem far less felicitous than the negative. The fullest account of the *kalām* in a modern language is to be found in M. Horten, *Spekulative und positive Theologie des Islam nach Rāzī (1209 †) und ihre Kritik durch Tūsī (1273 †)*, Leipzig, 1912. D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

KALEVALA.—The *Kalevala*, the national epic of Finland, is unique in literature. It is a poem in fifty runes or cantos, averaging nearly 500 lines each, compiled from popular songs by an industrious patriot. He pieced his acquisitions together to the best of his judgment, without any essential alterations or padding, and with such success that Max Müller and many others have placed the *Kalevala* among the half-dozen great world-epics.

There is practically no suggestion that the poem

is the work of one author. Its component parts were produced by various singers at different periods; but sporadic traces of apparent Christian influence help us to limit its youth if not its age. These bards were all inspired with a passionate love for their nation and with sympathy for the popular traditions, and they reflected the character and natural bent of the people as peaceable yet patriotic, practical yet superstitious, simple-minded yet romantic.

[1. **Original materials.**—The materials of the *Kalevala* consist not only of epic, but also of lyric and magic folk-poems. The fusion of the various types and themes—a process which, in many cases, had already been effected among the people themselves—was possible because the whole mass was of a single metrical form, the octosyllabic trochaic.

i. *THE EPIC POEMS.*—These were composed partly among the Finns and partly among the Esthonians, although it was among the Karelians of Ingria (in the Government of St. Petersburg) in East Finland, and in districts lying beyond the borders of Finland (the Governments of Olonetz and Archangel) that the epics were moulded and linked together in such a way that they could be combined into an epic whole. These epic poems may be classified as (*a*) songs of heroes, (*b*) legends, (*c*) ballads of chivalry, (*d*) imaginative songs, and (*e*) songs of everyday life.

(*a*) *Songs of heroes.*—These date from a period anterior to the official adoption of Christianity in the latter half of the 12th century. The names of the various heroes have in certain cases been connected with those of Scandinavian heroes, as, *e.g.*, Kaleva (cf. Caelic weold Finnum in Widsiþ) with Kylfing Skilfing; Vetra (Vetrikka, from which comes *witikka*, 'rogue,' in the *Kalevala*) or Utra (from which perhaps Untamo) with Vederas, Vedergéatas in *Beowulf*; Osmus or Osmo with Osmund, Áśmundr; Rego or Riiko with *rîkr*; Hermandroinen with Hermanarik. Vuojolainen means 'the Gothlander.' The name Ahti or Ahvo, which, as denoting the 'water-dweller,' has been derived from *ahva*, 'water,' is likewise a human name, to which are attached epithets signifying dignity and strength. Even Väinämöinen, 'dweller in the narrow sea,' is to be interpreted, not as a divine name (as the present writer assumed in art. FINNS [Ancient], vol. vi. p. 24[b]), but as a heroname. The name of the smith, Ilmarinen, as connected with the sky-god Ilmarinen, was formed from that of a smith called Ismaro (from Osmaro). To this group of songs belong also those of Joukamoinen 'the mighty' (?), Lemminkäinen 'the beloved' (?), and Kaukamoinen.

These heroes are represented as beautiful and strong, with long curling hair. They wear mantles of red or blue material, and always have a sword by their side. They travel on horseback or by boat. They are rich in lands and gold, and possess slaves. They drink home-brewed intoxicating ale, and seduce maidens, yet they are less eager for gold, ale, or women than for feats of warlike prowess.[1]

The heroes, however, are also capable workers in field and meadow, and they are skilled blacksmiths. Moreover, they are poets, singers, and musicians. As experts in magic and healing they know how to fashion the magic runes. They are designated kings, holy ones, and gods. In popular usage some of their names still survive as designations of individuals belonging to a former race of heroes, and also as names of stars (cf. K. Krohn, 'Kaleva und seine Sippe' in *Journal Soc. Finno-ougr.* xxx. [1914] 35).

(*b*) *Legendary poems.*—These consist mainly of stories about Christ, and from them the Russo-Karelian popular poets in the Government of Archangel had compiled a legendary epic, 'The Cycle of the Creator' (J. and K. Krohn, *Kantelettaren tutkimuksia* ['Investigations of Kanteletar'], Helsingfors, 1900–01, iii.). An important element in the Sampo myth of the *Kalevala* is the beautiful legend narrating the deliverance of the sun, which was brought by the Saviour from Pohjola, 'realm of the North' (*i.e.* hell), and set in a tree of gold—first of all among the lower branches, whence he shone only upon the rich and the wise, and then among the higher branches, from which he gave light to all without distinction. The song of Lemminkäinen's death is the same version of Christ's death which is reproduced in the Icelandic myth of Balder (*Finn.-ugr. Forsch.* v. [1905] 83–138). Part of the account of Väinämöinen's voyage belonged originally to a legend telling of the storm on the Lake of Gennesaret—a legend which also underlies the story of Thor and the Midgard serpent (*ib.* vii. [1907] 167–180). The dreadful rush of blood from the wound in Väinämöinen's knee is taken from the narrative of the blood which flowed from Christ upon the Cross, and Väinämöinen's journey to Tuonela is simply a transcript of Christ's descent to Hades. The story of Henry of England, the apostle of Finland, is, however, of purely Finnish origin.

(*c*) *Ballads of chivalry.*—These date from mediæval times, and are mainly of Scandinavian origin. To this class belongs the song of Kullervo's (originally Turo's) sister in the *Kalevala* (Grundtvig, no. 338, Hr. Truelses Dötre; Child, no. 14, Babylon). The song of Iivana Kojosenpoika was composed in Ingria on the model of a Russian *bylin* by Ivan Godinovič; and to it corresponds the story of the second wooing of Ilmarinen in the *Kalevala*. 'Elina's Death,' the greatest Finnish ballad of real dramatic power, is, however, a genuinely Finnish folk-poem.

(*d*) *Imaginative poems.*—This class consists of poems ostensibly but not really mythical, such as those telling of the process of creation from birds' eggs, of the giant oak, of the huge ox, and of the courtship of the heavenly bodies. The genuinely mythical song of Sämpsä Pellervoinen (cf. art. FINNS [Ancient], vol. vi. p. 25[a]) is a ritual poem.

(*e*) *Narrative poems of everyday life.*—These are chiefly about wives and maidens.

ii. *LYRIC POEMS.*—This class is now represented in West Finland only by lullabies, nursery rhymes, and pastoral songs. These songs, as yet only slightly investigated, arose mainly in Esthonia, thence finding their way through Ingria to Finnish and Russian Karelia, though it is probable enough that some of them took shape among the Eastern Finns themselves. The most important sub-group is that of the marriage-songs.

iii. *MAGIC POEMS.*—These were versified in West Finland from the Christian spells of the Scandinavians, and in East Finland were further elaborated and embellished with additions from the epic poems. The Christian appellations of the characters involved are in some cases retained; in others they are superseded by heathen designations, and in still larger numbers are transformed into names apparently heathen. The later Finnish mythology is dealt with in *Suomensuun uskonnot*, i. *Suomalaisten runojen uskonto* ('The Religions of the Finnish Race,' i. 'The Religion of the

[1] Cf. the words of Lemminkäinen in *Kalevala*, xii. 74–106:

'But for home-brewed ale I care not,
Rather would I drink stream-water
From the end of tarry rudder.
Nought I care for home-stored treasures;
One mark won by far is better.'

Cf. also (xxx. 1–106) the fine lament of his ship of war, and his comrade's eager readiness to follow him, though that comrade had but recently married a young wife.

Finnish Poems'), the first part of which has just appeared (Borgo, 1914). Of these originally Christian names occurring in the *Kalevala*, a few may be mentioned as examples:

Mielikki, the goddess of the forest, is formed from *mieluisa*, 'pleasant,' an epithet of St. Anne (Annikki); her other name, Mimerkki, is a corruption of Immerkki, Himmerki (Swed. *Himmelrike*, 'kingdom of heaven'); Kuippana (also Kuihtana, Kuitua, and Huitua), the name of the forest-god, is a folk-etymological derivative from Hubertus, the tutelary saint of the hunter. Ilmatar, 'the air maiden,' Luonnotar, 'the nature maiden,' and Suvetar or Etelätär, 'the daughter of the South,' are all epithets of the Virgin Mary, as is also Kivutar, 'maiden of sorrows,' on the Kipumaki, 'the mount of sorrows' (*i.e.* Golgotha). K. KROHN.]

2. Name and subject.—The word *Kalevala* (*Kalĕvalä*) is derived from Kaleva, the progenitor of the Finnish heroes, and means 'the land of the heroes.' Kaleva himself does not appear in the epic; but Kalevatar, his daughter, and Kalevaläinen, his descendant, are mentioned. In the poem there are five main characters: Väinämöinen, the patriotic minstrel; Ilmarinen, the magic smith; Lemminkäinen, the reckless adventurer; Kullervo, a morose and violent slave; and Louhi, the mistress of Pohjola, a crafty witch.

Pohjola, the North country, is in the poem understood to be Lapland, or a dismal land to the north thereof; and Kalevala, of course, is Finland. Throughout the epic there is a continual conflict between the Finns and the Lapps, representing the constant opposition between light and darkness, good and evil. The hero is always able to overcome an evil power if he can chant the origin of it, implying probably that we could exterminate evil if we only knew how or whence it came. The conflict is carried on by means of magic arts, which generally presuppose toil of some kind, thus suggesting that the best magic consists in industry, skill, and perseverance. It is interesting to note how frequently humble instruments are enlisted for the attainment of great ends, and how high a moral tone pervades the epic from beginning to end.

3. Origin.—The *Kalevala* is unique in being the only example of a national epic compiled from songs actually existing among the people, independent of a larger national poem. The compiler, Elias Lönnrot, visited the most remote districts of his beloved land, industriously and carefully reaping and gleaning from aged singers and reciters such songs or fragments as they knew. His harvest was rich, and it has a literary charm absolutely unknown in compilations, and only to be found in a work proceeding from one, and that a more than usually gifted, author.

Finnish literature proper is not ancient in the sense of having come down in parchment or print from former centuries. It is traditional, and was handed on from sire to son until about a century ago. Nearly all the traditional poetry is anonymous and composed in unrhymed lines of eight syllables, in the versification with which Longfellow has made us familiar in *Hiawatha*, the idea of which was derived from the *Kalevala*. At first the versification of the translation seems cramped, but the reader is quickly undeceived; for the vigour and grace of the poetry compel his admiration. One of the distinctive features of this versification is parallelism, such as we find in some of the OT Psalms, the second line repeating the sense of the first, either in different words or giving a new shade of meaning. Many of the songs are rich in imagery and choice of language through this poetic form. The other features of this poetry are more common in other literatures; alliteration and assonance, for example, are freely employed.

Lönnrot has issued two collections in addition

toja, 'The Magic Songs of the Finnish People' (Helsingfors, 1880), consisting of some 900 incantations, invocations, and other religious formulas, which help us to understand the superstitions and magic of the Finns; and *Kantéletar*, 'The Daughter of the Harp' (1st ed., Helsingfors, 1840 [with variants], 3rd ed., 1887), consisting of lyrics and ballad poetry which reveal the customs, habits, and life of the people in all their phases.

As these traditional songs were collated, the students of literature noticed the frequency with which certain names and characters appeared; and it gradually dawned on them that these fragmentary incidents might belong to some complete tale. Efforts were, therefore, made to gather in from every quarter every song or verse in the Finnish tongue, and eventually, in 1835, Lönnrot published a collection of the episodes and verses that seemed to belong to an original epic, and to this compilation he gave the name *Kalevala*. He divided the work into 32 cantos or runes, the whole amounting to some 12,000 lines. But he was not satisfied; and he continued to gather material until, in 1849, he issued the *Kalevala* as we now have it, in 50 cantos, containing, in all, 22,793 lines. Lönnrot alone is responsible for the selection and arrangement of the material. As the original fragments and songs, culled from many sources, have been carefully preserved, often in many variants, it is known that the compiler made only such trivial additions and alterations as were absolutely necessary to weld the fragments into a connected whole. Universal praise has been accorded to him for his self restraint, his literary skill, and his loyalty to the unknown poets whose songs had survived until he rescued them from possible oblivion.

4. Scheme of the epic.—The great defect of the *Kalevala* as a work of art is its lack of unity and continuity. Much might be left out, and additional verses or even runes might be inserted, without attracting the attention or decreasing or increasing the interest. For this reason it is difficult to indicate in few words what the subject of the *Kalevala* really is. In the poem there are at least four main cycles of songs; and, in addition, seven separate romances are woven into the epic. The four cycles are: (*a*) the Sampo Songs, in which, *inter alia*, we find the Finnish conception of the Creation; (*b*) the Väinämoinen songs, *i.e.* songs relating to the national hero, apart from the Sampo cycle; (*c*) the Lemminkäinen songs; and (*d*) the Kullervo cycle. Probably it would be right to say that the Sampo is the key to the *Kalevala*. For the story of the Sampo and its possession by the Finnish people—the origin, the hiding, the quest, the rape, and the loss of the Sampo—is the central fact that makes the poem an epic; and Lönnrot himself says that, without the Sampo, the *Kalevala* would fall into a number of independent cycles having very little connexion with each other.

5. The Sampo cycle.—

Ilmatar, the daughter of the Air, tired of lofty solitude, descended to the surface of the waters, and was embraced by the boisterous waves. She was tossed about for 700 years before she shaped the earth and could bring forth her son Väinämöinen. In due time this son cleared the land and sowed barley and other plants. He wooed a Lapland girl, Aino, but she would not marry him, and was drowned in escaping from his ardour. His mother advised him to seek a bride in Pohjola, the North country; and, as he was riding over the water on his magic steed, Aino's brother shot at him and killed the horse. Väinämöinen, however, was conveyed by an eagle to the castle of Pohjola, whose mistress, Louhi, offered to give him her beautiful daughter if he would forge for her the Sampo, a magic mill, which could produce, on demand, either grain or salt or gold, the symbols of prosperity. Väinämöinen himself could not make the mill, but he sent his younger brother Ilmarinen, by whose magic the task was accomplished and the Sampo given to Louhi. Väinämöinen, Ilmarinen, and Lemminkäinen in turn made love to Louhi's daughter, but she chose the handsome

smith, Ilmarinen, who made the Sampo. So long as the magic mill remained in Pohjola, the country prospered exceedingly. Kullervo, having been ill-treated by Louhi's daughter, Ilmarinen's wife, killed her. Thereafter the three wooers set out on an expedition to Pohjola to recover the Sampo which Louhi had hidden under a mountain and protected most cunningly. Eventually they overcame every difficulty, seized the Sampo, and escaped with it. But Louhi followed them, and in the struggle for supremacy the Sampo fell into the sea and was broken into fragments, some of which were cast upon the shore. Väinämöinen regained enough to ensure the prosperity of Kalevala; but Louhi secured only a fragment, so small that it was of no benefit to her or Pohjola.

This is the natural close to the epic; but the last canto of 620 lines has an interest of its own.

6. The Finnish Virgin Mary myth.—The fiftieth and final canto of the *Kalevala* gives us the story of Marjatta.

She was a damsel who was rarely beautiful,
'And was always pure and holy,
And was ever very modest.'

One day on the mountains she swallowed a cranberry and so conceived. She was discarded by her kindred and compelled to take refuge in the stable of Hiisi, the Evil One; and there, warmed by the vapours of the fire-breathing steed, she found comfort;

'And a little boy was born her,
And a sinless child was given,
On the hay in horses' stable,
On the hay in horses' manger.'

The child was spirited away whilst Marjatta slept. In her distress she sought him far and wide. The stars and the moon refused to reveal the hiding-place; but the sun directed the mother to the spot where he was concealed. The child grew in beauty, increasing in strength and in wisdom and in favour with men, so that 'All Suomi [Finland] saw and wondered.' Marjatta sent for a priest to baptize him; but he desired proof that the boy was no son of some black wizard. Väinämöinen, being appealed to, inquired into the matter, and suggested that, as the boy had sprung from a berry, he ought to be exposed on the mountains. But the fortnight-old child spoke up for himself and reproved Väinämöinen for his unrighteous judgment. The priest immediately took the side of the boy, crossed him, and

'Quick baptized the child with water,
As the king of all Karelia
And the lord of all the mighty.'

Greatly offended,

'Then the aged Väinämöinen
Went upon his journey singing,
. . . . . .
Sailed away to loftier regions,
To the land beneath the heavens,'

leaving behind his harp and his songs as a parting gift to his people.

7. Other cycles and separate romances.—In the course of the epic there are many songs and episodes in which Väinämöinen, the Finnish national hero, appears, and in which national customs and habits are delineated with minuteness and vigour.

The Lemminkäinen songs set forth the misadventures of this reckless adventurer. Time after time he escapes disaster or death by his own magic skill or that of his mother, to whom he is devotedly attached.

The Kullervo cycle has hardly any connexion with the main subject of the *Kalevala*; and these songs, with one peculiarly sad episode, are introduced because Kullervo killed Ilmarinen's wife.

The separate romances include the strange and moving tale of Aino, the fishing for the Maiden of Vellamo, the wooing of the Virgin of the Air, the Golden Maiden, the Son of Kojonen's wooing, the deliverance of the sun and moon, and the story of Marjatta, already described.

LITERATURE.—A full bibliography up to the year 1910 is given in the last Finnish ed. of the *Kalevala*, published at Helsingfors in that year. Unfortunately most of the best books on the *Kalevala* are to be had only in Finnish, a language which is but little known by scholars of other lands; but translations of some of these are promised in more common tongues. The most important of these works are: **E. Aspelin**, *Kalevalan tutkimuksia* ('Researches on the Kalevala'), i. (Helsingfors, 1882); **J. Krohn**, *Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden historia* ('History of Finnish Literature'), i. 'Kalevala,' Helsingfors, 1883–85 (Swedish tr., 1891); **A. Ahlqvist**, *Kalevalan karjalaisuus* ('Karelian Origin of the Kalevala'), do. 1887; **K. Krohn**, *Kalevalan runojen historia* ('History of the Kalevala Songs'), do. 1903-10; **F. Ohrt**, *Kalevala som Folkedigtning och Nationalepos*, Copenhagen, 1907 (contains a trustworthy summary of the most recent Finnish research). Translations of the *Kalevala* have appeared in Swedish by **M. A. Castren**, Helsingfors, 1844, and **K. Collan**, do. 1864–68, in French by **L. Le Duc**, Paris, 1845 and 1868, in German by **A. Schiefner**, Helsingfors, 1852, and **H. Paul**, do. 1885–86, in Hungarian by **F. Barna**, Pesth, 1871, and **B. Vikár**, do. 1909, in Russian by **L. P. Bielskij**, St. Petersburg, 1889, in Italian by **T. Cocchi**, Città di Castello, 1909, **P. E. Pavolini**, Milan, 1910, and **F. di Silvestre-Falconieri**, do. 1910, in Esthonian by **M. I. Eisen**, Dorpat, 1891 and 1898, in Bohemian by **J. Holeček**, Prague, 1894-95, and in English by **J. M. Crawford**, New York, 1888, and **W. F. Kirby**, London, 1907. **C. J. Billson**, *The Popular Poetry of the Finns*, London, 1900, is a brief and excellent introduction to the epic. The best known (but already out of date) work on the subject is **Domenico Comparetti**, *Der Kalewala*, Halle, 1892, Eng. tr. by I. M. Anderton, *The Traditional Poetry of the Finns*, London, 1898 (with introduction by A. Lang).

J. BEVERIDGE.

KĀLIGHĀṬ.—Kālīghāṭ (*Kālī*, a form of Durgā [*q.v.*], and *ghāṭ*, Skr. *ghaṭṭa*, Beng. Hind. *ghāt*, 'a flight of steps for bathing and other purposes on a river bank'), where the most sacred temple of the Indian goddess Kālī is situated, is now a southern suburb of Calcutta. Tolly's Nullah, earlier Gaṅgāsāgar Nullah, the tidal water-course from the Hūgli upon which the temple stands, represents the ancient course of the sacred river Ganges. It is still termed the Ganges, and revered as such by the pilgrims and worshippers at Kālīghaṭ. The modern name Tolly's Nullah merely commemorates a Colonel Tolly who, in 1775, was at the expense of deepening the *nullah*, or water-course. The old course of the Ganges was disappearing, but now lives again as a cross-country canal. The name Kālighāt itself signifies the *ghāt*, or steps, of Kali by which the worshippers from the temple descended to the stream for their ablutions.

The original temple of Kālī stood within what is now the city of Calcutta, not in the suburb of Kālīghāṭ, three miles farther south. The mythological legend of its sanctity is now, however, quite rooted in the popular mind in connexion with the latter, not the former, place.

Daksa, father of Satī (a title of Durgā or Kālī, wife of the god Mahādeva or Siva), omits to invite Mahādeva to a great sacrificial gathering at his house, to which all the other gods are invited. Satī asks an explanation of the indignity, and her father adds insult to injury by calling her husband Mahādeva names. Unable to bear the humiliation, Satī causes her soul to leave her body. Then Mahadeva, furious at the news of Satī's death, sweeps down upon the scene, picks up Satī's dead body from the ground, and dances madly about with it, threatening destruction to the whole world. Through Brahma the Creator, the gods succeed in inducing Viṣṇu, the Preserver, to save creation from the wrath of the terrible destroyer Mahādeva, mad with grief and drunk with loss. Viṣṇu flings his discus at the body of Satī in Mahādeva's hands and breaks the body into fifty-one pieces, which fall to earth in various places. Every spot where a fragment falls becomes from that moment a holy spot full of the divine spirit of Satī. Calcutta is one of the fifty-one spots so consecrated, for the little toe of the right foot of Satī fell upon its site (*Census of India*, 1901, VII. i. [Calcutta] 5).

Such is the mythological explanation of the sanctity and repute of the place known at first as Kālīkṣetra, or the place of Kālī, and subsequently as Calcutta. Kālikṣetra is mentioned in the Piṭhāmālā of the Nigamakalpa, which may take us as far back as the 12th century.

Other forms of the legend are given by C. R. Wilson (*Early Annals of the English in Bengal*, i. 129, note) and by W. W. Hunter (*Statistical Account of Bengal*, vol. i.). Wilson also gives a different derivation for Calcutta, and Hunter would derive the name from Kālīghāṭ itself.

When and how the Kālī temple in Calcutta was superseded by that at Kālighāṭ is not known, but by the year A.D. 1495 a Kālīghāṭ was in existence separate from Calcutta, and as a place of worship, which apparently Calcutta had ceased to be (see Bipro-dās, a Bengali poet, quoted by Wilson, *op. cit.*; see also W. Ward, *Hindoos*[2], Madras, 1815, ii. 125 ff.).

According to tradition, it was during an earthquake in the 15th cent. that the Calcutta temple disappeared. Kālī's shrine was thereupon raised

at the Kālīghāṭ in the neighbourhood of her husband's shrine in the adjoining suburb of Bhawānīpur. To Kālīghāṭ also, as has been said, the mythological account of the sanctity of the Calcutta shrine has now been transferred, with further local particulars added. In these additions we seem to see a ray of light cast upon the beginnings of the southern shrine.

In the neighbourhood where the temple now stands, so the Kālīghāṭ legend runs, somewhere about the 15th cent. lived an ascetic, by name Jaṅgal Gir ['tenant of the jungle'?]. To him one night Kālī herself revealed that one of the portions of her body had descended to earth there. Next day Jaṅgal Gir dug down at the spot, found 'the petrified toes,' and set them up for worship in a small wooden house (Wilson, i. 130).

Jaṅgal Gir, a jungle devotee, the traditional founder of Kālīghāṭ about the 15th cent., was himself probably, as a historical fact, the first attraction to draw worshippers thither. The reverence for holy men is an attractive feature of Hinduism.

Two centuries later than Bipro-dās, in 1676, when Streynsham Master visited the Hūgli on behalf of the East India Co., he referred in his description of the river to the shrine at Kālīghāṭ, and made no reference whatever to Calcutta, whose secular era had not yet dawned (Wilson, i. 54). Finally, by the middle of the 18th cent. the repute of Kālīghāṭ is apparent. Leading past the town of Calcutta, upon the east, lay a great pilgrim thoroughfare to Kālīghāṭ, known as 'the Broad Road,' now Bentinck St. and Chowringhi Road. The *Gaṅgā Bhakti Taraṅgiṇī* of about A.D. 1740 speaks of Kalighāṭ as a wonderful place, where the worship 'is celebrated with much pomp and sacrifice' (*Census of India*, 1901, VII. i. 8 and 11, note). The author of the *Census Report* of 1901 gives good grounds for believing that the shrine and the Tāntric rites associated with Kālī-worship began to rise into prominence at the end of the 16th cent., when the well-known Hindu general Mān-singh ruled Bengal for the Muhammadan Emperor.

The buildings within the temple enclosure are not in themselves in any way distinctive or of architectural note. The features of Kālīghāṭ are the packed crowds of worshippers and the great slaughter of young goats on the days of the annual celebrations of the Durgā Pūjā and the Kalī Pūjā (*pūjā* = 'worship'). Between seven and eight hundred goats are said to be sacrificed during the three days of the Durgā Pūjā. The decapitation taking place within the temple enclosure, it becomes at such times a veritable shambles, muddy with trodden earth and blood. From the place of decapitation the heads are carried to be piled up before the idol, and become thereafter temple perquisites, the worshipper carrying away the body with him to furnish the family feast.

'In this [sacrificing] there is no idea of effacing guilt or making a vicarious offering for sin' (M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 25).

The great mass of the crowd, too poor to offer a goat, press eagerly into the passage before the eastern door of the shrine to enjoy the opportunity of saluting the goddess as they pass and of casting their copper coin at her feet.

Kālīghāṭ is of special interest to the student of religions as the chief scene of bloody sacrifices within India, probably in the whole world. Such sacrifices are associated with the worship of certain goddesses—Kālī, the *mātas*, or Mothers, of Western, and the *ammans*, or Mothers, of Southern India, and others. At Kālīghāṭ, probably upon an aboriginal basis, they illustrate the later Śākta and Tāntric aspects of Hinduism.

The Durgā Pūjā, supposed to be a festival of the autumnal equinox, falls within the sixth Bengali month, Āśvin, beginning on the first day of the second quarter of the moon (the eighth day of the new moon between 15th Sept. and 15th Oct.). Of the three days, the second is the chief day at Kālīghāṭ. The date of the Kālī Pūjā (*kāla* = black) is fixed by the darkest night, the night of no moon, of the seventh Bengali month, Kārtik (the night of no moon between 15th Oct. and 15th Nov.).

LITERATURE. — *Calcutta Review*, vols. lii., xviii., XXXV.; *Indian Census Reports*, 1901, *Bengal* and *Calcutta*; W. W. Hunter, *Statistical Account of Bengal*, i. (London, 1875); *IA* ii. (1873); W. J. Wilkins, *Modern Hinduism*[2], Calcutta, 1900; C. R. Wilson, *Early Annals of the English in Bengal*, i. (London, 1895).

JOHN MORRISON.

KALMUKS.—See MONGOLS.

KALWĀR (Skr. *kalyapāla*, 'a distiller,' *kalya*, 'spirituous liquor').—The tribe of distillers, liquor-sellers, and traders, the great majority claiming to be Hindus by religion, found in all parts of India, but most numerous in Bihar and Orissa and the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 954,241. Like most of the trading classes of India, the Kalwārs, though probably including some non-Aryan elements, wish to rise in the social scale, and pose as orthodox Hindus, favouring in Bengal the Vaiṣṇava cultus, which is usually adopted by the mercantile castes. But in Bengal they are still on their promotion, and, though they employ Brāhmans for their religious and social rites, these are deemed to be of inferior rank in the priestly order. In the same province with the cultus of the orthodox gods they combine the worship of various minor deities. Thus one sub-caste offers rice and milk to Sokhā on Mondays during the light half of Śrāvan (July–August); goats and sweetmeats to Kālī and Bandē on Wednesdays and Thursdays; sucking pigs and spirits to Goraiyā on Tuesdays. Another sub-caste during the same period presents cakes and sweetmeats to the Pāñchoṅ Pīr (see PACHPIRIYA); and another offers similar gifts to Barham Deo in August–September and January–February. All these offerings are eaten by members of the worshipper's family, except the sucking pigs, which, being lawful food only to the menial castes, are buried after dedication. In the United Provinces the Kalwārs seem to occupy a somewhat higher position than in Bengal, the Brahmans who serve them being received on an equality by their brethren. Here they combine the cult of the Mother-goddess Durgā in the form of Kalikā with that of lower deities like the Pāñchoṅ Pīr, Phūlmatī, and the hero of cholera, Hardaur Lāla. Madain, the god of spirituous liquor, though worshipped by the Kalwārs when distillation is going on, is more generally reverenced by the lower castes, like the Chamārs or curriers, who are addicted to drinking. These people regard an oath by Madain as more likely, if violated, to attract retribution than that by any other god in the pantheon. The Kalwārs specially venerate the *āmlā* tree (*Phyllanthus emblica*) by feeding Brāhmans and performing a fire sacrifice (*homa*) at its foot. They also revere the *nīm* tree (*Melia azidirachta*) and the *pīpal* (*Ficus religiosa*), the former being regarded as the abode of the goddess Devī, to which women bow as they pass; the latter as the home of Vasudeva (Kṛṣṇa) and other gods. They fast on Sundays in honour of Sūraj Nārāyaṇ, the sun-god, and pour spirits on the ground in honour of Saiṛī or Sayarī, who seems to be a form of the earth goddess. Each house has a family shrine at which the household deities are worshipped. This rite is specially performed at childbirth, and the deity thus revered is usually Ghāzī Miyaṇ, one of the Pāñchoṅ Pīr, whose symbol, an iron spear, is kept near his shrine. In the Central Provinces the Kalars, who are iden-

tical with the Kalwārs, worship the deified bridegroom, Dulhā Deo, who is said to have perished in a tragical way during his wedding rites (Crooke, *PR*[2], 1896, i. 119 ff.), and a goddess called Rātmā, who is represented by a flat plate of gold or silver. Some, however, have advanced so far in the direction of monotheism that they worship Bhagvān, 'the glorious, prosperous one,' who is recognized as the Supreme Being. They also practise the cult of deceased ancestors by worshipping at the Holī, or spring festival, Bahādur Kalariyā and his son Susan Chābārī, who were said to be successful distillers, and the ruins of their factories are still pointed out. The assertion that the Halbās of Central India worship a pantheon of glorified distillers lacks confirmation.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Risley, *TC*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 386; W. Crooke, *TC*, do. 1896, iii. 111 ff.; for the Central Provinces, *The Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 1870, introd. cxxi; *JASB* lviii. pt. i. 292, 297.

W. CROOKE.

KANAKAMUNI.—Kanakamuni (Pāli Koṇāgamana), according to the tradition, was the second of the four Buddhas of the present age, his predecessor being Krakuchchhanda (Pāli Kakusandha), and his successors Kaśyapa (Pāli Kassapa) and Śākyamuni himself. Of these the first three are said to have been born in the neighbourhood of Kapilavastu (*q.v.*), the birthplace of Gautama, in the Nepalese *tarāi*. In the Bhadrakalpa, the time of Kanakamuni, men lived to the age of 40,000 years. Interest attaches to him, more than to the other predecessors of Gautama Buddha, on account of the discovery in the year 1899, in the course of a tour of archæological exploration undertaken on the border country of India and Nepāl, of the pillar erected by the Emperor Aśoka in honour of Kanakamuni and in commemoration of his visit to the place where the sage was believed to have been born.

The Chinese pilgrims Fā-Hian and Hiuen Tsiang both in turn visited the birthplace of Kanakamuni, and have recorded in a few words their journey thither and the condition of the buildings and site. Fā-Hian states that the town where Kanakamuni was born was less than a *yojana* north of the birthplace of his predecessor Krakuchchhanda, the latter place being twelve *yojanas* south-east of Śrāvastī. There was a *stūpa*, but no mention is made of the pillar.[1] The narrative of Hiuen Tsiang is as follows:

'To the north-east of the town of Krakuchchhanda Buddha, going about 30 *li*, we come to an old capital (*or*, great city) in which there is a *stūpa*. This is to commemorate the spot where . . . Kanakamuni Buddha was born.

To the north-east of the city, not far, is a *stūpa*; it was here, having arrived at complete enlightenment, he met his father.

Farther north there is a *stūpa* containing the relics of his bequeathed body; in front of it is a stone pillar with a lion on the top, and about 30 feet high; on this is inscribed a record of the events connected with his *Nirvaṇa*; this was built by Aśoka-raja.'[2]

The 'old town' where Krakuchchhanda was born is stated to have been about fifty *li* south of Kapilavastu. In his time human life was prolonged to 60,000 years.

Of the *stūpa* of Kanakamuni, with relics seen by the Chinese monks, no trace apparently exists. The broken parts of the pillar were found lying on the western bank of a large tank, the Niglīva Sāgar, south of and about a mile from the village of Niglīva, not far from the spot where the pillar erected by Aśoka in commemoration of his visit to Gautama's birthplace was discovered. The tank is now almost dry. The pillar is broken, but the total length of the two fragments still in existence is stated to be about 25 feet. The capital also has disappeared, and with it the lion surmounting the pillar, to which Hiuen Tsiang refers. There is, moreover, no trace of the inscription of which the pilgrim speaks, but four short lines of Tibetan script record a date and the so-called Buddhist creed *Om maṇi padme hūm*. The more ancient inscription of Aśoka is imperfect; the pillar itself also has been removed from its original position, and now lies at the top and bottom of the high embankment of the tank.

The inscription is in four lines on the lower broken part of the pillar, which together cover 15 or 16 inches in the height of the stone. The rendering is as follows:

'His Majesty King Piyadasi [*i.e.* Aśoka] in the fifteenth year of his reign enlarged for the second time the *stūpa* of Buddha Konākamana, and (in the twenty-first year) of his reign, having come in person, he did reverence, and set up (a stone pillar).'[1]

The approximate position of the pillar is lat. 27° 40′ N., long. 82° 10′ E.[2]

Of the numerous Buddhas whose names are recorded in the Buddhist books as predecessors of Gautama it would seem therefore historically probable that a real basis of fact underlies the name and personality of Kanakamuni; and also of his successor Kāśyapa. Nothing more, however, is known of him.

LITERATURE.—The available authorities are cited in the footnotes.

A. S. GEDEN.

KANAUJ (Skr. *kanyā-kubja*, 'the crooked maiden,' in allusion to a legend of the hundred daughters of Kuśanābha, king of the city, who were rendered deformed by the ascetic Vāyu because they refused to comply with his licentious desires [*Rāmāyaṇa*, i. 32]).—A famous ancient city in the Farrukhābād District of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh; lat. 27° 3′ N.; long. 79° 56′ E. It has been identified with the Kanogiza of Ptolemy, but this is disputed (J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, Calcutta, 1885, pp. 134, 227 f.; V. A. Smith, *JRAS*, 1908, p. 766). It was an important seat of Buddhism, as appears from the account by the Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (S. Beal, *Buddhist Records*, London, 1906, i. 206 ff.); but later, under the Gupta dynasty, it became a centre of Brāhmanical Hinduism. Its last king, Jai Chand, was defeated by Muhammad Ghorī, A.D. 1194 (Smith, *loc. cit.* 765 ff., *Early Hist. of India*[3], Oxford, 1914, p. 385 ff.). As the capital of the great monarch Harṣa (A.D. 606–645), and a centre of the two chief religions of N. India, it must have contained numerous religious buildings; but of these nothing now remains above the surface. Out of the materials of some of them the fine Jāmi' Masjid, or cathedral mosque, was built in A.D. 1406 by Ibrahīm Shāh of Jaunpur; but the site is still called Sītā-ki Rasoī, 'the kitchen of Sītā,' the heroine of the *Rāmāyaṇa* epic. There are many tombs of Muhammadan saints, the most important being those of Makhdūm Jahāniya, Makhdūm Akhai Jamshīd, and Bālā Pīr and his son Shaikh Mahdī, famous religious teachers who flourished in the reigns of Shāh Jahān and Aurangzīb. Other names for the city were Kuśasthala, Kanśa, Gādhipura, and Mahodaya (C. Lassen, *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, i.[2] [Leipzig, 1867] 157 f.).

LITERATURE.—Besides authorities quoted in the art. see *IGI* xiv. [1908] 370 ff.; A. Führer, *Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions, N.W. Prov. and Oudh*, Allahabad, 1891, p. 78 ff.

W. CROOKE.

KĀÑCHĪPURAM (Conjeeveram).—A city in the Chingleput District, lying about 45 miles W.S.W. of Madras.

[1] Fā-Hian, *Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, ch. xxi. (tr. J. Legge, Oxford, 1886, p. 64).

[2] S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1906, ii. 19.

[1] V. A. Smith, *Aśoka*, Oxford, 1901, p. 146.

[2] P. C. Mukherji, *Report on a Tour of Exploration of the Antiquities in the Tarai, Nepal, the Region of Kapilavastu, during February and March 1899*, Calcutta, 1901, pp. 30, 56, and pl. xvi.

1. Name.—In Tamil literature the most usual form of the name is Kachchi, with or without a suffix signifying 'place,' and this is probably the original name. Regarding its derivation nothing is known. The name Kāñchī is probably a Sanskritized form of the Tamil name, the form Kañchī, which is also found, being perhaps a connecting link between the two. The attempt to connect it with *kāñch* ('to shine') is fanciful. To Kāñchī the suffix *puram* ('place') came to be added. Among Europeans this was corrupted into Conjeveram or Conjeeveram. The older forms, however, are still used by the people and by Indian historical writers.

2. Significance.—Kāñchī is included by Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas alike among the seven cities in all India which are regarded as most sacred. How it first came to be so regarded we cannot tell, but that its fame as a sacred city goes back to ancient times is certain. The oldest buildings date from the 7th cent. of our era, but the place was famous at least eight hundred years earlier. As a home of learning its name has been known for nearly two thousand years. The city is of special interest to the student of architecture. In the oldest temples we can study to great advantage the transition from Buddhist to Hindu architecture, and mark the beginning of the Dravidian style (see ARCHITECTURE AND ART [Hindu]), while in some of the temples we can trace the slow evolution of that style through the centuries, until it culminates in the huge structures that astonish the visitor. To the student of religion, too, the city gives a unique opportunity. Almost every religious movement that has affected the South for two thousand years and more has been connected in some way with Kāñchī and has left visible traces of its influence. One has the feeling that, if its story could be fully unravelled, much would be added to our knowledge of the history of South Indian religion. The epigraphical records are unusually numerous, and much valuable work has been done, especially during the last thirty years. But much remains to be done, and many problems remain unsolved. All that is possible in the following sketch is to give the outline of the story, so far as it has been made out with tolerable certainty, with the proviso that further research may lead to some modification in detail.

3. History.—(1) *Early period (to 4th cent. A.D.).*—The earliest mention of Kāñchī occurs in Patañjali's Commentary on the Grammar of Pāṇini; and Patañjali lived not later than the 2nd cent. B.C. The fact that the name occurs in the Sanskrit form leads to the inference that the place had already been colonized by the Aryans. The Chinese traveller Hiuen Tsiang, who visited the place *c.* A.D. 640, states that 'Tathâgata [Buddha] in olden days, when living in the world, frequented this country much; he preached the law here and converted men' (*Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. S. Beal, ii. 229). It is possible that an Aryan migration took place as early as Buddha's day, but that Buddha himself came so far south is extremely improbable. When, however, Hiuen Tsiang goes on to say, 'And therefore Aśôka-râja built *stûpas* over all the sacred spots where these traces exist,' we may accept the substance of the statement as probable, for the *Mahāvaṁsa*—a Buddhist chronicle composed in Ceylon about the 3rd cent. A.D. (T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, p. 276 ff.)—mentions places not far from Kāñchī as among those to which Aśoka sent missionaries. The fact that no trace remains of Buddhist buildings of any kind is not a fatal objection to this view, since such buildings, when Buddhism disappeared, would form valuable quarries for Hindus or Jains, and the buildings which existed in Hiuen Tsiang's day have also disappeared. Regarding the date of the appearance of Jainism in the South nothing is known; but that it had obtained a footing before the end of this period may be taken for granted, since Hiuen Tsiang's testimony shows its prevalence in the succeeding period. If we could be sure that the Tamil epic, the *Maṇimēkhalai*, belonged to the 2nd cent. A.D. (see DRAVIDIANS [South India]), we would have in it an interesting glimpse of Kāñchī during this period, and testimony to the fact that in those early days the votaries of the Brahmanical religion (doubtless considerably modified by contact with the Animism of the Dravidians) dwelt in a condition of mutual toleration, if not of actual harmony, with Buddhists and Jains; but regarding the date of this work there is considerable doubt, some recent writers putting it as late as the 8th century.

(2) *Pallava period (4th to 9th cent.).*—During the greater part of the early period Kāñchī belonged to the Chola empire. Before the end of the period a new power had arisen before which the Chola dominion waned. The Pallavas, of whose origin nothing can be affirmed with certainty, had established themselves in the Andhra country to the north of Kāñchī about the 2nd cent. A.D., and by the middle of the 4th, if not earlier, they had made Kāñchī their capital. From the 5th cent. to the 8th they were the dominant power in the South, though at times, more especially towards the end of this period, they had to defend themselves against the Chālukyas and Rāṣṭrakūṭas on the North-West, and the reviving Chola power on the South. To this period belongs the visit of Hiuen Tsiang already mentioned. He describes the city, which he calls Kin-chi-pu-lo, as about 30 *li* (5 miles) round.

'The climate is hot, the character of the people courageous. They are deeply attached to the principles of honesty and truth, and highly esteem learning; in respect of their language and written characters, they differ but little from those of Mid-India. There are some hundred of *saṅghārāmas* and 10,000 priests. They all study the teaching of the Sthavira (*Chang-tso-pu*) school belonging to the Great Vehicle. There are some eighty Dêva temples, and many heretics called Nirgranthas' (*loc. cit.*).

Thus at the time of his visit (A.D. 640) Kāñchī was still a stronghold of the Buddhists. Hiuen Tsiang mentions Dharmapāla, a renowned Buddhist teacher who is said to have flourished shortly before the time of his visit (H. Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, Strassburg, 1896, pp. 9, 130), as a native of Kāñchī. The Jains (Nirgranthas) apparently lived side by side with the Buddhists. Under the head of 'Dêva temples' he doubtless included the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava temples, and probably the temples of the *ammans*, or Mothers, whom the Dravidians worshipped before the advent of the Aryans. Thus several different forms of Hinduism were already strong; but just about this time began a remarkable revival of Hinduism, before which first Buddhism and then Jainism began to wane. Epigraphical evidence shows that the central shrine of the Kailāsanātha temple was erected by the Pallava king Rājasiṁha (otherwise known as Narasiṁhavarman II.) about A.D. 670, and the Vaikuṇṭa Perumāl temple a few years later by his son Parameśvaravarman II. (Venkayya, *The Pallavas*, p. 17 f.). Several other temples are so similar in style that they may be placed about the same period, and the resemblance to the rock temples of Māmallapuram (the Seven Pagodas) is very striking. Apart from simple excavations, these temples are the oldest in South India which are known to us. Fergusson has shown that they are copied from Buddhist models, being imitations either of the *chaitya*, or hall for common worship, or of the *vihāra*, or monastery. The *vimāna*, or central tower, of the Kailāsanātha temple, for instance, is in the shape of a *vihāra*, and consists of several storeys built up of imitation *chaityas*.

The *gopuram*, or gate-tower (later), is in the form of a *chaitya*, and from such simple beginnings the evolution of the great *gopurams*, which are such a notable feature of the Dravidian style, may be traced (Fergusson, *Hist. of Ind. and East. Arch.*[2] i. 170-175, 302-362).

But the zeal of the Pallava kings, which showed itself in the building of these temples, was not the only factor in the triumph of Hinduism over its rivals. In Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism alike, during the Pallava period, remarkable groups of poets arose, whose songs in praise of the gods did much to win the people over from Buddhism and Jainism. Appar and Tirujñānasambandhar in the 7th cent., and Sundaramūrti in the 8th or 9th, were the authors of the hymns in praise of Śiva known as the *Dēvāram*. The songs of the twelve Ālvārs, or Vaiṣṇava saints, who are placed in the 6th and three following centuries, are gathered up in the *Nālāyiraprabandham*. How many of these poets actually lived in Kāñchī we cannot say with certainty. Poygai Alvār is said to have been born there (time uncertain), and definite traditions connect Tirujñānasambandhar and Tirumaṅgai Ālvār (9th cent.), among others, with the place. Be this as it may, the shrines of Kāñchī were well known to many of these singers, five Śaiva shrines being mentioned in the *Dēvāram*, and fourteen Vaiṣṇava shrines in the *Nālāyiraprabandham*. These all remain to the present day, though only in cases where the literary evidence is confirmed by the archæological can we be sure that the actual buildings which now exist can be traced so far back (K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar, in *Madras Chr. Coll. Mag.*, new ser., xiii. [1913] 244-247). Before the end of the Pallava period still another force was at work. The great Śaṅkara is said to have visited Kāñchī; and, if the usually accepted dates of his life are correct, the visit must have taken place early in the 9th century (*ib.*). Thus alongside of the Śaiva Siddhanta of the *Dēvāram* poets, and the Vaiṣṇavism of the Ālvārs, the *Advaita* (*q.v.*) system came to be taught.

An image of Śaṅkara stands in the temple of Kāmākṣī (a name for the wife of Śiva), and it is said that the goddess cannot stir beyond the temple precincts without getting permission from Śaṅkara. This prohibition is said to originate from Śaṅkara's victory over the goddess, the local tradition being that in Śaṅkara's day Kāmakṣi was a ferocious goddess who could be satisfied only with human blood, and that Śaṅkara brought such pressure to bear on her as to lead her to abandon her evil ways. The legend is only one out of the innumerable stories which cluster round the temples of Kāñchī, and may be of no more historical value than any other. Yet it may be an attempt to depict the victory—only partial—of the philosophic ideas of Śaṅkara over the worship already mentioned, in which evil goddesses are propitiated by bloody offerings, and may even demand human sacrifices. It is interesting to note that to this day the *archakas* (priests) of Kāmakṣi's temple are Nambūdri Brāhmans, who claim to be the descendants of those whom Śaṅkara brought with him from Malabar.

According to local tradition, Śaṅkara conducted a vigorous controversy with the Jains. The fact that nothing is said of the Buddhists in this connexion may be an indication that, so far as Kāñchī was concerned, their day was past. In the 8th and 9th centuries Jainism still flourished, and two of its protagonists, Samantabhadra and Akalaṅka, are associated with Kāñchī. On the whole, however, Hinduism was gaining ground. Of definite persecution of Buddhists and Jains there is little decisive proof, but the combination of royal favour with the efforts of poets and sages led to the disappearance of the followers of these religions, mainly by their gradual absorption into the Hindu community.

(3) *Chola period* (*9th to 14th cent.*).—During this period Kāñchī passed many times from hand to hand, but throughout the greater part of it the Cholas were in undisturbed possession, and for a time made it one of their capitals. In many inscriptions found in Kāñchī and the neighbourhood their victories are celebrated, and much interesting light is thrown on their administration (Krishnaswami Aiyangar, *Ancient India*, ch. vi.). In the Chola period Kāñchī became more distinctively than before a Hindu city. The Jains, indeed, retained a considerable measure of influence under the early Chola rulers. There is a strong local tradition that some temples which are now Hindu were once Jain, but the only Jain temple now remaining is just outside the modern city, in the village of Tirupparuttikunram. It is assigned by Fergusson to the 11th cent. (*op. cit.* p. 362), and contains a number of inscriptions of this and the following period (Sewell, *Lists of Antiquities*, i. 176-187). The legend in the Madura *Sthala Purāṇa* (*Gazetteer of the Madura District*, i. [1906] 254 f.) of the magical efforts made by the Jains of Kāñchī to convert the Śaivas of Madura may be regarded as testimony to the influence which the former were believed to be capable of exerting. But the movements in favour of Hinduism which were in progress in the previous period continued in this. The Chola kings went on with the work of temple-building, as many inscriptions testify (Sewell, *loc. cit.*). New temples were erected and old temples added to, and to old and new alike grants of land were made. Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava temples shared in this royal favour; but by the 11th cent. Vaiṣṇavism was gaining ground, mainly through the influence of Rāmānujāchārya.

This remarkable teacher was born in Śriperumbūdūr, about 20 miles E. of Kāñchī. Though belonging to a Vaiṣṇava family, he was placed under an Advaita teacher in a village near Kāñchi, but soon rejected the teaching of his master, and became the pupil of a Vaiṣṇava teacher in Kañchi who is usually known as Kañchipūrṇa. Attaching himself to the service of the god Varadarāja (Viṣṇu), he remained in Kañchi till he was over thirty years of age, when he was called to Śrīraṅgam to succeed Yāmunāchārya as head of the Vaiṣṇava community. He became the developer and exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy, in association with the Vaiṣṇava religion, Viṣṇu being regarded as the Supreme Being. Throughout his long life he was a controversialist, and we read of controversies with Buddhists, Jains, Advaitis, Śaivas, and Śāktas. On Kāñchi he left an impression which remains to this day. The Śrivaiṣṇavas, as his followers are called, have for about seven centuries been divided into rival sects—the Teṅkalais, or southern sect, and the Vaḍakalais, or northern sect. The founder of the latter was Vedāntadeśika, who was born at Kañchi about the middle of the 13th cent., and taught there for several years before being called to Śrīraṅgam (Rajagopalachariar, *Vaishnavite Reformers of India*, pp. 97-125). The Chola period, as we see from this outline, was a period of controversy and sometimes of persecution, Rāmānuja himself in his later years being persecuted by the Chola king Kulottuṅga I. (Govindāchārya, *Life of Rāmānujāchārya*).

(4) *Vijayanagar period* (*14th to 17th cent.*).—After a time of confusion Kāñchī became a part of the great Vijayanagar empire. Though no longer the capital of a kingdom, it was still regarded as the capital of the province of Tondaimandalam, and was the seat of a viceroy. Its sacredness was recognized by the Vijayanagar kings. Some of them frequently visited it, and at least one of them had his coronation ceremony performed there. It was in this period that the great temples attained their present huge dimensions, older buildings being added to and adorned, and in some cases surrounded by great courtyards with high walls and lofty *gopurams*. The work of many of the kings can be definitely traced through the inscriptions on the temples, from which we learn that the temples were enriched with many royal gifts. Although the Vijayanagar empire received a severe shock in A.D. 1565, it lingered on as a small kingdom till 1646, when its temporary capital, Chandragiri, was captured by the king of Golkonda. With this Kāñchī passed from Hindu to Muhammadan rule (Sewell, *loc. cit.*; Subrahmanya Aiyar, *Madras Chr. Coll. Mag.*, new ser., xiii. [1914]; for the Vijayanagar rule in general see Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*).

(5) *Modern period* (*middle of 17th cent. to the*

present day).—During the first century of this period Muhammadan rulers were in occupation of the place. This was not indeed their first appearance, for in A.D. 1310 Kāñchī was captured and plundered by Malik Kafūr, a general of 'Ala-ud-dīn of Delhi. A similar disaster befel it in 1481, when it was sacked by Muḥammad Shāh of Bījāpur.

According to Firishtah, this conqueror was incited to the attack by what he had heard of the wealth of one of the temples, 'the walls and roof of which were plated with gold, ornamented with precious stones' (Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 101). Another writer says that the victors 'levelled the city and its temples with the ground, and overthrew all symbols of infidelity, and such a quantity of jewels, valuable pearls, slaves and lovely maidens and all kinds of rarities fell into their hands that they were beyond computation' (quoted by Subrahmanya Aiyar, *loc. cit.*).

This statement must be regarded as an exaggeration. That great booty was carried off is probable, but, though some temples may have been plundered, others escaped with little damage, and survive to this day. Local tradition says that some of the 'symbols of infidelity' were saved by being buried. Such occupation was only temporary, but from 1646 to 1751, when it was captured by the French, Kāñchī was almost continuously under Muhammadan rule, first as part of the kingdom of Golkonda, then conquered by generals of Aurangzīb, and finally included in the dominions of the Nawāb of the Carnatic. During the Carnatic and Mysore wars it changed hands many times, the great temples being used as fortresses. Much damage was done, especially by Haidar 'Alī, who occupied the place in 1768 and again in 1780. In his time the terror of the Hindus was so great that many of the idols were removed to Tanjore and other places, and not till 1799 was confidence sufficiently restored to allow of their return. Meanwhile the district had been granted by the Nawāb to the East India Company in 1759, and, apart from Haidar's occupation, it has remained British territory since that date. During the Muhammadan occupation there was much friction between Muhammadans and Hindus. A number of mosques were erected, and one of the largest was originally a Hindu *maṇḍapam* ('pillared hall'), the pillars of which remain, though any Hindu figures that may have been carved on them have been removed. This mosque bears the date A.H. 1106 (=A.D. 1700), and is said to have been the work of Razafar 'Alī Khān, who came to take vengeance on the Hindus for an outrage to the person of a Muhammadan who had dared to wash his hands in a sacred tank. The same general is credited with the completion of the largest of the mosques, which commemorates a Muhammadan sage, Shāh 'Amīd 'Auliah, regarding whom and his contests with the representatives of Kāmākṣī and other deities many wonderful stories are related (for this period see Crole, *Manual of the Chingleput District*, pp. 141–200).

4. Present condition.—Kāñchī now measures nearly 4 miles from N.W. to S.E., with a maximum breadth of about a mile and a half. According to the census of 1911, the population was 53,864. Of these 1746 were returned as Muhammadans, and 139 as Christians. Only a few families of Jains are left, and the only Jain temple is that already referred to as standing outside the city. A small Sikh monastery where the Granth is worshipped forms a rallying place for Sikh pilgrims from the North, who, though not allowed by their creed to worship idols, have a remarkable fondness for visiting Hindu shrines. But, while other religions have retained, or are gaining, a foothold, the city remains essentially Hindu. The visitor is astonished at the number and size of the temples. He finds, too, that almost everything that comes under the title 'Hinduism' is represented in the place. The old Dravidian worship has survived the impact of all the other forces that have been at work, and the *ammans* are still worshipped, sometimes by themselves, sometimes in connexion with the Hindu pantheon. For instance, an obscure goddess called 'Elāgōli amman' is regarded as the mother of Pārvatī, and the latter repairs to her abode every year when her marriage is to be celebrated. In one of the smaller temples, where, among others, the five Pandavas are worshipped, the principal deity, Renukā, the mother of Paraśurāma, is identified with Māri, the Dravidian goddess of smallpox. The majority of the gods, however, are either the great gods of the pantheon under special aspects or deified men.

The principal divisions of the city are known as Śiva Kāñchī and Viṣṇu Kāñchī, but the nomenclature is not strictly accurate, for a number of ancient and important Vaiṣṇava shrines are in Śiva Kañchi. The greater temples of this section, however, are connected with the worship of Śiva. In the largest of all, Śiva is worshipped as Ekamranātha. Begun in the Pallava times, celebrated in the *Dēvāram*, and associated with Śaṅkara, this temple has been added to by succeeding dynasties till it now stands as one of the largest in India. Its great tower is 188 ft. in height, and the area enclosed within its outer wall is about 25 acres. Near the central shrine is a mango tree, under which Pārvatī is said to have done penance for putting her hands over Śiva's eyes. The principal object of worship is the *pṛthvī* ('earth') *liṅga*. Among the other objects now worshipped are the sixty-three Śaiva saints. During the last twenty years over £100,000 has been spent on the renovation of the temple by a few wealthy members of Nāṭṭukoṭṭai Chetti caste. Second in size among the Śaiva temples comes that of Kāmākṣi, already mentioned more than once. Śiva Kāñchi contains seven tanks of special sanctity, each being specially sacred on one day of the week. The largest is the Sarvatīrtham, in which all the Indian rivers are believed to have gathered to witness the penance of Pārvatī. The temples which are shown by architectural evidence to belong to the Pallava period are all in Śiva Kāñchī, and all except one are Śaiva temples.

In Viṣṇu Kāñchī the greatest temple is that of Viṣṇu under the name of Varadaraja (*i.e.*, the kingly giver of boons). It contains many inscriptions of the Chola and Vijayanagar periods (Sewell, *Antiquities*, where it is called the Arulāla Perumal temple). Although it cannot be distinctly traced further back, it was already famous when Rāmānuja attached himself to it early in the 11th century. It measures about 1200 ft. in length and 800 in breadth, being unsurpassed in size in the whole city except by the Ekāmranātha temple. Its hall of 100 pillars is an excellent specimen of the carving of the Vijayanagar period. Although the temple is said to have been plundered by Haidar, it still has great wealth. It is said that a Brahman devotee vowed that he would not eat on any day till he had collected Rs.10, and that he collected in all Rs.24,000, with which valuable ornaments were purchased. Rāmānuja and other great Ācharyas (or Vaiṣṇava teachers), and several of the Ālvārs, are worshipped within the precincts. The comprehensive nature of Hinduism is illustrated by the fact that at one end of the temple the lofty philosophy of Rāmānuja is taught in a Sanskrit college, while near the other offerings are presented to a living cobra. The great festival of this temple is by far the most important of all that are connected with the city. It takes place in the month of Vaikāśi (May–June), and lasts nominally for ten days; but, as the car festival counts as one day, and seldom occupies less than three, the

festival usually continues at least twelve days. Except on the seventh day, when the idol is drawn in a huge car which takes about a thousand people to pull, the image, adorned with the temple jewels, is carried out morning and evening on different vehicles. The procession, after passing along the narrow main street of Viṣṇu Kāñchī, enters the broad street of Śiva Kāñchī (said to date from Chola times); and, after going round that portion of the city, it returns, the total distance traversed being about six miles. According to the local legends, Viṣṇu and Śiva are brothers-in-law, and the Vaiṣṇava deity on the sixth day of the festival rests for a time in a *maṇḍapam* in front of Śiva's great temple. A strange relic of the Muhammadan domination is found in the fact that, when the daily procession reaches a *maṇḍapam* near the tomb of Shāh 'Amīd 'Auliah, a representative of that sage receives tribute in the shape of two small cakes of different kinds, one in the morning, and the other in the evening. On the third day of the festival, when the image is carried on the *garuḍa*, or mythical kite, which is Viṣṇu's special vehicle, it has to submit to the doubtful compliment of receiving a garland from the representatives of a small shrine belonging to the Pariahs. During these days large crowds, including many of the rich and educated, assemble from far and near, and men of wealth vie with one another in meeting the expense of the fireworks and other means of popular enjoyment. At all times, and especially during the festival, the authorities have to be on their guard to prevent rioting between the two sects of the Vaiṣṇavas, the Teṅkalais and the Vaḍakalais. The old feuds between Hindus and Muhammadans are at an end, and Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism no longer manifest the rivalry of an earlier day. The controversy is now between these two sects into which Rāmānuja's followers are divided, and, while the great majority of the sectarians know little or nothing of the points of difference,[1] feeling always runs high, and law-suits dealing with the position of the two sects in connexion with the temple worship go up from court to court, occasionally even reaching the Privy Council. While the festival of Varadarāja far surpasses all others, there are probably not many days in the year when some temple or other is not *en fête*; and quite apart from special festivals a stream of pilgrims from the most distant parts of India pours unceasingly through the place. For their entertainment many *choultries* ('rest-houses') have been built and endowed.

As a seat of learning, Kāñchī retains something of its ancient glory. In addition to the Viśiṣṭādvaita College, there are several Sanskrit schools, and some of the *gurus* who instruct pupils privately have a wide reputation. The Tamil scriptures are also extensively studied. Education on modern lines is now becoming popular, and is represented chiefly by two large high schools; the older of these dates from 1839, and is carried on by the United Free Church of Scotland, while the other is supported by an endowment left by a wealthy native of the place.

LITERATURE.—R. Sewell, *Lists of Antiquities*, 2 vols., Madras, 1882–84, *A Forgotten Empire*, London, 1900; *South Indian Inscriptions*, ed. E. Hultzsch, Madras, i. (1890), iii. pt. 2 (1903); numerous references in *Epigraphia Indica*, esp. viii. [Calcutta, 1905–06], ed. E. Hultzsch; **Hiuen Tsiang**, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. S. Beal, London, 1906, ii.; **C. S. Crole**, *Manual of the Chingleput District*, Madras, 1879 (superseded as far as periods (1)–(4) in § 3 are concerned); **V. Kanakasabhai**, *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, do. 1904; **J. Fergusson**, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*[2], ed. J. Burgess, i., London, 1910; **V. Venkayya**, *The Pallavas*, Madras, 1907; **A. Rea**, 'Pallava Architecture,' *Archæological Survey*, new imperial series, xxxiv., Madras, 1909 (somewhat unreliable, but containing many valuable plates); **K. V. Subrahmanya Aiyar**, 'The Ancient History of Conjeeveram,' *Madras Christian College Magazine*, new ser., xiii. (1913–14), 'The Origin of Buddhism and Jainism in Southern India,' *IA* xl. (1911); **V. A. Smith**, *The Early History of India*[3], Oxford, 1914; **T. W. Rhys Davids**, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903; **S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar**, *Ancient India*, with introd. by V. A. Smith, London and Madras, 1911; **A. Govindāchārya**, *The Holy Lives of the Āzhwārs*, Mysore, 1902, *The Life of Rāmānujāchārya*, Madras, 1906; **C. N. Krishnaswami Aiyar**, *Sri Sankaracharya*, do., n.d.; **T. Rajagopalachariar**, *The Vaishnavite Reformers of India*, do. 1909. The present writer is much indebted to Mr. T. A. Gopinatha Rao, Superintendent of Archæology to the Maharaja of Travancore, for valuable information and guidance.

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KĀÑCHULIYĀS.—A class of Indian Śāktas (*q.v.*). The name is derived from the Skr. *kañchulī*, 'a bodice.' They are found in Southern India (*Madras Manual of Administration*, i., Madras, 1886), where they are called Kāñjuliyās (from *kāñjuli*, the Tamil corruption of *kañchulī*), and have also been noted in Bombay. They are adherents of the most extreme left-handed Śākta doctrines, their chief ceremony culminating in the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes. This ceremony is called *ghaṭa-kañchulī*, or 'jar and bodice.' The number of male and female celebrants must be equal. A jar is placed in the centre of the place of worship, into which each woman throws her bodice, leaving the upper part of her body exposed. An orgy of eating and drinking is followed by each man taking at random a bodice from the jar and pairing with its owner, however near in kin to him she may be, for the rest of the night.

LITERATURE.—For a general account of these orgies see **J. A. Dubois**, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, ed. H. K. [illegible] do. 1817, i. 247 ff., may also be consulted. For the ghaṭa-kañchuli worship see **Wilson**, *op. cit.*, p. 263, and (for Bombay) **K. Raghunāthji**, in *IA* x. [1881] 73, 287. Cf. also the Uchchhiṣṭa-Gāṇapatyas, in art. GĀṆAPATYAS.

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KANDH, KHOND (the derivation of the name is uncertain; G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa*, 1893, p. 144, connects their title Koī, Kuī, with *ko*, *ku*, 'a mountain'; Risley, *TC* i. 398, connects it with *khāṇḍā*, 'a sword,' said to be the distinguishing mark of the tribe).—A tribe found in Bengal and Madras, the bulk of those formerly residing in the Central Provinces having passed into Bengal on the transfer to that province of the States of Kālāhaṇḍī and Patnā and the Sambalpur District. According to the Census of 1911, they number 673,346, of whom 355,137 are found in Madras, 302,883 in Bihar and Orissa, and the remainder in Bengal, the Central Provinces and Berar, and Assam. The tribe has for a long time attracted the attention of anthropologists owing to their custom of human sacrifice, known as *Meriah*. But, owing to their isolation, the information regarding them is still incomplete.

'Much has been written about them; but from reports received it seems clear that observers have in some cases been too ready to attribute to the whole of the tribe customs which are in reality only locally observed. A people which is split up, as they are, by hill and jungle into communities which cannot easily communicate with one another naturally develop a considerable diversity in their ways' (*Madras Census Report*, 1901, i. 161).

1. The tribe in Bengal.—The earliest and most generally accepted account of their beliefs is that of S. C. Macpherson (*Memorials of Service in India*, ch. vi. p. 84 ff.).

[1] The distinction is mainly connected with ritual, the Vaḍakalais using extracts from the Veda (Skr.), while the Teṅkalais use the *Nālāyiraprabandham* (Tamil). Doctrinally, it is analogous to that between Arminianism and Calvinism. The Vaḍakalais hold the 'monkey' doctrine, that the soul must cling to God as a monkey cub to its mother; the Teṅkalais maintain the 'cat' doctrine, that God takes hold of the soul as a cat does of her kitten. Further, the Vaḍakalais observe caste-restrictions far more closely than the Teṅkalais (see Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, pp. 124–127.

He represented them as believing in 'One Supreme Being, self-existing, the source of good, and Creator of the universe, of the inferior gods, and of man. This divinity is called, in some districts, Boora Pennu, or the God of Light; in others, Bella Pennu, or the Sun God; and the sun and the place from which it rises beyond the sea are the chief seats of his presence. Boora Pennu, in the beginning, created for himself a consort, who became Tari Pennu, or the Earth goddess, and the source of evil.' Finding her wanting in wifely complaisance, he determined to create from the earth a new being, man, who should render to him the most assiduous and devoted service, and to form from it also every variety of animal and vegetable life necessary to man's existence. 'The creation was perfectly free from moral and physical evil. Men enjoyed free intercourse with the Creator. They lived without labour upon the spontaneous abundance of the earth; they enjoyed everything in common, and lived in perfect harmony and peace. They went unclothed. They had power to move not only on the earth, but through the air and the sea. The lower animals were all perfectly innocuous' (p. 84 ff.). This paradise was destroyed by the intrigues of Tari Pennu, who 'instilled into the heart of man every variety of moral evil . . . and at the same time introduced every species of physical evil into the material creation. . . . Boora Pennu, by the application of antidotes, arrested and held in abeyance the elements of physical evil; but he left man perfectly free to receive or reject moral evil.' Those who remained sinless he raised to the rank of immortal gods. 'Upon the corrupted mass of mankind Boora Pennu inflicted high moral penalties by the withdrawal of the antidotes which had arrested them. He entirely withdrew his face and his immediate guardianship from mankind. He made all who had fallen subject to death; and he further ordained that, in future, every one who should commit sin should suffer death as its consequence. Universal discord and war prevailed, so that all social and even family ties were broken up.' Some, he goes on to say, believe that Boora 'proved triumphant in the contest, and, as an abiding sign of the discomfiture of Tari, imposed the cares of childbirth upon her sex.' Others, however, hold 'that she remained unconquered, and still maintains the struggle with various success' (p. 86 f.). 'Boora Pennu, say his sect, resolved that, for his own honour, his work should not be lost, but that man should be enabled to attain to a state of moderate enjoyment upon earth, and to rise after death, through the practice of virtue, to a state of beatitude and partial restoration to communion with his Maker' (p. 88). Six deities 'were created to meet the primary wants of man on earth after the introduction of evil, namely: 1. Pidzu Pennu, the god of rain. 2. Boorbi Pennu, the goddess of new vegetation and first fruits. 3. Pitterri Pennu, the god of increase, and of gain in every shape. 4. Klambo Pennu, the god of the chase. 5. Loha Pennu, the god of war (literally the iron god). 6. Sundi Pennu, the god of boundaries. To which is to be added, as an inferior god of the first class, 7. Dinga Pennu, the judge of the dead' (p. 89 f.). 'Next in rank to this class of inferior gods is the class of deified sinless men of the first age. . . . The third class of inferior deities are sprung from the gods of the first two classes. . . . The following are the chief of this class of gods: 1. Nadzu Pennu, the village god; 2. Soro Pennu, the hill god; 3. Jori Pennu, the god of streams; 4. Idzu Pennu, the family or house god; 5. Moonda Pennu, the tank god; 6. Sooga Pennu, the god of fountains; 7. Gossa Pennu, the forest god; 8. Kootti Pennu, the god of ravines; 9. Bhora Pennu, the god of new fruits produced on tree or shrubs' (p. 90 f.). 'Men are endowed with four souls. First, there is a soul which is capable of beatification and restoration to communion with Boora. Secondly, there is a soul which is attached to some tribe upon earth and reborn for ever in that tribe, so that upon the birth of every child the priest declares, after inquiry, which of the members of the tribe has returned. Thirdly, there is a soul which endures the sufferings inflicted as the punishment of sin, and performs the transmigrations imposed on that account. This soul, moreover, has the power of temporarily quitting the body at the will of a god, leaving it weakened, languid, sleepy, and out of order. Thus, when a man becomes a priest, this soul always leaves his body for a time to hold an interview with, and receive instructions from, the god who has appointed him his minister; and when, by the aid of a god, a man becomes a tiger, . . . this, I believe, is the soul which animates the bestial form. Fourthly, there is a soul which dies on the dissolution of the body' (p. 91 f.). Dinga Pennu, judge of the dead, administers justice to departed souls. 'The chief sins are: 1. To refuse hospitality, or to abandon a guest; 2. to break an oath or promise, or to deny a gift; 3. to speak falsely, except to save a guest; 4. to break a solemn pledge of friendship; 5. to break an old law or custom; 6. to commit incest; 7. to contract debts, the payment of which is ruinous to a man's tribe, which is responsible for the engagements of all its members; 8. to skulk in time of war; 9. to betray a public secret' (p. 92 ff.).

This elaborate system of mythology and ethics naturally gave rise to criticism. J. Campbell (*Thirteen Years' Service among the Wild Tribes of Khondistan*) disputed the statements made by Macpherson.

He calls the Kandhs 'a degenerate race, with all the ignorance and superstition of savages' (p. 15); 'just what I expected barbarians to be—sunk in the depths of ignorance, superstition, and sensuality' (p. 108). He protests against Lord Elphinstone's assertion that 'in their religion we find traces of the primitive elemental worship of the Vedas before it was overlaid by the superstructure which now almost conceals it from our eyes, as well as from those of the generality of Hindoos themselves' (p. 39). He expresses wonder that such a pantheon as Macpherson described could be asserted to exist among such an ignorant people, 'and in the course of my long inquiries and researches, I found nothing in the hill districts resembling the array of deities referred to in this report' (p. 163). 'Sacred images of the most barbarous type are to be found in most villages, and of these the priests, as ignorant as the rest of the people, can give no intelligible account. Indeed, save at the time of sacrifice, when wrath is to be averted, and their malignant deity propitiated by the offering of human blood, the Khonds are a most irreligious people' (p. 163 f.). They have no idols more artistic than 'a log of wood, sometimes rudely fashioned after the manner of some animal's head, and only used on the occasion of the immolation of a human victim'; and he denies the existence of a priesthood corresponding to 'the elaborate system of idolatry provided for this semi-barbarous people' (p. 165). Campbell, it is true, was, for official reasons, hostile to Macpherson. But there seems little reason to distrust his general conclusion that Macpherson, who knew little of the tribal dialects, was misled by his interpreters and native subordinates. The whole story illustrates the danger of such methods of inquiry. At the same time, Bûrhâ Deo, the consort of the earth-goddess, is a deity worshipped by the Gonds and kindred tribes. In fact, Dalton, though his acquaintance with the Kandhs was limited, is inclined to believe that, while Macpherson's system of mythology and ethics is 'more profound than one would expect to find amongst so ignorant a people,' and that it is 'a melange of Genesis, the several Hindu systems, and primitive paganism. . . . it is quite possible that such a system may have been gradually built up for them by Brâhmans, Gosâins, and other Hindus, who not only lived amongst them, but joined in their sacrifices, supplemented by notions gleaned from Missionary teaching or books' (*Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 296). Risley (*TC*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 403) regards Macpherson's account as 'quite out of keeping with their primitive social organization, and one is inclined to suspect that the persons from whom he derived his information must have described to him rather their ideal view of what the religion of the tribe ought to be than what it actually was. . . . The Kandhs of the Kandhmals recognise three principal gods—Dharma Pennu, Sâru Pennu, and Târu Pennu. The functions of Dharma Pennu appear to be of a somewhat more general character than those assigned to the other two. No regular times or seasons are fixed for his worship, and he is appealed to only in cases of illness or at the birth of a first child. His worship is performed by a *guru* who may be of any caste, but is usually either a Kandh or a Pân. The *gurus* usually have the power of throwing themselves or feigning to throw themselves into a state of hypnotic trance, and are supposed to be able to cure diseases by touching people, tying them up with bits of thread, and similar mummery. Sâru Pennu is the god of the hills, a divinity apparently of much the same type as the Marang Buru of the Santâls and Mundas. He is a jealous god, and does not like people to trespass on his domain, and the chief object of the worship which is performed in his honour in April and May is to induce him to protect from the attacks of wild animals people whose business takes them among the forest-clad hills of the Kandhmals, and also to secure a full yield of the jungle products which the Kandhs, like most similar tribes, use so largely for food. The priests of Sâru Pennu are called *dehuri*, and the appropriate offerings are a goat and a fowl with rice and strong drink. The offerings are partaken of by the worshippers. Târu Pennu, the earth god, takes the place among these Kandhs of Târi Pennu, the earth *goddess*, familiar to students of the voluminous official literature which treats of the suppression of human sacrifice among the Kandhs. He is believed to be very vindictive, and to wreak his anger upon those who neglect his worship, afflicting them with various diseases, destroying their crops, and causing them to be devoured by tigers and leopards. In order to avoid these evils the Kandhs offer buffaloes and goats to the god at irregular intervals, apparently whenever they think that he stands in need of being appeased. His priests are called *jhankar*, and the person who actually sacrifices the animals is known as *jani*. The functions of the *dehuri*, the *jhankar*, and the *jani* are hereditary.'

2. Human sacrifice.—The chief interest in the religion of the Kandhs rests in their system of human sacrifice, which has now, under the pressure of the British Government, been discontinued. A full account of these rites, based on the authorities already quoted—Macpherson, Campbell, Dalton, Risley—is given by J. G. Frazer in his *GB*[3], pt. v. vol. i. (London, 1912) p. 245 ff. As Frazer's account is generally accessible, only a bare summary is required. The *Meriahs* (Oriya *mĕrlā*, from Kandh *meroi*, *merei*, or *mriwi*, 'a human victim'; see *Man*, xi. [1911] 38) were sacrificed to Târi Pennu, the earth-goddess, in order to ensure good crops and immunity from disease and accidents. It was necessary that they should be bought for a price, and they were procured

through the agency of the menial Pān tribe from the plains of Bengal. The victim was well treated before the sacrifice, which was preceded by several days of revelry and debauchery. He was anointed with oil, butter, and turmeric. There was a struggle to secure relics of his person while he was tied to the sacrificial post. This post was often in the form of a peacock or elephant. The only surviving example is preserved in the Madras Museum (E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, iii. 371, with photograph, p. 377). Before sacrifice the victim was sometimes led in procession, and he was finally killed by being either strangled or squeezed to death. The flesh was divided among the participants in the rite, who buried it in their fields. Frazer disputes the theory suggested in the contemporary accounts of the rite, that the victims were offered to propitiate the earth-goddess. The custom, he thinks, cannot be explained merely as a propitiatory sacrifice. Part of the flesh was certainly offered to the goddess; but the rest was buried in the fields, or the ashes were scattered over them; some was laid in the form of paste in the granaries, or mixed with the new corn.

'These latter customs imply that to the body of the Meriah there was ascribed a direct or intrinsic power of making the crops to grow, quite independent of the indirect efficacy which it might have as an offering to secure the good-will of the deity. In other words, the flesh and ashes of the victim were believed to be endowed with a magical or physical power of fertilising the land. The same intrinsic power was ascribed to the blood and tears of the Meriah, his blood causing the redness of the turmeric and his tears producing rain; for it can hardly be doubted that, originally at least, the tears were supposed to bring down the rain, not merely to prognosticate it. Similarly the custom of pouring water on the buried flesh of the Meriah was no doubt a rain-charm. Again, magical power as an attribute of the Meriah appears in the sovereign virtue believed to reside in anything that came from his person, as his hair or spittle. The ascription of such power to the Meriah indicates that he was much more than a mere man sacrificed to propitiate a deity. Once more, the extreme reverence paid him points to the same conclusion. . . . In short, the Meriah seems to have been regarded as divine. As such, he may originally have represented the Earth Goddess or, perhaps, a deity of vegetation; though in later times he came to be regarded rather as a victim offered to a deity than as himself an incarnate god' (*GB*², pt. v. vol. i. p. 250).

The Kandh prayers are discussed by Tylor (*PC*², London, 1873, ii. 268 f.) and by Farnell (*The Evolution of Rel.*, do. 1905, p. 183).

3. **Beliefs in the Central Provinces.**—The following account refers to the tribe before its transfer to Bengal. The belief in a future state is indicated by the death customs. A rupee or copper coin is tied in the shroud, so that the deceased may not go penniless to the other world. Sometimes his clothes and bows and arrows are buried with him. On the tenth day the soul is brought back to his family. Outside the village, where two roads meet, rice is offered to a cock, and if it eats it is a sign that the soul has come. The soul is then asked to ride on a bow-stick covered with cloth, and this is brought to the house and placed in a corner with those of other relatives. The souls are fed annually with rice at the harvest and *Dasahrā* festivals. In Sambalpur a ball of powdered rice is placed under a tree with a lighted lamp near it, and the first insect that settles on the ball is supposed to be the soul, and it is brought home and revered. The souls of infants who die before the umbilical cord has dropped off are not brought back, because they are considered scarcely to have come into existence. One cause of female infanticide among the tribe was the belief that the souls of girl children would not be born again. The souls of women who die during pregnancy, or after a miscarriage, or during the monthly period of impurity, are not brought back, no doubt because they are held to be malignant spirits (*Ethnographical Survey Central Provinces*, pt. vii. [1911] p. 55).

The *Semi-jātrā*, or bean festival, is held in November when that crop is ripe; some offerings are made to the earth-god to obviate the risk of consuming the firstfruits. A similar festival in March, called the *Mahūl-jātrā*, solemnizes the ripening of the *mahuā* (*Bassia latifolia*), as the *Dasahrā* in September marks the rice harvest, when new rice is offered to the earth-god. Before these festivals it is dangerous to eat these kinds of food (*ib.* 58 f.).

The pantheon includes eighty-four gods, of whom Dharnī Deotā, the earth-godling, is chief. He is supposed to have replaced the female deity, Tārī Pennu or Berā Pennu. Such change of sex is not unusual; in Chhattīsgarh the earth-deity is either a male, Ṭhākur Deo, or a female, Ṭhākurānī Māī. The earth-god is usually accompanied by Bhātbarsī Deotā, godling of hunting. Dharnī Deotā is represented by a triangular wooden peg driven into the ground, and Bhātbarsī has a place at his feet in the shape of a piece of conglomerate stone with circular granules. Once in four or five years a buffalo is offered to the earth-godling in lieu of the human sacrifice which is now prohibited, as in Madras a monkey is sometimes substituted for the *Meriah* (E. Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of S. India*, London, 1912, p. 207). The animal is predestined for sacrifice from its birth, and is allowed to wander loose and graze on the crops at will. The stone representing Bhātbarsī is examined periodically, and when the granules on it appear to have increased it is decided that the time has come for sacrifice. In Kālāhandī a lamb is sacrificed every year, and strips of the flesh are distributed to all the villagers, who bury them in their fields as a divine means of fertilization, as the flesh of the human victim was formerly buried. The Kandh worships his bow and arrows before he goes out hunting. He believes that every hill and valley has its own deity, who must be propitiated with the promise of a sacrifice before his territory is entered; if this is not done, he will hide the animals within it from the hunter, or will help them to escape when wounded. These deities are closely related to each other, and it is important when arranging an expedition to know the connexion between them. This information can be obtained from any one on whom the divine afflatus periodically descends (*ib.* 59 f.).

4. **Beliefs in Madras.**—Various accounts of the beliefs of the tribe in Madras are on record. At Chollapadam in the Vizagapatam District, worship is offered to Koṇḍā Deotā, the nameless mountain spirits, who dwell in a hill cave; to Jākarā, the tribal deity, of whom a Kandh is priest; to Polamma, a village deity imported from the Telugu country, whose priest is a Jātapū, or civilized Kandḷ; and to Kāśiviśveśvara, 'lord of the universe,' Śiva at Kāśī or Benares, at whose shrine a Jangam Liṅgayat (*q.v.*) officiates, the chief festival being held at the Śivarātri, or 'night of Śiva' (W. Francis, *Vizagapatam Gaz.*, 1907, i. 75). In the Ganjam District the soul is believed to survive the death of the body, and on the day after death a little cooked rice is laid on the spot where the cremation took place, and the priest delivers an incantation asking the spirit to eat the food, to enjoy itself, and not to change into an evil spirit, or a tiger, and worry the relatives. Purification follows a death; and, when a man is killed by a tiger, a pig is sacrificed and the body of the animal is passed between the feet of the villagers; it is a bad omen for any one if it happens to touch his legs (Thurston, *Castes and Tribes*, iii. 395). Another sacrifice intended to save the cattle from injury consists in burying the head of a chicken near the post of the cowshed, and in front of it a rotten egg. When the cattle come home in the evening, the women, who have

fasted all day, are obliged to eat; drinking and dancing follow for two days, during which time the manure is not removed from the shed. On the third day a lump of manure is brought out by each owner and thrown in a heap, over which the priest pours spirituous liquor and rice (*ib.* iii. 406 f.). Oaths are taken before a basket containing a blood-sucker (lizard), a bit of tiger's skin, a peacock's feather, earth from an ant-hill, rice mixed with fowl's blood, and a lighted lamp. Witchcraft is common, and various forms of ordeal are used, such as holding the hand of the suspected person in boiling water; if the hand is scalded, the accused is condemned and has to pay a fine to the tribe (*ib.* iii. 408 f.). From a still more recent account it appears that the Hindu belief in *karma* and reincarnation is not found, except in a vague way, among those who have come in contact with the people of the plains. They certainly believe in the survival of the spirit after death, and in its possible temporary transference during life, it being commonly supposed that the spirit of a man killed by a tiger guides the animal in its search for other victims. But it is very difficult to distinguish their beliefs from those of the Hinduized peasantry in their neighbourhood. Their gods are Bura Penu, who with his wife Piteri (probably the S. Indian Pidari) is worshipped as Creator of mankind, who controls a host of minor gods; Dondo Penu, god of hunting, who lives in sacred trees which no one dares to cut; Loha Penu, god of iron, who directs the arrows of his votaries against the enemy and averts their counter-shafts; Odu Penu, god of the outside, who is the village guardian, in which duty he is assisted by Dandere Penu, the door-keeper, who watches the back of the village, Darni Penu, who watches the inside from beneath a heap of stones, beside which a rotten egg is buried, Teki Penu, god of vessels, who guards the house goods, and Goheli Penu, god of the stable, who protects the animals from tigers. Besides these are Murdo and Rugo, deities of smallpox and cholera; another god whose activity is chiefly shown by his demanding tobacco; a god of precipices and a hot spring at which worship is offered. If there is no actual ancestor-worship, tales are told of hero and giant forefathers (*Madras Census Report*, 1911, i. 62 ff.).

5. **Totemism.**—Among the branch of the tribe in Madras there are three totemistic septs named after a peacock's egg, a small bird, and a dung-worm, which are nominally exogamous, though the strictness of this prohibition has now become weakened. How far each sept reveres its totem is a matter of uncertainty (*Madras Census Report*, 1911, i. 65). Among the northern branch of the tribe more precise information has been collected by J. E. Friend-Pereira (*JASB* lxxiii. pt. iii. [1905] p. 40 ff.), fully analyzed by J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, ii. 305 ff.

LITERATURE.—For the Bengal branch of the tribe: S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, London, 1865; J. Campbell, *Thirteen Years' Service among the Wild Tribes of Khondistan*, do. 1864; E. T. Dalton, *Descrip. Ethnol. of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872; H. H. Risley, *TC*, Calcutta, 1891; W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, London, 1872. For the Madras branch: E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes* (with a detailed bibliography), Madras, 1909, *Ethnographic Notes in S. India*, do. 1906; *Census Reports Madras*, 1901, 1911; *District Manuals* (*Ganjam*, by T. J. Maltby and G. D. Leman, 1882; *Vizagapatam*, by D. F. Carmichael, Madras, 1869, W. Francis, 1907); G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa*, Westminster, 1893.

W. CROOKE.

KANDY.—Kandy is a small modern town in Ceylon, beautifully situated on the border of a lake in a plain about 1718 ft. above sea level, and about 75 miles nearly N.W. of Colombo. The mountains, 2000 to 4000 ft. higher, rise around it; and in the Sinhalese time the town was difficult to approach, being surrounded by thick jungle. It was the residence of the kings of Ceylon from 1592 to 1798. During this period the kingdom of Ceylon had reached the lowest depth of disorder and decay. Half its territory was lost; and the half still remaining was harassed by frequent civil wars between rival claimants to the throne; and, when one or other of these claimants succeeded in gaining the upper hand over his rivals, there were recurring struggles against outside enemies—Tamils, Portuguese, Dutch, and, finally, English. These rival claimants to the throne were not Sinhalese but South Indians by blood, and by religion, though nominally Buddhist, were at heart Hindus. They built four *devālas*, Hindu temples, in the town.

Knox unfortunately gives no description of Kandy. But we have a good one by John Pybus, who was there in 1762. It is preserved in *Account of Mr. Pybus's Mission to the King of Kandy*, reprinted from the Madras Government records by the Government printer in Ceylon in 1862. We read there (p. 35) that the town then consisted of two main streets (the one running north and south being about a mile long) and several cross streets. Only a few of the houses were tiled. The streets were not lit; but about 8 o'clock a bell was rung along them, and after that no one was allowed abroad unless he carried a large light in his hand. The Palace was a rambling pile to the south of these streets with a large garden in front of it. This is confirmed by J. Forbes,[1] but in his time the lake which Pybus does not mention had been constructed 'by the late king' Rāja Siṅha in 1807. J. E. Tennent, writing about 30 years later,[2] describes the modern European town, and the wonderful road to it up the Kadugannāwa Pass. It is now a prosperous little place of about 25,000 inhabitants, with a busy railway station, and many villas on the slopes of the surrounding hills.

The English name, Kandy, is a corruption of the old name, not of the town, but of the county or province in which it was situated. This was Kanda-uda ('Up in the Hills'). The Sinhalese name of the town was Senkada-gala-nuwara.

Besides the four Hindu temples there are two small *vihāras*, or residences for members of the Buddhist Order, named respectively Asgiriya and Malwatte Vihāra. No one, according to a regulation issued, in defiance of the old *Vinaya* (the Rules of the Order), by the Sinhalese court, can be received into the Order except at a chapter held at one or other of these *vihāras*.[3] There is also the well-known Daladā Maligāwa, a pretty little building containing the supposed tooth of the Buddha—really not a human tooth at all, but possibly the tooth of some pre-historic animal. The history of this supposed relic is long and complicated, and has been the subject of various writings. In the 13th cent. Dhamma-kitti wrote a Pāli poem about it based on an older Sinhalese work in prose.[4] According to the tradition preserved in this poem, the tooth was brought to Ceylon in the 4th cent. of our era, and had remained there up to the time when the poem, the *Dāṭhā Vaṁsa*, was written. According to Portuguese accounts quoted by Tennent (*loc. cit.*), the Portuguese captured the tooth, ground it to powder, and threw the powder into the harbour at Goa. The Sinhalese say that the tooth thus destroyed was a Hindu relic seized by the Portuguese in the Tamil country at Jaffna, and that the Buddhist relic now in Kandy is identical with the one whose history was written by Dhamma-kitti.

[1] *Eleven Years in Ceylon*[2] [1827–38], London, 1841, i. 290–301.

[2] *Ceylon*[2], London, 1859, ii. 194–221.

[3] See Forbes, *op. cit.* i. 299.

[4] Edited by the present writer in Roman characters in *JPTS*, 1884.

Kandy was taken by the English in 1815, and the king of Kandy was deported to Vellore in S. India, where he subsequently died.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are given in the article.

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KANHERI (Skr. *Kṛṣṇagiri*, 'hill of Kṛṣṇa'). —One of the most important of the Buddhist cave temples in the island of Salsette, about 16 miles N. of Bombay; lat. 19° 13′ N.; long. 72° 59′ E.

The site, lonely, picturesque, and close to the great trading marts of the W. coast, combines the three leading characteristics of the chief groups of W. India temples. 'But Kanheri is the only rock-cut monastery in W. India that has the feeling of having been, and of being ready again to be, a pleasant and popular dwelling-place. The rows of cells, water-cisterns, dining-halls, lecture-halls, and temples joined by worn flights of rock-cut steps, and the crowded burial gallery show what a huge brotherhood must have once lived in Kanheri' (*BG* xiv. [1882] 123). The caves were excavated at various periods, the great Chaitya cave bearing an inscription of Yajña Śrī Gautamīputra Siriyaṇa Śātakarṇi, a king of the Āndhra dynasty (A.D. 173–202) (V. A. Smith, *Early Hist.*[3], Oxford, 1914, p. 211). Not far off is the Darbār Cave, which 'is not a *vihāra* in the ordinary sense of the term, though it has some cells, but a *Dharmaśāla* or place of assembly, and is the only cave now known that enables us to realize the arrangements of the great hall erected by Ajāta Śatru in front of the Sattapaṇṇi cave at Rājagriha, to accommodate the first convocation held immediately after the death of Buddha' (Fergusson-Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, p. 353).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works quoted in the art., see J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Arch.*, ed. London, 1910, i. 162 ff.; *BG* xiv. [1882] 121 ff.; L. Rousselet, *India and its Native Princes*, London, 1882, p. 49; *IGI* xiv. [1908] 399.

W. CROOKE.

KANIṢKA.—Kaniṣka was an Indo-Scythian king of N. India and Afghānistān, who plays the part of a second Aśoka in the traditions of the Buddhist schools of N. India, Tibet, China, and Mongolia, especially as the convener of a council held in Kashmīr, or, according to certain authorities, at Jālandhar (see COUNCILS [Buddhist]). His name is sometimes spelt *Kāṇiṣka* in inscriptions. It appears on coins in Greek script as *Kanerki*, or in the genitive *Kanerkou*, which some scholars read as *Kaneshki* and *Kaneshkou* respectively. Kashmīr tradition gives the variant *Kaniṣṭha*, which becomes *Kaniṭ'a* in Chinese.

He was a member of the Kushān (Kuṣana, Guṣana, or, according to von Holstein, Kuṣa) section of the great Yuechi nation of Central Asian nomads, and is mentioned in numerous Indian inscriptions bearing dates ranging from 3 to 41. Prolonged controversy has ranged round the interpretation of these dates, and general agreement has not yet been attained. In the opinion of the present writer, it is certain that Kaniṣka was the immediate successor of Kadphises II. (Wima, etc., of coins and inscriptions, Yen-kao-ching, etc., of Chinese), and almost certain that his accession (or possibly coronation) coincides with A.D. 78, the epoch of the Śaka era. That era appears to have been established by Kaniṣka.

Kaniṣka, who is often described as king of Gandhāra, had his capital at Puruṣapura (Peshāwar), and was a powerful monarch, whose influence, as Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang) testifies, extended to distant regions, even into the basin of the Tārīm beyond the Pāmīrs. He held all the countries now included in the kingdom of Afghānistān, at least as far as the Oxus, and was the lord paramount of the whole of N.W. India. His arms are said to have penetrated to Pāṭaliputra, and his dominions included Sind. His viceroys, called 'satraps' after the Persian fashion, ruled W. India from Nāsik and Ujjain. He warred against the Parthians, and in his later years seems to have conquered from China the regions now known as Chinese Turkestan. It is said that he was murdered by discontented officers while he was engaged in a trans-Himālayan campaign. Vāsiṣka and Huviṣka (Huṣka), probably his sons, appear to have ruled the Indian provinces on his behalf, while he was absent on his distant wars. Vāsiṣka apparently predeceased him. Huviṣka certainly succeeded him in the rule of the entire empire, probably about A.D. 123. The father of Kaniṣka was Vajheṣka (? Vajheṣpa), presumably a near relation of Kadphises II.

During the long reign of Kaniṣka his Indian subjects divided their allegiance among the three great indigenous religions—Buddhism in its various forms, Brāhmanical Hinduism, and Jainism. Kadphises II. had favoured the Śaiva form of Hinduism, but there is no evidence that Kaniṣka took any interest in the doctrines of the Brāhmans. The occurrence of numerous Persian deities on his coinage suggests that in early life he may have been a Zoroastrian, and that many of his subjects must have been adherents of the creed of Zoroaster. Late in his life the king became an active patron of Buddhism. He placed the image of Buddha on his coins, summoned a council of Buddhist theologians to prepare commentaries on the scriptures, and erected magnificent sacred buildings, notably the lofty *stūpa* of Peshāwar, the foundations of which have recently been excavated. The explorers found a relic casket engraved with the names of Kaniṣka and his Greek superintending engineer, Agesilaus, and adorned with images of the king. An inscribed portrait statue of him, unfortunately headless, has been discovered near Mathurā.

Tradition associates Kaniṣka with Aśvaghoṣa (*q.v.*), who was a pupil of Pārśva, by whom the council was summoned, according to some authorities. The president is said to have been Vasumitra, Aśvaghoṣa being content with the vice-presidency. The date of the council may be stated as +A.D. 100, but, of course, it depends on the view taken of the chronology of the reign.

The powerful patronage of Kaniṣka undoubtedly promoted the cause of Buddhism in both India and Chinese Turkestan.

LITERATURE.—V. A. Smith, *The Early History of India*[3], Oxford, 1914, which gives abundant references.

V. A. SMITH.

KANJAR. — One of the nomadic, gypsy-like tribes of N. India. At the Census of 1911 they numbered 23,983.

They are found in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh and the Panjāb, with smaller groups in other parts of N. India. They wander about in gangs, supporting themselves by the usual gypsy industries, but more especially by theft and highway robbery. According to J. C. Nesfield (*Calcutta Review*, lxxvii. [1883] 368 ff.), they possess no idols, temples, or priesthood. They are in constant dread of evil spirits, the souls of the malignant dead. To these they attribute all deaths, except those obviously due to old age. Hence they bury the dead in deep graves to prevent the ghost from 'walking'; and they believe that such spirits are under the control of an exorcist (*nyotiyā*), who by means of shamanistic rites is supposed to be able to transport a goblin into the body of some living person, and make that person his mouthpiece for declaring its will. Their principal deity is a mango, Mānā, believed to be one of the ancient worthies of the tribe. He is worshipped chiefly in the rainy season, when the tribe is less migratory

than at other times. No altar is erected, no image is worshipped; but his votaries collect under a tree, where they sacrifice a pig, goat, sheep, or fowl, and make an offering of roasted flesh and spirituous liquor. Formerly, it is said, they used to sacrifice a child, having first made it insensible by draughts of fermented palm-juice. At the feast which follows most of the worshippers get drunk, and occasionally one of them declares himself to be possessed by the tribal god, and delivers oracles. Meanwhile the others dance round the tree and sing songs commemorating the wisdom and valour of Mānā. Mari, the goddess of death or epidemics, known also as the 'Queen goddess' (Mahārāṇī Devī), is supreme, and seems to be worshipped as the animating and sustaining force of nature. Parbhā or Prabhā, goddess of light, controls health, and more particularly the welfare of cattle. With her is worshipped Bhuiyān or Bhavānī, the earth-goddess. In other parts of the United Provinces they are specially devoted to the worship of deceased ancestors, who are regarded as more kindly than among other inferior castes, and are satisfied if at marriages and other festive occasions platters of food are laid on their graves. The chief deified worthies are Dhāmin Devā, or Mānā, and Pahlwān, or the wrestler. To their graves they make pilgrimages, sacrifice a pig, and pour spirits on the ground. The offering of meat is eaten in secrecy and silence by the males of the tribe, no woman being allowed to be present or to share in the meal. When they have become more Hinduized they worship Vindhyavāsinī Devī, the guardian goddess of the Vindhyan hills, and the Pāñchoṅ Pīr (see PACHPIRIYA) with the sacrifice of a cock. They also revere many of the local gods of the villages through which they wander, and one clan is specially devoted to the cult of Nānak, the *guru* of the Sikhs, to whom they make a special prayer: 'Praise be to thee, who hast preserved us in safety for a year! We hope for the same favour in the future!' They are much devoted to demonology, and a special medicine-man, known as 'the wise one' (*syānā*), is appointed to propitiate those spirits which are believed to be responsible for the evils which beset the tribe. When a person is attacked by some disease which indicates spirit possession, the *syānā* makes an offering of treacle, butter, cloves, incense, and red lead to the tribal Devī, by throwing these things into the fire. The Devī enters the *syānā*, who names the evil spirit which is afflicting the patient. He then places a cup of spirits on the sick man's head, and waves it round him. This causes the spirit to enter the cup, which the *syānā* drinks, thus taking upon himself the dangerous influence which has caused the disease. In more serious cases an offering is placed on the spot where four roads meet (cf. Westermarck, *MI* ii. 256, n. 2). The friends of the sick man sing and beat a brass tray over his head to scare the evil spirit, which is believed to enter the offering and thence be transferred to any passer-by who may accidentally touch it (cf. *PR*[2] i. 164 ff.). The *churel*, or ghost of a woman dying in a state of impurity, is much dreaded. The ghosts of young children take the form of *masān*, the evil spirit which haunts graveyards. Any one dying by snakebite or in some other abnormal way becomes an *āūt*, *i.e.* one for whom there is none to make the water oblation which causes the repose of the soul. The tribal beliefs are thus a combination of the primitive Animism with a veneer of Hindu belief and usage. There are some indications of totemism, but this is closely connected with tree-worship, the tamarind being regarded as the special abode of spirits, and a kind of reed grass and the leaves of the mango being fixed upon the marriage shed.

LITERATURE.—W. Crooke, *TC*, Calcutta, 1896, iii. 136 ff.; H. A. Rose, *Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and N.W. Frontier Province*, Lahore, 1911, ii. 47 f.

W. CROOKE.

KANPHATA.—See YOGIS.

KANT.—**1. Life and principal works.**—Immanuel Kant was born on 22nd April 1724 at Königsberg, in the province of Eastern Prussia. His father was a harness-maker in poor circumstances. Kant believed that his grandfather was a Scottish immigrant, and that the original form of the name had been Cant, the initial having been changed to avoid the pronunciation Tsant; but there seems to be no documentary proof of this. He entered the University of Königsberg in 1740, registering himself as a student of theology; but the subjects of the preparatory ('philosophical') course, especially natural science and philosophy proper, soon claimed his interest. After completing his course he acted as a private tutor in several families in the neighbourhood. In 1755 he took his degree with an essay *de Igne*, and habilitated as privatdozent with a dissertation entitled *Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicæ nova dilucidatio* (Königsberg, 1755). He remained in the position of a *magister legens* for fifteen years; but in 1764 he had declined the offer of a chair in Poetic Art in Berlin, and in 1766 was made sub-librarian in his own University at a salary of about £10. Then in 1770 he was promoted to a full professorship in philosophy. Apart from these changes, his life was quite uneventful; with study, teaching, and writing books, one year was like another. He never travelled beyond the borders of his native province; he never married; and he reduced the details of life to a clock-work regularity. Towards the close of his working days he was officially reprimanded for the breadth of his theological views, but he made his peace with the government. In personal character he was simple and reserved, generous and pious, and the reputation that ultimately came to him left him quite unspoiled. He ceased lecturing in 1796, and his increasing weakness of body and mind ended with his death on 12th Feb. 1804.

The development of Kant's thought is a very complex subject. Taken broadly, it consisted of two great periods, the pre-critical and the critical, with an interval between them of about ten years, when he was feeling his way to the position that was to prove so epoch-making. In the pre-critical period itself we can trace shorter stages. His dozent's thesis and his earlier works are mainly in the Leibnizo-Wolffian manner. He afterwards came under the influence of English empiricism, and this influence appears in *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* (Königsberg, 1762), *Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral* (1762, pub. Berlin, 1764), and *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen* (Königsberg, 1763), to which may be added *Träume eines Geisterschers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik* (do. 1766). In his inaugural lecture as professor, *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* (do. 1770), he is feeling his way towards a unifying point of view between, or rather above, dogmatism and scepticism; but, as already indicated, his thought had to ferment for another decade till he reached at length the 'critical' solution, and gave the first instalment of its exposition in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Riga, 1781; 2nd ed., with important changes, do. 1787; the two edd. combined, with notes, by E. Adickes, Berlin, 1889, also in tr. of Max Müller, 1881). The great works of the critical period are named below; to them

may be added *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können* (Riga, 1783), *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (do. 1785), and *Metaphysik der Sitten* (Königsberg, 1796-97), dealing with law and the virtues. His interest in the problems and principles of natural science can be traced all through his life, as, *e.g.*, in his early work, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* (Königsberg, 1755), and *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (Riga, 1786).

2. The place of Kant in the history of philosophy. —(*a*) *His direct relation to Leibniz.*—Kantianism is the characteristically German philosophy, just as the philosophy of France is to this day more or less determined by Cartesianism, and English philosophy is essentially characterized by the thought of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The Germans lagged behind the other European peoples in taking a place in the movement of modern philosophy, but at length they secured in Leibniz (*q.v.*) a thinker who combined the new conceptions of modern philosophy in one grand system, from which, again, in virtue of a profound transformation, sprang the philosophy of Kant. The Kantian teaching is certainly a radical metamorphosis of the Leibnizian system as far as regards the method by which *a priori* knowledge is discovered, established, and de-limited, and yet it is at the same time an essentially unchanged continuation of Leibniz's views regarding the nature and meaning of reality. Even as regards method, indeed, Kant's advance upon his predecessor must not be exaggerated. The system of Leibniz belongs to the rationalistic, Platonizing type of speculative philosophy, or, in other words, it is an *a priori* doctrine of ideas, and this holds good also of the system of Kant. The only real difference is that in the latter the *a priori* forms of knowledge are deduced, and applied, and have their limits assigned, in a different way. In order to understand the system of Kant we must, therefore, first of all make a rapid survey of that of Leibniz.

(*b*) *The system of Leibniz.* — Leibniz, like the other pioneers of modern philosophy, started from the empirico-inductive and mathematico-mechanical science of nature, and, in point of fact, from physics, the only natural science that had at that time attained any adequate development. Having adopted the doctrine that nature is built up of infinitesimal elementary bodies, he followed up the idea of force, as that which must be assumed for the inter-action and orderly inter-relations of these. This force he regarded as something immaterial, and this immaterial constituent, again, he described as a thinking, perceptive, or quasi-conscious power, thus applying to it the only term that was then available to connote a non-material reality. In this way he made the transition from a materialistic and mechanical to a spiritualistic and dynamic mode of thought. If the element of force be taken as in reality a thinking substance, however, its activities in relation to the other elements of force, as also the latter themselves, will appear as ideas or percepts of the element of force. Such an element thus becomes the monad, which perceives itself and its orderly relations to the other monads. Now it would be irrational to speak of this monad and its congeries of perceptions as the sole existing object. There must be a plurality of monads, existing *realiter* side by side. This hypothesis, however, is possible only on the ground of two presuppositions, viz. (1) that the co-existing monads have each the same ordered and logically articulated content of perceptions—a condition which is explained by the pre-established harmony of the monads with one another, and (2) that each single monad virtually holds within itself the whole universe, though it may bring only a part of it to clear consciousness—a position elucidated by Leibniz's theory of the unconscious, or of the conscious in an infinitely small degree. We are thus brought to a thoroughly spiritualistic system, in which, by an *a priori* necessity of reason, the individual monads severally perceive themselves and the universe contained in them as organic wholes, and, notwithstanding their absolute isolation, are in harmony with one another in virtue of the aggregate perceived and articulated by them. The various monads are endowed in very different degrees with the consciousness of the self-perceptive power, but are nevertheless connected and unified through the identity of the content variously known to each. Thus knowledge—in cases where the monads really have knowledge—may be interpreted as a process of discerning the content of consciousness according to the *a priori* laws immanent therein. From the condition of the non-conscious, or the pre-conscious, Leibniz disengages the rationally necessary laws and concepts in order that he may by means of them construct the system of the world as a complete whole. The ultimate pre-condition of all, indeed, is a self-identical, perfectly and logically conceived cosmic content, *i.e.* God, and the self-transformation of the divine universal substance into the infinite multiplicity of different monads, each of which contains in its own individual way the divine world-substance, and, in the measure of its individual capacity of becoming conscious, brings that content to a logically ordered comprehension. Philosophy is thus simply the measure of completeness and clearness to which the human monad can attain in its perception of the world.

(*c*) *Kant's reconsideration of Leibniz under the stimulus of Hume.*—Kant adhered to the views of Leibniz for about twenty years of his mature life, making modifications of them only in detail, more especially on the physical, mathematical, and astronomical sides. To the starting-point of the monadology in general, however—its analysis of consciousness and of the content of consciousness—as well as to its idea of the *a priori* validity of the rational laws that regulate that content, Kant remained permanently faithful, and we shall never understand his position unless we make full allowance for this survival in time of the Leibnizian point of view and tendency. He was at no time the pure phenomenalist, who acknowledges only subjective phenomena within what might be called the closed space of consciousness. Rather, he always dealt with the thinking subject as a central force working towards the logical unification of the manifold, and rejected the idealism or phenomenalism of Berkeley—what German philosophers now call 'psychological idealism.' Moreover, he never denied the apriority of the logical laws, or their being evolved from their pre-conscious self-activity. He was never a sceptic or an agnostic, never a pragmatist or a relativist. The point which marks his departure from the philosophy of Leibniz and from which he proceeded to construct his own system was one quite apart from such considerations. It was simply this: he could not permanently remain blind to the fact that, while a theory like that of Leibniz might logically articulate the reality immanent in consciousness, it was essentially incapable of passing beyond that sphere or of predicating anything whatever regarding the real which transcends consciousness. Leibniz's conception of God, his doctrine of the pre-established harmony, and of the individuation of the deity into countless monads varying in their capacity of thought, at length seemed to Kant, as already to other disciples of Leibniz, to be mere philosophical myths—figments of the imagination.

From this standpoint Kant began to suspect all forms of metaphysical theory, as they did not permit of strict demonstration and showed no unanimity in their conclusions. Although he continued to attach the utmost significance to the practical or moral convictions of the mind, he now came to doubt the possibility of developing and establishing them as realities of a transcendent metaphysics.

If, however, the Leibnizian mode of reaching the reality beyond consciousness from the content of consciousness itself and from the reflexion guided by *a priori* laws was thus invalid, philosophy was thrown back upon what is immanent in consciousness. But, if this were so, of what avail were the *a priori* laws which enable us to articulate in thought our conscious experience? They never carry us into the sphere beyond consciousness; can we, therefore, cognize anything at all by means of them? Are they not, with their *a priori* necessity, restricted exclusively to formal logic and the mere explication of concepts? Is not their necessary truth thus of a purely analytic kind, *i.e.* do they not merely analyze a given thought into the consequences already contained and implied in it? Is it not possible, therefore, that, in particular, mathematics itself, the chief instrument of natural science, may be no more than an analytic elucidation of thoughts already virtually contained in definite numerical and spatial magnitudes? It was at this stage that Kant became acquainted with the views of Hume—views which had been developed upon an entirely different foundation. Hume, working from the standpoint of pure phenomenalism, had divided knowledge into two departments: first, an *a priori* formal logic (including mathematics) entirely without content and purely self-interpretative; and, secondly, a real knowledge, empirical and substantial, but having no logical necessity or *a priori* character. For Hume, knowledge of reality was constituted only by the principle of custom—by our becoming accustomed to certain associations of perceptions—and by the practical verification of such customary associations, and thus our reference of perceptions and their relations to a reality lying beyond consciousness has no real ground to rest upon, but is at most the object of an absolutely indispensable belief. Hume's reasonings affected Kant in the most profound way, as they appeared to undermine the whole structure of *a priori* rationalism, and, in fact, to bring all philosophy of the Platonic type to an end. All that remained of rationalism seemed to be 'analytic judgments *a priori*,' *i.e.* the analysis of the logical content of certain propositions in formal logic and mathematics—a purely logical play of reason, but not a real knowledge of things by means of reason. Hume had apparently rendered it impossible, not only to pass beyond experience, but even to articulate experience itself by logically necessary principles; he seemed to have shown the futility of all *a priori* synthesis of the real, and, therefore, also of rational science of nature and rational ethics. Thus, if Kant found in Leibniz his positive foundation, he was on the negative side decisively influenced by Hume, both as a stimulus to his thought and as an antagonist to be overcome.

(*d*) *Kant's discovery of the critical solution.*—The arguments of Hume, as has been said, wrought upon Kant with profound effect, not, however, in the sense of drawing him into the sphere of the Scottish thinker's ideas, but rather in the sense of forcing him to provide fresh foundations for, and set new limits to, the essentially Platonic doctrine which he had inherited from Leibniz. Hume's influence, in short, was not such as to convert Kant to phenomenalism. The idea of ar experience limited to consciousness he had taken over from Leibniz, and all thoughts of transcending that experience by metaphysical constructions based upon it he had at length abandoned in view of the contradictions in which alone such attempts result. Hume certainly confirmed him in this position, but it was not Hume who brought him to it. The influence of Hume lay rather in clarifying his mind with reference to the problem of elucidating and systematizing the contents of consciousness with a view to attaining a logically demonstrable and, therefore, necessary knowledge of the real. Kant formulates this problem very simply in the question whether we have only analytic judgments *a priori*, or also synthetic judgments *a priori*, as instruments for reducing the contents of consciousness, or of experience, to form and order. Or, to give the question a more direct expression: Is there a logically necessary connexion in the real—an inherently necessary conception of nature which imposes a logical order upon the concrete? The 'real' that Kant seeks is attained not by reaching out towards a realm transcending consciousness, but by a synthetic articulation of an actually given content of consciousness or experience. He entirely ignores the question how this experience comes to be; it is simply given, and that is sufficient for us. As a matter of fact, he finds the real in the results of the logical elaboration of experience. By means of that process he distinguishes logically classified and abstractly necessary relations of phenomena from the chaotic state of the manifold prior to such elaboration, as also from relations wrongly imposed upon the facts; and for him the former is the real. In short, the real arises out of the valid and correct elaboration and elucidation of conscious experience, as contrasted with invalid, erroneous, or confused determinations of it and an uncritical linking together of phenomena. The problem before him was the possibility of a natural science which is at once empirical and rational, enabling the mind to unify the empirical data of consciousness by rational and *a priori* principles, and thus to transform the naive and confused representation of things into a representation that is scientifically clear and valid. Kant's aim was to establish a rationalism of pure experience, upon which might be constructed a conception of nature at once scientifically valid and embracing all experience.

This is the fundamental position from which we must interpret Kant's thought—his presupposition of the ego as the focus to which all thinking is related, of the content of experience as given to the mind in order that it may be brought to a fully realized clearness and completeness, of the *a priori* logical activity of the mind as moulding and combining the matter given to all according to the laws which cohere in the logical subject itself, and which come into consciousness and unfold themselves in the actual operation of thought. With these, again, is connected his refusal to recognize a supposed metaphysic which would urge *a priori* thought beyond its task of moulding and arranging the data of experience, since the *a priori* forms have to do with such data alone, and, if employed apart from and beyond them, remain altogether empty—a use of them which results in a futile metaphysical hypostasis, such as was fabricated by Plato and, in a more cautious and covert way, by Leibniz. Kant's presuppositions and his surrender of a transcendent metaphysic determined for him the only possible aim of knowledge or philosophy, viz. the safeguarding of the *a priori* and ideal character of our knowledge of nature by confining it to experience within consciousness.

This line of thought, which in the first resort related only to the conception of nature, Kant subsequently extended to ethics, the philosophy of

religion, teleology, and æsthetics, his method of dealing with all of these being essentially determined by his principles of intellectual cognition. As treated by him, these other spheres of rational activity were all designed to supply, not metaphysical knowledge of realities lying beyond consciousness, but the proofs of a valid mode of reflexion which issues from the nature of consciousness itself, and as such is to be applied to the criticism of experience. None of them passes beyond valid and necessary modes of thought and interpretation. The proof of their subjective necessity supplies the measure of all the objective knowledge which they can attain. A philosophy of this kind is in reality reason's knowledge of itself, and is indirectly a knowledge of facts only in so far as it reveals the necessary activities of reason, and arranges and interprets the data of consciousness by means of them. It sets out as a theory of the presuppositions, possibilities, and limits of science, and then proceeds by analogy to comprehend the other great activities of the mind, which likewise present merely the knowledge and interpretation of experience by means of reason.

(*c*) *The meaning of the various designations of Kant's philosophy.*—From this point of view, again, we are able to see the purport of the various designations applied to the philosophy of Kant by himself or by others. It is Idealism—in a double sense, indeed, as it regards the mind not only as that which possesses experience, but also as the active subject of the necessary forms of thought through which alone experience gains order and meaning; in other words, it is a system which arranges and interprets experience within the limits of consciousness by means of ideas, and is thus directly opposed to materialism and sceptical relativism of every type. It is also criticism, since, in fixing by a critical investigation of principles the limits of the realm of formal ideas, it prevents these from transcending experience, and disengages the separate activities of that realm from its naive and prescientific state of nebulosity. The system is transcendentalism, because it recognizes the *a priori* validity of the ideas and asserts that they contain an element superior to experience, while, however, it uses the ideas, not as a means of reaching beyond experience, but simply as a means of moulding, classifying, and interpreting it. The word 'transcendental' is here meant to imply that the ideas have no validity with reference to what lies beyond consciousness, and are accordingly not 'transcendent.' They are, in fact, immanent in experience, but are nevertheless truly *a priori*, are not derived from experience, and are only to that extent above or beyond experience. Such is the implication of Kant's original and noteworthy use of the term 'transcendental'—in contrast to 'transcendent'—as meaning 'making experience possible by means of ideas.' Kantianism has also been called a formal intra-experiential rationalism. Some, again, describe it simply as an epistemology—a designation which, however, must be received with circumspection, and which has given rise to much misconception. Since the days of the Sophists and Plato nearly all systems of philosophy have had an epistemology; this, however, was merely the pre-condition of, or the preparation for, the system proper, which might vindicate or deny the metaphysical knowledge of things. In Kantianism, however, the epistemology is actually the system itself, since for it valid truth or reality lies in the necessary character which it proves to be inherent in the activities of thought. The subjective necessity of the functions of arrangement and interpretation yields the only objective knowledge attainable by man—a knowledge which, in virtue of its being grounded in that necessity, is indeed genuinely objective. For similar reasons Kant's teaching has been known since Fichte's day as a *Wissenschaftslehre, i.e.* a gnosology or doctrine of science, since its aim is to determine the possibilities and limitations of science—the knowledge of the real. So understood, it would be the theory of cognition upon which is based the systematic development of knowledge in the special sciences. But, in view of Kant's extension of the *a priori* from the field of science proper to ethics, teleology, and æsthetics, the designation is undoubtedly too narrow. In point of fact, Kantianism is a theory of reason in all the aspects of its *a priori* functions; it is a Platonism without Plato's metaphysics.

3. The structure of the system.—Except in its most general features, the actual structure of Kant's philosophy could not be inferred from the foregoing account of it as a whole. It is the fruit of earnest and persevering reflexion, and its most important sections are those devoted to the solution of intricate special problems. These cannot be dealt with here. Of peculiar importance are the movements by which Kant proceeds from his original interest in the scientific conception of nature to the consideration of ethics, religion, and æsthetics. He grapples with these various subjects one after another, and deals with them according to the procedure applied in his primary field of interest, viz. the conception of nature. But, as might be expected, the changes of the subject-matter involved also certain amplifications and modifications of the method itself.

(*a*) *The theoretic philosophy.*—The first product of his mature and critical period was *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ('Critique of Pure Reason')—the work in which he determines the significance of *a priori* ideas for the formation of a conception of nature embracing the totality of things. At the very outset (and this is of decisive importance for all his subsequent work) he shows that even experience of the most elementary kind—sense-impressions as apprehended and ordered in time and space—contains an *a priori* element, *i.e.* an element which does not emanate from experience, but rather creates it and makes it possible. Time and space are transcendental conditions of experience, already involved, no doubt, even in our naive and preconscious state, but recognizable by consciousness as such conditions in the self-analysis of reason. This signifies, as against Hume's doctrine of the purely analytic character of mathematics, the synthetic nature of the spatial and numerical judgments of mathematics. It also signifies, of course, that space and time exist only in their application to possible sensuous experience, and that they have no function whatever outside such experience—a view in conformity with which the possibility of a supra-experiential metaphysics is at the very outset greatly attenuated, since a space-less and time-less reality is for us absolutely unimaginable and inconceivable. To his doctrine of time and space Kant gives the name 'transcendental æsthetic,' the word 'æsthetic' meaning here, of course, not a critique of art, but the science of the laws of sense-perception. From this significant opening Kant then proceeds to his second great theme, the 'transcendental analytic,' the theory of the categories. Here he shows that, just as sensibility involves *a priori* forms of perception, so the so-called empirical investigation of nature contains *a priori* principles of combination and relation, and, above all, the conceptions of substantiality and causality. These principles, already naively and unsystematically used in the most ordinary thinking, are simply disengaged in a pure form by the all-embracing mathematico-mechanical science of nature, and so developed into the conception of

the rational articulation of nature as a whole. To the conception of nature, according to Kant, belong also psychical phenomena, the relations of which to physical facts and to one another must likewise be dealt with by the principles of this conception of nature. The consequence of such a view is, of course, determinism. Then, as with psychical phenomena, so with the process of history, this too being incorporated in the conception of nature, though it must be admitted that Kant did not here give any further consideration either to psychology or to history. Another and very important consequence of his argument is that the categories have validity only when applied to experience within consciousness, and that they fall into sheer vacuity whenever we attempt to carry them beyond that field. Their function is confined to the relation of form and matter, and, where there are no data of experience for them to encompass, they become void. This brings us to the most significant result of all—positively, to a conception of nature as partly conditioned by *a priori* forms of reason, and, therefore, also to the comprehension of the entire manifold of experience under rational laws; and, negatively, to the rejection of every attempt to apply these forms and categories to anything that may lie beyond, anterior to, or behind experience—in other words, to the impossibility of all rational metaphysics.

Nevertheless, the need for such a metaphysic constantly re-asserts itself, and with this Kant deals in the third great division of his *Critique*, viz. the 'transcendental dialectic.' Here he shows that, while the need of a rational metaphysic is perfectly warranted, and belongs, in fact, to the *a priori* function of reason, yet it cannot be satisfied by means of a rational investigation, as the conceptions employed for the purpose by ordinary metaphysics are simply the categories of substantiality and causality used without application to experience, and so working in a mere void. That need, for which the theoretical reason can accordingly make no provision, can be satisfied only by the convictions of the moral will. Only in the sphere which we are compelled to think of as lying behind the moral will do we find that which the need for metaphysics has a right to demand. The theoretical reason can lend support to these moral convictions only indirectly—only in so far as its intra-experiential rationalism posits the unknown behind all experience and behind the thinking subject, and because, by restricting the conception of nature to experience, it nullifies every attempt to find matter for the conception of nature in the transcendent sphere. Kant could accordingly say that he had abolished (metaphysical) knowledge in order that he might make room for (moral) faith.

(*b*) *The ethical and religious philosophy.*—This subject—the moral judgment and the metaphysic of faith based upon it—is dealt with in Kant's second great work, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* ('Critique of Practical Reason'). In this he extends his peculiar and original method of deducing the *a priori* in experience to ethical judgments. These are, in the first instance, elicited psychologically, and, in view of their peculiar nature, characterized as imperatives, *i.e.* judgments regarding what ought to be—imperatives, in fact, of absolute authority, the nature of which appears in the fact that reason affirms them unconditionally, and regards them as universally binding, and that they appeal to the dignity of man which is to be attained in obedience to their 'ought.' They thus present themselves, like the *a priori* forms and categories of the theoretical reason, as purely formal judgments. Their function, however, is not to apprehend the matter of experience, but to determine the motives of the will. They must all be brought under the Categorical Imperative, *i.e.* the moral judgment which is distinguished from all others by its being formally unconditional. Man's recognition of an unconditional 'ought' constitutes his true dignity and his true personality, and forms also the link that binds human beings together as persons. It is true that, so far, we have here only a moulding of the countless empirical motives of the will by a judgment that issues *a priori* from the soul—a judgment which bids us act unconditionally upon the personal conviction of conscience. We are not yet, it would seem, within the domain of metaphysics at all. But, as a matter of fact, we are; for the Categorical Imperative, unlike the logical category, does not govern its matter wholly by its own might, but is conditioned by the resolve of a will which thereby rejects other possible alternatives. Here, indeed, we come into touch with the fact of freedom—the power of submitting or surrendering ourselves to a law felt to be of unconditional authority. The realm of theoretical reason contains nothing analogous to this. In the fact of freedom, therefore, Kant sees the gleam and manifestation of an altogether different realm—the supersensuous, metaphysical, intelligible world which is not subject to the conception of nature, but is of a character all its own and beyond the grasp of all theoretical reason.

It cannot certainly be asserted that Kant succeeded in reconciling the anti-rational metaphysical freedom here discovered with his conception of nature and the deterministic psychology which it involves. All the more important to him, therefore, was the manifestation, thus authenticated, of a realm distinct from nature, a world which vindicates its existence to man as a moral agent, and which Kant usually calls the intelligible world. Having thus posited a metaphysic based upon practical, ethical grounds, he proceeds to set forth its further implications. From it issues the idea of an intelligible realm of spirits, with the Moral Law as its focus, which may also be represented as Deity. The question as to the relation of this intelligible realm of the good to the physical and natural world carries him to the postulates of a divine universal order that keeps both realms in harmony, and of an immortality in which the antinomies of earthly experience may be reconciled. These two postulates, again, lead us once more to the idea of God. Such is the way in which the metaphysic of the religious postulates involved in his ethics and actually deduced from the fact of freedom is developed by Kant as his philosophy of religion, and this he sets forth more distinctly in his *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* ('Religion within the Limits of mere Reason'). The religious implications of these postulates he regards as constituting the kernel of Christianity in the only form in which it can now be maintained.

(*c*) *The æsthetic and teleological philosophy.*—There remains still another function of pure reason, viz. that which finds expression in the teleological conception of reality as subservient to the ends of spirit. As reality, in relation to the beholder, is felt to have meaning and purpose also in art and in æsthetic satisfaction, Kant deals with both the teleological and the æsthetic judgment in his third great work, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* ('Critique of the Faculty of Judgment'). In this work, following the method of his earlier *Critiques*, he shows that in our teleological conceptions likewise there is an *a priori* mode of judgment that emanates from the very nature of reason. The design, or purposive character (*Zweckmässigkeit*), of the world cannot be metaphysically demon-

strated, but it asserts itself in an *a priori* type of judgment or interpretation as an irresistible conviction. We cannot fail to see how far apart this *a priori* lies from that of theoretical science, as also from that of the ethico-religious sphere. It implies no theoretical and logical certainty, no ethically imperative obligation, but a process of interpretation that plays freely upon things, making as if these subserved a kingdom of spiritual ends. The teleological interpretation is thus closely related to the artistic. In the latter, however, 'end' has a peculiar meaning: the æsthetic end of the beautiful is a disinterested end; it is that inner harmony of the contemplated object in which the necessity of nature and the freedom of the spirit seem to coincide, and in this apparent coincidence lies the end that gives us pleasure. The beautiful is, in fact, the harmony of the real, which is otherwise always in discord with itself, and it exists only in the contemplating and formative subject; but, as in contemplating it we simultaneously feel an *a priori* necessity, it is of more than merely individual or transitory validity. The beautiful is thus the symbol of the inner unity of the real—a unity which cannot be demonstrated by theoretic metaphysics. As such a symbol it has an essential function in the domain of reason, since it guarantees from the side of the subject that conception of reality which could otherwise be fabricated only by a teleological metaphysic, though, of course, never really attained by it.

(*d*) *Defects of the system.*—With the *Critique of Judgment* Kant completed his discussion of the series of great philosophic problems which lay within his view. As was indicated above, his survey lacks a systematic psychology, while at the same time a psychological basis is presupposed in the tripartite division of his critical work as well as in his exposition of the functions of reason to which he devotes his several *Critiques*; and this ambiguous attitude towards psychology has been much criticized. The system likewise lacks a properly developed logic—a want which is all the more felt because Kant carefully distinguishes his own transcendental logic from the formal logic of the Aristotelian type. He used the latter as the starting-point and guiding thread of his philosophy; the former, as a theory of an intra-experiential rationalism, constitutes the actual content of his system. He nowhere definitely explains the relation between the two, and yet that relation is felt to be of the utmost importance whenever we ask upon what theory of knowledge his distinctively epistemological system is constructed. Nor did Kant give any special consideration to history; all that he provides in this field is a few short studies in which certain principles for an estimate of history are deduced from his ethical philosophy of religion.

4. The further development of the Kantian philosophy.—For a time the system of Kant in its original form seemed to German thinkers the only possible philosophy—philosophy, indeed, in its absolute and final expression. After the lapse of a decade or two, however, this attitude was abandoned, and the system has since been amended, supplemented, or transformed from many points of view. It has nevertheless maintained its position as the nucleus of German philosophy, and even to the present day all the great systems either emanate directly from it or define their position by critical reference to it. The later modifications arose partly from the system itself, in which lay the seeds of various germinative ideas and various possibilities of development, partly also from the influence of certain general movements of contemporary thought which assimilated it or mingled with it. We may distinguish three main lines of development.

(*a*) *The metaphysical development.*—In its view of consciousness and the *a priori*, the Kantian theory undoubtedly contains metaphysical elements which it took over from Leibniz, but did not recognize or define as metaphysical. If, however, we follow up Kant's idea of consciousness—if we ask, as Leibniz had asked, why individual minds agree with one another, how consciousness is related to the data of experience, and what is the source of the *a priori* in consciousness—we are brought once more to metaphysical problems akin to those of Leibniz, and, in particular, to the idea of the absolute consciousness, or God, and the task is then to find a way back to the individual reason. A metaphysic of this kind—partly influenced, no doubt, by the ethical and literary tendencies of the time—was evolved from Kantianism by Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer; and, just as such metaphysic sprang directly from Kant himself, so it is still drawn by many thinkers of to-day from the neo-Kantianism of recent times.

(*b*) *The psychological development.*—It was possible to proceed in a directly opposite way, and to emphasize and further develop the anti-metaphysical aspects of Kantianism. Those who took this course proposed to regard the *a priori* as assigning the final limits to specifically human knowledge, and to dissolve in it all relations to a 'consciousness in general.' Instead of a conception of things still inherently metaphysical, there thus emerges an anthropological conception which sees in the *a priori* our only organ of experience, and in its limits our essential limitation. Such is the teaching of J. F. Fries (1773-1843), who regarded himself, in contradistinction to the metaphysicians, as the true continuator of Kant. Once the *a priori* had come to be interpreted in a manner essentially anthropological, however, it was impossible to evade endeavours to derive and explain it; and, if such procedure could not look for support to metaphysics, the *a priori* necessarily became the object of psychology, its apparently absolute objectivity being explained by social psychology and the emotion of reverence. Thus transcendentalism was resolved into relativism, psychology, and even pragmatism. An instance of the first is the philosophy of Simmel; of the second, that of Vaihinger.

(*c*) *The epistemological development.*—Finally, it may be regarded as Kant's great design to keep clear of both metaphysics and psychology, and to safeguard those presuppositions of all logic and all science which form the groundwork of correct thinking. Philosophy in that case is exclusively a doctrine of the *a priori* conditions of science, and of its vindication as an entirely independent and inwardly necessary activity in which the autonomous and ideal nature of the spirit finds expression. This view of the *a priori* is one that adheres rigidly to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and altogether disregards the *a priori* of the other *Critiques*, which certainly cannot be brought under the conception of purely scientific theory. Philosophy is thus transformed into epistemology and logic. This is the theory held by Cohen, Natorp, Liebmann, Riehl, Windelband, Rickert, and Husserl—thinkers who, no doubt, differ from one another in much, but are all at one in resolving criticism into logic and the theory of knowledge. Philosophy, they hold, does not cognize realities, but takes account only of the laws of reason, through which alone the real is brought within the sphere of the scientific consciousness. The methods of philosophy produce and guarantee real objects by subjecting them to thought. The critical and logical analysis of consciousness must be much more rigidly separated from the psychological and genetic analysis than was done by Kant himself. The proper

subject-matter of philosophy is logic; metaphysic is abolished, or ranked with practical convictions; psychology is a science of consciousness lying side by side with, but quite independent of, philosophy in the proper sense. We need not wonder that a theory of this kind should be met with ever renewed criticism at the hands of both metaphysicians and psychologists.

LITERATURE.—Kant's works are collected in the ed. of G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1867-69. A new complete ed. is being issued by the Berlin Academy of Sciences. From the enormous mass of literature relating to Kant we may select the following works: K. Fischer, *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre*[3], Heidelberg, 1909 (= *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, iv. and v.); Alois Riehl, *Der philosophische Kritizismus*[2], Leipzig, 1908; H. Cohen, *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*[2], Berlin, 1885; J. Volkelt, *Immanuel Kant's Erkenntnisstheorie nach ihren Grundprincipien analysirt*, Leipzig, 1879; G. Simmel, *Kant*, do. 1904; F. Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant: Leben und Lehre*, Stuttgart, 1898, Eng. tr., London, 1902; H. Vaihinger, *Die Philosophie des Als Ob*[2], Berlin, 1913; O. Liebmann, *Kant und die Epigonen*, Stuttgart, 1865, *Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit*[4], Strassburg, 1911; H. Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*[2], Tübingen, 1913; W. Windelband, *Präludien*, do. 1911; Paul Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*, Leipzig, 1903; E. Troeltsch, *Das Historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie*, Berlin, 1904; E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 2 vols., Glasgow, 1889.

Translations: *Critique of Pure Reason*, by J. M. D. Meiklejohn, London, 1897, F. Max Müller, London, 1881; *The Metaphysic of Ethics*, by J. W. Semple[3], Edinburgh, 1871; *Critique of Practical Reason, and other Works on the Theory of Ethics*[3], by T. K. Abbot, London, 1879. A copious bibliography is given in *DPhP* iii. [1905] 286-320. E. TROELTSCH.

KAPĀLA-KRIYĀ.—*Kapāla-kriyā* (Skr. 'skull-rite') is the Indian ceremony of breaking the skull of the corpse, performed at the cremation or at the burial of a member of an ascetic Order.

'We are told in the Garuḍa-purāṇa that when a man [who, from his evil deeds during life or from some defect in the proper ceremonies at his decease, becomes subject to Yama's penalties] dies his spirit takes a downward course through the intestines and emerges in the same manner as the excreta; whereas . . . the spirit of a good man finds its way through the tenth aperture of the body, which is a suture at the top of the skull, called the Brahma-randhram, "Brahma's crevice"' (M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hindūism*[4], London, 1891, p. 291).

This orifice is also known as the *suṣumṇāḍi*, 'blessed channel.' It is further believed that Sannyasī or Yogī ascetics, whose spirits pass through the crown of the head, go straight to heaven. Such a man, it is said, by the force of his austerities, has the power of concentrating his soul in the crown of his head and of dying at will, when the soul leaves the body through the *brahmarandhram* (*BG* xv. i. [1883] 150 n.).[1] The corpse of such a teacher is placed in the grave in a sitting posture, and his successor in office, to effect the release of the spirit, strikes a coco-nut or a conch-shell on the skull, and in the opening thus formed lays the sacred ammonite, the *śālagrāma*. The Chuvashes of E. Russia similarly believe that the soul leaves the body through the back of the head (J. G. Frazer, *JAI* xv. [1886] 83 n.). It is remarkable that in the Neolithic Age and among some modern savages it was the custom, in cases of epilepsy or similar maladies believed to be the work of evil spirits, to trepan the skull of the patient so as to give exit to the evil spirit (A. W. Buckland, *JAI* xi. [1882] 7 ff.; W. Johnson, *Byways in British Archæology*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 321). Among the Buddhists of Sikhim,

'after advising the spirit to quit its body and its old associations and attachment to property, the Lāma seizes with the forefinger and thumb a few hairs of the crown of deceased's head, and plucking it forcibly is supposed to give vent to the spirit through the roots of these hairs; and it is generally believed that if the *Aphobo* [Lāma] is, as he should be, a Lāma of exceptional virtue, an actual perforation of the skull occurs at this instant through which passes the liberated spirit' (L. A. Waddell, in *Gazetteer of Sikhim*, Calcutta, 1895, p. 379; cf. his *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 480).

[1] On the importance which is attached to the openings of the body in magico-religion see W. R. Halliday, *Greek Divination*, London, 1913, p. 175.

Hence arises the belief that the cutting of a lock of hair from the top of the head facilitates the departure of the soul (Frazer, *loc. cit.*). In India the rite of smashing the skull is generally performed when the corpse is half burnt, the chief mourner using a piece of sacred wood or a bamboo for the purpose.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities quoted, see *BG* ix. i. [1901] 49; J. A. Padfield, *The Hindu at Home*[2], Madras, 1908, p. 214; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*, tr. H. K. Beauchamp[4], Oxford, 1906, p. 539; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of Southern India*, Madras, 1909, ii. 299. W. CROOKE.

KAPILA.—The name of the founder of the Sāṅkhya system (see SĀṄKHYA). Since all Indian tradition is unanimous in recognizing under this name the author of the Sāṅkhya school, we are unquestionably bound to see in Kapila a historical person, who, as is proved by the dependence of Buddhism on his teaching, must have lived before the middle of the 6th cent. B.C. All the accounts, however, which have been preserved in the literature of the Brāhmans relating to the life of Kapila are so full of legends and contradictions that we are unable to attribute to them any historical value. The information given by the Buddhist authorities with regard to him deserves more serious consideration, since they connect Kapila with the name of the city of Kapilavastu, the birthplace of the Buddha, and ascribe to him, therefore, a sphere of activity the geographical site of which agrees well with the internal relations which subsist between Buddhism and the Sāṅkhya philosophy.

No work by Kapila has been preserved. For that the *Sāṅkhya-sūtras* are an entirely modern work, and have no claim to bear his famous name, has long been an established conclusion. We have no real ground for supposing that any compositions at all are due to his authorship.

LITERATURE.—R. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 25 f.; F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, p. 287 ff. R. GARBE.

KAPILAVASTU.—Kapilavastu (-vatthu, -nagara, -pura), interpreted either as 'tawny town' or as 'the town of Kapila' (a mythical sage), according as the first element of the word is taken to be an adjective or a proper name, is the name of the town famous in legend as the ancestral home of Gautama Śākyamuni, the Buddha, commonly called Buddha. The four great holy places of Buddhism from very early times were Kapilavastu, Gayā, Benares, and Kuśinagara, associated respectively with the birth, enlightenment, ministry, and death of the Master (see art. BUDDHA). The myths descriptive of the foundation of Kapilavastu, which assume diverse forms, all equally unhistorical, are summarized as follows by Watters ('Kapilavastu in the Buddhist Books,' *JRAS*, 1898, p. 535):

'This city, according to the mythical accounts of the Buddha's royal ancestors, had been founded by the sons of an Ikṣvāku king of the Solar race. The king who reigned at Potalaka, according to some, or at Saket, according to others, yielding to the entreaties of his wife or concubine, drove his four sons into exile. These princes, accompanied by their sisters and a large retinue, went northwards, and after a long journey halted at a pleasant suitable site near the hermitage of a rishi [sage] named Kapila. The rishi welcomed the exiles, and with solemn rite gave over to them a piece of ground on which to settle and build their city. When the city was laid out and occupied, the settlers called it in gratitude Kapilavastu or Kapilanagara, from the name of their kind patron. This happened in a period of remote antiquity. The city of Kapilavastu thus founded was, according to the generally received accounts, situated near, or at the southern slopes of the Himavat [Himalaya] mountains and in the kingdom of Kosala. . . . It must be noticed, however, that in some of the Chinese texts the site of Kapilavastu is placed in a district to the north of the Himavat, the royal exiles being represented as having crossed this range and settled on the south side of a mountain beyond. . . . But the majority of the texts is in favour of the supposition that the city was situated on or near the southern slope' of the Himālaya. This position, which is indicated by the earliest Indian texts,

must be accepted as the correct one, because the town, notwithstanding the mythical tales of its origin, had a real existence to the south of the mountains. Its site continued to be visited by a series of Chinese pilgrims for several centuries after A.D. 400, and even now, in spite of obscurities in detail, can be identified to a certain extent with ruins situated in the plain not many miles distant from the outermost Himálayan range.

The *Lalitavistara* and other works which profess to tell the story of Buddha's infancy and early life are full of glowing descriptions of the material glories of Kapilavastu, and of the magnificence of the royal court supposed to have been held there by Rājā Suddhodana, father of Gautama Buddha. But these tales are purely works of imagination without any basis of solid fact. The real life-story of Buddha is almost completely lost, and the romance which does duty in the books for his biography will not bear criticism. There is no sound reason for believing that either he or his father ever enjoyed the position of regal magnificence ascribed to them by the pious imagination of later ages. Even some of the Buddhist treatises, as Watters points out, describe Kapilavastu as 'a small unimportant town without any attractions,' too small for the accommodation of the growing families of the legendary Ikṣvāku princes. The real Kapilavastu, although raised to a certain degree of ecclesiastical grandeur by the erection of monasteries and other religious buildings after the time of Aśoka, never can have been a large and wealthy city.

Tradition placed the actual scene of the nativity, not at Kapilavastu itself, but at a grove or garden called Lumbinī, some miles to the eastward. There the holy infant was fabled to have sprung from his mother's right side as she stood under a tree, to have been caught in the arms of the gods, and forthwith to have taken seven steps, and proclaimed himself Lord of the World. The legend of these and other supposed incidents of the nativity was well established by the beginning of the Christian era, and supplied subjects for long mythological narratives and numerous works of art. Writers and sculptors found equally welcome material in the many miracles with which the imagination of the faithful adorned the early life of the founder of their religion. All these marvels were closely associated with Kapilavastu. A specially favourite topic was the story of the departure of the young prince from the gate of his father's palace, as he started on his journey into the wilderness in order to assume the mendicant's robe and to live the hard life of a begging friar. Certain bas-reliefs described by A. Foucher (*L'Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhâra*, Paris, 1905, p. 360) exhibit the figure of a personification of Kapilavastu in the conventional garb and pose of a Greek city-goddess lamenting the loss of her youthful lord. After he had obtained full enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree at Gayā (*q.v.*), Gautama was believed to have paid two visits to his Śākya relatives at Kapilavastu. The wondrous words and deeds attributed to him on those occasions will be found detailed in all the works dealing with the legendary history of Buddhism. His final visit to his ancestral town is associated with the legend of its destruction by King Vidūdabha (*alias* Viṛūdhaka, etc.). Like the connected fairy tales, this story is told in more ways than one, but all the narratives agree that Vidūdabha either expelled or massacred almost all the inhabitants. Gautama sighed over the desolation of the place, which he had tried in vain to prevent, and departed, vowing that he would never return. From that time Kapilavastu passed almost out of existence, and it is certain that the first authentic record of the site at the beginning of the 5th cent. A.D. represents the town and its neighbourhood as a wilderness nearly uninhabited.

A curious group of seventeen small *stūpas* discovered at Sāgarwā, two miles north of Tilaura Kōṭ, in Jan. 1898, by A. Führer, and destroyed by his excavations, may possibly mark the traditional scene of the massacre of the Śākyas by Vidūdabha. At the level of the foundations of each of these structures the lowest layer consisted of nine, seven, or five bricks, the central brick of each being carved with the design of a full-blown lotus, under which the relic-caskets were placed embedded in the soil. The other bricks of the layer had figures of maces, tridents, axes, and other ancient weapons stamped upon them, which indicate that the monuments were erected in memory of a band of warriors regarded as sacred persons. If the massacre of the Śākyas by Vidūdabha really occurred, it must be dated about 500 B.C., or a little earlier, the date of the death of Buddha being taken as *c.* 487 B.C.

In those legendary days the territory of Kapilavastu seems to have been a dependency of the kingdom of Kosala, which was equivalent approximately to the modern province of Oudh. The books enumerate a considerable number of towns and villages as situated within the borders of the Kapilavastu country, but none of them can be identified, and at the date of our first authentic and detailed account of the region all those towns and villages had decayed. There is little reason to expect that the sites of most of the various settlements mentioned in the Buddhist treatises will ever be determined. A city designated variously by the names of Koli, Devadaha, and Vyāghrapura, which lay to the east, some miles beyond the Lumbinī garden, was intimately associated with Kapilavastu by tradition, and there are some grounds for thinking that its position may be ascertained by local investigation. The introduction to the *Kuṇāla Jātaka* (no. 536 in tr. by H. T. Francis and E. B. Cowell, vol. v., Cambridge, 1905) narrates a curious story about a threatened fight between the inhabitants of Devadaha and those of Kapilavastu concerning disputed claims to water for irrigation.

About 249 B.C. the emperor Aśoka (*q.v.*), under the guidance of his preceptor, Upagupta, performed a pilgrimage in state to the spots sanctified by the sojourn of Buddha. The first place visited is said to have been the Lumbinī garden, the scene of the nativity. The fact that Aśoka actually came to that spot is placed beyond doubt by the inscribed pillar at Rummin-dēī, which was erected by the emperor in the twenty-first year after his coronation, to commemorate his visit. Thence Aśoka proceeded to Kapilavastu, and the inclusion in his tour of that locality, only a few miles distant from the Lumbinī garden, is attested by another inscribed pillar now lying by the side of the Nigālī tank, but not exactly in its original position. The inscription, however, does not mention the name of Kapilavastu. The literary tradition (*Aśokāvadāna*), which professes to give the details of the imperial pilgrimage, locates at Kapilavastu a number of legends, which probably were not invented until after Aśoka's time.

The earliest definite description of the town of Kapilavastu and the surrounding country is that given by the first of the Chinese pilgrims, Fa-hian (Fa-hsien), who was shown round the reputed holy places at the beginning of the 5th cent. A.D., about six hundred and fifty years subsequent to the pilgrimage of Aśoka. In or about A.D. 636, Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang), the most learned and eminent of the Chinese pilgrims, followed his predecessor's example, and, under the guidance of local monks, minutely examined and carefully recorded the positions of the numerous localities at or near Kapilavastu associated by tradition with the legend of Buddha. All modern attempts

to identify existing ruins with Kapilavastu necessarily have for their basis the descriptions recorded by the two pilgrims named, which are the only extant ancient detailed accounts of the town. The topographical and archæological problems suggested by the pilgrims' narratives are far too complicated for discussion here, but a brief notice of the travellers' observations is indispensable.

The visit of Fa-hian to Kapilavastu may be dated with approximate accuracy in A.D. 403. He found there 'neither king nor people.' The site of the city was marked only by desolate ruined mounds, and was uninhabited save for a few monks and a score or two of the common people. The surrounding country was equally deserted, the inhabitants being few and far between, and the roads infested with wild elephants and lions. The monks who clung to the dreary ruins and acted as guides to pilgrims were not embarrassed by philosophic doubts, and had no hesitation in pointing out the exact spots where Gautama sat under a tree, met his father, and so forth. Fa-hian, too, was easy of belief, and found no difficulty in accepting as gospel truth all that was told him by his guides. Hiuen Tsiang, notwithstanding his erudition, was equally credulous, and was shown even more 'sights' than his predecessor. The country continued to be in much the same state as in Fa-hian's time, the city of Kapilavastu being so utterly ruined that its limits could not be ascertained. But the solid brick foundations of the central 'palace city' were still visible, and were estimated to measure nearly three miles in circuit. This walled town is not mentioned by Fa-hian, who places Kapilavastu about nine miles to the westward of the Lumbini garden. Hiuen Tsiang locates his Kapilavastu some fifteen or sixteen miles from the same point. Now the site of the Lumbinī garden is determined beyond the possibility of doubt, as already observed, by the Aśoka inscription, which, it may be added, is supported by other cogent proofs. The discrepancies between the two pilgrims in the matter of the distance from the fixed point, and in sundry other particulars, show that different places must have been pointed out to them as being Kapilavastu.

Local investigation, in which the present writer took a share, makes it clear that the 'palace city' of Hiuen Tsiang is represented by the ruined walled town now known as Tilaura Kōṭ, while the Kapilavastu of Fa-hian must be identified with the group of ruins near the village of Piprāwā, about ten miles S.S.E. from Tilaura Kōṭ. This conclusion, although in reality inevitable from the premisses, has been criticized as being incredible, but a little consideration diminishes the apparent improbability. The town, according to tradition, had been utterly destroyed more than 900 years before the visit of the earlier pilgrim, and more than 1100 years before that of his successor, and both the pilgrims found the region in a state of utter desolation. It is obvious that, if there is any truth in the tale of the destruction of the place by Vidūdabha, genuine knowledge in detail of the particular holy spots so glibly pointed out by the local guides could not possibly have survived, and that their identifications must have been fanciful. As Watters observes (*JRAS*, 1898, p. 543), they failed to show the Śākyas' assembly-hall and other objects frequently mentioned in the books, the reason apparently being that the guides either did not know where to place them or had never read the books in which they are described. The same inference may be drawn from their silence respecting the now famous Piprāwā *stūpa*, the most interesting building in the whole region, which is not mentioned by either pilgrim. Evidently it had been completely forgotten. The whole of the 'identifications' recorded in detail by the pilgrims have a fictitious and unverifiable aspect. The walled town of Tilaura Kōṭ was much better suited than the Piprāwā ruins to fit in with the legend of the regal splendour of Kapilavastu, and it does not seem incredible that the site associated with the legend should have been moved in the course of more than two centuries. Whatever may be the correct explanation of the ascertained facts, the present writer adheres to the opinion published by him in 1901, that the Piprāwā group of ruins represents the Kapilavastu of Fa-hian, while Tilaura Kōṭ and the neighbouring remains represent the Kapilavastu of Hiuen Tsiang. The known position of the Lumbinī garden and the local conditions limit the possible alternatives to these only.

The Piprāwā *stūpa*, alluded to above, when opened by W. C. Peppé in Jan. 1898, proved to have been built for the purpose of preserving a great sandstone coffer, in which were placed five vessels, one being of rock-crystal and four of steatite. Sundry minute fragments of bone distributed among the vessels were accompanied by more than a thousand gold stars and minute jewels, mostly of exquisite workmanship. The bits of bone evidently were the relics in honour of which the jewels were deposited and the *stūpa* erected. An inscription scratched round the lid of one of the vases in very ancient Brāhmī script, probably earlier than that of the Aśoka period, is interpreted by Barth, Bühler, Rhys Davids, and Pischel as meaning that bodily relics of the Blessed Buddha were deposited by his brethren the Śākyas with their sisters, sons, and wives. Fleet disputed the accuracy of this rendering, proposing to read the inscription as recording the deposit of relics of Buddha's relatives and not those of Buddha himself. The knowledge of the most ancient Prakrit is not yet sufficiently advanced to warrant a final solution of the linguistic problem presented by the inscription, but it may be said that Fleet's view is open to grave objections, and that the current interpretation probably will prove to be substantially correct. If this should be the case, the opinion of Rhys Davids that the Piprāwā *stūpa* is that erected by the Śākyas over their share of the relics from Buddha's funeral pyre may be defended with good reason, and the present writer's theory that Piprāwā represents the Kapilavastu of Fa-hian will receive strong support. The numerous archæological problems suggested by the imperfectly known remains in the Nepālese *tarāi* and adjacent districts of British India—Bahraich, Basti, Gorakhpur, and Champāran—are so closely interwoven with the history of Buddhism that the solution of them would be a matter of world-wide interest. But they cannot be solved without patient and scientific exploration, conducted for an adequate time by competent persons, equipped with sufficient funds and appliances, and heartily supported by the governments of both India and Nepāl. Unfortunately there is little reason to suppose that these conditions will be soon satisfied; and in all probability the mystery of Kapilavastu will continue for many years to be the sport of unverified conjecture.

The following indications will enable the reader to trace on any large-scale map of India the approximate positions of the places named in this article. The Lumbini garden is represented by the mound now known as Rummin-dēi, *i.e.* 'goddess of Rummin.' In the ancient Māgadhi dialect, in which the inscription on the pillar was written, initial *R* is replaced by *L*, so that *Lumbini* or *Lummini* is identical with *Rummin*. The mound is situated in the Nepalese *tarai*, about six miles north-east of Dulhā in the British District of Basti, and is in Tappa Rummin-dēi, about two miles north of Bhagwānpur, the head-quarters of the Nepālese *tahsil*, or subdivision, and one mile north of the village called Paḍaria or Paṛaria. The Tilār river, the 'river of oil' of Hiuen Tsiang (*tel*='oil'), flows a short distance to the east of the mound. The nearest railway station is Uskā, on a branch of the B. and N. W. Railway. The position of the mound approximately is 27° 29′ N., and 83° 20′ E., about 50 miles in a direction slightly west of north from Gorakhpur (26° 45′ N., 83° 22′ E.). The village and Buddhist ruins of Piprāwā stand on the Birdpur estate of W. C. Peppé, near boundary pillar no. 44, and just inside the border of the Basti District. The direct distance from Rummin-dēi, in a direction south of west, is barely 9 miles. Tilaura Kōṭ, in Nepālese territory, is about 10 miles N.N.W. of Piprāwā, and 14 or 15 miles from Rummin-dēi in a north-westerly direction as measured on the map. The ruins to the S.S.W. and east of Tilaura Kōṭ extend for two or three miles. The outermost range of hills is about 12 or 15 miles to the north of the Kōṭ.

LITERATURE.—J. Legge, *Travels of Fa-hien, A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, Oxford, 1886; *Buddhist Records of the Western World (Travels of Hiuen Tsang [Yuan Chwang])*, tr. S. Julien (Paris, 1853), S. Beal (London, 1906), and T. Watters (do. 1904, 1905); Aśoka inscriptions (see ASOKA and BUDDHA);

P. C. Mukherji and V. A. Smith, 'Antiquities in the Tarāi, Nepāl, the Region of Kapilavastu' (*Arch. Surv. Rep.*, Imp. ser., vol. xxvi. pt. i., Calcutta, 1901); various writers in *JRAS*, 1898, 1899, 1905, 1906; *ZDMG* lvi. (1902); and *Bull. Académie des Inscriptions*, 4th ser., vol. xxvi. (1898).

VINCENT A. SMITH.

KARAITES.—The Karaites are a Jewish sect which took its rise in Babylon during the latter half of the 8th cent. A.D. Their Hebrew name is *Karāim* (קראים), 'adherents,' or *Bnē miḳrā* (בני מקרא), meaning 'sons of the writing,' the watchword of the sect being 'Back to Scripture from Tradition,' *i.e.* from 'Talmud.' The watchword, however, came to be a purely theoretical one, as the Karaites developed a tradition of their own, the only difference being that it was called, not 'tradition,' but 'the yoke of inheritance' (סבל הירושה), and that they held as binding the doctrines and usages which, while not taught in the Bible, were recognized as obligatory by all (the קבון, or עדה, corresponding to the Muslim *ijmā'*, *i.e.* 'consensus'), and of which a large number had come down from those who returned from the Exile, *i.e.* from 'the good figs,' as they are designated, with an allusion to Jer 24[5].

The designation 'Karaites,' however, was not applied to the sect until the 9th cent. A.D. Originally they were known as 'Ananites, from the name of their founder, 'Anān b. David, of Baghdād. Our sources of information regarding 'Anān and the motives that prompted him to initiate the new movement are meagre and shrouded in obscurity; moreover, they are not altogether reliable, as, in the first place, the oldest of them are not of earlier date than the first half of the 10th cent.; and, secondly, they all show considerable bias, as emanating either from his adherents or from his opponents, the Rabbinists. They agree only in two points, viz. that 'Anān was descended from the exilarchs, *i.e.* that he was of the lineage of David, and that he was deeply versed in Rabbinic and Talmudic lore. The Karaites will not admit, however, that they are a sect of late origin, or that they separated from the integral organism of Judaism. On the contrary, according to the earliest extant Karaite account, viz. that of Abū Yūsuf Ya'ḳūb al-Ḳirḳisānī (or Ḳarḳasānī), as given in his *Kitāb al-'Anwār w'al-Marāḳib*,[1] written in A.D. 937, the first Jewish schism took place in the reign of Jeroboam; thereafter arose the first sect—the Samaritans—and then, at the foundation of the Second Temple, the Rabbinists, whose leader was Simeon the Just, and who simply continued the evil work of Jeroboam. These, in turn, were opposed by the party of the Sadducees, which arose under the leadership of Zadok and Boëthos. Zadok discovered a portion of the truth, but the finding of the whole truth was the achievement of the exilarch 'Anān, who lived in the reign of the Khalīf al-Manṣūr (754–775). The Rabbinists tried to compass the death of 'Anān, but God saved him from their hands. This reading of history appears in all the Karaite chroniclers, and at length, in the later of them—Mordecai b. Nisan, Solomon b. Aaron Troki, Simḥah Isaac Luzki, and Abraham Firkovitch—it assumes the most fantastic forms.[2] But it is quite unhistorical, and, besides, it fails to explain the origin of the Karaite teaching. The reports of the Arabic writers all show the influence of the Karaite sources.[3] According to the Rabbinical records, again, the earliest of which is that of Sa'adya Gāōn (892–942), the motive of 'Anān's revolt was injured pride. In the election of the exilarch by the Geōnīm, who did not believe in his orthodoxy, he was set aside, and his younger brother, Ḥananiah, a man of inferior learning but more staunch in the faith, chosen instead. 'Anān refused to accept this decision, proclaimed himself exilarch, and was in consequence thrown into prison. Here he made the acquaintance of a comrade in persecution—none other than the celebrated Abū Ḥanīfa, the alleged founder of the Ḥanifite School,[1] who is said to have advised him to appeal to the Khalīf as the champion of another religion. In this way 'Anān was induced to take the path that led to schism.

That personal motives played a part in the action of 'Anān may well be the case, but in the light of religious history it is quite impossible to suppose that personal motives alone could have created a movement which maintained a vigorous life for centuries. The truth is that in the 7th and 8th centuries the foundations of Judaism in the East were most insecure. The rise of Islām and the religious conflicts within its pale, the influx of general knowledge, and other factors of the kind acted with revolutionary effect upon the Jewish mind, and gave rise to various sects, as, *e.g.*, that led by Abū 'Īsā al-Isfahanī (end of the 7th cent.), who was partly a pseudo-Messiah and partly a sectary, and who acknowledged the prophetic character of both Jesus and Muḥammad; that of his pupil Yudghan, and others. It is possible, moreover, that Sadduceeism had not wholly died out, and in some form or another made itself felt as an underlying force in religious life. But the Sadducees and the Karaites were at one, above all, in their adherence to the written Word and their rejection of oral tradition; and then, secondly, in their acceptance of certain tenets which have been handed down as expressly Sadducean, as, *e.g.*, the literal application of the *ius talionis* (Ex 21[24]), the interpretation of ממחרת השבת (Lv 23[15]) as meaning the Sabbath, so that the Feast of Weeks should always fall on the first day of the week, etc. The first to draw attention to this relationship was A. Geiger,[2] according to whom there was, in addition to the common Halākhā that was ultimately deposited in the Talmud, an older Halākhā, which is dimly traceable in the earlier Talmudic writings, and was common to the Samaritans, the Sadducees, and, subsequently, the Karaites. Other indications of the relationship are found in the statements of Ḳirḳisānī already referred to, in the writings of the many Rabbinists (Sa'adya, Abraham b. Da'ūd, Judah Ḥalevi, Abraham ibn Ezra, Maimonides, etc.) who simply identify the Karaites and the Sadducees, and, finally, in the fact that not only Sa'adya, but also Karaite writers of the 10th cent., had 'Sadducean writings' in their hands.[3] It was with these various elements, to which others were subsequently added, that 'Anān instituted his movement.

'Anān is said to have expressed his distinctive tenet in the bipartite formula quoted in connexion with his name by Japheth b. 'Alī (end of 10th cent.): 'Search thoroughly in the Scripture, and do not rely upon my opinion.'[4] The primary article of they are all dependent upon Karaite writings is shown by the fact that they all speak of 'Anān as an exilarch (راس الجالوت).

[1] ed. A. Harkavy, *Zap. Vost. Otdel. Imp. Russ. Archeolog. Obščestva*, viii. [1894] 247 ff.

[2] Cf. Poznanski, *REJ* xliv. 161 ff.

[3] The Arabic authors who give more or less inaccurate information about 'Anān and the Karaites are: Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir al-Maḳdisī (pseudo-Balḫī), ed. C. Huart, Paris, 1899–1907, iv. 34; al-Bīrūnī, ed. E. Sachau, London, 1879, p. 58 f.; al-Shahrastānī, ed. Cureton, London, 1842–46, i. 167; and Maḳrīzī, in S. de Sacy, *Chrestomathie arabe*[2], Paris, 1826, i. 91. That

[1] Cf. *REJ* xliv. 167, note 2.

[2] See esp. *Das Judenthum und seine Geschichte*, Breslau, 1864–65, ii. 55 ff., and cf. Poznanski, in *Abraham Geiger's Leben und Lebenswerk*, Berlin, 1910, p. 382 ff.

[3] Cf. *REJ* xliv. 176; S. Schechter, *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, Cambridge, 1910, i. p. xviii ff.

[4] Cf. *REJ* xliv. 180.

his confession is accordingly the searching of the Scripture, and it signifies that Scripture is of itself sufficient, and requires no supplement of tradition. By Scripture is meant here, not merely the legislative portion of the Pentateuch, but the whole Bible; even the narrative parts must be drawn upon for the deduction of legal ordinances. In point of fact, however, 'Anān adopted all the methods of the Talmudists, who were likewise at pains to base their oral teachings, *i.e.* tradition, upon the written Word, and he made extensive use of the thirteen canons of Rabbi Ishmael. He availed himself, above all, of the canon of analogy (היקש, Arab. *kiyās*), perhaps under the influence of Abū Ḥanīfa, but his great aim was to read the laws always in the sense carrying the heaviest obligation. This rigour he applied very specially to the laws of the Sabbath and of marriage. With reference to the former, he extended the idea of forbidden work to such processes as, being begun on a Friday, would automatically continue on the Sabbath; thus it was unlawful to light on a Friday a candle that would keep burning till next day—Ex 35^3 being interpreted in that sense—whence he enjoined his adherents to sit in darkness on Friday evenings; and similarly, reading Ex 16^{29} literally and as binding for all time, he forbade them to leave their homes on the Sabbath, except to attend the worship of God. The marriage law he made more rigorous in two ways: interpreting Gn 2^{24} literally, he maintained that husband and wife were really one flesh, so that, *e.g.*, the wife's brother was to be regarded not as the husband's brother-in-law, but as his brother; while, again, applying the method of analogy here too, he extended the forbidden degrees to all collateral lines, whether ascending or descending.[1] This so-called *rikkūb* ordinance (רכוב) put great obstacles in the way of intermarriage among the Ḳaraites. Of 'Anān's other innovations special mention may be made of his reconstruction of the calendar: he bade his followers determine the months according to the earlier method, *i.e.* observation of the new moon, and fix the intercalary month in view of the condition of the crops (cf. art. CALENDAR [Jewish], vol. iii. p. 118 f.). In this matter, too, he brought his adherents to a state of mischievous confusion, as in different localities they celebrated the festivals on different days,[2] and evil results followed also from his discarding the prayers hitherto in use, and substituting for them the recitation of psalms and verses from Scripture. Other regulations introduced by him relate to details of the laws about food and ceremonial purity, of feasts and fasts, of circumcision, and many other things. His injunctions, moreover, are pervaded by a strain of gloom. He forbade the Jews of the Diaspora to eat flesh, as, according to his interpretation of Dt 12^{21}, the use of such food was dependent upon the existence of a sanctuary and a sacrificial ritual. It should also be noted that, notwithstanding his adherence to the literal meaning of Scripture, he interpreted many of the Biblical laws in an allegorical sense.[3]

'Anān set forth his views in an Aramaic writing entitled *Sēfer ha-Miṣwōth* ('Book of Commandments'), of which, however, only fragments[4] survive. He also wrote a kind of compendium of that work, which is referred to by its Arabic title of *Fadhālika* (פדלכה), and survives only in a few quotations.[1] There is no dogmatic theology in either of these works, but, according to Ḳirḳisānī, their author believed in metempsychosis, and composed a work treating of it;[2] and he is further said to have held, on the authority of Lv 17^{11}, that the essential nature of the soul consists in blood.[3] Moreover, his 'Book of Commandments' is free from all controversy with the Rabbinists, nor does it contain a single opprobrious reference to them. According to Moses Taḳū,[4] a writer of the 13th cent., 'Anān expressed a wish to have all the Jewish (*i.e.* Rabbinical) scholars inside him, and then to have a sword thrust through him, so that he and they might die together. But the witticism comes from a period later than 'Anān's.

The second clause of 'Anān's formula—'Do not rely on my opinion'—operated with disastrous effect among his early followers, who took each his own way, so that Ḳirḳisānī (ed. Harkavy, p. 285_{23}) complains that it was hard to find two Ḳaraites who agreed in all things. There also arose in consequence various parties and groups, which, however, were all at one in rejecting tradition. The 'Anānites, the adherents of 'Anān in the narrower sense, formed a distinct sect, which survived as such till the 10th cent.; his followers in general, however, called themselves Ḳaraites.

The history of their outward and inward development may be divided into five periods: (1) the earliest (9th cent.), (2) the Arabic (10th and 11th centuries), (3) the Byzantio-Turkish (12th–16th cent.), (4) the Taurido-Lithuanian (17th and 18th centuries), and (5) the modern (19th cent. and after). To recount this varied development is, however, no easy task, the reasons being, first, that only a fraction of the Ḳaraite literature is accessible in printed form, secondly, that the Ḳaraites are deficient in the historical sense, and have left behind them scarcely any historical works at all, and, thirdly, that they mix and confound periods and persons, partly because of their defective sense of history, and partly for the express purpose of glorifying their sect, the result being that the student of their literature often feels as if he were groping about in a dark wood.[5]

1. The early period (9th century).- The movement initiated by 'Anān found the environment responsive, especially in Persia, where, owing to the variety of religions (Parsiism, Judaism, Christianity, Islām) strongly represented in the country, syncretistic and sectarian tendencies were widely prevalent; and, indeed, the majority of the Muslim sects and heresies, as also the earliest Jewish sects ('Isāwites, Yudghānites), originated there. In Babylonia, his native region, however, his teaching seems to have evoked less response, and this explains why the official representatives of the Jews resident there, the Geōnīm, take no notice of Ḳaraism, and why, *e.g.*, the Gāōn Naṭronai b. Hillai (A.D. 853, *i.e.* almost a century after 'Anan) knows of the 'Book of Commandments' only by hearsay.[6] According to the later Ḳaraite writers, 'Anān migrated from Babylonia to Palestine, and founded the still surviving Ḳaraite synagogue in Jerusalem. These statements, however, have no historical foundation;[7] in point of fact, his descendants, who were nearly all honoured with the

[1] Cf. Poznanski, *Kaufmann-Gedenkbuch*, Breslau, 1900, p. 173.
[2] According to the narrative of Sa'adya already cited, 'Anān specially urged upon the Khalif that his rejection of the fixed calendar was the distinctive mark of a new religion. Generally, the calendar plays a great part in the history of Jewish sectarianism.
[3] Cf. Poznanski, in *Studies in Jewish Literature issued in Honour of K. Kohler*, Berlin, 1913, p. 240 ff.
[4] ed. Poznanski, in *REJ* lxv. [1902] 54 ff.; Harkavy, *Studien und Mitteilungen aus der St. Petersb. Bibliothek*, viii., St. Petersburg, 1903, and Schechter, *op. cit.* ii.

[1] Cf. *REJ* lxv. 184 ff.
[2] Poznanski, in *Semitic Studies in Memory of Kohut*, p. 437 ff.
[3] Sa'adya, *Kitab al-Amanāt*, ed. S. Landauer, Leyden, 1881, p. 190.
[4] Cf. *REJ* lxv. 201.
[5] Steinschneider, *Die hebraischen Uebersetzungen*, p. 948.
[6] *Siddūr R. 'Amram*, fol. 38*a*; cf. *REJ* xliv. 199.
[7] Cf. Poznanski, in *Jerusalem*, ed. A. M. Luncz, x. [1913] 85 ff.

title of 'exilarch' or 'prince,' are found in Egypt. Of these descendants his immediate successors are said to have been his son Saul and his grandson Josiah, of whom we know hardly more than their names.[1] Josiah is said to have been the teacher of Benjamin b. Moses Nahawandī (*i.e.* of Nahawand in Persia), who flourished *c.* 830, and with whom began a new era in the history of the sect; in fact, the Arabs speak of the Ḳaraites as 'the companions of 'Anān and Benjamin' (اصحاب عانان وبنيامين),[2] and one Arabic writer makes Benjamin the head of a distinct sect, the Benyaminya.[3] Benjamin is the first of extant authors to speak of the Ḳaraites as *Benē miḳra* (see p. 662[a]); and, while 'Anān wrote in Aramaic, he used Hebrew. While he followed the Rabbinists in regard to many precepts of the Law, his method, especially with reference to the deduction of the Law from the Scripture, was more consistent and systematic than theirs. He laid greater stress than 'Anān upon the necessity of independent investigation of Scripture.[4] He applied himself also to dogmatics, and affirmed, *inter alia*, that the personage who created the world, sent the prophets, performed all the miracles, revealed the law, etc., was not God Himself, but an angel whom He had created—a view which he based upon various passages of Scripture, especially Ex 3^{2-6}, where the angel who appeared to Moses says: 'I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.' In reality, however, we have here the Logos-doctrine of Philo, whose writings, translated into some Oriental language, circulated in the East, and may quite well have been known to Benjamin.[5] Another of the latter's doctrines, founded upon Ezk 32^{27}, was that divine penalties fall upon the bones of men.[6] He read an allegorical sense into many passages of Scripture.[7] He enjoined that the months of Nisan and Tishri alone should be determined by observation of the moon; the others, as was the practice among the Rabbinists for all months, by computation. He frequently differed from 'Anān in his applications of the Law. Of his writings only the 'Book of Laws' (*Sēfer Dinīm*, published under the title משפט בניסן, Eupatoria, 1836) has been preserved. He also wrote a 'Book of Commandments' (*Sēfer ha-Miṣwōth*) and Biblical commentaries, of which, however, nothing is known beyond a few quotations by other writers.[8]

Daniel b. Moses al-Ḳūmisi, or al-Dāmaghānī, is spoken of as a pupil of Benjamin. As his surname indicates, he was a native of Dāmaghān, in the province of Ḳūmis (Ṭābaristān); he flourished towards the end of the 9th century. A point of special interest is his attitude to 'Anān, whom at first he designated 'the head of the wise' (ראש המשכילים), and afterwards 'the head of the fools' (ראש הכסילים).[9] In contrast to Benjamin, he was hostile to secular knowledge, and rejected reason as a means of deciding questions of religious law; and his opposition to his teacher is seen also in his denial of the existence of angels. The 'angels' mentioned in the Bible, as appears from Ps 78^{49} 104^{4}, were nothing but natural forces. He was also entirely opposed to the allegorical interpretation of the Commandments, since 'God did not ordain his commandments in allegorical form.'[1] In his interpretations of the religious law he tends to favour the more severe alternative. Daniel likewise composed a 'Book of Commandments,' preserved only in a few quotations,[2] and Biblical commentaries, of which only two small fragments (on Leviticus) survive;[3] he is also referred to as the author of a work on the law of inheritance.[4]

2. **The Arabic period (10th and 11th centuries).**—This period is so named because most of the Ḳaraite works dating from the centuries indicated were written in Arabic. It is the most brilliant age of Ḳaraite literature—an age in which the sect produced theologians, grammarians, lexicographers, exegetes, teachers of the Law, controversialists, etc., some of them writers of great and lasting importance. This illustrious advance was due in part to the influence of the Rabbinists and of their now active bent towards secular science and their desire to provide a scientific foundation for Judaism; while, in turn, the Ḳaraites influenced the Rabbinists, and, in particular, constrained them to engage more profoundly in the investigation of the Hebrew language and the rational exegesis of Scripture. Modern Jewish historians (Pinsker, Graetz, Fürst), indeed, would characterize all the earlier Jewish grammarians, Massoretes, and Biblical theologians as Ḳaraites; but, while this view has been completely refuted by criticism,[5] there can be no doubt that the Ḳaraites, whose very *raison d'être* was their literal view of the Bible, devoted themselves in a special degree to the branches of knowledge in question, and often gave the initiative to the Rabbinists. Another effective factor in the movement was polemics. The passive attitude of the Geōnīm had to give way before the impetus and the recruiting power of Ḳaraism; and now there arose the Gāōn Sa'adya, who as a youth of twenty-three had attacked 'Anān in a polemical work in the Arabic language (*Kitāb al-radd 'alā 'Anān*), and who made it one of the great tasks of his life to fight against Ḳaraism. His challenge brought the Ḳaraites into the field, and the contention inspired them with new life. While the struggle was of a purely literary character, it was sometimes conducted in no very becoming way on either side, and not infrequently with a biased deviation from truth.[6] The Ḳaraites were not slow to retaliate upon their assailants, and directed their pointed but not always well-aimed shafts mainly against the anthropomorphic Haggādā of the Talmud, as also against the mystical writings of a like kind that emanated in part from the schools of the Geōnīm.

The literary activity of the Ḳaraites during the period under notice asserted itself in nearly all the more important Muslim lands, *i.e.*, besides Babylonia and Persia—the cradle and the nursery of Ḳaraism—in Egypt, N. Africa, and especially Palestine. In the last-named country an eager intellectual interest also prevailed among the Rabbinists during the 10th and 11th centuries; here arose, as a counterpart to the official school of Geōnīm in Babylon, a distinctively Palestinian Gāōnate, and here the Ḳaraites likewise conducted a zealous propaganda about the same time.

The most eminent representative of Ḳaraism in

[1] Cf. Harkavy, *Istoričeskiye Očerki Karaimstva*, ii. 1 f.
[2] *Jeshurun*, ed. J. Kobak, ix. 35.
[3] *REJ* xxix. 207.
[4] Poznanski, *REJ* xliv. 184a; Harkavy, *Studien und Mitteilungen*, viii. 176.
[5] Cf. Poznanski, *REJ* l. 10 ff.
[6] Sa'adya, *Kitāb al-Amanāt*, ed. Landauer, p. 201; Harkavy, *Hadashim gam yeshanim*, vii. 20.
[7] *Studies in Jewish Literature*, p. 247.
[8] Cf. Poznanski, in *Ozar Yisrael*, iii. 126.
[9] Kirḳisānī, ed. Harkavy, p. 280, line 17.

[1] Hadassi, *Eshkōl ha-Ḳōfer*, Eupatoria, 1836, § 240 ר; cf. *Studies in Jewish Literature*, pp. 243, 248.
[2] Collected in Harkavy, *Studien und Mitteilungen*, viii. 1, 187–192.
[3] *Ha-Ḥoḳer*, ed. I. S. Fuchs, i. [1891] 169–173, and *Sa'adyana*, ed. S. Schechter, Cambridge, 1903, no. lv.
[4] Cf. *Saadyana*, no. xii.; also Poznanski, in *Yevreyskaya Enzyklopedya*, *s.v.* 'Daniel b. Moses,' vi. 915.
[5] Cf. esp. Steinschneider, *Magasin für die Wissensch. des Judenthums*, xx. 236.
[6] Cf. Poznanski, 'The Anti-Karaite Writings of Saadiah Gaon,' *JQR* x. [1897-98] 238–270, and *The Karaite Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon*, London, 1908.

this period was undoubtedly the already mentioned Abū Yūsuf Ya'ḳūb al-Ḳirḳīsānī, or al-Ḳarḳasānī (*i.e.* of Circesium on the Euphrates, or of Ḳarḳasān, near Baghdād). As appears from his writings, he travelled widely, visited Persia and India, observed the customs of the heathen living there, was in personal touch with the representatives of various Jewish sects, and argued with Muslim theologians on various questions relating to their religion, of which he had a thorough knowledge. So far as we can estimate from his writings, he was a widely cultured and thoughtful man, 'who adhered loyally to his ancestral faith, but neither assumed an uncritical position towards the weaknesses of his own religious community, nor set himself against the adherents of other religions' (T. Friedländer, *ZA* xxvi. [1912] 94). In 937 he composed the first Ḳaraite book of laws in the Arabic language; it is entitled *Kitāb al-'Anwār w'al-Marāḳib* ('Book of Luminaries and Outlook Towers'), and is divided into thirteen sections. It differs from all works of its class in the fact that its first four sections are devoted to items of historical information and questions of dogmatic theology. The most important section is the first, which contains a survey of all the Jewish sects down to the writer's own day.[1] Ḳirḳīsānī gathered his information partly from his own observation and his conversations with others, partly from the writings of his predecessors, and, above all, from those of David b. Merwān al-Muḳammaṣ, and from the *Kitāb al-Maḳālāt* of Abū 'Īsā al-Warrāḳ. The book is invaluable as a storehouse of information provided by no other source, as, *e.g.*, regarding the Sadducees, who, it states, forbade divorce, and reckoned by solar months of thirty days;[2] regarding the sect of the Maghāriya, *i.e.* 'cave-dwellers,' who are perhaps identical with the Essenes;[3] regarding the remnants of the 'Isāwites, Oḳbarites, and 'Anānites still surviving in his day, etc. It is interesting to find that he includes the Christians among the Jewish sects. In the opinion of many Ḳaraites, Jesus was a righteous and devout man, but Pauline Christianity was sheer heresy and a denial of God.[4] The subjects of the second section are the necessity of investigation and speculation with reference to the injunctions of the Torah, and the vindication of the proof *ex ratione et analogia*. In the third section Ḳirḳīsānī refutes the views of the sectaries, and in the fourth indicates the paths that lead to the knowledge of the Law. He was likewise the first to direct a searching criticism upon the anthropomorphism of the Haggādā, and to formulate a canon to determine when the requirements of the Law were to be interpreted according to the inner, *i.e.* the figurative, sense. His position in these matters was influenced by his contemporary Sa'adya, whose opinions he also cites and refutes in other writings.[5] In his views of the religious Law his attitude is one of independence.

MSS of the *Kitāb al-Anwār* are found in St. Petersburg and the British Museum. In addition to the first section, various chapters from the other sections have been edited by H. Hirschfeld (*Arabic Chrestomathy in Hebrew Characters*, London, 1892, pp. 116-121), and more fully by Poznanski (in various publications). Friedländer (*op. cit.*) edits the chapter against Islām (iii. 18), which reveals an intimate knowledge of its subject. Ḳirḳīsānī regarded the *Kitāb al-Anwār*, his greatest work, as only an introduction to his commentary on the Pentateuch (*Kitāb al-Riyāḍ w'al-Ḥadā'iḳ*, 'The Book of Flower-beds and Gardens'), portions of which survive in MS. He refers also to the following writings as from his pen: a commentary on Job and Koheleth, and treatises on the unity of God, on translations of the Bible, and against the prophetic character of Muḥammad.

A number of other eminent Ḳaraite men of learning may be named here. David b. Boaz, a descendant of 'Anān in the fifth generation (*i.e.* c. 910, though Ibn al-Hīti brings his date down to *c.* 993; cf. Poznanski, *The Karaite Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon*, p. 18), is always designated 'prince,' and enjoyed a position of great authority. His principal works were Biblical commentaries in Arabic, still partly extant in MS; and a treatise on the fundamental doctrines of religion (*Kitāb al-Uṣūl*) is also ascribed to him. His place of residence is unknown. The letter said to have been written by him from Jerusalem in 1009 is a forgery.[1] David b. Abraham al-Fāsi (*i.e.* of Fez, in Morocco), belonging to the latter half of the 10th cent., wrote in Arabic a magnificently planned Hebrew lexicon, entitled *Kitāb Jami' al-Alfāẓ*,[2] which contains numerous contributions to Biblical exegesis and the comparative philology of the Semitic languages. Attempts to assign the work to the 12th cent. have proved futile. Sahl b. Faḍl (Heb. Jāshār b. Ḥesed) of Tustar, in Khūzistān, Persia, lived in the first half of the 11th cent., and among other works wrote a critical adaptation of Aristotle's *Physics*.[3] Nissi b. Noah was long regarded as a pupil of 'Anān, but, according to recent research, he lived in the 11th cent., and resided in Persia. He composed what might be called a commentary on the Decalogue, in which he made use of Hebrew philosophical terms. The most prolific Ḳaraite exegete of the period was Japheth b. 'Alī of Baṣra (end of 10th cent.), who translated the whole OT into Arabic, and also wrote a very full commentary to it in that language.[4] He was well-affected towards secular knowledge,[5] and composed, among other things, a polemical work against Sa'adya and his pupil, Jacob b. Samuel. Levi, a son of the foregoing, wrote in Arabic a 'Book of Commandments' (1007), which survives only in a Hebrew translation, and also Biblical commentaries. In the field of sacred jurisprudence he was one of those who prefer the less exacting interpretation; thus, *e.g.*, he inveighed against 'Anān's requirement that no light should be allowed to burn on the eve of the Sabbath. 'Reason ordains that in honour of the Sabbath there should be light in the house, for thus it is said (in Is 24[15]): "with lights glorify the Eternal" (Bashyazi, *Adderet Eliyahū*, Eupatoria, 1835, fol. 31[b]). Thus sound common sense came at length to triumph over a rigid adherence to the letter.

About this period, however, Ḳaraite learning had, as was said above, a special centre in Jerusalem, where the Ḳaraites seem for a time to have been a stronger party than the Rabbinists. Jerusalem was perhaps the home (*c.* A.D. 940-960) of Solomon b. Jeroham, the most zealous and fiercest anti-Rabbinic controversialist among the Ḳaraites. He was opposed to philosophy and secular knowledge; he declaimed against the learning of foreign languages — though he himself sometimes used Arabic — and the reading of secular literature; he was even a foe to Euclid and the Hebrew grammar. He wrote in

1 ed. Harkavy, St. Petersburg, 1894 (cf. W. Bacher, *JQR* vii. [1894-95] 687 ff.).

2 Cf. Schechter, *Documents of the Jewish Sectaries*, i. p. xviii. ff.

3 Poznanski, *REJ* l. 14 ff.

4 The Ḳaraites were inclined to coquet with Christianity and Islām, although they sometimes assailed them vehemently, and, *e.g.*, like other Jewish writers, they stigmatize Muḥammad as a פסול (*pasūl*, a sarcastic play upon the word *rasūl*). The Muslim powers are said to have been at first favourably disposed towards the Ḳaraites (cf. *REJ* xliv. 165).

5 Cf. Poznanski, *The Karaite Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon*, p. 8 ff., *Studies in Jewish Literature*, p. 249.

1 P. F. Frankl, *MGWJ* xxv. [1876] 56 ff.

2 MSS in St. Petersburg and Oxford. Extracts have been published by A. Neubauer, *Notice sur la lexicographie hébraïque* (*Extrait du Journal Asiatique*, Paris, 1861), pp. 27-155, and in the appendix to Abū'l Walīd Merwān ibn Janāḥ, *Kitāb al-Uṣūl*, Oxford, 1875, coll. 773-808.

3 Cf. Steinschneider, *Die arab. Literatur der Juden*, § 69, and G. Margoliouth, *REJ* lvii. 314.

4 Of this the Song of Solomon and Daniel have been published in full; certain other books only in part.

5 Cf. *JQR* xiii. [1900-01] 340.

Hebrew a bitter and vulgar rhymed epistle against oral doctrine in general, and Sa'adya in particular; to this a pupil of Sa'adya—perhaps Jacob b. Samuel—composed a rejoinder in Arabic (cf. Poznanski, *Zeitschr. für hebr. Bibliog.* x. [1906] 47). Solomon was also a writer of Biblical commentaries in Arabic, of which only a specimen portion of his Lamentations has been printed.[1] Sahl b. Maṣliaḥ (end of the 10th cent.) was a man of kindred mould with Solomon, but superior to him in many respects. He too wrote Biblical commentaries in Arabic,[2] and likewise composed a violent epistle against Jacob b. Samuel; but his horizon was wider than Solomon's, and he was a wonderful master of diction. In his epistle we find interesting data regarding the Karaites of Jerusalem, their ascetic manner of life, and their successful propaganda among the Rabbinists. These data he repeats in his Hebrew introduction to a 'Book of Commandments' which he wrote in Arabic;[3] in that work he urges his co-religionists to settle in the Holy City. He was likewise the first Karaite to propound canons for the determination of religious law. They are four in number: (1) reason or speculation (חכמת הדעת), (2) the actual words of Scripture (משמעות), (3) analogy (היקש = Arab. قياس [see above]), and (4) the *consensus* of the community (עדה [see above]; cited by Hadassi, *Eshkol ha-Kofer*, § 168 b). Joseph b. Noah (*c.* 1002) seems to have played a great rôle among the Karaite scholars of Jerusalem. According to Ibn al-Ilūṭī,[4] his seminary was always attended by seventy learned men—doubtless an ideal figure, assimilated to the membership of the ancient Sanhedrim. Of Sahl's four canons Joseph rejected the third, analogy, and he had a controversy with Sahl regarding the question of fixing leap-year by the coming of spring (Abīb). He wrote a commentary to the Pentateuch, which his pupil Abū'l Faraj Hārūn b. al-Faraj recast in an abbreviated form;[5] and also a work on grammar, which is quoted by the same pupil. This Abū'l Faraj was himself a distinguished grammarian, lexicographer, and Biblical exegete, and is referred to by Rabbinist writers as 'the grammarian of Jerusalem.'[6] He was the author of a grammatical treatise, *Kitāb al-Mushtamil* (completed in August 1026), in eight books, of which the 7th and 8th are of special interest, the former being of the nature of a lexicon, giving the various meanings of each triliteral root, and the fresh significations it acquires by the transposition of its radicals,[7] while the latter deals with Biblical Aramaic and its affinity to Hebrew.[8] He also wrote, in Arabic, *Kitāb al-Kāfī*, a grammatical work, *Sharṭ al-Alfāẓ*, a book giving definitions of Biblical words, and a commentary to the Pentateuch.

A still more important scholar of the period was Joseph b. Abraham al-Baṣīr (Heb. *ha-Rôeh*, euphemism for 'the Blind'), another pupil of Joseph b. Noah, and at once the first and the most renowned philosophical theologian among the Karaites. Even at an early date he was confounded with Kirḳisānī, or else regarded as anterior to him; but it is now certain that he flourished in the first half of the 11th cent., and died probably *c.* 1040.[9] As a philosopher, al-Baṣīr was dominated by the influence of the Mu'tazilite *kalām*, as was indeed the case with almost all the Karaite philosophers;[1] hence the Karaites as a sect are usually referred to by Arabic writers as *ahl al-'adl w'at-tawḥīd* (اهل العدل والتوحيد), *i.e.* 'the people of the righteousness [or equity] and the unity [of God].' Thus he too enunciates five principles of the confession of the divine unity: (1) the necessary assumption of atoms and accidents, (2) the necessary assumption of a creator, (3) the necessary assumption of divine attributes, (4) the necessary rejection of attributes falsely ascribed to God, and (5) the assumption of His unity notwithstanding the plurality of His attributes—the attributes being elements of His nature, and not entities that exist outside of Him. Al-Baṣīr was a believer in free will (*ḳadr*), and an opponent of 'Anān's doctrine of metempsychosis—though he upholds it as true in the case of the 'Abdiya—repudiating an idea current in many Mu'tazilite groups, viz. that God's dealings with the children and animals to which He allots suffering are justified by that doctrine. He was likewise opposed to the theory of Benjamin al-Nahawandī (see above). He expounded his philosophical views in two Arabic treatises. His chief work is the *Kitāb al-Muḥtawī*,[2] 'the one surviving pattern of a work on the Mu'tazilite *kalām* that might quite as well have been composed by a Muslim'[3]—just as in the introduction he maintains that revelation by the prophets must necessarily be supplemented by speculative knowledge. For centuries the treatise was known only in the Hebrew translation by Tobiah b. Moses (below, 667b), bearing the title *Sefer ha-Ne'imôth* (ספר הנעימות), and it is only recently that certain chapters, both of the original and of the translation, have seen the light in the form of graduation theses.[4] A compendium of the *al-Muḥtawī* is found in the *Kitāb al-Tamyīz*, or *al-Mansūrī*,[5] translated into Hebrew by Tobiah b. Moses as *Maḥkimath Peṯhî* (מחכימת פתי).[6] An analysis of both works has been published by P. F. Frankl.[7] The *al-Muḥtawī* exercised a vast influence upon the scholars of the age, and even the last Karaite philosophical theologian, the Aaron b. Elijah to be dealt with below (1364), owes everything to it. Al-Baṣīr was likewise the author of other philosophical treatises,[8] for the most part now lost. He occupied an influential position as a teacher of the Law. He was the first to protest against the rigorous Karaite regulations concerning marriage, the so-called *rikkūb* theory (above, p. 663a). In A.H. 428 (A.D. 1036–37) he wrote in Arabic a 'Book of Commandments', entitled *Kitāb al-Istibṣār*, sections of which, treating of legacies and ceremonial purity, are found in MS in the British Museum. It was no doubt from this work that his successors drew their numerous references to his views of religious law.

Joshua b. Judah (Arab. Abū'l Faraj Furḳān ibn Asad) was a pupil of al-Baṣīr, and, like his teacher, a philosopher and a teacher of the Law, while he was also an exegete. He executed an Arabic translation of the Pentateuch, and composed two commentaries on it, one of which (1050) was an exhaustive work, the other (begun 1051) an epitome.[9] His work as an exegete was greatly esteemed by Abraham ibn Ezra. As a philo-

[1] ed. S. Feuerstein, Cracow, 1898; cf. Poznanski, *JQR* xiii. 336 ff.
[2] There is a MS fragment of his *Deuteronomy* in St. Petersburg.
[3] ed. Harkavy, in *Ha-Meliẓ*, 1879, p. 639; cf. Poznanski, *The Karaite Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon*, p. 33, and *Jerusalem*, ed. Luncz, x. 97.
[4] *JQR* ix. [1896–97] 433; cf. *Zeitschr. für hebr. Bibl.* ii. [1897] 79.
[5] MS in St. Petersburg; cf. Harkavy, *ZATW* i. 156.
[6] Cf. Bacher, *REJ* xxx. 232–256, and Poznanski, *ib.* xxxiii. 24–39, 197–219, lvi. 42–69.
[7] Cf. Poznanski, *REJ* xxxiii. 24 ff., 197 ff.
[8] ed. Hirschfeld, in *Arabic Chrestomathy*, pp. 54–60.
[9] Cf. Poznanski, 'Nouveaux renseignements sur Aboul-Faradj ben al-Faradj' in *REJ* lvi. 43 ff.

[1] Cf. Maimonides, *Dalalat*, i. ch. 71.
[2] MS in Budapest.
[3] Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Uebersetzungen*, p. 453.
[4] Budapest, 1905–1913, containing chs. 15, 19, 23, 25–30, 34, and portions of 3, 22, 24.
[5] MS in the British Museum.
[6] In several MSS.
[7] *Ein mu'tazilitischer Kalām*, etc., Vienna, 1873; cf. also his *Beitrage zur Litteraturgeschichte der Karäer*, Berlin, 1887.
[8] Enumerated in Steinschneider, *Die arab. Literatur der Juden*, § 50.
[9] Cf. G. Margoliouth, *JQR* xi. [1898–99] 187 ff.

sophical theologian, he wrote philosophical homilies on Genesis and numerous dogmatic treatises, which survive, however, only in Hebrew translations. His philosophical position is exactly that of his master, and, like the latter, he was an adherent of the Mu'tazilite *kalām*. The only extant memorial of his activity as a teacher of the Law is a treatise on incest in a Hebrew translation, *Sēfer ha-Ārāyōth* (ed. I. Markon, St. Petersburg, 1908), in which he delivered a more decisive blow to the *rikkūb* theory than even his teacher had done, with the result that it was completely discredited. The outstanding achievement of Joshua, however, consists in his having trained a group of pupils who carried the Karaite teaching to European countries.

Joshua was the last representative of Karaite learning in Palestine, and after his day, *i.e.* from the last third of the 11th cent., the intellectual activity of Karaism disappears from the Holy Land, while the period of spontaneous and creative vigour comes likewise to an end. This collapse was probably due to political occurrences, viz. the capture of Jerusalem by the Seljuks in A.D. 1071, and by the Crusaders in A.D. 1099.[1] It is recorded that a large number of the Karaites—or all of them—were, together with the Rabbinists, driven into a synagogue by the army of the Crusaders, and there burned to death.[2] In 1642 the Karaite traveller, Samuel b. David, found in Jerusalem only twenty-seven Karaites, occupying fifteen houses,[3] while it is said that in 1749 there was not a single adherent of the sect in the Holy City.[4] In 1912 the Karaites in Jerusalem numbered eighteen persons (five males and thirteen females), belonging to five families and living in three houses (in one of which was the synagogue).[5] The centre of Karaite life was now transferred to Eastern Europe, and this brings us to the beginning of a new period.

3. The Byzantio-Turkish period (12th-16th cent.).—This may be divided into three shorter stages, viz. (*a*) a time during which the Karaites, by translating the works of the Arabic period into Hebrew and gathering up the results of the past, simply maintained and consolidated what had already been attained (close of the 11th cent. and the 12th cent.); (*b*) a time of advance and quasi-renaissance (13th-15th cent.); and (*c*) a time of complete decadence (16th cent.).

The outstanding feature of the first of these three sub-periods was its activity in the work of translation. Young men came in large numbers from Byzantium to study under Joshua at Jerusalem, and there learned Arabic. They then returned home, mainly to Constantinople, where in a relatively short time they translated all the more important Karaite works that had been written in Arabic—a feat which Frankl[6] characterizes as 'an achievement so great in respect of mere mass that we cannot wonder if its quality should be poor.' Its defects of quality were due to the translators' inadequate grasp of the Arabic language. The translators were mostly of Byzantine origin, and were familiar with Byzantine culture; and in their translations, besides Arabic words which were taken over unchanged, we find large numbers of Greek words, and these, again, as we might expect, were subjected to great corruption by the copyists. The influence of the translations was nevertheless very great, as they alone, and not the originals, were studied. The greatest and most eminent of the translators was Tobiah b. Moses, who is sometimes indeed called Ha-Ma'atik ('the translator'). Being in a manner a pioneer, he had to construct a terminology, and this is harsh and often ill-devised. His principal translations are those of the writings of al-Baṣīr and his teacher Joshua, and, while he sometimes added to the matter of these works, he also now and then condensed it. Of Tobiah's own works the best known is his very full commentary on the Pentateuch, entitled *Ōṣār Neḥmād*, which, however, is for the most part a compilation from David b. Boaz and Japheth b. 'Alī.[1] He also enjoyed a considerable reputation as a teacher of the Law, and reference is often made to his dictum that every tradition accepted by the Karaites is suggested in Holy Scripture, and that it was mere lack of understanding to assert that there were Karaite traditions which had not the support of Scripture.[2] Another greatly valued translator was Jacob b. Simeon; the names of the rest are unknown. Other noteworthy Karaite scholars of Byzantium in this epoch are Aaron b. Judah Kusdimi (*i.e.* of Constantinople), who devoted himself specially to the study of the marriage law, and Jacob b. Reuben, author of a commentary on the Bible entitled *Sēfer ha-'Ōsher*, and drawn mainly from his predecessors, especially from Japheth b. 'Alī.

This sub-period closes with the publication of one of the most notable productions of Karaite literature, the *Eshkōl ha-Kōfer*, written by Judah b. Elijah Hadassi in 1148.[3] Jost[4] compares it to a sea into which flow all the streams of Karaite learning. Even on its formal side the work is remarkable. It consists of 379 sections, written in a rhymed prose, and all its strophes, which, with few exceptions, are acrostically arranged under the Hebrew alphabet in the direct and inverse order (*i.e.* א"אבנר and ת"תשרק), end in ת. This—to say nothing of the affected language and the cumbrous diction—gives the work a character of tedious monotony. Moreover, Hadassi tabulates all the injunctions of the Law and his other data under the Ten Commandments of the Decalogue; and here, too, he has to resort to all manner of artifice. He claims to be no more than a compiler, and frequently emphasizes the fact (see especially the end of the twenty-third repetition of the alphabet), and, in point of fact, the *Eshkōl ha-Kōfer* takes the form of an encyclopædia in which are accumulated the results of all previous Karaite learning. In his attitude towards the Rabbinists he is most spiteful and savage, and may in this respect be matched with Solomon b. Jeroham and Sahl b. Maṣliaḥ. He fastens, above all, upon the first, second, and ninth Commandments of the Decalogue, and he reproaches the Talmudists for having in their grossly sensuous Haggada obscured the unity of God, conjoined Him with other beings, and made false representations of the Biblical personages.[5] He was also well versed in secular science, philosophy, and dogmatic theology. His views are dominated by Mu'tazilite influence;[6]

[1] These two events also caused irreparable damage to the Palestinian Gâônate already referred to. The Seljuk conquest forced it to abandon Jerusalem. It settled in Trabulus, and, when that city was itself taken by the Crusaders on the 12th of July 1109 (cf. R. Röhricht, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem*, Innsbruck, 1898, p. 81), the Gâônate no longer existed in the Holy Land (cf. *REJ* xlviii. 170).

[2] Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, vi.[3] 95.

[3] J. H. Gurland, *Ginze Israel*, Lyck and St. Petersburg, 1865-67, i. 12.

[4] Cf. *Jerusalem*, ed. Luncz, vi. 240.

[5] Cf. the monthly periodical, *Karaimskaya Zhizn*, for 1912, p. 50.

[6] *Beiträge*, p. 11

[1] *REJ* xxxiv. 181.

[2] Cf. Aaron b. Elijah, *Gan Eden*, Eupatoria, 1866, fol. 8*b*, etc.

[3] ed. Eupatoria, 1836.

[4] *Geschichte des Judentums*, ii. 352.

[5] Cf. esp. alphabets 105-124 and 358 f. Hadassi, nevertheless, does not scruple to make copious use of Rabbinical writers, nor does he always acknowledge his sources. This is particularly true of his work in the field of Hebrew philology. Thus he plagiarizes from the *Mōznayim* of his younger contemporary, Abraham ibn Ezra, in a manner that amounts to sheer fraud (cf. Bacher, in *MGWJ* xl. 73, 126).

[6] Cf. M. Schreiner, *Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur*, Berlin, 1895, p. 33.

but his information in the sphere of secular science is drawn in part from Byzantine sources, as appears from the numerous Greek glosses to his work, which, however, are sometimes omitted and sometimes distorted in the published edition.[1] Hadassi was likewise the first Karaite writer who formulated articles of faith. These are ten in number—to correspond, no doubt, with the Ten Commandments—and are as follows: (1) creation from nothing; (2) the creator is God; (3) God is one, formless, and different from all other beings; (4) God sent Moses and the Prophets; (5) through Moses, God revealed the Torah, which in its wording is of itself sufficient, and does not require to be supplemented by oral teaching (the specifically Karaite article); (6) the Torah must be learned by every Israelite in the original Hebrew; (7) God appointed a sanctuary; (8) the resurrection of the dead; (9) reward and punishment in the future life; and (10) the redemption of Israel by a Messiah of the posterity of David. These articles were set forth in a work which, as a later writer, Aaron b. Elijah,[2] proudly affirms, was composed twenty-nine years before the *Sefer ha-Madda'* of Maimonides.

About this time, as we read, there were Karaites also in the extreme west of Europe, in Spain. A certain al-Taras had migrated from Castile to Jerusalem, where he embraced Karaism and became a pupil of Joshua b. Judah, and then returned to his native place as a propagandist of his new faith. After his death his work was taken up by his wife, designated Mu'allima ('the teacher') by their adherents, who seem to have been fairly numerous. By the intervention of Rabbinist dignitaries at the Castilian court, however, the Karaites in Spain were subjected to persecution, and it is stated that from 1178 they were completely lost sight of. There is evidence to show, nevertheless, that there were Karaites in Castile as late as the 13th century.[3] In other West European countries the sect was known only by repute,[4] although an occasional Rabbinist scholar, as, *e.g.*, Meshullam b. Kalonymus,[5] thought it necessary to deal critically with its teachings.

In the East, and especially in Egypt, the Karaites at this time occupied a position of great respect, and perhaps used it domineeringly. In Egypt they numbered amongst them many physicians of eminence, as, *e.g.*, Abu'l Bayyān al-Mudawwar and Sadīd al-Dīn Abu'l Fadl Dā'ūd b. Sulaimān (perhaps a son of the foregoing).[6] It was in Egypt also that their 'princes,' the descendants of 'Anān, resided, and about the period under notice their prince was Solomon b. David (Arab. al-Ra'is Abū'l Fadl), the author of several works. Here, too, lived the earliest and the only outstanding Karaite poet, Moses b. Abraham Dar'ī, whom their uncritical historians assigned to the 11th cent. and regarded as the model of all the greater Hebrew poets, Gabirol, the two Ibn Ezras, and Judah Halevi, while, as a matter of fact, the relation was exactly the reverse.[7]

As time went on, the Karaites came to be more and more affected by the influence of Rabbinism and the Rabbinical literature, and their power gradually waned. The Rabbinical intellectual giants of Spain carried Judaism to heights which the Karaites were quite unable to scale. In Egypt their prestige was shattered by the advent of Maimonides. The latter certainly dealt most gently with them, but he saw to it that Karaite usages and Karaite interpretations of the Law which had crept into Rabbinistic communities were rooted out.[1] From the end of the 12th cent. the vitality of Karaism was all but completely spent. Attempts were made to revive it; strong personalities arose within its pale; there were conciliatory approaches to the Rabbinists; but the sect was no longer truly alive. Its unyielding insistence upon adherence to the past shut it off from the vitalizing springs of progress and doomed it to a fatal atrophy, and from this point onwards its fortunes require but brief narration.

At the beginning of the second portion of the Byzantio-Turkish period, *i.e.* in the opening years of the 13th cent., we hear with growing frequency of Karaites living in the land of Kedar (*i.e.* of the Tatars)—the Crimea. Why they came there, and whence they came, are questions not easily answered. At a later day an attempt was made to show that they had migrated thither, as one might say, in pre-historic times; but this is a mere falsification of history (see below, § 5). It is possible that the Chazars who had been converted to Judaism had intermingled with the Karaites, and that this might explain the presence in the Crimea of a body of people exhibiting a somewhat impure Jewish type of religion. Our earliest information regarding this body is provided by the traveller Pethahya of Regensburg (end of 12th cent.). He states that there were heretics in the land of Kedar who did not follow tradition—of which, indeed, they had never heard—who were accustomed to sit in the dark on Friday evenings, whose prayers consisted only of psalms, etc. Further, Sulchat in the Crimea was the native place of the Aaron b. Joseph or Aaron the First (*c.* 1260–1320) who removed to Constantinople—one of the most sympathetic minds that the Karaites ever produced. He was a doctor by profession, but he wrote (in 1294) a commentary on the Bible entitled *Sefer Mibhār*,[2] a very remarkable piece of work. His fair-mindedness towards Rabbinist adversaries, with whom he often agrees, is particularly worthy of note. 'Truth and error,' he says, 'are not what they are in virtue of the person who utters them, but are so entirely on their own account.' At a later date he was actually regarded as a pupil of Nahmanides. His views in theology and the philosophy of religion, like those of his predecessors generally, are based upon the Mu'tazilite *kalām*, but he also shows leanings to Aristotelianism.[3] He rendered his party a more effective service, however, in the sphere of religious worship, as the order of prayer universally adopted among the Karaites from his day was due to him, and he also enriched the ritual of the synagogue with about eighty sacred poems;[4] he was, in fact, the most prolific and distinguished of Karaite

[1] Cf. Frankl, in *MGWJ* xxxiii. [1884] 440 ff.
[2] *'Es ha-Hayim*, ch. 18.
[3] Cf. Loeb, *REJ* xix. 206 209.
[4] But cf. Epstein, in E. Gunzig's *Ha-Eshkol*, vii. 221.
[5] Cf. Freimann, *Judaica* (*Cohen's Festschrift*), Berlin, 1912, p. 569 ff.
[6] Cf. Ibn Abī Usaibi'a, ed. A. Müller, Königsberg, 1884, ii. 115–118; Steinschneider, *Die arabische Literatur der Juden*, § 153 *f.*
[7] On Moses cf., most recently, Poznanski, in *Yevreyskaya Enzyklopedya*, *s.v.* (vii. 18 f.), and the literature cited there. It is possible that Elijah b. Abraham's valuable little work on the separation of the Karaites from the Rabbinists (חלוק הקראים והרבנים, ed. in Pinsker, *Likkute Kadmoniot*, pp. 99–106, on which cf. Poznanski, *The Karaite Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon*, p. 73) was also written about this time. Samuel ibn 'Abbās, who became a Muslim convert in 1163, says that most of the Oriental Karaites of his day had embraced Islām, and that all of them were prepared to do so (cf. *MGWJ* xlii. 260); but it is a question whether we can believe him.

[1] Cf. Bacher, *Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimûnis*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 174; Neumann, in the Hungarian *Bloch-Jubelschrift*, Budapest, 1905, pp. 164–170; Friedländer, in *MGWJ* liii. 469 ff.
[2] The greater part of it was printed at Eupatoria in 1835.
[3] Schreiner, *op. cit.* p. 57.
[4] In addition to the writings mentioned, he composed a small grammatical treatise entitled *Ketāl Yefi*, which, however, he left unfinished; it was completed in the 16th cent. by Isaac Tishbi (Constantinople, 1581; Eupatoria, 1847). It was in the time of Aaron that Shemariah Ikriti of Negropont (fl. *c.* 1290–1320) made his attempt to adjust the differences between the Karaites and the Rabbinists (cf. Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, vii.[2] 300 f.).

liturgical poets. It may be remarked here that the Karaites adopted many of their synagogue songs from the Rabbinists, and that in other parts of their liturgy as well they could not evade the influence of the latter. Moreover, in different countries they instituted different ritual forms.[1]

A still more versatile, more fertile, and more learned writer was Aaron b. Elijah or Aaron the Second (born Nicomedia, *c.* 1300; †Constantinople, 1369), who was at once a philosophical theologian, a teacher of the Law, and an exegete, and is designated by his co-religionists 'the Karaite Maimonides.' He expounded his philosophical and theological views in his *'Eṣ ḥa-Ḥayim*,[2] in which he is chiefly concerned to guard the Mu'tazilite *kalām* against the Aristotelian teachings which had found their way into Judaism largely through the writings of Maimonides. A more significant work is his exposition of the religious law, the *Gan Eden*,[3] in which he lays down the principle that belief in the unity and the other attributes of God, as also in His government of the world, is the final aim of the Law. In his commentary to the Pentateuch, *Keter Tôrah*,[4] the influence of Ibn Ezra is clearly traceable.

In the early years of the Turkish domination the Karaites were frequently persecuted by the government; but, as an offset, their relations with the Rabbinists became quite friendly. Mutual forbearance and tolerance helped to bring about this result. Elijah Mizraḥi of Constantinople (*c.* 1455–1525), one of the greatest Rabbinical scholars in Turkey—in opposition to Moses Kapsali, the chief Rabbi of Turkey—allowed the Karaites to be instructed even in oral tradition. Many Karaites sat as scholars at the feet of Enoch Saporta and his pupil Mordecai Komtino, a man of universal culture (middle of the 15th cent.), and received instruction in the Talmud, decisions, and general science.[5] Don Gedaliah, who had come to Constantinople from Lisbon († before 1487), tried, with the acquiescence of the Karaites, to bring about a re-union with the Rabbinists. One of the pupils of Komtino was Elijah b. Moses Bashyazi, the most eminent Karaite scholar of the day, who resided first in Adrianople and then in Constantinople, and whom the Karaites call 'the last Decisor' (המסק האחרון). His most important work is his treatise on the Law, *Adderet Ēliyāhū*, a monument of clear expression and arrangement. He favours, on the whole, the less rigorous application of the Law, and he asserts that the divine commandments require to be fulfilled only in accordance with human capacity. He was a man of the most varied culture, and was, *e.g.*, an eager student of mathematics. He owed much to the writings of Maimonides. He died in 1490, leaving his *Adderet* unfinished; it was continued—though still left incomplete—by his brother-in-law and pupil, Caleb Afendopolo (born 1455; †after 1509). He was a polymath, and his writings embrace treatises on jurisprudence, philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy, to say nothing of his poems, both secular and liturgical—over twenty works in all.[6]

The other Karaite writers of Turkey during this and the following division of the period under consideration (15th–17th cent.) are generally of little importance, being almost wholly wanting in creative power, and they merit no particular notice. An exception should perhaps be made of Moses Bashyazi, a great-grandson of Elijah, and regarded as a youthful prodigy. He knew Arabic, Greek, and Spanish; he travelled widely in the East, where he became acquainted with the writings of the earlier Karaites; he had a leaning towards historical investigation, and wrote a number of works, of which only one, a treatise on incest, has been printed.[1] He died, probably in 1555, at the age of twenty.

The East was at this time the nursery of many other Karaite writers, but for the development of the sect as a whole it had no further significance. We are told that, through the efforts of Abraham Maimūnī II., a great-grandson of Maimonides, a fairly large Karaite community in Egypt was converted to Rabbinist teaching.[2] Cairo was the centre of nearly all the more eminent Karaite writers of the period, viz. Japheth al-Barkamani (probably *c.* the middle of the 13th cent.), author of a medical work in Arabic and a refutation of the Rabbinists;[3] Israel ha-Ma'arabī (first half of 14th cent.), the writer of numerous works in Arabic and Hebrew, including one (originally in Arabic, but translated into Hebrew) treating of regulations for the slaughter of animals (1306; printed, Vienna, 1830), as also of many hymns for use in the synagogue; he was regarded as an authority in marriage law, and was the first to assert that the intercalary cycle of nineteen years was instituted by those who returned from the Exile ('the good figs,' see above);[4] Japheth b. Sagir, a pupil of Israel, and author of a 'Book of Commandments' in Arabic, most of which is extant in MS; Samuel b. Moses al-Maghribī, a physician, and the writer of another 'Book of Commandments' entitled *Kitāb al-Murshid*, which is a model of perspicuity but shows no independence.[5] Of writers not resident in Cairo mention may be made of Ibn al-Hiti (first half of 15th cent.), who wrote a valuable chronicle of Karaite scholars.[6]

4. The Taurido-Lithuanian period (17th and 18th centuries).—Reference was made above to the presence of Karaites in the south of Russia, especially in Taurida (the Crimea), as early as the last third of the 12th century. They increased in number during the 13th century. Towards the close of the 14th cent. the Grand Duke Witold of Lithuania carried away from the Crimea, among other Tatar captives, a number of Karaites, and settled them in Troki, near Wilna, whence they spread to other towns—in Lithuania, Volhynia, and Podolia (now Galicia). The Karaites of the Crimea and Lithuania show at first not a symptom of intellectual life, and the writers whom they are said to have produced at that time are mere fabrications. Towards the end of the 15th cent., however, we hear of a correspondence between the Karaites in Lutsk and Troki and Elijah Bashyazi in Constantinople, who recommended them to send him two pupils.[7] In the Crimea, where under the Tatar sway there was no intellectual life, the Karaites, too, failed to develop one; but in Lithuania, where the Rabbinists founded strong Talmudic schools in the latter half of the 16th cent., they exerted themselves to cultivate the

[1] Cf. L. Zunz, *Die Ritus des synagogalen Gottesdienstes*, Berlin, 1859, pp. 156–162; Jost, *op. cit.* pp. 307–325; G. Margoliouth, *JQR* xviii. [1905–06] 505 ff.; N. Porges, *Zeitschr. für hebr. Bibl.* xi. [1907] 60 ff.; Poznanski, *Die kar. Literatur der letzten dreissig Jahre*, p. 13 ff.

[2] 'The Tree of Life,' written in 1346; ed. F. Delitzsch, Leipzig, 1841, and with a commentary (*Or hā-Ḥayim*), Simḥa Isaac Lutski, Eupatoria, 1847.

[3] Eupatoria, 1866. [4] Eupatoria, 1866–67.

[5] Cf. Gurland, *Ginze Israel*, pt. iii.

[6] Enumerated by Poznanski, in *Oṣar Yisrael, s.v.* (ii. 172); cf. also Steinschneider, in Ersch and Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyklopädie, s.v.* (ii. 32, 118), and in *MGWJ* xxxviii. 76.

[1] ed. Markon, in *Ha-Ḳedem*, iii. [1912] 57–78.

[2] Estori Farḥi, *Kaftor u-Ferah*, ed. Berlin, 1849, ch. 5; cf. Graetz, vii.[2] 305.

[3] Steinschneider, *Die arab. Lit. der Juden*, § 172.

[4] Poznanski, in *Oṣar Yisrael, s.v.* (v. 247).

[5] Many of its sections have appeared in print; cf. Poznanski, *JQR* xvi. [1903–04] 405, xvii. [1904–05] 594, xviii. 560, xx. [1907–08] 631, new ser., ii. [1911–12] 445.

[6] ed. Margoliouth, London, 1897 (cf. Poznanski, *Zeitschr. fur hebr. Bibl.* ii. 78).

[7] Neubauer, *Aus der Petersburger Bibliothek*, p. 60; Harkavy, *Ḥadashim yam yeshanim*, ii. 15.

higher interests. Here about this time arose one very distinguished and interesting writer, viz. Isaac b. Abraham of Troki (1533–94), the author of an unfinished anti-Christian work called *Ḥizzūḳ Emūnā* ('The Confirmation of Faith').[1] The book reveals a wide knowledge of Christian literature; but its author had also engaged in oral discussions with the heads of the Christian Reformers, who were at that time very numerous in Poland. It shows no distinctively Ḳaraite colouring, and the religious beliefs of its writer had to be elicited by literary criticism. Its erudition and its intellectual acumen astounded even Voltaire. It was completed by one of Isaac's pupils, Joseph b. Mordecai Malinovski, himself the author of several works. A brother of this Joseph, Zephaniah by name, wrote, among other works, a treatise on the breadth of the new moon and on the calendar. A contemporary of the brothers was Zerah b. Nathan, who also resided in Troki. The Rabbinic polymath, Joseph Solomon Delmedigo, a native of Candia, was then living in Lithuania as the private physician of Prince Radziwill, and to him the said Zerah appealed for information—first of all in 1620, when he proposed seventy questions, mainly of a mathematical and astronomical nature. Delmedigo responded, to begin with, in an epistle entitled *Iggeret Aḥūz*,[2] which contains also a sketch of the history of Hebrew literature; and subsequently in a series of mathematical writings. Zerah was likewise the author of a long list of liturgical poems.

The dreadful massacres of the Jews at the hands of the Cossacks in 1648-49, and the commotions which followed in Poland, affected the Ḳaraites also, whose destinies here, as generally elsewhere, were closely bound up with those of the Rabbinists. Moreover, the two religious groups were now, as a rule, on good terms with each other. At one of the so-called Synods of the Four Lands endeavours were made to unite the two groups, but were rendered vain by a capricious Rabbi who appealed to a Talmudic calembour.[3]

The example of the Lithuanian Ḳaraites acted as an incentive to those of the Crimea, who sustained a constant intercourse with the former, and, indeed, had already a link of connexion with them in the Tatar language used colloquially by both. The Crimean Khans varied in their attitude towards them; they were often quite friendly, and they entrusted to them the coining of their money. But the Crimean Ḳaraites produced little that could stand beside the intellectual achievements of their northern brethren. In this period their only writer deserving of notice was Elijah b. Baruch Yerushalmi[4] (latter half of 17th cent.; originally from Constantinople), the author of various works; he also transcribed certain writings of the earlier Ḳaraite scholars, principally such as were of an anti-Rabbinic tendency, to which he added bitter invectives of his own. Three Ḳaraites who travelled from the Crimea to Palestine wrote interesting reports of their observations (1641–42, 1651 55, 1785–86), in which they give a varied mass of statistical data.[5] A notable and original writer appears in Abraham b. Josiah Yerushalmi, of Chufut-Kale, whose productions include one entitled *Emūnā Omēn*, dating from 1712 (ed. Eupatoria, 1846), and remarkable for its breadth of outlook, its extensive knowledge of Rabbinical literature, its lenient attitude towards the Rabbinists, and its veneration for Maimonides.

The Ḳaraites of the Crimea, however, poor as are their achievements in this period, are certainly superior to those of the Orient. Of the latter, mention should perhaps be made of Jacob Iskandarānī, the Ḥakam of the Ḳaraites in Cairo, who met the above-named Delmedigo there in 1616; and of the family of Firūz in Damascus, of whom the most eminent was the physician, Daniel b. Moses (fl. 1665–1700).

From the middle of the 17th cent. Christian scholars began to take an interest in the Ḳaraites. Some of them made visits to the centres of the sect, and especially to Troki, and opened a correspondence with its members. Of these Christian scholars we may name Johann Rittangel, who visited Troki in 1641, and Gustav Peringer, a professor in Upsala, who, at the instance of Charles XI. of Sweden, travelled to Lithuania in 1690, and in the following year addressed to Ludolf his *Epistola de Karaitorum rebus in Lithuania*. Reference should also be made to Johann Puffendorf of Riga, Lewin Warner, and his valuable collection of Ḳaraite MSS in Leyden, Jacob Trigland, of Leyden, and his *Diatribe de secta Karæorum* (Delft, 1703), and Johann C. Wolf, of Hamburg, and his *Notitia Karæorum* (Hamburg, 1721). These scholars were instrumental in arousing the historical sense among the Polish Ḳaraites, though it must be confessed that the Ḳaraite historians frequently tamper with the facts, sometimes in ignorance but sometimes of set purpose, and that they represent their sect as being the genuine Jews, and the Rabbinists as the seceders, while they also do great violence to the chronology. The earliest of these Ḳaraite historians were Solomon b. Aaron, of Troki (fl. 1680–1715), and his relative, Mordecai b. Nisan, of Kokizov, near Lemberg (1699). Solomon, in addition to several other works, and numerous liturgical songs in the Hebrew and Tatar languages, wrote, at Puffendorf's request, his *Appirgōn ʻāšā lō*, a short treatise on the severance of the Ḳaraites from the Rabbinists, and the main legal differences between the two parties.[1] Mordecai wrote, in answer to the questions put by Trigland, his *Dōḳ Mōrdᵉḵai*,[2] and also, in response to the inquiry of Charles XII., a short work called *Leḥush Malkūt*.[3] In the composition of his *Dōḳ Mōrdᵉḵai* he had the assistance of his relative, Joseph b. Samuel, known as Joseph ha-Mashbir, who had been a pupil of his father. This Joseph was a native of Lithuania, but removed about 1700 to Halicz in Galicia, and did much for the revival of an intellectual life among the Ḳaraites there, who had been living outside the range of general culture. Of his many works, one in particular, *Pōrāt Yōsēf*, treating of grammar, is highly praised. His descendants were all leading figures among the Ḳaraites of Halicz till well on in the following period.

The most prolific writer of the Taurido-Lithuanian period is Simḥa Isaac b. Moses. He belonged originally to Lutsk, but removed *c.* 1750 to Chufut-Kale in the Crimea, where he died in 1766. He was well versed in the writings of the Rabbinists, and held the Ḳabbālā in high honour. He wrote in all twenty-four works, of which only two have appeared in print,[4] viz. the *Ōr hā-Ḥayyim*, already mentioned as a commentary on the philosophical work of Aaron b. Elijah, and a historical treatise entitled *Ōraḥ Ṣaddiḳim*, in which he gives the Ḳaraite conception of the origin and historical development of Ḳaraism in its most extreme form.

[1] First edited in J. C. Wagenseil, *Tela Ignea Satanæ*, Altdorf, 1681; it was translated into Yiddish, Spanish, German, English, and Hungarian.

[2] ed. in Isaac b. Solomon's *Iggeret Pinnat Yiḳrat*, Eupatoria, 1834, and in A. Geiger's *Melo Ḥofnayim*, Breslau, 1840.

[3] תקראים אינם מתאחים לעולם; cf. *Mo'ed Ḳaṭon*, 25*a*, at the top.

[4] 'Yerushalmi' denotes a Ḳaraite who had made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, and is an imitation of the Arab. Ḥājji.

[5] ed. Gurland, *Ginze Israel*, pt. i.

[1] ed. Neubauer, as an appendix to his *Aus der Petersburger Bibliothek*.

[2] Finished on the 18th of July 1699; ed., with Latin tr., by Wolf in his *Notitia Karæorum*; also Vienna, 1830.

[3] ed. Neubauer, *loc. cit.*

[4] See Poznanski, in *Oṣar Yisrael*, *s.v.* (x. 164).

This work also contains the first bibliography of the sect. Simḥa Isaac's migration to the Crimea was no mere passing event. The Crimea now became the centre of Karaite life, and there, in Chufut-Kale, the first Karaite printing-press was established in 1734. Then came the two political occurrences which served at once to draw the Karaites out of their isolation and to link them together by a common bond, viz. the annexation by Russia of the two districts in which they were most numerous—the Crimea in 1783 and Lithuania in 1702. With these two events begins the final period of Karaite history.

5. The modern period (19th cent.-the present day).—From the outset the Russian Government treated the Karaites with good-will. With this attitude there was associated, no doubt, a tendency to play them off against the Rabbinists, the adherents of the Talmud. The last representative of the Karaites at the court of the Khan in the Crimea, Benjamin b. Samuel Aga († 1824), continued to hold the position under Russian rule, though not officially. In 1795, Catherine II. had relieved them of the double tax imposed upon Jews, and in 1827 they were exempted from military service by Nicholas I. They now enjoy the full rights of Russian citizenship. In 1840 they secured what might be called an internal constitution, according to which a non-spiritual official called the Ḥakam—who represents them publicly—presides over them with the assistance of a supreme spiritual board, controlling the Karaites of the Crimea and the South of Russia. This board has its headquarters in Eupatoria; the first Ḥakam was the influential and energetic Simḥa Bobovitch (1790–1855).

The more eminent Karaite scholars of the first half of the 19th cent. were the following: Isaac b. Solomon (1755–1826), of Chufut-Kale, was the reformer of the Karaite calendar (cf. art. CALENDAR [Jewish], vol. iii. p. 120), his views on that subject being set forth in his *Or ha-Lebāna* (printed at Zhitomir, 1872); he was also the author of a work on the ten Karaite articles of faith, entitled *Iggeret Pinnat Yiḳrat* (Eupatoria, 1834; Zhitomir, 1872), numerous songs for use in the synagogue, etc. Joseph Solomon b. Moses Lutski, surnamed הר"ש (1770–1844), was a native of Kokizov, and lived for a time in Lutsk, whence he removed in 1802 to Eupatoria; his most outstanding work is his supplementary commentary to the *Mibḥār* of Aaron b. Joseph, issued as *Ṭirat Kūsef* (Eupatoria, 1835). David b. Mordecai Kokizov (1777–1855), a great-grandson of Mordecai b. Nisan, was an opponent of the foregoing, and among other works wrote a theological treatise called *Semaḥ Dawid* (St. Petersburg, 1897). Mordecai b. Joseph Sultanski (fl. 1850–70), who had a reflective cast of mind, was the author of various grammatical, historical, and theological works. One of his pupils was the kindly-natured Solomon b. Abraham Beim (b. 1817; † before 1860), Ḥakam in Chufut-Kale and afterwards in Odessa, who was the first to introduce secular subjects into Karaite schools; he wrote a little book on the antiquities of Chufut-Kale (*i.e.* 'the Jewish refuge,' as the place formerly known as Kala'a came to be called).

All these writers, however, were eclipsed by Abraham b. Samuel Firkovitch (b. Lutsk, 1786; † Chufut-Kale, 1874), with whom begins a new epoch not only in Karaite historiography, but also in the investigation of Hebrew history and literature. Firkovitch's literary career began with the composition of supplementary commentaries and additions to Aaron b. Joseph's commentary to the Pentateuch (Eupatoria, 1836),[1] and of a vigorous anti-Rabbinical work named *Massā ū-Meriḇāh* (do. 1838), which is written in rhyme and arranged in the order of the Ten Commandments, after the manner of the *Eshkōl ha-Kōfer* of Hadassi described above. At the instance of the above-mentioned Ḥakam, Bobovitch, he made repeated journeys, from 1839 onwards, to Caucasia, Egypt, Palestine, and other countries, with the object of discovering archæological materials which might serve to demonstrate the early origin of the Karaites. It seemed at first sight as if he had perfectly succeeded in his purpose. Both in the Crimea and elsewhere he discovered epigraphs in Torah rolls and other writings, tombstones, and the like, in which the most remarkable data were treasured up. These memorials included the famous inscription of Judah b. Moses ha-Nakdān, dating from A.D. 604, and that of Abraham b. Simḥa, from A.D. 906; the tombstones of Isaac Sangari, who is said to have converted the king of the Chazars to Judaism, and Shabbathai Donnolo, a Jewish scholar of Southern Italy in the 10th cent., etc. Firkovitch contended that these various discoveries sufficed to prove that there were Jews in the Crimea as early as the 6th cent. B.C., having migrated thither in the reign of Cambyses, king of Persia; that the Karaites had persuaded the Chazars to embrace Judaism, and were the founders of the Massora, of Hebrew grammar, of the Biblical sciences, etc. Incredible as some of these inferences must appear, they were nevertheless believed, and were even incorporated in histories of the Jews. Firkovitch's results were accepted, in particular, by a number of eminent Jewish scholars—Pinsker, Fürst, Graetz, and Chwolson. Literary criticism, however, soon entered its protest, and pointed to various clumsy forgeries; we need only recall the strictures of Rapoport, Schorr, Steinschneider, Geiger (who vacillated, however), Neubauer, Strack, P. F. Frankl, and, above all, Harkavy, who showed that the above-mentioned data could not possibly serve as historical evidence. Firkovitch, two years before his death, summed up the result of his discoveries in a work entitled *Abne Zikkārōn* (Wilna, 1872), in which the epigraphs in question are reproduced. His finds were often assailed by mere hypercriticism, and facts and dates were rejected which in many cases proved to be quite reliable, as was the case, *e.g.*, with regard to the existence of many ancient Karaite scholars and their works. An attempt to defend the genuineness of the suspected tombstones was recently made by a living Karaite writer;[1] and the final solution of many of the problems involved must be left to the future.[2] When all is said, however, the work done by Firkovitch was of an eminently serviceable kind. On his journeys, besides the inscriptions referred to, he discovered, and thus restored to science, numerous Rabbinical and Karaite books that had been regarded as lost. He was also instrumental in creating an interest in the scientific investigation of Karaism, and to some extent supplied the materials for it.

The death of Firkovitch ushers in a period of complete decadence among the Karaites. Since that time they have produced not one single scholar of repute, but at best a few litterateurs, as, *e.g.*, Samuel Pigit (1849–1911), Ḥakam in Ekaterinoslav, who published a volume of sermons, etc., bearing the title *Iggeret Nidhē Shemu'ēl* (St. Petersburg, 1894), and a collection of Tatar popular

[1] In the thirties of last century there was formed in the Crimea an association for the publication of earlier Karaite works that still remained unprinted or had become rare, and Firkovitch was one of the most zealous supporters of its efforts. To this society we owe a considerable number of valuable printed edd. of Karaite works (cf. Geiger, *Judische Zeitschrift*, xi. 144 ff.).

[1] Judah Kokizov, *44 grobnych nadpisiey*, St. Petersburg, 1910.

[2] Cf. Dubnow, in *Yevreyskaya Starina* for 1914, p. 1 ff.

tales, *Dabār Dabūr* (Warsaw, 1904); Elijah Kazaz (1832–1912), a man of wide and varied culture, who, *inter alia*, translated the works of several French popular philosophers into Hebrew;[1] and the Judah Kokizov just mentioned, who, however, usually writes in Russian. Among the Karaites, indeed, the Russian language has gradually dispossessed the Tatarie.

In 1911 a number of Karaite students at the University of Moscow tried to initiate what might be termed a Neo-Karaite movement, and founded a Karaite monthly in the Russian language and bearing the title *Karaimskaya Zhizn*, which, though it displayed great vigour, did not survive its first year.[2] A further evidence of the spiritual impoverishment of the Karaites is the fact that since the death of their last Ḥakam, Samuel Pampulo († 31st Dec. 1911), they have failed to find an eligible successor, and are thus in a most critical situation.[3] In 1897 the Karaites in Russia numbered 12,894—6372 males and 6522 females (cf. the same periodical, June 1911, p. 30); and it seems unlikely that during the last seventeen years this total has appreciably increased, if indeed it has increased at all, as in 1909 there were but seven additions (*ib.* March–April 1912), and in 1910 only four (*ib.* June 1911, p. 39). Outside Russia, the sect may perhaps number some 2000 souls in all, living in Halicz (in Galicia), Constantinople, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Hit on the Euphrates; its one community of any size is that of Cairo. The future of Karaism—the only Jewish sect in the proper sense of the term—is thus a rather gloomy one. Its vital element all through was polemics, and this was finally exhausted by the death of its last great champion, Abraham Firkovitch.

LITERATURE.—i. *HISTORICAL AND GENERAL.*—The first really scientific account of the Karaites is **I. M. Jost**, *Geschichte des Judenthums und seiner Sekten*, Leipzig, 1857–59, ii. 294 381; materials for a history of the sect are given by **S. Pinsker**, *Likḳuṭe Ḳadmoniot*, Vienna, 1860, in which, however, the writer too uncritically follows Firkovitch (cf. the notes and [illegible] Poznanski, pp. [illegible]; **A. Geiger**, *Geschichte der Juden*, Leipzig, 1853–70, v. ff. (see the indexes, *s.v.* 'Karaer'), and **J. Fürst**, *Geschichte des Karäerthums*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1862–69, likewise follow Firkovitch, they are of little use, and the latter especially must be read with the utmost caution; of a more critical stamp are **A. B. Gottlober**, *Bikḳoret le-Toledot ha-Ḳara'im* (Heb.), Wilna, 1865; **A. Neubauer**, *Aus der Petersburger Bibliothek*, Leipzig, 1866, and **I. H. Weiss**, *Zur Geschichte der jüdischen Tradition* (Heb.), iv., Vienna, 1887, pp. 46–110. The work of the Karaite **Isaac Sināni**, *Istoriya vozniknovsheniya i razvitiya Karaimizma* (Russ.), 2 vols., 1888–89, is written from the Karaite point of view, but quite unserviceable. The artt. *s.v.* by **P. F. Frankl**, in Ersch and Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyklopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste*, Leipzig, 1818 ff.; **A. Harkavy**, in *JE*; **Harkavy, Balaban**, and **Hessen**, in *Yevreyskaya Enzyklopedya* (Russ.), 16 vols., St. Petersburg, 1908–14, and **Revel**, in *Ogar Yisrael* (Heb.), 10 vols., New York, 1907–13, are comprehensive and are written in view of modern scientific requirements; **B. Ryssel**, in *PRE*³, is less reliable.

ii. *MSS.*—The richest collections of Karaite MSS are found in Leyden, St. Petersburg, and the British Museum. An account of the Leyden MSS is given by **Steinschneider**, *Catalogus Codicum Hebræorum Bibliothecæ Academiæ Lugduno-Batavæ*, Leyden, 1858 (includes also a repertorium of the history of [illegible] 305, ii. 155). Certain less extensive collections are described by **J. Bardach**, *Mazkir libne Reshef* (Heb.), Vienna, 1869; **E. N. Adler**, *About Hebrew MSS*, London, 1905, pp. 17–33 (cf. Poznanski, *ZDMG* lx. [1906] 698), and **P. Kokowzow**, *Notitia Codicum Hebraicorum*, etc., St. Petersburg, 1905 (cf. Poznanski, *Zeitschr. für hebr. Bibl.* x. [1906] 25).

iii. *'ANAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE MOVEMENT.*—**Harkavy**, *Istoricheskiye Ocherki Karaimstva* (Russ.), 2 pts., 1897–1902, 'Zur Entstehung des Karaismus,' in Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, v.⁴, Leipzig, 1909, pp. 472–489, 'Anan,' in *Jahrbuch für jüdische Geschichte und Literatur*, ii. [Berlin, 1899] 107–122, 'Anan ben David,' in *JE* i. 553 ff.; **Poznanski**, 'Anan et ses écrits,' *REJ* xliv. 161–187, xlv. 50–69, 176–203.

iv. *WORKS DEALING WITH OTHER EMINENT KARAITES.*—These have in most cases been cited in the course of the article; cf., further, the relevant artt. by **Poznanski** in the Heb. Encyclopædia, *Ogar Yisrael* (אוצר ישראל), and in the Judæo-Russian Encyclopædia, *Yevreyskaya Enzyklopedya*. On the Karaites who wrote in Arabic see the corresponding artt. in Steinschneider, *Die arabische Literatur der Juden*, Frankfort a. M., 1902 (cf. Poznanski, *Zur jüdisch-arabische Litteratur*, Berlin, 1904). On Kirḳisāni see **Poznanski**, in *Steinschneider's Festschrift*, Leipzig, 1896, pp. 195–218, and *Semitic Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. A. Kohut*, ed. G. A. Kohut, Berlin, 1897, p. 435 ff.; on Joshua b. Judah, **M. Schreiner**, 'Studien über Jeschua b. Jehuda,' in *Bericht der Lehranstalt für die Wiss. des Judentums zu Berlin*, xviii. [1900]; on Hadassi, **Frankl**, in *MGWJ* xxxi. [1882] 1 ff., **W. Bacher**, *ib.* xl. [1891] 14 ff., and *JQR* viii. [1895–96] 431 ff.; on Isaac b. Abraham of Troki, **Geiger**, *Isaak Troki*, Breslau, 1853; on Firūz, **Poznanski**, *Die karaïtische Familie Firuz*, 1913; on Abraham b. Josiah of Chufut-Kale, **Poznanski**, הקראי אברהם בן יאשיהו ירושל מי; on the Karaite philosophers, **S. Munk**, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, Paris, 1857–59, p. 474 ff. (obsolete), and **Steinschneider**, *Die hebräischen Uebersetzungen des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1893, p. 449 ff.; on the poets of the Karaite synagogue, Luzzatto, in A. Berliner and D. Hoffmann, *Oṣar Ṭob*, 1883, pp. 27 32, 1884, pp. 3–6; on the Greek writings of the Karaites, **Danon**, in *Actes du xvie Congrès international des Orientalistes*, 1912, p. 170; on their Tatar language, **K. Foy**, in *Mitteilungen aus dem Seminar für orientalische Sprachen*, i. [Berlin, 1898]; and **J. Grzegorzewski**, *Ein turktatarischer Dialekt in Galizien*, Vienna, 1903; on their Tatar literature, **Poznanski**, in *Keleti Szemele* (*Revue Orientale*), xiii. 37–47, 360, xiv. 233 f.; on the Karaites in Galicia, **Balaban**, in *Yevreyskaya Starina*, iv. [1911] 117–121, and **Fahn**, in *Ha-Ḳedem*, iii. [1912] 160–173. The special privileges granted to the sect in Russia are tabulated in **Z. Firkovitch**, *Sbornik*, etc. (Russ.), St. Petersburg, 1890.

v. *FIRKOVITCH.*—There is a voluminous literature on Firkovitch and his discoveries. Only a selection can be given: **S. L. Rapoport**, in *Kerem Ḥemed*, v. 197 ff., and in *Ha-Meliz*, i. [1860] 227, 256; **D. Chwolson**, *Achtzehn hebräische Grabschriften aus der Krim*, St. Petersburg, 1865; **Geiger**, in *Jüdische Zeitschrift*, xi. [1875] 142–157; **A. Jellinek**, *Abraham Firkowitsch*, Vienna, 1875; **Harkavy** and **H. L. Strack**, *Catalog der hebraischen Bibelhandschriften . . . in Petersburg*, St. Petersburg and Leipzig, 1875 (cf. **Riehm**, in *ZDMG* xxx. [1876] 336–343, and **Frankl**, in *MGWJ* xxv. [1876] 418 ff.); **Strack**, *A. Firkowitsch und seine Entdeckungen*, Leipzig, 1876; **Harkavy**, *Altjüdische Denkmäler aus der Krim*, St. Petersburg, 1876; **Frankl**, 'Karäische Studien,' *MGWJ* xxv. 54 ff., and in *Ha-Shaḥar*, ed. Smolensky, vii., viii.; **Deinard**, תולדות אבן ראשי, Warsaw, 1875, and משא קרים, do. 1878 (written with considerable bias).

vi. *RECENT LITERATURE AND PUBLISHED TEXTS.*—On Karaite literature since Firkovitch's time see **Poznanski**, *Die karäische Literatur der letzten dreissig Jahre* (1878–1908), Frankfort a. M., 1910. Karaite texts have been edited by Bacher, Bargès, J. Gurland, Harkavy, H. Hirschfeld, D. S. Margoliouth, G. Margoliouth, Markon, Neubauer, Pinsker, Poznanski, Schreiner, and many others.

SAMUEL POZNANSKI.

London, 1889, and **G. Margoliouth**, *Catalogue of the Hebrew and Samaritan MSS in the British Museum*, i. [do. 1899] 189–271, ii. [1905] 172–196, 450–478 (notice by Poznanski, *REJ* xli.

[1] Cf. Poznanski, *REJ* lviii. 315.

[2] An earlier Karaite journal was *al-Tahdīb*, a bi-weekly in Arabic, published in Cairo; it lived from the 12th of August 1901 to 1905 (cf. R. J. H. Gottheil, in *Harkavy Festschrift*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 120).

[3] Another typical indication of the present condition of the sect appears in the fact that, when a Karaite synod in Eupatoria adopted a mitigation of the marriage law in November 1910, protests against it were at once forwarded from Troki, Constantinople, and Cairo (cf. Poznanski, *JQR*, new ser., ii. 449, note 3).

KARĀ-LIṄGĪS.—A class of wandering Indian ascetics. The name is derived from Skr. *kaṭaka*, 'a ring,' and *liṅga*, the male organ. They claim to be worshippers of Śiva, and are also called Sewaras (possibly a corruption of the Skr. *śabara*, the name of a wild mountain tribe, also used as a title of Śiva). They generally go about in troops, with matted hair and red-ochre-coloured garments, but are sometimes solitary and stark naked. To mark their triumph over sensual desires, they affix an iron ring and chain to the male organ, which they also mutilate. They extort money by pretended miracles, such as wringing Ganges water out of their dry matted hair. Khewaras, a sub-variety of Sewaras, carry skulls. One of their tricks is to turn spirituous liquor into milk, and then to drink it; another is to rub their hands together till wheat or other grain issues from them. The name is a fanciful one, derived from 'Sewara.' The writer once met a Karā-liṅgī in Lower Bengal who had his private parts locked up in a kind of

cage. This could never be opened, except with the consent of the head of his order, who kept the key.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, p. 236; G. A. Grierson, tr. of the *Padumāwati of Malik Muḥammad Jāisī*, Calcutta, 1896, p. 17.

G. A. GRIERSON.

KARAMNĀSĀ, KARMNĀSĀ (Skr. *Karmanāśa*, 'that which destroys the merit of works').—The accursed river of Hindu mythology, which rises in the Kaimūr hills, Bengal; lat. 24° 32′ N., long. 83° 26′ E.; forming in part of its course the boundary between the provinces of Bengal and the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and finally, after a course of about 146 miles, joining the Ganges. It has been identified with the Κομμερδάης of Megasthenes (J. W. McCrindle, *Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian*, Calcutta, 1877, p. 186 ff.). On the borders of the District of Mirzapur it hurls itself over a sandstone precipice, forming, under the name of Chhānpatthar, 'the stone-sifter,' one of the finest waterfalls in India.

In Hindu mythology the stream is connected with the legend of Satyavrata or Triśaṅku, a prince of the solar race and king of Ayodhyā. He aspired to perform a sacrifice by which, in his mortal body, he might ascend to heaven. He requested the sage Vasiṣṭha to officiate for him in this rite. On his appeal being refused, he invoked the aid of the hundred sons of the sage, by whom he was cursed and degraded to the status of a Chāṇḍāla, or out-caste. In this extremity he had recourse to a rival sage, Viśvāmitra, who undertook the sacrifice, and invited the presence of all the gods. They refused to appear, and Viśvāmitra, by his own magic-working powers, transported Triśaṅku to the skies, whence, on his arrival, he was hurled down head-foremost to earth by the enraged deities. But Viśvāmitra arrested his downward course, and he remained suspended between heaven and earth, and formed a constellation in the S. hemisphere. Another tale describes him as a wicked prince, guilty of the three heinous sins (*tri-śaṅku*); and in its modern form the story states that the river is formed by the saliva which drops from his lips as he hangs suspended in the air. The tale seems to represent some ancient conflict of rival cults, represented by the contest between the sages Vasiṣṭha and Viśvāmitra (J. Muir, *Orig. Skr. Texts*, pt. i.², 1872, p. 371 ff.). It may have been attached to this river because, as in other parts of India, the stream may have formed an ethnical or endogamous boundary. It may have marked at an early period the furthest point of the eastern advance of the Aryan-speaking races, as in later days it formed the boundary of the kingdom of Magadha.

Whatever may be the origin of the legend, the river maintains its evil reputation to the present day. Though its water flows clear as crystal, no orthodox Hindu dares to bathe in it or drink from it. In olden days, pilgrims employed the services of men of low caste, who supposed themselves safe from contamination, to convey them on their backs across the ill-omened water. Even the ferrymen, when the river was in flood during the rainy season, were implored by their passengers not to splash up the water with their oars. To obviate the risks to which pilgrims were thus exposed, the famous Rānī Ahalyā Bāī of Indor attempted to bridge it; but she failed, and the work was finally accomplished by a wealthy banker of Benares, Rājā Patnī Mal. This bridge and another on the E. Indian Railway now secure safe transit for orthodox Hindus.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, London, 1864-77, iii. 284-287; F. Buchanan, in M. Martin, *Eastern India*, do. 1838, i. 309 ff.; J. Dowson, *Classical Dictionary*, do. 1879, p. 288 ff.; Bholanauth Chunder, *Travels of a Hindoo*, do. 1869, i. 234 f.; *Memoirs of Baber*, tr. J. Leyden and W. Erskine, do. 1826, p. 408; *Ain-i-Akbari*, tr. H. Blochmann and H. S. Jarrett, Calcutta, 1873-94, ii. 151; *IGI* xv. [1908] 21.

W. CROOKE.

KARĀRĪS.—A sect of Indian Śāktas (*q.v.*). The origin of the name is unknown. It may be an Indianized form of the Persian *qarārī*, 'firm,' 'established,' in the sense of 'stanch,' or a derivative of the Skr. *karāla*, 'terrific,' the Karārīs being worshippers of Devī in her terrific form. According to Wilson, they are the modern representatives of the Aghoraghaṇṭas and Kāpālikas, who in former times sacrificed human beings to Kālī, Chāmuṇḍa, Chhinnamastakā, and other hideous personifications of the *śakti* of Siva. The modern Karārīs inflict upon themselves bodily tortures, piercing the flesh with hooks or spits, running sharp-pointed instruments through the tongue and cheeks, gashing themselves with knives, or lying upon beds with sharp-pointed spikes. This is usually done to extort money rather than for devotion.

LITERATURE.—For the general question of this self-inflicted torture see J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, ed. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906, p. 597 ff. For the Karārīs see H. H. Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, i. 264, and K. Raghunāthji, in *IA* x. [1881] 73.

G. A. GRIERSON.

KARENS.—See BURMA.

KĀRLĒ, KĀRLĪ (also known as Vihārgānv, 'temple-village').—A place on the road from Bombay to Poona; lat. 18° 45′ N., long. 73° 29′ E.; famous as the site of important Buddhist caves, excavated a little before the Christian era.

'It is the largest as well as the most complete *chaitya* cave hitherto discovered in India, and was excavated at a time when the style was in its greatest purity. In it all the architectural defects of the previous examples are removed; the pillars of the nave are quite perpendicular. The screen is ornamented with sculpture—its first appearance apparently in such a position—and the style had reached a perfection never afterwards surpassed' (J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Arch.*², i. 142).

The building resembles, to a very great extent, an early Christian church in its arrangement, consisting of a nave and side-aisles, terminating in an apse or semi-dome, round which the aisle is carried. Its arrangement and dimensions are similar to those of the choir of Norwich Cathedral, or of the Abbaye aux Hommes at Caen, omitting the outer aisles in the latter building.

'Of the interior we can judge perfectly, and it certainly is as solemn and grand as any interior can well be, and the mode of lighting the most perfect—one undivided volume of light coming through a single opening overhead at a very favourable angle, and falling directly on the *dāgaba* or principal object in the building, leaving the rest in comparative obscurity. The effect is considerably heightened by the closely-set thick columns that divide the three aisles from one another, as they suffice to prevent the boundary walls from ever being seen; and as there are no openings in the walls, the view between the pillars is practically unlimited' (*ib.* i. 147 f.).

Immediately under the semi-dome of the apse is a great *dāgaba*, or relic-shrine, which originally was probably painted and decorated, or adorned with hangings. This is surmounted by a *tee* (Burmese *h'ti*) with the remains of a wooden umbrella which originally overhung it. The cave is entered from three doorways under a gallery like our roodlofts, forming one great window through which light is admitted to the interior. Near the great cave is a Hindu shrine dedicated to Ekvīrā, the goddess of the Kolī tribe, which is probably older than the Buddhist excavations.

LITERATURE.—J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Arch.*², London, 1910; Fergusson-Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, do. 1880; L. Rousselet, *India and its Native Princes*, do. 1882, p. 64 ff., with illustrations; *Bti* xviii. [1886] pt. iii. p. 454 ff.; *IGI* xv. [1908] 44 ff.

W. CROOKE.

KARMA.—**1. Importance of doctrine.**—The Indian solution of the great riddle of the origin of suffering and the diversity of human conditions is to be found in the word *karma*, which, through the theosophists, has become familiar to European ears. Hindus believe that souls have been transmigrating from the beginning; they practically hold that the wellbeing or the suffering of everybody is only the result of former acts (*karma*). This solution of the great riddle is not altogether satisfactory, as we get no answer concerning the 'very beginning'; but it is a happy one, eminently moral, and to a large extent a true one.

The doctrine of *karma*, *i.e.* acts and their retribution, is of great antiquity in India. It gradually broke away from Vedic naturalism, mysticism, and piety.

'Karma struck hard against the old belief in sacrifice, penance, and repentance as destroyers of sin' (E. W. Hopkins, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 583).

It became formulated at an early stage in definite terms:

'As a man himself sows, so he himself reaps; no man inherits the good or evil act of another man. The fruit is of the same quality with the action, and, good or bad, there is no destruction of the action' (*ib.* p. 581).

This doctrine might be called the essential element, not only of all moral theories in India, but also of popular belief. If a person is born deformed or unhealthy, it must be—so people say—because of sins committed in his former life. It is in Buddhism, however, that the doctrine of *karma* reaches its climax and assumes a unique character. Elsewhere it meets with correctives; there are counteractions to human acts; but in Buddhism it may be said that *karma* explains everything, or ought to.

2. Ego and karma.—Other Indian philosophies admit the existence of a self-existent soul or an ego. In Buddhist philosophy the ego is merely a collection of various elements constantly renewed, which are combined into a pseudo-personality only as the result of action. It has, therefore, been asserted that Buddhism does not admit transmigration: when a being dies, a new being is born and inherits his *karma*; what transmigrates is not a person, but his *karma*. This explanation is justified by some texts;[1] but it would be more exact to put the matter in a different way: an existence is a section of the existence of a certain soul—or, to use Buddhist terms, of a 'series' composed of thoughts, sensations, volition, and material elements. This series never had a beginning. It has to 'eat' the fruits of a certain number of acts under certain conditions, and the experience of these acts constitutes an existence (see DEATH [Buddhist]). When this existence comes to an end, there are still some acts to be 'eaten,' both new and old. The series, therefore, passes into another existence, and lives a new section of life, under new conditions. It cannot be said that acts are the sole material cause of this re-incarnation; for the physical elements of the new being, blood and seed, are not intelligent; *karma* (the possibilities of retribution called *karma*) is not intelligent; while the new being is intelligent from the embryo. It is the 'series' as a whole, with all its moral and material elements, that is incarnated. If the series does not dissolve at death, if it becomes re-incarnate, it is because its acts must entail retribution. The new being is what its acts have made it: all the pleasant and unpleasant experiences to which it will have to submit are simply the retribution of acts. In fact, there is no agent (*kartar*); there is nothing but the act and its fruit; organs, thoughts, and external things are all the fruit of acts, in the same way as pleasant and unpleasant sensations.

3. Karma and destiny.—Over and above human energy and free will Brāhmanism placed destiny (*daiva*, from *deva*, 'god'). To Buddhists destiny is merely 'past acts.' The earlier Indian belief was that the world was re-created by Brahmā at the end of each period of chaos. Buddhists hold that the whole universe, with all its variety, is the work of acts. But by 'acts' we must here understand the combined mass of the acts of all beings; *e.g.*, at the beginning of the re-creation of the world there rise in the vast void of the universe 'winds born of acts,' which heap up the clouds from which the creative rain will pour, and so on (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Buddhist]).

4. Nature of karma.—'Act' was variously interpreted by the Indian philosophers. The early thinkers attributed an importance to liturgical action and penance which Buddhists contest or even deny. For them an act is essentially action that can be morally qualified. It is (1) volition (*chetanā*), mental or spiritual act (*mānasa*), and (2) what is born of volition, what is done by volition, what a person does after having willed, *i.e.* bodily or vocal act. Mental acts are acts *par excellence*, inasmuch as there is no act without mental action. We are what we think; we are what we will.[1] No act is imputable, or, in Buddhist terminology, accumulated (*upachita*), put in reserve for future retribution, unless it is intentional, deliberate, accomplished, and free from regret and antidote (remorse, confession, etc.). *Chetanā*, being mental, leaves traces (*vāsanās*) in the 'series of thoughts' (*vijñānasantāna*); this is the explanation of retribution. In certain cases the act of thought is the most potent act; the anger of a *ṛṣi*, *e.g.*, can depopulate a whole region. But the mental act is not the only act; and, as a rule, 'what one does after having willed' is more important than the willing. To kill an enemy is more efficacious and more serious than to wish to kill him. Hence the importance of physical and spoken acts. Physical and spoken acts make something known (*vijñapayati*), for speech and gesture are significant; they are, therefore, named *vijñapti*; but the Buddhist school admits that they create *avijñapti*. By *avijñapti* we must understand a thing of particular nature, derived from the four great material elements, earth, water, etc., but subtle. Once produced by a conscious and voluntary vocal or bodily act, it exists and develops of its own accord, without the agency of thought, unconsciously, whether a man is sleeping, waking, or absorbed in contemplation. It is part of the series that takes the place of the soul in Buddhism.

5. Saṁvara and asaṁvara.—Here we must notice the important tenet of *saṁvara*, moral restraint, and its opposite, *asaṁvara*. The man who, in accordance with the established rules of the community, undertakes to keep the Buddhist vows, or simply the five rules 'not to kill,' 'not to steal,' etc., creates by this solemn declaration (*vijñapti*) an *avijñapti* of particular virtue. This *avijñapti* constitutes what might be compared—roughly, of course—to the merit attaching to religious vows in Christian theology. The merit of the man who has declared (*vijñapayati*) his intention of keeping the vows goes on increasing. Every abstention from murder, theft, etc., is reckoned a merit to him, though, as a rule, it is no special merit to the ordinary man to abstain from those crimes. The *saṁvara* constituted by the acceptance of rules continues to exist until the rules are categorically renounced—until an act is committed which is in direct opposition to them.

The man who, on the other hand, devotes himself professionally to a certain sin—the murderer, butcher, judge, or king—lives in *asaṁvara*, and is vowed to perdition.

6. Pure and impure karma.—There are two kinds of acts: acts free from *āsravas*, or pure acts, and acts accompanied by *āsravas*, or impure acts. The meaning of *āsrava* is not quite certain ('deadly floods' [according to Rhys Davids]; 'discharge, matter, pus' [Childers]), but it is right to say that it has something to do with desire and ignorance: 'pure' means free from passion (*kleśa*). Being free from desire and ignorance, pure acts have no retribution; they do not contribute to existence; they are, by their nature, the destroyer of existence; they prepare the way to *nirvāṇa*. Such are the 'volitions' by which one gets rid of human and transitory interests to contemplate and

[1] The present writer has recently found one text with this meaning, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, iii. 24; but see *ib.* iii. 11 f.

[1] In this the Buddhists differ from the Jains, who do not recognize mental acts.

meditate upon the four 'noble truths' by which one enters into the path of Arhatship.

All other acts are impure, and are further distinguished as good or bad, merit or demerit. The principle of distinction seems to be retribution: the act with pleasant retribution is good; that with unpleasant retribution is bad. It may also be said that acts performed with a view to happiness in this world are bad; acts performed with a view to happiness in the world beyond are good. We sometimes meet with the noteworthy statement that good and bad actions (*sucharita* and *duścharita*) are characterized by their intention for the good or harm of others.

7. Roots of karma.—The good act (*kuśala*) has three roots: the absence of lust (*alobha*), of hatred (*adveṣa*), and of error (*amoha*). All bad acts are in contradiction to good acts; but false doctrine alone (*mithyādṛṣṭi*)—'denial of good and bad, of fruit, of salvation'—cuts the 'roots of the good act.' It must, however, be strong-strong (there are nine categories: weak-weak, weak-medium, weak-strong, etc.). Only men can cut the root; gods cannot, because they know the retribution of acts; women cannot, according to some teachers, owing to their instability of mind. In order to cut the root, a man must be an 'intellectual' (*dṛṣṭicharita*), a being capable of a strong determination to sin; this excludes 'passionate men' (*tṛṣṇācharita*), eunuchs, the damned, and animals. The roots are restored by doubt as to the existence of good and evil, and by recovery of belief in good and evil.

8. Classifications of karma.—Acts are distinguished as of three kinds: good (*kuśala*), bad (*akuśala*), and indifferent (*avyākṛta*), *i.e.* beneficial, pernicious, and neither the one nor the other; *i.e.* acts protecting from suffering either temporarily (by assuring a happy lot) or finally (leading to *nirvāṇa*), acts followed by unpleasant retribution, and acts different from both of these—not to be 'enjoyed' pleasantly or painfully.

Acts may also be classified as meritorious (*puṇya*), demeritorious (*apuṇya*), and fixed (*āniñjya*). The good act of the sphere of desire, *i.e.* bearing fruits which will be well rewarded in the sphere of desire (*Kāmadhātu*; see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Buddhist]), is called meritorious; when it attaches itself to a higher sphere, it is called 'fixed.' As a matter of fact, the retribution of a good act in the sphere of desire is not absolutely determined: an action which ought to have a retribution of force, beauty, and so on, may in fact be enjoyed in a divine, human, or animal birth. This is not the case with the good act to be rewarded in the higher spheres; here an act never gets retribution in one stage instead of in another. The demeritorious act is the bad act. The act which is a final protection from suffering, *i.e.* which leads to *nirvāṇa*, is good (*kuśala*), since it is 'pure,' but not meritorious (*puṇya*).

9. Retribution (*vipāka*).—The fruit of retribution of acts includes not only the sensation, but also everything that determines the sensation—organs, etc. The three kinds of acts produce agreeable sensation (*sukhavedanīya*), disagreeable sensation, and indifferent sensation. The first two are easily understood; the proper sphere of retribution for the third is the fourth ecstasy; but it is also believed that the indifferent act produces the vital organ, etc., and other data hedonistically neutral. It is regarded as good, but not intense.

Acts may be (*a*) determinate (*niyata*), and (*b*) indeterminate (*aniyata*)—*i.e.*, they involve or do not involve a necessary retribution.

(*a*) Five kinds of acts are called *ānantaryas*, 'immediate,' because their retribution (hell) cannot be interrupted by an act allowing of fruit in another existence: matricide, patricide, murder of an Arhat, schism, and malicious wounding of a Buddha. Mother and father are benefactors in an eminent degree; the Arhat, the community, and the Buddha are 'fields of qualities.' To kill one's father in the endeavour to kill flies is not *ānantarya*; but to kill an Arhat without knowing that he is an Arhat is *ānantarya*, because the intent to murder is determined: 'I shall kill some one.'

Acts said to be 'similar to *ānantaryas*,' and necessarily entailing hell, are violation of a mother who is an Arhatī, murder of a Bodhisattva, murder of a saint of the *śaikṣa* class, theft from the community, and destruction of a *stūpa*.

(*b*) The retribution of all other acts may be arrested (1) by the acquisition of the spiritual stage called 'patience' (*kṣānti*), which brings one past the stage of retribution of acts leading to evil destiny, just as a man may escape his creditors by emigrating; (2) by the acquisition of the quality of the saint 'who never returns' (*anāgāmin*); one passes beyond the sphere of desire; only those acts bear fruit which must bear fruit in this present existence; (3) by the acquisition of Arhatship; all *karma* is destroyed, with the reservation already noted. When, by so-called 'worldly' perfection (*laukika*), *i.e.* not properly Buddhist, a man obtains birth into the higher spheres and detachment from all affection for the sphere of desire, the retribution of acts to be rewarded in the sphere of desire is suspended, since the lower sphere cannot be finally abandoned except by the 'noble path.'

Good acts of the body, voice, and thought are purification; they arrest, either temporarily or finally, soiling by the passions of bad acts.

A distinction is also drawn between (1) the act felt in the same life in which it is accomplished; (2) the act felt in the following life; and (3) the act felt later.

10. Projection of karma.—An existence is 'projected,' or caused, by an act; but a number of acts combine to condition an existence, and hence the variety of human fortune. Here the theory of the white-black act applies.

Every bad act is black; the act that is good in relation to the higher spheres is white; the act that is good in relation to the sphere of desire is white-black, because, being always weak, it is always mixed with evil. It is good in itself, but co-exists in the 'series' (soul) along with bad acts.

A human existence cannot be projected except by a good act. But, supposing this existence follows an infernal existence, the latter has been projected, in the course of the existence preceding it, by a bad act 'to be punished in a following existence'; the former has been projected, in the course of the same preceding existence, by a good act 'to be rewarded in an existence following the following.' In a human existence following upon an infernal existence, a man may have a short life, or may suffer scarcity of food and property, or may wed an unfaithful wife, etc. All these misfortunes are the fruit of the stream (*niṣyanda*) of murder, theft, adultery, etc., which have had infernal existence as their fruit of retribution (*vipāka*).

A man causes suffering to the living being whom he kills, therefore he must suffer in hell (*vipāka*); he makes him die, therefore he must himself die soon (*niṣyanda*).

Acts have also a fruit of a general kind. Towards the end of the little cosmic period (*antarakalpa*; see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Buddhist]), plants etiolate, are crushed by stones and rain, and bear little fruit; this is the result of a superabundance of murder, theft, etc.—the fruit of *karma* as sovereign (*adhipati*). The creation of the universe is the result of the acts of all beings

together; the hells are created by the acts that require to be punished in hell, and so on.

II. Paths of karma.—Among good and bad acts ten paths of acts (*karmapatha*) are distinguished because of their gravity: (*a*) for the body: murder, theft, and forbidden love; (*b*) for the voice: lying, slander, insolence, and 'unprofitable conversation' (stultiloquium, etc.); (*c*) for the spirit: covetousness, malice, and false doctrine. Their opposites are abstention from murder, etc.

False doctrine (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) is the denial of good and evil, of retribution and salvation. It is bad because it is the principle of the will to hurt others.

The first seven, from murder to 'stultiloquium,' are physical and spoken acts (*karma*), and paths of acts (*karmapatha*), *i.e.* paths of mental action, *i.e.* volition (*chetanā*); the last three, covetousness, malice, and false doctrine, are not acts, but simply paths of volition. Confusion of passions (*kleśas*) with acts must be avoided.

We must further distinguish in an act the preparation, the act proper, and the 'back' (*pṛṣṭha*)—*e.g.*, all the preparation for the murder of an animal by the butcher (the going to the market to buy the beast, etc.), the actual death-dealing blow, and the cutting up and selling of the meat. The act proper alone constitutes the 'path of act'; and hence important consequences arise from the point of view of responsibility.

It is also to be noted that the 'path of act' presupposes accurate knowledge of what one is doing, and is incompatible with a mistake in the person. When one is in doubt whether the thing which he hits is alive or not, he is thinking of destruction, but not of murder. The Jains hold that the man who commits a murder without intent is none the less guilty, just as a man who touches fire is burned.

This, however, would lead to palpable absurdities. The Jain himself would be culpable for preaching terrible austerities; the embryo and the mother would be culpable for making each other suffer; the murdered being himself would be culpable, since he is the origin of the action of murder. Further, a man would not be guilty of murder if he got another person to commit it; for we are not burned if we touch fire by means of another.

All this is very well worked out, but in other things the school is not so wise.

If a man has intercourse with another man's wife, thinking that she is his own, he is not guilty of adultery. If he has intercourse with another's wife while thinking that she is the wife of a third man, opinions differ as to his guilt. Some hold him guilty of adultery, for the wife of another man is the object of the preparation and the object of the indulgence. Others say that there is no adultery, for the object of the preparation and the object of the indulgence are different persons.

The somewhat mechanical and very scholastic character of the Buddhist theory of retribution may be illustrated by the subjective and objective elements in giving.

For a thorough valuation of the merit of giving, or charity (*dāna*), we must take into account (1) the qualities of the giver (faith, morality, learning, etc.), and the manner of giving (with respect, with the right hand, at the opportune moment, etc.); (2) the qualities of the object given (excellence in colour, smell, etc.); and (3) the qualities of the person who receives: (*a*) excellence in relation to his lot in life; a gift made to an immoral man has 100 times the value of one made to an animal; (*b*) excellence due to suffering; a gift to an invalid, a person who is cold, etc.; (*c*) excellence due to services received (parents, preacher of the True Law, etc.); and (*d*) excellence due to qualities (morality, knowledge, etc.).

There is a hierarchy among acts—*e.g.*, whether one's destiny is human, or infernal, etc., is determined by morality (*śila*, abstention from murder, etc.). Gifts are only a sort of extra, to assure riches and other enjoyments.

LITERATURE.—*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ch. iv. (tr. in *Muséon*, Louvain, 1914), gives a complete résumé of the doctrine of *karma* in Buddhism; R. Spence Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*[2], London, 1880, p. 461 f.; 'Birth Stories' (*Jātakas*) and *Avadānas* contain many details on the retribution of *karma*; see, *e.g.*, E. Chavannes, *Cinq cents contes et apologues extraits du Tripiṭaka*, Paris, 1911. Every work on the philosophies and religions of India contains some exposition of the doctrine of *karma*—*e.g.*, E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, London, 1896, pp. 199, 231, etc.; A. Barth, *The Religions of India*, do. 1882, pp. 77, 110; P. Oltramare, *Hist. des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde*, i. (Paris, 1906) 99, 196; H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1896, Index, *s.v.* 'Karma'; R. C. Childers, *Dict. of the Pali Language*, London, 1875, pp. 178 f., 198. Special mention may be made of the articles by E. W. Hopkins on 'Modifications of the Karma Doctrine' in *JRAS*, 1906, pp. 581–593, 1907, pp. 665–672, which give a clear view of the contradictions and evolution of the doctrine. For the theory of the Jains, who regard action as a subtle matter, see the texts translated by H. Jacobi in *SBE* xxii. [1884] and xlv. [1895], and cf. art. JAINISM.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

KARMA-MĀRGA.—Of the three ways of salvation as commonly conceived in orthodox Hinduism, *karma-mārga*, *jñāna-mārga*, and *bhakti-mārga*, the first, though least considered by the philosophers, has probably been most followed by the vast bulk of the people. These three ways—though not necessarily inconsistent with each other (in this resembling the respective Gospels of the Apostles James, John, and Paul, with their peculiar stress laid upon the necessity for works, knowledge, and faith), and combined, as in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, into one consistent system—have usually been placed to some extent in mutual opposition, and may well be treated separately here. In particular, we shall find a certain opposition between works and knowledge; the idea of *bhakti*, loving faith, is of considerably later origin. The doctrine of salvation according to works will best be treated by considering the relative importance attached to it in the different phases of religious development in India, taken in the following order. Rigveda, Brāhmanas, the philosophical Brāhmanic development, the Dharmaśāstras as reflecting popular Brāhmanism, and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. But it must always be borne in mind that no real line of demarcation can be drawn between these periods; each merges insensibly into, or exists contemporaneously with, the other.[1]

(1) In the *Rigveda* the gods are concrete, active, anthropomorphic beings; therefore man's attitude towards them must also be something concrete and active. They are not mere abstractions to be apprehended only by the intellect, or by some process of mystical cognition; but they are beings, whose works can be perceived by the ordinary senses, and who must, therefore, be propitiated and appeased by concrete actions. Hence sacrifice, though not as yet grown to unwieldy proportions, is a necessary means to obtaining the favour of the gods, and a share in that after life which, though still misty and undetermined, is the aim of all. Some have seen in the hymns only a simple nature-poetry, others only the accompaniment of an elaborate sacrificial ritual. The truth probably lies in the middle way, that, while many are simple outbursts of devotional feeling, some undoubtedly possess a strictly ritualistic setting.[2] But sacrifice alone was not sufficient; for to find favour with heaven a man must also be piously minded towards gods and *manes*, liberal towards priests, courageous, and truthful; while in the last book we see the first beginnings of the demand for those ascetic austerities that attained to such a monstrous growth in later times.[3]

(2) Coming to the *Brāhmaṇas*, we find a complete change. The sacrifice, now called *karma*, or work *par excellence*, is all-important. It overshadows the whole of life; every action must be regulated with regard to it; and without it nothing can be obtained or hoped for. By its means alone can a man expect to attain salvation, still for the most part looked upon as a material heaven.[4] Not only men but the gods also are subject to its influence,

[1] Von Schroeder, *Indiens Literatur und Cultur*, p. 291; Hopkins, *Religions of India*, p. 7.
[2] Cf. Hopkins, p. 13 ff., and literature there quoted.
[3] *Rigveda*, x. cliv. 2, cix. 4; Hopkins, p. 148.
[4] Hopkins, p. 204 ff.

and by it have obtained their present position.[1] Henceforward *karma*, as a way of salvation, always carries with it the connotation of sacrifice and ritual. The intention that accompanies the deed is of no importance, only the deed itself.[2] At the same time the power of good actions is recognized. In the Brāhmaṇas we meet with the phrase 'man's debts.' These debts are, to the gods, sacrifice; to the seers, study of the Veda; to the *manes*, offspring; to fellow-men, hospitality. Whoever pays them has discharged all his duties, and by him all is obtained, all is won.[3]

(3) Meanwhile *philosophic speculation* had advanced. The universe was no longer an aggregation of separate material entities. Behind all was one uniform self-existent cause.[4] Individual souls owe their self-consciousness to the action of ignorance on the primal non-conscious cause, Brahman; the whole material world is the result of illusion. Self-consciousness will continue as long as actions which lead to re-birth (*saṁsāra*) continue.[5] The aim of religion or philosophy is to free the individual from re-birth and the continuation of self-consciousness. This result can be attained only by knowledge, *jñāna*, a recognition of the essential unity of the seeming individual with Brahman. This is the *jñāna-mārga*, as opposed to the *karma-mārga*, or path of works, which can lead only to re-birth, in accordance with the truth that every action must be followed by its reaction. But, despite this necessity for desisting from action, the Vedāntist recognizes that such a course, at least at first, is not altogether possible. By a right series of actions the searcher after salvation may fit himself to proceed to the higher knowledge: the *karma-mārga* leads into the *jñāna-mārga*, by which alone the goal is to be reached. Rāmānuja, in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, says:

'For the fact is that the enquiry into Brahman—the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and permanent—follows immediately in the case of him who, having read the Veda together with its auxiliary disciplines [*i.e.* that part of religious literature dealing with actions, the *karma-kāṇḍa*], has reached the knowledge that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has conceived the desire of final release.'[6]

But, since actions may lead to the higher path of knowledge, where is to be found the authority to decide the kind of actions necessary? This is the Veda. Speaking of the authority of the Veda, Śaṅkara says:

'Here others raise the following objection:—Although the Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions. . . . Why so? Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it.'[7]

But to make the Veda the final authority by no means solves all difficulties. The great bulk of the *karma* prescribed by the Veda consists of sacrifice. To begin with, there can be little doubt that before and during the time of the composition of the Brāhmaṇas, among Brāhmans belonging to different schools and different localities, different sacrificial customs had arisen, but that, after the Brāhmaṇas had been composed and had acquired some sort of general authority, it was felt necessary to reconcile these outside sacrificial practices with those prescribed by the Brāhmaṇas. Further, even within the Veda itself was to be found a mass of bewildering inconsistencies—a fact not surprising, when we consider the great differences in time, authorship, and purpose. The difficulties thus arising were many. A few of the more typical may be mentioned. It sometimes happened that the Brāhmaṇa-passage describing the action of a certain sacrifice was not always in harmony with the *mantra* to be recited during the performance:

'The Brāhmaṇa-passage maintains that from out a series of sacrificial acts a certain one is to be performed in the sixth place, while in the section that contains the mantras accompanying the series of acts the mantra referring to the particular act occupies the tenth place.'[1]

Again, it may not be made quite clear who it is that must perform the sacrifice, or how exactly any one of the numerous modifications of the typical sacrifices, which the Veda describes in full detail, is to be performed. The necessity for clearing up all such obscure points led to the formation of a set of rules, in accordance with which it was possible to settle disputed points without impugning in any way the authority of the Veda.

'So for instance . . . it is laid down that, whenever the place of the mantras accompanying a certain action and the place assigned to the action by a Brāhmaṇa-passage are in conflict, the mantra is to have greater weight than the Brāhmaṇa, because the former, being actually recited during the sacrifice, is connected with it more intimately than the latter, which is not directly used during the performance.'[2]

These rules, and the principles lying behind them, are collected in the *sūtras* of Jaimini, which form the ground of the *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā*, or 'Preliminary Investigation,' as opposed to the *Uttara-mīmāṁsā*, or 'Secondary Investigation' (*i.e.* into the nature of Brahman); for the necessity of works comes before the necessity of knowledge. The *Pūrva-mīmāṁsaka* devoted considerable attention to the criteria of knowledge. They are five in number: sense-perception, inference, comparison, presumption, and verbal information, with sometimes a sixth—non-existence. But of only one do they make considerable use—*śabda*, or verbal information, *i.e.* Scripture. For duty cannot rest on human authority, which is fallible, but must rest on some infallible authority, and this is found only in the Veda. Hence there follows the necessity of proving the infallibility and superhuman origin (*apauruṣeyatva*) of the Veda (for a discussion of the proof see Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 270 ff.). For the rest the *Mīmāṁsā* is occupied with the explanation and conciliation, in accordance with those principles of interpretation and authority, of apparently conflicting instructions and statements contained in the Veda.

(4) We have now reached a point at which we can consider how these two different religious attitudes—salvation according to works and salvation according to knowledge—were combined into one consistent system for the practical purposes of everyday life. This is seen in the precepts of the *Dharmaśāstras*—books dealing with religious and social duties. In this respect their prescriptions concern only the three upper—or Āryan—castes; neither with the *karma-mārga* nor with the *jñāna-mārga* has the Śūdra anything to do. For the Āryan it was necessary as a boy to study the Veda; as a householder to perform sacrifices; and, finally, there was an ever-growing desire to spend the last few years of life in the quiet shelter of the forest, or as a beggar, wandering from village to village, ever in search of that knowledge of his own unity with the universal Brahman which alone could bring final release from the cycle of birth and death. In this way, with the passing of time the life of an Āryan came to be divided into four definite stages, called *āśramas*. At a certain age, which varied with the caste to which the boy belonged (for the Brāhman the eighth to the tenth year), the young Āryan was sent to the house of a Brāhman, there to live and be taught the Veda. For a period which might vary from twelve to forty-eight years,[3] the student must remain with his teacher, whom it was

[1] *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, III. i. 4. 3, IV. iii. 2. 5; *Aitareya Br.* II. i. 1.
[2] *Śat. Br.* I. vi. 3. 8.
[3] *Ib.* I. vii. 2. 1 ff.; Hopkins, p. 202 *f.*
[4] See artt. VEDĀNTA and SĀṄKHYA.
[5] See art. KARMA. [6] *SBE* xlviii. [1904] 3 *f.*
[7] *SBE* xxxiv. [1890] 23 *f.*; cf. also the Bhāṣya on *Jaimini-sūtra*, I. i. 2. 5, quoted by Śaṅkara.

[1] Thibaut, *Arthasaṁgraha*, p. iv. [2] *Ib.* p. v.
[3] *Āpastamba-dharmasūtra*, I. i. 2. 12–16.

his constant duty to help and care for. In return for this the teacher, called the *guru*, instructed the student, or *brahmachārin*, in the knowledge of the Veda. At the end of his time of study the *brahmachārin* left the house of his *guru*, and with the title of *snātaka*, 'one who has bathed,' entered into the *āśrama* of a *gṛhastha*, 'householder.' Now, in addition to the duties which he owed his family, he had to engage in a definite series of sacrifices addressed to the gods and the spirits of his ancestors. But, when his sons were grown up and could themselves found families, his duties were finished; the end of the way of works was already in sight. With or without his wife he might now take refuge in the forest as a *vānaprastha*; freed from almost all duties and sacred rites, he was at liberty to spend his days in meditation. Last of all, renouncing every remaining duty, he was ready to enter the final stage of a *sannyāsin*, and to leave behind him for ever the *karma-mārga*, free to travel along the path of knowledge, wandering from village to village, until death removed the last barrier that prevented his absorption into the universal Brahman. In this way the journey, taken by not a few, began upon the path of works and ended upon the path of knowledge.

(5) Lastly, we have to consider the doctrine of works as it appears in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Hitherto the works that have been included under the designation of *karma* have been chiefly the sacrifices and general religious duties laid down in the Brāhmaṇas and the law-books, and they have been performed entirely for the sake of the performer. In the *Bhagavad-Gītā* we meet with a completely different conception. Knowledge is no longer the only way that leads to salvation; that may be reached also through *bhakti* (loving faith), or by works. But works, to be efficacious for salvation, must be disinterested. The *karma-yoga*, as this rule of works is called, has two phases. In the first the follower of the rule must discharge all his religious and social duties in utter indifference and unattachment to their fruits. He makes a sacrifice to the Lord of all his works, so that they no longer bind his soul to existence. Thus detached from all desires, he gains final redemption. The following verse is typical:

'This world is fettered by works, save in the work that has for its end the sacrifice. Work to this end do thou fulfil, O son of Kunti, free from attachment'[1]—in the words of the Christian: 'Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.'[2] For a fuller discussion of this see art. BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ.

The attitude of Buddhism differs little in this respect. In fact, one may reasonably surmise that the author of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* was influenced by Buddhist doctrines. Selfishness is the one thing that the Buddhist must avoid; acts performed with reference to self only bind the doer more firmly to the wheel of existence; but works of unselfish love are without effect, except in so far as they bring the worker nearer that absolute detachment which alone can open the gates of *nirvāṇa*.

'Our mind shall not waver. No evil speech will we utter. Tender and compassionate will we abide, loving in heart, void of malice within . . . and with that feeling [love] as a basis, we will ever be suffusing the whole world with thought of love, far-reaching, grown great, beyond measure, void of anger and ill-will.'[3]

To-day in India we may still find the old contrast between the path of knowledge and the path of works. There is the philosopher, who sits meditating on the infinite and awaiting the moment of final salvation; and there is the peasant, sacrificing his goats to Śiva or to Kālī, and punctiliously performing the multifarious round of prescribed duties in his journey along the *karma-mārga*, by which he hopes in the next birth to obtain a better position on the wheel of life.

LITERATURE.—Cf. artt. ĀŚRAMA, BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ, BHAKTI-MĀRGA, BUDDHISM, JÑĀNA-MĀRGA, KARMA, MĪMĀṂSĀ, and NYĀYA. For Rigveda and Brāhmaṇas: E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, London, 1896, pp. 3–23, 147 ff., 199–207; *SBE* xxix. [1886] and xxx. [1892] *passim*, for a minute description of sacrificial ritual. For *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*: MAX MÜLLER, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, ch. v.; G. Thibaut, *Arthasaṅgraha*, Benares, 1882 (Introd. and text); *SBE* xxxviii. [1896], Introd., *passim*; E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, *Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha*, London, 1882, ch. xii. For the Four Āśramas: *SBE* xxv. [1886] chs. ii.–vi.; L. von

pp. pp. 64–71. R. L. TURNER.

KARMATIANS.—See CARMAṬIANS.

KARNAPRAYĀG (Skr. *Karṇaprayāga*, 'the sacred river junction of Karṇa').—A place in the British Himālayan province of Garhwāl in N. India, situated at the junction of the Alaknandā (*q.v.*) and the Pindar rivers; lat. 30° 16′ N., long. 79° 15′ E., at an elevation of 2300 ft. above sea-level. It is an important place of pilgrimage on the upper sources of the Ganges.

As its name denotes, it is connected with the legend of Karṇa, half-brother of the Pāṇḍava heroes of the *Mahābhārata* epic. He was the son of Kuntī by Sūrya, the sun-god, and was born fully equipped with arms and armour. He was exposed by his mother, and reared by Nandana or Adhiratha, charioteer of the warrior Dhṛtarāṣṭra. Indra, in the disguise of a Brāhman, induced him to surrender his divine cuirass, and gave him in return a magical javelin charged with certain death to the enemy. Karṇa fought in the great war, and was finally slain by a crescent-shaped arrow discharged by Arjuna. The region from which the streams which form the Ganges rise is closely associated with the story of the Pāṇḍavas, and many places, like this, are supposed to gain their sanctity from them and their companions. The temple dedicated to the hero and some other remains are of no architectural importance.

LITERATURE.—E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gaz.* iii. [Allahabad, 1886] 394 f.; A. Führer, *Mon. Antig. and Inscr. N.W.P. and Oudh*, do. 1891, p. 45; *IGI* xv. [1908] 60. For the legend of Karṇa see J. Dowson, *Classical Dictionary*, London, 1879, p. 150 f. W. CROOKE.

KATABANIANS.—See SABÆANS.

KATĀS (according to Cunningham, from Skr. *kaṭākṣa*, 'sidelong glance').—One of the famous places of pilgrimage in N. Panjāb, a holy pool in the Jhīlam District; lat. 32° 43′ N., long. 71° 59′ E. The name is derived, according to the Brāhmanical legend, from the fact that Śiva was so inconsolable at the loss of his wife, Satī, that the tears falling from his eyes formed the sacred lake Puṣkara, or Pokhar, and the Kaṭākṣa pool. The place has been identified with the Śang-ho-pu-lo, or Sinhapura, of Hiuen Tsiang (S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1906, i. 143 f.); but the question of distances renders this improbable.

'The Sat-ghara, or "seven temples," are attributed to the Pāṇḍus, who are said to have lived at Katās during a portion of their twelve years' wanderings. On examining the place carefully I found the remains of no less than twelve temples, which are clustered together in the north-east corner of the old fort. Their general style is similar to that of the Kashmir temples, of which the chief characteristics are dentils, trefoil arches, fluted pillars, and pointed roofs, all of which are found in the temples of Katās and of other places in the Salt Range. Unfortunately these temples are so much ruined that it is impossible to make out their details with any accuracy; but enough is left to show that they belong to the later style of Kashmirian architecture which prevailed under the Karkota and Varman dynasties from A.D. 625 to 939' (A. Cunningham, *Arch. Survey Reports*, ii. [1871] 189).

LITERATURE.—Besides Cunningham's *Report* quoted above, see *Gaz. Jhilam District*, Lahore, 1883–84, p. 36 ff.; *IGI* xv. [1908] 150 f. W. CROOKE.

[1] *Bhagavad-Gītā*, tr. Barnett, iii. 9.
[2] 1 Co 10[31].
[3] *Majjhima-nikāya*, i. 129, tr. Rhys Davids.

KĀṬMĀṆḌŪ, KĀṬHMĀṆḌŪ (Hindī *kāṭh*, Skr. *kāṣṭha*, 'wood'; *maṇḍuā*, 'a hut or shed').—The capital of the kingdom of Nepāl; lat. 27° 42′ N., long. 85° 12′ E., towards the W. side of the valley, at the junction of the Bāghmatī and Viṣṇumatī rivers. It has been known by many names—the earliest Mañju Pātan, 'city of Mañju,' after Mañjuśrī, the Bodhisattva; Yindesī; Kāntipur; and Kāṭhmāṇḍū or Kāṭhmādū; the last said to be derived from an ancient building, originally made of wood, which stands in the heart of the city, near the Darbār palace. According to Brown (*Picturesque Nepal*, p. 65), a building still exists which is said to have been made from the wood of one monster tree. The city is oblong in form, and, according to the Buddhist Newār tradition, it was built in the shape of the sword of its founder, Mañjuśrī, while the Hindus profess that it resembles the scimitar of their goddess.

Kirkpatrick (*Account*, p. 159), who visited the city in 1793, suggests that the name of the place is derived from 'its numerous wooden temples, which are, indeed, among the most striking objects it offers to the eye. . . . Besides these, Khatmandu contains several other temples on a large scale, and constructed of brick, with two, three, and four sloping roofs, diminishing gradually as they ascend, and terminating pretty generally in pinnacles, which, as well as some of the superior roofs, are splendidly gilt and produce a very picturesque effect' (for a discussion of the Nepāl style of architecture see J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Arch.*², i. 277 ff.).

A notable feature of some of these temples is the profusion of indecent carvings, the intention being to scare evil spirits (Crooke, *PR*² i. 68 f.). One of the most important Hindu temples is that dedicated to Talejū, or Tallijū, the local form of Tulsī Bhavānī, the goddess of the holy basil plant (*Ocymum sanctum*), who, with the saint Gorakhnāth, is the guardian deity of the royal family.

'In front of several of the temples are tall monoliths, some surmounted by figures of old Rājās, others by the winged figure of Garur [Garuḍa]. The figures are often in a kneeling posture, facing a temple, and are generally overhung by a brazen snake, on whose head is perched a little bird. Not far from the palace, and close to one of the temples, is an enormous bell, suspended to two stone pillars; and in another building are two huge drums, about eight feet in diameter. . . . Here, too, are several huge and hideous figures of Hindu gods and goddesses' (Wright, *Hist. of Nepāl*, p. 10). During his residence in Nepāl, Wright twice heard of persons having committed suicide before these figures. 'The suicide always takes place at night, and the body is found in the morning with its throat cut from ear to ear, and its limbs decorously arranged, lying on one of the steps,' the inference being that these were cases of human sacrifice (*ib.* 10 ff.).

The temple known as Mahenkal [Mahākālā], of great antiquity, is the most popular 'chapel-of-ease' in the valley. Hindus regard it as dedicated to Śiva, while Buddhists maintain that the sacred figure represents Padmapāṇi or Avalokita, and assert that this is proved by the little stone figure rising from the forehead of the idol, which is believed to represent Amitābha (Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, i. 110). However this may be, this temple has become a sort of neutral ground at which Hindus and Buddhists meet to pray before one common god, the Śiva of the former, the Padmapāṇi of the latter. Besides these the city abounds in temples of many kinds.

'Many of them present a most repulsive appearance, being dabbled over with the blood of cocks, ducks, goats, and buffaloes, which are sacrificed before them' (Wright, p. 11).

Of the more modern temples, the chief are that erected by Sir Jang Bahādur in 1852 on the foundation laid by Bhīm Sen, and dedicated to Jagannāth; that to Viṣṇu in the form of Nārāyaṇa; and several at the sacred junction of the rivers Bāghmatī and Viṣṇumatī. While the Hindu temples are generally placed near some of the main thoroughfares, all the chief Buddhist shrines are hidden away in squares or quadrangles in the parts of the city exclusively inhabited by the Buddhist Newārs. The chief of these are the temple of Ādibuddha, known also as Buddhmaṇḍal, the older part of which is now enclosed within the roots of a sacred fig-tree. Nothing is known of its history prior to its restoration in A.D. 1579 (Oldfield, ii. 256 ff.). The most important Buddhist monument, however, is that known as Sambhunāth (Skr. *svayambhu*, 'self-existent'), which is a very fine specimen of a Buddhist *chaitya*, or mound-temple.

'It consists of a solid hemisphere of earth and brick, about sixty feet in diameter and thirty feet in height, supporting a lofty conical spire, the top of which is crowned by a richly-carved pinnacle of copper gilt' (Oldfield, ii. 224).

The same writer (ii. 219) gives a full account of this interesting edifice, which is one of the few existing great Buddhist ecclesiastical buildings of which only the ruins survive in India. It is traditionally attributed to a Rājā of Nepāl named Goradeo, who is said to have flourished between 2000 and 3000 years ago; but there are no trustworthy records of it until its restoration in A.D. 1593. On the whole, Kāṭhmāṇḍū offers a most promising field for archæological investigation; but excavation and surveys of the existing buildings will be impossible so long as the native Government maintains its present policy of jealous seclusion.

LITERATURE.—D. Wright, *History of Nepāl*, Cambridge, 1877; H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, London, 1880; R. Temple, *Journals in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim, and Nepal*, do. 1887; L. Oliphant, *A Journey to Katmandu*, do. 1852; P. Brown, *Picturesque Nepal*, do. 1912. Older accounts are those of F. Hamilton (formerly Buchanan), *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal*, Edinburgh, 1819; W. Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul*, do. 1811. For the architecture see J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*², London, 1910; Sylvain Lévi, *Le Nepal: Étude historique d'un royaume hindou*, Paris, 1905.

W. CROOKE.

KĀYASTH, KĀYASTHA (said to be derived either from Skr. *kāyesaṁsthita*, 'staying at home' [H. T. Colebrooke, *Essays*, London, 1858, p. 273 n.], or from *kāya-stha*, 'situated in the body, incorporate,' being sprung from the body of Brahmā).—The writer class of Hindustān, numbering, at the Census of 1911, 2,178,390, of whom the great majority are found in Bengal and the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Practically all of them are Hindu by religion.

In Bengal, Risley classes them in two divisions: those of Bengal proper and those of Bihār. Like all the literary and trading castes, the Kāyasths, since the British occupation of the country, have tried to assert a social status not admitted under native rule. One mark of their promotion is that they usually affect extreme orthodoxy and are liberal in support of Brāhmans, by whom they are barely tolerated. It is singular, as Risley remarks, that, while the teaching of Chaitanya has united almost all the artisan and agricultural castes of Bengal proper in a common Vaiṣnava faith, the three highest and most intelligent classes adhere to the Śākta ritual, or the worship of the female principle. In E. Bengal all Kulin Kāyasths, and something like three-fourths of the other sections, are believed to practise Śāktism, and it is asserted that a large proportion of these follow the cult in its grosser development, known as the Vāmāchāra, or 'left-hand,' ritual of the Tāntras. Every Kulin family has a domestic chapel in which the *linga* of Śiva is daily worshipped by the head of the household. All Kāyasths, in addition, observe the Śrī Pañchamī, or 'sacred fifth,' the festival which occurs on the fifth day of the waxing moon in the month of Māgh (Jan.–Feb.), known also as the Dawāt Pūjā, or 'worship of the inkstand,' in honour of Sarasvatī, goddess of learning and eloquence, whom they regard as their patron deity.

'On this day the courts and all offices are closed, as no Hindu penman will use pen and ink, or any writing instrument, except a pencil, on that day. When work is resumed a new inkstand and pen must be used, and the penman must write

nothing until he has several times transcribed the name of the goddess Durgā, with which all letters should begin' (J. Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of E. Bengal*, p. 315). On this day also the Kāyasth must eat a *hilsā* fish (*clupea aloṣa*), whatever its price may be, while from the Śrī Pañchamī festival in January to the Vijaya Dasamī in September-October fish must be eaten daily; but from the last to the first month it must not be touched—a tabu probably founded on some hygienic consideration. The Kāyasths of Bihār follow one or other of the main Hindu sects: Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, Śākta, Kabīrpanthī, Nānakshāhī, and the like. The worship of Durgā and the Śakti is the most popular. Chitragupta, the mythical ancestor of the caste, is honoured once a year on the 17th day of the month Kārttik (Oct.–Nov.), at the feast of the Dawāt Pūjā, with offerings of sweetmeats and money, and the worship of the pen and ink, the implements of the trade. For religious and domestic rites the caste employs Brāhmans, who are received on equal terms by other members of the priestly body. In the United Provinces they also follow the orthodox Hindu sects, of which the Śaiva, Śākta, and Ārya Samāj are most important. But the fact of belonging to different sects does not bar association and inter-marriage; and, if a man who is a Vaiṣṇava marries a Śākta girl, the former may remain a vegetarian and abstain from meat and spirits, while his wife continues to indulge in these luxuries. The worship of the progenitor Chitragupta and of the Kula Devata, or family gods, is carried on side by side with the cultus of the greater orthodox deities. While the domestic worship is generally conducted by the head of the household, the orthodox ritual is performed by Brāhmans, who do not suffer any social discredit by officiating for Kāyasths. In the Deccan the allied caste, known as Kāyasth-Prabhū, are generally followers of Viṣṇu, while children are known as Devīputra, 'sons of Devī,' because they worship the Devī or local Mother-goddess rather than the orthodox gods.

LITERATURE.—J. Wise, *Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of E. Bengal*, London, 1883; H. H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1891; W. Crooke, *Tribes and Castes of the N.W. Provinces and Oudh*, do. 1896; A. Baines, *Ethnography* [=*GIAI* ii. 5], Strassburg, 1912, p. 38 f. For the branch in Bombay see *BG* ix. 1. [1901]. W. CROOKE.

KEDĀRNĀTH (Skr. *Kedāranātha*, 'lord of Kedār,' a title of Śiva, the derivation of which is unknown; it has been suggested by E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gaz.* ii. [1884] 796, that Kedār is an ancient title of Śiva).—A famous temple and place of pilgrimage in the Garhwāl District of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, lat. 30° 44′ N., long. 79° E. The twin peaks of Badarīnāth (*q.v.*) and Kedārnāth rise at a distance of ten miles apart, and between these, at a height of more than 11,000 ft. above sea-level, the temple is situated. The sanctity of the Śiva *liṅga* is extolled in the *Vāmana Purāṇa*.

According to the local legend, Pārvati asks: 'What is Kedār? What are the fruits of visiting its sacred places and bathing in its waters?' Śiva replies: 'The place that you have spoken of, O goddess! is so dear to me that I shall never forsake it. When I or Brahmā created the universe, Kedār so pleased me that it shall ever remain sacred to me. Brahmā and the other gods are there; whoever dies there becomes one with Śiva.' The title of the deity is Sadāśiva, 'always happy,' and he seems to be the successor of an older god, Paśupati, 'lord of animals.'

The temple ranks among the twelve famous *liṅga* shrines of India. The Pāṇḍavas, it is said, came to the Himālaya, and arrived at the river Mandākinī to worship Śiva. In their eagerness they desired to touch the god, but he avoided them and plunged into the earth, offering to his votaries only the sight of the lower part of his body. The upper part is said to have come to the surface at Mukhār Bind in Nepāl, where it is worshipped as Paśupatināth. The Pāṇḍavas were cleansed of their sins and built five temples in honour of the god. In Buddhist times the place became a centre of the Bauddhamārgī cultus, which was overthrown about the beginning of the 8th cent. A.D. by the Śaiva reformer, Śaṅkarāchārya, who died here at the age of 32. As is the case at Badarīnāth, the shrine is served by Nambūtiri Brāhman priests from S. India who were introduced by the great Śaiva missionary. The sanctity of the place has been explained by the fact that pilgrims are overpowered by the strong scent of the roses and syringa bushes close to the border of the eternal snow. This, combined with the rarity of the air, produces a sense of faintness, which is naturally attributed to spirit agency, while the strange sounds produced by falling avalanches and rendings of the ice and snow doubtless contribute to the same belief. The existing buildings are of no architectural importance. Sacred places abound in the neighbourhood, the most important of which is Mahāpanth, where there is the famous cliff, known as Bhairava Jhāmp, from which pilgrims were accustomed to precipitate themselves as an offering to Śiva; as in other parts of the Himālaya, a human scapegoat slides down a rope—a rite which has its parallels in other places—the object being apparently to secure the fertility of the crops (J. G. Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, pp. 196 f., 254, *Pausanias*, do. 1898, v. 401). A second form of immolation, of which instances are believed still to occur among fanatics, is to wander up the snowy slopes and court death by exposure.

LITERATURE.—E. T. Atkinson, *Himalayan Gazetteer*, ii. [Allahabad, 1884]. Two early papers are worth reading: H. T. Colebrooke, 'The Sources of the Ganges in the Himādri or Emodus,' and F. V. Raper, 'A Survey for the Purpose of discovering the Sources of the Ganges,' both in *Asiatic Researches*, xi. [1812]; see also J. B. Fraser, *Journal of a Tour through part of the Himālā Mountains, and to the Sources of the Rivers Jumna and Ganges*, London, 1820; E. S. Oakley, *Holy Himalaya*, Edinburgh, 1905; C. A. Sherring, *Western Tibet*, London, 1906; J. Muir, *Notes of a Trip to Kedarnath*, Edinburgh, 1855. W. CROOKE.

KEDESHAH.—See HIERODOULOI (Semitic and Egyptian).

KENOSIS.—**1. The scriptural references.**—The word 'Kenosis' is applied in Christian theology to that attitude or action of Jesus Christ, or the Logos, referred to by St. Paul in Ph 2[6f.], where he says of Jesus Christ: *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε μορφὴν δούλου λαβών*. This is practically all that can be said with certainty on the subject. We cannot even say definitely what the Apostle intended to convey by the words quoted. No other passage in his writings casts any light upon them. There is certainly no doubt that by the phrase *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* he was expressing the same idea as he had in his mind when speaking of 'Jesus Christ' in 2 Co 8[9]: *δι' ὑμᾶς ἐπτώχευσε πλούσιος ὤν*. This passage, however, is no less ambiguous than the former. In both alike the grammatical connexion of the statement with the antecedent designation 'Jesus Christ' seems to indicate that the Apostle had in his mind an action of the historical Jesus. But, on the other hand, the *μορφὴ θεοῦ* and the *μορφὴ δούλου* of the first passage, and the 'being rich' and the 'becoming poor' of the second, are in each case so pointedly antithetic as to suggest that St. Paul was thinking of a surrender of the one for the other, and that accordingly he is speaking here of an action effected by the pre-existent Christ at His incarnation.

In 2 Co 8 the context does not help us, while in Ph 2, though the parenetic aim of the passage seems at first sight to point to the historical Jesus,

the context in reality presents several possibilities of interpretation. This would not be the case, indeed, if we could accept the hypothesis of A. Resch,[1] viz. that in Ph 2[6ff.] St. Paul, on the ground of a primitive gospel which, according to Resch, has left traces in the baptismal liturgy of the Severians, was speaking of a *κένωσις* that began with the baptism of Jesus. Resch had every confidence in his theory, believing that he was justified even in saying (p. 81):

'In place of the life-like impression which Ph 2[6ff.] gives of the historical Christ and His first public appearance at the baptism in the Jordan, unfortunately an unsound theory of Kenosis has been built up upon an ungrammatical foisting in of the λόγος ἄσαρκος as the subject of the passage, and in this way a dogmatizing exegesis has moved further and further away from the original sense.'

But Resch fails to show even the probability—let alone the certainty—of the underlying assumption of his verdict, viz. the use of a primitive gospel by the Apostle.

The exegesis of the passage is thus thrown back upon the actual words. Nor, again, does the clause *οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ* enable us to decide whether St. Paul was referring to the historical or the pre-existent Christ. Even the so-called 'active' sense of *ἁρπαγμός* ('robbery,' 'usurpation,' 'opportunity for robbery' or 'for self-enrichment') has been made to fit in with either alternative, though the present writer is of opinion that its compatibility with the theory of the pre-existent Christ is far from obvious. The tenability of both interpretations is much less questionable if, with most modern scholars, we decide for the 'passive,' or rather the 'concrete,' sense of *ἁρπαγμός* (*præda*, 'prize'). The translation in that case would be: 'He regarded the *εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ* not *as a prize to be held fast*,' or '*as a prize that he might or must obtain*,' and the former rendering at least is quite in keeping with either interpretation. This may also be said of the *εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*. If we take the phrase as equivalent to *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ εἶναι*, then it has no direct bearing upon the question as to the subject of *ἡγήσατο*; if we feel it necessary, however, to make a distinction in meaning between the two phrases, the former accords very well with the theory that the whole passage refers to the historical Christ, while it harmonizes with the reference to the pre-existent Christ only if we assume—an assumption widely held, but, the present writer thinks, untenable—that St. Paul regarded the pre-existent Christ as the 'heavenly man.'

Nor can we decide with confidence between the exegetical alternatives presented by Ph 2[6] even by an appeal to the only non-Pauline passage of the NT that perhaps rests on the same underlying ideas, viz. that verse of the high-priestly prayer which Origen (*de Princ.* III. v. 6) applied in the same way: *καὶ νῦν δόξασόν με σύ, πάτερ, παρὰ σεαυτῷ τῇ δόξῃ ᾗ εἶχον πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι παρὰ σοί* (Jn 17[5]). Not that we would contend that St. Paul should not be interpreted by St. John; as a matter of fact, if the Johannine writings contained an unambiguous passage which exactly agreed with any one of the possible interpretations of Ph 2[6], it would certainly lend a sanction to that interpretation. But is Jn 17[5] unambiguous? Even if, in view of other passages in the Fourth Gospel (1[27. 30] 6[33. 38] 8[58]), we reject the interpretation of *εἶχον* as implying a possession in the *destinatio divina*—an interpretation endorsed by the Socinians, the Rationalists, and Schleiermacher, and defended with new arguments by H. Wendt—we cannot venture to call it so, for the view that Jn 17[5] refers to a glory regarded as having been surrendered in the act of incarnation cannot be maintained in face of Jn 1[14] 2[11] 11[4. 40]. If Jn 17[5], accordingly, can be taken only as referring to a complete and plenary re-entrance upon a glory which was in some sense veiled during the earthly life of Jesus, it also fails to help us in determining the sense of the Pauline *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*. On that interpretation we may certainly regard Jn 17[5] as implying an action of the λόγος ἄσαρκος upon which rested the *possibility* of such veiling, but we may equally well see in the passage an attitude of the λόγος ἔνσαρκος of which His being veiled was the result. Moreover, the exegesis of Jn 17[5] is rendered difficult by the fact that we cannot definitely say whether an appeal to the Logos-idea is here justified at all, or whether the truth lies with those who hold that St. John, in conformity with Jewish thought, usually associates the pre-existence of Christ with His entire person, and that his restricting it to Christ's pneumatic existence, as contrasted with His flesh, is found only in the Prologue.

In the circumstances it is but natural that exegetes should still be at issue as to the interpretation of Ph 2[6ff.]. In point of fact they are at present even more divided than they were about thirty years ago, as it seemed for a time that the interpretation which found the subject of *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* and *ἡγήσατο* in the pre-existent Christ held the field in scientific exegesis, so far at least as this was not under the influence of confessional Lutheranism. Of late, however—and not from the Lutheran side only—the position has been challenged by quite a number of interpreters.[1]

2. The exegesis of Ph 2[6ff.] in the early Church.—Even in the early Church exegetes were less agreed with regard to Ph 2[6ff.] than has sometimes been assumed. Here we meet with three types of interpretation that at first sight seem to be quite distinct.

(*a*) *The interpretation which identified the subject of the Kenosis with the* λόγος ἄσαρκος.—The earliest traceable view is that which saw in the phrase *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* a reference to the act of the λόγος ἄσαρκος in His becoming incarnate. We find it already in the Valentinian Gnostic Theodotus, as, *e.g.*, when he says:

ἑαυτὸν κενώσας, τουτέστιν ἐκτὸς τοῦ ὅρου γενόμενος . . . ὡς ἀπὸ Πληρώματος προελθών (Clem. Alex. *Excerpta*, 35).

This interpretation is found also in the Christian Gnosis of the Alexandrians—Clement (*Pædag.* III. i. 2, *Protrept.* i. 8) and Origen:

ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτὸν καταβαίνων ἐντεῦθεν, καὶ κενώσας ἑαυτὸν, ἐλάμβανε πάλιν ταῦτα ἀφ' ὧν ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν (*in Jerem. Hom.* i. 7; cf. also, *e.g.*, *de Princ.*, præf. 4, and III. v. 6, *in Joann.* vi. 10);

and it is supported even by Tertullian:

'Et Sermo enim Deus, qui in effigie Dei constitutus, non rapinam existimavit pariari Deo' (*de Carnis Resurr.* 6).

In the East, indeed, it came to be the prevailing view. Not only do we find it in Eusebius (*e.g.*, *de Eccles. Theol.* I. xx. 10) and Apollinaris,[2] but we can trace it also in the line of the orthodox Fathers, from Methodius (*Conviv.* iii. 8), through Athanasius (*e.g.*, *Orat. contra Arianos*, i. 40) and the Young Nicæans,[3] to Cyril of Alexandria and the later orthodox theology. As a matter of fact, the interpretation in question received in some sense an official sanction, as it found expression in Cyril's *Epistula ad Orientales*, which was recognized as a standard of doctrine by the Council of Chalcedon:

ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καταφοιτήσας ὁ θεὸς λόγος κεκένωκεν ἑαυτὸν, μορφὴν δούλου λαβών (*Ep.* 39 [*PG* lxxvii. 180 A]).

(*b*) *The Pelagian exegesis.*—A diametrically opposite interpretation of the passage is met with *c.* 400 in the West, viz. in the Commentary of Pelagius on St. Paul's Epistles. Pelagius finds the

[1] Cf. W. Lütgert, *Die Vollkommenen im Philipperbrief*, Gütersloh, 1909, p. 89 ff.; W. Warren, *JThSt* xii. (1911) 461 ff.; G. Kittel, *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, Gotha, 1912, p. 376 ff.

[2] Cf. H. Lietzmann, *Apollinaris*, Göttingen, 1904, frag. 124, p. 227, and frag. 71, p. 221.

[3] Cf. Gregory Naz. *Or.* xxxviii. 13: *ὁ πλήρης κενοῦται· κενοῦται γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δόξης ἐπὶ μικρόν.*

[1] 'Agrapha'[2], *TU* xxx. 3 and 4 (Leipzig, 1906), p. 79 ff.

subject of the expressions *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, ἡγήσατο,* and *ἐταπείνωσεν ἑαυτόν* in the human being in whom the Logos became incarnate: 'Quia se assumptus homo humiliare dignatus est, divinitas quae humiliari non potest eum qui humiliatus fuerat exaltavit' (*PL* xxx. 884 C). Even 'secundum hominem' Christ was, according to Pelagius, 'in forma Dei,' *i.e.* 'in imagine Dei,' because He 'absque peccato erat,' and because He was the one 'in quo Deus erat,' *i.e.* 'plenitudo deitatis' (*loc. cit.*; cf. pseudo-Primasius, *PL* lxviii. 630); although 'quod erat, humilitate celavit, dans nobis exemplum ne in his gloriemur quae forsitan non habemus' (*PL* xxx. 884 BC).

The text of Pelagius—at this point probably not completely traceable in pseudo-Hieronymus—does not provide a particular exposition of *ἐκένωσε* or *οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, κτλ.*, nor can pseudo-Primasius be used here as supplementing it, since he has manifestly interpolated something of his own; still, the exegesis of Pelagius can be made out distinctly enough. In view of Col 2^9—a passage which he undoubtedly had in his mind—the phrase *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* is adequately explained by the words 'quod erat, humilitate celavit,' while the words 'dans nobis exemplum ne in his gloriemur quae forsitan non habemus' suggest the following explanation of *οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο, κτλ.*: 'non gloriatus est in his quae habebat' (*i.e. τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ = τὸ εἶναι ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*). The latter interpretation, again, is further explained by what Pelagius says with reference to 'formam servi accipiens': 'ita ut pedes lavaret discipulorum; celavit quod erat, Adam vero et antiquus hostis usurparunt superbia quod non erant' (*PL* xxx. 884; H. Zimmer, *Pelagius in Irland*, Berlin, 1901, p. 377).

Thus, in dealing with Ph 2^6, Pelagius, like the recent expositors Lütgert (*op. cit.*) and J. Weiss,[1] has been reminded of Gn $3^{5ff.}$, and under the influence of this reminiscence applies the entire passage in Ph. to Christ as the second Adam. It would seem that this interpretation was suggested to him by earlier tradition, as his older contemporary, Phœbadius of Aginnum, is also reminded by Ph $2^{6f.}$ of the fact that the Logos 'induerat quod servire, quod mori posset: hominem scilicet . . . ut [printed 'et'] secundus Adam per obedientiam restitueret quod primus transgressione perdiderat' (*contra Arianos*, 21 [*PL* xx. 29 A]).

(*c*) *The Antiochene-Occidental interpretation.*—The third interpretation of Ph $2^{6ff.}$ takes a middle course between the two discussed above. It was known to Pelagius, who, however, rejected it in the interests of anti-Arianism:

'Aliqui hunc locum ita intelligunt quod secundum divinitatem se humiliaverit Christus, secundum formam scilicet Dei, secundum quam aequalitatem Dei non rapinam usurpaverit quam naturaliter possidebat, et exinaniverit se, non substantiam evacuans, sed honorem declinans, formam servi, hoc est naturam hominis, induendo, et per omnia ut homo tantummodo apparendo atque humili obedientia nec crucis mortem recusando' (*PL* xxx. 884 A; cf. Zimmer, *op. cit.* p. 377, and pseudo-Primasius).

This interpretation was at that period widely current in the West. It was adopted by Ambrosiaster (*PL* xvii. 409)—though with some points of resemblance to the view of Pelagius, as, *e.g.*, with regard to the 'forma Dei'—and also by Phœbadius (*ib.* xx. 29 A) and his contemporary Gregory of Elvira;[2] while, as regards Ambrose,[3] Augustine,[4] and even Hilary,[5] it is obvious that they too favoured this interpretation, though with certain modifications due to Greek influence, *i.e.* to the view indicated under (*a*) above. Apart from these modifications, this current Western interpretation agrees with the Pelagian in three important particulars. (1) It takes Ph $2^{6ff.}$ as referring to the historical Jesus Christ, though—diverging here from Pelagius—to Christ 'secundum divinitatem,' *i.e.* to the *λόγος ἔνσαρκος*. Ambrosiaster is quite aware of his divergence at this point from the view noted in (*a*), and explicitly says:

'Non enim mihi sicut quibusdam videtur, sic formam servi accepisse dum homo natus est; vide enim quid dicat: Hoc sentite in vobis quod et in Christo Iesu, id est, Deo et homine' (*PL* xvii. 432 A).

But, on the other hand, Phœbadius, Gregory of Elvira, and, above all, the Græcizing Fathers (Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine) include in the Kenosis also the 'incarnatio' of the Logos, as the decisive inception of the process expressed by the words *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* and wrought out in the life of the historical Christ. (2) The current Western interpretation and that of Pelagius have in common the idea of the *co-existence* of the 'forma Dei' and the 'forma servi'—an idea very prominent also in Hilary, Ambrose, and Augustine (cf. Reuter, *loc. cit.*). (3) In connexion with that view, they agree also in regarding the *κένωσις* as a *κρύψις* ('celavit quod erat').

In all these three points, again, the current Western interpretation coincides with the common Antiochene, though the latter, like the Græcizing Western Fathers, often ingrafts the *ἐνανθρώπησις* into the conception of the *κένωσις*. The correspondence is clearest in the case of Nestorius. While Nestorius recognizes the *ἐνανθρώπησις* as the essential starting-point of the *κένωσις*,[1] he expressly says with reference to Ph $2^{6ff.}$: *οὐκ εἶπε* (*sc.* *ὁ Παῦλος*)· *τοῦτο φρονεῖσθω ἐν ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ θεῷ λόγῳ* (*Nestoriana*, p. 254).

Moreover, the co-existence of the *μορφὴ θεοῦ* and the *μορφὴ δούλου* which we already find in the Fragments of Nestorius[2] is shown by his *Liber Heraclidis* to have been one of his leading ideas, inasmuch as he identifies *μορφή* and *πρόσωπον*,[3] and the exchange of the *πρόσωπα* is the decisive factor in his conception of the 'unio personalis' of the two natures.[4] Lastly, it has long been recognized that Nestorius attached great importance to the Christological *κρύψις*; thus, to take but a single instance, we quote here what he says regarding the self-restraint of Jesus Christ at the Temptation: *οὐκ ἐκκαλύπτει τὸν κεκρυμμένον θεόν . . . ἀλλ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος ψιλὸς ἀντιφθέγγεται* (*Nestoriana*, p. 343).

Like Nestorius, Eutherius of Tyana, a writer of kindred views, emphatically asserts that Ph $2^{6ff.}$ ought not to be read as referring to the Logos; in opposition to the words of Cyril quoted above (*a*), he writes:

'Sequere apostolum Paulum . . . ; non ait, Ipse de coelo descendens Deus Verbum exinanivit semetipsum . . . sed quid dicit? Hoc sentiatur in vobis quod et in Christo Jesu' (J. D. Mansi, *SS. Concilia Coll.*, Venice, 1759–98, v. 983 B–C; cf. G. Ficker, *Eutherius von Tyana*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 49 f.).

The views maintained by Nestorius and Eutherius in connexion with Ph $2^{6ff.}$ were, however, not distinctively Nestorian; they were rather in the line of the common Antiochene tradition. In fact, notwithstanding the fragmentary form in which the writings of the earlier Antiochians survive, it seems certain that the teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia regarding the *πρόσωπα* of the two natures in Christ must have been very similar to that of Nestorius, and the former's exposition

[1] In *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, i. (Tübingen, 1909) 1726.

[2] *de Fide*, 8 (*PL* xx. 47 f.); *Tractatus Origenis*, ed. P. Batiffol, Paris, 1900, vii. 83; cf. A. Wilmart, *BLE*, Oct.–Nov. 1906, p. 233 ff., and G. Krüger, in *PRE*[3] xxiii. 593 f.

[3] Cf. H. Reuter, *Augustinische Studien*, Gotha, 1887, p. 210 f.

[4] *Ib.* p. 198 f.; O. Scheel, *Die Anschauung Augustins über Christi Person und Werk*, Tübingen, 1901, p. 218 ff.

[5] Cf. I. A. Dorner, *Entwickelungsgesch. der Lehre von der Person Christi*[2], p. 1043 ff.; *PRE*[3] x. 253 f.

[1] *Nestoriana*, ed. F. Loofs, Halle, 1905, p. 175.

[2] *Ib.* p. 258.

[3] *Liber Heraclidis*, tr. F. Nau, Paris, 1910, p. 147: 'La forme est le prosôpon; de sorte qu'il est l'un par l'essence et l'autre par l'union au point de vue de l'humiliation et de l'exaltation.'

[4] Cf. Loofs, *Nestorius and his Place in the History of Christian Doctrine*, Cambridge, 1914, p. 83 ff.

of Ph $2^{6ff.}$ shows that he too regarded the historical Christ (or the λόγος ἔνσαρκος) as the subject of ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε and interpreted the κένωσις as a κρύψις:

τὸ οὖν 'ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε' ἀντὶ τοῦ 'οὐκ ἔδειξεν ἑαυτόν.' μορφὴν γὰρ δούλου λαβὼν τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκείνην ἀπέκρυψε, τοῦτο τοῖς ὁρῶσι εἶναι νομιζόμενος ὅπερ ἐφαίνετο (*Theodori episcopi Mopsuesteni in epistulas B. Pauli commentarii*, ed. H. B. Swete, Cambridge, 1882, i. 216 f.).

(*d*) *The question as to the priority of the various exegetical traditions; Novatian.*—Which of these three types of exegesis has the longer tradition behind it is a question not to be answered by a mere reference to the fact that Theodotus, Clement, Tertullian, and Origen were of earlier date than Pelagius and the Antiochians. For the circumstance that what is common to the Pelagian and the current Western interpretation appears also among the Antiochians lends probability to the supposition that here too[1] the Antiochene and the Western expositors were dependent upon a common tradition; and this tradition may well have been in existence prior to the period of the Apologists. This possibility is so far borne out by a conjecture which, as the present writer thinks, is urged upon us by a detailed examination of both the Pelagian and the ancient Western-Antiochene view—namely, that the exegesis associated with each of these goes back to a single earlier interpretation, according to which the subject of ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε was the integral personality of the historical Jesus Christ. An objective argument in favour of the hypothesis in question is provided by the interpretation of Ph $2^{6ff.}$ given by Novatian (*de Trin.* 22 [17] [*PL* iii. 957 f.]). The interpretation is not indeed homogeneous. For the most part it centres in the historical Christ, thus:

'Quamvis ex Deo Patre Deum esse meminisset, nunquam se Deo Patri aut comparavit aut contulit (p. 958 A); exinanivit se, dum ad injurias contumeliasque descendit, dum audit infanda, experitur indigna' (p. 958 C).

But Novatian, in another passage (p. 959 B), includes also the 'nasci' and the 'humanam conditionis fragilitatem suscipere' in the *exinanitio*, and actually finds (p. 958 C) the κένωσις in the circumstance that the

'auctoritas divini Verbi, ad suscipiendum hominem interim conquiescens, nec se suis viribus exercens, delicit se ad tempus atque deponit, dum hominem fert quem suscipit.'

Even in the last two passages, however, the 'self-emptying' of the Logos is not an action of the λόγος ἄσαρκος, but an attitude of the λόγος ἔνσαρκος—a self-restraint which Novatian ascribes to the historical Christ. Then as regards Ph 2^{9}, Novatian refers it—in the first instance without making any distinction between the 'homo Christi' and the Logos—to the historical Saviour in His undivided personality, while subsequently he says of the historical Christ that He was man because He had humbled Himself, but was God and Lord because He had received the 'nomen Dei.' Have we not here the common root of the later Pelagian and the current Western view? And does not the interpretation of Novatian, precisely because of its lack of unity, point back to a view of the Philippian passage according to which the subject of ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε was more clearly and consistently identified with the historical Christ?

3. Theories of the Kenosis current in the early Church.—While the early Church thus provides three several interpretations of Ph $2^{6ff.}$, it was, nevertheless, more unanimous in its conception of the Kenosis than that fact might lead us to suppose. The truth is that no theologian of any standing in the early Church ever adopted such a theory of the κένωσις of the Logos as would involve an actual supersession of His divine form of existence by the human—a real '*becoming*-man,' *i.e.* a transformation on the part of the Logos.

(*a*) *Popular conceptions.*—Among the masses, no doubt, views of the kind just indicated were widely current at an early period, and, indeed, have always been so. As a matter of fact, they rest upon a legitimate basis, *i.e.* they cohere with a view which is eminently intelligible to a living Christian faith. The genuinely Christian conviction of the perfect revelation of God in the person of the historical Jesus Christ found expression at an early period in the doctrine that the invisible, incomprehensible, and impassible God had become visible, comprehensible, and passible in the historical Jesus (Ignatius, *ad Polyc.* iii. 2); and this type of formulation, which, though it has a 'modalistic' complexion, was not put forward in a modalistic sense, and might be described as 'religious-modalistic,' or 'naive-modalistic,' was especially popular in the theological tradition of Asia Minor.[1] The sense in which such formulations were understood by the 'simplices' may be seen in the so-called modalistic Monarchianism. To that school of doctrine there was nothing objectionable in the idea that God had transformed Himself in the manner indicated, and it could be said of Him:

Τοῦτον εἶναι ἀόρατον ὅτε μὴ ὁρᾶται, ὁρατὸν δὲ ὅτε ὁρᾶται· ἀγέννητον δὲ ὅτε μὴ γεννᾶται, γεννητὸν δὲ ὅταν γεννᾶται ἐκ Παρθένου· ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀθάνατον ὅτε μὴ πάσχῃ μήτε θνήσκῃ, ἐπὰν δὲ πάθη προσέλθῃ, πάσχειν καὶ θνήσκειν (Hippolytus, *Philosoph.* x. 27; cf. Loofs, *Dogmengesch.* § 27, 3*b*, p. 185).

That in quarters where the subject of the Incarnation was found in the Logos as distinguished from the θεὸς πατήρ such conceptions should be transferred to the Logos by simple minds is not to be wondered at, and the fact of such transference is capable of proof. Basil the Great is acquainted with and argues against those who interpret the incarnation of the Logos in the sense that πᾶσα ἡ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς φύσις ἐτράπη (*Ep.* ccliii. 2), while in Hilary (*de Trin.* x. 57; cf. 50) and in Cyril of Alexandria (*adv. Anthropomorph.* 19 and 18; cf. *PRE*[3] x. 250. 20 ff.) we have a polemic on the same lines. Thus, when at an earlier stage we find Celsus making sport of the notion that the θεὸς λόγος forsook His throne and suffered a μεταβολὴ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ εἰς κακόν (Origen, *c. Celsum*, iv. 5 and 14), we need not imagine that he is maliciously indulging his wit in forced interpretations; it is likely enough that he had already encountered that conception of the ἐνανθρώπησις τοῦ λόγου which we can trace in the 4th century. And, indeed, does not the καταβαίνειν in Jn 3^{13} $6^{33.38}$ point back to such popular conceptions? At all events it must soon have suggested them; and, alike under the influence of the Johannine passages and apart from them, analogous ideas have been current among the masses in all periods. It may well be that they were not associated with the academic concept κένωσις, but so far as the notion was popularly understood it would derive its connotation from the ideas in question. Popular preaching and poetic language frequently adapted themselves to such views. Even to-day, in the evangelical songs of the Church, we are often told, *e.g.*, how the Son of God 'left His throne of glory,' and the like. In all periods, too, there have been theologians whose 'system' was cast in the mould of popular doctrine, or was at least largely indebted to it.

(*b*) *The Apologetic and Arian conceptions of the mutability of the Logos.*—In the early days of Christian theology, among certain of the 2nd cent. Apologists, there appears a train of thought which agreed to some extent with the popular conceptions just noticed, but differed from them widely in origin. Justin (*Dial.* cxxvii.), Theophilus of Antioch (*ad Autol.* ii. 22), and Tertullian, in conformity with the subordinationism of their philosophical doctrine of the Logos, and with a view to preserving both the philosophical idea of God as abstractly supramundane and the reality of the Biblical the-

[1] Cf. Loofs, *Nestorius*, pp. 107–125.

[1] Cf. Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*[4], Halle, 1906, § 21, 2*b*, p. 142.

ophanies, resolved the ideas of God's becoming visible in Christ indicated above (*a*) into the idea that the Logos [who had appeared in Christ] was a *δεύτερος θεός* who was not equal to the *ἄρρητος πατήρ* in the plenitude of the Divine majesty, and was capable of becoming visible. This idea finds its most uncompromising form of expression in Tertullian—although in a manner that repeatedly betrays its original reference to the historical Christ:

'Constat eum semper visum esse ab initio qui visus fuerit in fine, et eum nec in fine visum qui nec ab initio fuit visus [cf. 1 Ti 6[16]]; et ita duos esse, visum et invisum' (*adv. Prax.* xv.); 'quaecumque exigitis Deo digna habebuntur in Patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum Deo; quaecumque autem ut indigna reprehenditis deputabuntur in Filio et viso et audito et congresso' (*adv. Marc.* ii. 27).

That this idea was associated with the doctrine of the Kenosis by any of the Apologists can certainly not be proved; it is, in fact, hardly probable; for, so long as the 'Incarnation' could in some sense be brought into line with the theophanies of the OT, or with the operation of the Logos in philosophers (Justin, *Apol.* i. 5) and prophets, it was not an event of the kind that forced one to think of a self-limitation of the *θεὸς λόγος*: the *λόγος* had appeared *ἐν ἀνθρώπου μορφῇ* even to Joshua (Justin, *Dial.* lxi.); and Clement of Alexandria, who shared the Logos-conception of the Apologists, could actually say that the Logos also *διὰ τῶν προφητῶν ἐνεργήσας σὰρξ ἐγένετο* (*Excerpta*, xix.). But these notions of a 'Deus visibilis' existing side by side with the 'philosophorum Deus invisibilis' would have a very different effect among the people generally. Nor is there the slightest doubt that the Arian views of the *per se* mutable Son of God, who Himself became the subject of all the experiences of the historical Jesus, including His growth and His experience of hunger and pain, were connected by tradition with the Logos-doctrine of the Apologists, and it is probable that the Arians too made use of Ph 2[6] in the service of their Christology.

(*c*) *The orthodox doctrine of the immutability of the Logos.*—In the further development of the orthodox theology, if we are to judge by such utterances as are not designed merely for popular edification, the idea that the Logos *per se* could have relinquished invisibility for visibility, impassibility for passibility, and the Divine omnipresence for finite human existence was repudiated in the most positive terms. In Clement of Alexandria we may still trace an echo of his broad conception of incarnation indicated in (*b*) above, when he thus speaks: *οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταταί ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐ μεριζόμενος, οὐκ ἀποτεμνόμενος, οὐ μεταβαίνων ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, πάντη δὲ ὢν πάντοτε καὶ μηδαμῆ περιεχόμενος* (*Strom.* VII. ii. 5. 5).

All the later orthodox writers, when speaking in terms of theological science, express themselves in similar fashion. Origen makes use of the same ideas in order to parry the satire of Celsus referred to above. Celsus, he says, does not realize the power of God, nor does he realize that the Spirit of God fills the earth; God has descended in virtue of His *δύναμις*; the Logos, in becoming man, has neither passed from one locality to another nor undergone any other change; God changes not (Mal 3[6]), *μένων γὰρ τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἄτρεπτος συγκαταβαίνει τῇ προνοίᾳ καὶ τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν* (*c. Cels.* iv. 5 and 14; cf. v. 12). During the earthly life of Jesus, accordingly, the Logos was not confined 'intra brevissimi corporis claustra,' but rather 'et in corpore et ubique totus aderat Dei Filius' (*de Princ.* iv. 3 [30]).

This idea, viz. that during the earthly life of Jesus the Logos still continued to rule over all things, and that therefore He was not only wholly in Christ, but also wholly 'extra carnem'—a view which, as held also by the Calvinists, was spoken of by the orthodox Lutherans as the 'Extra Calvinisticum'—represents the settled belief of all the theologians of the early Church. Testimonies to its currency might be adduced alike from the East and from the West. To the theologians of the early Church it was, in view of the immutability of God, as obvious as it was unquestionable. Further, the Nicene Creed, in its anathemas, formulates as a dogma the thesis that the Logos is *ἄτρεπτος* and *ἀναλλοίωτος*. Of the theory that the Logos, in consequence of a mutation in His essential being, confined Himself to an existence in the historical Jesus, Basil the Great writes thus: *τοῦτο οὐδένα ἠγοῦμαι νοῦν ἔχοντα καὶ τὸν φόβον τοῦ θεοῦ κεκτημένον πάσχειν τὸ ἀρρώστημα* (*Ep.* ccxli. 2).

(*d*) *The common doctrine of the Kenosis in the early Church.*—On the assumption that the ideas discussed above were valid, there remained only one theologically intelligible view of *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* as implying an act of the Logos—the view, namely, to which Irenæus had given expression, though not in connexion with Ph 2[6]:[1]

συνανεπίαζεν <ὁ> υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, τέλειος ὤν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐ δι' ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου νήπιον οὕτω χωρούμενος, ὡς ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸν χωρεῖν ἠδύνατο (IV. xxxviii. 2; cf. 1).

This view was adopted by Novatian (cf. **2** (*d*) above), and also by Origen:

'Per ipsam sui exinanitionem studet nobis deitatis plenitudinem demonstrare' (*de Princ.* I. ii. 8).

Origen explains it by a figure, and his idea may be concisely expressed as follows:

Imagine a statue of such size as to fill the whole world—its very magnitude would preclude its being seen; a small copy of it in the same material, however, would give us some idea of it. Similarly, as we could not have beheld the splendour of the pure light flowing from the Divine majesty of the Logos, by His Kenosis He made it possible for us to look into His divine light; 'brevissimae insertus humani corporis formae ex operum virtutisque similitudine Dei Patris in se immensam atque invisibilem magnitudinem designabat' (*loc. cit.*).

Here the Kenosis is that self-limitation of the Logos which was involved in His manifestation in a human form, though at the same time He is not in any way limited as to His cosmic position. This conception of the Kenosis may be regarded as the recognized view of the early Church. It is the view alike of the theologians who refer the *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* to the *λόγος ἄσαρκος*, and so identify *κένωσις* with *ἐνανθρώπησις* (**2** (*a*)), and of those who find the subject of *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε* in the *λόγος ἔνσαρκος*. For the theologians who identify *κένωσις* and *ἐνανθρώπησις* firmly believe, like the other group, that the Logos, notwithstanding His incarnation, remained *ἀναλλοίωτος*, and, as regards His divine place in the universe, unconditioned—*ἀκένωτος* (as Apollinaris himself puts it; cf. **4** (*b*) below). In the view of all these theologians, moreover, the two *μορφαί* are in reality co-existent, inasmuch as the *πρὸς θεὸν ἰσότης*—even according to Apollinaris (cf. **4** (*b*))—was still retained by the *λόγος ἔνσαρκος*. Both groups were alike convinced that the 'flesh,' *i.e.* the human vehicle of the manifestation, stood in the way of a complete revelation, or—what is the same thing, *κένωσις* and *κρύψις* being here identical—made it impossible for the Deity to reveal His majesty fully within the limitations involved. Thus the two interpretations given respectively in **2** (*a*) and **2** (*c*) above might frequently merge in each other. Nor, indeed, does the Pelagian exegesis (**2** (*b*) above), to which that of the Antiochians frequently approximates,[2] rest upon any other conception of the Kenosis. The idea that the Logos in assuming human nature surrendered the universal operation of His deity certainly seems very far removed from the idea that He became incarnate in a man who veiled the indwelling *πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος*, humbled Himself, etc. Yet, so long as the 'Extra Calvinisticum' (cf. (*c*) above)

[1] Cf., however, IV. xxiv. 2 [Massuet].

[2] Cf. also Justinian, *adv. Nonnullos*, etc. (*PG* lxxxvi. 1, col. 1063 A).

is adhered to, the Kenosis is taken in a sense essentially the same in both cases.

4. Diverse aspects of the early Church theories.—It is nevertheless undeniable that the theories regarding ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε propounded by the early theologians seem to differ very greatly from one another. The extreme poles of the variation are found in Apollinaris and Pelagius. But the differences do not arise out of any essential disparity of view regarding the Kenosis; they are due rather to the various degrees in which theological theory is mingled with popular doctrine.

(*a*) *The influence of popular doctrine upon the orthodox theologians.*—Although Clement of Alexandria held, as already noted, that a μεταβαίνειν ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον could not possibly be ascribed to the Logos, we nevertheless find him saying: αὐτὸς κατῆλθε (*Quis dives*, xxxvii. 2). Origen often expresses himself in similar fashion, and, indeed, no theologian of the following period ever quite discarded the formulæ and symbols of the popular conception of the ἐνανθρώπησις. Even the Nicene Creed, immediately before its anathema upon the ἀλλοιωτὸν λέγοντας εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, speaks of τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς κατελθόντα. Frequently, too, the old 'religious-modalistic' view of the person of Jesus, or the plethora of rhetorical language that to some extent adopted its terms, made its influence felt. Gregory of Nazianzen, *e.g.*, writes thus:

μεταβαίνει τόπον ὁ ἐκ τόπου ὁ μηδενὶ τόπῳ χωρούμενος, ὁ ἄχρονος, ὁ ἀσώματος, ὁ ἀπερίληπτος (*Orat.* xxxvii. 2);

and yet he not only accepts, as is shown by these words, the 'Extra Calvinisticum,' but still adheres to the essentially 'Nestorian' view of Origen, viz. that the Incarnation was effected 'substantia animae inter Deum carnemque mediante':

ὁ ἀχώρητος χωρεῖται διὰ μέσης ψυχῆς νοερᾶς μεσιτευούσης θεότητι καὶ σαρκὸς παχύτητι (*Orat.* xxxviii. 13).

(*b*) *Apollinaris of Laodicea.*—Of all the theologians of the early Church it was Apollinaris of Laodicea who accommodated his views most fully to popular dogmatics. His doctrine of the Incarnation, according to which the Logos is the νοῦς of the μία φύσις σύνθετος of Christ, might even be described as a materially and formally ingenious attempt to mould the popular views of the ἐνανθρώπησις into a theological theory. In Apollinaris, indeed, we find statements that seem to indicate a type of Kenosis implying a real change in the λόγος:

σάρκωσις κένωσις (Lietzmann, *Apollinaris*, frag. 124, p. 237); εἰ μὴ νοῦς ἔνσαρκος γέγονεν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ σοφία ἦν ἐν τῷ νῷ, οὐ κατέβη ὁ κύριος οὐδὲ ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν (*ib.* frag. 71, p. 221, 14 f.). Yet he also says: κενώσας μὲν ἑαυτὸν κατὰ τὴν μόρφωσιν <δούλου>, ἀκένωτος δὲ καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος κατὰ τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν (οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀλλοίωσις περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν) οὐδὲ ἐλαττοῦται οὐδὲ αὐξάνεται (*de Unione*, 6, Lietzmann, p. 188, 1); οὐκ ἄρα μετέπεσεν ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ἰσότης, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτος ἡ θεότης ἔμεινεν ἐν ταυτότητι (*ib.* 15, p. 192, 2 f.).

Even in Apollinaris, therefore, notwithstanding his affinity to the popular doctrine, there is no place for a theory of the Kenosis which diverges from the general tradition of the early Church (cf. 3 (*d*) above).

(*c*) *The Antiochians.*—It is true that the Christology which is furthest removed from Apollinarianism, *i.e.* that of Nestorius, and that of Pelagius (which coincides with the latter in many of its formulæ), does not merely 'seem to differ.' In so far as, in the divergence referred to, the question regarding the agent in the person of Christ was brought to discussion in the theorizings of the early theologians, the differences are profound. The Nestorian doctrine of the Kenosis (cf. Loofs, *Nestorius*, p. 82 ff.) is a lucid development of the Kenotic views to which Irenæus and Novatian had already given expression, and which were never really discarded by the theology of the early Church—a development which had disengaged itself as far as possible from popular dogmatics. The Apollinarian doctrine, on the other hand, tends unquestionably to pass beyond the earlier views and to advance towards a conception of the Kenosis more akin to the popular idea. This tendency also appears, though to a slighter degree, in Cyril's theory of a ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν of the two natures in Christ which is not clearly distinguished from a ἕνωσις φυσική, and also in the orthodox Chalcedonian doctrine of the ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν, although that doctrine was put forward as an 'unio personalis.' In the early Church, however—even in the hands of Apollinaris and the Monophysites—the tendency never attained its final development. This would have been secured only if the idea of the μία φύσις σύνθετος with which Apollinaris had at least attempted to deal in a serious fashion,[1] the idea of the ἕνωσις φυσική, to which Cyril sometimes attaches the same meaning,[2] and that of the ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν had been fully wrought out in Greek theological thought. But the Apollinarian theory of the μία φύσις σύνθετος and the allied idea of a ἕνωσις φυσική conflicted with that ἀναλλοίωτον εἶναι of the Logos which was likewise maintained, and also with the accredited doctrine that the Logos had not forfeited His πρὸς θεὸν ἰσότης, while, in the orthodox tradition, the theory of the ἕνωσις καθ' ὑπόστασιν broke down in face of Theopaschitism, since even the idea that εἷς τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος πέπονθε σαρκί adds nothing to the theologically unserviceable paradox of Athanasius: αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ πάσχων καὶ μὴ πάσχων (*Ep. ad Epict.* 6). Nothing but an earnest and resolute handling of the ἕνωσις φυσική in an unreserved Theopaschitism could have yielded a real Kenosis of the Logos. But could the Monophysite theologians, who attached great importance to the Trisagion in its monophysitically expanded form, unreservedly maintain the idea expressed in the words ἀθάνατος . . . σταυρωθεὶς δι' ἡμᾶς?

5. The Kenosis in the Middle Ages, and in the Roman Catholic Church.—Mediæval theology, so far as it was concerned at all with the idea of the Kenosis—the idea certainly never stands out prominently—continued to adhere to the consensus of the early Church in its Western form. The same may be said of Roman Catholic dogma at the present day. Thus, according to Wetzer and Welte (*Kirchen-Lexikon*, iii.[2] [1884] 271) 'semet ipsum exinanivit' (Ph 2[7]) is affirmed of Christ's assumption of human nature, 'and not, as pseudomystics and many Protestant theologians believe, of His divine nature and person *per se*.' The *Kirchen-Lexikon* (xii.[2] [1901] 179) can speak of the neo-Protestant theory (see below, 8) thus summarily dismissed only in the most caustic terms:

'Even the overt denial of the hypostatic union is hardly a more mischievous attack upon the deity of Christ than this "Kenosis," which subverts the essential nature of God Himself; not unjustly has Biedermann characterized this doctrine as "a complete kenosis of the understanding."'

6. The Kenosis in the Reformed theology.—The Kenosis was insisted upon more strongly by the so-called Reformed theology, which found the subject of ἐκένωσε in the Logos—whether ἄσαρκος, as becoming man, or ἔνσαρκος—and connected the idea with its doctrine of the 'states' of Christ. In the earlier theologians of the Reformed Church, in fact, we occasionally find assertions which readily explain why certain Lutherans spoke of a special 'Reformed doctrine of the Kenosis':

'Christus in assumpta forma servi sese evacuavit omni sua gloria divina, maiestate, omnipotentia, omnipræsentia' (H. Zanchi, in A. Schweizer, *Die Glaubenslehre der evangel.-reformierten Kirche*, ii., Zürich, 1847, p. 297).

The sense in which such utterances are to be understood, however, is made clear by Zanchi

[1] Cf. Lietzmann, frag. 113, p. 234: μεσίτης θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐν Χριστῷ· οὐκ ἄρα οὔτε ἄνθρωπος ὅλος οὔτε θεός, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου μίξις.

[2] *De recta Fide*, xl. [*PG* lxxvi. 1193 B]: Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς . . . εἷς ἐν τι τὸ μεταξὺ συγκείμενος.

himself in his interpretation of ἐκένωσε as an action of the Logos:

'Gloriam illam et majestatem in qua erat apud patrem, ita abdiderit in forma servi, ut ea penitus evacuasse visus sit, quia nimirum illa gloria in carne non fulgebat, ut ab omnibus conspici possit' (in H. Schultz, *Die Lehre von der Gottheit Christi*, Gotha, 1881, p. 178).

Thus the Reformed theology, even in assertions that seem to go beyond the early Church tradition, does not really break away from the latter. It retained the 'Extra Calvinisticum' in all its precision:

'Cum divinitas comprehendi non queat et omni loco praesens sit, necessario consequitur, esse eam quidem extra naturam humanam quam assumpsit, sed nihilo minus tamen esse in eadem eique personaliter unitam permanere' (*Catechismus Palat.*, quæst. 78). 'Sic λόγος naturam humanam sibi univit ut totus eam inhabitet et totus, quippe immensus et infinitus, extra eam sit' (S. Maresius, in M. Schneckenburger, *Zur kirchlichen Christologie*, Pforzheim, 1847, p. 9, note 2).

And, where the Reformed theology connects the exaltation with *both* natures, this is to be understood in the sense that the 'divina natura exaltata est κατά τι, patefactione majestatis quae in statu exinanitionis tanquam sub velo sese occultaverat' (J. H. Alstedt, in Schweizer, *op. cit.* ii. 345).

7. **The Kenosis in orthodox Lutheran doctrine.**—The Lutherans and the 'Kenoticists' of the 19th cent. were in their respective ways the first to strike out upon really fresh lines. Luther, who, at an early stage (A D. 1518: Weimar ed., 1883 ff., i. 268 f.), and, as always (cf. *PRE*[3] x. 259), in dependence upon Erasmus (Letter of Feb. 1519, in E. L. Enders, *Briefwechsel Luthers*, Calw and Stuttgart, 1903, i. 439. 65) and in conscious opposition to the Fathers who Ph 2[6ff.] 'ad divinitatem torserunt' (Enders, p. 440. 93), had referred the ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε to the historical Christ, and to Him 'secundum humanitatem' (*ib.* p. 93), was led, in consequence of the sacramentarian controversy, to give definite expression to his conviction that Christ was 'Deus revelatus,' precisely in His humanity, in the genuinely scholastic theologoumenon of his doctrine of Christ's omnipresence:

'Where you set God before me, there you must set before me the Humanity likewise: they cannot be separated . . . it has become one person' (*Bekenntnis*, Erlangen ed., 1826–57, xxx. 212).

As regards Luther himself, we may doubt (cf. *PRE*[3] x. 259) whether, apart from his theory regarding the presence of Christ's body in the Supper, he ever seriously grappled with the idea that the humanity of Christ had in a real 'communicatio' received the divine attributes at the inception of the 'unio personalis' in the Virgin's womb; but, as regards the Formula of Concord (1577), there can be no question that this idea was endorsed in all seriousness:

'Quod ad majestatem attinet ad quam Christus secundum humanitatem suam exaltatus est, non eam tum demum accepit, cum a mortuis resurrexit et ad coelos ascendit, sed tum cum in utero matris conciperetur' (*Sol. decl.* viii. 13).

Here the question how, on this assumption, the 'status exinanitionis' is distinguished from the 'status exaltationis' still remained outside the sphere of living interest, and thus received no distinct answer. Even the idea that the Kenosis, which, in agreement with Luther and all the later orthodox Lutherans, was ascribed to the 'humanitas Christi,' presupposed a κτῆσις ('possessio') of the 'idiomata divina' on the part of Christ's human nature in His 'status exinanitionis' was not rigorously adhered to; and still less was the question debated whether, the κτῆσις being assumed, the Kenosis should be regarded only as a κρύψις χρήσεως ('usurpationis') or as a κένωσις χρήσεως; art. viii. 64 seems to assume no more than a κρύψις χρήσεως, while in art. viii. 26 it is asserted that Christ 'secundum assumptam naturam, ad plenam *possessionem* et divinae majestatis *usurpationem* evectus est' only in virtue of His exaltation.

It was the controversy between the Tübingen and the Giessen theologians (1616–27)—who were at one in their view of the κτῆσις—that first brought this Lutheran problem regarding the Kenosis into the field of serious debate. The Tübingen group, who thought of the κένωσις only as a κρύψις χρήσεως, thereby fell into manifest absurdities and a concealed Docetism. Of the Giessen group, Balthasar Mentzer († 1627) tried to establish the theory that the Kenosis was a κένωσις χρήσεως by arguments[1] which must be regarded as an attempt to supplant the idea of a substance with permanently—even if only potentially—inherent properties (an idea prevalent in the doctrine of the Natures, as also in the doctrine of God) by the idea of the living actuality. Mentzer's formulation triumphed over the Tübingen theologians, but the profounder thoughts by which he tried to establish it were soon forgotten.

8. **The modern 'Kenoticists.'**—Views forming a complete contrast to those of orthodox Lutheranism—views, indeed, which the Formula of Concord bans with an anathema (*Epitome*, viii. 39)—are found among the modern 'Kenotic' theologians, who regard the κένωσις as a real surrender of the 'forma Dei' for the 'forma servi,' and thus assume that the Logos, in order to become man, actually renounced, either wholly or in part, His divine attributes. Such ideas, which recall the popular dogmatics of earlier and later times (cf. 3 (*a*) above), soon emerged sporadically in Protestant theology. They crop out in Menno Simons († 1559);[2] N. L. Zinzendorf († 1760) developed them with all the self-confidence of a lay theologian,[3] and, following the fresh line taken by F. C. Oetinger († 1782), P. M. Hahn († 1790), and other Pietists, the Pietistic physician Samuel Collenbusch († 1803) published lengthy disquisitions on the same side.[4] In the confessional theology of Neo-Lutheranism the first to advocate kindred views was E. W. Sartorius (1831 and 1832). It is possible that popular views supplied the incentive to some of these pioneers of the modern doctrine of the Kenosis. But the present writer thinks that this does not apply to the modern doctrine itself, which originated rather in the endeavour at once to maintain the Trinitarian doctrine of the early Church and to do justice to the true humanity of Jesus Christ and the unity of His person. The writer who gave the doctrine its scientific foundation was G. Thomasius († 1875);[5] and, in Germany, his views, with more or less modification, were adopted by many Lutherans—C. T. A. Liebner († 1871), C. K. Hofmann († 1877), W. F. Gess († 1891), C. F. A. Kahnis († 1888), Franz Delitzsch († 1890), F. Frank († 1894), C. E. Luthardt († 1902), and others—and by a few Reformed theologians, *e.g.* J. P. Lange († 1884) and J. H. A. Ebrard († 1888). In French Switzerland the new doctrine found an early adherent in F. Godet († 1900). It first gained a footing in Britain about 1889,[6] by which date fresh tendencies were already asserting themselves in Germany. As recently as 1903, Sweden had a convinced champion of the doctrine in O. Bensow (see literature at end of art.). The views of these writers vary greatly in detail—appearing now in a purely Biblical (Godet) and now in a speculative (Liebner, Hofmann, Frank) form, here showing great re-

[1] Cf. E. Weber, *Der Einfluss der protest. Schulphilosophie auf die orthodox-lutherische Dogmatik*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 163 ff.

[2] 'Van der Menschwerdinge,' *Opera Omnia Theologica*, Amsterdam, 1681, p. 361*a*.

[3] Cf. B. Becker, *Zinzendorf*, Leipzig, 1886, pp. 387–392.

[4] Cf. *PRE*[3] iv. 238.

[5] *Beiträge zur kirchlichen Christologie*, Nuremberg, 1845, *Christi Person und Werk*, 3 vols., Erlangen, 1853–61,[2] Leipzig, 1886–88.

[6] Cf. W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, Oxford, 1910, p. 74 ff.

straint, there venturing upon the most daring conclusions (Gess)—and cannot be set forth here; we must simply refer the reader to Bensow's historical introduction (pp. 42–127) and to the works of Dorner, Schultz, and Günther cited below.

One brief observation, however, should be made. The modern theory of the Kenosis is consistent only on condition that it surrenders everything in the nature of an 'Extra Calvinisticum.' Thomasius, in fact, actually ventures to say in his *Beiträge* (p. 236):

'The Logos reserved to Himself neither a special existence nor a special knowledge outside His humanity. He truly became man.'

Such a view certainly secures the true humanity of Jesus and the unity of His person. But as certainly it traverses the immutability of God, and it is fraught with conclusions most incongruous with the conception of the Trinity. If, again, the 'Extra Calvinisticum' be in any degree retained—as it always is when, say, the 'immanent' and the 'relative' attributes of God are distinguished in such a way that the latter alone are regarded as having been relinquished by the Logos—then (to say nothing of the logical difficulties) the theory does not secure what it aimed at securing, viz. the unity of the person of Jesus. If, however, in order to obviate the logical difficulties, the Kenoticists, in their statements regarding the divine nature and its 'idiomata,' seek to bring the ancient doctrine of substance more or less into conformity with that of the living reality, the result is a blurring of the distinction between their own theory and the Christology most repugnant to them, *i.e.* 'Nestorianism.' Moreover, the modern theory of the Kenosis, in all its forms, still carries an air of presumption, inasmuch as it ventures upon constructions which would have a meaning only if God's relation to the world, or, let us say, the relation of the Logos to God, and His divine and divine-human self-consciousness, could be grasped—and analyzed—by the finite mind of man.

9. Estimate and conclusion.—Does the foregoing discussion throw any light upon the *κένωσις* in Ph $2^{6ff.}$? The present writer ventures to think that it does. The early Church exegesis of the passage and the early Church theory of the Kenosis would seem to throw us back upon an interpretation of St. Paul's words that starts from the integral personality of the historical Jesus. In the Jesus Christ of history there dwelt *πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος*. Can we not therefore also say that He was *ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*? This question, more especially in consideration of Gn 1^{26} (*ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν*), 2 Co 4^4 (*Χριστοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*), and 2 Co 3^{18} (*τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα*; cf. Ro 12^2 *μεταμορφοῦσθε τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός*), is, as we think, to be answered in the affirmative. Adam desired to grasp at equality with God (Gn $3^{5ff.}$); but He in whom dwelt *τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος, οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ, ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε, κτλ.* No exegete of the early Church ever hazarded the mythological idea that the Logos surrendered the *μορφὴ θεοῦ* for the *μορφὴ ἀνθρώπου*. What, then, is there to justify our ascribing the idea to the Apostle? His words refer to the historical Christ. The theory of Irenæus, that the Incarnation, the self-manifestation of God in a human life, necessarily entailed a self-limitation of God or of the Logos—*οὕτω χωρούμενος, ὡς ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸν χωρεῖν ἠδύνατο* (cf. 3 (*a*) above)—cannot certainly be finally set aside, since as human beings we must perforce think and speak of divine operations in human terms. But it is hardly likely that in Ph $2^{6ff.}$ St. Paul had any such thought. And apart from the (as the present writer believes) erroneous application of Ph 2^6 to the Logos, it is improbable that any theologian would ever have spoken of such a self-limitation as a 'Kenosis.'

LITERATURE.—In addition to Histories of Dogma, text-books of Dogmatics and Biblical Theology, and Commentaries on Philippians, see M. Schneckenburger, *Zur kirchlichen Christologie*, Pforzheim, 1847; I. A. Dorner, *Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi*[2], 2 vols., Stuttgart and Berlin, 1845–53 (Eng. tr., 5 vols., Edinburgh, 1861–63); A. Tholuck, *Disputatio Christologica de loco Pauli Ep. ad Phil. ii. 6–9*, Halle, 1848; I. A. Dorner, 'Über die richtige Fassung des dogmatischen Begriffs der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes,' in *JDTh* i.–iii. [1856–58]; G. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, ii.[2], Erlangen, 1857; E. H. Gifford, *The Incarnation: A Study of Philippians ii. 5–11*, London, 1897; F. Loofs, art. 'Kenosis' in *PRE*[3] x. [1901] 246–263; O. Bensow, *Die Lehre von der Kenose*, Leipzig, 1903; W. Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*, Oxford, 1910; H. Schultz, *Lehre von der Gottheit Christi*, Gotha, 1881; E. Günther, *Die Entwicklung der Lehre von der Person Christi im 19ten Jahrhundert*, Tübingen, 1911; H. Cremer, *Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der neutestamentl. Gräzität*[10], ed. J. Kögel, pts. 1–6, Gotha, 1911–13.

FRIEDRICH LOOFS.

KĒRES (Κήρ, Κῆρες).—In singular or plural form the word occurs countless times in Greek literature of all periods; it is 'perhaps the most untranslatable of all Greek words' (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*[2], p. 212), ranging from a vivid sense of personal vital energy to mere metaphor out of which all literal meaning has faded.[1]

Kēres are primarily sprites or spiritual beings (*δαίμονες*), invisible yet very real agents, not mere impersonations; the conception is wider and more vital than that of ghosts. Kēres are evil, or at least generally associated with evil for human bodies and souls, and, indeed, all earthly things.

'There are many fair things in human life, but in most of them are, as it were, adherent Kēres which pollute and spoil them'—*οἷον κῆρες ἐπιπεφύκασιν, αἳ καταμιαίνουσιν αὐτά* (Plato, *Laws*, xi. 937 D)—'like a sort of personified bacilli' (J. E. Harrison, p. 166). Cf. Clemens Alex. *Strom.* vi. ii. 21 (p. 749): *Θεόπομπος γράφει· 'εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὸν κίνδυνον τὸν παρόντα διαφυγόντας ἀδεὼς διάγειν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον χρόνον, οὐκ ἂν ἦν θαυμαστὸν φιλοψυχεῖν, νῦν δὲ τοσαῦται κῆρες τῷ βίῳ παραπεφύκασιν ὥστε τὸν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις θάνατον αἱρετώτερον εἶναι δοκεῖν.'*

All diseases are caused by, or rather are, these spirits, which find entrance to body and mind despite all precautions:

νοῦσοι δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ ἠδ' ἐπὶ νυκτὶ | αὐτόματοι φοιτῶσι, κακὰ θνητοῖσι φέρουσαι | σιγῇ, ἐπεὶ φωνὴν ἐξείλετο μητίετα Ζεύς (Hesiod. *Works and Days*, 102 ff.).

Originally these evil sprites, all the manifold ills of man, were shut fast in the great jar (*πίθος*), but in an evil hour Pandora lifted the lid, and they all flew out (*ib.* 90 ff.).[2] Since that day a swarm (Æsch. *Suppl.* 684: *νούσων δ' ἑσμὸς . . . ἀτερπής*) as of noxious insects hovers unseen in wait for man, spirits of calamity, disease, madness, old age, and death, from which he cannot hide or escape:

Κῆρες ἐφεστᾶσιν θανάτοιο | μυρίαι, ἃς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν βροτὸν οὐδ' ὑπαλύξαι (Hom. *Il.* xii. 326 f.);

they are so closely packed that the spike of a blade of corn cannot pass between them:

ὅτι 'πλείη μὲν γαῖα κακῶν πλείη δὲ θάλασσα', καὶ 'τοιάδε θνητοῖσι κακὰ | κακῶν ἀμφί τε κῆρες εἰλεῦνται, | κενὴ δ' εἰσδυσις οὐδ' ἀθέρι'[3] (tr. in Plut. *Consol. ad Apoll.* 26).

Even Hope ('Ελπίς), just like other human passions, is often an evil Kēr:

ἁ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος Ἐλπὶς | πολλοῖς μὲν ὄνασις ἀνδρῶν, | πολλοῖς δ' Ἀπάτα κουφονόων ἐρώτων (Soph. *Ant.* 615 ff.)—'to many is a Delusion that wings the dreams of desire'—an external agent luring men to ruin.[4]

[1] The collection of passages in Roscher extends to eleven closely packed pages. The word is connected with Skr. *śar*, 'tear asunder, injure, destroy,' O. Ir. *ir-chre*, 'destruction,' etc. (E. Boisacq, *Dict. étymol. de la langue grecque*, Heidelberg, 1907 ff., pp. 450, 435).

[2] *πρὶν μὲν γὰρ ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων | νόσφιν ἄτερ τε κακῶν, καὶ ἄτερ χαλεποῖο πόνοιο, | νούσων τ' ἀργαλέων, αἵτ' ἀνδράσι κῆρας ἔδωκαν.* For the last words ('grievous diseases which give Kēres to men') J. E. Harrison (art. 'Pandora's Box' in *JHS* xx. [1900] 103) proposes *ἅστ' ἀνδράσι Κῆρες ἔδωκαν* ('which Kēres give to men'). This is probably right.

[3] *ἀθέρι* is G. Murray's correction of the MS *αἰθέρι*. Cf. *καὶ ὡς ἔφη τις τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν σοφῶν κενὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ὅσον ἀθέρα καὶ τρίχα βαλεῖν*, in the dialogue *Theophrastus* (p. 390 E) by Æneas of Gaza.

[4] Cf. Thuc. v. 103 (the Melian dialogue), where, 'in a style of labyrinthine contortion' (Dion. Hal. *Thucyd.* 40), he makes

So Demokritos calls Jealousy, Envy, and Hatred Κῆρες:

οὐκ ὀλίγας κῆρας ἐν τῷ βίῳ διώσεαι, φθόνον καὶ ζῆλον καὶ δυσμενίην (fr. 191 = Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[3], Berlin, 1912, ii. 101; cf. fr. 285: γινώσκειν χρεὼν ἀνθρωπίνην βιοτὴν ἄφαυρήν τε ἐοῦσαν καὶ ὀλιγοχρόνιον, πολλῇσιν δὲ κηρσὶ συμπεφυρμένην καὶ ἀμηχανίῃσιν).

Theophrastos, in his *de Caus. plant.* v. x. 4, says that each locality has its own peculiar Kēres dangerous to plants, some coming from the soil, others from the air—the naive explanation of men facing the bewildering mutability of Nature before her 'laws' were discovered.

From the swarm of minor ills, two emerge and impress the Greek mind as most relentless and most to be dreaded—Old Age and Death:

Κῆρες δὲ παριστήκασι μέλαιναι· | ἡ μὲν ἔχουσα τέλος γήραος ἀργαλέου, | ἡ δ' ἑτέρη θανάτοιο (Mimnerm. ii. 5 ff.; cf. Theognis, 765 f., where the prayer τηλοῦ δὲ κακὰς ἀπὸ κῆρας ἀμύναι, | γῆρας τ' οὐλόμενον, καὶ θανάτοιο τέλος strongly expresses the sense of the personal reality of Kēres; just as in 835—Δισσαί τοι πάσιος κῆρες—the Kēres of Thirst and Drunkenness lurk in the wine-cup, not in a mere metaphorical sense).

The combination 'Kēres of Death' tended to be narrowed in meaning to that of Death simply and the fate of Death; this is the familiar Homeric semi-abstract use in the oft-recurring phrase κὴρ θανάτοιο (generally, but not everywhere, correctly rendered 'fate of death'). In Hom. *Od.* xii. 157, ἦ κεν ἀλευάμενοι θάνατον καὶ κῆρα φύγοιμεν, we seem to 'catch the word at a moment of transition' (J. E. Harrison, p. 174). In one passage only in the *Iliad* (xviii. 535—the Shield of Achilles) is a Kēr materialized, as it were, and exhibited as a demon of slaughter raging on the battle-field; but that is in a work of plastic art. This is further developed in Hesiod (*Shield of Hercules*, 249 f.: a crowd of 'blue-black Kēres' [κῆρες κυάνεαι]; cf. Paus. v. xix. 6: description of a female figure inscribed Kēr on the chest of Kypselos at Olympia).

The conception of Kēres of blessings, and especially of a Kēr within a man as in some sort a Genius, or δαίμων, on which his life depends for good or evil, is almost completely overlaid by the more baneful aspect (cf. the δίχθαδιαι κῆρες of Achilles in Hom. *Il.* ix. 411; Hes. *Theog.* 217). Probably this idea lies at the root of the curious Hesiodic epithet κηριτρεφής (*Works and Days*, 416), not 'nourished for death,' but 'Kēr-nourished'[1]—the word bearing witness to a 'primitive doubleness of functions when the Kēres were demons of all work' (J. E. Harrison, p. 185), analogous to the Moirai which control human weal and woe. This conception was never developed to any precision, and remains, even in Homer, incoherent and self-contradictory (see B. Niese, *Entwickelung der hom. Poesie*, Berlin, 1882, p. 34, note 1).

Something of what the Athenians thought about Kēres is discoverable from the customs connected with the Anthesteria, or Feast of All Souls—a festival overlaid in classical times with Dionysiac elements originally foreign and of more recent date.[2] Its real meaning is indicated by the ritual command spoken apparently on the last day, called Chytroi—'Out of the house, ye Kēres! 'tis no longer Anthesteria' (θύραζε κῆρες, οὐκ ἔτ' Ἀνθεστήρια—ὡς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Ἀνθεστηρίοις τῶν ψυχῶν περιερχομένων, Suid. *s.v.* θύραζε).[3] The festival was a great day for the Athenians when they specially propitiated the ancestral ghosts, who had been summoned from the tomb on the first day, the Pithoigia (πίθος, 'burial-urn' or 'jar'), which came to be misunderstood as a festival of the opening of the wine-jar and first tasting of the new wine, when the three days of the Anthesteria became a revel of Dionysos (cf. G. Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, p. 30; and Phot. *s.v.* μιαρὰ ἡμέρα: ἐν τοῖς Χουσὶν Ἀνθεστηριῶνος μηνός, ἐν ᾧ δοκοῦσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν τελευτησάντων ἀνιέναι).[1]

Kēres, therefore, were also souls of the dead, and on vases they appear as gnat-like figures, winged, but in other respects human, flitting about the grave-mound, or enclosed within it (reff. in Roscher). As ghosts (εἴδωλα) they are powerful for good, but more specially for evil, and quick to take offence (cf. schol. in Aristoph. *Av.* 1490: ἥρωες δυσόργητοι καὶ χαλεποὶ τοῖς ἐμπελάζουσι γίγνονται—quoted in Rohde, *Psyche*[4], p. 246, note 4). They become ministers of death, and actually hale off living souls[2] (cf. Hom. *Od.* xiv. 207; Apoll. Rhod. *Argon.* iv. 1665 ff.: 'Medeia invoked the Death-spirits, devourers of life, the swift hounds of Hades, who, hovering through all the air, swoop down upon the living' [R. C. Seaton, in *Loeb Class. Libr.*, London, 1912]).

Most potent for evil is the vengeful ghost of a murdered man, which has gone to join the great company of maleficent 'elementals':

ὦ μεγάλαυχοι καὶ φθερσιγενεῖς | Κῆρες Ἐρινύες, αἵτ' Οἰδιπόδα | γένος ἀλέσατε πρύμνοθεν οὕτως (Æsch. *Sept.* 1054 ff.).

The word Erinys in this combination Κῆρες Ἐρινύες was originally simply a descriptive epithet meaning 'angry ones,' just as Eumenides is 'kindly ones.'[3] So 'the idea of Erinys as distinct from Kēr is developed out of a human relation intensely felt' (J. E. Harrison, p. 214)—as Plato probably recognized (*Laws*, ix. 865). Already in Homer, however, the Erinyes are no longer human souls, but avengers of souls upon the living (see *Il.* ix. 571: τῆς δ' ἠροφοῖτις Ἐρινὺς ἔκλυεν—when summoned by Althaia to avenge her *two* brothers). Abstraction being pushed still further, the Erinyes become avengers of offences against all moral law, or even the laws of physical Nature:

τῷ δ' ἄλγεα κάλλιπ' ὀπίσσω | πολλὰ μάλ', ὅσσα τε μητρὸς ἐρινύες ἐκτελέουσιν (Hom. *Od.* xi. 279 f.)—compared with *Od.* ii. 135 f.: ἐπεὶ μήτηρ στυγερὰς ἀρήσατ' ἐρινύς, | οἶκον ἀπερχομένῳ. See also *Il.* ix. 454 and xix. 259, 418.[4]

Formless in Homer, they were first differentiated from Kēres and analogous mythological figures, and portrayed in visible shape in drama, by Æschylus (*Eumen.* 46 ff.). The more primitive view of them reappears later in literature at intervals, as, *e.g.*, in Sophocles (*Œd. Tyr.* 471 and 481), as embodied Dooms (cf. Eur. *Elek.* 1252). It would be hard to prove that the primitive conception ever died out completely.

LITERATURE.—A long art. by O. Crusius, in Roscher, ii. (1890–1897), gives the fullest collection of passages, chronologically arranged; see also O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, ii., Munich, 1906 (in I. von Müller, *Handb. der klass. Altertumswiss.*). The fullest general treatment, apart from mere accumulation of references, is J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*[2], Cambridge, 1908.

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[1] O. Crusius aptly brings the epithet κηριτρεφής into connexion with the words of Hippokrates (Περὶ ἐνυπνίων, 2, p. 14 K): ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ἀποθανόντων αἱ τροφαὶ καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ σπέρματα γίγνονται. See E. Rohde, *Psyche*[4], Tübingen, 1907, p. 247, note 1.

[2] For the name see A. W. Verrall's art. 'The Name Anthesteria' in *JHS* xx. (1900) 115 ff. (cf. J. E. Harrison, p. 32 f.). It is derived from ἀναθέσσασθαι, and is a Feast of Revocation of the dead.

[3] Suidas gives as a usual form θύραζε Κᾶρες, κτλ. This has a certain plausibility, as we know that the household servants were admitted to the festivities and licence of the Pithoigia.

[1] Probably in classical days κῆρες had already become an old-fashioned word for souls, and the formulary may have been easily misunderstood' (J. E. Harrison, p. 35, note 1). A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen*, Leipzig, 1898, p. 386, will not accept this. But cf. the Lemuria at Rome (W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, p. 106).

[1] These ideas and practices of the Athenians were probably a survival from the pre-Hellenic stratum of race and religion.

[2] Cf. the beautiful vase fragment published in *JHS* xii. (1891) 340, where a Κὴρ θανάτοιο, a small winged figure, hovers over the head of a dying warrior, and is in the act of taking the breath of life from his lips—according to the probable interpretation.

[3] See Paus. VIII. xxv. 4: τῷ θυμῷ χρῆσθαι καλοῦσιν ἐρινύειν οἱ Ἀρκάδες, and cf. the story told in Paus. I. xliii. 7 about Koroibos, who slew the fiend Poine, the avenging ghost of the child of Psamathe; cf. *Anthol. Pal.* vii. 154: εἰμὶ δὲ Κὴρ τυμβοῦχος, ὁ δὲ κτείνας με Κόροιβος.

[4] So even an injured dog was said to have his Erinys.

KESHAB CHANDRA SEN.—See BRĀHMA SAMĀJ.

KEYS.—See LOCKS AND KEYS.

KEYS (Power).—See BINDING AND LOOSING.

KHĀKIS.—A Rāmaite Vaiṣṇava sect of N. India, said to have been founded by Kīlh, a disciple of Kṛṣṇa-Dāsa Paya-ahārī, the disciple of Anantānanda, the disciple of Rāmānanda.[1] He therefore flourished at the end of the 16th century. The name of the sect is derived from the Persian *ḫāk*, 'ashes,' and, in spite of its traditional foundation by Kīlh, it claims to have existed from the time of the banishment of Rāma-Chandra from Ayodhyā, as described in the Sanskrit *Rāmāyaṇa*. Rāma's brother, Lakṣmaṇa, is said, in his grief, to have smeared his body with ashes. Hence he was called 'Khāki,' and his admiring followers bear that name to the present day.[2] Their principal seat is accordingly at Ayodhyā, in the present Faizābād District of the United Provinces, where they have an *akhāṛhā*, or cloister, founded by one Dayā Rām from Chitrakoṭ in Bundelkhand—another locality hallowed by the Rāma story—in the days of Shujāu-'d-daula, the Nawāb Vizier of Oudh (1754–75). In 1905 the Order numbered 180 persons, of whom 50 were resident and the rest itinerant. The then head was eleventh in succession from the founder. At the temple of Hanumāngaṛhī[3] in the same city, dedicated to the monkey-god Hanumān, the friend and helper of Rāma, the priesthood consists of these Khāki ascetics.[4]

Another cloister of the sect, of some local celebrity, exists at Lunāvāḍā, in the Rewakantha State, lying between Gujarāt and Rājputānā, with an important branch at Ahmadābād.[5] This, together with the fact recorded by Nābhā-Dāsa (*loc. cit.*) that Kīlh himself belonged to a Gujarāt family, lends countenance to the hearsay statement of H. H. Wilson[6] that the *samādh*, or spiritual throne of the founder, is in Jaipur in Rājputānā.

Our knowledge of the customs and doctrines of the Khākīs is confined to what is said by Wilson (*op. cit.*). Although Vaiṣṇavas, and worshippers of Rāma, Sītā, and, especially, Hanumān, in accordance with the Indian tendency to syncretism they have adopted several Śaiva customs, such as the use of ash-smearing, dressing the hair in the fashion of the Śiva *jaṭā*, going about almost naked, and the use of the term *samādh* for the throne of their founder. Those who reside in fixed establishments generally dress like other Vaiṣṇavas, but those who lead a wandering life go either naked or nearly so, often with only a thick black cord round their loins,[7] and always with their bodies smeared with the pale grey mixture of ashes and earth.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes. A summary of Wilson's notice will be found in E. Balfour, *Cyclopædia of India*[3], ii., London, 1885, *s.v.* 'Khaki.'

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KHALSA.—See SIKHS.

KHARWĀR, KHAIRWĀR (the former title derived from Hindī *khar*, Skr. *khaṭa*, 'thatching grass,' said to be the tribal totem; the latter from Hindī *khair*, Skr. *khadira*, the tree *Acacia catechu*, the preparation of which is one of their industries). —A non-Aryan tribe found in Bengal, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and the Central Provinces, numbering, at the Census of 1911, 147,231. As is the case with many similar tribes, they fall into two groups—the one primitive and isolated, retaining animistic forms of belief, the other influenced by the Hindus in whose vicinity they live.

According to E. T. Dalton, the Cheros and Kharwārs both 'observe, like the Kols, triennial sacrifices. Every three years a buffalo and other animals are offered in the sacred grove, "sarna," or on a rock near the village. They also have, like some of the Kols, a priest for each village, called pāhn. He is always one of the impure tribes—a Bhūiya, or Kharwār, or a Parheya, and is also called baiga [see BAIGĀ, vol. ii. p. 333], and he only can offer this great sacrifice. No Brahmanical priests are allowed on these occasions to interfere. The deity honored is the tutelary god of the village, sometimes called Duār Pahār, sometimes Dharti, sometimes Purgahaill or Daknai, a female, or Dura, a sylvan god, the same perhaps as the Darhā of the Kols' (*Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 129).

In one village of Kharwārs the same writer found that the Baigā priest was offering, in the name of the village, biennial sacrifices to Chindol, a male spirit, to Chanda, a female spirit, and to Parvin.

'Buffaloes, sheep, and goats are offered to these promiscuously. They do not associate Chanda with Kālī, and make no prayers to any Hindu gods; but when they are in great affliction, they appeal to the sun. They have no particular name for the luminary, calling it "súraj" [Skr. *sūrya*], and any place on which he shines may be the altar. The other gods have shady retreats. These villagers honored their ancestors by a yearly offering of a wether goat; this is strictly a family affair. The animal is killed and eaten at home' (*ib.* p. 130). According to H. H. Risley, 'the main body of the tribe, and particularly those who belong to the landholding class, profess the Hindu religion, and employ Sākadwipī Brahmans as priests. Mahadeo and Sitaram are the popular deities; Gauri and Ganesh being worshipped during marriages. In addition to these, the miscellaneous host of spirits feared by the Mundas and Oraons are still held in more or less reverence by the Kharwārs, and in Palāmau members of the tribe sometimes perform the duties of pāhan or village priest' (*TC*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 476).

In the United Provinces they call themselves Hindus, but they do not regularly worship any of the orthodox gods, except Sūraj, the sun, to whom they appeal in time of trouble. Their chief goddess is a local Juālāmukhī (*q.v.*) Devī, who must not be confounded with the Panjāb goddess of the same name. They also worship a local deity called Rājā Lākhan or Lakhaṇa Deva, who is one of their deified Hindu conquerors, son of the famous Rājā Jai Chand of Kanauj, who fell at Benares under the sword of Shihāb-ad-dīn, the Musalmān invader, and became a popular hero (V. A. Smith, *Early Hist. of India*[2], Oxford, 1908, p. 356). He is annually worshipped at the platform where the tribal dead are propitiated. As in Bengal, they also worship Rājā Chandol, and Dharti, or Mother Earth, while those under Hindu influence employ Brāhmans to worship Śiva on their behalf. Dūlhā Deo, said to be a deified bridegroom who died under tragical circumstances, is their marriage god. Darapāt Deo and his spouse, Aṅgārmatī, are the tribal gods of war.

The most remarkable cult practised by the branch of the tribe in Chotā Nāgpur, however, is that of Māchak Rānī, who is said to belong to the Chamār caste (see CHAMĀRS). Every three years a sacrifice in her honour is made at the village threshing-floor, and her marriage is performed with much ceremony.

The people, accompanied by musicians, ascend the hill where she is supposed to live. One of the party acts as the marriage priest, and marches in front of the procession, shouting and dancing until he works himself into a state of frenzy. They halt at the mouth of her cave, into which the priest enters, and brings out the Rānī, who is represented by a small, oblong, smooth stone, daubed all over with red lead. This is draped with silk and cotton robes, slung in a bamboo, and carried away like a bride. The procession halts for a time under a tree, and then proceeds to another hill, where her consort, who is believed to belong to the Agariā (*q.v.*) tribe, is said to live. Offerings are made to the bride, and she is then flung into the cave of

[1] See art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA, vol. ii. p. 546. For an account of Kīlh see Nābhā-Dāsa, *Bhakta-Mālā* (17th cent.), 40 f. and comm.

[2] *Gazetteer of Oude*, Lucknow, 1877, i. 5; *Gazetteer of Fyzabad*, Allahabad, 1905, p. 62.

[3] See *Rep. Arch. Surv. Ind.* i. [1871] 322.

[4] W. Crooke, *PR*[2], Westminster, 1896, i. 88.

[5] *Bombay Gazetteer*, vi. [1880] 25.

[6] *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, i. 98 f. Wilson mentions another Khāki cloister at Farrukhābād, on the Ganges, but there is no reference to this in modern Gazetteers.

[7] M. A. Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, iii. (Calcutta, 1881) 60.

her bridegroom, which is believed to be of immense depth. As she falls the people eagerly listen to the crash of the stone as it strikes the sides of the abyss. When the sound ceases, they return and end the rite with dancing. These two caves are supposed to be connected by an underground passage; and every third year the Rāni is believed to return, in the form of the same stone, to her parents' home.

Formerly, it is said, the rite was performed annually; but on one occasion the Rāni caused a scandal by appearing at the house of the Baigā priest on the morning after the rite. This conduct being deemed improper, she was punished by the cessation of the annual marriage rite, which is now performed every three years. This seems to be a rite of sympathetic magic intended to promote the fertility of the members of the tribe and of their crops, like the *ἱερὸς γάμος* of Zeus and Hera (*Il.* xiv. 346 ff.) and similar rites in many other parts of the world (J. G. Frazer, *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 98 f.; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 482).

LITERATURE.—In addition to the accounts by Risley and Dalton quoted above, see W. Crooke, *TC*, Calcutta, 1896, iii. 247 ff., and A. Baines, *Ethnography* [=*GIAP* ii. 5], Strassburg, 1912, p. 116 f. For the marriage-rite of Mūchak Rāni see L. R. Forbes, *Settlement Report of Palamau*, Calcutta, 1876, reprinted in *NINQ* iii. [1893] 23 f., 167. The Khairwārs of the Central Provinces are described in *Reports of the Ethnographic Survey*, pt. v., Allahabad, 1911, p. 45 ff.

W. CROOKE.

KHĀSIS.—The Khāsis are a hill tribe inhabiting the Khāsi and Jaintiā Hills District of Assam, which is situated between 25° 1′ and 26° 5′ N. lat., and between 90° 47′ and 92° 52′ E. longitude. The District contains an area of 6157 sq. miles, and is mountainous. About half of it, including the country around the capital, Shillong, is outside the limits of British India. It consists of a collection of small States in political relations, regulated by treaty, with the Government of India, but enjoying almost complete autonomy in the management of their local affairs. In the remainder, called the Jaintiā Hills, the indigenous system of administration through officers called *dolois* has been maintained. The population of the Khāsis resident in the Khāsi and Jaintiā Hills consisted of 161,865 at the last Census, exclusive of 28,245 Christians, the greater portion of whom are Khāsis belonging to the Welsh Calvinistic mission. The Khāsis are linguistically allied to the Mon-Khmer family of Further India, and by their appearance are sharply differentiated from the Mongoloid tribes which surround them in Assam, the Khāsi skull being mesocephalic, the eyes horizontal and not oblique, with openings round and broad and not like narrow slits, the base of the nose wide, the skin varying from dark to a light yellowish brown, according to locality (fairer in the upland than in the lowland), the hair black and straight, the stature short, and the males very muscular. These physical characteristics closely correspond with those of all speakers of Austro-Asiatic languages (as reported by Schmidt), of which the Mon-Khmer form an integral part.[1] The calves are very highly developed—which is due probably to the Khāsis, both males and females, being accustomed to carry very heavy burdens up and down hills. The females, when young, are comely and of a buxom type. The people are cheerful in disposition, good-tempered as a rule, and fairly industrious, especially the females. An interesting trait is their fondness for music, the hymn tunes which are taught them by the Welsh missionaries being rapidly learned and retained without difficulty. The most important and probably the most interesting characteristic of the Khāsis is the observance of the matriarchate.

'Their social organization presents one of the most perfect examples still surviving of matriarchal institutions, carried out with a logic and thoroughness which, to those accustomed to regard the status and authority of the father as the foundation of society, are exceedingly remarkable. Not only is the mother the head and source, and only bond of union, of the family: in the most primitive part of the hills, the Synteng country, she is the only owner of real property, and through her alone is inheritance transmitted. The father has no kinship with his children, who belong to their mother's clan; what he earns goes to his own matriarchal stock, and at his death his bones are deposited in the cromlech of his mother's kin' (C. J. Lyall, in P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*, p. xxiii f.).

1. **Origin and affinities.**—The origin of the Khāsis is a difficult question. In the opinion of the present writer,[1] they are an offshoot of the Mon people of Further India; but as to their ultimate source, apart from their fairly close approximation to the Malay type, all that we can guess now is that we are on the right track, originally pointed out by J. R. Logan as regards India and Further India, and it is to be hoped that the researches of scholars such as W. H. R. Rivers, in Melanesia, will help us very greatly (see Gurdon, pp. 12–18).

The use by the Khāsis of a very peculiarly shaped spade (*mokhiw*), which may perhaps be regarded as the prototype of the 'singular shoulder-headed celts' found in the Malay Peninsula and Chotā Nāgpur and figured in the *JASB* of 1875, may be mentioned. These shoulder-headed celts are, according to E. Aymonier (*Le Cambodge*, Paris, 1900–04, iii.), neolithic.

'Ces celtes, dits épaulés, parcequ'ils possèdent un talon d'une forme particulière, paraissent appartenir en propre à l'Indo-Chine et à la presqu'île dekkhanique. Ils fourniraient donc un premier indice, non négligeable, d'une communauté d'origine des populations primitives des deux péninsules, cis- et trans-gangétiques.'

Here, again, we may hope for some important discoveries, during the researches of Rivers in Melanesia, as to the relative affinities of peoples which belong to the Austronesian family.

It should be clearly understood that the Khāsis are not Indian as regards appearance, proclivities, or language, and that we must look more to Further India and possibly beyond, among the peoples of the Pacific, for tribes exhibiting like peculiarities.

2. **Domestic life.**—The greater number of the population subsist by agriculture, but a considerable proportion earn their livelihood as porters, carrying potatoes to the *hāts*, or markets, and various commodities to their homes therefrom. There is also a fair demand for Khāsi domestic servants, both among the Europeans and among the Bengali and Assamese clerks who are employed at the headquarters of the administration at Shillong. The manufacture of country spirit gives employment to a considerable number of persons, most of whom are females. The Khāsis, although in some villages acquainted with the art of weaving, do not seek this form of employment on a large scale, but import most of their cloths from the Plains Districts. In the Wār country they both keep bees themselves and collect the wild honey. The honey is exceptionally good, but little organized export of it exists, the trade being mostly local. There is probably an opening for a productive business in the export of honey from the Khāsi Hills. The houses of the people in the interior are, as a rule, substantial thatched cottages with plank or stone walls, and raised on a plinth some 2 to 3 ft. from the ground. The only window is a small opening on one side of the house. The fire is always burning on an earthen or stone hearth in the centre, and the smoke hangs in a dense cloud about the room, as there is no chimney. Above the hearth is a swinging shelf upon which the firewood is placed to dry. In Shillong, Cherrapunji, and Jowai, houses built after the European style have largely displaced the Khāsi thatched

[1] See review by G. A. Grierson of W. Schmidt's *Die Mon-Khmer Volker*, in *JRAS*, 1907, pp. 187–191.

[1] *Khasis*, p. 10.

cottages. The Khāsis build their villages a little below the tops of the hills, and seldom change their sites. The villages have been situated in their present positions for many years, as is evidenced by the large number of memorial-stones and cromlechs which are to be seen near them. The Khāsi chief, or Siem, lives in the village, in the midst of his people. There is little furniture in the houses in the interior, although the more up-to-date Khāsis use furniture of European patterns. In every house are to be seen the *ki knūp*, or rain shields, which are made of basket-work, and also the baskets, *ki khoh*, of different sizes for carrying on the back. The Khāsis possess very few musical instruments, and those which they do have are of the Assamese or Bengali patterns. They are hard-working cultivators, and achieve very fair results, considering the unproductive nature of the hill-sides on the uplands. There is a considerable amount of wet paddy cultivation among the Syntengs of the Jowai subdivision. The most important crop in the uplands is the potato, the tuber having been introduced into the country by the British. The cultivation of oranges in the Southern portion of the district is of equal importance with that of the potato in the Northern. Oranges grow best in the warm valleys lying on the Sylhet side of the hills. The Khāsi orange has always been famous for its excellence. According to *Letters received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East*, i. (London, 1896), it was exported many years ago to Europe with the oranges of Garhwal and Sikkim.

Khāsis use bows and arrows for hunting, and spears for both casting and thrusting. Fishing is largely resorted to, the method employed being to poison the streams. The Khāsis eat practically all flesh, except that of the dog, which they consider to be 'the friend of man.' In this respect they differ from the Nāgā, Gāro, and Kuki tribes of Assam, all of whom eat the dog. The Khāsis, except some of the Christian community and some of the people of Mawkhar in Shillong, do not use milk or its compounds, following in this respect the Kāchāris and Rābhās of the plains or the Gāros of the hills. The Mongolian race in its millions, as a rule, does not use milk for food; but the Tibetans and some of the Turkoman tribes are exceptions. The Khāsis are heavy drinkers of both rice-beer and rice-spirit. Archery may be said to be the national game. Manufactures are few in number, and do not tend to increase. The iron industry in former days was an important one, but has now died out completely.

3. Tribal organization.—The people of the Khāsi and Jaintiā Hills may be divided into Khāsi, Synteng, Wār, Bhoi, and Lynngām. These sections are subdivided, the Khāsis into the inhabitants of the central high plateau, Cherra and Nongstoin, Māhārām, Mariaw, Nongkhlaw, and the neighbouring Siemships; the Syntengs into Syntengs proper, Nongtungs, and Khyrwangs; the Wārs into Wār proper, and Wār Pnar; the Bhois into Jinthongs, Mynris, Rynkhongs, and the Khāsi-Bhois, *i.e.* Khāsis who inhabit the low country to the north of the district which is called generally the 'Bhoi.' The Lynngāms are a separate division, being half Khāsi and half Gāro. These tribes and sub-tribes are neither strictly endogamous nor strictly exogamous, but they are more endogamous than exogamous; *e.g.*, Syntengs more often marry Syntengs than Khāsis, and *vice versa*, and it would usually be considered derogatory for a Khāsi of the uplands to marry a Bhoi or Wār woman, and a disgrace to marry a Lynngām.

These divisions are subdivided into a number of septs, taking Risley's definition of 'sept' as the largest exogamous division of the tribe, and these septs may be called 'clans' for the purpose of this article. Many of the clans trace their descent from ancestresses, or *kiaw* (grandmothers), who are greatly revered, indeed almost deified, and in some of the clans the names of the ancestresses survive, *e.g.* the Mylliem-ngap and the Mylliem-pdah clans. The descendants of one ancestress of the clan, *ka Iawbei Tynrai*, are called *shi kur*, or one clan. Next comes the division called the *kpoh*, or sub-clan, all the descendants of one great-grandmother (*ka Iawbei Tynmen*) being styled *shi kpoh*. Then comes the *iing* (lit. 'house'), or family. The grandmother, styled *ka Iawbei Khynraw*, or the young grandmother, to distinguish her from the two other grandmothers already mentioned, is the head of the *iing*, or family.[1] A prominent characteristic of the Khāsi clan is the common clan sepulchre; another is strict exogamy: a Khāsi can commit no greater sin than to marry within his own clan, the women of which are *sang*, or tabu, to him. Some of the clans bear the names of animals, or, as in the case of the Diengdoh clan, a tree name; but the clan members apparently do not regard the animals or trees as totems, since they do not abstain from killing, eating, or otherwise utilizing them.

4. State organization.—The Khāsi States may be said to have been formed by the voluntary association of villages or groups of villages, their heads being the Siems, or chiefs. These chiefs possess little authority except that derived from the Durbar, or State assembly; indeed, Khāsi States are limited monarchies, being constituted on distinctly democratic lines. A fact of universal application is that succession to the Siemship is through the female line, the sons of the eldest uterine sister inheriting in order of priority of birth; here it should be noted that this rule of succession differs from the ordinary rule of succession to real property, which passes to the youngest daughter of the deceased's mother, and after her to her youngest daughter (for a more detailed description of the rules of inheritance see Gurdon, pp. 68–75).

5. Marriage and divorce.—The most remarkable feature of Khāsi marriage is that it is usual for the husband to live with his wife in his mother-in-law's house and not to take the bride to his own home, as in other communities. As long as the wife lives in her mother's house, all her earnings go to her mother, who expends them on the maintenance of the family. Among the Syntengs, however, and the people of Maoshai, if the husband does not live in the mother-in-law's house, he visits his wife there only after dark, and does not take his meals in the house. Divorce is common and may occur for a variety of reasons, such as adultery, barrenness, incompatibility of temperament, etc. The essential act in divorce is the giving or exchange of five cowries or pice. The wife gives her five cowries or pice to her husband, who places them with his own and returns the ten pieces to his wife, who again returns them to him. The husband then throws the cowries or coins on the ground, and the divorce is complete.

6. Inheritance.—The Khāsi saying is *long jaid na ka kynthei* ('from the woman sprang the clan'). When reckoning descent, they count from the mother only; the man is nobody. If he is a brother, *u kur*, he will be lost to the family or clan when he marries; if he is a husband, he is regarded merely as *u shong kha*, 'a begetter' (for further details see Gurdon, pp. 82–85).

7. Head-hunting.—The Khāsis are not head-hunters, like the Nāgās of Assam, nor do they appear to have practised such a custom in former times; since the period of the Jaintiā rebellion they have settled down into a nation of peaceful cultivators. There is little crime among them, but many murders have been caused by a curious superstition called *u thlen*. The *thlen* is believed to be a gigantic snake which requires to be appeased periodically with human victims (Gurdon, pp. 98–104).

8. Religion.—The main religion of the Khāsis is the cult of ancestors, although the propitiation of spirits of evil by means of offerings is also al-

[1] For an explanation of how the Khāsi clan developed from the Khāsi family see Gurdon, p. 63 f.

most universal. The propitiation of ancestors was formerly thought to be effected by offering food to them on the flat table stones, or *maw-kynthei*, so much in evidence in the Khāsi and Jaintiā Hills, and this practice still obtains in the villages in the interior of the hills. The more popular practice, however, at the present time is to make the offerings in the house, either annually or at times when it is thought necessary to invoke the aid of the departed. As is the case in other countries, and among other people, it is possible that some of the Khāsi gods of to-day are merely the supposed spirits of deceased ancestors (for a comparison between the Khāsi ancestor-worship and that of the Shinto cult of Japan see Gurdon, pp. 109–111).

Of the deceased ancestors the Khāsis revere *ka Iawbei* the most. *Ka Iawbei* is the ancestress of their clan; a large number of the flat table stones to be seen in front of the Khāsi menhirs are erected in her honour. In former times it was the custom to offer food to her on those stones. In cases of family quarrels or dissensions among the members of the same clan, which it is desired to bring to a peaceful settlement, it is customary to perform a sacrifice to *ka Iawbei*, the first mother, but before sacrificing it is necessary to take an augury by breaking eggs.[1] The next ancestor in importance is *U Suid-Nia*, or *U Kni Rangbah*, the first maternal uncle, *i.e.* the elder brother of *ka Iawbei*. The great central menhir in the Khāsi line of stones is erected in his honour. The offering of food to placate the spirits of Khāsi ancestors may be compared with the practices of some of the tribes in the Malay Archipelago (*GB*[2] ii. 462 f.). The Khāsis, like other rude tribes, propitiate also the spirits of fall and fell, especially at times of ill news or other misfortune, when the name of the particular malignant being must be ascertained by the breaking of eggs. They possess priests called *lyngdohs*, who perform sacrifices either for the good of the State or for private purposes. The *lyngdoh* must be assisted at these sacrifices by a priestess, and merely acts as her deputy when sacrificing. This priestess is probably a survival of the time when females took a more important part in public religious life than they do at present.

9. Disposal of the dead.—The bodies of the dead are burned, the ashes and uncalcined bones being collected and placed in small *kistvaens* on the hill-sides to await collection to the great ossuaries of the clans. Such collections are made often after very long intervals, and are carried out under an elaborate ritual, part of which is the erection of memorial stones. The main object of the collection in the ossuaries is to confine the spirits of the dead and to prevent them from haunting the living. The bodies of deceased Siems are disposed of with the greatest formality, the remains of U Ram Singh, Siem of Cherra, having been cremated recently before several thousand spectators. The corpse of this Siem has been preserved in a dwelling-house of the Siem family for more than 30 years by the peculiar Khāsi system of embalming.

10. Memorial stones.—This is a subject on which much could be written. Those who are interested in observing a custom which may possibly have accounted for some megalithic remains in other parts of the world may be referred to Gurdon, pp. 144–155. A striking feature of the Khāsi stones is the flat table stone, or dolmen, in front of a line of menhirs, the menhirs being almost invariably of uneven numbers, *e.g.* 3, 5, 7, 9, or even 11 stones. Here it may be noted that the unevenness in number is also a special feature of the Belgaum stones. The largest existing Khāsi menhir is that of Nartiang in the Jaintiā Hills, which is 27 ft. high and 2½ ft. thick, and the largest table stone is that at Laitlyngkot in the Jaintiā Hills, which is 28½ ft. by 13½ ft. and 1 ft. 8 in. thick. There are some table stones in the Khāsi and Jaintiā Hills which may have been for sacrificing human victims (cf. the great table stones at Jaintiāpur and the stone at Ieu Ksih near the Kapili river).

11. Folklore.—The Khāsis possess a considerable amount of folklore which shows very few signs of Indian or Aryan influence. The story of the *thlen*, or fabulous snake, has already been referred to (for a detailed account see Gurdon, p. 98 ff.). This tale or superstition may possess counterparts in Cambodia or in the Mon country or among the Palaungs.

12. Language.—Khāsi has been placed by Grierson in the Mon-Khmer group. As far back as 1853 the connexion of Khāsi with the other languages of the Mon-Khmer family was recognized, when Logan in his paper on the 'General Characters of the Burma-Tibetan, Gangeitic, and Dravirian Languages' in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, spoke of it as a

'solitary record that the Mon-Kambojan formation once extended much further to the North-West than it now does.'

It was not, however, till 1889 that E. Kuhn showed conclusively the true affinity of this language. W. Schmidt of Vienna not only confirms Kuhn's conclusions, but goes a step further and includes Khāsi in the Austro-Asiatic family of languages, a western branch of a still larger family of languages stretching from the Panjāb in the West through Indonesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia, right across the Pacific to Easter Island in the East; from the Himālaya in the North to New Zealand in the South, which Schmidt names the 'Austric' field of languages.

'We must confess that it is the most widely spread speech family of which the existence has yet been proved' (Grierson, *loc. cit.*).

Schmidt's theory has thus been accepted by Grierson, our greatest living authority on Indian languages. For a description of the Khāsi language, see the chapter on language in Gurdon, which is based chiefly on C. J. Lyall's skeleton grammar contained in *Linguistic Survey of India*, ii.; cf. also the treatises of Kuhn and Schmidt.

LITERATURE.—W. J. Allen, *Report on the Administration of the Cossyah Jynteah Hill Territory*, Calcutta, 1858; H. S. Bivar, *Administration Report on the Khasi and Jaintia Hills District*, 1876; E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872; E. A. Gait, 'Human Sacrifices in Ancient Assam,' in *JASBe* lxvii. [1898] pt. iii. pp. 50–65; P. R. T. Gurdon, *The Khasis*, London, 1907; J. D. Hooker, *Himalayan Journals*, do. 1854; W. W. Hunter, *Statistical Account of Assam*, do. 1879; E. Kuhn, *Ueber Herkunft und Sprache der transgangetischen Volker*, Munich, 1883, *Beiträge zur Sprachenkunde Hinterindiens*, do. 1889; A. W. C. Lindsay, *Lives of the Lindsays*[3], London, 1849; J. R. Logan, a series of papers on the ethnology of the Indo-Pacific Islands which appeared in the *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, Singapore, 1850–57; A. Mackenzie, *History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1884; A. J. M. Mills, *Report on the Khasi and Jaintia Hills*, 1853; H. Roberts, *Sub-Himalayan: a Grammar of Khassi*, London, 1891; W. Schmidt, *Die Mon-Khmer Völker: ein Bindeglied zwischen Völkern Zentralasiens und Australnesiens*, Brunswick, 1906; H. Yule, 'Notes on the Khasi Hills and People,' in *JASBe*, xiii. [1844] 612 ff.

P. R. T. GURDON.

KHAWĀRIJ.—*Khawārij*, plural of *khārij*, 'a rebel,' is used as the name of a group of Muslim sects, of which apparently only the Ibādis (*q.v.*) now survive. They are first heard of in connexion with the murder of the third Khalif Uthmān—an event which, owing to the want of contemporary documents, is somewhat obscure. Of the offences with which this personage was charged the most serious appears to have been his ordering the destruction of all existing copies of the Qur'ān, in order that the recension which he introduced should be unchallenged; but, since this order was effectively carried out, the Muslim historians are compelled to express approval of the act, as

[1] For divination by egg-breaking see Gurdon, App. C, p. 221.

otherwise they would be throwing doubt on the authenticity of the only surviving copy. It would appear that 'Alī obtained the Khalifate by the support of the insurgents who had killed Uthmān, but afterwards was compelled to express abhorrence of that act; and, by accepting arbitration in the dispute which afterwards arose between himself and Mu'āwiya (founder of the Umayyad dynasty), he incurred the enmity of those who had organized the plot against Uthmān. He defeated them in the bloody battle of Nahrawān (37 or 38 A.H.), but was soon assassinated by one of the survivors in revenge. Their shibboleth for some time appears to have been a declaration that Uthmān had deserved his death, and their formula was 'None but God is judge,' with reference to the arbitration to which 'Alī had consented. They are sometimes known by the name *shurāt*, said to mean 'those who buy God's favour with their lives.'

During the whole of the Umayyad period, persons who employed these names and formulæ gave the government trouble, sometimes being able to carry on protracted civil war, at times only able to organize ephemeral revolts. The greatest success which they attained was under the command of one Shabīb, who, in the reign of 'Abd al-Malik, repeatedly occupied the important city Kūfa. The wars of al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra with the Khārijite Qaṭarī are recorded at length in the *Kāmil* of the grammarian Mubarrad († 285 A.H. = A.D. 998).

In the chronicles and popular literature the Khārijites are represented as Puritans, driven to take up arms against a government which failed to satisfy their ideals of piety and asceticism. Familiarity with the Qur'ān is claimed for their women (*Raudat al-'Uqalā*, Cairo, 1328, p. 35; Yāqūt, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, London, 1913, vi. 94), one of whom declares that the ignorance of the sacred volume displayed by the ruling powers was what forced them to rebel. One of their revolts was occasioned, it is said, by a magistrate's failing to give redress to a Muslim who had been given wine in lieu of vinegar at a shop. Those who organized the risings are described as devotees and students of the Qur'ān, and indeed the name *qurrā'*, literally 'readers,' but often used for 'devotees,' is sometimes given them. Besides these qualities they had a reputation for fanatical courage. This they retained in the 3rd cent. of Islām, when, under 'Abbāsid rule, they played a less important part than under the Umayyads. Towards non-Muslims they are represented as scrupulous in their dealings; but towards Muslims who disagreed with them they were inordinately savage; they slaughtered women and children, though some of their number disapproved of this practice.

The author of *Al-Farq bain al-Firaq* ('The Distinction between the Sects'; † 429 A.H. = A.D. 1037) divides the Khawārij into twenty branches. The doctrine common to them all was the obligation to resist an unjust sovereign; besides this they all applied the name *kāfir* ('unbeliever') to Uthmān, 'Alī, the two arbiters, all who approved of the Arbitration, and all who had taken part in the first Civil War (the Battle of the Camel). Some made their characteristic doctrine the application of this name to all who committed capital offences. It would appear, however, that their most important doctrine was that any Muslim of good character might be sovereign, whence they were in permanent opposition to the supporters of the hereditary dynasties.

It is not easy to fit the number 20 to the list of sects given by the author quoted; the main divisions come far below that number, whereas the subdivisions far exceed it. An artificial classification with the view of obtaining the number 20 was afterwards made by Shahrastānī (*Religionsparteien und Philosophenschulen*, tr. T. Haarbrücker, Halle, 1850–51, i. 128 ff.). 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī († 561 A.H. = A.D. 1166) reduces it to 15 divisions. One of the names meets us frequently in Arabic literature, viz. the Ṣufriyya; references to the Ibāḍiyya also occur. The differences between them were largely on the same doctrinal questions as divided the other communities—*e.g.*, predestination, the relation of capacity to conduct, whether infants are Muslims, etc. But there were also differences which emanated from their own special doctrines—*e.g.*, whether an evildoer was to be called *mushrik* ('pagan') or only *kāfir* ('denier'), and whether the latter word could be interpreted 'ungrateful' as well as 'unbelieving.' Certain other differences belonged to the details of Islāmic jurisprudence—*e.g.*, the minimum theft whereby the punishment of handcutting was incurred, the amount of alms to be paid on the produce of land watered by rivers and springs, etc.

Although some of these sects were able to maintain themselves in various Islāmic provinces for a time, and the Ibāḍīs have done so permanently, it is probable that the historians of the sects have in many cases overrated their importance, and represented the followers of some particular insurgent as continuing in existence long after the movement had been defeated. As might be expected in the case of such warlike communities, their literature was rich in ballad-poetry, which the archæologists collected. Of their controversial and juristic treatises little has as yet come to light.

LITERATURE.—J. Wellhausen, *Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam*, Berlin, 1901.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

KHIDR.—Khidr (pronounced by the Persians and Turks as Khisr),[1] 'the green one,' is the name or, rather, the title of a Muhammadan saint who, according to the popular conception in Islām, is still alive to-day. The origin of the name is obscure, although different attempts have been made to explain it (see below). Whatever the origin of the name, it is certain that the figure of Khidr as conceived in Islām is not derived from one definite source, but is rather the composite of a large number of legends and myths of widely divergent origin and character, which were current in the lands of Islām prior to the Muhammadan occupation. It has been justly said that Khidr is the product of Muhammadan syncretism (K. Vollers, *ARW* xii. [1909] 238), implying thereby that the whole Khidr figure, while a prominent feature of the religion of the Muhammadan masses, is yet entirely made up of non-Muhammadan elements, and owes to Islām only the amalgamation of all these heterogeneous elements into one whole. It is impossible here to enter into a discussion of the extremely complicated problem of the Khidr legend. We shall limit ourselves to a brief indication of the principal sources upon which it has drawn and of the salient features now attributed to Khidr and originally derived from those sources.

Frequently in Muhammadan literature and innumerable times in Persian poetry Khidr is mentioned as one (or rather the only one) who has gained life immortal by drinking from the Fountain of Life. According to a more definite statement quoted by early Muhammadan historians, Khidr was the vizier of Dhū-l-karnain, 'the two-horned' (the Syro-Arabic title of Alexander the Great), who discovered the Fountain of Life which his royal master had failed to find. This leads us unmistakably to the famous story of the Fountain of Life recorded in the Greek Alexander romance which goes under the name of pseudo-Callisthenes, a work of a very complex literary character, which was finally completed about A.D. 300.

According to this account, which is recorded in several varying recensions, Alexander went out to search for the Fountain of Life in order to attain to life everlasting. By the merest chance his cook, who in some of the recensions is called Andreas, discovered the fountain. He was cleaning a salted

[1] With a different vocalization the name is also pronounced Khaḍir and Khuḍr.

(or dried) fish in the fountain in preparation for a meal, when the fish came to life again and disappeared in the water. The cook partook of the life-giving liquid and became immortal. Alexander, who could not find his way back to the fountain, decided in his jealousy and disappointment to kill the cook; but, as death had no power over him, Alexander threw him with a millstone round his neck into the sea, where he became a sea-demon.

This story, which originally formed a separate legend and was transmitted as such long before and long after pseudo-Callisthenes, came in this shape to the Syrians, and through them into Arabia. A reflexion of it is found in the Qur'ān (xviii. 59–63), in which, like so many other legends, it has been mutilated almost beyond recognition. It is obvious, and indeed is expressly and circumstantially related in later Muhammadan sources, that Khidr is identical with Alexander's cook who discovered the Fountain of Life by means of the salted fish. According to a conjecture put forward by several scholars and upheld by the present writer, Khidr, 'the green one,' is the original designation of the sea-demon into which the cook Andreas was transformed when thrown into the sea.[1]

A far more important prototype of Khidr is the prophet Elijah. The Tishbite is, no doubt, the most prominent and the most popular figure in the legendary world of post-Biblical Judaism. The most striking attributes of this post-Biblical hero are eternal life and omnipresence. He attends every circumcision ceremony performed in a Jewish family, and it is still customary to keep a special seat, the so-called 'chair of Elijah,' ready for his reception; and he visits every Jewish home on Passover eve, when a special cup of wine is set aside for him. In contrast to his vehement Biblical prototype, the post-Biblical Elijah figures essentially in the amiable rôle of an adviser and helper. He reveals himself to scholars, whom he enlightens on the 'secrets of heaven' and on different points of Jewish law. He is particularly to be met with on the road and in deserted places. The kabbalists, or Jewish mystics of a later age, laid particular stress on this popular belief of *gillūy Ēliyāhū* ('revelation of Elijah'), and many of them claimed to have derived their mystical ideas, and even whole books, from their personal association with the prophet.

One such Elijah story quoted by a Jewish authority of the 11th cent., but undoubtedly of much older origin, must be singled out from among the rest. In this story Elijah accompanies a famous Rabbi of the 3rd cent. on his travels, and shows him several incidents which, on the surface, seem to militate against God's justice, but, when interpreted by the prophet, are revealed as wonderful instances of the wisdom and justice of Divine Providence.

This story, or rather some earlier variant of it, has found its way into the Qur'ān (xviii. 64–81). The place of the Talmudic Rabbi is taken by Moses, while Elijah is designated anonymously as 'one of our servants.' This fact alone suffices to prove what is to be assumed *a priori*, that this most striking figure of post-Biblical Jewish legend was known in Arabia in the time of Muhammad. Since Khidr's salient attribute was everlasting life, just like that of Elijah, it was natural to identify the two figures. Hence the exegetes and theologians of Islām declare with remarkable unanimity that the servant in the Qur'ān (xviii. 64) is no one but Khidr. This is the first express reference to the name of Khidr in literature. As a result of this combination, the story of the Fountain of Life in the Qur'ān (xviii. 59–63), on the one hand, and the Elijah legend (64–81), on the other, which originally had nothing to do with one another and are easily distinguishable by their different rhymes, were subsequently made to follow one another, and were in a most artificial and clumsy manner welded into one continuous narrative, which has been accepted as a unit not only by all Muhammadan theologians, but also, in spite of the obviousness of the underlying facts, by many European scholars. The combination has had the additional result that it has suppressed the further development of the original, undeniably pagan, conception of Khidr as sea-demon in Islām, and transformed him into a sacred figure, who is classed by various Muhammadan theologians either as a prophet or as a saint (*walī*), and by some even as an angel. Whatever of the original Khidr myth was still known (and a great deal of it *was* still known) to the legend-collectors and story-tellers in Islām was forced into a new channel. Khidr, the cook of Alexander, was raised to the rank of general and vizier, and in this capacity was made the leading figure in the Muhammadan Alexander romance, completely overshadowing his heathen master.

[1] Since the story of the Fountain of Life bears a striking resemblance to the Glaukos myth, it has been suggested, and is believed by the present writer, that Khidr and Γλαῦκος, which are identical in meaning, are also ultimately identical in origin, although the literary medium cannot as yet be definitely ascertained. Others explain the name as the genius of vegetation, or as a mutilation of Khāsisatra, the ancestor of Gilgamesh in the famous Babylonian epic.

There can be no doubt that originally the Muhammadans themselves were conscious of the identity of the legendary character of Khidr with that of Elijah, for they declare—and the view is generally accepted within Islām—that the real name of Khidr is Iliya (afterwards corrupted into Balya), the Jewish form of Elijah. The Jews living in Muhammadan countries took the same combination for granted, for those whose name was Elijah called themselves Khidr, and the Turks still imply the same combination by calling our prophet Khidrlās (Khidr=Ilyās). What is of far greater importance, the prevalent conception of Khidr is an exact reproduction of the Elijah figure, to a degree which is truly astonishing. Khidr, like Elijah, is the eternal prophet who is omnipresent, 'who appears when his name is called.' He is helper and adviser in the time of need; he reveals himself to those worthy of his companionship, to whom he transmits divine secrets; he appears, according to a story recorded in the canonical Muhammadan tradition (the so-called *Ḥadīth*), at the death of Muhammad to offer his condolence to the bereaved companions of the founder of Islām. Like the kabbalists in Judaism, the Ṣūfīs, or mystics, of Islām lay particular claim to intimate companionship with Khidr. Innumerable stories are told of the opinions, doctrines, and prayers entrusted by the prophet to particularly favoured Ṣūfīs, and many works are declared by their authors to be the direct product of his personal instruction. The remarkable closeness between the Jewish Elijah legend and the Muhammadan Khidr belief may be gauged from the fact that, just as Elijah in Jewish sources is identified with Phinehas, so is Khidr in Muhammadan writings, and that, just as Elijah in the Talmud, so does Khidr in the Muhammadan legend appear occasionally in the disguise of a Bedawī. Numerous details of a similar kind which can be easily supplied testify to the same relationship.

Owing to the fact that the prophet Elijah is mentioned in the Qur'ān by name (in the Græco-Syrian form Ilyās), and is described in Biblical rather than in post-Biblical colours, the Muhammadan theologians saw themselves subsequently compelled to make of Khidr=Iliya, on the one hand, and of Ilyās, on the other, two distinct personages. The primitive relationship, however, shows itself in the attempt to identify Khidr with Elisha, the disciple of Elijah, and in the countless legends in which Elijah (or, more correctly, Ilyās) and Khidr appear as inseparable twins. The original distinctive function of both Elijah and Khidr is clearly revealed in the belief, commonly accepted by Muhammadans and illustrated by

innumerable stories, that, while both prophets are entrusted with the task of protecting the travellers on their journeys, Elijah is *mukallaf fi'l-barr*, 'the guardian of the dry land,' particularly of deserted places, while Khiḍr is *mukallaf fi'l baḥr*, 'the guardian of the sea.' The maritime character of Khiḍr, which the Muhammadans accept as an unalterable fact without being able to explain it, is preserved throughout the whole field of Muhammadan folklore. Down to this day Khiḍr is essentially the *Khawwāḍ al-buḥūr*, 'the one who traverses the seas'; he is the patron of sailors, who invoke his aid in time of need; a sacrifice is offered to him when a boat is launched (S. I. Curtiss, *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, Germ. ed., Leipzig, 1903, p. xvi f. and p. 111). This conception and the rites reflecting it are still current throughout the whole of Syria, and can even be traced as far as Northern India.

The combined figure of the sea-demon Khiḍr and the prophet Elijah followed in the wake of the Muhammadan arms. It is now generally recognized that the conquered nations who were converted to Islām managed to carry with them into the new religion many of their former doctrines. In a similar way Khiḍr became the depository of all kinds of ancient myths and popular rites current in the lands occupied by Islām. The data on this aspect of the Khiḍr figure are not yet complete. As far as Syria is concerned, extremely valuable material has been collected by Curtiss (in the volume referred to above), and, in part prior to him, by C. Clermont-Ganneau (*Horus et Saint-Georges*, Paris, 1877). From this material it is evident that Khiḍr, as now revered, indeed one may say worshipped, in Syria, embodies many conceptions of primitive Semitic religion, perhaps also including the ancient Babylonian Tammuz cult. The whole coast of Syria is dotted with Khiḍr sanctuaries in which sacrifices and the first-born of animals are still offered to him. In the crude vagueness of the popular religion Khiḍr has become a divine being. As an unsophisticated Muhammadan innocently put it to Curtiss, 'Khiḍr is near, but God is far' (*op. cit.* p. 111). Through the identification with St. George (*Mār Jirjis*), whose origin lay in the same country, new relations have been created which made our versatile prophet acceptable to the Christians, as he is also popular among the Jews.

The official theologians of Islām are, and always have been, averse to these excesses of the popular Khiḍr belief. Many of them have insisted—and, indeed, have made Muhammad himself declare—that Khiḍr, who, as they were compelled to admit (largely because of the canonical account of his appearance at the death of Muhammad), was a contemporary of the Prophet, died shortly after him. This attempt, however, which was directed against the extravagant Khiḍr cult, particularly as cherished by the Ṣūfīs, remained unsuccessful. On the other hand, the theologians had no hesitation in making Khiḍr a favourite object of their scholarly speculations. Muhammadan literature records a bewildering number of conjectures which identify Khiḍr with various figures of Biblical and Apocryphal legend. Of these conjectures, which are purely the product of unfettered speculative fancy, the identifications with the following personages may be mentioned: Melchizedek, Seth, Enoch, Jonah, Jeremiah, Lot, and the Messiah.[1] Finally, it may be mentioned as a possibility that another striking attribute of Khiḍr, his incessant wandering—'to wander like Khiḍr' is a current Arabic phrase—is responsible for the name of the Wandering Jew. Ahasuerus may be an adaptation of Khiḍr in its Persian-Turkish pronunciation as Khisr.

[1] It can be shown that all these personages were believed, either in Rabbinical or in Christian legend, to be immortal.

LITERATURE.—The literature on the subject is extensive and extremely scattered. The relations between the Khiḍr legend and the Alexander romance are treated in detail by I. Friedlaender, *Die Chadhirlegende und der Alexanderroman*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1913 (full bibliography on pp. xviii-xxiii). For the sake of completeness, G. Zart's essay, 'Chidher in Sage und Dichtung,' in *Sammlung gemeinverständlicher wissenschaftlicher Vorträge*, new series, vol. xxxii. (Hamburg, 1897), no. 280, may be added. Cf. also T. Nöldeke's note in *ARW* xiii. [1910] 474 *f.* Meijer de Hond, *Beiträge zur Erklarung der Elhidr-legende und von Korân, Sure 18, 59 ff.*, Leyden, 1914, merely confuses the issue.

I. FRIEDLAENDER.

KHŌS.—A race inhabiting the Chitrāl Valley and adjoining country south of the Pāmirs, on the N.W. frontier of British India. To the E. lie Yasin and Gilgit, where the language is Shinā; to the W. is Kāfiristān, where various Indian Kāfir dialects are spoken; to the N., across the Hindū Kush, lie the Pāmirs, where the language is Iranian; and to the S. lie a number of small tribes, mainly of Shin origin, but partly also Pathān, separating them from India proper. The Khōs (properly *Ḥōs*), together with the Shins of Gilgit and the Kāfirs of Kāfiristān, are often classed together as 'Dards'; but this name is properly applied only to the Shins. The present writer looks upon all three as representing the ancient *Piśāchas*. The habits and customs of the Khōs much resemble those of the true Dards, and in the present article attention will chiefly be drawn to those particulars in which they differ from the latter (see DARDS, vol. iv. p. 399).

The Khōs are not the ruling class of Chitrāl. These call them contemptuously *Fakīr Mushkin*, or 'poor beggars' (quasi-Arab. *Faqīr Miskīn*). A superior grade, who are paid servants of the Mehtar, or ruling chief, of Chitrāl, are known as *Erbābzādas* ('sons of possessors'). The two grades intermarry. Above them are the later conquerors of the country—the *Ādamzādas* ('sons of men').[1] The origin of these last is uncertain, but some of them at least came from the north, across the Pāmirs, in the 16th cent. A.D. The Khōs have imposed their language upon them.

According to tradition, the whole Chitrāl Valley was once occupied by Kāfirs, and some Kāfir tribes, *e.g.* the Kalāshās, still inhabit it. This tradition is borne out by the fact that the Kāfir dialects are much more nearly related to the Shinā dialects of Gilgit than either of the two groups is to Khō-wār,[2] the language of the Khōs. The last, although undoubtedly belonging to the same linguistic group, differs from the other two in some essential particulars, such, even, as the forms of the pronouns, in regard to which they agree rather with the Iranian Ghalchah languages of the Pāmirs.[3] It looks as if the whole tract composing the present Kāfiristān, Chitrāl, and Gilgit was once occupied by one homogeneous race, which was subsequently split into two divisions by a wedge of Kho invasion, representing members of a different, but related, tribe coming from the north (cf. Biddulph, p. 158 f., for a slightly different explanation).

According to Biddulph (p. 73), the Khōs show certain physical peculiarities not shared by their Dard relations. In personal appearance they may be called Aryans of a high type, not unlike the Dards, but more handsome, with oval faces, finely cut features, and large beautiful eyes, so that they would compare favourably with the highest type of beauty in Europe. They are famous for their long hair, of which they are inordinately proud, and in this they differ from their Kāfir

[1] O'Brien, *Gram. and Vocab. of the Khowâr Dialect*, p. vi.

[2] Called by Leitner (*Languages and Races of Dardistan*) 'Arnyia,' a name based on the Shin word *Arinak*, employed to designate a portion of Yasin where Khō-wār is spoken.

[3] Cf. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*, p. 155.

neighbours, whom they style 'bald' (p. 65). The women were formerly sought out for their beauty in the slave-markets of Kābul, Peshāwar, and Badakhshān.

The men wear caps bound round with a scanty turban, a cotton shirt, loose drawers tucked into coloured knitted stockings, and soft leather boots. The women wear a white silk embroidered skull cap, a loose chemise of coarse coloured cotton stuff, fastening at the throat and reaching to the knees, and wide drawers. They wear boots and stockings like men, but, as a rule, only when travelling (Biddulph, p. 73f.; O'Brien, p. vi). It is a common practice (O'Brien, p. ix) for young women and girls to blacken their faces with burnt powdered horn, which is supposed to soften the skin and to prevent sunburn.

Great stress is laid upon customary rules of politeness. Friends embrace on meeting. An inferior always dismounts on meeting a superior, and kisses his hand. The other then kisses him on the cheek (Biddulph, p. 75; O'Brien, p. viii). Excitable creatures of impulse, the Khōs have been well described by G. S. Robertson (*Chitrāl*, London, 1898, p. 6 f.):

'Sensuality of the grossest kind, and murder, abominable cruelty, treachery or violent death, are never long absent from the thoughts of a people than whom none in the world are more delightful companions, or of simpler, gentler appearance. So happy seems everyone,—the women are mostly secluded,—so lovely are the little children, so much natural politeness is met everywhere, that if it were not for the occasional glimpses of famished slaves living on fruit or dying of starvation when past their first youth, a hurried traveller might almost imagine himself in a smiling dreamland.'

Polo-playing (*ghal*) is the national game, and is played with great dash. It is slightly different from the polo of Gilgit. The ground is long and narrow, with low walls at each side, off which the ball rebounds in play. A couple of large stones at each end mark the goal. The sticks in use are very short, and the players, going at full speed, reach almost to the ground. The losers have to do what the winners order—usually dance. Every village has its polo-ground, called *janāli* (Biddulph, p. 84; O'Brien, p. xi). Shooting at a popinjay from horseback is also a favourite pastime, and, considering the clumsiness of the weapons used, the marksmanship is sometimes wonderfully good (Biddulph, p. 85; O'Brien, p. xi). Other national amusements are music and dancing. Feast-day, birthday, wedding, or any occasion for a gathering serves as an excuse for the latter. Music is always played at the polo-matches, a goal being the signal for a wild flourish and beat of drums. Some of their airs are very taking (Biddulph, p. 85; O'Brien, p. xii f.).

In former times the religion of the country was Buddhism.[1] A Buddhist rock-cut figure, bearing a Sanskrit or Pāli inscription which is not older than the 3rd cent. A.D., and is probably later, has been found about 20 miles north of the town of Chitrāl (Biddulph, p. 149). The Khōs are now Musalmāns, mostly Sunnīs, but in the northern valleys, as in northern Gilgit, they are generally members of the Maulā'ī sect.[2] Islām was introduced about the 14th cent., and the present Musalmān dynasty came from Khorāsān in the 16th (*ib.* 117, 150). The Khōs differ from the Dards in not hating the cow and in not worshipping the *chilī*, or juniper tree (*ib.* 113, 116; *ERE* iv. 401). As regards festivals, the Dard *Nōs*, in honour of the winter solstice, is called *Dashti*, and is celebrated without bonfires (Biddulph, p. 101). The Dard *Bazono*, or spring festival, is not held, but the *Ganoni*, or festival of the wheat harvest, is observed under the name of *Phindik* (*ib.* 103). The *Jastandikaik*, or 'devil-driving,' in honour of the completion of the harvest, corresponding to the Dard *Domenika*, is celebrated by the firing of guns and shooting at a sheep's head set up as a mark (*ib.* 103). Corresponding to the Dard *Chilī*, or festival of the beginning of wheat-sowing, is the Khō *Biniwik* (*ib.* 105).

When a child is born, the mother is unclean, and no one will eat from her hand for seven days. North of the Hindū Kush the same rule obtains, but the period is extended to forty days, and even the infant may not suck its mother's breast for seven days. In some of the higher Chitrāl clans there is a custom that every infant is suckled in turn by every nursing mother of the clan, so that each becomes its foster-mother. There is thus a constant interchange of infants going on among the mothers, for the purpose of strengthening tribal unity (*ib.* 81, 83). Marriage ceremonies are conducted much as among the neighbouring tribes, but the following customs are peculiar to Chitrāl.

After the Mullāh has read the marriage service, the bride is led out by her mother, who hands her over to the bridegroom, receiving a present in exchange. He starts at once for home, but, after leading her out, returns alone and deposits a present of a sword or a gun on the hearth. On the other hand, north of the Hindū Kush he is taken to the bride, and does not go off with her till the next day. In Gilgit the custom is again different, as there is a formal ratification of the marriage on the third day (*ib.* 79 f.). Polygamy is practised, and the custom of the levirate is also common, although it is not compulsory on the widow. In Gilgit, on the other hand, it is compulsory (*ib.* 70). Marital infidelity is extremely common, and the men show little jealousy of their wives. In the neighbouring States of Hunza-Nagar, where old traditions still prevail, infidelity is not regarded as an offence, and custom requires that a man should place his wife at the disposal of his guest. The *droit de seigneur* was also in force down to a comparatively late time, and even now a man considers himself as highly honoured if his wife has attracted the attention of the Thum, or tribal chief, of either of these two States. At the same time, in Chitrāl, a husband has the right to slay the erring couple when he finds them together; but, should he kill one and not the other, he is held guilty of murder (*ib.* 77).

The common form of Musalmān interment is now used. A piece of flat stone or slate, three or four feet long, is placed at each end of the grave, which is neatly plastered over (*ib.* 82). Superstitions are much as in Dardistān. There is a general belief in fairies (cf. *ERE* iv. 401). Tirich Mīr, the highest peak (25,426 ft.) in the country, is said to swarm with them, and to them the Khōs attribute the sounds coming from its glaciers (O'Brien, p. x; cf. Biddulph, p. 59).

LITERATURE.—Almost the only source of information regarding the Khōs as a people is J. Biddulph, *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh*, Calcutta, 1880, which contains a full description of the people and a grammar and vocabulary of their language. D. J. T. O'Brien, *Grammar and Vocabulary of the Khowār Dialect*, Lahore, 1895, gives a brief account of Chitrāl and its inhabitants in the Introduction. These two works have been freely utilized in the foregoing account. A vocabulary mixed up with much grammatical information is contained in G. W. Leitner, *The Languages and Races of Dardistan*, Lahore, 1877.

G. A. GRIERSON.

KHONDS.—See KANDHS.

KIERKEGAARD.—1. Relation to his father.—Sören Aabye Kierkegaard was born at Copenhagen on the 5th of May 1813. He was the youngest child of Michael P. Kierkegaard, a retired woollen draper in good circumstances, another of whose sons, P. C. Kierkegaard (1805–88), rose to eminence as bishop of Aalborg. The life of Sören Kierkegaard has but few points of contact with the external world; but there were, in particular, three occurrences—a broken engagement, an attack by a comic paper, and the use of a word by H. L. Martensen—which must be referred to as having wrought with extraordinary effect upon his peculiarly sensitive and high-strung nature. The intensity of his inner life, again—which finds expression in his published works, and even more directly in his notebooks and diaries (also published)—cannot be properly understood without some reference to his father.

The latter came from a peasant home near Ringköbing in Western Jutland, and, as it would seem, was, while yet a mere child, deeply influenced by a Pietistic movement in the

[1] Cf. S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki, Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1884, i. 119; T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, do. 1904, i. 226.

[2] See *ERE* iv. 400. For the Maulā'is see Biddulph, p. 119.

district. It is probably to be read as a manifestation of his sincere and earnest temperament, that once, while tending sheep on the moors, the boy Michael, overcome with hunger and cold and a sense of loneliness, mounted a hillock and solemnly cursed God as the dispenser of so wretched a lot. Shortly afterwards he went to a situation in Copenhagen, where he soon began to prosper; but, with his natural tendency to morbid introspection, strengthened by stern religious feeling, he interpreted his later success as a sign that he had with his boyish curse committed the sin against the Holy Ghost; the turn of the tide showed at once that he had been presumptuous in denying God's care of him, and that the sin was too great to be punished (as a less grave sin might have been, *e.g.* by adversity) in this world. This idea still further suffused his religious views and his religious life with gloom and melancholy, and these, again, descended, partly by inheritance and partly by training, upon both of his distinguished sons.

Sören, the child of his old age, came, even as a youth, to surmise that there was some dark secret gnawing at his father's heart, and at length, shortly before his father's death, learned the true facts about the curse. The discovery shook him, as he says, like an earthquake. He made a note of the circumstance, and put it among his private papers, where it was found a considerable time after his death; and, when H. P. Barfod, the first editor of his posthumous papers, showed the note to Bishop Kierkegaard, the latter burst into tears with the cry: 'That is our father's history and ours also.' It should be added that the father was a man of remarkable intellectual gifts, and that, with all his severity, he won the devoted affection of his sons.

2. His personality.—The fundamental and decisive element in Sören Kierkegaard's personality is found by George Brandes in his combined reverence and scorn; by H. Höffding (more in accordance with the fact that he was his father's son) in his melancholy; by O. P. Monrad, his latest biographer, in emotion or passion. Certainly the emotional factor—as it forms the decisive element in personal character generally—best suggests the distinctive feature of Kierkegaard's personality. In his published writings and in his journals we are in touch with a nature of unwonted intensity, with an inner life at white heat. This is seen in his abnormal sensitiveness; he was touched to the quick by things that others might have ignored or easily forgotten. Again, while he was admittedly the most original mind that Denmark ever produced, his thought seldom operated in cool dialectic, but was in its nature 'existential,' expressive of his whole personality; with amazing imaginative fertility he constructs, not chains of reasoning, but 'experiments in psychology,' *i.e.* persons and situations depicting a real, living experience. Similarly, religion was for him, not a group of doctrines requiring merely to be believed, defended, or systematized, but a fact making a tremendous demand upon life; the joy of salvation was to be won in the most intense appropriation of the truth and the most impassioned submission to its claim. His natural melancholy was, as already said, partly an inheritance, strengthened by his early training, and doubtless also by the sickly and infirm body with which his impetuous spirit was united; but it was deepened by his sense of the awful imperative of Christianity and his failure to realize it. His perfervid nature appears also in the iron resolution with which he wrought out his, as he thought, divinely appointed task; for he might claim, as few others, that in all his work he had striven for but one thing; and in prosecuting it he lost friends, means, health, was mocked by the crowd and denounced by the religious, but held on, if not serene, yet undismayed, to the end.

3. His purpose and method.—What, then, was the 'one thing' that he willed? As he makes clear in *Om min Forfatter-Virksomhed* ('My Literary Activity,' 1851), it was religion; or, more definitely, his one aim was to teach his age what it is 'to become a Christian.' When he was about twenty-five years of age—after a period of irresponsible life—the discovery of his father's secret, and his father's death, constrained him to live more earnestly, and he passed his examination for orders and took his degree. About this time, too, he became engaged, but adhered to the engagement for little over a year, being convinced that his melancholy (and perhaps something else) unfitted him for married life. This was, in fact, one of the turning-points of his career. The broken engagement has left its tragic mark on the writings of his earlier period, but this was simply because it had brought him to see that he was not as others, and to realize his true vocation, viz. to hold up the ideal Christian life before his contemporaries. How was this to be done? We shall never understand the real Kierkegaard, never even comprehend rightly any of his books, until we first of all grasp his proposed method—a method not fully understood by himself at first, but gradually revealed to him in the course of events.

His starting-point was the conviction that once more in Denmark the times were out of joint; his fellow-men were so far astray that they could not profit by a direct Christian message. They were all 'Christians'—Christians by birth, just as Jews are Jews by birth—but their life was lived on the plane of sense (the 'æsthetic'), or, at best, on the plane of customary morality. Moreover, Christianity had been appropriated by philosophy, had become part of the 'system' (Hegelianism) which reduces existence to thought, and sees unity and harmony everywhere. The Church itself had forgotten the ideal, and the necessity of personal choice; it preached peace without the sword. The situation seemed to Kierkegaard like that of Greece in the age of the Sophists; and, just as Socrates (who had been the central figure in his graduation theses on *Irony*) sought by his 'irony' to bring his hearers to a sense of their own ignorance, and by his 'maieutic' to help them to bring forth truth, so Kierkegaard proposed by the method of 'indirect communication' to arouse his age from its self-content, and lead it—not in the mass, indeed, but as individuals—to realize what it is to live, and, above all, what it is to live the Christian life. Where the prevailing mode of thought made all easy, he would 'make difficulties.' And his method would be to take his stand, as did Socrates, beside those whom he wished to instruct. He would fabricate characters representative of various aspects of contemporary life, letting each work out his own views. Hence Kierkegaard's most characteristic works are pseudonymous; he is not to be considered as their author, and, indeed, it is only when, in the elaboration of his plan, his fabricated personalities approximate to his own standpoint that he puts his name, as editor, on the title-page.

4. His works.—(*a*) *The 'indirect message.'*—The first phase of the 'indirect message' appears in *Enten—Eller* ('Either—Or,' Feb. 1843), a work in two parts, A's Papers and B's Papers, with Victor Eremita as the ostensible editor. A's Papers are eight in number (including 'The Seducer's Diary,' which is not by A, *i.e.*, it is still further removed from Kierkegaard's own position), and depict various aspects of the 'æsthetic' life—the life of sensuous enjoyment in its most refined form. B's Papers are letters to A, and show how the ethico-religious man, in fitting himself into the ordinary human relations, such as marriage, from a sense of duty, really attains to a higher æsthetic condition than the æsthetic man himself, whose only hope is to realize his state as one of despair, and so 'choose himself,' *i.e.* become a personality. B closes with a sermon which sets forth the true

religious attitude as one of continued penitence—'that we are always in the wrong in relation to God'—and ends with the undogmatic dogma that 'only the truth that edifies is truth for thee.' The necessity of decision, of choosing one's personality, of coming to oneself (what one actually decides for is not so important)—such was the message of *Enten—Eller*.

For the moment Kierkegaard thought that his task was done. But in writing B's Papers he had personally attained to a deeper grasp of Christianity, and had come to feel that there was a stage of life higher than the ethico-religious standpoint of B. It was now, probably, that he became more fully cognizant of his plan, and of what was necessary to its development. The higher and more distinctively Christian form of religion is set forth in *Frygt og Bæven* ('Fear and Trembling,' Oct. 1843), the message of which is illustrated by the fact that Abraham was commanded to do what was ethically wrong, *i.e.*, to kill Isaac, and obeyed in virtue of a personal relation to God; he had faith—he staked the earthly, and yet believed that he should possess it still. Such faith is no common or easy thing, but is a relation to the Absolute which baffles reason, and can be won and held only in an infinite passion. In *Gjentagelsen* ('Repetition,' Oct. 1843), Kierkegaard sketches an abortive transition to the religious sphere. 'Repetition' is one of his characteristic ideas; it signifies persistence in, and faithfulness to, a chosen course of life, and is thus opposed to the æsthetic standpoint, with constancy only in change. But Kierkegaard also gives the word a more special meaning—that rather of 'resumption' (*Gjentagelse*, 'taking again')—implying that each higher stage of life carries with it the lower in a transfigured form. *Gjentagelsen* tells of a young man who seeks to pass from the æsthetic to the religious sphere, but for want of a true penitence becomes merely a romanticist; *i.e.*, he simply resumes his old self; and his case is contrasted with that of Job, who humbled himself utterly before God, and at last regained all that he had lost, and more—the true 'repetition."

In *Philosophiske Smuler* ('Philosophical Bits,' June 1844, by 'Johannes Climacus,' with Kierkegaard as editor) he comes closer to his real problem, 'How to become a Christian,' but so far discusses only the general question, 'How can an eternal salvation be based upon a historical event?' As an 'experiment in thought' his pseudonym argues that an appearance of God in time-relations must be a 'paradox' for human reason. Thought must find such an appearance a stumbling-block, and may seek either to reject it or to explain it—both equally in vain. The true procedure of the intellect is to abase itself before the 'paradox,' which can be grasped only in the passion of faith. Such is the condition of salvation, in regard to which, accordingly, the earliest and latest generations are essentially on the same ground. The next step was to indicate what is at once the presupposition of and the obstacle to the great work of faith. This is done in *Begrebet Angest* ('The Idea of Dread,' June 1844), a psychological investigation of the Fall, and so of sin in general. Sin is not to be explained scientifically; psychologically it is preceded by a vague apprehension (*Angest*) of something that both attracts and repels, but this does not bring us to sin itself, which, as an act of the human personality, comes by a 'spring.' In *Stadier paa Livets Vei* ('Stages on the Way of Life,' April 1845) is given a kind of résumé of the foregoing books. This work exhibits the three spheres of life—the æsthetic, the ethical, the religious—and thus supplements *Enten—Eller*, developing the ideas of *Frygt og Bæven* and *Gjentagelsen*. The most important section is the third, entitled 'Guilty—Not Guilty' (based, as are also in part *Frygt og Bæven* and *Gjentagelsen*, upon his personal experiences in connexion with his engagement), a narrative of suffering—suffering resulting from the break with the natural life and from the sense of guilt, which drive the subject of the narrative towards religion in its highest form. Isolated from man, isolated before God, he does not reach peace, for he represents only the approximation to religion. The full statement of what is involved in becoming a Christian is given in the *Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift* ('Concluding Unscientific Postscript,' *i.e.* to 'Philosophical Bits,' Feb. 1846, by the same pseudonym and editor). The starting-point of the book is the individual's passionate desire for his own salvation, and its problem is not 'Is Christianity true?', but 'How am I to become a Christian?' The passionate desire rejects the proofs from Biblical theology, from the existence of the Church, and from the philosophy which, in identifying being and thought, distorts Christianity and subverts individuality. Man may construct a logical system; a system of existence is for God alone. The essential truth of Christianity, viz. that the Absolute has entered into time-relations, is a paradox for thought, and can be appropriated only by an impassioned faith. Subjectivity is truth; the essential thing is not *what*, but *how*, we believe.

These works were produced within about four years; but in addition to, and concomitantly with, the pseudonymous books Kierkegaard had issued a series of *Opbyggelige Taler* ('Edifying Discourses') designed for the 'individual' whom his other works might have awakened. By these, moreover, he intended not only to indicate his own religious position, but also to show that—should it ever be questioned—he was a religious writer from the outset. These 'discourses' are marked by the finest spiritual discernment.

(*b*) *The portrayal of ideal Christianity.*—Once more Kierkegaard believed that his special task was finished, and actually thought of seeking a rural charge. But now came the second event that deeply influenced his life and thought. In the early forties the *Korsar*, a satirical journal edited by M. A. Goldschmidt, a friend of Kierkegaard, while holding up to ridicule everybody else of note in Copenhagen, always spoke with something like veneration of Kierkegaard's works. In 1846, Kierkegaard invited the paper to attack him too, and the challenge was accepted. The *Korsar* satirized him—his person, his clothes, his pseudonyms—with pen and pencil. The better class left him in the lurch; the crowd grinned. All this struck Kierkegaard to the heart; he saw in it a proof of the awful depth to which a 'Christian' people had sunk. His scorn for the multitude grew apace, and the political ferments of the time at home and abroad only served to intensify it. But in this bitter experience he won, as he believed, a deeper comprehension of Christianity. He began to work at a series of distinctively Christian writings, mainly in the form of discourses, and published under his own name. Pre-eminent among these are: *Opbyggelige Taler i forskjellig Aand* ('Edifying Discourses in various Spirits'), *Kjerlighedens Gjerninger* ('Works of Love'), *Christelige Taler* ('Christian Discourses')—all messages.' The first develops the idea that the Christian life necessarily involves suffering; the second sets forth the absolute demand of Christianity ('Thou *shalt* love')—the inevitable suffering must not provoke to hate or scorn; in the *Christelige Taler*, composed of four series of discourses (the third of which bears a motto asserting that Christianity does not call for defence, its function being to attack), Kierkegaard depicts the

Christian life as in its hope, its suffering, its earnestness, entirely unconformable to the world; and in this work we hear, in fact, the first clear note of the coming open challenge to conventional Christianity. Thereafter he wrote *Sygdommen til Döden* ('The Sickness unto Death') and *Indövelse i Christendom* ('Practice in Christianity'), but delayed their publication for various reasons—his respect for J. P. Mynster, primate of Denmark ('my father's priest'), his sympathies with simple-minded people, and his desire not to arrogate to himself a higher Christian standing than he really had. In the meantime he published *Tvende ethisk-religieuse Smaa-Afhandlinger* ('Two Short Ethico-religious Treatises,' 1849); one of them arguing that none but an apostle has a right to let himself be martyred for the truth, the other setting forth the distinction between a genius and an apostle. Then at length followed *Sygdommen til Döden* (1849) and *Indövelse i Christendom* (1850)—by 'Anticlimacus' (indicating that they exhibit an ideal of Christianity which Kierkegaard himself, who is merely the 'editor,' had not attained)—his most powerful works. In the former he analyzes sin as a state of conscious or unconscious despair, as the fatal disease which true Christianity alone can cure; in the latter he depicts reconciliation with Christ, but only through a personal appropriation of Him in His humiliation and suffering, *i.e.* by becoming contemporary with Him in spirit; He who said, 'Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden,' was in the form of a servant—a poor, despised man; and faith is precisely the resolve, produced by a consciousness of sin as the one bane of human life, to follow Him in suffering and humiliation. In *Til Selvprövelse* ('For Self-examination,' 1851) he sums up his conception of Christianity in a popular form. The general conclusion of these works was that Christendom, existing Christianity, the Church, was in reality a travesty of true Christianity. Kierkegaard hoped—and from conversations with Bishop Mynster he believed that he had good grounds for hoping—that the primate would publicly and officially concede this; then would he gladly point the way of grace. But Mynster, on the contrary, was bitterly offended by the works, and kept silence. Kierkegaard still waited, however; and that he too kept silence—for three years—must be regarded as a proof of the absolute sincerity of his hope.

(c) *The direct attack upon the Church.*—The final act in Kierkegaard's life-drama—the dark and stormy close—turned upon a word used by H. L. Martensen. Bishop Mynster died in January 1854, and Martensen, in the funeral sermon, spoke of him as a 'witness for the truth' (*Sandhedsvidne*)—as a link in 'the chain of witnesses that extends from the apostles' days to our own.' Kierkegaard had a profound respect for Mynster, but had latterly come to feel that the primate embodied in his own person that travesty of Christian thought and life which the whole series of books from *Enten—Eller* to *Indövelse i Christendom* had been designed to expose and impeach. That Mynster should now be designated a 'witness for the truth' demanded, therefore, a strong protest. Kierkegaard at once drafted an article in which he asserted that Mynster, far from being a *Sandhedsvidne*, had, in fact, completely failed, alike in life and in word, to present the Christianity of the NT, one distinctive note of which is 'suffering.' This article, however, was held over until Martensen was appointed to the vacant see, and was eventually published in *Fædrelandet* in December. It made a great sensation. Martensen replied, and Kierkegaard followed with one philippic after another, evoking rejoinders from many hands, and kindling a controversy of such fierceness that Danish writers compare it with Pascal's conflict with the Jesuits. Kierkegaard then issued successively the nine numbers of *Öieblikket* ('The Moment'), in which the master of irony set forth his indictment of existing Christianity in language that none could mistake. His standing thesis here was that the Christianity of the NT was now simply non-existent. His claim was, not that he was a Christian, but that he understood what Christianity was. His demand was 'honesty'—a frank avowal on the Church's part that it was not Christian, and he called upon every honest man to sever himself from it till that avowal was made.

The strain was too much for Kierkegaard's sickly frame. The bitterness and ruthlessness of his language in these last days were doubtless partly due to the pain and weakness which now oppressed him. In September 1855 he fainted in the street and was taken to a public hospital. Here he was occasionally visited by Pastor Emil Boesen, a friend from childhood's days, who found him very low, but looking for death with humble trust. On one occasion Boesen asked him if he would take the sacrament, and Kierkegaard, resolute to the last, answered, 'Yes, but not from a clergyman.' He died on 11th November 1855.

5. **His achievement.**—Kierkegaard had in an extraordinary measure the gifts of poetic passion and keen dialectic power. Either alone might have sufficed to give him a place among the great figures of European literature or philosophy. In combination they produced the 'indirect communication' and the arraignment of the Church. The indirect message pulsates with emotion, but is rendered obscure by its dialectic structure; the attack upon the Church moves on logical lines, but was virtually a failure by reason of its violence. Kierkegaard's critics have drawn attention to the fundamental antinomy in his literary production as a whole—his earlier insistence upon the subjectivity of truth, and his later demand for unconditional submission to an objective Christianity. Formally, no doubt, the contradiction is glaring; yet one may ask whether it is not inherent in Christianity itself. For the Apostle Paul, too, everything turns on the objective fact that God has become man, and yet all depends upon the subjective appropriation of that fact. It must certainly be admitted that the peculiar manner in which Kierkegaard developed the two sides of the antithesis has served to keep his distinctive views outside the main current of European thought, though in substance—identified, it may be, with other names—they have found their own place; we must remember, moreover, that what Kierkegaard had in view from first to last was not the universal idea, but the individual soul. Be this as it may, there remain in Kierkegaard's achievement the keen psychological analysis with which he struck at the roots of the 'system'; the searching presentation of the Christian life as the ideal in the light of which the existing Church shrivels to a mere travesty; the often tender and always impressive appeal of his 'discourses'; and the profound suggestiveness of his doctrines of subjectivity, the paradox, repetition, the spring, and the necessity of our becoming contemporary with Jesus Christ—to say nothing of the brilliant style and the lyrical profusion which he brings to their expression. There remains also the pathos of his lonely life—that of a great sympathetic soul, like Isaiah or Dante—seeking the response that never came; and, last—perhaps greatest—of all, the absolute self-consecration and singleness of purpose with which, in bodily and mental suffering, and in 'the loss of all things,' he strove, both in his personal life and in his work, to realize the ideal.

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A. GRIEVE.

KIN, KINSHIP.—I. *INTRODUCTORY.*—1. **Use of term.**—At the present time the word 'kinship' is used in different senses by writers on human society. In one of these senses, which corresponds with the ordinary usage of the English language, the word applies to the relationship set up by consanguinity, and is dependent ultimately on the institution of the family, this term being used for the social group consisting of a man, his wife, and their children. When used in this way, the term may include cases in which the relationship depends on some kind of social convention, such as adoption. By many writers on sociology, on the other hand, the meaning of the word has been extended so as to include, or even apply primarily to, the relationship set up by common membership of a clan or other similar social group. In this sense, the meaning of the word is not dependent on the institution of the family, but it is applied to persons with whom there is no tie of consanguinity, or of the equivalent conventional relationship. Every member of an American or African clan or of an Australian or Melanesian moiety stands in a social relation to every other member of his clan or moiety, a relation which involves definite social duties; and some sociologists use the words 'kin' and 'kinship' explicitly for this relationship, while still more use the words loosely so that they apply both to this group-relationship and to that set up by consanguinity or conventional membership of the family. The use of the terms in these widely different senses is a potent source of confusion, and it is therefore necessary to limit the use of 'kinship' to one or other of the two senses. In this article both kinds of relationship are dealt with, but the first of the two senses will be implied when the words 'kin' and 'kinship' are used in the body of the article.

2. Definition.—The fact of kinship can be determined and defined in several different ways: by consanguinity, genealogy, terminology, or function.

(1) The least satisfactory is *consanguinity*. Among ourselves such a relationship as that which exists between parent and child, or between brother and sister, can also come into existence by social conventions such as adoption (*q.v.*), but among many peoples this formation of relationships by social processes may be the habitual practice. A consanguineous relationship may count for little or nothing unless it has been ratified by some kind of social process, or a social process may result in the formation of a relationship between persons wholly devoid of any consanguineous tie. Thus, in the Banks Islands in Melanesia the relationship of parent does not come into existence by the facts of procreation and parturition, but it is such acts as the payment of the midwife, the first feeding of the child, or the planting of a tree on the occasion of a birth that determine who are to be the parents of the child for all social purposes. Similarly, among a polyandrous people like the Todas, it may be the performance of a ceremony during pregnancy that determines which of the husbands of the mother is to be regarded for all social purposes as the father of the child. Indeed, the fact of fatherhood is so strictly determined by this ceremony that a male who performs it becomes the 'father' of the child even if he be only a few years of age or have never seen the mother before he is called upon to take part in the ceremony. Kinship cannot be determined and defined by consanguinity even among ourselves, still less among other peoples.

(2) *Genealogy.*—Nearly all, if not all, peoples of the world preserve, either in writing or in their memories, a record of those with whom they are related by consanguinity or by those social conventions which, as we have seen, serve the same social purpose. Among many peoples, and especially among those of rude culture, the knowledge of relationship thus genealogically determined is far more extensive than among ourselves. Pedigrees preserved in the memories of a rude tribe of cannibals may rival, if not surpass, anything which even the most enthusiastic genealogist is capable of carrying in his mind. Among such peoples it is the facts recorded in the pedigree of a person that largely determine his use of terms of relationship and regulate all the social functions which those terms connote.

(3) If the use of terms of relationship is determined by pedigrees, it follows that the definition of kinship by the *terminology* of relationship must be less satisfactory than by genealogy; but this third mode of defining kinship is even less valuable for another reason: the terms used for relatives as determined genealogically are precisely the same as those used for the relationships set up by membership of the clan or other social group, and therefore it is impossible by their means to define the tie of kinship in the strict sense.

(4) *Function.*—Two persons may be regarded as kin if their duties and privileges in relation to one another are of the kind usually associated with ties of kinship. Thus, a number of social functions and psychological ties belong to the relationship of parent and child, and it has been held[1] that those functions and ties can be used as a means of defining kinship. It is evident that such a mode of definition could be of no practical utility even in the case of near relatives, and it would break down absolutely in the case of more distant relationships. Any description of kinship must take into account the social functions and psychological ties which exist between kin, but they cannot be used as a means of definition.

The genealogical mode, therefore, is that which furnishes the most exact and convenient method of defining kinship. Kinship may be defined as relationship which can be determined and described by means of genealogies. As thus defined, kinship will be both narrower and wider than the relationship set up by membership of the clan or other similar social group. If, as is now customary,[2] the term 'clan' is used for an exogamous social group, it would be only members of the father's or mother's clan, according as descent is patrilineal or matrilineal, who would be kin if the term were used for membership of the social group. To take a specific instance: if kinship were used exclusively

[1] B. Malinowski, *The Family among the Australian Aborigines*, London, 1913, p. 172 f.

[2] See *Notes and Queries on Anthropology*, London, 1912, p. 156.

for the clan-relationship, the father would not be kin where there is matrilineal descent, nor would the mother's brother be kin where descent is patrilineal. If, on the other hand, kinship is used for relationship determined genealogically, both father and mother's brother will be kin, whatever the mode of descent, but members of the father's or mother's clan so remote that no genealogical connexion can be traced will not be kin.

The definition of kinship as genealogical relationship will also exclude the metaphorical sense in which terms of relationship are often used by peoples at all stages of culture. This article deals especially with kinship as thus defined, but the relationships set up by common membership of the social group are also considered, especially in so far as those relationships are connected with kinship proper.

II. *THE TERMINOLOGY OF RELATIONSHIP.*—The collection of terms denoting relationship used among a people is usually spoken of as the system of relationship of that people. Such systems comprise a definite body of social facts which can be described, classified, and compared with one another. Such comparison shows that the systems used by different peoples vary greatly, and these variations are found to depend on the application of different principles of classification of relationships. For instance, while we class together the father's brother and the mother's brother under the common denomination of 'uncle,' most peoples of the world assign these two relatives to social classes so distinct and with such different functions that their social systems would be reduced to chaos if they were driven to adopt our mode of classification. On the other hand, two relatives whom we distinguish definitely, as the father and the father's brother are by nearly all peoples of rude culture put into one social category, and the social life of these peoples is such that this mode of classification leads to no confusion, but the common nomenclature carries with it an organized system of common social functions.

Two chief varieties of system of relationship are usually distinguished, which, following Lewis Morgan, are called the classificatory and the descriptive. This distinction is not a happy one; for all systems are classificatory in that they class together certain relatives, while the term 'descriptive' is unsatisfactory, as many of the systems to which it is usually applied, such as our own, are not in any way descriptive, while descriptive terms are often prominent in the systems called classificatory. The classificatory principle is, however, so pronounced and shows itself so conspicuously in a large group of systems used by peoples of rude culture that it is a fairly appropriate term and will probably long continue to be used.

The use of Morgan's other term cannot be so readily justified. His 'descriptive' systems include many which are wholly devoid of a descriptive character. Thus, if our own system were truly descriptive, we should not speak of a grandfather or uncle, but should always distinguish between the father's father and the mother's father, and between the father's brother, the mother's brother, the husband of the father's sister, and the husband of the mother's sister. Such descriptive nomenclature occurs in many European and in some African systems of relationship, and Morgan justified his inclusion of systems like our own in the descriptive category by the assumption that they had formerly possessed a truly descriptive character.

1. The classificatory system.—As already indicated, the special feature of this system is the application of its terms to large groups of persons so that in its most complete form no single term can be used as the means of distinguishing an individual. Thus, the term 'brother' is not only used for sons of the same father and mother, but is also applied to all the sons of the father's brothers and of the mother's sisters, the terms 'brother' and 'sister' in these latter cases being used in a similar wide sense. In other varieties of the classificatory system, the term is used even more widely for all the sons of the father's sisters and of the mother's brothers, 'brother' and 'sister' being used in a similar wide sense. Similarly, the term applied to the father is also used of all the brothers of the father and of all the husbands of the mother's sister, 'brother' and 'sister' being again used in the classificatory sense. One result of this usage—one which is a potent source of misunderstanding and perplexity—is that the language of a people who follow the classificatory system possesses no equivalents for our European terms of relationship, so that an accurate translation of those terms is impossible. Similarly, European languages have no equivalents for the terms of a classificatory system. It is, therefore, necessary to state at the outset that, when an English term of relationship is used in this article, it is to be taken in its usual English meaning except when definitely stated to be used in a classificatory sense.

There are several classes of terms of relationship. In the case of certain relatives, and especially the father and mother, it is often the case that one term is used when addressing such a relative, and another term when speaking of him or her to others. The terms used in address correspond to our familiar terms, such as 'Papa' or 'Daddy,' but the distinction between the two kinds of term in classificatory systems is much more rigorous than we are accustomed to.

Another variant is found in some places where terms of relationship are used in a collective or reciprocal sense. Thus, a Fijian highlander will address his father's father as *tui*, but, when speaking of himself and his father as a social group, he will say that they are *veitumbuni*, using a word *tumbu*, which in other parts of Fiji is a term by which a grandfather is addressed.

A feature very widely present in classificatory systems is a peculiar reciprocity in the use of terms of relationship, which suggests that they denote relationships rather than relatives. This reciprocal usage, which among ourselves is limited to relatives of the same generation, such as brother, sister, and cousin, occurs between persons of different generations in the classificatory system, so that a man and his mother's brother or a man and his grandchild may use only one term between them; there may be only one term for the relationship between mother's brother and sister's son, or for that between father's father and son's son. A similar usage occurs between husband and wife so that there is only one in place of our two terms. It is as if the word 'spouse' were the only term in the English language for the partners in a marriage.

It is probably a variation of this principle of reciprocity that is seen in a very peculiar and characteristic mode of terminology for brothers and sisters. In most classificatory systems, two brothers use one term, two sisters the same or another often closely related term, while a brother and sister use a wholly different term. A similar custom is general in the nomenclature for brothers-and sisters-in-law: two men use one term, two sisters the same or a different term, while a man and woman use still another term or other terms. This feature also characterizes the nomenclature for cross-cousins in some Fijian systems. Looked at from another point of view, this character-

istic of classificatory systems means that the use of a term of relationship does not depend merely, as it does with us, on the sex of the person addressed, but also on that of the speaker. Thus a man may use one term for his sister and a woman another; similarly, a man may use one term for his sister's son and a woman a quite different term for hers, and men and women may use different terms for their grandchildren. In some cases, even, a father and mother may use different terms for their child.

Another feature which is very general in classificatory systems is the use of different terms for certain relatives according to age. This is especially frequent in the case of the relationships between brothers and between sisters, while frequently the brothers of the father, and less frequently the sisters of the mother, are denoted differently according as they are older or younger than the father or mother. This practice occurs only very rarely, if at all, in the case of the relationship between brother and sister, and is very exceptional in the case of the mother's brothers or the father's sisters. Thus, systems are very frequent in which there is a term for elder brother (man speaking) and elder sister (woman speaking); another for younger brother (man speaking) and younger sister (woman speaking), but only one reciprocal term is used both for brother (woman speaking) and for sister (man speaking), irrespective of age.

Two varieties of this practice occur: in some cases the usage is determined by the relative ages of those who use the terms, while in other cases it is determined by the ages of the children of some more or less distant ancestor. In the latter case, a man will address a relative as elder if the latter belongs to an elder branch of his pedigree, even if he (the speaker) is the older in years. These usages may be distinguished as dependent on age and seniority respectively.

Still another feature very general in classificatory systems is the presence of a rigorous distinction between relatives through father and mother. This is especially frequent in the case of those whom we call uncles and aunts, and less frequently applies also to grandparents and grandchildren.

One result of these various peculiarities of the classificatory system is that it usually possesses a far richer terminology than exists among ourselves or other European peoples. Thus, even without distinctions according to age, it is theoretically possible to have sixteen different terms for the different varieties of the grandparent-grandchild relationship; two each for father's father, father's mother, mother's father, and mother's mother, one term of each pair being used by the grandson and the other by the granddaughter; and, similarly, two terms each for son's son, son's daughter, daughter's son, and daughter's daughter, one term of each pair being used by the grandfather and the other by the grandmother. There is no known system of relationship in which all these sixteen possible terms are present, but in some Fijian systems as many as eight of them are in use, the absent terms being those which depend on the difference in sex of the grandchildren.

The richness of terminology of classificatory systems may also be increased by the presence of terms for relationships for which we have no special designation. Thus it is common to find special terms used beween men who have married sisters or between women who have married brothers, and special terms may also be used between the parents, or even between the grandparents, of a married couple, marriage between two persons thus setting up a relationship between their parents or their grandparents which is of sufficient social importance to lead to the use of a special term.

If the principle of reciprocity is in full action, so that two persons of different generations use only one term for each other, the number of terms will be diminished; but, even so, most classificatory systems are very rich in terminology.

It is also common in the classificatory system to find relatives classed together whom we distinguish. Some of these classifications, such as the father's brother with the father or the mother's sister with the mother, are due to the working of the classificatory principle, and are found in nearly all classificatory systems, but there are others which occur only here and there. Thus, the mother's brother is frequently denoted by the same term as the father-in-law and the father's sister's husband, or the father's father may be classed with an elder brother, or the father's sister's son with the father. Most of these correspondences in nomenclature can be shown to be due to special forms of marriage, and will be considered more fully in the various sections of art. MARRIAGE; all that need be noted here is that features of this kind introduce an element of complexity into classificatory systems of relationship which combines with their variations in richness of nomenclature to give these systems an immensely greater variety than is found in European systems. This variety is so great, and there are so many gradations, that any systematic grouping of classificatory systems is far from easy; but certain main distinctions are possible.

2. Varieties of the classificatory system.—In his great work on the *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family*, Morgan considered three main varieties of the classificatory system—the Ganowanian system found in N. America, the Turanian in Asia and some parts of Oceania, and the Malayan in Polynesia—but the Ganowanian and Turanian systems were found to be so similar that he regarded them as forming one variety, the Malayan forming another. Though the name was badly chosen, the Malayan system has much right to be regarded as a special variety. Morgan drew his chief example from the Hawaiian Islands, and hence we may call it the Hawaiian system. It occurs also among the Maoris of New Zealand and probably in other parts of Polynesia. It is a very simple system, in which the classificatory principle is carried to an extreme degree, so that all relatives of the same generation are classed with brothers or sisters, all of the previous generation with the father and mother, and of the generation before that with the grandparents, so that in the Hawaiian Islands, excluding relatives by marriage, there are only fifteen terms of relationship altogether.

There is, however, no hard and fast line between this system and the more usual forms of the classificatory system. Thus the system of Eddystone Island in the British Solomons differs only in the fact that, while all relatives of the generation older than the speaker are classed with the father or mother, one relative in the generation following the speaker, viz. the sister's son, is distinguished from the rest.

A more definite principle of classification can be based upon the special features derived from different forms of marriage. Thus, the cross-cousin marriage (see MARRIAGE) produces a number of special features which enable the system of a place where this marriage is practised to be recognized at a glance. Similarly, other special forms of system dependent on forms of marriage can be distinguished, though numerous gradations are possible owing to the fact that the special features dependent upon a form of marriage often

persist after the marriage has ceased to be practised, and their disappearance may be so gradual that no line can be drawn between a system dependent on a given form of marriage and one in which the evidence for such dependence is definitely absent. Again, systems of relationship may depend on more than one form of marriage, such systems being, as a rule, very complex.

If special varieties of the classificatory system are thus dependent on social institutions such as marriage, the question arises whether its general character has not been determined by some form of social organization, and there can be little doubt that it has been derived from the clan. Wherever the clan exists, classificatory terms of relationship are used, and they are not only applied to persons with whom definite genealogical relationship can be traced, but they are also used to denote membership of the clan. Thus, all the men of the clan of the speaker and of his own generation are classed in terminology with his brothers. If the clan is patrilineal, all men of the previous generation of his clan are classed with his father, and all of the succeeding generation with his sons. Similarly, all the men of his mother's clan and of her generation are classed with his mother's brother, and all the men of the succeeding generation with his mother's brother's children.

Moreover, most forms of the classificatory system possess certain features which suggest that they may have arisen out of that special form of the clan system which may be called the dual organization, in which a tribe or other community consists of two exogamous moieties. The children of the father's brothers and of the mother's sisters are classed with brothers and sisters, while the children of mother's brothers and of father's sisters are classed together, but distinguished from brothers and sisters; this is a mode of classification which would be the natural result of the dual organization. If the term 'classificatory' is regarded as unsatisfactory, one would be justified in speaking of the group of systems to which this name is usually applied as 'clan systems.'

3. Morgan's descriptive system.—The systems classed together by Morgan as descriptive show a number of varieties characterized by the different degrees in which the descriptive principle is in action. A fully descriptive system would contain a number of terms denoting single persons or very small groups of persons, and all other relatives would be named by combinations of these primary denotative terms. The Celtic and Esthonian systems appear to be examples of this descriptive usage, in which many relatives, including the grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins, are described by their relation to the father and mother.

At the other end of the scale come such languages as English, which are completely devoid of any descriptive character, but consist exclusively of denotative and classificatory terms.

An intermediate variety is found among the peoples who speak Arabic, in which there are simple denotative terms for the grandparents and for the brothers and sisters of father and mother, while the wives and children of the latter are indicated by descriptive terms; thus, the mother's brother being *khāl*, the mother's brother's wife is *marat khāl*, his son *ibn khāl*, and his daughter *bint khāl*.

Morgan classed such systems as our own with the descriptive variety, because he inferred that they had once had this character. It is, however, far from satisfactory to class together systems which differ so widely from one another. In spite of the objection that all terms of relationship are in one sense denotative, such systems as our own might be classed together as 'denotative,' while the term 'descriptive' might be reserved for those systems in which description is prominent. These different systems might also be named by means of the forms of social structure from which they are derived. Our own system and those of most Teutonic and Romance languages contain a number of terms which can be used of one person and of one person only, and the persons thus definitely indicated are the members of the family (a social group consisting of a man, his wife, and their children). The more remote from the family the relationship is, the less definite becomes the nomenclature. Such systems are clearly founded on the social institution of the family. It is only for those persons who form part of the family that an exact system of nomenclature is necessary. Such systems might appropriately be called 'family' systems.

Such a system as that of the Arabic language, on the other hand, shows the past or present existence of a state of society in which some special motive exists for the clear distinction of brothers and sisters of the father and mother as well as of their wives and children. Such social motives are to be found in some form of the kindred or extended family, and it has been suggested[1] that these systems might be called 'kindred' systems.

It is an interesting illustration of the neglect of the subject of relationship by sociologists that only recently has any attempt been made to use European systems of relationships as instruments for the study of social organization. When the lesson taught by the study of the classificatory system has been learnt, much light will be thrown on the nature of Indogermanic and Semitic social organization by means of the terminology of relationship.

4. Geographical distribution of relationship-systems.—(1) *Europe.*—Most of the Romance and Teutonic languages possess systems of relationship in which denotative terms are prominent and from which descriptive terms are absent. The systems of these peoples are of a simple character, possessing relatively few terms; only in French is there any sign of distinctions according to age. In the past, however, European languages were richer in nomenclature, Anglo-Saxon, Middle High German, and Latin distinguishing the brothers and sisters of the father from those of the mother—relatives now classed together. The Latin system was an extremely definite example of a denotative or family system, but it is possible that it was largely a legal product, and that a less strictly scientific nomenclature was in use among the people. The Celtic languages present high development of the descriptive principle, and this principle also shows itself to some extent in the Scandinavian languages.

Slavic systems of relationship are in the main denotative, but some of them present features of a classificatory kind. Thus, in Bulgaria the father's brother's son is called *otchichu brat*, or 'brother through the paternal uncle,' being thus classed with, and at the same time distinguished from, a brother. Similarly, in Poland cousins are classed with brothers or sisters, but distinguished by terms referring to their relationship through an uncle or aunt. In Poland also the grandfather's brothers may be classed with the grandfather, and the terms used for the father's and mother's brothers are also applied to the cousins of the father or mother. These features suggest that Slavic systems are not very far removed from a classificatory form, that they are classificatory systems in which special denotative terms have come into use for the brothers and sisters of father or mother, but their children still show by their nomenclature that they were once definitely classed with brothers and

[1] Rivers, *Kinship and Social Organisation*, p. 80.

sisters. In this connexion it is interesting that some Slavic systems, such as the Bulgarian, show the distinction between elder and younger brothers which is so characteristic of the classificatory system; thus, in Bulgaria there are special terms for the younger brother and younger sister of the husband.

The Magyar system has many features which distinguish it in a striking manner from other European systems, and shows many points of similarity with certain systems of N. America, and possibly also with those of northern Asia. Especially striking in this respect is the presence of definite terms for elder and younger brother and for elder and younger sister, and the classification of uncles and aunts with elder brothers and sisters. Another feature of interest is the wide use of a term *unoko*[1] in the designation of cousins and uncles, which seems to show the existence of a mode of social grouping in which descendants of a grandparent are classed together.

The Finnish system differs much less from Indo-germanic systems, and the linguistic character of some of the terms suggests that this is the result of modification produced through the present environment of the people. According to the list furnished to Morgan, the Esthonian system is characterized by a very high degree of development of the descriptive principle.

The Turkish system resembles the Magyar to some extent, the differences being probably due to Arabic influences.

The Basque language preserves the use of a single reciprocal term between brother and sister, a feature so characteristic of the classificatory system as to suggest that the whole system must once have had this character.

(2) *Africa.*—Most of the peoples of the northern part of this continent have been influenced by the Arabic system, the special features of which have already been described. Closely similar systems are found among the Shilluks, Dinkas, and other Nilotic peoples. These systems are likewise characterized by the use of special distinctions for half-brothers and sisters, arising out of the practice of polygyny. This feature is also present in the systems of the Bantu peoples, which differ, however, from the Nilotic systems in being definite examples of the classificatory principle with complexities dependent on certain forms of marriage.[2] In W. Africa, on the other hand, the available evidence points to the absence of the classificatory system, its mode of nomenclature being largely descriptive.[3]

(3) *Asia.*—Some of the peoples of Asiatic Turkey appear to use systems of relationship of the same kind as the Turks and Magyars, with decided traces of Arabic influence, while the Armenian system is descriptive.

The systems of northern Asia are definitely of a classificatory kind, approaching the Hawaiian type in the north-eastern part of the continent. The system of the Tungus classes the elder brothers of a man with his father's younger brothers—a feature similar to those characteristic of the Magyar system.

The Persian system is largely descriptive, and the use of terms borrowed from Arabic for uncles and aunts suggests that these relatives had originally no distinctive terms; but this would leave open the question whether the previous nomenclature was classificatory or descriptive.

All the Dravidian languages, and probably most of the other languages spoken in India at the present time, use the classificatory system, but this appears to have been absent from Sanskrit, which had to some extent a descriptive character.

The systems of the Burmese and Karens are not only definitely classificatory, but they show an extreme development of the classificatory principle which brings them very near to the Hawaiian form.

The Chinese system resembles those of Burma in its highly developed classificatory character, but with the important difference that in any one class, such as 'brother,' a number of distinctions are made according to the line of descent to which a relative belongs. The Chinese system has carried out the method of classification on special lines, and may be regarded as a highly specialized variety of the Hawaiian form of classificatory system. The Japanese use a classificatory system approaching the Hawaiian type, but, in place of the further development of the classificatory character which has taken place among the Chinese, there appears to be a movement in the denotative direction. Little is known of the nomenclature of relationship of the Malays or of other peoples of the Malay Archipelago.

(4) *Oceania.*—In New Guinea and Melanesia the classificatory principle is universal. Their systems show very great variety, due partly to different degrees of simplification in the direction of the Hawaiian form, partly to the influence of numerous peculiar forms of marriage.

Most Polynesian systems are of the Hawaiian type; but some, such as the systems of Tonga and Tukopia, show forms intermediate between the Hawaiian and the more usual forms of the classificatory system.

(5) *Australia.*—The systems of this continent are classificatory, and are characterized by great richness of nomenclature, but by few of the complexities which are so general in Melanesia. The relationship of Australia is closely connected with the elaborate system of social groups known as matrimonial classes, which seem to be only systematizations of the classificatory system. They seem to form a highly specialized mode of putting the classificatory principle into action in the regulation of marriage.[1]

(6) *America.*—Chiefly through the work of Morgan we have a larger collection of material from N. America than from any other part of the world, and with one exception all the recorded systems are definitely classificatory, with all the main features, including the distinction of age, well developed. These systems are subject to much variation, depending partly on the occurrence of changes in the direction of the Hawaiian system, partly on the classing together of certain relatives, probably as the result of certain ancient forms of marriage. At present, however, this subject has received so little attention that these features may be found to depend on social conditions different from those which have determined similar features elsewhere. There seems to be a tendency in N. America to class together relatives of different generations if of one clan, and it is possible that this may explain certain features which elsewhere depend on forms of marriage.

The single exception to the subjection to the classificatory principle is formed by the Eskimos, whose system is chiefly denotative and descriptive. The brothers and sisters of the grandparents are classed with the grandparents, and the children of

[1] The present writer is indebted for his knowledge of this term to Mrs. Singer and Mr. L. K. Kiss. It is remarkable that none of the terms in which this word occurs were included by Paul Hunfalvy in the list which he drew up for Morgan.

[2] See esp. J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 128; and H. A. Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912-13, i. 217.

[3] N. W. Thomas, *Anthropological Report on the Edo-speaking Peoples of Nigeria*, London, 1910, pt. i. p. 112, and *Anthropological Report on the Ibo-speaking Peoples of Nigeria*, do. 1913, pt. i. p. 72.

[1] A. R. Brown, *JRAI* xliii. [1913] 143 ff.

cousins with nephews and nieces, and on those grounds Morgan assigned the Eskimo system to the classificatory category; but it is less classificatory than such European systems as the Bulgarian and Magyar, which it resembles in the use of distinctions for age. Like these systems, it has classificatory features which point to its having once been a classificatory system which has now been greatly modified in the denotative and descriptive directions.

At present we have no exact knowledge of the system of relationship of any S. American people.

III. *SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RELATIONSHIP.*—These may be grouped under three heads: duties, privileges, and restrictions. An examination of the social functions of relationship shows that a given relative may be subject to an obligation to perform certain social actions, or may be allowed to perform certain actions which are not permitted to others, or may not be permitted to perform actions which are allowed to others.

The very important place which these functions of relationship take in the culture of many peoples may be illustrated by contrasting them with similar functions found among ourselves. In our own society it is the duty of a father to provide for his child up to a certain age, but it is very difficult to state in any exact way the social actions which are included under the term 'provide.' The duties of a father may be put under two heads: his legal obligations, and those which devolve upon him by custom, the latter differing greatly in different ranks of society. The duties of a child towards his father are even less definite and obligatory, and, when we pass to more distant relatives, their social functions become so indefinite that they can hardly be said to exist. Many may regard it as a duty to help all those related to themselves by the exercise of social interest, if not in a more material way, but such duties are in no way obligatory, and are not even sufficiently habitual among all classes to allow them to be described and classified. If we study the past of our own society, however, we find that the social duties of relatives have been much more definite, the best known of these duties being that of assisting in the payment of *wergeld*, or blood-money, the proportions of this payment due from relatives of different kinds being very strictly regulated.

In other European countries the duties of relatives are more definite and more strictly regulated than in England, one such function in France, for instance, being that of taking part in a family council.

Among such peoples as the Hindus and Chinese the social functions associated with relationship are very definite and strictly regulated, this regulation being especially obvious in those cases in which social institutions, such as marriage, are associated with much ceremonial.

It is, however, when we pass to peoples of ruder culture that the social functions of relationship reach their highest degree of definiteness and strictness of regulation, and among these peoples definite duties, privileges, and restrictions are not limited to the parents or other near relatives, but are present, and may even be more numerous and definite, in the case of other relatives, such as the husband of the father's sister or the son of the mother's brother. Sometimes the duties and privileges associated with relationship seem to have become the basis of important social institutions.[1]

Before considering these social functions in detail, we may point out the definite relation between the presence of social functions and the terminology of relationship. In such a region as Oceania, there is a definite correlation between the presence of special terms for relatives and social functions. It is only when such a relative as the mother's brother or the father of the son's wife has definite social functions that a special term is applied to him, distinguishing him from other relatives. There is reason to believe that one relative is distinguished from another in nomenclature only if his social functions produce a need for this distinction. At present we have little information about the social functions of relationship in other parts of the world, but the rule which holds good of Oceania will probably be found to be of general application.

1. **Parents and children.**—In general, we have little definite knowledge concerning the social regulations connected with parent and child. Among peoples who use the classificatory system these relatives do not appear to be subject to such clear-cut regulations as occur with other relationships. It is possible, however, that this may be due only to lack of interest in this relationship on the part of the collector of ethnographical data. The presence of special regulations connected with such relatives as the mother's brother or the mother-in-law is apt to attract the attention of the investigator and lead him to neglect the more homely relationship of parent and child. Nevertheless, there is a certain amount of evidence derived from the comparison of the duties of parents with those of other relatives. In general, it would seem that the relations between parents and children associated with the classificatory system are much like those which exist among ourselves. The father and mother provide for the child, feed, clothe, and train him, while the child obeys his parents and assists them in their occupations. There are, however, definite exceptions. Thus, among many peoples, while the duty of obedience to the father may exist, it is nevertheless a matter of explicit social regulation that this duty is less obligatory than in the case of other relatives, such as the mother's brother. Disobedience to the father is explicitly recognized as a privilege, and may perhaps even be an obligation. Similarly, there may be definite restrictions on the conduct of father and child, as in the Banks Islands, where a father and son should not eat together. The social functions of the mother must also be judged chiefly by the exceptions. In some societies the duty of suckling is not confined to the mother, but other women have a right to share in this function, and cases are known in which a child is definitely removed from all social contact with the mother at a certain age, sometimes as early as three years. In general, however, it would seem that the social relations existing between parents and children among peoples who use the classificatory system differ but little from those customary among ourselves.

2. **Brother and sister.**—Here, as in the case of parents and children, we have little knowledge concerning social functions except in those cases where there are definite restrictions. In some societies the restrictions between brother and sister are of the most rigorous kind, being examples of the custom usually known as 'avoidance' (see below). In several parts of Melanesia a brother and sister are not allowed to speak to one another or even see one another, and this avoidance may be so strict that it continues after death, a man not being allowed to enter a house in which his dead sister is lying. Avoidance between brothers is not known to occur in any pronounced form, but in Lepers' Island in the New Hebrides a man may not laugh in the presence of his brother, and this practice is probably to be associated with the custom of avoidance.

[1] See A. M. Hocart, *JRAI* xliii. 101 ff., 109 ff.

3. Mother's brother and sister's son.—Special customs associated with this relationship are very frequent among those who use the classificatory system, and the importance of the distinction of the mother's brother from the father's brother is shown by the fact that such special functions are quite unknown in connexion with the latter relative.

Among many peoples who use the classificatory system the mother's brother is definitely responsible for the welfare of the child, for his upbringing and training for adult life. He may take the chief place, or at any rate a more important place than the father, in the ceremonies which accompany social events, such as naming, the assumption of the first clothing, circumcision, initiation, and marriage. The duty of obedience to the mother's brother may be so strict that a boy will at once respond to any command, however contrary to his own wishes. A man and his sister's son often share their property in common, and there is little doubt, even if the practice no longer occurs, that in Melanesia they once had their wives in common.

In other cases a man's sister's son has the right to use, or even to take for his own use, any of the possessions of his uncle. This right has reached its highest development in Fiji, where the rights of the sister's son, or *vasu*, of a chief over the property of his uncle extend to the property of all the subjects of his uncle, so that the *vasu* of a chief is able to take for his own use any of the property, as well as the women, of the district over which his uncle rules.

The close relation between a man and his mother's brother is natural in a state of mother-right, in which these persons necessarily belong to the same social group. The relation is often found, however, in combination with patrilineal institutions, in which cases it is probably a survival of an older matrilineal condition (see MOTHER-RIGHT). In other cases the special position of the mother's brother may be the result of other social institutions (see MARRIAGE).

4. Mother's brother's wife.—Sometimes there are definite privileges or restrictions on conduct in connexion with this relative, but these are usually the result of her position as a potential wife (see MARRIAGE).

5. Father's sister.—Special privileges in connexion with this relative have been recorded only in Melanesia, Polynesia, and India, but probably occur elsewhere. In Melanesia this relative is especially honoured, but with this honour rules of avoidance are sometimes associated, while the relationship resembles that between a man and his mother's brother in that to some extent a woman and her brother's child have their property in common. In India this relative is important chiefly in marriage ceremonial (see MARRIAGE).

6. Father's sister's husband.—Special conduct towards this relative has been recorded only from Melanesia, where it forms an extreme example of the joking relation (see below), a man being the natural butt for the wit and practical jokes of his wife's brother's son.

7. Cousins.—Rules of conduct between cousins are best known in the case of those, often called cross-cousins, who are the children of brother and sister. Where special rules of conduct exist between those of different sex, they are usually the outcome of the potential relationship of husband and wife.

8. Grandparents and grandchildren.—Sometimes the grandfather has a special position of authority, while in other cases definite ceremonial duties in connexion with his grandchild may be assigned to him.

For relatives by marriage see MARRIAGE.

9. Avoidance.—Many of the restrictions on the conduct of relatives have in common the feature that relatives avoid one another or avoid certain modes of conduct, and these restrictions are often grouped together as customs of avoidance. These customs have attracted especial attention from anthropologists in the case of relatives by marriage, and will be again considered in the art. MARRIAGE, but their general character may be discussed here.

They are very various in kind. In the most extreme cases relatives must never be in the presence of one another. The avoidance may be so strict that a person who has to avoid a relative will not even enter a village where this relative is living, and in the extreme case of Lepers' Island in Melanesia the avoidance between brother and sister persists after death. In other cases the avoidance is less absolute. A person may leave a house into which a relative enters, or, if relatives who should avoid one another meet, they may get out of each other's way sufficiently to ensure that they do not touch one another, or they may pass with averted eyes.

Sometimes avoidance includes the total prohibition of speech, or relatives may speak to one another only so long as they do not see one another. In other cases, relatives may speak to one another at a distance, or conversation may be limited to strict matters of business, and it is only familiar conversation that is disallowed. Another manifestation of avoidance is that relatives may not use certain words or expressions when speaking to one another.

A custom which seems to be related to these customs of avoidance is the prohibition of the personal name, not only when relatives speak to one another, but when one speaks of the other in his absence. This prohibition applies not only to relatives who avoid one another, but often to a much wider circle of relatives. In other cases, the avoidance may apply only to special acts, *e.g.*, touching the head, taking a load from another, or approaching a relative when he is sitting.

Customs of avoidance are more frequent, and usually more strict and elaborate, between persons of different sex than between those of the same sex, and it is certain that they are often associated with the idea that sexual relations between those who avoid one another are liable to take place. In some parts of Melanesia certain relatives of different sex will practise avoidance only so long as sexual relations have not taken place between them, and the practice of, or failure to practise, avoidance will be a sign to all of the nature of the relations existing between the persons in question. This association of avoidance with the possibility of sexual relations seems to be especially definite in the case of relatives by marriage, but there is little doubt that the association is also present in connexion with the avoidance between brother and sister, and that, where this avoidance is present, sexual relations between brother and sister are recognized as liable to occur. It would seem as if one of the functions of customs of avoidance is to ensure that sexual relations shall not occur between certain relatives. The presence of these regulations in connexion with certain relatives and not with others shows that a tendency towards sexual relations is present in the one case and not in the other. They suggest that the relations now so strictly forbidden that the persons concerned are not even allowed to see or speak to one another must once have occurred frequently, if not habitually and as an organized practice, between those who now avoid one another. The fact that similar avoidances exist between persons of the same sex shows, however, that the prohibition of sexual relations is not the

only factor in the production and maintenance of these customs. In Melanesia the avoidance between male relatives is less pronounced than between relatives of different sex, and usually applies only to such actions as one approaching when the other is sitting down, or one taking a load from the shoulder of the other. There is much reason to believe that these customs are the result of social relations arising out of the interaction and fusion of peoples.

10. Privileged familiarity.—In Melanesia customs exist which seem to be the converse of those of avoidance. Customs of avoidance prohibit any kind of familiarity between certain relatives, while the customs now to be considered enjoin such familiarity and make it a regular and habitual feature of conduct. In the Banks Islands, for instance, the relation of the custom to avoidance seems to be shown by the fact that one of the most frequent forms which avoidance takes is the prohibition of the custom of joking. In these islands the highest development of such joking occurs in the case of the husband of the father's sister. Whenever a person meets this relative, it is not merely his privilege, but it would seem almost his duty, to jeer at, insult, or play practical jokes upon him. In the cases of other relatives, this mode of behaviour seems to be less habitual. It is possible in these islands to arrange relationships in a series, from the husband of the father's sister at one end to the wife's mother at the other, in which there is a gradual transition from a condition in which joking is habitual to one in which not only is it absolutely forbidden, but the social relations are of a kind which remove all opportunity for its occurrence.

The only other people among whom this organized system of joking has been recorded are the Crow and Hidatsa Indians of N. America,[1] but in their case it would appear that the privileged joking is practised between members of certain clans rather than between certain relatives. It is persons whose fathers belong to the same clan who are allowed to play practical jokes upon one another.

See also INHERITANCE (Hebrew) and INHERITANCE (Teutonic).

LITERATURE.—Lewis H. Morgan, *Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family* (Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge, xvii., Washington, 1871), *Ancient Society*, London, 1877; J. Kohler, *Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe*, Stuttgart, 1897; A. L. Kroeber, *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 77 ff.; J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, *Psyche's Task*², do. 1913 (for avoidance); W. H. R. Rivers, *Kinship and Social Organisation*, do. 1914, *History of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914. W. H. R. RIVERS.

KINDNESS.—1. Etymology and usage.—The etymology of the word 'kindness' (connected with A.S. *cynde* or *cunde*, 'natural' or 'in-born,' O.E. *genus*) as *OED*, *s.v.*), or the natural right or title derived from birth. Afterwards it came to be used of natural aptitude or inclination; and, finally, of (1) the quality of being kind, and (2) kind feeling or affection, *e.g.*, S. Johnson, *Lives of the English Poets*, ed. G. B. Hill, Oxford, 1905, i. 89 ('Milton'): 'He left the university with no kindness for its institution' (quoted in *OED*). The objective use of an act prompted by kind feeling (*e.g.*, 'a kindness' or 'kindnesses') easily followed from the above usages. In general, kindness, whether viewed as a subjective quality or as manifested objectively in outward behaviour, word, or act, carries with it varying shades of goodwill, which may be expressed in such terms as friendliness, mercifulness, generosity, thoughtfulness, and the like. It is opposed to the spirit of harshness, unrelenting anger, or *hauteur*, vengeance, callousness, etc.

2. Ethics.—As a manifestation under special conditions of a fully developed justice, or benevolence (*q.v.*), or love (*q.v.*), the virtue of kindness occupies a high place in the ethical teaching of both OT and NT (see *HDB*, art. 'Kindness'). It is associated with the character of God in such passages as 1 S 20^{14}, 2 S 2^6 9^3, Neh 9^{17}, Ps 31^{21}, and Is $54^{8.\ 10}$, where חֶסֶד, often used with the suggestion of hospitality, is applied to the dealings of God with men. Further, as connected with the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, it finds expression in Lk 15^{20}, Mt 5^{45}, Ac 14^{17}. In the teaching of our Lord the spirit of kindness is inculcated in various directions—*e.g.*, as one with the forgiving disposition (Mt 18^{15}), as the love of enemies or persecutors (Mt 5^{44}), as an exhibition of the law of mercy overriding legal enactment (Lk 13^{15} 14^{1-5} [in relation to the Sabbath]), as a tenderness towards little children or babes (*βρέφη*, Lk 18^{15}), and in the 'golden rule' (Mt 7^{12}) as defining our general treatment of humanity. Such parables as the Prodigal Son, the Good Samaritan, the Two Debtors, or Dives and Lazarus illustrate kindness in action. Similarly, it finds expression in apostolic ethics—*e.g.*, Ro 12^{10}, 1 Co 13^4—and elsewhere, while it calls forth a whole group of beautiful words, like *χρηστότης* (Ro 3^{12}, Gal 5^{22}, 2 Co 6^6, Col 3^{12}, Eph 2^7, Tit 3^4), *φιλανθρωπία* (Ac 28^2, Tit 3^4), *φιλαδελφία* (Ro 12^{10}, 1 Th 4^9, He 13^1, 1 P 1^{22}, 2 P 1^7), *ἀγαθωσύνη* (Ro 15^{14}, Gal 5^{22}, Eph 5^9, 2 Th 1^{11}), the last of which differs from its synonym *χρηστότης* in expressing a more active type of goodwill, *bonitas* as compared with *benignitas* (R. C. Trench, *Syn. of the NT*[9], London, 1880, p. 231 f., who quotes Lightfoot on Gal 5^{22} to that effect). We may add to the above list *φιλοξενία* (Ro 12^{13}) and *φιλόξενος* (1 Ti 3^2, Tit 1^8, 1 P 4^9) as indicating a form of kindness—hospitality to strangers—commended by the apostles to the early Church.

The doctrine of the divine Fatherhood may lead, as has frequently been noted, to a one-sided conception of God's nature. God's *φιλανθρωπία* is a kindness that coexists with 'wrath,' the eternal hostility of perfect Holiness to evil. It is not to be interpreted as 'softness and sentimentalism.'

'The mere amiability of "le bon Dieu" of much modern opinion is but one step removed from the moral indifference of Omar Khayyám's "Good Fellow"' (W. H. Moberly, in *Foundations*, London, 1912, p. 279, referring to the *Rubáiyát*, lxiv.: 'He's a Good Fellow, and 'twill all be well').

The Christian conception of kindness marks a great advance on Greek ethics. Perhaps the highest conception of benevolence is to be found in Aristotle's portraiture of the *ἐλευθέριος*, or liberal-minded man, in *Nic. Eth.* IV. i. 16 f., where nevertheless 'we do not find a word about benevolence or love to others as prompting acts of liberality' (A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*[3], London, 1866, ii. 60). The claims of others do not enter into the activity of Aristotle's virtuous man, for whom 'the first requisite to nobleness seems to be self-respect' (*ib.* 59). Kindness, like *caritas*, begins at home—*i.e.*, as a virtue of kinship. In general, 'one touch of nature makes the whole world kin' (Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, III. iii. 175); but it is in the family that the virtue of kindness finds its earliest sphere of influence. The love of the mother for her child is the original ethical source of the law of kindness in human life.

'Love for children is always a prior and stronger thing than love between father and mother' (Drummond, *Ascent of Man*, London, 1894, p. 302).

Drummond finds in the struggle for the life of others the ethical principle which many observers eliminate from the cosmic process. The emergence

[1] R. H. Lowie, *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, ix. [1912] 204.

of affection or kindness from the circle of the home is due to the advance in ethical conception which accompanied the moral progress of mankind. It was seen that kindness narrowed to a circle might readily become a vice.

'Mollis illa educatio, quam indulgentiam vocamus, nervos omnes et mentis et corporis frangit' (Quintilian, *Inst.* I. ii. 6).

It may rightly be argued, as J. H. Muirhead has done (*Elements of Ethics*[2], London, 1904, p. 199), that 'love of humanity is the best guarantee against the exclusiveness which turns family affection into a vice.' It is the function of 'justice touched with emotion' to extend the relationships of human beings from those of mere contract to actual friendship or love. As a disposition of the character or as a practical outcome of the humanitarian spirit, kindness of temper, of speech, and of act is a potent civilizer of human intercourse. To it belong the ideas of courtesy, cheerfulness, good humour, and hospitality, the desire to make the best of all, irrespective of social status, to behave so as to cause people to feel at home in the society to which they belong or have been introduced, to diffuse the spirit of radiant goodwill and sympathy, and to practise all 'the chivalries of the Christian gentleman.' The full ethical history of kindness would deal with the various motives and sanctions by which a primitive sentiment developed into a duty which embraced the realm of human and animal life. In Christian ethics 'the cup of cold water' (Mt 10^{42}) is the symbol of the everyday habit of charitableness, which is expressed with striking emphasis in contradistinction to the old law of revenge in the precept 'Give to him that asketh thee' (Mt 5^{38-41}; see C. Gore, *Sermon on the Mount*, London, 1896, ch. v.). Even quixotic kindness may on occasion be justified as a Christian duty: the classic example is the bishop's treatment of Jean Valjean in *Les Misérables*. 'Indiscriminate charity' (see art. CHARITY), on the other hand, is not Christian, inasmuch as it is a mere 'indulgence of our feelings of compassion with little trouble to ourselves and at the expense of society' (Gore, *loc. cit.*). Furthermore, the higher ethic demands a certain delicacy of method and manner in the doing of a kindness.

The truly kind man 'knows for how much the manner, because the heart itself, counts, in doing a kindness. He goes beyond most people in his care for all weakly creatures; judging, instinctively, that to be but sentient is to possess rights' (W. H. Pater, *Marius the Epicurean*[4], London, 1898, ii. 7).

If the kindness of the Christian ideal founds a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, it will likewise support a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and protest against unnecessary inhumanity in vivisection. Indeed, the rights of all dumb creatures to kind treatment, as passages quoted above show, is an integral feature of Christ's teaching, besides being a certain corollary of His broad humanity. Browning is but expressing the Christian standpoint in this matter when he says:

'God made all the creatures and gave them our love and our fear,
To give sign, we and they are his children, one family here' (*Saul*, vi.).

3. Psychology.—To the psychologist kindness is a subjective emotion owing its development and practical manifestations to the nature of the object or stimulus which acts on it. There is a difference of opinion among experts as to whether tender emotion is primary or otherwise; but the former opinion is now more generally held. The maternal instinct which compels a mother to protect and cherish her child is common to the higher ranges of animal life, and was probably transferred to members of the other sex. Infanticide among savages might seem to negative this theory; but, in replying to this objection, W. MacDougall (*Introduction to Social Psychology*[5], London, 1912, p. 69) writes:

'There is no feature of savage life more nearly universal than the kindness and tenderness of savages, even of savage fathers, for their little children. All observers are agreed upon this point. I have many a time watched with interest a blood-thirsty head-hunter of Borneo spending a day at home tenderly nursing his infant in his arms. And it is a rule, to which there are few exceptions among savage peoples, that an infant is only killed during the first few hours of its life. If the child is allowed to survive but a few days, then its life is safe; the tender emotion has been called out in fuller strength, and has begun to be organized into a sentiment of parental love that is too strong to be overcome by prudential or purely selfish considerations.'

The same writer combats Bain's view that tender feeling is as purely self-seeking as any other pleasure, and pronounces it to be 'a gross libel on human nature.' The extensions of this primary impulse from the relationship of a mother and her child are almost endless. It has a marked association with the emotion of pity on the one hand and moral indignation on the other, especially in relation to the sight of helpless suffering, the sounds or cries of pain or distress, and, imaginatively, to the woes depicted in some moving romance. Here disgust or aversion caused by the sight of blood or wounds is overcome by the impulse of kindness, as in the case of the Good Samaritan. With the priest and Levite of the story, neither pity nor disgust ripens into the impulse to succour. Kindness is an element 'of the system of emotional dispositions that constitutes the sentiment of love' (MacDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 123). In its active manifestations it is really a complex emotional state. The germ is tender emotion, but tender emotion tinged with pity, moral indignation, or sympathetically induced pain or pleasure, as the case may be. That such emotions appear to be innate in some people is a matter of experience. Cf. the Scots proverb, 'Kindness comes o' will: it canna be coft' (bought). On the other hand, it is also a psychological law that reciprocation intensifies sentiment. Some instincts die for want of satisfaction; 'the milk of human kindness' tends to foster a corresponding impulse in those to whom it is imparted; cf. Sophocles, *Aj.* 522:

χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτουσ' ἀεί.

And 'kindness, nobler ever than revenge' (Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, IV. iii. 130), is one of those altruistic impulses which bind the human family together and ennoble the social order.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities quoted above, the following may be consulted: H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*[6], London, 1901, bk. iii. chs. iv., viii.; J. R. Seeley, *Ecce Homo*[12], do. 1876, chs. xix., xx.; F. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, New York, 1901; J. Butler, *Sermons*, ed. J. H. Bernard, London, 1900, xi., xii. 'Upon the Love of our Neighbour.'

R. MARTIN POPE.

KING.

Introductory (A. E. CRAWLEY), p. 708.
Egyptian (G. FOUCART), p. 711.
Greek and Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 715.
Indian (L. H. GRAY), p. 720.
Iranian (L. C. CASARTELLI), p. 721.
Muslim (C. DE VAUX), p. 723.
Semitic (A. S. TRITTON), p. 725.
Teutonic and Litu-Slavic (O. SCHRADER), p. 728.

KING (Introductory).—The title 'king' is difficult to define, except in rather broad terms. The history of the institution of 'kingship' is similarly complex; various lines of social evolution have produced it at different times and in different ways. The following definition may be accepted

as applying to modern times: 'king' is 'the usual title of the male sovereign ruler of an independent State, whose position is either purely hereditary, or hereditary under certain legal conditions, or, if elective, is considered to give to the elected the same attributes and rank as those of a (purely or partly) hereditary ruler.'[1] In English history the term 'king' first appeared as the name of chiefs of the Anglo-Saxon kins. The O.E. *cyning*, *cyng*, or *cing* seems to imply the 'representative' of the *cynn*. Each tribe elected its *cyning* from a 'royal' *cynn*. When Wessex rose to predominance in the 10th cent., these tribal kings disappeared, and the Wessex king was the representative of the Angel-cynn.

The Greek *βασιλεύς*, the Latin *rex*, the Persian *shāh*, and the Hebrew *melek* present other aspects of the institution. The early Greek *ἄναξ* is an ethical rather than a political term. In *βασιλεύς* and *rex* there are proofs of priestly office and survivals of magical duties. The reasons for the abolition of the monarchy by the Romans remain somewhat obscure. It is a remarkable fact that the term *rex* was practically a tabued word ever afterwards. To avoid it, the emperors adopted such designations as *imperator* and *princeps*. The Oriental ideas of a divine king, as exemplified by Persia, China, and Japan, hardly suffice to explain the horror of the Roman attitude. The religious aspect of kingship is to be seen in the Hebrew *melek*.

1. Origins.—Anthropological research has lately revolutionized opinion as to the origin of kingly office. Without excluding the elements of leadership, organization, and generalship in war, J. G. Frazer has established by a long array of facts the theory that among primitive peoples it was the medicine-man, the shaman, or public magician who laid the foundations, at least in part, of the kingly office.

'Beginning as little more than a simple conjurer, the medicine-man or magician tends to blossom out into a full-blown god and king in one.'[2]

R. H. Codrington observes of the Melanesian political system:

'The power of chiefs has hitherto rested upon the belief in their supernatural power derived from the spirits or ghosts with which they had intercourse. As this belief has failed, in the Banks' Islands for example some time ago, the position of a chief has tended to become obscure; and as this belief is now being generally undermined a new kind of chief must needs arise, unless a time of anarchy is to begin.'[3]

Here the spiritual and temporal powers are combined in one person. In other cases there is a convergence of the two.

Thus, in New Guinea, 'chiefs have not necessarily supernatural powers, but a sorcerer is looked upon as a chief';[4] and in Matabele land the power of the witch doctors was as great as, if not greater than, the king's.[5]

It is true, in a logical sense, that the dual rule of the pope and the emperor in mediæval Europe is a case of division; historically it was a case of accidental competition, the spiritual power aiming at political ascendancy. This result had been anticipated in lower cultures. Centuries later in date, but ages earlier in evolution, the Pelew Islanders provide an instructive example.

'In some of the islands the god [a man possessed by a divinity] is political sovereign of the land; and . . . is raised to the same high rank, and rules, as god and king, over all the other chiefs.'[6]

Two psychological tendencies may be traced in these elemental ideas about the divine king or human god: a veneration for authority and a belief in magic. The intense feeling of loyalty shown by the Jacobites is a modern instance of the former tendency; popular beliefs about the supernatural power of the pope and even the priest among Roman Catholic peasants are an instance of the latter.

The Siamese language has no word 'by which any creature of higher rank or greater dignity than a monarch can be described; and the missionaries, when they speak of God, are forced to use the native word for 'king.'[1] 'In India every king is regarded as little short of a present god.'[2] Among the Battak of Sumatra there rules a king who is held to be a god.[3] The Sultan of Menangkabau was worshipped similarly.[4] In the South Sea region the same ideas prevailed. The king of Tahiti was identified with the gods of the land.[5]

Frazer's view has its most luminous illustration in the Malay beliefs collected by W. W. Skeat.

'The theory,' he concludes, 'of the real divinity of a king is said to be held strongly in the Malay region. Not only is the king's person considered sacred, but the sanctity of his body is supposed to communicate itself to his regalia and to slay those who break the royal taboos. Thus it is firmly believed that anyone who seriously offends the royal person, who imitates or touches even for a moment the chief objects of the regalia, or who wrongfully makes use of the insignia or privileges of royalty, will be *kena daulat*, that is, struck dead by a sort of electric discharge of that divine power which the Malays suppose to reside in the king's person and to which they give the name of *daulat* or sanctity. The regalia of every petty Malay state are believed to be endowed with supernatural powers; and we are told that "the extraordinary strength of the Malay belief in the supernatural powers of the regalia of their sovereigns can only be thoroughly realised after a study of their romances, in which their kings are credited with all the attributes of inferior gods, whose birth, as indeed every subsequent act of their after-life, is attended by the most amazing prodigies." Now it is highly significant that the Malay magician owns certain insignia which are said to be exactly analogous to the regalia of the divine king, and even bear the very same name. . . . It seems, therefore, to be a probable inference that in the Malay region the regalia of kings are only the conjuring apparatus of their predecessors the magicians.'[6]

2. The supernatural aspect of kingship.—Turning to special aspects of the curious personal influence which is the prototype of the divinity that 'doth hedge a king,' and to some extent of his political power, we find the primitive king (or tribal or clan chief) to be very often not so much a representative of his people as a puppet responsible for their welfare and the course of nature determining it.

'At Rome and in other cities of Latium there was a priest called the Sacrificial King or King of the Sacred Rites, and his wife bore the title of Queen of the Sacred Rites. In republican Athens the second annual magistrate of the state was called the King, and his wife the Queen; the functions of both were religious. . . . Many other Greek democracies had titular kings, whose duties, so far as they are known, seem to have been priestly.'[7]

Again, Asia Minor in historical times was 'the seat of various great religious capitals peopled by thousands of sacred slaves, and ruled by pontiffs who wielded at once temporal and spiritual authority, like the popes of mediæval Rome. Such priest-ridden cities were Zela and Pessinus. Teutonic kings, again, in the old heathen days seem to have stood in the position, and to have exercised the powers, of high priests. The Emperors of China offer public sacrifices, the details of which are regulated by the ritual books. The King of Madagascar was high-priest of the realm.'[8]

Such cases are complete prototypes of priestly rule as it has occurred in Hebrew and European society, but they derive from the exactly analogous authority of the savage sorcerer, who establishes an unofficial, but imperative, influence over native credulity. The fact is interesting that, where the ruler, either in primitive or in modern times, has not combined religious duties with political office, the credulous public have often treated him as a priest or a god. The fact indicates a more or less

[1] *OED*, *s.v.*
[2] J. G. Frazer, *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 375.
[3] *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 46.
[4] J. Chalmers, in *JAI* xxvii. [1897–98] 334.
[5] L. Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, London, 1898, p. 154.
[6] Frazer, *Magic Art*, i. 389, quoting J. Kubary, 'Die Religion der Pelauer' in A. Bastian, *Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde*, Berlin, 1888, i. 30 ff.

[1] E. Young, *The Kingdom of the Yellow Robe*, London, 1898, p. 142.
[2] M. Monier-Williams, *Religious Thought and Life in India*, London, 1883, p. 259.
[3] *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië*, iii. [1870] 289.
[4] W. Marsden, *Sumatra*[3], London, 1811, p. 370 *f.*
[5] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], London, 1832–36, iii. 108.
[6] Frazer, *Magic Art*, i. 398, 362.
[7] *Ib.* i. 44 *f.* [8] *Ib.* i. 47 *f.*

permanent association between authority and supernatural power in the popular mind.

The primitive sorcerer and the primitive 'king,' his successor, were associated with the regulation of natural forces and the course of the seasons. Terms equivalent to 'god' or 'king' are regularly applied to the sorcerer of the seasons, just as his powers are demanded of the political ruler. Responsibility for the social welfare is balanced by social veneration.

'The king of Loango is honoured by his people "as though he were a god. . . . They believe that he can let them have rain when he likes; and once a year, in December, which is the time they want rain, the people come to beg of him to grant it to them."'[1] Among the Wanyoro of Central Africa, 'the great dispenser, he who has absolute and uncontrollable power over the rain, is the king; but he can divide his power with other persons, so that the benefit may be distributed over various parts of the kingdom.' The Barotse on the Zambesi believe 'that a chief is a demigod, and in heavy thunderstorms the Barotse flock to the chief's yard for protection from the lightning. I have been greatly distressed at seeing them fall on their knees before the chief, entreating him to open the waterpots of heaven and send rain upon their gardens. . . . The king's servants declare themselves to be invincible, because they are the servants of God (meaning *the king*).'[2] Rajah Brooke, the English ruler and benefactor of Sarawak, was regarded by his subjects as possessing magical powers for social welfare. 'Once when a European remarked that the rice-crops of the Samban tribe were thin, the chief immediately replied that they could not be otherwise, since Rajah Brooke had never visited them, and he begged that Mr. Brooke might be induced to visit his tribe, and remove the sterility of their land.'[3] To come nearer home, 'it was the belief among the ancient Irish that when their kings acted in conformity with the institutions of their ancestors, the seasons were favourable, and that the earth yielded its fruit in abundance; but when they violated these laws, that plague, famine, and inclemency of weather were the result.'[4]

The last case, among others, indicates that a social inertia has its effect in producing such dependence upon responsible persons. It is so in the relations of people and priest, and of labour and capital. When science is yet unborn, results meteorological are believed to be in the control of human rulers, on the same lines as are social happenings.

The power of the people against the 'king' is very early exemplified. Primitive folk dealing with a defaulting magic-king are not unlike the Commonwealth dealing with Charles I. The difference is one of education.

In W. Africa, 'when prayers and offerings presented to the king have failed to procure rain, his subjects bind him with ropes and take him by force to the grave of his forefathers, that he may obtain from them the needed rain.'[5] If harvest fails in Loango, the king is deposed.[6] 'Fetish kings' are common in Africa; they afford remarkable instances of the combination of religious and civil power. On the Grain Coast there was one who was regarded as 'responsible for the health of the community, the fertility of the earth, and the abundance of fish in the sea and rivers; and if the country suffers in any of these respects [he] the Bodio is deposed from his office.'[7]

Put into modern terms, this is merely dissatisfaction with the government, whose permanent, and in many cases nominal, head is a king.

Popular resentment for failure to fulfil responsible functions has gone further.

'In the time of the Swedish king Domalde a mighty famine broke out, which lasted several years, and could be stayed by the blood neither of beasts nor of men. Therefore, in a great popular assembly held at Upsala, the chiefs decided that King Domalde himself was the cause of the scarcity and must be sacrificed for good seasons. So they slew him and smeared with his blood the altars of the gods.'[8] When the Chukchi suffered from a pestilence, the shamans persuaded the people that the chief must be slain.[9]

3. Departmental kings.—The association of sacred or magical functions 'occurs,' says Frazer, 'frequently outside the limits of classical antiquity, and is a common feature of societies at all stages from barbarism to civilisation. Further, it appears that the royal priest is often a king not only in name but in fact, swaying the sceptre as well as the crosier.'[1] It appears that specialization was as familiar to primitive society as it is to us. Kings of rain, of fire, and of water are described by Frazer.

The natives of the Upper Nile acknowledge as 'kings' only 'the Kings of the Rain, *Mata Kodou*, who are credited with the power of giving rain at the proper time, that is, in the rainy season. . . . Each householder betakes himself to the King of the Rain and offers him a cow that he may make the blessed waters of heaven to drip on the brown and withered pastures. If no shower falls, the people assemble and demand that the king shall give them rain; and if the sky still continues cloudless, they rip up his belly, in which he is believed to keep the storms.'[2]

Two famous instances of 'departmental' kings of nature are the Cambodian king of the fire and king of the water.[3] These men have no political authority; 'they are simple peasants, living by the sweat of their brow and the offerings of the faithful.' Accounts vary, however; one avers that they are members of royal families, that is to say, their families are 'royal.' The offices are hereditary—another interesting point. There is a political king of Cambodia who interchanges gifts with those two mysterious personages. They are clearly survivals, and the term 'king' as applied to them is significant.

4. Royal tabus.—Where royal tabus are connected with a ruler's daily life and action, the same magical or supernatural functions are to be inferred as existing or surviving. The tabus are intended to preserve not so much the life of the king as his mystic power and communion with the forces of nature—his 'virtue,' or *mana*. In the case of a special language employed when speaking to or of the king, it is not clear whether we have to deal with a mere ceremonial respect for royalty or a real tabu.

The sacred language devoted to the king of Siam includes special terms for his head, feet, and even his breath. Particular verbs are used for sleeping, eating, and other actions.[4] The smallest detail of the life of a king in Loango was regulated by tabus.[5] For the kings of Egypt 'everything was fixed . . . by law, not only their official duties, but even the details of their daily life. . . . The hours, both of day and night, were arranged at which the king had to do, not what he pleased, but what was prescribed for him.'[6]

A widely spread tabu is that the king may not be seen when eating or drinking. Again, the king is confined to his palace, and his face is veiled.[7] The case of the Mikado was an extraordinary instance of tabu.[8] The practice of killing the king is explained by Frazer as due to a desire to prevent his mystic power from decaying,[9] but the subject is still obscure.

The continuity in European civilization of these ideas with the later aspects of kingship is shown by the case of the Athenian *βασιλεύς*, the Roman *rex*, and others.[10] In England and France the belief that the touch of the king cured scrofula lasted till comparatively modern times.[11]

The theory of the divine right of kings was a recrudescence of the same tendency, but not a

1 Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 396, quoting authorities.
2 F. S. Arnot, *Garenganze*, London [1889], p. 78.
3 H. Low, *Sarawak*, London, 1848, p. 259.
4 J. O'Donovan, *The Book of Rights*, Dublin, 1847, p. 8 n.
5 J. B. Labat, *Relation historique de l'Ethiopie occidentale*, Paris, 1732, ii. 172 f.
6 A. Bastian, *Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-Küste*, Jena, 1874, i. 354.
7 J. L. Wilson, *Western Africa*, London, 1856, p. 129.
8 Frazer, *op. cit.* i. 366 f., quoting S. Sturlason, *Chronicle of the Kings of Norway*, tr. S. Laing, London, 1844, saga i., chs. 18, 47.
9 F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 15.

1 Frazer, *op. cit.* ii. 1.
2 'Excursion de M. Brun-Rollet dans la région supérieure du Nil,' *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, ii. [1852] 421.
3 Frazer, *op. cit.* ii. 3 ff.
4 Young, *The Kingdom of the Yellow Robe*, p. 142.
5 Bastian, *op. cit.* i. 355.
6 Diodorus Siculus, i. 70.
7 Frazer, *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 117 ff.
8 *Ib.* 2 ff.
9 Frazer, *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 9 ff.
10 Frazer suggests that the Roman *rex* was considered to be an incarnation of Jupiter (*Magic Art*, ii. 174 ff.).
11 T. J. Pettigrew, *Superstitions connected with the History and Practice of Medicine and Surgery*, London, 1844, p. 117 ff.; see, further, art. KING'S EVIL.

survival. It was a legal theory, chiefly due to Hobbes, and then exaggerated by Filmer.[1]

5. Division of political and religious kingship.—The process and causes of the gradual separation of the civil and religious functions of the king have been described by Frazer:

'The burdensome observances attached to the royal or priestly office produced their natural effect. Either men refused to accept the office, which hence tended to fall into abeyance; or, accepting it, they sank under its weight into spiritless creatures, cloistered recluses, from whose nerveless fingers the reins of government slipped into the firmer grasp of men who were often content to wield the reality of sovereignty without its name. In some countries this rift in the supreme power deepened into a total and permanent separation of the spiritual and temporal powers, the old royal house retaining their purely religious functions, while the civil government passed into the hands of a younger and more vigorous race.'[2]

Typical examples are those of Japan, Mexico, and Athens.[3] The W. African practice of having a 'fetish,' or religious, king and a political king seems not to be due to the causes cited above.

6. Evolutionary importance of the king.—An interesting aspect of the early evolution of the kingship is its social importance. It has been argued that the rise of monarchy was essential to the emergence of the race from savagery.[4] The development proceeds from the chief of a clan or tribe to the king, generally *primus inter pares*, and not autocratic, of various tribes federated or consolidated into a nation. The case of Wessex is typical. In the Roman world 'king' was a superior title to 'emperor'; mediævalism reversed the precedence. In mediæval times also the nation was often in contrast with the kingdom, the latter being rather the domain of a lord.

Apart from the advantages of organization under one sovereign, various social privileges follow from the institution. Thus the king serves as a general asylum and refuge for the poor, the weak, and the wronged. The appeal to Cæsar and the Haro of the Channel Islands are two cases out of many. The king protects strangers and fatherless children. He is a focus of patriotic feeling.

7. Intellectual aspect of the early kingship.—With regard to the primitive religious or fetish king, Frazer observes that such men must have been the ablest. They were not mere fighting men, but medicine-men, dealing with the crude elements of science and art. Carpenter has pointed out that the savage sorcerer, shaman, and medicine-man are very frequently of a type intermediate between the two sexes, and that such types are often credited, and justly, with unusual insight. But for the power exerted by these types, he thinks that social functions would never have broadened out, but that men would have remained hunters and fighters, and women agricultural labourers and managers of the house.[5]

8. The modern attitude to kingship.—Since the 17th cent. there has been a tendency to regard kingship as a survival, unsuitable to a democratic political society. America and France have substituted a president of the republic. This involves once more the question of terminology. The president with a veto or casting vote is a king in effect; the king who may only advise is not a king in effect.

9. Dramatic and mock kings.—The imitation of kingship in folk-drama and ritual may be a survival from the old religious office and its duties, or merely an assimilation. The extraordinary prevalence of this is illustrated by Mannhardt and Frazer abundantly. It includes the May King, King Hop, King of the Bean, and others. The mock kings, suffering death as substitutes for the real, form a curious problem.[1]

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article. For the legal status of primitive kings see A. H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1894-95, i. 387-417.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

KING (Egyptian).—A vast subject like kingship in Egypt demands delimitations and eliminations. The Pharaoh, in the Nile valley, was, in a sense, an epitome of the whole life of the nation, and the Egyptian monuments and texts are full of his names and symbols. We need not discuss the historical or administrative aspect of the monarchic institution, or the material life of the king, but shall confine ourselves to a treatment of the kingship of classical Egypt in its religious and ethical bearings.

1. The religious character of Egyptian kingship.—From the very first the most striking characteristic revealed by the examination of the titles, names, and prerogatives of the king in Egypt has been the exclusively religious—or rather divine—origin of the various elements involved in the Egyptian definition of monarchy. Even the references to functions or prerogatives of a feudal or military character are, in reality, simple deductions from the divine functions or nature of the monarch. This is true even of things which might at first sight seem to be survivals or reminiscences of historical or political events. Investigation shows that here also the reminiscences are purely mythological in character (*e.g.*, the alleged proto-historic wars from which the king derives some of his titles, or whose anniversaries he celebrates). In fact, there is nothing in any of the attributes or denominations of the kingship (titles, costume, functions, etc.) which might be a survival or indication of the historic modes of formation or of the origins of the monarchy. Some material signs (such as the sceptre [*hikā*] of the shepherd people, or the plaited lock, worn exclusively by gods and their royal heirs) enable archæology to outline hypothetical theories regarding the possible origin of the masters who imposed their rule upon the Nile valley; but the texts and monuments yield no information whatever regarding these beginnings; and, as far back as we can go, we find ourselves in the presence of a conception of monarchy which is composed of purely theological elements and based solely upon the assimilation of the king to the gods who are the makers of the world and the mythical founders of Egyptian society. This explains the importance attached by the Egyptians to the power and to the exact utterance of the different names by which they designated the king. These names, taken together, form a kind of *abrégé* of the nature of the Pharaoh, and of the royal attributes.

2. The divine lineage of the king.—The various names of the king prove, by all their elements, that the divine filiation of the master of Egypt is as ancient as Egyptian society. The earliest form of Egyptian religion which we can reach by the Pyramid texts and the funerary literature belongs to a period remotely pre-historic. We find here the old 'sky-god,' source of life and death, of rain and heavenly fire. Among his names, that of Horū (symbolized conventionally by the hawk) has given rise to the so-called 'hawk names,' which appear among the most ancient forms of royal names with which we are acquainted—viz. the series of names from the monuments belonging to the Thinite period (Ist and IInd dynasties). These show, when set in order, that the reigning

[1] W. A. Phillips, art. 'King,' in *EBr*[11]; J. N. Figgis, *The Theory of the Divine Right of Kings*, Cambridge, 1896; art. DIVINE RIGHT.

[2] Frazer, *Taboo*, p. 17.

[3] *Ib.* p. 21 f.

[4] Frazer, *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, London, 1905, p. 82.

[5] E. Carpenter, *Intermediate Types*, London, 1914, p. 171.

[1] Frazer, *Magic Art*, i. 11, ii. 84 *f.*, 378 *f.*, *The Dying God*, pp. 149 ff., 205 ff., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, pp. 218 ff., 307 ff., 313 ff.

king is a form or emanation upon this earth of the Supreme Being—or, more exactly, one of the 'souls' of that Being. The 'hawk name,' probably the most ancient of all those that have been borne by the sovereigns of the Nile valley, persisted to the very end of the nation's history, preserved by the subtlety of successive theologies at the periods when the original 'sky-god' had been replaced by the 'sun-god' as creator of the world. How this has taken place cannot be explained here; it must suffice to say that that ancient name had become, in historic times, what is still called in Egyptian archæology the 'Horus name,' or sometimes (very inaccurately, through the perpetuation of an old error) the 'standard-name' (see below).

The primitive conceptions of the pre-historic Egyptian religions later than the sky-god are found in the titles and epithets given to the king in the very ancient liturgies, and in the protocol of the Thinite monuments. There, where he is called, *e.g.*, 'the two Horū,' or the 'Horū-Siti,' we see a reminiscence of the system which divided the world into two halves, each with its Supreme God, in heaven and on earth. Similarly, the religion of the sky-goddess Nuit, who was believed to have produced the world, first by her own activity, and later by union with the earth-god Sibū, gave the king the name of 'son of Nuit' or 'eldest son of Sibū.' This prepared the way for the assimilation of the Pharaoh to Rā, then to Osiris, according as the successive theologies, reversing the order of the first cosmogonies, have made Rā the son of Nuit, or, on the other hand, the father of Sibū and Nuit, and the grandfather of Osiris. In the last form, the Pharaoh is the successor of Osiris, as the direct descendant of Horus, son of the pair Isis-Osiris. These various assimilations have been justified by an examination of hundreds of Egyptian texts, and may be accepted here. The point which it is essential to keep in mind is that at all periods, and throughout all the cosmogonic religions of Egypt, the outstanding characteristic of the king has always been that he was either an incarnation of the god who made the world or his son (in the literal sense of the word, not symbolically, or by a mystic adoption, but by real filiation). The king of Egypt has thus never been merely a representative or interpreter of the Supreme God, or his 'vicar'; either he is the god himself, manifest upon the earth in a human body in which is incarnate one of the souls of the god, or he is the god's own son.

The form of this affirmation best known to us is the title of Sē Rā, 'son of the sun,' which was inaugurated as early as the middle of the Vth dynasty, under the influence of the priesthood of Heliopolis, and persisted as long as the Pharaonic protocol was in existence (see below).

This divine descent was, as a rule, proved by the ordinary genealogy. From ancestor to ancestor, the reigning king was able to trace back his lineage to the fabulous Menēs, or Mini, the legendary founder of the first human Egyptian dynasty, and from him he went back through the mythical reigns of the Menēs as far as Horus, son of Isis, and son and avenger of his father Osiris, the first king-god of the valley of the Nile. But in certain exceptional cases (of which we possess three or four historical examples), in order to establish his legitimacy indisputably, the Pharaoh seems to have claimed the testimony of a more direct and recent intervention of the Supreme God. Thus (1) in the temple of Luxor for Amenhotep III., (2) in the temple of Deir-el-Bahri for Hatchopsitū, and (3) at Erment for Cæsarion, the bas-reliefs tell how the god himself descended to the earth in order to have union with the queen and himself beget the little prince who should one day reign over Egypt. They also show the birth of the divine scion, the magic charms which accompanied him, and the benediction of the god upon the new-born child when it was presented to him.

To the priesthood of the Nile valley, however, such a conception of the king appeared inadequate. They felt that the kingship must be the final result of all that legendary Egypt had known of divine domination; or, rather, that it meant the total heritage of all that the world contained of the forces belonging to the beneficent gods. Hence the walls of the temples show the king as heir and adopted son of all the great deities of the national pantheon in succession—the great feudal gods of the Nile valley and the chief elementary or stellar gods.

In the case of gods, the king is styled 'well-beloved son,' and he addresses all the gods by the name 'Father.' In the case of goddesses, they make the young king their veritable son by giving him milk from their breast in token of adoption (*q.v.*). Even this accumulation of divinity seemed insufficient to the Egyptians to constitute their god-king completely. The true Pharaoh does not exist, theologically speaking, until he has received, at Heliopolis, all the magico-religious consecrations which transform him into a living incarnation of Rā, the sun-god, creator of the world. The elaborate series of ceremonies employed to accomplish that transformation is well known to us to-day through: (1) the historical inscriptions, such as that of the celebrated Ethiopian conqueror Piankhi, (2) the ritual published in the Pyramid texts, (3) the bas-reliefs and special enactments of the solar temples of Abūsir, (4) the extracts from anointing and coronation scenes sculptured in the great temples, chiefly at Thebes, (5) the statues and statuettes commemorating coronations (notably at Karnak), and (6) the descriptive scenes telling of the 'jubile' feasts of *habsadū* (see below). Finally, the Thinite monuments discovered at Abydos provide evidence that the whole of this ceremonial was already established, in its essential elements, at the Thinite period. Even under the Ist dynasty there appeared scenes of that distant epoch similar to those found in the Greek period upon the walls of the temple of Edfū or other sanctuaries built in Egypt by the Ptolemys.

3. The royal titles.—The king, then, is a being constituted by all that, in this world, religion could know of divine forces, governing powers, magic resources, and super-terrestrial science. The enumeration of the many virtues and heritages of the king naturally resulted in the redaction of a long protocol, which was practically an *abrégé* of all the historical and pre-historical sources that had contributed to form such a personage. A king of Egypt had at least five names in the classical period: (1) 'birth-name,' which is his human name, expressing the relation of the reigning dynasty to one or another of the great provincial gods of Egypt (*e.g.*, Thōthmes='Thōth has fashioned him'; Amenhotep='he is united to Amen'); this is the name which is preceded by the epithet 'son of the sun' (Sē Rā) in the inscriptions; (2) the coronation name, preceded by the affirmation of kingship over the world of the north and world of the south by the heraldic figuration of the Reed and the Bee;[1] this name (chosen by

[1] This figuration of the king as heir of the crown of the north and crown of the south is of purely sacerdotal origin, and not historical, resting upon an astrological conception of the division of the world and its forces. It was regarded as figuring a state of things which had actually existed in Egypt, and it has given rise to the idea that at the period anterior to history there had really been two kingdoms in Egypt, one of the north and one of the south, and that they were united under Menēs I. Most scholars seem to have adopted that view, unconsciously instigated, perhaps, by the opinion of the first Egyptologists,

the astrological colleges of priests according to horoscopic indications) materialized, somehow or other, the aspect and attributes of the particular solar soul that came to transform the young prince into a god on the day of his anointing; it was sometimes a long motto expressing the rôle or the energies of Rā in this world (*e.g.*, 'Rā is the lord of the cosmos,' 'Great are the successive becomings of Rā'); (3) the hawk name (*i.e.* sky-god name [see above]); this was enclosed in a kind of panel or rectangle representing a façade of a palace, and surmounted by the hawk, divine Horū; (4) a name called in archæology 'name of the vulture and of Uræus,' intended to express the king's authority, which reached to the extreme frontiers of Egypt, from El Kab to Būlo; (5) a name, often incorrectly called 'golden hawk name,' which, preceded by the figure of a hawk perched on a sign of gold (*nūb*), declares in reality that the king is the heir to the stellar powers who share the two astrological halves of the universe.

To this list, absolutely necessary for the complete title of a reigning king, etiquette usually added a number of almost imperative epithets intended to express aspects or important attributes of the king-god. Sometimes, as heir of the warlike gods, he was called 'Powerful Bull,' sometimes 'the master who can do everything' (Nib iri khitū), or 'Resplendent in his glorious appearings' (Nib khaū). Some of these names expressing the virtues or forces of the kingship bear a curious resemblance to those which describe (or designate) the kings of certain monarchies in black Africa (*e.g.*, the sovereigns of Dahomey or of Benin), and it would be worth while to draw up a list of the possible comparisons. None of these epithets should be regarded (as they too often are) as arising from vanity or grandiloquence, for each corresponds theologically to a very precise definition of a function or force belonging to one or other of the great gods of Egypt.

One of the most characteristic epithets, which, moreover, has not yet been found in any other African religion, is the epithet 'Good God' (Notir Nofirū); it is of constant occurrence, and is one of the most manifest signs of the rôle which the earthly kingship filled in the ideas of the Egyptians (see below).

The laudatory titles and titles of etiquette imagined by the protocol (*e.g.*, 'Double Palace,' 'Sublime Gate,' 'Sun of the two Earths') are too numerous to detail here. One of the secondary epithets of this official phraseology has had a singular fortune. It designates the king by the veiled expression 'Great Dwelling' (=the Royal Residence), the equivalent of which is found in the royal title-list of certain black monarchies of W. Africa. The Egyptian term *pir-aō* has become the word 'Pharaoh,' which served throughout the classical world to designate the king of Egypt.

4. The earthly counterpart of the gods.—The sovereign is thus a singularly complex person, whose body contains even more souls (*biū*), doubles (*kaū*), and 'shadows' (*ḫaibit*) than that of ordinary men (see BODY [Egyptian]). These are frequently figured being formed by the gods in heaven, or being suckled at birth by the fairies, or accompanying the king (but distinct from him) in coronation and procession scenes.

As the king of Egypt is a living epitome of all that is divine in the Nile valley, the explanation of his functions is clear. First, he is in every function an earthly image of the various gods, and performs their legendary activity on the earth. In his justice he is Thōth, in his power he is Rā; like the first divine masters of the divine valley, he destroys the enemies of the work done by the ancient gods when they assisted Rā in the conflict against darkness and in the organization of the *κόσμος*. This view, the very beginning of dualism (*q.v.*), originated in the primitive cosmogony, and was later transformed by the Osirian legend into the myth of the conflict between the partisans of Horus and the bad spirits who were the friends of Set. The Pharaoh is thus heir to the powers and qualities of the good gods, whose powers are symbolized by, and materialized in, the various pieces of the royal costume (sceptres, crowns, necklaces, bracelets, pectorals, girdles, talismans, amulets, precious stones, magic jewels, etc.). These symbolical ornaments probably originated in the same way as the magical disguise worn by heathen fetish-chiefs; they were neither purely priestly tradition nor simply magical in character. The organized theologies ascribed to the royal person a thousand different rôles, implying a thousand traditional moral duties and magical powers. Some of these duties concern war, and perhaps may seem somewhat brutal for our taste; others are as noble as modern thought could desire. Scenes and texts display the king 'as a bull young, ardent, and resistless, which tramples down under its hoofs the enemies of Egypt' (*Hymn of Thothmes III.*), the 'rebels,' the 'accursed,' the 'children of ruin'; as a 'devouring lion'; as a Sūdan leopard; or as a hawk which tears and rends the foreign nations with beak and claws (cf. the Thinite palettes). To each of these representations there is attached a rôle formerly played by the national gods, which the king assumed when he ascended the throne of Horus. The lion, the griffin, the bull, the hawk, and the sphinx are repetitions in painting and sculpture of statements made by hundreds of texts. The king 'treading the nine bows under his feet,' and 'placing his sandals on the head of his foes,' represents an essential side of the perpetual duty of the divine monarch—as essential as the side represented by the expression 'Lord of all order and truth,' or by the figuration, under his throne, of the Nile gods gathering into sheaves the heraldic flowers of the Lotus of the North and the Red Lily of the South. Rā and his friends, the gods, organized the world; their final purpose was the reign of order and the triumph of good. Egypt and its people were the land and people chosen and beloved by the gods; it was, therefore, essential that the son of the gods should be able to bring the work to a successful issue, and this enterprise demanded that strangers, the ungodly, the enemies of Egypt, and all that was hostile to the ultimate triumph of the good should be destroyed or subdued.

That obligation presupposed that in the practice of those virtues by which the conflict for the good is maintained the king should be the pattern for his subjects. The Pharaoh was thus the living image and continuation of that 'Good Being,' called Osiris, who was the first god reigning on the earth in human form. He must maintain order in his kingdom, for administrative regularity is the first condition of material prosperity. He must ensure equal justice for all, protect the feeble, abhor iniquity, and be like a father to his children (as he himself communes with the god 'as a son talks to his father'). He must be Notir Nofirū, the 'Good God.' That in practice the kings of Egypt were not adequate for so noble a task is of secondary importance, and the objection that the reality was remote from the official ideal has little philosophic value. The fact of real importance is

who were more or less influenced themselves by some fugitive connexions with Biblical history. Things took place probably in a less simple manner, and the collection of kingdoms or of pre-historic principalities of which Egypt was formed must rather have passed through phases similar to those of the formation of the modern kingdom of the 'King of Kings' of Ethiopia.

the rise of a human society able at such an early date to express in these outlines the origins and obligations of royal power.

The moral ideal of the nation was consequently, at every step of the social scale, the imitation of the type of perfection incarnate theoretically in the Pharaoh, the son of Osiris. Baillet (see Literature) has shown the importance of that ideal in the evolution of Egyptian ethics and the influence which the moral character of the kingship exercised in the codification of obligations.

5. **Practical results of the kingly ideal.**—This ideal of kingship moulded all the manifestations of religious and public life in Egypt. As son and successor of all the divinities (national or local) of the kingdom, the Pharaoh is by right the chief servitor of the Supreme God (*honûf*) and the chief pontiff of all the priesthoods. In the bas-reliefs of the temples he is figured as the chief officiating priest, and everywhere he is represented in the dwellings of his divine fathers, celebrating sacrifice, offering incense or libations, or consecrating the offering, opening the tabernacle, adoring the divine image, and going in front of his retinue.

He is also the necessary mediator between the gods and men; to him the divine will speaks in divination (*q.v.*) or in dreams (*q.v.*). And he is the depositary of and the surety for the private endowments for the worship of the dead; it is he who explains the invariable title of the *proscynèmes* of the tombs: *sûton dû hotpû* (=royal constitution of the offering).

For the living and the dead the assurance of the royal approval is the supreme recompense. The episode of a dignitary commanded to the palace, arriving at the royal audience, and receiving the eulogy, or honorific distinctions (such as the 'collar of gold') from the divine monarch, is the culminating point of his whole career, and the crowning moment which he wished to have depicted on the walls of his 'eternal abode.' When he appears before the tribunal of Him who is the ancestor of Pharaoh, that will be the decisive proof of his merit for worthy service of the gods. To his children it will be his last message, at once an example and a claim upon the Pharaoh's goodwill. The highest reward which the dead can attain is to receive from the king, in recognition of their services, materials for the rich parts of the tomb (the stela, the sarcophagus, and rare stones to be sculptured into figures of the 'double' of the deceased). The Theban frescoes of Gurneh and Amarna, stelæ, as those of Ouni or Ahmes, tales like the romance of Sinûhit, and the laudatory biographies of every period prove that such ideas existed at the earliest period known to us, and that they persisted throughout the whole duration of Egyptian society.

Finally, the ideal of the Pharaonic kingship explains how, in public law, the god-king is regarded as the only master or possessor of the earth, and the only person who can give valid investiture in any office, fief, or dignity (see INHERITANCE [Egyptian]).

6. **The royal life.**—Since so many divine principles are incarnate in the Pharaoh, the consequences are apparent in his life. He is at once god and man, and thus combines two groups of 'personalities,' which are curiously separated in certain religious circumstances where the man-king worships the god-king—himself. He builds and consecrates sanctuaries in his lifetime to his own 'statues of millions of years' (see, *e.g.*, that of Thothmes III. at Karnak and the relative inscriptions at the temple of Ptah at Thebes); as king he publicly worships his own consecrated images in the temples of his fathers; and he is even seen (*e.g.*, at the Nubian temple of Soleb) coming in great pomp to inaugurate the edifice erected for the worship of his 'souls' (*bîû*); the living king, as a mortal prince, renders worship to the immortal fraction of divinity which became incarnate in him on his coronation day, or perhaps even to particles of a solar soul deposited in the human embryo on the very day of its conception in his mother's womb. In the present state of our knowledge this theological distinction is offered with great reserve.

This duality suggests a solution of the very difficult problem of the Egyptian *habsadû*, usually translated by the term 'jubile,' which is only a provisional approximation. Few problems of Egyptology have been so much discussed as the problem of the exact significance of these great solemn feasts. They are mentioned in thousands of temple formulæ, and representations of them exist, more or less abridged, from the earliest Thinite monuments down to the Ptolemaic inscriptions. It is certain that the feast is an anniversary and a repetition of coronation scenes; but, although these ceremonies were the most important of the sovereign's life, there is no precise knowledge of their religious purpose or of the chronological conditions required for their celebration. The Greek term τριακονταετηρίς has suggested the idea of a jubile every thirty years, but that is contradicted by repeated celebrations of the *habsadû* sometimes at very short intervals by the same Pharaoh. A recent theory finds in the *habsadû* an 'osirification' of the king, viz. a fictitious death of the sovereign, who returns through a fictitious resurrection for a new reign. That would be the substitution of a simulacrum for a pre-historic ceremony in which the king was really put to death at the end of a certain number of years, because he had gradually lost the divine forces which made him the natural chief of the nation. No positive confirmation of such a practice has been found in any Egyptian text or scene. Egyptologists who are influenced by the examples collected by J. G. Frazer in his *Golden Bough* seem to believe that they have found an explanation of the ideal of kingship in the Nile valley in the practices of the non-civilized races; but the opinion of the present writer is that the *habsadû* was rather a feast whose variable dates were indicated by astrology, and whose purpose was to infuse into the royal person a new particle of divinity, and that the sovereign was not at any time put to death either in fact or in symbol.

7. **Death.**—The destinies of the king, *post mortem*, were equally varied. His human principle received the usual worship offered to ordinary dead men; his tomb, statues, funerary furnishings (at least in part), and sacrifices corresponded to the hypogees and *mastabas* of his subjects. Like the 'doubles' of other men, the 'double' of the king's human principle goes to dwell in the fields of the Osirian paradise, there to work and harvest (see, *e.g.*, the scenes of the temple of Ramses III. at Medinet Habû). His divine principles go in other directions. The solar soul which formed part of his secret essence returns to Rā, the star from which it emanated. The *bîû* return to the sky, where they are mingled with the sun, and perhaps accompany the sun in its course across the world and in its conflicts during the twelve hours of its nocturnal journey through the inferna (see, *e.g.*, the frescoes of the royal hypogees of the Biban-el Molûk). Here we see the adaptation to the solar theologies of more ancient conceptions, according to which the souls of the kings were one by one assimilated to the various stellar gods, as well as to the sun, moon, and planets. In spite of efforts towards unification made by the priests of Heliopolis, the Pyramid texts retain evident traces of the beliefs which are so characteristic of the primitive religions of Egypt. Another divine principle survived on earth, in the temples, where it was worshipped as one of the living forms, or *khopirrû*, of Osiris which had occupied the throne of Egypt.

Finally, as a divine son of Rā (or, later, of Amon-Rā), the dead king became, in the funerary temples raised for his worship, a patron deity, theologically distinct from the ancestor-god, though one of his manifestations. Ignoring these difficult dogmatic subtleties, popular superstition sometimes took possession of these royal funerary cults, and transformed the dead king into a kind of tutelary god, who was an oracle, a healer of sickness, and a protector of the unfortunate. Such has been the case at the sanctuary of Montûhotep

(XIth dynasty) at Deir-el-Bahri and in the celebrated cult of the Statue of the Theban king Ahmes I. (XVIIIth dynasty).

LITERATURE.—The subject is treated throughout the whole expanse of Egyptological literature. The following may more specially be consulted: J. Baillet, *Le Régime pharaonique dans ses rapports avec l'évolution de la morale en Égypte*, Paris, 1913; E. A. W. Budge, *The Book of the Kings of Egypt*, London, 1908, Introduction, pp. xii–lix, *History of Egypt*, do. 1902, vol. i. ch. 2 f., pp. 112–171; A. Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, tr. H. M. Tirard, do. 1894, pp. 53, 78; G. Foucart, *Histoire des religions et méthode comparative*[2], Paris, 1912, pp. 177–216; G. Maspero, *Histoire ancienne des peuples de l'Orient classique*, do. 1895, i. 259–287; A. Moret, *Du Caractère religieux de la royauté pharaonique*, do. 1902; E. Naville, *The Festival Hall of Osorkon II. in the Great Temple of Bubastis*, London, 1892; W. M. F. Petrie, *The Palace of Apries (Memphis II.)*, do. 1909, pp. 5–10, and pls. ii.–ix.; A. E. P. Weigall, *The Life and Times of Akhnaton*, Edinburgh, 1910, pp. 7, 18.

G. FOUCART.

KING (Greek and Roman).—**I. GREEK.—1. Evolution of the conception.**—The Greeks themselves did not fail to observe the wide prevalence of monarchy during the early history of their race, or to speculate on its origin as an institution. Aristotle (*Pol.* iii. 14, 1285[b] 6), speaking of the monarchies of the heroic age, makes the suggestion that the founders of a dynasty won their thrones by services performed for the people, either by their eminence in the arts of peace or by their achievements in war; and that the office became hereditary after their death. The view that success in war was the principal avenue to the throne has met with some approval (*e.g.*, A. H. J. Greenidge, *Greek Constitutional History*, London, 1896, p. 14); but, while no inference can be drawn concerning the office from the name *βασιλεύς*, the derivation of which is unknown,[1] the elevation of a chieftain on account of his warlike prowess implies the existence of an organization to which the royal dignity was already familiar, and the functions performed by the kings of the heroic age indicate that their authority was the result of a more complex development. In another passage (*Pol.* i. 12, 1259[b] 10), Aristotle draws a comparison between the position of a king in relation to his subjects and that of a father to his children, without attempting to conclude therefrom that the former was a historical product of the latter. The comparison is sound and valuable. The heroic king actually exercised in a wider sphere prerogatives similar in character to the authority which the father of the family wielded over the members of his household. It should be observed, in particular, that the king in his priestly character was associated with the common hearth of the State in the Prytaneum (Æsch. *Suppl.* 376, etc.), which has been identified with the primitive residence of the royal family (J. G. Frazer, in *JPh* xiv. [1885] 145 ff.). Although we cannot trace the process in history, it seems a reasonable inference that, when the separately organized families coalesced into the larger unity of the tribe, the chieftain took over from the patriarch the duties performed and the privileges enjoyed by the latter within his narrower circle; and that the same absorption was repeated on a larger scale when the tribal system in its turn grew into a commonwealth. In *Pol.* i. 2, 1252[b] 19, Aristotle declares that such was the case, and that the reason why States (*πόλεις*) were at first governed by kings was that they were aggregates of households which were accustomed to this kind of rule. Further, it seems natural to regard an institution so developed as essentially hereditary, and such was in fact the character of the office in the Homeric age. But recent investigations into the history of the family (see art. FAMILY [Greek]) have shown that the patriarchal system was by no means primitive, and traces of an earlier prevalence of mother-right have been discovered in Greek tradition (W. Ridgeway, in *Cambridge Prælections*, 1906, p. 148). Again, it is certain that the regular succession of the eldest son to his father's kingdom was not distinctive of early Aryan civilization (F. Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, on Arist. *Pol.* iii. 4, 1285[a] 16 [London, 1894]). It follows, therefore, that the evolution of the kingly office did not proceed from a realized type of household organization, but rather that the development of the monarchy and of the family advanced on parallel lines. The conclusion is fortified by the discovery in Greek custom and legend of another type of monarchy than the heroic, betraying a conception of the royal functions much more primitive and remote. That is the conception of the medicine-man as king, because he possesses magical powers which are employed in due season to maintain the well-being of the community; as one whose period of office is not for life, but for a fixed term, or until his powers decay; as one who ultimately must be put to death, in order that by his death the welfare of his people may pass into the keeping of his more vigorous successor. The classic instance is the priesthood of the *Rex nemorensis* at lake Nemi near Aricia, which has been exhaustively investigated by J. G. Frazer in his *Golden Bough*. Less familiar examples of temporary kingship may be found in the recurring sacrifice at Halus of the eldest son of the Athamantidæ (Herod. vii. 197); in the sovereignty for nine seasons of the divine Minos in Crete (G. Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, Oxford, 1907, p. 127); and in legends like those of Codrus and Menœceus, where one of the royal house is bidden by an oracle to slay himself for the safety of the people. Similarly, reasons have been given for believing that the Dorian kings of Sparta were formerly deposed at intervals of eight years (J. G. Frazer, *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 58 f.); or, if not at fixed periods, the king might be punished by deposition, imprisonment, or death, if the crops failed or were spoilt by drought or floods (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 366 f.; cf. *GB*[2] i. 157). In all such cases the king is merely the representative of the vital force of the tribe, and is distinguished from his fellows because in him is concentrated the common heritage of magical power which is available for the control of nature. But, when a higher level of culture is reached in the supersession of magic by the maturer conceptions of law and government, the medicine-man of the savage is succeeded by the legitimate monarch. For the development see Frazer, *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, pp. 35, 81, etc. The manner in which the idea of the king as we know him gradually emerged from the clan-consciousness, as the embodiment in his various aspects of law, of religion, and of individuality, is clearly sketched by F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, London, 1912, p. 102 ff.

2. Varieties in the kingly office.—The various kinds of monarchy with which he was familiar were thus classified by Aristotle (*Pol.* iii. 14, 1285[a] 1 ff.): (1) generalship for life, typified in the authority of the Spartan kings; (2) the absolute monarchy of the barbarian type, distinguished from 'tyranny' by the permanence of its establishment; (3) 'elective tyranny' (*αἰσυμνητεία*), exemplified by the rule of Pittacus at Mytilene; (4) the monarchies of the heroic age; (5) an absolute monarchy (*παμβασιλεία*) after the pattern of domestic economy, in which the ruler is as supreme as the head of a household in his family. The last is Aristotle's designation of the ideal type of kingship, and need not be considered further; nor is it necessary to discuss in detail the *αἰσυμ-*

[1] For the chief attempts at explanation, with literature, see E. Boisacq, *Dict. étymol. de la langue grecque*, Heidelberg, 1907 ff., p. 115 f.

νητεία, which was an occasional office somewhat similar to the Roman dictatorship.

3. Heroic monarchy.—Thucydides (i. 13), when speaking of the establishment of tyrannies, contrasts them with the earlier monarchies, which he describes as hereditary and as enjoying fixed privileges; and Aristotle uses language of an exactly similar character (*Pol.* iii. 14, 1285^{b} 22). The hereditary element implies a divine ancestor (cf. *διοτρεφής*, etc.), and may be taken to be a later expression of the traditional divinity of primitive kings (Frazer, *The Magic Art*, i. 387 f.). The sceptre passed from father to son as the symbol of office, and was originally the gift of Zeus (*Il.* ii. 101 ff.). Agamemnon is described as 'most kingly' (*βασιλεύτατος*, *Il.* ix. 69); but neither this nor the title 'king of men' (*ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν*), which is given most frequently to him, though not to him alone, signifies that he was other than *primus inter pares* as commander of the whole confederacy. On the other hand, the existence of thirteen kings in Phæacia (*Od.* viii. 390 f.) and the protest against the evils of divided sway in *Il.* ii. 204 f. have been referred to a time when the growing power of the feudal nobility was ousting the earlier supremacy of the overlord (v. Schoeffer, in Pauly-Wissowa, iii. 56). The Homeric king was at once general, priest, and judge (Arist. *Pol.* iii. 14, 1285^{b} 9). In the first capacity he exercised the power of compelling a levy (*Il.* xxiii. 297), of marshalling his army (ii. 362), and of maintaining discipline to the extent, if necessary, of imposing the penalty of death upon the disobedient (ii. 391 f., xv. 248). As priest the king performed on behalf of his people all such sacrifices as were not specially reserved for members of the priestly caste (Arist. *Pol.* iii. 14, 1285^{b} 9), and these functions would doubtless be found even more important, if it were possible to trace them still further back. Temples are seldom mentioned in the Homeric poems (P. Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik*^{2}, Leipzig, 1909, p. 296 ff.), but it has been held (v. Schoeffer, *loc. cit.* 58) that the *τέμενος* was a plot of land assigned to the king (*Il.* vi. 194, etc.) in order to compensate him for the expenses incurred in his religious duties, and that this is indicated by the later universal application of the word to sacred property as well as by the close connexion of the king's house with the oldest sanctuaries (*Od.* vii. 81). Another view (W. Ridgeway, in *JHS* vi. [1885] 335 ff.), however, regards the king's *τέμενος* as the sole instance of private property in a land-system otherwise organized on the basis of the common field. His duties as judge were the most important of his civil functions. In virtue of these he was the guardian of the 'dooms' (*θέμιστες*, *Il.* i. 238, ix. 99), a body of common-law precedents, inherited as a privileged possession of the royal house. But his jurisdiction was scarcely wider than that of an arbitrator in private disputes submitted for his decision, and the enforcement of the award seems to have been dependent upon the terms of the submission, if it has been rightly inferred that the two talents mentioned in *Il.* xviii. 507 were a deposit to be paid out to the successful litigant (J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht*, Leipzig, 1905, p. 4). There is no trace of a magisterial control directed to the punishment of crime; vengeance for the wrongs of its members was exacted by the clan (see art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Greek]). It was customary to make presents to the king in his capacity of judge (*Il.* ix. 155), and this custom, exercised in favour of unworthy recipients, became a fruitful source of oppression and corruption (Hes. *Op.* 39). Similar privileges in the partition of booty (*Il.* i. 163) or of the sacrificial meal (*Il.* viii. 161 ff.) were awarded to the general and the chief priest. The power of the monarch rested more upon custom and personal character than upon his material resources. The influence of the assembly of the commons does not seem to have been great, except in war, when it was necessary to obtain its assent; at other times it was rarely convoked (*Od.* ii. 26). On the other hand, the support of the nobles was essential, whether in the field or in the council-chamber; and it would be easy to collect from the poems instances of their independent or hostile action (*e.g.*, *Il.* ix. 32 ff.). It is thought that the age of the Epics was characterized by a steady growth in the power of the subordinate chieftains (v. Schoeffer, 65), and the opinion is certainly confirmed by the downfall of the monarchies in the succeeding period.

4. Decay of monarchy.—Although there are traces of the earlier existence of the kingly power in almost every part of the Hellenic world, in Argos, Corinth, Elis, Arcadia, Messenia, Thebes, and Athens, as well as in the Ionian and Dorian colonies of Asia Minor and the islands, all these monarchies decayed and disappeared in the course of the period extending from the beginning of the 8th to the end of the 6th century. Sparta stood alone in the retention of her kings, but the importance of the exception is, as we shall see, diminished by its special circumstances. The cause assigned by the Greeks themselves for this remarkable revolution in government was that the occupants of the throne became enervated by luxury or were guilty of wanton violence towards their subjects (Plat. *Legg.* 690 D; Polyb. VI. vii. 6-9). The explanation is clearly superficial, and it is hardly more satisfactory to suppose that the kings everywhere sought to extend their power beyond its legitimate limits (A. Holm, *Hist. of Greece*, Eng. tr., London, 1894-98, i. 256). Grote remarked (*Hist. of Greece*, iii. 7) that the need for a single ruler as a bond of union between outlying territories ceased to be felt owing to the smallness of the various Hellenic societies—which also explains why the monarchy continued to exist in the wider areas of Epirus and Macedonia. But Grote's suggestion may be supplemented and extended. The heroic monarchies had flourished in a period of national unrest. After the cessation of the migrations, an era of comparative quiet followed; and the nobles, with their attention concentrated on the local interests of their community, were able to extend their authority against the weakly-supported prerogatives of the king. The same period was marked by the change to city life, perhaps the deepest cause of all those which undermined the power of the monarchies (J. B. Bury, *Hist. of Greece*^{2}, London, 1902, i. 73). The course of events was naturally various; but the result was usually not the expulsion of the royal family, but the limitation of the royal power, and particularly its restriction to the sacerdotal sphere, as in the case of the *βασιλεύς* at Athens. The immediate occasion for the change of government was often afforded by rivalries within the royal house, or by the minority or incapacity of the legitimate heir. The change itself was gradually effected. Thus the royal clan of Bacchiadæ at Corinth supplied the annual *πρύτανις* for at least a century (Paus. II. iv. 4); and the Medontidæ at Athens alone enjoyed the decennial archonship (*Parœm.* i. 214). A similar history may be assigned to the rule of the Basilidæ at Erythræ (Arist. *Pol.* v. 6, 1305^{b} 18) and of the Penthelidæ at Mytilene (*ib.* v. 10, 1311^{b} 25).

5. The Spartan kingship.—This was distinguished from all others by the duplication of its tenure. The two kings belonging to the rival clans of Agidæ and Eurypontidæ, of which the former was accounted the more honourable in virtue of its seniority, both claimed an Achæan as

distinguished from a Dorian origin. There was a curious provision respecting the royal inheritance, according to which the eldest son was not necessarily the heir unless he was also born while his father occupied the throne; otherwise he was excluded in favour of the eldest of his brothers so born (Herod. vii. 3). The traditional account of the double kingship starts with a legend concerning the birth of twins in the royal family (*ib.* vi. 52); but modern scholars are inclined to reject it in favour of the theory that the double kingship arose from the fusion of two separate communities (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* i.[2] 546, n. 4; Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.*, i.[2] 4). However this may be, the duality probably contributed to the shrinkage of the royal power which is discernible in the historic as compared with the heroic age. The statement of Aristotle, that the Spartan kings were not much more than hereditary commanders-in-chief of the army during their lives (*Pol.* iii. 14, 1285[b] 27), is a sufficiently accurate definition of their office, so far as we are acquainted with it from the 6th cent. onwards. Even this power tended to be restricted. Originally capable of declaring war or concluding peace without interference, and possessed of absolute authority in the conduct of a campaign and in the maintenance of discipline (Herod. vi. 56; Thuc. v. 66, etc.), they were afterwards accompanied on all their expeditions by two ephors appointed to act as overseers of their conduct (Xen. *Rep. Lac.* xiii. 5), and from 418 a board of advisers was chosen to control the king's initiative (Thuc. v. 63). There are sufficient indications in their surviving privileges that the authority of the kings had been formerly more extensive than it afterwards became. Apart from complimentary precedence and other rights enjoyed at banquets, sacrifices, and games (Herod. vi. 56 f.), and extraordinary honours paid to them after death (*ib.* 58), the kings possessed extensive domains in the occupation of the *περίοικοι*, from which they drew the revenues, so that they were accounted the richest individuals in the Greek world ([Plat.] *Alcib. I.* 123 A). The priestly functions of the king were of considerable importance, especially during war, when he conducted the sacrifice on every critical occasion (Xen. *Rep. Lac.* xiii. 2). He also possessed the sole right of consulting the Delphian oracle and of receiving its replies, and was accordingly invested with the power of appointing two delegates called *Pythii*, who became the channel of communication (Herod. vi. 57). The greater share of the civil jurisdiction at Sparta belonged to the ephors, while criminal trials were conducted before the council of elders, of which the king was president. He had, however, sole jurisdiction in claims for the hand of an heiress, and probably in other cases of inheritance. Further, he was competent to deal with disputes concerning the public roads, that is to say, to decide questions of boundaries and rights of way (Herod. vi. 57). The political influence of the kings was largely diminished by the transference of executive authority to the ephors. The king had a seat and vote in the council of elders, with the proviso that if he was absent his vote should be given by the elder most nearly related to him by blood (Herod. vi. 57; Thuc. i. 20). But, in spite of all the restrictions to which his office was subject, a king who possessed military ability was in a position to add to his venerable privileges the exercise of predominant political power.

6. Various titular kingships.—In many other Greek States we find the kingly title assigned to priestly or judicial officers, who appear to be the representatives of the former ruling dynasty. For the present purpose the facts may be briefly stated. In most cases we have merely the record of the title, sometimes an indication of the character of the office, but only at Ephesus an express statement that the descendants of Androclus, the founder, continued to bear the title of king with such privileges as the presidency of the games and the right to wear the royal purple (Strabo, 633). The other evidence, which is largely derived from inscriptions, may be divided into two classes according as it refers to a college of kings or to a single official. The former occurs only in connexion with States which had an aristocratic—or originally aristocratic—constitution, so that the 'kings' are the later representatives of the old heroic nobility. The States in question are Elis, Cyme, Mytilene, and Cyzicus. On the other hand, a single 'king' appears as a municipal officer in States where the government of the nobles had been overthrown—a category which comprises Argos, Megara, Chios, Miletus, Olbia, and Siphnos (for the details see Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.*, ii. 272, 323).

7. The sovereignty at Athens.—The history of the sovereignty at Athens is obscure. The traditional lists of the Attic kings bear the signs of various influences, and are clearly untrustworthy. This much alone is certain, that the powers of the king were gradually curtailed, until he became a member of the annually appointed college of nine archons, with definite sacerdotal and judicial functions assigned to him. For the tradition which identified the king-archon with the early ruler of the State is scarcely to be doubted. The earliest settlement, known as that of Ion, recognized the division into four tribes, each represented by its tribal king. These tribal kings (*φυλοβασιλεῖς*) were perhaps an advisory body to the sovereign; in later times we find them still associated with the king-archon as judges in the court of the Prytaneum (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* lvii. 3). The name of Theseus is connected not merely with the unification of the whole of Attica and the centralization of its government under a single king (*συνοικισμός*, Thuc. ii. 15), but also with a limitation of despotic power which earned for him the title of founder of the democracy (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* xli. 2; Paus. I. iii. 3). The early chapters of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* are unfortunately lost, and we have no means of estimating the nature of these reforms, which, though referred to an individual, may have been actually spread over a long period. The royal power was reduced by the participation of others in its functions and by its limitation in point of time. The first change, traditionally ascribed to the feebleness of some of the kings, was the appointment of a war-chief (*πολέμαρχος*), and the first holder of the new office was Ion, when he took part in the war against Eleusis (Paus. I. xxxi. 3; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* iii. 2). At a later date, variously assigned to the reigns of Medon and Acastus, the office of chief archon (*ἐπώνυμος*, as giving his name to the current year) was introduced. The reason for his appointment is unknown; Aristotle merely states that his administration was confined to additional (*ἐπίθετα*) as distinguished from established (*πάτρια*) functions, and that the subsequent dignity of the office was due to the increasing importance of the former (*Ath. Pol.* iii. 3). The archonships were held at first for life, and subsequently for ten years (*ib.* iii. 1); at a later date (683 B.C.) they became annual. The king-archon was entrusted chiefly with religious duties, especially those of old inherited usage (*πάτρια*). As a survival from primitive times may be mentioned the mystic marriage of his wife (*βασίλιννα*) with the god Dionysus, which was celebrated during the festival of the Anthesteria in the *βουκολεῖον*, the precinct of the god worshipped in bull-form (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* iii. 5; [Dem.] lix. 74 ff.). It should be

added that the βουκολεῖον, which was also the residence of the king-archon, was in the immediate neighbourhood of the Prytaneum. The functions of the king-archon may be classed as administrative or judicial. The former comprised the general superintendence of the State religion, and in particular the supervision of priestly appointments, the organization of important festivals such as the Eleusinian mysteries and the Lenæa, and the management, subject to various limitations, of sacred property. The chief of his judicial functions was the presidency of the court in all cases of homicide. It should be observed that this duty is an addition to those assigned to the heroic king; but it is clear that the responsibility must have been imposed before the abolition of the kingship, on the ground that the king was particularly concerned, as representative of the commonwealth, in removing the pernicious consequences of the blood-feud, and, as religious head of the State, in purifying it from the taint of homicide. For a more particular account of the judicial duties of the king-archon see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Greek).

8. Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia.—It has already been remarked that monarchy continued to exist for a much longer time among the half-Hellenized States on the northern boundaries of Greece. Thus, the kings of the Molossi, who claimed descent from Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, and before 400 B.C. had extended their sway over the whole of Epirus, maintained their power until the latter part of the 3rd century. Aristotle attributes the survival of the Molossian kingdom to the limitation of the royal authority, and compares it in that respect with the Lacedæmonian (*Pol.* v. 11, 1313ª 23). We have hardly any means of verifying his statement, but we know that king and people annually exchanged oaths, of submission to the laws on the one hand, and of loyalty on the other (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5). Shortly before its final overthrow, the king's power was temporarily increased by Pyrrhus, who owed the enlargement of his authority to his popularity with the army. Thessaly never formed a united monarchy, although there is some evidence that in comparatively late times a chieftain was elected as general (ταγός) to represent the whole people. Such was the position occupied by Jason of Pheræ (Xen. *Hell.* VI. iv. 28), and possibly by Aleuas and Scopas at an earlier date. But Jason's ascendancy was short-lived, and as a rule the Thessalian tetrarchies were distracted with rival jealousies, especially those of the Aleuads of Larisa and the Scopads of Crannon. The kings of Macedon traced their descent to Temenus the Heraclid. Their constitutional position, so far as it can be ascertained, was analogous to that of the Homeric king, when allowance has been made for the change of circumstances. The king received all taxes and tribute together with the rents of the domain lands, but his power depended upon custom only and upon the strength of his individual character. The nobility were always ready to put themselves in opposition, if the king failed to conciliate or to overawe them; and to this cause must be ascribed the constant struggles for the throne, and the risings of pretenders supported by a party of the nobility against a legitimate heir, if weak and unprotected (see also J. P. Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*², London, 1896, p. 23 ff.).

9. Later Greek monarchies.—The career of Alexander opened a new chapter in the history of Greek monarchy. Alexander made himself the successor of the Persian king, whose sovereignty was that of an absolute owner over his chattels (Arist. *Pol.* iii. 14, 1285ᵇ 18). On this model were founded the kingdoms which established themselves after the wars of the Diadochi—those of Egypt, Syria, Pergamus, and Macedonia. Of these the Syrian Seleucids came nearest to the pattern of an Oriental monarchy, from which their rule was distinguished only by its dependence upon Greek resources. The Ptolemys in Egypt were less despotic, partly because they relied upon Macedonian troops for their support, and partly because their government was based upon the semi-Greek city of Alexandria. The Attalids at Pergamus, while retaining the chief power in their own hands, made a show of submitting to the forms of a democracy. The condition of Macedonia remained much as it had been in former days, except that the power of the nobles, many of whom were dispersed in foreign lands, was less adequate for resistance to the encroachments of an ambitious monarch. The Macedonians were a race of soldiers, no less backward in culture than untrained in civil government; and they were always ready to follow a capable leader who understood how to humour them (Mahaffy, p. 231 f.).

II. *ROMAN.*—**1. Nature of kingship.**—The traditional history of early Rome begins with a period of monarchical government; and, although the details partake largely of a legendary character, there is no reason to doubt its general truth. In addition to *a priori* considerations, tradition is confirmed by the survival into republican times of traces of an earlier monarchy, such as the use of the *regia*, or king's house, as the office of the *pontifex maximus*, and the continuance of the titles *interrex* and *rex sacrorum*. We must not, however, add the festival *regifugium*, although this was traditionally explained as a festival held in celebration of the banishment of the kings (Ov. *Fasti*, ii. 685 f.); for it has now been brought into connexion with other sacerdotal flights on the occasion of a sacrifice, which, whatever their real nature, were certainly not the mimic representations of historical events (W. Warde Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, p. 327 ff.; Frazer, *The Magic Art*, ii. 308–310, and *Lectures on Kingship*, p. 264). On the other hand, it is unreasonable to doubt that the peculiar odium which attached to the title *rex* was inspired by a deep-rooted prejudice, springing from the recollection of the overthrow of a hateful tyranny. The charge of aiming at the throne was the most heinous form of treason, and was as fatal to Sp. Cassius and Sp. Mælius in early times as to Tib. Gracchus and Julius Cæsar in the days of the later Republic.

It will be remembered that the tyrant against whom Brutus conspired was the representative of a foreign dynasty which aspired to establish hereditary power. The native Roman kingship was of a different character. Its patriarchal and primitive origin is attested by the proximity of the king's residence to the hearth of the State—the perennial fire in the temple of Vesta—and to the store-houses under the protection of the Penates (*di penates publici p. R. Q.*), who were housed under the same roof (Tac. *Ann.* xv. 41). Some modern scholars have concluded that the Vestals and Flamens were in the first instance the daughters and sons of the king, who by his direction undertook the duties of kindling and maintaining the sacred fire (Warde Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 147, 288). But the king was more than the head of the clan. The genius of the Roman people asserted itself at an early date in the discovery that legal limitations might be imposed upon the exercise of an authority otherwise uncontrolled (*imperium legitimum*, Sall. *Cat.* vi. 6). The king was during his life the sole repository of powers derived from the people, which he exercised subject to the condition that he must act,

not like a slave-owner, but as the mandatory of his free fellow-citizens. Thus the king, while free to follow the inclination of his will, was checked by the conviction that he must act not contrary to, but in accordance with, the law. The people were the source of the law, which could not be altered without their sanction. Thus, as Mommsen has suggested, the constitution of Rome resembled, in some measure, constitutional monarchy inverted.

'In the Roman constitution the community of the people exercised very much the same functions as belong to the king in England: the right of pardon, which in England is the prerogative of the crown, was in Rome the prerogative of the community; while the ordinary operations of government devolved entirely on the crown' (*Hist. of Rome*, Eng. tr., i. 34).

This conception was undoubtedly the outcome of a period of growth, the various stages of which are lost to our view. Our evidence respecting the regal constitution comes from writers who relied entirely upon a tradition incapable of verification; and it is scarcely possible that their accounts have not been coloured by the introduction of features characteristic of a later age.

Our authorities agree in denying that the kingship was hereditary (Cic. *Rep.* ii. 24), and also in the assertion that the king was elected by the people on the proposal of the *interrex*, and with the previously expressed approval of the senate (Livy, i. 17; Cic. *Rep.* ii. 31). The existence of the office of *interrex*, on the one hand, shows that the demise of the crown was not necessarily and immediately followed by the succession of the heir; but, on the other, the nomination of the *rex sacrorum* and of the dictator in later times suggests that free election was not so primitive an institution as the authorities affirm. The view of Mommsen (*Röm. Staatsrecht*, ii. 7, and *Hist. of Rome*, i. 68) is now generally adopted that the king was entitled, if not required, to nominate his successor; and that, if he failed to do so, the duty fell upon an *interrex* chosen from the senate. In either case, however, the approval of the senate was normally, if not necessarily, obtained; and the new king immediately submitted himself to the people, by himself proposing the adoption of a *lex curiata* as the ratification of his assumption of the supreme power (cf. Livy, i. 41). The entrance into office was incomplete until the assent of the gods had been obtained by a formal inauguration, in which the auspices were taken by a member of the priesthood other than the king himself (*ib.* i. 18).

2. Insignia.—In virtue of his pre-eminent authority, the king was invested with various insignia of office. Thus, whenever he appeared in public, he was preceded by twelve lictors (Cic. *Rep.* ii. 30), bearing rods and axes as a mark of his continuous right to command (*imperium*) during peace as well as in war. He wore a purple robe known as *trabea* (Verg. *Æn.* vii. 612; Juv. viii. 259), so called because crossed by belts of scarlet (Mayor, on Juv. x. 35); but in general his official dress varied in accordance with the succession of his duties. He wielded the ivory sceptre surmounted by an eagle, wore a crown of oak-leaves fashioned with gold, and occupied an ivory throne (Dion. Hal. iii. 61). He alone rode in a State-chariot within the city walls; and from this custom the *sella curulis* of the republican magistrates was said to be derived (Fest. p. 49). He was endowed with ample domain lands, which were occupied on sufferance (*precario*) and kept in cultivation by the royal *clientela* (Cic. *Rep.* v. 3).

3. Functions.—(*a*) The king was the representative of the community in all its relations, including the superintendence of the State religion. For the first organization of the priesthood and the distribution of its duties Numa was traditionally responsible (Livy, i. 20). Accordingly, he is represented as having instituted the appointments of the three chief Flamens (those of Juppiter, Mars, and Quirinus), of the college of Salii, and of the Pontifex, while retaining for himself the administration of the chief religious ceremonies (Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* 15). After the expulsion of the Tarquins, the *rex sacrorum* was appointed to take over the sacred functions personally exercised by the monarch, while the *pontifex maximus* succeeded to the general presidency over the ecclesiastical bodies, which the king had held as chief of the State (for the difficulties in details see Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 51 f.).

(*b*) In secular as distinguished from religious functions the king was at once the highest civil authority and the supreme military commander. He had no colleague who could interpose a veto; he might, if he chose, delegate his powers, and subsequently resume them at will. The limitations of his authority were established by custom and precedent, followed or created by the holders of the office themselves (Tac. *Ann.* iii. 26). Thus, though the king completely controlled the division of booty and the disposition of conquered land (Cic. *Rep.* ii. 26), he was accustomed to consult the senate, whenever it was practicable, on all matters of foreign policy (Livy, i. 32). An exception would be the making of a treaty which closed a war; for on a foreign campaign it was impossible to postpone a decision until a reference was made to the authorities at home. On the question of a declaration of war it was even usual to obtain the ratification of the people (Dion. Hal. ii. 14).

4. Delegates.—Since it was impracticable for the king to perform in person all the duties required of his office, it was usual for him to appoint delegates to represent him, who exercised their functions during the king's pleasure. Chief of these was the *præfectus urbi*, who was left behind in Rome to take over the government during the king's absence in the field. The chief subordinate commands in war were those of the generals of infantry and cavalry (*tribuni militum* and *celerum*). With respect to criminal jurisdiction, we are informed that the more important cases were heard by the king in person, and the less important transferred to judges chosen from the senate (Dion. Hal. ii. 12). Further, it was made a charge against Tarquinius Superbus that he tried cases of serious importance without employing a panel of advisers to assist him (Livy, i. 49). Some scholars hold that such a *consilium* is to be found in the *duoviri perduellionis* (commissioners of high treason), who were appointed by Tullus Hostilius to try the case of Horatius (Livy, i. 26). These, again, have been identified with the *quæstores parricidii*, who are supposed to have existed in the time of the kings (Tac. *Ann.* xi. 22), although Mommsen (*Hist. of Rome*, i. 159) regards the latter as police officers, whose primary duty was to search for and arrest murderers. It has been inferred from the brief account of the trial of Horatius that, though the king might allow an appeal to the people (*provocatio*), he was not bound to do so. According to a statement of Dionysius (iv. 25), the king tried public causes himself, but remitted to others the adjudication of private suits, and in the latter case prescribed the formula by which the competence of the *iudex* was limited. This is the basis of the later distinction between proceedings *in iure* and *in iudicio*, when the prætor had succeeded to the office formerly occupied by the king. The power of legislation was theoretically vested in the people, who were the sole source of law (Dion. Hal. ii. 14); but the initiative was confined to the king, who alone possessed the right of consulting the assembly.

LITERATURE.—J. G. Frazer, *Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship*, London, 1905, esp. pp. 81–88; T. D. Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age*, New York, 1907, pp. 78–97; G. Grote, *History of Greece*, London, 1869, pt. i. ch. 20; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*[2], Gotha, 1893–1904, i. 505–509, 544–550, ii. 104 ff.; G. Gilbert, *Handbuch der gr. Staatsalterthümer*, i.[3], Leipzig, 1893, pp. 46–51, 121 ff.; V. v. Schoeffer, art. 'Basileus' in Pauly-Wissowa, iii. 55 ff.; A. H. Cooke, art. 'Rex (Greek)' in Smith's *Dict. Ant.*[3] ii. 546; T. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*[3], Leipzig, 1887, ii. 1–17, and *History of Rome*, Eng. tr., London, 1877, i. 60–70; E. Herzog, *Geschichte und System der römischen Staatsverfassung*, Leipzig, 1884–91, i. 52–82; L. Lange, *Römische Alterthümer*, Berlin, 1856–71, i. 284–389, and *Das römische Königthum*, Leipzig, 1881; F. Bernhöft, *Staat und Recht der römischen Königszeit*, Stuttgart, 1882; H. Schiller, in Iwan v. Müller's *Handbuch*, iv.[2] ii. 1 (Munich, 1893), pp. 51–53; A. H. J. Greenidge, art. 'Rex (Roman)' in Smith's *Dict. Ant.*[3] ii. 549, and *Roman Public Life*, London, 1901, pp. 42–65.

A. C. PEARSON.

KING (Indian).—The Indian kingship is peculiar in that the king belongs to the second—the Kṣatriya, or warrior—of the four great castes, the first and most powerful being the Brāhman caste. Throughout orthodox Sanskrit literature, therefore, a strict distinction is drawn between the priest and the king; anything even approximating to a priest-king is unknown in Aryan India. The king is inferior in position to the priest, who, as has frequently happened in modern times (*e.g.*, in the case of the Peshwas of the Mahratta dynasty), often became practically the real ruler, though nominally only chief counsellor of State.

The essentially administrative character of the Indian king is borne out by his name, *rājan*, 'the director,'[1] cognate with Lat. *rex* and O. Ir. *ri*, 'king' (from the Celtic group is probably borrowed Goth. *reiks*, 'ἄρχων,' and the Germanic group represented by Eng. *rich*), as well as with dialectic Turfân *paṭ-raušū*, 'ordered, arranged,' Skr. *rāji*, 'line, row,' Gr. ὀρέγω, 'I stretch out,' Lat. *rego*, 'I keep straight, guide, rule,' *rectus*, 'right,' O. Ir. *rigim*, 'I stretch out,' *recht*, 'law,' Germ. *richten*, 'to direct,' etc.

Among other synonyms for 'king' are 'lord of men' (*narapati*), 'lord of earth' (*bhūpati*), 'protector of earth' (*bhūpāla*), 'sustainer of earth' (*kṣitibhṛt*), etc. As Indra is the king of the gods, so the king is the 'Indra of men' (*narendra, manujendra*, etc.; cf. Böhtlingk-Roth, i. 803), and, although the 'god on earth' (*bhūdeva*) is, properly speaking, the Brāhman, the king is occasionally termed a 'god' (*deva*) or a 'god of earth' (*kṣitideva*; Böhtlingk-Roth, iii. 738). This does not, however, imply any divinity of the king, but merely that he is as much superior to the lower castes—Vaiśyas and Śūdras—as the gods are superior to mankind.

The king, says Manu, 'is a great deity in human form' (vii. 8: *mahatī devatā hy eṣā nararūpeṇa tiṣṭhati*), and, according to *Nārada Dharmaśāstra*, xviii. 54 f., there are eight sacred objects which must be reverenced, worshipped, and circumambulated sun-wise: a Brahman, a cow, fire, gold, *ghī* (clarified butter), the sun, the waters, 'and a king as the eighth.'

When Brahman created the king, we are told (Manu, vii. 3–7; cf. v. 96) that he took

'eternal particles of Indra, of the Wind, of Yama [the god of justice and of the dead], of the Sun, of Fire, of Varuṇa, of the Moon, and of Kubera [the god of wealth].' This passage receives its explanation in ix. 303–311: the king must shower benefits upon his realm as Indra [the rain-god] sends rain upon the earth; he must be as omnipresent as the wind; he must control all his subjects as does Yama; he must draw revenues from his kingdom as the sun draws water from the earth; he must be brilliant and of blazing anger against crime like the radiance of the fire; he must bind criminals as the fetters of Varuṇa enchain the wicked; he must be as beautiful in the sight of his subjects as is the moon in the eyes of mankind; like the earth—which in this list replaces the earth-godling Kubera—he must support all his subjects. A similar list, omitting Wind, Sun, and Varuṇa, is given in *Nārada DŚ*, xviii. 26–31.

The object of all this is, however, very explicitly stated to have been 'for the protection of this whole [creation]' (Manu, vii. 3), and it is for this reason that kings are always pure, 'least their business be impeded' (*Gautama DŚ*, xiv. 45), at least 'while engaged in the discharge of their duties' (*Viṣṇu DŚ*, xxii. 48), for

'as fire is not polluted even though it always burns the creatures of this world, even so a king is not polluted by inflicting punishment on those who deserve it' (*Nārada DŚ*, xviii. 18); and, moreover, he 'is seated on the throne of Indra . . . for the protection of his subjects' (Manu, v. 93 f.).

Another point of resemblance between the king and a god is that 'through his word an offender may become innocent, and an innocent man an offender in due course' (*Nārada DŚ*, xviii. 52); and the king is named in connexion with the gods in the requirement that a non-Brāhman must take his oath 'in the presence of the gods, of the king, and of Brāhmans' (*Gautama DŚ*, xiii. 13), as well as in the prohibition that a *snātaka* 'shall not speak evil of the gods or of the king' (*Āpastamba DŚ*, I. xi. 31. 5).

The death of a king or an accident to him interrupts the study of the Veda (*Gautama DŚ*, xvi. 32; *Baudhāyana DŚ*, I. xi. 21. 4; *Viṣṇu DŚ*, xxx. 23); and a *snātaka* may not step on a king's shadow (Manu, iv. 130).

The transfer of guilt in case of royal pardon is a rather striking feature of the Indian kingship. If a thief or other criminal is pardoned by the king, the guilt of the original crime devolves on the monarch (*Āpastamba DŚ*, I. vi. 19. 15 [quoting from an earlier text-book], ix. 25, II. xi. 28. 13; *Gautama DŚ*, xii. 45; Manu, viii. 316), because, if he kills the criminal, 'he destroys sin in accordance with the sacred law' (*Vasiṣṭha DŚ*, xix. 46, quoting from an earlier text-book). If the king grants such a pardon, he must fast a day and a night; if he punishes an innocent man, the length of the fast must be tripled (*ib.* xix. 40, 43).

The association of the king with Indra, already noted, appears again in the statement that the king in whose realm are no criminals 'attains the world of Indra' (*Viṣṇu DŚ*, v. 196; cf. *Bṛhaspati DŚ*, ii. 38); and we may also note that Soma is the 'lord of kings' and Varuṇa 'lord of universal sovereigns' (*chakravartin* [*q.v.*], *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XI. iv. 3. 9 f.).

There were, however, in India kings who by no means fulfilled the royal ideal. It is very bluntly declared that wicked kings go to hell (*Quotations from Nārada*, v. 10), and a *snātaka* must not accept gifts from a king who is wicked or a non-Kṣatriya, or, indeed, any king (Manu, iv. 87 ff., 84, 91); yet such was the reverence for the royal office that an attack upon even a wicked ruler was deemed one hundred times worse than the extremely heinous offence of murdering a Brāhman (*Nārada DŚ*, xv., xvi. 31).

Specifically royal tabus were rare in India, practically the only instances being that a king might never stand bare-footed on the ground and might not shave his head for a year after his inauguration (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, v. v. 3. 1 f., 6 f.).

The ceremony of inaugurating a king (Rājasūya) was very elaborate (cf. especially A. Weber, 'Ueber die Königsweihe,' *ABAW*, 1893; A. Hillebrandt, *Ritual-Litt.* [=*GIAP* iii. 2, Strassburg, 1897], pp. 143–147); but in this, as in the Vājapeya (on which see Weber, 'Ueber den Vājapeya,' *SBAW*, 1892, pp. 765–813; Hillebrandt, 141–143; both the Rājasūya and the Vājapeya are also discussed in art. ABHIṢEKA) and the Aśvamedha (*q.v.*), while the king was regarded as the sacrificer, the actual celebrant was his Brāhmanical representative, his *purohita*, or 'house-priest' (cf. H. Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, pp. 377–379). The Brāhmans were also entrusted with magic charms for the welfare of the king, specimens of these being such hymns of the Atharvaveda

[1] One of the terms for emperor, *rājarāj(a)*, 'king of kings,' is interesting as paralleling the O. Pers. *xšâyaθiya xšâyaθiyânâm*, Modern Pers. *shâhân shâh*, 'supreme king' (cf. O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterb.*, St. Petersburg, 1855–75, vi. 323).

as iii. 3 f., iv. 8, 22, and vi. 98 (cf. the series translated by M. Bloomfield, *SBE* xlii. [1897] 111–133).

Although the early Indian kingship was usually hereditary, there are clear indications that election to royal office was not unknown (Rigveda, X. cxxiv. 8: 'as subjects choosing for themselves a king,' *rājānaṁ vṛṇānā*; cf. VI. viii. 4); and with this may be connected an incident not uncommon in modern Indian folk-tales, and repeated in the Indian stratum of *The Thousand Nights and One Night* (tr. R. Burton, *Supplementary Nights*, London, n.d., i. 323), where the hero, wandering to a city whose king has just died, is singled out by one of the royal elephants, whose choice is regarded as a divine indication that the stranger is to be the next monarch.

In view of the inability of the Indian king to sacrifice or to take any other active part in religious rites, it is very significant to observe the rôle which is ascribed to him, particularly by the Upaniṣads, in the development of philosophy. Thus King Aśvapati Kaikeya instructs five learned Brāhmans concerning the nature of the Ātman Vaiśvānara after their fellow casteman Uddālaka Āruṇi had been unable to solve their perplexities (*Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, v. 11–24; cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, X. vi. 1); Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, prince of Pañchāla, teaches two Brāhmans the nature of Ākāśa (*ib.* i. 8 f.) and also explains to Śvetaketu, Uddālaka's son, the nature of metempsychosis (*ib.* v. 3–10, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upan.* vi. 2; cf. also *Kauṣītaki Upan.* i.); and the great Vedic scholar Gārgya Bālāki, after repeatedly failing to elucidate the nature of Brahman, receives the solution from King Ajātaśatru of Kāśi (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upan.* ii. 1, *Kauṣītaki Upan.* iv.). Considering this, it may well be that, as P. Deussen maintains (*Philosophy of the Upanishads*, tr. A. S. Geden, Edinburgh, 1906, p. 19 f.; cf. also R. Garbe's little essay on the origin of Indian monism in his *Philosophy of Ancient India*, Chicago, 1897),

'the doctrine of the Ātman, standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the principles of the Vedic ritual, though the original conception may have been due to Brāhmans, was taken up and cultivated primarily not in Brāhman but in Kshatriya circles, and was first adopted by the former in later times'; and that this teaching 'was fostered and progressively developed by the Kshatriyas in opposition to the principles of the Brāhmanical ritual.'

We must also remember, in this connexion, that the two great heterodoxies of India—Buddhism and Jainism—proceeded from the Kṣatriya caste, and that Buddha was himself an heir apparent (*yuvarāja*), being the son of Śuddhodana, king of the Śākya clan in Kapilavastu.

LITERATURE.—The chief references are given by **M. Winternitz**, *s.v.* 'King (*a*) in India,' *SBE* i. [1910] 322–324; cf. also **H. Zimmer**, *Altind. Leben*, Berlin, 1879, pp. 162–168; **W. Foy**, *Die königliche Gewalt nach den altind. Rechtsbüchern*, Leipzig, 1895.

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KING (Iranian).—The kingly office has always played a most important part in Iranian history and religion from the earliest times, both in the ancient Persian Empires and in the Mazdean religion. Indeed, to the Greeks the Persian monarch was known simply as *βασιλεύς*, or *ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς*, as constantly in Herodotus, Æschylus, and other classical writers. 'The Great Kings' styled themselves *khshāyaθiyā khshāyaθiyānām* ('King of Kings')—a title which has been perpetuated through the centuries to the present day, when the non-Iranian Persian sovereign still boasts the proud, though empty, title of *Shāhān Shāh*, which is merely the modernized form of the ancient title. Nowhere has royal power ever been more exalted or more absolute than in successive monarchies of both ancient and modern Irān. It is a curious fact, therefore, that, in strong contrast with so many of the ancient religions, there is no certain trace of 'king-worship' or of divine genealogies in any of the ancient Iranian dynasties, whether historical or legendary[1] (on 'king-worship' see C. Lattey, *Ancient King-Worship*, London, 1910; also E. Kornemann, *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte*, Leipzig, 1901). This is a necessary result of the practical monotheism of the Mazdean religion, in all its various forms. We have just indicated the distinction between the 'historical' and the 'legendary' dynasties in ancient Irān. By the former is meant, of course, the well-known great Persian Achæmenid monarchy of Cyrus, Darius, and their successors, familiar to us from the Greek historians and, in modern times, from their own famous rock inscriptions, which have thrown a flood of light upon both the political history of their reigns and the form of Mazdeism which they professed (see art. BEHISTŪN). Small and monotonous as is this 'literature,' it is distinguished by the deeply religious note that rings throughout, incessantly repeating the declaration of a burning faith, in which we have evidence of a sincere piety shown towards 'the great God,' the one God of the king and of his people. No question can be raised as to the religion professed by these kings, at least Darius and his successors, for we find that Darius, in the great Behistān inscription, adopts, with a sense of the deepest satisfaction, the title of 'Auramazdean'—proudly declaring:

'As an Auramazdean I swear (? or proclaim) that this is true' (*Dar. Bh.*, col. 4, § 57).

There is no mistaking the attitude of these old Persian kings; there is no claim to divine ancestry, as in the case of the Egyptian monarchs or Alexander the Great, nor to any apotheosis after death, as in that of the Roman Emperors, but the pious expression of the most absolute dependence upon Auramazdā, the one God. By his will or divine grace kings are allowed to reign ('per me reges regnant'); thus Darius exclaims:

'By the will of Auramazda I am king' (*ib.*, col. 1, §§ 5, 6).

By the same will the nations are made subject to him:

'By the will of Auramazdā, these nations have become my slaves and my tributaries' (*ib.*, § 7).

It is Auramazdā who gives to kings all their power:

'Auramazdā has invested me with sovereign power' (*ib.*, § 5).

A true Lord of hosts, it is he that gives the victory in battle:

'By the will of Auramazdā I put to flight the army of Nidintu-Bel. . . . I took possession of Babylon. . . . I defeated the armed bands of the rebels,' etc. (*ib.*, §§ 18–20; col. 2, § 26, etc.).

In a word, everything depends absolutely on the divine will:

'Everything that I have done, I have done, without exception, by the will of Auramazdā' (*ib.*, col. 4, § 62).

In another place, referring to his conquests, the king says:

'That which has been done, I did it all by the will of Auramazdā' (*Naqsh-i Rustam*, a, § 5).

It is a remarkable fact that, when we turn to that form of Mazdeism which is preserved in the Avesta, the sacred book knows nothing of the great Persian monarchs, Cyrus, Darius, Artaxerxes, and the others of the Achæmenid dynasty, whose names are so familiar in history. It knows, on the contrary, other great dynasties—the Pēshdādian and the Kayanian—utterly unknown outside of the Avestan literature and the folk-legends preserved in the poetry of later Persia, especially Firdausī. The legends of those dynasties are, of course, largely mythical. The first royal house, whose date, as usual, is thrown back to a fabulous antiquity, began with Haoshyanga (the later Hōshang), said to have ruled over the *daēvas*, or demons (probably the non-Iranian tribes), under

[1] But see Spiegel's view in Literature, below. There is, however, reason to believe that the Iranian kings were sometimes put on a plane with the gods, as in *AN*, Aug., i. [1867] 333; see also A. Rapp, *ZDMG* xx. [1866] 118 f.; E. Wilhelm, *ib.* xl. [1886] 108.

whose reign metals were first discovered and worked. His successor, with the very totemistic name Takhma Urupa ('strong fox,' the later Tahmūraf), taught his subjects how to use skins for clothing, to hunt, and to tame domestic animals, and caused them to be taught by the 'demons' the art of writing, but fell away into idolatry, and was slain by the evil spirit Ahriman. His successor was the great hero Yima Khshaēta (the later Jamshīd, familiar to readers of Omar Khayyām), who plays in the Avesta the part of both an Ādam and a Noah, and is connected with the 'Great Winter' that so strikingly corresponds with the Noachian Deluge. He was overthrown by the demoniacal monster Azhi Dahāka, the later Zohāk. After the latter's usurpation, the national revival took place under the most celebrated of these ancient heroes, Thraētaona (the later Farīdūn), who is spoken of as 'king of the earth,' and whose successor was Manushchithra, the later Minochihr. A later dynasty, that of the Kayanians—perhaps a Bactrian dynasty—derived their name and descent from Kai Kobādh (Av. Kavi Kavāta), followed by Kai Kāūs (Av. Kava Usa), Siyāvash (Av. Syāvarshan), Kai Khosru (Av. Husrava), Lohrāsp (Av. Aurvaṯ-aspa), and, finally, Gushtāsp (Av. Vishtāspa), in whose reign appeared the great Prophet Zarathushtra, who converted the king and his court.

Although these kings are no doubt largely legendary, and although the accounts of their reigns contain much that is mythological—indeed some of the names suggest Vedic or, rather, Indo-Iranian prototypes—still it is not improbable that some degree of historical truth underlies many of their legends. It may very well be that some of these dynasties, whose names and exploits are preserved either in the Avesta or in popular tradition, were the ruling families of different Iranian tribes, whether in Media, Bactria, or other regions outside of Persia proper; or that some of them may have been contemporaneous with one another, if not with the Achæmenid Empire. It is a remarkable fact that the Avesta itself knows nothing of the last-mentioned great dynasty. The great national Persian poet, Firdausī, in his epic, the *Shāh-nāmah*, ingeniously co-ordinates all these various dynasties from the earliest legendary hero-kings right through the historical Achæmenid era down to Alexander the Great. This skilful manipulation of legend, folklore, and sober history was necessary for the unity of his epic, but, of course, cannot be regarded as corresponding to historical facts.

Although no divine character was attributed to Iranian royalty, still there is one peculiar attribute of a supernatural character with which the Avesta endowed its kings, and also its prophets. This was the so-called *khvarenō*, which was regarded as a kind of effulgence or bright glory that attached to the kings, but could be forfeited by moral evil.

'It was a mythical talisman which belonged essentially to the royal house of Iran, though it vanished with Yima's sin, flying away in its three successive manifestations in the form of a bird. . . . The Glory can be seized by no sinner' (J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism* [*HL*], London, 1913, p. 276; we need not enter here into the author's discussion of the relation of the *khvarenō* with the *fravashi*).

Under the Old Persian form *farnah*, the word occurs in several well-known proper names, and even in Media, more than a century before Cyrus. The prophet Zarathushtra was also endowed with this *quasi*-divine splendour, and at the end of the world it is also to be the attribute of the Saviour Saoshyant.[1]

After the conversion of the monarch and the royal house to the Zoroastrian reform, the king of Irān was regarded in the religious system of the Avesta and the later Mazdean literature—in accordance with the favourite 'dualism' that all through has characterized Iranian thought (see DUALISM [Iranian])—as supreme head of the material or civil world, whilst the prophet Zarathushtra (and his successors, who enjoyed as a title the curiously formed superlative 'Zarathushtrōtema') was the corresponding supreme head in spiritual things. This is expressly laid down in the *Dīnkarṭ*, where it is said that the 'spiritual medicine' which depends upon 'the Good Law' (*i.e.* the Mazdean religion) is 'rendered more excellent by the rule of Master of the Worlds, the King, and of the Spiritual Director of the worlds, the Zarathushtrōtema' (*Dīnk.*, ed. P. B. Peshotan, Bombay, 1874 ff., vol. iv. ch. 157, § 4, tr. Casartelli, Louvain, 1886). This is of a piece with the frequent distinction between *ahu* and *ratu*, when meaning respectively 'prince' (or temporal ruler) and 'spiritual guide' or 'priest' (though at times the terms have other significations). It also corresponds exactly with the positions assigned respectively to *pāṯōkhshāyīh* (sovereignty) and *dīno* (religion), the one on the 'material' (*stihīk*) and the other on the 'spiritual' (*mīnōīk*) side of the curious table of the *Dīnk.* (vol. iv. ch. 137), cited in the art. DUALISM (Iranian). The Pahlavi translator of *Yasht* i. deduces from § 8 of the hymn that 'a man is not fit to be a king unless he possesses twelve virtues' (quoted by J. Darmesteter, *SBE* xxiii. [1883] 25).[1] As to the relations of the subjects to their king, J. J. Modi has lately published an interesting little volume (*Moral Extracts from Zoroastrian Books*, Bombay, 1914), in which he has a section (pp. 8–10) on 'Obedience to the King' as one of the chief virtues inculcated by Zoroastrianism.

Referring to Herodotus (i. 132, on the duty of prayer for the king, and viii. 118, for an instance of heroic loyalty), he quotes a striking prayer for the king[2] from *Āfringān*, i. 8–12; and of later authorities he cites: 'Be always truthful and obedient to your Kings' (*Paīvand-nāmah*); 'O almighty God, give a long life, a happy life, and a healthy life to the ruler of our land' (*Tan-dārustī*); 'Commit no fault against Kings and chiefs'; and again, 'Speak no evil against the rulers of the land, for they are the guardians of the land and through them prosperity flows upon earthly beings' (*Pand-nāmak-ī Āfurpāt-ī Māraspandān*, §§ 66, 103, following de Harlez's version in *Muséon*, vi. [1887] 66–77).

All this is quite in accordance with the ethics of the Achæmenid inscriptions, for in them the chief of all evils that are stigmatized is 'falsehood' (*drauga*, 'the lie,' whether personified, as Moulton surmises [*op. cit.* p. 1], and so equivalent to the Avestan name of the evil spirit, or merely an abstract noun); and it is to this evil that rebellion against the king is attributed.

Darius tells us that during Cambyses' absence in Egypt 'the people became hostile, and lying became widespread in the land' (*Dar. Bh.*, col. 1, § 10). In another place the same king, relating how a rebellion had taken place in many of the provinces of his vast empire, states that 'these provinces had broken into rebellion; it was lying that had made them rebellious' (*ib.*, col. 4, § 54).

Every time that a usurper rises up against the lawful sovereign it is said, 'He is one that lies' (*adurujiya*, from the root *duruj*, *druj*)—a phrase that constantly recurs. On the other hand, despotism and cruelty on the part of the sovereign are also considered as great crimes. Thus does Darius break forth with pride and say:

'Auramazdā has brought me help . . . for I have been neither a liar nor a tyrant' (*Dar. Bh.*, col. 4, § 63 *f.*).

In spite of such grandiloquent professions, however, the gruesome cruelties inflicted by the Iranian monarchs throughout the ages are only too well known, and it has been surmised, not without good reason, that the shockingly barbarous punish-

[1] On *khvarenō* see E. Wilhelm, 'Hvarenō,' in *Sir Jamshetjee Jejeebhoy Zarthoshti Madressa Jubilee Volume*, Bombay, 1914.

[1] Darmesteter's translation of *Sīrōzah*, i. 9, making Nairyō-sangha, the divine messenger of Ahura Mazda, to 'reside in the navel of the King,' seems quite untenable (see C. de Harlez, *Avesta traduit*[2], Paris, 1881, ii. 597 *n.*).

[2] Other translators, *e.g.* F. Wolff, Strassburg, 1910, take the supplication as being in favour of the speaker himself.

ments detailed in the *Inferno* of Ārṭā-ī Vīrāf, the 'Persian Dante,' are but too faithful a picture of those practised at the Persian court (see Casartelli, 'The Persian Dante,' in *Jamaspji Memorial Volume*, Bombay, 1914).

Anyhow the Avesta itself draws a sharp distinction between good and bad kings.

'May good Kings rule over us, not bad Kings, O Armaiti' (*Ys.* xlviii. 5).

Especially those rulers who were hostile to the Prophet and his reform are denounced and condemned to eternal perdition; amongst them is mentioned by name one Grēhma (*Ys.* xlvi. 11, xlix. 11, xxxii. 12-14).

A word must here be said of the relations between the royal dynasties and the national religion. As we have seen, there is no doubt about the religious convictions of the great Achæmenid kings—at least after Cyrus, for his religious position is still doubtful. They were professedly and devoutly Mazdeans—though the present writer is by no means yet convinced that they were Zoroastrians in any sense (see his *The Religion of the Great Kings*, London, 1910; *per contra*, the very striking arguments of Moulton, *op. cit.*, especially p. 40 ff., are deserving of careful consideration). The Avestan legend represents the Vishtāspa of the Kayanian dynasty and all his royal house as converts of the Prophet, the king playing the part of a Constantine or an Ethelbert. Coming back again to later and historical times, the relations of the Arsacid or Parthian dynasty (250 B.C.–A.D. 225) to the faith are unknown or obscure. The Sasanian kings (A.D. 226-651), however, were so fully and completely Zoroastrian that they made the Avestan system, in the greatly modified form in which it then existed, the State religion, and did not shrink from religious persecution in its defence or interests. It was under Shāhpūr II. (A.D. 350-438) that, according to the tradition, our present Avesta, *i.e.* whatever was left of the original scriptures after Alexander the Great's destruction of the greater part, was collected, revised, and corrected by the efforts of his great prime minister Āṭūrpāt-ī Māraspandān, whilst under his successor, Yazdagird II., the edict of his minister, Mihr Narseh (A.D. 440), played an important part in the religious life of the country. In the *Dīnkarṭ* (vol. i. ch. 28) we find the categorical assertion that 'the law of Irān is the Mazdean religion' (*Airāno dāṭo dīno Mazdayasno*), which, together with other indications, has always seemed to the present writer to point to the *Dīnkarṭ* as essentially of the Sasanid era.

LITERATURE.—In addition to writers quoted in text, W. Geiger, *Ostīrānische Kultur im Altertum*, Erlangen, 1882, p. 425 ff.; F. Spiegel, *Erānische Alterthumskunde*, Leipzig, 1871-78, esp. iii. 596 ff., where he endeavours at some length to prove that the ancient Iranian kings *dīd* claim divine parentage, probably from Mithra; E. Wilhelm, 'Königthum und Priesterthum im alten Erān,' *ZDMG* xl. [1886] 102-110.

L. C. CASARTELLI.

KING (Muslim).—**1. Sovereignty.**—Originally in Islām the conception of sovereignty was directly theocratic. There was no doubt on this point. Muhammad ruled in the religious order, the military order, and the judicial order; and in each of them his authority was accepted without dispute. Neither he nor any of his adherents seems to have thought of analyzing or dissecting sovereignty. They regarded it as divine in its source; Muhammad possessed it not as elected by men, but as a prophet sent by God. Originating thus, it was both integral and absolute.

This conception continued during the period immediately after Muhammad, which is called 'the perfect Khalifate.' The first successors of the Prophet did not, indeed, regard themselves as real sovereigns, that position belonging to the Prophet alone. They called themselves 'lieutenants,' which is the meaning of the word *khalīf*.[1] In practice they preserved their sovereignty in the military order; but in the religious and judicial orders the Qur'ān, which is regarded as perfect, had fixed the law, at least in its most important points. The Khalīf had nothing to add, and sovereignty in these matters passed into the hands of specialists, whose duty it was to criticize the texts, and to develop and apply the principles.

After the Arab conquest the Muslim Empire was immense; and, as it included regions and cities of advanced civilization, administration became complicated and difficult, and the Khalīf had to delegate a large part of his sovereignty to ministers. These were known at first by the modest title of 'vizīrs' (*chargés d'affaires*). They were of considerable importance in the Empire; it might even be said that some of them were the real sovereigns, until the day when they were crushed by a caprice of their master. Vizīrs played an equally important rôle in the Osman Empire after the Turkish conquest.

Towards the end of the history of the Arab Khalifate, during its decline, the general state of the Empire was very unsettled, and the military element assumed predominance over the administrative. The Khalīf, his power gone, was confined in his palace, and the actual authority was exercised by the chief guards, generally Turks and sometimes eunuchs.

In the feudal period authority was divided and subdivided just as in the West, but in a less systematic manner. The Khalīf had now only a theoretical power; princes of various races formed kingdoms for themselves out of the dismembered Empire, and arrogated to themselves a sovereignty *de facto*, which was no longer of a theocratic character, but was based on strength of arms. The dynasties which they founded have been of comparatively short duration. The Osman Sultans constituted a stronger unity in Islām than that which existed under the Arab Khalifs. Their power was absolute, except that they were required to respect the law of the Qur'ān and its interpreters (*muftī*, *'ulamā*, etc.), and were dependent on the fidelity of the troops. This despotic regime has lasted even to our day.

In Turkey at the present time the sovereignty resides in the Parliament, and the Sultan is only a constitutional monarch—a system which brings the Ottoman Empire into line with the other States of Europe, but which it is difficult to reconcile with the principles and the spirit of Islām.

2. Legitimacy.—The legitimacy of the Khalīf does not exactly depend on the manner of his election or on a law of succession; it is derived from the proclamation of the people. This proclamation consists in naming the sovereign in the Friday sermon (*khuṭba*) in the mosques, and in praying for him. When mention of a Khalīf has thus been made, without arousing protests, in the cathedral mosque of the capital of the Empire, this Khalīf is regarded as legitimate.[2]

[1] The title *khalīf* was borne by the first four successors of Muhammad, by the Umayyad and 'Abbāsid dynasties, and, among the Shī'ites, by the Fāṭimids. The title *imām*, denoting 'president,' was in use among the sects which recognized the right of the descendants of 'Alī. The title *amīr al-mu'minīn*, 'commander of the faithful,' was given to the Arab Khalifs; it had been used, even during the life of the Prophet, by one of his lieutenants in the year 2 A.H. As for the title 'Sultan,' it was in use among such secondary dynasties of the Middle Ages as the Ḥamdānids, the Būyids, the Ṭulūnids, and the Ghaznavids from the end of the 9th century. It was the title of the celebrated Saladin (Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn), of the Ayyūbid dynasty.

[2] The ceremony of proclamation is called *bī'at*. Among the Osmans it is renewed every year in the festivals of the Bairām, under the name of *muayad*. The *shaikh al-islām*, in these ceremonies, kisses the front of the Sultan's robe, and, raising his eyes towards heaven, prays for the prosperity of the Empire, and for the preservation of his Highness. The Sultan

A legitimate sovereign might be deposed. Among the Osmans deposition is regarded as just when it has been authorized by a *fatwā*, *i.e.* by a decision of the *shaikh al-islām*.[1]

The mode of succession of Muslim sovereigns varied. Muhammad had given no rule. Abū Bakr, his first successor, was chosen by the most influential party in the Muhammadan community; 'Omar was designated by Abū Bakr; Othmān, by electors whom 'Omar had named; the election of 'Alī was contested, and led to civil war; with Mu'āwiya the dynastic rule was established, first in the family of the Umayyads. Even within the dynasties the order of succession was not always constant. Sometimes the Khalīf chose one of his sons as his heir apparent; *e.g.*, the famous Hārūn al-Rashīd designated three of his sons with entail. The first of the three, Amīm, wished to oust the second, Ma'mūn; but the latter revolted and Amīm was beaten and killed. Among the Osman Sultans it is rather the brother who succeeds; and it has often happened that a Sultan, on his accession, has put his brothers and nephews to death. Formerly the Empire was divided among the brothers, especially in the Middle Ages. This was the case with the Būyids in Persia.

In principle the Khalīf, who was the president of the entire Muhammadan community, had to be of the Quraish race; but that was not the case with the Osman Sultans. In order to legitimatize them, it was admitted that they had inherited rights from the ancient Arab Khalīfs when, in the time of Salīm I., they conquered the sacred cities Mecca and Medina.

Among the Shī'ites the idea of legitimacy presents a rather peculiar religious character. Founding their belief on certain traditions, they hold that Muhammad had designated 'Alī as his successor, and in their eyes all the Khalīfs except 'Alī and his descendants are illegitimate. This belief has given rise to many troubles in the history of Islām. Secret societies have been formed and have long worked for the succession of the 'Alī dynasties; they succeeded in establishing the famous Fāṭimid dynasty in N. Africa and Egypt, thus named from Fāṭima, the daughter of the Prophet and the wife of 'Alī, from whom it claimed to descend.

The Mahdist idea is developed in the sects which maintain the rights of 'Alī. The Mahdī, a sort of king-prophet and expected Messiah, who is to perfect religion and to begin in the world an era of happiness, is to be of the family of 'Alī. The so-called sect of the Imāmites had a curious idea about him: they believed that the Mahdī, also named *imām*, was to be the twelfth descendant of 'Alī. The latter being dead, having disappeared at an early age, this sect professes that he continued to live a mysterious and endless life, from which he will return with glory when his hour is come. The time during which the Mahdī is to remain hidden is called the period of 'occultation' (cf. Carra de Vaux, *Le Mahométisme*, Paris, 1898, p. 134).

3. The status of the sovereign.—The power of the Khalīf is absolute within the limits of the religious law. Theoretically, he might dispose of the land and revenues of his Empire. The principle is that the soil belongs to God, and consequently to the Sultan, who is His mandatory. The Sultans, however, had a private estate, which was always of a considerable size. Thus under Sulaimān the Magnificent the private estate of the Sultan produced a revenue of five million ducats, while the general revenues of the Empire were only a little more than nine million ducats. This Sultan reserved to himself the right of granting the great fiefs; and, as a result of the same principle, confiscations were easy and remain so to this day.

As regards taxes, some are prescribed by the Qur'ān; such are the tithe for Muhammadans and the poll-tax for non-Muhammadans. Others are administrative taxes, which long ago acquired a certain regularity, and are therefore called *ḳānūnī*, *i.e.* 'regular'; such are taxes on marriages, law dues, transit and warehouse dues, and stamps. Besides these two kinds of taxes, the Sultan, under the old regime, reserved the right to impose as many as he pleased. Under Sulaimān the Magnificent imperial offices were sold, but not military offices.

Until 1877 the Sultan drew as he pleased on the Treasury for the needs of his ḥarīm. At this time, of eight million Turkish pounds that the budget produced, two-thirds passed to the palace. The Sultan published budget estimates, but he began by deducting his share of the receipts. He had, however, a civil list, which had been established since 1855; at first it was £1,200,000, but was reduced afterwards to £800,000. The property left to the mosques, as pious foundations, called *waqf* property, escapes the sovereignty of the Sultan, and is inalienable.[1] It forms an important part of the imperial territory.

Until the recent revolution, which made him a constitutional monarch, the Sultan naturally had the right of declaring peace or war. He has always preserved the right of commander-in-chief of his armies. He had the right of life and death even over the greatest personages in his Empire. When one of his old favourites who had fallen into disgrace received the noose with which he had to strangle himself, he accepted it as an order legitimately given, and as one which his conscience commanded him to obey. The Sultan was recognized to have the right to make subjects 'disappear,' to dispose of the life of his wives within his palace, and even to order massacres. The religious system of Muhammadanism does not condemn the massacres either of the Janissaries or of the Armenians.

Islām has a special law for the sovereign regarding wives. According to the Qur'ān (xxxiii. 52), he might have nine legitimate wives, all other Muhammadans having only four.

4. The ethics of the sovereigns.—There exist in Muhammadan literature several important treatises on the ethics of kings. One of the greatest philosophers of Islām, Fārābī (†950), wrote a treatise on the 'Model City,' in which he represents the princes as wise men, whose principal thought must be to prepare their subjects for the happiness of the other life. This theory, devoid of any practical character, is only an adaptation of the Platonic doctrines (cf. Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne*, Paris, 1900, p. 104). Another very well known author who studied this question is

in the meantime places his hands on the shaikh's shoulders, and bends his head to kiss him (M. d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire othoman*, Paris, 1787-1820, iv. 503, 550).

[1] *e.g.*, the *fatwā* which was given for the deposition of the Sultan 'Abd al-'Aziz by the Grand Muftī Ḥasan Khair Allah (the *shaikh al-islām* is the Grand Mufti of Constantinople): 'If the Commander of the Faithful pursues a foolish course of conduct, or if he has not the political knowledge necessary for governing; if his personal expenses are such that the empire cannot support them; if his continuing on the throne will have disastrous consequences, must he be deposed?' Reply: 'The law (the *shari'ah*) says, Yes.'

[1] The institution of the *waqf* furnished a means by which a testator might save his fortune from confiscation. The Sultans very often confiscated the property of prominent persons and public officials. The *waqfs* might be bequeathed to the mosques or set aside for some charitable purpose. The founder designated the person who should act as administrator. This was often the chief minister of a mosque or an inferior officer. But sometimes the choice of the administrator was left to the inspector general of the *waqfs* (d'Ohsson, ii. 524). Several Grand Vizirs—*e.g.*, Keuprulu, Rāghib, and Baraiktar—tried to secularize the *waqf*. An irade of 1873 and the law of August 23, 1875, imposed on them a fixed law of transmission and an annual tax, regulated according to the estate (A. de la Jonquière, *Histoire de l'empire ottoman*, Paris, 1881, p. 617).

Māwardī (†1058). He wrote a treatise entitled *Kitāb al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya* (i.e. *Constitutiones politicæ*), a work edited by R. Enger at Bonn in 1853, and recently translated into French by Léon Ostrorog. It contains the theory of the Khalifate, a description of the qualities necessary for a Khalif, a study of the different methods of election, and a definition of the power of the vizīrs and provincial governors, with an indication of its limits. This treatise has been highly valued in Islām. The same author has also left a collection of 'Counsels to Kings,' a work on the rules which ministers must follow, and still another on politics and government, entitled 'The Means of facilitating Reflexion and of hastening Victory' (*Tashīl al-Naẓar wa-ta'jīl al-Ẓafar*; see C. Huart, *Littérature arabe*, Paris, 1902, p. 242, Eng. tr., London, 1903, p. 243 f.).

A celebrated Seljūk vizīr, Niẓām al-Mulk, the founder of the academies of Baghdād, Nishapūr, and Baṣra (†1092), wrote on the art of government, which he himself practised in a very superior manner. His book, entitled *Siassat Nāmah*, 'A Treatise on Government,' and dedicated to the Sultan Malik Shāh, has been edited and translated into French by C. Schefer (Paris, 1891–93). Although this vizīr admits that kings are 'chosen by the most high God,' he allows them attributes which are not specially moral. They must, according to him, respect the learned doctors, must love a pure religion, and have a strong faith; but it is not their domain to govern religion. Their duty is rather to occupy themselves with economic interests: to drain the land, to build bridges, to found villages, to attend to the cultivation of the soil, to build strongholds, caravanserais, and beautiful monuments. These works will gain for a prince the gratitude of his people, an eternal recompense. Niẓām al-Mulk recommends kings to guard against the influence of women, and to have scant trust in ministers of another religion. We know that from the time of the Arab conquest, Christians have been employed by the Khalifs in their administration, and have rendered them great service. This custom was followed also by the Osmans, and continues to this day (cf. Carra de Vaux, *Gazali*, Paris, 1902, p. 140).

To the great Persian poet Sa'dī (†1264) we owe some very fine pages on the ethics of kings. The whole of the first chapter of his *Būstān* (translated into French by C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1880) is devoted to the duties of kings and good government. Nūshirwān exhorts his son Ormazd thus:

'Be the defender of the weak, and sacrifice your rest to work for them, to the alleviation of poverty and misfortune. A king owes the crown to his subjects; . . . avoid grieving the heart of your people; that would be to thoroughly destroy your own power.' 'The people,' the poet says further, 'is a fruit tree which must be cared for if its fruits are to be enjoyed.'

He has recommendations for labourers:

'The labourer works with more energy when he can count upon peace and prosperity.'

He has also some for merchants:

'The king who oppresses the merchants closes to the people and to the army the sources of wealth.'

He also recommends that 'men of war' and 'men of advice' should be befriended and soldiers well paid. Yet this great kindness which the poet wishes to find in the sovereign must be accompanied by mistrust and craft; he evidently prefers the latter to strength.

'While clever negotiations may assure the success of a transaction, gentleness is preferable to the use of force. Instead of traps, sow gold under your steps; your benefactions will blunt the sharpened teeth of the enemy. The empire of the world belongs to cleverness and craft; kiss the hand that you cannot bite; lavish caresses on your enemy as you would on your friend, while waiting for an opportunity to flay him alive. Dread the blows of the most humble of your adversaries; it is the drops of water that make the torrents.'

LITERATURE.—See the works cited throughout the article and in the notes.

B. CARRA DE VAUX.

KING (Semitic).—In Semitic languages the usual word for 'king' comes from the root *m l k*. In Babylonian the meaning is 'to advise'; this is common in Aramaic, and occurs in Hebrew. In Arabic and Ethiopic it means 'to possess,' 'have power over.' The king then would be the decider of conduct, the source of wisdom for his people. It is best to take the subject in three divisions: Syriac (chiefly Hebrew), Babylonian, and Arabian.

1. Hebrew.—It is very seldom that a true kingdom develops among nomads, and the Hebrews are no exception. Indeed it was not till after many years of settled life (tradition says four hundred) that the government crystallized into kingship. This development was gradual—through the judges, men of mark who by force of character and religious enthusiasm supplanted the tribal chiefs and, for a time at least, usurped their authority. In the case of Abimelech this authority became hereditary in the second generation, but this was largely due to the fusion of Israelites with the old settled population, the Canaanites. When the government was finally settled in the person of a king, it was in direct imitation of the nations round about (1 S 8^5)—recognition of the advantages of a fixed central authority. The older tradition believed that this change had the approval of God and was carried through by His instrument, the prophet Samuel. (Later tradition saw in this imitation of the Gentiles apostasy from God.) As in the case of the judges, Saul first proved his powers at the rescue of Jabesh-Gilead, and then the people ratified the position that he had won for himself. Possibly Samuel had looked to Benjamin for a king in the hope of thus avoiding the jealousy of the North and South. Saul the soldier, however, proved unequal as a politician to cope with the Philistines; and David, the idol of the South, was shown by events to be necessary to the Hebrew nation, and as such was acclaimed king by all parties. But even his genius and personal attractiveness failed to create a national feeling. The kingdom which he had created by his resistance to the Philistines was kept together by the fear of a hostile neighbour, and split along the natural line of cleavage as soon as that fear was removed.

These early kings were little more than the tribal chiefs of nomad days. The main differences were their recognition by the whole people and their possession of a bodyguard, consisting largely of foreigners, which was more serviceable than the tribal militia. At first there was very little organization. The vagueness of history suggests that Saul had no fixed capital. The king was judge (2 S $14^{52f.}$), general, and priest, the officers set apart for these duties being only his deputies. There is no clear statement of the king being the chief priest, but there are many indications that he sometimes exercised priestly functions. In Phœnicia, Tabnit styles himself 'priest of Astarte, king of the Sidonians,' like his father. His son Eshmunazar calls his mother (she was his father's sister) 'priestess of Astarte' and 'queen,' though he himself does not bear the priestly title. The story of Agag shows that Saul saw nothing wrong in offering sacrifice (1 S 15). At the coming of the ark to Jerusalem David wore a linen ephod (2 S 6^{14}), a priestly garment such as Samuel wore (1 S 2^{18}; cf. also Ex 28^4). Both David and Solomon blessed the people (2 S 6^{18} and 1 K 8^{14}; cf. Nu 6^{23}). The priests were the servants of the king, to be deposed or appointed at pleasure (1 K $2^{7.\ 35}$), while David's sons were priests, as if this were a prerogative of the royal family. Jeroboam I. probably acted as priest (1 K 12^{33}).

The army was a militia, and campaigns seem to have been confined to the summer. But a point

was given to this army by the institution of the royal bodyguard of mercenaries. Under David the captain was apparently a Philistine, and loyalty to their master was stronger than other motives. It was the fidelity of these hirelings that prevented Absalom from sweeping the country at the outset of his rebellion.

We have no certain information about the revenue of the early kings. As tradition insists on the lowly origin of both Saul and David, we must suppose that from the first they had a regular revenue from taxation apart from the booty that they might win in war. Jg 9^{6} makes it probable that in those times taxes were not unknown, and that each State had its treasury. 1 S 17^{25} assumes that taxes were the regular thing in the days of Saul. It is significant that in the second list of David's officials (2 S 20^{24}) an addition is made to the earlier (2 S $8^{16ff.}$)—the overseer of the tribute. The later version of Saul's appointment assumes a tax of 10 per cent. It is assumed on the strength of 1 S 16^{20} and a few other verses that the kings were frequently the recipients of presents; but probably these were, like gratitude, in expectation of favours to come. In Solomon's reign an elaborate system of tax-collectors was set up—a system which was intended further to break down the tribal divisions still existing among the people. The king also possessed certain agricultural privileges (Am 7^{1}), and in later times financial emergencies were met by special taxation (2 K 15^{20} 23^{35}). Solomon is credited with a large income from taxation apart from the profits of trade and foreign tribute. In addition he employed the *corvée* (cf. 1 S 8^{12}). David's kingdom illustrates Ibn Khaldūn's theory that a dynasty lasts only three generations: one of comparative barbarism, one of organized government and developed luxury, and then the crash. Solomon asked too much from his subjects; the splendour of the court was bought by the impoverishment of the countryside, and, as the tribes had not had time to degenerate into serfs, they broke away from the government that pillaged instead of protecting them. The Phœnician kings were at first absolute, but later their power was limited by the nobles, and the government became an oligarchy. David's successors were not equal to the task which almost crushed him—that of welding Judah and Joseph into one nation. While in the North the throne was a prize for any adventurer, in Judah all revolutions left David's family the crown—a tribute to the power of the king of all Israel.

As a general rule the crown was hereditary, descending to the eldest son—the chief exception being Solomon. In this case a palace clique abused the prestige of the dying king and the authority of religion in favour of its nominee. The king was a sacred person appointed by God (1 S 24^{17} and 2 K 9^{6}), and in him centred the hopes of the prophets. It is probable that anointing referred specially to the priestly side of the king's character.

2. Babylonian and Assyrian.—Though the Babylonian rulers of whom we hear first were Sumerians, yet the later forms of kingship are developments or modifications of Semitic ideas. In the earliest period of which anything is known the machinery of government was already well developed. We cannot trace the beginnings of any element of social life. The land was split up into a number of city-States, each under its own ruler, called either 'king' or 'patesi,' 'king' being the secular and 'patesi' the more religious title, signifying vicar of God. There is no clear distinction between the two titles, though a little later 'patesi' is used for a vassal king. Thus Eannatum of Lagash (*c.* 2900) calls himself both patesi and king, while Enannatum I., who reigned a little later, uses only the title patesi. The early rulers of Assyria (*c.* 1800) call themselves Ishakku (=priest-king). Whatever his title, the king ruled by divine right. Many inscriptions have been found in which a king boasts that his god had appointed him king of his land and shepherd of his people. 'Thou hast created me and intrusted me with dominion over men' (Nebuchadrezzar [Rawlinson, 1^{63}, col. 1, line 55 f.]). In theory at least the king was an autocrat, however much his power may have been limited in practice.

The king is the agent of his country's god; in the treaty between the cities of Lagash and Umma (before 3000) the patesis of the towns are not mentioned at all, but only the gods. They contended for their cities. 'Patesi' included the idea of priest, and it sometimes happened that one who assumed the style of king kept the older form, even putting the priestly rank first of his titles. It is not a very big step from regarding the sovereign as agent or representative of the god to considering him the manifestation of deity or as himself the god. This change took place very early. Perhaps it was helped by the rulers' habit of putting statues of themselves in the temples which they built, to keep themselves fresh in the memory of the gods. Then offerings were made, not to the statues, but for the persons whom they represented. It is specially noted that the offerings for the statue of Ur-nina (king of Lagash *c.* 3000) were continued during the reign of Lugal-anda, perhaps a hundred and fifty years later. The first kings to receive divine honours were the Semitic rulers of Akkad, northern Babylonia (*c.* 2600); Shargani-sharri is called the god of his land, and Narām-Sin's name always has the determinative for 'god.' Thence the custom spread to the Sumerian rulers of S. Babylonia; and Gudea, patesi of Lagash *c.* 2450, was deified after his death. About fifty years later, Dungi, the second king of the dynasty of Ur, always describes himself as god, and a temple is built in his honour. In later times Ashurbanipal calls himself offspring of Ashur and Belit. The suggestion that the deification of the king is due to Egyptian influence has not found favour.

At first the ruler was supreme in both the secular and the religious sides of life, but in time the priesthood developed till its help was needed for all religious actions. Yet the king remained priest in theory. God still spoke to him directly; Ishtar visited him in dreams to give him her commands. Lugal-zuggisi is proud to be called 'prophet of Nidaba.' He was the manifestation of the god, but also the representative of his people. This was never forgotten. The kings of Erech and Lagash are priests of Anu; another boasts himself 'keeper of the temple of Bel' at Nippur, and down to the latest times the Assyrian kings are priests of Ashur, sometimes giving the religious title the precedence. A son of Narām-Sin became a priest, and his daughter a priestess. The priests were always under the control of their chief, the king; their subservience appears in the attempts of the oracle priests to find in omens that were obviously unfavourable meanings pleasing to the king.

Another aspect of this is the national significance of the king's person: a calamity to him is a national disaster; hence the elaborate rules that fence his conduct. All ill omens must be kept far from him. Thus the ceremonies for the purification of a king are much longer and more complicated than in the case of a private person; royalty is so dangerous that the king has become the slave of the priesthood. On five days in the month he must not touch animal food, nor change his garments, neither dare he bring an offering to the gods. Thus the

question whether certain of the penitential psalms are individual or national is beside the point; it is the king, the people's representative, who speaks for the nation. The law tells the same tale. The court sits in a temple, and the oath is taken in the name of a god or gods, and sometimes in the king's name also; yet he is the final court of appeal (cf. the Hebrew oaths 'by the life of Jahweh' and 'by the life of the king,' also the association of Tiglath-pileser and a god in Barrekub's inscription from Zenjirli). As lawgiver he is guided by social and political expediency, but his decrees are published under divine auspices. The series of omens founded on the exploits (whether real or imaginary is immaterial) of Sargon I. can hardly be explained on the ground of the political importance of these exploits. It was the deeds of a hero peculiarly under divine protection that became normative for future ages.

Naturally the king was absolute, but he was the 'shepherd of his people,' and the government was always rather patriarchal. The people had their rights, which the monarch could not outrage. The splendid title 'king of righteousness' was not borne altogether in vain. In the South we have a witness in the reforms of Urukaginu of Lagash (*c.* 2800) and the Code of Ḥammurabi, while in Assyria, even in the days of its greatest power, any person could make a written appeal to the king. Though the Assyrians are unpleasantly notorious for bloodthirsty cruelty, they devoted great care to the internal economy of their own land. Not only was Assyria plentifully supplied with cattle of all sorts, the booty of innumerable wars, but the kings introduced new trees, and in other ways encouraged agriculture. The system of irrigation was, of course, their constant care. From the first the throne was hereditary, though we do not know whether primogeniture was the rule. In Assyria it is claimed that for fifteen hundred years the crown descended from father to son. The king's material power rested on the army. The idea that the king owned his domain had long since died out, yet part of the soil belonged specially to the State, being held on feudal tenure. The occupier was bound to military service, in payment for which he held his fief. This could not be alienated, and in default of heirs returned to the State. If the owner were summoned for service and had no one to leave in charge of his land, the State appointed a bailiff, who was charged to pay one-third of the produce to the owner's family. In addition, the feudatories had certain privileges, were, to some extent, outside the jurisdiction of ordinary officials, and were not liable to the *corvée*. The Assyrian government appears to have lived often on the tribute of vassal States.

3. **Arabian.**—It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no settled government has evolved among the nomads of Arabia. The dynasties of Ḥīra and Ghassān are only apparent exceptions. All Arabian States have had their centre in the cities that lie on the borders of the country, open to foreign influence by land or sea. Among the nomads the tribal chief is the leader in war, but at other times he has only advisory authority and the weight of personal influence. Even among the settled tribes in the hinterland of Aden it is often impossible to put a criminal to death; for by so doing the chief (he calls himself 'Sultan') would expose himself to the dangers of a blood-feud.

Among the fertile valleys of Yemen it was different, and at an early date settled States came into being. Unfortunately, the materials for a study of this period are scanty and largely inaccessible. No agreement has yet been reached as to the date of many of the inscriptions, the two schools of interpretation differing by some six hundred years. The chief States were (1) the Yemen, ruled by two dynasties having their capitals at Ṣirwāḥ and Ma'rib, and later by the Ḥimyarite kings of Saba and Dhū Raidān known to Arabic tradition as Tubba's; (2) Ma'īn or Ma'ān in the Jauf; (3) Qatabān; and (4) Ḥadramaut. The date of the kings of Ma'ān is uncertain. In Yemen the earliest rulers were the *mkrb*, probably Mukarribs, the priest-kings of Ṣirwāḥ. We have the names of thirteen princes who ruled between the 9th and the 6th cent. B.C., but their functions and powers are unknown. The title seems to mean 'he who makes offerings.' Their rule probably extended well to the east, for Sargon (715 B.C.) mentions one Ith'amara the Sabæan, presumably one of the dynasty. The name occurs on the monuments.

Next followed a line of kings ruling at Ma'rib, coming to an end about 115 B.C. and followed by the Ḥimyarite kings, whose kingdom was finally destroyed by the Abyssinians in A.D. 525. It is probable that the kings of Ma'ān were contemporary with the earlier rulers of Yemen (Saba), though Hommel and Glaser would put the first of them about 1500 B.C.

The royal title was not restricted to the head of the State, but was shared by his sons. In one inscription a father and two sons bear the title, just as in a State of that description to-day all members of the ruling house are called Sultan. Elsewhere Alhan Nahfan, king of Saba, does not give himself that rank, though he gives it to his sons (*CIS* iv. 308). Besides kings we read of lords, and it is probable that the people were divided into classes or castes; and the lords in their inaccessible castles may well have been as independent as the feudal barons in Europe. According to one tradition, the downfall of Dhū Nuwās, the last king of Yemen, was largely due to his lack of control over his barons. Women held an honourable position in the land; two together appear as 'lords,' and, like the king, receive the commands of their god through an oracle (*CIS* iv. 387). Occasionally the kings seem to be invoked along with the gods, though in a secondary place (*CIS* iv. 374)—reminding one of Babylonia.

Two other States rose in early Arabia, Ḥīra and Ghassān, though they were native in part only, being due to outside influence. Rome and Persia were continually annoyed by the incursions of the Bedawīn into the settled lands of Syria and Mesopotamia, so one protective measure was to make friends with the nearest Arabs. Ḥīra was a vassal of Persia, and in very close touch with its overlord; Arabs filled responsible posts at court, and Bahrām Gur, who afterwards became king, was educated at Ḥīra. These States closely resemble the rule of the Rashīds at Ḥail in the last century; the Sultan's power rested on the Bedawīn, who were held to their allegiance by tribal honour and presents from the taxes contributed by towns and trade. History has preserved the memory of the mixed population at Ḥīra—the tent-dwelling Arabs, the Christians of the town, and the allies—a mixed population which for various reasons settled under the government. There is no explicit evidence, but conditions must have been very similar in Ghassān, where the government remained migratory and Roman gold helped to uphold the loyalty of the Arabs. Ṭabarī tells us that Gadhīma, the founder of the dynasty of Ḥīra, was a prophet and soothsayer, suggesting that authority there was religious in its origin.

Muhammad founded a State where divine revelation was the supreme law, and after his time religion has played the greatest part in most States formed and ruled by Arabs. Ibn Khaldūn's observation remains true, that religion alone will not make a

State; the feeling of nationality must also be present (*Prolegomena*, Beirut ed., p. 159). The Umayyad Khalifs claimed to be the successors of the Prophet, and made this the chief prop of their authority; yet their power depended on the solidarity of their supporters, and, when the old strife of Qais and Kalb, Mudar and Yemen, broke out afresh, their kingdom collapsed; till then they had made head against all religious revolts of 'Alids and Khawārij (*q.v.*). The Carmatians (*q.v.*) can hardly be called a kingdom; yet the Imāms of Oman claimed first spiritual authority, as did the Wahhābis. Leadership might be hereditary or elective, but religion gave power and opportunity to the strength latent in a tribe or group of tribes. All these States are small copies of Muhammad's great example. There is one exception, the dynasty of the Rasūlids in Yemen; but that was founded by a foreigner, and it had to fight continually against leaders whose authority was spiritual, the descendants of the Prophet. After the fall of the Rasūlids the native authority was exercised by a spiritual head, the Imām. See, further, 'Muslim' section, above.

LITERATURE.—Hebrew: the Bible dictionaries. There is no special literature for the other countries. Phœnicia: R. Pietschmann, *Gesch. der Phönizier*, Berlin, 1889. Babylonia: L. W. King, *Sumer and Akkad*, London, 1910, and *Chronicles concerning early Babylonian Kings*, do. 1907; M. Jastrow, *Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Giessen, 1905 ff. Arabia: C. Huart, *Hist. des Arabes*, Paris, 1912; R. A. Nicholson, *Lit. Hist. of the Arabs*, London, 1907; *CIS*, pt. iv.; scattered notices in native authors.

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KING (Teutonic and Litu-Slavic).—1. Sources relating to the Litu-Slavs.—In seeking to trace the early historical development of kingship in Northern Europe, it will be well to deal first of all with the facts relating to the Litu-Slavic peoples, as these provide a basis also for a knowledge of the early Teutonic conditions. We begin, therefore, by quoting from the oldest available authorities a number of references to modes of government among the Litu-Slavs of Eastern Europe.

(*a*) The *Chronicle of Nestor* (ed. F. Miklosich, Vienna, 1860, ch. vi.): 'They lived each with his family and in his own locality [*i.e.* separate from one another], each ruling over his own family.'

(*b*) Procopius, *de Bell. Goth.* iii. 14: τὰ γὰρ ἔθνη ταῦτα Σκλαβηνοί τε καὶ Ἄνται οὐκ ἄρχονται πρὸς ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἐκ παλαιοῦ βιοτεύουσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀεὶ τά τε σύμφορα καὶ δύσκολα ἐς κοινὸν ('assembly of the people') ἄγεται.

(*c*) Mauritius, *Strategicum*, ix. 5 (ed. J. Scheffer, Upsala, 1664, p. 218): τὰ ἔθνη τῶν Σκλάβων καὶ Ἀντων ὁμοδίαιτά τε καὶ ὁμότροπά τέ εἰσι καὶ ἐλεύθερα μηδαμῶς δουλοῦσθαι ἢ ἄρχεσθαι πειθόμενα . . . πολλῶν δὲ ὄντων ῥηγῶν καὶ ἀσυμφόνως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἄποπον τινὰς αὐτῶν μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐγγυτέρω τῶν μεθορίων καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπέρχεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ πρὸς πάντας ἕχθρα ἑνωσιν ἢ μοναρχίαν ποιήσῃ ('. . . It will be well by means of conversations or gifts to win some of them, and especially those nearer the frontiers, to our side, and then fall upon the rest, so that a common hatred may not bring about a union or a monarchical government').

(*d*) Pseudo-Cæsarius of Nazianzus, in his theological tractate dating from the beginning of the 6th cent. A.D. (*PG* xxxviii. 985, dialogue 110, quoted in *Archiv für slav. Philologie*, xxxi. [1909] 579): Σκλαυηνοί . . . ὑπάρχουσιν αὐθάδειες, αὐτόνομοι, ἀνηγεμόνευτοι, συνεχῶς ἀναιροῦντες, συνεσθιόμενοι ἢ συνοδεύοντες, τὸν σφῶν ἡγεμόνα καὶ ἄρχοντα.

(*e*) Constantinus Porphyrogenetus, *de Administrando Imperio*, ed. Bonn, 1840, p. 128: ἄρχοντας δὲ, ὥς φασι, ταῦτα τὰ ἔθνη μὴ ἔχει πλὴν ζουπάνους [*župan*; see below] γέροντας, καθὼς καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ Σκλαβίναι ἔχουσι τόπον.

(*f*) Thietmar of Merseburg, vi. 18 (*MGH*, 'Script.' iii. [1830] 812), writing of the Wilzi: 'his autem omnibus qui communiter Liutici vocantur dominus specialiter non presidet ullus; unanimi consilio ad placitum suimet necessaria discucientes, in rebus efficiendis omnes concordant. Si quis vero ex comprovincialibus in placito contradicit, fustibus verberatur, et si forinsecus palam resistit, aut omnia incendio et continua depredatione perdit, aut in eorum presencia pro qualitate sua pecuniae persolvit quantitatem debitæ.'

(*g*) The *Chronicle of Boguchwal*, ch. i. (A. Bielowski, *Monumenta Poloniæ historica*, Lemberg, 1864–72, ii. 473; quoted by H. Schreuer, *Untersuchungen zur Verfassungsgeschichte der böhmischen Sagenzeit*, Leipzig, 1902, p. 73, note 24): 'Lechitae, qui nullum regem seu principem inter se, tanquam fratres et ab uno patre ortum habentes, habere consueverant, sed tantum duodecim discretiores et locupletiores ex se eligebant, qui quaestiones inter se emergentes diffiniebant et rem publicam gubernabant, nulla tributa seu invita servitia ab aliquo exigentes. Gallorum impetum formidantes quendam virum strenuissimum nomine Crak, cuius mansio protunc circa fluvium Wisiam fuerat, sorte sibi divinitus inter fratres suos Lechitas tributa, in eorum capitaneum seu ducem exercitus, ut verius dicam, nam iuxta Polonicam interpretationem dux exercitus woyewoda appellatur, unanimiter elegerunt. Iste Crak, qui latine Corvus dicitur, victor effectus, per Lechitas est in regem assumptus.'

(*h*) Adam of Bremen, iv. 18: '[the Prussians] nullum inter se dominum pati volunt.'

(*i*) Alfred the Great's tr. of Orosius (see F. Kluge, *Angelsächsisches Lesebuch*[3], Halle, 1902, p. 36): 'þæt Eastland (*i.e.* the Prussian country] is swyþe mycel, and þær biþ swyþe manig burh, and on ælcere byrig biþ cyninge. And þær biþ swyþe mycel hunig and fiscnaþ; and se cyning and þá ricostan men drincaþ myran meolc (mare's milk), an' [illegible] þá þeowan drincaþ medo.'

(*j*) Peter of Dusburg, *Chronica*, iii. 228: 'De latrunculis, qui LXX regulos terre Lethowie occiderunt.'

(*k*) Privilegium of the city of Bartenstein, in C. Hartknoch, *De republica veterum Borussorum* (quoted by O. Hein, 'Altpreussische Wirtschaftsgeschichte bis zur Ordenszeit,' in *ZE* xxii. [1890] 162): 'reges, nobiles et communis populus.'

(*l*) *Scriptores rerum Livonicarum*, Riga, 1846–53, i. 587. Here we read that, in a general rising of the Samlanders for the purpose of demolishing the Memel fortress, there was, first of all, an assembly of the 'wisest' by themselves, whose decision was then to be submitted to the public assembly.

(*m*) The *Olivær Chronicle* (*Scriptores rer. Pruss.*, Leipzig, 1861–74, i. 680; quoted in O. Hein, *op. cit.* p. 155): 'Illo in tempore erat in Warmia una *generatio* ['clan,' 'tribe'] valde potens, quae dicebatur Bogatini, qui simul congregati aedificaverunt Schrando.'

(*n*) The Arabian traveller, Ibn Rustah, writing of the 'Russians' (as regards whom, however, we do not know whether in the writer's day [10th cent.] they were Slavs or Scandinavian Varangians), says: 'When any of the Russians has a matter against another, he takes him to law before the Czar. Here they argue their case with each other; and when the Czar gives his judgment, what he commands is done. But if both parties are dissatisfied with the Czar's judgment, the final arbitrament must, by order of the Czar, be left to the sword' (quoted by L. K. Goetz, *Das russische Recht*, Stuttgart, 1910, i. 191).

2. General development among the Litu-Slavs.—While these fragments of what is at best a very meagre literary tradition show considerable differences in date and place of origin, we shall nevertheless not err very greatly in drawing from them the following general impression of the early conditions of government in Litu-Slavic Europe. We must necessarily take as our starting-point the family union (*a*, *g*, *m*), which formed a local community, and was governed by one (*a*) or more (*g*) of its members. The verb used of this type of rule is Old Slav. *vlasti* (cf. Lith. *wāldyti*, Goth. *waldan*). The rulers themselves are referred to by writers using Greek and Latin as ῥῆγες (*c*) and *reguli* (*j*), and in A.S. as 'kings' (*i*); and within a particular province or district they might be very numerous (*e.g.*, in Lithuania, seventy; cf. *j*). In their own language they are called simply *staroste* (Czech *coz mi starosta dá*; cf. Schreuer, *op. cit.* p. 59, line 49), *i.e.* γέροντες (*e*), 'elders,' and this term is found also in the Prussian district (cf. Hein, *op. cit.* p. 162). Another designation in current use was *župan*, from *zupa*, 'county,' 'district' (ζουπάνους; cf. *e*), as regards which we cannot say whether it is a native Slavic word cognate with Skr. *gópā*, 'oxherd' (lit. 'cattle reservation'), or a loan-word from the Turco-Tatar family of languages (cf. *Archiv für slav. Philologie*, xxxi. [1909] 587, note 3). Besides the ῥῆγες, *reguli*, 'kings' of the Prussian region, who are said to have lived in strongholds and drunk mare's milk—the ordinary man having to be content with mead (*i*)—we hear also of a kind of aristocracy, viz. 'discretiores et locupletiores' (*g*), A.S. 'ricostan men' (*i*), *nobiles* (*k*), the 'wisest' (*l*), who take the place of the 'kings' and are sometimes hardly to be distinguished from them. In times of danger, again, these men of rank choose from among themselves a *voyevoda* (*g*), 'duke.' This term, which means literally 'army-leader' (cf. O. Russ. *voy*, 'army,' *voditi*, 'to lead,' and is already found in the Greek of Constantinus Porphyrogenetus as βοεβόδος, can be

traced in the Old Polish and South Slavic dialects (see below), and may, therefore, be safely regarded as a primitive Slavic word. When such a *voyevoda* had led his forces to victory, he might become a *rex* (*g*). The position of these clans or family chieftains —*voyevode, reguli, staroste*, etc.—in relation to their people was by no means a secure or permanent one. If their rule came to be unsatisfactory to their subjects, they were assassinated at a meal or on the march (*d*). In particular, their authority was everywhere subordinate to that of the tribal assembly (*b, f, l*), the primitive Slavic name for which probably appears in O. Russ. *veče*, Czech *vesce*, Pol. *wiece* (? connected with Skr. *vāc*, Gr. *fētos*, 'discourse'); for the uniform and characteristic feature that manifests itself amid great diversity throughout all Eastern Europe is the democratic type of social order in which, with their intolerance of rule in the proper sense, the Slavs and Litu-Prussians lived (*b, c, d, f, h*). In some cases the affairs to be resolved upon by the popular assembly, where disorder and violence might prevail (*f*), were decided beforehand by the 'wisest' (*l*). We have very little information as to the rights and duties of these chiefs. They had no power to impose 'tributa seu invita servitia' (*g*). The first, in fact, to introduce regular imposts (*obroki*) among the Russians was Oleg (879–912), as we learn from other sources. In time of war, or, at least, in the more important campaigns, the command was assigned to the *voyevoda*, or 'duke.' We learn from Peter of Dusburg that this was also the practice among the Prussians (cf. Hein, *op. cit.* p. 162). The reference to the king among the Russians, as having a power of arbitration, perhaps applies to Scandinavians, and not to Slavs at all (*n*). Among the latter, in fact, the universal practice seems to have been the blood-feud in its most ruthless form (cf. BLOOD-FEUD [Slav.], vol. ii. p. 733 ff.; also Peter of Dusburg, in Hein, *op. cit.* p. 166: 'nulla compositio potest intervenire, nisi prius homicida vel propinqui eius occidantur'). One important duty and prerogative of the clan-chieftain, however, was to decide as to the territory which his people were to occupy—a task which would frequently fall to him in the numerous migrations of the age. Such an assignment is mentioned in the Bohemian legend related by Cosmas:

'Senior, quem alii quasi dominum comitabantur, inter cetera suos sequaces sic affatur, o socii . . . sistite gradum . . . haec est illa terra quam saepe me vobis promisisse memini' (i. 2; cf. Schreuer, *op. cit.* p. 77).

Finally, it should be mentioned that the several clans or family-unions lived in a state of constant mutual warfare, that they were all essentially alike in their social structure, and that they could be most easily subjugated by the policy expressed in the maxim 'divide et impera' (*c*).

We have been thus far unable to point to any fundamental difference between the Slavs and the Litu-Prussians in regard to their forms of government. But there is one remarkable feature, not as yet satisfactorily explained, peculiar to the Litu-Prussians, viz. the existence among them of a chief priest possessing an almost supreme authority. Of this personage Peter of Dusburg writes:

'Fuit autem in medio nationis huius perversae, scilicet in Nadrowia, locus quidam dictus Romow, trahens nomen suum a Roma, in quo habitabat quidam dictus Criwe, quem colebant pro papa, quia sicut dominus papa regit universalem ecclesiam fidelium, ita ad istius nutum seu mandatum non solum gentes praedictae sed et Lethowini et aliae nationes Lyvoniae terrae regebantur. Tantae fuit auctoritatis, quod non solum ipse vel aliquis de sanguine suo verum etiam nuntius cum baculo suo vel alio signo noto transiens terminos infidelium praedictorum *a regibus et nobilibus et communi populo* in magna reverentia haberetur' (*Script. rer. Pruss.* i. 53).

3. Points of resemblance among the Southern Slavs.—Apart from this figure among the Litu-Prussians, the general sketch of the Litu-Slavic mode of government given above holds good to a remarkable extent also of the Southern Slavs, more particularly in Montenegro and Herzegovina, almost to the present day, as we learn from the accounts of F. S. Krauss, *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, Vienna, 1885, pp. 24 ff., 58 ff. etc., and P. A. Rovinsky, 'Geographical and ethnographical Description of Montenegro' (Russ.), in *Collection of the Royal Academy of Sciences*, lxiii. (1897), esp. p. 158 ff. From the modern system of government among the Southern Slavs we may, accordingly, glean a wider and more precise knowledge of the state of matters among the ancient Slavs and Litu-Prussians. In Montenegro and Herzegovina likewise our starting-point must be the conception of the tribe or clan (*pleme*) based upon, or at least regarded as based upon, agnatic kinship, such clan or tribe, again, being subdivided into a number of brotherhoods (*bratstva*) and villages (*sela*). Those who were chosen by their people to stand at the head of these *plemena* are designated in various ways, *e.g.* as 'chiefs' (*glavari*), 'elders' (*stareyšine*), *zupani*, and, most commonly, as 'dukes' (*voyevode*); certain other terms applied to them are clearly borrowed from foreign usage, as, *e.g.*, *guvernadur* (Ital. *governatore*), *sirdar* (from Perso-Turkish; Mod. Pers. *sardār*, Pahl. *sālār*, O. Pers. **sara-dāra*; cf. Mod. Pers. *sar*, Avest. *sarah*—'head'), *knez* (from Teutonic; see below), *ban* (βοάνος in the Greek of Constantinus Porphyrogenetus, from Turk. *bayan*, 'rich'). A number of these titles are applied specially to the heads of the smaller groups.

The position of these chiefs of the *pleme*, if we may take that of the *voyevoda* as generally representative of the others, may be described as follows. The *voyevoda* was, above all, the leader of an army, and would, of course, be chosen for the post as one who had specially distinguished himself in war. His appointment was for life, although he might be deposed if he failed to justify his people's choice —if, *e.g.*, he fell short in heroic qualities or judicial ability. He could bequeath his position to his sons, though not without the consent of the people, who might, if they regarded the nominated son as incapable of leading them, choose instead a nephew or some other relative; the right of succession, in fact, pertained rather to the *bratstvo* to which the former *voyevoda* belonged, or, at least, the *bratstvo* retained the privilege as long as it had power to defend it. From time immemorial certain eminent families had possessed the right, not indeed *de iure*, but *de facto*, of appointing one of their own number to the leadership of the *pleme*. Among the Southern Slavs, accordingly, the families of the *zupani, bani*, and *voyevode* now represent what we should call the oldest nobility. But the main consideration in the choice of a leader was always personal character. The *voyevoda* was at first a herdsman like the rest, and it was only gradually, and mainly as a result of his military achievements, that he attained the position in which at length he controlled all the external and internal affairs of his *pleme*. Various honours were then accorded to him; in particular, he was assigned the place of honour at the top of the table. The present writer is unable to give any information regarding the revenues of the *voyevoda* (as regards the *zupan*, cf. Krauss, *op. cit.* p. 27). It was only the stronger *plemena*, however, that had their own *voyevoda*; the weaker ones put themselves under the power of the stronger.

The power of the *voyevoda* was thus in some cases very great; nevertheless, the real authority was in the hands of the people, who exercised it through their representatives in the public assembly (*sbor, skupština*). Each *pleme*, accordingly, had certain favourite places—a shady grove, a full-flowing spring—at which it held its assembly. The as-

semblies did not meet regularly, but were convened only on occasions of importance, as, *e.g.*, for the purpose of electing a *voyevoda*, of settling a long-standing feud, of adjusting a legal dispute that threatened the public peace, of conducting negotiations with hostile peoples, etc. The several *bratstva*, villages, and families also held assemblies. The separate *plemena* united only in times of great danger, and, as a rule, like the ancient Slavic family-societies already considered, lived in a state of savage warfare with one another.

4. Corresponding general features among the Teutons.—From the Litu-Slavs we turn to the Teutons, not so much, however, with the intention of giving a detailed and complete account of their forms of government—this has frequently been done already (most capably by H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, i.[2], Leipzig, 1906, and R. Schröder, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*[5], do. 1907) —as with a view to showing, in connexion with what has been said above, that the same (or at all events a very similar) mode of government must have once obtained among the Teutons as among the Slavs, and that, moreover, in the earliest historic, partly indeed in pre-historic, times, that mode of government had attained to a more advanced constitutional stage under Western, *i.e.* Celtic, influences.

The most comprehensive political term used by Cæsar and Tacitus in connexion with the Germans is *civitas*, 'a nationality,' 'a State,' Goth. *piuda*, O. Norse *þjóð*, A.S. *þéod*, O.H.G. *diota*, cognate with O. Irish *túath*, 'people,' Oscan *ϝοϝϝο*, '*civitas*,' Umbr. *tota*, '*urbs*,' Lett. *tàuta*, 'community,' 'people,' O. Pruss. *tauto*, 'land,' originally 'the whole' (cf. Lat. *totus*). The name given by the Romans to a subdivision of the *civitas* was *pagus*. The meaning of *pagus*, or at least its original meaning, as applied by Cæsar and Tacitus to the German institution, may be inferred from the primary signification of the Teutonic word which was rendered by the Lat. *pagus*, viz. Goth. *gawi*, O.H.G. *gewi* (Germ. *Gau*), 'canton,' 'shire.' The present writer was the first to suggest the theory (cf. *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 799)—now accepted also by F. Kauffmann (*Deutsche Altertumskunde*, Munich, 1913, i. 79; questioned by Rietschl in J. Hoops, *Reallexikon der germanischen Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1911–13, ii. *s.v.* 'Gau') —that Goth. *gawi* comes from **ga-aw-ya-m*, that it is cognate with Gr. *οἶη*, 'village,' *ὠγή* (=*ὠϝή*), *οὐαί* (=*φυλαί· Κύπριοι*) and thus means 'local union of village septs,' *i.e.* of clans united in villages. These clans are doubtless what Cæsar (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 22) speaks of as 'gentes cognationesque hominum qui una coierint,' and to which their 'magistratus ac principes quantum et quo loco visum est agri attribuunt' (on the assignment of territory by the chieftains of family-societies see above). They are also to be identified with the consanguineous communities which in grave emergencies could send some thousand warriors into the field; the *pagus*, in short, was the 'thousand' (cf. Eng. 'hundred,' as the division of a shire, in which, however, the reference is to families, not soldiers), at the head of which stood the *þūsundi-faps*. The Teutonic *pagi*, which, as we have seen, were, in the Roman period, subdivisions of the *civitas*, must certainly have been relatively independent in earlier times; and, indeed, as late as the war with Arminius, the Cheruscan *pagus* of Inguiomer, the uncle of Arminius, was still in a position to maintain its independence (cf. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, i. 115). Thus all our available data combine to show that the Teutonic *gau*—what the Romans called *pagus*—corresponds generally to the *pleme*, 'tribe,' 'clan,' which, as we saw, existed among the Slavs.

Of the development of kingly rule among Teutons as well as Slavs, accordingly, we are now in a position to form some such general impression as follows. Already in the remote primitive Aryan period, as appears from the linguistic group Goth. *piuda*, Irish *túath*, Osc. *ϝοϝϝο*, etc., noted above, certain clans combined at the call of special circumstances; and, just as among the Slavs such combinations were placed under the leadership of a *voyevoda*, so among the Teutons they were directed by an 'army-leader' (O. Norse *hertogi*, A.S. *heretoga*, O.H.G. *herizogo*) —a fact distinctly attested by early writers; thus Cæsar writes:

'Cum bellum civitas aut illatum defendit aut infert, magistratus, qui ei bello praesint, ut vitae necisque habeant potestatem, deliguntur. In pace nullus communis est magistratus; sed principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuunt' (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 23);

and Bede, speaking of the Saxons, says:

'Non enim habent regem iidem antiqui Saxones, sed satrapas [A.S. *aldorman*, in Beowulf *alder*—precisely like the Slav. *starosta*] plurimos suae genti praepositos, qui ingruente belli articulo mittunt aequaliter sortes, et quemcunque sors ostenderit, hunc tempore belli ducem omnes sequuntur, huic obtemperant; peracto autem bello, rursum aequalis potentiae omnes fiunt satrapae' (*HE* v. 10).

But, while among the Slavs such combinations, formed for a special purpose, soon dissolved again into their component parts (the *plemena*, or clans) when that purpose had been effected, they must, among the Germans, have been of a more incorporate and more permanent kind; and, in point of fact, this important advance towards the formation of a political State (in place of the primitive family, or clan-State, which was longest maintained among the Slavs) must have been the result of influences emanating from Western Europe, *i.e.* from the Celts, as the primitive Teutonic word denoting the domain of the *piuda* (*civitas*), viz. Goth. *reiki*, A.S. *rice*, O.H.G. *rîhhi*, primitive Teut. **rîk-yo-m*, 'realm,' 'kingdom' (Germ. *Reich*), is on indisputable linguistic grounds (cf. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, p. 451) a derivative of the O. Irish *ríge* (**rēg-yo-m*, **rīg-yo-m*), and this, again, is derived from the Celtic term for 'king,' O. Irish *rí*, acc. *rig* (cf. Orgeto-rix, Dumno-rix).

As regards the form of government, the *civitates*, as they were called by the Romans, fell into two classes, viz. those which were governed by a single *rex*, and those which were governed by a number of *principes* from the several *pagi*. The Teut. term for the king of a nationality (i.e. *rex civitatis*) appears in the series Goth. *piudans*, O.N. *þjóðann*, A.S. *þéoden*, all connected with the *piuda* discussed above. The chiefs of the several *pagi* ('clan-rulers,' or whatever we may call them) were, no doubt, originally called 'kings' (O.N. *konungr*, A.S. *cyning*, O.H.G. *chuning*). This word is related to Goth. *kuni*, 'kin,' 'tribe'; it means, however, not, as was formerly supposed, one belonging to a family (*i.e.* a family of rank), but rather something like 'king's son,' 'prince,' being derived, in fact, by the addition of the patronymic suffix *-inga* (cf. Wulfing, Atheling, etc.), from a simple form **kuni-s*, 'king,' which is

'tribe,' O.H.G. *chunni*, 'people,' only as regards gender, the relation of the two being exactly the same as between A.S. *léod* (masc.), '*princeps*,' and *léod* (fem.), '*gens*,' or between Salian Frank. *theod*, '*dominus*,' and O.H.G. *diot*, 'people' (cf. also Goth. *kindins*, 'ἡγεμών,' connected etymologically with Lat. *gens*, *gentis*). The **kunyo-s*, one might say, was the **kunyo-m* personified, and thus, since *kuni*, being etymologically identical with Gr. *γένος*, Lat. *genus*, denotes a tribe formed, or regarded as formed, upon a basis of kinship, the

philological evidence, too, brings us to the result that the *pagus* (the Goth. *gawi*; cf. the 'gentes cognationesque hominum' of Cæsar), which was governed by the *chuning* (*princeps*), must have been a group closely resembling in structure the Slavic *pleme*. Now the more frequently the *chuninga* (*principes pagorum*), by first gaining the leadership in war (the *hertog-* or *voyevoda*-ship), raised himself to the position of the king of a nationality, the more generally would the term *chuning* come to bear the fuller signification of the latter, so that at length the distinction between *piudans* and *chuning* became quite indefinite—the more so, indeed, as the constitutional position of the *reges* [*civitatum*] and the *principes* [*pagorum*] among the Teutons was in principle the same as, and in its main features virtually identical with, what it was among the Slavs and Litu-Prussians. As among the latter peoples, so among the Teutons, the *reges* and *principes* were elected by the people:

'reges ex nobilitate . . . sumunt' (Tac. *Germ.* vii.); 'eliguntur in iisdem conciliis et principes' (*ib.* xii.).

Among the Teutons likewise the kingship was to some extent hereditary—in so far, namely, as in the several States there were *regiæ stirpes*, *i.e.* powerful families of rank, or, as it might be put with reference to the Slavs, powerful *bratstva*, who were able to procure the election of one of themselves (*e.g.*, the son or other relative of the previous *rex* or *princeps*). As among the Slavs, moreover, the tribe, to whom the king or prince owed his election, might also depose, expel, or kill him—*e.g.*, when under his rule it suffered a failure of crops or a disaster in war, or found him acting contrary to its will:

'Apud hos [Burgundios] . . . rex appellatur Hendinos [*i.e.* "the first," connected with Irish *cét*, "primus," O. Gaul. Cintugnâtus; cf. O.H.G. *furisto*, "prince," lit. "the first"], et ritu veteri potestate deposita removetur, si sub eo fortuna titubaverit belli vel segetum copiam negaverit terra' (Amm. Marc. xxviii. v. 14).

Among the Germans, as among the Litu-Slavs, the *rex* or *princeps* had a very limited power in relation to his people:

'Nec regibus infinita aut libera potestas' (Tac. *Germ.* vii.); they were obeyed 'non precario iure parendi' (*ib.* xliv.); 'Verrito et Malorige, qui nationem eam [Frisiorum] regebant, in quantum Germani regnantur' (*Ann.* xiii. 54).

In the royal as in the princely states of both races under discussion, the real power was in the hands of the people, and its organ was the public assembly (Goth. *mapl*, O.N. *mál*, A.S. *mæðel*, O.H.G. *mahal*), in which the *rex* or the *princeps*, or whoever else happened to speak, effected his will, not by the influence of his position, but by the personal prestige which he enjoyed:

'Mox rex vel princeps, prout ætas cuique, prout nobilitas, prout decus bellorum, prout facundia est, audiuntur auctoritate suadendi magis quam iubendi potestate' (Tac. *Germ.* xi.).

Finally, the Teutons seem to have resembled the Slavs in providing no fixed revenues for their *reges* or *principes*; as regards the Germans, at all events, we have the express statement of Tacitus:

'Mos est civitatibus ultro ac viritim conferre principibus vel armentorum vel frugum: quod pro honore acceptum etiam necessitatibus subvenit' (*ib.* xv.).

5. Features peculiar to the Teutons.—There were several points of difference between the Teutons and the Slavs with regard to the position of their rulers. Among the Teutons a very prominent part of the duties that fell to the king or prince was his share in the administration of the law. So far as the *rex* is concerned, this may be inferred from the fact that he could claim a portion of the compensation paid by an offender (cf. Tac. *Germ.* xii., 'pars multae regi'). Of the *principes* Cæsar writes:

'Principes regionum atque pagorum inter suos ius dicunt controversiasque minuunt' (vi. 23);

and Tacitus says:

'Eliguntur in iisdem conciliis et principes, qui iura per pagos vicosque reddunt' (*Germ.* xii.).

With this may be compared what was said regarding the Slavs with reference to the extract (*n*) (p. 728[b]), though it was there observed that what the Arabian writer says of the function of arbitration that belonged to the king (Czar) may not refer to real Slavs at all. It is true that, according to the Chronicle of the year 862, the Slavs, in appealing to the Varangians, use the words: 'Permit us to seek a prince who will rule over us and judge according to law' (*sudilŭ po pravu*); but in the first redaction of the Russian *Pravda* (i. 19) it is still a communal court of twelve members (*starci*, 'elders') that decides legal cases (on these questions cf. L. K. Goetz, *op. cit.* i. *passim*).

Another feature characteristic of the Teutonic kingship, even in primitive times, was its relation to the gods, which is clearly brought out by Tacitus in his description of the German practice of divination:

'Proprium gentis equorum quoque praesagia ac monitus experiri: publice aluntur isdem nemoribus ac lucis, candidi et nullo mortali opere contacti: quos pressos sacro curru sacerdos ac rex vel princeps [N.B. a single prince] civitatis comitantur hinnitusque ac fremitus observant' (*Germ.* x.).

Here, again, the present writer is unable to adduce any clear analogy from the Litu-Slavic world.

Thus, on the whole, we may say that alike on Teutonic and on Slavic soil the position of the king or prince was in a political sense a distinctly weak one, and it is only among the Northern and Eastern Teutons that Tacitus finds a more vigorous grasp of royal power:

'Trans Lygios Gothones regnantur paulo iam adductius quam ceterae Germanorum gentes; nondum tamen supra libertatem. Protinus deinde ab Oceano Rugii et Lemovii; omniumque harum gentium insigne . . . erga reges obsequium' (*Germ.* xliii.). 'Suionum [Swedes] hinc civitates . . . est apud illos et opibus honos; eoque unus imperitat . . .' (*ib.* xliv.).

It is perhaps no mere coincidence that the Celtic term for 'king' survived only in the Eastern Teutonic dialect (Goth. *reiks*, from Irish *rí[g]*), while other derivatives from *rí[g]* denoting 'kingdom' (Goth. *reiki*) and 'powerful' (*reikeis*) are found in all branches of the Teutonic family of languages.

6. General features of the Teutonic development.—We are now in a position to summarize the development of kingly rule among the Teutons. Our first datum here, as among Slavs, Lithuanians, and Prussians, is the existence of agnatic family-groups, which survive in the *pagi* of the Roman writers (Teut. **ga-aw-ya-m*, 'village community of blood-relations,' Goth. *gawi*; and **kunyo-m*, 'family,' 'clan,' Goth. *kuni*). At the head of such a group stood the clan-chieftain, the **kunyo-s* (O.H.G. *chuning*; cf. *kuni-rîchi* above), but the actual seat of communal authority was the public assembly (**maplam*, Goth. *mapl*). From the earliest times these family-groups had combined with one another for common action under a chosen leader (**harituǵēn*, O.H.G. *herizogo*), so forming groups (**peuðâ*, Goth. *piuda*), which, once their object had been attained, were as a rule soon broken up into their component parts. Such temporary combinations, however, tended more and more to follow the Celtic model and to become permanent, even in times of peace, and at length resulted in the political structure which Roman writers call a *civitas*. The domain of a *civitas*, again, was designated **rik-yo-m* (Goth. *reiki*), a Celtic loan-word, while the title of its chief might either be the Celtic term **rîks* (Goth. *reiks*), or the Teut. **peuðana-s* (Goth. *piudans*), or, again, **kunyo-s* (O.H.G. *chuning*), the name applied originally to the head of the family-group. Frequently, however, the *civitas* itself had a plurality of heads; but, whether it had one or more, the real power was vested in the public assembly, and the government was, at least

originally, of an essentially democratic form. Now this Teutonic phase of kingly rule exerted an influence in very early times upon the East of Europe—upon Lithuanians, Prussians, and Slavs. This is shown in the clearest way by the evidence of language. From the Teutonic sphere come the O. Pruss. *riks*, 'kingdom,' *rikaut*, 'to rule,' and *rickaisnan*, 'government,' while a term traceable in all the Slavic tongues—O. Bulg. *kŭnedzĭ*, Russ. *knyazĭ*, Czech *knez*, Pol. *ksiadz*, etc.—was borrowed in primitive times from the Teut. * *kuningas*. These derivatives seem to indicate that among the Litu-Slavs likewise royal authority was here and there being more effectively established, and that there were movements tending to pass away from the old family-State. When the Slavic chroniclers wish to convey the idea of real authority, of actual government in a political State, as contrasted with a mere management of affairs in a district, they have to resort to the borrowed words *knyazenie*, *knyaziti*, in place of the native *vlasti*, *vladeti* (see above, p. 728b). It was as *knyae* that the Scandinavian Varangians were invited by the Slavs:

'Our land,' said the latter, 'is large, good, and blessed with all things, but there is no order in it; come to be *knyae* among us, and to rule over us' (*kŭneziti i vladeti nami*; cf. A. A. Šachmatov, *Story of the Invitation of the Varangians* [Russian], St. Petersburg, 1904, *passim*).

It is to be assumed, though we cannot follow up the subject here, that in an early epoch true *civitates* were formed upon the Teutonic pattern both in the East and in the West of the Slavic area—among Russians, Czechs, and Poles, and doubtless also in Prussia and Lithuania. Among the Southern Slavs, however, the primitive family-State, as was indicated above, survived until the political reconstructions of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is interesting to note that in the early Middle Ages the Slavs adopted a new term for 'king' from the proper name of Charlemagne, who came into hostile contact with them both in the East and in the South. This relatively modern importation appears in O. Slav. *kralĭ*, Russ. *koroli*, Czech *král*, etc. Here, accordingly, we have a phenomenon analogous to what had taken place about a century earlier among the Teutons, who adopted the term *Kaiser* (Goth. *kaisar*, A.S. *cásere*, O.H.G. *keisar*) from the name of the great Cæsar, used as a title of the Emperors of Rome.

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article. There is as yet no special work in which ancient Teutonic and ancient Slavic modes of government are considered in their mutual relations.

O. SCHRADER.

KINGDOM OF GOD.—I. *IN THE OT.*—**1. Introduction.**—Behind the ideal Kingdom of God, which appears in the prophets and psalmists, there had doubtless been, as the author of 1 S 8^7 assumes, the conception that Jahweh was Israel's King. This is found in the ancient song of Balaam (Nu 32^{23}); it is perhaps reflected in the name Malchishua, given to Saul's third son; and the manner in which the term 'King' is applied to Jahweh by the earliest literary prophets (*e.g.*, Is 6^5, Hos 10^3) indicates that it was an old practice. It was not peculiar to Israel; the Ammonites, *e.g.*, called their supreme god Moloch ('King') (1 K 11^7). The Kingship of Jahweh was not thought to be lowered by the rise of an earthly kingship in Israel; at least such a feeling did not long persist. For the worship of Jahweh was manifestly promoted by the centralization of the government under the kings, and the prophets of the 8th and 7th centuries thought of the government of Israel in the great future as vested in kings. If, then, there had ever been a feeling that the adoption of a kingly form of government was equal to the rejection of Jahweh's rule, as the editor of Judges and Samuel supposed (Jg 8^{22}, 1 S 8^7 12^{17}), it must soon have been overcome. The presence of two thrones in Jerusalem, that of Jahweh in the Holy of Holies and that of David, was regarded as normal for Israel. But Jahweh had not been long enthroned on Zion before the earthly kingdom was divided, and the period of decline began which was to end in exile and foreign domination. It was in this period and against this dark background that visions of an ideal kingdom arose in Israel.

2. The data.—Glimpses of the coming Kingdom of God, more or less vivid and detailed, are found from Amos onward, in the Psalms also, and to some extent in the historical writings, even those which deal with the remote past. Of these data none can claim to be much older than the age of the first literary prophets; some may be younger than the book of Daniel; the larger part, however, belongs to the period between Jeremiah and the Maccabees. The section of this long period which seems to have been most fruitful in visions of the ideal Kingdom is that of the Babylonian Exile, and the most barren section the first century after the rebuilding of the Temple (516 B.C.), unless, with some scholars, we assign the last eleven chapters of Isaiah to the period of Ezra-Nehemiah. The three events that occasioned the most clearly defined groups of data regarding the ideal Kingdom were the approach of the Assyrian power (722–701 B.C.), the fall of Jerusalem (586), and, the destruction of the Babylonian kingdom by Cyrus (538). In view of the first of these events, Amos and Hosea, Isaiah and Micah, spoke of a great future beyond the approaching day of evil; in view of the second, Jeremiah wrote; and, in view of the last, a part at least of Is 40–66 was composed. The Psalms which contain general features of an ideal future seem to presuppose such an acquaintance with the nations and with suffering as came to Israel with the Exile, and those Psalms that may concern an individual king of the Davidic line, as 2, 18, 21, 45, 61, 72, 89, and 110, are most easily understood as written after the fall of Jerusalem.

3. Jahweh and the ideal Kingdom.—The invariable and supreme factor in the great future is Jahweh. On this all prophetic writings are at one. Whatever agents assume prominence now and again, it is always Jahweh who is the efficient cause of the new and more perfect age. It is Jahweh who brings back the dispersed of His people (Am $9^{14f.}$, Hos $11^{10f.}$, Is $11^{11f.}$, Mic 2^{12}, Jer 3^{14}, Ezk 11^{17-19} etc.); Jahweh who gives material prosperity in the land of Israel (Hos 14^5, Jer 30^{19}, Ezk 34^{25}, Is 27^{2-6}, Jer 31^4, Ps 69^{35}, Is 66^{12}); Jahweh who makes a new people for His new land, washing away the filth of the daughters of Zion (Is 4^4), making a new covenant with His people (Jer 31^{31-34}), giving them a new heart (Ezk 36^{26}), and putting His spirit upon them for ever (Is 59^{21}); Jahweh who judges the nations (Am 1^2 etc.), brings foreigners to His temple (Is 56^7), and sends blessings on all flesh (Is 2^3 55^5). The ideal future presents itself as a time when Jahweh reigns in Zion over His people (Is 24^{23}, Mic 4^7), and teaches His ways to all nations (Is 25^6). This relation of Jahweh to Israel's ideal future is rooted in Israel's past. It is not something quite new, but a glorification of the old. The Mt. Zion of the ideal future is but the ancient mount made higher (Is 2^2), and the new people are people of a new covenant with Jahweh, more inward than the old (Jer 31^{31-34}). Thus at all points the ideal Kingdom is an idealization of the greatest facts of Israel's past.

4. Davidic rule and the ideal Kingdom.—A common but not constant feature of Israel's ideal future, important but never supreme, is the element of a Davidic rule. Davidic 'rule,' or house, we must say rather than Davidic 'king,' because it is relatively seldom that attention is fixed on a partic-

ular individual, and even in these exceptional cases it may be doubted whether the prophetic vision ever rested on an individual who was thought of as having no successor. Again, Davidic rule is to be preferred to the term 'Messiah,' which, as W. H. Bennett says (*Religion of the Post-Exilic Prophets*, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 348), is 'inconvenient and misleading.'

Davidic rule, it was said above, is a common but not a constant feature of Israel's ideal future. We find it in Amos (unless $9^{11f.}$ be regarded as post-Exilic), Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah, in Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Haggai, and Zechariah, perhaps in Ps 2 and Ps 18, but there is only a shadow of it (Is 55^4) in that section of the OT which is so rich in visions of the future Kingdom (Is 40–66); it is not found in the Minor Prophets (except in those mentioned above), in Is 24–27, or in Daniel. This element of Davidic rule, where found, is of very unequal significance. Thus, *e.g.*, in Hosea it is almost lost in the glory of Jahweh's presence (3^5). In Ezekiel it is obscured by the ideal temple; the Davidic representative is a 'prince,' with princely rather than kingly functions (Ezk 45^7 $46^{2.\ 16}$ etc.). In the Psalter it is represented vaguely at times (Ps 21 and 61 [?]), and again with authority (Ps 110). It stands out most conspicuously in Is $9^{6f.}$ and 11^{1-10}. This fluctuation in the value of the Davidic rule may have been due to changes in the political environment or to individual peculiarities of the various writers. In the prophetic outlook on an ideal future the Davidic house, as has been said, is more commonly mentioned than an individual Davidic king. In Amos and Hosea it is only the line of David that comes into view; in Jeremiah and Ezekiel an individual is indeed mentioned (Jer $23^{5f.}$, Ezk 34^{23}, and possibly a different individual in Ezk 21^{27}), but their common references are to a royal house (Jer 33^{22}, Ezk 37^{25}); in the later visions of the book of Zechariah it is again the Davidic house that is considered ($12^{7.\ 8.\ 10.\ 12.}$ 13^1); in the Psalms both the house and an individual king appear (Ps 45, 72, 2, 110); in 2 S 7^{12-16} the divine promise concerns the royal succession down to the end; in Isaiah and Micah, Haggai and Zechariah (1–8), we confront primarily an individual. In view of the prevailing prophetic usage, in view also of the fact that Jeremiah and Ezekiel speak of an individual king and at the same time of a royal house that is to exist indefinitely, it seems doubtful whether, in the relatively small number of passages which contemplate an individual king, we are to suppose that the author, in any case, thought that this individual was to be without a successor. This would amount to attributing everlasting existence to him, which the texts nowhere seem to warrant. If claimed for Is $9^{6f.}$ and Ps 110, then these passages are not to be reconciled with Jeremiah and Ezekiel, for an individual and a succession of individuals are different conceptions. But Is $9^{6f.}$ may be concerned rather with a quality of government than with its agents. It is hardly possible to hold any other view if Isaiah had the young Hezekiah in mind as the man through whom Jahweh was about to introduce a new era for Israel. As to Ps 110^4 more can hardly be said with confidence than this, that, if there was in the OT the conception of a Davidic king who should reign for ever, this word of the Psalm would seem to confirm it. Alone, it is not sufficient to form a basis for such a doctrine.

It remains to sketch the character and limits of the Davidic rule in the ideal future. This rule is conceived in general as an improved copy of the historic rule of David. The name 'David,' not 'son of David,' is often given to the ideal ruler, as though he were thought of much as a re-incarnation of the heroic king who was a man after God's own heart. Special stress is laid on the ethical character of the ideal ruler and line, and the picture in this respect surpasses all that was ever realized in the founder of the royal house. The spirit of Jahweh rests upon him (Is 11^2); he is beautiful and glorious (Is 4^2); his righteousness is so perfect that it is likened to the righteousness of Jahweh (Jer 23^6); he loves peace, and makes it, not only in Israel but among the nations (Is 9^6 11^{6-9}, Zec $9^{9f.}$, Ps $72^{3.\ 7}$). In the attitude of the ideal house towards the wicked and the Gentiles the language of physical force and a tone of severity are employed. Thus the Davidic ruler slays the wicked with the breath of his mouth (Is 11^{1-10}) or with swords and arrows (Ps 45), and, unless the Gentiles do homage to him, he will dash them in pieces as a potter's vessel (Ps 2). In the time of Isaiah it was thought that the nations would flock to his standard (Is 11^{11}), but in the time of Ps 110 the outlook on the nations is one of judgment. This function of judging is habitually attributed to Jahweh, but the execution of judgment is sometimes given to the king (*e.g.*, Ps 2, 45, 110). Thus the king of the ideal future is an ideal man, and in his rule he is an idealized David. The picture varies with the times, for it reflects what the leading spirits of different generations held most dear in a ruling house. The question of natural or supernatural cannot be raised in connexion with the king or the royal line of the ideal future (Is 7^{14} 9^6, Mic 5^2, historically interpreted, do not transcend natural limits).

5. The material side of the ideal Kingdom.—The ideal future of Israel is invariably bound up with the land which Jahweh gave to the fathers. It is a future on the earth and on the hither side of the grave. With Amos, the shepherd-prophet, the material side of the ideal future is naturally set forth in rural imagery (9^{13}), which is variously enriched by subsequent writers (Is 32^{15} 29^{17}, Jer 31^{12}, Ezk 34^{13-16} 36^{28} 47^{1-12}, Is 30^{25} 51^3, Jl 3^{18}, Zec 14^8). To the material blessings of Israel's ideal future Hosea added a covenant of peace between Jahweh and wild beasts (2^{18})—an image elaborated by Isaiah (11^{6-9}) and the unknown prophet of the Exile (Is 65^{25}). Ezekiel puts extermination in place of the covenant of peace (34^{25}), a circumstance illustrative of the freedom with which the prophets handled the details of the ideal future. With Isaiah, the city-prophet, a glorified Jerusalem comes into the foreground of the vision of an ideal future (4^5 30^{19} 33^{20}). Later prophets dwell on this feature (Jer 33^9 Is $62^{3f.}$ 60^{18} 66^{24}). The inhabitants of this ideal city and land are multiplied until the places are too strait for them (Jer 30^{19}, Ezk $36^{10f.}$ 37^{26}, Zec 10^{10}); they blossom as the lily, and cast forth their roots as Lebanon (Hos $14^{5f.}$); a little one becomes a thousand and a small one a strong nation (Is 60^{22}); no one says, 'I am sick,' and the days of the life of a man are as the life of a tree (Is 33^{24} 65^{22}). Once, indeed, the prophetic language rises to the assertion that death is swallowed up for ever (Is 25^8), which is probably to be regarded as affirming no more than is affirmed in Is 65^{20}, that the child shall die a hundred years old. Very long life shall be the lot of those who inherit the ideal Kingdom.

6. The spiritual side of the ideal Kingdom.—In the prophetic view of the ideal future the spiritual side, though resting on the real past, departs from that past more widely than does the material side. The present paragraph will set forth what is implied in the statement already made, that the supreme factor in the ideal Kingdom is Jahweh. In the first place, the people who are to constitute the community at the beginning of the ideal future are a 'remnant' (Is 4^3 and often). They are the good 'kernels' that Jahweh does not suffer to fall and be lost (Am 9^9), the chosen ones who are left when

Jahweh makes a 'full end' of judgment in the land (Is $10^{22f.}$). Thus the beginning of society in the ideal future was thought of somewhat as the new planting of the race after the Flood. The new stock is not sinless, but it is purified and ennobled. Even Jeremiah thinks of men in the ideal future as needing priestly intervention with offerings and sacrifices, though the covenant with Jahweh is then written on the heart (Jer $33^{18.\ 22}$). With Ezekiel the need of a temple and priesthood is conspicuous (40–48), though he thought of the people as having experienced a profound change (37^{19}).

Nor did Isaiah, while declaring that every one who was left in Zion should be called holy (4^{3}), think of a sinless race of men. Like the post-Exilic Malachi (3^{1-4}), he thought rather of a people who were morally and spiritually quickened and exalted, but yet capable of sin (Is 33^{24}). The hopeful prophet of the Exile, though seeing by faith a city and land in which Jahweh would take delight (Is 62^{5}), a Zion whose children were all to be taught of God (54^{13}), and all righteous (61^{3}), nevertheless believed that this new Zion would have a temple (44^{28}), and seems to admit the existence of sin when he says that the 'sinner' being a hundred years old shall be accursed (65^{20}). Thus, while neither the little company with whom the ideal future society begins nor their descendants are thought of as sinless, their moral and spiritual state is indeed exalted. The prophets are fond of setting this forth in two closely related terms, that of knowing Jahweh and that of intimate association with Him. The new Israel shall address Jahweh as Ishî, 'my husband' (Hos 2^{16}), and Jahweh shall rejoice over His people as a bridegroom over his bride (Is 62^{5}, Zeph 3^{17}). Much more frequently the happy state of the redeemed in the great future is summed up as 'knowing Jahweh.' That is the key to Isaiah's vision of peace (11^{9}), the fruit of Jeremiah's new covenant in the heart (31^{34}), and it is promised to all the children of the tempest-tossed Zion (Is 54^{13}). Of the depth and vital character of this knowledge we have indications in Hosea's sorrowful word, 'My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge' (4^{6}), in Jeremiah's connecting it with the new inward covenant (31^{33-34}), as well as in his thought that the shepherds who shall teach the new Israel will be according to Jahweh's heart (3^{15}), and clearly in the statement of the Exilic prophet that Jahweh Himself will be the teacher (Is 54^{13}). This is a knowledge that permeates the entire man, the will and the heart no less than the understanding. In Ezekiel and certain post-Exilic writings the moral and spiritual state of restored Israel is conceived less profoundly. Ezekiel's New Jerusalem is dominated by ritual. He speaks indeed of a new heart, but it is to be manifested in keeping the old statutes and ordinances ($36^{26f.}$). In Joel and Zechariah the holiness of redeemed Israel seems to be thought of as physical separation from everything that is ceremonially unclean. No stranger shall pass through Jerusalem, no Canaanite come into Jahweh's temple (Jl 3^{17}, Zec 14^{21}).

Such were the prophets' thoughts of the individual member of the ideal Kingdom. Other features of that Kingdom remain to be mentioned. Judah and Israel, which had been separated for three hundred years when Jeremiah wrote, are again to walk together (Jer 3^{18}, Ezk 37^{15-17}). Justice and righteousness are to prevail everywhere, in the wilderness as well as in the fruitful field (Is 32^{15}). Moreover, the new knowledge of Jahweh bears fruit not only in right relations between man and man, but also in great joy and abiding peace. The redeemed shall not sorrow any more (Jer 31^{12}), but shall have a wreath of everlasting joy upon their heads (Is 35^{10}). Jahweh will create Jerusalem a rejoicing and her people a joy (Is 65^{19}). Such statements, since sin and death are still to exist in the ideal future, must be understood in a relative sense; not less so the announcement that a deep, universal, and abiding peace will characterize the new Israel (Is 2^{4} 11^{9} 32^{18} 54^{13}, Zec 9^{10}).

To the spiritual side of the ideal Kingdom belongs its religious relation to the nations. This is variously conceived by different prophets. It is not touched by Amos or Hosea. According to Is $2^{2f.}$ all the nations flow unto Jahweh's house in Jerusalem, apparently by a spontaneous movement. Jahweh's house is exalted so high that they see it and are attracted. They have confidence that Jahweh will teach them, and they come with a purpose to walk in His ways. Since peoples do not readily change their gods, this conception of Isaiah that *all* nations would be drawn to Jahweh's house implies that, in his view, the religion of the new Israel would be far more powerful in the lives of men than religion had ever been in the past. There is no suggestion of missionary work on the part of Israel in the conversion of Egypt (Is 19). Jahweh sends a deliverer to Egypt in a time of crisis, and in consequence Egypt worships Jahweh. Not only so, but the prophet appears to teach that the Assyrians become worshippers of Jahweh through the influence of Egypt. This outlook of Isaiah has no parallel for a century and a half, but in the latter part of the Exile and in the post-Exilic age we hear again of Israel's religious relation to the Gentiles in the ideal future. In Deutero-Isaiah, exclusive of the Songs of the Servant, and in Ps 2 and Ps 72, the religious influence of Israel is associated with the idea of its political dominion, and owes to this fact a certain tone of severity (Is 45^{14} 60^{12}). In one of the late visions attributed to Zechariah (14^{16-19}), the remnants of the nations are to go up to worship Jahweh and to keep the Feast of Tabernacles; if they do not, they are to be punished. Far different is the conception of Jahweh's purpose in Is 25, which may be later than the return from Babylon: Jahweh is to give a great banquet in Zion to all nations, and is there to destroy the 'veil that is spread over all nations.' There is no hint of political subjection to Israel. The nations come into the spiritual light and joy which Jahweh gives.

Still more significant is the conception of Israel's ideal religious service to the Gentiles which is found in the Songs of the Servant. It is not now in Zion, but afar, in their respective homes, that they receive Jahweh's salvation (Is 49^{6}). It is not at a banquet given by Jahweh, but through the efforts of His faithful people, that the nations have the 'veil' removed. It is not here through the largess of the King that the Gentiles are blessed, but through the quiet and patient testimony (Is $42^{2f.}$), through the bitter suffering and martyrdom, of the Servant (Is 52^{13} 53^{12}; cf. 61^{6}). With this profound view of Israel's ideal relation to the spiritual welfare of the Gentiles we may associate the prayer of the psalmist (67), that God would bless Israel *to the end* that His salvation might be made known to all nations, and also those Psalms in which the faithful people seem to be Jahweh's 'anointed,' to serve Him among the Gentiles (Ps $68^{20.\ 24.\ 28.\ 35}$ $22^{27f.}$; cf. 84^{9}). This view of Israel's spiritual relation to the world is the deepest ethical thought of the OT on the subject.

7. Realization of the ideal Kingdom.—To judge intelligently of the prophets' visions, we must, of course, assume the prophets' point of view. When we do this, and look out upon Israel's ideal future, we see that what the prophets anticipated did not come to pass. The great pacific king of Isaiah's vision did not come, nor did the event which was

to have immediately preceded it, that is, the breaking of Assyria's power; the mountain of Jahweh's house was not exalted above the hills, and the nations did not flow unto it; Egypt was not brought to Jahweh; nor did Egypt lead Assyria to worship the God of Israel. The ideal future of which Jeremiah spoke did not dawn after seventy years (29[10]), nor did the Davidic deliverer of Ezk 29[13-21] arise at the close of the forty years' desolation and captivity of Egypt. The hope associated with the return of the exiles whom Cyrus released (Is 41[25] 45[13] 60) was not fulfilled; nor was Zerubbabel the Davidic king who was to bring in the long-expected day (Hag 2[23], Zec 6[12] 4[9]). As with these hopes which contained an element of time, so with the others. The vision of Jahweh's glory in restored Israel and Zion—a city most splendid, a temple surpassing Solomon's, and the Shekinah rendering sun and moon unnecessary—did not find an embodiment when Jahweh brought back the captives; nor did the reign of peace among the nations and peace in Nature begin. The restored people were not multiplied until they overflowed into Gilead and Lebanon, the land was not more fertile nor the hills and mountains more plentifully supplied with water, life was not prolonged so that a child died a hundred years old, nor was prosperity secure from one generation to another. Judah and Israel were not re-united on the return from Babylon; indeed, Israel never returned.

As for the people who came back to Jerusalem, they were not the men of the ideal future of whom Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah had spoken. They were doubtless a chosen remnant in respect of their loyalty to Jahweh and their patriotic devotion to Zion, but the literature that deals with post-Exilic history plainly shows that they were not a people in whom Jeremiah's new covenant was realized, not a people taught of Jahweh in a unique manner and established in righteousness. The one conspicuous event of the prophetic outlook that was accomplished was a return from captivity. This does not appear to have been on a scale commensurate with the prophetic expectation, or to have been carried out with the glory with which it had been depicted; nevertheless it was an event of such surpassing importance for the development of religion in the earth that it justified the promise of those prophets who had sought to kindle Israel's hope and faith by their words of a better future.

Another fact is to be noted in this connexion. The prophets themselves were well aware that prophetic expectations had been disappointed, and yet they did not cease to speak with confidence of God's purposes for Zion. In 734 B.C. Isaiah expected, within a little while, the Davidic prince who, the Assyrian power having been broken, would inaugurate the ideal Kingdom; and then, a generation later, in 702 B.C., though his earlier expectation had not been accomplished, he spoke again, with equal assurance, of the turning back of the invader and the dawn of a new age (Is 30). Sennacherib's army was, indeed, turned back, but the hoped-for age was not therewith inaugurated. A century later, in the new crisis that had arisen with the approach of the Babylonians, the prophet Jeremiah put the new future, which Isaiah had looked for in his own day, beyond an exile of long duration. Deutero-Isaiah foresaw Israel's return in connexion with the overthrow of Babylon as an event of the near future, and associated the ideal Kingdom with that return; and, though this hope was not realized, Zechariah, in those very days, declared that Jahweh had returned to Zion, and that He would gather His dispersed into the midst of Jerusalem and would do good to His people (8). Later, perhaps much later, we hear an unknown prophet foretelling that after the distress which was to befall Jerusalem the new age would dawn, when Jahweh's name would be one in all the earth (Zec 14[9]). Thus the vision of an ideal future which had arisen with Amos and Hosea did not fade into the light of common day, though its realization was again and again vainly though confidently expected. As time passed it underwent modifications more or less important; but the succession of the prophets, undeterred by its failure to become embodied on earth, and hating no jot of heart or hope, looked for its realization in a future not too remote.

This persistence of hope, taken together with the fact of a considerable element of change in the visions of the ideal future, seems to show that the prophets were not greatly concerned with the particular details of their pictures, but were established in certain great principles of Jahweh's character and will. Their thoughts of times and seasons, of agents and methods of fulfilment, of fit material and political accompaniments of the coming ideal State, might vary one from another, and might all be very imperfect or quite wrong; they still held to an ideal perfecting of Jahweh's gracious will in a glorious Kingdom for His chosen people. Whether the vision of the prophets in its essential elements found its fulfilment in Jesus and His work, or is yet to find it there, is a question that lies beyond the limits of this article.

II. *In the NT.*—**1. Introductory note.**—For the study of the Kingdom of God in the NT two points are of fundamental importance: (1) the use of the term by Jesus, and (2) the word 'Church' as used by the early disciples. The present article is limited to the former. In determining the content of the term 'Kingdom of God' in the thought of Jesus, the hope of progress lies in a more careful analysis and valuation of the various sources of His teaching.

The apocalyptic literature, beginning with Dn 7[13, 14], influenced the form rather than the content of Jesus' teaching on 'the Kingdom of God,' or, in particular, on the consummation of that Kingdom. Even this influence is often exaggerated. The *Logia* contain very little that presupposes an influence of apocalyptic literature (as Mt 19[28] 24[26-28, 37-42]), and Mk 13 cannot all be ascribed to Jesus. The thought of the nearness of the Kingdom of God sprang out of Jesus' consciousness of God's presence with Him, and was not at all due to the apocalypses. Moreover, what is most characteristic of Jesus, His supreme emphasis on the ethical-religious life, is hostile to the spirit of much of the apocalyptic literature, for the authors of that literature lived in visions of the consummation.

2. The data.—It is significant that the term 'Kingdom of God' (or 'Kingdom of heaven') occurs in the material which is peculiar to Matthew about three-quarters as many times as in the *Logia*, the oldest Gospel, and the matter peculiar to Luke taken together (*Logia* eight, oldest Gospel eleven, matter peculiar to Luke three, matter peculiar to Matthew seventeen). We infer that it was a favourite term with the editor of the First Gospel—an inference that receives support from the fact that he has sometimes prefixed the term to parables where its use appears to be extremely vague (*e.g.*, Mt 25[1]). If, however, the term was a favourite one with this editor, we should form our judgment regarding the prominence of the conception in the teaching of Jesus, not from his usage, but from the *Logia* and the oldest Gospel. Having regard to these sources, we must say that the term does not seem to have been employed by Jesus with great frequency. The *Logia* may count slightly less than 200 verses, and the words of Jesus in the oldest Gospel a few more

than that, and, as was said above, the former source contains the term in question but eight times and the latter only eleven. The matter peculiar to Luke contains approximately 164 verses which are words of Jesus, and in these the term 'Kingdom of God' occurs but three times, while in Matthew's peculiar material, which contains about 187 verses which are words of Jesus, the term is found seventeen times. Further, it may be noted here that no one is reported to have asked Jesus what He meant by 'Kingdom of God,' and that He never felt called upon to declare in what sense He used the term. His thought on the subject, like His thought on Messiahship, was left by Him to be inferred by those who had seeing eyes and understanding hearts. His handful of disciples occupied Jesus' thought far more than did the 'coming of the Son of man with the clouds of heaven,' and the least detail of their spiritual life was more important in His sight than all the computations of the apocalyptists regarding the day and hour of the 'end,' or how the 'end' was to be ushered in.

3. **Content of the term 'Kingdom of God' as used by Jesus.**—(*a*) *His agreement with the Prophets.*—The word of the oldest Gospel (Mk 1^{15}) that, when Jesus came into Galilee, He preached, saying, 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand,' shows clearly His consciousness of being in the prophetic line, a continuator of the prophetic hope of a divine Kingdom. But, when we hear what He said of the Kingdom at different times, it becomes plain that He was not a continuator of the prophetic hope in its entirety, and that His thought moved in line with what the great prophets had said of the spiritual side of the ideal Kingdom. He said nothing of the restoration of the Davidic throne, and nothing of the glory and riches of Palestine in the day of fulfilment. The only kingship that He contemplated was the Kingship of God (Mt 13^{41} is regarded as unauthentic). That this rule of God was regarded by Him as a teaching of the OT appears, *e.g.*, in the manner in which it is introduced into the model for prayer which He gave His disciples. They are taught to pray 'Thy kingdom come' (Lk 11^{2}), and it is taken for granted that they will understand this term. The petition is, indeed, a petition for the fulfilment of such OT words as Is 24^{23} and Mic 4^{7}.

(*b*) *Personal elements in His usage.*—(1) Jesus' thought of the Kingdom of God is not altogether identical with the spiritual side of that Kingdom as seen by the prophets. It is more inward and personal. Thus we read in the *Logia* that the Kingdom of God is like unto leaven (Lk 13^{21}), and in the oldest Gospel it is compared with the earth which, once the seed is deposited in it, carries forward its development until the corn is full (Mk 4^{26-29}). In both cases the Kingdom is a force working from within. It is self-propagating in the parable of the Leaven, and in that of the Automatic Earth it is a seed that the heart mysteriously germinates and matures. These parables go further than the prophets in their implications regarding the nature of man and his relation to God.

(2) Again, it is peculiar to Jesus, in distinction from the prophets, that He thought of the Kingdom of God as having a lowly beginning. The heart of a child is the most favourable soil for it (Mk 10^{14}). The mustard seed is the fittest symbol of it, both in smallness and in the size of the plant which it produces (Mk 4^{30}).

(3) The usage of Jesus differs from that of the prophets, further, in that He speaks of a Kingdom of God as existing on both sides of the grave, or in two spheres, an earthly and a heavenly. No difference between the earthly and the heavenly Kingdom of God is clearly marked in His words (Mt 6^{10} is probably a Christian expansion of the last clause of Lk 11^{2}). The *Logia* have one saying, possibly two, in which the Kingdom of God is equivalent to heaven (Mt 8^{11} = Lk 13^{28}, Lk 6^{20} = Mt 5^{3}), and the oldest Gospel has one such saying, possibly more (Mk 9^{47}; cf. 10^{14} 10^{23-25} 14^{25}).

(4) Finally, the usage of Jesus differs most widely from that of the prophets in that He thought of the Kingdom as having actually begun with Him and His disciples. In an important sense it was still future, but it was also present. This is clearly implied in a saying of the *Logia*, though it does not contain the term in question. Jesus said to His disciples (Lk $10^{23f.}$), 'Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see: for I say unto you, that many prophets and kings desired to see the things which ye see, and saw them not; and to hear the things which ye hear, and heard them not.' This reference to the OT hope determines the meaning of the words 'what ye see' and 'what ye hear'; it is the fulfilment of the prophetic vision of a better future. Again, in the oldest Gospel there are at least two sayings of Jesus that belong here. He said to His disciples: 'Unto you is given the mystery of the Kingdom of God' (Mk 4^{11}). The 'mystery' was something to be revealed and known, and the disciples were learning it in that very hour. Secondly, to a scribe who answered discreetly, Jesus said: 'Thou art not far from the kingdom of God' (Mk 12^{34}). It would seem a necessary inference from this word that His own disciples were regarded by Him as *in* the Kingdom of God. Quite in accord with this is the saying preserved in Lk $17^{20f.}$, 'The kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say, Lo, here! or, There! for lo, the kingdom of God is within you.' The new age had begun; therefore that of the Law and the prophets had come to an end. On the other hand, it is equally clear in the oldest sources that Jesus looked for the coming of the Kingdom of God in some future day. He taught His disciples to pray for it (Lk 11^{2}), and He assured them that it would come with power within a generation (Mk 9^{1}). The reconciliation of these apparently discrepant views lies in the nature of the Kingdom of God as Jesus conceived of it. Neither view can be ignored by the historical student. Both are contained in the conception of the Kingdom as a seed that develops and matures for the time of harvest (see, further, art. JESUS CHRIST, iii. *B.-C.* **2**, above, pp. 510-513).

LITERATURE.—A. Robertson, *Regnum Dei*, London, 1901; H. B. Sharman, *The Teaching of Jesus about the Future*, Chicago and London, 1909; E. F. Scott, *The Kingdom and the Messiah*, Edinburgh, 1911; J. Moffatt, *The Theology of the Gospels*, London, 1912, pp. 41-84; P. Feine, *Theologie des NT*, Leipzig, 1910, pp. 91-119; P. Volz, *Jüdische Eschatologie von Daniel bis Akiba*, Tübingen, 1903; E. von Dobschütz, *The Eschatology of the Gospels*, London, 1910; H. Weinel, *Biblische Theologie des NT*, Tübingen, 1911.

G. H. GILBERT.

KING'S EVIL.—This is the name given to scrofula, a disease which was supposed to be cured by the touch of the king of England. The same belief was held regarding the king of France. The Lat. *regius morbus* originally denoted jaundice, but, with *coincsevel* (Mid. Dutch) and *le mal le roy* (Old Fr.), was applied to scrofulous affections, and especially glandular swellings of the neck and face (see *OED*, *s.v.*). Doubtless other ailments were at times popularly included in the phrase 'the Evil' or 'the King's Evil.' There was a belief that the seventh son could cure the malady (H. Crooke, *Body of Man*, London, 1615, p. 340). This is sometimes extended to the seventh son of a seventh son, and even to the ninth son of a ninth son. This belief also was common to England and France. The method was by stroking. Fantastic medicines were prescribed for the curing of the Evil, such

as goose dung, viper's flesh, and lion's blood (Gulielmus vanden Bossche, *Historia Medica*, Brussels, 1639, Index, *s.v.* 'Scrophulis remedia').

Edward the Confessor is said to have been the first to cure by touch those suffering from ulcers. William of Malmesbury states that some of these miracles happened in Normandy before he came to the throne (*Gesta Regum*, London, 1840, ii. 222). It is, however, remarkable that Caxton's *Golden Legend*—a 15th cent. unhistorical view of the canonized king—whilst presenting an idyllic picture of England in his day and recording several of his miracles, does not mention any by touch. Shakespeare (*Macbeth*, IV. iii. 146) expresses the view of a later age when he makes Malcolm say:

> 'Tis call'd the evil:
> A most miraculous work in this good king;
> Which often, since my here-remain in England,
> I have seen him do. How he solicits heaven,
> Himself best knows: but strangely-visited people,
> All swoln and ulcerous, pitiful to the eye,
> The mere despair of surgery, he cures;
> Hanging a golden stamp about their necks,
> Put on with holy prayers: and 'tis spoken,
> To the succeeding royalty he leaves
> The healing benediction.'

The touch is not mentioned among the reasons for Edward's canonization in the bull of Alexander III. About 1180 Peter of Blois (*Ep.* 150 [*PL* ccvii. 440]) mentions this kingly power as well known. There is no evidence of the rite under the Norman monarchs, but it appears to have been fairly continuous from Henry II. to Queen Anne.

There is a curious passage in Sir John Fortescue's tract on the title of the House of York that is not mentioned in the recantation which he was forced to make in 1471 as a condition of his restoration. Arguing that a queen regnant is not allowed by the Constitution, he says: 'And sithen the Kinges of England ben enoynted in theyre hands, and by vertue and meane thereof God commonlie healeth sicknes, by putting to and touching the maladie, by thenontinge hands; and also gould and silver handled by them, and so offered on Good Friday have ben the meane and cause of great cures, as it is knowne, and therefore such gold and silver is desired in all the world. Which good things must needs cease for all the time that a woman were so Queene of that land because that a woman may not be enoynted in her hands' (first printed in T. F. Clermont, *Life, Works, and Family History of Sir John Fortescue*, London, 1869, i. 498). In the corresponding Latin of the *Defensio Juris Domus Lancastriæ* the name of the malady is given—*regius morbus* (*ib.* p. 508). Fortescue's doctrine was not accepted either as to the throne or as to the power of healing.

Edward I. gave money as alms, but Henry VII. was the first to bestow the small gold medal, which Shakespeare assigns to the generosity of the Confessor. There are cases in which it was alleged that the Evil had been cured by wearing the touch-piece originally given to another sufferer.

The healings were performed mostly in London (by Charles II. at the Banqueting Hall, Whitehall), but the ceremony was possible wherever the Court might be; and Langley, Newmarket, Chester, Bath, Salisbury, and Oxford are known to have witnessed such functions. Easter, Whitsuntide, and Michaelmas were the usual seasons, and the hot weather was avoided.

The first separate treatise on the King's Evil is *Charisma* (London, 1597), by William Tooker, who declares that Queen Elizabeth cured many thousands. In 1602 William Clowes, a famous surgeon of his day, published *A right frutefull and profitable treatise for the artificial cure of the malady called in Latin Struma, and in English the Evill cured by kinges and queenes of England.* He professed firm belief in the healing power. Thomas Fuller, who when young had seen James I. touch in Salisbury Cathedral, also professes unwavering faith.

'If any doubt of the truth thereof, they may be remitted to their own eyes for further confirmation.' He further asks: 'Shall we be so narrow-hearted as not to conceive it possible that Christian men, the noblest of corporeal creatures, kings, the most eminent of all Christian men, kings of Britain, the first-fruits of all Christian kings; should receive the peculiar privilege and sanative power, whereof daily instances are presented unto us?' (*Church History*, ed. J. S. Brewer, Oxford, 1845, i. 387-390).

As the finances of Charles I. contracted, he substituted silver for gold in the touch-pieces, and many received only the imposition of the royal hands. The monarch regarding whose healings we have the fullest information was Charles II., who touched 90,798 persons. Evelyn, in his *Diary*, ed. W. Bray, London, 1890 (6th July 1660), gives a detailed account of one, and also notes that on 28th March 1684 there was so great a concourse of people, with their children, that six or seven were killed in the crush at the office where the tickets had to be obtained. Each applicant had to bring a certificate from the clergyman of his parish, and signatures of the churchwardens also were required by a proclamation issued in 1683. The parishes were expected to keep a register of the certificates they issued. At the public healings the king sat in his chair uncovered and surrounded by members of his court. One of the chaplains read the Gospel from Mk 16, and at the latter part of v.[18], 'they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover,' the chief surgeon brought up the sick persons in order. The words from v.[18] were repeated for each person. The king stroked the face or neck, where the disease was evident, with both hands, and a second surgeon then took charge of the patient. The reading from Mark was finished after all the patients had been touched; and a second Gospel from the first chapter of John was commenced. At v.[8] the surgeons presented each patient a second time. The Clerk of the Closet, kneeling, presented to the king the gold medal on a white silk ribbon, which he then placed round the neck of the patient as the chaplain read v.[9]; the Gospel was continued to v.[14], and followed by prayers. At the close the Lord Chamberlain and two other noblemen brought linen, basin, and ewer for the king to wash his hands, and with this the ceremony ended. Such was the procedure under Charles II. The office for the healing appears to have been drawn up in the time of Henry VII. in Latin, and was in part a modification of the blessing for sore eyes, and the exorcism against evil spirits. This was sometimes modified. Elizabeth used the sign of the cross, which was omitted by her successors, but restored by James II., by whose authority the office was printed in English in 1686. It was reprinted along with the *Office for consecrating cramp rings* from a MS belonging to Dr. A. C. Ducarel, by F. G. Waldron (*Literary Miscellany*, 1789). The final modification was in the reign of Queen Anne, and was included in the Prayer Book, incorporating that of 1724, although George I. never performed the ceremony—a fact duly noted by his disaffected Jacobite subjects. The forms used by James II. and Queen Anne are given in the third and fourth editions of Hamon L'Estrange's *Alliances of Divine Offices* (1699, 1846). Occasionally there were private healings, when the ceremonial was less elaborate.

Patients were occasionally sent from various parts of the country at the partial cost of the places to which they belonged. In 1682 the Corporation of Preston paid 10s. for a bricklayer's son to go to London 'in order to the procuring of His Majesty's touch.' In 1687 5s. each was paid for two girls to be sent to Chester, where James II. then was (J. Harland and T. T. Wilkinson, *Lancashire Folklore*, London, 1867, p. 77). Similar payments from Ecclesfield, York, and Kirkham have been printed (W. Andrews, *The Doctor*, London, 1895, p. 19; H. Fishwick, *History of the Parish of Kirkham*, London, 1874, pp. 98, 106).

The Stuart pretenders as well as the Stuart kings claimed the healing power, and one of the charges

in the trial of the Duke of Monmouth was that he had touched children for the Evil. The last recorded instance of the rite occurred in the Jacobite rising of 1745, when Prince Charles Edward touched a scrofulous child at Holyrood Palace. 'Touch-pieces' were struck for James III. and Henry IX., *i.e.* the Old Pretender and Cardinal York. Thomas Carte, in the first volume of his *History of England* (London, 1747), in arguing that the healing power of the kings was not due to anointing, recited the case of Christopher Lovel, who went abroad to be touched by 'the eldest lineal descendant of a race of kings' who had not been crowned or anointed. This obvious reference to the Old Pretender led to a controversy, and the Corporation of London withdrew their subscription from the *History* (see J. Nichols, *Literary Anecdotes of the 18th Century*, London, 1812–15, ii. 495, where many details are given).

The power of healing the King's Evil was also claimed by the kings of France, and was said to have been given to Clovis at his anointment. Another account states that Philip I. was the first to touch, and that he was deprived of the power on account of his dissolute life. The ritual was settled by St. Louis. After coronation at Rheims, the king went on a pilgrimage to the shrine of St. Marcoul, who died in 658, and who was so successful in curing scrofula that it was called St. Marcoul's Evil after him. The sick were ranged in the church, or, when the number was too large, in the cloisters or in the park, where they were touched by the king and received a gift from the Grand Almoner. Healings are recorded by Charles VII. (1422), Louis XI. (1461), and Charles VIII. (1483). Cardinal Wolsey was present in 1527 when Francis I. touched 200 people. When Henry IV. was crowned at Chartres in 1594, as many as 1500 were present at a healing. His physician Laurentius asserts that 50 per cent were cured within a few days after being touched. Peter Lowe (*Discourse of the Whole Art of Chyrurgerie*[2], London, 1612) mentions the touch as used in France:

'The diseased first is viewed by the Chyrurgions, who findes it to be the kirnells or King's Evil, then the diseased is set on his knees, and presented to the king, who maketh a crosse on his forehead with his hand, saying: *Le roy te touche, Dieu te guerrie*, which is to say, the King doth touch thee, God make thee whole' (J. Finlayson, *Account of the Life and Works of Maister Peter Lowe*, 1889, p. 8).

Louis XIV. is said to have touched 2600 persons two days after his coronation, and 1600 on the Easter Sunday of 1686. Every French patient received 15 sous, every foreigner 30 sous. When Louis XV. was crowned, the shrine of St. Marcoul was brought to Rheims, and over 2000 persons were touched. The custom continued until 1776, and the authorized programme of the coronation of Charles X. included the healing ceremonial.

R. J. Dunglison (*History of Medicine*, Philadelphia, 1872, p. 209) asserts that the healing touch was not restricted to the kings of England and France; 'it appears to have been not unfrequently employed in Scandinavia.' He conjectures that it arose from Druidic practices—a theory for which there appears to be no evidence. The kings of Hungary were credited with the power of curing jaundice, to which the name of *morbus regius* was formerly also applied. The *Salutators* in Spain and the Netherlands claimed to cure sores by the touch, white linen, and prayers; but their efforts were prohibited. Valentine Greatrakes, an Irish gentleman, in 1662 conceived the idea that he could cure the King's Evil, and from that time until 1666 'stroked' a great number of people for scrofula, ague, rheumatism, and other diseases, with varying success. He accompanied his operations by prayer.

It may be noticed that in all these cures, whether by kings, seventh sons, or healers, the common feature is that of stroking with the hands. That many patients were apparently benefited by the touch need not be doubted. The change of air involved in a journey to the Royal Court, religious solemnity, the expectant attention, even the belief in the touch-piece as an amulet, would all tend to help the natural curative process. The history of the royal healing suggests that it is a fragmentary survival from a time when priesthood and kingship sometimes centred in the same person, and when, as disease was regarded mainly as demonic possession and medicine as exorcism and magic, the priest had often to exercise the function of the physician. It is noteworthy that in England the healings were most numerous in the reign of Charles II., when the 'patriarchal theory' of the origin of monarchy was held by the Royalists in an extreme form. But the materials at command are scarcely sufficient to warrant any broad generalization.

LITERATURE.—Most of the historical references are given in an art. 'On the Cure of Scrofulous Diseases attributed to the Royal Touch' by **Edward Law Hussey**, *Archæol. Journal*, x. [1853] 187 ff. (with engravings of touch-pieces). See, further, **William Tooker**, *Charisma*, London, 1597; **William Clowes**, *Treatise on Struma*, do. 1602; **John Browne**, *Charisma Basilicon*, do. 1684; **William Becket**, *Inquiry into Antiquity and Efficacy of Touching for the King's Evil*, do. 1722; **John Douglas**, *Criterion*, do. 1754; **Thomas Joseph Pettigrew**, *Superstitions connected with Medicine and Surgery*, do. 1844 (with engravings of touch-pieces); *Cérémonies et prières du sacre des rois de France*, Paris, 1825; **Hamon L'Estrange**, *Alliances of Divine Offices* (Oxford ed., 1846); **N. Menin**, *Traité hist. et chronolog. du sacre et couronnement des rois et des reines de France*, Paris, 1723; **William Andrews**, *The Doctor in History, Literature, and Folklore*, London, 1895; **J. G. Frazer**, *Hist. of the Kingship*, do. 1905, p. 126 f., and *The Magic Art*, do. 1911, i. 368–371.

WILLIAM E. A. AXON.

KISMET.—Kismet is an Arabic word, meaning 'lot,' 'distribution,' 'fate.' It is not found in the Qur'ān in this philosophical sense, the idea of fate being there expressed by comparison with a bird: 'Every man's augury (lit. bird) have we fastened on his neck' (xvii. 14); 'your augury (bird) is in God's hands' (xxvii. 48). Zamakhsharī interprets thus: 'The source of good and evil is in God; and this is your destiny (*ḳadar*) or your fate (*ḳismet*). If God wishes, He gives you; if He wishes, He denies you.' In Qur'ān xxxvi. 18 we read: 'Your augury (bird) is with you,' *i.e.* 'Your evil destiny accompanies you.' The origin of this comparison is unknown.

The idea expressed by the word *ḳismet* relates to events of the earthly life; it is the share of good luck or of accidents, of fortune or of misery, which falls to each. The term is not used in a theological sense like the words *ḳaḍā* and *ḳadar*, which refer to man's good or bad deeds and to his destiny in the hereafter (see art. FATE [Muslim]).

The belief that each one's fate is settled beforehand by God, and that, whatever one may do, one can scarcely modify it, is popular in Muslim countries, and is often to be found in Muslim literature, especially among the poets and story-tellers. In the rich collection entitled *Al-Mustaṭraf* (Fr. tr. by G. Rat, Paris, 1899) there are several chapters on fate and destiny, on fortune and its vicissitudes.

A man said one day to the philosopher Buzurgmihr: 'I have seen an ignorant person enjoying the favours of heaven, and a wise man being excluded from them; hence I have understood that man has not in his hands the disposition of his fate' (*al-Mustaṭraf*, i. 711). A poet has written: 'I know very well that it is only God who can be helpful or hurtful' (*ib.* 713).

Sa'dī, in his *Būstān* (tr. C. Barbier de Meynard, Paris, 1880, ch. v.), groups several anecdotes in which he explains the idea of fate and the duty of resignation.

'Happiness,' he says, 'is a gift of the divine justice' (it would be more exact to say 'of the divine arbitrariness,' adding, however, that man has never the right to regard this arbitrariness as unjust). A clever archer can usually pierce an iron target with his arrow, but, when fate deserts him, he cannot

even make a hole in a piece of felt or silk. A poor man loses a penny and searches for it in vain; an indifferent passer-by comes along and finds the penny immediately. 'What is the use then,' concludes the poet, 'of struggling against the force of destiny?'

The following quatrain is from Abū Sa'īd or from Khayyām:

'If your situation is good, it is not the result of your clever measures; neither is it your fault if it is unhappy. . . . Live resigned and content, since the good and evil of this world do not depend upon you' (Hoceyne-Azad, *La Roserais du savoir*, Paris, 1906, tr., p. 303).

In the story entitled 'The Story of the Sheik with the generous Palm,' in the *Thousand and One Nights*, a rich man twice gives a purse to a poor rope-maker to help him to free himself from his poverty; but scarcely has he received it than he loses it. Some one then gives him a worthless piece of lead, and this lead becomes the source of his fortune (tr. J. C. Mardrus, Paris, 1899–1904, xiv. 64 ff.; R. Burton, *Supplemental Nights*, London, n.d., iv. 341–365).

This doctrine of chance, which conduces to idleness and indifference, is one of the causes which hinder the progress of Muslim peoples in matters of economics. It is, however, only a popular belief, and is not accepted in theology, as has already been indicated in the art. FATE (Muslim).

LITERATURE.—This is given in the article.

B. CARRA DE VAUX.

KISSING.—Kissing is a universal expression (in the social life of the higher civilizations) of the feelings of affection, love (sexual, parental, and filial), and veneration. In its general use it is more or less symbolic, but in maternal and in sexual love it has an essential value of its own as a focus of physical emotion, which it not only expresses but stimulates.

1. General description.—A refinement of general bodily contact (the instinct to which is irreducible), kissing supplies a case, in the higher levels of physiological psychology, of the meeting and interaction of the two complementary primal impulses, hunger and love. It is remarkable that, though the act in its civilized form is very rare among the lower and semi-civilized races, it is fully established as instinctive in the higher societies. This is a case of an acquired character or of some corresponding process. Equally remarkable is the fact that a line can be drawn between the higher civilizations; thus, the kiss seems to have been unknown to ancient Egypt; in early Greece and Assyria it was firmly established, and probably its development in India was as early as the 'Aryan' age.

Touch is 'the mother of the senses,' and the kiss may be referred generally to a tactile basis, as a specialized form of contact. Animal life provides numerous analogies; the billing of birds, the cataglottism of pigeons, and the antennal play of some insects are typical cases. Among the higher animals, such as the bear and the dog, there is a development which seems to lead up to those forms of the act most prevalent among the lower races of man and also characteristic of the peoples of Eastern Asia. Far more similar, however, to the civilized human kiss and the non-olfactory forms of the savage kiss is the habit attested for cats of pressing or squeezing one another's nose.[1]

2. Forms of the kiss.—The lower types are incorrectly grouped by travellers under the term 'rubbing noses,' and various forms are often confused. The olfactory form occasionally includes mutual contact with the nose, as among the Maoris, Society and Sandwich Islanders, the Tongans, the Eskimos, and most of the Malayan races. The rubbing of noses, often styled 'the Malay kiss,' is described by Darwin thus: the giver of the kiss places his nose at right angles on the nose of the other, and then rubs it; the process occupies no longer time than a handshake among Europeans. Cook and others describe the South Sea Islands form as a vigorous mutual rubbing with the end of the nose, omitting the olfactory element.[1] Elsewhere, as among the Australians, general contact of the face occurs—'face-rubbing.'[2] In many lower races mothers lick their infants. But the typical primitive kiss is contact of nose and cheek; the Khyoungtha, for instance, apply mouth and nose to the cheek, and then inhale.[3] Among the Chinese, Yakuts, and various Mongolian peoples, and even the Lapps of Europe, this method is characteristic, and is thus described by d'Enjoy: the nose is pressed on the cheek, a nasal inspiration follows, during which the eyelids are lowered; lastly, there is a smacking of the lips. The three phases are clearly distinguished.[4] It is remarkable that this Eastern Asiatic method, typically primitive, should be retained by Chinese civilization. The Japanese have no word for kiss, and the act is known only between mother and child.

The European kiss consists essentially in the application of the lips to some part of the face, head, or body, or to the lips of the other person. Normally there is no olfactory element, and any tactile use of the nose is absolutely unknown. It is thus a distinct species, and to describe it as having been evolved from the savage form is erroneous. As a 'racial' habit, it distinguishes the European peoples, and their cultural or racial ancestry, the Teutons, the Græco-Romans, and the Semites, but it appears to have been unknown to the Celts.

As for its physiological derivation, we have excluded certain elements. Nyrop refers it to taste and smell; Tylor describes it as a 'salute by tasting,' d'Enjoy as 'a bite and a suction.'[5] Each of these definitions is untenable. Though popular metaphor inevitably speaks of taste, and even eating and drinking, there is nothing gustatory in the kiss.[6] Such suction as may be ascribed to it is merely the mechanical closing of the lips,[7] as in speaking and eating. This may be described as a refinement of biting, but it would be misleading. Similarly in abnormal forms some use of the tongue occurs. But no connexion with the bite can be maintained, except in the sense to be explained below. It is true that playful biting with the teeth is practised by savage mothers, and among various peoples by passionate lovers, but there is no derivative connexion between this and the kiss proper. The suggestion has been made that the kiss is practically a mode of speech. Emphasis is here laid on the weak or loud sound which often accompanies the 'sucking movement' (*sic*) of the muscles of the lips; this 'inspiratory bilabial sound' is compared to the lip-click of many barbarous languages.[8] The suggestion does not go far; the element of truth is the fact that the kiss,

[1] H. Gaidoz, quoted by C. Nyrop, *The Kiss and its History*, p. 180.

[1] E. B. Tylor, art. 'Salutations' in *EBr*[11] xxiv. 94; H. Ling Roth, 'On Salutations' in *JAI* xix. [1890] 166; G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 179; C. Nyrop, p. 180.

[2] E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, Melbourne, 1886, iii. 176.

[3] T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, London, 1870, p. 118.

[4] H. Ellis, *Sexual Selection in Man*, p. 220, quoting d'Enjoy.

[5] Ellis, p. 66; Nyrop, p. 185. As regards smell, the incident of Isaac proves no connexion.

[6] W. W. Skeat, *Etym. Dict.*, London, 1898, *s.v.*, traces the word to a Teutonic base, connected with Latin *gustus*, Gothic *kustus* = 'test,' and 'kiss' is a doublet of 'choice.' This is, however, very doubtful. The word may be connected with the Lat. (loan-word?) *basium*, 'kiss' (cf. A. Walde, *Lat. etymolog. Wörterb.*[2], Heidelberg, 1910, p. 84 f.), and is frequently compared with Gr. *κυνέω* (for **κυ-νε-σω*, cf. aor. *ἔκυσσα*), 'kiss' (so most recently P. Persson, *Beitr. zur indogerm. Wortforschung*, Upsala, 1912, p. 260, note 2), appearing with a different 'root-extensor' in Goth. *kukjan*, 'kiss.' O. Irish and Welsh have no Celtic word for 'kiss'; *póc* and *póg* are borrowed forms of Lat. *pax*.

[7] The *OED* defines kissing thus: 'to press or touch with the lips (at the same time compressing and then separating them).'

[8] Nyrop, p. 6.

like language, is a refinement of the nutritive processes of the mouth.

The kiss is a special case of tactile sensory pleasure. In it the lips (whose skin is the very sensitive variety between the ordinary cuticle and the mucous membrane) are alone concerned. The movement made is the initial movement of the process of eating. There is, no doubt, a true psychological nexus between affection and hunger, which is no less truly expressed in the mechanism of the kiss. The act is a secondary habit of the lips, just as speech is a secondary habit of the whole oral mechanism. The intimate connexion between the development of language and the masticatory processes of man has been drawn out by E. J. Payne.[1] The kiss, therefore, is not to be referred to the bite, or even to gustation, much less to mastication, suction, or olfactory processes. The primary movement of the lips is simply transferred to a metaphorical use, so to say, and their sensitiveness is applied to a secondary object, whose stimulus is not hunger, but the analogous emotions of love, affection, and veneration.

Lombroso has argued that the kiss of lovers is derived from the maternal kiss.[2] It is true that the latter is sometimes found among peoples who do not practise the former. The Japanese, for instance, are ignorant of the kiss, except as applied by a mother to her infant.[3] In Africa and other uncivilized regions it is a common observation of travellers that husbands and wives, and lovers, do not kiss. But all mothers seem to caress and fondle their babes. Winwood Reade has described the horror shown by a young African girl when he kissed her in the European fashion.[4] The argument, however, of Lombroso is of the same order as that which derives sexual love from maternal, and in neither case can there be any derivation, precisely because the subject during adolescence comes into a new physical and psychological environment, which itself is sufficient to explain a new reaction.

Some variation in the kiss proper (which we identify with the European) may here be noted. The kiss of North American Indian women is described as consisting in laying the lips softly on the cheek, no sound or motion being made.[5] This would not come under the Chinese criticism of the European kiss as being 'voracious.'[6] When Australian or negro women are mentioned as employing the kiss,[7] we may assume that it is of the olfactory variety. The former people (recently argued to be relatively high in the scale of human development) have one branch, the North Queensland tribes, where the kiss is well developed. It is used between mother and child, and husband and wife. In contrast with many early languages, the Pitta-Pitta dialect has a word for kissing.[8] As for distinctions in the civilized Western kiss, that of the ancient Romans still applies, though modern languages do not employ three terms for the three forms. In Latin, *osculum* was the kiss on the face or cheeks, as used between friends; *basium* was the kiss of affection, made with and on the lips; *suavium* (or *savium*) was the kiss between the lips, confined to lovers alone. The modern French retain, and other continental peoples (to some extent the English also) follow them, the distinction between the kiss on the cheek and the kiss on the mouth, the latter being reserved for lovers. Both in social custom and in literature the erotic symbolism of the lovers' kiss has assumed a remarkable importance among the French, who regard a kiss on the mouth, except in cases of love, as a real social sin.

It is interesting to note that Græco-Roman, Hebrew, and early Christian civilization have combined to form the modern European habit.

3. Social history.—Though kissing is said to be unknown in any form among the Japanese, prior to European influence, among the Indians of Guiana, the ancient Celtic peoples, and the ancient Egyptians, each statement is probably too dogmatic. The general conclusion is that the habit in some form or another has been prevalent since primitive times, and has received its chief development in Western culture.

Among the Greeks and Latins, parents kissed their children, lovers and married persons kissed one another, and so did friends of the same or different sexes.[1] The kiss was used in various ceremonial and religious acts. Very similar was the Hebrew practice,[2] with the exception that kissing between persons of different sex was discountenanced, though a male cousin might kiss a female cousin. The Rabbis advised that all such kisses should be avoided, as leading to lewdness, and restricted the kiss to greeting, farewell, and respect.[3] In Semitic life also there was more use of the ceremonial kiss than among the Greeks and Romans.

The early Christian habit of promiscuous kissing as a symbol of fellowship was an application of pagan social practice, and there are grounds for supposing that it offended the Hebrew element as it certainly shocked the Jewish Church.[4] This is St. Peter's 'kiss of love'; and St. Paul frequently writes: 'Salute one another with an holy kiss.' It possessed a sacramental value.

'The primitive usage was for the "holy kiss" to be given promiscuously, without any restriction as to sexes or ranks, among those who were all one in Christ Jesus.'[5]

Later, owing to scandals, or rather to such feeling as Tertullian mentions,[6] the practice was limited, and it was ordered that men of the laity should salute men, and women women, separately.[7]

The classical practice, rendered slightly more free by the early Christian extension, prevailed throughout the Middle Ages, with the curious detail that English women had more liberty than continental in kissing male friends. Erasmus in a famous passage describes the freedom possessed in this matter by English girls.[8] In Catholic ritual the kiss dwindled to more or less of a survival. In court ceremonial it persisted with other details of etiquette; and the same was the case with certain ecclesiastical and legal formalities. Knights after being dubbed, persons elected to office, and brides on marriage were kissed.[9] After the Renaissance a change appeared in England, and kissing became more and more restricted to parental and sexual relations. Thus, W. Congreve, at the end of the 17th cent., writes:

'In the country, where great lubberly brothers slabber and kiss one another when they meet; . . . 'Tis not the fashion here.'[10]

At the same time the practice of kissing between friends of different sex, other than lovers and relatives by birth or marriage, fell out of use. It had done so in France a century earlier, and the restriction was copied by English society.[11] In-

[1] *History of the New World called America*, ii. (Oxford, 1890) 144.
[2] Quoted by Ellis, p. 216.
[3] Lafcadio Hearn, *Out of the East*, London, 1895, p. 103.
[4] *Savage Africa*, London, 1863, p. 193.
[5] Ling Roth, p. 170. [6] Ellis, p. 221.
[7] Curr, i. 343; W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among N.-W.-Central Queensland Aborigines*, Brisbane, 1897, p. 184.
[8] W. E. Roth, *loc. cit.*

[1] Tylor, *loc. cit.*; Ellis, p. 7. Under the early Empire the practice assumed remarkable forms in social intercourse; it was fashionable, for instance, to perfume the mouth.
[2] A. Grieve, 'Kiss' in *HDB* iii. 5.
[3] J. Jacobs, 'Kiss and Kissing' in *JE* vii. 516; Nyrop, p. 90.
[4] T. K. Cheyne, 'Salutations' in *EBi* iv. 4254.
[5] E. Venables, 'Kiss' in *DCA* ii. 902.
[6] *Ad Uxor.* ii. 4 (a pagan husband was reluctant that his Christian wife should greet one of the brethren with a kiss).
[7] *Apost. Const.* ii. 57, viii. 11.
[8] F. M. Nichols, *Epistles of Erasmus*, London, 1901, p. 203 f.
[9] Nyrop, p. 163 f. [10] *Way of the World*, Act iii.
[11] Ellis, p. 7.

creasing moral refinement, or perhaps the increase of restrictions necessitated by an extension of individualism, may be assigned as a cause.

In modern social life the kiss is confined to lovers, members of the family, and women-friends. Between fathers and sons, and between brothers it does not survive adolescence. In continental countries it still persists, especially in France, between male friends, and this fashion is preserved between sovereigns. The courtly use of kissing a lady's hand as a mark of respect came from the court life of Renaissance times. It is obsolete in common life, but clings to the etiquette of great personages. As already stated, the distinction is carefully preserved among continental peoples between the kiss of affection and the kiss of affianced love.

4. Social and religious usages.—(1) In the etiquette, natural or artificial, of salutation, the kiss is a central point, where the relations involve tenderness or veneration, or where these emotions are supposed. Its importance is illustrated by various facts of language. The 'embrace' and the 'salute' are synonymous with it. Where the act is obsolete, language preserves its memory. The Spaniard says 'I kiss your hands'; the Austrian describes an ordinary salutation by the phrase *Küss d' Hand*.[1]

According to Rabbi Akiba, the Medes kissed the hand only.[2] Odysseus, on his return, was kissed by his friends on the head, hands, and shoulders.[3] In Greece generally inferiors kissed the hand, breast, or knees of superiors.[4] In Persia equals in rank kissed each other on the mouth, and those slightly unequal on the cheek, while one much inferior in rank prostrated himself.[5] Esau 'fell on the neck' of Jacob and kissed him.[6] Among the Hebrews the cheek, forehead, beard, hands, and feet were kissed; some deny the practice of kissing on the lips. The phrase in the Song of Songs does not prove its existence, but there is no *a priori* reason against it in the case of the lover's kiss.[7] The customary kiss in modern Palestine is thus described:

'Each in turn places his head, face downwards, upon the other's left shoulder ["falling on the neck"], and afterwards kisses him upon the right cheek, and then reverses the action, by placing his head similarly upon the other's right shoulder, and kissing him upon the left cheek. . . . A man will place his right hand on his friend's left shoulder, and kiss his right cheek, and then lay his left hand on his right shoulder, and kiss his left cheek.' This is a second form. A third consists in the following process—the giver of the kiss lays his right hand under the head of his friend and supports it while he kisses it.[8] The last appears to be referred to in Joab's assassination of Amasa.[9] It has been suggested that, when Absalom to gain popularity kissed the people, he employed the second form.[10]

Equals saluted one another on the cheek or head; so Samuel saluted Saul. Inferiors kissed the hands of superiors. If, in the betrayal of Jesus, Judas kissed his Master on the face, it was an act of presumption.[11] The fact that the kiss was passed over without remark seems to show that it was, as it should have been from disciple to master, a kiss on the hand. The Prodigal Son would kiss his father's hands before being embraced and kissed.[12] Inferiors also kissed the feet (the woman 'who was a sinner,' and would-be borrowers),[13] or, again, the 'hem of the garment.' Vassals, in the Assyrian inscriptions, show submission by kissing the monarch's feet. Similar homage may be assigned to the phrase of Ps 2[12], 'kiss the Son.' As an act of piety, the Pharisees practised kissing the feet, as did the pious generally.[1] The humiliation of the symbolic act of Christ in kissing the disciples' feet has been preserved till recent times by some religious orders, and even by European monarchs. The foot of the pope is kissed in ceremonial audiences. By the year A.D. 847 it was said to be an ancient usage. There are grounds for supposing it to be derived from a usage in the Emperor-worship of Rome.[2] Prostration is an instinctive expression of fear, awe, or adoration; to clasp the knees, as was the custom with Greek suppliants, is equally instinctive. The act of kissing the feet is a refinement of these. The OT phrase 'licking the dust' is doubtfully referred to the kiss upon the feet. In ancient India it was a familiar salutation of respect.[3] The feudalistic aspect of the little court held by the old Roman *patronus* is illustrated by Martial's epigram, which complains of the burdensome civility of the kisses of clients.[4] In the court ceremonial of mediæval and modern Europe, the kiss on the cheek obtains between sovereigns; subjects kiss the sovereign's hand. In mediæval Europe the vassal thus saluted the lord, while it was not unusual to kiss a bishop's hand.[5] In modern Europe a kiss conveying blessing or reverence is usually on the forehead. 'In Morocco equals salute each other by joining their hands with a quick motion, separating them immediately, and kissing each his own hand.'[6] The Turk kisses his own hand, and then places it on his forehead. The Arab kisses his hand to the storm.[7] Such is the gesture of adoration to sun and moon referred to in the OT, and also used by the Greeks to the sun.[8] It was the Greek and Roman method of adoration. In explanation of the gesture, Oriental folklore agrees with European in identifying life or soul with the breath. More exactly, the thrown kiss is a symbolical act, transferring to an object at a distance merely the essence of the kiss.

The kiss in its legal aspect is a natural application of the ideas which produced hand-shaking and similar modes of contact. Mediæval knights kissed, as modern boxers shake hands, before the encounter. Reconciled foes kiss as a sign of peace.[9] It was specially in connexion with marriage that the kiss, *osculum*, *oscle*, was prominent. *Osculum* was a synonym generally for *pactum*; *osculata pax* was a peace confirmed by a kiss; *osclare* meant 'dotare'; and *osculum intervenions* was a term applied to gifts between engaged persons. If one of them died before marriage, the presents were returned should no kiss have been given at the betrothal.[10] It is significant that the kiss was symbolical of marriage as 'initium consummationis nuptiarum.' In old French and mediæval law generally the term *oscle* was applied to the principle that a married woman kissing or being kissed by another man than her husband was guilty of adultery.[11]

(2) Besides the permanent objects of the kiss, in family and analogous relations, the relations of superior and inferior, lord and vassal, sovereign and subject, there are many others which, with more or less permanence, have claimed the kiss as a religious service. It is very significant of the affectionate element in religion that the kiss should have played so large a part in its ritual. The meeting-point between the social and the religious

1 Tylor, *loc. cit.* 2 *Ber.* 8*b*. 3 *Odyssey*, xxi. 224.
4 Tylor, *loc. cit.* 5 Herod. i. 134. 6 Gn 33[4]; see 45[14].
7 Cheyne denies the kiss on the mouth in Gn 41[40], Pr 24[26] (*loc. cit.*).
8 J. Neil, *Kissing*, p. 37.
9 2 S 20[9]. 10 Neil, *loc. cit.*
11 G. M. Mackie, 'Kiss' in *DCG* i. 935; Cheyne, *loc. cit.*; Lk 22[47f.].
12 Lk 15[20]. 13 Lk 7[45], Sir 29[6].

1 *Baba bathra*, 10*a*; Jer. *Kid.* i. 61*c*.
2 H. Thurston, 'Kiss' in *CE* viii. 665 (said to have been instituted by Diocletian).
3 *SBE* ii. [1897] 190. 4 Martial, xii. 59.
5 J. Bingham, *Ant. of the Chr. Church*, London, 1843-45, i. 128 f.
6 Westermarck, *MI* ii. 151.
7 C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, Cambridge, 1888, ii. 67.
8 Job 31[26-28]; Lucian, *de Salt.* 17.
9 Nyrop, p. 107 f. 10 Bingham, vii. 321 f.
11 C. Dufresne du Cange, *Glossarium*, Paris, 1733-36, *s.v.* 'Osculum,' vi. 72 ff.

aspect of the kiss is perhaps to be found in the application of the salute to saints and religious heroes. Thus, Joseph kissed Jacob, and his disciples kissed Paul.[1] Joseph kissed his dead father, and the custom is retained in our civilization of imprinting a farewell kiss on dead relatives. To suggest, however, that the act of Joseph proves the worship of Jacob as a divine being is against psychology.[2] All that can be said is that so fine a human sentiment is on the border-line between social and religious feeling. In mediæval Europe there was a similar feeling about the kiss of state. This is shown by the instances of Henry II. and St. Thomas of Canterbury, and of Richard I. and St. Hugh.[3] Similarly in social life generally; it is said that among the Welsh the kiss was used only on special occasions, and a husband could put away his wife for kissing another man, however innocently.[4] The early Christians exploited the social value of the kiss. Though in strong contrast to the Welsh custom, this is equally sacramental. It has been argued that the ritualistic 'kiss of peace' alone obtained among the Christians, and that the social salute was not practised. But the evidence is strong enough to prove the latter custom.[5] For St. Ambrose this was 'pietatis et caritatis pignus.'[6] The custom involved a peculiar sentiment, if we consider it in connexion with the Christian ideal and practice of love, in which passion was encouraged, though chastity was enforced (see art. CHASTITY [Christian]).

In the early Church the baptized were kissed by the celebrant and the congregation after the ceremony.[7] Roman Catholic ritual still includes the kiss bestowed on the newly ordained by the bishop. The bishop on consecration and the king when crowned received the kiss.[8] The kiss bestowed on penitents after absolution was connected with the kiss received by the Prodigal Son. The practice of giving a farewell kiss to the dead is probably connected with the old Italian rite of receiving the soul of the dying in his last breath. In the 6th cent. the Council of Auxerre (A.D. 578) prohibited the kissing of the dead.[9] Penitents were enjoined to kiss sacred objects.[10]

5. The kiss of peace.—First mentioned in the 2nd cent. by Justin,[11] the kiss of peace was one of the most distinctive elements in the Christian ritual. To Clement of Alexandria it was a 'mystery.'[12] The εἰρήνη was a preliminary rite in the primitive mass. Conybeare has suggested that it was derived from an institution of the synagogue.[13] Philo speaks of a 'kiss of harmony' like that between the elements; the Word of God brings hostile things together in concord and the kiss of love.[14] However that may be, the *pax* became a feature of both Western and Eastern ritual, more conspicuously in the former. St. Cyril writes:

'This kiss is the sign that our souls are united, and that we banish all remembrance of injury.'[15]

This kiss seems to have been given at the beginning of the offertory, between the washing of hands and the *sursum corda*. But, later, the kiss was in close connexion with the Communion. It has therefore been conjectured that the *pax* was twice given.[16] In the modern Roman ritual it is given only at High Mass, and rarely to any of the congregation. The celebrant kisses the corporal, and presents his left cheek to the deacon, with the formula *pax tecum*, answered by *et cum spiritu tuo*. The deacon conveys the kiss to the subdeacon, and he to the other clergy. In the Greek liturgy the celebrant says, 'Peace be to all,' and kisses the gifts, while the deacon kisses his own stole.[1] On Easter Sunday in the same church the congregation kiss one another.[2]

The fact that the Christians of the time of the younger Pliny were called upon, when arrested, to 'adore' the effigy of the Emperor was sufficient to emphasize the ritual importance of the kiss. *Adoratio* ('the act of carrying to the mouth'), the Roman form of homage and worship, consisted in raising the right hand to the lips, kissing it, and then waving it in the direction of the adored object,[3] after which the worshipper turned his body to the right.[4] During the ceremony the head was covered, except when Saturn or Hercules was adored. Plutarch suggests fantastic reasons for exceptional uses in which the worshipper turned from right to left.[5]

But both Greeks and Romans employed the kiss direct in worship. Cicero observes that the lips and beard of the statue of Heracles at Agrigentum were almost worn away by the kisses of the devout.[6] The kiss indirect, or the kiss at a distance, may be described as a natural extension of the direct, capable of development by any people independently. But it is a curious fact that it can be traced from Græco-Roman civilization to that of modern Europe, where, however, it appears to be instinctive in children.

The adoration of the Roman Emperors was influenced by Oriental ceremonial. It consisted in bowing or kneeling, touching the robe, and putting the hand to the lips, or kissing the robe; a variation was the kissing of the feet or knees.[7] It does not seem to have become the fashion before Diocletian.

The kiss of homage in the Middle Ages was so important a part of the ceremony that *osculum* became a synonym for *homagium*.[8] The vassal kissed the lord's feet (rarely his thigh).[9] Afterwards he offered a present for the privilege, a *baise-main*, a term which shows the connexion or confusion with the equally prevalent fashion of kissing the hand of the sovereign. It is said that Rolf the Ganger, the first Duke of Normandy, when receiving the province as a fief from Charles the Simple, kissed the monarch's feet by lifting them to his mouth as he stood erect.[10] When homage was paid in the lord's absence, the vassal kissed the door, lock, or bolt of his castle; this was *baiser l'huis* or *le verrouil*.[11] Mediæval charters make pretence of kissing the king's feet.

6. Death by kissing.—Rabbinical lore includes a unique fancy, explanatory of the death of the righteous. According to this, the death of a favourite of God is the result of a kiss from God (*bi-n'shîḳāh*). Such a death was the easiest of all modes, and was reserved for the most pious. Thus died Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Aaron, Moses, and Miriam.[12] There is a legend that, as St. Monica lay dying, a child kissed her on the breast, and the saint at once passed away. Italian folklore preserves the Hebrew idea in one of its phrases for death: 'addormentarsi nel bacio del Signore.'[13]

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[1] Gn 50[1], Ac 20[37].
[2] Jacobs, *loc. cit.*
[3] Thurston, *loc. cit.*
[4] Ellis, p. 217.
[5] See Thurston, *loc. cit.*
[6] *Hexaem.* vi. ix. 68.
[7] Cyprian, *ad Fid. Epp.* lxiv. (lvIII.) 4. Similarly in lower stages of culture, a girl after 'initiation' is kissed by her female kin (*JAI* xx. 118).
[8] Thurston, *loc. cit.*
[9] *Ib.*
[10] Du Cange, *s.v.* 'Adoratio horarum,' i. 89.
[11] *Apol.* i. 65.
[12] Among the terms used are εἰρήνη, *pax*, *osculum pacis*, *osculum sanctum*, φίλημα ἅγιον, φίλημα ἀγάπης; the last three, together with ἀσπασμός, *salutatio*, show its general identity with the Christian social kiss.
[13] *Exp*, 4th ser., ix. [1894] 461.
[14] Thurston, *loc. cit.*
[15] *Catech.* xxiii. 3.
[16] Thurston, *loc. cit.*

[1] Thurston, *loc. cit.*
[2] Nyrop, p. 106.
[3] Apuleius, *Metam.* iv. 28.
[4] Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 25; *CIG* 5980.
[5] *Numa*, 14.
[6] *In Verrem actio secunda*, iv. xliii. 94.
[7] W. Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities*, *s.v.* 'Adoratio.'
[8] Du Cange, *s.v.* 'Osculum.'
[9] Nyrop, p. 124.
[10] Nyrop, p. 122 f.
[11] *Ib.* 125.
[12] Jacobs, *loc. cit.*; *Ber.* 8*a*; *Baba bathra*, 17*a*; *Deut. R.* xi.
[13] Nyrop, p. 96; 'to fall asleep in the Lord's kiss.' The kiss of a ghost (in other folklore) produces death (*ib.* 171).

7. Kissing sacred objects.—Kissing the image of a god was a recognized rite of adoration among both Greeks and Romans. The early Arabs had the same rite. On leaving and entering the house they kissed the house-gods.[1] In the Eleusinian Mysteries the sacred objects were kissed.[2] The toe of St. Peter's statue is kissed by Roman Catholics. The Muslim kissed the Ka'ba at Mecca. In the wall there is a black stone believed by Muslims to be one of the stones of paradise. It was once white, but has been blackened by the kisses of sinful but believing lips.[3] The Hebrews often lapsed into the idolatrous practice; Hosea speaks of 'kissing calves'; the image of Baal was kissed.[4] Together with kneeling (*q.v.*), the kiss comprises belief and homage. The Hebrews kissed the floor of the Temple,[5] and to this day, in the Hebrew ritual, it is the practice to kiss the *ṣiṣith* of the *ṭallith* when putting it on, the *mᵉzūzāh* at the door when entering or leaving, and the Scroll of the Law when about to read or to bless it.[6] It is even customary among Jews, though not obligatory, when a Hebrew book is dropped, to kiss it. *Kissing the Book* is a case, surviving (as a real living ceremony) in the highest civilization, of primitive conceptions of the oath. These were expressed in various forms.[7]

> One method of 'charging an oath with supernatural energy is to touch, or to establish some kind of contact with, a holy object on the occasion when the oath is taken.'[8]

The view of Westermarck, that *mana* or *baraka* is thus imparted to the oath, is further developed when the name of a supernatural being is introduced; thus the modern English ceremony retains the words, 'So help me God.' A complementary aspect is supplied by forms whose object is to prevent perjury.

> The Angami Nāgas 'place the barrel of a gun, or a spear, between their teeth, signifying by this ceremony that, if they do not act up to their agreement, they are prepared to fall by either of the two weapons.'[9] In Tibetan law-courts 'the great oath' is taken 'by the person placing a holy scripture on his head, and sitting on the reeking hide of an ox and eating a part of the ox's heart.'[10] 'Hindus swear on a copy of the Sanskrit *haribans* [*Harivaṁśa*].'[11]

The European ceremony of kissing the book of the New Testament after taking the oath in a law-court connects in its material form rather with the kiss of reverence, as instanced in the kissing of relics and sacred objects generally. But in essence there is still some of the primitive sense of responsibility by contact, rendered stronger by the invocation of the name of the deity. Derived indirectly from the Græco-Roman ritual kissing of sacred objects and the Hebrew reverence for the Scroll of the Law, it was early developed by the Christians into their characteristic ceremony of oath-taking. Chrysostom writes:

> 'But do thou, if nothing else, at least reverence the very book thou holdest out to be sworn by, open the gospel thou takest in thy hands to administer the oath, and, hearing what Christ therein saith of oaths, tremble and desist.'[12]

Ingeltrude is represented repeating the words:

> 'These four Evangelists of Christ our God which I hold in my own hands and kiss with my mouth.'[13]

In the former quotation the act of kissing can only be inferred from the word 'reverence.' The holding of the book is less definite than the Hebrew rite of placing the hands on the scroll when swearing. Even in the Middle Ages an oath was often taken merely by laying the hand on the Missal.[1] The Lombards swore lesser oaths by consecrated weapons, the greater on the Gospels, but it is not certain whether they kissed the book.[2] An oath ratified by contact with a sacred object was a 'corporal oath'; the object was the *halidome*, the equivalent of the Greek ὅρκος, oath and object being identified. No doubt contact by means of the lips was at an early date regarded as more efficacious than contact by means of the hand, and thus the more primitive notion was superimposed upon that of adoration. In Islām the rite is that usual in adoration and does not include the kiss.[3] In modern England a detail to be noted is that the hand holding the book must be ungloved. The book varies according to the creed; a Jew is sworn on the OT; a Roman Catholic on the Douai Testament. The term book,' employed with special reference to the oath upon the NT, has been regular in England since the 14th cent. at least.[4]

Among Anglican clergy it is customary to kiss the cross of the stole before putting it on. The Catholic Church enjoins the duty of kissing relics, the Gospels, the Cross, consecrated candles and palms, the hands of the clergy, and the vestments and utensils of the liturgy. It was formerly part of the Western use that the celebrant should kiss the host. He now kisses the corporal. The altar is regarded as typical of Christ, and as such is kissed by the celebrant.[5] In the Greek Church relics are kissed.

The 'kiss of peace' was in mediæval times the subject of a curious simplification of ritual, by which it became, as it were, a material object. In the 12th or 13th cent., for reasons of convenience, the *instrumentum pacis*, or *osculatorium*, was introduced.[6] This was a plaque of metal, ivory, or wood, carved with various designs, and fitted with a handle. It was brought to the altar for the celebrant to kiss, and then to each of the congregation at the rails. This is the pax-board or pax-brede of the museums.[7]

8. Metaphor and myth.—The metaphorical applications of the idea of the kiss are not numerous. In some phrases it expresses a light touch. Generally it implies close contact or absolute reconciliation or acquiescence;[8] to kiss the dust is to be overthrown; to kiss the rod is to submit to chastisement;[9] to kiss the cup is to drink. Philostratus inspired Ben Jonson's image of the loved one leaving a kiss in the cup.[10] A 'butterfly kiss' is a light one.

Folklore developed in interesting ways the connexion between the emotional gesture and the ideas of magic and charms. Relics were kissed to regain health. Conversely, the kiss of a sacred person, a specialized form of his touch, cures the leper, as in the case of St. Martin.[11] Some similar association of thought may attach to the nursery practice of 'kissing the place to make it well'; gamesters used to kiss the cards in order to secure luck with them; an Alpine peasant kisses his hand before receiving a present. Pages in the French Court kissed any article which they were given to carry.[12] A famous instance of symbolism is the kiss bestowed by Brutus on his mother-earth—an application of the kiss of greeting. But in German

1 J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentumes*, Berlin, 1887, p. 105.
2 C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, p. 135.
3 *SBE* vi. (1900) p. xlii. 4 Hos 13², 1 K 19¹⁸.
5 *Suk.* 53*a*. 6 Jacobs, *loc. cit.*
7 See *MI* ii. 118 ff. 8 *Ib.* 119.
9 *Ib.*, quoting J. Butler, *Travels and Adventures in Assam*, London, 1855, p. 154.
10 L. A. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 560, note 7.
11 *MI* ii. 120.
12 *Ad pop. Antiochenum homil.* xv. 5 (*PG* xlix. 160).
13 Du Cange, *s.v.* 'Juramentum,' iv. 451.

1 Nyrop, p. 119. 2 Du Cange, *s.v.* 'Juramentum.'
3 The right hand is placed on the Qur'ān, and the head is brought down touching the book.
4 *OED*, *s.v.* 'Book,' quoting document of 1389: 'Eche of hem had sworen on pe bok.'
5 Thurston, *loc. cit.* 6 Nyrop, p. 120.
7 Thurston, *loc. cit.* 8 Cf. Ps. 85¹⁰.
9 Similarly in slang, to kiss the stocks, the clink, the counter; to kiss the hare's foot = be late.
10 Derived from the Greek and Roman method of drinking a health.
11 Nyrop, pp. 121, 90. 12 *Ib.* 108, 136 ff.

folklore to kiss the ground is a synonym for to die.[1] The privilege in English folk-custom known as 'kissing under the mistletoe' is a Christmas festal practice connected by Frazer with the licence of the Saturnalia. It may have originated independently as an expression of festivity. Greek, Latin, and Teutonic mythology employed the motive of unbinding a spell by a kiss—*le fier baiser* of Arthurian romances, which changes a dragon into the maiden who had been enchanted.[2] The Sleeping Beauty awakened by the kiss of the lover is a widely-distributed motive. An analogy, without actual derivation, is to be found in many primitive cases of cancelling a tabu. Thus in Australian ceremony bodily contact, analogous to the kiss, in various forms, removes the tabu between two persons, such as the celebrant and the subject of a rite. An analogy may be seen between Teutonic and early Christian ritual in the connexion drawn out by Grimm between minne-drinking and the kiss. He finds this both in sorcery and in sacrificial rites.[3] Closely parallel to the magical power of the kiss in breaking tabu and restoring to consciousness is the myth-motive in which a kiss produces both forgetfulness and remembrance. This capacity is evidently based on human experience, and is significant in connexion with the practice of the kiss in religion. It brings to one focus the kiss of love and the kiss of adoration. In the psychology of adolescence the kiss produces a forgetfulness of old conditions and awakens the subject to a new life. The kiss appears to have no symbol in art. European children and adolescents express it in writing by a cross, perhaps merely an accidental choice. The Slavic Jews style an insincere kiss as a 'kiss with dots.' Some Rabbis explain that Esau's kiss was insincere (Gn 33[4]), and every letter of the word נשקו is dotted by the Massoretes.[4]

LITERATURE.—E. B. Tylor, 'Salutations' in *EBr*[11]; H. Ling Roth, in *JAI* xix. [1890]; H. Thurston, in *CE*, *s.v.*; J. Jacobs, in *JE*, *s.v.*; H. Havelock Ellis, 'The Origins of the Kiss' in *Sexual Selection in Man*, Philadelphia, 1905; C. Lombroso, in *Nouvelle Revue*, xxi. [1897]; C. Nyrop, *The Kiss and its History*, tr. W. F. Harvey, London, 1901; J. Neil, *Kissing: its Curious Bible Mentions*, London, 1885; E. W. Hopkins, 'The Sniff-kiss in ancient India,' *JAOS* xxviii. [1907] 120-134. For an elaborate schematization of the love-kiss in India see R. Schmidt, *Beitr. zur ind. Erotik*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 453-477.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

KISTNA (Skr. *Kṛṣṇa*, 'the dark one').—One of the great rivers of S. India, which, like the Godāvarī (*q.v.*) and Kāverī, to which it is inferior in sanctity, flows nearly across the entire peninsula from W. to E. It rises in the Mahābaleśwar plateau of the W. Ghāṭs, only 40 miles from the Arabian Sea.

At its source is an ancient temple of Śiva, inside which the infant stream pours out of a stone formed in the shape of a cow's mouth (*gaumukhi*). This place, known as Kṛṣṇabāi, 'the lady Kṛṣṇa,' is a favourite resort of pilgrims. Fifteen miles down stream is the old Buddhist town of Wāī, one of the most sacred places in its course, with a group of cave-temples and several later Hindu shrines (*BG* xix. [1885] 610 ff.). Farther on it passes close by the town of Sātāra, Karād, or Karhād, at the junction with the Koyna and Māhulī, where it is joined by the Yennā. In the Bijāpur District, Sangam, at its junction with the Mahāprabhā, possesses a temple of some sanctity, dedicated to Śiva under the title of Saṅgameśvara, 'lord of the sacred meeting of the waters,' the site of an annual religious fair. Thence passing through the dominions of the Nizām of Haidarābād, it reaches the Bay of Bengal in the British Kistna District. Here Bezwāda contains some rock-caves of the Buddhist period and a few ancient Hindu temples.

LITERATURE.—*BG* xix. [1885] 13 *f.*, 472, 516, 610, xxi. [1884] 10, xxiii. [1884] 7, 675, xxiv. [1886] 8 *f.* For the Bezwāda caves, J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, p. 95 ff.; S. H. Bilgrami and C. Willmott, *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of the Nizam's Dominions*, Bombay, 1883, i. 11 *f.*

W. CROOKE.

KIZIL BASH.—Kizil Bash, 'Red Heads,' is the name by which are denoted the members of a sect distributed throughout the whole of Asia Minor. They call themselves 'Alevis; their nickname, which in Persia and Afghanistan was and is given to other peoples also, originates doubtless from the colour of their head-dress. Their total number is estimated at more than a million; they form an important section of the population of the vilayets of Sivas (about 305,000), Erzerum (107,000), Angora, and Mamurete ul-Aziz (Kharput), and in certain districts constitute even the majority. Their language is Turkish or Kurdish. Though reckoned officially as Musalmān Sunnites, in reality they are not such; they practise Islāmism only in a formal way to avoid persecution. When they think they are in safety, they do not attend the mosques, read the Qur'ān, say the prayers, or perform the Muhammadan ablutions. Except in the presence of a Sunnite, their women are not veiled. They drink wine, they do not observe Ramadān, and some of them do not practise circumcision or shave the head and other parts of the body as the Turks do. Moreover, they cherish a profound aversion to the Turks, and regard them as unclean; when they are obliged to entertain them, they even go so far as to pollute the dishes with which they serve them. On the other hand, they show great goodwill in their villages towards the Christians. They have secret beliefs and practices which they reveal only with extreme reluctance, and no one has hitherto been able to penetrate, except very imperfectly, the mystery with which they are surrounded.

Their sect, like some Christian Churches, has a hierarchical organization. They have priests called *dédéhs*, whose dignity is hereditary from father to son, and who are the necessary intermediaries between God and the rest of the community. This sacerdotal caste is subject to a species of bishops. These themselves render obedience to two patriarchs, who are regarded as descendants of 'Alī, and who are invested with a sacrosanct authority. One of these is the Shaikh of Khubyār (about 34 miles to the N.W. of Sivas), a popular place of pilgrimage. It is certain that the Kizil Bash possess a sacred book, probably liturgic in character, but as yet no part of it has been made public.

Three superimposed stratifications in the religion of the Kizil Bash may be distinguished.

(1) There is an old *pagan foundation* going back to the ancient Anatolian beliefs, tinged with Persian Mazdæism, which were practised in the country before its conversion to Christianity. The Kizil Bash regard certain heights or certain rocks as sacred, *e.g.* near Kara Hissar (Taylor, *Journal Royal Geogr. Society*, xxxviii. [1868] 297), and on holidays they sacrifice sheep and fowls on these summits. The trees which grow there—usually pines—are surrounded with superstitious regard, and no one is allowed to carry an axe near them (cf. F. and E. Cumont, *Voyage dans le Pont*, Brussels, 1906, p. 172 ff.). The Kizil Bash, like the ancient Mazdæans, worship streams and especially springs. They also venerate fire; when they build a house, they light a fire with great ceremony, and this must be kept burning as long as the house remains standing. The place of honour is near the hearth, and to spit there is sacrilege. A fire-

[1] Nyrop, p. 130.
[2] *Ib.* 94.
[3] J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882-88, p. 1102.
[4] Jacobs, *loc. cit.*

altar hewn out in the rock is still the object of devotion at Manasgerd (C. Wilson, *Handbook of Asia Minor*, London, 1895, p. 250). They worship the sun at its rising and setting, and a day in which it does not appear is for them a day of mourning. They also worship the moon.

Everybody in the East accuses the Kizil Bash of giving themselves up to orgies in their nocturnal ceremonies (cf. below), when, the lights out, each man has commerce with a woman taken by chance. That is why the Turks call them, in derision, *terah sonderan*, 'extinguishers of the light.' It is difficult to know what degree of truth there is in this imputation. But it is remarkable that the same promiscuity was, during their feast of 1st January, laid to the reproach of the Paulicians in the 9th cent., who were distributed throughout the same regions as the Kizil Bash of to-day (Manichæan formula of abjuration, in *PG* i. 1469: *μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἑσπερινὴν μέθην ἀτοσβεννύουσι τὰ φῶτα, σαρκικῶς τε ἀλλήλοις ἐνασελγαίνουσι, καὶ μεδεμιᾶς ὅλως φειδομένοις φύσεως ἢ συγγενίας ἢ ἡλικίας*). It is possible that those supposed acts of debauchery may be an inheritance from the sacred prostitution of the worship of Mā and Anaïtis. This would also be true of the custom, if it were well attested, of offering a young girl every year to the *dédéhs*, whose son, they say, if one is born, becomes a priest, or whose daughter must remain a virgin and set herself apart for the cult (C^te^ de Cholet, *Arménie, Kurdistan et Mésopotamie*, Paris, 1892, p. 96).

(2) The influence of *Christianity* is evident both in the beliefs and in the rites of the sect. The Kizil Bash teach that God is One in Three Persons, and that the principal incarnation of God, before 'Alī, is Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world, who intercedes with God for humanity. They are devoted to Mary, who is, they believe, the Mother of God, and who conceived without ceasing to be a virgin. At the same time, they acknowledge the existence of five powers, lower than the Trinity, mediators between the Supreme Being and man, analogous to the *yatîm* of the Nosairis, a kind of archangels which are perhaps derived from the Iranian Amesha Spentas (*q.v.*). Moreover, they assume the existence of twelve ministers of God, who correspond to the twelve apostles and the twelve *naqîbs* of the Nosairis. Unlike the Yezidis, they offer no worship to Satan, whom they regard as the irreconcilable adversary of God. Like the Nosairis, they believe that at the end of the ages the spirit of evil will come to fight a final battle against the last incarnation of Jesus. Mazdæan dualism is here combined with Christian ideas.

The Kizil Bash have a ceremony which they celebrate by night on certain holidays—the 10th of the month of Muharram was mentioned to the present writer—and also at irregular intervals, when a *dédéh* visits their villages.

'Accompanying himself with a musical instrument, the priest who officiates sings prayers in honour of 'Alī, Jesus, Moses, and David. . . . The priest has a willow cane which suggests the *barsom* [*q.v.*] of the Avesta. He dips it in water while he says the prayers. The water thus consecrated is afterwards distributed throughout the houses. In the course of the ceremony those who take part make public confession of their sins, after the manner of the early Christians. The priest prescribes various penances, frequently in the form of a fine, in money or in kind. Then they put out the lights and engage in lamentations over the faults of which they have been guilty. When the lights are re-kindled, the priest pronounces the absolution; then he takes some slices of bread and a cup of wine or some analogous liquid, consecrates them solemnly, dips the bread in the wine, and distributes it to those of the company who have obtained absolution. . . . Among the Kurd Kizil Bash a sheep is sacrificed according to a certain rite after the public confession, and portions of it are distributed by the priest along with the bread and the wine. . . . The Kizil Bash celebrate Easter on the same Sunday as the Armenians, and they pay homage to several Christian saints, as, for instance, St. Serglus' (Grenard, in *JA* x. iii. 516).

(3) What the Kizil Bash have borrowed from *Islâmism* affiliates them with the Shī'ites rather than with the Sunnites. They have adopted the legend of 'Alī, whom they regard as an incarnation of God the Father, while Jesus is an incarnation of the Son. Like the Shī'ites, they fast during the first twelve days of Muharram, and bewail the death of Ḥasan and Ḥusain. Some say that they regard Muhammad as the hypostasis of the Spirit, the Paraclete, but the veneration which they show towards the prophet is only formal; in reality they refuse to credit him with any divine inspiration.

To sum up: the religion of the Kizil Bash is in many respects a survival of the ancient paganism of Anatolia, which in the east of the peninsula was deeply marked by the dic of Mazdæism (cf. F. Cumont, *Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*[2], Paris, 1909, p. 213 ff., Eng. tr., Chicago, 1911, p. 143 ff.). The country population of these regions was imperfectly and slowly converted to Christianity, and we know that colonies of Magi dwelt there until at least the end of the 5th cent. (cf. F. Cumont, *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, Brussels, 1895–99, i. 10), and perhaps until the Musalmān conquest. Further, in the 12th cent., Nerses Shnorhali gives interesting details regarding the 'Sons of the Sun,' who worshipped the stars, and who venerated, among trees, the poplar (F. C. Conybeare, *The Key of Truth*, Oxford, 1898, p. 159). In the 8th and 9th centuries it was in the countries inhabited by the Kizil Bash that the dualistic Paulicians (*q.v.*) found their most numerous adherents, and even after their extermination by the Byzantine emperors their teaching probably did not cease to exert an influence there. Finally, the relations of the Kizil Bash with Shī'ism are probably explained by their forced conversion to Islām under the Seljuks, at a time when the Persian influence was powerful, perhaps also by the transportation of Shī'ites of Turkish origin into Kurdistan in the time of the Sulṭāns Salim I. and Sulaimān I. (16th cent.). It is much to be desired that a copy of the sacred book of the sect should be obtained, or that a transcription should be made at least of the hymns of its service. It would then be possible to clear up the mysteries surrounding this very curious religion which retains numerous disciples even in our own times.

LITERATURE.—R. Oberhummer and H. Zimmerer, *Durch Syrien und Kleinasien*, Berlin, 1899, p. 393 ff., where citations will be found from the more ancient authors; F. Grenard (Consul of France at Sivas) has collected some new and accurate information in *JA* x. iii. [1904] 511–522. The writer of this article has added here some facts gathered by himself among the Kizil Bash of the region of Amazia in 1900.

FRANZ CUMONT.

KNEELING.—Kneeling may be described as a natural reaction to the emotions of self-abasement and supplication. As such, it has been observed among unsophisticated peoples. In a less degree only than prostration, it symbolizes inferiority and dependence, by the abandonment of the erect posture of human active life. According to Tylor,[1] kneeling as a ceremonial posture prevails in the 'middle stages of culture.' The same limitation, however, applies to prostration as still practised in Islām and Hinduism. Both in the middle and in the higher stages kneeling is more or less constantly associated with a third gesture—bowing, a symbolic expression of respect or reverence. It would be quite erroneous to 'derive' ceremonial kneeling from prostration, or bowing from kneeling. But certain forms of the bow, surviving in modern etiquette, include some bending of one or both knees: such are the curtsey, still made by ladies at court, and the bow of ceremony in which one

[1] Art. 'Salutations' in *EBr*[11] xxiv. 94.

foot is moved backward while the knee of the other leg is bent.

Primitive peoples hardly developed kneeling as a ceremonial posture in either of the two spheres in which it obtains—social etiquette and religious ritual. What generally corresponds to kneeling in the latter sphere is squatting on the heels, still the Muslim mode of kneeling and certainly a primitive posture, though originally expressing attention rather than reverence. It is employed largely by the Australian natives in their ceremonies.[1] As the stages of the higher barbarism are reached, kneeling appears, developed from the natural supplicatory posture. In Central Africa it is a tribute paid to rank. When a chief passes, the native drops on his knees and bows his head.

'When two grandees meet, the junior leans forward, bends his knees, and places the palms of his hands on the ground.'[2]

At higher stages prostration is usual among Oriental peoples, except the Chinese, who bow, or kneel and bow, according to the rank. To kings they kneel.[3] It is chiefly in Semitic and Græco-Roman culture that kneeling has been prevalent as a ceremonial posture.

In Greek and Roman civilization much prominence was given to the suppliant and the act of supplication, just as was the case in the Middle Ages with the practice of sanctuary. In both ceremonial customs kneeling, the natural posture of earnest entreaty and self-abandonment, was the constant attitude. Such phrases as 'nixæ genibus' (Plaut. *Rud.* III. iii. 33) and 'genibus minor' (Horace, *Ep.* I. xii. 28) are common in metaphor. It seems that in the Assyrian States not only subjection to kings but worship of gods was expressed by kneeling.[4] In the latter case it may be assumed as certain that the attitude has no essential connexion with prayer, as in the Christian use; the king and the god alike were, it appears, pre-eminently despotic, and court and temple ceremonial had similar forms expressing similar ideas, the chief of which was submission.

Among organized religions Christianity alone has given special significance to the posture of kneeling. During half its history the posture signified penitence; during the rest it signified prayer. At the change (marked by the Reformation) it was, by a curious association of ideas, identified with adoration or idolatry.

The process by which Christianity adopted kneeling as a ceremonial posture is somewhat uncertain in detail. The Hebrews, deriving many elements of their worship from Mesopotamian cults, may be supposed to have adopted kneeling from that source, and as a posture of humility it is found in the OT.[5] The Talmud speaks of bending the knee with the face touching the ground—a still more Oriental gesture,[6] almost identical with prostration. Elijah on Carmel 'put his face between his knees'[7]—a similar posture. Kneeling to Baal[8] may have been a form of prostration. Kneeling in prayer is mentioned in the cases of Solomon, Ezra, and Daniel. At the dedication of the Temple Solomon knelt on his knees with his hands spread up to heaven. Ezra fell upon his knees and spread out his hands unto the Lord. Daniel knelt upon his knees and prayed.[9] The posture in those three cases seems identical with the Christian.

The Jews usually prayed standing, but knelt in prayer on special occasions of solemnity or distress.[1] Hannah stood and prayed.[2] It was the same in the time of Christ; He said, 'When ye stand praying.' In the parable both Pharisee and publican stood to pray.[3] The posture of supplication or homage referred to in Mk 10[17] and Lk 5[8] (*προσκύνησις*) seems to be complete prostration. Kneeling in prayer occurs once only in the Gospels, when Christ Himself knelt during the Agony.[4]

The first Christians may be assumed to have, like the Founder, usually stood in prayer, following the practice which was common to both Hebrew and Græco-Roman ritual. The catacomb frescoes represent the *orantes* standing with outstretched arms.[5] But earlier than this, at the period represented by the Acts, kneeling appears to have become a characteristic posture. When Stephen knelt just before his death, after the stoning, no posture of prayer can be assumed.[6] It seems as if the posture were so regular a feature of the faith that it was applied indiscriminately on every occasion by the chroniclers. But there is no doubt that the attitude was a feature of the faith at this time. Peter knelt down and prayed; Paul knelt and prayed with them all; 'we kneeled down on the shore and prayed.'[7] For St. Paul kneeling and praying are synonymous.[8] In view of the catacomb evidence and of that of the next stage, it is clear that there is some prejudice in the evidence of Acts. But clearly there is a presumption in favour of the early adoption of kneeling for some aspect of Christian worship. The facts may perhaps be reconciled in this way: the pioneers of the faith probably emphasized the penitent and suppliant posture (which was familiar both to Jews and to Greeks and Romans) on all possible occasions;[9] but, when the faith attained a secure position, the posture was relegated to its traditional use. The case would thus be a microcosm of the change of attitude shown by Christianity itself as a whole.

By the time of the *Shepherd* of Hermas (the middle of the 2nd cent.) kneeling had become familiar in Christian prayer and worship.[10] The position has been summed up thus for the ante-Nicene period:

'The recognized attitude for prayer, liturgically speaking, was standing, but kneeling was early introduced for penitential, and perhaps ordinary ferial, seasons, and was frequently, though not necessarily always, adopted in private prayer.'[11]

The strange thing is that in neither the pre- nor the post-Pentecostal period has kneeling a penitential aspect. This may possibly have been a special development of the Hebrew solemn use of the posture, as in mourning, or of the Græco-Roman and Mesopotamian use in supplication or homage. However that may be, kneeling has ever since in Roman Catholicism retained a primary connexion with penitence. In private prayer it is still, as it has been since the 2nd cent., usual but not obligatory. In public adoration it is regular, though prostration may be used.

But as the posture for public prayer kneeling has never been regular except in Protestantism. The subject requires some detail. Origen in the 3rd cent. is one of the earliest writers to emphasize the penitential meaning; if forgiveness is required, he says, kneeling is essential.[12] St. Ambrose, in the 4th cent., writes:

[1] See Spencer-Gillen, *passim*.
[2] J. Thomson, *Central African Lakes*, London, 1881, p. 318; V. L. Cameron, *Across Africa*, do. 1877, i. 226.
[3] S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom*, New York, 1883, i. 801.
[4] L. Ginsberg, in *JE*, *s.v.* 'Adoration.' [5] 2 K 5[18].
[6] *Ber.* 30*b*. [7] 1 K 18[42]. [8] 1 K 19[18].
[9] 1 K 8[54], Ezr 9[5], Dn 6[10]. Joining the hands (contrary to the Jewish, Græco-Roman, and early Christian gesture of outstretched arms, retained by the celebrant in the Consecration) seems derived from the mediæval practice of homage.

[1] See F. T. Bergh, in *CE*, *s.v.* 'Genuflexion.'
[2] 1 S 1[26]. [3] Mk 11[25], Lk 18[11.13], Mt 6[5].
[4] Lk 22[41].
[5] Bergh, *loc. cit.* The fact may indicate a difference of ritual between the Italian and the Levantine Christians.
[6] Ac 7[60]. [7] Ac 9[40] 20[36] 21[5]. [8] Eph 3[14], Ph 2[10].
[9] F. S. Ranken (*DCG*, *s.v.* 'Kneeling') ascribes the Christian development of kneeling to Hellenistic influence.
[10] Hermas, *Past.* i. 1; Tertullian, *ad Scap.* iv.
[11] F. E. Warren, *Liturgy of the Ante-Nicene Church*, London, 1897, p. 145.
[12] *de Orat.* 31 (*PG* xi. 552).

'The knee is made flexible, by which the offence of the Lord is mitigated, wrath appeased, grace called forth.'[1]

Pseudo-Alcuin has the general explanation:

'By such posture of the body we show forth our humbleness of heart.'[2]

As early as Tertullian's time a distinction was marked; he observes that on Sundays and during Pentecost prayer was not to be said kneeling.[3] The implication that a divergence of use existed is proved by the ruling of the Council of Nicæa, more than a century later:

'Because there are some who kneel on the Lord's Day and on the days of Pentecost, that all things may be uniformly performed in every parish or diocese, it seems good to the Holy Synod that the prayers be by all made to God, standing.'

Standing was the attitude of praise and thanksgiving. Hence standing was obligatory during the psalms, hymns, and Eucharistic prayer. For a similar reason, perhaps, St. Benedict uttered his dying prayer standing, 'erectis in cœlum manibus.'[4] In his lifetime he had instructed his monks to kneel during private prayer, not to stand as when in choir.[5] There was, it is to be assumed, an inner meaning of penitence attaching to private prayer, and some importance here seems to have been given to the Gospel account of Christ's kneeling in solitary prayer. Naturally, public penance made use of the attitude of kneeling. The custom of the early Church is clearly marked by St. Basil, who describes kneeling as the lesser penance (*μετάνοια μικρά*) and prostration as the greater (*μετάνοια μεγάλη*).[6] A posture with such associations was a favourite one for anchorites and ascetics. Some such associations of thought may have inspired Eusebius's observation that the knees of James, 'the Lord's brother,' became callous like a camel's, from continual kneeling.[7]

The Canon Law emphasized still further the distinction between standing and kneeling. The latter was forbidden in public prayer at all the principal festivals. To be degraded into the class of *genuflectentes* or *prostrati*, who were obliged to kneel during public service even on Sundays and in paschal (or pentecostal) time, was a severe punishment.[8] A gradation of posture appears in the two terms quoted, which still obtains in Roman Catholic adoration.

That kneeling is a posture characteristic of prayer, as such, is a principle developed by the Reformation Churches, adoration, on the one hand, and penance, on the other, being disregarded. The 'Declaration on Kneeling' during the Lord's Supper illustrates the avoidance of Roman Catholic adoration. The Presbyterians sat to receive the Communion. The originally threefold use of the attitude was perhaps assisted towards its Protestant simplification or reduction into one for prayer alone by the negative emphasis which it received from contrast with the Roman Catholic idea.

It is also remarkable that the practices of kneeling and genuflexion, or bending of the knee, are relatively modern in their application to ideas of reverence or adoration.[9] Here, no doubt, religious and social ritual reacted upon one another. Genuflexion with one knee was developed in the Middle Ages, clearly showing a connexion with homage. The Carthusians are noteworthy for a traditional objection to kneeling in worship; they bend the knee without touching the ground.[10]

In Roman Catholic ritual the rules governing kneeling are precise. The congregation kneel throughout a Low Mass, except during the reading of the Gospel. At High Mass they kneel or prostrate themselves at the words 'et incarnatus est' and 'verbum caro factum est'—a modern development. When adoring the Blessed Sacrament unveiled, the faithful genuflect with both knees, but with the right knee only when revering it in the tabernacle. In the old bidding prayers, as in the diaconal litanies of the Greek Church, the officiating priest, asking the congregation to pray for some special 'intention,' said, 'Flectamus genua.'[1] In penance and confirmation, and at the coronation of a king or queen, the blessing of a new knight, reconciliation, etc., kneeling is prescribed. The celebrant in the Roman, Greek, and Anglican Churches kneels in adoration, but communicates standing. The Lutheran Church and the Church of England have always prescribed reception of the sacrament kneeling. The Lutherans, however, stand at prayer. The Presbyterians stood at prayer, but in recent times they have adopted kneeling.

In European history the social uses of kneeling are confined to court ceremonial, when subjects salute the monarch, the ritual of homage in mediæval feudalism, and various courtly symbolic fashions, as between gentleman and lady. In feudal times the rule was kneeling on one knee in homage, on two in worship. Social friction has been produced in recent times by insistence on the kneeling attitude in connexion either with religious prejudice or with ideas of military discipline.[2]

The differences in the form of the posture of kneeling are simple. The only uncertainty is with the early Christian forms. Most probably there was in these an element of prostration, as was usual in Oriental forms then and is now, being characteristic also of Islām. The Muslim kneels by sitting on his feet, and in that position can make various grades of prostration of body and head.[3] The words of Seneca, 'inflexo genu adorare,'[4] refer to an Oriental, not Græco-Roman, posture of reverence. The classical *adoratio* was performed standing. The fashion of venerating the Roman Emperor in a posture of prostration, complete or from the knees, was of Persian origin, and its introduction is ascribed to Diocletian. It still obtains in Asiatic courts. Prostration in a more natural form was usual in Greek times for suppliants. Its incomplete form was kneeling. Here Augustine illustrates the natural evolution of the posture, and suggests at the same time the lines of its introduction into Christianity, by identifying kneeling with the suppliant attitude:

'They fix their knees, stretch forth their hands (a gesture of prayer), or even prostrate themselves on the ground.'[5]

LITERATURE.—This is fully given in the article.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

KNOTS.—The symbolical use of the knot and the ceremony of tying and untying are practices of great antiquity and of world-wide distribution. Knots have, among practically all primitive races, a special mystical signification, namely, that as amulets they possess the power of hindering or impeding specific conditions. Generally speaking, the ultimate reason for this is not abstruse: the act of tying a knot implies something 'bound,' and hence the action becomes a spell towards hindering or impeding the actions of other persons or things. Similarly, the act of loosing a knot implies the removal of the impediment caused by the knot, and from this belief are derived the various customs of unlooping knots, unlocking and opening doors and cupboards, setting free

[1] Bergh, *loc. cit.*

[2] The 'kneeling controversy' in Bavaria (1838–45) arose from the King's Roman Catholic preferences (see E. Dorn, in *PRE*[3] x. [1901] 590–594). The British Army has seen in the use of 'on the knee' an excess of discipline.

[3] T. P. Hughes, *Dict. of Islam*, London, 1895, *s.v.* 'Prayer,' has a series of elaborate drawings of the Muslim prayer-attitudes.

[4] *Herc. Fur.* 410.

[5] *de Cura*, 5.

[1] *Hexaem.* vi. 9 [74].

[2] *de Divin. officiis*, xviii. (*PL* ci. 1210).

[3] *de Cor. Mil.* 3; it is *nefas*.

[4] Gregory, *Dial.* ii. 37.

[5] Bergh, *loc. cit.* Eusebius says that kneeling was the regular attitude of Christians in private prayer (*Vita Const.* iv. 22).

[6] Bergh, *loc. cit.*

[7] *HE* ii. 23.

[8] Bergh, *loc. cit.*

[9] *Ib.*

[10] *Ib.*

captive animals, etc., at periods when undesirable hindrance of any event is feared. Such customs are instances of imitative or homœopathic magic, and the same principle underlies cases in which the tying of knots has a beneficent influence; a person suffering from disease, *e.g.*, may rid himself of it by tying knots in some object, such as a string or twig. The examples here given from the vast number which exist in literature may best be grouped according to their principal uses.

1. General.—The theory of knots from a scientific point of view was first discussed by J. B. Listing,[1] and later, more exhaustively, by P. G. Tait, who analyzed knots in their various forms according to the number of their crossings.[2] The expression 'knot' enters into several phrases of an obscure nature: thus 'nuts of May' is a corruption of 'knots of May,' from the custom of gathering knots of flowers on May-day. The 'Gordian knot' refers to the famous tradition that Gordius, a peasant called to the throne of Phrygia, in obedience to an oracle of Jupiter, dedicated to that deity his waggon, the yoke of which was tied to the draught pole so that it could not be unloosed; another oracle declared that he who unloosed the knot would become ruler of Asia, and Alexander the Great accomplished the task by cutting the knot with his sword.[3] Among the Romans the augur's wand, or *lituus*, which was used to mark out the sacred region (*templum*) for the observation of birds, had to be made from wood containing no knot.[4] In China the earliest means of communication, other than oral, is stated to have been by knotted cords.[5] Similar to this are the *quipus* of ancient Peru.

'The *quipu* was a cord about two feet long, composed of different-coloured threads tightly twisted together, from which a quantity of smaller threads were suspended in the manner of a fringe. The threads were of different colours, and were tied into knots.' The signification of the cords depended on their colour, their order, the number of knots, and their distance from the main string.[6]

Similar contrivances are found in Hawaii and among various African tribes, as well as in eastern Asia and the Pacific Islands.[7] Among some of the tribes of the southern United States, if a definite time was set for a certain event, count was kept by untying one knot each day; by this means the Pueblo Indians were enabled to make simultaneous revolt against the Spaniards in 1680.[8] The nautical 'knot' is another case in point.

2. Knots in religious ceremony.—In the religious systems of the East the importance of the knot in various ceremonies is well recognized. At the initiation ceremony the sacred girdle with which the Brāhman was invested was wound round the waist three times from left to right and tied with one, three, or five knots;[9] at a later stage in the ceremony the initiator made a threefold knot in the girdle on the north side of the navel and drew this to the south side of it.[10] Girdles with three knots are also worn by the Dervishes in S.W. Asia.[11] In the *naōjot*, or initiation ceremony, of Zoroastrianism, the sacred *kustī*, or girdle, is wound round the waist three times and fastened with two knots, one in front and the other at the back, these knots symbolizing certain religious thoughts (see INITIATION [Parsi]).[12]

1 'Vorstudien zur Topologie,' *Göttinger Studien*, 1847.
2 *Trans. Roy. Soc. Edin.* xxviii. [1870] 145.
3 Arrian, *Anabasis*, ii. 3; Quintus Curtius, iii. 1; Justin, xi. 7.
4 Livy, i. xviii. 7. 5 *Elir*[11] vi. 218.
6 W. H. Prescott, *Conquest of Peru*, London, 1847, p. 51; L. Locke, 'The Ancient Quipu,' *Amer. Anthropologist*, new series, xiv. [1912] 325–332.
7 E. C. Richardson, *Beginnings of Libraries*, Princeton, N.J., 1914, p. 92 f.
8 J. Adair, *Hist. of the Amer. Indians*, London, 1775, p. 75; *HA I* i. [1907] 719.
9 *SBE* xxix. [1886] 61 f. 10 *Ib.* xxx. [1892] 67, 148.
11 J. O'Neill, *The Night of the Gods*, London, 1893–97, i. 127.
12 *Sad-dar*, ch. x.; J. J. Modi, *The Naojote Ceremony of the Parsis*, Bombay, 1909, p. 16; cf. West, *SBE* xviii. [1882] 122, note.

In the religious ceremonies of the Assyrians the god Marduk is directed to soothe the last moments of a dying man by knotting a woman's kerchief with seven knots and tying it on his head, hands, and feet. The gods will then receive his dying spirit.[1] Similar ideas may underlie the origin of the phylacteries of the Jews and their practice of binding holy texts round the limbs.[2] The Jewish phylacteries, or 'frontlets,' are small leather boxes in which are strips of parchment with passages from Hebrew Scripture. They are fixed on the forehead and on the back of the right hand. That on the head is attached by having its strap tied at the back of the head into a knot of the shape of a 'daleth.' The strap attached to the hand is formed into a noose by means of a knot of the shape of a 'yod.' These knots, together with the letter 'shin' of the head phylactery, make up the letters of the sacred name 'Shaddai' ('Almighty').[3] In Roman religious ceremonials the Flamen Dialis, the priest of Jupiter, was not allowed to have any knots in his clothing, the ring on his finger was broken, and any one coming to his house in chains had instantly to be loosed.[4] Muslim pilgrims on the journey to Mecca also avoid having knots about their person when in a state of sanctity.[5] The Qur'ān contains a reference (cxiii. 4) to 'those who puff into knots,' and these words are believed to refer to women who tie knots in cords and blow and spit on them for magical purposes. It is even recorded that a Jew once bewitched the prophet Muhammad by tying nine knots on a string; Muhammad fell ill and recovered only when the baleful thing was found and its knots undone by the recitation of certain charms.[6] In Biblical literature there are many references to the ceremony of 'binding,' the signification of the term being similar to that of tying a knot.

3. Knots in relation to love and the marriage ceremony.—The magic of knots and the ceremony of binding and loosing had a particular reference in earlier times to women; in classical times, *e.g.*, the unloosing of the girdle (*q.v.*) was symbolical of the loss of virginity,[7] and by tying three knots on three strings of different colours a maid might seek to draw her lover to her side.[8] Among the Arabs a girl, in order to attract the object of her affections, would tie knots in his whip.[9] The true-love-knot is a symbol of plighted affection; the direct origin of its symbolism is uncertain, but from its form and signification it is possible that Thomas Browne's suggestion[10] of its derivation from the *nodus Herculaneus* and the *caduceus* is correct.

The symbolical use of the knot in the marriage ceremony is widely distributed and dates back to extremely ancient times. Among the Brāhmans, towards the end of the marriage ceremony, the husband advances towards his young wife, who is seated facing the east, and, while reciting *mantras*, he fastens the *tali*—a little gold ornament which all married women wear—round her neck, securing it with three knots; before these knots are tied the father of the bride may refuse his consent, but after they are tied the marriage is indissoluble.[11] A cord

1 Tablet K. 3169, 4R3 (Brit. Mus.); H. F. Talbot, *TSBA* ii. [1873] 54.
2 W. R. Smith, *JPh* xiii. [1885] 286; Talbot, p. 55.
3 *HDB* iii. 870.
4 Aulus Gellius, x. xv. 6. 9; H. Nettleship and J. E. Sandys, *Dict. of Class. Ant.*, London, 1899, p. 238.
5 E. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, Paris, 1909, p. 87 f.
6 Al-Baiḍāwī's *Comment. on the Qur'ān, ad loc.*; J. G. Frazer, *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 302.
7 W. J. Dilling, *Caledon. Med. Journ.* ix. [1913–14] 337, 403.
8 Vergil, *Ecl.* viii. 77–79.
9 J. Wellhausen, *Reste arab. Heidentumes*[2], Berlin, 1897, p. 163.
10 'Vulgar Errors' in *Works*, ed. C. Sayle, London, 1904, ii. ch. xxii. § 5, p. 266.
11 J. A. Dubois and H. K. Beauchamp, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*[3], Oxford, 1906, pp. 224, 226.

is also tied round the bride's waist,[1] and, when she departs from the house, the verse 'I loosen thee' is said.[2] In the Parsi marriage ceremony, a curtain is held up to screen the bride and groom from each other; under this they grasp each other's right hand, after which another piece of cloth is placed round them so as to encircle them, and the ends of the cloth are tied together by a double knot. In the same way, raw twist is taken and wound round the pair seven times. It is then tied seven times over the joined hands of the couple as well as round the double knot of the ends of the cloth around them.[3] The Bhandāris tie the hands of the wedded pair together with a wisp of *kuśa* grass.[4] The Karans of Bengal believe the essential part of the marriage ceremony to be the laying of the bride's right hand in that of the bridegroom and the tying of their two hands together with a piece of thread spun in a special way.[5] In upper India the clothes of the bride and bridegroom are knotted together as they revolve round the sacred fire.[6]

The greatest development of the symbolism was in classical times. At the Roman marriage ceremony the bride's garments were bound with a girdle made of sheep's wool and tied with a Herculean knot; after the marriage the bride, on proceeding to her husband's house, tied the door-posts with woollen fillets,[7] and later, in the bridal chamber, the Herculean knot was untied by her husband and the girdle removed; over this loosening ceremony Juno Cinxia presided.[8] Further details of the ceremony are given by Festus,[9] who states that the application of the girdle symbolized the binding character of the marriage oath, while its unloosing was for a good omen, so that they might be as fortunate in rearing children as was Hercules, who had seventy offspring. On the other hand, Macrobius,[10] in his description of the *caduceus*, states that this represents the union of a male and female serpent as an offering to Mercury, and that they are united by a Herculean knot, which symbolizes necessity; Athenagoras[11] says that the wand of Mercury is a symbol of the union of Jupiter and Rhea, whom Jupiter, disguised as a dragon, bound to him in the form of a Herculean knot. A. Rossbach[12] suggested that the Herculean knot was associated originally with the god Sancus, and that the latter, as god of light, protected men from illness and witchcraft—apotropaeic powers which the knot possessed, as being his symbol. In the opinion of the present writer, the symbolism of its tying was that of the binding character of the ceremony, and its loosing represented the loss of virginity. From a physical standpoint the Herculean knot was difficult to unloose.[13]

A somewhat similar custom prevails among the natives of the East Indian island of Rotti. A cord is fastened round the waist of the bride, and nine knots are tied in it and smeared with wax in order to increase the difficulty of unloosing them; the bride and bridegroom are then secluded, and the latter has to untie the knots with the thumb and forefinger of his left hand. Not until this has been done may the man possess the woman as his wife. Frazer, in recording this case, suggests that the nine knots may refer to the months of pregnancy.[1] Before the wedding procession a Macedonian bride has a girdle tied round her waist with three knots by one of her brothers;[2] and among the Russians, during a marriage ceremony, a net, 'from its affluence of knots,' is thrown over the bride or the bridegroom, and the attendants are girt with pieces of net or girdles, 'for before a wizard can begin to injure them he must undo all the knots in the net, or take off the girdles.'[3]

Not only was the knot important in the consummation of marriage and in the protection of the married couple from witchcraft; it was also a powerful amulet in the hands of a third person in preventing the wedding ceremony or the union of the parties concerned. Thus in the Middle Ages a person could prevent a marriage by tying a knot in a cord or fastening a lock. The cord or lock had then to be thrown into water, and, until the charm was recovered and undone, no real marriage could take place.[4] Such practices were punishable, and in 1705 two persons were condemned to death in Scotland for stealing charmed knots which had been made, with intent to mar the wedded bliss of Spalding of Ashintilly.[5] The tying of these knots was known in Germany as *Nestel knüpfen* and in France as *nouer l'aiguillette*. Those who made or used such spells were, as early as 1208, directed to be excommunicated,[6] and the *Ritual* of Paris of 1630 contains the statement:

'Nous dénonçons pour excommuniés tous magiciens et magiciennes, sorciers et sorcières, devineurs et devineresses, noueurs d'aiguillettes et autres qui par ligatures et sortiléges empêchent l'usage et consummation du saint Mariage.'[7]

There are innumerable examples of this superstition in mediæval literature, and the same idea seems to have been prevalent among the Northern Semites in A.D. 700, since mention is made of persons 'who bend a needle and insert the head in the eye, or set seals on locks and throw them into a deep well or hide them in the ground that a man may be kept away from his wife.'[8]

In Perthshire, in 1793, knots were also tabued at the marriage ceremonies, as is illustrated by the following custom, recorded by the minister of Logierait:

'Immediately before the celebration of the marriage ceremony every knot about the bride and bridegroom (garters, shoe-strings, strings of petticoats, etc.) is carefully loosened. After leaving the church, the whole company walk round it, keeping the church walls always upon the right hand. The bridegroom, however, first retires one way with some young men to tie the knots that were loosened about him, while the young married woman in the same manner retires somewhere else to adjust the disorder of her dress.'[9]

For a similar reason it was a common practice for the bride and bridegroom to have one or both shoes untied during the marriage ceremony.[10] In Syria the bridegroom must have no knots or buttons fastened in his wedding garments; otherwise their magic will deprive him of his marriage rights.[11] Similar beliefs exist among the North African races.[12] A curious belief connected with marriage is that prevalent among the Pidhireanes, a Ruthenian people on the hem of the Carpathians,

[1] *SBE* xxix. 33.
[2] *Ib.* xxix. 39; Rigveda, x. lxxxv. 24.
[3] D. F. Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, London, 1884, i. 179.
[4] H. H. Risley, *TC*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 92.
[5] Risley, i. 425; W. Crooke, *PR*, London, 1896, ii. 46.
[6] Crooke, *PR* ii. 46 f.
[7] Pliny, *HN* xxix. 9.
[8] Festus, *de Verborum significatione*, iii., *s.v.* 'Cinxiae Junonis'; Arnobius, *adv. Nationes*, iii. 21, 23, 25.
[9] *s.v.* 'Cingulo'; cf. Nonius Marcellus, *de Proprietate sermonum*, *s.v.* 'Cingulum'; Catullus, lxi. 50 f., lxviii. 26.
[10] *Saturnalia*, i. xix. 16–18.
[11] *Legatio ad Imp. Antoninos*, xx. (*PG* vi. 932).
[12] *Die römische Ehe*, Stuttgart, 1853, p. 279.
[13] For full evidence see Dilling, *Caledon. Med. Journ.* ix. 351–354.

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 301.
[2] G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 167 f.
[3] W. R. S. Ralston, *Songs of the Russian People*, London, 1872, p. 390; Abbott, p. 170.
[4] J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*[4], Berlin, 1876–78, ii. 897, 983; J. Brand, *Pop. Ant.*, London, 1900, p. 742.
[5] J. G. Dalyell, *Darker Superstitions of Scotland*, Glasgow, 1835, pp. 302, 306 f.
[6] J. B. Thiers, *Traité des superstitions*, 4 vols., Avignon, 1777, iv. 510.
[7] *Ib.* p. 514; the whole subject is treated on pp. 503–526.
[8] P. A. de Lagarde, *Reliquiæ juris ecclesiast. antiquiss. Syr.*, Leipzig, 1856, p. 133; W. R. Smith, *JPh* xiv. [1885] 116, note.
[9] J. Sinclair, *Statistical Account of Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1791–99, v. 83.
[10] J. Pinkerton, *Voyages and Travels*, London, 1808–14, iii. 91, 325, 382; C. Rogers, *Social Life in Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1884–86, iii. 232.
[11] Eljûb Abêla, *ZDPV* vii. [1884] 91 f.
[12] Doutté, pp. 288–292.

where a widow who wishes to remarry unties the knots on her dead husband's grave-clothes;[1] here again the magic is imitative and symbolizes her freedom from her bond.

4. Knots at child-birth.—The symbolism of the knot at birth is obvious, and its use is probably the most widely distributed of all such beliefs. Birth is associated in all countries with the idea of unloosing, and various peoples adopt different charms of a homœopathic character to facilitate delivery. Hence arise such customs as opening doors and windows, undoing hair, girdles, and all knots in the clothing, preventing the husband and other persons from sitting with the legs crossed, setting free captive animals and even school children, etc. A few examples of these customs must suffice.

In ancient India it was a custom to unloose all knots at the time of child-birth,[2] and among the Romans and Greeks such beliefs were common. Thus Ovid states that the pregnant woman is to unbind her hair before praying to the goddess of child-birth,[3] and she must also avoid having knots in her clothing.[4] At the delivery of Alcmene, Eileithyia is represented as having sat cross-legged before the house in order to delay matters.[5] The same superstition as that mentioned by Ovid occurs in Bilāspur, where the woman's hair is never allowed to remain knotted while the child is being born,[6] and unmarried Jewish girls undo their hair if a difficult labour occurs in the house.[7] The prospective mother, among the Kayans of Borneo, must refrain from tying knots;[8] and in Persia, when a birth was imminent, the school-masters were asked to give liberty to the boys, whilst birds in cages were allowed to escape.[9] In Denmark knots had to be undone when a birth was about to occur; and in Smaaland, to render future parturition easy, the bride should untie the straps of her horse's saddle when returning from the church. Here also the bride did not tie her shoe-laces before the wedding, in order that 'she might bear children as easily as she could remove her shoes,' and she would have toothache at the birth of her child if anything were tied over her bridal crown.[10] Among the Ilos of Togoland, when a difficult confinement occurs, a magician is called, who declares: 'The child is bound in the womb, that is why she cannot be delivered.' To loose the bonds he binds the hands and feet of the patient with a tough creeper and then, after calling the woman's name, he cuts through the creeper with a knife, saying, 'I cut through to-day thy bonds and thy child's bonds.' The creeper is then cut up into small pieces and put in water, with which the woman is bathed.[11]

Similar superstitious beliefs and customs may be traced in the folklore of ancient and modern India, Java, Sumatra, the Sea and Land Dayaks, Cochin China, Central Australia, Mecklenburg, Voigtland, Transylvania, and even to the present day in Scotland.[12]

5. Knots in the cure of diseases.—Knots were largely employed by the Assyrians in their spells for removing illness; thus, for headache, the head of the sick person must be bound with a bundle of twigs, accompanied by the recitation of magic words, and at eventide the twigs are to be cut off and thrown into the street 'that the sickness of his head may be assuaged.'[1] Another text recommends the use of the hair of a virgin kid, spun and bound with twice seven knots to the head, neck, and limbs of the sufferer.[2] As a charm for ophthalmia, black and white threads or hairs are woven together, with seven and seven knots therein, and during the knotting an incantation is said; the thread of black hair is then to be fastened to the sick eye, and the white one to the sound eye.[3] The Babylonian witches could strangle their victims or seal their mouths, etc., by tying knots in a cord, and by undoing these knots the sufferer could be relieved.[4] Similar customs have been found among the Persians[5] and Arabs[6] in modern times. Pliny, referring to wounds, remarks:

'It is quite surprising how much more speedily wounds will heal if they are bound up and tied with a Hercules' knot; indeed, it is said that, if the girdle which we wear every day is tied with a knot of this description, it will be productive of certain beneficial effects, Hercules having been the first to discover this fact.'[7]

He also states that inguinal tumours could be cured by taking a thread from a web, tying seven or nine knots on it, and then fastening it to the patient's groin, although it was also necessary to name some widow as each knot was tied.[8] Again, to cure swelling of the groins due to ulcers, the patient is directed to insert in the sores three horse hairs tied with as many knots.[9] In 1718 the Parliament of Bordeaux sentenced an individual to be buried alive for spreading desolation through a family by means of knotted cords;[10] and in Scotland,[11] Denmark, and Sweden[12] knotted cords are still in use to protect both men and beasts from illness, the number of knots being usually three or nine. In Russia a skein of red wool is wound about the arms and legs to protect the wearer from fever, and nine skeins tied round a child's neck protect it from scarlatina.[13] One of the most common of such beliefs is that warts may be cured by tying as many knots in a string as one has warts, and to obtain the ultimate cure either the knots are unloosed or the string is thrown away or placed under a stone, when the first person to tread on the stone or pick up the string acquires the warts;[14] or each wart is to be touched by one of the knots.[15] In the days when the belief in the possibility of transferring diseases to inanimate objects was prevalent, knots were made in the branches or twigs of trees; the ceremony, being accompanied by spells, transferred the disease to the tree.[16] For protection against disease the Ilos of Togoland tie strings round the different parts of the body.[17] Knots are even believed to be a protection against death itself, and the soul cannot leave the body till they are loosed.[18]

6. Other beliefs in knots as amulets.—Among the Assyrians the knot was used to prevent the spirits of the dead from annoying the living. To attain this end, the following directions are given:

'Spin a variegated and a scarlet thread together, and tie seven knots in it; thou shalt mix together oil of cedar, spittle of the

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1 R. F. Kaindl, *Globus*, lxxiii. [1898] 251.
2 W. Caland, *Altind. Zauberritual*, Amsterdam, 1900, p. 108.
3 *Fasti*, iii. 257 f.
4 Servius on Vergil, *Æn.* iii. 518.
5 Brand, p. 721; Ovid, *Metam.* ix. 285; Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 17; cf. Pausanias, ix. xi. 3.
6 E. M. Gordon, *Indian Folk Tales*, London, 1908, p. 39.
7 *JE* xi. 600.
8 *Customs of the World*, ed. W. Hutchinson, London, 1912, p. 201.
9 J. C. Lettsom, *Hist. of the Origin of Medicine*, London, 1778, p. 48, note.
10 K. R. v. Wikman, *Öfvertryck ur Hembygden*, Helsingfors, 1912, nos. 5, 6.
11 J. Spieth, *Die Ewe-Stämme*, Berlin, 1906, p. 692.
12 Frazer, pp. 293–313.

1 R. Campbell Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, London, 1908, p. 166.
2 *Ib.*
3 H. C. Rawlinson, *WAI* iv. [1875] 29*, 4, c. i. 15.
4 M. Jastrow, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, pp. 268, 270.
5 E. O'Donovan, *Merv*, London, 1883, p. 290 f.
6 Thompson, p. 168 f.
7 *HN* xxviii. 17. 8 *Ib.* 12. 9 *Ib.* 61.
10 Dalyell, pp. 302, 306 f.
11 R. C. Maclagan, *FL* vi. [1895] 154 ff.
12 Wikman, *loc. cit.* 13 Ralston, p. 388.
14 J. G. Frazer, *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 48.
15 Wikman, *loc. cit.* 16 Cf. Frazer, p. 56.
17 Spieth, p. 531.
18 Dalyell, p. 307; T. F. Thiselton-Dyer, *English Folk-lore*, London, 1878, p. 229 f.

man, the leavened dough, earth from an old grave, a tortoise's (?) mouth (?), a thorn (?), earth from the roots of the caper, earth of ants; thou shalt sprinkle the knots with this. While thou tiest them, thou shalt repeat this incantation [(and) bind it] on the temples [of the man]. Thus shalt thou tighten it, until the darkening of the white part of the face and the whitening of the dark-coloured part of the face takes place.'[1]

To remove a tabu from a man, directions are given to bind his limbs with a double cord of black and white threads which has been twisted on a spindle; the cord then appears to be cut by the hands of Marduk, who also releases the man from the tabu.[2] Evidently a witch could cast a tabu on a man by tying knots and chanting a spell, for we are told that 'her knot is loosed, her sorcery is brought to naught, and all her charms fill the desert.'[3] The ancient Hindus believed that knots tied in the garments of a traveller would protect him on a dangerous journey;[4] and in classical times spells were removed by knots, for Petronius mentions that, in removing a spell from Encolpius, 'she then took from her bosom a web of twisted threads of various colours and bound it on my neck.'[5] Charms of many coloured threads were tied on the necks of infants to protect them from fascination.[6] The same idea explains the wearing of the sacred thread, or *janeû*, by high-caste Hindus. The knots on it, known as *Brahma-granthi*, or 'the knots of the Creator,' repel evil influences, and Muhammadans on their birthdays tie knots in a cord, which is known as the *sālgirah*, or 'year knot.'[7] To drive away rain, the Mirzāpur natives name twenty-one men blind of an eye (and, therefore, ill-omened), and make twenty-one knots in a cord, and tie it under the eaves of the house.[8] The tying of knots in a string and subsequently unloosing them to raise wind for sailing is a custom common to many fishing people—*e.g.*, Finlanders, Laplanders, Shetlanders, and natives of the Hebrides and Isle of Man.[9] South African natives before starting on a journey will knot a few blades of grass so that the journey may be prosperous,[10] and the knotting of grass in a forest is supposed by Laos hunters to prevent others from being successful there in the pursuit of game.[11] Russians have the belief that knots act as a protective against violent death from weapons, which, as it were, are 'tied' by the knots; and knots also prevent the death of cattle and people by 'binding up' the mouths of wolves and other ravenous animals—a belief which is also current in Bulgaria[12] and Armenia.[13]

LITERATURE.—References are given in the footnotes. Many other examples are cited in J. G. Frazer, *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, pp. 293–313; and also under artt. CHARMS AND AMULETS. For Egyptian knotted cords (use unknown) see W. M. F. Petrie, *Amulets illustrated by the Egyp. Collection in Univ. Coll., London*, London, 1914, p. 29, and plates xvii.–xix.

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KNOWLEDGE.—See EPISTEMOLOGY.

KNOX.—1. Birth and early life.

—Neither the place nor the date of John Knox's birth is certain; but Giffordgate, a hamlet contiguous with Haddington, is the site for which most and against which least can be said; and a date between 24 Nov. 1513 and 24 Nov. 1514 (not 1505, as, until recently, was usually supposed) is most probable.

Local tradition in favour of Giffordgate was old in 1785 (G. Barclay, in *Trans. Soc. of Antiq.* i. 69; publ. 1852), and is accepted by D. Laing (*Works of Knox*, Edinburgh, 1864, vi. xviii.), A. F. Mitchell (*Scottish Reformation*, do. 1900, p. 79), and D. Hay Fleming (*Original Secession Mag.*, 1889). The ancient *Registre* of Geneva and Knox's contemporary, Archibald Hamilton (*de Confusione Calviniance sectæ*, Paris, 1577, p. 64), describe him as a native of Haddington. His designation by Beza (*Icones*, 1580) as 'Giffordiensis,' and the statement by J. Spottiswoode (*Hist. of the Church of Scotland* [published 1655], ed. 1850, ii. 180) that he was born in Gifford, are consistent with the above (Giffordgate being on the Gifford Estate), but are believed by T. McCrie (*Life of John Knox*[6], Edinburgh, 1839) and by S. Kerr of Yester (*Where was Knox born?*) to indicate Gifford village, 4 miles from Haddington, as the real birthplace—a village, however, which appears in no map older than the 17th century. D. Louden (*History of Morham*, London, 1899, pp. 34–51) advocates Morham, within Haddington Constabulary; and it is favoured by P. Hume Brown (*John Knox: A Biography*, London, 1895). In the 14th cent. this parish passed by marriage to the Giffords, and in Knox's time was owned by the Bothwells—which would account best (it is held) for Knox's acknowledgment (Laing, *Works of Knox*, ii. 323) of feudal obligation to that family. But, against this view, the name Morham was never superseded by Gifford.

The two earliest authorities for Knox's birth-year are Peter Young, of Edinburgh, and Theodore Beza, of Geneva—both personal friends of the Reformer. Beza states (*Icones*) that Knox died after reaching the age of 67; but Young's testimony that he died in his 59th year is to be preferred as being contained in a letter (recently recovered) written from Edinburgh expressly in answer to Beza's inquiry. The date 1505 (formerly accepted) rests on Spottiswoode's authority (*Hist. of Church of Scotland*, ii. 180), followed by D. Buchanan (*Life and Death of Knox*, published 1644), who had access to Spottiswoode's then unpublished MS. McCrie found confirmation (perhaps the basis) of Spottiswoode's statement in the recorded entrance of a John Knox into Glasgow University in 1522; but eight John Knoxes were students there in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Knox is stated by Beza to have been a student at St. Andrews under John Major, who was settled there in 1531. His student life must have begun not very long after Patrick Hamilton's martyrdom at St. Andrews in 1528, and the words in Knox's *History* (i. 36), 'when those cruel wolves had devoured their prey, there was none within St. Andrews who began not to enquire wherefore was Patrick Hamilton burnt?' sound like a personal reminiscence. At any rate Knox was probably affected by the martyrdom; and this, along with the teaching of Gavin Logie, who fled from St. Andrews about 1534 on account of Reformed views, and also the oath which graduates had to take against 'Lollardism,' may have led to Knox's non-graduation as *Magister Artium*. On the other hand, Major's influence and Knox's keenly patriotic spirit may have kept him from identifying himself with a cause which, in its earlier stages, came, justly or unjustly, under suspicion of being associated with unpatriotic subservience to England. Knox entered the priesthood at some date prior to 1540; and, up to 1545, there is no evidence of his public support of the Reform cause. In 1543, however, he had received a lively impression of the truth from Friar Thomas William, one of the Regent Arran's evangelical chaplains (D. Calderwood, *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, i. 155 f.); and the seed fructified under the ministry of George Wishart, who came to East Lothian in 1545. Knox, then tutor in Hugh Douglas's family at Longniddry, 'waited on Wishart from the time he came to Lothian,' and attended him in Haddington on the evening before Wishart's midnight arrest. Henceforth Knox was a recognized adherent of the Reformation.

2. Call and ministry at St. Andrews.—The assassination of Beaton in May 1546 was condoned by Knox as a 'godly fact,' justified by the failure of the civil authority to punish the Cardinal's illegal oppression. He had no scruple, therefore, about taking refuge from peril in the Castle of St. Andrews held by the conspirators and other opponents of the Roman Catholic religion. From the Castle congregation, led by John Rough, an evangelical preacher, he accepted a solemn call to the Reformed ministry. From the pulpit of the Parish Church he declared that the evil lives of the clergy (from popes downward), corrupt Roman doctrine, unscriptural enactments, and

1 Thompson, p. 33 f.
2 *Ib.* p. 165.
3 Rawlinson, lv. 49, 34a.
4 *SBE* xxix. 432, xxx. 127.
5 *Sat.* cxxxi.
6 Persius, *Sat.* ii. 31.
7 *PR*[2], ii. 47.
8 *Ib.* i. 77.
9 Brand, p. 589.
10 J. Shooter, *The Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country*, London, 1857, p. 217 f.
11 E. Aymonier, *Notes sur le Laos*, Saigon, 1885, p. 23 f.
12 Ralston, p. 388 ff.
13 M. Abeghian, *Armen. Volksglaube*, Jena, 1899, p. 115.

blasphemous papal pretensions proved that the Church of Rome was 'not the body of Christ, but the whore of Babylon.' 'A great number openly professed' Reformed doctrine at St. Andrews; and Holy Communion was celebrated for the first time publicly in Scotland according to a Reformed ritual. What had hitherto been only a Protestant movement thus grew into a Reformed Church. Meanwhile, however, partly as a divine judgment (so Knox declared) on account of the evil doings of a portion of the Castle community, the garrison were constrained, in the autumn of 1547, to surrender to the French fleet, and Knox, along with other prisoners, was consigned to the 'torment' of the galleys.

3. Ministry in England.—After eighteen months of toil and tribulation as a galley bondsman, Knox was released through the English Government's intervention. Gratitude to his liberators and the impracticability, then, of effective ministry in Scotland induced him to settle in England, where Archbishop Cranmer and Protector Somerset were accomplishing, under Edward VI., a more real Reformation than that of Henry VIII. In Berwick (1549-51) Knox ministered to a congregation consisting of garrison and citizens, using a Puritan form of service. The Communion office was largely borrowed from Swiss sources, and the practice of kneeling was discontinued as a symbolical endorsement of the Adoration of the Host. During this Berwick ministry he publicly testified against the 'idolatry' of the Mass before the ecclesiastical 'Council of the North,' and vindicated the Puritan position that 'all worshipping invented by the brain of man, without God's express command, is idolatry.' Such action and testimony justify Carlyle's designation of Knox as 'the Chief Priest and Founder' of English Puritanism (*Heroes and Hero-worship*, London, 1872, p. 132). In 1551 he was promoted to Newcastle, and in 1552 he became one of six royal chaplains, who also itinerated on behalf of the Reform cause. He declined the bishopric of Rochester, not owing to any objection to episcopacy in itself, but because he disapproved of 'your prowde prelates' great dominions and charge (impossible by one man to be discharged)' (Laing, v. 518). As a patriotic Scot, moreover, he would be reluctant to undertake responsibilities which might debar him from eventual service to his native land. Partly through Knox's influence, sitting at Communion was favoured by many; and in Edward's Second Prayer Book, while kneeling was retained, the existing rubric was inserted at Knox's instigation (J. Foxe, *Acts and Monuments*, vi. 510; P. Lorimer, *John Knox and the Church of England*, London, 1875, pp. 99-107), declaring that by kneeling no adoration is intended either of the sacramental elements or of Christ's 'natural flesh and blood.' At Edward's death Knox not only took no part in the plot to enthrone Lady Jane Grey, but, as Royal Chaplain, prayed publicly for 'our Sovereign Lady Queen Mary,' and besought God to 'repress the pride of them that would rebel.' When the Queen's policy of persecution, however, became assured, Knox crossed over to Dieppe early in 1554. 'My prayer,' he writes, 'is that I may be restoirit to the battell again' (Laing, iii. 154 f.).

4. Leader and pastor of Protestant exiles on the Continent (1554-59).—Knox's exile was no period of inactivity. He not only accomplished much literary work,[1] and kept himself in constant touch, through correspondence, with reforming friends in Scotland and England, but he also ministered to congregations of fellow-exiles. In Frankfort he became pastor, in March 1554, to an English community of Puritan tendency, using a Service-book of his own based on Calvin's Liturgy. The subsequent arrival, however, of other exiles, who desired the use of Edward VI.'s Second Prayer Book, led to conflicts which issued in Knox's withdrawal and in his settlement, early in 1555, at Geneva, as one of two pastors chosen by the British exiles there. Knox's Genevan ministry continued until Jan. 1559, with two breaks—viz. a nine months' visit to Scotland in 1555–56, and a ten weeks' sojourn, in the winter of 1557–58, at Dieppe, where he organized a French Protestant community of 800 members. His stay at Geneva was the most peaceful and perhaps the happiest period of his ministry. 'The Church of Geneva,' he writes in 1556, 'is the most perfect school of life since the days of the Apostles.' Fellowship with Calvin was a joy and a strength, an education and an incentive. To Geneva, in Sept. 1556, he brought his wife, Marjory Bowes, whom Calvin describes as 'suavissima'; her mother had been a devoted member of Knox's Berwick flock. Mrs. Knox died in Dec. 1560. In Geneva were born his sons Nathanael and Eleazar, who entered Cambridge University after their father's death; the latter became vicar of Clacton Magna in 1587. Among notable members of Knox's Geneva congregation were Miles Coverdale, William Whittingham, and two future prelates, Bentham and Pilkington (afterwards bishops respectively of Lichfield and Durham).

5. First return to Scotland.—The anxiety of the Regent Mary of Guise to secure the marriage of her daughter, Mary Stuart, to the Dauphin of France led her to court the favour of Scottish Protestant nobles, and to adopt a tolerant religious policy which encouraged Knox to visit Scotland in Sept. 1555. In districts where influential laymen gave him support, particularly West Lothian and Midlothian, Forfarshire, Ayrshire, and Strathclyde, he propagated Reformed doctrine and persuaded Protestant leaders to abstain from Mass and to celebrate Holy Communion with a Reformed ritual. Scottish Protestants thus acquired courage and consolidation. Knox even made a bold attempt to win the Regent by a conciliatory letter in which he praises her 'moderation and clemency.' In vain; she treated his elaborate address as a 'pasquil.' The Bishops cited him to trial for heresy at Edinburgh in May 1556, and Knox arrived to meet his accusers; but they received no support from the Regent, and departed from the charge on the ground of some alleged informality. On the very day appointed for his trial Knox preached to a larger congregation than ever before had listened to him. An appeal, however, in midsummer, from his Geneva flock, and the conviction that the Reform cause, strengthened by his visit, might now be better served by his withdrawal for a time to prevent the resumption of persecution, led to his return to Geneva.

6. Final return to Scotland and accomplishment of the Reformation (1559–60).—In Dec. 1557 there was drawn up at Edinburgh, largely through the absent Reformer's stimulating influence, the first Scottish 'Covenant,' an organized Protestant league for defence against religious despotism and for the advancement of the Reform cause. This movement, along with Mary Stuart's marriage to the Dauphin in 1558, and the consequent removal of the Regent's motive for toleration, led to renewed persecution; and the Scottish Reformers, realizing their need of Knox, invited him to return. He arrived at an opportune moment, on 2nd May 1559. Four notable preachers—

[1] This included his *First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment* [i.e. *Rule*] *of Women*, his *Appellation against the Scottish Hierarchy*, a *Brief Exhortation to England*, and a *magnum opus* on *Predestination*.

Harlaw, Willock, Christison, and Methven—had been cited to Stirling on 10th May to answer the charge of unauthorized and heretical ministrations, in rebellious defiance of the Privy Council's prohibition. For non-appearance they were declared to be outlaws, and the raising of an army of 8000 (partly French) by the Regent provoked the gathering of a Protestant host. A trifling incident precipitated the conflict. On 11th May Knox preached in St. John's Church, Perth, against the 'idolatry' of the Mass. While the congregation were dispersing, a priest began the celebration of what Knox had been denouncing. A lad protested loudly, was struck by the irritated celebrant, and retaliated by throwing a stone which broke an image. It was as if a lighted match had been applied to a heap of combustibles. Wide-spread 'purging' of churches and demolition of monasteries ensued. After temporary truces and fruitless attempts at compromise, the Regent, supported by France, and the Reformers, by England, carried on civil war which terminated only with the Regent's death in June 1560. Knox took a leading part in the conflict as preacher and counsellor. A significant sermon at St. Andrews on the 'Cleansing of the Temple'; another in St. Giles vindicating the Reformers' aim as being not any alteration of authority, but the reformation of religion and suppression of idolatry; an extensive itinerancy for the enlightenment of the people and the establishment of a Reformed ministry in chief centres; an important share in the negotiations which issued in the alliance between the Scottish Reformers and the English Government; a signal service at Stirling after a defeat by the French army, when the depressed spirits of the Reformers were 'wondrously re-erected' by Knox's inspiring assurance that their cause *must* and shall prevail because 'it is the eternal truth of the eternal God'—these are some of the Reformer's contributions to the Reform movement during that critical time (Laing, i. 348, 365, 471, vi. 30, 56, 78). The Regent's dying counsel to both sides was to procure the withdrawal of both the English and the French armies. This was effected; and the settlement of Scottish ecclesiastical affairs was left to the Estates of the realm. The issue was the establishment of Protestantism as the national religion by the Convention (a virtual parliament) of Aug. 1560, so far at least as this was constitutionally possible in the absence of monarch and regent.

To Knox and five colleagues was entrusted the composition of a Confession of Faith; the outcome was the 'Scots Confession,' which held the field until it was superseded by that of Westminster. Inferior in logical precision to its successor, the older Confession is superior in theological breadth and spiritual warmth (see art. CONFESSIONS, vol. iii. p. 872). Knox and his associates drew up a Church polity embodied in the *First Book of Discipline*. It recognizes five classes of office-bearers—superintendent, minister, elder, deacon, and reader. The first office was apparently a tentative arrangement, whose continuance or discontinuance might depend on its effectiveness or otherwise; gradually it disappeared; the readers were a temporary institution until sufficient ministers became available. The Church courts were the Kirk Session, Synod, and General Assembly; the Presbytery was developed after Knox's death. Worship was regulated by his *Book of Common Order*. A school as well as a church was to be established in every parish, and a 'college' in every 'notable town,' at which preparation was to be provided for the University. The *Book of Discipline* anticipated modern legislation by advocating compulsory education. The patrimony of the Church, which, prior to the Reformation, included nearly half the property of the realm, was to be expended on the maintenance of the ministry, the education of the young, and the relief of the poor; but unfortunately, notwithstanding Knox's indignant protest, the Scottish landowners 'greadelie gripped to the possessionis of the Kirk' (Laing, ii. 128), which had to be content with a sixth of her ancient patrimony.

7. Knox and Queen Mary.—The young Queen's return in 1561 and the permission of the otherwise interdicted Mass in the private chapel at Holyrood filled Knox with anxiety. He declared from the pulpit that 'one Messe was more fearful to him then gif ten thousand armed enemyes war . . . in the Realme' (*ib.* 276). His first interview with Mary deepened his solicitude. The chief subject of conversation was the right of subjects to resist their princes, particularly in the religious sphere. 'God commandis subjectis to obey thair Princes,' said Mary; 'think ye that subjectis having power may resist thair Princes?' Knox, long before, had learned from John Major the principle of constitutional monarchy, and he replied: 'Yf Princes exceed thair boundis, and do against that whairfoir they should be obeyed, . . . thei may be resisted.' 'I perceave that my subjectis shall obey you, and not me,' said the Queen. 'My travell,' responded Knox, 'is, that boyth princes and subjectis obey God.' He closed the interview with the loyal prayer that Mary might be 'as blessed within the Commoun-wealth of Scotland as ever Debora was in the Commoun-wealth of Israell'; but he stated to friends his conviction, 'yf thair be not in hir a proud mynd, a crafty witt, and ane indurat hearte against God and his treuth, my judgment faileth mo' (*ib.* 277–286). This first encounter fairly exemplifies their relations. Knox in his bearing towards the Queen united on the whole the courtesy of a gentleman with the firm and sometimes stern maintenance of his right as a 'profitable member within the commonwealth' publicly to criticize his sovereign's doings, especially in religious concerns. At their last recorded meeting, in Dec. 1563, when Knox appeared before the Queen and her Council to answer the charge of 'convoking the lieges' without her authority, he uttered the memorable manifesto: 'I am in the place quhair I am demandit of conscience to speik the treuth; and thairfoir I speik. The treuth I speik impung it quhoso list' (*ib.* 408).

8. Knox and the Protestant statesmen.—Amid general agreement between Knox and lay Reformers on the vital question of dethroning the Roman Catholic and establishing a Protestant Church, there was serious disagreement as to important details. The difference consisted chiefly in the familiar divergence between principle and expediency. While Knox was against the toleration of the Mass even in the Queen's private chapel, Moray and Maitland thought this a cheap price to pay for Mary's acquiescence in Protestant supremacy. Knox emphasized the necessity of free Assemblies: 'Take from us the freedom of Assemblies, and you take from us the Evangel.' The Protestant statesmen, especially Maitland, saw in the freedom of convocation and enactment a perilous *imperium in imperio*. Knox demanded the legalizing of the *Book of Discipline* by royal and parliamentary endorsement; the lay leaders of the Reformation resisted the claim alike as an occasion of rupture between Church and landowners and as a dangerous aggrandizement of ecclesiastical wealth and power. There was never much love to lose between Knox and Maitland, but the temporary estrangement between Knox and Moray (1563–65), the immediate occasion of which was the latter's unwillingness to press the Queen formally to recognize the Reformed as the National Church, caused a painful breach between two men

who had regarded each other with esteem and affection. The breach was closed about the time of the Queen's marriage to Darnley, when the statesman (who opposed it) became an exile, and the Reformer the leader of a depressed Church. Common misfortune helped to heal discord.

When Mary's mad marriage with her husband's murderer alienated the national sentiment and led to her enforced abdication, Knox and the Regent Moray co-operated loyally in securing the full establishment of Protestantism, a guarantee against the accession of any non-reformed sovereign, and more adequate maintenance of a Protestant ministry. To Knox Moray's tragic death was not only a great public calamity, but a heavy personal bereavement; and his funeral sermon, from the significant text, 'Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord,' moved a vast congregation to tears (Calderwood, *Hist.* ii. 526).

9. Last years and death.—The eventide of Knox's life was clouded with trouble. Moray's removal strengthened the party which favoured Mary's restoration; and some influential men now seceded to it, including Maitland and Kirkcaldy of Grange. On the other hand, the Regent's party, to which Knox loyally adhered, strained the fidelity of the Reformer and others by 'merciless devouring' of the Church's patrimony and oppressive interference with her liberty. When to these troubles was added in 1570 a stroke of apoplexy, Knox was persuaded to leave Edinburgh for the quieter environment of St. Andrews, where he remained for half a year. He describes himself as there 'lying half-dead,' but he did not cease from preaching.

He had to be 'lifted to the pulpit,' writes James Melville, an eye-witness (*Memoirs*, p. 75), 'where he behoved to lean at his first entry; but ere he had done, he was like to ding that pulpit in blads and flee out of it.'

During his residence in St. Andrews took place that introduction of a modified episcopate into the Reformed Scottish Church which became the fruitful source of discord, despotism, and rebellion. Knox did not protest against episcopacy in itself; but he warned the Church of the abuses to which it might lead, and suggested safeguards against the appointment of unqualified persons and the simoniacal alienation of ecclesiastical property to secular use. In autumn he returned to Edinburgh—to die; but two notable functions he lived to discharge: his sermon after the massacre of St. Bartholomew, when he denounced 'that murderer the king of France' in the white heat of righteous indignation, and his last pulpit service on 9th November, when James Lawson was inducted as his successor, and when Knox with 'weak voice' but fervent heart 'prayed that any gift which *he* had possessed' might be bestowed on his successor '1000 fold' (R. Bannatyne, *Memoriales*, p. 281). A 'last good night' to the elders and deacons of St. Giles; a solemn and affectionate Godspeed to his colleague; farewell interviews and messages, in particular a meeting with Morton whom he supported but did not love, and an assurance of divine mercy to Kirkcaldy whom he loved but opposed; a dying prayer for 'the troubled Kirk'; a dying vision of the 'Delectable Land'; and a last request to his devoted young wife[1] to read the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, 'where,' he said, 'I first cast anchor'—these are some of the chief incidents of the Reformer's latest hours (*ib.* p. 288 f.). He was buried in what was then the churchyard of St. Giles, at or near the spot afterwards indicated by his initials between the church and Parliament House. As the remains were laid in the grave, Morton uttered his disinterested witness: 'Here lyeth a man who in his life never feared the face of man' (J. Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 60). This panegyric indicates what in Knox's character most impressed his contemporaries. But beneath this fearlessness towards men was his steadfast faith in God, and in his own call to be God's servant. Knox was intolerant towards Romanists as well as Romanism; but we must remember the great difference between the Roman Church of Scotland in the 16th cent. and in the 20th. He was a stern man when conscience demanded severity; but there was in him a vein of tenderness and sympathy of which life-long conflict did not deprive him. We catch a glimpse of this side of his character in the almost intolerable pain which (as he told the Queen) he felt when constrained to punish his children; in the yearnings of a wounded yet affectionate spirit which are revealed in his letter to Moray at the time of their quarrel; and in the solicitude which he manifested on his deathbed for the salvation of Kirkcaldy, his antagonist but former friend. Knox's unreserved self-dedication—at once patriotic and devout—to the Scottish Reformation contrasts well with the defective patriotism and ignoble self-seeking of some of his fellow-labourers, who reaped spoil from the Church's heritage. His incessant and devoted labours after his final return to Scotland, notwithstanding 'a weak and fragile body,' his courageous maintenance of divine truth, by voice and pen, before high and low, and his heroic faith through which the faith of others was sustained, in the eventual triumph of Protestantism, justify the historian Froude's judgment that 'no grander figure can be found, in the entire history of the Reformation in this island, than that of Knox' (*History of England*, London, 1856–70, x. 455).

[1] Margaret Stewart, daughter of Lord Ochiltree, to whom Knox was married in 1564. The youngest of their three daughters, Elizabeth, became the wife of the celebrated John Welch, minister of Ayr.

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KODAS.—See MUṆḌĀS.

KOL, KOLARIAN.—'Kol' and 'Kolarian' are terms applied to a race and a group of languages spoken by people found on the Vindhyan-Kaimūr hill range, which flanks the Ganges valley to the South in N. India. The origin of these names presents many difficult questions. Skr. *kola* means 'a hog,' and, according to some authorities, the tribal designation is a term of contempt applied by the early Hindus to the dark-skinned aborigines. According to Jellinghaus (*ZE* iii. [1871] 326), the word means 'pig-killer'; but it is more probably, like Oraon (*q.v.*), a variant of *horo*, the Muṇḍā term for 'man' (H. H. Risley, *TC*, Calcutta, 1891, ii. 101; E. T. Dalton, *Descript. Ethnology of Bengal*, do. 1872, p. 178). The term Kola used in the *Harivaṁśa* and other Purāṇas (J. Muir, *Orig.*

Skr. Texts, ii.[3] [1874] 422; H. H. Wilson, *Vishṇu Purāṇa*, London, 1864–77, iii. 293) is supposed to be applied to the Karnāṭa or Kanarese people; but it seems more probable that it refers to the N. tribe (R. Caldwell, *Comparative Grammar of Dravidian Languages*[2], London, 1875, Introd. p. 18). The origin of the term Kolarian is more remarkable. F. Wilford tried to show (*Asiatic Researches*, ix. [1809] 92) that 'Colar' was the oldest name of India, this hypothesis being based on a passage in pseudo-Plutarch (*de Fluviis*, iv. 1) which speaks of a nymph Kalauria in connexion with the origin of the Ganges. The use of the term Kolarian to designate this people and their language is due to G. Campbell (*JASBe* xxxv. pt. ii. [1866], supplement, p. 27 f.), and was adopted by Dalton and other ethnologists, but was repudiated by Risley on anthropometric grounds:

'Another theory of the origin of the Dravidians was adopted by Sir William Hunter in the account of the non-Aryan races of India given by him in *The Indian Empire*. According to this view there are two branches of the Dravidians—the Kolarians, speaking dialects allied to Mundāri, and the Dravidians proper, whose languages belong to the Tamil family. The former entered India from the North-East and occupied the northern portion of the Vindhya table-land. There they were conquered and split into fragments by the main body of Dravidians who found their way into the Punjab through the North-Western passes and pressed forward towards the South of India. The basis of this theory is obscure. Its account of the Dravidians seems to rest upon a supposed affinity between the Brāhui dialect of Baluchistan and the languages of Southern India; while the hypothesis of the North-Eastern origin of the Kolarians depends on the fancied recognition of Mongolian characteristics among the people of Chota Nagpur. But in the first place the distinction between Kolarians and Dravidians is purely linguistic, and does not correspond to any differences of physical type. Secondly, it is extremely improbable that a large body of very black and conspicuously long-headed types should have come from the one region of the earth which is peopled exclusively by races with broad heads and yellow complexions. With this we may dismiss the theory which assigns a trans-Himalayan origin to the Dravidians' (*Census Report of India*, 1901, i. 503, *The People of India*, Calcutta, 1905, p. 46 f.).

The question has assumed another form as the result of linguistic researches. The original substratum of the type of languages now known as Mōn-Khmēr is found to have

'covered a wide area, larger than the area covered by many families of languages in India at the present day. Languages with this common substratum are now spoken, not only in the modern Province of Assam, in Burma, Siam, Cambodia and Annam, but also over the whole of Central India as far west as the Berars. It is a far cry from Cochin China to Nimar, and yet, even at the present day, the coincidences between the language of the Kōrkūs [see KŪRKŪS] of the latter District and the Annamese of Cochin China are strikingly obvious to any student of language who turns his attention to them' (G. A. Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India*, ii. [Calcutta, 1904] p. 2, iv. [1906] 'Muṇḍā and Dravidian Languages,' p. 2 ff.).

Further, many ethnologists are not prepared to admit Risley's doctrine of the uniformity of the brachycephalic type in trans-Himalaya (*JRAI* xlii. [1912] 450 ff.); and the origin of the Muṇḍā-speaking races is now attributed to the arrival of the first of three great invasions of Further India from the eastern uplands of Central Asia. It is improbable that the wide distribution in N. India of languages of the Mōn-Khmēr type could have occurred in any other way than by an emigration of these people from Further India. The identity of physical type between the Kolarians and the Dravidians may be the result of contact metamorphosis and the control of a common environment. The latest authority, A. Baines (*Ethnography* [=*GIAP* ii. 5], Strassburg, 1912, p. 3), thus sums up the question:

'The other race, to which the title of Kōl or Muṇḍā is generally attached, is not known south of the forest Belt, in which it is at the present time concentrated under its distinctive tribal appellations. Formerly, however, it was spread over the whole of the great plains of Upper India, and, according to recent philological discoveries, it is akin, at least in language, to communities now settled on the borders of Assam, and far to the east of the Bay of Bengal. Some investigators, indeed, spread its former habitat over a still wider area. In the east and north-east of India, however, its identity has been obscured, if not obliterated, by the successive immigrations of people of Mongoloidic race from eastern Tibet and the head waters of the great Chinese rivers, whose main streams of migration have sought the sea by the valleys of the Irāwadi, Salwin, and Mekhong. In the Gangetic plain the type is traceable throughout the population, slightly, indeed, along the Jamnā, but more distinctly as the east is approached, and almost everywhere more prevalent as the social position is lower. This graduation is due to miscegenation between the Kōl, who, as far as ethnography is concerned, may be considered the autochthonous inhabitants of these tracts, and a taller and fairer race, which entered India by the passes of the north-west or the plains of Balūchistān.'

See also artt. MUṆḌĀS and ORĀONS.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the authorities quoted in the article, see G. Oppert, *Original Inhabitants of Bharatavarṣa or India*, Westminster, 1893, p. 121 ff.; W. Crooke, *TC*, do. 1896, iii. 294 ff. On the Mōn-Khmēr question, W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 439 ff.; *Census Reports*, 1911, Assam, i. 96, Burma, i. 207 f., 261 ff.

W. CROOKE.

KORAN.—See QUR'ĀN.

KOREA.—The Korean Peninsula, very mountainous and well watered, projects from the continent towards Japan. On the north it adjoins the wooded mountains of Manchuria, and the plain of Lyao, which has always been a cause of contention to the Chinese, the hunters of the north-east, the shepherds of the north-west (the Manchus), and the Mongols (or their predecessors); on the south-west side it stretches well into the vicinity of Shantung and Central China; the southern extremity comes close to Tsushima; but the north-eastern coast, on the Sea of Japan, is somewhat inhospitable.

1. **History.**—The history of Korea may be extracted from the above remarks: its neighbours, when more advanced or stronger, have prevailed over it by virtue of their civilization, and have often brought it into subjection by force of arms; at some rare intervals it has lived its own life. Its unity was brought about with difficulty. Its entrance into history was about the time when it was invaded first by Chinese and then by Japanese, while the natives settled down as independent kingdoms, Kokurye in the north-west, Paikchei in the south-west, Sillā in the south-east, Kārāk between the two latter—to say nothing of the tribes of the Yei on the Sea of Japan, and the kingdom of Puye situated in the country which is now Manchuria. At last, through the assistance of China, a union was accomplished in the interest of Sillā (668) and in opposition to Japan. To that southern kingdom succeeded the kingdom of Korye (918), and then that of Chosen (1392); the latter was absorbed by Japan in the year 1910.

2. **Nature-worship.**—Numerous facts indicate that earlier than the Korye dynasty there was a nature-religion whose traces are still visible to-day. Sacrifices to heaven were offered by the kings or the people in Sillā, Paikchei, Kokurye, and Puye, and among the Yei. Under the dynasty of Korye the worship of heaven was celebrated by the king, although he was a vassal of the Emperor; the rites had probably become Chinese, and the place of the ceremony was, as in China, a round knoll. The first sovereigns of the Chosen dynasty kept up these old rites. As early as the reign of Thāi-chong, in 1410, 1411, and 1414, debate had arisen regarding the right of the king of Korea to celebrate a sacrifice which the Chinese rituals reserved for the Emperor. Suppressed, then re-established, the sacrifice to heaven does not reappear after 1457 until 1897, when Korea was independent and known as the Empire of Tāi-hān.

Worship of the sun, moon, and stars existed in Sillā and in Kokurye, and is found again during the Korye dynasty. In the last-mentioned period, and also in that of Chosen, mention is made of

altars dedicated to the stars; at these altars offerings and prayers were burned. In the middle of the 15th cent. these ceremonies, Taoist in character, were suppressed; like the sacrifices to heaven, they did not conform to the strict orthodoxy of Confucianism.

In the kingdom of Sillā, at a period when the Chinese civilization had already penetrated, the sacrifices in connexion with agriculture kept their national character; they took place three times a year—in spring, summer, and autumn.

One of the most important points in the ancient religion was the worship of mountains, rivers, and seas. The *Sām kuk sa keui* gives a list of the holy places of the kingdom of Sillā, classified into three groups, according to their importance. Under the dynasty of Chosen, sacrifices were regularly offered, sometimes at the places consecrated by tradition, sometimes at a mountain- or river-altar (after 1405 the altars had official guardians). The regulations of 1866 include ritual rules along with a kind of sacred geography. In spite of the intolerance of the Confucianists, who have gradually effaced so many traces of the ancient beliefs, this worship has survived. It is very deep-rooted among the people; there is hardly a sacred mountain where some sanctuary is not to be found, dedicated to the spirit of the place or to a Buddha as its substitute. At every important or difficult pass there is a sacred tree, at the foot of which each passer-by lays a pebble; some travellers tear strips from their garments and tie them to the branches; the devout present rice. Similar offerings are made at the fords and at the eddies of the rivers. The great trees, the *miryek* (gigantic statues, perhaps Buddhist in origin, which occur in fairly large numbers), and the posts painted red, with the tops roughly representing a human head, are the objects of a similar devotion.

A last mark of the ancient religion has reference to ritual purity. At the beginning of each year there were general sacrifices of propitiation and purification; these were offered also in time of war; and at such times all rejoicings were forbidden. Practices analogous to that great annual purification may be found in the feudal China of the Cheu and in ancient Japan. In the modern Chinese worship, fasting and the washing of hands which precedes every sacrifice have not so general a significance. The use of purifications and of public prayers on the occasion of calamities, fires, and invasions is often noted even during the period of Korye, under names which recall the Japanese *Ohobaraki*. The people observed a custom of the same nature; each year, on the 15th day of the 6th moon, they went to wash their hair at the river in order to remove all misfortunes; then they gathered together to drink and make merry.

3. **Ancestor-worship.**—The *Sām kuk sa keui* assigns a remote origin to the worship of the royal ancestors of Sillā.

'Under the king Nām-hal, the second reign, the 3rd year (A.D. 6) in spring, they set up for the first time the temple of Si-cho Hyekkesei; at the four seasons they offered sacrifices to him. His own younger sister, Aro, presided at the sacrifices. King Chi-cheung (500–514), 22nd reign, at Nāi-eul, birthplace of Si-cho, founded a temple in order to offer sacrifice to him. Coming to the 36th reign, king Hyei-kong (765–780) for the first time determined the five temples; he chose king Michu (262–284) as the first ancestor of the Kim family; kings Thāi-chong (654–661) and Mun-mu (661–681), who had pacified Paikchei and Kokurye, and had great merits, were each of them ancestors whose [worship] the successive generations [might] not abolish; with these were grouped his two nearest temples, that made five temples.'

The place of a woman in the ceremonies makes us think of the Imperial Japanese priestesses of Ise and Kamo; and, as in Japan, the guardians of the royal tombs seem to have formed a hereditary class of the population in Sillā and in Kokurye.

The worship of dead kings in Kokurye is thus attested:

'The 3rd year of king Tāi-mu-sin (A.D. 20), the temple of the first ancestor, king Tong-myeng (37–19 B.C.), was built.' The Chinese historians confirm the existence of this worship: 'They have two temples for the spirits; one is called the spirit of Puye, represented by a carved wooden image of a woman; the other is called the spirit of Ko-teung (or, rather, the spirit which rose to the heights); they say he is Si-cho, son of the spirit of Puye. For each temple they have established officials, and send men to guard them. These would be the daughter of the god of the river and Chumong.'

The last phrase, added by the author of the *Sām kuk sa keui*, indicates very precisely that Kokurye adored their first king and his mother; the legend of these two personages, recorded in the *Sām kuk sa keui* and in the inscription of 414 of Kokurye, testifies that Si-cho (Chumong, the king Tong-myeng) and his mother were born in Puye; Si-cho did not die a natural death, but disappeared, rising up to heaven, whence the name Ko-teung.

The worship of the founder of the dynasty is likewise observed in Paikchei and in Kārāk.

Since the 10th cent., at least, the worship of the royal ancestors has been Chinese as regards formulæ and rites; and since the year 988 the Korean rituals have been directly inspired by Chinese rituals. The formalities of ancestor-worship have been extended, in accordance with Chinese principles, to the worship of all spirits. Generally a wooden tablet is inscribed with the name of the spirit; the tablet represents him or acts as a support for him; for the ceremony it is set up on a throne. The name of the sacrifice varies: *chei* and *sa* are applied to the worship of the spirits of nature, the first term referring to the earthly, and the second to the heavenly, spirits; *hyāng* is reserved for the manes; *keui* is a requisition or a proclamation made to the spirits; in the worship of Confucius the expressions *hyāng* and *sek tyen* are found. Some of the sacrifices are offered at a fixed time—*e.g.*, at new moon and full moon, at each season, or in spring and in autumn, according to the diversity of spirits; others take place when special events call for them. The king is sacrificer by right, and officiates in person or by his representatives. The principal sacrificer is assisted by various acolytes, masters of ceremonies, invocators, and others; these are merely assistants, not priests. There is no specially constituted priesthood.

The essential elements of the sacrifice are the offering of incense, cloth, wine, and different kinds of food, and the reading of a prayer; at the great sacrifices, musicians chant hymns and dancers perform [illegible]. A [illegible] ficer, food is then handed to him, which he receives, and, after the ceremony, consumes. The rest of the offering, along with the text of the prayer, is interred in a trench dug for the purpose. The text of the prayer, and the quantity and nature of the offering, vary according to circumstances.

The offerings placed before each tablet for the sacrifice of the proclamation to the gods of the harvests were: two bamboo baskets, covered (dried stag-flesh, chestnuts); two wooden bowls, covered (salted stag-flesh, pickled vegetables); two copper plates, rectangular, covered (rice, sorghum); two wooden plates, round, covered (two kinds of millet); a wooden tray (pork fat); a bamboo basket, covered (cloth); two wax tapers, one perfume-burner, one cup for libations; two bowls of plain wood (pure water, sweet wine); and two pitchers of carved wood (pure water, clarified wine).

Of the places where the official worship is celebrated, some—*myo, tyen, sa*—are covered buildings, separated by courts, and contained within an enclosing wall; and these buildings, more or less extensive and sumptuous, are consecrated to the worship of the manes. The others, *tān*, are altars in the open air, formed of a levelled surface which is raised above the surrounding ground and is

reached by steps; these are encompassed by one or two enclosing walls, square or rectangular in form, often rather low, and built of stone; the altar and the walls are orientated. In the middle of each of the walls is an opening which serves as a passage; it is adorned with the Korean wooden gate, called *hong sāl mun*. The altars are employed for the most part for the worship of the spirits of nature. Several other temples, called *kung* or *myo*, are dedicated to different members of the royal family, heirs to the throne, wives of the second rank, and so on. At death-anniversaries and at several feasts, worship is celebrated at the tombs of the kings and other members of the royal family. The tombs of the kings and queens, *sān reung*, 47 or 48 in number, are situated mostly in the neighbourhood of Se-ul; the tombs of the second and third class, *wen* and *mo*, number more than 10. There are also temples consecrated to Confucius and to various celebrated men and benefactors of the country.

Principal temples and altars.—*Chong myo*, at Se-ul, temple of the royal ancestors of Chosen; *Yeng-heui tyen*, at Se-ul, where the portraits of several kings are honoured; *Kyeng-mo kung*, at Se-ul, built in 1764 for the manes of the crown-prince Chāng-hen (Sa-to); *Hām-heung pon kung*, at Hām-heung, an ancient habitation of Thāi-cho, who founded the Chosen dynasty; *Sung-in tyen*, at Phyeng-yāng, in honour of the legendary Keui-cha, founder (A.D. 1122) of the second kingdom of Chosen; *Sung-tek tyen*, at Kyeng-chu, dedicated to the first king of Sillā; *Mun-sen oang myo*, temple of Confucius at Se-ul; *Koān oāng myo*, at Se-ul, temples of the god of war who fought with the Korean army against the Japanese in 1592 and 1597; *Sen-mu sa*, at Se-ul, in honour of two Chinese generals who fought for Korea in that war; *Mu-ryel sa*, at Phyeng-yāng, dedicated to several Chinese mandarins who took part in the war against the Japanese (1592–98); *Chhung-min sa*, at Sun-thyen, where Ri Sun-sin is honoured, the great Korean admiral who so often conquered the Japanese; *Tāi-yo tān*, at Se-ul, an altar dedicated to three Ming Emperors—Thai-tsu, Shen-tsung, who rescued Korea in 1592–98, and Yi-tsung, the last of the dynasty; and *Sā-chik tān*, at Se-ul, altar of the gods of the harvests.

In theory ancestor-worship exists in every family, just as in the royal family: the eldest son inherits the sacrifices and presents offerings to his father, his grandfather, and great-grandfather, as well as to their wives, *i.e.* to one, two, or three generations of ancestors in the male line; the more remote ancestors have neither tablets nor special offerings. The ceremonies take place at the same periods and in connexion with the same events as those of the worship of the royal ancestors, and may be performed in the principal room of the house, in a room or chapel set apart for this purpose, or near the tombs.

For the sacrifice presented by a man of the people (*i.e.* not an official) to his father and mother, the offerings are by right the following: a bowl of vegetables, a plate of fruits, a bowl of dried meat and of salted meat, a bowl of roasted liver, two bowls of cooked rice, two bowls of broth, a spoon and chop-sticks for two persons, and six cups (of wine).

In practice the aristocracy of the *ryāng-pān* and the demi-aristocracy of the *chung-in* seem to be the only people who celebrate this private worship. It is regulated by the ritual of Chu Hi and by many Korean commentaries, but it is not mentioned, even in a native form, earlier than 1015.

There are many buildings, more or less important, bearing the name of *sa*, *se-uen*, or *myo*, which belong neither to the official nor to the domestic worship. They are dedicated to celebrated men, Korean or Chinese, philosophers, officials, and soldiers, distinguished by their loyalty, their virtues, and the loftiness of their teaching. The little work entitled *Cho tu rok* mentions no fewer than 383 outside of Se-ul—*i.e.*, on an average, more than one for each district. In some of the chapels not more than one personage is adored, in others half a dozen or more; some men receive sacrifices only in one locality, while the names of others are found in all the provinces, or in several districts of each province. If the terms were taken in their exact sense, the *sa* and the *myo* would be essentially the places of worship; in the *se-uen*, the principal part would be the *kāng tāng*, where the disciples gather together to read and comment upon the works of their master, and to discuss and expound his teaching; as a matter of fact, the three expressions are not kept distinct. These chapels, built by the piety of descendants, disciples, and adorers in order to honour the memory of a respected master, received from their founders gifts of rice-plantations and slaves; and often the king bestowed similar benefits on them, exempted them from taxation, or gave them a tablet bearing characters written by his hand.

There is no doubt that the new international conditions of Korea will modify the religious customs.

4. **Buddhism.**—The formalities of Buddhism in Korea do not differ essentially from those in China, whence it has penetrated into the peninsula. The bonze Sun-to, carrying images and sacred texts, was sent to Kokurye by the king of Tshin in A.D. 372; in 384 the bonze Marananda coming from Tsin went to Paikchei; fifty years later some bonzes from Kokurye entered Sillā, which practised the Buddhist precepts in 528. Before long it was forbidden in that kingdom to kill any living thing; many people became monks and gave their goods to the monasteries; some kings took the bonze's robe; and in 551 the dignity of patriarch of the kingdom was created. Under the Korye dynasty Buddhism shone with incomparable radiance; the *kouk sa*, preceptor of the kingdom, was often possessed of great power, while the bonzes, fortified in their monasteries, and owners of numerous slaves and extensive domains, intrigued, plotted, and strove by force of arms against the ministers who displeased them. The dynasty of Chosen, however, treated the monks mainly with distrust; the *chong*, Buddhist Orders or sects, were, by decree, reduced to the number of two (1419), and then abolished (1512). The monastic profession was surrounded by many hindrances (1469); the monasteries of Se-ul were destroyed, and it was forbidden to build others; the bonzes were prohibited from entering the capital and were ranked among the lowest castes. These persecuting laws have been suppressed since the Japanese domination.

5. **Confucianism.**—The accession of the dynasty of Chosen had been, in fact, a reaction against the bonzes and against the Mongols. In opposition to that twofold tyranny, the nobles had become Confucian *literati*. In spite of the encouragement given by several of the first kings of Korye, the teaching of the Chinese sage, scarcely approved of in Sillā, had failed to find more adherents later on, and in the middle of the 13th cent. Ān Yu complained that he saw the temple of Confucius in ruins and the Great School without pupils. After the fall of the Sung in China, many Confucian books were introduced, and *literati* came into the country. This was the beginning of a Confucian renaissance, of which the great names are those of Ri Saik and Cheng Mong-chu (second half of the 14th cent.). The triumph of the *literati* in Korea followed the fall of the Mongols and the accession of the Ming at Peking. The first kings of Chosen, in particular Thāi-chong (1400–1418) and Sei-chong (1418–1450), organized their kingdom according to the principles of the School, revived the competitive examinations and the rules for the conferment of offices, and surrounded themselves with *literati*, whom, however, they knew how to keep in subjection. In the following century, however, the Confucianists grouped in the official provincial schools, the temples, and colleges around renowned masters, communicating from town to town, and represented at Se-ul by the *literati* of the temple of Confucius and often by the highest officials, spoke

out to the court and to the kings. Two princes resisted and were deposed; the others had usually to submit to a strict puritanism founded upon the classics, and to take part in the persecution of all dissenters, Buddhist and others. It was the reign of Chinese rituals; but the *literati* were not of one mind about the interpretation of the texts. They split up into parties, and fought for power; hence arose exiles, massacres, and violation of tombs; all parties at certain times showed equal ferocity, especially in the 16th and 17th centuries, before and after the invasion of the Japanese and that of the Manchus. Among the great sages of that period mention must be made of Ri Theu-kyei, Seng U-kyei, and Ri Ryul-kok, who kept themselves apart from the factions, and He Mok and Song Si-ryel, whose partisans stained the land with blood. Since the 18th cent. the Confucian philosophy has continued to be studied, and the rites have been practised, with milder feelings.

6. Christianity.—Christianity was introduced from Peking in 1784 by some members of the annual embassy; the priests were at first Chinese. The first European missionary who made his way into Korea (1836) was M. Maubant. In 1866 there were in Se-ul and in the provinces twelve missionaries and ten thousand converts, but the massacres decreed in that year almost annihilated the Korean Church. Since 1883, in consequence of the treaties with the European powers, it has been possible to establish all the religious missions openly in the land.

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MAURICE COURANT.

KORKUS.—See KŪRKŪS.

KORWAS.—See MUNDĀS.

KORYBANTES.—See KOURETES AND KORYBANTES.

KOURETES AND KORYBANTES.—1. Kouretes.—The nature and functions of the Kouretes are in great part deducible from a right understanding of their name. We must, in all probability, distinguish between *koúrητες* and *kουρῆτες*, which apparently come from entirely different bases.

Κούρης, 'young man, warrior' (*e.g.*, *Il.* xix. 193, 248), is probably to be connected with Homeric *κοῦρος*, *κούρη*, 'youth, maiden,' Doric *κῶρος*, *κώρᾱ*, which, as shown by the Arcadian form *κόρϝᾱ*, 'maiden,' are for **kor-vos*, **kor-vā*, and are to be connected with the base **kere-*, 'to grow,' which appears, among many other words, in Lat. *creo*, 'I create' (H. Osthoff, *Etymolog. Parerga*, Leipzig, 1901, i. 27; E. Boisacq, *Dict. étymol. de la langue grecque*, Heidelberg, 1907 ff., p. 497). It means properly 'adolescent.' Κουρῆτες (Cretan *κωρῆτας*), on the other hand, the subject of the present art., may represent an original **gor-s-ētes*, and thus be connected with Gr. *κουρά*, 'shearing, tonsure,' and with *κείρω* (**ger-s-yō*), 'I shear, cut.' The Greek lexicographers confused the two bases, and connected *κοῦρος*, *κούρη* with *κουρά*, as in the *Etymologicum Magnum*, *s.v.* *κουρόσυνα*: *κοῦρος . . . λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὁ ξυρὸν αὐτοῦ τὸ γένειον*; *Etymologicum Gudianum*, *s.v.* *κούρη*: *κόρη καὶ Ἰωνικῶς κούρη . . . ἡ κειρομένη ἔτι*. On the other hand, both lexicons, as well as Hesychius, rightly distinguish between *κούρητες* and *κουρῆτες*.

The *κουρῆτες*, then, may be regarded as meaning those who had undergone some form of tonsure, and this tonsure was one of, and perhaps among the Greeks the most important among, the rites of puberty-initiation. Hair among most primitive people is sacred because regarded as a source and vehicle of life (cf. art. HAIR AND NAILS, vol. vi. pp. 474-477). The sprouting of the beard is a mark of virility attained; and, as puberty both for man and for woman has significance only in relation to marriage, Greek custom enacted that a young man should offer his beard and a maiden her locks before entering on marriage. Our earliest definite evidence for hair-shearing as a rite preliminary to marriage is in the *Hippolytos* of Euripides (1425 ff.). Artemis says to Hippolytos:

> Τιμὰς μεγίστας ἐν πόλει Τροζηνίᾳ
> δώσω· κόραι γὰρ ἄζυγες γάμων πάρος
> κόμας κέρουνται σοι.

And Lucian (*de Syr. Dea*, 60), quoting the custom of Troezen, says that it was the same at Hierapolis in Syria.

'The young men offer the firstfruits of their beards (*τῶν γενείων ἀπάρχονται*), and they then let down the locks of the maidens, which have been sacred from their birth. They then cut these off in the sanctuary and place them in vessels, some of silver, and many of gold.' Lucian notes that the name of the dedicator was often inscribed, and adds: 'I did this myself when I was still a youth, and my lock of hair and my name still remain in the sanctuary.'

The Kouretes, then, we may conjecture, were the mythological projection of youths who had undergone puberty-initiation. The custom of hair-shearing survived in the ceremony of *κουρεῶτις*, which gave its name to the third day of the Apatouria at Athens, on which the youths and maidens were enrolled on the phratry-lists, and the children's hair was shorn and dedicated to Artemis.

Strabo devotes most of the 10th book of his *Geography* to the discussion of the Kouretes. What puzzled him was that he knew of two sorts of Kouretes—one sort real young men living and giving their name to tribes living in Eubœa, Ætolia, and Acarnania; the other sort a kind of magical priest, a semi-mythical person attendant on the gods, and akin, according to him, to other mythical ministrants—like Satyrs, Seilenoi, and Tityroi—to Korybantes, Kabeiroi, Idæan Daktyls, and Telchines. The confusion that seems hopeless to Strabo is cleared up for us by comparative anthropology. Two principles necessarily hidden from Strabo serve to unravel the tangle. First, we know now that social institutions tend to 'project' mythological figures. Actual men dancing in animal skins for ritual purposes beget the notion of mythical figures half-men, half-animal, *e.g.* Satyrs. Actual young initiates, or *kouretes*, tend to project mythological idealized Kouretes. The process is marked by the capital letter. The second principle is even more important. Tribal initiation ceremonies, once their purport is obscured, tend to become the mysteries of secret societies. Privileges once open to all at puberty are confined to the few willing to purchase them either by actual payment to already existing members or by submission to particular tests. The initiate, the *koures*, develops into the professional medicine-man.

All over Greece in primitive days there were presumably Kouretes, warriors who had shorn their hair at puberty, but in Krete only do we find the Kouretes as a special sect of medicine-men or embryo priests. The chorus in the *Hypsipyle* of Euripides (frag. iii. 24) tell how Europa landed on holy Krete, rearer of Zeus, 'nurse of the Kouretes,' and the Bacchants sing (Eur. *Bach.* 119):

> Ὦ θαλάμευμα Κουρή-
> των ζαθέου τε Κρήτας
> Διογενέτορες ἔναυλοι.

In Krete, it would seem, was not only the sacred birth-place of Zeus, but the marriage-chamber of the Kouretes. Here, though the Kouretes are half-mythologized, their primary function as marriageable initiates is still remembered, and in the light of this function we can understand the characteristic myth in which they appear as attendants of the Mother (Rhea) and rearers and

protectors of the holy child (Zeus), as παιδοτρόφοι and φύλακες.

'In the Kretan discourses the Kouretes are called the nurses and guardians of Zeus' (Strabo, x. 468).

Krete, then, was by common consent the birth-place of the Kouretes, and, wherever Kretan civilization spread, the specialized Kouretes are apt to be found. Their particular geographical distribution is matter of the general history of the spread of Kretan civilization, and does not here concern us.

The great central worship of Krete was the worship of the Mother-goddess. In the bridal-chamber (θαλάμευμα) of Krete the young men, before they might win their earthly brides, were initiated to the Mountain-Mother, and became symbolically her consorts or husbands; by this ceremony her fertility was promoted and theirs safeguarded. In natural sequence these potential fathers became the guardians of the Mother's child, re-born each year, on whose re-birth the fertility of nature and man alike depended. This marriage of the initiate with the Queen or Mother underlies all the Kretan and Asia Minor mysteries. On an Orphic gold tablet the mystic avows Δεσποίνας δὲ ὑπὸ κόλπου ἔδυν χθονίας βασιλείας, and one formulary of the mysteries of Dea was ὑπὸ τὸν παστὸν ὑπέδυν, where the παστός corresponds exactly to the marriage-chamber (θαλάμευμα) of the Kretan Kouretes.

The functions of the *koures* in the secondary and derivative sense as medicine-man, a member of a secret society, were not confined, any more than were those of the young tribal initiate, to that of marriage. It was the multiplicity of these functions that puzzled Strabo. He finds that the Kouretes are magicians, prophets, and armed dancers, as well as child-rearers, and always half-dæmonic. These manifold functions are natural enough if we regard the Kouretes as a blend of medicine-man and culture-hero. The medicine-man is always half-dæmonic, and often dressed up as a bogey; he is always a seer and a healer, always charged with magical power, and it is interesting to find that Epimenides, the great magician-healer of Krete who was summoned to Athens to purify the city, was hailed as the 'New Koures' (Κουρής, not Κοῦρος, as in the printed edd.). He was a man of Phaistos, according to Plutarch (*Vita Sol.* xii.), 'an adept in religious matters dealing with the lore of orgiastic and initiatory rites,' and his life, with its magical sleep in the Diktæan cave and its dream-taught lore, reads like the tale of the initiation of a savage medicine-man.

Diodorus brings the Kouretes before us as culture-heroes, as the projections, half-historical, half-mythological, of man's primitive energies and discoveries. They dwelt, he tells us, on mountains and in wooded places and glens where there was natural shelter. They were distinguished by their ingenuity in inventing things for the common good. They first taught men to collect four-footed beasts in flocks, to tame wild animals, the art of bee-keeping, how to hunt and shoot, and they

'taught men how to live together in societies, and were the originators of harmony and a certain good order. They also discovered swords and helmets and armed dances, and by means of those they made a great din and deceived Kronos' (v. 65).

Following Diodorus, modern mythologists have always explained the characteristic clashing of arms by the Kouretes as part of the tendance of the holy child. As such it appears in the reliefs and on the various coins where the birth is represented. The Mother and child, or sometimes the child only, are figured in the centre, and above them the Kouretes clash their shields. Rendel Harris has shown that the shield- or, rather, cymbal-clashing was connected with the child's sacred *food*, as much as or more than with the child. 'Butter and honey shall he eat.' His nursing mothers (τροφοί) are Amalthea ('she of the milk') and Melissa, the honey-bee. It was 'a rude music meant to call the swarming bees to a new hive' (*Boanerges*, p. 350). It finds its counterpart in the 'noise of tin pans and kettles which may be heard in the neighbourhood of any cottage in the country when the bees are swarming.' Virgil remembers the connexion between bees and the cymbals of the Mother. When the bees swarm, he says, strew bruised balm-leaves and honey-wort,

'Tinnitusque cie, et Matris quate cymbala circum' (*Georg.* iv. 64),

and a little later he definitely connects the bees and the Kouretes, speaking of the bees as

'Curetum sonitus crepitantiaque aera secutae' (*ib.* 151).

It is important to note that on our earliest monument representing the Kouretes—one of the votive bronze shields, found actually in the sacred cave on Mt. Ida and dating about the 8th cent. B.C.—the Kouretes are clashing not shields but cymbals or a sort of gong.

Though their aspect as culture-heroes was of great importance, the central function of the Kouretes remained that of husbands and potential fathers. On the symbolic performance in ritual of this function depended the fertility and, in general, the luck or fate of the whole community. Of this, happily, we are certain, owing to the discovery of a priceless monument, the Hymn of the Kouretes, recently found at Palaikastro in Eastern Krete. The Hymn dates from about the 4th cent. A.D., but it embodies a much older original. It opens with an invocation to the 'Kouros most great,' the mythical projection of the band of *kouroi*. He is addressed as 'Kronian,' as 'Lord of all that is wet and gleaming' (παγκρατὲς γάνους), *i.e.* lord of moisture and of life begotten and nurtured by moisture. Moreover—an all-important point—he is bidden to come to Dikte 'for the year' (ἐς ἐνιαυτόν). The birth and nurture of the holy child are then recounted—a birth which implied to the ears of the initiated a sacred ritual marriage. The Hymn then passes to the consequences of the holy birth. Because the child is annually born, the Seasons (Horæ) began to be fruitful year by year; the cause of the Seasons, their order and way (Dikē), is inaugurated, never again to be disturbed, and in virtue of this birth there results fertility for man and beast, for flocks and herds and bee-hives, for cities and seafaring ships, and finally, by virtue of this goodly rite (θέμιν) of initiation, fertility for the newly initiated citizens (κὲς ν[εοὺς πολ]είτας). For all this the worshippers and their god are bidden in primitive fashion to 'leap' (θόρε). The Kouretes stand then as salient examples of two fundamental principles in primitive Greek religions. (1) Mythological figures are the projection of (*a*) social structure, and (*b*) human activities. The Kouretes reflect the matrilinear social structure, which centres in the Mother and Child, with accessory consort or consorts. Their religion was obscured and all but effaced by the later patriarchal system in which the Father dominates the Mother, and in which tribal initiation at puberty has ceased to be prominent; the human energies expressed by the Kouretes are those of fighting and fatherhood combined with early food-producing activities—the tending of flocks and herds and bees. (2) Primitive ritual is always magical in character; *i.e.*, the worshipper *does* what he wants done, his rites are those of magical induction; he marries that the land may be fertile, he tends symbolically a holy child that his own children may be nurtured.

Then, as the religious instinct develops, he projects a dæmon leader—a Greatest Kouros, to whom he hands over the functions which he himself performed.

2. Korybantes.—The Korybantes are but a specialized form of one function of the Kouretes; they are the embodiments or projections of the orgiastic ritual-dance. Their name is of interest; it means 'peak.' Thus the Macedonian form of *koryphe*, 'mountain-peak,' is *korybe*, and is probably akin to *kurbasia*, a peaked head-dress worn by, *e.g.*, the Persian king and the Roman Salii, figures near akin to the Kouretes. The Korybantes, like the Kouretes, had initiation-mysteries which seem to have emphasized death and burial rather than marriage and birth; but it must be borne in mind that death and burial rites, followed by resurrection, are equally effective 'medicine' for fertility with rites of marriage and birth. The Peak-Men were naturally, like the Kouretes, satellites of the Mountain-Mother, and in her honour celebrated wild mountain dances (ὀρειβάσια). Some said that they were the first men sprung from the Earth in the form of bees. Their worship was confused with that of the Kabeiroi, and they were at home in Phrygia rather than in Krete. To Plato the Korybantic dances are the stock instance of orgiastic κάθαρσις (*Legg.* 790 D: τὰ τῶν Κορυβάντων ἰάματα). This κάθαρσις by dancing included for the ancient Kouretes and Korybantes, as for the modern savage, two elements apparently contrasted, but in reality closely inter-connected—the expulsion of evil, *i.e.* barrenness, sickness, madness, and the induction of good, *i.e.* fertility, health, growth, and sanity. To-day in French Guinea, while some of the natives sow seed, a man armed with a musket dances, and the intent of this is explained as twofold: for exorcizing the spirits and causing the grain to sprout; and in West Africa at sowing time half of the people go out armed for battle, the other half carry only farm tools.

LITERATURE.—For literary and monumental evidence see Roscher, *s.v.* 'Kureten,' Daremberg-Saglio, *s.v.* 'Curetes,' and O. Gruppe, *Griech. Mythol. und Religionsgesch.*, Munich, 1906, Index, *s.v.* 'Kureten' and 'Körybantes.' For the Palaikastro Hymn of the Kouretes see three artt. in *BSA* xv. [1908-09] 309-365, by R. C. Bosanquet, Gilbert Murray, and J. E. Harrison, discussing respectively the finding of the Hymn, the editing of the text, and its religious significance. For the Kouretes as initiates and culture-heroes see J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 6 ff., 51 ff.; for their relation to matrilinear culture, *ib.* p. 492 ff. For the Kouretes as consorts of the Mother see A. B. Cook, *Zeus, the Indo-European Sky-God*, Cambridge, 1914, p. 650, and *ib.* pp. 23, 24, note 6, for the interpretation of the Kouretes as those of the shorn hair. For the Korybantes as Peak-Men, *ib.* p. 107. For the cymbal-clashers as bee-keepers see J. Rendel Harris, *Boanerges*, Cambridge, 1913, pp. 348-357. For prophylactic and inductive functions of armed dancing priests see J. G. Frazer, *GB*[3], pt. vi., 'The Scape-goat,' London, 1913, p. 231 ff. For bronze shields of the Idæan cave see F. Poulsen, *Der Orient und die frühgriechische Kunst*, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 74-82.

J. E. HARRISON.

KRISHNA.—See INCARNATION (Indian).

KSHATRIYAS.—See CASTE.

KURDS.—See SUNNIS, KIZIL BASH.

KŪRKŪS.

1. Race, habitat, and census.—The Kūrkūs belong to the Munda family of India, and are closely akin to the Kols of Chotā Nāgpur and the Santāls of the Santāl Parganas.[1] They inhabit the Sātpurā hills and the contiguous plains in the Central Provinces, especially the Districts of Hoshangābād, Nimār, Betūl, and the Melghāt Tālnq of Ellichpur. Their total number, as given in the Census of 1911, was 152,363, which marks an increase of 27 per cent on the returns of 1901, whereas the latter showed a decrease of 8 per cent on those of the previous decade, due to the famine years from 1897 onward.

[1] For an account of the distribution of this family, and a discussion as to the propriety of the various terms by which it has been dominated, see *Linguistic Survey of India*, iv. [1906] 2 ff.; and cf. *Census of India*, 1901, i. 278.

2. Tribal organization.—The Kūrkūs are also known by the name Muāsī; but this, again, is used as a subdivisional name along with three other terms, viz. Bāwariā, Rūma, and Bondoyā. Thus the Kūrkūs are divided into four sub-tribes, mainly on a territorial basis, but also with a marked traditional cleavage approximating to caste distinction. The sub-tribes are further divided into totemic septs, named, for the most part, after trees, plants, animals, and other natural objects, animate or inanimate—*e.g.*, Chilāūī (*Cæsalpinia sepiaria*), Jāmbū (*Eugenia jambolana*), Bēṭē (*Gmelina arborea*, Roxb.), Tākhēr (cucumber), Sākōm (leaf), Mūrirānā (peafowl), Dhāprī (ass), Ākhandī (mountain), Kāsā (earth), and Āthoā (wooden ladle). Accounts vary as to the correct number of these septs. According to one version, each sub-tribe has 36 septs. The writer of this article has been assured by Kūrkūs that the number is properly 12½, which is also the figure given by Driver;[1] but the sept names in actual use are found to exceed these limits, so that the statement is probably due to Gond—and ultimately to Hindu—influence. The origin of these sept divisions is naturally hidden in obscurity, though various stories are current which purport to give the explanation. The art. 'Kor'ku' in the *Ethnographic Survey of the Central Provinces* (iii. 'Draft Articles on Forest Tribes' [1907] 54) records a tradition that

'the names are derived from trees and other articles in or behind which the ancestors of each sept took refuge after being defeated in a great battle.'

A variant of this was told to the present writer to the effect that the names were given by Bhagwān on an occasion when he called the ancestors of the tribe into his presence and inquired whence they had come, and, as each one indicated the locality by reference to some special object, Bhagwān named him accordingly. Perhaps this version looks more in the direction of J. G. Frazer's theory that the ultimate explanation of totemistic names is to be sought in connexion with primitive ignorance regarding the processes of procreation, though it would be precarious to lay particular stress on any special interpretation of such unstable traditions. With the predominance of the totemic sept, there is a corresponding weakness in the development of the clan principle. But, while the latter fails to affect the general organization of the tribe, various degrees of relationship are distinguished with great particularity, as among the Hindus; and what Frazer (*Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 21) notes as characteristic where the 'classificatory system' prevails holds good among the Kūrkūs, viz. that the language

'has separate terms for elder brother [*dādā* or *dādū*] and younger brother [*bōkō*], for elder sister [*bāī* or *jijī*] and younger sister [*bōkōjē*], but no term for brother in general or for sister in general.'

The Kūrkūs, like some sections of the Gond tribe, occasionally seek to establish a Rājput ancestry, and various tales are current with this intent. The element of truth here seems to be that some measure of intercourse has taken place, resulting in the loss of caste on the part of individual Rājputs and their identification with the Kūrkū people. The term Rāj Kūrkū is, however, regarded as an honourable distinction and is usually reserved for the wealthier and more powerful members of the tribe.

3. Social and religious practices.—The Kūrkūs are animists, but their animism is modified by a considerable admixture of Hindu beliefs and practices. This is reflected in the 1911 Census, which

[1] *JASBe* lxi. pt. i. [1893] 128 ff.

gives figures showing more than half the Kūrkū people as Hinduized. But the figures cannot be relied on as an exact index of the change. The process is too gradual and imperceptible to admit of mathematical treatment, especially at the hands of unskilled enumerators. The influence of Hinduism is distinctly noticeable in the current folklore of the Kūrkūs, the simpler substrata of which are now largely overlaid with names and notions foreign to the tribal tradition. Thus the horse, which to the Kūrkū is the agent of malevolent spiritual powers—a notion which perhaps echoes some old-time terror aroused by the incursions of a warlike foe—has become associated with Indra; the crow, which fulfils a traditional function reminiscent of Noah's raven and dove, is transformed into Kāgeśwar; and the spiritual powers, which, according to the limitations of the Kūrkū language and the genius of their primitive animism, were expressed, in highest terms, by the names for the sun and the moon, are now resolved into a council of gods in which not only Bhagwān but also Mahādeo, Indra, and other deities and demi-gods find a place. But the more original elements can usually be distinguished and the crude fabric of a naive cosmology pieced together. They have their own story of creation, in which man is fashioned from red earth; stories to account for the origin of vegetation and of death; a story of a lost revelation in which a dog, the agent of the beneficent spiritual powers and the enemy of the horse, appears with the message written in the venation of a leaf of the Kēndē Nāngan creeper—the signs are still there, but are no longer legible! While the Kūrkūs are coming gradually to recognize Hindu deities and to observe some of the Hindu festivals, much of their religion is still peculiarly their own. Their everyday beliefs and practices are of the aboriginal order, their normal hopes and fears continuing to find common expression by means of animistic symbols and rites. Their more familiar objects of worship—Mūtūā Gōmōij (the village god), Dōngōr Gōmōij (the jungle god), and Hardūlī Gōmōij (the cholera god)—come under this category. They usually consist of mere heaps of stones, frequently with a lump of quartz crystal on top. *Gōmōij* is the Kūrkū word for the sun, which, according to Kūrkū conceptions, is the supreme power in the universe. The Kūrkūs have their own priests (*bhūmkās*), and are in no way dependent on Brāhmanical direction. The customs observed at the birth of a child, and at marriage and funeral ceremonies, are, in the main, likewise peculiar to the people, though in the case of marriage customs in particular there is a tendency to copy their Hindu neighbours.

On the birth of a child, the father is excluded from the house for five days, and compelled to rest content with the shelter of a cattle-shed or similar building not used as an ordinary human habitation. Child-marriage is the exception among the Kūrkūs, though it is said to be increasing under Hindu influence. The septs are exogamous; the sub-tribes normally endogamous. Usually a marriage is arranged through the mediation of friends of the prospective bridegroom's family. These wait upon the parents of the girl, who, as a matter of etiquette, reject the proposals and maintain their opposition thereto for a period which may extend from a few months to two years. But at last their consent is gained and the bride-price is agreed on—usually about sixty rupees. One peculiar custom observed at a Kūrkū wedding may be noticed here, because of its probable relation to earlier polygamous practices: the bridegroom and his elder brother's wife are made to stand on a blanket and embrace seven times. Sometimes the father of the girl insists on the would-be husband working for a period of years in lieu of the payment of the bride-price, but not infrequently this leads to a runaway marriage on the part of the couple concerned, in which case an indemnity may be demanded of the boy's parents. Polygamy is permitted, the main restriction being the practical one which arises from the very frequent absence of means to support a large household. The women-folk are well-treated, but there is no trace of the matriarchate with regard to sept-genealogy or inheritance: children belong to the sept of the father, and the property is divided among the widow and the unmarried sons. Kūrkūs may either burn or bury their dead. The latter is the more common method. The spirit of the deceased is set at rest at a subsequent ceremony called *shādūli*, in connexion with which elaborate rites are performed, extending over three days, and consummated by the erection of a memorial post rudely carved with representations of the sun and the moon, facing the east, and other figures of men on horseback, dancers, apes, peacocks, fowls, crabs, spiders, trees, etc.

The Kūrkūs have many practices which give evidence of their belief in imitative and sympathetic magic.

LITERATURE.—*Ethnographic Survey of the Central Provinces*, III. (Allāhābād, 1907) 49 ff.; C. A. Elliott, *Settlement Report Hoshangabad District*, do. 1867; S. Hislop, *Papers relating to the Aboriginal Tribes of the Central Provinces*, Nāgpur, 1866, p. 26; *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, do. 1870, p. 49.

JOHN DRAKE.

KURUKH.—See ORĀONS.

KUŚINAGARA (**Kuśanagara**, or **Kusinārā** [Pāli]).—The most ancient name is said to have been Kuśāvatī, which is connected in *Jātaka* 531 with a legendary king Kusa, son of Okkāka (Ikṣvāku). Well-authenticated and credible tradition affirms that Gautama Buddha, Śākyamuni, died and was cremated close to Kusinārā, which consequently became one of the four most holy places of Buddhism, and one of the most frequented pilgrim shrines.

At the time of Buddha's death (*c.* 487 B.C., or, as others prefer, 483), Kusinarā was described as 'this sorry little town, this rough little town in the jungle, this little suburban town' (Introd. to *Jātaka* 95, tr. E. B. Cowell and R. Chalmers, i. 231), and evidently was a place of no intrinsic importance. But its association with the last scene of the Buddha's life made it famous throughout the Buddhist world, and drew such multitudes of pilgrims that the petty town became the centre of important religious establishments and grew in population and size. It was visited at the beginning of the 5th cent. after Christ by Fa-Hian (Fa-Hsien), the first Chinese pilgrim, who writes briefly as follows:

'East from here [Rāmagrāma] four [three, Beal and Giles] *yojanas*, there is the place where the heir apparent [Gautama Buddha] sent back Chaṇḍaka with his white horse, and there also a tope was erected. Four *yojanas* to the east from this (the travellers) came to the Charcoal tope, where there is also a monastery. Going on twelve *yojanas*, still to the east, they came to the city of Kuśanagara, on the north of which between two trees, on the bank of the Nairañjana river [Hiraṇyavatī, Beal; Hsi-lien, Giles], is the place where the World-honoured one, with his head to the north, attained *parinirvāṇa* (and died)' (*Travels*, ch. xxiv., Legge's version). The pilgrim mentions several topes [*stūpas*] and monasteries as still existing, and proceeds: 'In the city the inhabitants are few and far between, comprising only the families belonging to the (different) societies of monks.' He then traces the road in a south-easterly and easterly direction for 17 *yojanas* [12 + 5, the 5 being 10 in Legge] to Vaiśāli, the modern Basārh (about 25° 58′ N., 85° 11′ E.), which lies about 27 miles a little west of north from Patna.

The earlier Pāli account in the *Parinibbāna Sutta* gives the names of several villages lying between Vaiśāli and Kuśinagara (Kusinārā) which would settle the position of the place, if they could be identified, but, unfortunately, there is no clue to their identification. The next and only other detailed description of Kuśinagara after that of Fa-Hian is that recorded by Hiuen Tsiang (Yuan Chwang), about A.D. 637. He enters into much detail concerning both the geographical position of the town and its topographical features. At first sight it would seem that his account should preclude all doubts, and yet, when it is critically considered, doubts remain as to the identification of the site. The publications enumerated in the Literature below examine the question in all its bearings.

The later pilgrim agrees substantially with the earlier in the statement of the distance and direction of the Ashes (= Embers = Charcoal) *stūpa* from the fixed point of the Lumbini garden

(Rummindēī), the distance according to Fa-Hian being 12 *yojanas*, and according to Hiuen Tsiang about 480 or 490 *li*, at the rate of 40 *li* to the *yojana*. In direction the only difference is that Fa-Hian gives an easterly bearing for all the stages, whereas Hiuen Tsiang places the Ashes *stūpa* to the S.E. of the next preceding stage, namely, the *stūpa* of Chandaka's return. He is habitually more precise in the indication of direction than his predecessor. Fa-Hian states that Kuśinagara lay 12 *yojanas* (about 90 miles marching distance) to the east of the Ashes *stūpa*. Hiuen Tsiang does not give the distance, but places Kuśinagara to the N.E. of that *stūpa*, and notes that the road was a narrow and dangerous path, infested with wild oxen, wild elephants, and murderous robbers who haunted the great forest.

From those elements, combined with the statement that Kuśinagara was close to the river Airāvatī (*al.* Ajitavatī, *al.* Hiraṇyavatī), the present writer deduced the conclusion that the site of Kuśinagara must be sought in Nepāl beyond the passes, close to the Little Rāptī or Airāvatī, somewhere about 84° 51′ E., 27° 32′ N. General H.H. Prince Khadga Sumsher Jung Rana Bahadur, sometime Governor of West Nepāl, in a letter to the *Pioneer Mail*, dated Feb. 26, 1904, declared that the spot where Gautama Buddha attained *nirvāṇa* 'was at the confluence of the Hiraṇyavatī and Achīravatī, near Bhavasār Ghāṭ,' *i.e.* the confluence of the Little Rāptī with the Gandak. That site seems best to satisfy the terms of both the pilgrims' itineraries as traced from the Lumbinī garden, but the identification has not been verified by local examination. So far, the result of the investigation seems to be satisfactory enough; but, when we come to discuss the bearings of Kuśinagara in relation to two other fixed points, Benares and Vaiśālī, fresh difficulties arise. Fa-Hian makes Vaiśālī lie in a south-easterly direction from Kuśinagara, at a distance of 17 *yojanas* (=about 127 miles), and those details do not at all suit the site indicated in Nepāl, while they suit the rival site near Kasiā. Hiuen Tsiang reckons about 700 *li* (say 130 miles marching distance) from Kuśinagara to the kingdom of Benares, in a south-westerly direction. If he meant to reckon the distance to the city of Benares, the actual distance from the supposed Nepālese site is much greater; but, if we assume that the distance was reckoned to the river Ghāgrā (Gogra), the pilgrim's estimate might be accepted. These remarks are enough to indicate the nature of the difficulties which exist in interpreting the detailed itineraries recorded by the Chinese pilgrims in the 5th and 7th centuries. Full statement and discussion of those difficulties is impossible in this place.

Kuśinagara has usually been identified with the remarkable group of Buddhist ruins lying near Kasiā (about 26° 45′ N., 83° 55′ E.), 35 miles due east from Gorakhpur city and in the Gorakhpur District. The principal remains, which lie in the lands of Bisanpur, to the west of Kasiā, were formerly enclosed within a boundary wall surrounding a space of about 36 acres. They comprise many structures, including a great *stūpa* and a temple containing a colossal recumbent image of the Dying Buddha, almost unique in India, and executed in the 5th cent. A.D. Excavation has proved that the site was regarded as one of the highest sanctity continuously from the time of Aśoka to the end of the 12th cent.—during some fourteen or fifteen centuries. Several great monasteries of various dates have been revealed, besides other buildings and crowds of votive *stūpas*. The site unquestionably was one of the most venerated spots in the world for Buddhist pilgrims, and the colossal image of the Dying Buddha agrees well with Hiuen Tsiang's description of a similar image at Kuśinagara. But in other respects the remains do not agree with the pilgrim's detailed account. He saw the remains of a walled town.

> 'The city walls,' he observes, 'were in ruins, and the towns and villages were deserted. The brick foundations of the "old city" (that is, the city which had been the capital) were above ten *li* (2 miles) in circuit; there were very few inhabitants, the interior of the city being a wild waste' (Watters, ii. 25).

It is difficult to believe that all trace of the old walls should have disappeared, but it is admitted that now there is no sign of them, although plenty of extremely ancient fortifications remain at numerous sites in the Gorakhpur District. In the neighbourhood of Kasiā there is no considerable town, and the demand for bricks has never been large. Moreover, the pilgrim places the Ajitavatī (*al.* Airāvatī, *al.* Hiraṇyavatī) river to the N.W. of the town, but there is no river near Kasiā. He also states that in his time the great *stūpa*, although ruinous, was still above 200 ft. high. The existing great *stūpa*, re-constructed or repaired apparently in the 5th cent., prior to the pilgrim's visit, never can have been more than half that height. These facts led the present writer in 1896 to reject decisively the identification of the remains near Kasiā with Kuśinagara. His finding to that effect was generally accepted for some years.

The later explorations of the Archæological Survey, however, have produced fresh evidence complicating the problem. Many hundreds of seals belonging to the Mahāparinirvāṇa monastery have been discovered, besides others belonging to the Makuṭabandha or Bandhana ('Diadem') monastery. Both those institutions undoubtedly were at Kuśinagara. The fact that most of the seals were broken, as if torn from letters and parcels, seems to indicate that the sealed packets were sent from Kuśinagara to the dependent institution near Kasiā. The people at the latter place cannot have addressed letters to themselves. The inference thus deduced is confirmed by the discovery of one seal-die belonging to the Veṭhadīpa or Viṣṇudvīpa monastery, which stood at one of the eight places among which the relics of Buddha were originally divided. So far as the seals go, they lead to the conclusion that the ruins near Kasiā mark the site of Veṭhadīpa or Viṣṇudvīpa.

A still later discovery, however, throws doubt on that conclusion. The Survey found enshrined in the relic chamber of the *stūpa* adjoining the colossal recumbent image a copper plate distinctly inscribed as having been deposited 'in the [*Parini*]*rvāṇa chaitya*.' We know that a building called the *Parinirvāṇa* temple ('temple du Pan-nie-p'an') existed at Kuśinagara (travels of Ta-ch'êng-têng in Chavannes, *Voyages de pèlerins bouddhistes*, p. 73). That discovery of the copper plate, consequently, seems to indicate that the remains near Kasiā must be those of Kuśinagara. The only other conceivable explanation is that the shrine at Viṣṇudvīpa also may have been called a *Parinirvāṇa chaitya*. The remark must be added that the bearings from Kuśinagara to both Vaiśālī and Benares as given by both pilgrims agree much better with the Kasiā site than with the Nepāl site. On the other hand, it has been shown that the detailed itineraries from the Lumbinī garden, an absolutely certain fixed point, cannot be reconciled with the position of the Kasiā site, which, moreover, has no river and no walled town.

On the whole, the present writer is of opinion that the remains near Kasiā most probably are those of Veṭhadīpa or Viṣṇudvīpa, that the site of Kuśinagara is to be sought in Nepāl, and that it is most likely to be found at the confluence of the Little Rāptī with the Gandak. But positive certainty is not attainable at present. Almost conclusive evidence against the Kasiā site is

afforded by the testimony of the pilgrims that in or about A.D. 405 and 637 Kuśinagara and its vicinity lay desolate and in ruins, whereas we know that at the Kasiā site building was in active progress during the 5th cent., and that it continued for some seven centuries later. Moreover, it is not credible that the road from Kasiā to Benares can ever have been the narrow and difficult path, infested by wild beasts and robbers, described by Hiuen Tsiang. His account suits well if applied to the passes of the Somēsar range.

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V. A. SMITH.

KWAN-YIN.—Kwan-yin or Kwan-shi-yin (Kwan-non or Kwan-je-on in Japanese) is the Chinese name for Avalokiteśvara, and means 'one who looks (*kwan*) towards a (supplicatory) sound (*yin*) of the world (*shi*).'

1. History.—(*a*) *China.*—The oldest Chinese name was Kuang-shi-yin, 'shining over the sound of the world,'[1] and the original name appears at about the same time in a vague transcription, 'A-ha-Lou-huan,' in a Sukhāvativyūha text translated into Chinese A.D. 147-186.[2] The worship of Kwan-yin, however, does not seem to have been very popular until Kumārajīva translated the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* (the 'Lotus of the Good Law'), A.D. 402-412, in which he introduced the name Kwan-shi-yin, of which Kwan-yin is a curtailed form. The section on the *Samantamukha* (25th in Chin. and 24th in Skr.) of the text in question specially relates to the Bodhisattva, and has been widely read in China.[3]

The popularity of the belief was further increased when the famous Chi-i, the founder of the Tien-t'ai school in China, wrote several treatises on the *Samantamukha* section (589-618),[4] and since that time practically all the schools of Chinese Buddhism seem to have adopted the worship.

The pilgrims who witnessed the worship of the saint in India also contributed much to the propagation of the belief at home. Fa-Hian (399-414) says that all the followers of the Mahāyāna in India honour the saint, and, when his home-bound ship is in danger during a gale, he hastens to pray to him. Hiuen Tsiang (629-645), who introduced a new translation of the name, viz. Kuan-ts'u-ts'ai, 'Self-existent who gazes' or 'Gazing Lord,' records the presence of images of the saint almost everywhere in India, and mentions a *pūjā* to him by King Śīlāditya of Kanauj during the festival. I-Tsing (671-695) distinguishes the Mahāyāna from the Hīnayāna by the worship of Bodhisattvas, which is peculiar to the former. These facts are fully borne out by the discovery of the sculptured images of the saint from the valley of Gandhāra to the caves of Ellora for a period of about eight or nine centuries.

With the introduction into China of the *mantra* school of Buddhism during the T'ang and the Sung dynasties (*c.* A.D. 700-900), the cult of Kwan-yin seems to have become exceedingly powerful, its climax being reached in the reign of Wen-tsung, who, in 828, ordered that an image of Kwan-yin should be set up and worshipped in all monasteries of the Empire, which then numbered about 44,600.[1] We do not know its fate after the decline of the mystic school in China.

(*b*) *Japan.*—The worship of Kwan-non in Japan is almost as old as the introduction of Buddhism (A.D. 552). In the reign of the Empress Sui-ko (593-628) the saint found an able devotee in the Crown Prince Shōtoku, who built a special hall for him called Yume-dono, 'Hall of Dreams,' in the Hōriuji monastery. Here he used to sit and meditate every morning before he attended to State affairs. He himself wrote a commentary on the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, including the *Samantamukha* section. The subsequent development of Japanese Buddhism centres in the text of the 'Lotus,' the two powerful sects of Tendai and Hokké being founded on the doctrine of the text. The twelve sects of Japanese Buddhism all honour or worship the saint directly or indirectly; there is, in fact, no other deity so popular as Kwan-non. He is the principal figure in art, both pictorial and plastic, in general literature, and in the religious life of the Japanese.

A religious reform movement started lately, basing its foundation solely on the doctrine of Avalokiteśvara, and it is fairly successful.

2. General character.—Kwan-yin is a bodily healer as well as a saviour. His relation to Amitābha is like that of Maitreya to Śākyamuni, and the boundless mercy of Amitābha is made known only through his efforts. Until all beings have been saved he himself will not become Buddha. He would, it is said, ever remain in midstream with his boat ready to carry beings across. There are more than 60 books in the Chinese Tripiṭaka which profess to teach the mercy of the saint.

The principal exposition, however, will be found in the *Samantamukha* section already mentioned. The devotees make this a separate text, calling it the 'Avalokiteśvara sūtra,' and recite it every day. The expedients (*upāya*) with which he approaches the world are minutely described in the text, and are literally believed by the people.

3. Incarnations.—Thirty-three manifestations in which Kwan-yin has approached the people are given in Kumārajīva's translation of the 'Lotus,' whereas in the Sanskrit text only sixteen are mentioned. But the number thirty-three has become so sacred and peculiar to the saint in China and Japan that a simple mention of thirty three *avatārs* implies him. While instructing the people he would assume any form of incarnation that was necessary, such as a Buddha, *Pratyekabuddha*, *śrāvaka* ('disciple'), Brahmā, Indra, Īśvara, Maheśvara (Śiva), the heavenly general (*Senāpati*), Vaiśravaṇa (Kubera), a Rāja, a merchant, a female merchant, a retired man, a retired woman, a minister, a minister's wife, a Brahman, a female

[1] Bunyiu Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka*, Oxford 1883, no. 232 (A.D. 148-170).

[2] *Ib.* no. 25.

[3] J. Takakusu, *Record of the Buddhist Religion . . . by I-Tsing*, Oxford, 1896, p. 102.

[4] Nanjio, *Cat.*, nos. 1555, 1557, 1562.

[1] See E. H. Parker, *China and Religion*, London, 1905, p. 135.

Brāhman, a mendicant, a female mendicant, an *upāsaka* (layman), an *upāsikā* (laywoman), a boy, a girl, a *deva*, a *nāga*, a *yakṣa* (demon), a *gandharva* (heavenly musician), an *asura*, a *garuḍa*, a *kinnara*, a *mahoraga* (great serpent), or *vajra-pāṇi*. That the number thirty-three was not originally intended, however, is obvious from the fact that the names enumerated often differ from one another. Actually thirty-three forms of Kwan-yin have been created and often represented in art. In Japan there are thirty-three sacred places of pilgrimage where some one of the seven Kwan-nons given below is enshrined and worshipped. The thirty-three shrines of the Western region (Saikoku) are the most famous, while those of the Eastern region (Ban-tō) and those of Chichibu are also renowned. Besides, there is in Kyoto a great hall of Kwannon called the 'Thirty-three partitioned Hall' (San-jū-san-gen-dō), which contains 1,000 images of the saint. There are smaller heads on the foreheads and haloes, or held in the hands of these images, altogether making up the number 33,333.

4. Activities.—Seven cases of distress are generally specified in which Kwan-yin is ready to extend his hand of mercy. These are generally selected from the thirteen cases of distress of the *Samantamukha* section; they are dangers caused by a sword, fetters or chains, fire, water, demons (*rākṣasa*), goblins (*bhūta*), and an enemy. Sometimes danger by storm is added to these to make four pairs complete, and facilitate pictorial representation.

In the so-called Buddhist litany represented in some sculptured reliefs of Ajanta (no. 4), Ellora (no. 3), Aurangābād (no. 7), and Kānheri (no. 4), we can trace several scenes of dangers more or less akin to the above seven. In the cave of Ajanta (no. 4) we see a representation of dangers from an elephant, a lion, an enemy with a sword, and a young man against a woman, on one row, and those from a fire, a snake, a flood, and a female against a male, on the other, while a standing figure of Kwan-yin is represented at the centre. In Ellora (no. 3), fire, sword, and flood are noticeable, while the rest are quite indistinct. In one of the eastern caves, Aurangābād (no. 7), we have a very good representation of the litany. The eight scenes are specified by a fire, a sword, a thief, and a shipwreck on the right, and a lion, a snake, an elephant, and a man with a woman on the left. Kwan-yin is flying towards the centre to their rescue.

Further, in one of the 108 caves of Kānheri (no. 4) the scenes are ten instead of eight: (1) a girl with a man; (2) a man in a striking attitude before a snake-king; (3) a man brandishing a sword against a female with a child; (4) a man with a stick before another who is prostrating himself; (5) a man squatting and one side invisible; (6) an elephant; (7) a lion; (8) a serpent; (9) a man lifting both hands over his head, his body invisible, probably drowning; (10) a man with his hands raised, probably in a pushing attitude. Thus almost all the thirteen cases mentioned in the 'Lotus' are to be found represented in these caves, which are probably excavations of the 7th or 8th cent. and are certainly Mahāyānistic.

We can safely conclude from these facts, and from the records of eye-witnesses of the same period, that the text of the *Samantamukha* section of the 'Lotus,' or at any rate the belief in Kwan-yin as the saviour of the distressed world, was in vogue and very popular among Buddhists during the same period as it was in China and Japan.

5. Kwan-yins adopted into the mystical school of Buddhism.—Six or seven Kwan-yins are enumerated and often represented in art in China and Japan, especially in the latter.

(1) Āryāvalokiteśvara (Shō-Kwan-non, 'Holy'), otherwise called Mahākāruṇika ('Great Compassionate'). This is the original Bodhisattva and the most Buddhistic of all Kwan-yins. He is always shown with a lotus-flower in the left hand, with his right hand held up to his breast, and with or without an image of Amitābha over his head.

(2) Sahasrabhuja (Sen-ju, 'Thousand-armed'), otherwise called Sahasranetra (Sen-gen, 'Thousand-eyed'), or Mahāpadmarāja ('Great Lotus King'). This Kwan-yin, as he has the names common to Viṣṇu, Indra, and Durgā, seems to have been borrowed from the Brāhmanical deities. He is generally represented with three eyes (*trilochana*) and forty or thirty-eight arms, the palm of each hand being marked with an eye. Among the things which he carries are a sword, an arrow, a halberd, an axe, a *vajra*, a hook, a rope, or a skull-banner, mostly peculiar to Durgā. He is far the most popular of all Kwan-yins, at least in Japan, fifteen of the thirty-three shrines having him horse-headed, two-tusked, and with eight arms, two of which hold a *vajra* and a lotus. He is a *daitya* (demon), hostile to Viṣṇu in the Hindu pantheon, probably converted into a Tantra deity by mystic Buddhists. Only one of the thirty-three temples gives the place of honour to him.

(4) Ekādaśamukha (Jū-ichi-men, 'Eleven-faced'). He has eleven faces, of which the three front are compassionate, the three left wrathful, and the three right admonishing, while the one at the top and the proper face show equanimity. He has four arms, which carry a rosary, a lotus, a waterpot, and a mark of *abhayanda* ('bestowing security'), i.e. a raised hand with its palm outward. Ekādaśottama, 'chief of the eleven (Rudras),' is an epithet of Śiva, and so is Chaturbāhu ('Four-armed'). Thus this Kwan-yin too seems to have originated from the Hindu deity. Five places of worship are accorded him.

(5) Chaṇḍī (according to Nanjio, Chuṇḍi), otherwise called Saptakoṭibuddhamātṛ ('Mother of seven Koṭis of Buddhas'). Different from the rest of the Kwan-yins, this is from the beginning a female deity, and her name is never translated, being always Chun-t'i in Chinese and Jun-iei in Japanese. She is represented with three eyes (*trilochana*) and eighteen arms (*aṣṭādaśabhuja*), and is no other than Chaṇḍi Maha-devi Durgā, also called 'the Goddess of eighteen arms,' who destroyed the *asura* Mahiṣa. An auspicious pot (*bhadrakumbha*), a mark of security (*abhayandamudra*), a rope, a lotus, a *vajra*, etc., are among the articles carried by her. Only one place honours her.

(6) Chakravartichintāmaṇi, or sometimes Chintāmaṇichakra (Nyo-i-rin, 'Wishing wheel'). He is generally two-armed, rarely six-armed, and is represented in a meditative attitude with his right hand against his cheek, his head slightly turned to the right, and his left hand on his left knee. When he is six-armed, he carries a wishing gem (*chintāmaṇi*), a wheel (*chakra*), a rosary, and a lotus. He occupies six places of worship.

(7) Amoghapāśa (Fu-kū-ken-saku, 'Unfailing rope'), or sometimes simply Amogha ('Unerring'). The common feature of this Kwan-yin is that he has three faces and eight arms, and a rope in his hand. As Amogha is the name of Śiva and a rope is often carried by Durgā, this deity also is probably imported from the Hindu pantheon. One of the thirty-three shrines is sacred to him.

6. Kwan-yins known among Buddhists generally.—We shall name only five here, which are important for their artistic representations.

(1) Byaku-e (Pāṇḍaravāsini, 'White-robed'), the goddess with a white veil and robe, is the chief favourite among artists. Two other Kwan-yins, Byaku-shin (Śvetabhāgavati, 'White-bodied deity') and Yō-i (Palāśāvali, 'Leaf-streaked'),[1] are closely allied with this deity.

(2) Yō-riu ('Willow-tree'). The peculiarity of this deity is a willow leaf either held in the hand or placed in a pot beside her. The origin of this emblem is doubtful, though an off-hand explanation is not wanting among Buddhists. It may have originated from an olive tree or a palm-leaf, seeing that the goddesses Athene and Victory have been sculptured in Gandhāra. It is, however, just possible that it may be of purely Chinese origin, for we do not know how far this form of Kwan-yin carries us back.

(3) Gyo-ran ('Fish-basket') is another very popular deity who carries a basket with a fish in it. He is probably a counterpart of the fish *avatār* of Viṣṇu, or a representation of Matsyendra or Mīnanātha, who is sometimes worshipped in India and Nepāl.

(4) Koyasu ('Easy-child-birth') is a female Kwan-yin like Tārā, and is often represented with a child in her arm or below her. Properly speaking, she is not a separate Kwan-yin, for any Kwan-yin who is celebrated as answering prayers for easy labour can be called Koyasu. It was under this name that the Madonna of the Christian Church found her way among the worshippers of the Virgin, during the period of persecution in Japan under the Shōgunate government (1603–1867).

(5) Shōgyō (Nīlakaṇṭhaiśvara, 'Blue-necked lord') seems to be another imported from the Hindu pantheon, for Nīlakaṇṭha is the name of a form of Śiva in his capacity of churning the ocean. He is white and three-faced, with a lion's face on the right and a boar's on the left. The Buddha Amitābha is found on his proper head. He has four arms, which hold a stick, a lotus, a wheel, and a conch-shell.

7. The sacred resort of Kwan-yin. — As this article is in a way a continuation of that on Avalokiteśvara (*q.v.*), all the characteristics of the saint found there are omitted here. Only one

[1] Nanjio, no. 973; Parṇaśavari seems to be an error.

thing not found there has to be supplied here. That is Potala, Potalaka, or Potaraka,[1] the name of a place sacred to the Bodhisattva, and never separated from the worship. It is sometimes said to be an island in the sea or sometimes a rocky hill. We have Potala (= Πατάλα), a harbour at the mouth of the Indus in an island called Patale,[2] and the river here is said to begin to form a Delta like the Nile. If this name can be identified with Patara, now Patera, the capital of Lycia in Asia Minor on the eastern side of the mouth of the river Zanthus, we can further identify Avalokita or Apalokita (in Pāli) of Potalaka with Apollo Pataræus, both being in this case patron deities of mariners. This conjecture was once proposed by the present writer to solve the riddle of the strange name 'Avalokita,' though there are some philological difficulties in the identifications. Be this as it may, the name Potala is always transferred with the worship of the saint. In the 7th cent. we find Potalaka as the resort of Kwan-yin in the eastern side of the Malaya range near the extreme corner of the south coast of India.[3] The island Pu-t'o-lo (Potala), in the Chusan group off Ningpo, is the centre of the worship of Kwan-yin in China. This shrine was founded by a Japanese priest, Ye-gaku by name, who was sent by an Imperial order to China as a Buddhist student, but remained there as the founder of the famous Pu-t'o-lo (Potala) monastery (A.D. 858).

We are familiar with the existence of the Potala palace in the heart of Tibet as the residence of an incarnated Kwan-yin, viz. the Dalai Lāma; and in Japan we can trace two or three places which bear the Buddhistic name Fu-da-la-ku as shrines of Kwan-non.

8. The formula of invocation.—The famous six-syllable formula, *Oṁ maṇi padme hūṁ*, was once Indian, for it is often mentioned in the texts of the Chinese Tripiṭaka translated from Sanskrit (see art. JEWEL [Buddhist]). At present, however, this formula is exclusively Tibetan or at least Lāmaistic. The non-Lāmaistic Buddhists use the old formula *Namo 'valokiteśvarāya Bodhisattvāya* (*Namu-Kwan-je-on-Bosatsu*), 'Hail to the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara.'

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J. TAKAKUSU.

L

LABOUR.—See EMPLOYMENT, ECONOMICS.

LAISSEZ-FAIRE.—So great a part has this celebrated phrase played in economic and sociological, and even in religious, discussion during the past century that a whole book was published at Berne in 1886 upon the maxim—A. Oncken's *Die Maxime Laissez faire et laissez passer*. The occasion of its origin is perhaps best understood by a comparison of the policies of two great French Ministers of Finance—Colbert (1619–83) and Turgot (1727–81). The former, towards the end of the 17th cent., brought industry and commerce under a system of extreme regulation and coercion; his ideals were those of the Mercantilists—protection, subsidy, and privilege. A century later, we see a complete reversal of this policy in the financial administration of Turgot, who worked on the principle of commercial freedom. Between these two men stand the founders of scientific economics in France, whose school is usually known under the name of the Physiocrats. It is said, indeed, that the first authentic use of the phrase *laissez-faire* was a retort made by a merchant to Colbert himself.

The names which are of chief importance are those of Gournay (1712–59) and Quesnay (1694–1774). Gournay was an administrator rather than an economist, but he had great influence on Turgot, who accompanied him on some of his official journeys. It is through Turgot that we know of his principles. In his *Éloge* of Gournay, Turgot attributes to him maxims of trade and welfare, based on the utmost liberty of personal competition, and on the view that private interest and general welfare were coincident, if this kind of freedom were given. The complete phrase *laissezfaire*, *laissez passer* is first attributed to him. Quesnay was the real head of the Physiocrats, and holds a place in French economic science similar to that of Adam Smith in Great Britain. Competition and self-interest were the bonds out of which a compact system of industrial life could alone be created. Though he does not use the phrase *laissez-faire*, he is obviously in line with the movement.

In view of the expressions of Adam Smith, it is of importance to note that the identification of *laissez-faire* with the 'natural system' had taken place in France in the writings of the economist Boisguillebert (1646–1714). It was left to Smith to introduce into the system a still further idea—that of religious guarantee.

Free competition as the advantageous, as the natural, and as the divinely ordered basis of industry—these are the steps of the development. The evil aspects of the phrase are usually charged to Adam Smith's account, and it is, therefore, of interest to understand his statement of the case. Smith was not only an economist, but a moral philosopher, and a Scottish one at that. The classical passages of the *Wealth of Nations* (1776) are in bk. iv. ch. ii. They sum up and extend the whole preceding statement of *laissez-faire*, without, however, using the phrase itself. What is of advantage to the individual is 'advantageous' to the society; this is so 'naturally, or rather necessarily'; and, if we ask the reason of the coincidence, that is because the individual, in seeking his own gain, is 'led by an invisible hand' to promote the social good, although this was no part of his intention. Now, if we turn to Smith's earlier work on the *Moral Sentiments* (1759), we find some remarkable passages, showing that the basis of his ideas in this respect was ethical or religious rather than economic. In the section on 'Utility' (pt. iv. sect. i.)—to quote only one extract—there is a remarkable vindication of the luxury of the rich and the inequality of wealth.

'The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in

[1] Potalagāma occurs in the *Buddhacharita* (Chinese), and Potala and Potalaka are the names of two demons living there (see *SBE* xix. [1883] 244).

[2] See Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1872, *s.v.* 'Potala'; Ptolemy, VII. i. 59; Pomponius Mela, iii. 7; see also C. Lassen, *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, i.[2] [Leipzig, 1867] 125, ii.[2] [1874] 191 f., and especially V. A. Smith, *Early Hist. of India*[2], Oxford, 1908, pp. 99–102.

[3] S. Julien, *Mémoires de Hiouen-Thsang*, Paris, 1857–58, x. 123.

spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are *led by an invisible hand* to make nearly the same distribution . . . as if the earth had been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants.'

It is no wonder that, after the miseries of the Industrial Revolution, teaching of this kind brought some odium upon economic science; and it was overlooked that Smith had established his objections to existing forms of regulation by inductive, far more than by deductive, reasoning.

Smith's views must be judged in the light of two general facts: (1) that he was leading a reaction against excessive regulation; and (2) that the *form* of industry in his time was itself so individualistic. It was still the day of the individual manufacturer and the small unit; to ask for freedom at that time was practically to ask for independent competition. It does not follow that, when the form of industry had changed, Smith would have construed freedom in the same way. With the larger unit created by the Factory System for both labour and capital, it must have become apparent that to combine was a free act, and that economic freedom could no longer mean independent or individualized competition.

Some hidden fallacies in the early statement of *laissez-faire* are exposed by D. G. Ritchie in his *Natural Rights* (London, 1895). Especially dangerous was the introduction of the word 'natural.' For the natural is taken to mean the ideal, or the original, or the non-human. As soon as we say that a certain system is a 'natural' system, we first idealize it, and then, by a transition to another meaning of the word, we identify it with what is not of human device or with what is prior to human institution. Thus we slip into the position that a non-regulated system is an ideal one. But, in fact, nature in its broadest sense includes human life; and 'is made better by no means, but nature makes that means.'

Competition without control has not actually been taught by any English economist; but phrases have been seized on and misapplied. In spite of the opposition created to the idea of competition by stressing the words of early writers, an analysis of recent thought shows a desire not to suppress, but only to reorganize, this force. The claims of democracy are often, indeed, for greater freedom of competition; it is sought to remove privileges and monopolies, to extend education, to make it possible for any one with ability to challenge any position in the State. And the greatest social bitterness is not between those who compete most with each other, as workman with workman, or employer with employer, but between classes who do not compete, such as employer and employed, and often simply on the ground that effective competition is so limited across that line. The real objection that is summed up in the bitter use of the phrase *laissez-faire* is to the defects of a *certain organization* of industrial competition.

We may indeed say that, properly understood, *laissez-faire* is a maxim quite in keeping with the extension of State control, if the form of industry so changes as to require this. What is the object of the verb? In Smith's time it was the individual who was the economic agent; then, said Smith, leave him free. In Mill's time it was the group; then let the group be free to work. In our time, for many purposes which only economic evolution could have revealed, it is the municipality or the State; then let the State be free to do its proper work. The object of the verb can be the individual, the group, or the public authority; for we cannot fix the form of industry, or force on modern conditions the meaning which any maxim had a hundred and thirty years ago. The law of the land should not suppress, or refuse to give scope for, any kind of social agency or force; but, in the changing conditions of industrial life, it must guard the rights and watch the limits of each force and agency.

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D. H. MACGREGOR.

LAITY, LAYMEN.—This article is not concerned, unless indirectly, with the origin, development, and nature of the Christian ministry. It deals only with the position, rights, and duties of those Christians who are not of the official ministry, and the latter will be referred to only negatively, or in connexion with elections by the laity or similar matters. A large controversy will, therefore, be left entirely on one side. We have to consider what the laity were called by the older Christian writers, and what position they held in the divine society, especially with reference to appointments, to worship and the sacraments, to councils, and to Church work generally.

1. Names of the laity.—In the Bible ὁ λαός is used of the Jewish people, as distinguished from their priests and rulers, in Mt 26^5, Ac 5^{26} etc., and especially as distinguished from the high priest and the priests in He 5^3 $7^{5.\ 27}$; so, in the OT, in Ex 19^{24}, 2 Ch 24^{10}. Similarly, ὁ λαός is frequently used in the Greek liturgies to denote the congregation as distinguished from the officiating priest; for an early example see *Apostolic Constitutions*, viii. 12 (at end): 'Let all the people say, Amen.' The Latin liturgies have *populus* in a similar place, and the Syriac liturgies have the Syriac equivalent *'amā* (*e.g.*, *Testament of our Lord*, i. 21, which we possess only in a Syriac translation by Jacob of Edessa, c. A.D. 700). Elsewhere in Latin writings *plebs* is used for the laity, as ordinarily in Tertullian, Cyprian, Jerome, and Augustine, and in can. 77 of the Council of Elvira (*c.* A.D. 305).

From λαός is derived λαϊκός (*laicus*), which, however, is not found in the NT or LXX. In Clement of Rome (*Cor.* i. 40, a passage which describes the relation of the layman to the clergy) a step is taken (*c.* A.D. 95) towards the somewhat later use of λαϊκός as a technical substantive, 'a layman'; but it is there used only as an epithet. The 'lay-man' (ὁ λαϊκὸς ἄνθρωπος) is bound by the lay ordinances (τοῖς λαϊκοῖς προστάγμασιν). At the end of the 2nd cent. Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* iii. 12, near end) uses λαϊκός as a substantive, 'a layman,' in contrast to 'presbyter' and 'deacon,' with reference to marriage, clerical and lay; but he also uses it as an adjective, and speaks of λαϊκὴ ἀπιστία in *Strom.* v. 6, *i.e.* 'the unbelief of the people.' Tertullian also uses *laicus* for 'a layman' (*de Bapt.* 17, *de Exhort. Cast.* 7), as do the Roman clergy in a letter to Cyprian (Cypr. *Ep.* xxx. 5). The substantive λαϊκός is found in the *Answers to the Orthodox* (Ἀποκρίσεις πρὸς ὀρθοδόξους, § 97), which at one time was assigned to Justin Martyr, but is certainly of a somewhat later date; and often in the 4th cent., as in the *Clementine Homilies* (now usually assigned in their present form to that date): see the *Ep. of Clement to James*, § 5; in the Sacramentary of Serapion (*JThSt* i. [1899-1900] 101), where a prayer is called χαιροθεσία λαϊκῶν ('blessing of the laymen'); and in the *Apost. Const.* (*e.g.*, viii. 11 and 28, where λαϊκοί are opposed to 'the clergy' [οἱ τοῦ κλήρου or κληρικοί]); it is also found frequently in the *Apostolic Canons*. In Syriac we find as a rendering of λαϊκός the words *'almāyā* and *'almānāyā*, lit. 'one of the world,' as in the *Test. of our Lord*, i. 35, in the litany which has a suffrage for 'the faithful laymen'; see other instances in R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, ii. (Oxford, 1901) 2900 f.

Another, but less common, word for 'layman' is ἰδιώτης, which has sadly degenerated in meaning, having become in English 'idiot.' But in classical Greek it means simply 'private person.' Philo (*de Vit. Mos.* iii. 29, ed. Mangey, ii. 169) uses it to denote a Jew who is not a priest. In 1 Co $14^{16.\ 23f.}$ it probably means 'one who has not the charisma of tongues' (RVm; see notes by A. Robertson and A. Plummer *in loco* [*ICC* '1 Cor.,' Edinburgh, 1911, pp. 313 f., 318 f.]). In Ac 4^{13} it means 'unlearned' or 'uneducated'; here Tyndale and Coverdale render it by 'laye people,' a translation which may be compared with our use of the word 'layman' to denote one who is

not versed by training in the particular matter in hand, a sense in which ἰδιώτης was also used in classical Greek (see Liddell and Scott, *s.v.*). The word is similarly used in 2 Co 11[6]. In 1 Co 14[16] the 'place of the ἰδιώτης' can hardly refer to the special seats occupied by laymen in the Christian assembly (below, § 6). In an interpolation in Pr 6[8] cited in the *Apost. Const.* (ii. 63), ἰδιῶται is opposed to *βασιλεῖς*, and means 'the king's subjects'; the corresponding passage of the older *Didascalia*, which the *Constitutions* incorporate, here has 'rich and poor' (see F. X. Funk, *Didasc. et Const. Apostolorum*, Paderborn, 1905, i. 180). Isidore of Seville, early in the 7th cent., uses *privatus* (as well as *laicus*) in the sense of 'layman' ('nec privatis nec clericis,' *de Eccl. Off.* ii. 25).

Another name of the laity is 'the brethren' (οἱ ἀδελφοί). In the *Apost. Const.* ii. 57 (near the beginning) they are so called in contrast to the bishop and deacons (not in the parallel *Didascalia*); cf. 1 Ti 4[6], where 'the brethren' means 'the whole community.' It is a little curious to note in this connexion that in Ac 15[4. 22] the expressions 'the church,' 'the whole church,' are used in contrast to 'the apostles and elders.'

2. Who is a layman?—Hitherto 'the laity' have been spoken of negatively, as being those Christians who are not ministers. But, owing to modern conditions, and especially owing to the divisions of Christendom, some further definition is necessary. For instance, in England, it has been maintained that every Englishman there resident is in the eye of the law a layman of the Church of England, unless he is a bishop, priest, or deacon. Apart, however, from legal rights, every Christian community is bound to ask itself who are its laymen, not only from a negative, but also from a positive point of view. The first step in the definition has usually been to affirm that he must be a baptized person, or at least a catechumen; with regard to the latter qualification we may note—and this has a bearing on the practice of missionary Churches of the present day—that the *Canons of Hippolytus* style catechumens 'Christians' (can. x.; ed. H. Achelis, in *TU*, new ser., Leipzig, 1891, § 63). But the question whether a baptized person is a layman belonging to a particular Christian community is not so easy to answer. A positive definition of 'laity' may perhaps be found in some such phrase as 'those who (not being ministers) from baptism or after baptism have been attached to' that community, and 'who have not by any overt act declared their dissent from its communion.' This does not raise the question of 'full membership,' by which is often meant the status of a communicant.

3. The priesthood of the laity.—This, which seems at first sight to be a contradiction in terms, is nevertheless asserted of Christians in 1 P 2[5. 9] and Rev 1[6]. They are a 'holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices . . . a royal priesthood, a holy nation.' Christ 'made us [all Christians] to be a kingdom, to be priests unto his God and Father.' The same thing had been asserted with equal emphasis of the Jews in Ex 19[6]: 'Ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation.' The NT asserts in the first place the priesthood of our Lord (*e.g.*, in Hebrews, *passim*), and then, as derived therefrom, the priesthood of His people. In the highest sense of the word, Christianity is a sacerdotal system. But this must not be misunderstood. It does not mean that the Christian ministry is vicarious, and that its ministers take the place of the people in approaching God. When, therefore, J. B. Lightfoot says, perhaps rather hastily (Essay on 'The Christian Ministry,' *Philippians*, ed. London, 1903, pp. 181, 185), that Christianity 'has no sacerdotal system,' he means, as he himself most truly explains (*ib.*), that 'it interposes no sacrificial tribe or class between God and man, by whose intervention alone God is reconciled and man forgiven. Each individual member holds personal communion with the Divine Head. To Him immediately he is responsible, and from Him directly he obtains pardon and draws strength. . . . As individuals, all Christians are priests alike.' For the same view of the priesthood of the laity see C. Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*[4], p. 76 ff.

Let us consider one practical result of this NT doctrine. It follows, as the ancient liturgies so often assert, that the laity offer the Christian sacrifice of prayer and praise equally with the officiating minister, though he is or may be the instrument by which they offer it, for it would ordinarily be inconvenient if all people spoke at once in Christian worship. This fact is the rationale of the 'Amen' or 'So be it' by which the laity audibly 'seal' the prayers and praises. Jerome compares the Amen of the people at Rome to a thunder-clap, so loud and hearty was it:

'Ubi sic ad similitudinem cælestis tonitrui *Amen* reboat, et vacua idolorum templa quatiuntur?' (*Com. on Galatians*, Prœm. in lib. ii.).

The same may be said of the 'prayers in common' of which Justin (*Apol.* i. 65) and Augustine ('communis oratio,' *Ep.* lv. 34 Ben. [cxix.] *ad Inquis. Januarii*) speak, and which must have involved some audible partaking by the laity in the supplication (see INTERCESSION [Liturgical]). Such also are the litanies and hymns (especially the Sanctus) which became common at least from the 4th cent. onwards. In the *Test. of our Lord* the whole people are bidden to repeat with the bishop part of the central act of the Eucharist (i. 21), a direction with which we may compare the old custom of 'concelebration' (priests audibly celebrating the Eucharist along with the bishop). All this is evidence of the universality of the doctrine that every Christian layman possesses a priesthood.

The same teaching is much emphasized by the Fathers. In the middle of the 2nd cent. Justin Martyr (*Dial.* 116 f.), quoting Mal 1[11], dwells on the fact that all Christians 'are the true high-priestly race of God,' and that the Eucharist is offered by 'Christians in all places throughout the world.' He speaks similarly, addressing Jews, of the Jewish sacrifices being offered 'by you and by those priests of yours.' So, at the end of the century, Irenæus (*Hær.* IV. viii. 3, V. xxxiv. 3) says that 'all the righteous possess the sacerdotal rank' and that 'all the disciples of the Lord are Levites and priests'; and, a little later, Tertullian (*de Exhort. Cast.* 7) asks, 'Are not even we laics priests?' (this work was written after his secession to Montanism). In the 3rd cent. Origen (*Hom.* 9 *in Lev.* § 1) says to the layman in general:

'Dost thou not know that the priesthood (*sacerdotium*) is given to thee also, that is, to all the church of God and the people of believers? [he quotes 1 P 2[9]]. Thou hast, therefore, the priesthood because thou art a priestly (*sacerdotalis*) race [cf. Justin above], and so thou oughtest to offer to God the sacrifice (*hostiam*) of praise, of prayer, of pity, of modesty, of justice, of holiness.'

In the 4th cent. Jerome declares (*c. Lucif.* 4) that the priesthood of the layman is his baptism ('sacerdotium laici, id est, baptisma'); he uses the word 'baptism' in the full sense of the complete rite.[1] So Augustine (*de Civ. Dei*, XVII. v. 5) says, 'He gives the name priesthood to the very people whose priest is the mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus' (he quotes 1 P 2[9]). Many other such passages might be cited. The teaching was common to all ages.

The doctrine that all Christian people are priests does not, it need hardly be said, mean that there is no such thing as a ministerial priesthood. The whole nation of Israel were priests, and yet Aaron and his sons had a special or ministerial priesthood. And so, without discussing controverted questions, we may conclude that there is at least no contra-

[1] It has often been held that the priesthood of the laity is given to the baptized, not at the immersion, but at the laying on of hands or confirmation (A. J. Mason, *Relation of Confirmation to Baptism*, London, 1891, p. 462 f.). But it seems unnecessary to distinguish thus sharply between different parts of what was originally one rite.

diction involved in the assertion of the same characteristic in Christianity. The confusion of minister and layman as to function is such ἀταξία ('want of order') as the author of the *Apost. Const.* so eloquently protests against (viii. 31, 46). Clement of Rome (*c.* A.D. 95) says that the Christian ministers are 'rulers' and 'presbyters' (ἡγούμενοι, προηγούμενοι, πρεσβύτεροι), to whom the laity are to be subject (ὑποτασσόμενοι) and to give reverence (*Cor.* i. 1, 21). Hermas, a little later, calls the clergy 'the rulers' (προηγούμενοι, *Vis.* ii. 2, iii. 9). The same nomenclature is found in He $13^{7.\ 17.\ 24}$, and also in 1 Th 5^{12}, where the ministers are 'they that are over you' (προϊσταμένους ὑμῶν). See, further, § 5.

4. Election of bishops and clergy by laity.—Under this head we have to consider a very important part in the Church played by laymen. We note that in Ac $6^{3.\ 5}$ the people choose, but the apostles appoint (cf. ἐπισκέψασθε and ἐξελέξαντο with καταστήσομεν). The laity elected the Seven and placed them before the apostles, who laid hands on them with prayer. And this was the ancient method of appointment, though the details might vary. In the *Didache* (§ 15, *c.* A.D. 120?) the writer bids the people to elect (χειροτονήσατε) for themselves bishops and deacons, *i.e.* the local ministry; nothing is said of the appointment of the itinerant 'apostles and prophets.' It must here be remembered that χειροτονεῖν does not necessarily carry with it the idea of ordination by the persons electing (see below). Early in the 4th cent. popular election is much insisted on by Athanasius. He quotes (*Apol. c. Arian.* 6) a letter of the Egyptian bishops which says that he was elected (A.D. 326) 'by a majority of our body [the bishops] in the sight and with the acclamation of all the people,' in order to refute a calumny of the Arians that he was clandestinely consecrated by six or seven bishops unknown to the laity. Gregory of Nazianzus (*Orat.* xxi. 8) says that Athanasius was elected 'by the vote of the whole people, not in the evil fashion which has since prevailed, nor by means of bloodshed and oppression; but in an apostolic and spiritual manner, he is led up to the throne of St. Mark.' He means, no doubt, that this was the ancient method of election. The same practice is seen in the Church Orders—*e.g.*, in the *Test. of our Lord* (i. 20), which speaks very emphatically about the election of bishops ('being chosen by all the people according to the will of the Holy Ghost'), and somewhat less so about presbyters ('testified to by all the people,' i. 29) and deacons ('chosen as has been said above,' i. 33). The other Church Orders make similar provisions (*Canons of Hippolytus*, can. ii. [ed. Achelis, § 7], *Verona Latin Fragments of Didascalia*, etc., ed. E. Hauler, Leipzig, 1900, p. 103, *Egyptian Church Order*, § 31 [ed. H. Tattam, *The Apostolical Constitutions*, London, 1848, p. 32], *Ethiopic Church Order*, § 21, *Apost. Const.* viii. 4). We find the same regulations in the Gallican code known as the *Statuta Ecclesiæ Antiquæ*, perhaps made by Cæsarius of Arles, *c.* A.D. 500 (formerly cited as the canons of a supposed Fourth Council of Carthage, A.D. 398). In can. 22 it is directed that a bishop is not to ordain any one without the advice of his clergy, and that he is bound to seek the assent (*conniventiam*) and testimony of the citizens—a phrase which has a bearing on a well-known dictum of St. Cyprian (see below, § 8; for a translation of the *Statuta* see C. J. Hefele, *Councils*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1871–96, ii. 410 ff.).

On the other hand, the people were at an early date deprived of this right. The Council of Laodicea (*c.* A.D. 380) says that 'the choice of those to be appointed to the priesthood shall not rest with the multitude' (can. 13). This movement may have been due in part to the encroachments of the State and its officials after the time of Constantine, and it may have also been due to the interpretation placed in the East on the 4th canon of Nicæa (A.D. 325), which says that the bishop is to be appointed (καθίστασθαι) by the comprovincial bishops, three of whom at least shall meet. The first of the *Apostolic Canons*, a collection made *c.* A.D. 400, though some of them are doubtless older, has a similar provision, but with χειροτονείσθω.[1] The Nicene rule was understood by the second Council of Nicæa, the '7th Ecumenical' (A.D. 787, can. 3), as meaning that only the bishops could *elect*, and it forbids, with reference to *Apost. Canon* 31, the election of a bishop, priest, or deacon proceeding from a secular prince; but the Latins at first interpreted the Nicene canon to refer to the confirmation of election and consecration to the episcopate by the comprovincial bishops (Hefele, *op. cit.* i.[2] [1894] 385 f.). And this is probably the real meaning. A bishop, before being consecrated, must be approved by the people (and clergy) whom he is to serve, and also by the bishops of the province. This is the true reason (one can hardly doubt) of the ancient rule about the three bishops consecrating the elect. At a later date it was suggested that this was to remove all fear of invalidity in the position of any one of the consecrators; but this could hardly have been a consideration at so early a date. Three bishops, or, as *Apost. Canon* 1 says, 'two or three,' must come together to the election that they may signify the assent of the comprovincials.

In Western Europe, from the time of Charlemagne onwards, the election by the laity to bishoprics was represented by the sovereign's nomination, or in England in Anglo-Saxon times by that of the Witenagemot. But patronage of benefices by laymen became very common. This was exercised (*a*) by an individual, who originally, in many cases, was, or represented, the founder of the church; or (*b*) by a corporation external to the benefice, for the same reason; or (*c*) by the persons to be ministered to, either as a whole body—rarely in the Anglican, but normally at the present day in the Presbyterian, polity—or through representatives chosen by them. The system of the Church of Ireland is a variation of the last method. When a benefice is vacant, a nomination to it is made by a patronage committee, consisting of the bishop of the diocese, three persons nominated by the diocese, and three persons appointed by the parish where the vacancy had occurred. In all Episcopal bodies the bishop has, at least in theory, a power of veto on elections to parishes, though there is usually an appeal to the metropolitan or to the comprovincial bishops if he refuse to institute; but in the Church of England this veto can be exercised only with considerable difficulty.

The share of the laity in appointing bishops, etc., in the present day may be seen from the following conspectus.

(*a*) *Anglican Communion* (see further details in art. 'Diocesan Bishop,' by E. A. Welch in the *Prayer Book Dictionary*, London, 1912, p. 279 ff.).—In *England and Wales* the sovereign issues a *congé d'élire*, and on the advice of the Prime Minister nominates a person to the dean and chapter of the cathedral, who elect, and the election is confirmed by the metropolitan; if there is no dean and chapter, the sovereign nominates directly. In *India* the sovereign acts on the advice of the Secretary of State for India. In *Scotland* a bishop is elected by a special body chosen *ad hoc*, consisting of two chambers of presbyters and laity of the diocese, and for his election a simple majority in either chamber is necessary; the assent of a majority of the comprovincial bishops is required to confirm the election, and, unless it be thus confirmed, proceedings must begin again. In *Ireland* the system is similar (except in the case of the diocese of Armagh, where an abnormal procedure takes place), but the

[1] This word, which often means 'elect,' apparently in these canons means 'ordain,' as the 2nd canon says that a presbyter and deacon and the other clergy (κληρικοί) are to be 'ordained' (χειροτονείσθω) by one bishop.

majority must be one of two-thirds; in some cases the choice, or the selection from certain names, is left to the bishops (see the *Constitution of the Church of Ireland*, Dublin, 1909, vi. 5). In *Canada*, *New Zealand*, *Australia*, and *S. Africa* the system is similar, with some variations of detail, especially as to the majority required in the different orders; in S. Africa the electing body is a special one, called the 'Elective Assembly'; the clergy elect, and the laity assent. In the *United States of America* a like practice is in vogue for the ordinary diocesan bishoprics, but to the 'missionary bishoprics' the House of Bishops appoints. Each diocesan 'convention' (synod) makes its own rules for election. In all the non-established branches of the Anglican federation the assent of the laity is required to an episcopal election.

(*b*) *Roman Communion.*—The laity appear to have no official share in the election of bishops, but in countries where a concordat with the pope is in force, as was the case till recently in France, the sovereign or the State nominates.

(*c*) *Eastern Orthodox Communion.*—Here the laity usually have a voice in electing bishops, though the practice differs in different countries; for a detailed account see M. G. Dampier, *The Organization of the Orthodox Eastern Churches*, London, 1910 (which, however, does not give information about the patriarchates of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem; these seem to follow Constantinople closely). In the patriarchate of *Constantinople* the bishops of the Holy Synod and the laity elect the patriarch; the whole assembly selects three names, and the bishops choose one of them. A mixed council of bishops and laymen attend to the temporal affairs of the patriarchate. A diocesan bishop is appointed by the Holy Synod, which consists of bishops only. The laity must be consulted before the bishop appoints a parish priest, or the parish priest appoints a deacon; and each parish has a lay committee for parochial affairs. In *Russia* the Holy Synod—which here consists of bishops, a few archimandrites (heads of monasteries), two representatives of the parish clergy, and the Tsar's procurator (a layman who has no vote in doctrinal matters, but is the connecting link between Church and State)—submits three names for bishoprics to the Tsar, who selects one. The parish priests are appointed by the bishop, and the clergy and laymen of each parish appoint a layman to administer the finances. In *Cyprus* the clergy and laity elect the bishops. The Synod consists of bishops only, for managing all ecclesiastical affairs. In *Mount Sinai* the archbishop is elected by the monks. In *Greece* the Holy Synod (consisting of bishops only) submits three names for bishoprics to the king, who selects one. Priests and deacons are appointed by the bishop after consulting their laymen. The king appoints a commissioner (*ἐπίτροπος*) to attend the Holy Synod, but he has no vote. In *Rumania* the bishops are elected by the other bishops and by (lay) members of Parliament. In *Servia* they are elected by the synod of bishops, but the metropolitan of Belgrade is elected by the bishops and the chief clergy and lay officials of the country. In *Montenegro* the metropolitan is nominated by the king; priests are appointed by the metropolitan. There are no other bishops besides the metropolitan. In *Bulgaria* the laity have a share in the election of the exarch and of the other bishops, and also of the parish priests. In *Austria-Hungary* practice varies. The metropolitan of Karlowitz is appointed by a mixed body, but the bishops of the metropolitanate appoint to the other bishoprics; while in Hermannstadt both metropolitan and bishops are elected by a mixed body. The metropolitan and bishops in Dalmatia are nominated by the Crown.

(*d*) *Armenian Communion.*—For details see M. Ormanian, *Church of Armenia*, ch. xxxi. (Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 151 ff.). In most countries the Armenian parish priests are elected by the parishioners in the first instance, but the laity have no voice in the selection of priests ordained in monasteries. The 'catholici' of Sis and Aghthamar, the patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem (patriarchs are of inferior rank to the catholici among the Armenians), and the diocesan bishops are elected by mixed councils of laymen and clergy, the former largely preponderating. In Russia the influence of the laity is much less. 'The government permits the existence of lay councils (ephorates) [of parishes], but it has done away with the diocesan councils, whose prerogatives have been transferred to a synod and to consistories made up of ecclesiastics' (Ormanian, p. 153).

(*e*) *East Syrian or Nestorian Communion.*—The laity have an indirect share in clerical appointments. The bishops are supposed to ordain a parish priest only when the parishioners elect him, and, as a matter of fact, they generally consult their wishes; but ordinations without 'titles' or cures of souls assigned are somewhat frequent. In the case of bishoprics, a vacancy is usually filled from the late bishop's nephews or cousins, as the office can be held only by those who have been brought up as 'Nazirites'; of these there are sometimes more than one, and the laity are supposed to choose from them a successor. See A. J. Maclean and W. H. Browne, *The Catholicos of the East and his People*, London, 1892, pp. 186 ff., 205 f.

From what has been said it will be seen that the ancient share of the laity in electing to ministerial offices has remained, though more or less altered, in a large part of Christendom till the present time.

5. The laity and the sacraments.—(*a*) *The Eucharist.*—No real instance has been found, except in some heretical or separated bodies, of a layman being allowed to celebrate the Eucharist, even in cases of emergency. In connexion with this it is perhaps necessary to repeat the caution that *εὐχαριστεῖν* is sometimes used in Christian antiquity in the sense of 'saying grace' or 'asking a blessing' at a meal, and that it does not always mean 'to celebrate the Eucharist.'

The 18th canon of Nicæa (A.D. 325) asserts that even deacons have not the power of 'offering,' *i.e.* of celebrating, the Eucharist[1] (*τοὺς ἐξουσίαν μὴ ἔχοντας προσφέρειν*), while presbyters are expressly called 'those who offer' (*τοῖς προσφέρουσι*). The same thing is found in the Church Orders, where the bishop and the presbyter are expressly recognized as being capable of celebrating the Eucharist (for the presbyter, cf. *Apost. Const.* iii. 20, vii. 26, *Ethiopic Didascalia*, § 16, *Test. of our Lord*, i. 31), while the deacon is explicitly forbidden to do so (*Apost. Const.* viii. 46); cf. the repeated statement that a deacon is not ordained to the priesthood—which would have been meaningless if the deacons had not been pushing their claims (*Test. of our Lord*, i. 38; *Statuta Ecclesiæ Antiqua*, § 4; *Egyp. Ch. Order*, § 33; *Ethiop. Ch. Order*, § 24; *Verona Fragments of Didascalia*, ed. Hauler, p. 109). But, if a deacon could not celebrate the Eucharist, *a fortiori* a layman could not do so.

Nor was this a prohibition invented in the 4th century. Not only is there no evidence of a layman inside the Church celebrating the Eucharist in ante-Nicene times, but Tertullian, in a work written before his secession (*de Præscr. adv. Hær.* 41), by implication strongly repudiates such a theory. He condemns the heretical sects because they confused the functions of laity and ministry.

'To-day one man is their bishop, to-morrow another; to-day he is a deacon who to-morrow is a reader; to-day he is a presbyter who to-morrow is a layman. For even on laymen do they impose the functions of priesthood.'

With this it is instructive to compare the same writer's language after his secession. In *de Exhort. Cast.* 7, after saying that all laymen are priests (see above, § 3), he continues:

'It is the authority of the Church, and the honour which has acquired sanctity through the joint session (*consessus*) of the Order, which has established the difference between the Order and the laity. Accordingly, where there is no joint session of the ecclesiastical Order, you offer [see above], and baptize (*tinguis*), and are priest, alone for yourself. . . . You have the right of a priest in your own person, in cases of necessity.'

Here Tertullian, writing in his later days, claims for a layman, if necessity urges, the right *inter alia* to celebrate Holy Communion.

It might be suggested that in this respect Montanism was conservative of an old custom which had elsewhere died out, owing to the supposed increase of 'sacerdotal' feeling in the Church. But, whatever Montanism was, it was not, and did not profess to be, conservative. Such, indeed, is not the characteristic of any movement which magnifies 'charismatic' powers. Montanism professed to have received a new inspiration by the Holy Ghost, and rather despised than honoured old existing customs. See, further, a long investigation in Gore, *op. cit.* pp. 184-196, and Appended Note H on Montanism (pp. 355-359).

(*b*) *Baptism.*—Had we no history to guide us, we might have imagined that, if the laity could not celebrate the Eucharist, neither could they baptize. And yet, though Christian opinion has not been unanimous on the subject, the great majority have held that, in cases of necessity, a layman, and even a laywoman, may rightly baptize.

It is not quite conclusive that the apostles did

[1] For this meaning of *προσφέρειν* or *ἀναφέρειν* see the present writer's *The Ancient Church Orders* (Cambridge, 1910), p. 48 f. These words sometimes mean 'to bring the oblation to the bishop' (*ib.* and Ancyra [A.D. 314], can. 2; but the latter has 'to offer the bread and the cup').

not, as a rule, themselves baptize, though they laid on hands after baptism. St. Paul says that it was not his usual custom to baptize (1 Co $1^{14ff.}$); St. Peter *commanded* Cornelius and his company to be baptized (Ac 10^{48}). It is also not quite certain, though it is probable, that the apostles did not themselves baptize all the three thousand converts in Ac 2^{41}; if they did not do so, lay brethren must have baptized, since there was as yet no ministry other than the Twelve. But, though the NT evidence is not quite conclusive, opinion from early times favoured lay baptism. Tertullian (*de Bapt.* 17) allows it to deacons and laymen, but not to women; in *de Virg. Vel.* 9 also he forbids women to baptize. But we may note that his argument in the former passage, that 'what is equally received can be equally given,' if valid, should refer to women no less than to men. The older *Didascalia* (3rd cent.; iii. 12; Funk, i. 210) allows it to deacons, but (iii. 9; Funk, i. 198) forbids it to women; the permission to deacons is not found in the parallel *Apost. Const.*, which here incorporate the *Didascalia*. The Spanish Council of Elvira (*c.* A.D. 305) says that a catechumen on a sea voyage or in a place where there is no church near can be baptized in great illness by a layman who has not apostatized or been a bigamist (can. 38), and similarly allows a deacon on some occasions to 'rule' a congregation—apparently in a country district—and to baptize (can. 77); but in all these cases confirmation by the bishop is to follow unless the baptized person dies. The *Test. of our Lord* (*c.* A.D. 350?) allows deacons to baptize (ii. 10). Jerome (*c. Lucif.* 9) says that, 'if necessity so be, even laymen may, and frequently do, baptize.' Augustine (*c. Ep. Parmen.* II. xiii. [29]) says that baptism by a layman, 'if necessity urges, is either no sin or a venial one.' But he appears to be a little doubtful about the matter. The *Statuta Ecclesiæ Antiqua* (can. 100), by saying that 'a woman may not baptize,' probably imply that a man, even if a layman, can do so. Isidore of Seville very grudgingly says that lay baptism is for the most part allowed, but only when a person is *in extremis* (*de Eccl. Off.* ii. 25).

A striking case, which brings in other considerations of importance, occurred in the 4th century. The famous Athanasius is said, when a boy, to have administered baptism in play. This was observed by Alexander, the bishop of the diocese (Alexandria), who, on hearing that the proper words had been used, forbade re-baptism, but administered confirmation. For this story see Sozomen (*HE* ii. 17) and Rufinus (*HE* i. 14); Socrates (*HE* i. 15) alludes to it without mentioning Alexander's action. Whether the story is historic or not, it is instructive as showing that the historians treated lay baptism as an actual and not unusual fact. On the other question, that of 'intention,' Alexander's decision is much more doubtful.

We find that a contrary opinion as to lay baptism was not unknown in the 4th century. Even a deacon is forbidden to baptize in the *Apost. Const.* viii. 28, 46, and so are the laity and minor orders in iii. 10 f., and women in iii. 9; of baptism by women it is said that 'there is no small peril to those who undertake it, for it is dangerous, or, rather, wicked and impious.' The *Ethiopic Didascalia* (§ 13 f.) also negatives lay baptism; this manual is largely derived from the *Constitutions*.

We may notice opinion on this question in later times. In the mediæval West lay baptism was fully and officially recognized and, in cases of necessity, encouraged. Midwives were instructed how to baptize infants when in danger of death. This is the present attitude of the Roman Communion. It was also the attitude of the Church of England in the Middle Ages and down to 1604. Lay baptism was extremely common. The Sarum manual provided for it, as did the English Prayer Books of 1549, 1552, and 1559. The rubrics before the Office of Private Baptism in these three books say that baptism is to be administered by laymen only when 'great need shall compel,' but that, if so, they 'that be present' are to 'call upon God for his grace, and say the Lord's prayer, if the time will suffer. And then one of them shall name the child, and dip him in the water, or pour water upon him, saying,' etc. After the Hampton Court Conference, however, as a concession to Puritan feeling, a change was made in the Prayer Book, and since 1604 only an official minister has been explicitly recognized therein. Yet we notice that in the questions directed in the Prayer Book to be asked at private baptism there is a distinction. First they that bring the child are asked by whom he was baptized, and who was present; then 'because some things essential to this Sacrament may happen to be omitted,' the persons are asked with what matter and words the child was baptized. The implication would seem to be that the status of the baptizer is not one of the 'things essential.' Lay baptism has never been forbidden in England, and has been a continuous custom. Hooker has defended its validity, even if administered by women (*Eccles. Polity*, v. 61 f.; this book was first published in 1597), and his great influence has prevailed, though not quite universally, to this day. The English law-courts (in 1809, Kemp *v.* Wickes, and in 1841, Mastin *v.* Escott; see J. H. Blunt and W. G. F. Phillimore, *Book of Church Law*[3], London, 1899) have upheld the same view.

To the Eastern mind the matter has presented itself in a different way. A Western can distinguish between what is irregular and what is invalid, and is accustomed to the saying 'fieri non debet, factum valet.' But an Eastern makes no such distinction; to him 'irregular' and 'invalid' mean the same thing. Quite irrespectively of the validity of the Western Orders, the question has arisen in the East whether Western baptisms are irregular, and therefore (to the Eastern) invalid. To this question the Russian Church has replied No, and has admitted Western, including Lutheran and Calvinist, baptisms since 1718; but the Constantinople Church has replied Yes. On this very complicated subject see W. J. Birkbeck, *Russia and the English Church*, London, 1895, p. 63 n.

6. The laity in the Church services: churchwardens.—From the earliest times, as it would appear, the laity had a place of their own in the Christian synaxis, or assembly. Putting aside Justin Martyr's description (*Apol.* i. 65–67), which does not help us here, the first account of the arrangements of the synaxis is in the older *Didascalia* (3rd cent.). In this description the presbyters sat on either side of the bishop, the laymen behind the presbyters, and the women behind them, all apparently facing east (ii. 57; Funk, i. 158, 160). In the corresponding passage of *Apost. Const.* (ii. 57; Funk, 159 ff.), the description is somewhat confused, but it would seem that the bishop and his presbyters here sat (at least at the beginning of the Eucharistic service) behind the altar, facing the west. In this account also the laity sat by themselves, the men in one place and the women in another; the young people and the older people sat separately, the younger women, the mothers, the widows, the virgins, and the elder women all having distinct places. In this work the assembly is likened to a ship, the bishop being the commander, the deacons the mariners, the 'brethren' (the laity, see above, § 1) the passengers—a metaphor still carried out in the word 'nave' for the part of the church where the congregation worship. In the *Test. of our Lord* (i. 19), and also in the derived chapters of the *Arabic Didascalia* (§ 35; Funk, ii. 124), the laymen and the

laywomen sit in separate places. For a somewhat later period see W. E. Scudamore, in *DCA* ii. 915[b].

Now, in the Church Orders (*e.g.*, *Didascalia* and *Apost. Const.*, *locc. citt.*; *Test. of our Lord*, i. 34) the deacons are represented as moving about rather than as having seats, and, in the case of several of them, as keeping order in the assembly, watching the doors, and assigning seats to the different classes. But, as time went on, deacons, who, as the Church Orders show, were constantly pressing their claims (Maclean, *Ancient Church Orders*, p. 69), devolved their duties on sub-deacons and members of the minor orders. At a somewhat later date—though it is not easy to say when—lay officials took over these duties of deacons, and received the name of 'church-wardens.' But their duties were not and are not confined to keeping order in church. They are in the present day charged with the supervision of the church fabrics and churchyards, with seating the people, with parochial church finance, and with the relief of the poor. In Lyndwoode's *Provinciale* (15th cent.) they are called *guardiani ecclesiæ*. The English canons of 1603 call them also 'quest men.' Their assistants are called 'sidesmen' (see below, § 8). In England there are ordinarily two church-wardens in each parish, one usually nominated by the rector or vicar, and one by the parishioners, and these are admitted to office by the archdeacon. For a full account see P. V. Smith in the *Prayer Book Dictionary*, p. 205 f.

7. Lay preaching.—It was often discussed in the early ages of the Christian era how far a layman might be allowed to teach or preach in church. The case of the learned Origen (3rd cent.), who was, when still a layman, allowed to do so, caused some misgivings in certain quarters; and J. B. Lightfoot (*Apost. Fathers*, pt. i. 'Clement of Rome,' ii. [1890] 195 n.) remarks that the objections raised in his case show that the practice was rare. Eusebius (*HE* vi. 19), to whom we are indebted for the information, evidently approved of the invitation given to Origen. At the end of the 4th cent. the *Apost. Const.* (viii. 32, near the end) speak approvingly of lay teachers, but the reference is perhaps not to public teaching in church. The *Statuta Ecclesiæ Antiqua* (can. 98) say that a layman may not teach in the presence of the clergy except at their command. The Quinisext or Trullan Council (A.D. 692) decrees that the laity are to be excluded from preaching publicly in religious services (can. 64).

We should gather from the gospel story that among the Jews any layman who had the capacity to give instruction in the synagogue might do so. From the Jewish point of view, our Lord, when He taught in the synagogue service, was a 'lay preacher' (Lk 4^{16-32}). So Paul and Barnabas were invited by the Jewish authorities to speak in the synagogue at Pisidian Antioch (Ac 13^{15}) and elsewhere. And in the early ages of the Church, when charismatic gifts were common, it is probable that the same liberty was frequently allowed. These charismata included 'the word of wisdom,' 'the word of knowledge,' 'prophecy,' and 'interpretation of tongues' (1 Co 12^{8-10}). See, further, J. Wordsworth, *The Ministry of Grace*, London, 1901, pp. 163–166.

There was, however, except among the Montanists and some other sects, a great objection to women preaching. Tertullian, even after he became a Montanist, disliked it; he says:

> 'It is not permitted to a woman to speak in the church, nor yet to teach' (*de Virg. Vel.* 9).

Even the *Test. of our Lord*, which enthusiastically advances the claims of the order of widows, and admits them within the sanctuary in the Eucharistic Service, will not allow them to speak in church (i. 40: 'in the church let her be silent'), though it bids them teach women in private. So the *Apost. Const.* (iii. 6) strongly forbid them to 'teach in church,' and bid them 'pray and listen to the teachers.' The prohibition of St. Paul (1 Co 14^{34}; cf. 1 Ti 2^{12}) was considered conclusive.

8. The laity in councils.—There is a considerable contrast between ancient and modern practice with regard to the position of laymen in ecclesiastical synods or councils. With the growth of the parliamentary conception in the civil State has arisen the organization of corresponding Church Parliaments in which the various orders give a vote on the questions decided, and each has a veto on the decisions of the others. It will be of interest to watch the growth of this conception. In the NT we have the description of two 'councils,' one of which may be called the prototype of the general or ecumenical synods of later days, and the other of the diocesan synods. In Ac 15 we read of a meeting called to discuss a difficult question which had arisen in the Church, whether the Gentile converts to Christianity must keep the Law of Moses—whether, in fact, the only entrance to Christianity was through Judaism. Delegates, including Paul and Barnabas, were sent up to Jerusalem to discuss the question with the 'apostles and elders' (v.[2]), who came together to consider the matter (v.[6]). But others than the apostles and elders were present. The delegates were received not only by them but by 'the church' (v.[4]; see above, § 1), who heard them declare the progress of the gospel. And, when the meeting for discussion took place, 'the multitude' were present (v.[12]). It is not clear what part these 'laymen' took in the proceedings. There was much 'questioning' (ζήτησις) before Peter spoke, and they may have had their share in this. When Paul and Barnabas began to describe the wonderful progress made among the Gentiles, 'all the multitude kept silence' (ἐσίγησε, v.[12]). The aorist would imply that before that they had not kept silence; but whether they had contributed to the debate by speeches or by acclamation does not appear. After Paul and Barnabas had spoken, James, the Lord's brother, who presided over the local church at Jerusalem, summed up the discussion and gave as the finding of the meeting what was clearly the mind of those assembled. Then 'the apostles and the elders, with the whole church,' determined to send chosen men of their own company to Antioch with Paul and Barnabas (v.[22]); but the letter which these 'chosen men' carried ran in the name of 'the apostles and elder brethren' only (v.[23] RV; the AV has a faulty text here). We thus see that laymen (but local laymen, not representatives of other Churches) were certainly present at the Apostolic Council, and perhaps spoke at it, and yet that there was a difference between their position at the meeting and that of the 'apostles and elders' in whose name the decree ran. In Ac 21^{18} we have an assembly more closely resembling a diocesan synod of succeeding ages, which was a meeting for discussion between a bishop and his presbyters—though the term 'diocesan synod' is now often used in a different sense. Paul and his companions (including Luke) came to Jerusalem and conferred with James and his 'elders' on further aspects of the question which had been discussed at the Apostolic Council. It seems that on this occasion no laymen were present.

The impression which one receives from Ac 15 is that the apostles determined to carry with them not only the official ministry, but also the whole Christian community. A similar deduction may be made from Cyprian's famous dictum that from the beginning of his episcopate he had proposed to act only after taking the advice (*consilium*) of

the clergy, and the concurring feeling (*consensus*) of the laity (*Ep.* xiv. [v.] 4, 'To the presbyters and deacons'). But modern ideas have been read into this saying. It has been interpreted as meaning that Cyprian disclaimed the power to take any action unless the laity gave their consent. The Latin word *consensus*, however, has not the same sharply defined meaning as our 'consent'; it conveys no idea of voting or of vetoing. Cyprian very rightly determined to carry his people with him in his episcopal rule, and this is the meaning of his expression *consensus*. That this view is just may be inferred from the fact that, if the dictum meant that the laity had the right to veto the bishop's actions, they would have had a higher position than that of the clergy, who had only the right to give advice (*consilium*).

In the provincial councils of the earlier centuries the bishops were the constituent members. But the essence of conciliar action is publicity, and both clergy and laity were present, often in considerable numbers, not only for their own information, that they might learn from the deliberations of the bishops, but in order that they might give information. Those who were qualified to do so, whether clergy or laymen, were brought or invited to the councils. Athanasius was present at Nicæa, in attendance on Bishop Alexander, though only a deacon (Socrates, *HE* i. 8). Eusebius (*Vit. Const.* iii. 8) says that the bishops brought in their train an immense number of presbyters, deacons, acolytes, and other attendants. Yet there is no record in ancient times of either clergy or laity exercising a veto on the bishops' decisions. Their influence was often great, but it was an indirect influence, one wielded not as an exercise of right by a class or an order, but from the qualification of knowledge and experience. They were called in, *e.g.*, to give advice about the lapsed in Cyprian's day (*Ep.* xvii. [xi.] 3, 'To the people'). See, further, art. COUNCILS AND SYNODS (Christian), vol. iv. p. 186 f.; and A. W. Haddan, in *DCA*, art. 'Council' (i. 481 f.).

The opinion of the latter writer is that, while 'bishops were the proper, ordinary, and essential members of a provincial council,' the presbyters 'as a body were consulted, as of right, down to certainly the 3rd century, and not only continued to be present, but were admitted to subscribe in several instances in later centuries.' But he doubts if 'they ever actually voted in a division'; while deacons and laity were often present and sometimes subscribed decrees, 'no proof at all exists that the laity, and no sufficient proof that the deacons, ever voted individually in actual divisions.'

We may notice here a saying of Hooker. He maintains (*Eccl. Pol.* viii. 451) that 'in all societies, companies, and corporations, what severally each shall be bound unto, it must be with all their assents ratified.' But whatever force such an opinion may have as regards the laws of a voluntary society, in matters of religion it is of very doubtful application; even to the laws of a State it can be applied only by somewhat unsatisfactory explanations. In this case it would appear that Hooker is less 'judicious' than usual.

A difficulty in the relation of laymen to synods arises from the fact that synods have so often had to deal with Christian doctrine. To legislate on doctrine is to exercise the office of teaching, and the laity have not, as a class, been commissioned, as the clergy have been commissioned, to teach, even though individual laymen may have been so commissioned (see § 7 above). Had the synods had to deal only with practical questions of Church organization, no doubt laymen would much sooner have been admitted to take a more active share in them.

An early step towards the more modern idea of a Church Parliament was the organization of the English Convocations (also called synods), in which the clerical representatives of the Lower House have a vote or veto on the decisions of the bishops in the Upper House;[1] for, without the concurrence of both Houses, no decision is an Act of Convocation. It is true that the Convocations were first thus fully organized (in the 13th cent.) for fiscal purposes; but, whatever the purpose, the result has been as stated. The addition of Lay Houses of Convocation, as consultative only, is a quite recent experiment.

Since the Reformation there has been a great movement in the West towards giving the laity an equal voice with the clergy in ecclesiastical synods. In Ireland and the British Colonies the Anglican communities have, as a rule, done this. This is also the case in the Presbyterian Communion, in which ministers and 'elders' are admitted to the General Assemblies on equal terms. It has, indeed, been discussed whether these 'elders' are or are not properly laymen, inasmuch as they have received a certain ordination or commission by laying on of hands. Neither the Church of England nor the Episcopal Church in Scotland has gone so far. The position of the laity in the former has been described above. In the latter the provincial synods are composed of the bishops and representatives of the clergy only, the clergy having a veto on the findings of the bishops, and the bishops on those of the clergy; but no legislation can take place without the representatives of the laity having an opportunity of expressing their opinion upon it, and all matters of business organization are dealt with by the Representative Church Council, in which laymen have at least an equal voice with clergymen. In this system a clergyman accused of an ecclesiastical offence can be tried only by his bishop as advised by his fellow-presbyters in diocesan synod—a sort of jury system; and he has an appeal to the 'Episcopal Synod,' which consists of the whole body of bishops.

In the Roman Catholic Communion the laity have no part, as of right, in synods, though they have sometimes been called in to give advice. In the Eastern Orthodox bodies, as will have been seen from what is stated above (§ 4), laymen have often a very considerable share in ecclesiastical councils of some kinds; but questions of doctrine are reserved for the bishops. In this connexion it may be observed that the difficulty, which has so often been felt in the West, of distinguishing questions which are doctrinal from those which are not doctrinal—for so many fall into both categories, according to the aspect in which they are viewed—does not seem to have troubled the more subtle but less logical East.

In connexion with the summoning of laymen to give evidence before synods, mention may be made of the interesting relic in England and Ireland of 'sidesmen' (in the 1603 canons 'sydemen' or 'sidemen'). It was the custom in the Middle Ages for the bishop to summon to his diocesan synod laymen as *testes synodales*, to bear witness to the moral condition of their parishes. The name 'synodsmen' is thought to have been corrupted into 'sidesmen.' Since the Reformation, however, these lay officials have been merely assistants to the church-wardens, and help to keep order in the church (English canon 90).

LITERATURE.—On the general relation of laity to clergy see J. B. Lightfoot, essay on 'The Christian Ministry' in *Philippians*[4], London, 1878, and many later editions (since reprinted in a volume of essays); C. Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*[4], do. 1900; A. Barry, *The Position of the Laity in the Church*, do. 1903; and W. E. Scudamore, art. 'Laity' in *DCA*. On lay baptism see R. Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, new ed., Oxford, 1843 ff.; J. Bingham, *Scholastical History of Lay Baptism*, London, 1712 (these two writers are in favour of the practice); W. Elwin, *The Minister of Baptism*, do. 1889; D. Waterland, *Letters on Lay-Baptism*, new ed. by F. N. Oxenham, do. 1892 (these two writers deny or doubt the validity of lay baptism); and T. Thompson, *The Offices of Baptism and Confirmation*, Cambridge, 1914, pt. ii. ch. iii. On the laity in councils see E. B. Pusey, *The Councils of the Church*, Oxford, 1857; A. W. Haddan, art. 'Council' in *DCA* (an exhaustive treatise on the subject); and A. Barry, *op. cit.*

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[1] For a possible precedent at Rome see COUNCILS AND SYNODS (Christian), vol. iv. p. 186[b].

LAKE-DWELLINGS.—The term 'lake-dwellings' (Fr. *habitations lacustres*; Germ. *Pfahlbauten*; Ital. *palafitte*) is a generic expression to designate those singular habitations which certain peoples were formerly in the habit of constructing, chiefly on fresh-water lakes, and the remains of which are at the present time not infrequently disinterred from ancient lacustrine deposits, either along the shallow margins of existing lakes or on the sites of some of the smaller lake-basins which, in the course of time, have been obliterated by the growth of peat. It is only in comparatively recent times that even the existence of such structures has come to the knowledge of archæologists, but practical researches have already abundantly shown that they were at one time common in many parts of the world, especially in Central Europe and in the British Isles. Herodotus (4th cent. B.C.) describes (v. 16) a lake-dwelling community in Lake Prasias, in Thrace, who lived in huts placed on a wooden platform, supported on tall piles, and connected with the shore by a wooden gangway. Each habitation had a trap-door which gave access to the water beneath; and the lake so abounded with fish that a man had only to open his trap-door and let down a basket by a rope into the water, and, on drawing it up in a short time, he would find it full of fish. But this, and a few other historical notices suggestive of the custom of constructing lake-habitations, failed to disclose the archæological treasures which have lain buried for so many centuries in the ancient lacustrine deposits of nearly all the lake-basins of Central Europe. Now the antiquarian materials collected on lake-dwelling sites are so vast and varied that they hold a prominent position in the principal archæological museums of Europe. To have rescued the evidence of so remarkable a phase of human civilization from oblivion is justly regarded as one of the greatest triumphs of pre-historic archæology. In 1890 the present writer described the *terremare* of the Po valley, the *terpen* of Holland and other analogous structures in Hungary and elsewhere, as mere variants of the lacustrine system of habitation, and, as some remarkable discoveries have since been made in these somewhat obscure fields of research, it is desirable to include a brief notice of them in this article as separate sections.

1. **Lacustrine researches.**—Although the discovery of the remains of pile-structures in Lake Zürich during the winter of 1853–54 is generally regarded as the starting-point of lacustrine archæology, we are not without valid evidence to show that analogous structures, though not so ancient, were known in Ireland fifteen years earlier. It seems that in 1839 curiosity was roused at the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy by the frequency of the visits of a local dealer offering for sale objects of a miscellaneous character, many of which were of rare antiquarian value. These objects were said to have been found in a peat-bog in County Meath, and their assortment in such a place seemed so strange to the Museum authorities that G. Petrie and W. R. Wilde determined to visit the locality. On this expedition they were conducted to the peat-bog of Lagore, near the village of Dunshaughlin, where, within the boundaries of a drained lake and under a thick covering of peat, was an artificial mound then partially exposed by peat-cutters. It seems that this mound had been well known to bone collectors for upwards of ten years; during that time they had dug out and exported to a factory of bone-manure in Scotland no fewer than 150 cart-loads of bones.

The mound was 520 feet in circumference and along its margin were 'upright posts of black oak, measuring from 6 to 8 feet in height; these were mortised into beams of a similar material laid flat upon the marl and sand beneath the bog, and nearly 16 feet below the present surface. The upright posts were held together by connecting crossbeams, and (said to be) fastened by large iron nails.'

An abstract of a paper by Wilde on the Lagore 'find,' from which the above extract is taken, was published in the *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* for 1840, and its contents were so suggestive to local antiquaries that almost immediately several other sites were recognized as island-forts, or *crannogs* (the name given to such structures in the Irish annals). Moreover, during the workings of the Commission of the Arterial Drainage and Inland Navigation of Ireland, no fewer than 22 *crannogs* were brought to light throughout the counties of Roscommon, Leitrim, Cavan, and Monaghan. Reports of these discoveries by the engineers of the Board of Works, with plans, maps, sections, and a large assortment of relics, were deposited at the time in the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy.

The fortuitous circumstances which led to the discovery of the pile-structures (*Pfahlbauten*) of Switzerland are so well known that it is hardly necessary to dwell on them here. It appears that, owing to the lowness of the water in Lake Zürich during the winter of 1853–54, two of the inhabitants of Ober-Meilen, whose vineyards in ordinary times came close to the water in the lake, began to extend their limits by enclosing portions of the exposed shore with a stone wall and filling in the space with the adjacent mud. In course of these operations they came upon the decayed stumps of wooden piles, stone axes, flint implements, and various worked objects of horn and bone, which excited some curiosity among the workmen. J. Staub (*Die Pfahlbauten in den Schweizer-Seen*, Fluntern, 1864, p. 8) informs us that the village schoolmaster, Herr Aeppli, having seen some of the objects with his pupils, went to inspect the locality, and was so impressed with the importance of the find that he sent a brief statement of the facts to the Antiquarian Society at Zürich. Within four hours of the dispatch of his epistle three representatives of the Society arrived at Ober-Meilen, among them being the president, Ferdinand Keller. After careful consideration of the facts, Keller came to the conclusion that originally the piles had supported a platform upon which huts had been erected; that these huts had been inhabited by an industrious population, who were the owners of the stone axes and the other primitive relics disinterred from the mud; and that the lacustrine village had come to an untimely end by a conflagration which destroyed the entire structures down to the water edge.

News of the discoveries at Ober-Meilen spread rapidly among the Swiss people, with the result that an army of explorers immediately began to search for similar remains in other lakes. Guided partly by traditional stories of submerged cities long current among the fishing community, and partly by the knowledge of local fishermen, who, from practical experience of disasters to their nets, could at once point to numberless fields of submerged woodwork, the efforts of these pioneer *lacustreurs* were speedily crowned with success. Keller's first report on the Swiss lake-dwellings, which appeared towards the close of 1854 under the title of 'Die keltischen Pfahlbauten in den Schweizerseen,' at once brought this singular mode of human habitation prominently before the scientific world.

To dredge the bed of a lake with hand-worked appliances in a small boat was a slow process, always expensive, and often unproductive. Yet such was the enthusiasm with which that kind of work was carried on year after year by the Swiss antiquaries that there is scarcely a Cantonal

Museum in the country but contains a valuable collection of lacustrine relics secured in this way. In the course of time, these prosaic methods were powerfully supplemented by the prosecution of various kinds of public works, such as drainage operations, the deepening of harbours, the construction of railways, jetties, etc. Of exceptional importance among such incidental works was the completion of the gigantic operation known as the 'Correction des Eaux du Jura,' which embraced the deepening of the entire waterway of the Jura valley, from the junction of the Lower Thièle with the Aar to the outlet of the Broye at Lake Morat, the result of which was to lower the surface of the lakes of Bienne, Neuchâtel, and Morat from 6 to 8 feet. The permanent effect of these works on the Jura lakes, especially Lake Neuchâtel, was very marked—harbours, jetties, and extensive tracts of shoreland being left high and dry by the subsiding waters. This was the harvest time of archæology. Many of the sites of lacustrine villages became dry land and were visited by crowds of eager relic-hunters; even fishermen forsook their normal avocation, finding it more profitable to fish for pre-historic antiquities.

Another illustration of how public works were utilized for the advancement of archæology was the construction of the splendid bridge which now spans the Limmat at its outlet from Lake Zürich, and the laying out of the adjacent promenades, gardens, and ornamental quays, which occupy what was formerly part of the lake. The filling up of this large area necessitated the use of dredgers, by means of which gravel and mud were raised from the most convenient shallows along the shore and transported as required. Among the localities selected for these operations were the 'Grosser Hafner' and the outskirts of the Bauschanze. The rich loamy deposits of the 'Haumessergrund' at Wollishofen were found to be a suitable soil for the floral gardens. All these localities turned out to be the sites of lake-villages, and yielded an enormous amount of industrial remains of all ages. Indeed, the collection of Bronze Age relics from Wollishofen now deposited in the Antiquarian Museum at Zürich is one of the most valuable hitherto brought to light through lake-dwelling researches.

It is not necessary to notice the successive investigations which have been made throughout Europe in consequence of the publicity given to these discoveries in Switzerland. Suffice it to say that systematic explorations on an extensive scale have conclusively shown that lake-villages, generally in the form of pile-structures, had been prevalent during the Stone and Bronze Ages in the sheltered bays of nearly all the lakes of France, Switzerland, S. Germany, Austria, and N. Italy. More recently the area of their distribution has been extended to Bosnia, Greece, Asia Minor, and probably other localities.

The remarkable development of lake-dwellings during the pre-historic ages in Central Europe seems to have come to a sudden end in the early Iron Age, and so completely had the system fallen into desuetude that scarcely a trace of it has survived in the local traditions of the districts in which such dwellings were most numerous. The habit of constructing houses built on platforms supported on piles is not, however, absolutely confined to pre-historic times, for we find from various books of travel that such habitations are still prevalent in various parts of the world—*e.g.*, in the Gulf of Maracaibo, the mouths of the Orinoco and Amazon, on the Coasts of New Guinea and Borneo, at Singapore, along the creeks and harbours running into the Straits of Malacca, etc. V. L. Cameron (*Across Africa*, London, 1877, ii. 63) describes three villages in Lake Mohrya, in Central Africa, with drawings of their picturesque appearance as seen from the shore. A. Goering (in *Illustrated Travels*, London, 1869–75, ii. 19–21) gives an account of a visit which he paid to the pile-dwellers of a tribe of Goajiro Indians in the neighbourhood of the town of Maracaibo, from which the following extracts may be interesting:

> In this way we reached the Goajiro village. Here a lively one presented itself. The houses, with low sloping roofs, were like so many little cock-lofts perched on high over the shallow waters, and they were connected with each other by means of bridges, made of narrow planks, the split stems of palm trees. . . . Each house, or cock-loft, consisted of two parts, the pent-roof shelter being partitioned off in the middle: the front apartment served the double purpose of entrance-hall and kitchen, the rear apartment as a reception and dwelling chamber, and I was not a little surprised to observe how clean it was kept. The floor was formed of split stems of trees, set close together and covered with mats. Weapons and utensils were placed in order in the corners.'
>
> Access was got to these villages from the shore by dug-out canoes, the inhabitants mounting to their 'cock-lofts' by a notched tree-trunk, which served as a ladder. Goering states that such villages are numerous along the shores of the great 'Lake,' or Gulf, of Maracaibo. 'The piles on which they rest are driven deep into the oozy bottom, and so firmly do they hold that there is no shakiness of the loftily-perched dwelling perceptible, even when crowded with people.'
>
> Pile-structures are still more numerous in the east Indian islands. J. S. C. Dumont d'Urville (*Voyage de découvertes autour du monde*, Paris, 1836) describes the inhabitants of the bay of Dorei as living on four groups of pile-villages, each containing from eight to fifteen houses entirely constructed of timbers. Some of these houses have a double row of cells or cabins, separated by a passage which runs from end to end, and give accommodation to several families.
>
> As early as 1860, F. Troyon (*Habitations lacustres*) quotes from the books of a number of travellers recording the existence of pile-structures in nearly all parts of the world; but little further information is to be derived from this class of evidence.

The discovery of an older lacustrine civilization in Switzerland was hailed by Irish antiquaries with the greatest enthusiasm, for it was only then that the significance of their own *crannogs* came to be fully realized; and henceforth *crannog*-hunting was pursued with renewed vigour. The Irish annals were now carefully searched for references to *crannogs*, and many of the localities thus indicated were identified and partly explored. In 1857 Wilde published the first part of his well-known catalogue of the antiquities in the Museum of the Royal Irish Academy, in which he gave an excellent account of the *crannogs*. In it he states that 46 were known up to date, and predicts that many more would come to light as the drainage of the country advanced—a prediction which has been amply verified, as every succeeding year has seen an increase to their number. Now the total number of Irish *crannogs* known and more or less explored is upwards of 200.

In 1857 Joseph Robertson read a paper on Scottish *crannogs* at the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland. The chief facts adduced by him consisted of historic references to island-forts, and submerged wooden structures exposed in the course of the drainage of lochs and marshes during the last two centuries. The first great discovery, however, which brought the subject on the field of practical research in Scotland, was made in the Loch of Dowalton, Wigtownshire, upwards of fifty years ago. In order to drain the extensive meadows occupying the western portion of the Dowalton valley the proprietor, William Maxwell, conceived and successfully carried out a project of draining the loch by cutting a new outlet through a narrow lip of rock which separated its waters from the lower grounds beyond. This excavation was completed during the summer of 1863, and, as the waters subsided, a group of five or six artificial islands gradually emerged from the bosom of the lake. The antiquarian remains collected on these islands ultimately disclosed a picture of early Scottish civilization hitherto unknown.

A descriptive account of the Dowalton *crannogs* was read by the Duke of Northumberland (then

Lord Lovaine) at the meeting of the British Association held at Newcastle-on-Tyne in 1863.

Two years later J. Stuart, secretary of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, visited Dowalton, and, owing to the more complete drainage of the loch, was enabled to examine the islands under more favourable conditions. The result of his labours was an elaborate paper to the Society (1866), in which he gave a detailed account of their structure and of the relics found on them.

The discovery and excavation of the Lochlee *crannog* (1878–79) was the beginning of a series of explorations, conducted under the auspices of the Ayr and Galloway Archæological Association, which culminated within a few years in the excavation of about half a dozen typical *crannog* sites throughout the counties of Ayr and Wigtown. The assortment of relics recovered from their débris indicates the range of their occupancy to have extended from the Romano-British period down to mediæval times. Since the publication of the reports on these excavations three other typical *crannogs* have been investigated in Scotland, viz. one in Lochan Dughaill, Argyllshire, one at Hyndford, near Lanark, and one in Ashgrove Loch, near Stevenston, Ayrshire. The Hyndford *crannog* is of special interest on account of the number of objects belonging to Roman civilization which were among its relics.

Until the discovery of the Glastonbury lake-village, in the spring of 1892, by Arthur Bulleid, the recorded indications of lake-dwellings south of the Scottish border are too meagre and fragmentary to call for any notice in this sketch. The excavation of the Glastonbury settlement has been in progress since its discovery, and is now completed. Its site occupies some 3 or 4 acres of flat meadow-land, within the boundaries of what is justly supposed to have been formerly a marshy lake. Before excavations were begun, all that the eye could discern was a group of low mounds huddled in the corner of a field. These mounds turned out to be the sites and débris of dwelling-huts resting on a foundation of layers of brushwood and the stems of small trees. These under-structures were sometimes bound together with transverse mortised beams, precisely similar to those so commonly met with in the Scottish and Irish *crannogs*. A thick palisading of piles and brushwood surrounded and protected the village. Its marginal boundary was very irregular, probably owing to the fact that enlargement of the original area of the village had been subsequently made by the addition of huts projecting from its sides. The huts were circular or slightly oval, and varied in size from 20 to 35 ft. in diameter. Each hut contained a central hearth, sometimes neatly made of flat stones embedded in the clay flooring which existed in all of them; and, as subsidence, due to the compression and decay of the under-structures, progressed, the occupants superadded new clay floorings, which on section showed a well-marked stratified appearance. Several hearths, five or six not being an unknown number, were thus observed to have been superimposed one above the other—precisely as was the case on the Lochlee *crannog*.

The relics collected on the site of this remarkable lacustrine village are so numerous and varied that they illustrate, with rare and singular completeness, the life-history of the community who inhabited it. They exhibit the special characteristics of 'Late Celtic' art, as it existed prior to the spread of Roman civilization in that part of Britain; and it is this fact that gives the Glastonbury collection an exceptional importance among the antiquarian remains hitherto discovered within the British Isles.[1]

[1] Within the last few years another lacustrine village has been discovered at a place called Meare, about two miles from Glastonbury, and is now in the course of being excavated during each summer. So far, both the structural and cultural relics disclosed at this new site are precisely similar to those of the Glastonbury village.

2. Structure of lake-dwellings.—It will be understood from the foregoing remarks that the structural details of lake-dwellings have to be gathered more or less from different, and sometimes widely separated, settlements, and re-constructed on the principles of comparative archæology. As regards the pile-structures of the Stone and Bronze Ages, everything—huts, platforms, and even the submerged piles, except their lower ends—has disappeared ages ago, either from natural decay or by conflagrations. The complete destruction of a lake-village by fire was by no means a rare catastrophe, and, strange to say, it was, from an archæological point of view, the most fortunate termination that could have happened to it. During the bustle and scrimmage consequent on the conflagration of such combustible materials not only did many articles of value drop into the water beneath, but some of the most perishable commodities, such as grain, fruits, bread, cloth, portions of the clay mouldings which covered the cottage walls, etc., were more or less charred before being deposited in the lake-silt—a condition which rendered them less liable to decomposition. It is by collecting, assorting, and comparing such fragmentary materials that archæologists are enabled to form some idea of the appearance and internal structure of these lacustrine villages, as well as of the culture, civilization, and domestic economy of their inhabitants.

The preliminary problem which had to be solved before habitable huts of any kind could be erected was the construction of a level platform, sufficiently elevated above the surface of the water to place the dwelling-huts beyond the action of the waves and floods. The methods adopted to secure this end may be briefly described.

(*a*) One method was by driving long piles of wood into the bed of the lake, leaving their tops projecting at a uniform height above the water, and then placing over them transverse beams with mortised holes, into which the tops of the piles were fitted—thus forming a platform capable of supporting human habitations, and, of course, varying in size according to the requirements of the community. That the earliest lake-dwellers had the requisite skill to accomplish such work is established beyond doubt by the discovery among the débris of nearly all the stations of mortised beams, tenons, portions of wood containing both round and square holes, together with a various assortment of wooden implements, vessels, etc. A common method of steadying the piles was to throw around them after being placed in position large quantities of stones. The stones were transported from the adjacent shore in canoes, one of which, still containing its load, was actually observed buried in the mud off the Ile de St. Pierre, in Lake Bienne, where it had evidently been swamped. These extensive collections of stones formed here and there a kind of submerged mound, which from time immemorial was locally known as a *Steinberg*. One or more of these *Steinbergs* have been found on almost all the sites of the pile-villages of the Stone Age. The long straggling settlement at Schaffis contained three, the largest measuring 217 ft. in length by 65 ft. in breadth. The fishermen, in order to prevent injury to their nets, were in the habit of pulling up these piles; and so abundant were they in the three great lakes known as the 'Jura waters' that they had become the source of a small industry among cabinet-makers, who had long recognized the valuable properties of the black oak for the manufacture of ornamental articles. A more striking appearance has rarely been seen than that which the stations of Möringen and Lattringen presented shortly after Lake Bienne became affected by the operations of the 'Correction des Eaux du Jura.' Photographs then taken show quite a forest of black stumps rising a few feet above the muddy bottom which then, for the first time, became exposed to view.

It is estimated that the actual number of piles used in the construction of some of the larger settlements was not far short of 100,000. One of the stations at Morges, in the lake of Geneva, was 1200 ft. long and 150 ft. broad; and the whole of this area was thickly studded with the stumps of the piles which formerly supported the village. E. von Fellenberg calculated, by counting the number of piles in one or two selected localities, that the entire number requisite for the Bronze Age settlement at Möringen could not have been less than 10,000.

In the construction of the earlier villages the piles were simply round stems of trees, but latterly, apparently for the purpose of economizing the wood, they were split into two and

sometimes into four portions—a structural feature said to be characteristic of the Bronze Age. It may also be noted that, when a Stone Age site continued in occupation during the Bronze Age, the débris of the latter settlement lay invariably on the outside of the former, showing that with the use of metal tools their constructors were enabled to plant the piles in deeper water. During the Stone Age the woodwork had been manipulated by stone implements—a fact which was clearly demonstrated by Keller on the occasion of the first discovery of the kind at Ober-Meilen. Here some of the piles, on being freshly pulled up, were observed to have their tips pointed by blunt implements, and it was experimentally ascertained that the cuts on them could be closely imitated by using the stone axes which were picked out of the surrounding mud.

(*b*) A second method by means of which lake-dwellers secured an adequate basis for their huts was to construct a series of rectangular basements of wood a few feet apart, each basement having its sides formed by a succession of horizontal beams lying one above the other, like the logs in a Swiss châlet. The ends of the beams overlapped for a few feet, and at the four crossings a few uprights were placed, apparently for the purpose of steadying the structure. These compartments varied in size from a few feet in diameter to as many yards. The lowest beams rested on the bed of the lake, and, when the requisite height above the water was reached, transverse beams to form the habitable platform were laid across, thus covering up the empty spaces underneath. This plan, which was probably selected for the purpose of saving the structural materials, may be regarded as analogous to the vaulted foundations of modern houses. Examples of such structures have been found in Lake Paladru in France (Merovingian period) and in the lakes of Persanzig, Arys, Daber, and in a few other sporadic lake-dwellings of the Iron Age in N. Germany.

(*c*) Contemporary with the pre-historic pile-structures already noticed, there existed throughout the same regions of Central Europe certain lake-dwellings which, instead of platforms supported on piles, had solid sub-structures composed of closely set timbers arranged in horizontal layers and often alternating with beds of clay. Such structures were commonly erected in the smaller lakes, and their remains are now generally embedded in peat. Characteristic specimens of this class belonging to the Stone Age have been investigated at Wauwyl, Niederwyl, Schussenried, and a few other localities. An artificial island in the lake of Inkwyl, near Soleure, was shown by C. A. Morlot to have been originally a pile-structure which at a later period had become consolidated into an island by the gradual accumulation of the débris of a lengthy habitation. Another in Lake Nussbaumen is, according to Morlot, surrounded by a circle of piles, after the manner of the Scottish and Irish *crannogs*. It has also been proved that the prettily wooded Isola Virginia in Lake Varese, though now about three acres in extent, was originally a pile-structure. At present it contains several buildings, one of which is a valuable archæological museum erected by the proprietor, Ettore Ponti.

It was, however, within the British Isles that the artificial islands, or *crannogs*, acquired their greatest development. Precise information as regards their structure has been supplied by an exhaustive investigation of a few Scottish specimens, notably those at Lochlee and Buston, in the county of Ayr, the result of which may be briefly summarized as follows.

A suitable locality having been selected—the topographical requirements seem to have been a small mossy lake with its margin overgrown with water-plants—the next consideration was the selection of materials for constructing the island. In a lake bed composed of many feet of decayed vegetable matter it is manifest that heavy substances, such as stones and earth, would be inadmissible, owing to their weight, so that solid logs of wood in the form of trunks of trees would be the best material that could be used. The plan adopted seems to have been to make in the first place a floating raft of tree-stems, brushwood, heather, bracken, etc., with which were mingled stones and earth. On this basis they continued to add similar materials until the mass grounded. It was then surrounded with a stockade in the form of one or more circles of piles united by intertwining branches, or, in the more elaborately constructed specimens, by horizontal beams with mortised holes to receive the ends of the piles. These horizontal beams were arranged in two ways. One set ran along the circumference and bound together all the uprights in the same circle, while others took a radial direction and connected each circle together, some of these radial beams being long enough to bind the uprights in three circles together. The mechanical skill displayed in the construction of these stockades was specially directed to give stability to the island, and to prevent supernumbent pressure from causing the general mass to bulge out laterally.

The internal structure of the Lochlee island was carefully ascertained by cutting a large rectangular hole near its centre down to the original silt of the lake—a depth of some 10 ft. from the lowest floor of the dwelling-house, or about 16 ft. from the original surface of the mound. The result of this was to show that nearly the entire mass was composed of the unbarked stems of various kinds of trees, from 6 to 12 ins. in diameter, laid in transverse layers one above the other. Interspersed here and there among the woodwork were some long slender oak planks, which appear to have formed a binding framework between the central parts of the island and its margin. One such beam, on having its attachments traced out, was found to have its inner end pinned by a long wooden peg to an adjacent large tree-stem, while its outer end was pinned to another slender oak plank which extended outwards and was similarly attached to the marginal structures.

Some of these *crannog* islands in Scotland and Ireland had been constructed of stones with or without a wooden foundation. According to G. H. Kinahan, the largest and most typical example of the stone *crannog* in Ireland is Hag's Castle, Lough Mask, Co. Mayo. As a Scottish example may be cited a mound on the margin of the White Loch of Ravenstone, Wigtownshire, explored a few years ago by Lord Borthwick and the present writer. It turned out to be a mass of stones, presenting a level surface of about 80 ft. in diameter and 6 or 7 ft. thick, resting on a foundation of large beams. On the surface of this mound were the foundations of stone buildings divided into five compartments.[1]

Most of the pile-structures of Central Europe had been connected with the shore by one or more gangways, supported on a double row of piles, with dimensions varying according to the requirements of each village. E. von Fellenberg informs us (Keller, *Lake-Dwellings*, p. 181 f.) that the bridge leading from the shore to the Bronze Age settlement of Möringen was about 200 yards in length, and nearly 20 ft. in width, while that to the Stone Age settlement in the same locality was considerably shorter, and only 5 to 8 ft. wide. The area occupied by piles at Robenhausen extended to about 3 acres, and the nearest point of the old lake shore was some 2000 paces distant; but yet, from traces of piles found in the peat, it would appear that a wooden bridge traversed the whole of this distance. Remains of similar approaches have occasionally been discovered in connexion with the later dwellings of the Iron Age, both in N. Germany and in the British Isles. Some of the Scottish and Irish *crannogs* were also accessible by a submerged stone causeway, the existence of which had become known in some instances only upon the drainage of the lake. It has been conjectured that such submerged approaches might have been intentionally constructed so as to supply to the initiated a secret means of escape in emergencies—an idea strengthened by the zig-zag direction presented by some of them, such as a stone causeway in the Loch of Sanquhar. Other *crannogs*, however, appear to have been completely insulated and accessible only by boats. The frequency with which canoes have been disinterred from the débris of lake-dwellings of all ages shows how prevalent and widely distributed was their use as a means of communication with the shore. These primitive boats, whether emanating from a Swiss *Pfahlbau* or from a mediæval *crannog* of the British Isles, were almost invariably dug-outs, and presented no special feature either in form or in structure by which their age or provenance could be determined.

The evidential data, on which our knowledge of the structure of the actual habitations of the lake-

[1] During the last few years a preliminary survey of the artificial islands in the Highland lochs, preparatory to excavating the more promising sites, has been completed by F. Odo Blundell of St. Benedict's Monastery, Fort Augustus, under the auspices of a Committee of the British Association. Several interesting reports have already been published by the Association, as well as in the *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*. For the year 1914 a small grant has been obtained from the Carnegie Research Fund towards the expense of investigating the artificial island in the Loch of Kinellan, Ross-shire.

dwellers is founded, consist of portions of burnt clay mouldings, the position of hearths and culinary implements, traces of walls and partitions, the disposition of food refuse, etc. The inference from the clay castings is that the timbers which formed the walls of the huts had been placed close together in an upright position, and then plastered over with puddled clay. Burnt clay impressions found at Robenhausen indicated timbers about an inch and a half in diameter, but other fragments indicated merely a kind of wicker-work. It may be noted that clay mouldings found in Lake Bourget, supposed to have been portions of the ceiling of a room, were ornamented with concentric circles and parallel lines. Other burnt fragments from the same locality were portions of the funnel of a small furnace or stove.

As to the form of the huts archæologists are divided in opinion, some, in their ideal restorations, figuring them as circular, and others as rectangular. F. Troyon, judging from some clay casts found at Wangen, came to the conclusion that they were circular, and, accordingly, figures them as such in his *Habitations lacustres*. On the other hand, E. Frank, the investigator of Schussenried, came upon the foundations and portions of the walls of a cottage embedded in peat. The structure was rectangular, measuring 33 ft. in length and 23 ft. in breadth, and was divided into two compartments by a partition. The walls and partitions were constructed of split stems of trees set upright, and plastered over with clay. On the south side there was a door, a little over 3 ft. wide, which opened into one of the chambers. The flooring of both these chambers was composed of four layers of closely laid timbers separated by as many layers of clay. These repeated floorings may have been necessitated by the gradual rise of the surrounding peat, which ultimately compelled the inhabitants to abandon the dwelling altogether.

The diameter of the circular area enclosed by the stockades at Lochlee was about 60 ft., and in its central portion there was a space, measuring 39 ft. square, paved with closely laid beams like railway sleepers, and along each of its sides were the stumps of posts, apparently the remains of a wooden wall. A row of similar stumps divided the paved area into two compartments. Five or six superimposed hearths occupied the middle of the northern compartment, and the doorway, clearly defined by portions of two stout posts, was situated on the south side, while facing it on the left was an immense refuse heap, beyond which were the remains of a gangway connecting the island with the shore. On the other hand, the structural remains on the Buston *crannog* indicated one large circular dwelling-house, a form of habitation which was also disclosed by the excavation of the *crannog* in Lochan Dughaill. We have already seen that the huts of the Glastonbury lake-village were more or less circular. It may, therefore, be inferred that both forms were indiscriminately used by the lake-dwellers not only during the prehistoric period, but also during the subsequent ages in which such structures were in vogue.

On the pile-structures proper the hut floor was made of clay mixed with rushes, and over this was placed the hearth, which consisted of a few flat stones embedded in clay. From discoveries made at Niederwyl, Jacob Messikommer (Keller, *Lake-Dwellings*, p. 73) concluded that the roofs of the huts in that settlement were thatched with straw and rushes. That thatch of some kind was used in Western Europe in proto-historic times finds some corroboration in the writings of classical authors.

Thus, Strabo (iv. iv. 3) writes that the Belgæ lived in 'great houses, arched, constructed of planks and wicker-work, and covered with a heavy thatched roof'—a description which correctly applies to many of the Scottish *crannogs*.

3. Culture and civilization of the lake-dwellers of Europe.—There is no class of antiquities which gives greater support to the general accuracy of the chronological sequence of the so-called three ages of Stone, Bronze, and Iron than the various collections of lake-dwelling remains which are to be seen in the archæological museums of Europe. Founded in the Stone Age, these pile-structures continued to flourish during the whole of the Bronze Age, and even overlapped into the early Iron Age, so that the period of their duration entirely covers the introduction and development of bronze into Middle and Western Europe. It is beyond doubt that from the very start the lake-dwellers were acquainted with, and sedulously practised, various arts and industries, that they reared most of the ordinary domestic animals, and that they cultivated the growth of flax, fruits, and various kinds of cereals.

Several varieties of cloth, fringes, nets, cords, and ropes were brought to light by Messikommer from the very lowest relic-bed at the Stone Age station of Robenhausen; and even specimens of embroidery were found at the adjoining station of Irgenhausen. Remains of linen cloth, thread, nets, basket-work, etc., have also been found on many other stations, as at Vinelz, Locras, Schaffis, Lagozza, Laibach, etc. The absence of such fragile relics from other stations is not to be taken as evidence that their inhabitants were unacquainted with such industries; for it is only when fabrics are carbonized, or deposited in circumstances exceptionally favourable to their preservation, that they resist for a prolonged period the process of natural decay. Thus, at Schussenried, though there was no actual specimen of cloth found, the impression of a well-woven fabric was clearly visible on a consolidated mass of wheat—probably that of the sack in which the grain had been stored. At Laibach, a similar impression was observed on a fragment of pottery. In the museum at Freiburg (Switzerland) there is a carbonized spindle from Lake Morat, which shows fine threads still coiled round it; and Gross figures a similar object from Locras.

One of the stations at Moosseedorf-See, which was carefully investigated by the experienced archæologists Jahn, Morlot, and Uhlmann, yielded a large assortment of the osseous remains of animals, among which the following were supposed to have been in a state of domestication: dog, sheep, goat, pig, and various kinds of oxen. A few bones and teeth of the horse were also found, but these might have belonged to the wild species, as it is not agreed that this animal was domesticated till the Bronze Age. The cultivated plants recorded from this station were barley, two kinds of wheat, pea, poppy, and flax. At Wangen two varieties of wheat and the two-rowed barley were distinctly recognized both in whole ears and as detached grain—the latter in quantities that could be measured in bushels.

That the ceramic art was well known to, and practised by, the early lake-dwellers is amply proved by the quantity of pottery, mostly fragmentary, indicating bowls, plates, cups, jugs, spoons, and large vessels, now stored among lacustrine relics in the various museums throughout Europe. These vessels were made without a knowledge of the potter's wheel, and the paste frequently contained coarse sand or small pebbles; but a finer kind was also used for the manufacture of smaller vessels. Generally speaking, they were coarsely made in the earlier stations, having perforated knobs instead of handles; yet examples are occasionally found which show that handles

were not unknown. The ornamentation consisted of finger- and string-marks, irregular scratchings with a pointed tool, raised knobs, and perforations round the rim, together with dots and lines variously combined.

For the prosecution of the ordinary avocations of social life the lake-dwellers were in possession of a varied assortment of tools and implements, the precise function of some of them being, however, difficult to determine. They used axes, knives, saws, scrapers, borers, etc., of flint and other hard stones. Cutting instruments, pointers, chisels, etc., were also made of horn, bone, and the tusks of the wild boar. With such tools they constructed wooden houses, scooped out canoes, and shaped wood into various kinds of dishes, clubs, and handles.

The food supply derived from agriculture and the rearing of domestic animals was supplemented by the produce of hunting, fishing, and gathering such seeds and fruits as nature produced in the vicinity. The weapons and tools used in these pursuits are abundantly met with. Arrow- and spear-points of flint, and sometimes of rock-crystal and jade, or other mineral, and of bone, are common among lake-dwelling remains; and even a few of the bows made of yew wood, notwithstanding their liability to decay, have come to light—two from Robenhausen, and one from each of the stations of Vinelz, Sutz, and Clairvaux.

The introduction of cutting implements of bronze into general use among the lake-dwellers gave a great impulse to the advancement of all the industries and ordinary affairs of life. In lieu of the primitive weapons and tools previously in use, we now meet with a splendid array of swords, daggers, lances, axes, knives, razors, chisels, gouges, sickles, etc., all made of the new material. The simple dagger of bone or flint, which could be used only by a thrusting blow, not only became more effective, but developed into a new weapon—the double-edged sword. Indeed, all weapons, implements, and ornaments underwent more or less evolutionary improvements, the various stages of which can be readily traced by a comparison of extant specimens. Thus, the primitive stone axe at first retained the same form in bronze, and, as such, had a wide distribution throughout Europe; but it gradually succumbed to the flanged type, with or without a loop, till finally all forms gave way to the socketed implement, which appears to have been regarded as the best form of axe prevalent in the Bronze Age. It was only when iron superseded bronze in the manufacture of cutting implements that the modern type of axe, *i.e.* with a transverse socket, came into general use.

In the category of ornaments and articles of the toilet there falls to be considered a large assortment of new and fanciful forms, such as bracelets, pendants, necklaces, fibulæ, pins, combs, belt-clasps, finger-rings, buttons, studs, ear-rings, chains, and a few trinkets of gold, amber, and glass.

That the horse was in a state of domestication among the lake-dwellers during the Bronze Age we have very circumstantial evidence, in the discovery of bridle-bits and various ornaments for harness, as well as a wheel and other mountings of a carriage.

These progressive innovations in domestic and public life could hardly fail to influence the art of the potter. Accordingly, we meet with a better quality of paste, greater variety and elegance in the style and form of vessels, and some approach to systematic decoration. Ultimately colouring materials were utilized, which considerably enhanced the effect of the geometric style of ornamentation. Besides patterns of recurring figures, formed by impressions in the soft clay, we occasionally find similar patterns traced on the surface of vessels in thin strips of tin-foil made to adhere to the dish by means of a kind of gum or asphalt. Such vessels were made of fine black paste, with a smooth surface, and were extremely elegant in shape.

Lacustrine archæology does not supply the materials requisite for a review of the culture and civilization prevalent in the early Iron Age, as no lake-dwellings have been discovered showing a transition in the manufacture of bronze and iron objects. Iron appears in a few instances, towards the close of the Bronze Age, as in ornamental bands encrusted on a few swords and bracelets, but there are no tools or weapons of the transition stage, such as was the case at Hallstatt, where iron is seen, as it were, competing with bronze in the manufacture of all kinds of objects. On the contrary, the few objects of iron found on the sites of one or two of the Swiss lake-dwellings are mostly La Tène types, which, of course, are very different, not only in material, but in form and technique, from those of the previous age. On these stations not only were iron objects of La Tène forms found, but also Roman tiles, pottery, and coins. The introduction of iron into general use in Europe seems, therefore, to have been the work of an alien people who subjugated the lake-dwellers and destroyed their villages. On the other hand, the sporadic lake-dwellings found outside the area of these earlier habitations belong almost exclusively to the Iron Age, and their respective inhabitants had no common bonds of affinity. The vast majority of the Scottish and Irish *crannogs* flourished from the Romano-British period down to the 17th cent.—a statement which, according to R. von Virchow ('Die Pfahlbauten des nördlichen Deutschlands,' *ZE* i. [Berlin, 1869]), is applicable to their analogues in N. Germany.

The well-known station of La Tène, regarded by the earlier *lacustreurs* as a true lake-dwelling of the Iron Age, is now shown to have been an *oppidum*, or fort, of the Helvetians, erected at the outlet of the lake when its waters stood at a lower level than they did immediately before the 'Correction des Eaux du Jura.' The remarkable assortment of weapons, implements, and ornaments collected from this site gives a striking picture of the metallurgical skill to which their owners had attained prior to the influence of Roman civilization in Gaul. The style of art disclosed by them seems to be closely allied to that known in Britain as 'Late Celtic,' as represented, *e.g.*, by the relics found on the Glastonbury lake-villages; and so important is this group considered by archæologists that the name 'La Tène' has become a generic expression for those well-defined Marnian remains which are Celtic in origin, and are not to be confounded with those classified as Greek, Roman, Etruscan, or Phœnician.

4. Terremare.—Shortly after the middle of the 18th cent. certain artificial mounds of an earthy substance found scattered here and there over some of the eastern provinces of the Po valley became known to agriculturists as possessing great fertilizing power—a property which was henceforth turned to account by using their contents as a field manure. To such an extent has this practice been carried on that, out of about 100 sites then known, few now remain. On the removal of a few feet of surface soil the fertilizing materials come to view in the form of stratified deposits of clay, sand, ashes, etc., of various colours—yellow, brown, green, and black—shown conspicuously on section as parallel bands running across the mound. The finer materials, procured by riddling, are sold to the farmers under the name *marna* or *merne*;

and hence these mounds are now known in scientific literature as *terremare*. In course of these annual excavations a number of antiquarian objects were encountered by the workmen, such as fragments of pottery, Roman coins and tiles, implements of bronze, bone, and horn, the bones of domestic and wild animals, and occasionally those of men. These discoverics for a long time failed to lead to any scientific investigation, and, when the mysterious mounds happened to be noticed by the early writers of last century, each had a theory of his own to account for them. The celebrated naturalist G. Venturi (1822) assigned them partly to the Boii, a Celtic race who here cremated their dead warriors and ceremonially threw their weapons and animals taken in war into the burning pile, and partly to the Romans who subsequently inhabited the country and selected these mounds as burial-places. Others supposed them to have been the sacred and traditional cemeteries of successive races, and hence their contents were called cemetery-earth (*terra cimeteriale*); and it is a curious fact that many of these truncated mounds are to this day crowned by a modern church or convent, around which the Christians have been in the habit of burying their dead. B. Gastaldi thought the stratification of the deposits could be accounted for only by the intervention of floods and inundations, such as the annual overflowings of the Po and the bursting of the numerous torrents which descend from the Apennines.

These and similar theories, based on the supposition that the *terramara* mounds were the abodes of the dead, were not, however, in harmony with the domestic character of the pottery and industrial implements which were turned up. The starting-point of a long series of researches which ultimately solved the problem was the announcement, in 1861, of P. Strobel that the remains of a *palafitte*, analogous to those found in lakes and peat-bogs, were to be seen below the true *terramara* beds at the station of Castione dei Marchesi, near Borgo San Donnino, in the province of Parma. This discovery aroused much speculative interest, especially when correlated with the researches initiated by B. Gastaldi regarding pile-dwellings in lakes and marshes, the existence of which, in Italy, had just then been proved by the discovery of their remains in the peat-bog of Mercurago and in Lake Garda.

Reflecting on these novel revelations, Strobel and Luigi Pigorini, both then residing at Parma, began a series of investigations regarding the *terremare* in their own vicinity, the outcome of which was a joint report, first published in 1862 as part of Gastaldi's well-known work, *Nuovi cenni sugli oggetti di alta antichità trovati nelle torbiere e nelle marniere dell' Italia*.[1]

Interest in the whole subject now rapidly increased, and extended to agriculturists and local observers. Yearly excavations were carefully scanned for antiquities, and special excavations in the interests of science were even undertaken by the State. The outcome of these elaborate researches has been to show that a typical *terramara* settlement was virtually a land *palafitte*, trapezoidal in shape (with two sides always parallel), and orientated—the degree of orientation being dependent on the direction of the sunrise when the settlement was founded. In their construction one uniform plan was adopted.

Having selected a site suitable in size to the requirements of the community, the constructors proceeded to surround it with a moat, the excavated materials being thrown up in the form of a dike or rampart on the inner bank. The inside edge of this dike was then lined with a series of small rectangular enclosures made of horizontal beams laid one above the other, as in a Swiss châlet. The beams, which were roughly hewn and partially mortised at the points of crossing, projected irregularly beyond the enclosed spaces, some extending as far as the adjacent compartments. The interior of these log-houses was then filled with rubbish—clay, gravel, pottery, bits of wood, etc. From special investigations conducted at Castione, Pigorini came to the conclusion that the purpose of this curious structure was to support the inner side of the earthen dike (*contrafforte dell' argine*), and so give it a perpendicular facing. The area thus enclosed was then thickly planted with stakes, the tops being brought to a common level, and over them a wooden platform was laid. On this platform, huts, made of light timbers and plastered over with clay, were erected. Thus, in a very simple manner, was constructed a fortified village, access to which was secured by a wooden bridge spanning the surrounding moat. The vacant space beneath the common platform became a convenient receptacle for all sorts of refuse, including lost and worn-out objects of industry. When, in the course of time, the space became filled up, the *terramaricoli*, in order to avoid the labour of removing the débris which would have accumulated around them, adopted the ingenious plan of constructing a brand-new platform above the former. It seems that, in some instances, a preliminary step to the carrying out of this project was to set fire to the entire village, thus at one coup getting rid of all sanitary difficulties as well as of a number of uninvited guests. Having started *de novo* with a clean bill of health, they elevated the surrounding dike to the requisite height, and planted stakes, as formerly, over the habitable area for the support of the new platform. This mode of procedure appears to have been repeated over and over again, until in the course of time the successive deposits accumulated to a height of 15 or 20 feet.

Of subsequent discoveries the most remarkable were the result of systematic excavations on the *terramara* of Castellazzo di Fontanellato, in the province of Parma, conducted by Pigorini at suitable intervals during the summers of 1888 to 1896.

In this station the surrounding moat was 30 metres wide and 3½ deep below the original level of the plain. It was kept supplied with water from a neighbouring stream by an artificial canal, and in another part there was an overflow canal only half a metre in depth, so that water always remained in the moat to a depth of 3 metres. Along the inside of the moat there was a rampart, 15 metres broad at the base, having its outer side sloping and its inner side vertical—being kept in this position by a *contrafforte*. Although the woodwork of this structure had almost entirely decayed, there was no difficulty in recognizing that it was similar to that of Castione, already described. The only access to the interior was by a wooden bridge, from which the main street, 15 metres wide, extended midway between the two parallel sides of the fort. Along the middle of the east rampart and a little to its inside, there was a raised mound of earth, 100 metres long and 50 broad, surrounded by a moat and a *contrafforte*, and crossed by three bridges. This was the citadel of the village, and within it was an open trench, at the bottom of which were five rectangular pits in a row, each of which had been covered with a wooden lid. These receptacles are supposed to have been for ritual purposes, and are regarded by Pigorini as the prototypes of analogous pits found in Roman camps, such as those described by M. Jacobi of Hornburg as occurring in the *Limes Germanicus*. Facing the middle bridge of the citadel, another street, but only half the breadth of the former, ran across the settlement, at right angles to the main street. Pigorini has also pointed out that these two intersecting streets are virtually the same as in a Roman camp, with its *cardo maximus* and *decumanus maximus*. Other streets ran parallel to the two main roadways, and thus divided the whole habitable area into rectangular divisions of equal size. All the spaces formed by the intersection of the streets contained traces of the piles which had supported the wooden platforms on which the huts had been erected.

Among the more important results of the investigations at Castellazzo was the discovery of two cremation cemeteries containing vases with calcined bones. One, situated near the south-east corner of the village, was of a square shape, each side measuring 165 metres. On being examined, this necropolis turned out to be a veritable pile-structure, having rows of cinerary urns placed close together, not, however, on the ground, but on a wooden platform. It was surrounded by a moat, 10 metres broad and 1·60 metres in depth, from which it would appear that the houses of the dead were constructed on the same plan as those of the living.

The station of Castellazzo was by no means a newly discovered site when Pigorini began his investigations, as its fertilizing earths were excavated by the peasants from time immemorial. The relics

[1] This work was translated into English by C. H. Chambers under the title of *Lake Habitations and Pre-historic Remains in the Turbaries and Marl-beds of Northern and Central Italy*, and published in 1865 by the Anthropological Society of London.

found on it from time to time had not been carefully collected, but nevertheless a goodly number had been sent to the museums of Parma and Rome. They are similar to the ordinary relics characteristic of the *terremare*, such as pottery (including the famous *ansa lunata*), loom weights, terra-cotta figurines of animals, and various objects of deer-horn, together with an assortment of Bronze Age implements, weapons, and ornaments.

The opinion of Pigorini and other Italian authorities is that the original lake-dwellers came into Italy from the great highway of the Danube by way of Croatia, Carinthia, and Venetia. On reaching the Po valley, they founded settlements in the lakes of Garda, Fimon, Arquà, and others during the transition period between the Stone and Bronze Ages. In the lake of Garda the settlements were numerous, and some of them continued to flourish down to the early Iron Age. In moving westwards these immigrants followed the left bank of the Po, founding settlements in the intermediate lakes, until they reached the lakes of Varese and Maggiore, which henceforth became their headquarters in the western part of the valley. Meanwhile the early settlers who remained in the eastern district began to found lake-dwellings (*palafitte*) on swampy ground, the lakes here being too few to afford suitable accommodation for their increasing agricultural and pastoral pursuits. Subsequently they crossed to the south side of the Po, where, the land being low-lying and subject to inundations, they continued their inherited system of habitations with the addition of having them fortified by a moat and a rampart. The crossing of the Po, which doubtless was a great military achievement, is supposed to have taken place at Viadana, and it is worthy of note that the great camp of Castellazzo was in the vicinity, on the frontier of the territories of the Ibero-Liguri, the original inhabitants of the country—a fact which seems to the present writer to have been the *raison d'être* for the exceptional defences of the *terramara* villages of Western Emilia. On the east side, towards Bologna, the hut-constructors of the Stone Age were conquered and subjugated by the *terramaricoli*, who then installed themselves in their hut villages—thus accounting for the remains of the two civilizations being met with in the stations and habitable caves all along the coast of the Adriatic. Gradually these *terramara* folk moved southwards, and, according to Pigorini, became the actual founders of Rome. At any rate, a typical *terramara* station has been discovered as far south as Taranto.

5. **Terpen.**—We now proceed to inquire if structures analogous to the *terremare* are found elsewhere in Europe. It is a remarkable fact that, notwithstanding the striking appearance which the Swiss lake-villages must have presented to strangers, classical writers are absolutely silent about them. Such reticence does not, however, apply to the class of remains now about to be described. Before the construction of the great sea-dikes of Holland, the whole of West Friesland would have been in that hybrid condition described by Pliny (*HN* xvi. 1), in which it was difficult to say whether it belonged to sea or land:

'Here a wretched race is found, inhabiting either the more elevated spots of land, or else eminences artificially constructed, and of a height to which they know by experience that the highest tides will never reach. Here they pitch their cabins; and, when the waves cover the surrounding country far and wide, like so many mariners on board ship are they,' etc.

At the present time this region is studded with certain low mounds called *terpen*. From a map of their geographical distribution recently issued by the Friesch Genootschap, it appears that their number in Friesland alone amounts to 500, of which 200 have already been excavated. Of the remaining 300 many are not available for either agricultural or archæological purposes, being occupied by villages, churches, cemeteries, etc. Like the *terremare*, these *terp*-mounds have for a long time been excavated on account of their rich ammoniacal deposits, which are used by agriculturists as guano; but, until they accidentally attracted the attention of archæologists, nobody seemed to have given a thought to their origin. As their excavation is prosecuted solely in the interests of agriculture, little attention is paid to the position of the archæological treasures which they contain. Either a canal or a railway siding is conducted to the perpendicular facing of the excavation, and from it the transporting boats or waggons are filled. Most of the larger antiquarian objects are thus secured, but many of the smaller articles, such as beads and ornaments, escape observation. From the relics thus collected the curator of the Leeuwarden Museum has the privilege of selecting any that he thinks necessary for the national collection, but the rest may be sold or disposed of privately.

As to the origin of the *terpen*, they are now proved to have been originally constructed as pile-dwellings, at least as regards some parts of their interior; and some of them are probably the actual mounds described by Pliny. The *modus operandi* was, in the first place, to raise a circular ring-mound of mud during ebb-tide. When this mound was sufficiently elevated to keep the waves outside, wooden platforms supported on short stakes were erected in the interior, and on these huts were placed. As the rubbish accumulated the process was repeated until the interior became a solid mound, precisely like what took place in the *terremare*. The towns of Leeuwarden and Leyden are said to be built over one or two *terp*-mounds. The industrial remains collected in the course of the excavations of the *terpen*, and carefully preserved in the museum of the Friesch Genootschap at Leeuwarden, give a vivid picture of the culture and civilization of their inhabitants from pre-Roman times down to the 12th century.

Among the relics the following may be noted: egg-shells (hen and goose), some of which were unbroken; a flute made of the shank bone of an animal; Anglo-Saxon, Byzantine, and Roman coins; wooden spades; large casks for storing water; canoes; bone skates; clay loom weights; toilet and weaving combs; beads of amber and glass; quantities of the débris of flax; mittens with one stall for the thumb; cock-spurs, etc. Latterly fibulæ of La Tène types, Roman tiles and pottery (*terra sigillata*)—some specimens of the latter having makers' marks on them—bridle-bits of iron, bronze pots, and Merovingian brooches have come to light; but no objects characteristic of the Bronze Age.

During the year 1905 a number of urns and human skeletons were found in a localized spot within a *terp* near Leeuwarden. Some of the skeletons were enclosed in coffins made of the hollowed trunks of trees and some in wooden boxes. The cinerary urns were hand-made, and are regarded as of Saxon origin, dating from the 5th or 6th cent. A.D. There were, however, a few wheel-made urns, which are considered to be the work of the Franks, as the wheel was not used in Friesland, either by the Saxons or Frisians, till the 10th or 11th century.

Osseous remains representing the following animals are abundantly met with: horse, ox (several varieties), cat, dog, sheep, wild boar, deer, roe, and fallow-deer. Among the skulls of these animals are one or two of the four-horned sheep. It may be of interest to note that the bones of this animal were among those identified by W. R. Wilde as coming from the *crannog* of Lagore in Ireland.

Analogous structures, under the names 'Warfen' and 'Wurfen,' have been described in the low-lying regions of East Friesland, the fen district of Holland, the embouchure of the Elbe, and, indeed, in nearly all the marshes along this part of the North Sea coast (see *Munro Lectures* for 1912, p. 445 f.).

6. Pile-structures in rivers.—Habitations erected over the margins of rivers, though possessing features common to both lake-dwellings and *terremare* proper, yet differ in other respects so much that they must be treated as a separate group.

(*a*) *Butmir* (Bosnia).—The fertile plain of Ilidze, occupying the centre of a wide basin, about 11 kilometres long by 7 broad, has been formed by sedimentary materials imported by numerous streams from the surrounding hills, which, by their junction here, give rise to the river Bosna. In earlier times this basin was more or less a lake, and, indeed, in winter parts of it are still submerged. Almost in its centre there is a portion of land covering several acres, which, on careful inspection, is seen to be a little more elevated than the part of the plain in its immediate proximity. This elevation was selected by the Government as the site of offices for a model farm; and, when, in 1893, excavations for the foundations of these buildings were begun, it was discovered that all this raised area was composed of the refuse of early human occupancy. This pre-historic settlement, or workshop, as some suppose it to have been, is now known under the name of 'the neolithic station of Butmir.' Part of the area is now occupied by a large dairy and other buildings, and the rest of it has been excavated for scientific purposes. A perpendicular section, specially prepared to show the position and nature of the materials of which the elevation was composed, disclosed the following deposits in successive strata from above downwards.

On the surface were 12 to 16 inches of clayey soil; then a blackish streaky mixture of clay mould, charcoal, etc., arranged in wavy and more or less parallel strata. The depth of this heterogeneous mass was from 3 to 5 feet, and it was in it, dispersed apparently throughout its entire contents regardless of depth, that all the relics were found. Beneath this again was a natural deposit of fine yellowish clay, very adhesive and well adapted for the manufacture of pottery. The discovery of hollows, extremely variable both in size and in form, in this underlying virgin clay, suggested to W. Radimsky, the superintendent of the excavations, the idea that they were the foundations of the original huts of the inhabitants. The subsequent discovery of a number of round holes in these hollows, which were readily recognized as having been formed by wooden posts, because, although the wood had entirely decayed, the spaces had become filled up with débris, gave rise to the theory that the settlement was really a pile-structure—an opinion which the present writer has supported on the following grounds: (1) the extreme irregularity in form and size of the so-called hut-foundations; (2) the occasional presence of pieces of charcoal, pottery, and other débris on the surface layer of the virgin clay, thus showing that the deposition of the latter had not entirely ceased when the settlement was founded; (3) the presence of some of the idols and other relics among the stuff which lay in these hollows, together with the entire absence of hearths or evidence of fire in any of them; (4) the general horizontality of the strata which, in section, were seen to run across the margin of the hollows without any break in continuity; (5) at various levels throughout the débris were to be seen portions of burnt and beaten clay platforms, as well as clay casts of the timbers which formed the walls of the huts.

A peculiarity of the Butmir station was the scarcity of organic materials; not even a bone or wooden handle remained, although, from the abundance of perforated stone implements, such objects must have been largely used—all having apparently disappeared by natural decomposition. Quantities of charred corn were found in different places throughout the débris. That grain and seeds were largely used as food is inferred from the fact that no fewer than 900 stone grinders, including fragments, were found throughout the station. The industrial remains consist of about 70 fragments of idols, mostly in human form, quantities of broken pottery, including some with beautiful spiral ornamentation, and a large assortment of polished stone implements—knives, saws, scrapers, borers, chisels, hammers, axes, and adzes—but no metal object is among the collection.

(*b*) *Ripač.*—The village of Ripač lies on the east bank of the river Una, a tributary of the Save. Here the stream widens into a kind of lake in which are two small islands accessible by wooden bridges supported on piles. Like other Bosnian rivers, the water of the Una holds in solution a large amount of calcareous matters which, on exposure to the atmosphere, are deposited, causing in some localities barriers across the stream. The miniature falls and currents by which the waters escape over these barriers are often utilized as the motive-power of corn-mills. At Ripač there is such an obstruction stretching from the larger island to both shores, and along it may be seen a row of these little mills, in the form of wooden cabins planted on tall piles. In course of removing some obstructive materials to the free escape of the water from the small water-wheels, the workmen encountered the stumps of thickly-set piles in a blackish relic-bed containing fragments of pottery, clay weights, broken bones, etc. This discovery was recognized to be of so much importance that the Government gave orders to have the locality investigated under W. Radimsky, the chief inspector of mines. Exploratory operations were carried on during the summers of 1893 and 1894, and it was then ascertained that a pre-historic pile-structure not only occupied the whole space between the islands, but also embraced a considerable portion of the larger island and the bank of the river. The upper deposits contained only Roman and later remains, but in the true culture-bed underneath were found burnt beams, organic materials, portions of platforms and huts, and a large assortment of relics of the pre-historic period. The piles were mostly made of oak stems, sometimes split and perforated, but of these only the stumps remained; and there were two sets of them, a lower and an upper, which suggest an earlier and a later structure. There was also evidence that the settlement, or at least a portion of it, had been destroyed by a conflagration; but this catastrophe did not bring it to an end.

The objects collected were made of iron, copper, bronze, silver, lead, stone, clay, glass, bone, wood, and vegetable fibre. Among the relics were numerous articles characteristic, not only of the Stone and Bronze Ages, but of the well-defined periods of Hallstatt and La Tène, thus proving that the habitation was occupied continuously from the end of the Neolithic Age till taken possession of by the Romans. During the Middle Ages the larger island became a fortified castle.

Radimsky states that indications of similar pile-structures are to be seen at several other localities on the river Una, viz. at Golubic, Ribić, Kraljc, and Brekovica.

(*c*) *Donja Dolina* (Bosnia).—The site of this pile-structure is on the south bank of the river Save, a tributary of the Danube. Here an oval-shaped terrace, some 500 paces in length and half this in breadth, presents a steep front to the river, but elsewhere falls away, except at the west end, where the escarpment turns abruptly inland, forming the bank of what was formerly a bay in the river. The surface of this terrace is 3 or 4 metres higher than that of the surrounding land, and is almost the only spot in the neighbourhood that is not submerged during the periodical floodings of the Save. It is called 'Gradina,' *i.e.* 'fort,' by the peasants; and here, during heavy floods, they find shelter for themselves and their cattle; and for the same reason it contains two village cemeteries—one for the Catholics and one for the Orthodox Protestants.

For several years, articles of antiquarian value from the vicinity of Donja Dolina were now and again presented to the Landesmuseum at Sarajevo—a fact which at last induced Ciro Truhelka, head of the archæological department, to visit the

locality. On walking along the river, at the foot of the 'Gradina,' he observed the tops of oak piles protruding through the river mud, while scattered around them were fragments of pottery, spindle-whorls, prism-like objects of burnt clay, worked portions of deer-horn, etc., from which he concluded that before him lay the débris of a prehistoric pile-structure. Excavations were begun in the following year (1900), and continued for several successive seasons when the water-level of the Save was favourable. The results are of great archæological importance from the wealth and variety of the relics discovered, and the ability with which they are recorded in two magnificently illustrated reports by Truhelka (*Wissensch. Mitt. aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina*, ix. [Vienna, 1904] and xi. [do. 1909]).

From the very beginning of the excavations it became evident that the structural details of this settlement deviated, in many respects, from the ordinary *Pfahlbauten* as hitherto known in Europe. The first interesting discovery was a row of piles running parallel to the river, which proved to have been the under portion of a palisade against the current, as the piles were bound together by intertwining willow thongs. In continuing the excavations inwards, the excavators brought to light the remains of several houses supported on wooden posts. These posts were thickly set, no fewer than 978 having been counted over an area of 1160 square metres—nearly one for every square metre. Many of them, however, belonged to a later period, and were inserted to strengthen old timbers for the support of new houses. They were for the most part made of oak tree-stems, seldom split or squared, and well pointed with sharp metal tools. A little back from the river palisade there was a raised promenade from which a sloping gangway gave access to the underground vaults containing the supporting piles, as well as to the platforms on which the houses had been erected. Little of the structural details of the dwelling-houses remained, except the foundations of the partition walls and some loose spars and boards, which crumbled into dust as soon as they were exposed to daylight. During the excavations the sites of eleven houses were exposed, all of different dimensions, one measuring 4·5 metres by 6 metres, and another 6 by 9 metres. By comparing the more perfect remains from different sites, a fairly correct idea of their plan and internal arrangement was obtained. Each consisted of a large room and one or two smaller compartments. The former was regarded as the kitchen, with a fire-place, a hearth, and an oven made of well-burnt clay.

It is difficult to determine the former extent of this singular settlement. Strong stumps of piles were met with over a large area of the adjacent river-bed. It has also been ascertained that during the digging of graves in the Catholic cemetery the same class of relics were often thrown up. From these and other suggestive facts, it has been conjectured that the whole of the 'Gradina Hügel' consists of the débris of pile-dwellings—an area approximately amounting to 25,000 square metres.

That the underground vaults were sometimes utilized as cattle-pens was made evident by the large amount of animal dung that had accumulated in some of them. But this was not the only use to which they were put, as in several instances cinerary urns and wooden coffins (the latter containing human remains) were found. One coffin, that of a child, had the skeleton below the pelvis pierced by a supporting pile, showing that this burial was older than the reconstruction of the superincumbent dwelling-house. The urns contained the incinerated remains of bodies, charcoal, ashes, and an extraordinary wealth of grave-goods; but, unfortunately, the latter had been greatly damaged by the fire. It would appear, from the valuable nature of some of these offerings, that the cremated persons were of greater social distinction than those buried by inhumation. The objects consisted of fibulæ and spiral bracelets of bronze, beads of glass, amber, and enamel, and other ornamental relics characteristic of the Hallstatt period. Of special interest was one urn, which contained a necklet composed of several hundred beads of amber, enamel, and coloured glass, seven cowrie shells, two perforated teeth, and a large clay bead without any ornamentation. Among the relics which supply a clue to the latest date of the settlement were five coins, one of bronze and the others of potin—all 'barbarous imitations of the tetradrachms of Philip of Macedon' (356-336 B.C.).

A discovery which materially helped to define the chronological horizon of the pile-dwellings was the identification of the cemetery in which their inhabitants were buried. It was located on some ridges, not subject to submergence, at a distance of some 600 paces to the south-west of the *Pfahlbau*, and 200 from the present bed of the river. This necropolis contained both burnt and unburnt interments, and yielded an immense assortment of relics which, from the standpoint of archæology, were recognized to be precisely similar to those disinterred from the excavations in the 'Gradina.'

(*d*) *Pile-structures in Hungary.*—On the right bank of the Theiss, a few miles from the railway station of Szolnok, near the village of Tószeg, there is an artificial mound to which, since the meeting of the International Congress of Pre-historic Archæology at Budapest, in 1876, much importance has been attached, on account of the opinion expressed by L. Pigorini that it is identical in structure with the *terramara*-deposits of Northern Italy. The mound, though considerably undermined by the river Theiss during the great floods of 1876, is still of considerable extent, measuring 360 metres in length and 100 in breadth, and rising to a maximum height of 8 metres above the surrounding plain. It is only in times of flood that the waters reach the mound, its usual bed being a mile and a half distant. When the artificial nature of the mound became known in consequence of the section exposed by the floods, some extensive excavations were made to ascertain the archæological character of its contents. An assortment of the objects collected during these researches was exhibited at the Congress, among which were the following:

Perforated hammers of stag-horn, various pointed implements of bone and horn, perforated teeth and the leg-bone of a horse pierced in two places, probably a skate, polished stone celts (some perforated), four flint flakes (one of obsidian), corn grinders, and various worked stones; a fragment of a bronze pin, a bronze knife, and a small ingot of this metal; pottery, in the form of a variety of dishes, some with handles; various objects of burnt clay—a whistle, buttons, spoons, and eighteen pyramidal and perforated clay weights; a considerable amount of food-refuse, such as bones of animals, scales of fish, land shells, charred grain, etc.

During the meeting of the Congress, L. Pigorini, R. von Virchow, and Miss J. Mestorf visited the Tószeg excavations and made some further researches which enabled them to agree on the correctness of the following propositions, which were published in separate reports after their return home:

(1) The existence of piles and wooden beams was satisfactorily proved at three different levels; (2) the materials which contained the débris of human occupancy were distinctly stratified, and formed undulating layers amounting to a total thickness of 4 metres; (3) the antiquities collected belonged to the three pre-historic ages of Stone, Bronze, and Iron.

F. Romer gave an account of his excavations at Tószeg and other localities to the members of the Congress in an article entitled 'Les Terramares en Hongrie.' It is worthy of note that in one of the

stations, viz. Ascott-halom, he mentions that rotten piles were observed in its lowest stratum before Pigorini called attention to their significance. The author concludes his article by stating that *terramara* deposits are by no means confined to the valley of the Theiss, as they have already been observed in various other low-lying localities in the Danubian valley, both above and below Budapest. But the task of excavating such huge masses goes beyond the means at the disposal of ordinary archæological societies.[1]

7. General remarks.—Notwithstanding the discovery of various portions of human skeletons at several stations, and their subjection to the examination of anatomical experts, anthropologists are not agreed that the data thus ascertained prove that the constructors of the pre-historic pile-structures belonged to one race with definite physical characteristics. T. Studer (*ZE* xvii. [1885] 548) advocates the theory of Troyon, viz. that with the introduction of bronze there came a new race of people; and this opinion he bases on the fact that at Sutz and Vinelz two kinds of human skulls were found, viz. brachycephalic and dolichocephalic, whereas in the pure Stone Age stations only the former were, according to him, met with. Virchow's conclusions on lacustrine craniology are as follows (*ib.*, p. 300):

(1) In the stations of the pure Stone Age brachycephalic skulls only are known to a certainty to have existed. (2) In the transition period both brachycephalic and dolichocephalic skulls are known. (3) In the full Bronze Age there is a slight preponderance of dolichocephalic skulls.

On these grounds Virchow thought that during the Bronze Age a new people joined the original lake-dwellers by degrees, but not as conquerors subverting the previous order of things—an opinion which seems to be strengthened by the undoubted continuity of the same social organizations in both these periods. Bronze was gradually introduced, and it took some time to supersede the cutting implements previously in use. Nor was there any violent disturbance of the previous conditions of social life. The original system of constructing lake-villages was continued, and the only changes detected in their structure were such as can be accounted for by the use of better implements.

Although trepanning was practised in Central Europe as far back as the Stone Age, it does not appear that this custom was prevalent to a great extent among the lake-dwellers. Segments of the upper portions of human crania, supposed to have been used as drinking-cups, were found at Gerlafingen, Sutz, Schaffis, and Locras; and from the last-named there was also a skull having a circular portion cut out, as if *post mortem* trepanning had been performed. Roundlets cut out of skulls are supposed to have been used as charms, and such relics are frequently found in the graves of the period. From lake-dwellings only two of these objects have been recorded; one from Concise has two small perforations, and another, figured by Gross, has one hole. On the Trajan column a Dacian village is represented as having human skulls set on poles before the walls. The finding of skulls of different races in the lake-villages might, therefore, be accounted for on the supposition that they were trophies of their enemies, and not the skulls of their actual inhabitants.

In eastern Switzerland and the Danubian valley the number of settlements greatly decreased during the Bronze Age, while in the Lake of Geneva they increased, and in Lake Bourget its eight stations flourished almost exclusively in the Bronze period.

In instituting a comparison between the ordinary lake-dwellings and the *terremare* of Italy, it may be observed that the latter term was originally applied only to the fertilizing materials, and not, as at present, to the *tout ensemble* of a settlement. From this point of view any organic refuse from an inhabited site containing a sufficiently large amount of ammoniacal products to be used as fertilizers (as was the case with the contents of the Barma Grande cave at Mentone) might be not inappropriately so designated. If, on the other hand, the special features of Castellazzo—moat, dike, *contrafforte*, canals, roadways, citadel, ritual pits, trapezoidal shape—must be regarded as essential characteristics of *terramara* stations in general, then it must be admitted that there are few such structures outside Western Emilia. If, however, the few known examples of the Castellazzo type be excluded on the ground that they were military forts, we can find in the Po valley parallels to all the settlements which we have described elsewhere in Europe. In pile-structures on the sea-shore, and on marshy ground liable to flooding, dikes were indispensable. The Butmir station belonged to the Stone Age, and it did not appear that a dike was necessary either for defence against enemies or to prevent flooding, as it was constructed over water.

Much significance has been assigned to the pottery known as *ansa lunata* or *cornuta*. Formerly the manufacture of this handle was supposed to be a monopoly of the *terramara* folk of Emilia, but now it has been shown to have a wider distribution, extending southwards along the coast of the Adriatic as far as Taranto and other localities in S. Italy. It is found in the lake-dwellings of the eastern district of the Po valley, but—what is very remarkable—it is entirely absent from those of Piedmont and Western Lombardy. Outside Italy it is common in the early Iron stations of Bosnia, as at Ripač and Donja Dolina, as well as in Bohemia, Lower Austria, Hungary, Styria (*Bullettino di Palet. Ital.* xv. [1889] 65). Before the brachycephalic lake-dwellers swarmed into Europe, its neolithic inhabitants were dolichocephalic, and disposed of their dead by inhumation. It appears that they freely associated with the newcomers, as was the case with the Ibero-Liguri in N. Italy, where remains of the two civilizations were found on the same stations, that of the Stone Age being in the lower strata. There is evidence to show that burial by cremation was practised by the *terramara* folk, and by both the eastern and western lake-dwellers towards the end of the Bronze Age and beginning of the Iron Age; but whether the latter were cremationists on their first appearance in Italy is a problem that has not yet been solved. Singularly enough, the same uncertainty has been experienced with regard to the burial customs of the lake-dwellers of Central Europe. Some archæologists are inclined to exaggerate the importance of this question, on the plea that the manner of disposing of the dead is hereditarily so rooted in the human constitution that it would not be readily changed. But, as a matter of fact, the contrary is the case. Cremation, being the outcome of religious ideas, powerfully influenced humanity in those early days, and spread like wild-fire throughout the whole of Europe, so that the change from inhumation to incineration might have been accomplished in a short space of time.

The cause of the almost sudden discontinuance of the *palafitte* system of habitation all over Europe at the end of the Bronze Age is not known. We may, however, surmise that it was deeply-seated, and partly due to the law of the survival of the fittest, or rather the destruction of the unfittest. In the smaller lakes the growth of peat would make lacustrine habitations useless as a means

[1] For an elaborate and highly illustrated account of the *terremare* and analogous remains in Europe, readers may consult the present writer's recent book, *Palæolithic Man and Terramara Settlements in Europe*.

of defence. Of the settlements in the Po valley the lake-dwellings of Lake Garda were the last to be abandoned, but the *terremare* ceased to be occupied at an earlier period, apparently having been found inadequate to supply the social comforts prevalent among the races who subsequently dominated the Italian peninsula.

In conclusion, we are justified, from a consideration of the archæological phenomena hitherto disclosed by lacustrine research, in formulating the hypothesis that the primary founders of the lake-dwellings of Europe were brachycephalic immigrants, in the neolithic stage of culture, who, in successive hordes, moved westwards by way of the Danubian valley, but occasionally diverged from the main route into the numerous affluents of the Danube. The goal of all these shepherd farmers was the rich and well-watered pasture-lands along the lakes, brooks, and springs of the Alpine regions, which constitute the primary sources of the great rivers of Central Europe and their tributaries. The Scottish and Irish *crannogs*, the Glastonbury lake-village, and other lacustrine habitations of the Iron Age were but sporadic remnants of the more ancient system, which, like every dying art, passed through a stage of degeneration before final extinction.

LITERATURE.—For an exhaustive list of the literature on lake-dwellings up to 1890, see 'Bibliography of Lake-dwelling Researches in Europe' appended to R. Munro's *The Lake-Dwellings of Europe*, in which over 500 books, monographs, and special articles on the subject are chronologically arranged. We shall therefore here note only a few of the more general works on lake-dwellings, classifying them in chronological sequence: F. Keller, 'Die keltischen Pfahlbauten in den Schweizerseen,' *Mitt. der antiquar. Gesellsch. in Zürich*, ix. (1854), being the first report on the Swiss lake-dwellings (since then other 8 reports

Academy, Dublin, 1857; W. M. Wyllie, 'On Lake-Dwellings of the early Periods,' *Archæologia*, xxxviii. (1859); F. Troyon, *Habitations lacustres des temps anciens et modernes*, Lausanne, 1860; L. Rütimeyer, *Die Fauna der Pfahlbauten in der Schweiz*, Basel, 1861; J. Lubbock, 'On the Ancient Lake-Habitations in Switzerland,' *Nat. Hist. Review*, 1862, and *Prehistoric Times*, London, 1865, 71913; F. Keller, *The Lake-Dwellings of Switzerland and other Parts of Europe*, Eng. tr., J. E. Lee, London, 1866, 21878; E. Desor and L. Favre, *Le Bel Âge du bronze lacustre en Suisse*, Neuchâtel, 1874; R. Munro, *Ancient Scottish Lake-Dwellings or Crannogs*, Edinburgh, 1882; V. Gross, *Les Protohelvètes*, Paris, 1883; E. Vouga, *Les Helvètes à la Tène*, Neuchâtel, 1885; W. G. Wood-Martin, *The Lake-Dwellings of Ireland*, Dublin, 1886; R. Munro, *The Lake-Dwellings of Europe*, London, 1890; T. E. Peet, *The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy and Sicily*, Oxford, 1909; R. Munro, *Palæolithic Man and Terramara Settlements in Europe*, Edinburgh, 1912. A monograph on the Glastonbury lake-village in two volumes is now being published by the Antiquarian Society of Glastonbury (1911–14).

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LALANGS.—See BODOS.

LĀMAISM.—The term 'Lāmaism' is now employed by many Europeans to designate the Buddhism of Tibet, and is intended to identify with that religion the Tibetan Buddhist monks, who are generally known as Lāmas, 'the superior ones.' It first appears to have been used by Köppen (and presumably coined by him) in his *Lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche*, 1859, which, as a pioneer work, gave some currency to the term, although it was employed by him only a few times and merely incidentally. It was not, however, adopted, though mentioned, by Emil Schlagintweit in 1863, who was the first authoritative systematic writer on the subject, setting aside the ponderous compilation by A. Giorgi of the 18th cent. (*Alphabetum Tibetanum*, Rome, 1762), which was little more than a literary curiosity. Altogether unknown to the Tibetans themselves, who designate their creed 'Buddha's religion' (*Sangs-rgyas-kyi ch'ös*) or 'the orthodox religion' (*nang-ch'ös*), this term is in many ways misleading, inappropriate, and undesirable. It conveys the implication that Tibetan Buddhism differs essentially from all other forms of that faith—which is not a fact, for its differences from mediæval Indian Buddhism are relatively trifling and mainly external.

The political ascendancy by which one sect of the Lāmas has achieved temporal power in modern times is in nowise an inherent part of the Buddhism professed by the Lāmas, nor is it shared by the older sects. It is not usual to designate religions by the generic name of their clergy; the epithet 'Brāhmanism' presents no real analogy, as that title is eponymic for the Supreme Creator in that faith, as well as descriptive of his ministers. Phonetically, also, the word is anomalous; for on the analogy of 'Buddhism' from Buddha, it should be 'Lāmism.' Altogether, therefore, 'Lāmaism' is an undesirable designation for the Buddhism of Tibet, and is rightly dropping out of use.

As the Buddhism of Tibet is intrinsically identical with, and derived from, Indian Buddhism of the Mahāyāna, the following account will indicate chiefly those features in which the Tibetan differs from the Indian Mahāyāna (*q.v.* for the general Buddhist doctrine and practices).

1. Introduction of Buddhism into Tibet.—The indigenous religion of Tibet was the Bon, a primitive animistic cult (see TIBET). According to all the vernacular histories, especially the most authoritative, the 'Chronicle of the Kings' (*Rgyal rabs*, and the somewhat apocryphal *Mani-bkah-hbum*), Buddhism was first introduced into Tibet in the reign of King Srong-btsan Gam-po, who died A.D. 650. But in the Lhāsa lithic edicts of 783, published by the present writer (*JRAS*, 1909, p. 931), the introduction of 'the orthodox religion,' *i.e.* Buddhism, is stated in general terms to have taken place several generations before Srong-btsan's epoch. This, however, may merely refer to the current legend that five generations before the advent of the latter, in the reign of a king named Lha Thotho-ri, certain Buddhist tracts and some relics fell from heaven upon the top of the king's palace, but that up till Srong-btsan's reign no one was able to decipher the writing. There seems to be no doubt that the indigenous histories are strictly correct in stating that before Srong-btsan's time Buddhism had not yet penetrated Tibet, and that that country was without a knowledge of the written character which is now called 'Tibetan,' which is merely a slightly modified form of the Indian alphabet as current in N. India (and in Khotan) in the middle of the 7th cent. A.D. It was certainly Srong-btsan who introduced this character, and along with it Buddhism in the form then most popular in India, the Mahāyāna.

The credit for the latter achievement is given in the *Mani-bkah-hbum* (the authorship of which is ascribed to Srong-btsan) to the two chief wives of the king, one the daughter of the king of Nepāl and the other an imperial Chinese princess. Though it is probable that these ladies may have contributed to the introduction of the new religion, as both of them certainly were Buddhists, it appears possible that Srong-btsan himself took the initiative, as he procured his Indian letters and early Buddhist texts from remote Kashmīr, and not from the more accessible Buddhist country of Nepāl, from which he would presumably have obtained them, had he been then married to his Nepālese wife; and his Chinese marriage was still later (in A.D. 641). The first booklet translated into Tibetan in the new letters was a hymn to Avalokita on the *Oṁ maṇi* formula—which formula, it is recorded, he engraved on stone. As the first patron of Buddhism in Tibet, Srong-btsan was canonized, as were also his wives, by the grateful monks in later days.

But Srong-btsan was not the saintly person he is pictured in the religious histories, for he is seen in the contemporary Chinese chronicles to have been engaged all his life in bloody wars (see his invasion of Central India in A.D. 647 as described by the present writer in *Asiatic Quart. Rev.*, vol. xxxii.

[1911]). He certainly did little, if anything, in the way of Buddhist propaganda. He built a few temples to enshrine the images brought to him in dower by his Buddhist wives. One of these was the nucleus of the present great cathedral-temple at Lhāsa, 'the house of the lord' (Jo-k'ang; cf. Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, pp. 23, 28, 300, and *Lhasa and Its Mysteries*, pp. 341, 361 f.). He built no monasteries, and, according to the vernacular histories, no order of monks was established till over a century later.

2. Establishment of the monastic Order.—After Srong-btsan's death (A.D. 650), Buddhism made little headway against the indigenous Bon cult, and was resisted by the people until the accession of Khri-Srong De-btsan, the fifth in succession after Srong-btsan. The son of an imperial Chinese princess, he was an ardent Buddhist and proselytizer. Desirous of establishing an Order of Buddhist monks among his people, on the advice of his family Buddhist priest, Śāntirakṣita, an Indian, he sent to India for the kinsman of the latter. This was Padmākara or Padmasambhava, of the then popular ritualistic and mystical Yoga school at Nālandā college, and skilled in Buddhist spells (*dhāraṇī*). He was a native of Udayāna (latterly known as Swāt and Kāfiristān) on the Peshāwar frontier of N. India, and he arrived in Tibet in A.D. 747, with several other Indian monks, who were induced to settle in the country. Padmākara established the first monastery at Sam-yäs in A.D. 749 on the left bank of the Brahmaputra river about thirty miles to the south-east of Lhāsa, and installed Śāntirakṣita as its abbot, with seven Tibetan novices as the nucleus of the Order. Of these novices three were elderly; and the first of them, Dpal-bañgs, who succeeded thirteen years later to the abbotship, may be said to be the first 'Lāma.' He appears to have studied in India also, and to be the same as Ska-ba-bha-po Dpal-brtsegs, who was one of the chief early translators of the Sanskrit Buddhist canon into the Tibetan language.

'Lāma' is a Tibetan word meaning 'supreme one,' and is strictly applicable only to Tibetan abbots (*q.v.*) and the most learned among the ordained monks. By courtesy, however, it is generally extended in popular conversation to ordained monks in general.

3. Founder of the monastic Order.—Padmākara, the founder of the Order of Buddhist monks in Tibet, is commonly known as Padmasambhava, 'the lotus-born' (in Tibetan Pad-ma Byung-gnas), or as 'the teacher treasure' (Guru Rin-po-ch'e), and also as 'Lô-pön' (*slob-dpon*), the Tibetan equivalent of the Indian *guru*, 'teacher.' It is not easy now to discover with certainty the details of his teaching, but from the remarkably high literary standard of the monks associated with him, as shown by their scholarly translations from the Sanskrit canon, it is difficult to believe that he was the quasi-shamanistic priest that he is represented to have been by the old unreformed sects. There is no doubt that he was a believer in Tantrik mysticism with its prayers to various Buddhist gods and goddesses; but so were the great Indian Buddhist patriarchs, the metaphysicists Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, before his day. No canonical translations are found ascribed to him; but he is the reputed author of several manuals of worship (*sādhanas*)[1] for compelling the good services of certain deities by means of the repetition of spells (*dhāraṇī*) after the style of the Brāhmanical *mantras*—a class of literature which was prevalent in Indian Buddhism at that period.

4. Translation of the Indian Buddhist canon.—Under the zealous patronage of King Khri-Srong De-btsan, Padmākara initiated an era of great literary activity and scholarship for the translation of the Buddhist canon from the Indian Sanskrit. Several of the most intellectual youths were sent to India to learn Sanskrit and Buddhist philosophy in its home in mid-India, and some of the most learned monks of India were induced to proceed to Tibet and settle there for this evangelizing work. In a letter embedded in the great commentary, the *Tan-gyur* (xciv. 387 ff.), addressed to this king by the Indian monk Buddhaguhya, we read:

'Thou didst dispatch to India Vairotchana, Ska-ba-dpal brtsegs, Kluyi rgyal mts'an, Ye-shes sde, Arnandju, and others, to whom thou didst intrust much wealth of gold and silver, to get the Dharma, increase the little religion that was in thy realm, and open the window which would let in the light on the darkness of Bod [Tibet], and bring in its midst the life-giving waters.'[1]

This indicates clearly that in the middle of the 8th cent. A.D. Tibet was scarcely recognized as a Buddhist country at all. The young Tibetans named therein are some of the best known translators of the Tibetan scriptures.

5. Authenticity and historical value of Tibetan canon.—These Tibetan translations of the Sanskrit Buddhist canon are now of great historical importance, as they preserve with remarkable accuracy the Indian texts, of which most of the originals have been lost in India. The Tibetan translations of these texts, as tested by the few surviving Sanskrit fragments and by isolated texts preserved in Nepāl, display such scrupulous literary accuracy, even down to the smallest etymological detail, as to excite the admiration of all modern scholars who have examined them. Thus their authoritativeness is placed beyond dispute.

These canonical texts thus afford, along with the less precise Chinese and Japanese translations of the same originals, invaluable means for controlling, supplementing, and correcting the less detailed Pāli versions of the early scriptures, and explaining ambiguous terms in the latter, thereby enabling us to gain a more correct knowledge of Buddha and his doctrine than has been forthcoming from purely Ceylonese sources. On this account the study of Tibetan has become indispensable to students of Buddhist Sanskrit and of Buddhism in general. The excellent Tibeto-Sanskrit dictionaries date from this literary epoch, and the formation of the classical Tibetan style. The divisions of the Tibetan Buddhist canon will be indicated below.

6. Growth of the Order and popular adoption of Buddhism.—The institution of the indigenous Order on these Indian lines was opposed by Chinese Buddhists, under a Mahāyāna monk named Hwa-shang (the Chinese term for a Buddhist monk corresponding to the Sanskrit *upādhyāya*, or 'master'). These Chinese, who appear to have been itinerant priests, were defeated in argument by the Indian Kamalaśīla, and expelled from the country, leaving the Indian system to be developed unmolested. Many monasteries and Buddhist temples were established all over the country, and Buddhism became the State religion of the land.

A second development of literary activity and Buddhist propaganda occurred in the reign of Ral-pa-Chan, the grandson of Khri-Srong De-btsan, in the latter half of the 9th cent. A.D., when the work of translation of the Great Commentaries by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Vasubandhu, etc., was actively prosecuted, and most of the remaining canonical books completed. Among the Indian translators employed by Ral-pa-Chan were the monks Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi, Surendrabodhi, Prajñāvarman, Dānaśīla, and Bodhimitra, assisted by the Tibetan translators (or *lo-tsa-va*) Pal-brtsegs

[1] See list of *sādhanas* by F. W. Thomas in *Muséon*, xxii. [1903] 41.

[1] W. W. Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, p. 221.

Ye-shessde and Ch'os-kyi-gyal-ts'an. At least half of the two great Tibetan collections, canon and commentaries, is the work of their hands.

Ral-pa-Chan endowed most of the monasteries with State lands and the right to collect tithes and taxes. His ardent devotion to Buddhism, indeed, led to his assassination and the downfall of the monarchy, which event paved the way for the eventual rise of a hierarchy. The murderer of Ral-pa-Chan was his brother Lang-darma, who was at the head of a Bon faction, on which some authentic light is thrown by the Lhāsa edict pillar inscription of A.D. 842, published by the writer (*JRAS*, 1909, p. 1267); on ascending the throne he actively persecuted the Buddhists, and did his utmost to uproot that religion. He desecrated and destroyed many temples and monasteries, burned the sacred books, and forced many of the monks to become butchers. He was in turn assassinated within three years by a Buddhist monk disguised as a Black Hat Bon devil-dancer, and this incident is now a favourite episode in the popular sacred plays.

7. Rise of the hierarchy.—Although on the downfall of the dynasty Tibet became subdivided into several principalities, Buddhism continued to grow steadily in popularity, and the priests became more and more influential, till eventually, in the 13th cent., a hierarchy was established with temporal sway. This was effected by the great Mongol Emperor Kublai Khān, whose grandfather Jenghiz Khān had conquered Tibet. Converted to Buddhism by the Tibetan abbot of the Sas-kya monastery in Western Tibet near the Nepālese frontier, Kublai created the Sas-kya abbot official head of the Buddhist Church in Tibet in return for the favour of formally crowning him as Emperor of China. He also conferred upon the learned Sas-kya Lāma—or 'Sas-kya Pandita,' as he is usually called—the temporal rulership of Western Tibet.

This first of the Tibetan hierarchs thus especially patronized by the Mongols achieved with a staff of his scholars the gigantic task of translating the bulky Tibetan canon into Mongolian, after revision and collation with Chinese texts, the Mongolian character being a form of Syriac introduced into Central Asia by Nestorian Christian missionaries.

The Sas-kya primacy maintained much of its political supremacy for several generations, and used its power to oppress its less-favoured rival sects. It burned the great Kar-gyu monastery of Dikung about A.D. 1320. But on the accession of the Ming dynasty in 1368 the Chinese Emperor deemed it politic, whilst conciliating the monks as a body, by gifts and titles, to strike at the Sas-kya power by raising the heads of two other monasteries to equal rank with it (Dikung of the Kar-gyu sect and Ts'al of the Kā-dam sect), and encouraged strife against it.

8. Rise of the priest-kings of Lhāsa.—At the beginning of the 15th cent. A.D., a Lāma named Tsong-Kha-pa or Je-Rin-po-ch'e re-organized the reformed Kā-dam sect which had been instituted by the Indian monk Atiśa in 1038, and altered its title to 'The Virtuous Order,' or Ge-lug-pa. This sect, which arose at Gah-ldan monastery near Lhāsa, wore as a distinctive badge a yellow cap, and hence was known as the 'Yellow Hat' Order. It soon eclipsed all the others, and in five generations achieved the priest-kingship of the whole of Tibet, which it retains to this day.

Its first Grand Lāma was Tsong-Kha-pa's nephew, Geden-dub, with his succession based on the idea of his perpetual re-incarnation. In 1640 the Yellow Hats leapt into temporal power under the fifth series of Grand Lāmas, the crafty prelate Lob-zang Gya-mts'o, also known as 'the fifth Jina' [a title of Buddha], Gyal-ba-Na-pa. At his request a Mongol prince, Gusri Khān, conquered Tibet and made a present of it to him, and in 1650 he was confirmed in the sovereignty by the Manchu Chinese Emperor, and also in the title of *Ta-lai*, usually written by Europeans *Dalai*, which is merely the Mongolian word for *Gya-mts'o* (or 'Ocean'), the surname of himself and his three predecessors.

This resourceful Dalai Lāma consolidated and extended his rule by inventing divine legends about himself, and by forcibly appropriating many of the monasteries of the older sects. He also built for himself the famous palace-monastery on the red hill at Lhāsa, the name of which he changed to 'Potala,' after the mythic Indian residence of the most popular of all Buddhist divinities, Avalokita, or Lord of Mercy, of whom he posed as the incarnation, and whose special spell was the famous *Oṁ maṇi padme Hūṁ* formula.

9. Origin of the succession by re-incarnation.—The idea of re-incarnation, which is a fundamental element of belief in Buddhism, derived from its parent Brāhmanism, does not appear to have been definitely utilized for the regulation of the hierarchical succession in India, although many cases are cited by Tāranātha, from the Indian histories, of Indian Buddhist patriarchs and saints having been re-incarnated in other saints some generations afterwards.

The succession of the Sas-kya hierarchs was clearly not based upon this system, but was by nomination of relatives. The Yellow Hat succession, however, indisputably shows by the dates of birth and death of the respective incumbents that the succession to the Grand Lāmaship was based upon the theory of direct re-incarnation. The spirit of the first abbot was supposed on his death to be re-incarnated in the world immediately as a new-born infant, and thus was re-born again and again for the good of his monastery and particular sect of Yellow Hats. This theory has latterly been adopted as a basis for succession to the leadership of several other sects as well.

Enlarging this theory, the fifth Grand Lāma introduced the fiction of a divine origin for himself and his predecessors. He declared that both he himself and the first Yellow Hat abbot were re-incarnations of the most powerful and popular of all the kings of Tibet, namely Srong-btsan Gam-po; and, further, that the latter in his turn was the earthly incarnation of the Compassionate Spirit of the mountains who had given the early Tibetans the magical food which transformed them from monkeys into men. This Compassionate Spirit was identified with the Buddhist 'god of mercy' Avalokita (see AVALOKITEŚVARA), known in Tibetan as Chān-rā-zi,' 'the all-seeing Lord' (lit. 'clad with eyes'). Avalokita is especially the god who regulates transmigration, and who can procure ready entrance to paradise and escape from hell. His favour can be won by the repeated utterance of his mystic spell, the *Oṁ maṇi* (see JEWEL [Buddhist]) of Indian Buddhism; hence the extreme popularity of this formula in Tibet, and the divine honours paid to the Dalai Lāma, who is believed to be the incarnation of this most powerful of all divinities.

10. Dual Grand-Lāmaship.—The only person whom this Grand Lāma of Lhāsa permitted to share to some extent his divine honours was the abbot of the large monastery at Tashi-lhunpo, the Western capital of Tibet, belonging to his own Yellow Hat sect, and his own tutor. He raised this abbot to the dignity of a Grand Lāma, and gave him the divine pedigree of descent from the Buddha-god Amitābha, the 'Buddha of Infinite

Light,' whose blissful paradise in the west is the popular heaven which was the goal of the majority of Indian Buddhists from the beginning of the Christian era, as it is to-day in Tibet, as well as in China and Japan. This pontiff is generally known to Europeans, after his residence, as the 'Tashi Lāma,' in contradistinction to the 'Dalai Lāma' of Lhāsa. To Tibetans, however, the former of these is usually known as 'the great treasure of learning,' Pan-ch'en Rin-po-ch'e, and the latter as 'the protector-treasure,' Kyab-gon Rin-po-ch'e, or 'the victor Jina,' a title of Buddha himself.

Latterly, a third and a fourth Grand Lāma of the dominant Yellow Hats were instituted for the two kingdoms outside Tibet, to which Tibetan Buddhism extended, namely Mongolia and China. The former of these at Urgya is known as Je-btsun Dam-pa, and possesses temporal sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, like the Dalai Lāma in Tibet; but, although posing as the head of the celibate monkhood, he is not himself celibate. The fourth was appointed by the Emperor Kang-Hsi about 1700, especially for Inner Mongolia, and has his special residence at Peking and Jehol. He is known to Tibetans as Chang-skya-Hu-thuk-thu, and is considered to be an incarnation of Rol-pai Dorje; and his succession, as well as that of the Urgya Grand Lāma, is arranged by the Dalai Lāma.

The spiritual jurisdiction of the Dalai Lāma is not acknowledged outside Tibet and Mongolia, including the land of the Buriats (*q.v.*) bordering Lake Baikal in Siberia, the tracts in Western China which formerly belonged to Tibet, the isolated Tibetan monasteries in N. China, and the Himālayan States of Bhutān, Sikkim, and Ladākh. Neither the Dalai nor the Tashi Lāma exercises any ecclesiastical authority in Tibet over the other and older sects, the Red Hats, whose relative laxity in Buddhist discipline, especially in the matter of uncelibacy, they despise.

11. Sects in Tibetan Buddhism.—No sects appear to have existed prior to Lang-darma's persecution in the 9th cent., nor till more than a century and a half later. The sectarial movement seems to date from the visit to Tibet of the great Indian Buddhist monk Atīśa in 1038. Atīśa, while clinging to Yoga and theistic Tantrism, at once started a reformation on the lines of the higher Indian Mahāyāna system, enforcing celibacy and high morality, and deprecating the Bon rites which had crept into some of the priestly practices of the Buddhist monks. The time was ripe for such a reform, as the monks in Tibet had become a very large and influential body, and possessed a fairly full and scholarly translation of the bulky Mahāyāna canon and commentaries.

The first of the reformed sects, and the one with which Atīśa most intimately identified himself was the Kā-dam, or 'those bound by the Orders'; and it was this sect that ultimately, three and a half centuries later, in Tsong-Kha-pa's hands became less ascetic and more highly ritualistic under the title of Ge-lug, or 'Virtuous Order,' the 'Yellow Hats,' now the dominant established sect in Tibet.

Atīśa, or 'the Lord' (Jo-bo-rje), was the sole profound reformer of Tibetan Buddhism; for we find that the other parallel early reformations were initiated by his pupils. These were the Kar-gyu and Sas-kya sects, which were directly based in great measure upon Atīśa's teaching. These two sects may be regarded as semi-reformations adapted for those individuals who found Atīśa's high standard of morality and discipline too irksome.

The residue, who remained wholly unreformed and weakened by the loss of their best and most intellectual members, were now called the 'Old,' or Nying-ma, as they adhered to the old corrupt practices. To legitimize some of their unorthodox practices borrowed from the indigenous Bon faith, the Nying-ma Lāmas began to discover hidden 'revelations' (*ter-ma*), or fictitious gospels, ascribed to Guru Padmākara, authorizing these practices, just as, it is related, the Indian monk Nāgārjuna, to secure an orthodox reception for his new doctrine, alleged that Śākyamuni had entrusted the developed gospels to Nāga demigods until men were sufficiently enlightened to comprehend the doctrine. Each of these 'finders' of the new revelations claimed to have been in a former birth one or other of the twenty-five traditional disciples of the *guru*. The 'revelations' treat mainly of Bon rites which are permissible in Buddhist practice; and they prescribe forms of worship mostly on the Buddhist model. These apocryphal gospels formed the starting-point for further subdivision of the semi-reformed and the old unreformed sects, which differ from each other chiefly by the particular *ter-ma*-book that they have adopted as sanctioning the worship of a particular Bon deity.

12. Sectarian distinctions.—The distinctions between the various sects are partly theistic and creedal, and partly ritualistic, and are also usually expressed by some external difference in dress and symbolism. None of them relate to the personality or doctrine of the historical Buddha as expressed in the canon, as this is accepted intact by all. These differences may be classed as: (1) personality and title of the primordial deity or Ādi-buddha (cf. ĀDIBUDDHA); (2) special source of divine inspiration; (3) transmitters of this special inspiration; (4) meditative system of mystical insight (*darśana*, Tib. *lta-wa*); (5) special *tantra*-revelation; (6) personal tutelary (*yi-dam*) or Śaivite Indian protective demon; and (7) guardian demon (*dharmapāla*, Tib. *ch'os-skyong*), sometimes of Tibetan type.

The Ge-lug, or dominant Yellow Hats, have as their primordial deity Vajradhāra ('holder of the thunderbolt'), and they derive their divine inspiration mainly, not from the dead Śakyamuni, but from the living Buddhist 'Messiah' Maitreya, the next coming Buddha, as revealed through the succession of Indian saints from Asaṅga down to Atīśa, and through the Tibetan saints from Atīśa's disciple Bromton downwards to Tsong-Kha-pa. The Ge-lug mystical insight is in the *Lam rim*, or 'graded path,' on which a commentary was written by Tsong-Kha-pa, and their special *Tantra*, or theistic manual, is *Rgya-ch'en-spyod*. Their tutelary Indian demon (*yi-dam*) is 'the fearful thunderbolt' Vajrabhairava (Tib. Dorje-jig-je), supported by Samvara (Śambara, Tib. Dem-chog) and Guhyakāla (Tib. Sang-'dus); and their 'guardian' demon (*dharmapāla*) is 'the six-armed lord' (Gon-po) or 'the horse-necked' (Hayagrīva, Tib. Tam-ch'en), both of them Indian, not Tibetan.

In organizing the Ge-lug sect Tsong-Kha-pa collected the scattered members of the Kā-dam from their ascetic retreats and housed them in monasteries, together with his new followers, under rigid discipline, setting them to keep the 253 Vinaya rules of primitive Buddhism, including strict celibacy, and hence obtaining for them the title of 'Vinaya-keepers' (Dulba-Lama). He also made them carry a begging-bowl and wear patched robes of a yellow colour after the fashion of the Indian Buddhist mendicant. The bowl, however, soon dropped out of use, as daily begging was not adapted to the sparse population of Tibet. He attracted followers also by instituting a highly ritualistic service, in part borrowed, perhaps, from the Nestorian Christian missionaries who were undoubtedly settled at that time in Tsong-Kha, the locality of his early boyhood in W. China. He

gave his monks the yellow hat which distinguished them from all the other sects, who wore red hats, in contradistinction to the black caps of the Bon priests.

The Kar-gyu, the next great sect after the Ge-lug, was founded in the latter half of the 11th cent. by the Tibetan monk Mar-pa, who had visited India. The name means 'follower of the successive Orders,' expressive of the belief that the rulings of the later Buddhist sages were inspired. Its distinctive features are its hermit practices—meditation in caves and other retired places—and the following peculiarities: its primordial Buddha is also Vajradhara, and its tutelary Saṁvara; but its mystical insight is Mahāmudrā (*p'yag-rgya-ch'en*) of the 'Middle path,' its Tantra Sum-kar bsduds, its guardian 'the lord of the black cloak' (Bar-nag); its hat has a frontal badge like a St. Andrew's cross (X), to symbolize that meditation with crossed knees is its special feature; with these is associated a stricter observance of the Indian monastic rules. One of its most famous monks was the hermit poet Milā-raspa.

The hermit feature of this sect rendered it so unattractive that several sub-sects arose out of it which dispensed with the necessity for hermitages. These were the Karma, Dikung-pa, To-lung-pa, and Dug-pa (the form dominant in Bhutān), which differ from each other in having adopted a different 'revelation' (*ter-ma*) to allow of worship of an aboriginal spirit. An important image in their temples is that of the founder of their particular sect or sub-sect. In Ge-lug temples Tsong-Kha-pa's image is prominent and receives worship as a canonized saint.

The third great reformed sect is the Sas-kya, or Sa-kya, taking its name from the monastery of that place, founded in A.D. 1072. As we have seen, it became under imperial Chinese patronage the first great hierarchy in Tibet, and in 1251 attained for a time the temporal sovereignty, until eclipsed by its later rival, the Ge-lug sect. Its special source of inspiration is the Bodhisattva Mañjuśri, through the Indian saints from Nāgārjuna to Vasuputra (Vasubandhu?). Its mystic insight is 'the deep path' (*gambhīra darśana*), its tutelary Vajra-phurpa, and its 'guardians' are 'the tent-lord' and 'the presence-lord' (Gon-po zhab).

Now, however, except in a few externals, it is practically undistinguishable from the unreformed Nying-ma, and celibacy is exceptional. From the Sas-kya two reforming sub-sects issued, the Ngor-pa and Jo-nang, which differ merely in the founders. To the latter sect belonged the famous Tibetan historiographer Tāranātha.

The wholly unreformed sect of Tibetan Buddhists are not numerous in Tibet. They are priests rather than monks, and are freely tinged with quasi-Bon cults. They are found chiefly in the more remote districts. They too have sub-sects, Urgyen-pa, Kartok-pa, and Lhat-sun-pa. The monasteries in Sikkim chiefly belong to the last sect. The Bhutānese lamaseries are not Nying-ma, as is usually asserted by Dug-pa, a sub-sect of the Kar-gyu above noted.

13. Special features of Tibetan Buddhism.—Contrary to Western belief, there is nothing in the Buddhism professed by the monastic Order in Tibet which differs greatly from the type of the Indian Buddhism of the Mahāyāna. The differences in discipline and clothing are mainly those enforced by different climatic conditions. In doctrinal beliefs and practice the Ge-lug monks, who form the great majority of the Order, differ little from the Indian Buddhist monks in the early centuries of our era. The use of sacred sentences as protective charms or spells has been shown by the present writer to have been a feature of Buddhism in India from its commencement, and on the evidence of the Pāli canon to have been practised even by Buddha himself (cf. JEWEL [Buddhist]), and the mechanical repetition of such spells (*dhāraṇī* or *paritta*) was extensively practised about the 5th cent. A.D. by Asaṅga and his brother Vasubandhu according to the circumstantial records quoted by Tāranātha,[1] and supported by an early *sādhana* bearing Asaṅga's name. The grosser priestly theistic and demonistic rites, the practice of which is restricted almost entirely to the unreformed sects which form a minority, are also largely of Indian Śaivite origin. Those which are borrowed from the indigenous Bon will be indicated in art. TIBET. The self-immolation by entombment is an extreme and revolting instance of asceticism, having its parallel in the self-torture of Indian *yogis*, but it is of altogether exceptional occurrence[2] and never practised by orthodox monks.

14. Grades in the Order.—The monks are of two chief grades—the novice and the ordained, as in Indian Buddhism; to these may be added at the lower end the neophyte and at the top the abbot, or head of the monastery.

(1) The *neophyte*, or probationer-pupil, usually a child of about eight years of age, is called *ge-ñen*, *i.e.* the equivalent of the Indian *upāsaka*, or 'virtuous follower,' the ordinary title of a lay devotee. He receives instruction as in a school under a tutor, and is called *gdā-pa* (*grwa-pa*), 'pupil.' (2) The *novice*, or *ge-ts'ul*, is a formally admitted candidate for the Order. He has gone through the ceremony of 'going forth from home' (*pravrajyāvrata*), of having his head formally shaved, and vowing to keep thirty-six of the precepts. He is now permitted to join in the religious services in the monastery. The great majority of the monks, even the old ones, never rise above this grade to full initiation. (3) The fully ordained monk is called *ge-long* (*dge-slong*), the equivalent of the Indian *bhikṣu*, or 'virtuous mendicant.' He is usually over twenty-five years, and comparatively few ever reach this high stage. He now has to vow to keep the 253 precepts. (4) The *abbot* is called *k'an-po* (cf. ABBOT [Tibetan]).

Nuns are given corresponding titles. They are not numerous, are very illiterate, as a rule, and are allotted an inferior position, scarcely higher than the ordinary lay devotee.

15. Excessive numbers of the monks.—In Tibet we see Buddhism at the extreme limit of its inevitable development when unfettered. For the monastic state is an essential condition for the attainment of Buddhist salvation; and in Tibet this condition has been realized more fully than in any other Buddhist country in the world. Indeed, nowhere else in the world does monasticism appear ever to have reached such vast proportions. This has been the result of the exceptionally favourable circumstances for its unchecked growth and development, under the fostering care of a temporal government which for several centuries has been entirely in the hands of the monks themselves.

As a consequence, there have arisen swarming armies of State-supported celibate monks who live parasitically upon the people and decimate them. Since Buddhism was introduced as the State-religion in the 8th cent. A.D., the Tibetan nation, which formerly was one of the most virile in Eastern Asia, and overran and even conquered China more than once, has steadily declined in power and numbers until it now has not a tenth part of its former population. The only general census of the population hitherto taken appears to be one made by the Chinese, so long ago as 1737; but the proportion probably still holds good, though the total number has greatly declined through the population having died off, presumably in the main as a result of the wide-

[1] F. A. Schiefner, *Gesch. des Buddhismus in Indien*, St. Petersburg, 1869, pp. 103*f.*, 121, 123, 146; L. A. Waddell, 'Dhāraṇī Cult in Buddhism,' *Ostasiat. Zeitschr.* i. [1912] 178.

[2] Waddell, *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, p. 236.

spread monasticism, for polyandry is far from common.

	No. of Lāmas.	No. of Laity (at 5 per family).
Central Province (Dbus)	302,500	602,190
Western „ (Tsang)	13,700	33,760
	316,200	635,950

This gives one monk for every three of the entire lay community, including the women and children.

The shrinking of the population is evident everywhere in Central and Western Tibet, where one sees numerous abandoned tracts of former cultivation and the ruins of former villages and homesteads. The population is, presumably as a consequence of over-monasticism, steadily drifting towards extinction.

16. Excessive monasticism an inevitable result of Buddhism.—Yet this wide-spread devastation worked by unfettered monasticism must inevitably be the outcome everywhere of Buddhism when that religion is free to develop without restraint. Buddhism, with its inveterate note of pessimism, repressing the wholesome instinct for living and for the development and enjoyment of nature's resources, is itself in direct antagonism to all worldly progress, whilst it restricts its goal of Nirvāṇa expressly to those who have entered its celibate monastic Order. This is clearly the teaching everywhere of Buddha himself, and of all orthodox professing Buddhists of all sections of Buddhism, both North and South, *pace* the modernizing theories of popular Western writers. No prospect whatever of attaining salvation or Nirvāṇa in this life is held out by Buddhism to any one except those who actually enter its celibate Order of monks.

This is manifestly the reason, in the opinion of the present writer, why heaven and not Nirvāṇa is the popular goal of lay Buddhists—Indra's heaven in the company of 'the coming Buddha' Maitreya, according to the 'Southern' Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam; or Amitābha's paradise in the West in the company of Avalokita, according to the Mahāyānist Buddhists. It is obviously because, in the first place, these respective heavens are the old traditional paradises of the layman's ancestors, and, in the second place, and chiefly, because there is no other goal of bliss open to him on his death; for, being a layman and forced to work for his living, or bound by family ties, he cannot afford to enter the monastic Order, which is the sole avenue to Nirvāṇa.

17. Tibetan Buddhist scriptures.—The scriptures of the Tibetan Buddhists are translations from the Sanskrit texts of Indian Buddhism by the most scholarly monks of mediæval India, assisted by learned Lāmas. A few books in the last volume of the *sūtras* were translated from the Pāli, and a very few from the Chinese. The whole forms a series of over three hundred volumes, each of which with its wooden covers makes a package about 26 ins. long, 8 ins. broad, 8 ins. deep, and weighing about 10 pounds. The volumes generally are in the form of xylographs, or prints from carved wooden blocks, as with the ancient Chinese books, no movable type having been employed; occasionally MS sets of the entire canon are to be found—as, *e.g.*, the set obtained by the present writer and now in the British Museum, MSS no. Oriental 672 ff.

The sacred texts consist of two great collections: (*a*) the canon, and (*b*) the commentaries.

The canon, or *Ka-gyur* (vulgarly *Kanjur*), 'translated word,' forms a series of one hundred, or, in some editions, one hundred and eight, volumes, and comprises 1083 distinct books. It is divided into seven great sections, as compared with the three divisions of the Pāli canonical scriptures, or *Tripiṭaka*. This difference in number is due to a subdivision of the *sūtras* (asterisked in the subjoined list), and the addition of the mystical Śaivite *sūtras* or *tantras*. The divisions are as follows (the constituent volumes being indicated by the letters of the alphabet, in the order of the Sanskrit alphabet):

1. Discipline, *Dul-ba* (Skr. *Vinaya*), in 12 volumes (K-P).
2. Metaphysics and transcendental wisdom, *Ser-p'yin* (Skr. *Prajñāpāramitā*), corresponding generally to the *Abhidhamma* of the Pāli, in the following recensions: (*a*) in 100,000 verses, *'Bum* (Skr. *Śatasāhasrika*), 10 volumes (K-N); (*b*) in 25,000 verses, *Nyi-k'ri* (Skr. *Pañchaviṁśatasāhasrikā*), 3 volumes (K-G); (*c*) in 18,000 verses, *K'ri-brgyad* (Skr. *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā*), 3 volumes (K-G); (*d*) in 10,000 verses, *K'ri* (Skr. *Daśasāhasrikā*), 1 volume (K); (*e*) in 8000 verses, *br Gyad-stong* (Skr. *Aṣṭasāhasrika*), 1 volume (K); (*f*) various abridged abstracts, *Na-ts'oga* (Skr. *Viśva*), 18 tracts in 1 volume.
3. Buddhist Congregation, *Phal-ch'en* (Skr. *Buddhāvataṁsaṅgha*), 6 volumes (K-Ch).
4. Perfection of the Buddha—ethical and metaphysical doctrine entitled 'The Jewel-heap,' *dKon-brtsegs* (Skr. *Ratnakūṭa*), 5 volumes (K-Ch).
*5. Sermons [of Buddha], *mDo-sde* (Skr. *Sūtrānta*), 30 volumes (K-A).
6. *Parinirvāṇa*, or 'Deliverance from Misery,' *Myang-'das*, 2 volumes (K-Kh).
7. Mystical theosophy, *rGyud* (Skr. *Tantra*), 21 volumes (K-Zh).

To these are added:

8. Prayers, *sMon-lam* (Skr. *Praṇidhāna*), 3 leaves.
9. Index, *dKar-chag* (Skr. *Sūchilipi*), 1 volume.

The commentary *Tan-gyur* (vulgarly *Tanjur*) is a great encyclopædic library of ancient Indian lore on metaphysics, logic, composition, arts, alchemy, etc., including the commentaries of ancient Indian Buddhist writers, Nāgārjuna and others, also some texts by Tsong-Kha-pa and other Tibetan saints. Its contents have not yet been fully examined.

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L. A. WADDELL.

LANDMARKS AND BOUNDARIES.—

1. Introduction.—A frequent subject of dispute is the boundary-line—between nations, that of their respective territories, between tribes, that of their hunting or fishing grounds, between individuals, that of their holdings. An excellent example of this is found in Gn 13^{5b}. It is true that in some instances land disputes are rare because there is a large area available for the needs of all,[1] but in general this is not the case; hence the need of the boundaries being carefully defined by landmarks. We must here distinguish between natural and artificial landmarks. The former mainly mark the bounds of public territories; the latter mainly those of private lands. On the other hand, sometimes carved pillars are set up on the boundaries of States, while natural landmarks—trees, boulders, and the like—may mark the limits of individual holdings. In early times nations and tribes often sought that the boundary of their territories should effectually prevent the encroachment of neighbouring peoples. Such an end was attainable where the sea, a region of ice, a range of mountains, an impenetrable forest, a river, or a waste and desert region existed on a frontier. Hence these natural boundaries are

[1] Cf. C. A. Soppitt, *Short Account of the Kuki-Lushai Tribes*, Shillong, 1887, p. 23; E. Nordenskiold, *Indianerleben; El Gran Chaco*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 36.

themselves a kind of landmark. Cæsar says of the Teutons:

'It is their greatest glory to have around them as extensive deserts as possible, with their confines laid waste.'[1]

Such boundaries or tracts of waste land formed neutral ground, which at once removed the fear of a sudden incursion,[2] and offered a zone where arrangements—political, commercial, and the like—might be effected.

As an example may be taken that primitive form of commerce called the 'silent trade' (*l'échange à la muette*), in which members of a distant tribe or foreign merchants lay out their goods at a certain place and retire. The natives then come and take them, leaving the equivalent value of their own products. This is frequently done at the boundaries, or on the seashore, itself a frontier-line. Such places being regarded as neutral ground, in course of time regular markets or fairs are held there. It was for this reason that Hermes, whose images (*ἑρμαί*) stood on boundaries, became the god of merchants, just as certain markets held on the frontiers of some Greek States were protected by *θεοὶ ἀγοραῖοι*.[3]

To such waste territory forming a boundary the name 'mark' was given, and an officer was charged with its defence—the lord of the mark, the marquis—while the dwellers by the frontier were the *marcomanni*.

That the boundary was often a forest is shown in the connexion between the words for 'boundary' and 'wood.' Cf. Old Norse *mörk*, 'wood,' *mark*, 'boundary,' Old Pruss. *median*, 'wood,' O. Ch. Slav. *mežda*, 'boundary.' The words for 'wood' easily took on the meaning of 'boundary.' This was also the case with words denoting fen- or marsh-land.[4]

As will be seen later, stones with or without inscriptions were often set up on the frontier-line of States, on mountains, water-sheds, the sea-coast, etc. Private lands were marked by hewn or unhewn stones, posts, or trees, the last sometimes having ownership marks cut upon them.

2. Boundaries and landmarks in the lower culture.—The Australians have well-defined areas with well-known boundaries, over which each tribe wanders, and from which strangers are expelled.[5] This was also true of the Tasmanians, who seldom moved beyond their boundaries. The tracks through the thicket were marked by small branches of bushes, broken and left hanging.[6] Among the Torres Straits people natural objects constituted landmarks, or such objects as a felled tree, a branch thrown down, and the like.[7] In New Britain the territorial divisions were those of the respective villages, and the boundaries of these were the customary fighting places when any dispute between districts occurred. The boundaries of the lands of which each family was possessed were well known.[8] In Banks' Island the exact limits of property are known. Each piece of land is divided by boundaries drawn from tree to tree.[9] In Fiji the boundaries were apt to contract or expand with the strength of the tribe. Where two tribes were nearly equal, disputes regarding boundaries were submitted to a kind of arbitration. To appropriate a patch of forest was a paltry offence, but to claim another man's plantation was a crime. Hence, where the council of a tribe wished to claim a boundary enclosing a piece of debatable land, men were sent to plant it with gardens. Thus it became theirs and their heirs'.[1] In Samoa the boundary-marks were pathways, rivers, trenches, and stones. At the boundary-line between two villages stood two stones representing two youths who, after a fight, had been changed to stone. Any quarrel had to be settled at these stones.[2] In Tahiti there were well-known landmarks at the boundary-lines, usually taking the form of carved images, or *tiis*. To remove these landmarks was a grave offence.[3] In New Zealand the *kumara* and *taro* grounds were contiguous and divided into portions, carefully marked by stones over which incantations had been said. This rendered them so sacred that to move one brought death to the remover. Streams, trees, rocks, or posts marked the bounds of the hunting area, which was held in common.[4] In New Zealand and elsewhere in Polynesia fields were protected by hedges, walls of unhewn stones, or fences, the making and repairing of which occupied much time.[5]

In Africa great care is taken to define the boundaries of provinces or of private possessions. Thus in the province of Oran there are heaps of stones at the frontiers of several tribes, where oaths are taken by parties in cases of litigation.[6] R. H. Nassau, writing of W. African tribes, says that, when a family settles on land, the place is marked out by trees and stones as boundary-lines.[7] Among the Washambala, Banaka, etc., pathways, trees, rivers, rocks, etc., are the landmarks of parcels of land and plantations; though in some cases the boundary-lines are imaginary, they are usually respected.[8] Among the Wadshagga, sacrifices are made at the boundaries when war threatens, and also at other times where a road leaves the territory, to prevent the entrance of an enemy.[9] Among the Yoruba the boundaries of farms are marked by heaps of earth in which certain trees are planted. One of these, the *akoko*, is a common boundary-mark, and is sacred to the god Ogun. Kola trees growing in the forest often mark the site of old farms and afford proof of ownership.[10] R. E. Dennett says that mounds of earth and leaves in the woods mark the frontiers of two provinces. Natives add to the heap, so that they may not be accused of bringing anything evil into the next chief's country.[11] The Asi of Equatorial Africa indicate the boundaries of property by planting trees in line, by hedges, or by stones sunk deep out of sight. The *nijama*, or executive power, decides in disputes as to boundaries. Village boundaries of trees and stones throughout this region are sacred.[12] In S. Africa with the Basuto the bounds of fields were carefully marked, and disputes were settled by the chief. Among the Baronga, rivers, trees, and other natural objects mark the boundaries of different clans. To define those of gardens, a ditch a foot deep is dug all round the field, and it can be traced

[1] *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 23; cf. 25 for the great Hercynian forest as a boundary, and iv. 3: 'They consider it their highest glory as a nation that the lands on their borders lie waste to the widest extent.'

[2] *Ib.* vi. 25.

[3] For examples of the effect of the silent trade and of markets on boundaries see P. J. Hamilton-Grierson, *The Silent Trade*, Edinburgh, 1903, pp. 44, 56 f.; J. A. Dulaure, *Des Cultes qui ont précédé et amené l'idolatrie*, Paris, 1805, p. 346 f.; and, for the silent trade generally, L. J.-B. Bérenger-Féraud, *Superstitions et survivances*, do. 1896, ii. 489 ff.; C. Letourneau, *Bull. de la Soc. d'Anthrop.*, do. 1895. Cf. also GIFTS (Primitive and Savage), vol. vi. p. 204 ff.

[4] See H. Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, Strassburg, 1905–07, pp. 390, 671; O. Schrader, *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, do. 1901, p. 307; S. Feist, *Kultur . . . der Indogermanen*, Berlin, 1913, p. 195 f.; J. Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, ii. (Berlin, 1865) 30 ff.; J. A. Dulaure, *op. cit.* p. 110 ff.; J. Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*[6], London, 1902, p. 318.

[5] Spencer-Gillen[2], p. 8; E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, Melbourne, 1886–87, ii. 232 ff.; L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, do. 1880, p. 232.

[6] J. Bonwick, *Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians*, London, 1870, p. 33; H. Ling Roth, *The Aborigines of Tasmania*[2], do. 1899, pp. 73, 104 f.

[7] A. C. Haddon, *JAI* xix. [1889–90] 386.

[8] G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 271.

[9] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 65.

[1] B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1908, p. 360.

[2] Brown, p. 339; G. Turner, *Samoa*, do. 1884, p. 45.

[3] W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*[2], do. 1832, iii. 116.

[4] R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*[2], do. 1870, p. 356.

[5] C. Letourneau, *Property*, do., 1892, p. 66; T. Waitz and G. Gerland, *Anthrop. der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859–72, v. ii. 79, vi. 63; Ellis, i. 138.

[6] E. Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord*, Algiers, 1908, p. 424.

[7] *Fetichism in W. Africa*, London, 1904, p. 23.

[8] S. R. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903, pp. 53, 197, 262 f., 389.

[9] D. Gutmann, *ARW* xii. [1909] 98.

[10] H. Ling Roth, *Great Benin*, Halifax, 1903, p. 187, App. xxiv.

[11] 'Bavili Notes,' *FL* xvi. [1905] 396.

[12] W. S. and K. Routledge, *With a Prehistoric People*, London, 1910, pp. 6, 204; H. M. Stanley, *The Congo*, do. 1885, i. 315.

years after even when the field has become fallow.[1] In general, trespass is resented and is a crime or the cause of frequent quarrels and bloodshed, but among the Kafirs it was permitted because, all having gardens and cattle, all were liable to it.[2]

Among the N. American Indians disputes regarding boundaries were also a constant source of quarrel. W. H. Dall says of the Indians and the Innuit that they were jealous of their boundary-lines—usually the summit of a watershed. Any one found on the wrong side was liable to be shot.[3] Tribal boundaries were rivers, lakes, mountain ranges, trees, stones, and other natural features. A boulder marked the limit of the Shewwits' land; a deep spring was the most prominent natural object on the line between the Onondagas and Oneidas.[4] The Iroquois ran straight lines as boundaries, marked here and there by well-known objects. Occasionally, as among the Californian Indians, Pueblos, Haidas, and other north-west tribes, artificial boundaries—posts and stones—were set up to mark the hunting and fishing grounds. Among the Serrano Indians the patches of land belonging to an individual or, more likely, the *gens* were indicated by trees with marks corresponding to those painted on the owner's face, so that they could be instantly recognized. Among the Wyandots the women of the tribe distinctly marked the household tracts after they were partitioned among the householders, out of the common land of the *gens*.[5] In modern treaties with Indians the bounds of their lands are carefully noted and described.[6] In S. America it is said of the Indians of Guiana that, while they have no clear tribal boundaries, yet each tribe lives in a separate district and allows therein no interloper from another tribe.[7] In Brazil the boundaries of each tribe were marked by trees, streams, and rocks, and also by artificial landmarks. The *pajés* took an active part in defining these, with much magical ritual, etc. Bark strips, rags, and baskets were sometimes attached to these landmarks. The trespasser was killed on the spot when caught.[8]

Among the aboriginal tribes of India the Todas mark the boundaries of their villages by stones.[9] Among the village peoples of N.W. India the arbitrator who walks the boundary does so with a raw cowskin on his head—the cow being sacred—and is under a solemn oath to decide correctly. He holds five sticks in his hand to show that he is the representative of the Pañchâyat. Boundaries and cattle paths are religiously preserved, and the curse is uttered: 'May the man who destroys a boundary, a cowpath, or a ditch have his lands sown by others, or may they lie waste.' A method of ordeal for fixing boundaries consisted in the arbitrator walking the bounds with a red-hot ball on his palm, protected by pipal leaves. If he was not burned, his decision was accepted.[10] In Mysore disputes as to boundaries were settled by the *holeya kuluvādi*, who held a ball of earth in his hand as he walked. If he diverged even accidentally from the true line, the ball went to pieces, and it was believed that he would die in fifteen days. In Jeypore the arbitrator had to eat earth. If he died within six months, this proved that his decision was wrong, and that the earth-goddess had punished him.[1] In some parts of India a goat is led along a disputed boundary, and the place where it shivers is the true limit.[2] Among the Abors the boundaries of clearings are marked by upright stones, and property thus defined is respected. The Bhils surround their fields with fences of boughs and bamboo.[3] Among the Kandhs boundary-lines, when determined by the public tribunals, are marked by stones set up in presence of the *abbayas*, or patriarchs. They are sacred to Sundi Pennu, god of boundaries.

A prayer to him asks that disease be kept from the boundaries, that hostile gods and tigers may not cross them, that waters from the higher lands may be attracted to them, that cattle may not stray beyond them, etc. A fowl or goat is sacrificed by the priest at a point on the boundary fixed by ancient usage. The god is common to two parties whose lands join, and is supposed to help the one whose cause is just when a fight takes place between them.

The flesh of human sacrifices to the boundary-god as well as to the sun- and war-gods is strewn along the boundary-line. A boundary-god also exists among the Gonds.[4]

The Veddas had well-defined boundaries to the hunting grounds of each group in the jungle, and these were seldom trespassed on. Where it was not possible for natural features—stream or hill—to mark the boundary, definite marks were made on the trees along the line.[5]

3. Landmarks in the higher culture.—(*a*) Among the *Semites* the landmark was of supreme importance both for the State and for the individual owner. The Babylonians called boundary-stones *kudurru*, though the name was also applied to the land within the boundary. They were sacred to certain divinities, but not themselves representatives of divinity like the Greek Hermæ, though the divinity exercised power, the power of the curse, through them. Among gods to whom boundaries and landmarks were peculiarly sacred were Nabu ('Nabu preserves the limits of the fields'), Papu ('lord of the boundary,' period of Ḥammurabi), Ninib and Nusku ('the name of this stone is Ninib and Nusku establish the bounds'), and Šamaš ('Šamaš hates those who falsify boundaries and weights'). The importance of the just boundary is also seen in the incantation texts used by the exorcizer as he tries to discover what evil has been done by the sufferer. 'Has he fixed a false boundary, Not fixed a just boundary, Has he removed a boundary, a limit, a territory?'

The *kudurru*, which probably had some phallic significance, varies in height from one to several feet. The inscription begins with the name of the stone—*e.g.*, 'Ninib and Nusku establish the bounds.' Then follow the measurements of the field and a description of the occasion of the gift of it by a king to its owner. To this succeeds the appeal to the gods—*e.g.*, 'Whoever overthrows the grant of this field or causes it to be seized, may Anu overthrow him.' Other gods—Enlil, Ea, Sin, Šamaš, Ramman—are asked to do him various evils: 'Ninib, lord of boundaries and boundary-stones, tear out his boundary-stone. 'Whoever removes this stone, in the dust hides it, burns it with fire, casts it into water, shuts it up in an enclosure, causes a fool, a deaf man, an idiot, to take it, places it in an invisible place; may the great gods who upon this stone are mentioned by their names curse him with an evil curse, tear out his foundation, and destroy his seed.' Then follow the names of the witnesses present at the sealing of the tablet.[6] On the *kudurru* are usually representations of serpents, scorpions, and monsters. These may represent the demons to whom the soil

[1] E. Casalis, *Les Bassoutos*, Paris, 1859, p. 167; H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1913, p. 9.

[2] D. Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, i. 185; G. A. S. Northcott, 'The Nilotic Kavirondo,' *JAI* xxxvii. [1907] 60; J. Maclean, *Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs*, Mount Coke, 1858, p. 113.

[3] *Alaska*, London, 1870, p. 144.

[4] F. S. Dellenbaugh, *N. Americans of Yesterday*, New York, 1901, p. 410 *f.*; 7 *RBEW* [1891], p. 42; 8 *RBEW* [1891], p. 28.

[5] 4 *RBEW* [1886], p. 182; 1 *RBEW* [1881], p. 65.

[6] 7 *RBEW*, p. 44; 19 *RBEW*, pt. i. [1900] p. 138.

[7] E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, pp. 171, 418.

[8] C. F. P. von Martius, *Von dem Rechtszustande unter den Ureinwohnern Brasiliens*, Munich, 1832, p. 34 *f.*

[9] W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 439.

[10] H. M. Elliot, *Memoirs on the Hist. of the Races of N.W. Provinces of India*, do. 1869, pp. 239, 257.

[1] E. Thurston, *Ethnographic Notes in S. India*, Madras, 1906, pp. 321, 371.

[2] Crooke, *PR*[2] ii. 224.

[3] H. B. Rowney, *The Wild Tribes of India*, London, 1882, pp. 35, 158.

[4] S. C. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, do. 1865, pp. 57, 67, 83 *f.*, 90, 366; E. W. Hopkins, *Rel. of India*, Boston, 1895, p. 528 *f.*; see also DRAVIDIANS (North India), vol. v. p. 115.

[5] C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 106, 112 *f.*, with fig.; R. Knox, *An Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon*, London, 1681, p. 63.

[6] See R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the OT*, New York, 1912, p. 387 and pl. 46.

belongs, and who would presumably resent trespass or removal of the landmark after the owner had duly propitiated them. Others have seen in them representations of the signs of the zodiac—a theory which receives support from the representation of heavenly bodies and shrines (? houses of the heavens) on the *kudurru*. They would then have reference to the time at which the grant was made.[1]

Stones were also set up at the frontiers by kings who had extended their territories or restored the boundaries of earlier times. Such landmarks are still found *in situ*. The well-known 'stele of the vultures' delimited the respective territories of two city-States.[2]

Among the Hebrews, as among other Semitic peoples, stones, whether monoliths, circles, or cairns, were sacred, and were used to mark places where certain events had taken place, burial-sites, and sacred places. Whatever the origin of the *maṣṣēbāh*, or upright stone, may have been, boundary-stones were included under this title, though a heap of stones might also form a boundary-mark. In Gn $31^{45ff.}$ E's narrative shows that a *maṣṣēbāh* was erected as a witness of the covenant between Jacob and Laban on the Aramæan frontier, but J speaks of a heap of stones. Both had the same purpose (v.^{52}), as a reminder that there was to be no transgression beyond the limit thus marked out (cf. Jos $22^{10ff.}$). Boundary-stones were also used to mark private property in land, and were not to be removed (Dt 19^{14}, Pr 22^{28} 23^{10}). The sacredness of landmarks was enforced by a curse on the remover of them (Dt 27^{17}), and such removal was regarded as a peculiarly wicked action (Hos 5^{10}, Job 24^{2}). Such landmarks are still common in the East to-day, and are regarded as sacred.[3]

(*b*) In *India*, besides the instances from present-day tribes already cited, the evidence from the older law-books is suggestive. The sections regarding landmarks and boundary disputes are full of detail. Such disputes were to be settled by neighbours, by people from neighbouring villages, by the elders, by men of a variety of occupations, or by the king. Witnesses were called and duly sworn. They were to have earth on their head and to wear chaplets. False witnesses were punished by a fine. The boundary-line was to be marked by trees of specified kinds, ant-hills, artificial mounds, hills, thickets, gardens, roads, dikes, tanks, wells, cisterns, temples, etc. In the ground were buried objects which would not decay —potsherds, charcoal, bones, stones, bricks, enclosed in vessels. These were pointed out to youths and children, who were to show them to their children in after years. The destroyer of a boundary-mark was to be punished by mutilation.[4]

(*c*) In *Egypt*, where the encroachments of the Nile caused the effacing of boundaries, there were continual government surveys of territories, and careful records were kept in each district. Herodotus, Plato, Strabo, and others ascribe the origin of geometry to this need of adjusting the measurements of the land after each inundation. Boundary-stones were set up along the limits of estates, and were inscribed with the name of the tenant at the date of their erection, and other details—*e.g.*, the nature of the soil, the situation, etc., or the name of the reigning Pharaoh. Such stones also received a name, which, once given, never altered for all time. Boundary-stones with inscriptions also marked the frontiers of the land, and were set up by the kings after each new conquest. One of these says that all who maintain the boundaries will be called 'my son.' Temples occasionally stood on the frontier line. The Negative Confession in the *Book of the Dead* says nothing of removing landmarks, but the equivalent, 'I have not falsified the cubit of land,' occurs.[1]

(*d*) In early *Greece* heaps of stones (ἑρμαῖος λόφος, ἕρμαιον) or erect stones (phallic), or both together, represented Hermes, god of commerce, of merchants, of travellers, etc., and were placed to mark paths, as well as frontier-limits and bounds of private lands. These gave place in many cases to quadrangular stones, surmounted by the head of Hermes and with an erect φαλλός, which were set up at street-corners, before houses, etc.[2] Pausanias describes the territorial boundary-stones, or ἑρμαῖ, marking the frontiers on Mt. Parnon.[3] Plutarch records how Theseus set up a pillar between Peloponnesos and Attica, on one side of which were the words: 'This is not Peloponnesos but Ionia,' on the other: 'This is Peloponnesos, not Ionia.'[4] Boundary-heaps may still be seen on the frontiers of Laconia.[5] Altars or grave-mounds occasionally marked boundary-lines.[6] Boundary-stones also separated public from private lands, marked off roads, temple-precincts, burial-places, as well as private lands.[7] They were under the protection not only of Hermes (Ἑρμῆς Ἐπιτέρμιος), but also of Ζεὺς Ὅριος, or, as among the Dorians, Ἀπόλλων Ἀγυιεύς, protector of streets and roads,[8] and in Greece, as elsewhere, it was dangerous to remove a landmark. Plato says that 'one should be more willing to move the largest rock which is not a landmark than the least stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between neighbours.' The consequences will be doubly fatal—a penalty coming from the gods and one coming from the law.[9]

(*e*) Among the *Romans* the poets looked back to a golden age when there was no private property in land and hence no boundary-stones.[10] To Numa was ascribed the first law regarding landmarks (*cippi terminales*). Stones sacred to Jupiter Terminalis or Terminus were to mark the limits of property, and yearly sacrifices were to be offered to them at the Terminalia. Any one removing such stones might be slain without any guilt being incurred by the slayer. He, as well as his cattle, was devoted to the god who guarded or cursed boundaries.[11] The earliest form of the boundary-mark was a post or stone; later the Greek form of the Hermæ was adopted. This landmark represented Terminus, god of boundaries, and, as Ovid says, possessed divinity.[12]

When it was set up, a trench was dug and the blood of a sacrificial victim poured into it. Then the body of the victim, along with incense, honey, wine, corn, etc., was consumed by

[1] G. Maspero, *Dawn of Civilization*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 328 *f.*; J. G. Wilkinson, *Manners and Customs*, ed. London, 1878, i. 323, ii. 364; Strabo, xvii. 3; H. Brugsch, *Egypt under the Pharaohs*, London, 1891, i. 81, 182, ii. 78, 81; *ERE* iii. 828^{a}, v. 478^{b}.

[2] See Hesychius, *s.v.* ἑρμαῖος λόφος; Suidas, *s.v.* ἕρμαιον; Paus. iv. xxxiii. 3; Plato, *Hipparchos*, p. 229 A.

[3] ii. xxxviii. 7; for other instances see iv. xxxiii. 3, viii. xxxiv. 6, xxxv. 2.

[4] *Thes.* 25.

[5] L. Ross, *Reise und Reiserouten durch Griechenland*, Berlin, 1841, i. 18, 174.

[6] Paus. viii. xi. 1, xxvi. 3.

[7] See inscriptions, etc., in I. von Müller, *Handbuch der klass. Altertumswissenschaft*, i.^{2} (Munich, 1892) 622 f.

[8] K. O. Müller, *Hist. of the Doric Race*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1830, i. 322.

[9] *Laws*, viii. 842 *f.*; see also K. F. Hermann, *Disputatio de terminis eorumque religione apud Græcos*, Göttingen, 1846.

[10] Virg. *Georg.* i. 125 ff.; Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 135 ff.; Tibullus, *Eleg.* i. 3.

[11] Plut. *Numa*, xvi. 1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* ii. 74.

[12] *Fasti*, ii. 640.

fire in the trench, and on the ashes the stone was placed.[1] On the Terminalia the possessors of adjacent lands sacrificed a lamb at an altar set up by the boundary-stone, and sprinkled the stone with its blood. The stone or image was garlanded by each on his own side.[2] Public sacrifices were also made at a boundary-stone by the sixth milestone on the Via Laurentina.[3] Curses were sometimes inscribed on landmarks against those who removed them.[4]

Besides marking private lands, boundary-stones also marked the limits of territories, public lands, etc.[5] In later times the removing of landmarks was punished by a fine of 5000 sesterces, and any one could lay the accusation. Hadrian enacted banishment for persons of higher degree, and for those of lower degree forced labour for two or three years.[6] Fearful curses had already been pronounced by the Etruscans against the remover of landmarks. The gods punished him by wasting disease, ruined crops, extinction of his family, etc.[7]

(*f*) Among the *Teutons* in the earliest times, according to Cæsar, a tract of waste or forest land was preferred as a territorial boundary.[8] Other natural features served as boundaries, and artificial landmarks were also used:

'Terminales lapides Alamannorum et Burgundiorum confinia distinguebant.'[9]

As to private property, Tacitus[10] and Cæsar[11] say that holdings were re-partitioned out to all once a year. This communal arable land divided into separate fields belonging to different owners was called the 'mark,' and in later times was surrounded by a fence or ditch, its limits being also shown by stones, posts, or trees, planted with great ceremony. In the case of the lands of the free-lord, he with his neighbours made a circuit of his domain, and marked the limits by cutting marks on trees, by stones, or by mounds of earth. The boundary-marks on trees and stones (often a cross) are frequently referred to in old documents. Both stones and trees forming landmarks were sacred. Even to break a twig off the latter was not permissible, and right down through the Middle Ages very severe and cruel punishments were meted out to those who removed a landmark. In folk-belief, ghosts wandering through the fields or the Jack o' Lantern were thought to be the spirits of those who had committed this crime or who had made false measurements of land. Certain divinities were guardians of boundaries—Thorr, Frea, and Holda—and in folk-sagas there are tales of boundary-ditches having been marked out by the spindle of a goddess. Holy fire was carried round boundaries, and the *Indiculus Superstitionum* (23) speaks of the custom of ploughing a furrow round the bounds of villages.[12]

(*g*) Among the ancient *Celts* in Gaul some of the many *simulacra* which Cæsar[13] describes as representing a Celtic Mercury, and which were probably menhirs or heaps of stones, may have been used as boundary-marks, as they were in later times (§ 7).

[1] Sic. Flacc. 141. [2] *Fasti*, ii. 639 ff.
[3] *Ib.* 679 ff.; for the Terminus stone in the Capitoline temple, possibly an old boundary-stone, see W. W. Fowler, *The Roman Festivals*, London, 1899, p. 326 f.
[4] Dulaure, *op. cit.* p. 136.
[5] For the inscriptions on boundary-stones see Müller, *op. cit.* 697 f.
[6] See details in T. Mommsen, *Römisches Strafrecht*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 822; W. A. Hunter, *Roman Law*[6], London, 1897, p. 249 f.
[7] Westermarck, *MI* ii. 68 f. [8] *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 23; cf. iv. 3.
[9] Amm. Marc. XVIII. ii. 15. [10] *Germ.* 26.
[11] *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 22.
[12] See J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*[3], Göttingen, 1881, pp. 541–548; Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, ii. 30 ff., 'Deutsche Grenzalterthümer'; H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1887, i. 115; K. Simrock, *Handbuch der deutsch. Myth.*[3], Bonn, 1864, p. 406 f.; D. W. Ross, *Early Hist. of Land-Holding among the Germans*, London, 1883, p. 12 f.; Schrader, p. 307; E. de Laveleye, *Primitive Property*, Eng. tr., London, 1878, pp. 110, 119, 224, 284; G. W. Dasent, *Story of Burnt Njal*, Edinburgh, 1861, i. pp. xxxvii, xlii; B. Thorpe, *Northern Mythology*, London, 1851, ii. 97, 202, 211.
[13] *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 17.

The Irish Celts are said in the *Leabhar na hUidhre* to have had no divisions of land, and therefore no boundaries, until the time of Aed Slane (A.D. 651–694), when they were introduced because of the increasing population. The Brehon Laws define a large variety of boundary-marks—*e.g.*, stones of worship, memorial stones, trees, stakes, mounds, ditches, rivers, lakes, wells, and roads—and give details of the fines for unlawful possession of lands.[1] In Wales the laws speak of the three 'stays of boundaries'—privilege, proprietary title, and prior occupancy—but elsewhere principal waters, a lawful *randir*, and a dwelling.[2] Three things preserve a memorial of lands and stand as witness—a fireback stone, stones of a kiln, and a mounting stone, because the mark of the kindred remains on them. An action for theft arises against the man who removes these, a forfeit of life attaching to all who destroy a strong testimony.[3] Trees, stones, ditches, and rivers are also mentioned as marks.[4] A fine is levied against any one who ploughs up a ditch or removes a stone cross, or timber, or anything else preserving a boundary, and he must restore it to its former state.[5] In disputes the church fixes the boundary to the court, the court to the country, and, in cases of lands belonging to those co-equal in privilege, the oldest men are to assign the boundary after inquiry of witnesses. The judge and the king in such cases receive fees.[6]

(*h*) In ancient *Mexico* each domain was carefully measured out, marked, and its limits shown on a register kept by an officer in each district. Separate fields were enclosed with hedges or walls. Those who changed the limits of private lands or removed landmarks were put to death.[7] Similarly in *Peru* the lands were carefully divided and marked out, and the remover of a landmark was punished severely.[8]

4. Landmarks and the curse.—As many examples cited above have shown, a curse is invoked on the remover of the landmark, and, as in the Babylonian instances, the gods are desired to bring it about. The gods are, in fact, frequently associated with boundary-marks, and protect the owners of land against those who would take some of it.

In the Finnish *Kalevala*, Väinämöinen himself divides the land into arable patches. The boundary-stones between Sweden and Russia were believed to have been hewn by a wood-spirit.[9]

It is probable, however, that in earlier times the curse was not brought about by a god, but was inherent in the landmark itself and worked through it upon the trespasser. Thus among many savage tribes not only articles of property, but fruit-trees, growing crops, etc., are protected by charms, fetishes, and the like, placed on or among them. These are recognized as tabu signs; but, if any one disregarded them, some terrible result would follow. In effect, a curse is inherent in them and works automatically. In many instances the charm is hung from a pole, post, or fence, or the fence itself is tabu. These are then a species of primitive landmarks, to disregard which produces an automatic curse, as in New Britain, where a spell said over a fence produces serious trouble to a thief.

Among the natives of the Congo, rows of stakes are set round fields, and on them the medicine-man ties bundles of herbs, which cause death to the trespasser or thief.[10] The Ewe fasten amulets to long sticks, placed in a conspicuous position among

[1] *Ancient Laws of Ireland*, Dublin, 1865–1901, iv. 143 f.; cf. iii. 149, vi. 102.
[2] *Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales*, ed. A. Owen, London, 1841, ii. 41, 403; cf. 148 ff.
[3] i. 455, ii. 523. [4] i. 554, ii. 96, 523. [5] i. 705.
[6] i. 160, 455, 528, ii. 77.
[7] *NR* ii. 224–226, 463; H. Beuchat, *Manuel d'arch. américaine*, Paris, 1912, p. 311; Letourneau, *Property*, p. 131 f.
[8] W. H. Prescott, *Conquest of Peru*, ed. London, 1890, p. 21 f.
[9] Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, ii. 54.
[10] J. Merolla da Sorrenta, in J. Pinkerton, *Voyages*, London, 1808–14, xvi. 238.

the crops.[1] Among the Bangala such sticks with charms attached mark the boundary between separate owners' fields, and the charms are protective.[2] Among the Koita of British New Guinea a *tora*, or tabu sign, set up on a path or in a garden with the consent of the older men has no magical power, but it is 'native law,' and, if violated, would bring the full force of public opinion against the offender. Gardens are tabued by planting sticks with a length of creeper between, to which is attached a tabu sign with a certain amount of magical force.[3] In Fijian gardens reeds were thrust into the earth, their tops brought together, and set in a banana or a nut. These would produce boils on the thief.[4] In Samoa the 'cross stick tabu'—a stick fastened horizontally to a tree—indicated the wish of the owner that the thief might incur disease.[5] In New Zealand *kumara* grounds and crops were made *tapu*; or a chief would tie one of his garments to a pole to make a place tabu.[6] In Madagascar poles with a bundle of herbs are placed on roads, fields, etc., to indicate that these are tabu.[7] Among the Oumanas, and also the Juris of S. America, a gap in a hedge round a field was merely protected by a thread tied across it. The trespasser who disregarded it would die.[8] In S. India stones called the Five Pándhus are set up in fields and regarded as guardians of the crops.[9]

When gods of boundaries were evolved, the curse was visited by them directly, not through the stones, etc., which were now merely regarded as sacred to them.

5. Beating the bounds.—The custom of riding the marches, or beating the bounds,[10] is of ancient origin. Its purpose was to make sure that the bounds and marks were not tampered with, to restore them when displaced, and also to establish them in the memory of the folk. It occurred annually, or every seven years, and in Christian times usually at Rogation-tide or Whitsuntide, Easter, or May-day. Probably the older processions of divine images for the fertility of the land were connected with these, if the procession went round the boundaries (see CROSS-ROADS, § 3). Though going round the bounds had a religious character—in mediæval times the clergy accompanied it with cross, banners, and bells, and gospels or passages from the lives of saints were read at halting-places, *e.g.* where a cross stood, or an altar was erected near a boundary-stone and mass was said and prayer made for the fruits of the earth—there was also a good deal of merriment, eating, and drinking, and there were numerous customs observed in each place. That of striking some of the younger folk against the landmarks, whipping them, throwing them into a boundary-stream, etc., is well known, and had the intention of fixing the parish or manorial boundaries in their minds. The custom is still in existence in Russia and in many parts of Germany, and has been revived in England in many parishes. In Scotland it occurs at Lanark ('riding the marches'), and at Hawick and Selkirk ('common-riding').[11] In England, after the Reformation, while much of the mediæval ceremonial was dropped, the religious character of the procession was not lost. According to the injunctions of Queen Elizabeth, at the stopping-places the curate had to admonish the people to give God thanks, the 104th Psalm was said, and the passages regarding the removal of landmarks were read (Dt 19[14] etc.). These customs are referred to in contemporary writings.[1] They correspond to the processions round the fields and lands on the Roman Ambarvalia in May for the averting of disease and blight, an object doubtless also sought in beating the bounds, as it still is in the processions round the fields in Italy in Rogation-week.[2] The boundaries were also renewed at the Ambarvalia, and there may have been a beating of the bounds of each *curia* at the Fornacalia.[3]

6. Superstitions regarding landmarks.—Besides the general belief that to remove a landmark is dangerous, other superstitions are sporadically connected with them. In Teutonic and Scandinavian lands the Jack o' Lantern is the ghost of a former remover of landmarks who now haunts them and the boundary-lines. In popular Hindu belief the ghost of a former proprietor will not allow people of another village to encroach with impunity on a boundary. *Bhūts* also haunt boundaries, and a stream of liquor is poured round these by the priest.[4] In S. India sorceresses are believed to ride round boundaries of seven villages by night on a tiger.[5] In the Isle of Man witches were believed to practise their evil deeds at the meetings of three boundaries or at cross-roads.[6] In the Hebrides blight could be removed from cattle by bringing the carcass of one of them near a boundary-stream; and water from such a stream was used with silver to remove the curse of the evil eye.[7]

Myths or folk-tales are often told regarding existing landmarks or boundaries and their origin. Where megalithic blocks have been utilized as landmarks, they are thought to have been placed there by a saint or by conquerors of the land.[8] There are legends regarding the assigning of specific boundaries in cases of former disputes, as at Uri and Glaris in Switzerland, and in Brittany.[9] The Mikirs have a myth relating how the gods marked the limits of their creative work by setting up four posts to be the boundaries of the world.[10]

7. Landmarks other than boundary-marks.—In different parts of the world heaps of stones, unconnected with boundaries, form a kind of landmark where specific acts are performed by the passer-by, most usually that of adding a stone to the heap.

(*a*) The ἑρμαῖος λόφος in Greece, connected with the cult of Hermes, was a heap of stones marking roads, and to it each wayfarer added a stone. Later myth found its origin in the heap of stones formed when Hermes was stoned.

Such heaps are found among many savage peoples, as well as the custom of adding a stone, or saying a prayer, or making an offering at them.[11] Strabo describes such heaps of stones on roads in Egypt.[12] They are common in Tibet on the tops of passes, where they have been erected by devotees, and each passer-by adds a stone for good fortune.[13] They are found among the Kirghiz in similar positions and where a Muhammadan saint has been buried, but also elsewhere, and offerings

[1] A. B. Ellis, *The Ewe-speaking Peoples*, London, 1890, p. 91f.
[2] J. H. Weeks, *JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 129; for similar customs among the Washambala see Steinmetz, *op. cit.* p. 263.
[3] C. G. Seligmann, *Melanesians of Brit. New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 136 ff.; cf. 576 f.; for similar tabu signs among the Banks' Islanders see Codrington, *op. cit.* pp. 77, 82, 216.
[4] T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, London, 1858, i. 249.
[5] G. Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia*, do. 1861, p. 295.
[6] Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui*, pp. 165–169.
[7] A. van Gennep, *Tabou et totémisme à Madagascar*, Paris, 1904, p. 184 f.
[8] F. L. de Gomara, in *Bibl. de autores españoles*, Madrid, 1852, xxii. 206; C. F. P. von Martius, *op. cit.* p. 37 f.
[9] S. Hislop, cited in Tylor, *PC*[3], London, 1891, ii. 164; for many other examples, as also of the tabu as curse, see J. G. Frazer, *Psyche's Task*, London, 1909, p. 17 ff.; *MI* ii. 62 ff.
[10] Gr. περιελθεῖν τὴν χώραν; M. Lat. *circumducere terminos, circuire fines* or *marcham, cavallicare marcham*; Germanic and Anglo-Sax. *lantleita, marchgang, markleita, grenzbegang, ymbgang*; O. Norse *merkja ganga*; Danish *markegang, gjerdegang*.
[11] For the last see A. and J. Lang, *Highways and Byways on the Scottish Border*, London, 1913, p. 270.

[1] *e.g.*, E. Grindal, *Remains*, Cambridge, 1843, pp. 141, 241; J. Whitgift, *Works* (Parker Soc.), do. 1851–53, iii. 277 f.; G. Herbert, *Country Parson*, London, 1652, p. 157; I. Walton, *Lives of Hooker*, etc., Oxford, 1805.
[2] Fowler, *op. cit.* pp. 114, 126, 304; Pliny, *HN* xviii. 8.
[3] For the custom in Germany see Grimm, *Kleinere Schriften*, ii. 61 ff.; W. Mannhardt, *Wald- und Feldkulte*[2], Berlin, 1904, p. 397 f.; Laveleye, *op. cit.* p. 119 f.; in Russia, D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, London, 1877, p. 366 f.; in England, J. Brand, *Popular Antiquities*, do. 1870, i. 110 ff.; R. Chambers, *Book of Days*, do. 1863, i. 582 ff.; *FLJ* v. [1887] 30 f.
[4] *PR*[2] ii. 182, 290 f. [5] E. Thurston, *op. cit.* p. 322.
[6] J. Rhŷs, *FL* ii. [1891] 292.
[7] A. Goodrich-Freer, *FL* x. [1899] 278.
[8] P. Sébillot, *Le Folk-lore de France*, iv. (Paris, 1907) 15.
[9] Laveleye, p. 75; Sébillot, i. [1904] 371.
[10] E. Stack, *The Mikirs*, London, 1908, p. 70.
[11] G. M. Theal, *Kaffir Folk-lore*, do. 1882, p. 19 (stone added for good fortune); E. Aymonier, *Notes sur le Laos*, Paris, 1885, p. 198 (prayer offered); other instances in *GB*[2] iii. 11 ff., and in Frazer's tr. of Pausanias, London, 1898, iv. 227.
[12] xvii. (p. 818).
[13] A. H. S. Landor, *In the Forbidden Land*, London, 1898, i. 185.

of all kinds are made at them.[1] In the Himâlaya region they are venerated by Hindus, Buddhists, and Muhammadans, and offerings are made at them.[2] Heaps of stones were known among the Hebrews (Pr 26[8] RV), and were also used to mark burial-places (Jos 7[26] 8[29], 2 S 18[17])—a custom common elsewhere.[3] They are well known all over the Semitic region. In N. Africa they are found on passes, often where the tomb of a saint is first seen, or they are regarded as the tomb. Others are commemorative, or mark routes. To the former, and to those which mark where a man has been killed, the passer-by adds a stone.[4] In the W. Highlands a cairn is erected where a suicide or sudden death has taken place out-of-doors, but in earlier times the cairn was erected as a burial-mound, and each passer-by added a stone. Hence the saying: 'I will add a stone to your cairn.'[5]

Although the added stone is an offering or for good luck and the like, it is not improbable that its primary intention, whatever the origin of the cairn may have been, was that of a rite of riddance of danger or the contagion of evil.[6]

(*b*) In many parts of the world stone circles serve a variety of purposes, and must form conspicuous landmarks. The circles dating from pre-historic times and found in large numbers in Great Britain and elsewhere—*e.g.*, N. Africa, Syria, India, etc.—are generally burial-sites.[7] In the Cross River district circles of stones carved in human form occur, and are said to be deities.[8] Among the S. Massim stone circles mark the places where the men of the village meet for talk, and circles called *gahana* were used for cannibal feasts.[9] Circles also occur in Gambia[10] and in Melanesia.[11]

(*c*) In many cases stones represent divinities, or a regular cult is paid to sacred stones.[12] These stones are landmarks in the sense of being rallying-places for worship.

(*d*) The great megalithic monuments (apart from circles) which are found in Europe, Asia, and Africa—menhirs, alignments, dolmens, etc., set up as memorials of events, as marking burial-places, or the scene of a slaying (*e.g.*, among the Garos and the Todas)[13]—whether the work of one or of many races,[14] must have been noticeable landmarks through the ages, and many curious superstitions show the reverence in which they were held.

(*e*) Burial mounds (*e.g.*, the tumuli of pre-historic times, Babylonian burial-mounds, the Hindu *dâgoba* or *stûpa*), tombs (*e.g.*, the pyramids), monuments of all kinds, temples, churches, and the like, standing out conspicuously from the surrounding landscape, often form landmarks or guides to travellers.

(*f*) Among lower races rocks, trees, and the like often mark the scene of traditional or mythic events—*e.g.*, among the Arunta, where they mark events of the Alcheringa (*q.v.*) period,[15] or in Guiana, where engravings on conspicuous rock faces may commemorate striking events.[16] Such engraved rocks are also common over the Semitic area, and act as landmarks.

LITERATURE.—This is given throughout the article.

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[1] Sven Hedin, *Through Asia*, London, 1898, i. 278.
[2] *42nd Rep. of Brit. Assoc.*, do. 1873, p. 194 f.
[3] See Bérenger-Féraud, *op. cit.* ii. 126 ff., for several instances; Ellis, *op. cit.* i. 359; cf. the burial cairns surviving from pre-historic times.
[4] Doutté, *op. cit.* p. 420 ff.
[5] Cf. *FLJ* vi. [1888] 63 (Ireland); see also F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 267 ff.; R. Andree, *Ethnograph. Parallelen und Vergleiche*, Leipzig, 1889, p. 46 f.
[6] See Frazer and Doutté, *locc. citt.*, and cf. § 2 for the custom among the Bavili.
[7] T. E. Peet, *Rough Stone Monuments and their Builders*, London, 1912; *Proc. Soc. Ant. Scotland, passim*.
[8] C. Partridge, *Cross River Natives*, London, 1905, p. 268 ff.
[9] Seligmann, *Melanesians*, pp. 464, 556.
[10] *Man*, 1903, no. 93. [11] Codrington, *op. cit.* p. 181.
[12] See STONES; J. Lubbock, *Origin of Civilisation*[6], p. 320 ff.; Codrington, *op. cit.* p. 182; A. Playfair, *The Garos*, London, 1909, p. 96 (sacrificial stones at the entrance to every village).
[13] Playfair, p. 97; Rivers, p. 439.
[14] On this question see Peet, *op. cit.* p. 143 ff., and the papers by him and G. Elliot Smith in *Rep. of Brit. Assoc.*, 1913.
[15] Spencer-Gillen[a], pp. 391, 427.
[16] E. F. im Thurn, *op. cit.* p. 406 f.

LAOS.—1. Introductory.—French Laos, which embraces only about a third of Laos proper (Muong Lao), was constituted by the treaty concluded between France and Siam in 1893. It is bounded on the N. by China, on the E. by Tong-king, on the S. by Cambodia, and on the W. by the Mekong, which separates it from the Shan and Burman States occupied by Britain, and from Siamese Laos. French Laos is inhabited by the Thai race, the most important group of whom are called Laotians; and by the half-civilized tribes called Mois by the Annamese, Phnôngs by the Cambodians, and Khâs by the Laotians (for these tribes see art. INDO-CHINA).

The Laotians are akin to the Thais of S. Tong-king and the Siamese. Their origin and history are very obscure. Their royal chronicles, the data of which are often not above suspicion, mention a first king of Laos who came from India, another who came from Cambodia, then four Khâ kings, and, finally, the intrusion and decisive seizure by the Laotians, who claimed to have come from the valley of Nam-hou. These immigrants, or conquerors, acquired several independent principalities, the two greatest of which seem to have been the kingdoms of Vien-chang and Luang-Prabang. Constantly at war, and attacked at the same time by Siam and Cambodia, they led a troubled and precarious life. In the 19th cent. the Siamese destroyed the kingdom of Vien-chang in order to annex it, and left only a nominal independence to the kingdom of Luang-Prabang, which, continuing in the same status under the French, is to-day the centre of the Laotian race.

a. Habitat.—The Laotians settled by preference along the river-banks and in the neighbourhood of rice-plains. They built huts on piles 5 to 6 ft. high, the huts measuring 20 to 40 ft. by 12 to 20 ft. The door, which nearly always faces the east, and to which they mount by a ladder, has a sort of balcony-verandah in front of it. The roof is made of palm-leaves, straw, or bamboo tiles. The furniture consists of kitchen utensils, tables, mattresses, mats, and chests for keeping clothes. Under the house are the weaving-loom, the domestic animals, and the poultry-yard; a little shelter at the side serves as a kitchen; the rice-granary is quite close, and always built on piles for fear of rodents.

3. Appearance and character.—The Laotians are well endowed as regards physical type; they have well-proportioned figures, and frank, open faces; and the young women especially have a graceful, supple carriage. They are of a lively and often refined intellect, with a certain aptitude for poetry; they are extremely pleasant and sociable, gay and happy-go-lucky, but extraordinarily indolent and sensual. The Laotian's indolence is a matter both of principle and of temperament: once he has got the means of living and amusing himself, he considers every kind of exertion not only useless but blameworthy. It is no use to look to him for the economic and intellectual transformation of Indo-China. He is a good builder, but a mediocre agriculturalist, often depending on hired labourers or slaves to work his rice-plantations; it is from trade and hawking principally that he makes his living. He is the usual intermediary between the 'savages' and the more civilized races. For six months out of twelve the Laotian does nothing—he does not even hunt or fish. The women work much harder: it is they who sow, prick, reprick, and harvest the rice, weave clothing, fetch water and wood, pound the rice, and, in addition to the multitudinous cares of housekeeping, manage the farm-yard.

4. Religious beliefs.—The Laotians, like the Cambodians, profess Sinhalese Buddhism. Although their pagodas are well supported and their bonzes well paid, their worship seems less fervent, and the morals of their clergy much less pure, than is the case in Cambodia. The bonzes mix freely with the laity in the festivals, eat and joke with them, smoke in public, breathe with impunity the flowers that abound in all Laotian solemnities, sometimes drink fermented liquors, accept objects directly from the hands of women, and even go to cut wood with them. They are shown less respect and are also granted more indulgence in their failings: for fornication, they are expelled from the pagoda, sentenced to pay a fine, and can then marry their accomplice. In Cambodia, the same offence would entail death or penal servitude for life.

The Laotians are Buddhists by tradition; but their most devoted worship is given to the good or bad spirits (*phi*), who animate all objects and beings, and preside over all the actions of human life. Hence spring innumerable beliefs and rites which have nothing in common with Buddhism.

When a man is building a house in Laos, he must fasten flowers, banana-shoots, and sugar-canes to the pillars bounding the part that is to be the sleeping-apartment, and also put a spinning-wheel and some threads of cotton at the pillars beside the foot of the bed, and a reel and some threads of silk at those beside its head. Before settling down in his house the proprietor invokes the deities with offerings and scented sticks. When a Laotian is going to work a rice-plantation, before he traces the first furrow and after he has his buffaloes yoked, he makes libations of lustral water, and offers a hen's egg, a tray of sweetmeats, and two betel-pellets to the spirits protecting the soil.

At the transplanting of the rice, he erects a little trestle in the middle of his field to serve as an altar; this remains until the close of the harvest. On this trestle he lays a boiled chicken, some cakes, and four betel-pellets, and plants seven stems in front of it; then, after a libation of alcohol, he invokes the deities as follows: 'On this propitious day I transplant my rice. Make it grow in abundance and full of grain, let it not be dried up, let it not wither away as it stands.' When the rice is matured, he decorticates a little of it to offer to the deities in order that they may protect the harvest from rodents. When the harvest is gathered and the rice put in stacks, the Laotian sets up a pole at the top of the stacks, fastening on the end of the pole the seven stems that had been planted in front of the trestle. A sacrifice is also made to the threshing-floor on which the rice has been trodden. Another more solemn sacrifice is made before storing the rice in the granary: the *phi* receive an offering of alcohol, rice, various dishes, and cakes, which the invited relatives and friends consume afterwards, tying their wrists together with cotton threads.

Like the Cambodians, the Laotians believe in the existence of a water-spirit Nöok (cf. Annamese, *nu'ó'c*, 'water'), a huge water-dragon, with a human head according to some, a cock's or ox's head according to others, which watches for all who cross the water, makes them fall, paralyzes their movements, and, after sucking their blood, throws them up on the shore some days after, bloodless and lifeless. Even elephants cannot resist it unless the elephant-driver himself gives them a wound, the blood of which appeases the dragon. Before any dangerous voyage, the Laotians sacrifice a live hen or goat to Nöok. They also sacrifice 'to the boat-heads,' or spirits of the junks (*ya néang*). Laotian sailors preserve a strict silence in presence of a cataract or waterfall: any cry, crack, gunshot, or sound of an instrument would offend the spirit by appearing to rival its voice.

In the regions of *bo*, or salt-wells, the business of extracting the salt is preceded every year by a ceremony which brings all the salt-makers of the *bo* together to get permission from the tutelary deity to descend into the wells. They sacrifice a prescribed animal—a pig, a tortoise, or a buffalo, according to the year. Besides this, the workers are bound to certain abstinences: they must wear no head-dress, must not put on a headband, must not protect themselves beneath parasol or umbrella; they must avoid all sexual relations; and, although they may move about and work in the *bo*, they are forbidden, as, indeed, is everybody, to 'cut' the *bo*, *i.e.* to cross it on foot, in a carriage, or on horseback. Any infringement of these rules is punished by a fine of a flask of brandy and an animal of the kind sacrificed at the beginning of the year. These offerings are given to a woman of the next village who has declared herself, according to certain regulations, possessed by the spirit of the *bo*, and who is the incarnation of its divinity. In certain districts, if a stranger dressed in red or black visits the *bo*, the spirit of the well is deeply offended, and would stop the flow of water if it was not appeased by a certain stated sacrifice. Because of an analogous belief the metal-workers make an annual offering at the beginning of their smelting operations to Phrah Bisnukar (=Skr. Viśvakarman), patron of artisans, of a woman's *langūti*, a hair kerchief, a comb, a bracelet, a boiled chicken, some alcohol, candles, and scented sticks.

Hunters sacrifice to their nooses and their nets. As a rule, if they want to be successful they must avoid talking among themselves, borrowing from each other, holding a pot, or walking over their weapons.

The Laotians not only believe in the spirits of natural forces, but they dread ghosts and reckon among the worst of evil spirits women who have died in child-birth, still-born children, and individuals who have died a violent death—who have been drowned, burned, assassinated, have committed suicide, or have been accidentally killed or devoured by wild animals.

5. Magic and sorcery.—Like all Indo-Chinese, the Laotians believe in magic and sorcerers. These sorcerers may be male (*phi kaḥ*) or female (*phi pop*). Their power comes to them by the direct or hereditary possession of a spirit, or else by initiation into magic. They also believe in tigress-women (the *smĕr* of the Cambodians [see CAMBODIA, vol. iii. p. 158ᵃ]), in spells and love-charms (lip-salve with wax, red jasmine flower), in incantations and amulets. In spite of the wonderful gentleness of the race, sorcerers who, voluntarily or involuntarily, have incurred the charge of witchcraft are sometimes put to death by the terrified people. They combine magic and medicine, like nearly all the Indo-Chinese, and, except for certain harmless and well-known ailments which alone are put into the hands of the doctor, and cholera and small-pox, which are too well known to be attributed to the ill-will of an individual, all serious or puzzling illnesses are the work of witchcraft, and the one thing that they require is the intervention of a witch-doctor.

6. Festivals.—The Laotians are even fonder of festivals than of idleness, and they bring to these rejoicings the sensual gaiety which is their characteristic. The profusion of flowers, sky-rockets, and kites is remarkable. We find in Laos all the great Buddhist solemnities of Cambodia and Siam: New-Year festivals which last seven days; hill-festivals; festivals for the opening and closing of the ecclesiastical retreat, or *vosa*; festivals for reunion with ancestors; a festival with great regattas at the end of the rainy season; the festival of flowers which a village offers to the pagodas of another village; the great annual festival of the offering of presents to the bonzes; and the occasional festivals at the ordination of bonzes.

7. Marriage customs.—The relations of the sexes before marriage are perhaps the most characteristic peculiarity of this sensual race. Boys and girls associate with absolute freedom; they walk together, and provoke each other to poetical combat, the foundation of which is a vivacity which is witty and licentious rather than sentimental. On moonlight nights, along the banks of the river, a band of women walk about in the evening singing improvised couplets to which a band of men, following at a respectful distance, reply. The Laotian girl is not responsible to any one for an account of her virginity. Her parents and public opinion seem to require no account from her, but she is protected by the *pcng huhòn*, 'sale, conviction for the advantage of the house,' a domestic law which requires a settled fine for every attempt against her person of which the girl complains. In spite of their loose customs, the Laotian girls usually marry between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. As in Cambodia, marriage consists in the request made by intermediaries on the part of the youth to the girl's parents; the regulation betrothal presents; an examination of the horoscopes of the future bride and bridegroom to see that the projected union is not unfavourable; the official betrothal, which cannot be wilfully broken without the penalty of the law; the dowry, or 'bride-price,' provided by the bridegroom; and the wedding with the expenses all paid by him. The dowry varies, of course, with the station and charms of the bride and the means of the suitor, but it is not honourable for a man to marry without offering a dowry for the woman of his choice. A marriage often costs the man who contracts it from 1200 to 1500 francs. The names

and ages of the couple, those of their parents, and the money and presents given on the occasion of the wedding are put in writing, and this constitutes a sort of marriage contract. The marriage-ceremony includes a rich banquet, with oblations to ancestors, the passing of cotton threads over the left wrist of the bridegroom and the right wrist of the bride, and the drinking of a mouthful of alcohol by both of them from the same cup. Next day it is repeated identically at the house of the bridegroom's parents. At Luang-Prabang the question of dowry and presents is discussed directly by the girl and the young man. The new couple usually live near the girl's parents, sometimes with them; in the latter case, the dowry to be given by the youth is reduced because of the work that the young couple will do.

Polygamy exists in Laos, but is practised only by the wealthy. Divorce is common and easy; it takes place almost always by mutual consent, the wife claiming her own personal belongings and the share of the acquisitions after marriage which comes to her by right, and the husband not interfering unless she unlawfully carries off everything. The woman has full right to divorce if her husband leaves her for three years without news of him.

Adultery, which is rare, is punished by death in theory, in practice by a fine paid by the wife and her lover to the husband.

8. Disposal of the dead.—The Laotians generally burn their dead; only the poor bury them. Before the French occupation women dying in child-birth and persons dying a violent death or from an internal complaint used to be abandoned on a current of water; but to-day only a pretence of this performance is gone through, and they are buried. Cremation takes place some days, or some months, or even a whole year after the death, according to the means of the heirs. In cases of a long interval, the corpse is often buried until the appointed ceremony; among the rich, it is put in a coffin hermetically sealed except for a small opening through which a long bamboo tube carries the putrid vapours beyond the roof; this coffin is placed under a special canopy on a rich catafalque, and the bonzes stand round it to pray in turn. During the whole time that the coffin is exposed there are friends and relatives in abundance at the house of the deceased, in holiday garb and provided with musical instruments. Lengthy banquets take place, with dances, songs, games, dramatic performances, etc. The guests must, in fact, cheer the spirit of the dead man as much as possible and prevent his heirs from abandoning themselves to a grief both useless and dangerous. This accounts for the very joyous character of Laotian funerals. The placing on the pyre and the cremation are performed as in Cambodia (see CAMBODIA, 9 (5)). When it is the cremation of an important personage, the fire for lighting the pile, which used to be provided by the court of Bangkok in the form of a tinder-box, comes to-day from Hanoï from the French Governor-General of Indo-China, under the form of an electric spark.

9. Political and administrative organization.—Laos was once divided into independent principalities, the most important of which were the kingdom of Vien-chang (now demolished) and the kingdom of Luang-Prabang. France has preserved these divisions as provinces, each under the control of one of her envoys. Each principality, or *muong*, was administered by a *chao*, or king, under whom came an *upahat*, then a *latsabong* and a *latsabut*. The title of king has been preserved by the French Government only in the single case of the king of Luang-Prabang, but the *upahats*, *latsabong*, and *latsabuts* have been retained. These dignified offices are the privilege of a hereditary nobility, who make recruits by election under the control of the protecting Power. These functions generally pass from father to son. All the other offices may be filled by the common people. As in Cambodia, the Laotian functionaries 'drink the oath water' before entering on the exercise of their duties. When a mandarin sends a delegate to another province, he generally gives him a cane with an ivory or copper handle, which serves him as a passport. Judgment in serious affairs is administered in the capital of the *muong*, or provinces; the decisions may be revised by the *chao*. Laos is regulated by the codes and customs of Vien-chang as much as by those of Luang-Prabang. This code of laws is clear and well-arranged, and evidently related to the laws of Cambodia. It is among the most lenient of Asiatic codes. The death penalty is rare, extenuating circumstances being admitted; *e.g.*, theft of food or fruit in case of dire necessity is sometimes, according to the necessity, even pardoned. The French Power has made only slight modifications in the code in order to further the progress of Laos and foster peace in its borders.

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LAPPS.—The religious conceptions of the Lapps come down to us from various periods. As in the religions of other Arctic hunting peoples, the primitive belief was a worship of the dead and the allied bear-worship.

1. Worship of the dead.—The Lapps worshipped their deceased relatives as guardian spirits. They believed that those spirits stood in the closest relation to their surviving kindred and protected them and their children from calamities, assisted them on their hunting and fishing expeditions, and watched over their reindeer in the forests. Moreover, if for any reason the dead were dissatisfied, they could injure their kinsmen—*e.g.*, by afflicting them with sickness. Alongside of the primitive worship of the dead there might also be found a more developed ancestor-worship, evident traces of which appear in sacrifices made by a certain family or clan in their special holy place. As a result of the different conditions under which the Lapps lived, the sacrificial places of the family or clan were situated on high mountains or on the shores or islands of lakes rich in fish. Such holy places (*passe*) were recognized by figures in stone or wood (*seide*). We know little about the shape of the wooden figures; but the stone figures, many examples of which have been preserved until the present day, are either natural rocks or strangely shaped blocks, often in the form of a bird. The sagas tell us that the figures had life, and originally were men turned into stone. In the Lapp districts of Pite and Lule, these figures are called by a special Swedish name, *storjunkare* ('grand younkers').

In the religion of the Lapps, even in its most primitive forms, an element of foreign influence can be traced. The belief of the Scandinavian Lapps, that the dead took up their quarters in the mountains, where they had the same occupations and lived under the same kind of conditions as in their previous life, recalls the conception of the Norsemen, that the dead continued their post-mortem life within the mountains; and the belief that the dead roamed about at Yule (*joulo-gadze* = 'Yule train') under the guidance of *Struottagalles* ('the man of Yule') or *Joulo-herra* ('the

Lord of Yule') is Scandinavian. To the spirits roaming about at Yule the Lapps offered food in a boat-shaped birch-bark basket which was placed on a tree. The word *saivo* may also be foreign. In the language of the more southerly Lapps it means both a sacred mountain and a subterranean spirit living in it. In the latter sense they spoke also of *Saivo-olmai* ('the *saivo* man') and of *Saivo-neida* ('the *saivo* maid'). The later conception, that the dead dwelt together in one subterranean abode, *jabme-aibmo* ('the world of the dead') or *mubbe-aibmo* ('the other world'), under the authority of *Jabmi-akko* ('the old woman of the dead'), corresponds to the Scandinavian conception of Hel, in the sense both of the kingdom of the dead and of a being ruling there. During the Roman Catholic period *jabme-aibmo* was transformed into an intermediate state, from which the dead, according to their deeds, proceeded either to *radien-aibmo* ('the ruler's world'), which corresponded to heaven in the Christian sense, or to *Ruto-aibmo* ('the world of Ruto'), where the dreaded blue-robed Ruto reigned and plagued men and beasts with sickness. He was sometimes called *Fuodno* ('the Evil One'). As an offering to him it was usual to bury a horse, on which he could ride away, and by the side of the horse the wooden image of a man. Some scholars believe that in Ruto they can recognize Odin, the Scandinavian god of death, who was likewise clad in blue and mounted on a horse. In any case the horse, as a victim of sacrifice, proves that such an offering cannot be of Lapp origin. The *kekri* or *keyri* ('spectre,' 'ghost') of the Finns has passed over to the *kovrre* or *kevrre* of the Russian Lapps.

2. **Bear-worship.**—Of all the ceremonies of the Lapps perhaps the most interesting is bear-worship, which comes down from the early hunting stage. To the Lapps, as to many other nature-folk, the object of their hunting was in a certain degree sacred. Both in hunting and in fishing the men alone took part, and the booty had to be carried into the *kâta* (the everyday tent) by a private door (*possjo*) at the back of the tent. In general they had to see that the bones were kept and buried, in order that the slain animal might come to life again. Nothing was of more importance than the careful observance of this rule in the case of the largest of the forest animals, the bear. Women might not be present at the bear-feast; but they were permitted to eat bear flesh in the *kâta*, only with a splinter of wood, and through a brass ring which was held in front of the mouth. The men alone might consume the heart of the animal (*bise bierga*, 'the sacred flesh'). There were all kinds of magical hunting usages associated with the bear ceremonies. It was the custom, *e.g.*, when the hunters came back from the forest, for the wives to salute their husbands by spitting the juice of chewed alder-bark in their faces, and for a certain period after a successful hunt a man was not permitted to have intercourse with his wife. It is worth mention that a woman might not drive a reindeer that had drawn a bear home from the forest, nor might the bear be taken home on a path which any woman had trodden. Of the utmost importance, too, was the burial of the bear; all its bones were carefully collected and arranged in their natural position in the grave.

3. **Tutelary spirits.**—There is some doubt as to whether the tutelary spirits of the Lapps were originally Lappish. The forest-spirit among the Norse Lapps, to whom attention should first be directed, was *Leib-olmai* ('the alder-man'), who ruled over all wild animals; but he was especially the tutelary spirit of the bear. To him, among other things, offerings of bows and arrows were made. This being was known only in a very restricted region, and he appears occasionally depicted on the Lapp drum in the shape of a bear—from which one may conclude that his origin may be assigned to the bear-worship itself. The name also points to this conclusion; for the juice of the alder-bark played an important part in the bear-hunting ceremonies. *Gidne* reminds us of the Scandinavian forest-maiden, a charmingly beautiful creature, who could be recognized by her long tail. From the neighbouring lands spring also *Gufittar* (Scandinavian *Go(d)vetter*, 'good being') and *Ulda* (Huldra) of the western Lapps. We can compare *Virku-akka* (*virka* = 'trap') of the Finnish Lapps with *Virankannos* of the Finns, and the Russian Lapps' *Tavaj* with *Tapio* of the Finns. There is also mention of a female, *Tava-ajk* (*tava* = 'mother'). The Russian Lapps had a spirit, *Miehts-chozjin* ('the master of the wood'), who shrieked and misled people in the forest; he seems to have come over from the Russians. A similar woodland spirit was *Vare-jielle* ('the one who lives in the woods'). A female divinity among the eastern Lapps was *Luot-chozjik* ('the reindeer guardian'), who looked after the reindeer while they roamed the forests untended during the summer. She did not, however, protect them from men. *Pots-chozjin* ('the reindeer master') had the same task of caring for the reindeer.

The water-spirit of the southern Lapps was *Tshatse-olmai* ('the water man'), to whom offerings were made in order that he might not cause any damage when men were journeying by water, or that he might drive fish into the nets of the fishers. A corresponding spirit among the Russian Lapps was *Tshadze-jielle* ('the one who lives in the water'), the sight of whom predicted disaster. A female deity in the western Lapp district was *Tshatse-neida* ('the water nymph'), who corresponded to the Scandinavian *Sjöjungfru* ('Lady of the Sea'); and *Tshadze-ienne* ('the water mother') of the eastern district, who was usually seen sitting on a rock, combing her hair, and who enticed people to come to her, seems to be identical with the Russian *rusalka*. In the sea lived *Akkruva* or *Avfruvva* (Scandinavian *Haffru*, 'mermaid'), who up to the hips had the body of a fish and above that the body of a girl, and there were water-spirits who predicted misfortune, such as *Nekke* ('nixie') and *Ravgga* (Norwegian *draug*) or *Tshatse-ravgga* ('water-spirit'), the spirit of a drowned person. The water giant *Vessedursses* was borrowed from the Finns. The Lapps called the tutelary spirits connected with certain districts by a common designation, *haldde*, borrowed from the Finnish *haltia* ('ruling').

The home also had a *haldde*. The Russian Lapps gave this spirit the names *Kyöde-jielle* ('the one who lives in the *kâta*') and *Pört-chozjin* ('the master of the kiln'); the latter, who corresponded to the Russian *domovoy*, lived in the house by the hearth, and not, like the original Finno-Ugrian domestic deities, in the back part of the *kâta*; this part was also deemed sacred by the Lapps, and no woman set foot on it. They spoke of a deity living there, *Possjo-akka* ('the old woman of Possjo'). The Scandinavian Lapps had, in addition, some borrowed domestic deities, such as *Tonto* ('the site') and *Smiera-gatto* ('the butter cat,' corresponding to the Scandinavian *Bära*, which stole butter for its master).

4. **Nature-gods.**—In addition to the dead and the spirits derived from the deceased, the Lapps had powerful nature-gods whom they worshipped. On the drums of the southern type the sun (*Beive*) occupies a very prominent place. But sun-worship was not originally Lappish, as is very evident from the oblations made by the Lapps. Like the Scandinavians, they offered white animals to the sun.

The symbol of the sun for sacrificial purposes was a ring. Scandinavian influence can also be traced in the mid-summer offering of the Lapps, viz. porridge set out in honour of the sun. A personification of the sun was *Beive-neida* ('the sun maiden'), and the moon (*Manno*), which in winter is an important light-giver in Lapland, seems also to have been worshipped. The Yule moon, *bissemanno* ('the holy moon'), was specially dangerous, possibly because the dead were then free to roam. When the new moon appeared, people had to avoid all noise; the women were not even allowed to spin in the *kâta*. A brass ring was placed in the chimney for the moon. Attention was also paid to *kuova-manno* (the joy month, February), a borrowing from a Scandinavian source. The Northern lights—*aurora borealis*—were regarded as living beings; and these lights were not to be irritated by noises. Among the Russian Lapps there is a tradition that the Northern lights are the evil spirits of dead men. The thunder was thought to be a living being, *Diermes* or *Ticrmes*; but it is uncertain whether the Lapps made offerings to him before they came in contact with tillers of the soil. At a later period the thunder-god was represented exactly like Thor and was called by his name, *Toragalles* ('old man Thor') or *Torat-uros* ('champion Thor'). He was supposed to be an old man (*Aija*) who killed goblins with a hammer; and his sacrificial symbol was a hammer held in his hand. From foreign sources also was derived the thunder-god's wife, *Akko* ('the old woman'), or, as she is sometimes called, *Ravdna* (*Rauni* of the Finns), to whom the rowan-tree was sacred; indeed, in her name may be recognized the Icelandic *reynir*, 'rowan.'

By the side of the thunder-god on the Lapp drum may also be seen depicted another Scandinavian deity, viz. the god of fertility, whom the Lapps called *Väralden-olmai* ('the world man'). He is pictured with a mattock in his hand, which proves, better than anything else, his southern origin. When the Lapps made offerings to him, they fastened to his sacrificial symbol a reindeer stag's genitals, to induce him to increase the reindeer herd. In addition to animal sacrifices, they offered in his honour agricultural implements, mattocks, and spades. All these features of the cult point to the Scandinavian Freyr, who was also called *Veraldar-goð* ('the god of the world'). At the sacrificial altars of Väralden-olmai, a 'world's pillar,' blood-besprinkled, was set up, a pillar with which he was to support the world. This was another borrowing from the Scandinavians, and it is seen in their sacred high-seat pillars, and in the sacred pillar (*irminsul*) of the early Saxons.

There was a third important Scandinavian nature-god whom the Lapps worshipped, viz. *Biegga-galles* ('the old man of the wind'), or *Bjegg-olmai* ('the wind man'), who drove out the wind with a club, and scooped it in again with a shovel when it had stormed enough. To this deity, who was also known in Finnish Lappmark, they offered, among other things, small boats. In the north he had a name, *Ilmaris*, borrowed from the Finnish *Ilmarinen*, one of the heroes of the *Kalevala*. Like the Ilmarinen of the Finns, Bjegg-olmai showed features which were most certainly derived from the Scandinavian *Njorðr*. In like manner the Lapp method of conjuring forth wind and storm, by undoing three magic knots, is of Scandinavian origin. From their agricultural neighbours the southern Lapps may have acquired *Jisen-olmai* ('the hoar-frost man') and *Rana-neida* (significance of *Rana* unknown), the former being a frost spirit and the latter a goddess of verdure or growth, who ruled over the mountains that become green earliest in the spring. It is probable that *Raz-ajk* ('the grass mother') of the Russian Lapps is of later origin, for grass is comparatively unimportant in the keeping of reindeer.

5. Other deities and mediators.—The goddess of birth was *Mader-akka* ('the old woman of the earth'); and her three daughters were *Sar-akka* or *Sar-edne* (from *sarrat*, which, according to K. B. Viklund, means 'to cleave sinews asunder for threads'; cf. the spinning of the Norns), *Juks-akka* ('the old woman of the bow'), who was identical with *Stäuk-edne* ('the gun mother'); and *Uks-akka* ('the door woman'). Sar-akka was most favoured, for she gave needed aid at childbirth and calving. The task of Juks-akka was to protect the child from falling and hurting itself; and with her Uks-akka, who lived under the door and changed girl children into boys in the mother's womb, was often confounded. All three lived under the *kâta*. The goddesses of birth, who were unknown to the eastern Lapps and to whom they offered spinning-wheels and alien sacrificial animals, corresponded to the Scandinavian Norns, just as the Lapps' porridge feast, which had to be eaten by women in child-bed in honour of the goddess, corresponded to the Faroe *nornagreytur*. During the Roman Catholic period Sar-akka was confounded with the Virgin Mary, who was frequently called *Sergve-edne* (significance unknown). Two strange ceremonies dated from the same period, viz. Sar-akka baptism and Sar-akka eucharist, which were simply imitations of the Christian sacraments. Roman Catholic tenets can also be recognized in the trinity of the Lapps—*Radien-attshe* ('the ruler's father'), *Radien-akka* ('the ruler's wife'), and *Radien-bardne* ('the ruler's child'), who are all depicted on the Lapp drum of the later periods. It was the duty of *Ailekes-olmai* ('the holiday man') to see that the week-end days, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, were properly observed; and *Fasto-olmai* ('the fast-man') had to see that the fasts were observed. *Ailekes-olmai* also furthered prayers presented to the god whom the Lapps called *Jubmel* or *Ibmel*—a name borrowed from the Finnish *Jumala*.

The mediators between mankind and the spiritual world were *noide*, *noite*, *noaide* (Finnish *noita*), shamans of the same kind as those of the Samoyeds and the northern Asiatic folk. Usually they were extremely nervous individuals whose characteristic troubles passed down from generation to generation. Yet the natural skill and dexterity had to be cultivated by means of an old shaman. The *noaide* could enter into touch with the spirit world when in an ecstatic state, a trance, during which his soul went to the kingdom of death in order to ask the advice of the dead about such things as the cause of the sickness of men or animals, the prospects of hunting, and so on. For the purpose of assisting him, the *noaide* had one or more tutelary spirits (*suoje*, originally 'shadow,' 'phantom'), which he could inherit, or buy, or obtain as a marriage portion. Often the spirit placed itself at the disposal of the *noaide*. This spirit company was called *noaide-gaddse* ('shaman retinue')—a name which is often given to certain animals who helped the shaman during his spirit journey. From the close connexion in which such animals stood to their masters, it is probable that it was the shaman's own soul that, severed from the body, could put on different shapes: as a reindeer (*saivo-sarva*) it hastened over the hills; as a bird (*saivo-lodde*) it flew through space; as a fish (*saivo-guölle*) it plunged through the subterranean waters; and as a snake (*saivo-guarms*) it undulated on the earth.

6. The Lapp drum.—As a means of producing an ecstatic trance *noaide* employed yelling, wild

dances, and unnatural food and drink, but above all an instrument of exaltation, the so-called Lapp drum (*geure* in the south, *kobdes* in the north). There were two distinct types of Lapp drums. The riddle-drum had a narrow or broad wooden frame bent in a circle, with a tanned reindeer skin stretched taut on it. The upper side of the drum was provided with a handle. The other type, the shell-drum, had a frame resembling an oblong shell, with a couple of holes in the bottom by which to grasp it. The latter was not nearly so large as the former. In order to get the drum to sound as loudly as possible, the shaman warmed its surface at the fire before he began to beat it with the drum-stick—a hammer-shaped implement elegantly carved from a horn. In order still further to increase the sound, the drum was often provided with various kinds of rattling objects; and in order to liven up the shaman's fantasy the Lapps painted figures and signs with blood or alder-bark juice on the drum-skin. In the later days these figures were multiplied and became a perfect microcosmos, representing the whole range of ideas of the Lapps. It is uncertain whether it was the increase of the figures or a new art of divination that had come from the south with a riddle that had the effect of changing the use of the Lapp drum so that it was employed more as a means of divination than of exaltation. A bunch of rings was kept hopping about on the drum-skin as the drum-stick rose and fell; and from the movement of the rings on and off the different signs the shaman predicted good or ill. If the bunch of rings stopped at any symbol of a deity, it might be concluded that the god desired a gift. The Lapp drum was quite common as an implement of divination, and it survived in secret in certain districts almost down to our own day.

7. Sacrifices and offerings.—Sacrifices were offered by the head of the family or by the shaman. In certain districts in the south of Lappmark the sacrificial priest wore a special dress: on his back a white linen robe, on the left arm a brass ring, and on the breast a badge resembling the riband of an order. When he sacrificed to the female divinities, he wore a white linen cap. He was often bedecked with flowers, while a garland was placed on the forehead of the victim. This sacrificial custom points to Southern lands. The images of the gods, which were set up on special pedestals or altars, undoubtedly indicated a Scandinavian influence. The Lapps anointed their gods with blood and grease; and the wood for the sacrifice, which was set up by the door, was called *luotte-muorra* ('sacrifice wood'). A fence, made of horns (*tjorvegardi*), was placed round the image. Besides reindeer, which were the proper sacrificial animals, the Lapps, on occasion, when they made sacrifices to gods belonging to alien religions, offered horses, cattle, sheep, poultry, etc., which they bought from the natives. In the custom of the Lapps that the bones of the victim should not be broken, except to be placed at the disposal of the god with pieces of all the more important limbs, we find an ancient idea which was common among the Finno-Ugrian peoples. A primitive Finnish sacrificial usage had also been adopted by the Lapps, viz. the custom of strewing green twigs under the *seide*, or image of the god—spruce in winter, and birch in summer. When the shaman lifted the stone, he perceived from its weight whether the god was favourable or not. This also was the way in which the Samoyed determined the disposition of his *kahe*. Finally, the caution with which women made their way past sacred places, and the absence of women from all sacrificial feasts, can be traced far back into the childhood of the human race.

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LATIN CHURCH.—See WESTERN CHURCH.

LATTER-DAY SAINTS.—See MORMONISM.

LAUD.—William Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, and chief minister of Charles I., was born, according to his diary (*Works*, iii. [1853] 131), on the 7th of October 1573, in the town of Reading. His father was a clothier by trade, and in later days his Puritan opponents did not allow him to forget the fact that he had not 'the good fortune to be born a gentleman.' Indeed, his unexalted origin was made the foundation of many malicious and exaggerated libels, which sound strangely in our ears in these democratic times. Had Laud lived under happier auspices, the ability and persistent energy with which he fought his way step by step to high position would doubtless have won their due meed of praise. As it was, he experienced to the full the disadvantages which belong to the lot of the *novus homo*, and to this circumstance some of the harshnesses and defects of his character may be traced.

Laud went to school at Reading, where he won the appreciation of 'a very severe schoolmaster,' who predicted that one day he would be a great man. In 1589, at the age of sixteen, he entered St. John's College, Oxford, and the following year became a Scholar. In 1593 he was admitted Fellow of St. John's, and a year later he became a Bachelor of Arts; his M.A. degree followed in 1598. In his diary he records various 'great sicknesses' which befell him both in infancy and during his University career. Indeed, throughout his life he was seldom free from ill-health for any long period, and in his arduous public life we can see an instance of the triumph of an indomitable will over a weakly constitution.

At the time that Laud entered Oxford, and for many years afterwards, Calvinism reigned supreme within its walls. The tide of extreme Puritanism which had set in after the reign of Queen Mary was running deep and strong. If the Puritans were in a minority in the country, they were very

resolute in holding to their ideals, and for those ideals they desired not toleration but mastery. They wished to see Episcopacy supplanted by the Presbyterian system, and for that end they steadily worked within the Church itself. Their objections to ceremonies, surplices, and liturgy were only steps towards the hoped for institution of the Genevan form of discipline as the Anglican standard. For the time being, it is true, this particular hope was in abeyance, and it was mainly as a doctrinal system that Calvinism now showed its strength. The leaders of the movement were in the ranks of the clergy, and the Universities were its strongholds.

To this system Laud soon showed himself a strong and dangerous opponent. He belonged to the school of Richard Hooker and Bishop Lancelot Andrewes, and the pious aspirations of men like George Herbert and Nicholas Ferrar were very precious in his sight. His ideal for the Church of England was that which in modern times is called Anglican. He saw in the English Church a great mediating communion, neither Roman on the one side nor Genevan on the other, primitive, Scriptural, and Catholic, purged from superstition yet reverencing antiquity, loyal to the truth once delivered and yet large-hearted in its welcome to new knowledge and fresh thought. Whatever grievous mistakes he made in furtherance of this ideal, it was to it that he devoted his life; and, after everything is said against Laud that can be said, the truth remains that his conception has been justified in the subsequent history of the English Church. To him in a large degree is due the settling of the character of that Church's system.

In setting himself against the Calvinism of Oxford, however, Laud entered upon a long and one-sided conflict with authority. In an academical exercise delivered soon after his ordination he gave great offence to Abbot, Master of University College and Vice-Chancellor and afterwards Archbishop, by tracing the authority of the Church, through the Roman Catholic hierarchy, up to the Apostles and the Primitive Church, and an outcry was raised later in 1604 when, in his exercises for the B.D. degree, he maintained the necessity of Episcopacy and the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Two years later Laud was attacked by the Vice-Chancellor, Henry Airy, for publishing 'popish opinions' in a sermon delivered in the pulpit of St. Mary's. A trial followed in the Vice-Chancellor's Court, from which Laud emerged scot-free. Amidst these and similar attacks Laud's coolness, courage, and ability served him in good stead. For a time he seemed to stand almost alone. In his own words, 'it was almost made a heresy for any one to be seen in his company, and a misprision of heresy to give him a civil salutation as he walked the streets' (Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus*, p. 54). On one occasion he sat in St. Mary's and heard himself abused for almost an hour together, being pointed at as he sat (*ib.* p. 66). The preacher on this occasion was Abbot, brother of the Archbishop, and Divinity Professor, who certainly castigated in trenchant style the supposed papistical leanings of this unruly member of the University.

Yet Laud was not without friends who sympathized with him in his baptism of fire. Bishop Young of Rochester, who ordained him as deacon in 1600 and priest in 1601, praised his study of the Fathers, Councils, and the ecclesiastical historians, and declared that, if he lived, he would be 'an instrument of restoring the Church from the narrow and private principles of modern times' (Mozley, *Hist. and Theol. Essays*[2], i. 116). Rapid preferment fell to his lot. He became chaplain to the Earl of Devonshire in 1603, and in 1607 he was made Vicar of Stanford in Northamptonshire. The following year the advowson of N. Kilworth in Leicestershire was given to him, and he took his degree of D.D., and became chaplain to Bishop Neile of Rochester. His first sermon before King James was preached in 1609, and shortly afterwards he was appointed to the charge of West Tilbury in Essex. Cuxton in Kent next fell to his care in 1610, but a few months later he left it to take charge of Norton. The same year the Presidentship of St. John's College became vacant, and Laud became a candidate. Naturally the whole strength of the Puritan party was put forth to prevent his appointment, Abbot, the Archbishop-Elect, and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere being indefatigable in their efforts. Yet, although Laud was disabled by sickness, and unable personally to take part in the contest, he was elected. An appeal was made to the Crown, which James in person disposed of by declaring Laud President of St. John's.

As head of a College, Laud was in his proper element, and his rule seems to have been a happy and beneficent one. In dealing with those Fellows of the College who had worked against him he showed a proper spirit of conciliation. As a patron of literature and sound learning he was wholly admirable, and his love of order and discipline found congenial scope in dealing with academic life and affairs. When he became Chancellor of the University in 1630, his opportunities for usefulness in this direction were much widened, and he used them to the full. The reforms which he instituted resulted in a large increase of students and in greater efficiency of teaching, and their effect remained long after Laud was dead.

It may be convenient here to summarize in anticipation the valuable results of Laud's connexion with Oxford. The codification of the University Statutes was perhaps his most important work, and his code still remains as the basis of the Statute-book of the University. Among its provisions were the institution of public examinations for University degrees, the revival of the College system with its moral and religious discipline and the academical dress, and an improved method of electing proctors. Laud's benefactions to the University were many and important. He founded the Laudian Professorship of Arabic, increased the endowment of the Hebrew Chair, and similarly augmented the emoluments of the Public Orator. He befriended foreign scholars like Gerhard Vossius, and helped to promote native men of learning like Jeremy Taylor, Selden, Lindsell, and Bedell. In 1633 Laud procured a royal patent for the foundation of the University Press—an institution in which he took the greatest interest. His munificence towards the then recently founded Bodleian Library was also great. He presented to this institution over 1300 MSS in various languages, besides a collection of coins, and built an extra wing to accommodate his gifts. His claim that no Chancellor had ever loved the University as he is well borne out by the record of his services and his gifts, and, when it is remembered that his educational work was carried out in the intervals of his ecclesiastical and political labours as Archbishop and Prime Minister, it seems all the more remarkable. Mention should also be made of the fact that, as Chancellor of Dublin University, Laud provided a Charter and Code for Trinity College, one of the features of the latter being the provision that the fellowships, originally of seven years' duration, should be tenable for life. The Colleges of Eton and Winchester also came within the Archbishop's care as visitor, and we find him

providing statutes for the Cathedral School of Canterbury. To the town of Reading and to the grammar-school where his instruction began he was a generous benefactor, and to his own College of St. John's he gave a new quadrangle and valuable presents of books.

One turns with less satisfaction to the record of Laud's career in the larger field of politics and ecclesiastical statesmanship. The problems of a kingdom cannot be handled in the same way as those of a College or a University, and Laud had all the defects of a purely academic character. He was lacking in that instinctive sympathy which enables the true statesman to grasp the conditions, unfavourable as well as favourable, under which his work has to be done. He did not realize the enormous power which prejudice plays in public opinion, and his bent was to treat men as a schoolmaster treats children. He was often hasty and severe. Harassed by his own love for details, he often failed to distinguish between the important and the trivial. His prodigious activity outran his strength, and, as he grew older, his temper became more uncertain and his attitude more arbitrary. As a Church ruler he presented himself more in the light of an official than of a Father-in-God, and as a statesman he was more inclined to rely upon force than upon influence. In holding high secular office in the State, and in promoting Juxon in England and Spottiswoode in Scotland to similar preferment, he ran counter to the public feeling of the country since the Reformation; and in becoming an agent of the despotic Government of Charles I. he involved the Church in a struggle with the growing power in the nation, and to all intents and purposes made the Church a department of the State.

Yet, with all his faults and mistakes, Laud has been hardly dealt with in the past. The picture of the monster drawn by Macaulay and the perpetrators of the great Whig legend does not correspond with the ascertained facts. S. R. Gardiner in his *History of England* has shown how to treat the man and his times in an impartial manner. And no one can read Laud's *Devotions*, with their unfailing note of penitence and of personal piety, without realizing that their writer was a man who strove conscientiously according to his light to serve his Church and his country. His diary, too, with its record of anxiety and disappointment, and its curious revelation of the writer's belief in dreams and omens, throws a very human light upon his brilliant but hazardous public career.

Laud's progress at Court was slow but sure. He became King's Chaplain soon after his election to the Presidency of St. John's, and, as time went on, further ecclesiastical preferments fell to his lot. In 1614 he received the prebend of Bugden, in 1615 he became Archdeacon of Huntingdon, and the year after Dean of Gloucester. At Gloucester he soon showed what his views were as to the externals of Church worship. Among other things he removed the Communion table from the centre of the choir to its old position at the east end. The Bishop of the Diocese was greatly offended at the innovation, and is said never to have entered the Cathedral again. In 1616 Laud was in the King's train during his visit to Scotland, and gave offence to Scottish susceptibilities by wearing a surplice at a funeral. Three years later King James offered Laud the Bishopric of St. David's, stipulating that he might continue to hold the Presidentship of St. John's. To this condition, however, Laud would not consent, and he resigned the headship of the College on the day before his consecration as Bishop. In 1622 there took place, at the command of the King, the famous controversy with the Jesuit Percy or Fisher, who had influenced, among others, the Countess of Buckingham, mother of George Villiers, the King's favourite. In the earlier stages of the conference, Francis White, afterwards Bishop of Ely, was the English champion, but after two meetings Laud was called in. Although he had not 'the full time of four and twenty hours to bethink himself' (J. Dowden, *Paddock Lectures*, p. 115), his learning and acuteness stood him in good stead. Denying that there is Scriptural or primitive warrant for an infallible pope, he proceeded to deal with Roman errors. Yet he conceded that Rome with its errors is a true Church, but not *the* true Church. Against the exclusive claims of Rome he appealed to the authority of a general Council, and to the witness of Scripture. The English Church as reformed, he declared, is also a true Church, holding the Catholic doctrines of Baptism and the Eucharist. In the Eucharist Laud saw a threefold sacrifice: (1) the memorial of the sacrifice of Calvary, (2) the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, (3) the sacrifice of ourselves, our souls and bodies.

One result of this controversy was the beginning of a close friendship and intimacy between Laud and Buckingham. Whatever may be said as to the strangeness of such an alliance, its sincerity was unquestionable. Laud became the confessor of the Court favourite, and undoubtedly exercised a real religious influence over him. In matters political also he was Buckingham's devoted ally, helping him with his advice and influence in times of trouble, and working to maintain his influence at Court. In 1625 King James died, and a new era of influence opened up for Laud. Charles gave him a fullness of confidence which his father had withheld. A schedule of the clergy was prepared by him at Buckingham's request, and laid before the King. Each name was marked O or P, the orthodox being listed for promotion, while the Puritans were to be left out in the cold. We find him defending Richard Montague against the Parliament's wrath incurred by his pamphlet against Calvinism, assisting Buckingham in his defence, and preaching up the King's prerogative before Charles's second Parliament. In 1626 he became Bishop of Bath and Wells, and two years later, shortly before the assassination of Buckingham, he became Bishop of London. Buckingham's death opened the way still further to Laud's promotion, and he became the chief adviser of the king. In 1633 he was translated to the Archbishopric of Canterbury, and became, under Charles, all-powerful in Church and State. In his diary (*Works*, iii. 219) he relates that the month before he became Archbishop he was twice approached by an emissary of Rome with the offer of a Cardinal's hat. Whatever may be thought of the sincerity of this offer, it had no effect upon Laud, who was thoroughly convinced of the strength of the Anglican position.

The character of Laud's administration in Church and State has already been briefly described. In matters ecclesiastical he put the care of outward things in the forefront, both because he believed that worship is the best form of teaching, and because he desired that Rome should not point the finger at Anglican slovenliness. He enforced uniformity of practice, and yet was willing to allow large liberty of thought. As a statesman he has incurred the odium of the severities practised by the Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission. But it must at least be remembered that the humanitarian sentiments of the present day did not exist in Laud's time, and that the cruelties of the Commonwealth far exceeded anything that

can justly be laid to his charge. He was not revengeful, and often treated his fallen enemies with private kindness. He was kind to the poor, and strove in various ways for social betterment.

Laud's connexion with Scotland was a fateful one. He had accompanied King James in his visit to that country as Dean of Gloucester, and again in 1633, as Bishop of London, he was one of the companions of Charles I. in a visit that produced an unfavourable impression among the Scots. The climax came in 1637, when the attempt to introduce the Prayer Book known as 'Laud's Liturgy' led to ecclesiastical and political revolution in both countries. In spite of its name, however, the Prayer Book was in the main the work of two Scottish Bishops, Maxwell of Ross and Wedderburn of Dunblane, Laud's share being confined to preliminary suggestion and subsequent revision. Both Charles and Laud, indeed, had wished the English book then in use to be adopted in Scotland, but gave way in the face of the patriotic representations of the Scottish Bishops. The real offence of the book lay in the arbitrary method of its introduction, regarded as the culmination of a series of despotic acts.

Laud met his fall with pathetic dignity, and bore his long imprisonment with all its trials very patiently. On 18th December 1640 he was impeached by Parliament, and the following March he was imprisoned in the Tower. His friend and colleague Strafford was executed on 12th May, and the Archbishop fainted at the window of his cell when attempting to give him his blessing on the way to the scaffold. In May 1643 Prynne was commissioned to rifle his papers, and to seize his diary, a mutilated edition of which was shortly afterwards published. His trial for high treason began on 12th March 1644. Laud showed the same coolness and ability in defending himself that he had exhibited many years ago in the Court of the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, and the prosecution failed. But his enemies were not to be baulked of their prey, and a special bill of attainder was passed by Parliament. On 10th January 1645 the Archbishop paid for his policy and his mistakes with his life. He was executed on Tower Hill in the presence of a large multitude, declaring that he had always belonged, in heart and soul, to the Church of England, and that he had never endeavoured the subversion either of law or of religion. His body was deposited in the chancel of the neighbouring Church of All Hallows, Barking, whence it was removed in 1663 to St. John's College, Oxford.

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A. MITCHELL.

LAUGHTER.—When we seek to assign to laughter a place and a function in social life, it is clear that we have in view the laughter of embodied persons. Even when 'the joyful roar to the benefit of the lungs' has undergone repression and refinement under the touch of civilization, there remains a more chastened expression which may be seen if not heard, and without which a fellowship in feeling is incommunicable. There is, indeed, when refinement and repression have reached their limit, a hidden and silent laughter of the mind which might be enjoyed by a disembodied spirit—though even here for embodied mortals there are, no doubt, more subtle physiological effects which, by purely inward reverberation, give heightened tone to the enjoyment. But such silent and unexpressed laughter has, on one side at least, lost touch with social life. Apart from some form of telepathic influence, it can call forth no echo in others. It may bring to the individual an access of glee—a touch of 'sudden glory'; it remains, however, unshared; there can be none of that beneficent contagiousness which, through the interaction of suggestion, imitation, and sympathy, gives one form of social value to laughter—a real value, though in its more primitive stages it may as yet afford little evidence of that progress in the art of good manners which, according to Bergson, it is its function to promote.

On its physical and expressive side, then, laughter is, among other things, a means of intercommunication, though it may not be consciously employed to that end. Like other such means, it implies as a basis a common mode of expression, inherited or acquired; and, in large measure in co-operation with language, it affords to others an index of the presence of a specific and probably indefinable mode of affective tone which accompanies man's outlook on his fellows. For amid much divergence of opinion as to the essential characteristics of that which is provocative of laughter, there seems to be fairly general agreement that it is the situations of, or in close relation to, human life that afford the natural objective of laughter when it comes to maturity. On the one hand, therefore, there is the physical laugh which invites others to join in the social chorus; on the other hand, the laughable, which is a property of some sort that characterizes a social situation; and between them stands laughter, in the sense in which the word will here be used, as that which subtly yet distinctively qualifies some one's consciousness.

Of the laugh and the smile as bodily expressions little need be said. It is probable that for both there are hereditary foundations, and that the behaviour involved is, in the narrower and biological sense, instinctive. But whether the smile is, in the infant, an expression of satiety, and whether the laugh is at the outset the reflex outcome of physical tickling; how far they are quite independent modes of response, or how far they have common factors; whether they have in themselves some element of survival value, or whether the muscles concerned are, from the habits of our race, the readiest and therefore the first to receive an overflow of 'nervous energy'; how the facial, vocal, and respiratory co-ordinations are brought about, and why they should come to be an expression of specific and somewhat varying mental states—these are matters beyond our present concern. They are questions of genetic origin which we can afford to pass by. It is to laughter and the laughable that we must restrict our attention, merely noting that the nervous laugh, the irritable laugh, the laugh of bitter scorn, though the same organic mechanism of response is employed, do not seem to express the sunny laughter of the mind. The laughter of the Bible is nearly always an expression of scorn and not of mirth (see, however, Ps 126[2] and Job 8[21]). Genial laughter and the laughable are in correlative relationship; at all events the laughable inevitably implies some one who does or might laugh thereat. If we add that laughter also implies something which is laughed at (which will exclude the laugh as an expression of pure joy and lightness of heart), the symmetry of the correlation will be preserved. But a good deal depends upon whether the laugher is regarded as a relatively detached and disinterested spectator or is looked upon as eminently self-centred in his outlook. Schopenhauer's doctrine of the incongruous involves the assumption of the former attitude;

Hobbes's 'sudden glory' shows an emphasis on the latter.

Men experience the passion of sudden glory 'either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men' (*Leviathan*, pt. I. ch. vi.).

The stress in Hobbes is on the sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the inferiority of others or with our own formerly. So self-centred is this form of laughter that the correlative laughable almost fades out of view, though the inferiority of others is presumably in some degree ridiculous. As a factor in a particular type of laughter, this exultation over others and the accompanying self-exaltation may be accepted; as a comprehensive theory of laughter, it can hardly pass muster. Not all exultation over inferiors is of the order of laughter; not all laughter is of the order of self-exaltation.

In Schopenhauer's doctrine of the incongruous the self-centred attitude is relatively unimportant. His is predominantly a doctrine of the laughable, though this must, of course, be apprehended as such.

'The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation' (*The World as Will and Idea*, tr. Haldane and Kemp, i. 76).

There is an element of the unexpected or of expectation baulked. A situation, presented or described, diverges from the course of its customary development, or we are swiftly transferred into the midst of a somewhat different situation. But not all incongruity is laughable. The situations of social life teem with incongruities; and many of them are provocative of sighs and tears rather than laughter and smiles. Spencer, therefore, distinguished between ascending and descending incongruity.

'Laughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares transferred from great things to small—only when there is what we call a *descending* incongruity' ('Physiology of Laughter,' *Essays*, i. 206).

In accordance with his physiological interpretation, the prior condition involves a volume of brain-excitement which, on the sudden descent, is too great for the occasion, and overflows, through habitual channels, into the smaller muscles of the smile or the larger muscles of the hearty laugh. But, unless, in line with the well-known thesis of W. James and C. Lange, the bodily laugh begets the laughter of the mind, the mental affection itself is not thus explained. The descending incongruity is translated into physiological terms; but we are left with that as determining the laughter and the laugh. No doubt it is applicable in many cases; but whether descent is in all cases necessary is, to say the least of it, doubtful. A man's hat on a child's head, and a child's hat on a man's head, may both make us laugh. Is this because in the one case we come down from the noble hat to the ridiculous child, and in the other from the dignity of the man to his absurd headgear? Or is there in each case a descent from the normal to the abnormal (cf. J. Sully, *Essay on Laughter*, p. 9 f.)?

Bergson reduces all forms of descending incongruity to one, and traces the genesis of laughter to the perception of some intrusion of a mechanical mode of action or gesture into a situation which should develop on the higher vital plane. For him there can be no descent more serious than that from life to mechanism. One would suppose that so fatal a fall would move Bergson to tears. But he suppresses these deeper emotions, and even insists that 'absence of feeling' is the usual accompaniment of laughter. One must look upon life as a disinterested spectator. To produce the whole of its effect, the comic demands something like a momentary anæsthesia of the heart. Its appeal is to intelligence pure and simple. Indifference is its natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe than emotion. Under these conditions the attitudes, gestures, and movements of the human body are laughable in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine. What is essentially laughable is that which is done automatically. Rigidity, automatism, absent-mindedness, and unsociability are all inextricably entwined; and all serve as ingredients to the making up of the comic in character. Such is his main thesis (H. Bergson, *Laughter*, Eng. tr., pp. 4, 5, 29, 139, 147). But, whereas for the most part serious discussions of the comic are dull enough, save for the welcome jokes and anecdotes which one enjoys all the more if one forgets all about the principles which they are supposed to illustrate, Bergson's book on *Laughter* is worthy to be placed on the same shelf as Meredith's *Essay on Comedy*. In both there is real distinction in matter and style. In both the sympathy of the artist is combined with philosophic insight. In both one is perhaps impressed by the inadequacy of any scientific formulation to hold in the bondage of clearly defined concepts the elusive spirit of laughter. One cannot but feel that Bergson's wide outlook on the laughable in life and in comedy overleaps the constraints of his theory.

He tells us that laughter is begotten of real life and akin to art. It is in the selective products of art that the thoughtful laughter of the mind reaches its fullest development. If, as he urges, there may be comic elements alike in situations, in words, and in character, the business of the artistic creator of the laughable is to combine all these elements into one synthesis which shall be provocative of laughter at its highest pitch of refinement. Witty dialogue, good in itself, must afford also a revelation of the comic in character, and must be organic to laughable situations presented. But how many and varied are the factors; how subtle is the harmonious synthesis! Here one sees portrayed the sudden glory of exultation, but it is not the sympathetic sharing of that alone that produces the thoughtful laugh. Or one may see cases of Kant's tense expectation evaporating in the void; but that does not cover the whole ground. There is, no doubt, much incongruity, not always descending; but episodic incongruity is subject to underlying congruity. We pass lightly from one universe of regard to another; but they are related, and each illuminates the other. This is seen in detail, and gives piquancy to the play upon words. If the after-dinner orator explains his success as due to his adoption of the principle that, if he does not strike oil in three minutes, he stops *boring*, two universes of discourse are related, and a sudden laughter-span bridges the interval between them. The incongruous implies some measure of separation, and there must be the subtle integration of some perceived congruity to produce the synthetic whole which the artistry of the comic seeks to attain. There is often, no doubt, some element of the mechanical, in a rather strained interpretation; but, notwithstanding Bergson's brilliant advocacy of a theory dictated by his philosophy, one feels that it is the free life of comedy rather than its occasional lapse into constrained mechanism that enshrines the true spirit of laughter. How many and varied are the constitutive factors of the laughable the sympathetic artist probably realizes better than the analytic man of science. And it is questionable whether the total exclusion of emotion (by which we must understand that which is in affective

antithesis to the laughing mood) is characteristic of the best comedy. If, as is generally held, humour is a blend of the playful and the serious, owing its timbre to overtones of something akin to pity, then, so far as humour is an ingredient of comedy, emotion is present. We have 'the richer laugh of heart and mind in one.' Meredith says that the humorist of high order has an embrace of contrasts beyond the reach of the comic poet. But this very contrast serves to enhance the richness of laughter, and characterizes the higher comedy as distinguished from farce; for 'the test of true comedy is that it shall awaken thoughtful laughter' (G. Meredith, *Essay on Comedy*, pp. 83, 85).

It is not the primary business of comedy to correct men's manners. That is one of the functions of laughter in social life; but it is introduced into comedy only as an ideal representation of that life. This disciplinary function of laughter is regarded by Bergson as the mark of its social utility (*op. cit.* pp. 17, 170, 197 f.). Laughter is above all a corrective. By laughter, which would fail in its object if it bore the stamp of sympathy or kindness, society avenges itself for the liberties taken with it. Its function is to intimidate by humiliating. Ridicule, we may say, is the whip with which society corrects the smaller faults of its children, and satire is the lash which is applied to corporate abuses when they have been stripped bare of their fine garments. In both there is something of self-centred superiority, even when it is felt to be the superiority of society embodied in the smiter. But, though the derisive smile or the scornful laugh may be there, it is not an expression of the true spirit of laughter, which is happy and genial. It is rather the lineal descendant of the exultant laugh of the savage over his vanquished foe. And it not infrequently fails in attaining its end, while the kindly good-humoured laugh has far greater efficacy in correcting the manners of boys and men.

It is questionable, however, whether this form of social utility is that which has given to laughter its chief evolutionary value in social life. This is rather a secondary utility like that of the insect's sting, which is derived from an organ of different ancestral value. There is a more genial form of utility. According to W. McDougall, laughter has been evolved in man as an antidote to sympathy with suffering (*Brit. Assoc.*, 1913, reported in *Nature*, xcii. [1914]). He contends that laughter arises only in situations which are mildly unpleasant except in so far as they are redeemed by laughter itself; or in presence of those things which would excite a feeble degree of sympathetic pain if we did not actually laugh at them. But are these conditions universal? Is the comic situation, or the joke, at which we laugh, always in some degree painful? Should we not substitute 'sometimes' for 'always'? There is, however, probably an element of truth (if not the whole truth) in the view that laughter is a protective reaction which shields us from the depressing influence of the shortcomings of our fellow-men—even when they jest. As pity softens the primitive callousness of laughter, so does laughter in turn relieve us from the depression which stupidity, for example, engenders. And it may have a wider influence.

'How many men in our highly civilized communities to-day may have learned to keep their heads above water by the practice of gentle laughter, no one knows' (Sully, *Essay on Laughter*, p. 408).

In any case, 'he who produces a laugh of pure gladness brightens the world for those who hear him' (Sully, *op. cit.* p. 417). Laughter is a tonic which braces both body and mind, and thus benefits both the individual and society.

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LAW.

Natural (R. EUCKEN), p. 805.
Primitive (E. S. HARTLAND), p. 807.
American (L. H. GRAY), p. 814.
Babylonian (C. H. W. JOHNS), p. 817.
Biblical—
  Old Testament (C. F. KENT), p. 823.
  New Testament (A. MENZIES), p. 824.
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LAW (Natural).—The idea of 'law' has a long and varied history. It has passed through important changes, and has occasioned manifold disputes. It took its rise as something relating to human society, and was then extended to external nature and the universe, whence, after undergoing a peculiar metamorphosis, it was brought back to the sphere of its origin, in order to shed light upon human life and action.

1. The development of the idea of natural law.—The development of the concept began in the ancient world, but it was not until the modern epoch that 'law' came to occupy a central position in all scientific procedure. The expression 'law of nature,'[1] which formed a theme of great interest in the classical age of Greece, was originally used with reference, not to the external world, but to human nature itself. It denoted the unwritten as contrasted with the written law. This unwritten law, however, was at first simply equivalent to traditional usage and custom, and it was only later that it came to be taken in the sense of a law written by the deity in the human heart. The term 'law of nature,' in its modern acceptation, is seldom

[1] The historical origin of the phrase 'law of nature' is discussed by E. Zeller, 'Über Begriff und Begründung der sittlichen Gesetze,' reprint from *ABAW*, 1883, and with signal caution and thoroughness by R. Hirzel, "Ἄγραφος Νόμος," in *ASG*, philol.-histor. Klasse, xx. [1900]. According to Hirzel, ἄγραφος νόμος primarily meant traditional usage and custom, and retained this sense throughout the ancient period; from the time of Thucydides, however, it came to bear another meaning as well, viz. that of the divine law written in the heart. Cf. also Hirzel's still more exhaustive work, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes*, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 366–411.

used by Plato and Aristotle;[1] it was especially among the Stoics that it took a more prominent place, and here the idea of divine laws led to that of natural laws. The expression 'natural law' was first brought into general usage by the Romans, and from them again it passed to mediæval writers. As yet, however, the expression was used without real precision; it denoted merely a certain regularity of events, so that the Church Fathers, and in particular Augustine, could regard natural laws as no more than the customary modes of divine action—modes of action which might quite well be departed from in exceptional circumstances. Thus the belief in natural laws in no way conflicted with the belief in miracles. The conception first acquired a more precise signification in modern times, especially since the time of Descartes, and in close connexion with the whole character of modern investigation. The great object of modern scientific inquiry is to analyze an existent state of things into its simple elements, and to interpret the whole by means of the parts. The laws of nature thus came to be regarded as but the simplest forms of motion among the elements. The discovery of these laws seemed to give man the power of interpreting nature intellectually, and at the same time of controlling it by practical and technical application of the laws. This fitted in with the whole tendency of modern thought, *i.e.* to regard nature not as the work of a Higher Power, but as something to be interpreted by its own concatenations. It was felt, however, that, if the laws of nature were to have a precise content, a mathematical formulation of them was indispensable; and in this way an ancient problem found at last a happy solution. The Pythagoreans had taught that nature could be resolved into mathematical forms, and this theory had all along been maintained by a relatively small group of thinkers. But it was found impossible to formulate definite laws, and even as late as the 15th cent. Nicholas of Cusa had declared the task to be beyond human capacity. The first to construct mathematical laws of nature was Kepler, in his famous three laws of planetary motion, which thus marked a profound revolution in the investigation of nature. Thereafter Newton proposed the idea of reducing all the phenomena of nature to mathematical laws,[2] and Kant even ventured to say that 'in every special science of nature there can be only as much real knowledge as there is mathematics.'[3]

Side by side with this precise modern formulation of natural law, however, the ancient and more indefinite conception still survives; and even at the present day the discovery of a mere order in phenomena is often hailed as a law. This is especially the case in modern biology, in which, *e.g.*, a peculiarly intricate complex of facts, if it only recurs, is often summarily designated a law, so that what purports to be a solution is, in point of fact, simply a problem. In other ways also the term law has been the cause of much confusion. Laws are often discussed as if they were living forces, and even revered as if they were divine powers. It has frequently been forgotten that they are merely the forms of natural processes, and that they in no sense explain the processes themselves. A further source of ambiguity is that law is not seldom thought of as an entity lying beyond and controlling the concrete facts. Thus even within the sphere of nature itself the employment of the idea of law is attended with grave difficulties and dangers, and the dangers are greatly increased when the idea is applied outside that sphere, and used as a means of transferring the methods of natural science to other provinces of human interest.

2. The application of 'natural law' to other provinces.—This extension of the idea of law to extra-natural data began as early as the 17th cent., when, in particular, the idea was employed in psychology. The procedure was continued in the 18th cent., being now applied to the fields of politics and history, but it was in the course of the 19th cent. that the tendency reached its highest development, and the idea of law became the subject of numerous disputes regarding method.

(*a*) *Psychology.*—The application of natural law to the soul was carried out in a most imposing manner by Spinoza. For him the entire inward life of man was but a texture of single and particular occurrences, which work and interlink exactly like external things. Psychological laws in the stricter sense—*e.g.*, the laws of Association—were set forth in particular by English thinkers. In Germany, Leibniz had spoken of the ethico-logical laws of the soul, and Wolff made further advances on the same lines, while Herbart, again, sought to carry mathematical formulæ into the inmost life of the soul. Modern psychophysics has attempted with no small success to give a mathematical formulation to the relation between bodily and psychical processes, and especially between stimulus and sensation. Greater difficulties were encountered in the endeavour to interpret not merely the fundamental forms, but also the spiritual content, of psychical life on the analogy of natural laws. A special theme of controversy here was the relation between natural and moral law, some thinkers endeavouring to bring the two into the closest possible relation, while others insisted upon the unmistakable difference between ethical principles and the laws of nature.[1] The pre-eminent representative of the latter position was Kant, who regarded the moral law, with its imperative of duty, as something spontaneous, unique, and superior to all experience, and who uncompromisingly opposed the freedom which it involves to the necessity of nature. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, contended for a close connexion between natural law and moral law,[2] but in trying to universalize the scope of morality he incurred the danger of attenuating its distinctive character. The problem is not yet solved, and is still being ceaselessly discussed.[3]

(*b*) *Sociology.*—In a somewhat different sphere a fruitful theme of discussion was introduced by the attempt of modern sociology to reduce the social life of man to simple laws. The main factor in this movement was the known fact that by taking sufficiently large numbers of human beings the fortuitous element of the individual phenomenon may be eliminated, and relatively constant averages ascertained, and that thereby the phenomena of the social sphere are found to be much more regular than appears at first sight.[4] By thus surveying mankind in large numbers modern statistical science has discovered a mass of interesting

[1] The only passages, indeed, are Plato, *Timæus*, 83 E, and Arist. *de Cœlo*, 268 A, 10 ff. The word more frequently used for 'laws of nature' in the classical writers, as, *e.g.*, in medical works, in Democritus, Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, is ἀνάγκαι. Among the Greeks, the conception of a natural law was probably first definitely applied in the spheres of astronomy and medicine.

[2] Cf. the beginning of his *Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica*: 'Missis formis substantialibus et qualitatibus occultis phenomena naturae ad leges mathematicas revocare.'

[3] *Werke*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1867–69, iv. 360.

[1] Of more recent works W. Windelband's essay on 'Normen und Naturgesetze' in his *Präludien*[4], Tübingen, 1911, is specially worthy of notice in this connexion.

[2] Cf. his *Werke zur Philosophie*, Berlin, 1834–64, ii. 397–417.

[3] *e.g.*, by H. Siebeck, 'Über das Verhältniss von Naturgesetz und Sittengesetz,' in *Philosophische Monatshefte*, xx. [1884] 321 ff.

[4] The pioneer in this field was the Belgian statistician L. A. J. Quetelet (1796–1874), especially in his *Sur l'Homme et le développement de ses facultés, ou Essai de physique sociale*, Paris, 1835, 2nd ed., Brussels, 1869.

facts. It is no doubt true that here certain uniformities have been rather prematurely resolved into laws, and that intricate congeries of facts have not always been sufficiently broken up into their simple elements; but, when all is said, the movement has opened fresh avenues of knowledge, and given effective incentives to inquiry.

(*c*) *Economics.*—The movement assumed a more intense and incisive phase upon the narrower field of economics proper. Here we find two modes of interpretation and investigation in conflict with each other. The advocates of the one mode sought to resolve the economic process into a mere tissue of self-regulating elementary movements, and so to explain them in accordance with natural laws, and they repudiated all interference in the political and social order as a derangement of natural processes.[1] The most prominent representative of this view is Adam Smith. It was maintained on the other side that, if the economic life of mankind was not to degenerate into a ruthless struggle of each against all, it must be ethically regulated. As representing this position the name of Thomas Carlyle will suffice. It is indisputable that in recent times this ethical view of economics has asserted itself more and more effectively in opposition to the purely scientific interpretation, and that, accordingly, the State has interfered more and more actively with economic conditions. Modern industry, with its huge manufactories, has been the main factor in this development.

(*d*) *History.*—There has been in recent times a considerable amount of discussion regarding the problem of historical laws. The abandonment of a religious reading of history has given rise to an endeavour to interpret the historical process by its own movement, and this again has led thinkers to construct a philosophy of history,[2] and to search for the laws that control the process. In the 19th cent. attempts to understand the movement of history as an ordered and articulate process were made—from opposite points of view, indeed, though not without a certain correspondence in results—by Hegel and Comte. Hegel regarded history as a self-evolution of the Spirit, which advances by means of antithesis, while Comte, by way of the 'three stages' in ceaseless progress, arrived finally at an intellectual interpretation of phenomena which provides a rational comprehension of human life as a whole.

In Germany, within recent years, a subject of much discussion and controversy has been the relation between history and natural science. Certain writers insist strongly upon the profound difference between the two, emphasizing the individual or particular character of historical processes, and seeing in these the pre-eminently valuable element of history. Windelband[3] and Rickert[4] are prominent champions of this view, and they are supported by the majority of German historians. A leading representative of the other school is Lamprecht, who puts forward the hypothesis of socio-psychical stages of development proceeding in a determinate order.[1]

3. Conclusion.—Thus the idea of 'law' provides an interesting example of the manner in which a general tendency works its way into all the various fields of human experience, and is used to mould them into conformity with the process of nature. But we also see here how the distinctive character of the several fields forms an obstacle to the tendency, and how this distinctive character is clearly revealed in the attempt to bring the various fields into correspondence with the laws of nature. It may be said, in general, that, if we are to speak of laws in the spiritual sphere at all, the conception of law must have quite a different meaning from that which it bears in the realm of nature. It is in particular the ideas of freedom and individuality that prohibit a simple extension of the laws of nature to other provinces.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works cited in the text of the art. cf. R. Eucken, *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*[4], Leipzig, 1909, Eng. tr. *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, London, 1912, p. 195 ff.; E. Boutroux, *De l'idée de la loi naturelle dans la science et la philosophie*, Paris, 1895; W. Köhler, *Geist und Freiheit: allgemeine Kritik des Gesetzesbegriffes*, Tübingen, 1913.

R. EUCKEN.

LAW (Primitive).—The definition of law, like that of religion, is by no means so easy as it looks. That framed by the great jurist, John Austin, so long dominant in English political philosophy, was derived from Hobbes, who in the 17th cent. elaborated the theory of paternal government. So high did he place the authority of the ruler that he made the king the arbiter, not merely of political and social conduct, but even of religion and morals. Austin, of course, did not go so far as this. When he formulated his theory, the controversy concerning the Divine Right of Kings was dead, theological and political passion on the question had cooled down, and the British Constitution, as settled at the Revolution, had been accepted by all parties. It was, therefore, necessary only to posit a supreme political authority, without theorizing as to its origin or dogmatizing on its proper form. According to Austin, positive law (as distinguished from the divine law, the moral law, the laws of nature, and other laws so called by way of analogy, and in his sense not really laws at all) is a rule of conduct prescribed by a sovereign, whether an individual or a definite body of men, to a member or members of the independent political society wherein its author is supreme (*Lectures on Jurisprudence*[3], London, 1861, i. 316). Laws are a species of command addressed by a political superior to those on whom he has the power and the will to inflict evil if his desire expressed in the command be disregarded. A sanction, or penalty for disobedience, is, therefore, annexed to, or implied in, every command of the sovereign—that is to say, in this connexion, every law.

'Command, duty, and sanction are inseparably connected terms. . . . Each embraces the same ideas as the others, though each denotes those ideas in a peculiar order or series' (*ib.* pp. 5 *f.*, 9).

This definition has the merit of avoiding all antiquarian questions and all theological dogma and philosophical speculation as to the origin of the supreme authority. It takes the facts as they are in modern civilized States, and as they were in imperial Rome, and frames a formula to express them. Nothing else was possible to that generation. Archæological inquiry into origins had hardly begun in 1832, when Austin's work was

[1] On the history of the question see I. Neumann, *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 3rd ser., Jena, 1899, who (p. 152 ff.) writes: 'Even in antiquity men sought for economic and social laws, and next, more especially from the latter half of the 17th century, from the days of Locke and Hobbes, they applied the term "law" to the facts of the former [*i.e.* economics], while the physiocrats themselves, in following these precedents, cannot be altogether exonerated from the charge of having been so influenced by the then all-powerful ideas of Natural Right that they were unable to keep such laws of events sufficiently distinct from those of the "ought," or ethical laws.' Cf. also his 'Naturgesetz und Wirtschaftsgesetz,' in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, iii. [1892], and F. Eulenburg, 'Naturgesetze und soziale Gesetze,' in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, xxxi.–xxxii. [1910–11].

[2] The expression 'philosophie de l'histoire' was first used by Voltaire, though not in a technical sense.

[3] W. Windelband, 'Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft' (*Strassburger Rektoratsrede*), 1894 (now also in *Präludien*[4]).

[4] H. Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*[2], Tübingen, 1913.

[1] The controversy as to the existence of laws in history is analyzed and explained by E. Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie*[6], Leipzig, 1908; cf. also F. Eulenburg, 'Über Gesetzmässigkeiten in der Geschichte ("historische Gesetze")', in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, xxxv. [1912], and art. HISTORIOGRAPHY

first published; or, if it had, it did not interest him; while the science of anthropology had not yet come to the birth. But during the last eighty or ninety years the extension and necessities of the Indian Empire, and the colonial, missionary, commercial, and scientific enterprises of every civilized nation have brought us into more and more intimate contact with peoples in every grade of culture and every variety of political, economic, and social constitution. To all thoughtful persons and to most civilized governments it has become obvious that the first requisite for good administration, as well as for missionary and commercial activity, is a right comprehension of the ideas and social order of nations thus brought under the sway, or at least the influence, of the white man. The scientific interest of the study has been quickened by these practical considerations, and has resulted in the accumulation of a vast amount of material unknown to our grandfathers. It has become clear that the social and political relations of a people, however wild or however backward in culture, cannot, and in fact do not, subsist without governing rules, and that such rules are equivalent to what on a higher plane is called law.

Moreover, the researches carried on simultaneously with these into the early history of the various European nations have emphasized the similarity of their original condition to that of many barbarous tribes in the present day. They have shown not only that the formation of codes of written law was gradual, but also that, side by side with them, a great body of unwritten but binding customs continued for ages, and possessed a validity and authority of its own. That authority antedated any formal prescription by a discoverable sovereign. It was recognized and enforced from time to time, but not created, by the sovereign's courts. In short, the customs were to all intents and purposes law equally with the written codes. Jurists have thus been compelled to reconsider the conception of law, and to take into account its historical origins. They could no longer content themselves with the *a priori* dogmatism that satisfied Hobbes and Austin. The problem how the conception of law may be so widened that its definition shall include the rules obeyed by all societies of men, whether savage or civilized, in their social and political intercourse became pressing in the latter part of the 19th century. Various solutions have been attempted, of which it will be necessary here to consider only two of the most recent.

P. Vinogradoff (*Common Sense in Law*, London, 1914, p. 33 ff.) argues that the notions of sovereignty and command are not necessary to the conception of law, that the term 'law' cannot be confined to a rule of conduct prescribed by the head of an independent political society, but extends to the rules to which the members of any society as such are required to conform, and, finally, that law does not rest ultimately on the physical sanction of force, but on recognition or agreement.

'Sooner or later we come to a point where law is obeyed not on account of material compulsion, but for other reasons—in consequence of reasonable acceptance or instinctive conformity, or habit, or absence of organized resistance. . . . It is not the material possibility of coercion so much as the mental habit of recognizing rules imposed by social authority that is decisive in regard to the existence of laws' (*ib.* p. 52).

Thus every part of Austin's definition is traversed; his elaborate argument for confining the term 'law' to the command of a political superior is set aside; and the sanction to which he attached so much importance is abandoned as a test of law, so far at least as it is an appeal to force.

Direct coercion 'is not absolutely necessary to constitute a legal rule.' It may be 'the most convenient means for enforcing law'; but it cannot be regarded as 'the essence of legal relations' (*ib.* p. 42).

A sanction of some kind must indeed be implied, but it need not be of a material kind, like death, imprisonment, or the forfeiture of goods. It need not be inflicted by any definite tribunal. It may be nothing more than the hostility of public opinion, or the contempt of all honourable men. Beyond this, law is often obeyed for reasons indicated above, quite apart from even such vague external sanctions.

Vinogradoff's own definition is 'a set of rules imposed and enforced by a society with regard to the attribution and exercise of power over persons and things' (*ib.* p. 59). The only point here calling for any further observation is the object and purpose of the rules. Put in another way, laws may be said to be aimed at the delimitation of wills. No society could hold together unless the wills of the individual members were limited and restrained; without this it would be a mere struggling mob; it would be chaos. It is by means of the limitation and direction of wills that it becomes an organized community. The rules effecting such limitation and direction are the laws of the society. But every limitation of one human will gives power to other human wills. It defines the scope within which they have free play, and the conditions which they must observe to give effect to the intentions either of the individual or of the society, alike as regards persons and things. Within that scope and subject to those conditions, it facilitates the exercise of power.

B. Malinowski in his recent work on *The Family among the Australian Aborigines* (London, 1913, pp. 10–15), applying the concept of law to a very archaic type of society, reverts to the test of sanction.

'All social organization,' he argues, 'implies a series of norms, which extend over the whole social life and regulate more or less strictly all the social relations.' These norms are of different kinds and enforced by different forms of social sanction. He enumerates three. The first kind owes its validity 'to the evil results which are intrinsically connected with their violation.' The norms included under the second head are observed 'because any departure from them would bring general contempt and ridicule upon the culprit: a form of chastisement to which the [Australian] natives are said to be extremely sensitive.' It is only to the third kind, 'sanctioned by a more direct collective action,' that he applies the term 'law,' because such norms 'enjoy an organized, more or less regulated and active social sanction,' involving violent or magical proceedings for the purpose of corporal coercion or punishment.

Let us examine this classification. The first kind of norm includes the Arunta prohibition against eating meat which has been killed or even seen by certain relatives: 'The food would disagree with him [who infringes the rule], and he would sicken and suffer severely' (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 469).

Similar rules enforced by similar sanctions prevent boys after initiation from partaking of certain food before their wounds have healed, and women from eating meat during pregnancy (*ib.* 471). So among the Jajaurung, 'whenever a female child was promised in marriage to any man, from that very hour neither he nor the child's mother were permitted to look upon or hear each other speak, nor hear their names mentioned by others; for if they did, they would immediately grow prematurely old and die' (R. Brough Smyth, *Aborigines of Victoria*, London, 1878, ii. 156).

Such penalties are what we call supernatural. But they are not the only supernatural penalties known to the Australian natives.

If a man among the Arunta, during the early stages of his wife's pregnancy, attempts to throw a spear or boomerang at any animal, the spirit of the unborn child, which follows him about, 'will cause the weapon to take a crooked course, and the man will know that he has lost his skill in the chase and that the child is angry with him.' Persistence, despite this warning, will largely increase the sickness and sufferings of the prospective mother (Spencer-Gillen[a], p. 471). Custom requires that on a death certain female relatives of the deceased must utter frenzied and reiterated lamentations, and must inflict serious wounds on themselves or one another, as if in an agony of

grief. Omission of these rites results in harm from the spirit of the deceased (*ib.* p. 510). Young members of the tribes about the junction of the Thomson and Barcoo rivers in Queensland are prohibited even from breaking an emu's egg. The prohibition is enforced by the threat that 'the offended spirits will shortly raise a storm of thunder and lightning, in which the unlucky culprit will probably be struck down' (E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, Melbourne, 1886-87, ii. 377). Among the tribes on the north-eastern coast of Queensland an infringement of the marriage-rules, the omission to wear the mourning necklace for the prescribed period, or the eating of forbidden food is said to bring on the offender the anger of a supernatural being called Kohin, and sooner or later death in consequence (A. W. Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904, p. 498).

Thus supernatural penalties are not, even among the Blackfellows, simply evil results 'intrinsically connected with' the violation of the norm, if by that phrase be meant an automatic operation of the sanction. They are often attributed to the action of ghosts and other imaginary or superhuman beings. On higher planes of culture we are familiar with offences against the gods, and innumerable tales are told of the vengeance of an outraged divinity. In this class of trespass we have to do with violations of a social rule that are so alien from ordinary conduct that they entail religious horror, expressed in the fear of a special kind of punishment. It is this horror that makes a supernatural penalty a social sanction. When the misfortune looked upon as the penalty overtakes a man, it is regarded as evidence of the trespass. The horror then fastens upon the guilty person and segregates him from his fellows. On the other hand, the consciousness of guilt often operates with overwhelming effect on the mind: men have been known to die from sheer terror when they have recognized their offence, though committed unintentionally.

Maori chiefs were fenced about with a very strict tabu. Not merely their persons, but everything which had come into contact with them, everything that had once belonged to them, was sacred. If an inferior made use of any such object, the tabu would kill him. Tannui, a high chief, once lost his tinder-box. Several persons who were so unfortunate as to find it and light their pipes from it, without knowing that it belonged to him, actually died from fright when they learned who the owner was (R. Taylor, *Te Ika a Maui: New Zealand and its Inhabitants*[2], London, 1870, p. 164).

Thus the supernatural sanction becomes itself an agent to preserve the norm recognized by society, apart from any penalty directly inflicted by the organized action of the community. But, while this is so, and while the operation of the community is indirect, acting through the conscience of the guilty man, the punishment is none the less of social origin. It is, therefore, not easy to see how a norm thus guarded can be distinguished from a law. But society is by no means always satisfied with this indirect penalty. The religious horror entailed by the trespass takes an active form, treats the offender with general contempt and ridicule, or with loathing, and drives him away, or even puts him to death—perhaps with all his family—and destroys all his possessions.

A familiar example is that of Achan, who, for appropriating a small portion of the spoil of Jericho which had been banned by Jahweh, was with his sons and daughters stoned to death, while all his property was burned, together with the corpses (Jos 7[25]). When King Uzziah trenched upon the prerogative of the priesthood by presuming to burn incense in the Temple at Jerusalem, the supernatural sanction immediately took effect: he was smitten with leprosy. Now, leprosy involved exclusion from religious rites and segregation from society. Uzziah, therefore, was cut off from the house of the Lord, and from the exercise of his royal office; he was shut up in a separate dwelling for the rest of his life, and Jotham his son was made regent (2 Ch 26[16ff.], Lv 13[45f.]). Orestes, after putting his mother to death, was seized with madness and pursued by her Erinyes. He fled not merely from them, but from the vengeance of the Argives. When he came to Troezen, no one would admit him to his house. He was kept in a state of tabu until he was purified and cleansed from the guilt of matricide (Pausanias, ii. 31).

These events represent the consequences that flowed in law and practice from offences primarily punishable by the supernatural powers. Such offences were visited with the whole weight of social indignation.

It is, in fact, impossible, if we have regard to the test of sanction only, to draw a strict line between the three categories into which Malinowski divides the social norms as known in Australia. One form of sanction frequently implies, or results in, another. It is not only in comparatively higher forms of civilization that the first class of norms (roughly corresponding to what in Roman law was called *fas*) is enforced by a sanction beyond the supernatural penalty. The painful manifestations already mentioned of mourning for a death among the Arunta are a norm prescribed by society, and society does not leave retribution for non-compliance entirely to the ghost; it inflicts on the offender the contempt and ridicule of his fellows. Obviously a similar penalty must also follow the infraction of other norms of the same class, though not expressly mentioned by our authorities. Indeed, so strongly do the aborigines feel on some of them (the marriage-rules, for instance) that no doubt can be entertained of punishment by violent measures, independent of the supernatural sanction.

Nor can these consequences be confined to cases where the religious horror is aroused by violation of the norm, as in the illustrations already given. To take a single example outside the Australian area—

Among the Dakotas of N. America certain relatives are forbidden to address one another by name. Offenders against this rule, both men and women, have been known to be punished by having their clothes cut off their backs and thrown away (J. G. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, iii. 112).

Clearly the destruction of the clothing was only part of the retribution; it must have involved also the contempt of the community.

Punishment, when directly inflicted by society, is the expression of society's reprobation; and its severity roughly corresponds to the intensity of the feeling aroused by the offence. The mildest form in which public opinion thus declares itself against the offender is ridicule and contempt. These are a very real sanction—most of all in relatively primitive societies, where numbers are small and the individual members are brought into close contact, for escape is difficult, if not impossible. When active measures are taken, it is because the feeling aroused by the trespass is more intense, amounting to indignation, abhorrence, or fear. But, where active measures are appropriate, they are not always taken by the community as a whole; they may be left to the group more directly aggrieved. When a man is slain, an offence is committed against the community at large; but over and above this his kin is the sufferer by the loss of a member, and by the injury to its prestige, so that it devolves on the kindred to obtain reparation by slaying in turn the criminal or some member of his clan. The avengers are supported in such a case by public opinion. They are in effect the instruments of society; and the knowledge that they are thus acting in accordance with the *mos majorum* and the tacit concurrence of the community strengthens their hands, and tends to be a powerful deterrent from wanton violation of the peace. When, however, death is imputed to witchcraft, active concurrence of the community in retaliation is apt to occur. Witchcraft—hostile magic—is forbidden by all relatively primitive societies. It is a secret treason from which no one feels safe, a subtle danger threatening all alike. It therefore arouses an agony of apprehension, fury, and abhorrence, and everybody joins in the hue and cry after the suspected criminal.

This is true even among a people so peaceful and little disposed to violence as the Eskimos. Nor do they limit public interference to cases of witchcraft; for, when a man has rendered himself generally obnoxious, either by witchcraft or in any other way, some one is deputed to put him to death

(D. Crantz, *Hist. of Greenland*, London, 1767, i. 194; F. Boas, *Bull. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xv. [New York, 1901-07] 117, 467). The weak point here, as a more recent writer on the Eskimos remarks, is that the death of the man, however intolerable he may have made himself, even to his kindred, may start a blood-feud between the kindred and those who have been the instruments of society in punishing him with death. The power of public opinion is, however, so strong that 'the mere knowledge of having displeased the community would be severe punishment in itself,' and, therefore, likely to restrain an ill-disposed person from carrying his evil or reckless propensities to an extremity (V. Stefánsson, *My Life with the Eskimo*, London, 1913, p. 365). On the other hand, so far from implacable are the Eskimos that a serious fault—even one that may imperil the entire community by the violation of a quasi-religious tabu—may often be redeemed by public confession.

But to fix attention on the sanction—and that a penal sanction—as the test of law in a community relatively primitive is to limit the definition of law to that which concerns what we call crimes. It is to ignore whole provinces of law. The religious side of life, so far as it is enforced by sanctions not involving the organized and regulated action of the community, is entirely omitted from consideration. No one who knows how profoundly what we in our contempt are apt to call 'superstition' dominates savage life can fail to appreciate the seriousness of the omission. So slowly and reluctantly, indeed, is religion separated from law that even to-day the ecclesiastical law is part of the law of the land in some highly civilized countries. In the oaths daily exacted in our courts we have a perpetual witness to the large share formerly taken by religion in the administration of the law. Oaths are an appeal to the divinity to attest the truth of the evidence. They are a relic of the ordeals once held conclusively to determine on which side justice lay. Such ordeals are still in use in the lower culture. Courts of law are there often held, as they were in classic times, in the temples of the gods and under the presidency of priests and medicine-men; nor had such practices ceased in Europe until the Middle Ages came to a close.

Equally, no account is taken of the class of rights enforcible by civil procedure, which has attained so remarkable a development among the black races of Africa. Among those rights the rights to property, directly or indirectly, occupy an important place. Private property is but feebly represented in the social institutions of the Australian natives; and the complaints that come before the tribal elders savour much more of the criminal than of what we should call the civil jurisdiction. Hence it may not have been necessary for Malinowski to take into account this class of rights. When, however, we come to inquire whether his definition can be applied to social conditions elsewhere, we cannot overlook them.

No less serious is the omission of constitutional law. Low as they are in the scale of civilization, the Australian savages are not quite ignorant of constitutional law. The population is composed of a number of tribes, each of which occupies exclusively a tract of country. The boundaries of this tract are recognized by the adjacent tribes. The members of the tribe are bound together by a common language and common institutions, differing more or less from those of their neighbours, and by a feeling of solidarity, if not a definite alliance. Each tribe is divided into local groups. There is no chief of a whole tribe; but each local group, speaking generally, has its headman, whose authority, in most cases, is real but vague, depending largely on his personal qualities. He is assisted by a council of the elders, which deals with the internal affairs of the group and its external relations, and whose decision is the supreme authority. The office of headman is sometimes hereditary, though even then it is frequently conditioned by ability. The local group is made up of families, each of them ruled by the husband and father, with large powers over his wife and children, and often his grandchildren. Local groups are independent of one another, but frequently unite for the purposes of war and of religious rites and festivals. The tribe is, moreover, with rare exceptions, divided into exogamous totemic clans, descendible sometimes only through females, in other cases only through males. In the latter case the clan tends to be coincident with the local group, for the wife usually goes to reside at the husband's camp. The Australian organization is thus rudimentary; it is none the less real on that account. That of the Andaman islanders is in most respects even more rudimentary, except that they recognize the authority, though very limited, of a chief of the tribe over the various local groups.

A type of constitution, very interesting because it clearly shows how the social and political relations of a people are dependent upon economic conditions, is that of the Yakuts. They inhabit the steppes of north-eastern Siberia. In former times they were almost entirely dependent on their herds of horses, which found pasturage on the steppe and supplied their owners with food and the material for clothing and shelter. The minimum drove on which a family of four persons could live consisted of ten head, that is to say, five mares, one stallion, one two-year-old, one one-year-old, and two suckling colts. This would hardly keep such a family from distress. A maximum, on the other hand, of from three hundred to five hundred head would allow a community of fifty persons to live in comparative ease. This community, whether large or small, would be composed of individuals who seem to have regarded one another as related, and may be referred to as the kindred, or *sib*. Between the members of the *sib* there was community of goods. Kindred seems formerly to have been traced exclusively in the female, but is now traced in the male, line. The number of persons comprised in the *sib* is thus dependent upon the number of a herd that can be pastured at any given station and the number of persons who can be found to manage and be maintained by it. Every *sib* belongs to some tribe, called *ulus*, and sub-tribe, or *nasleg*. The land of each tribe is apportioned, and from time to time re-apportioned, between the sub-tribes, and that of the sub-tribe is still more frequently re-apportioned between the *aya-ussa*, or kindreds. Every kindred chooses a deputy for this purpose, and every *nasleg* an officer to supervise the deputies. But these officials do not appear to have any other authority. The *sib* (and, so far as can be gathered, the *nasleg*) is governed by a mass-meeting or general assembly of the *sib* (or *nasleg*), at which the common affairs are settled by the oldest and most influential members, but subject to the general opinion. The *sib* was frequently subdivided, for the convenience of tending the herds, into smaller families. Of such a family the father was the head. It held together so long as his influence was paramount, or until the necessity to divide the herd arose. In the family the younger members were subjected to the elder, these to the head, and the women to the men. War, when it took place, generally arose, if the traditions are to be trusted, from the stealing of women or cattle. The feeling of solidarity between members of the *sib* was very strong. A blood-feud was the consequence of murder; but meetings with ceremonies for reconciliation were an institution. It hardly needs to be said that the spread of civilization, and the consequent introduction of new means of livelihood, new luxuries, and new ideas of property, have greatly modified the ancient customs, which in the more southerly and fertile districts are now to a great extent broken up, and even on the open steppes of the north are in decay (W. G. Sumner, *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 65 ff.).

On the whole, in a wide but poor and thinly peopled land the life of the Yakuts, occupied with the care of their herds and the occasional diversions of hunting and fishing, was externally one of peace. That of the Maoris of New Zealand, in utterly different conditions, was one of continual warfare. Every winter a raid was planned on some neighbouring tribe, and every summer it was executed with cannibalism and other circumstances of barbarity. For such a life a different organization was needed.

The people dwelt in strongly stockaded *pas*, or fortresses, and militarism developed a hereditary aristocracy. They were divided into tribes, occupying separate districts, at the head of each of which was a chief, who was by virtue of his descent enveloped in a sanctity called *tapu* (whence our word 'tabu'), which varied in intensity with his rank. The tribe was subdivided into *gentes*, each distinguished by its own patronymic and governed by its own chief; and the lowest unit was the family. The religion of the Maoris was practically the worship of ancestors. The prestige of the chiefs was largely that of their

ancestry. The *tapu* that encircled them was derived not merely from their own personal power, but from the divine forefathers of whom they were both children and priests. A curious consequence of the value thus attached to heredity was that the eldest son of a chief was deemed higher in rank than his father. On the birth of a son the prestige of the father, or at least some portion of it, was automatically transferred to the child. He was a step upwards in the ancestral ladder, with a longer array of forefathers. Within the family the paternal authority was nearly absolute. Slavery was common; and the head of the family could put his slaves to death with impunity. If he ventured, however, to go the length of taking the life of wives or children, he would in the former case be liable to a claim for compensation or to vengeance at the hands of the kindred of the murdered wife; in the latter case he would be called to account by the tribe. The power of a chief also was nominally absolute within his *gens* or tribe, as the case might be. Both domestic and foreign affairs, however, were debated by the principal chiefs in open assembly, at which the warriors, women, and even children were allowed to speak. The chiefs were thus made amenable to public opinion, though the final decision apparently rested with them. 'Public quarrels between chiefs are referred to the *rangatira nui*, or head of the tribe, and his fiat is generally conclusive. His authority is much respected; yet subordination is scarcely known, as, provided a chief is satisfied with his people, they may be insolent to any other party, independent of his authority; the people supporting their chief, who in turn winks at their exactions and ill conduct.' Such a state of things, it is obvious, would give abundant pretext for the wars to which the people were addicted. The head of the tribe was not necessarily the leader in war; the war-chief was elected (J. S. Polack, *Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders*, London, 1840, i. 60 ff., ii. 23 ff., 34 ff.; Taylor, *op. cit.* p. 350 ff.; E. Tregear, *JAI* xix. [1889] 112).

The Bantu and Negro populations of Africa are also all more or less warlike. Without going into details, which would be tedious as well as unnecessary in view of the different types of society already presented, it may be said that among them a still higher organization has been developed, culminating in kingdoms ruled by hereditary monarchs surrounded by hosts of officials, maintaining an elaborate ceremonial, having a standing army, and whose subjects are graded into classes, each with its own occupation, rights, and duties; the whole edifice resting, it may be, on the slavery of a conquered tribe.

Constitutional law, in truth, is the very framework of society. It is the foundation-norm. Without it there can be no regulated limitation of wills; society falls into anarchy; it ceases to exist. The possibility of this result is not within the contemplation of any community. Consequently constitutional law rarely or never has any definite penal sanction attached to its observance, even in the highest civilization. But this does not entitle us to deny it the name of law.

Again, international law must be recognized wherever there is contiguity or intercourse between two or more independent tribes or peoples. It certainly exists in Australia. Strict formality governs the relations between tribe and tribe. There is a way of accrediting messengers which renders their persons sacred; there are rules concerning meetings for barter, for the celebration of religious and other rites, for mutual conference and the settling of intertribal differences, for intertribal hospitality, and even for the prosecution of war. Such rules are also found on other planes of culture, though some of them may be disregarded where a warlike and arrogant people comes into contact with a feebler one, or where passions are greatly excited. On the whole, however, it is true to say that, while the conventions of international relations are very seldom provided with a formal sanction, they are habitually observed, and their breach is liable to be seriously resented.

For these reasons we cannot regard the test of sanction as satisfactory; we are driven back upon that of recognition. Where a rule is generally recognized, it may be said to be imposed and enforced by society, whether or not a definite external sanction be annexed to it. For public opinion and the individual conscience will co-operate to ensure its observance. We may then define law as *a set of rules imposed and enforced by a society, for the conduct of social and political relations.*

To a large extent morality and law cover the same ground. The law of every community is an index to its morals; and especially is it so with relatively primitive peoples. Among them the standard of the collective conscience is external; the idea of motive as affecting the value of an act has not yet been fully evolved. To such peoples, for instance, the unconscious violation of a tabu entails the same guilt as the most deliberate; it is equally heinous to slay a man by accident and with malice aforethought. The distinction drawn by our morality between the different classes of homicide, and adopted by our law, matters nothing to them; bloodshed even in self-defence demands atonement. Until the individual conscience has been cultivated by the reflexion of generations on the social norms and their adaptation to the changing environment, and until the emotions have been disciplined and directed with some conscious effort, if not to the general wellbeing, at all events to the maintenance of the existing customs and constitution of society, morality cannot emerge as distinct from law. The process commences early. It is indispensable to the growth of civilization. It is one of the most important dynamic forces contributory to that growth. But its operation is slow.

On the other side, law is concerned with procedure. Actively to enforce compliance with the rules governing a society, or to punish non-compliance, certain steps have to be taken, and certain forms observed; otherwise the enforcement is lawless violence or individual caprice; it has not the consent and the power of the collectivity behind it. These forms are frequently, in the early stages of culture, crude enough; but they are forms recognized as the proper means of obtaining reparation for wrong. The sentence of death passed by a band of Eskimos on an obnoxious person, though passed in his absence and without his knowledge, is the sentence of the community, given in a manner more or less formal. In Australia such a decision would be arrived at by consultations of the governing elders. In either case it would carry the weight of the community. When the duty of retaliation for the death or injury of a man is left to his kin, it is because this is the recognized means of restraining lawless aggression. Stigma and contempt would follow their neglect of vengeance; but for others to interfere would be to commit a new offence, to arouse a new blood-feud; it would be outside their duty; it would not be in pursuance of the law. The feuds resulting from this method of enforcing the norm against bloodshed within the community are, however, in time perceived to lead to new dangers. To obviate these more than one method is available. The rule of a life for a life is commuted for a pecuniary compensation, agreed on between the parties or assessed by a recognized tribunal. With the advance of culture this is often, as among the ancient inhabitants of the British Isles, both Celtic and Teutonic, elaborated into a regular scale of payments in accordance with the rank of the victim, and is applied to other injuries—to those against property as well as against the person. The beginnings of the practice of referring outrages for redress to a recognized tribunal appear very low down in culture.

Among the tribes of south-western Victoria 'persons accused of wrong-doing get one month's notice to appear before the assembled tribes'—probably the tribe of the complainant and that of the defendant—'and be tried, on pain of being outlawed and killed' (J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, Melbourne, 1881, p. 76). 'In the Narrinyeri tribe offenders were brought before the *Tendi* (council of old men) for trial. For instance,

if a member of one clan had been in time of peace killed by one of another clan, the clansmen of the latter would send to the friends of the murderer, and invite them to bring him for trial before the united Tendis. If, after trial, he were found guilty of committing the crime, he would be punished according to his guilt' (Howitt, 341). It is a very wide-spread practice of the Negro and Bantu peoples, equally in cases of what we should call a civil dispute and of crime, to have recourse to a *palaver* —which is, in effect, an action at law. The accused is summoned before a properly constituted court, a trial takes place, witnesses are examined, advocates are heard, and sentence is given. Only then can punitive measures be taken against the offender or the person liable on the claim. In certain cases, such as an accusation of witchcraft, the matter is decided by means of an ordeal, under which the accused may die. Such is the confidence felt in the *palaver* that the blood-feud has receded more and more into the background. Indeed, in at least one tribe in the Congo basin, recent scientific explorers have been unable to discover a trace of it (E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, *Les Bushongo*, Brussels, 1910, p. 76).

With procedure morals have little directly to do. It is sufficient that its rules are part of the law, and as such must be observed. How far any modification of those rules has in relatively primitive communities arisen out of moral considerations is a question to determine which the data do not at present exist.

The question must be answered: Whence does a law derive that recognition which determines its validity as a rule imposed and enforced by society? Even in highly organized and civilized communities the answer given by Austin is incomplete and unsatisfactory. For, though the written law expressed by a specific act of legislation is a rule definitely formulated and prescribed by the sovereign power, we are still left without any account of the source of that large body of rules equally binding on the community and known as the 'unwritten law,' in England called the 'common law.' In many modern States the law is wholly contained in a code supplemented and amended by subsequent legislation. Where there is no code, legislation presupposes, and is ultimately founded on, the unwritten law. This unwritten law is found expressed in judicial decisions given upon the cases brought before the courts from time to time. This was a process well known in ancient Roman jurisprudence. Decisions merely profess to declare the pre-existing law, and apply it to the relations of the parties in litigation. They may, in effect, formulate and make binding a new rule. If so, this is done by adopting and applying some principle already held by the community to be morally binding. When the result is generally accepted, the decision becomes law; and, though not formally an act of legislation, it has the same consequences. Otherwise it is overruled by a subsequent decision, or by the sovereign power.

In a relatively primitive society there is not always an authority capable of formulating a legislative act. All laws are unwritten. They depend for their validity, like the decisions of English judges, on acceptance and recognition. To a large extent they come down from remote and unrecorded antiquity; and on that plane of culture the forces of conservatism, influential as they are with us, wield immensely greater power. The custom of the fathers acquires a religious sanction beyond and apart from its appropriateness to the circumstances and condition of the people. The feeling was accurately if not completely expressed by the Bœotian who told an inquisitive and supercilious foreigner that he knew only one thing, namely, that it was right to maintain the customs of one's ancestors, and that it was not right to apologize for them to foreigners. The answer was incomplete because it did not give adequate expression to the awe, the religious fear, the devotion—in short, the complex of emotions—that guard and preserve the institutions of savage society.

The cannibal Fang, we are informed, are not only 'not quick to adopt reforms or to introduce new methods; they are more or less the slaves of custom, and have a superstitious dread of departing from ancestral habits'—and this in 'all the proceedings of life' (*JAI* xxix. [1899] 80). The inhabitants of the island of Serang, one of the Moluccas, are reported to have an aversion to novelties, and to be very superstitious and much attached to their ancient usages. 'Custom is for them the law, and not to follow it is in their eyes not merely an outrage on it, but also an insult to the forefathers from whom the old customs have descended' (J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 97). The same tale is told almost everywhere. To such lengths did a Bechuana chief carry his objection to change that, when one of his tribesmen had obtained some maize and planted it, although he allowed him to reap and eat of it, he would not allow him to plant it a second time, because it was a plant 'unknown to the fathers' (T. Arbousset and F. Daumas, *Exploratory Tour*, Cape Town, 1846, p. 172). Innovations are indeed often punished as a crime. Among the Arunta 'any infringement of custom, within certain limitations, is visited with sure and often severe punishment' (Spencer-Gillen, p. 11 f.); while among the Bangala on the Upper Congo adherence to custom is secured by the fear of being charged with witchcraft; in other words, that is the penalty imposed by society on him who departs from it (J. H. Weeks, *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 108).

The circumstances and condition of a people, however, are never quite steadfast; they are always changing, although slowly and insensibly, with everything else in the world. Appropriate customs arise gradually and unmarked, and are adapted from time to time to these slow changes with the same gradual and imperceptible progression. Hence to the members of such a society their customs frequently appear to be unchanged from the beginning, the unaltering bequest of the wisdom of the primeval ancestors, or a necessary part of the scheme of things without which they cannot conceive of the existence of society. Yet it is evident that both the original customs themselves and the changes that they undergo, however gradually and imperceptibly, must have been initiated by individuals. The collective opinion and the collective will are merely the concurrence of individual opinions and individual wills. Perception of this individual action is indicated in the traditions of many peoples; and, though the tradition of individual legislation may not in any specific case be trustworthy as history, it assuredly points to a consciousness of the fact of change and of change by individual initiation. Sometimes, no doubt, a Lycurgus might arise, and by force of his personality and genius impress his countrymen with his opinions and will to the extent of legislation. More usually a change, when recognized as such, is the result of long and repeated discussions among the leaders of the tribe. Spencer and Gillen give sound reasons for thinking that this is a course from time to time adopted by the aborigines of Central Australia (*op. cit.*, p. 12). If they are right, the conclusion cannot be limited to the tribes described by them. Such a change would not be ventured upon unless the elders were satisfied that the tribe was ripe for it. When announced, it would have to run the gauntlet of criticism by the whole tribe, and its validity would ultimately rest on general acceptance. In the lapse of time the superseded law might sink out of memory; the new law would then be regarded as of primeval authority.

At a somewhat later stage in civilization the lawgiver invokes the authority of the gods for his legislation. The Mosaic Law is ascribed to Jahweh; Hammurabi receives his famous code from Shamash; Minos is instructed by Zeus. In this way the general acceptance and permanence of the law would be secured by investing it with the sanctity of religion. The same intention is visible in the legislation of King Alfred the Great, who, in collecting and adapting the laws of his predecessors, placed at the head of the compilation the divinely inspired Decalogue and other Mosaic precepts. Acceptance is facilitated by the indistinction still characteristic of the institutions of such a society. We may analyze them under the

heads of law, religion, medicine, morals, and so forth; we may distinguish between different kinds of law; we may sever religion from medicine and medicine from magic; the members of the community itself do none of these things; no such analysis is possible to them. All their institutions are for them bound together into one equally authoritative and homogeneous whole. Each is part of all the rest, and cannot be severed from them. They see nothing extravagant in publishing a code in the name of a god, nothing incongruous in combining in the same code ritual, moral, agricultural, and medical with what we understand by strictly juridical prescriptions, prohibitions of homicide, rape, theft, and fraud with meticulous directions as to food—what must be avoided, what may be eaten, and how it must be prepared—the treatment of disease, the method of tillage, and the garb in mourning. The same code in the same divine name and with equal authority may make regulations for the conduct of commercial transactions and of the most intimate conjugal relations, as well as for a complex and splendid ceremonial of divine worship. All these are part of the national institutions, equally carrying the sense of obligation, and all actively fostering the sense of solidarity; therefore no impropriety can be felt in ascribing them to the same source.

The indistinction thus found has always been one of the chief hindrances to missionary enterprise. To break with one custom is to break with all; to renounce the religious ideas of the ancestors is to renounce the entire scheme of culture with which they are bound up. The same indistinction has retarded scientific inquiry into the jurisprudence of the lower culture. Observers have been apt to record practices, not law. Striking and superficial differences between savage culture and ours have riveted the attention, to the neglect of the principles underlying all social organization. Consequently the meaning of those differences has too frequently been missed, and their place in the development of civilization has been misunderstood.

Thus in a scientific periodical we are told by a writer who has lived and laboured among the tribe: 'The Fang have no system of law, no judge or tribunal for punishment of crime.' Yet he immediately goes on to say: 'Theft, murder, offences against the person are all settled according to native custom'; and he describes the procedure for the purpose (*JAI* xxix. 73).

A definite procedure for the purpose of settling claims that else will blossom into open warfare may not be literally a system of law; it is at all events a long step in the evolution of jurisprudence. But the observation quoted shows that what the writer has in mind is a highly civilized judicial system, such as he has been familiar with in his native land. He must be aware that the Fang, like all other tribes, have a body of customs having the force of law. They are the rules generally recognized and habitually observed, by means of which Fang society is held together. The particular procedure which he describes, if it discloses the want of a functionary armed with judicial authority, is not a picturesque but haphazard practice without sanction or recognition; it is a real juridical process. The author exhibits it by means of an example, thus:

'A Fang of the Esisis clan steals goods or a woman from a Fang of the Nge clan. The Nge who has been wronged does not go to the offender for settlement, he goes to another near town and shoots the first goat he sees in the street, or, if very angry, he may shoot a woman. The owner of the goat or woman demands of the Nge his reason for doing so. The Nge replies, "An Esisis" (giving the man's name) "has wronged me; I put the palaver (his offence) on you." The third party then goes to the Esisis and says, "An Nge" (giving the man's name) "has shot my goat (or woman) because you have made trouble with him; he has put your palaver (trouble) on me. You must pay me!" The original offender is now responsible and liable to two parties.'

These steps are thus the formal and regular preliminary to a palaver, and are as well understood over a considerable area of the continent of Africa as the king's writ or a police-court summons in Great Britain. So far from starting with an explosion of random rage, they are ingeniously calculated to enlist the active interference of a third party, and to render the wrong-doer liable in a double penalty—to the person injured by himself in respect of the original wrong, and to the third party in respect of the loss suffered by him at the hands of the latter. The palaver is publicly 'talked' by the representatives of the respective parties before the representatives of their respective clans. Though it does not appear that these have any direct power to impose a fine or order payment of the claims, such a discussion must in most cases tend to compose the differences, for it informs the public fully on the merits of the dispute. And the aggressor knows that, if he fails to 'cut' the palaver, by paying a reasonable compensation to the satisfaction of the aggrieved parties and their clans, he and his clan will have to run the certain risk of hostilities by two clans with public opinion behind them. The process, therefore, offers powerful incentives to peace, doubtless actively assisted by the representatives of the clans involved.

It is, of course, perfectly true that the laws of the Fang, and of all other relatively primitive societies, extend (as has been pointed out above) to many subjects that in the progress of civilization have dropped out of legislation. The use of the term 'law' in common parlance limits it to acts of the legislature and such other rules as are recognized by the courts of justice. It obscures for us the fact that many of the rules which we observe in daily life, though they are not amenable to the king's courts, are laws which have their own sanction, and breach of which will subject us to penalties tending to exclude us from the society of our fellows and make life burdensome in other ways. By virtue of the indistinction which we have already noted, savage mentality, though admitting a difference in the penalties, heaps all these rules together as customs. As such they are sacred. All alike they rest on a traditional basis; together they constitute the ethos of the society, which is not likely to be infringed. The variance of our point of view from that of the savage, the indifference or the comparative leniency with which we regard some acts or omissions that seem highly important to him, and the emphasis which we lay on other acts or omissions that he treats as trivial are a measure of the distance of our civilization from his, and should not blind us to the fact that what we call the customs of a tribe are as much a body of laws as the *Code Napoléon*.

LITERATURE.—The substance of the laws of peoples in the lower culture is mostly to be gathered from the general accounts of travellers, missionaries, and scientific explorers; and its collection and comparison is as laborious a process as any other branch of anthropological inquiry. In some instances, however, European rulers have for purposes of government found it necessary to collect and in some measure codify the laws of their subject-peoples, notably on the continent of Africa. Among such collections may be mentioned *A Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs*, compiled by direction of J. Maclean, Cape Town, 1866; *Report and Proceedings with Appendices of the Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs*, published by the Government of the Cape of Good Hope, Cape Town, 1883 (a very valuable collection); *Les Coutumes indigènes de la Côte d'Ivoire*, by F. J. Clozel and R. Villamur, Paris, 1902 (a comprehensive juridical work giving the laws of the various tribes separately); *Fanti Customary Laws, a brief Introduction to the Principles of the Native Laws and Customs of the Fanti and Akan Sections of the Gold Coast, with a Selection of Cases thereon decided in the Law Courts*, by John Mensah Sarbah, London, 1897 (the author was a Negro barrister practising in the Courts; comparison of this with the last-mentioned work affords an admirable example of the difference between the French and English methods and views of jurisprudence). A collection of the laws of the Dinkas in the Egyptian Sûdan was made by Hugh O'Sullivan for practical purposes, when in charge of the Dinka divisions of the Upper Nile Province. It was published in *JRAI* xl. (1910) 171. Col-

lections of the laws of the Herero, a very interesting tribe in German S.W. Africa, have been published by **Eduard Dannert** (*Zum Rechte der Herero*, Berlin, 1906). As might be expected, these compilations, from their practical purpose, contain little beyond the native laws so far as they are administered by the Courts. **Felix Meyer's** *Wirtschaft und Recht der Herero* (Berlin, 1905) comprises somewhat more. A more general work, written in a scientific spirit, is *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz: Ethnologisch-juristische Beiträge zur Kenntniss der einheimischen Rechte Afrikas*, by **A. H. Post**, 2 vols., Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1887. The best compendium of the whole subject, with abundant bibliographical references, is the same author's *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, do. 1894–95, to which may be added **S. R. Steinmetz**, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903.

In various periodicals devoted to jurisprudence, articles on the subject are occasionally found. Such articles are frequent in the *ZVRW*, Stuttgart, 1887 to date. One of the editors, **Josef Kohler**, devotes special attention to it.

Accessible works on the general subject are those of **Henry J. Sumner Maine**, esp. his *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions*, London, 1875. But it must be borne in mind in reading them that a generation of further research has resulted in conclusions widely differing from his on several important points.

E. SIDNEY HARTLAND.

LAW (American).—In so vast a culture-area as the two Americas, with their wide range of stages of civilization, from the savage tribes of S. California or the Amazonians to the highly organized Aztecs and Peruvians, the concept and the scope of law necessarily present extreme divergencies; and the difficulty of the task of preparing a *Corpus juris Americani*—a work urgently needed by all students of comparative ethnological jurisprudence—is enhanced by the scantiness of the records which have been preserved of extinct or obsolescent American Indian stocks, as well as by our almost utter ignorance of many living stocks, particularly in S. America, while scarcely any of the earlier observers studied from a juristic point of view the tribes with whom they came in contact.

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the American Indian, even of the most undeveloped stock, is a lawless being. In a very real sense he may be essentially more law-abiding than those who are commonly regarded as highly civilized; for to him law is well-nigh synonymous with custom (*q.v.*); it is not something imposed from without, or supported by pleas of 'the greatest good of the greatest number,' or exercised by a class who may be regarded with antipathy by many members of the community, or a bondage ingeniously and sophistically to be eluded or circumvented by clever legal illegality, or a purely human convention to be flouted and broken by any lawless individual of sufficient strength to do so.

1. North America.—The general basis of N. American Indian government was the family—on a totemistic foundation—which formed a part of the gens, and this, in turn, of the tribe. Matriarchy was the rule, and the women possessed much influence in the election of the chiefs, of whom there might be more than one, so that separate chiefs presided over military and civil affairs among Iroquois, Muskhogeans, Chippewa, Dakota, and Pomo, and sometimes, as among the Caribs, there were chiefs only in time of war. The position and source of the chieftainship varied among the different stocks, and the general problem here is connected with that of the origin of the kingship (see the series of artt. on KING). Among many tribes, such as the Iroquois, Caddo, Omaha, Cheyenne, Arapaho, Comanche, the Plains Indians generally, Maidu, Yurok, Miwok, Kutchin, Tlingit, and Kaniagmiut, the chieftainship was elective, depending on the women or the shaman, often practically restricted to certain families, but conditioned in great part by wealth, and still more by personal ability. Elsewhere the office was hereditary, unless grave obstacles forbade, as among the Natchez, the Carolina tribes, Pawnee, Pomo, Gallinomero, Gualala, Nutka, and, under certain conditions, the Dakota; and among still other tribes both systems were in simultaneous use, as among the Abenaki, with whom the *sachem*, or supreme ruler of a number of tribes, held office by hereditary right, while the individual tribal heads, or *sagamores*, were elected.

The power of the American Indian chief is restricted, sometimes by more or less elaborate tribal councils, as among the Comanche, sometimes—and more effectually—by public opinion. Only rarely, as among the Natchez and the Santee, did he have power which might become tyrannical. Frequently he is little more than *primus inter pares*, this being especially the case in the less organized forms of government, such as the Maidu, Karok, and Californians generally. Much, however, depended on a chief's personal ability, notable instances of wielders of wide power being the Wampanoag Massassoit and the Powhatan Wahunsonacock.

The territorial scope of the chief's power also varies widely. In a few regions in N. America—most notably the Iroquois (*q.v.*)—real states and confederacies were established, but elsewhere—as on the west coast and among the Apache, Comanche, Shoshoni, and Eskimos—each chief was head only of a village. The Iroquois had developed the elements of international law, having a regular system of sending envoys, whose persons were sacred, to declare war or to make peace; and tribes less advanced politically possess the rudiments of similar institutions.

In very few instances the chieftainship is traced back to a divine origin, the most notable example being the Natchez chief, who was descended from the sun, although occasionally, as among the Nutka, the chief is at the same time a 'medicine-man,' or, as among the Calusa, he was believed to possess supernatural power, and was deposed or killed if he did not use this for the welfare of his people.

Among the Iroquois an insolvent debtor was tied to a tree and flogged, but among the Oregon tribes he became a slave. Death usually cancelled debt, as among the Eskimos. As regards contracts, the same general rules held as among ourselves, although the Tlingit and, with some reservations, the Eskimos expressly provided that either party might withdraw from a contract upon which he had agreed. For the American Indian laws regarding property see art. PROPERTY.

American Indian criminal law is concerned mainly with murder and theft. The penalties for murder have been considered in art. BLOOD-FEUD (Primitive). The normal punishment for witchcraft was death, which was also the penalty for incest among some of the Carolina tribes, for robbing a grave, as among the Chinook, for cowardice, as among the Kansa, and for desertion by an adopted prisoner of war, as among the Missouri tribes, this being regarded as treason to his new tribe. As regards theft, the thief was generally bound to make simple restitution; but the Huron required double restitution; and among some of the N. Carolina tribes, as also among the Tlingit, the thief, if unable to make the restitution required, became a quasi-slave. Among the Comanche, murder, adultery, theft, and failure to cure the sick were punished by death. As a rule, however, even the gravest crimes might be commuted by fines (cf. art. BLOOD-FEUD [Primitive]).

Legal procedure naturally varied according to the stage of civilization attained by each tribe. In the most primitive strata the punishment for non-capital offences was public contempt; in case of capital crime the persons injured—or their kin—themselves acted as executioners. Anything approximating a formal court was, however, ex-

tremely rare; the tribal councils normally took cognizance only of peace, war, and other matters affecting the tribe as a whole. Nevertheless, totem and tribal courts were found among the Huron, which acted especially on charges of murder, treason, and witchcraft. Any error in the form of procedure before these courts quashed the whole case. Certain Missouri tribes had courts of arbitration, whose decisions it was an obligation of honour to fulfil, while elsewhere considerable influence is exercised by the tribal councils, as among the Hopi and Iroquois.

2. Mexico and Central America.—The Aztec sovereign was regarded as the earthly representative of the gods, whence implicit obedience was due him, and his power was absolute. Like the Peruvian Inca, he was assisted by many officials, and there seems to have been a special department of justice, while in each large city there was a viceroy (*cihuacohuatl*) controlling both the general administration and justice, and constituting the final court of appeal in criminal cases. The rules as to the succession of the Mexican kingship differed in various times and places. In Tezcuco, Tlacopan, Michoacan, and Tlascala, as well as among the Miztec and Zapotec, the eldest son was normally the heir to the throne; but in Mexico it was usually the eldest brother or the eldest brother's eldest son who succeeded, though there seems to have been no rigid rule of succession, ability and character being more potent in the eyes of the electors than mere kinship to a deceased ruler. Over the Zapotec city of Yopaa a hereditary priest-king ruled.

In the smaller cities there were judges who decided minor cases, referring others to the higher courts, *e.g.*, to those consisting of three judges, who sat under the control of each *cihuacohuatl*. Both Mexico and Tezcuco seem to have been divided into six circuits, each represented at the capital by two judges, who formed the lower court for important cases, the court of last resort consisting of twelve or thirteen judges appointed by the sovereign, apparently for life, and required to assemble, under the presidency of the king or his representative, for ten or twelve days every four months (80 days). Any bribery, negligence, or partiality exposed them to reproof, and, if repeated, to degradation or even death; and the entire court system was worked in minute detail. Besides the regular courts, there were special courts for markets and for military affairs.

The Mexican laws, which recognized circumstantial evidence, seem to have been codified, and were administered strictly, though some leniency was shown to first offenders. The stern impartiality with which the judges acted was most admirable, and high rank or kinship to the king was of no avail to the criminal; indeed, Netzahualpilli put his own wife to death for immorality, and Netzahualcoyotl had his only legitimate son executed for high treason.

The best known portions of Mexican law are those relating to criminal procedure. Here the evidence of witnesses was requisite, although the oath of the defendant was accepted as evidence. Formal complaint was not always essential to begin prosecution, common reputation, as in cases of adultery, sometimes forming sufficient ground for legal proceedings. All grave crimes were punished by death, the mode of death varying according to circumstances, rank, etc. The death penalty was prescribed for murder (even of a slave), kidnapping, adultery, incest, rape, unnatural vice, pandering, witchcraft, altering landmarks, appropriation of another's property or of the royal insignia, selling land already sold, selling stolen goods, falsifying weights, slander, drunkenness or other excesses of priests and royal retainers, military insubordination, flight from the enemy, permitting an enemy to escape, selling or releasing a prisoner of war, treason (involving slavery or banishment for kinsmen to the fourth degree, and in Tlaxcala the death of kindred to the seventh degree), false accusation before the king, false guardianship, striking or insulting a parent, squandering patrimony, challenge to a duel, perjury, harbouring an enemy of the State, and, according to some authorities, abortion and wearing the garments of the opposite sex. A thief must not only make restitution, but also pay a fine to the treasury; under aggravating circumstances (as in the marketplace) or for repetition of the offence, he suffered death, but in Cuzco he was blinded. Slavery was often a punishment for crime—*e.g.*, for theft (apparently when the thief was unable to make the reparation demanded) and stealing another's child, as well as for delicts arising from negligence, if the delinquent was unable to make compensation otherwise, failure to lodge information of high treason, unauthorized sale of property, obtaining goods on false credit, embezzlement, failure to pay taxes, etc.; mutilation also occurred, as when the lips of a calumniator were pierced or partly cut off; and degrading punishments were inflicted in Analuac for pandering. Drunkenness was an especial object of legislation, the drunkard's head being shaved, his house torn down, and all public office denied him; in some instances he even suffered the death penalty. Imprisonment as a punishment was rare, the usual use of the prison being restricted to those condemned to death or sacrifice. The *particeps criminis* in abortion was as severely punished as the principal, but received a milder penalty in cases of theft. Pardon might, however, be granted by the monarch, and certain festivals carried amnesty with them, while forgiveness by the injured party or his kinsman might mitigate a penalty.

All possible provision was made for the poor from the State treasury; and the laws of Tezcuco sought to protect the forests as well as agriculture, besides forbidding undue luxury—*e.g.*, gold and silver vessels for the wealthy nobles. There was also among the Aztec a law of contracts which must be made under oath; and gambling debts were valid so far as they came within the law of contracts. Another form of contract was farming on shares. Interest on loans was unknown, but commissions on sale and deposits in pledge were common.

The Mayan sovereignty was hereditary in the male line, and the power of the king was absolute, though he was constantly advised by his nobles; among the Quiche the king seems to have been succeeded by his brother, the heir-presumptive being the king's eldest son. Among the Lacandones and Nicaraguans the chieftainship was elective, and among the latter the chief was practically subject to the council; in Darien and among the Mosquito, on the other hand, hereditary chiefs ruled; while in Chichen (in Yucatan) a priest-king held power, in which connexion it should be noted that all the semi-mythical founders of Maya civilization, such as Votan, Zamná, and Kukulcan, were both priests and kings.

The system of courts was elaborate, and it is noteworthy that both here and among the Aztec advocates (though probably not with a special legal training) were appointed to aid both the judges and the parties to the case. Inspectors seem to have traversed the country to see that justice was properly administered, but there appears to have been no power of appeal after a decision had once been rendered. In cases of grave crime, torture is said to have been employed at Vera Paz to elicit

testimony. The Maya punishments were death, enslavement, and fine; imprisonment, except for detention, was rare, though inflicted at Coban for non-payment of taxes. The death penalty usually involved confiscation of property and enslavement of the criminal's family; it was inflicted for murder (although in Yucatan and Nicaragua, in a case of extreme provocation or other extenuating circumstances only a fine was inflicted, while, if a man killed another's slave, he was required to pay damages), incorrigible thieving, stealing large amounts (San Salvador—all theft in Darien) or from a temple, adultery (Darien, Yucatan, Itza, and Guatemala), rape (Guatemala), incest and seduction (Yucatan), sodomy (Nicaragua), treason, desertion, interference with payment of tribute to the king, kidnapping, killing the quetzal bird (Guatemala), disrespect for religion, lying in time of war (Pipile), sorcery, sexual relations with a foreigner (Carib), false testimony (Darien), and fornication between slaves (Vera Paz). Sometimes the choice between death and fine lay with the injured party, as for fornication and for poaching.

Enslavement was the penalty for murder by a minor (Yucatan), theft (if the thief was unable to make restitution and also pay a fine to the royal treasury) or attempted robbery, continued unchastity by a woman, unsuccessful rape, and obtaining goods on false credit (Guatemala), repeated adultery (Vera Paz), cohabitation with another's female slave (Pipile). Small thefts and improper advances to a woman were punished by banishment in San Salvador, as was bigamy in Nicaragua, but thieving was penalized by mutilation in Darien; a degrading punishment was flogging for falsehood (Pipile), theft by a noble (Yucatan), and adultery (Honduras and Nicaragua). All but the most heinous offences could, however, be commuted by fines. Strict fulfilment of contracts was required, and they were made valid by the parties drinking in the presence of witnesses.

3. South America.—The general level of civilization is far lower in S. America than in the northern continent; indeed, the conditions are, broadly speaking, very little superior to those of the Californian tribes. The usual centre of government in S. America is the village, each village having its own chief. Succession to the chieftainship seems generally to be by inheritance, as among the Bororo, Uaupe, western Tupi, Araucanians, and the tribes along the Xingu; but sometimes, as among the Caribs, Chiquito, Guahibo, Cren, Coroado, and Paraguayans, each chief is elected, though among some tribes, as the Tupinambaza, only from a special family. Only rarely does he claim divine power, as when a chief near Coro asserted that he was creator and lord of earth. Unlike N. America, which is matriarchal, both matriarchy and patriarchy are found in S. America; hence succession is sometimes matriarchal, as in British Guiana and among the Warrau, and sometimes patriarchal, as among the Uaupe, Araucanians, and the tribes along the upper Xingu, although among the latter, in default of a son, a sister's son becomes chief.

In time of peace the functions of the S. American chief are mainly conditioned by his personal ability, though in any event he is a counsellor rather than a ruler. He controls, in great measure, agricultural operations, organizes the expeditions for hunting and fishing, determines on places of settlement, and, at least sometimes, settles disputes that may arise. Among the Karaya he protects orphans and illegitimate children, and among the Macusi he convenes the village assemblies. One other function of importance he enjoys which is strikingly alien to his N. American fellow—his control of barter with neighbouring tribes and his duties as representative of his own village and as host to guests from other villages. Barter is much more important in S. than in N. America, and commercial relations between different stocks lead to a greater development of the rudiments of international law than is the case in the northern continent. So far is this carried that, among the Karaya, skill in conducting mercantile transactions is a more important qualification for chieftainship than ability in war, and even adopted prisoners of war may become chiefs if their business capacity is sufficient. In time of war the powers of the chief are greatly increased, as among the Caribs, Araucanians, Molucho, and Puelcho. If a chief is absent, he may be represented by a vice-chief, *e.g.* his sister; and if he dies, a kinsman, *e.g.* his widow's brother, may act until another chief assumes formal office. Among the Pampas tribes, on the contrary, the chief is authoritative only in time of peace.

Village councils deliberate on affairs of general importance; and sometimes, as among the Araucanians, sale of any part of the settlement is dependent on their approval, or, as among the Macusi, contesting parties submit to their decision, while among the Pampas tribes matters of religion come within their purview.

A further point of difference between S. and N. American government is the greater power of the 'medicine-man' (*paje*) in the former, particularly in matters that fringe upon the sphere of religion, *e.g.* in making war to revenge a murdered tribesman. However great the influence of the 'medicine-man' in N. America, he does not limit or circumscribe the power of the chief as he does in S. America.

The execution of justice usually depends upon the wronged individual or his friends or kin, although the functions of the Macusi council, just mentioned, form an exception to this general rule. Where a crime affects the whole community, as in cases of witchcraft, all seek to punish the offence. Death, often at the instance of the *paje*, is the penalty for sorcery and treason, as among the Araucanians, or for a woman who is unlawfully present at dances or in the men's house, as among the Chambira and some of the tribes along the upper Xingu, as well as among the Amazonians. Minor punishments are flogging or blinding, as for theft among the Brazilians. Among the Araucanians, torture may be used to extort a confession of guilt.

Occasionally legal responsibility is highly developed, as among the Goajiro, where one who lends an animal is responsible for any damage which it may do, and he who sells intoxicants for any mishap that may result. The Brazilians are acquainted with a system of deposits in pledge.

4. Peru and the Chibchas.—The culture of Peru stands quite isolated in S. America, where a high degree of civilization has been secured by no other people except the Chibchas (*q.v.*). The Peruvian government was essentially a socialistic despotism. Like the N. American Natchez, the Peruvians believed that their Inca was descended from the sun, whence he united within himself all civil and religious power, and was regarded as perfect. He was aided by a host of officials, themselves under strict inspectors, and everything was regulated to the minutest detail; in the giving of tribute, for instance, the natives of Pasto, being deemed stupid and dirty, were required to contribute at least some quota in the form of a levy of vermin. Poverty and idleness were as impossible as avarice; but, on the other hand, the socialism of the Inca's State stifled all initiative and all personal endeavour, placing everything on one dead, though relatively lofty, level. Land, for instance, was

apportioned by the State to the individual in proportion to the size of his family, and the allotment was changed annually according to the change of his circumstances—a usage which also appears elsewhere, as among the Brazilians and Huron. Labour was required of all—even children of five had their appointed tasks—and this labour was as meticulously regulated as were clothing, food, the care of strangers, the sick, the poor, and orphans and widows. The succession to the Incaship, as well as to the principal offices of State, was in general—though there were exceptions, and the authorities are not altogether in agreement—by inheritance in the male line.

Obedience to law was a marked characteristic of the Peruvians, particularly as law was of divine origin, and violation of it was believed to bring the wrath of the gods upon the land. The judges, who were supervised by inspectors and obliged to give an account of their administration, were bound by definite laws, and from their decisions there was no appeal, although the more important cases were tried before the higher officials, *e.g.* provincial governors. The severity of punishment was mitigated by alleviating circumstances, such as a first offence, provoked murder, or theft because of necessity; parents shared in punishment for offences committed by their children, and sometimes the superior was made a co-defendant with his inferior. On the other hand, men of rank were punished more severely than the ordinary citizen; *e.g.*, if one of the Inca's retinue committed the smallest theft, he suffered death.

The death penalty was freely inflicted, as for abortion, immorality, adultery, murder, ordinary theft, sorcery (the sorcerer's entire family being extirpated), fornication by a vestal of the sun (her lover and her whole kindred suffering with her), blasphemy of the sun, cursing the Inca, bridge-burning, etc.; lesser offences were punished with imprisonment; idlers were flogged; and even lying and slovenly housekeeping were visited with legal penalties.

The Chibcha ruler possessed despotic power. Succession passed first to the sister's son, or, in default of him, to the deceased ruler's brother. The laws were severe, and are remarkable for the number of fines which they levied, hereby enriching the royal treasury. Death was the penalty for murder, rape (if the culprit was married, his wife might be exposed to double the outrage which he had committed), incest, sodomy, and cowardice in war (in the latter event the coward might instead be forced to wear women's clothing). The thief was blinded; and other forms of mutilation are also mentioned as penalties. The nobles usually suffered degrading punishments, such as shearing off of the hair or flogging by their wives.

LITERATURE.—A complete survey of American law could be gained only by study of all the material thus far accessible on the peoples dwelling in the Americas. The chief summaries—by no means exhaustive—are the following: C. F. P. von Martius, *Von dem Rechtszustande unter den Ureinwohnern Brasiliens*, Munich, 1832; J. Kohler, *Recht der Azteken*, Stuttgart, 1892, 'Ueber das Recht der Goajiroindianer,' *ZVRW* vii. [1887] 381-384, 'Die Rechte der Urvölker Nordamerikas,' *ib.* xii. [1895] 354-416; M. Schmidt, 'Über das Recht der tropischen Naturvölker Südamerikas,' *ib.* xiii. [1899] 280-318; T. Waitz, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker*, iv. [Leipzig, 1864] 404-417 (for Peru); H. H. Bancroft, *NR*, San Francisco, 1882-83, ii. 133 ff., 433-472 (for Mexico), 630-660 (for Central America). Much material, with references, is scattered throughout A. H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1894-95.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

LAW (Babylonian).—Babylonian law naturally was based upon ancient custom. The origin of such custom, however, is often hidden from us in the mists of antiquity. We may legitimately argue back from historic conditions to the prehistoric implications, but the methods usually adopted are guesses in the dark. The invention of writing and the use of clay as the writing material have combined to preserve documentary evidence of the nature of the old consuetudinary law of Babylonia to a very remarkable degree. The disputes which arose among the ancient Babylonians were settled by a court consisting of judges and a group of assessors, the elders of the city. In the times of a settled monarchy the judges were recognized, if not appointed, by the king, and ultimate appeal was made to him. Their decisions, if not revoked on appeal, carried the weight of his authority as viceregent of the god—just as in earlier times human judges had declared the decision of the divine judge of men. Ultimately, therefore, judicial decision and royal enactment were a divine law; Babylonian law ran in the name of God.

The population of Babylonia was in all but the very earliest times a mixture of races. Racial customs must in early times have been diverse and conflicting. The earliest people whose monuments have reached us are known as Sumerians (see art. BABYLONIANS AND ASSYRIANS). They were early in contact with, and influenced by, Semitic folk. When invasion and conquest by successive waves of immigration had blended these races, they were subjected to further inroads by the Hittites, Kassites, Assyrians, Aramæans, Chaldæans, Persians, and even Greeks. For the most part, however, the life of the people had assumed a very stable form, and neither law nor custom suffered much change. This conservatism was largely due to the high degree of justice and the exact suitability to local conditions which the law had reached by the time of the Ist dynasty of Babylon, whose sixth monarch, the celebrated conqueror and lawgiver, Ḫammurabi, promulgated a code of laws known by his name as the Code of Ḫammurabi.[1]

Certain customs which had grown up under the oppressive rulers in Sumerian times were abrogated in favour of easier and fairer regulations by a series of enactments which are sometimes called the Code of Urukagina, after the monarch who claimed thereby to have relieved his people of the exactions of the royal tax-gatherers and priests. The rulers themselves and a host of their officials had ground down the people by fees and fines for legal matters such as divorce, marriage, or burial. To a considerable extent this was a legal reform; but, *e.g.*, while Urukagina abolished the fee demanded for divorce in former times, he has left us no statement of the conditions on which divorce was to be obtained in future. His reformation did away with abuses and restored the laws of God, but his record of it affords little information as to what those laws had been.

As it is probable that the Sumerians, over whom Urukagina ruled in the South of Babylonia, regained after his reforms their own native customs, uninfluenced by the Semitic peoples soon (about 20 years later) to rise to empire in the North under Sargon of Akkad, we must deplore the fact that we cannot treat the Code of Urukagina with adequate fullness as an authority for Sumerian law. When Sargon conquered the South, we may assume that great changes took place there, but we have evidence that the Sumerian law was adopted, in a great measure unchanged, by the Semitic invaders. Their very law-terms were taken over. Even when the bulk of the legal document was written in Semitic, Sumerian words and phrases were adopted unchanged, and 800 years later appear even in the Code of Ḫammurabi. The use of Sumerian as a language for legal documents in Southern cities such as Nippur survived the Ist dynasty of Babylon.

[1] This we shall usually quote as 'the Code.'

We must therefore bear in mind that Babylonian law has its roots in Sumerian soil; and, while Semitic customs were retained where race prejudices or religious needs demanded, the laws which regulated the settled civilization of the community were due to economic necessity rather than to racial characteristics. They had been elaborated by Sumerians, but Semites assimilated them as too valuable to alter or discard. The Code of Ḫammurabi embodies the judgments of a long series of judges acquainted with an already formulated system of law which had considered most of the points involved in their decisions. Perhaps the need for any further enactments arose from the conflict between ancient law as found in the land and a recent custom due to the modifications introduced by the new race. For the dynasty to which Ḫammurabi belonged rose to power as the result of a fresh immigration of a Semitic folk called 'Amorites.' The Semitic speech already in use in Babylonia was known as Akkadian, but that of the new-comers showed marked differences from it and affinities with the Western dialects. We may assume that customs marked by similar affinities came in with it.

Hence we cannot claim even racial purity for Babylonian law. It is the product of the interplay of many peoples. It would be a task outside our limits to attempt to unravel the threads which are easily discernible in its texture—even if the materials for judging of their composition were available.

Curiously enough, the Semitic scribes who adopted the Sumerian methods of writing compiled extensive lists of words and phrases, such as would occur in legal documents, and attached Semitic renderings. These lists have naturally proved of great assistance in reading the Sumerian portions of the many thousands of legal documents, such as conveyances, deeds of sale, leases, bonds, marriage settlements, receipts, and other memoranda, which have come down to us. They were obviously drawn up to assist young lawyers, who were to become notaries. By a happy accident one scribe has preserved what looks like an extract from a code and has been called the 'Sumerian Family Laws' (see *ERE* iv. 257, v. 447).

The great Code of Ḫammurabi was often copied even at the time when promulgated, and copies were made for the library of Ashurbanipal, king of Assyria (668–626 B.C.), which reproduce its decrees with marvellous fidelity 1200 years later. Copies, made in Babylonia, of even later times, exist. They were divided into books, or chapters, and read and commented upon almost to the end of Babylonian power. But copies of other later laws also exist, which show marked changes. The legal documents of the Chaldæan period of Nebuchadrezzar and his successors also show changes. We may, for want of a more precise term, call this Neo-Babylonian law.

With the details of a citizen's rights and obligations we are not well acquainted. Much is assumed in the Code as well known which we would gladly be told explicitly. The Code recognizes the *amêlu*, a free-born person of high birth and standing, the *mushkênu*, free, but of lower rank, and the *wardu*, slave. These three great classes were separately treated. A slave could be sold or pledged, and had no wage for his services. If injured by a third person, his injury was assessed and the offender fined, but the fine went to his master. The master seems to have had the power to punish him, but not to kill him, though he might brand him. The master clothed and fed him, and he had a right to three days' cessation from labour a month, at any rate in some cases. He might acquire property and even marry a free woman. He could buy his freedom and sometimes was freed by adoption. The slave girl often bore children to her master, but acquired rights thereby, so that she could not be sold outright, and even when insolent to her mistress could only be reduced to slave rank again, and was free in any case on her master's death. The slave went freely about the city and district, but was strictly guarded against flight. Any one who captured a runaway slave and restored him to his master was entitled to a fixed reward. To harbour a slave or connive at his flight was severely punished. To obliterate the slave-brand was treated as theft.

Some slaves, possibly captives in war, were owned subject to a fixed period of State service, extending to four or five yearly terms, either for war or for public works.

The status of a *mushkênu* was that of a plebeian. It may well have embraced the whole population, not of noble birth, who yet were free. The legal documents rarely refer to such members of the community except to name the quarter of the city where they dwelt. Injury done to them was punished more severely than injury done to a slave, but less severely than injury to an *amêlu*. But the *mushkênu* had less to pay for his crimes than a noble would, just as his offering was less in the temple. In all other respects he was free, and in many laws he is included among the *amêlu*, being named solely when treated as distinct.

The *amêlu* was properly a man of family, his genealogy being enrolled, his birth, marriage, and death being subjects of registration, and he was by strict interpretation an aristocrat—a title borne by the king himself. His status covered not only the rich proprietors, but also the military, priestly, and professional classes. Gilds of artificers existed, and had special quarters in which they usually dwelt. They were inter-connected by family relations, but admitted as apprentices both slaves and freemen. Nevertheless, they ranked as *amêlu*.

The king was in theory a benevolent despot, and the prosperity of his land depended to an extraordinary degree on his powers of hard work and organization. He took cognizance of all sorts of affairs throughout his kingdom—oppression, distress, neglect of officials, building, sheep-shearings, and movements of supplies, as well as military measures. Above all, he was the source of justice and the fount of honour. He had long ceased to be owner of all land, though conquest made him owner of much territory, especially the land of those killed in battle. He had his own estates as a private person as well as entailed endowments, as also had the great officers of State. But he had to buy like a private individual if he wished for more, or at any rate compensate at market price those whom he displaced. In most cities there was a palace which was usually occupied by his viceroy, or by a local magnate. Thus the *rabiânu*, or city mayor, had his palace. It was a hereditary office subject to royal approval.

Under the Ist dynasty a great many military or feudal retainers were settled in the land. To each was assigned a definite holding of field, house, and garden, together with some stock, for which he owed service. The service was 'the king's errand,' whether for war, garrison duty, postal duty, or command of troops or of gangs of work men on the *corvée*. The holding was inalienable, but refusal to go on the king's errand forfeited it and life together. It was carefully protected from oppression or the encroachments of higher officials, and was reserved for its holder if he returned from foreign service within three years. If he had a son able to manage it in his father's

absence, it was entrusted to him; if not, the duty was delegated to a *locum tenens*, one-third being reserved to the holder's family. Neglect on his own part to manage it forfeited the holding. If such a feudal tenant was taken captive abroad, he was ransomed at his own expense, but, in default of means to ransom himself, his city was bound to ransom him, and, if that failed, the State did so.

Such feudal tenants were captains, or at least sergeants, in the army and taskmasters on the *corvée*. All able-bodied men were liable to serve on both accounts, with the exception of temple servants, shepherds, stewards on estates, palace servants, and those whose service was essential at home. In the course of time military service was commuted for payment, or a group of families was called upon to provide and maintain a soldier, while the State found him arms. As early as the 8th cent. B.C. a definite area of land was required to furnish a bowman and his attendant pikeman, and was known as a 'bow' of land. These were grouped in tens and hundreds. Later, a horseman with his equipment was due from certain estates.

Closely allied with this military tenure was that of a *shukha*, whose office is not entirely clear. He was a 'catcher,' but whether of fish or men is not certain. If the former, fisheries were State property; if the latter, he was a sort of policeman. Subject to his service, whatever it was, he held lands on the same terms from the king. Other lands were held on condition of paying rent or tribute. The latter was due from holders of conquered lands. The king often rewarded his faithful subjects by grants of lands, and might further exempt such estates from State obligations.

Riparian owners had liabilities to furnish work to keep open or repair the canals, bridges, quays, etc. These public works were carried out at the expense of a king, a temple, or some public benefactor, but the beneficiaries were responsible for their upkeep.

The State claimed also fixed rates of all crops, stock, etc. Every city had its own octroi, customs, ferry dues, and highway and water rates, levied on all but its own citizens. Each city claimed some special rights; thus a burgher of Nippur could not be pressed for the army; Asshur was exempt from the *corvée*; and every citizen of Babylon had the right to trial even if caught at burglary. We happen to know of these facts accidentally, but probably most cities preserved laws distinct from the Code.

The king's messengers in peace, and a general or levy-master in time of war, could commandeer horses, fodder, cattle, grain, vehicles, etc., giving a receipt to the victim which ensured their return or compensation. Apparently the temple treasuries, which received a share of the spoil taken in war, were called upon to furnish means for war, the king borrowing of them and sometimes returning the loan. Later we find the palace acting as treasury and arsenal also.

The temple was a most important factor in Babylonian city life. The god, in theory, owned all the land, and every holder paid a tribute or rent to the city-god. The holders were, of course, members of the clan or association of people who had settled the city and built the temple. These and their descendants also had the right to furnish its priests, who inherited shares of the right to minister in the temple; and profit by its revenues became a valuable species of property, freely sold or leased, but entailed to certain lines of succession. The tribute to the temple from those who held its lands was early commuted to a tithe of all produce of the lands. But many holders had inherited the right to share this revenue. Private ownership of land may have arisen from the fact that a man inherited land on which he paid tithe ultimately to himself. Conquest and commercial arrangements gradually dissolved old obligations, and estates were freed by charter; but, while much land became private property, much was always entailed, or subject to redemption by next of kin. The temple also always retained much in its own possession, and acted as a large land-owner. It owned great herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and goats; it made up raw stuff, especially into garments; and it lent freely to those in necessity and on security, both with and without interest. Naturally the temple grew rich and employed large numbers of servants. The convents or cloisters of vowed women made the same progress, till the temples and allied institutions became much like the monasteries in mediæval towns.

Doubtless the concentration of power in the hands of the monarch and consequent centralization, coupled with incessant intercourse, gradually tended to break down local and city custom and make for uniformity. But there were other important factors.

A principle which had established itself through ages of commercial activity was that of contract. If parties could agree, they made a contract. Their deed of agreement was drawn up by a notary public, confirmed by an oath taken in the temple, and duly sealed by the parties in the presence of witnesses, who often affixed their own seals also. These witnesses were usually neighbours or collaterally interested parties. The manner in which such a contract was executed excluded as a rule any illegality or impiety. A clause was often appended, by which the parties bound themselves, in case of breach of contract, to abide by the decision of the king. The Code constituted such a decision in all the cases with which it dealt.

In case of a breach of contract, the injured party brought a suit before a court consisting of one or more judges, together with the elders of the city as assessors. A most important feature of procedure was the production of the contract and the witnesses to it. The contract was usually executed in duplicate, each party taking a copy, while the notary often held a further draft or third copy. To secure the deed from being tampered with, it was usually enclosed in a cover or envelope, also of clay. The envelope was inscribed with a copy of the document and fully sealed. While it would have been easy to falsify either deed or envelope, both being often of unburnt but sun-dried clay, it was impossible to reproduce both with their seals. The envelope might be tampered with, but the interior could not be. The judges in delivering judgment declared that they had seen and inspected the contract, and only rarely set it aside, and then only on grounds of mistake in fact. In some cases, suit was made to certify a fresh copy where the original had been lost, in which case the original was declared invalid, and ordered to be destroyed if found. After the contract was fulfilled, as when a loan was repaid, both copies were destroyed; and if, for any cause, one was not producible, an order was issued and recorded that whenever found it was to be destroyed.

The Code recognizes this practically universal habit of contract and the use of writing to embody agreements. It even insists on it, as when it declares that without marriage bonds a woman is no wife, or that no money or goods can be brought into account for which written receipt had not been given and was now produced. It was seldom that a contract was repudiated on the ground that it had been originally illegal.

On the other hand, the Code lays down that a man who is in debt shall not hand over his land and crops to his creditor unconditionally, even if the creditor is willing to speculate on the future yield, but must himself husband the crop and pay off his debt from the produce. This was intended to check the ruinous habit of borrowing on security of future crops, by which the debtor might pay dear for temporary accommodation or a lender lose his money through a failure in crop.

Consequently, it must not be assumed that the Code merely embodied contemporary custom or old-established precedents. It constituted a standard appeal. It did not prevent contracts (many of

which have come down to us), which were voluntarily entered upon, from being sustained by the court and carried out. It did set up a standard which subsequent practice gradually accepted. Even its criminal clauses were not at once enforced. In many cases they really define a maximum penalty or minimum wage, but the judges used their discretion as to its exaction.

The Code recognized the power of the oath, especially in cases where guilt turned on intention. A man who struck a fatal blow could purge himself of murderous intent by oath. In a deeply religious community fear of divine wrath constituted a strong security against the violation of an oath. The witnesses as well as the parties were put on oath. In many cases it was left to this 'fear of God' or 'conscience' to secure justice between men; but the written specification of the form which justice should take was a great step in advance.

In early times an oath 'by the king' alone is quite frequent. In all cases the oath by the local god is usual. When Babylon became the metropolis, Marduk, the city-god of Babylon, was usually associated with the local god and the king in oaths. The form of the oath is usually 'he, or they, singly or both together, swore by (lit. took the name of) such and such god or king.' Rarely is the purport of the oath given. It was 'not to repudiate the contract,' whether by default or by raising a plea on its terms. What form the divine vengeance on the faithless would take is not clear, but it is 'the god's evil.' When kings called down the curses of the gods on the malefactor who should contravene their orders, or deface their monuments, they were extraordinarily explicit and exhaustive as to the evil consequences to follow; but this was to deter from wrong any who should purpose its commission. The oath was a personal acceptance of obligation, not a fulmination against unknown wrong-doers. The agent who was robbed was put on oath as to his loss. The buyer of a slave abroad had to take oath as to his price.

Crimes and their punishments are dealt with in a separate article by T. G. Pinches (vol. iv. pp. 257-260), to which reference should be made. Very little evidence of crime beyond breach of contract can be expected from the deeds or bonds, but a number of legal decisions, laid down in special cases, have been preserved. For the most part, these do not state the nature of the suit, only the result and verdict of the court. The plaintiff seems always to have brought his complaint, 'captured' his defendant, and found judges, and each then conducted his own case. Written pleas and answers were put in, but advocates are not mentioned. We find orders given to defendants to appear and answer the charge. As the decisions are drawn, the plaintiff usually wins. But this is deceptive, for both parties were regarded as plaintiffs; each party brought the other into court. The decision as stated thus makes the winner appear to have been plaintiff. The parties could demand the venue to be changed so that the case should be tried in their own city. In any case we hear of many local courts. The unsuccessful suitor was often degraded to slave status, but, except that he had lied or borne false witness, no ground for this punishment is stated, and he paid damages also.

In the Code no punishment is assigned to murder. We may assume that this was left to the avenger of blood, but can only argue from silence. We are also left in doubt as to the agency for the execution of judgment. As, however, a man was to be scourged 'in the assembly,' we may assume a general responsibility on the part of the local assembly for execution. In two cases the Code specifies that the punishment shall be executed on the scene of the crime: a thief at a fire shall be thrown into it, and a burglar is to be gibbeted opposite the breach that he made in the house which he broke into.

The power of the king to over-ride the decision of the local court is implied by the Letters of Hammurabi summoning certain cases, including the judges and witnesses, as well as the parties, to his judgment-seat. But the Code mentions the royal pardon only in the one case of an adulterer when the injured husband has already condoned the offence by pardoning his wife.

Corporate responsibility is seen in the fine inflicted on a burgh or parish for murder or robbery within its confines, and as compensation to the sufferer or his family. This was imposed in cases where the malefactor was not produced.

Private property in land was the rule, but subject to the State dues and obligations. There were usually a number of consents and pre-emptions to be considered on a proposal to transfer ownership. Not all obligations went with the land; a sale might transfer the estate to another official's sphere and so be a detriment to the previous overlord. Hence a State official, the city, the county, or parish, so to speak, the levy-master or recruiting sergeant, all might have claims. Sometimes governors of a district enforced its transfer to a different land-group, or alienated land from a temple, or included it in their own subdivision. This was usually regarded as a wrong, and the king was appealed to for reversal of the transfer. A new owner was usually bound to take up the State obligation. Royal charters in granting an estate as reward for signal services to the State often gave exemption in perpetuity from State obligations.

A very interesting form of property was the right to income for the receipts at a certain door of the temple, or to exercise certain functions in the temple itself. The right was entailed, and so often came into possession of a woman or other person who could hold but not exercise it, or merely did not see fit to do so. The right was then pledged, or sold, to others, but reverted to legal heirs on the death of the beneficiary.

The Code recognizes many ways of disposal of property: sale, barter, gift, dedication, lease, loan, pledge, deposit, and testamentary disposition, all of which were primarily matters of contract. Sale was the delivery of the purchase in exchange for the price agreed upon. In the case of real estate, delivery was symbolized by handing over a staff, or the key of a house, or later the deed of conveyance. Estates were often exchanged, the difference in value, if any, being paid in money. Money payments might be made in silver, or its equivalent in corn or other natural produce. Credit was given for the remainder of a price not paid in full, but was treated as a loan from the seller to the purchaser, who gave a bond for it. The Code allows no claim unsubstantiated by a duly executed deed. The buyer had to convince himself of the seller's title. He might demand guarantees against State obligations or against a creditor who had lent money on the estate. The Code insists that he should himself discharge the State liabilities. Certain feudal holdings could not be sold or exchanged, and, if a purchaser claimed to have acquired such, he had to return the estate, and in addition forfeit the consideration which he had given for it. The next of kin might exercise his right of redemption, if it came under the head of *bît abišu*, lit. 'his father's house,' *i.e.* if the seller had inherited the property. If a man bought or received on pledge or deposit from a slave or a minor without written power of attorney to dispose of the property, it was by the Code fraudulent

possession; he was accounted a thief, and was obliged not only to restore and forfeit the consideration given, but also to lose his life. Attempts to upset a sale were rarely successful, but their occurrence shows that a buyer needed to exercise caution.

In the case of goods, exchange of receipts was the rule. The buyer of a slave usually exacted a guarantee that he would not develop disease, especially the dreaded *bennu*—a disease not yet clearly identified, but having a long period of incubation, possibly of 100 days. The seller also stipulated for a fixed period of rest or abstinence from labour for his slave, three days a month in some cases. He might guarantee against the slave being recalcitrant, against desertion, obligation to State service, and other depreciations in value. These all came under the head of *sartu*, lit. 'blame' or 'fine,' and were matters of contract, and the buyer probably could not repudiate his purchase on their account unless guarded by contract. But the Code expressly annuls his purchase for him if the slave develops *bennu* within a month, and awards him return of the price paid. On the other hand, it makes the seller responsible for any claim made on the slave after sale. If slaves were bought abroad and, when delivered to the buyer in Babylonia, turned out to be the lost or fugitive property of a Babylonian, they were, if native Babylonians, to be set free. If they were foreigners, they were to be given over to their former owners for the same price as paid for them abroad, as to which the buyer's oath was to be accepted. Properly a native Babylonian could not be enslaved except as a punishment for crime. But slaves born in the house might be sold abroad, or freemen captured by the enemy might be enslaved by the enemy and bought in the foreign market to sell in Babylonia. They had to be set free and their sale was illegal.

In the case of all goods, the seller might have fraudulently appropriated them, and the buyer be at the mercy of the real owner, who might recognize and claim them. The claimant had, of course, to establish his previous ownership of his lost goods or be adjudged a would-be thief. If he did establish his right, the buyer would be adjudged a thief unless he could prove a *bona fide* purchase. He had to produce the seller and the witnesses to the sale. If these were not on the spot, he was allowed six months to produce them. If he could not prove purchase, he lost his life. If the fraudulent seller was produced, he suffered death, and the wronged purchaser could recover from his estate, if any. If the seller had died, the purchaser could recover five-fold. So far the Code itself. The seller, however, usually guarded against all claim to repudiate purchase by a clause in the sale contract that the buyer was satisfied and took his oath not to enter any claim against him. In return he guaranteed the buyer against defect in title.

In the great majority of cases an owner cultivated his own land, but the principle of hire was well understood and clearly worked out.

Lease of fields, gardens, or houses was made for a term of years, usually one or two, rarely longer. The date of entrance upon possession was often stated, and sometimes the date of expiry of lease. The rent was usually stated, and a portion, often a half or a third, paid at once in advance. The rent taken was often a share of the produce, a half or a third. In practice it is often specified as so much per acre. The case of share-rent raised difficulties which this avoided. If the landlord, *e.g.*, was to receive half and was paid in advance, a storm might ruin the tenant's share, but the Code ruled that he must stand the loss. If the storm came before payment was made, both shared equally in the loss.

In many cases, along with a field in full yield another area was leased to reclaim. This appears usually to have been part of the pasture land, or open field, which lay outside the ring of irrigated land or water meadows surrounding the city. Perhaps it was a recognized right that land so reclaimed to full cultivation became the private property of whoever reclaimed it. Some such convention must have obviated the gradual restriction of grazing land. Sometimes it appears that the land had simply gone out of cultivation. In all these cases the area to be reclaimed was allotted free of rent, on condition that at expiry of the term it should, usually in the third year, pay an average rent. Meanwhile the already cultivated land went with it at average rent, so ensuring the maintenance of both landlord and tenant, the latter making what he could out of the reclaimed land.

In a slightly different case, a plot of land might be let to make into a garden, orchard, or palm plantation, the tenant paying no rent for a period fixed according to the nature of the crop and the time it needed to become productive. The Code set an average term of four years, and in the fifth year tenant and owner divided the crop. After that it was the owner's. If he let it, he let it as a garden. If the gardener left any part unplanted, it went into his share. The division was one of area, not of produce. The owner took first choice. Another system has been called *métayer*. It was specially common with temple lands. Here the landlord found seed, oxen to plough and to harvest, agricultural implements, and in some cases even labour. The tenant was a sort of bailiff or steward. The Code lays down regulations of a more stringent character than those usual in the few contracts concerned with this system. For theft of the seed, of fodder supplied for the oxen, or rations for the labourers, the tenant had his fingers cut off. For stealing the implements or overworking the oxen he was fined, a still heavier penalty being levied for sub-letting the oxen or for entire neglect to cultivate. As he was likely to be poor, it was laid down that, if unable to pay his fines, he should be torn limb from limb by the oxen on the field.

The Code allows sub-letting as long as the landlord suffers no damage. But the contract, whatever its terms, must be kept. From accident or circumstances over which he had no control the cultivator might get no crop. A flood might carry away the produce, or a drought impoverish the crop or utterly destroy it. The Code rules that in such cases the tenant may carry over and pay the year following. The phrase is peculiar: 'to wet his tablet' may refer to an obvious custom of damping the sun-dried clay of the contract and so altering its terms. One thinks at once of the Unjust Steward in Lk 16. His lord's debtors 'moistened their tablets' and altered not the date, but the amount, of their debts. If a gardener failed to make a garden, he had a double debt to pay. He had kept the owner out of five years' produce of the land and disappointed his hope of a garden. He had therefore to pay five years' average corn-land yield and make the garden after all. The tenant of land was bound to cultivate it, not only because it might become foul and so not readily let to a new tenant, but because the rent was usually a share. If the tenant were neglectful, he could not get off with the stipulated share of the actual produce; but the Code fixed the rent at half an average crop for the locality. He had, further, to complete all the operations on the land as he would have done after a good crop if himself continuing the tenancy. He had to plough it, break it up with hoes and picks, gather out and burn the weeds, and generally leave it in good order. The fields do not appear to have been manured, and the rich alluvial soil might not have needed it; but gardens, orchards, and palm-groves were dunged with oxen manure.

Houses were usually let by contract, which stated the size and situation of the house. The term of lease was also stated—usually one year—and the amount of yearly rent. A clause often occurs to the effect that the house is in good repair. The doors, door-frames, and some other woodwork were removable, and the tenant might bring in his own. If let with the house, they were inventoried. The tenant covenanted for all repairs, the nature of which might be specified. In the rainy climate, houses of sunburnt brick required constant and immediate attention. The accessaries of the house are often mentioned, such as a court, a barn, a shop, a cellar, a well, but we have little exact information as to the usual accommodation in old Babylonian houses. They rarely exceeded one storey in height.

The Code enacted that, if the landlord wished to recover possession before the end of the lease, a fair proportion of the rent should be remitted. The tenant had full possession and could pledge the house.

A common plan was to lease a piece of land to a man to build upon. After a somewhat longer lease than usual the house came into possession of the landlord. The Code fixed the cost of building a house per area.

Boundary or common walls were often the cause of dispute, usually as to which neighbour should repair, or as to the right to fix beams. The condition that one might build it if the other might fix beams in it, *e.g.*, was matter of contract. Most of the sections relating to houses have disappeared from our copies of the Code.

Labourers were often specifically hired, the most common cases being to get in the harvest, for building, and to transport goods by road or canal. The wage was a matter of contract, but the Code fixed minimum rates. Cattle for ploughing, carting, and working the irrigation machines, etc., and the associated agricultural machines, chariots for journeys, and ships for voyages as well as for freight, were often hired.

The pastoral pursuits were highly developed. The kings and many rich land-owners, and, above all, the temples, owned large flocks and herds. As a rule, these were committed to shepherds, who gave a receipt for the animals entrusted to their care, and were bound to return the flock or herd undiminished and with proper increase after breeding, or to answer for them. A shepherd had to make good all loss due to his neglect. He was frequently a foreigner, belonging to one or other of the nomad races who roamed the deserts or open pasture.

Questions of currency arose. The standard by which the precious metals were weighed varied from city to city, and there is often a clause specifying the standard in which money should be repaid. The Code enacted that this could not be enforced. Payment in kind was to be accepted, and a creditor was bound to accept even goods at fair value.

Debt was secured on the person of the debtor, and in default of means must be worked off. But the father of a family could name a substitute—wife, child, or slave—to work off his debt. To mitigate the hardships of this custom, the Code protected the hostage for debt from ill treatment, and fixed the term of servitude at three years as a maximum, whatever the debt. If the hostage died a natural death, the creditor had no further claim; but, if he contributed by cruelty, he had to restore son for son or pay for the slave. He could sell the slave hostage, but not if it was a slave-girl who had borne children to her master. She had to be redeemed by her owner, *i.e.* replaced by a different pledge.

Pledges were often taken as security for debt, but could not be sold without consent of the real owner. Frequently, when profitable, as a slave or cattle might be, their value was taken by the creditor in lieu of interest. Pledges were often left with the debtor and served merely as security. Personal guarantee on the part of friends that the debtor would pay at the proper time was often given, and the debtor sometimes had to pay for this assistance.

Trade was thriving, and Babylonian merchants carried on a considerable overland commerce to distant lands. The foreign products in their markets were numerous and brought from afar. Palestine, Cappadocia, Elam, and the lands beyond these countries were conspicuous sources. Many who stayed at home took shares in enterprises conducted by travellers. Merchants received money or goods to be traded away. The Code regularized this practice, enacting that the parties should exchange receipts, and that demands should be based on documentary evidence. The agent had to deposit an inventory and receipt for what was entrusted him, and no claim could be substantiated except by such receipt. Profits were good; the agent must pay 100 per cent, whatever his own gains. He was not responsible if he was robbed on his travels, but had to be put on oath as to the extent of his loss. Profits were usually divided equally by contract on the termination of the business.

These trade journeys afforded the opportunity for transport. A considerable amount of forwarding was done. Debts were paid abroad by travelling merchants and purchases executed at a distance. The Code enacts that a merchant shall give a receipt for the consignment, take all responsibility, and exact a receipt on delivery. If he should default in any respect, he was penalized five-fold. Deposit was a common transaction, especially the warehousing of grain. The Code fixed a statutable rate of one-sixtieth for warehousing. The warehouseman took all risks, and paid double for all shortage, but only if he had given a proper receipt. If the goods were stolen from him, he had to recover as best he could; but he had no relief against the depositor.

The network of canals supported a vast amount of water traffic. Ships, whose tonnage was estimated by the amount of corn that they could carry, were incessantly plying for hire between the great cities. The contract specified the goods and their destinations, and named the charges. These were for carriage solely, but, when a whole ship was employed, the rations for the crew were charged specifically. The Code fixes the price for building, navigating, etc., and insists on a year's guarantee with a new boat. The captain was responsible for ship and freight, and bore all risks. If he sank a ship, he was fined half its value, even if he refloated it. In the case of collision the boat under way was responsible for damage to a boat at anchor.

The Code regulated traffic in liquor, fixing a fair price for beer, and severely punishing a tavern-keeper for allowing disorderly conduct or treasonable assembly. The hostess was to hale offenders to the court—which seems to imply efficient and accessible police officers, or perhaps the command of able-bodied slaves.

Payment through a banker, or by written draft against account, was usual. Bonds to pay were treated as negotiable. A man could usually borrow without interest from the temple treasury of his city, for a fixed term, but paid interest if his debt were left overdue. It is not quite clear, however, whether this privilege did not imply some relationship to the temple, possibly only full citizenship. Merchants, and temples in other cases, charged interest at varying rates, usually high, commonly 20 to 30 per cent, but for short terms. Long loans were rare, if known at all. A feature which seems to us somewhat irrelevant is that the money or corn appearing in a loan or other transaction is often specified as to origin and purpose; *e.g.*, so much silver, part of the rent of a house, is lent to hire reapers; so much corn produce of a peculiar field is lent to buy oil, or to pay a tax. The exact purpose of such specification is not clear, and, so long as the loan was punctually repaid, there seems no reason to restrict its use. No penalty is named for using the accommodation for a different purpose from that for which it was taken. Possibly there lurks in this specification an analogy to our 'for value received,' or it was

an acknowledgment of the moral claim of the borrower on the lender for accommodation.

LITERATURE.—For laws relating to marriage, inheritance, etc., see 'Semitic' sections of artt. MARRIAGE, ADOPTION, ADULTERY, FAMILY (Assyro-Babylonian), and INHERITANCE (Babylonian). The peculiar situation of vestals and vowed women comes under HIERODOULOI (Semitic), HOLINESS (Semitic). For details cf. C. H. W. Johns, artt. 'Babylonian Law' in *EBr*[11] iii. 115, 'The Code of Hammurabi' in *HDB*, v. 584, as well as *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, Edinburgh, 1904. The most important addition to the bibliography there given is J. Kohler and A. Ungnad, *Hammurabi's Gesetz*, Leipzig, 1909, which gives full transcription, complete vocabulary, juristic excursus, and about 1400 transcribed and translated legal documents of the Hammurabi period, to be followed by a large selection from the Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods. This body of material affords an almost complete text-book for the study of Babylonian law. C. H. W. JOHNS.

LAW (Biblical, Old Testament). — Ancient peoples, almost without exception, regarded their laws as of divine origin. At the top of the front side of the stele containing the famous code of Hammurabi, the sun-god Shamash is pictured in a bas-relief seated on his throne and presenting to the king the laws which follow. In ancient Egypt, law was attributed to the gods (J. H. Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*, London, 1906, p. 242). Ex 34[1-28] (J) represents Jahweh as dictating the primitive decalogue to Moses, who acts as His amanuensis, and the later tradition of Ex 24[12] states that Jahweh Himself 'wrote down the Ten Words' (cf. Ex 31[18]). Dt 6[1] implies that all the commands contained in that law-book were given directly to Moses by Jahweh. The late priestly tradition (*c.* 400 B.C.) of Ex 25[1] and 35[1] states that all the laws found in Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers were a direct revelation from God through Moses. Demosthenes asserted that 'every law is a discovery and gift of God' (*Aristogeit.* A, 16, ed. F. Blass, Leipzig, 1888). Even Cicero declared: 'Lex nihil aliud nisi recta et a numine deorum tracta ratio' (*Phil.* xi. 12). The belief that underlying all man-made laws was a perfect law, emanating from divine mind, was the foundation of Roman law. It is reaffirmed by W. Blackstone, who says:

'This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God Himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this origin' (*Commentaries*, ed. London, 1857, i. 27).

Thus it is that each age has expressed the conviction that law is not a mere human convention, but is conditioned by the eternal nature of things, and that behind nature is Intelligence and Will.

A more careful study of the ancient sources and the contributions of anthropology and sociology have shed new light upon the origin and growth of law. The ancients were not wholly ignorant of man's part in its development. In the epilogue to his great code Hammurabi declares: 'If a man heed my words which I have written upon my monument, do not efface my words, do not alter my monument, so may Shamash prolong his reign.' Recent discoveries have brought to light some of the older Sumerian laws which he incorporated (cf. *OLZ* xiii. [Leipzig, 1914]). Egyptian kings, like Horemheb of the XIXth dynasty, freely enacted new laws and gave them equal authority with the older laws which tradition ascribed to the gods (Breasted, *op. cit.* p. 242).

Notwithstanding the late traditions, which represent all Israel's laws as being directly dictated by Jahweh, the OT contains some of the best existing illustrations of the different stages by which law evolved. The custom of blood-revenge is a survival of the primitive stage of self-help, when, in the absence of an organized government, the individual or the clan undertook to redress all grievances (see, further, art. BLOOD-FEUD). It is typical of customs that were inherited from the pre-historic past and represented the crude beginnings of law. Some of them were based on wide observation and experience, and were beneficial to society; others were but the result of savage ignorance and superstition. Law began to take definite form when men began to refer their cases to an arbiter or judge. Ex 18[13-27] contains a vivid illustration of this important stage in the evolution of law. It represents the people of Israel in the wilderness bringing their cases of dispute to Moses for his judgment. The decisions which he rendered were called *tôrôth*. The singular of this word, *tôrâh*, is the common Hebrew designation of 'law,' and comes from a root which means 'to throw out' (the lot), then 'to direct,' 'to teach.' It corresponds closely to the two terms used in Homer for 'law': δίκη, which means a way pointed out, a course prescribed by precedent, and θέμις, that which is laid down. In 1 S 30[21-25] is found a clear example of the way in which such a decision grew into a judicial precedent possessing all the validity of the law. After David's followers overtook and vanquished the plunder-laden Amalekites, he decided, as the chief of his clan, that,

> 'As is the share of him who goeth into battle,
> So is the share of him who remaineth with the baggage,
> They shall all share alike.'

The historian adds significantly, 'And from that time he made it a statute and a precedent for Israel to this day.'

Usually the *tôrôth*, or decisions, were rendered by the priest, the representative of Jahweh, by the use of the sacred lot. Mal 2[6f.] states that 'the *tôrâh* of truth was in the mouth of the priest . . . and the people were wont to seek the *tôrâh* at his mouth.' It is evident that in the mind of the people these decisions enjoyed from the first the divine sanction. This fact represents the germ of the later Hebrew theory of the divine origin of law. Until the days of Nehemiah the oral decision of the priests was apparently ascribed equal authority with the written law.

The other common Hebrew word for law, *mishpāṭ*, is equally suggestive. It originally meant a specific judgment or decision. In Ex 21[1] it is used in the plural as a title for the decisions or judgments which embodied the fundamental principles of early Israelitish law and custom. At first it apparently referred only to civil law, but in Lv (*e.g.* 18[4. 5. 26]) it is extended to include ceremonial laws. The authority attributed to the decision (*tôrâh* or *mishpāṭ*) rendered by the priest, or tribal chief, or king, or civil judge gave ample opportunity for the development of custom and law. Ordinary cases were decided according to older precedents. When new cases arose, this flexible system made it possible for the judges to decide them, and, in so doing, to establish new precedents which, if just, soon gained the authority of definite laws. The passage already quoted from Ex 18 plainly illustrates the process. When the cases referred to Moses became so many that he did not have time to pass judgment upon them all, he appointed judges to decide all the questions that were analogous to those covered by *tôrôth* already rendered by him (v.[20]). 'They judged the people at all times, but the difficult cases they brought to Moses' (v.[26]). The principles which he thus concretely promulgated represent the historical foundation of the later tradition that he was the author of all Israel's laws.

Among the Hebrews, as among most primitive peoples, the customs and the oral laws, which grew up on the basis of those decisions, long sufficed. The OT contains some interesting illustrations of the gradual transition from oral to written and definitely codified law. The nine (at first probably ten) groups of ten words or decalogues, found in

Ex 21¹–23¹⁹, are the result of an attempt to embody the important principles of Israel's early law and customs in systematic, compact form (cf. C. F. Kent, *The Founders and Rulers of United Israel* [= *Historical Bible*, ii.], London, 1909, pp. 209–219). Each decalogue deals with a distinct subject and is divided into two pentads, indicating that they were first intended to be committed to memory—each law being associated with a finger or thumb of the two hands—rather than to writing. Thus, *e.g.*, the decalogue in Ex 21²-¹¹ deals with the rights of slaves: the first pentad (21²-⁶) with male slaves, the second (21⁷-¹¹) with female slaves. The first five decalogues contain civil laws and are very explicit. They clearly represent earlier customs and precedents—*e.g.*, 'If a man strike another so that he die, the manslayer shall be put to death' (21¹²). The remaining decalogues consist of moral and ceremonial laws, and are simply mandatory or hortatory—*e.g.*, 'Thou shalt not wrong nor oppress a resident alien, for ye were resident aliens in the land of Egypt' (22²¹).

In time these primitive Hebrew decalogues were committed to writing. They may at first have been inscribed on tablets and set up in the Israelite sanctuaries. They represent the same stage in the development of Hebrew law as the more elaborate Code of Hammurabi, which was inscribed on stone and originally set up in order that (as is definitely stated) the oppressed who had a suit to prosecute might read and understand these laws and learn how to secure justice (C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws*, Edinburgh, 1904, p. 393). Typical western analogies are the Code of Gortyn, set up in the market-place of that ancient Cretan town, and the Twelve Tables of the Romans.

The next step in the development of law was the modification, expansion, and codification of the earlier codes to meet the needs of a more advanced civilization and to embody the higher ideals of the later age. Again the OT contains excellent illustrations of this process. The Hebrews and most Oriental nations failed to develop an authoritative, legislative body. Even the Romans for centuries kept alive the legal fiction that the Twelve Tables were the sole foundation of all Roman law. During the latter half of the 7th cent. B.C. it became evident to the enlightened priests and prophets of Judah that the primitive laws of Ex 21¹-23¹⁹ (which were probably formulated as early as the 9th cent.) were inadequate. Many questions not contemplated by these earlier laws had arisen. Under the preaching of the great ethical and social prophets of the 8th cent., many new moral and religious principles had been proclaimed and accepted by the leaders of the nation. The spirit of reform that was at work called for a definite programme, if it was to bear permanent fruits. A detailed comparison of the primitive codes and of the laws embodied in Deuteronomy reveals the methods, as well as the work, of these self-appointed lawgivers. Three-fourths of the older laws are represented in the later code: some are simply reaffirmed, others are abrogated, the majority are modified or expanded in accordance with the principles of justice, humanity, and loyalty to Jahweh enumerated by Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah. The result is a remarkably complete code, well adapted to the needs of the Judæan kingdom about 625 B.C., and yet put in the mouth of Moses, whose early precedents it incorporates. 2 K 22¹-23²⁵ contains a remarkably clear account of how this privately-prepared code was promulgated. Evidently it had the sympathetic support of the ruling party and of an able group of reformers. At the opportune time it was brought from the temple, formally presented to the king, read before him and the assembled people, and then solemnly accepted by him in behalf of his nation. The final step was its rigorous enforcement by Josiah.

Interpreted in the light of the earliest records, Israel's legal history illustrates the five closely related stages in the growth of law. The first is the period of relative lawlessness, when the individual or the clan is the only recognized authority and human relations are determined by customs, most of which originated in the pre-historic past. The second stage is when questions of dispute are referred to tribal chieftains, priests, or judges, and their decisions are held to be binding not only in specific, but also in analogous, cases. The third stage marks the development of a definite oral law, based on earlier customs and precedents, and transmitted in the form of decalogues or concrete typical formulas. The fourth stage is when the primitive oral laws are committed to writing. The last stage is when the primitive laws are modified, expanded, and codified, and new laws are constantly being promulgated to meet the needs of a developing civilization.

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C. F. KENT.

LAW (Biblical, New Testament).—**1. Fading of the Law in the NT.**—In the Synoptic Gospels the Jewish Law forms a large part of the background of the narrative; but from that point forward less and less is heard of it, until it disappears entirely, and another standard of conduct takes its place. This change was due in the main to the action of the two great persons who were the founders, the one of Christianity and the other of Gentile Christianity. Both were too great to remain under the yoke of the Law as the Jews understood it; but, while the first never had any open conflict with the Law, the second waged a war upon it which began early and continued long.

2. Jesus and the Law.—Jesus was brought up in a pious home, in the religion of the Law which to the ordinary Jew in Palestine was no burden (Lk 1⁶). 'He never learned,' we read in Jn 7¹⁵; *i.e.*, He did not follow a life of learning nor place Himself under a scribe. His sympathies did not incline Him to men of that class. On the other hand, He lived in full sight of Gentile life, witnessing the social and religious usages of the heathens, and He had no aversion to people who were not Jews, and we never find Him boasting, as does the Jew of Ro 2¹⁷-²⁰, of the superiority which the possession of the Law gave to the Jews. Yet He regarded the Law with profound respect; He considered it to be the way of life that God had given to His people, and He experienced little reaction against it. He regarded it chiefly as a moral code; as a system of ritual, He was less impressed by it, and the tradition which the scribes had built up around it He must from early times have regarded with indifference, as being apart from the way of life that God had given to His people, and in some points inconsistent with it. He regarded the Law as containing, so far as it went, all God's will and all man's duty, though those who sought for perfection had some aims which transcended its precepts; and He was able to say (Lk 16¹⁷, Mt 5¹⁸) that it was easier for heaven and earth to pass than for one tittle of the Law to fail. The passage, Mt 5²¹-⁴⁸, in which Jesus appears as definitely superseding commandments of the Law by more ethical commandments of His own, belongs certainly in its arrangement, and also in much of its detail, to a later state of things; the Law is made ruder than it was as then practised, in order to act as a foil to the more elevated injunctions set over

against it, and some of the sayings (*e.g.*, vv.[39-42]) reflect the controversy of the Church of Palestine with the synagogue. Jesus Himself upheld the religious system of His country, and encouraged others to do the same.

He did not, however, treat all the commandments of the Law as being on the same level. To the question, a common one in His day, 'Which is the greatest commandment of the Law?' He replies by citing two precepts of the Pentateuch, the first requiring love to God with all one's powers, the second love to one's neighbour (Mt 22[34-40]). The Golden Rule (*q.v.*), stated by Him in the positive form that one must do to others what one desires that they should do to oneself, is said to be the cardinal injunction on which hang all the Law and the prophets (Mt 7[12]). The comparison of the weighty matters of the Law with those less weighty is certainly authentic (Mt 23[23]), and shows Jesus to have occupied the same position as the prophet Micah (6[8]). The words of the prophet Hosea, who declares that God requires mercy and not sacrifice, are twice put in His mouth in the First Gospel (Mt 9[13] 12[7] = Hos 6[6]).

We find, accordingly, that Jesus was never accused, as were Stephen and St. Paul, of any attack on the Law. On several points He pleads for an elastic view of the Law. He is not rigorous as to the Sabbath or in the matter of fasting; but on these points general opinion seems to have upheld His views. The only instance of His deliberately setting aside a law of the Pentateuch is in connexion with divorce, for which Moses provided, but which Jesus held to be quite inadmissible (Mk 10[2-12]). Divorce, He held, was allowed to the Israelites when they were in a backward state, and unable to support the whole of God's will as seen in the original constitution of human nature, which made marriage indissoluble. It may be doubted if Jesus used the words 'except for fornication'—that would of itself bring marriage to an end.

The example of Jesus could thus be appealed to by those of His followers who held the Law in honour and practised it. But He also prepared the way for those of them who sat loose to it and regarded it as a code of morals and scarcely more. He taught no ritual, and stood somewhat aloof from the great ritual system of His country. He was impatient of the minute and burdensome tradition which the scribes had built up around the Law and which the Pharisees regarded as being itself the Law and diligently practised. He formally broke with that vast system which sought to provide rules for every case that could occur in human life, and to bring under strict regulation the whole of conduct and action. In Mk 7[1-23] He repudiates the authority of the tradition, as being made by man, not given by God, and in many cases opposed to the law of God. And the Law itself was a very different thing from the law with the tradition added to it. The ignorant could keep it; the Gentiles could accept it.

Jesus was opposed with His whole soul to the pedantic rigour of the system of the scribes because their multiplied rules depressed rather than elevated the people, and drove away from the true religion rather than attracted to it. The tradition, as they applied it, was a merciless institution, binding heavy burdens on men's shoulders, shutting them out of the kingdom of heaven, losing sight of the weightier matters of the Law, mercy and justice and faith, in the strict attention paid to the small matters, mint, anise, and cummin (Mt 23[4. 13. 23. 25]; all these verses are in Q). In Mk 6[34] He regards with compassion the multitude which has prevented the repose that He sought to give His disciples, because they are harassed and scattered like sheep without a shepherd, and He begins diligently to teach them. He taught them doubtless of a lighter yoke, of more practicable duties than had generally been asked of them. He taught them that the Law was not their only link with God, that He was their Father, and that they had access to Him at all times, and could learn for themselves, by meditation and prayer, what He asked of them. By His teaching He brought the question of the Law to the position in which the Church took it up; appeal could be made to Him both for continuing to practise the Law (for He Himself had done so) and for a spiritual attitude in which the Law parts imperceptibly with its authority.

3. Attitude of the Jews in Palestine.—In Palestine the followers of Jesus continued after His removal to be good Jews. They frequented the Temple, gave alms, attended to their prayers, and even—if Mt 5[23f.] is not to be taken figuratively—offered sacrifice (see Ac 21[23-26]). They observed the Levitical laws as to clean and unclean in food and other matters. Circumcised Jews would see no reason in their attachment to Christ for throwing away the advantages of their position. To their piety as Jews they added another piety as followers of Jesus; they kept His commandments in addition to those of Moses, and began to collect them into a code, as we see in Mt 5[21-48], as well as in collections like Q and in the *Didache*.

When the gospel spread to Gentile soil, new questions arose. Those who named the name of Christ naturally sought to meet together and to practise their common worship in the form of common meals. From this sprang the first great controversy of the Church as to the terms on which Jewish and Gentile Christians could live together. The strict Jewish Christians held that Gentile believers must become Jews and keep the whole Law; and in this they only upheld the practice which obtained in the Jewish missions to the Gentiles. But Jewish missions had been great failures for this very reason; and easier terms had to be sought for the Gentile converts. In Ac 15 the Church at Jerusalem draws up an easy rule: Gentiles are to be admitted to the Church on agreeing to adopt the Jewish standard as to sexual intercourse, to have their meat for table prepared in the Jewish fashion, and to abstain from meat offered to idols. (It seems scarcely possible that the addition to these outward abstentions of the far-reaching ethical rule added in Cod. D, 'and not to do to others what they would not have done to themselves,' can be original.) Of this compact little is heard afterwards. The claim, moreover, made in Ac 10 for Peter, that he was the first to be led by Providence to see that the barrier which kept Gentiles outside the Church ought no longer to prevail, can scarcely stand against the evidence of Ac 15 and Gal 2 that Paul and Barnabas went to Jerusalem to get the question settled as to the terms on which Gentiles should be received, and that Peter afterwards broke through the adjustment then made. If the story of Peter and Cornelius has a historical kernel, it probably belongs to a later period than that in which Acts places it. The question may have arisen in more parts of the world than one, and have been settled in various ways. In some of the Pauline churches we know that it occasioned acute controversy and that the solution which Paul aimed at and no doubt attained was that the Gentile Christians were recognized as children of Abraham without coming under any obligation at all to the Jewish Law, and that it was recognized that the difference between Jew and Gentile had ceased to be regarded; they were all one in Jesus Christ.

4. St. Paul and the Law.—The question of the

attitude of Christian missions to the Law must have occupied Paul's mind as soon as he became convinced of his own call to carry the gospel to the Gentiles, *i.e.*, if we are to accept his own statement in Gal 1[16], from the time of his conversion. Ro 7, with its incisive definition of the character of the Law and its relation to those wearing human nature, shows how impossible it was for him to demand of the Gentiles obedience to a Law which brought so little comfort to himself. In that chapter he arrives at a different conclusion as to the Law from that of his own upbringing. It is idealized as Jesus idealized it, and regarded as a searching standard of entire perfection, dealing not with acts but with motives and springs of conduct, and holding up to man all that he ought to be. It is holy and just and good; to keep it would be to find the promises fulfilled that one should live by it (Gal 3[21]). But, alas! it is too good for man to live at peace with it. The Law is spiritual, but man is carnal and cannot love the standard of ineffable goodness. It acts as an irritant on him and brings to the surface his innate weakness and recalcitrancy, and so, while his reason approves of it, he cannot keep it, and is driven by it to despair.

The view of the Law which is here set forth as a matter of personal experience, and a truth of psychology, is set forth again and again in the Pauline Epistles as a general doctrine. So the Law acts, so it was intended to act, on those who are placed under it; it is by God's decree and counsel that it does so. The Law is the strength of sin (1 Co 15[56]), which is the sting of death; it came in to multiply transgression (Ro 5[20]), for where there is no law there is no transgression (4[15]); the Law, therefore, works wrath. Every one who does not keep it in every point is under a curse (Gal 3[10]). The ministry by which it was introduced into the world was a ministry of death (2 Co 3[7]).

The Apostle was confirmed in this view of the nature and effects of the Law, to which his own experience had brought him, by his missionary practice and experience. He saw that the Gentiles were being saved quite apart from the Law. The Law was not proposed to them as in any way a condition of salvation; only Christ crucified was declared to them, and, on their believing in Christ crucified, the Spirit at once took possession of them, and they began to exercise the gifts of the Spirit (Gal 3[1-5]). From this he inferred that God was, as a matter of fact, justifying the Gentiles by faith (Gal 3[8]), and from this he drew the broad conclusion that the method of salvation by keeping the Law was now discontinued by God in favour of the new method—that of salvation by faith in Christ alone—and that this method now alone availed (Ro 3[21-28]).

Holding this very radical doctrine about the Law, the Apostle could no longer follow up his career as a Jewish Rabbi (Ph 3[7-9]); and he became the object of the bitter hatred of the Jews wherever he went, and also of many Jewish converts to Christianity, who represented him (Ac 21[21, 28]) as teaching that the Jews living among the Gentiles should renounce their allegiance to Moses, and should give up circumcising their children and the observance of Jewish customs. That this was a gross exaggeration there can be no doubt; he himself adhered to many a Jewish custom, and he did not interfere with such practices on the part of other Jews (1 Co 9[20]). But to Gentiles he made it quite clear that the Law was no condition of salvation for them; and to Jew and Gentile alike he proclaimed that salvation did not come through the Law, but only through faith in Jesus Christ (Gal 2[15f.]). To those who sought to make his Gentile converts Judaize, practise circumcision, and observe Jewish festivals and Jewish restrictions in diet, he offered, as the champion of the liberty of these converts, an uncompromising opposition.

5. Position of the OT in Pauline churches.—Something must be said of the place of the OT in the churches of Pauline foundation. The converts were supposed to be familiar with the history and the words of the OT; it was the revelation of which the gospel of Christ was the consummation and flower; it was full of Christian things; the promises recorded in it were now being fulfilled to believers in Christ (1 Co 10[11], Ro 1[17]); its types were coming to reality in their experience. The Law and the Prophets were Christian books, and the discerning could find Christ in them in most unlikely places. The moral standard of the OT, an object of envy to the Gentiles, was from the first that of the Church; the heathen converts were at once lifted up to it, though they accepted its requirements not from the dead code but from the living spirit of Christ, and were taught, as He had taught, that love was the fulfilling of the Law. The provisions of the Law were not quoted either in setting up the standard of Christian conduct or in correcting the lapses which took place from it. Nor was any appeal made to the OT in arranging the internal affairs of the Church; in these the mind of Christ is the supreme authority, where the Apostle's own authority does not suffice (1 Co 7[10] etc.). When disputes break out among believers, the Apostle advises that recourse should not be had to the heathen courts, but that an arbiter should be found among their own number. The OT Law has completely disappeared as law for the Gentile converts.

The arguments by which Paul sought to account for the Law, which in his missionary practice he had deprived of all authority, are of various kinds. Some consist of bold speculations on the divine economy of salvation, some are Rabbinical devices, bringing a new meaning out of a text of the OT. Of the former kind the most powerful and impressive is that of Gal 3[23]–4[7], where he speaks of the Law as the tutor placed over the growing heir to check his freedom till the day arrives when he attains his majority. This had been the case with mankind when Christ came, and in Him the spirit of adoption took possession of the human race now entering on its inheritance, so that the guardian is no longer needed. The Law is treated in this chapter as being on a level with those constraining influences, or spirits of the world, under which the Gentiles also were confined, to be prepared for Christ. A great thought also is contained in the argument that the promise was antecedent to the Law, which could not set it aside, and that the promise to Abraham, made to him before circumcision was instituted, is fulfilled directly to the Gentiles who, like him, take faith and not works for their guiding principle and, therefore, are Abraham's true children (Gal 3[14-22], Ro 4). Of another calibre are the arguments that the seed, in the singular, to whom, with Abraham, the promise was addressed, must indicate an individual person, and that Christ is that person, faith in whom now saves (Gal 3[16f.]), and the argument that the radiance on the face of Moses when he came down from Mount Sinai was fading away, and that he put on a veil to hide that circumstance from the Israelites, who think that the radiance still rests on the Law, though it is quite outshone by the exceeding radiance of Christ (2 Co 3[7-18]).

6. Conclusion.—The controversy about the Law subsided in Paul's life-time. In Galatians it is acute; in Romans the argument is free from passion; in the Corinthian Epistles there is little of it; in the later Epistles only a few phrases are found to show that he still stands where he stood (Ph 3[6-9], Col 2[14-17]). On the other hand, the com-

mandments of Christ are valid wherever they apply. This is the case in every part of the Church. The eternal validity claimed by Christ for the old Law (Lk 16^{17}) is attached to the words of Christ Himself (Mk 13^{31}), and the law of love is spoken of both by Paul and in many of the later books of the NT as the sum of Christian duty (Gal 6^{2}, Ro 13^{8-10}, Ac 20^{35}, Ja 1^{27} 2^{8}, He $13^{1.\ 16}$, Jn $13^{34f.}$). In the Fourth Gospel the Law of Moses is spoken of as 'their law' (Jn 15^{25}), as if Christ had not acknowledged it and His followers had nothing to do with it.

LITERATURE.—The Commentaries and Bible Dictionary articles, especially J. Denney, 'Law (in NT)' in *HDB*. On the recent discussion on the Apostolic Decree and the relation of Acts to Paul, see K. Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, London, 1911; A. Harnack, *Luke the Physician*, Eng. tr., do. 1907, *The Acts of the Apostles*, do. 1909, *The Date of the Acts*, do. 1911; W. Sanday, 'The Text of the Apostolic Decree,' in *Exp*, 8th ser., vi. [1913]; B. W. Bacon, 'The Apostolic Decree against πορνεία,' *ib.*, 8th ser., vii. [1914]. A. MENZIES.

LAW (Buddhist).—In the strict sense of the word there is no Buddhist law; there is only an influence exercised by Buddhist ethics on changes that have taken place in customs. No Buddhist authority, whether local or central, whether lay or clerical, has ever enacted or promulgated any law. Such law as has been administered in countries ruled over by monarchs nominally Buddhist has been custom rather than law; and the custom has been in the main pre-Buddhistic, fixed and established before the people became Buddhist. There have been changes in custom. But the changes have not been the result of any enactment from above. They have been brought about by change of opinion among the people themselves. And in order to ascertain whether such change of opinion was, or was not, due to the influence of Buddhism it would be necessary, in each case, to ascertain what the custom had been before the introduction of Buddhism, in what degree or manner it had changed, and what had been the probable cause of the difference shown. Unfortunately our knowledge of the history of social conditions in Eastern Asia, whether before or after the 6th cent. B.C., is at present much too meagre to enable us to deal with the subject in so thorough a manner. Nothing has yet been written on the subject, and only a slight beginning may yet be made.

The Buddhists, for instance, had from the beginning what we term their canon law, what they called *Vinaya*, *i.e.* 'Guidance.'[1] It consists of 227 rules to regulate the conduct of the members in outward affairs, and some supplementary chapters on special subjects. These 'articles of association' are quite apart from the Buddhist religion, and indeed have little or nothing that is specifically either Buddhist or religious. No religious community could avoid quarrels and disruption without the assistance of rules of the kind. Now, just before the rise of Buddhism there were quite a number of such Orders. The names of ten of them are preserved in the *Aṅguttara*.[2] Unfortunately, the records of nine out of the ten have perished. They had no writing; and, as each Order died out, both its doctrine and its canon law, kept alive only in the memory of its members, died out also. Only one of these pre-Buddhistic communities has survived—that of the Jains; and the internal regulations of the Jain Order have not yet been published. It was inevitable that the early Buddhists should have adopted in many details the customs already followed by these other wanderers. But in the main, no doubt, the rules were Indian in origin, the common inheritance of all the schools.

There is nothing in the 227 rules of the *Vinaya* which would be included under the English term 'law' in its modern sense. In the explanations and applications, however, of the rules, as interpreted in the chapters of the Order when a particular case came up for decision, there is a good deal of what we should now call case law. For example, Rule No. 3 is as follows:[1]

'Whatsoever Bhikkhu shall knowingly deprive of life a human being, or shall seek out an assassin against a human being, or shall utter the praises of death, or incite another to self-destruction, saying, "Ho! my friend! what good do you get from this sinful, wretched life? death is better to you than life!"—if, so thinking, and with such an aim, he, by various argument, utter the praises of death or incite another to self-destruction—he, too, is fallen into defeat, he is no longer in communion.'

In the elucidation and discussion[2] of this rule a very large number of all possible cases of alleged infringement of it are given. The cases are not real ones that actually happened, but hypothetical. The offences, or alleged offences, are sorted into grades, which are distinguished one from another as modern English law-books distinguish between assault, aggravated assault, manslaughter, and murder. The penalty for the gravest kind is exclusion from the Order; that for the lesser kind is suspension in varying degrees, and for varying duration.

For instance, a man digs a pit; that is no offence. He digs it in the hope that X will fall into it; that is a *dukkaṭa* ('evil act'). The man (X) falls into it; that is another *dukkaṭa*. He is badly hurt; the man who dug the pit is guilty of a 'grave offence' (*thullaccchaya*). The man falling is killed, then the digger of the pit is guilty of 'defeat' (*pārājika*), involving expulsion.[3]

This is not criminal law. It is intended only to keep the Order pure; and the penalties are very mild. But it is interesting to find in these discussions the doctrine of malice aforethought, or accessory before (or after) the fact, used much as a modern jurist would use it, and leading up to decisions which are very much what a modern jurist would give.

H. Oldenberg, in his introduction to his edition of the text, has carefully considered the manner in which these documents enshrining the Buddhist *Vinaya* were gradually built up, and their approximate date. He concludes that the whole text, as we now have it, was in existence within a century of the Buddha's death; and that much of it—for instance, the 227 rules referred to above—is older, and may go back to the generation in which Buddhism arose. It will be seen at once that this is quite modern compared with the Ḥammurabi Code of customary law. Such value as these Buddhist documents have in the history of law depends upon their being the oldest legal texts which apply the principles of equity to the problems to be solved. They do not pretend to put forward any code of law. They belong to a stage beyond that, and only attempt to utilize for the practical requirements of an association of co-workers the results of previous thought on legal points. We shall probably never know how far these results may have been modified or softened by the Buddhists for the purpose of application to the new problems to be met.

The administration of this law (if law it can be called) was very simple. The decision lay with the Chapter, which was composed of all members of the Order resident within a certain boundary. The boundary, also fixed by the Chapter, was so arranged as to secure the possible attendance of from a dozen to a score of members. All the members were equal, and the senior member presided. If the matter came to a vote—which seldom happened—the voting was by ticket. Complicated matters were referred to a special committee for report, and the decisions in most cases were unanimous. The Chapters had no authority to

[1] Ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1879–83.
[2] See T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899–1910, i. 220–222.

[1] *Vinaya Texts*, i. 1 (*SBE* xiii. [1881] 4).
[2] *Vinaya*, iii. 68–86; not yet translated.
[3] *Ib.* iii. 76.

settle any matters not included in the *Vinaya*, or to deal with property not the property of the Order. All such matters were the province of the State, to be settled according to the customs of each locality. They were regarded as secular, not religious. Thus customs as to marriage and divorce, the inheritance and division of real or personal estate, the law of contract and criminal law, were all purely secular matters to be determined by the sense of the lay community. This continued to be the attitude of mind of the Buddhists throughout their long and varied history.

The expression 'Buddhist law' as used of law administered in English courts in Ceylon and Burma has a very different meaning. When the English had taken the whole of Ceylon, they introduced English law except on certain matters, which, they imagined, would or might offend the religious feelings of some of the inhabitants. Thus, with regard to marriage and inheritance, they granted to the Dutch the Roman-Dutch law on these points, and to the Hindus and Muhammadans the Hindu and Muhammadan law respectively. Taking for granted, in their ignorance of Buddhism, that the relation between law and religion on these points must be the same for the Buddhists as for these others, they decided to incorporate into the law of the Island the customs prevalent there among the majority, the Buddhists, on the same points. For this purpose they made inquiries as to what those customs were, and finally recognized two different groups of custom as valid, the one for the low-country Sinhalese, the other for the Kandians in the hills. By so doing they made customs current at the beginning of the 19th cent. valid for ever, and deprived the lay community of any power of change or adjustment which they possessed. On the other hand, they soon began, and have continued, to change the customs by two methods, one of interpretation by judicial decisions, the other by legislative enactment. By the latter they have introduced the registration of marriages, and conferred upon the laity the power of making wills.

The original report on Kandian customs has been recently discovered and a translation of it published by C. J. R. Le Mesurier and T. B. Pānabokkē, under the title *Niti Nigandava* (Colombo, 1880). The course of events in Burma, since it was taken over, has been very similar. But, whereas we know nothing or next to nothing of Sinhalese law before the conquest, we have for Burma a most valuable summary of the gradual growth of the customary law in E. Forchhammer's *Jardine Prize Essay* (Rangoon, 1885). He shows how the customary law, originally introduced there from S. India in the 10th cent. A.D., has been constantly but slowly modified by the influence of the Buddhist laity. He mentions also the numerous codes in which such alterations have been incorporated. D. Richardson has translated one of the latest of these codes under the title *The Damathat, or Laws of Menoo*, Rangoon, 1906.

LITERATURE.—The authorities are given in the course of the article.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

LAW (Celtic).—**1. Law.**—Of the legal institutions of the ancient Celts we have no knowledge beyond the evidence of philology and the statements of Cæsar with regard to Gaul. Both the Goidelic and the Brythonic branches of the Celtic languages contain a term for law cognate with the Latin *rectus* (Ir. *recht*; Welsh, *rhaith*), while the words for judgment (Ir. *bráth*; Welsh, *brawd*) also correspond in these branches. Similarly, we have in both branches the same word for 'duty' or 'responsibility,' namely Ir. *dligeᵭ*; Welsh, *dyled*. Throughout the Celtic world, too, the organization of society had a tribal basis, and the legal institutions of the Celts were, consequently, in their origin tribal in character. This tribal character, though in a greater or less degree modified, survived unmistakably in Irish and Welsh law, as we know it in historic times. The evidence of Cæsar as to Celtic law (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13) relates to the druids, of whom he says that they decided practically all public and private disputes and assessed the fines and penalties in the case of any crime, as, for instance, homicide, while it was they also who gave their decision in the case of any dispute regarding inheritance or boundaries. In the case of refusal to abide by their judgment they had recourse to excommunication from religious ceremonies—a punishment which, in practice, involved the loss of all civil rights, and which survived as outlawry in Irish and Welsh law. The druids, according to Cæsar, formed an organized community, at whose head was a chief druid. It is, however, from the surviving Irish and Welsh legal literature that we derive most information concerning actual Celtic law. In Breton and Cornish there are no legal documents in existence, but we may surmise that ancient Breton and Cornish law was substantially the same as that of Wales, while the clan-system of the Gaels of Scotland, which was introduced by the Dalriad Scots, had, as its legal counterpart, institutions of the same essential character as those of Ireland. From a study of the Irish legal treatises, which reflect the older tribal system better than do the Welsh laws, we find that legal decisions were not given by judges appointed by the king, but by men of legal learning, who were of two grades: (1) the *brethem* (gen. *brethemon*, whence 'Brehon'), a term usually translated 'judge,' but more correctly 'advocate,' and (2) the *ollamh*, or law-agent. It is not impossible that, originally, recourse was had to the judgment of men of known probity, without regard to legal training, but, though the judicial powers of non-professional magistrates and noblemen survived in Ireland for certain purposes, it is clear that for all the more important cases a trained judge was necessary. Each district appears to have had a Brehon, and some more than one, while the king and the great magnates had Brehons of their own. Where there were more than one Brehon in a district, a litigant had a choice. In Welsh law there are plain indications of the earlier tribal basis as in Ireland, but there are also clear signs of the growth of the influence of the royal power upon law, and of the beginnings of a police system in a rudimentary form. In Ireland the policing of the law was practically in the hands of the tribal community, who, in the last resort, in the case of contumacy, could outlaw the offender. Side by side with the growth of the central power (possibly through the influence of England) we find much more prominence given in Wales than in Ireland to severe punishments, such as hanging and mutilation, and later to such a mode of trial as ordeal. It is interesting to find that, both in Ireland and in Wales, there were legal variations in different localities, and, in Ireland, this variation led to the broad division of *Cáin*-law, or law of general application, and *Urradhus*-law, which varied with the locality. The trial of cases arising under the latter type of law was open to noblemen and local magistrates, but cases under the former type could be tried only by trained judges. There is no clear evidence of any personal or collective legislation in ancient Ireland, but it would appear that portions at any rate of written custom were recited at some of the great annual gatherings, such as that of Tara, for which the Irish had so marked a predilection. It is sometimes stated that Irish legal practice did not distinguish between crimes and torts. This is true so far as the existence of a

pecuniary method of compensation was concerned, but motive nevertheless entered in, for in the case of homicide, *e.g.*, malice doubled the penalty (see (CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Celtic]).

It might be thought that the position of arbiter in Ireland was one which placed the community at his mercy. In practice, however, the Brehon had to exercise his judgment with great care, for, if on appeal his judgments were reversed, he was liable to lose his practice, to pay damages, and to lose any free land which might be in his possession. It was also generally believed that blotches would arise on the face of a judge who gave false judgment. The main function of the judge was to assess damages and compensation correctly, and the Irish legal treatises contain minute rules for this purpose. The task of obtaining the damages from the defendant lay with the plaintiff and his kin, and, when the defendant was obstinate, recourse was had to the process of distraint—a process which occupies a very large place in the extant legal treatises of Ireland. The scope and the nature of Celtic law, as it has come down to us, can best be estimated from a survey of extant Celtic law-books.

2. The law-books of Ireland.—A number of the legal treatises of Ireland were published in the Rolls Series, in five volumes, together with a glossary forming the sixth volume, at various dates between 1865 and 1901, under the direction of the Commissioners for publishing the Ancient Laws and Institutes of Ireland. These volumes contain not only the texts of the various legal treatises, but also translations of them, together with introductions which vary considerably in value. The MSS of these treatises contain, along with each text, a commentary to each section of it. Sometimes the commentary throws light upon the text, but frequently the commentary merely embodies the practice of a later age. Vols. i. and ii. and part of vol. iii. of the Irish Laws are occupied by the most important Irish legal treatise, namely, the *Senchus Mór* (or 'Great Collection'). Vol. i. and the first part of vol. ii. are occupied by one of the most elaborate portions of Irish law, namely, that of 'distress.' The two chief varieties named are 'distress without delay,' and 'distress with delay,' but possibly the most interesting type of distress mentioned is that initiated by 'fasting against' a person—a form of distress resorted to when an inferior pressed for payment from a superior. This form of distress had a powerful social sanction, since, when the inferior threatened to die of hunger at the door of the superior, the guilt of his death was regarded as falling on the superior's head (cf. A. H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnolog. Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1894–95, ii. 562). The remainder of vol. ii. contains a brief treatise on 'The Law of Services of Hostage-sureties.' Hostage-sureties played a large part in the social life both of Ireland and of Wales. This treatise is followed by 'The Law of Fosterage,' which deals with an institution which held a prominent place in Irish and Welsh life (see CHILDREN [Celtic], FOSTERAGE). Land tenure, too, receives its share of attention in this volume, and we have first the 'Law of Free (or *Sáer*) tenure,' and then the *Cáin Aigillne*, or 'Law of *Dáer*-stock tenure,' *i.e.* the less honourable tenure by *giallna-* (or pledge-) security. This section also contains an interesting account of the Irish law of contract. The remainder of vol. ii. deals with the '*Cáin*-law of social connexions.'

The social connexions here meant are, according to the text of this treatise, those of 'the chief with his *aigillne*-tenants; the Church with her tenants of ecclesiastical lands; the father with his daughter; a daughter with her brother; a son with his mother; a foster-son with his foster-mother; a tutor with his pupil; a man with a woman.'

This part of the *Senchus Mór* is of interest as containing an account of the conditions of marriage among the ancient Irish. Vol. iii. contains a valuable introduction on the general principles of Irish jurisprudence, and completes the *Senchus Mór* with a treatise called *Córus Bescna*, or 'The Customary Law.' This treatise also deals with contracts, and lays stress on the importance of keeping oral contracts. These discussions of contract show the advance which the Irish had made on the way described by Maine as from 'status to contract.' We have here a discussion of a wide range of topics, including the regulation of banquets, gifts to the Church, and the like. Throughout the *Senchus Mór* the Church is treated with the highest respect. The next treatise in vol. iii. is the 'Book of Aicill,' said to have been so named after Aicill near Tara, and attributed to Cormac, the author of the well-known glossary. It deals very largely with what we should now call criminal law, and it is interesting to note that one of its dicta is 'Fines are doubled by malice aforethought.' In this treatise the commentary is remarkably long as compared with the text. Other dicta are:

'Every judge is punishable for his neglect'; 'every king is entitled to compensation for injury to his road'; 'what is cast ashore is the property of the owner of the shore'; 'thou shalt not kill a captive, unless he be thine.'

Numerous topics are touched upon, and the wrongs and injuries discussed are not confined to crimes, while one of its most interesting features is the discussion of responsibility. Vol. iv. contains first a treatise entitled 'Of taking Legal Possession,' and treats of the symbolic ceremonial that was necessary in Ireland (as in other ancient countries) for the institution of an action for the recovery of land. One part of the treatise is called 'The Beginning of Customary Law,' and deals with matters other than the main topic of the treatise. The treatise which follows is called 'Judgments of Co-tenancy,' and discusses important problems arising from this aspect of Irish life. It deals with the partition of lands, fences, trespasses by cattle, bees, hens, or dogs, and gives rules as to the relations between landlord and tenant. Herein we see clearly the growth in Ireland of the individual ownership of land. This treatise even considers the trespasses of pet herons and pet hens, pet deer and pet wolves, pet old birds and pet foxes. Another treatise which throws light on older conditions of life is that called *Bech bretha*, or 'Bee-judgments,' which deals with various contingencies arising from the keeping of bees, a very important phase of country life at the time when mead was drunk and sugar was unknown. The next treatise, *Coibnius Uisci*, or 'The Right of Water,' deals, among other subjects, with the right to construct water-courses and mills. The next treatise, called *Maighne* ('Precincts'), deals with such topics as the violation of precincts, the position of fugitives, and the like. In this document is to be found a very interesting account of sanctuary among the Irish. The treatises which follow are, 'Of the Judgment of every Crime,' 'Division of Land' (a mere fragment), 'Of the Divisions of the Tribe of a Territory' (containing a valuable account of the Irish tribal system), and the document called *Crith Gabhlach*, giving mainly an account of the rights and emoluments of the higher classes of Ireland. This treatise, however, frequently describes an ideal rather than an actual state of things. To this treatise is appended a sequel to *Crith Gabhlach*, and also a fragment on 'Succession.' The treatises given in vol. v. are of a miscellaneous character. The first and second are called respectively 'Small Primer' and 'Heptads,' and they were evidently intended as manuals to be used in the law-schools of Ireland. The former shows some trace of the

influence of the Civil Law, and of an attempt on the part of the writer to show his familiarity with Latin. The substance of the work, however, deals with Irish custom, notably in connexion with the *Sáer-* and *Dáer*-grades, and gives a summary of the Irish legal system. The Heptads arrange the different legal maxims in groups of seven, as may be seen from the following example:

'There are with the *Féini* (*i.e.* the free Irishmen) seven reboundings that shed blood, which incur not debts nor sick-maintenance: the rebounding of a chip from the chipping of firewood or of carpentry; the rebounding of a piece from a flesh fork; the rebounding of a branch backwards; the rebounding of a flail from the ground; the rebounding from horses' shoes; the rebounding in a forge; the rebounding of a stone off another.'

Then follows a treatise called 'Judgments on Pledge-Interests,' in which the various pledges given by men and women are dealt with in detail. The next treatise, 'On the Confirmation of Right and Law,' consists in its earlier part of triads on various topics, while the latter part is of a miscellaneous character. This series of legal documents ends with a brief tract called 'On the Removal of Covenants,' which deals with the rights of property.

3. The law-books of Wales.—The law-books of Wales are not legal treatises like those of Ireland, but consist of a code attributed to Hywel Dda (Howel the Good), a Welsh prince of the 9th cent., together with one or two amendments attributed to other princes, and a series of mediæval legal maxims. The code in question is found in Latin and in Welsh MSS, and the Welsh MSS fall into three main groups called *Venedotian* (that of N.W. Wales), *Dimetian* (that of S.W. Wales), and *Gwentian* (that of S.E. Wales) respectively. The propriety of the term 'Gwentian' has been disputed, and some at any rate of the MSS of this group may belong to Powys (East Central Wales). Howel ruled over a large part of Wales, and was in touch with the English Court, and it is not improbable that he signalized his reign by means of a code after the manner of other kings of his epoch. Tradition, as embodied in the introduction to the Dimetian code, regards Whitland, in Carmarthenshire, called in Welsh *Y Ty Gwyn ar Daf* ('The White House on the Tâf'), as the place where the code was drawn up at an assembly consisting of the leading men in Church and State, the bishops being present in order to prevent any collision with the law of the Church. A perusal of the laws themselves, however, brings to view much that is not Christian and that must have been derived from pre-Christian usage in Wales, and, ethnologically, this pre-Christian matter is of great value. Still, to distinguish ancient tribal usage from positive enactment in the Welsh laws is no easy task. The oldest known copy of the Welsh Laws is in Latin, and dates from the last quarter of the 12th century. The next MS in point of age is a Welsh one, giving the Venedotian version of the code, which bears the name *Llyfr Du'r Weun* ('The Black Book of Chirk'), now in the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth. This MS was written about A.D. 1200 and was probably copied from a pre-Norman archetype. The oldest MS of the Dimetian version of the code was written about A.D. 1282, and there are in existence several other MSS of Howel's Laws. These Laws deal with various topics, such as the royal household and the officers of the king and queen, the ætheling or heir apparent, the king's majesty, the king as the fountain of justice, criminal law, with fines, accomplices, blood-feud, and life-price, together with the Welsh penal system; the law of property and succession, touching upon inheritance to personal property, succession by testament, and the succession of women; the execution of justice and the surety-system. Further, there are important laws relating to women, to trespass, to the values of animals, tame and wild, and of buildings, trees, utensils, etc. The Welsh Laws show clearly the advance of a territorial system represented by the *arglwydd* (lord), as the king's viceroy in each district, as compared with the earlier tribal system, wherein the *pencenedl* (chief of the tribe) was supreme in each tribe. In addition to the mediæval legal triads, which are given in the MSS, there are published in the *Myvyrian Archaiology* certain triads called the 'Triads of Dyfnwal Moelmud' (an imaginary Welsh lawgiver), which were first brought to view (and probably invented) by a certain Tomas ab Ifan of Glamorgan in 1685. In the Laws of Howel reference is sometimes made in a conventional way to the 'Law of Howel,' as evidence for a given legal doctrine; but, in spite of the unhistorical character of these references, the very prominence of the royal court in the code makes it highly probable that it had a royal origin. The two Welsh princes whose amendments of the law are quoted, in addition to Howel, are Bleddyn ab Cynfyn (1063–75) and Rhys ab Gruffudd (1155–97). The Welsh Laws in their several versions, like those of Ireland, deserve close study, especially in connexion with the history of the gradual advance in Celtic countries from a tribal to a territorial system, and the consequent legal evolution.

LITERATURE.—*Ancient Laws of Ireland*, Rolls series, 6 vols., Dublin and London, 1865-1901; **W. F. Skene**, *Celtic Scotland*[2], Edinburgh, 1886–90; **H. d'Arbois de Jubainville**, *Études sur le droit celtique*, Paris, 1895, *La Famille celtique*, do. 1905; *Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales*, ed. Aneurin Owen, Rolls series, London, 1841; *Welsh Medieval Law*, ed. A. W. Wade-Evans, Oxford, 1909; **F. Seebohm**, *The Tribal System in Wales*, London, 1904; **Hubert Lewis**, *The Ancient Laws of Wales*, do. 1889; **P. Vinogradoff**, *The Growth of the Manor*, do. 1905; *Cyfreithieu, Hywel Dda ac eraill*, ed. W. Wotton, do. 1730; *The Cambrian Register*, vols. i. and ii., do. 1796 and 1799; *Myvyrian Archaiology of Wales*, vol. iii., do. 1807, [2] Denbigh, 1870; **W. Probert**, *Ancient Laws of Cambria*, London, 1823; **G. Peignot**, *Tableau des mœurs au dixième siècle, ou la cour et les lois de Howel-le-Bon, roi d'Aberfraw, de 907-948*, Paris, 1832; **Timothy Lewis**, *Llanstephan MS 116*, Aberystwyth, 1913; *Glossary to Welsh Laws*, Manchester, 1913. See also 'Celtic' sections of artt. CHILDREN, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, FAMILY, INHERITANCE.

E. ANWYL.

LAW (Chinese).—The first mention of Chinese law in the classics is the institution of the Five Punishments by Emperor Yao twenty-four centuries before the Christian era. In the next reign, that of Shun, the Five Punishments could be commuted into transportation and deportation, and even, if there were extenuating circumstances, into fines. Mistake and misadventure were pardoned, while aggravated crime and recidivism found no mercy. In cases of doubt, the accused was given the benefit of the doubt. These institutions and principles, couched in quaint language, are to be found in the *Shu King* ('Book of Records'), the oldest book extant in Chinese literature. Embodying, as they do, some of the principles underlying the most enlightened of modern legal systems, they testify to the progress already achieved by Chinese jurisprudence at that remote period. Mercifulness in administration and brevity in legislation were the aims which ancient Chinese statesmen and jurists always had in view.

Codification was attempted about the time of Confucius, the laws being inscribed in bamboo or in metal, reminding one of the nearly contemporaneous Twelve Tables of that other legal system which, after moulding Western jurisprudence, is destined to influence profoundly the Chinese also. Unfortunately, practically nothing is now known of those early codes. During the period of the 'Warring States' (7th cent. B.C.), a code was compiled by Li Kwei which remains the basis of Chinese jurisprudence. The laws of Ts'in (249-210 B.C.) were severe and complex, and were one of the causes of the early downfall of the dynasty. When Liu Pang, the founder of the

Han dynasty, captured the Ts'in capital, he abolished all the harsh laws and substituted for them the famous Three Articles, undoubtedly the shortest and simplest code in history, punishing murder, wounding, and robbery. Of course, this abbreviated code could not serve the needs of the Empire, and another code was enacted later, based mainly on that of Li Kwei, with the addition of three books. Hereafter each dynasty had its code or codes, until we come to the late Tsing dynasty with its *Ta Tsing Lu Li*, which, founded on those of the previous dynasties, in particular that of the Mings, was published in 1647, three years after the Manchu dynasty was established in China. This body of laws, together with the subsequent amendments, held sway until the latter days of the dynasty, when, under pressure of circumstances and influenced by Western ideas, the Emperor established a bureau for the revision of laws, which had among its members many who had knowledge of Western laws, particularly Japanese law. It had also Japanese advisers who exercised considerable influence. It drafted several codes—criminal law, civil law, criminal procedure, and civil procedure, besides other laws, some of which have been enacted, including a temporary criminal code which takes the place of the *Ta Tsing Lu Li* and is still actually in force under the Republic. While the draftsmen of the new laws displayed considerable knowledge of comparative law, Japanese ideas were, naturally, predominant. The Japanese modelled their legal system upon that of the Germans, who in turn inherited from the Romans. Thus the two systems of law, which were each inscribed in bronze at about the same time, are, after the lapse of nearly thirty centuries and through the intermediary of more than one nation, finally brought together.

As the laws of China are at present in a transitional state, and will in future be largely influenced by exotic notions, to get some idea of them in their greatest purity one should go back to the discarded *Ta Tsing Lu Li*. It is well arranged under seven heads: the first may be described as the 'general' part, and the remaining six are named after the former six ministries of the government—civil, fiscal, ritual, military, criminal, and public works. The language is clear and concise, comparing favourably with the productions of modern Western legislation. It has been said that China has only criminal law, and that the *Ta Tsing Lu Li* is only a penal code, what in foreign countries would be civil law being left to local and trade customs and usages. In a sense this is true, because everything in the code is punishable as a crime, but there are many things in it which would be described in other countries as civil law.

(1) The first part deals with general definitions and principles, in some cases with great minuteness and precision. There are also descriptions of the Five Punishments (different from and lighter than the Five Punishments of the ancients), definitions of the ten heinous crimes, statement of the eight privileges, lists of crimes which are not pardonable by a general amnesty, etc. (2) The civil part deals with the conduct of officials, and corresponds to a certain extent with the *droit administratif* of the continental countries of Europe. (3) The fiscal part contains largely what would be civil law. Among its topics are registration of census, real property, marriage, public granaries and treasuries, smuggling, usury, treasure-trove, and weights and measures. The family law is strikingly like that of the Romans, though rather after it had been tempered by Prætorian edicts and Imperial constitutions than at the time of its primitive severity. The notion of what constitutes a family is similar in both laws. Agnatic relationship is more important than cognatic; hence 'Mulier est finis familiæ' is to a certain extent applicable to China. *Patria potestas* there is, but the power of life and death possessed by the Roman *paterfamilias* is lacking. It is also tempered by paternal love and filial piety, for which the Chinese are justly noted. Marriage is an all-important institution for the continuation of the family. Divorce is regulated by the code, though rarely carried into practice. If polygamy, or rather polygyny, means marriage with more than one wife at the same time, then Chinese law does not permit it; in fact, the code punishes bigamy. One and only one wife is permitted. However, as Mencius teaches, 'there are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them'; to ensure against this calamity it is permitted to have concubines, who are in no sense wives. They are frequently chosen by the wife, and occupy a subordinate position, while their children are considered the children of the wife. (4) The ritual part deals with sacrificial, court, and official rites and ceremonies. (5) The military part is not altogether a code of military law, since it contains, *inter alia*, provisions for the guarding of palaces, guarding of passes and fords, keeping of official cattle, injuries inflicted by animals to person and property (cattle 'damage feasant'), and carrying of dispatches by couriers. The articles more particularly applicable to the army provide for mobilization of troops, divulging military secrets, substitution of recruits, lack of discipline, etc. (6) The criminal part is the criminal code *par excellence*. The aphorism 'Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea' is religiously observed throughout the articles: a man is not punished for a criminal act unless his intent be also criminal. In homicide, *e.g.*, no fewer than six different degrees are distinguished, varying from culpable to excusable. Most of the crimes found in Western law are also in the code. The use of abusive language is a crime; likewise adultery, which, though in England only a cause for divorce and action for damages, is a crime in France, Germany, and other European countries, as well as in some of the States of the American Union. Gambling is another offence; and so is causing a fire in one's house, which is culpable because of the element of carelessness and the dangerous consequences to the neighbourhood. (7) The part relating to public works deals with such subjects as the maintenance and repair of granaries, dikes, and bridges, and encroachment on public highways.

From this hasty survey of Chinese law, one characteristic may be noted—a characteristic which can be observed not only in law, but in the whole fabric of government itself. Writers on and admirers of English law and institutions have noted a distinguishing feature which they call the rule or supremacy of law. The characteristic of Chinese law is what may by analogy be called the rule of morality. Confucius says:

'If the people be led by law, and uniformity sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue, and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame, and, moreover, will become good.'[1]

Before and since Confucius, this has been the maxim of Chinese rulers and the first principle of government. Law occupies but a secondary place; morality comes first. Law is intended to reach only where morality is ineffective. In other words, law is supplementary to morality. It may be said that this is true of every civilized society, and that no society can live with only law to guide

[1] *Confucian Analects*, tr. J. Legge, Hong-kong, 1861.

it. But the difference between China and other civilized societies is that in China this is a principle of government, a maxim recognized by law itself. From this arise some curious results. Peculiarities in Chinese law for which foreigners seek an explanation in vain become quite clear once this principle is grasped.

As pointed out above, China has, in one sense, no civil law. There is no civil code governing rights of contracts and of property, a breach or violation of which entitles the aggrieved to an action in court whereby he may claim damages. Nevertheless, in China these things are also governed by rules. Some of these rules are local, customary, or professional. Some of them are to be found in the code, which, however, instead of giving the complainant monetary compensation, punishes the defendant with the ordinary criminal punishments. While the distinction between criminal and civil law, a crime and a tort, is a fruitful source of difference among jurists, seeing that even in Western law many acts are at the same time both a crime and a tort, yet the fact remains that China treats everything under one law and one sanction, the reason being that the legislators have upheld the doctrine of the rule of morality. Western legislators say that a breach of promise of marriage is only an infringement of a private right, giving rise to an action for damages, whereas bigamy is so serious that it is considered something more than that; it is a matter which concerns the community at large, and should be punished as a crime. The Chinese lawgiver, on the other hand, not only punishes bigamy, but also punishes the father who has broken his promise to give his daughter in marriage (the nearest Chinese equivalent to a breach of promise of marriage in a Western sense). He considers that the father has broken the moral code, and therefore deserves punishment as a criminal. Chinese officials and judges encourage arbitration and private settlement in every way; but, when the parties refer their differences to the court, unless there has been *bona fide* mistake, the man who breaks a promise is as much a criminal as a murderer, though, of course, the penalty and the consequences are very different. To those who disagree with the Chinese view, and in view of the impending radical changes to be made in Chinese law in this respect, it will be interesting to quote the words of T. E. Holland:

'The far-reaching consequences of acts become more and more visible with the advance of civilisation, and the State tends more and more to recognise as offences against the community acts which it formerly only saw to be injuries to individuals.'[1]

There is in Chinese law the doctrine of vicarious responsibility. When a particularly heinous offence is committed—*e.g.*, high treason—not only is the criminal punished, but relatives up to a certain degree are also punished. While doubtless deterrence is the principal motive for this provision, as it is not otherwise easy in such a large country and with inadequate police supervision to prevent the commission of crime, yet, in theory at least, these relatives are responsible because they have not exercised a moral and benign influence on the culprit—an influence which the law presumes they are, on account of their relationship and intimacy, in a position to exercise. Similarly, when parricide has been committed—a crime particularly egregious in the eyes of the filial Chinese—the officials of the jurisdiction, from the district magistrate up to the Governor and Viceroy, all receive more or less punishment. The theory is the same; these officials have charge, among other things, of the morality of the people within their jurisdiction; and, when such a horrible crime as the murder of a person's parents is permitted to come to pass, there has been a breach of duty on the part of the officials. In no other way can the doctrine of vicarious responsibility in Chinese law be explained than by the principle of the rule of morality. Considerations of policy doubtless have their influence, but in theory and origin it is because the Chinese government is essentially a government by morality.

As already stated, the code is no longer in force, and another penal code has taken its place. Drafts of other codes and laws were in course of preparation even before the fall of the Manchus. The legal revolution preceded the political revolution. In the admiration for Western laws, there is danger of a slavish imitation without ascertaining whether the new tree is suited to this ancient soil. This danger is particularly evident in the law of persons. As J. Bryce has pointed out,[1] the law of persons in all countries is the most difficult and the last to change, since it touches most nearly the question of status, the family relations, the very foundation of the social structure of the community. The drafts prepared in the last days of the Manchus are to be submitted to another body of select men for consideration. It is, therefore, premature and unprofitable to prophesy as to the future. That Japanese, and hence German, influence will largely be felt there is no doubt. Anglo-Saxon legal principles also have admirers, so that they too will probably be adopted to a certain extent. But Chinese law and custom should form the foundation of the new structure, so that the Chinese law of the future may still be an institution which is the product of the genius of the people, and that, while useful and suitable principles may be borrowed from the West, there may be no apish imitation of others; that, in a word, the law may still be Chinese law.

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CHAO-CHU WU.

LAW (Christian, Western).—I. *INTRODUCTION.*—There are, first of all, certain distinctions to be made. The first distinction is between *ius* and *lex*. *Lex* (*loi*, *Gesetz*, *νόμος*) is a precept[2] made by right authority, which the subject of that authority is morally bound to obey. This is our 'law' in one sense. *Ius* (*droit*, *Recht*, *δίκη* or *δίκαιον*) may be understood either subjectively or objectively. Subjectively, it is defined as 'the moral power of doing, omitting, or demanding anything, so that another be obliged to do or omit something.' It includes much of what we call 'right' or 'authority.' 'Ius habeo' may be rendered 'I have the right.' Objectively, in the sense in which it is studied by jurists, it is 'the complex of norms by which the actions of individual members of a society are regulated in regard to other members or to the whole society, so that the society may be preserved and may attain its end.' The English word 'law' is used in this sense too; thus we speak of State law, Church law, and canon law, as distinct from a particular law (*lex*). Starting from the idea that all *ius* comes ultimately from the will of God, canonists distinguish the following kinds. *Ius naturale* is the eternal law of God, imprinted in our conscience by Him naturally, so that all men know, or may know, what is essentially right or wrong, by the light of their own conscience. This is the sense in which St. Paul says the Gentiles, who have not the Law (*sc.* of Moses), do by nature the things of the law (the natural law of God; Ro

[1] *Jurisprudence*[10], London, 1906, p. 320.

[1] *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1901.

[2] We may prescind here from the difference between a public *lex* and a private *praeceptum*.

2[14]). This natural law is promulgated by God in making human nature. No power can abrogate it or dispense from it. Different from this is *ius positiuum*, that is, law made by a legislator about things not in themselves necessary, which become necessary as the result of his legislation. Things forbidden by natural law are 'prohibita quia mala'; those forbidden by positive law are 'mala quia prohibita.'

Positive law may be divine or human. Divine positive law is that promulgated by God Himself, as the Law of Moses, or laws made by Christ in the NT. This is not the same as natural law. Many commands of the old Jewish Law are about things in themselves indifferent. It differs also in binding only the subjects to whom it is given (as does all positive law), whereas natural law binds all men. No man can abrogate or dispense from divine positive law. Human positive law is that promulgated by a human authority. Indirectly this too comes from God (or it would not be binding law at all), but only in the sense that God has delegated authority to him who makes it. Positive human law can be abrogated, modified, or dispensed by the authority that laid it down. It is divided into civil law and ecclesiastical law. The *ius ecclesiasticum* is called also by other names. It is *ius sacrum*, as opposed to *ius profanum* (civil law); in old days it was often called *ius pontificium*, as opposed to the civil *ius cæsareum*; and, opposed to *ius ciuile*, it is not infrequently called *ius canonicum*, though there is a more accurate sense in which *ius canonicum* is a part of ecclesiastical law. Another distinction which crosses this, and so may lead to confusion, is between *ius diuinum*, in the sense of all Church law, whether promulgated immediately by Christ or by the authority of the Church, and *ius humanum*, meaning all secular law. This distinction is better avoided. The distinctions of ecclesiastical law are *ius generale* and *ius speciale*. *Ius generale* is a law which applies to all cases in which the circumstances for which it provides are found; *ius speciale* is a law made for a particular case, which does not apply to another case, even if the circumstances are the same. From Roman civil law the Church has taken the distinction between *ius commune* and *ius singulare*. *Ius commune* is that which flows from general principles and so applies normally to all subjects; *ius singulare* is law made for a particular class of persons. This distinction has much in common with that of *ius generale* and *ius speciale*, but is not quite the same. From the point of view of the legislating authority we distinguish *ius uniuersale* and *ius particulare*. Universal law is that which is made by the universal authority of the whole Church; particular law is made by limited authority, as by a bishop for his own diocese. So we have the principle that *ius particulare* may enforce and add to the universal law, but may never contradict it. Lastly comes the much discussed distinction between *ius publicum* and *ius priuatum*. This regards the matter of the law. *Ius publicum* contains laws for the whole Church and for its public authorities; *ius priuatum* is concerned with the rights and duties of private members of the Church. Several modern canonists of the German school (*e.g.*, Phillips) reject this distinction as absurd. It is defended by most others (cf. C. Tarquini, *Iuris eccl. publici institutiones*, Rome, 1896, p. 1 f.). *Ius publicum* is either *externum*, if it regards the relation of the Church to other societies (*e.g.*, the State), or *internum*, if it regards the internal affairs of the Church.

'Canon' is the Greek κανών, a rule or measure. Already in the 4th cent. Church synods began to call the rules laid down by them canons (so the Synod of Ancyra in A.D. 314, the Nicene Synod in 325, etc.). From this time 'canon' begins to be used exclusively in the sense of an ecclesiastical law laid down by public Church authority. It is contrasted with civil law, which is *lex* (νόμος). Gratian defines the word in this sense:

'Ecclesiastica constitutio canonis nomine censetur' (ed D. 3, § 1); 'porro canonum alii sunt decreta pontificum, alii statuta conciliorum' (*ib.* ad c. 2).

Since about the 8th cent. collections of such canons were made under the titles *Liber canonum*, *Corpus canonum*, etc. So arose the term *ius canonicum*, the law made by canons, in this sense. But, since the typical collection of canons, the *Corpus iuris canonici*, was closed in 1317, it has been common to use the term *ius canonicum* only for what is contained therein and in the 'Extrauagantes' which form its supplement (to the 15th cent.). In this sense it does not cover later Church law; on the other hand, it includes much contained in the *Corpus iuris canonici* which is really civil law.

Although so far these definitions are taken from Western canonists, and so represent Roman Catholic principles, they are general ones, which are accepted on all sides. We shall here describe Roman Catholic canon law; for that of the Eastern Churches see the following article.

II. *Roman Catholic canon law.*—1. **Written and unwritten law.**—Roman Catholic canon law distinguishes first between two sources of law, *ius scriptum* and *ius non scriptum*. The *ius scriptum* consists of laws which are formally laid down by authority in an authentic document; *ius non scriptum* is the law which arises from practical application on the part of the community, without any such formal promulgation. It does not cease to be *ius non scriptum* when it is written down, but only when it is promulgated anew by authority under the conditions which make a written law.

(*a*) The *fontes iuris canonici scripti* are: (1) The NT. The OT is not considered a source of Christian law at all, but at most an *adminiculum*. The positive old Law was abolished by the preaching of the gospel, and its moral precepts are contained in natural law. So the OT, as such, does not occur as a *fons iuris* at all. On the other hand, the NT and the laws therein contained constitute the foundation of Church positive law. From the NT we have three principles—the power of legislation given by Christ to His Church, the constitution of the Church as an organism with a hierarchy, and the social character of Christianity, from which we conclude that the Church is a perfect society, having the rights of such. These are the foundation of all positive Church law. (2) The decrees of synods. Before the Council of Trent decrees about faith were called dogmas, and those about positive law were called canons. The Council of Trent changed these terms, calling its decrees about faith *canones*, and its disciplinary laws *decreta*. The Vatican Council followed this new terminology. Only the decrees of ecumenical councils have force for all Catholics; those of particular councils oblige only those for whom they are promulgated, over whom the council has jurisdiction. But many decrees of particular synods have since become universal by virtue of a new promulgation of universal authority extending them. Disciplinary decrees of ecumenical councils oblige until they are repealed by universal authority. The Church has the power of abrogating or modifying her own positive laws. (3) Constitutions of popes. The pope, by virtue of his universal jurisdiction, has the power of making laws for the whole Church. He does this in two forms—in a more solemn form by bulls (*bullæ*) and less solemnly by briefs (*breues*). There is no difference in the binding force of bulls and briefs; the greater or less solemnity concerns only the im-

portance of the matter. Bulls are regularly issued from the papal Chancellery; before Leo XIII. they were written in Gothic characters and had attached a leaden seal tied to the parchment by silk threads. Leo XIII., in 1878, ordered that in future bulls should be written in Roman letters and sealed with a red seal representing St. Peter and St. Paul and bearing the name of the pope. Only in bulls of special importance is the old leaden seal to be retained. Bulls always begin with the name of the pope and the title 'Seruus Seruorum Dei' only; briefs begin with a fuller title and are sealed in red with the seal of the Fisherman. They are prepared at the Secretariate of Briefs. The use of bulls or briefs is not easy to account for. Frequently matters of great importance are determined not by bulls but by briefs (see, further, art. BULLS AND BRIEFS). According to the matter and the force of obligation, papal constitutions are variously distinguished. General laws for the whole Church are called by the generic name *constitutiones*, and *decreta* are those which are issued 'motu proprio'; *literæ decretales* generally come from a consultation and are answers to questions. Encyclicals are addressed to the bishops of the whole Church or to those of some province. With regard to the extension of their binding force, we distinguish between *constitutiones generales* for all and *rescripta* for special cases, to which alone normally they apply. All Roman Catholics are bound by general constitutions, and also by *epistolæ decretales* if they are expressly extended to all. Otherwise, they do not constitute a general law, from defect of promulgation. Immediately they bind only those to whom they are addressed. But to others they have the force of authentic interpretations of law, and are often published with the purpose of constituting a precedent. Rescripts have no legal force except for those to whom they are addressed. Rescripts may be *iustitiæ*, containing an obligation, or *gratiæ*, conferring a favour, or *mixtæ*.

So far we have considered the *fontes iuris generalis*. *Ius particulare* is made by the decrees of provincial councils, diocesan laws, or statutes of corporations, such as chapters for their own body. It is obvious that a particular authority can bind only those who are subject to it. Many civil laws are included as particular canon law; not that the Church recognizes the right of a civic authority to legislate in ecclesiastical matters, but either because they are the civil sanction of already existing Church laws or because Church authority has given them the force of canon law. Connected with civil law are concordats. These began in the Middle Ages, *e.g.*, the 'Concordatum Calixtinum' of 1122, between Pope Calixtus II. and the Emperor Henry V., which put an end to the dispute about investitures (see art. INVESTITURE CONTROVERSY). A concordat is defined as 'a treaty between Ecclesiastical and Civil authorities, by which the connexion between both societies concerning mixed affairs is regulated.'[1] According to modern principles, only the pope makes the concordat on the side of the Church. For the State its governing authority acts. The matters treated in concordats are all the 'mixed' questions in which both Church and State have an interest, such as questions of property, marriage, presentations to benefices, and so on. Concordats are now generally said by Roman Catholic canonists to be true bilateral contracts, which oblige both sides in justice, being binding on the subjects of both powers as particular Church law and civil law (see, further, art. CONCORDAT).

(*b*) The *fontes iuris canonici non scripti* are: (1) Natural law as the origin of all positive law. The basis of positive law is the principles of natural law; nor can positive authority make any law which contradicts that of nature. (2) Tradition, which affects principles of discipline as well as those of faith. So we distinguish divine, apostolic, and ecclesiastical traditions in matters which bind conduct. (3) Custom (*consuetudo*). This plays a great part in Catholic canon law. It is defined as: 'A law introduced by the repetition of similar actions on the part of the community, with the consent of the legislator.'[1] The difference between *consuetudo* and *traditio* is that in the case of a law coming through tradition it is presumed that it was originally formally promulgated by authority, although knowledge of that promulgation is to be had only through tradition. In the case of custom there is no promulgation at the beginning; the law gradually acquires its force through repeated acts. Custom is, in fact, the same principle as prescription, except that prescription usually connotes a right, and *consuetudo* a duty. It may be universal for the whole Church, special in the case of a particular though perfect society in its own order (as a chapter or religious order), or *specialissima*, if it affects an imperfect society, such as a family or parish.

Custom may be according to law, in which case it only makes the force of the law more clear, and perhaps interprets it (hence the proverb, 'Consuetudo est optima legum interpres'); or it may be beside the law ('præter legem'), adding to, but not contradicting, the *lex scripta*; or it may be against the law ('contra legem'), which abrogates or abolishes a law. This is the most important case. It is called *desuetudo* when custom simply abolishes a law by continual non-observance, *consuetudo contraria* when by repeated acts a new law is introduced which abrogates a former one.

There are many precautions in canon law against the too easy admittance of custom. First, it must be introduced by a perfect community, *i.e.*, by one which has the power of making or receiving a true law, as distinct from a particular precept. Hence one man can never obtain a right for himself by repeated acts. The custom must be introduced by repeated, free, and public acts on the part of the greater part of the community. Most canonists require that these acts should not be made through an erroneous opinion (*e.g.*, ignorance that the law exists); they must certainly be free, in the sense of not being made through force or fear. Nor is a new law introduced by custom when the people who practise the custom do so with the deliberate consciousness that they are merely performing a free work of piety. There must be, at least eventually, some signs of an intention (not necessarily explicit) to prescribe a custom 'præter legem.' The object of a *consuetudo* may be anything which is not opposed to natural law, or opposed to right reason, or an immediate occasion of sin, or injurious in itself to the whole system of Church discipline. The only general and certain principle that can be laid down with regard to the time required for a custom to obtain the force of law is that there must be a sufficiently repeated number of acts, extending over a sufficient time, for a reasonable person to be able to say that the custom is already in firm possession. Generally canonists apply to *consuetudo* the same principles as are required by civil law for the prescription of a right. For customs 'præter legem' some demand ten years, for customs 'contra legem' forty years. Others think ten years sufficient in this case too, at least when it is a case of law which has never been observed by the community, against which custom began as soon as the law was pro-

[1] S. Aichner, *Compendium juris eccl.*[9], Brixen, 1900, p. 26.

[1] Aichner, *op. cit.* p. 31.

mulgated. The last condition for a *consuetudo*, and the most important, is the consent of the legislator. This really does away with all that otherwise would be anomalous in the principle of *consuetudo*, and makes it consistent with the normal principles of canon law. For in this case also the rule obtains that ultimately the only source of law is the act of the legislator in some form. The consent of the legislator may be expressed, or tacit, or merely legal, when he is ignorant of the custom, but intends in general to apply always the canonical principles affecting custom. In such a case he has an implicit intention with regard to each particular custom, even if he does not know of it. In this case, too, the real source of the obligation of the *consuetudo* is the will of the legislator. When the legislator knows of the custom and could put a stop to it but does not do so, we have a case of tacit consent. Custom may be abolished by abrogation, which simply puts an end to the one which now exists, but in no way prevents a new custom of the same kind from arising; or by prohibition, which not only ends the custom but forbids a new one to arise; and, finally, by reprobation, which declares the custom to be in itself pernicious and incapable of ever obtaining the force of law. But the formulas which are often appended to positive laws (such as 'non obstante quacumque consuetudine') do not always mean as much as they would seem to mean. Often such formulas are intended only to make the beginning of a *consuetudo contraria* more difficult. A new positive law is always supposed to abrogate general customs contrary to it, but not local customs, unless a clause to this effect is added. A custom may be abolished by a new custom opposed to it, or by simple *desuetudo*.

Other *fontes iuris canonici non scripti* are enumerated in the text-books. There are the opinions of learned canonists. These are not strictly a source of law; but the *responsa prudentum*, as in Roman civil law, so also in canon law, are considered a safe guide as to the meaning of laws whose form is ambiguous; they furnish a precedent according to which authentic declarations are made; as in moral theology, the consent of a number of canonists of repute constitutes a probability which may be followed safely. In much the same way the Fathers of the Church, though each one has no more authority than the reason he gives, form a witness of tradition which is often of great importance. Moreover, many sayings and decisions of Fathers have afterwards been incorporated into authentic collections of laws, and from this incorporation receive the force of law in the strict sense. In matters concerning which there is yet no positive law, it is probable that the judgment of illustrious Fathers will be considered when a law is framed. Many early text-books of canon law include answers of Fathers and their sentences in test cases. The *usus forensis* also occurs in connexion with *ius non scriptum*. Thus a repeated number of decisions in special cases, which all show agreement with the same general principle, form a precedent which may be of great importance for general law. Here it is probable that, if a new law be drawn up, it will be in accordance with the precedent set by the *usus forensis*. Meanwhile this use gives a greater or less probability as to the correct interpretation of laws. Among the Roman tribunals which make the *usus forensis* the Rota Romana is of chief importance. Formerly disputed cases from all parts of the world were sent to the Rota for judgment. Its jurisdiction is now limited by that of other tribunals; but it still remains the most important one.

The *stylus curiæ* also occurs among the *fontes non scripti*. This means the use of certain conventional or technical terms and methods of procedure, which the student of canon law should understand, since they affect the meaning of the decisions.

2. History of the sources of canon law.—Canonists distinguish three main periods of canon law—the *ius antiquum* from the foundation of the Church to the publication of Gratian's *Decretum*, *ius nouum* from Gratian to the Council of Trent, and *ius nouissimum* from the Council of Trent to our own time.

(1) *Ius antiquum.*—After the NT there is but little canon law extant down to the Council of Nicæa (325). The modern canonist in practice does not refer much to this time, but in theory the same rules apply to it as to later times. A law made during the first three centuries by proper authority binds the subjects of that authority till it be repealed or fall into desuetude. But there are hardly any such documents now extant. There are a few papal letters, letters of other bishops, such as St. Cyprian, and the decrees of one or two councils, such as the two held at Carthage in 256. Moreover, since later legislation has covered almost the whole field of possible Church law, it is unlikely that any law of the first three centuries would be cited. It will have been either re-enacted or abrogated at a later period. After the Council of Nicæa we have a large collection of canons, chiefly pseudo-apostolic, such as the *Canons of Hippolytus*, the various Church Orders, etc. The most important of these are the so-called *Apostolic Constitutions* and *Canons*. When it was believed that these were the work of the apostles, naturally they seemed of enormous importance. The Quinisextum Synod ('in Trullo,' at Constantinople, 692) recognized the 85 *Apostolic Canons* as an authentic source of canon law, whereas in the West a Roman synod under Pope Gelasius I. rejected them as spurious as early as 495. Eventually fifty of these canons, by their reception in the *Corpus iuris*, obtained a certain recognition, though not technically authority, in the West. Now that every one knows that they are spurious, they have only an archæological interest. Some of them, however, are really repetitions of authentic canons of Nicæa and the Synod of Antioch in 341. From the Council of Nicæa (325) there are decrees of œcumenical synods, which have the full force of law for the whole Church, and those of particular synods, which are authentic sources for the provinces concerned. The other source of the *ius antiquum* consists of papal letters and decrees. There are *literæ synodicæ* (treating chiefly of matters of faith) and papal decrees in various forms from the time of Damasus I. (366–384). These are collected in *Regesta*, and still have full force, unless they have been repealed by later legislation.

Long before the famous *Decretum Gratiani* attempts had been made to collect and arrange the growing mass of sources of canon law. The first collection of this kind is the so-called *Versio Hispanica*, long supposed to be the work of St. Isidore of Seville. Really it is a Greek collection, to which a Latin translation was added in Italy. Its first edition, composed and translated not long after the 4th cent., contained only the decrees of Nicæa; to these the Latin version added those of Sardica, then supposed in the West to be Nicene. Later the decrees of Ancyra, Neo-Cæsarea, and Gangra were added. Such a collection would naturally constantly be brought up to date, and new canons would be added by copyists. Finally, in Spanish and Gallican texts, the canons of Chalcedon were added. From the 5th to the 9th centuries there are a number of such collections. The so-called *Versio prisca* is an Italian translation of a Greek

collection made in the early 5th century. In Gaul a great but disordered collection of canons of councils, and of papal and episcopal letters, was made in the beginning of the 6th century. This was published by Pasquier Quesnel,[1] who thought it to be the oldest official Roman collection. F. Maassen counts thirteen other early Gallican collections of the kind.[2] In Italy Dionysius Exiguus (536) made two large collections, one of canons and one of decretals (papal letters) down to Anastasius II. (496-498). These were then joined together, and became the official Roman text-book, practically displacing all others. Later canons were added to the collection. Pope Adrian I. in 774 sent a copy of this to Charles the Great (with additions down to his own time). This became the official *Codex Canonum* of the Church of Gaul. It was made State law in Charles's empire in 802. In Africa the chief collections are the *Breuiatio Canonum* of Fulgentius Ferrandus in the first half of the 6th cent., and the *Concordia Canonum* of Crescentius about the year 690. Spain had a number of such collections. In the end of the 6th cent., Martin, Bishop of Braga, made a *Collectio Canonum* (also known as *Liber Capitulorum*). About the same time appeared an *Epitome* from Martin of Braga and other sources; from this further *Epitomes* were made. It was also at the end of the 6th cent. that the great *Hispana Collectio* was composed. The preface of this is taken for the chief part from the *Etymologics* of St. Isidore of Seville († 636). This is the main source of pseudo-Isidore. In the 9th cent. it was increased by a great number of forged decretals and was ascribed by the forger to St. Isidore. Ireland had a collection of canons, chiefly taken from Dionysius, about the end of the 7th century. In the 9th cent. appeared three collections in the Frankish kingdom which consisted largely of forged documents. These are the *Collection of Capitularies* of Benedict Levita, the famous forged *Decretals* (pseudo-Isidore), and the *Capitula Angilrammi*. The forged *Decretals* especially had a disastrous effect on later canon law. They contain so great a mass of documents, touching all kinds of matter, that for centuries canonists took their material from them. It is now generally admitted that the forged *Decretals* were compiled between the years 847 and 853, in Gaul. They were probably begun at Mainz and completed at Rheims. The compiler calls himself Isidorus Mercator (in other copies, Isidorus Peccator or Mercatus). Various persons have been suggested as the compiler (Benedict Levita, Rothad of Soissons, etc.). The forgeries consist for the most part in ascribing authentic documents of a later age to an earlier one. In the 15th cent. Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa and John Turrecremata first doubted their authenticity. Since then this has been so established that no one any longer quotes them. Other collections are those of Regino of Prum (*c.* 906), Burchard of Worms († 1025), Anselm of Lucca († 1086), Cardinal Deusdedit (1086-87), and the *Decretum* and *Pannormia* of Ivo of Chartres († 1117).

(2) *Ius nouum.*—The *ius nouum* begins with the *Decretum* of Gratian, which superseded all earlier ones and became the universally accepted collection of the Middle Ages in the West.

Gratian (Magister Gratianus) was a Benedictine monk at Bologna. He lectured on canon law, and, feeling the need of a text-book, he composed his *Decretum* about the year 1150. He intended this to be not so much a collection of canons as a text-book in which he lays down theses and proves them by quotations. In each case he first states a thesis (these statements are the 'dicta Gratiani,' which come first); then, as proof, he quotes documents, canons of synods, papal decrees, and even civil laws. His idea was also to harmonize apparently discordant canons; hence the name, given either by himself or soon after, *Discordantium canonum concordia*. Gratian's book was, in comparison with all that had gone before it, so well arranged, and contained so much matter, that it soon became the universal text-book in the West. No other canonical work approaches it in importance. Soon it began to be commented. An immediate disciple of Gratian, Paucapalea, made the divisions of the first and third parts as we have them now. He also added notes which have become incorporated into the work, each under the special heading 'Palea' (for Paucapalea); then the notes of other commentators were added with the same heading, so that 'Palea' became a general title for notes at the end of Gratian's 'Distinctiones.' A mass of longer commentaries and glosses gathered around the text. The 'Glossa ordinaria' printed at the foot of modern editions is by Iohannes Teutonicus (Johann Zemeke), Canon of Halberstadt († 1245), and Bartholomew of Brescia († 1258). After the work had passed through innumerable hands and had received all manner of additional notes and corruptions of the text, Pope Pius IV. appointed a special commission of cardinals to revise it. They continued their work under Pius V. These are the 'Correctores Romani' whose corrections are added beneath the text. Finally, Gregory XIII. in 1852 issued an authentic printed edition of the *Decretum*.

It consists of three parts. Part I. (sometimes called 'Tractatus ordinandorum') treats of the sources of canon law and of ecclesiastical persons and offices. It has 101 Distinctiones, each of which begins with a dictum headed 'Gratianus.' This is his thesis. It is then proved by a number of canons. At the end often comes the Palea. Originally these Distinctiones and canons were not numbered, and were quoted by their first words. The edition of Charles Dumoulin (Paris, 1547) is the first to number them. Le Conte (Paris, 1556) numbered the Paleæ also. Part II. contains solutions of disputed questions. It is divided into 36 Causæ. Each begins with a statement of the case by Gratian, followed by a number of 'Quaestiones,' each having a proposition by Gratian, which is then proved by a number of canons. Among these is one quæstio which amounts to a complete treatise or excursus by itself. This is the third quæstio of Causa xxxiii. It bears the special title 'Tractatus de Poenitentia' and is divided into seven Distinctiones and these again into canons. 'De Poenitentia' is quoted as a separate treatise. Part III. is headed 'de Consecratione.' It treats of liturgical matters, especially of the Mass. This part has five Distinctiones, each beginning with a 'dictum Gratiani,' which is proved by a series of canons. The second and third parts also have Paleæ.

There is a recognized manner of quoting the *Decretum Gratiani* which should be noted. Since each part is arranged differently, it is not necessary to begin by saying which part one quotes; this is shown by the quotation itself. From the first part we quote by canon and Distinctio (c. and D.); thus 'c. 3, D. xcv.' means the third canon of the ninety-fifth Distinctio of the first part. In quoting the second part three numbers occur, those of the canon, Causa, and quæstio (in that order); *e.g.* 'c. 6, C. vii. q. 4.' The treatise 'de Poenitentia' is known by the addition of those words (or in a shortened form, 'de Poen.,' or even 'D.P.'), then (either before or after this) come the canon and the Distinctio—*e.g.*, 'c. 3, D. 5, D.P.' In quoting the third part the words 'de Consecr.' are always added; otherwise the quotation by canon and Distinctio is the same as in the first part—*e.g.*, 'c. 123, D. iv., de Consecr.'

Gratian's *Decretum* then became the nucleus of the *Corpus iuris canonici*, of which it is still the first (about half in length). To this gradually four other parts were added. Gratian had used canons down to Innocent II.; the latest quoted by him is of 1139. As time went on, and further material accumulated, it became necessary to add to these. Notably the third and fourth Lateran councils (1179 and 1215) added considerably to the material of canon law in the West. During this period, when the papacy reached its greatest power in civil life, a great number of papal decrees were issued. After Gratian about seventeen different compilations of this new material were made, when Pope Gregory IX. thought of publishing an authentic addition to the *Decretum Gratiani*. This was prepared by St. Raymund of Pennafort, the

[1] In the *Opera Leonis Magni*, ii. (Paris, 1675).
[2] *Gesch. der Quellen und der Lit. des can. Rechts*, pp. 821-878.

pope's penitentiary. Gregory published this collection in 1234 by the bull *Rex pacificus*, sent it to the Universities of Paris and Bologna, and ordered that it should be accepted as authentic. This is the *Decretals of Gregory IX.*

The work is divided into five books, treating of the matters described in the verse 'Iudex, iudicium, clerus, connubia, crimen,' namely of ecclesiastical officials and judges, of procedure in canon law, of the rights, duties, and property of clerks, of laws about marriage, of criminal cases and their process. Each book is divided further into 'Titull,' and these into 'Capitula.' This division already existed in the compilation of Bernard of Pavia (Papiensis), about 1191, which is the basis of that of Gregory IX

The sign by which a quotation from this part of the *Corpus iuris canonici* may be known is the word 'extra' or the letter x, meaning that it is outside the *Decretum Gratiani*. Thus: 'c. 1, x, de clericis non resid. (III. 3)' means the first chapter of the Titulus 3 (which is about clerks who do not reside) of book III., extra, namely, in the *Decretals of Gregory IX.* The addition of the heading of the Titulus is now no longer necessary, since in later editions they are numbered.

The work has been enlarged since it was first published. Raymund, with the idea of maintaining brevity, did not write out the statement of the case, but only the solution. Nor did he quote the whole *Decretal*, but only fragments of it. The result of this was that it was often impossible to understand his text unless one went to the original source. To remedy this Le Conte in his edition (Paris, 1556) added what Raymund had omitted. These additions are the 'partes decisæ,' printed in italics in modern editions. The decretals are arranged in chronological order; in some cases Raymund, when the matter did not seem sufficiently clear, obtained from the pope a special decree made to be inserted here. These are put at the end of the Tituli. There is a 'Glossa ordinaria' made by Bernardus de Bottone of Parma (1263).

The third part of the *Corpus iuris canonici* consists of the *Liber Sextus Decretalium*, added by Boniface VIII. It is the sixth book after the five of Gregory IX. This became necessary in the same way as those of Gregory IX. In 1245 and 1274 the first and second Councils of Lyons had been held. From the decrees of these, of popes since Gregory IX., and of his own, Boniface VIII. in 1298 published his *Liber Sextus*, by the bull *Sacrosanctæ*. In this he expressly forbids any decrees to be accepted as valid except those contained in this collection. John Andreæ made the 'Glossa ordinaria' to this part of the *Corpus*. At the end the pope added 88 'Regulae iuris,' short maxims about procedure. The *Liber Sextus* is divided in the same way as the *Decretals* of Gregory IX. Although the whole is the *Liber Sextus*, it has itself five books, divided into Tituli and chapters. It is quoted as in Gregory IX., except that, instead of x, we write 'in vi.'

The fourth part of the *Corpus iuris canonici* is the *Constitutiones Clementinæ*. In 1314, Clement V. published a collection of his own Constitutions, including those of the Council of Vienne (1311–12); but he died before his work had been received by the Universities of Orleans and Paris, to whom it was addressed. His successor, John XXII., in 1317 sent the collection to the University of Bologna with the bull *Quoniam nulla*, ordering its use by schools of canon law and in courts. Clement meant to call his collection the Seventh Book of Decretals; but, since it contains only his own, not all those which had been issued since Boniface VIII., the commentators refused to give it this title and called it the *Constitutiones Clementinæ*.

It is divided, like the *Decretals* of Gregory IX., into five books, and these into Tituli and chapters. It is quoted in the same way, with the special rubric 'Clem.' instead of 'x.' It has a Glossa by John Andreæ (1326), improved by Francis Zarabella (1417).

These collections, those of Gratian, Gregory IX., Boniface VIII., and Clement V., constitute the *Corpus iuris canonici clausum*, a name which begins with a misunderstanding of a phrase in the acts of the Council of Basel.[1] The *Corpus iuris canonici*, however, received yet two appendices. Decrees made later, and, therefore, not in the *Corpus*, were called 'Extrauagantes,' as being outside the official book. Then they began to be added to copies of the *Corpus* as an appendix. Finally, John Chappuis in his edition (Paris, 1500) printed two such appendices of 'Extrauagantes' which, although collected only by his private authority, are now always added. These are the 20 'Extrauagantes' of Pope John XXII. (1316–34), which had already been edited with a Glossa by Zenzelinus de Cassanis in 1325. They are distributed in 14 Tituli. The other appendix contains 'Extrauagantes communes,' decrees of various popes from Boniface VIII. (1294–1303) to Sixtus IV. (1471–84). Chappuis published seventy of these; later (in 1503) five more were added. These are arranged in five books on the same principle as those of Gregory IX. But the fourth book ('Connubia') is wanting, because there had been no new decrees about marriage. The whole work is considered one *Corpus*, including the 'Extrauagantes.' Matthew of Lyons in 1590 published a so-called 'Liber Septimus' containing constitutions of popes from Sixtus IV. to Sixtus V. (1585–90); and Paul Lancelloti in 1563 wrote a compendium of canon law which he called *Institutiones iuris canonici*. These also, with the approval of Paul V., have been added to the *Corpus* since 1605. They can hardly be considered in any sense part of it, though they are authentic collections which may be used in canonical processes.

This is the end of the *Corpus iuris canonici*. Its historical importance is enormous. For centuries it has been the one official collection of the Roman Catholic Church; it is the most important book of canon law ever published. But, in spite of the reverence with which it is still regarded, it has ceased to have more than a historical interest. There has been far-reaching legislation since, notably by the Councils of Trent and the Vatican. Moreover, the *Corpus* has many errors of various kinds. Gratian's decree, its nucleus, is not on the level of modern erudition. He quotes a number of spurious papal decrees, including many from pseudo-Isidore. It is not likely that any further additions will be made to a work which would need rather complete re-casting. At the Vatican Council one of the Postulata was for a new *Corpus*, to be made by a special commission. Meanwhile the modern canonist refers rather to a modern work.

The *Corpus iuris canonici* has not the same authority throughout. Although it is an official collection, this does not mean that everything in it must be accepted as authentic. The *Decretum Gratiani* has never been made a 'codex legalis' in the strict sense. Therefore it remains, in itself, a private collection, which confers no new force on the decrees which it quotes. Each of these has no more value than it had before Gratian quoted it. His Dicta and the Palea have no juridic value. But the *Decretals* of Gregory IX., Boniface VIII., and Clement V. were published as a 'codex legalis.' This means that the publication, apart from their origin, was promulgation of a new law. All that is in them thereby obtained the value of common law, even when the original decree was addressed to some particular person only. But this law is subject to the usual conditions. It may be abrogated, prescribed against, etc., as may all common law. According to the opinion of canonists, the constitutions among the 'Extrauagantes' do not receive any new authority from their insertion here.

[1] The Council speaks of papal reservations 'which are included in the *Corpus*' ('in corpore iuris expresse clausis') (sess. xxiii. 6 [Mansi, xxix., col. 120, E]). From this phrase originated the idea of a 'Corpus iuris canonici clausum,' afterwards adopted in many documents, *e.g.* Benedict XIV. in the const. *Iam fere*, etc.

(3) *Ius nouissimum.*—The *ius nouissimum* begins with the Council of Trent (1545–63). Of the twenty-five sessions of the Council, thirteen made decrees affecting law. These decrees were to have force as soon as they were promulgated. This was done by the bull *Benedictus Deus* of Pius V. in 1564. The pope fixed 1st May of that year as the date from which the decrees should be in force. The question occurs whether it be possible lawfully for a custom to abrogate any Tridentine decree. The possibility of this has often been denied, so that there is an axiom often quoted: 'Contra concilium Tridentinum non ualet consuetudo.' This axiom has no authority behind it. It is true that the Council of Trent has the gravest authority; but there is no reason to suppose an exception to the common principle about *consuetudo* in this case either. In fact, a number of customs have arisen against its decrees in various parts of the Church, which, supposing the usual conditions, are admitted as lawful. In order that there might be a permanent body capable of giving authentic interpretations of the Tridentine decrees, Pius IV. founded the 'Congregatio concilii Tridentini interpres' (commonly called the 'Sacra congregatio concilii,' 'S.C.C.'). This congregation still exists; it has acquired extended functions regarding other matters also.

Since the Council of Trent there has been a considerable increase in the sources of canon law. The immense number of papal constitutions is edited in the *Bullarium Romanum*, of which several editions have appeared, the most important being the *Magnum Bullarium Romanum* of Luxemburg (1726–58) and Rome (1733–56). There is also a *Bullarii Romani Continuatio* (Rome, 1835–57), bringing it down to Gregory XVI. (1831–46). These are in themselves only private collections. But Benedict XIV. (1740–58) published a collection of his own bulls (1754–58). The publication of this work is considered equivalent to a new promulgation; so that Benedict XIV.'s *Bullarium* has the same authority, as a collection, as the *Decretals* of Gregory IX., etc., in the *Corpus iuris canonici*. The disciplinary decrees of the Vatican Council (1870) form a *fons iuris* of great importance. The laws of Pius IX. (1846–78), including the Syllabus of 1864,[1] and of Leo XIII. (1878–1903)[2] are published in special collections. Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) there have been concordats with various States, and provincial synods. During the late pontificate there has been considerable legislation. The Holy See functions through the Roman Congregations.

According to the reform of Pius X. (*Sapienti consilio*, 1908), there are now twelve Congregations of Cardinals: (1) 'S. Cong. Sancti Officii' (the Inquisition), which looks after matters of faith and morals, indulgences, matters affecting the theology of the sacraments, and certain marriage cases; (2) 'S. Cong. Consistorialis,' which has to do with consistories, and with the affairs of dioceses not under propaganda; (3) 'S. Cong. de disciplina Sacramentorum,' for disciplinary matters affecting sacraments; (4) 'S. Cong. Concilii' (*sc.* Tridentini), mentioned above; (5) 'S. Cong. de Religiosis,' for affairs of religious Orders; (6) 'S. Cong. de Propaganda fide,' for missions, with two divisions, one for the Roman rite and one for Eastern rites; (7) 'S. Cong. Indicis,' which forbids dangerous books; (8) 'S. Cong. sacrorum rituum,' for rites and ceremonies, especially those of the papal court; (10) 'S. Cong. pro negotiis eccl. extraordinariis,' for concordats and other affairs of special importance; (11) 'S. Cong. studiorum,' for schools, seminaries, and universities; (12) 'S. Cong. renouandæ fabricæ S. Petri,' which looks after the property and building of St. Peter's at Rome.

There are three Roman 'Officia': the 'Cancelleria apostolica,' which prepares and sends bulls concerning the erection of new dioceses, chapters, and other important matters; the 'Dataria apostolica,' which has to do chiefly with minor benefices; and the 'Camera apostolica,' which looks after the property of the Holy See, especially 'sede uacante,' and gives jurisdiction to the Camerlengo for that time. There are three Tribunals: the 'S. Poenitentiaria,' which has to do with matters of confession and others 'in foro interno' only; the 'S. Romana Rota,' the highest tribunal for all canonical cases; and the 'Signatura apostolica,' which is the court of appeal that may reverse the judgment of the Rota or of the congregations. Among the commissions instituted by Pius X. the most important for our purpose is the 'Commissio pro codificatione iuris canonici.' This has undertaken the enormous task of revising, simplifying, and codifying the whole body of Roman Catholic canon law.

The position of the Uniates (Christians of Eastern rites in union with Rome) has nothing abnormal in principle, though practically they have many points of canon law special to themselves. They are bound, as are all Catholics, by ecumenical laws, but not by all papal constitutions, since many of these are intended only for Latins. The sources of canon law for Uniates are the canons of synods held before the great schism of the 9th cent., except such as have been abrogated since; their liturgical books approved by the Holy See; and their local synods approved in the same way. There have been several of these, some of great importance, *e.g.* the Ruthenian Synod of Zamoisk in 1720,[1] the Maronite Synod of Mount Lebanon, held at the monastery of Deir Luwaise in 1736,[2] and the Armenian synod held at Rome in 1911.[3] They are bound by special papal constitutions for Eastern Churches and by decrees of propaganda addressed to them. In 1631 Urban VIII. declared that Uniates are bound by general papal decrees in three cases only: when the decree concerns a matter of faith, when they are expressly named, and when something is decreed which implicitly affects them. The local law of one Uniate church does not affect the others, unless it be explicitly extended to them; nor has the authority of one jurisdiction over the others, unless it is received by delegation from the Holy See.

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ADRIAN FORTESCUE.

LAW (Christian, Eastern).—1. Canon law in the Orthodox Church.—In general principles the Orthodox Church agrees with the Church of Rome as to canon law. She too recognizes the NT,

[1] *Acta Pii IX.*, 3 vols., Rome, 1848–75.

[2] *Leonis XIII. encyclicæ, constitutiones et epistolæ*, 2 vols., Milan, 1887.

[1] *Syn. prou. Ruthenorum hab. in ciuitate Zamoscæ*, Rome, 1838.

[2] *Syn. prou. a R.D. Patr. Antiocheno . . . nationis Syrorum Maronitarum . . . in Monte Libano celebrata*, Rome, 1820.

[3] Encyclical *Quanta animi*, 22 Dec. 1911.

tradition (παράδοσις), custom (ἔθος), and positive ecclesiastical legislation (ἡ ἐκκλησιαστικὴ νομοθεσία) as the sources of canon law. But she takes a different attitude towards civil law. As the result of the long Byzantine period, during which emperors made laws for the Church which were accepted by Eastern bishops, the Orthodox Church gives more importance to the State in Church matters than does the Church of the West. Orthodox canonists explain this. They urge that, as the Christian State accepted canon law in its province, and confirmed Church law by civil proclamation and civil sanctions, so the Church accepts all State law, even that of heathen emperors, as hers, so long as this does not contradict the canons. By this acceptance the Church 'canonizes' State law and gives it promulgation from herself. John Scholasticus (6th cent.), in his collection of canons, includes as an appendix a number of the *Novellæ* of Justinian I. which affect Church matters. The *Nomocanon* contains the rule: 'In cases where the canons contain no decision, we must follow the laws of the State.'[1] Theodore Balsamon (13th cent.), however, ascribes greater authority to the canons than to civil laws. In a case of conflict the canons, not the laws, must be obeyed. The Orthodox Church also ascribes canonical authority to the *responsa prudentum* (ἀποκρίσεις τῶν σοφῶν), *i.e.* the opinions of learned canonists given in the form of answers to questions or as statements. In this, like the Latin Church, she follows a principle of Roman civil law.

With regard to positive Church law (κανών in the strict sense) the Orthodox admit, as binding the whole Church, the 85 *Canons of the Apostles* (to which they still give apostolic and ecumenical authority, as containing principles derived from the Apostles, and as being confirmed by the Trullan Synod of 692) and the decrees of ecumenical synods. Of these they acknowledge seven, including the second of Nicæa (787) as the last. Although they hold their Church to be the whole Church of Christ on earth (so that she should have the same power of convoking an ecumenical synod as had the Church before the great schism), as a matter of fact they have held no synod claiming to be ecumenical since that schism. These are in theory the only authorities that can legislate for the whole Church, though the decrees of many particular synods and even canons of individual Fathers are considered to have acquired ecumenical authority by the later acceptance of the whole (Orthodox) Church. A Patriarch can legislate for his Patriarchate only; since the formation of permanent synods to govern national Churches, they give to these the same authority as a Patriarch has. In neither case can the particular authority legislate against the universal canons. In theory each bishop has the right to legislate for his own Eparchy, within the bounds of general law. He can summon diocesan synods, and promulgate laws for his people in the form of pastoral letters. In practice, however, this right is now much circumscribed. Each national Orthodox Church is considerably centralized under its Patriarch or Holy Synod. The independence of each national Church is balanced by a very complete dependence of each bishop within it. In the Orthodox States the government has much to say in the matter of the legislation of ecclesiastical authority.

The source of universal canon law for all Orthodox Churches is the *Nomocanon* compiled in the year 883. This is divided into fourteen titles. It contains the *Canons of the Apostles*, those of the seven ecumenical synods, those of ten particular synods, namely Ancyra (314), Neo-Cæsarea (between 314 and 325), Gangra (*c.* 340), Antioch (341), Laodicea (*c.* 343), Sardica (343), Constantinople (394), Carthage (419), Constantinople (861), and Constantinople (879). The *Nomocanon* adds so-called canons of thirteen Fathers, namely Dionysius of Alexandria, Gregory of Neo-Cæsarea, Peter of Antioch, Athanasius, Basil, Timothy of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Amphilochius of Iconium, Gregory of Nyssa, Theophilus of Alexandria, Cyril of Alexandria, Gennadius of Constantinople, and Tarasius of Constantinople. These constitute the fundamental law of the Church. In the *Athenian Syntagma* (G. A. Rhalles and M. Potles, Athens, 1852–59), after these sources are added rules taken from St. Basil, St. John Chrysostom, St. Anastasius of Sinai, the synodical letter of Nicholas of Constantinople (895–925), and the *Canons* of Nicephorus Confessor and of John the Faster of Constantinople (582–595). After these (which are comprised under the heading διαφορά) comes the rubric τέλος τῶν ἱερῶν κανόνων. As these have been received by the various national Churches, they are considered now to have ecumenical authority.

The chief collections of canons are the *Nomocanon* of Photius (*c.* 883), who, however, only revised a former one, and that of John Zonaras (*c.* 1120), who used a different source from that of Photius. Theodore Balsamon, Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch residing at Constantinople, made a collection of canons after the order of Zonaras and dependent on his, and a commentary on Photius's *Nomocanon*. Already in the 5th cent. there was an *Epitome of Canons* (κανονικὴ σύνοψις) made by a certain Stephanus of Ephesus. To this, in course of time, other canons were added. About the year 1160, Alexius Aristenus, Nomophylax of Constantinople, wrote a commentary on this *Epitome*, and Simeon the Logothete edited the same *Epitome* in another arrangement, similar to that of Zonaras and Balsamon. The Emperors Leo III. (717–741) and Constantine V. (741–775) published an *Extract of Laws* (ἐκλογὴ τῶν νόμων) from Justinian. This and the following collections of civil law contain much canonical matter. In 1255 Arsenius, monk of Athos, composed a new *Synopsis of Canon Law*. In 1562 Manuel Malaxes published a *Nomocanon*. In 1335 Matthew Blastares made an alphabetical arrangement of laws (σύνταγμα). The most important modern printed collection of Canons is the *Pedalion* (πηδάλιον).[1] This was compiled in the first case by two monks of Athos, Agapios and Nikodemos, and was published by authority of the ecumenical Patriarch Neophytos VIII. at Leipzig in 1800. Theodoretos (ἱερομόναχος), who controlled the printing, added a number of passages which were opposed to the law of the Orthodox Church; but in 1802 the Patriarch sent out an Encyclical ordering all possessors of the book to erase these additions. A second edition, without them, appeared at Athens in 1841, and a third, revised by Sergios Rhaphthanes, at Zakynthos in 1864. This third edition contains the *Canons of the Apostles*, the Canons of ecumenical and particular synods, and those of the Fathers. To the text, commentaries (ἑρμηνεῖαι) and solutions of difficulties (συμφωνίαι), in modern Greek, are added. In 1852, two Greek lawyers, George A. Rhalles and Michael Potles, invited by the Athenian Holy Synod, began a new collection of sources of canon law. The work was completed in six volumes by 1859 and published at Athens. This is the *Athenian Syntagma* (Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων κ.τ.λ.).

Vol. i. contains Photius's *Nomocanon*, with Balsamon's commentary and other dissertations by older canonists; vol. ii.

[1] *Syntagma* (Athenian ed.), iii. 68 (*Nomocanon*, tit. i. cap. 28).

[1] In 1672 William Beveridge (afterwards bishop of St. Asaph's) published an important collection of Greek laws: *Synodicon sive Pandectæ canonum ss. Apostolorum et Conciliorum ab Eccl. Græca receptorum*, 2 vols., London. Nearly all later Orthodox collections are based on this.

gives the *Canons of the Apostles* and those of the ecumenical synods, with the interpretations of Zonaras and Balsamon; iii. the particular synods with commentaries; iv. the canons of the Fathers; v. synodical decrees of ecumenical Patriarchs, laws of Emperors which affect Church matters, *responsa prudentum*, and a number of disquisitions by various canonists; lists of sees and of the offices of the Great Church (the Byzantine Patriarchate), the Greek civil laws of 1852 regulating the organization of the Church of Greece and the Holy Synod which governs it; and vi. the *Syntagma* of Matthew Blastares and an alphabetical index of the whole work.

The *Athenian Syntagma* is the most complete collection of Orthodox canon law. It has been officially recognized, as an authentic codex, by the ecumenical Patriarchate and by most of the national Churches. For this reason N. Milasch judges that all canons contained in it must be regarded as having ecumenical authority.[1]

The Slav and Rumanian Churches have for the most part translations of Greek collections, with additions and commentaries.[2]

In modern times laws are made for each Church by its central authority. The tendency is now strongly in favour of synods and councils of various kinds, instead of the old rule of one Patriarch or Primate. Even the Patriarchs now have their synods, mixed councils, and so on. The later national Churches are governed by Holy Synods, formed after the model of the Russian one (formed in 1721). These synods, under considerable influence from the governments, make laws regulating all the affairs of their Churches.[3]

2. The lesser Eastern Churches.—Each of the Nestorian and Monophysite Churches has its own system of canon law, evolved from the general principles of Eastern Church law with the necessary special modifications. They do not seem to have a clear concept of the difference between ecumenical and local law. As each is an *Œkumene* to itself, the two concepts naturally are confused. They admit in their canon law the decrees of certain early councils, which they recognize, and have then their own rules, made by their special synods and Patriarchs. In the Middle Ages these Churches evolved schools of canon law of some importance. They have great canonists among their writers. In modern times, at least among the Nestorians and Jacobites, there is a tendency to replace the old canons by new decisions made for each case by the Patriarch, in agreement with the other bishops or notables.

Nestorian canon law is derived from three main sources. First come the 'Western Synods,' *i.e.* such synods held in the Empire before their schism as they recognize. These include many particular synods, such as those of Antioch (341) and Ancyra (358). There is a collection of these made by Mâruthâ of Maiferḳat in 410, to which the disciplinary canons of Chalcedon (451) were added later. The second source is the 'Eastern Synods,' namely, those held by Nestorian Katholikoi down to the 8th century. The old rule was that each Katholikos should hold a synod as soon as he was appointed. An unknown Nestorian collected these in the *Book of the Sunhâdaus* between 775 and 790. The *Sunhâdaus* begins with the Synod of Mar Isaac in 410 and ends with that of Mar Ḥnânyeshu' II. in 775; an appendix adds the Synod of Mar Timothy I. in 790. The *Sunhâdaus* also contains a selection of canons of Western synods. This is the chief Nestorian canonical authority.[4] The third source consists of all laws made since the 8th century. These have not been completely codified. In the 13th cent. 'Ebedyeshu' Bar Barîḳâ, Metropolitan of Nisibis, made a codex from those three sources. This is the *Nomocanon of Ebedjesus*, the most complete collection of their laws.

The chief sources of *Coptic* canon law are the 31 canons of the Patriarch Christodulos (1047–77), the 30 canons of Gabriel II. (1131–46), and the canons of Cyril III. (1235–43). Gabriel III. not only made canons himself, but ordered that a complete collection of all those existing should be drawn up. The *Abyssinian* Church recognizes and obeys Coptic canon law.

The *Jacobite* Church once had a considerable school of canonists. Bar-Hebræus, their greatest theologian, was also one of the most important of all Eastern canonists. His *Nomocanon* (*Ktâbâ dHudddye*) remains their classical collection.

The *Armenian* Church recognizes the first three General Councils, but even before she was separated from the rest of Christendom she began to have her own canon laws. The most famous particular Armenian canons of antiquity are the 21 canons of the Katholikos Isaac issued about the year 406.[1] Then from the time of the Synod of Tovin (Duin), about the year 554, which condemned Chalcedon, the Armenians have had a long series of national synods, each of which added to their canon law. The acts of these synods have been collected and translated by Angelo Mai.[2] In modern times Russian laws affecting the supreme Katholikos of Etchmiadzin, the virtual separation of Armenia in Turkey from his jurisdiction, and the formation of the National Assembly and diocesan councils have completely modified the old law. The Katholikos of Etchmiadzin has a theoretic authority over the whole Armenian Church, which he exercises in conjunction with his permanent synod of seven auxiliary bishops. In affairs of the greatest importance he would, no doubt, take the lead in forming a new law; otherwise he has little real authority beyond his own Patriarchate. The practical head of the Armenian Church in Turkey is its Patriarch of Constantinople. He is assisted by a National Assembly, composed for the most part of laymen. With these he rules and makes laws. In each diocese there is also a council of laymen, and in each parish a body of lay administrators, who look after the property and have much to say in all Church affairs. The modern Armenian Church is ruled practically by the decisions of these assemblies.

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ADRIAN FORTESCUE.

LAW (Christian, Anglican).—**1. Nature of the present Anglican Church law.**—The Anglican Communion is a federation of more or less autonomous Churches; hence its ecclesiastical law varies in different countries. It consists partly of the written law which is now universally acknowledged to be in force, and partly of custom, depending in a large degree on the ancient and mediæval canon

[1] *Kirchenrecht der morgenl. Kirche*, p. 80.

[2] For these see Milasch, *op. cit.* pp. 137–157, 191–199; F. H. Vering, *Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts*, Freiburg i. Br., 1893, pp. 58–63.

[3] The best account of the constitution of each national Orthodox Church is Silbernagl's *Verfassung* (see literature).

[4] Germ. tr. by O. Braun, *Das Buch der Synhados*, Stuttgart, 1900; Syr. text and Fr. version by J. B. Chabot, *Synodicon orientale*, Paris, 1902 (from a MS written at Rabban Hurmizd, now no. 332 in the Bibliothèque nationale).

[1] These will be found in H. F. Tournebize, *Hist. pol. et rel. de l'Arménie*, Paris, n.d., p. 354 f.

[2] In his *Veterum Scriptorum nova collectio*, Rome, 1825–38, vol. x. p. ii.

law of Western Christendom. In England and Wales (also in Man, Berwick-on-Tweed, and the Channel Islands) complications arise owing to the close connexion between Church and State, which involves the result that the Church's law cannot become binding unless the State assents to it. This is the case also in India, where the relations of Church and State are very close. But in most of the other branches of the Anglican Federation the Church is free to make its own laws, which become binding on the basis of a voluntary contract (see below, § 6).

(*a*) In *England* the present written ecclesiastical law is mainly found in the 'Book of Common Prayer' and the 'Ordinal' of 1662 (these are the popular titles only), in the Thirty-nine Articles of 1562, and in the canons of 1603 (1604), as slightly amended in later years. The Prayer Book and the Ordinal, after being agreed upon by the Convocations, were enacted as part of the statutory law of the realm by being inserted as a schedule in an Act of Parliament known as the Act of Uniformity of 1662. We need not here enter into the vexed question of later Acts of Parliament affecting the Church, in which the Church as such had no part. The Thirty-nine Articles have also the authority both of Church and of State. Thus the Prayer Book and Articles are certainly binding on both clergy and laity. The canons of 1603, as also those of 1640, 1865, 1888, which added to or amended them, were agreed upon by the Convocations and published by the sovereign's authority under the Great Seal (Blunt-Phillimore, *Church Law*, pp. 17 f., 371 ff.; in the latter place they are given in full as amended).

There was an irregularity in that the Royal Letters Patent were given for the 1603 canons before the York Convocation had discussed them, though after the Canterbury Convocation had passed them. The York Convocation, however, obtained the king's licence to discuss them afterwards, and then passed them (J. H. Overton, *The Church in England*, London, 1897, ii. 11). The validity of the 1640 canons, which were passed before the fall of Laud, was disputed (see Overton, ii. 77 f., 88). The predecessors of the 1603 canons, those of 1571, held good only in Elizabeth's reign. They are given in English and Latin by W. E. Collins in the Church Historical Society's publications, no. xl. (London, 1899).

The canons of 1603 as amended undoubtedly bind the clergy, but it is uncertain (seeing that they have not been sanctioned by Parliament) how far they bind the laity.

Lord Hardwicke (in Middleton *v.* Croft [Blunt-Phillimore, p. 23]) was of opinion that they do not '*proprio vigore* bind the laity, but only the clergy,' adding: 'I say *proprio vigore*, by their own force and authority, for there are many provisions contained in these canons which are declaratory of the ancient usage and law of the Church of England received and allowed here, which in that respect and by virtue of such ancient allowance will bind the laity.'

The Prayer Book and canons as at present in force have been somewhat influenced by Royal and Episcopal Injunctions from the Reformation onwards.

Besides the laws mentioned above, the great canonists of the 18th cent., such as Gibson, mention numerous Acts of Parliament which deal with crimes against the moral law, and with marriage and other matters which affect the Church. With these we are not here concerned.

(*b*) *Church of Ireland.*—The present written law is founded on a 'Constitution' agreed upon in 1870 by the archbishops, bishops, and representatives of clergy and laity in a General Convention assembled in Dublin, and of 'constitutions and canons ecclesiastical' decreed by General Synods in 1871, 1877, and 1889. The Constitution of 1870 and the 'constitutions and canons ecclesiastical' have since 1909 been consolidated in a single Constitution, the 'constitutions and canons ecclesiastical' being ch. ix. thereof. The written law also includes the Thirty-nine Articles and the (revised) Book of Common Prayer and the Ordinal, approved in the Constitution. We must here notice the difference between the ancient and modern use of the word 'constitution.' Originally a 'constitution' was much the same as a 'canon,' and so it is in the titles of the English and Irish codes of canons. But the word 'constitution' as now used often means a more fundamental document than the canons, one governing the organization of the Church (see below (*d*)).

(*c*) *Episcopal Church in Scotland.*—The constitution here is contained in the canons, and is not a separate document. The written law consists of a code of canons passed in 1911, built up on the basis of codes of previous Provincial Synods in 1743, 1811, 1828–29, 1838, 1863–64, 1875–76, 1890, and 1905. The present code authorizes the services of the Prayer Book, with certain modifications, and also of the 'Scottish Liturgy or Communion Office,' and forbids departure from them 'in public prayer and administration of the Sacraments or in the performance of the other Services,' except as the code provides. In this branch of the Federation the word 'constitution' is used for a document subsidiary to the canons. Each incumbency must have such a 'constitution' regulating matters not dealt with in the canons, especially with the patronage of that charge. Such a constitution is an agreement between the bishop of the diocese and the clergy and laymen of that congregation. The constitutions of different incumbencies vary considerably.

(*d*) *United States of America.*—The 'Protestant Episcopal Church' revised the Prayer Book in 1790, soon after the War of Independence, and again in 1892. A Constitution was adopted at Philadelphia in 1789, and since modified; canons have been passed at various dates.

In Scotland the canons, and in Ireland and the United States the constitution and canons, are primary, and the Prayer Book has authority only because these documents prescribe it.

(*e*) *British colonies.*—In the Colonial Churches of the Anglican Federation the process seems to have been as a rule different from that which has just been described. The Prayer Book has descended to them, being daughters of the Church of England, as a primary authority, and in some cases they have bound themselves to make no alterations in it until the mother Church takes action, or have limited themselves in some degree in this direction. Most or all of them, however, have also made canons to regulate their internal affairs, and these have validity because of contract (see above; and, for further details, cf. § 4). In some branches of the Federation, as in S. Africa, dioceses are also permitted to make canons for themselves on purely local matters, in submission, however, to the provincial canons. This is not allowed in Scotland or in Ireland, where the resolutions of diocesan synods have not the nature of canons, and have no binding power as such.

2. The legislative bodies of the Anglican Churches.—In *England* there are two provinces, of Canterbury and York, and each has two Houses of Convocation, the Upper House consisting of the diocesan bishops, and the Lower House of the deans, the archdeacons, and the proctors (or representatives) of the clergy. Two consultative Houses of Laymen are also appointed—one to assist each Convocation; but this is a voluntary and modern arrangement, having no recognition in law. The Convocations can, under Royal licence, discuss and pass canons; but these have no effect until they receive the sovereign's assent. In practice, the Convocations very rarely pass canons; and, owing to the connexion with the State, no other laws can receive validity until they have passed the Civil Legislature as Acts of Parliament.

In the non-established branches of the Anglican Federation there are General (or Provincial) Synods —called Conventions in America—for the purpose of legislating. In the *Episcopal Church in Scotland*, which now has one province only (the metropolitan powers being held in commission by the seven bishops), the Provincial Synod consists of two chambers, the first of the bishops, and the second of the deans of the seven dioceses, about 35 representatives of the clergy, and one or two clerical officials. Each chamber must assent by a simple majority to any change in the canons before it can take effect. The Synod meets only when legislation is required; but, before any changes provisionally made by the Synod have been confirmed at a subsequent meeting of Synod, such proposed alterations must be submitted to a mixed Consultative Council, consisting of the bishops, about 40 clergy, and the same number of laymen, who meet all together (but may, if desired, vote or debate by orders), and may, if they think fit, express any opinion on the changes, or suggest other alterations. The Consultative Council may also suggest legislation in the first instance, and this was the course adopted in 1911, when it carefully discussed the whole code and noted the changes which it desired.

In the *Church of Ireland*, where there are two provinces (of Armagh and Dublin), there is a single General Synod which legislates, consisting of two Houses, the one of bishops, and the other of representatives of clergy and laity, who normally sit all together. According to the present Constitution, the representatives of the clergy number 208, and those of the laity 416. Voting by orders is provided for. Unless in certain exceptional cases, each House must assent to any change, and, if the laymen and the clergy vote by orders, also each order.

In the *United States* the General Convention consists of two Houses, the one of the bishops, the other of 'deputies' or representatives, not more than four presbyters and four laymen from each diocese. Both Houses must agree to any change in the law before it becomes valid. A vote by dioceses and by orders is provided for if desired, under the regulation that the dioceses are in that case equalized by only one clerical vote and only one lay vote being allowed for each; and a majority of dioceses and of each order is then required for legislation. The General Convention meets once every three years.

In most of the *Colonial Churches* of the Federation, legislation (which, however, as we have seen, is somewhat limited) is effected by synods consisting of bishops, and clerical and lay representatives. It is usually enacted that voting and debating may be by orders, and, if so, that a majority of each order is necessary for carrying any alteration.

3. The older canon law and customary law.—(*a*) *Origin and growth.*—The written law—except the law of God, or the Moral Law, which has been universally regarded as unalterable—has gradually grown up, coming from decisions of 'individual great bishops, but later on in the shape, usually, of canons of councils' (Collins, *Nature and Force of the Canon Law*, p. 13). Such councils were either ecumenical (general) or local (see art. COUNCILS AND SYNODS [Christian]). As time went on, their regulations increased greatly in number, and collections of canons were made. Among these may be mentioned those of Dionysius Exiguus (*c.* A.D. 500), Isidore of Seville (early 7th cent.), whose work was supplemented in the 9th cent. by 'pseudo-Isidore,' the compiler of the great collection which contained the 'Forged Decretals,' and Gratian (12th cent.), whose *Decretum* was the corner-stone of mediæval canon law, and is sometimes called the *Corpus iuris canonici* (Collins, p. 19; see, further, above, p. 835 f.). The mediæval system of canon law was not at first meant to be more than something to be aimed at, and it was never fully carried out, any more than the liturgical regulations which set forth the elaborate ceremonial possible in the great cathedral of Salisbury were thought to be practicable in every little parish church of England. In this respect the older canon law differs from civil law, especially from modern civil law, which is much more rigid, though not so logically complete or so fully systematized. This fact has a great bearing on the binding nature of the canon law in later times (see below (*d*)). In the Middle Ages the more rigid view of law gradually grew up, and, at least since the Reformation, an ecclesiastical canon is as much and as literally obligatory on those who are bound by it as any civil law.

(*b*) *How far it was accepted in England in mediæval times.*—On this point there has been some controversy. According to one view, it was held to be valid in England only when accepted by Act of Parliament or by custom. This is the opinion of Gibson (*Codex*, ii. 945–947), who quotes Acts of Parliament of the time of Henry VIII., asserting that the old canons were accepted only if not contrary to the laws (of England) and the royal prerogative. Only those laws which were made by the realm or were acknowledged by common assent or established custom were received. Gibson illustrates this by citing the proposal to legitimate in England children born before marriage. Pope Alexander III. had published a canon to provide for this, but it was against the law and custom of the kingdom, and, when the bishops tried to introduce it, the Lords (in the Parliament of Merton, A.D. 1236) declared that they would not have the law of England altered ('nolumus leges Angliæ mutari'). Gibson also gives other instances. With regard to this legitimation question it is noteworthy that Scotland did accept the papal canon, while England did not, and that, therefore, to this day the laws of the two countries differ in this respect. On the general subject Ayliffe (*Parergon*, p. xxxiii) expresses a similiar view. On the other hand, F. W. Maitland, a high authority, has maintained that, at any rate according to the canonists of the 14th and 15th centuries, the canon law as a whole *did* run in England then (*English Historical Review*, July and Oct. 1896, Oct. 1897). He is here followed by Eves (*Prayer Book Dictionary*, p. 128) and, apparently with some hesitation, by Collins (*op. cit.* p. 35 f.). There is perhaps not really any great difference between these two views. Everything depends on what is meant by 'accepted.' The one view holds that the 'canonists'—ecclesiastical writers who compiled codes of canons—considered that the complete Western canon law (with some local reservations) was accepted, but that the State would not allow parts of it to be put in force. On the other hand, much of the old canon law had, as a matter of fact, no practical effect in England. And, if we bear in mind the difference between canon and civil law (below (*d*)), this is all that practically concerns us.

(*c*) *Collections of English ecclesiastical laws.*—A very early collection of English 'constitutions' was made by William Lyndwood or Linwood (who in 1442 became bishop of St. David's), under the name of *Provinciale*; he gives 14 constitutions by Archbishops of Canterbury from Stephen Langton (1207–29) to Chichele, which bring us down to the middle of the 15th century. But the greatest activity in this respect is found in the 18th century. John Ayliffe's *Parergon* (new edition published in 1734) was, as its second title states, a 'commentary

by way of supplement to the canons and constitutions of the Church of England.' John Johnson (the famous vicar of Cranbrook) published in 1720 his (English) *Laws and Canons* (up to the Reformation), arranged chronologically as a history. David Wilkins' *Concilia*, first published in 1737, carries the collection down to 1717; and Edmund Gibson, bishop of London, 1723–48, whose famous *Codex* was brought out in a second and considerably enlarged edition in 1761, gives the canons and the Acts of Parliament which relate to the Church, arranged according to subject instead of chronologically.

No one in the older days did for Scotland what Lyndwood did for England; but in our own time Joseph Robertson has collected the Scottish provincial constitutions under the title of *Statuta Ecclesiæ Scoticanæ*.

(*d*) *How far the older canon law is now binding.*—The opinion has been expressed that the whole of the *Corpus iuris canonici* is now binding, unless explicitly repealed by an authority equal to or higher than that which enacted it. It has been maintained that a council of inferior status cannot repeal the canons of one of higher status, or a local council those of a larger one. The result would be that the Anglican Church of to-day would be bound by a number of ancient regulations which have little or no relation to the needs of the time. Such a view, however, looks at canon law from the point of view of the civil law. In the case of an Act of Parliament, laws remain in force (at any rate in England) till repealed by a later law. But this was not meant to be the case with canon law, in which desuetude could repeal. A contrary custom invalidated it, and canonists have debated how long the custom must have existed to do so—in some cases ten years, in others forty years being fixed on (see above, p. 834 f.). This was also a principle of the Roman civil law (Collins, pp. 25–30; see also Eves, in *Pr. Bk. Dict.*, p. 126). It is stated, indeed, by E. G. Wood (*Regal Power of the Church*, p. 84) that 'the question whether any particular law has been abrogated by desuetude is one far from being easy of solution. It is one requiring the application of a highly technical set of rules, maxims, and limitations, by an expert possessed of considerable skill and canonico-legal instinct. It is, moreover, only within a very limited area that desuetude can effect abrogation of common law.' But, as Collins remarks (p. 32), this allows the principle in words but denies it in application.

It is instructive to turn to one or two instances of repeal of canons or other regulations by desuetude; and we may take the most difficult case, the abrogation of those enacted by an ecumenical council. The 15th canon of Nicæa forbade the translation of a bishop, priest, or deacon from one city to another, but almost immediately the canon fell into desuetude; a partial revival of its spirit is seen in the American branch of the Anglican Communion, for that body greatly dislikes the translation of bishops. Again, the decree of Nicæa about the keeping of Easter has been modified. That ecumenical council decided that the Church was to follow the existing Roman computation (see the encyclical letter of the council, and also Constantine's letters, given by Socrates in *HE* i. 9). But Pope Gregory XIII., in 1582, modified the regulation, being followed by other countries at an interval—by England in 1752 (the Græco-Russian Church has not yet done so). Those, therefore, who hold the Anglican position that a pope is not above an ecumenical council must take this as an instance of the canons of such a council being repealable by custom or by an inferior authority. Another example is the 20th canon of Nicæa, which decrees that all are to offer prayer to God standing and not kneeling on the Lord's day, and 'in the days of Pentecost,' i.e. in Eastertide (see art. KNEELING). But this has long been obsolete in the West. And, if we go into the canons of the older councils, ecumenical or otherwise, we shall be struck by the fact that a very large number are now obsolete. It has been calculated that the majority of the canons of Nicæa have thus been abrogated in the West, and to a large extent in the East (Collins, p. 25).

These and similar considerations make it difficult to maintain that a local Western Church cannot alter, for its own organization, regulations which were once (*ex hypothesi*) in force in the whole of the West. As a matter of fact, the alteration of mediæval canon law did not take place at any one time in England. A 'Reformatio Legum' was, indeed, attempted in the disturbed times of the 16th cent., but it came to nothing. The process was a gradual one. But the effect of the older canon law has been that there is, as there always was to a certain extent, a *customary law*, which is largely the outcome of old written enactments; and so far the older canon law has frequently been appealed to in ecclesiastical suits. (On the whole question see the learned essays by W. E. Collins and E. G. Wood cited above; these writers hold different views on the subject.)

It may be noted that, in the Episcopal Church in Scotland, the canon on interpretation in the 1863 and 1876 codes enacted that the general principles of canon law should alone be deemed applicable thereto. This was modified in 1890 by the enactment that the canons are in all cases to be construed in accordance with the principles of the civil law of Scotland, but that any generally recognized principles of canon law may be appealed to in cases of dispute and difficulty. These provisions have all disappeared from the present code (1911). In S. Africa (can. 30, code of 1883) the same provision is made as in the Scottish canons of 1863.

It may be of interest to give one or two instances of customary law in the (local) Church of England at the present day. Since 1604 lay baptism comes under this head (see LAITY). The irremovability of beneficed clergy is a matter of custom; as also is the consecration of churches and churchyards, the reading of the lessons at Matins and Evensong by laymen, and the saying (as is done in some cathedral and collegiate churches) of the first part of the litany by lay clerks.

4. Contents of the canons, etc.—(*a*) *English canons of 1603 as since amended.*—These deal (1, 2) with the king's supremacy, and (3–12) with the assertion of the Church of England as a true Church. Canons 13–30 deal with the due celebration of divine worship, the keeping of Sundays and Holy Days, and the use of the litany, with rules for the service of Holy Communion and for the vestures to be used thereat, with the reception of that sacrament, and the repelling of persons therefrom, and with baptism, sponsors, and the sign of the cross. Canons 31–76 deal with the ministry, and give rules about ordinations, subscriptions of assent, institution to benefices, simony, plurality, residence of clergy, strange preachers, the 'bidding prayer' before sermons, vestures, catechizing, confirmation, marriages, visiting the sick, burials, private conventicles, sober apparel and life, etc. Canons 77–79 deal with schoolmasters, canons 80–88 with churches and their furniture, glebe-lands, etc., canons 89–91 with church-wardens and their assistants, and with parish clerks. Canons 92–138 deal with ecclesiastical courts, both those of an archbishop (including matters of marriage and divorce) and those of a bishop, and give rules as to ecclesiastical judges, surrogates, proctors, registrars, and apparitors. Canons 139–141 deal with synods.

(*b*) *Church of Ireland.*—The 'constitution' of 1909 is divided into fifteen chapters. The first five give the functions and organization of general and diocesan synods, and deal with parochial machinery and the appointment to cures of souls; the 6th with the election of archbishops and bishops; the 7th with cathedrals; the 8th with ecclesiastical tribunals and offences; the 9th contains the canons; the 10th and 11th deal with the representative body which holds Church property and with certain funds; the 12th and 13th with burial-grounds, glebes, and parochial buildings; the 14th and 15th with provision for widows and orphans of clergy and with superannuation. The canons have in the main the same antiquated appearance as the English canons, being the older code with some quite modern additions. They regulate (1–6) divine service, (7–16) preaching, catechizing, baptisms, burials, marriages, confirmation, private communions, etc.; and deal with (17) archdeacons, (18–22) ordinands, (23–25) institution to and patronage of benefices and simony, (26–33) the work and life of ministers and their assistants, (34–40) the

furniture and ornaments of churches, Holy Communion, and other services, (41) the consecration of churches, (42–43) duties of church-wardens and 'select vestries,' (44–46) repair and furnishing of churches, etc., (47, 51) appeals, (48) the General Synod, and (49, 50, 52–54) repelling from and readmission to Holy Communion.

(*c*) *The Episcopal Church in Scotland* has gradually built up its canons since 1811, and the code has a more modern appearance. It is now arranged as follows: canons 1–10 deal with the Primus (the presiding bishop), and diocesan and coadjutor bishops, and their appointment and jurisdiction, and with cathedral churches; canons 11–20 with the ordination and licensing and duties of presbyters and deacons, subscriptions of assent and institution to benefices, and with lay readers; canons 21–29 with the services of the Church; canon 30 f. with vestures, and with the structure and ornaments of churches; canons 32–38 with congregational organization; canons 39–45 with diocesan and provincial officials; canons 46–50 with synods and councils; and canons 51–53 with judicial proceedings and disputes, notices, and interpretation. A bulky set of appendices not only give the forms of deeds, but also, gathered together in one place, the list of additions to and deviations from the Book of Common Prayer, as canonically sanctioned.

(*d*) *United States.*—The 'constitution' is divided into eleven heads dealing with (1) the General Convention, (2) the election of bishops, (3) bishops for foreign lands, (4) standing committees in each diocese as the bishop's advisory council, (5, 6) admission of new dioceses and missionary districts, (7) provinces, (8) ordination and admission of strangers, (9) trials, (10) authorization of the Prayer Book, and arrangements for revising the same, and (11) alterations in the constitution. The canons (1902) are much more detailed, and are of great length. They are divided into four 'titles,' each with many subdivisions. The first deals with the ministry and church services, the second with discipline (including marriage and divorce), the third with organized bodies and officers of the Church, the fourth with the enactment and repeal of canons.

(*e*) *South Africa.*—This province has one or two peculiarities. Its constitution, as made in 1870 and 1876, accepts the doctrinal standards and Prayer Book of the Church of England, and disclaims any right of altering them *proprio motu*, but with the proviso that the province is not bound by the interpretations of them by any ecclesiastical or other tribunal except its own (this famous proviso has since been altered). The constitution makes the provincial synod the legislative body, and says that it can adapt, abridge, and add to the Church Services if such alterations are consistent with the spirit and teaching of the Prayer Book. It can also review and revise any diocesan canons, (above, § 1), and can alter its own constitution and its canons. The canons of this province have been frequently amended. Besides legislating, the provincial synod frequently passes 'resolutions.' It is understood that these are only expressions of opinion, and are not legally binding on members of the Church.

(*f*) It is not necessary to do more than refer to two other examples of the law of the colonial branches of the Anglican Federation, as having originated in somewhat different circumstances. The branch in *Canada* has a constitution as well as canons. The former was made under the authority of an Act of the Provincial Legislature in 1857 (19–20 Vict. ch. 121), which sanctioned the meeting of bishops, clergy, and laity in the province to make a constitution and regulations, and the meeting of those in each diocese to make diocesan regulations. Another Act of 1858 explained some details. The Anglican Church in *New Zealand* has a constitution first made in 1857 as a 'voluntary compact' between the members of the Church in the colony; it has the same limitation of powers as the province of S. Africa has in the matter of altering formularies. The whole question of the *nexus* between the daughter and the mother Church is being keenly discussed in this colony, as is also the case in Australia, especially since all the dioceses of that continent have been federated in one organization.

5. Church law and State law when divergent.—When a voluntary club or society makes laws which are consistent with the laws of the State, and the latter afterwards alters its laws so as to be inconsistent with those of the club or society, the laws of the club or society in the ordinary course must go by the board. When, however, the society is a religious community, the question of moral obligation may arise, and the individual has then to ask himself whether he ought to obey the law of his Church and break the law of the State, taking the consequences of such action. Whether he is morally justified in doing so must depend on circumstances. If a heathen State commands one of its Christian subjects to sacrifice to a heathen god and his Church forbids him to do so, he must necessarily choose between the two, and few at the present day would fail to think him justified in determining to break the State law, even though he had to face martyrdom. Such contradictions between Church law and State law are less likely to arise in times and in States which tolerate diverse religions, and which have determined more clearly than in older days what is the province of each in legislating. But divergences may often arise. It is proper to observe, however, that this means merely that the State allows what the Church as a whole, or a part of the Church in particular, forbids. To take an example from recent legislation: in Great Britain and in some other countries a man is now allowed by the State to marry his deceased wife's sister. But this does not mean that every Church[1] must allow its own members to do so; each Church has the right, if it sees fit, to say that any of its members who use the liberty given by the State shall not be married by one of its ministers or in its buildings, or shall not be considered any longer a member, or shall be repelled from Holy Communion for a longer or a shorter time. There is no real *contradiction* here between the Church law and the State law; it is not as if the State had enacted that every widower *must* marry his sister-in-law, if he has one. This has been taken as an example only. The general principle is that a particular society may limit for its own members a liberty allowed or not forbidden by the State.

6. Interpretation of ecclesiastical law.—In the Church of England a great controversy has gone on for more than a generation as to the validity of the courts which interpret the ecclesiastical law. Into this controversy we cannot enter here, except to say that it turns on the question whether the State can erect ecclesiastical courts (the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and that of the judge under the Public Worship Regulation Act) without the assent of the Church. The controversy appears to be no nearer a solution now than it was when it arose; and it has practically paralyzed the actions of the ecclesiastical courts with regard to questions of worship. Various solutions have been proposed, but the difficulties have been great, and are enhanced by the close connexion between the Church and the State. It may be said, however, that the controversy does not turn on the question who the

[1] For simplicity we may put aside the case of an established Church and deal only with one that is not established.

s, the interpreters of the law, are—whether bishops or laymen—but on the question by whom their court has been appointed, and whether an ecclesiastical or quasi-ecclesiatical court is bound by the decisions of a superior court (the Judicial Committee) which does not profess to be anything but a State court.

It may be useful to consider how the Church law is interpreted in the non-established branches of the Anglican Federation. In these each Church has set up its own courts, and there is no dispute as to their validity. They may give an erroneous or foolish decision, but their power of deciding has not been questioned; it is explicitly acknowledged by those who make the subscriptions required of them before receiving an office. In the Church of Ireland the supreme court consists of three bishops and four lay judges, and, though the latter are in a majority, the spiritual character of the court has never been questioned. In the Episcopal Church in Scotland the supreme court (which is the court of appeal from the bishop in synod, and the court of first instance in the trial of a bishop) consists of all the diocesan bishops only, though they may (and, as a matter of fact, always do) have a lay assessor learned in the law to advise them, without being bound to follow his advice. The American and Colonial branches have each set up their own court, variously constituted, but on more or less similar lines.

But the question arises, What is the relation of such voluntary ecclesiastical courts to the State courts? The former can command obedience to their interpretation of the law only by virtue of the contract entered into by those who come before them. Every clergyman, before being ordained or receiving any office, makes a subscription, not only of doctrinal agreement with the Church, but promising obedience to its canons and tribunals. It is, therefore, instructive to see what view the State would take of the decisions of such Church courts. We may take the position of the Episcopal Church in Scotland as a good example of this attitude, since two or three cases in which that Church has been concerned (one of primary importance) have arisen to illustrate it.

In the case of Forbes *v.* Eden and others (*Leading Ecclesiastical Cases decided in the Court of Session, 1849-1874*, Edinburgh, 1878, p. 388 ff.), the Rev. G. Forbes, an incumbent at Burntisland (well known for his liturgiological eminence), disapproving of certain canons made in the General or Provincial Synod of 1862-63, and maintaining that he was not bound by them, as he had promised obedience at his ordination to the code previously in force, sued all the members of this synod to have, *inter alia*, the new canons declared null and void. The case was given against him by the unanimous decisions of the Court of Session in 1865 and of the House of Lords in 1867, on the ground that the code of canons which he had subscribed provided for alterations being made, and that the said synod had fulfilled all necessary requirements for making alterations. The new canons then enacted were, therefore, binding on all. In the Inner House—the Court of Appeal—Lord Cowan said that it was the province of the civil courts to redress civil wrongs. It was not their province, and it had not been their practice, to interfere as a court of review with the theological dogma or the internal regulations on discipline of religious sects or denominations. In the House of Lords the Lord Chancellor said that no civil court could take cognizance of the rules of a voluntary religious society made for the regulation of its own affairs, except so far as they related to collateral questions affecting the disposal of property. This judgment, then, makes it clear that an autonomous Church can alter its laws, if its code contains provisions to that effect.

In a more recent case, which was taken to the House of Lords (*Scottish Guardian*, Edinburgh, 1893, pp. 148, 504), it was remarked in the Inner House by Lord Young that the civil courts could not entertain an action concerning merely the government of the Church unless it involved a breach of contract; and this principle was affirmed in the House of Lords, which gave an additional ground of action before the civil courts, namely, if the managers of a congregation had in trust some funds of which the pursuer was in whole or in part beneficiary, and if they refused to pay him. To this extent would the civil courts investigate and decide on the Church documents.

The civil courts might be called in if a clergyman deprived or suspended by the Church courts declined to recognize their sentence. The Church, having no power in itself to enforce its decrees, must invoke the help of the civil courts, if necessary, to ensure the carrying out of the contracts made. This might happen if the clergyman in question refused to give up his parsonage or church; or, if costs were given in the ecclesiastical courts against a certain party, and payment was refused, the civil court might be called in. In such cases the State tribunal would treat the case purely as a matter of contract, and they would investigate whether the procedure in the Church court had been regular and in accordance with the current canons. In the Forbes case (see above), where Forbes sued for damages because he was refused an assistant curate, Lord Benholme remarked that 'this exercise of ecclesiastical discipline on the part of the bishop under the superintendence and review of the ecclesiastical court of appeal' could not be made the subject of a civil claim for damages in the Court of Session (*Leading Eccles. Cases*, p. 426).

From what has been said it would appear that, if a clergyman deposed for heresy by the Church courts appealed to the civil courts, the latter would not determine whether or not the doctrine in question was in accordance with the formularies of the Church, but would ask whether the Church courts to which the clergyman had promised obedience had proceeded regularly. In the discussions it is quite possible that doctrinal questions might be touched on, as, in fact, was done in Forbes *v.* Eden, when the Eucharistic Controversy was referred to, and (as might be expected when men go outside their own line of study) some curious *obiter dicta* in theology and ecclesiastical history were uttered. But this would happen only incidentally.

An important question of Church law was touched on in Forbes *v.* Eden, which illustrates the recent case of the Free Church of Scotland. In the latter case, as the present writer understands it, it was ruled by the House of Lords that the Free Church had not in its constitution explicit powers of complete alteration, but was subject to the limitation that certain things were unalterable. Something of this sort was the case in the Episcopal Church in Scotland from 1838 to 1890, when the codes of canons limited the alterations to those which were 'in conformity with the recognized constitution of the Church' (until 1863 also with its 'acknowledged practice'). In the Forbes case in 1865 the Lord Ordinary observed that the 'civil courts do not undertake to protect Churches or individual members of Churches from the influx of new doctrines. They only interfere to prevent the uses of property being perverted through its being retained by a majority who only keep the name while they have abandoned the principles of the Church to which it was devoted' (*Leading Eccles. Cases*, p. 401 n.). In the Inner House Lord Inglis said that a majority may be restrained on the application of a minority from carrying an alteration of a fundamental article of the constitution, and as an illustration said that a proposal to abolish the Thirty-nine Articles and to substitute Knox's Confession of Faith of 1567 would require unanimity in the Episcopal Church (*ib.* p. 404). In the Provincial Synod of 1890 the limitation on the power of alteration contained in the vague phrase 'recognized constitution' was removed.

Experience, then, tends to show that a non-established Church may make, interpret, and administer its law, in the existing civil conditions of this country, without any undue interference from the State. But it must be careful to see that its autonomous powers are clearly laid down in the documents that govern it.

LITERATURE.—i. *OLDER BOOKS.*—**R. Hooker,** *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Oxford, 1843, etc., bk. viii.; **W. Lyndwood,** *Provinciale*, new ed., do. 1679; **D. Wilkins,** *Concilia Magnæ Britanniæ et Hiberniæ*, 4 vols., London, 1737; **J. Johnson,** *Collection of the Laws and Canons of the Church of England*, do. 1720, new ed. (by J. Baron), Oxford, 1851; **J. Ayliffe,** *Parergon Juris Canonici Anglicani*[2], London, 1734; **E. Gibson,** *Codex Juris Ecclesiastici Anglicani*[2], Oxford, 1761.

ii. *MODERN BOOKS* (a small selection).—**J. H. Blunt** [and **W. G. F. Phillimore** and **G. E. Jones**], *The Book of Church Law*, London, 1899; **P. A. Lemprière,** *A Compendium of the Canon Law*, Edinburgh, 1903 (has special reference to the Episcopal Church in Scotland); **R. S. Eves,** art. 'Canon Law,' and **G. Harford,** art. 'Ritual Law,' in the *Prayer Book Dictionary*, London, 1912; **J. W. Joyce,** *The Civil Power in its Relations to the Church* ('The Sword and the Keys'), do. 1889, and *Handbook of Convocations*, do. 1887; **E. G. Wood,** *The Regal Power of the Church*, Cambridge, 1883; **W. E. Collins,** *The Nature and Force of the Canon Law* (Church Historical Society, no. xxxiv.), London, 1898; **J. Robertson,** *Statuta Ecclesiæ Scottiicanæ*, Edinburgh, 1866.

iii. The constitutions and canons of the Anglican Churches have been published and may be seen as follows: those of England in Blunt-Phillimore as above, and (unrevised) bound up with the older Prayer Books; those of Ireland in *The Constitution of the Church of Ireland*, Dublin, 1909, and the canons are bound up with the Irish Prayer Books; the present canons of the Episcopal Church in Scotland were published in Edinburgh in 1911; for the United States see *Digest of the Canons . . . together with the Constitution, Printed for the Convention*, 1902 [no place mentioned]; the S. African constitution and canons were published at Capetown in 1887. These and the other branches of the Anglican Federation have published their laws locally after each revision of them. The Irish *Constitution* is reprinted every ten years, when the changes made in the interval since the last reprinting are incorporated.

A. J. MACLEAN.

LAW (Egyptian).—No body of Egyptian laws has come down to us, but some kind of written code is probably to be recognized in 'the forty leather rolls' laid before the *wazir's* judgment-seat in the XVIIIth dynasty (J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, Chicago, 1905–07, ii. §§ 675, 712). We have to depend for our knowledge of Egyptian law and its procedure almost entirely on the few royal decrees, business documents, or the like, that happen to have survived on stone or papyrus to represent the varying practices of several thousands of years. It is impossible to give even a meagre sketch of Egyptian law from these materials; a brief enumeration of the documents or groups of documents in order of date may be of service.

1. Old Kingdom.—For the Old Kingdom there is an interesting series of royal decrees conferring immunity from taxation and services of different kinds on particular temples, their personnel, lands, serfs, etc. (K. Sethe, in *GGA*, 1912, p. 705). In the tombs we find concise records of the conditions under which the tomb endowments are entrusted to the *ka*-priests (cf. Breasted, i. §§ 201, 232, etc.). There exists also a papyrus which briefly states a claim made in regard to the property of a deceased man involving guardianship and its denial by the opposing party, together with directions as to how the question should be settled (A. Erman and F. Krebs, *Aus den Papyrus der königlichen Museen*, Berlin, 1899, p. 83). A stele records the sale of a house in the presence of witnesses for goods the value of which is reckoned by a fixed standard (H. Sottas, *Étude critique sur un acte de vente immobilière*, Paris, 1913).

2. Middle Kingdom.—From the Middle Kingdom comes a remarkable record of a tomb endowment in the shape of ten contracts made with the priests and necropolis officials of Siut for the benefit of the nomarch's tomb, and the directions given to the single well-endowed *ka*-priest to whom the whole care of the tomb and its services was confided (Breasted, i. § 535). It shows that the Old Kingdom system of appointing an entire staff of hereditary tomb priests had failed. A group of papyri from house ruins give two examples of testamentary dispositions (*amt-per*), census-lists (*sputi*) of two households, a *sunt*, or record, of the hire of services and payment to be made, and a statement of a claim before the courts (F. Ll. Griffith, *Kahun Papyri*, London, 1899), and a memorandum in support of the claim to an inheritance (*PSBA* xiv. [1892] 328). The inscription of Chnemhotp (Breasted, i. § 619) shows the king regulating the boundaries of and succession to a nomarch's province. A royal decree (*ib.* § 773) deposes a nomarch for sheltering an enemy, and excludes his descendants from the office for ever.

3. New Kingdom (dynasties XVIII.–XX.).—From the XVIIIth dynasty we have the difficult and fragmentary inscriptions of the duties of the *wazir* already referred to (Breasted, ii. § 663); the latest treatment of one of the texts, the royal charge to the *wazir*, is by K. Sethe (*Die Einsetzung des Veziers unter der 18. Dynastie*, Leipzig, 1909). There is also the brief proclamation of a king's accession (Breasted, ii. § 54), the dedication of the city Akhetaton to the Sun-god by the heretic king Akhenaton (*ib.* § 949), a royal gift of lands to an official (*ib.* § 1042), and the edict of Horemheb, being a series of enactments to punish the unjust impositions of tax-gatherers and royal officers (*ib.* iii. § 45). Of documents on papyrus we have group of two *sunt* (hirings of female slaves) and two other documents connecting those with a lawsuit (A. H. Gardiner, in *ZÄ* xliii. [1907] 27). Ostraca record a dispute about an inheritance (W. Spiegelberg, *Studien und Materialien zum Rechtswesen des Pharaonenreiches der Dynast. XVIII.–XXI.*, Hanover, 1892, p. 16), and a few other memoranda of law-suits.

From the XIXth dynasty we have the long record of a dispute between cousins regarding the title to some land (A. H. Gardiner, *The Inscription of Mes*, Leipzig, 1905), and the settlement of another dispute about land (Erman and Krebs, *Aus den Papyrus*, p. 84). The international treaty with the Hittite king (Breasted, iii. § 367) must be looked upon as belonging properly to Hittite rather than to Egyptian legal phenomena.

The XXth dynasty has given us a notable series of papyrus records of criminal prosecutions concerning (1) a conspiracy in the royal *ḥarîm* (Breasted, iv. § 416), and (2) the robberies in the Theban necropolis, and especially of the royal tombs (*ib.* § 499); also memoranda of criminal charges against a ship-master (Spiegelberg, in *ZÄ* xxix. [1891] 73). A fragment remains of a royal decree like that of Horemheb (Spiegelberg, *Rechtswesen*, p. 95), and there are some ostraca with records of the division of property to heirs (*ib.* 29, 92).

4. Deltaic dynasties.—(1) *Dynasties XXI.–XXIV.*—At Thebes the virtual will of a high priest of Ammon in favour of his son was cast into the form of a decree of the god himself (Erman, in *ZÄ* xxxv. [1897] 19). A dispute about the ownership of a well in the Oasis of Dakhel was settled by reference to the local god Seth (Breasted, iii. § 725; Spiegelberg, in *RTr* xxi. [1899] 12). A case supposed by Erman to be of summary jurisdiction is now shown to be rather of assassination of persons who knew too much of a State secret (Gardiner, *Journ. of Manchester Egyp. Soc.*, 1912–13, p. 57).

(2) *Dynasties XXV.–XXX.*—With the Ethiopian conquest begins a period when the writing down of contracts appears to have been more and more insisted on. Our collections henceforward furnish a thin stream of legal papyri; and, though it is interrupted at periods of national disaster and disturbance, it tends to increase down to the time when the Egyptian language for such purposes ceased in the 1st cent. A.D. Religion was not so obtrusive in settling legal matters as it had been in the last period, but it was the age of oracles; oaths by the local deity in his temple always played a large part in both criminal and civil cases; and to the end of the reign of Psammeticus I.,

in the early contract papyri, an oath by the king and Ammon was customarily recorded.

All documents of this time which had been published or were accessible to him in original or photograph are enumerated by the present writer in his *Catalogue of the Demotic Papyri in the John Rylands Library*, Manchester, 1909, vol. iii., where the papyri of that collection are also fully translated. They comprise sales of land, houses, temples, priesthoods, funerary offices, and cattle; leases of farms; also contracts of marriage and divorce, of son-ship (adoption), and of servitude. A large and complete papyrus in the Rylands Collection contains an elaborate petition presented to the *wazīr* by a much-injured priest seeking redress and restoration of hereditary rights.

5. **Ptolemaic period.**—After the Macedonian conquest sales of lands and houses and of mummies with their funerary services, mortgages, leases, loans, marriage-contracts, and exculpatory oaths are common, but contracts of divorce, adoption, and servitude are not to be found, nor wills in any form. The native forms are modelled on those that preceded them, and are quite distinct from the flood of Greek contracts being produced in Egypt at the same time (see the above-mentioned *Rylands Catalogue* and numerous publications of papyri by Spiegelberg). The great priestly decrees of Canopus and of Memphis (the Rosetta stone) may also be mentioned here.

6. **Roman period.**—The native legal documents are practically confined to house-sales and mortgages in the Fayyūm of the 1st cent. A.D. See also ETHICS AND MORALITY (Egyptian), § 12.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works specified above, the most recent and therefore best publications of documents include W. Spiegelberg, *Die demotischen Verträge der Papyri Hauswaldt mit einem rechtsgeschichtlichen Beitrag von Josef Partsch*, Leipzig, 1913; O. Gradenwitz, F. Preisigke, and W. Spiegelberg, *Ein Erbstreit aus dem ptolemäischen Ägypten*, Strassburg, 1912. The numerous works of E. Revillout on Egyptian law are too fanciful to be recommended.

F. LL. GRIFFITH.

LAW (Greek).—I. *UNITY OF GREEK LAW.*—Although the Greek world was made up of a great number of commonwealths, each possessing independent laws of its own, and although every allowance must be made for local peculiarities, the leading conceptions of Greek law as a whole may still be considered as a unity. Most of our material, of course, comes from Athens, but Athens, as 'the school of Hellas,' is in a great measure representative of Greece. The Greeks felt very strongly that their customs and laws were peculiar to themselves as a nation, and presented a marked contrast to those of other people (Eur. *Androm.* 174 ff., and Dem. *in Lacritum*, 45).

II. *PERIODS.*—The history of Greek law falls into three principal periods, which may be called the archaic, the classical, and the Hellenistic. In the first, the rules of Greek legal lore are one of the varieties of Aryan tribal customs, which must be studied by the methods of comparative jurisprudence in close connexion with Indian, Italic, Celtic, Germanic, and Slavic law. The second covers roughly the 6th, 5th, and 4th centuries B.C., and is concerned chiefly with the laws and institutions of the autonomous city-States. The third corresponds to the time when Greek conceptions were acting as a kind of leaven in the vast tracts of the East—Asia Minor, Pontus, Syria, and Egypt—through which the Greek population had been dispersed by emigration and the Macedonian conquests.

1. **The archaic period.**—The States of the earliest periods were federations of the clans. Thus in Athens the commonwealth of the Eupatrids was subdivided into four tribes (*φυλή*), each of which consisted of three phratries (*φρατρία*), while each phratry was supposed to consist of thirty kindreds (*γένος*). The chief contribution of this period to Greek law consists in the principles of family law and succession. The community of family interests is symbolized by the hearth (*ἑστία*) as the centre of the household; the estate, which forms the basis of the material subsistence of the household, is the *κλῆρος*, and even in Athens of classical times certain rights and duties were considered as peculiarly attached to this estate (see, *e.g.*, Dem. *in Macart.* 1069 ff., as to the duties of criminal prosecution, corresponding to rights of succession to the *κλῆρος*). For this reason the practice of adoption was as well developed in Athens as in Rome (see art. ADOPTION [Greek]). A special case arose when a person died leaving a daughter to succeed him. She was emphatically 'joined to the estate' (*ἐπίκληρος*), and destined to marry the nearest agnate in order to preserve it. Instances from Athenian practice are quite common, but the custom is also well illustrated by examples from Sparta and Crete (Herod. vi. 57; Code of Gortyn, as to the *πατρωιῶκος*, i. 50 ff.; Dareste, *Rec. des inscr. jur. gr.*, i. 379 ff.; see, further, art. INHERITANCE [Greek]). The wider kindreds were constituted on the agnatic principle, as units organized under a chief (*ἄρχων τοῦ γένους*); but in many respects relationship through females was also recognized. The *ἀγχιστεία*, as the narrower circle of kindred, included all relatives down to the degree of first cousins once removed. The admission of relatives through females by the side of agnates may be explained to some extent by tradition from a period of matrilinear organization, which, according to a popular legend, existed in Athens at the time of Kekrops (Athenæus, xiii. 2 [555]); but it is also connected with alliances between clans (*e.g.*, the case of Kleisthenes the Alkmæonid). The influence of kinship on legal rules is well exemplified by the extensive rights of kinsmen in regard to criminal prosecutions. In cases of homicide, an action (*δίκη φόνου*) had to be brought by relatives of the deceased, and, if the offence amounted to manslaughter, it might be condoned by the relatives (*ἀίδεσις*) (Law of Drakon; Dareste, *Inscr. jur. gr.*, ii. 1) and compensation given by the slayer to the kindred. The family authority of the father over the children and of the husband over the wife appears in Greek as well as in other Aryan laws; but it is not so drastically expressed as in the Roman system. The father is not the absolute ruler of the household, but, as it were, a party to an implied compact, providing protection and education for his children, and entitled to support from them in return (*γηροβοσκία*).

2. **The classical period.**—(*a*) *General characteristics.*—In this period we must be careful to distinguish between oligarchic and democratic political principles. Aristotle (*e.g.*, *Pol.* vii. [v.] 1309*a*) often calls attention to the fact that the laws assumed a different aspect according to the system of government which was in force. The ideal of oligarchy is government by a small number of equals (*ὁμοῖοι*), though in practice many inequalities may arise (*Pol.* ii. 9. 1270*a*); the tendency of democracy, on the other hand, is to give freer scope to individual liberty of judgment and action (*Pol.* viii. 1317*b*, 3; cf. the funeral speech of Perikles [Thuc. ii. 39]). In Athens, we are dealing with a system which, more than any other, embodied these democratic principles.

(*b*) *The Athenian system.*—Athenian law of the classical period was essentially a popular, not a technical, body of rules. It represents the most striking experiment in history to administer law according to the standards of the 'average man' as to equity and justice. The commissions of heliasts, the sworn judges of the courts (*δικαστήρια*),

numbered some 200, 500, or 1000 citizens, who had to decide by vote after hearing the pleadings, but without previous debate among themselves. In these circumstances, no doubt the action of the tribunals was often extremely capricious and swayed by merely emotional considerations (*e.g.*, Lykurgus, *in Leocharem*; cf. Wyse's *Isæus*, *passim*). But the real wonder is not that these defects existed, but that in spite of them the administration of justice was of such a kind as to produce not only fine oratory, but remarkable juridical ideas.

(*c*) *Nature of law.*—The Greeks set a very high ideal to the State; its aim was not merely negative—to provide order and security for its members—but positive—to ensure the welfare of the individual. The policy might be called a cultural socialism—*οὐ μόνον τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν* (cf. Plato, *Legg.* xi. 923 A). Thus the State was regarded as being primarily an educational and cultural institution. To the attainment of its ideal, the laws were the chief instrument: they provided a *παιδείαν πρὸς τὸ κοινόν* (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* v. ii. 11). Their object was to embody the eternal justice (*δικαιοσύνη*); and it is characteristic of the Greek conception that there is no term in the language equivalent to the Latin *ius*, the expression *τὸ δίκαιον* meaning not only 'the lawful' but 'the just.' Hence the archaic conception of law was that it was essentially sacred in its origin, being the gift of the gods to men (see passage from Dem. *adv. Aristogeitonem*, quoted *Dig.* i. iii. 2), the concrete expression of a universal and immutable *δικαιοσύνη* (cf. Herakleitos, fr. 114; H. Diels, *Herakleitos von Ephesus*[2], Berlin, 1909, p. 44); and hence the view, which frequently recurs in the orators, that the most ancient law is the best (*e.g.*, Isok. *Περὶ τῆς Ἀντιδόσεως*, 82). In the classical period, however, this ancient idealistic view was subjected to searching criticism. The 5th cent. was a time of great fermentation, when, as Thucydides says, 'men believed nothing but that nothing was secure' (iii. 83); a growing acquaintance with new countries and peoples impressed the Greeks vividly with the diversity of national ideas and customs (Herod. iii. 38); the great catastrophes of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars produced a distrust of settled institutions; and, lastly, the development of philosophical theories led to a marked assertion of individualism. The general result was an acute realization of the relativity of all human affairs, which in practical life acted as a powerful social dissolvent. It became a common contention that law was merely the product of force, or an arbitrary and artificial arrangement which superior persons were entitled to disregard (Thrasymachos and Glaukon in the *Republic*, Kallikles in the *Gorgias*). In the domain of jurisprudence the great problem was to determine how far the fundamental laws could be considered as ingrained in the nature of man, and how far they were merely subjective and factitious. It was the Sophists who chiefly canvassed this question, but the inquiry did not by any means originate with them; it appears as early as Demokritos, who first sets up the antithesis between *φύσις*, or that which exists by nature, and *νόμος*, or that which exists by convention (fr. 1; cf. Archelaus, *ap.* Diog. Laert. ii. 4, and Hippolytus, *ap.* H. Diels, *Doxographi Græci*, Berlin, 1879, p. 564). This principle of relativism runs throughout all the speculation of the Sophists, and, as is well known, reached its highest point in Protagoras. But a justification had to be provided for positive law; even the Sophists had to recognize the fact that society and law continue to exist in spite of the divergent tendencies of individualism. This was to be explained, they said, by the social instinct: man is led by nature to evaluate his own actions—hence the feeling of shame (*αἰδώς*)—and at the same time to strike a balance between conflicting rights—hence justice (*δίκη*) (Plato, *Protag.* 322 B). How was this to be reconciled with relativism? According to Plato, Protagoras held that the laws were the result of conventions imposed by each city according to its own particular standards (*Theæt.* 172 A, B). It was useless to dispute concerning the truth of these different views of law; but the event would show which of them was useful and which not. In this system, therefore, individualism is supplanted by pragmatism. The doctrine of the *δόξα τῆς πόλεως*, fully developed by Protagoras, remains one of the corner-stones of Sokrates' teaching. The citizen who has been nurtured by the *πόλις*, and chooses to remain in it, must abide by its decrees; at the same time, freedom must be allowed to individual thought, and Sokrates was optimistic as to the ultimate triumph of right knowledge in politics and jurisprudence as well as in science; his standard for the examination of laws is a logical standard, and his method necessarily dialectical. Plato follows upon much the same lines as Sokrates. The *δόξα τῆς πόλεως*, in his view, means that the State, not the individual, is to set the standard of morals and law; justice is 'writ small in the individual and writ large in the State' (*Rep.* ii. 368 ff.). Its essence is the distribution of rights and duties on the principle of not meddling with the concerns of others (*Rep.* iv. 433 A). The privileges of each class of the community—thinkers, fighters, and workers—must be strictly proportionate to its responsibilities. It is, unhappily, not any existing State, but only an ideal commonwealth, that is equal to the task of setting and maintaining the standard of justice (*Rep.* vii. 519). Aristotle sums up the preceding theories concerning the justification of positive law, and gives the famous classification which divides the subject under the heads of 'justice in general' (*τὸ δίκαιον καθ' ὅλου*) and 'justice in particular' (*τὸ δίκαιον ἐν μέρει*). The latter is further subdivided into justice which is distributive (*διανεμητικόν*) and legal redress (*διορθωτικόν*). Justice in general deals with moral precepts brought under the cognizance of the State by its laws (*τὸ νόμιμον*), while justice in particular deals more especially with equality (*τὸ ἴσον*). As to the distribution of rights and duties, it has to find its standard, not in absolute equality, but in proportion (*κατ' ἀναλογίαν*), which is taken as geometrical proportion. Men must claim rights in accordance with their standing and their duties. Legal redress is directed to determining rights which may be in dispute, and giving compensation for material and moral injuries. Besides giving these categories of justice, Aristotle dwells on the necessity of correcting general rules according to the circumstances of particular cases; this forms the sphere of *ἐπιείκεια* (see below) (*Eth. Nic.* v. ii. 8, 10, iii. 7, iv. 2 f., v. 1).

(*d*) *Sources of law.*—Let us now consider how these jurisprudential principles were embodied in the practice of law. (1) *Enacted law.*—The most important source was written or formulated enactment. The sovereign people did not care to entrust the administration of justice to the independent judgment of magistrates and officers: the 'rule of law' was fully recognized by Athenian democracy (*e.g.*, Isok. *Panath.* § 138). As soon as the authority of *νόμος* was usurped by popular decree (*ψήφισμα*), democracy, said Aristotle, was undermined (*Pol.* vi. 4. 1292*a*, 27 f.). Elaborate precautions against hasty legislation were taken by means of the *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, oaths and penalties (Hyperides, *Philipp.* §§ 4, 6; Dem. *adv. Aristoc.*

86). (2) *Customary law.*—Nevertheless, there was also a vast body of customary law, which was mainly passed on to democracy by the preceding period, since only a few of the rules as to procedure and substantive law were actually promulgated as θεσμοί (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* iii. 4). Sacral law in general remained uncodified; ancestral customs (τὰ πάτρια) were recognized as a definite and sacred source of legal rules, and as such were interpreted by the exegetæ (Dem. *in Eucrgum*, p. 1160, § 68 f.). The ancient jurisdiction of the archons, and that of the Areopagus, until the reforms of Perikles and Ephialtes, were also largely concerned with traditional usages. (3) *Precedent.*—Precedent was never regarded as binding on the Athenian courts, but various kinds of non-litigious custom—*e.g.*, in dowry, commercial practice, maritime law, and forms of pleading and conveyancing employed by the professional scribes (γραμματεῖς) of the courts together with various forms of executory agreements (cf. Dareste, *Inscr. jur. gr.*, i. 318)—tended to establish precedents; and, in general, existing decisions had at least a symptomatic value, as showing the prevailing views and tendencies of popular courts (cf. Dem. *in Dionys.* 48). (4) *Natural law.*—Though in the orators and philosophers there are many indications of an 'unwritten law' (νόμος ἄγραφος) which is founded on instincts of human nature (Arist. *Rhet.* I. x. 3), the theory of a transcendent law of nature was not erected into a positive juridical doctrine. It appears most forcibly in the poets (*e.g.*, Soph. *Antig.* 454), though it was sometimes appealed to in actual litigation (Lysias, *in Eratosthenem*, § 2). (5) *Equity.*—A conscious juristic theory of the law of nature was rendered unnecessary by the conception of ἐπιείκεια, which gives a peculiar colouring to the whole system of Greek law. It amounted in practice to a liberal interpretation and application of legal rules. Although the oath of the heliasts enjoined them to frame their decisions according to their consciousness of justice (γνώμῃ καὶ δικαιοτάτῃ) only where there was no definite law to go by, in practice popular tribunals took great liberties in the application of existing laws. To some extent this was made necessary by the archaic origin and obscure expression of many fundamental laws (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* ix.). Wills and contracts provided fruitful material for such discretionary justice.

(c) *Distributive justice.*—The principle of the distribution of rights and duties, so characteristic of the Greek legal system, was by no means confined to theory, but was very definitely asserted in practice. Privileges and burdens were dispensed according to what the individual did and could contribute to the common stock. Military service, taxation, and the liturgies—*i.e.* public services such as the fitting out of ships, providing choruses for dramatic performances, etc.—were all regulated upon this basis. Those who considered themselves unfairly burdened by the very heavy requirements of the liturgies might resort to the ἀντίδοσις. A citizen who had been called upon to perform a liturgy might claim that another was better able to undertake it than himself, and demand that he should either do so or exchange properties (Dem. *in Phæn.*; Isok. Περὶ τῆς Ἀντιδόσεως). Similarly, if a citizen had been exempted from public burdens or granted a subsidy, he might be called upon to defend his privileges (Lysias, *Or.* xxiv. § 6 f.). The law of property in Athens never developed on such rigid lines as in Rome. There was no theory of absolute ownership. The κλῆρος was primarily the thing which was 'allotted' to the individual, but a kind of 'eminent domain' was reserved to the commonwealth. Therefore the typical action for the recovery of property was the διαδικασία, which was not a claim for absolute title, but only for guaranteed possession. Expropriation and interference with contracts were practised with a disregard for private right which is startling to modern notions (*e.g.*, legislation in Ephesus at the time of the Mithridatic war [Dareste, *Inscr. jur. gr.*, i. 22]).

(*f*) *Wrong and crime.*—We distinguish in the Greek theory of wrong and crime three elements which call for juridical treatment. (1) The first is that of redress. 'Damages,' in Aristotle's scheme, are not merely compensation, as in modern theory, but an equation of the loss to the party wronged (ζημία) and the gain to the wrongdoer (κέρδος). All wrongs are considered chiefly from the personal point of view. There is no sharp cleavage between the private action (δίκη) and the public action (γραφή); as a transitional form, the δίκη κατά τινος, a private action for crime, is distinguished from the δίκη πρός τινα, a purely private suit. As for the assessment of damages, the contending parties presented rival valuations between which the court had to decide. (2) The element of public reprobation assumes a religious form. Bloodshed, *e.g.*, was a pollution which excited the wrath of the Erinyes and the Olympian gods, and must be cleansed by religious purification. Hence even in classical times all actions of homicide were tried in temples, and even an inanimate object which caused the death of a human being was solemnly judged and sentenced before the hearth of the government (Prytaneum). Hence also the importance which was attached to orthodoxy: impiety, which was taken to include professions of free thought, was indictable by the γραφὴ ἀσεβείας (*e.g.*, the case of Sokrates). (3) How far was it recognized that in every crime there is a revolt of the individual will against the supreme will of the community? There are many indications that the Greeks were conscious of this element in crime, *e.g.*, Isok. *c. Lochitem*, § 7). They were not concerned with problems of individual free will in the theory of punishment. In view of the predominance of the commonwealth over the individual, punishment itself often took the terroristic form of actual extermination and intimidation. Demokritos puts the criminal on the same plane as a wild beast (frags. *ap.* Stob. *Flor.* xliv. 16, 18, 19), and Plato unequivocally states the necessity of removing obnoxious members of the body politic by means of capital punishment (*Legg.* 862). The social effect of intimidation was one of the leading principles of Protagoras's theory of law, and Plato fully endorses the view of the great Sophist that the object of punishment is not revenge for what, after all, cannot be undone, but the prevention of similar offences in the future (*Protag.* 324B).

3. The Hellenistic period.—It is impossible to enter in detail upon the discoveries which the recent researches of papyrologists and epigraphists have made in the Greek law of this period, especially that which prevailed in Egypt. One of its most remarkable features was the personification of the State in the king (the Pharaoh; cf. art. KING [Egyptian]), and the subjection of all juridical relations to the fiscal point of view. Under the rule of the Ptolemys, *dominium* was vested in the monarch, and private property in land amounted only to a species of leasehold (γῆ ἐν ἀφέσει), while the cultivation of State domains (γῆ βασιλική), and, later on, of all taxed land, was ensured by every means, including a compulsory distribution of plots (ἐπιβολή) among peasant farmers. In the ascription of the peasantry (δημόσιοι γεωργοί) to the crown lands we find the germs of the doctrine of local origin which played such a large part in the later Roman Empire. In Asia Minor, under the Seleucidæ, there was even a class of tenants, called

λαοὶ βασιλικοί, whose status may be described as 'ascription to the glebe' (Rostowzew, *Gesch. des röm. Kolonates*, p. 256 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Some of the original texts of Greek law have been preserved for us in inscriptions—*e.g.*, the laws of Gortyn in Crete, and Drakon's law as to homicide in a copy made in 409–408 B.C. A selection of texts and of legal instruments of different kinds, with an excellent commentary, is presented in the *Recueil des inscriptions juridiques grecques*, ed. R. Dareste, B. Haussoullier, and T. Reinach, Paris, 1892–95. Other collections are W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Græcarum*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1898; *CIG*, Berlin, 1873, etc.; H. Collitz and F. Bechtel, *Die griech. Dialekt-Inschriften*, Göttingen, 1883 ff.; P. Cauer, *Delectus Inscriptionum Græcarum*, Leipzig, 1883; E. S. Roberts and E. A. Gardner, *Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, Cambridge, 1887–1905. As to laws and acts preserved in papyri, see L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde*, Juristischer Teil, Leipzig and Berlin, 1912. A rather antiquated collection of the principal notices as to Athenian law is that of J. B. Téfy, *Corpus Juris Attici*, Budapest and Leipzig, 1868. The speeches of Attic orators pleading before the Courts afford, of course, a copious source of information; see especially the speeches of Demosthenes, and also the translations, with instructive notes and appendices, by C. R. Kennedy, of orations against Leptines, Meidias, etc. (London, 1877), orations against Timokrates, Aristogeiton, etc. (do. 1871), and Select Speeches (Cambridge, 1841); R. Dareste, *Les Plaidoyers civils de Démosthènes*, 2 vols., Paris, 1875; *The Speeches of Isæus*, ed. William Wyse, Cambridge, 1904, with a commentary remarkable for its learning and acumen as well as for its exaggerated criticisms of Athenian legal practice; R. Dareste and B. Haussoulier, *Les Plaidoyers d'Isée*, Paris, 1898; and the speeches of Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias, Isokrates, Deinarchus, Lykurgus, Æschines, and Hyperides. The lexicographers—Harpokration, Hesychios, Pollux, etc.—have preserved many fragments of Greek laws. In the writings of the philosophers there is much information about Greek doctrines of jurisprudence; see especially Xenophon, *Memorabilia*; Plato, *Republic*, *Laws*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Theætetus*; Aristotle, *Ethics* (particularly bk. v.), *Politics*, *Rhetoric*, *The Constitution of Athens*, and other fragments of the work on *Constitutions* (πολιτεῖαι). Theophrastos's treatise on laws has been lost, with the exception of one or two fragments.

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Most valuable contributions on various questions of law are to be found in the great Encyclopædias of Pauly-Wissowa and Daremberg-Saglio; cf. W. Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities*[3], London, 1890–91.

PAUL VINOGRADOFF.

LAW (Hindu).—Law in India is closely connected with religion. Thus the so-called Code of Manu contains a great deal more about *ăchāra*, 'established practices,' *i.e.* observances of caste, domestic ceremonies, funeral rites, oblations to the *manes* and to the gods, rules of diet, and other religious questions, including purely religious and philosophical discussions, than on the subject of secular laws (see CUSTOM [Hindu]). Hence, after an exordium in the first book on the creation of the world, the four stages in the life of a Brāhman form the principal if not the only subject treated in the 2nd to the 6th book. The 7th book contains the rules of government, including the art of war. The 8th book—the longest of all, it is true—and the 9th are the only ones which deal with law in the proper sense of the word (*vyavahāra*). The last three books (10–12) treat of the duties of the various castes, of penances, and of transmigration. The legal portion of the Code does not amount to more than one-fourth of the whole. Nor do the other law-books (*Dharmaśāstras*) differ from Manu in this respect; most of the Codes do not deal at all with positive law, but confine their attention to penances, purification, and other religious topics. Forensic law is arranged under 18 heads in the Code of Manu (viii. 4–7), viz. non-payment of debt, deposit and pledge, sale without ownership, concerns among partners, resumption of gifts, non-payment of wages, non-performance of agreements, rescission of sale and purchase, disputes between the owner of cattle and his servants, disputes regarding boundaries, assault, defamation, robbery and violence, adultery, duties of man and wife, partition of inheritance, gambling and betting. The *Dharmaśāstra* of Nārada divides the 18 titles into 132 branches. Thus, *e.g.*, the first title, the law of debt, is said to consist of the following 25 divisions: (1) which debts have to be paid, and which not; (2) debts; (3) property; (4) subsistence of a Brāhman in times of distress; (5) modes of proof; (6) lending money at interest; (7) usurers; (8) sureties; (9) pledges; (10) documents; (11) incompetent witnesses; (12) witnesses for the plaintiff; (13) witnesses for the defendant; (14) where no witnesses are required; (15) validity of testimony; (16) false witnesses; (17) exhorting the witnesses; (18) valid evidence; (19) invalid evidence; (20) proceedings on failure of both documents and witnesses; (21) ordeal by balance; (22) ordeal by fire; (23) ordeal by water; (24) ordeal by poison; (25) ordeal by sacred libation. It appears that the law of evidence and judicial procedure, including ordeals, in general is here mixed up with the law of debt, pointing thus to the special importance of debt which may be considered the principal reason for going to law in a primitive state of society. A creditor is, however, allowed to recover a debt from his debtor privately, by force or by fraud. The rate of interest is extremely high; it is generally paid in kind.

As regards deposits, we can understand that the insecurity of property led to the entrusting of valuable articles for safety to the keeping of others. The habit of concealing such articles somewhere accounts for the prominence of the subject of treasure-trove in the Indian law-books (see TREASURE-TROVE [Hindu]). All purchases and sales are to be effected in open market, secrecy being considered a sign of dishonesty. The public fixing of market rates and the enforcement of them correspond to modern practice. When a man repents of a bargain, he is at liberty to annul it within ten days. The rules regarding concerns among partners refer, particularly, to societies of priests; and by 'gifts' are meant, in the first place, religious gifts to Brāhmans (see GIFTS [Hindu]). A herdsman is to receive a tenth part of the milk of his cows in place of wages. The detailed rules regarding the boundaries of fields

show that the arable land was already held in severalty.

In the family laws, the institution of marriage is improved by prohibiting purchase of a wife, and declaring a contract of marriage, if once concluded, to be irrevocable. Nevertheless, the position of women is one of absolute inferiority to the male sex. Thus a wife is liable to be chastised by her husband; and, even when he is unfaithful to her, she must worship him like a god. A woman is declared to be never fit for independence, and has to live under the perpetual tutelage of her father, husband, and sons. Polygamy is allowed, and seems to have been very common in rich and noble families. Infant-marriage is recommended, and the re-marriage of widows prohibited or discouraged. As regards proprietary right (*strīdhana*), women are said to be incapable of holding any property (except their *strīdhana*, or peculiar property); nor can they inherit, under the early law of succession at least, which was subsequently modified so as to let the widow in as an heir, with certain restrictions, on failure of male posterity. All family property is supposed to be held in common by a sort of joint ownership (joint family), the father or manager being regarded as a head partner. The family members are kept together by the sacred oblations offered in common by its living head to its deceased members (see INHERITANCE [Hindu]). After the father's death the sons divide his property equally, or with a specific deduction for the eldest son; or the eldest succeeds to the whole estate, the others living under him as under their father. Twelve different kinds of sonship are recognized, each of the secondary sons succeeding in default of his superior in rank, whilst the real legitimate son excludes them all from inheriting. The passages in the law-books extolling the possession of a son for spiritual purposes, as saving his father from hell, generally relate to the real legitimate son. The gross usages relating to the affiliation of the subsidiary sons were discouraged by the legal writers, and no doubt the existence of these usages throws an unfavourable light on the constitution of the family in ancient India. Thus there is the *kṣetraja*, or son begotten by levirate (*niyoga*); the *gūḍhaja*, or secretly born son of an adulterous wife; the *sahodha*, or son of the pregnant bride; the *kānīna*, or unmarried damsel's son; the *krīta*, or purchased son; the *apaviddha*, or deserted son. The more recent writers do not acknowledge as legitimate in the present age of sin (*Kaliyuga*) any but the true son, procreated in lawful marriage (*aurasa*), and the adopted son (*dattaka*) (see ADOPTION [Hindu]). There is diversity of opinion as to whether a widow may be allowed to adopt, with the assent of her husband given shortly before his death, this being the only case in which a sort of testamentary power of the owner of property is recognized. A father may, indeed, distribute his property among his sons during his lifetime; but, in doing so, he can exercise discretion only as to his self-acquired property, the ancestral property being held by father and sons in common, according to the joint-family principle.

Passing to criminal law, we find the suppression of crime recognized as a sovereign and a sacred function. There are hardly any survivals left of the right of private war and of the *wergild* (see BLOOD-FEUD [Hindu]). The removal of thorny weeds (*kaṇṭakaśodhana*), *i.e.* the suppression of criminals, is regarded as one of the principal duties of a ruler. Legal offences are also moral sins, and kings, by punishing the wicked and protecting the virtuous, obtain their own absolution. Punishment is personified as a god (see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Hindu]). A king in whose dominions there are no thieves, adulterers, calumniators, robbers, murderers, (after death) attains the world of Indra. Abuse, assault, theft, violence, including manslaughter and robbery, and sexual crimes, such as adultery, rape, seduction, and forbidden intercourse, are regarded as the five principal crimes. Theft and robbery seem to obtain special attention. A thief appearing before the king with flying hair, holding a club in his hand, and proclaiming his deed, is purified of his guilt, whether he be slain or pardoned; but, if the king does not strike, the guilt falls on him. Cattle-lifting appears to have been specially common, and the village to which the robbers were tracked was made answerable. The principle thus laid down has remained an effective part of the law down to our day, and elaborate rules are still in force in Kāthiāwār for following up the track from village to village, the Talukdar of the last being held primarily responsible. Stolen property in general must be restored by a king to its owner, according to Manu; and a ruler is even bound to make good the loss occasioned by his negligence. The king is required to cause taverns, shops, festive assemblies, old gardens, forests, and other places of retreat to be guarded by companies of soldiers, in order to keep away thieves, and to find out thieves with the aid of clever reformed thieves, and destroy them. The notion of theft and robbery is extended very far, so as to include cheating of every sort, forgery, bribery, jugglery, dishonest dealing in judicial proceedings, false gambling, etc. To steal gold belonging to a Brāhman is regarded as particularly punishable; but it is in the law of abuse and assault, of homicide, and of adultery, that the gradation of punishments according to the caste of the offender and of the offended comes out most clearly. Thus a low-caste man must suffer death for an intrigue with a guarded Brāhman woman, as a safeguard of caste purity, whereas adultery with a woman of inferior caste is punishable only with a fine. Fines are inflicted equally on Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas who defame one of a higher caste, while the Śūdra offender incurs corporal punishment. Fines are the most common form of punishment, but there are many other forms (see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Hindu]). Barbarous cruelty, the prevalence of the *lex talionis*, and want of system characterize the Indian as well as other primitive codes. Death is prescribed by Manu for aggravated theft, for harbouring robbers, swindling, and kidnapping, for certain cases of adultery and insult—in short, for a great many more crimes than under more balanced systems. Death by torture was the punishment of a dishonest goldsmith, and mutilation that of the destroyer of a boundary-mark—which shows how great was the alarm at their offences. When we find that a red-hot iron spike ten fingers long is to be thrust into the mouth of a low-born wretch for reviling a Brāhman, we are reminded that the composers of these law-books were Brāhmans. Although the judges, like the jurists, were generally Brāhmans, it appears doubtful whether the privileges claimed by the sacerdotal class and incorporated with legal rules were actually accorded to them. Many of their rules belong to the moral sphere, and go beyond what we recognize as the proper province of the penal law. Excessive drinking is punished as a crime in itself, not only as a breach of public order. Gambling is viewed in the same light. There are rules for securing chastity and sexual purity. Hospitality is considered a duty to be enforced by law in certain cases. The practice of magic rites and incantations meant to destroy life is punishable by a fine. Every one must be strictly kept to the employment of his own caste. Matrimonial duties and family relations are elaborately regu-

lated. The proper province of moral obligations and delinquencies, however, is the ecclesiastical law, with its long lists of offences and religious penances and austerities (see EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT [Hindu]). Punishment and penance may be combined, as when the slayer of a milch-cow or of a bull (these being sacred animals) has to pay a fine first and do penance afterwards, or when, in cases of sexual criminality, the king inflicts punishment and the sin committed is expiated by a penance. Should an offender fail to perform the penance prescribed for his offence, he is at once expelled from his caste by the ceremony of *ghaṭasphoṭa*, 'the breaking of the water-pot'—a ceremony which is performed down to the present day in such cases. Punishment by itself is also supposed to have a purifying effect, as in the above-mentioned case of a thief who appears before the king of his own accord and is struck down by him.

Judicial procedure is simple and patriarchal. It presents the open court method of investigating accusations for crime, the king, attended by learned Brāhmans, entering his court of justice every morning, and there, after having seated himself on the judgment-seat and having worshipped the gods, undertaking the trial of the causes brought before him. The king has to fast for one whole day if a criminal deserving punishment is allowed to go free, and for three days if an innocent man is punished. The more recent law-books mention a number of other members of a court of justice besides the king—the king's domestic priest, his chief judge, who may also represent him if absent, his ministers of State, the assessors of the court, who are required to state their opinion of the case unreservedly and in accordance with the dictates of justice, the accountant, the scribe, the beadle. Gold and fire are used in the administration of oaths and ordeals, and water for refreshment. In giving a decision, the king must attend to local usage, written law, and the practice of the virtuous, if not opposed to local, family, or caste usages. Villages, tribes, and castes have also tribunals of their own, corresponding to the modern Pañchāyats; but from these an appeal to the king is possible. There is no essential difference between the trial of civil and criminal suits, except perhaps that the character and other qualifications of a reliable witness are not examined so strictly in criminal cases as in civil ones, and that the defendant in a criminal case cannot be represented by a substitute. The litigants must always be heard in person, and the king or the judge watches their countenances and their conduct carefully. Witnesses are watched in the same way, the depositions of witnesses being regarded as the most important part of the evidence. Certain persons are not admissible as witnesses on account of their personal relations with the litigant parties, or on account of age, dignity, sex, devotion to religion, moral or personal defects. There are also some provisions as to the number of witnesses, as that there shall not be less than three. In the event of a conflict of testimony, that of the majority generally prevails. The witnesses are solemnly adjured to speak the truth; and, if they should happen to meet with a calamity within seven days after making their deposition, this is held to prove its falsehood. Perjured witnesses are severely punished, and have to endure fearful pangs in a future existence, and destroy their own relatives through their wickedness. Perjury, however, is tolerated where an accused person may be saved from death by it.

The later law-books give special prominence to documents, and make written prevail over oral evidence, the plaint and the answer of the defendant having, likewise, to be stated in writing. The trial is to be conducted discreetly and skilfully, for liars may have the appearance of veracious men and veracious men may resemble liars, or documents may be forged. If human proof should fail, divine test is to be resorted to, of which there are many kinds, such as the water and fire ordeals, the ordeal by poison, the ordeal by hot metal (a gold coin has to be taken out of a vessel filled with boiling oil and butter), the ordeal by drawing lots, and the ordeal by sacred libation. The deities are invoked to supervise these proceedings, and are believed to establish the innocence or guilt of the accused. In less important cases, oaths are to be administered, the accused swearing by the head or feet of a Brāhman, or of his wife or son, or of an idol, and his innocence being established if within a certain period he should not meet with an extraordinary calamity, such as an illness, or the loss of a son or of his fortune. The custom of performing ordeals has survived down to very modern times; and oaths by an idol, a Brāhman, etc., are even now in vogue, an accident happening to the person afterwards being considered to prove his guilt. The decision of the judge in a suit is to be stated in writing, and a copy of it is to be handed to the victorious party. 'When lawsuits are decided properly, the members of the court are cleared from guilt. But where justice, wounded by injustice, approaches, and the judges do not extract the dart, then they also are wounded by that dart of injustice' (Nārada, p. 17; Manu, viii. 12).

The sources of the sacred law, according to Manu (ii. 6, 12), consist of the whole Veda, the *Smṛti*, or tradition, the customs of holy men, and self-satisfaction (where there is no other guide). The four Vedas, together with auxiliary literature, all of which is believed to be eternal and inspired, are confined to the consideration of religious rites, and contain very little about secular law, though they are considered the fountainhead of the whole law. *Dharmaśāstras* or *Smṛtis* are the real sources of law from a legal point of view. The term *Smṛti* means literally 'recollection,' and is used to denote a work or the whole body of Sanskrit works in which the sages of antiquity set down their recollections of the divine precepts regarding the duty of man. In reality, the earliest law-books were composed in and for the Brāhmanical schools studying the various parts of the Veda, and have been preserved as portions of the manuals of Vedic lore used in those schools, or as independent works. Such compositions are the *Dharmaśāstras* or *Dharmasūtras* of Āpastamba, Baudhāyana, Gautama, Vasiṣṭha, Viṣṇu, and some others. They are composed in the aphoristic Sūtra style, either entirely in prose or, more usually, in mixed prose and verse. Some of these works are supposed to have been written in the 5th or 6th cent. B.C., or even earlier, but they may have undergone many changes since then. Their contents are mainly religious, but the positive law is also treated in them, and they are very useful for tracing the gradual development of legal institutions in India.

From these aphoristic treatises we pass to the versified works, composed in the *śloka* metre, such as the celebrated Code of Manu, the Magna Charta of Brāhmanism; the Code of Yājñavalkya, distinguished for its concise and systematic treatment of the whole law, in three books, on *ācāra*, *i.e.* religious rites and duties, *vyavahāra*, *i.e.* jurisprudence, and *prāyaścitta*, *i.e.* sins and their atonement; and the Code of Nārada, unique in its being confined to jurisprudence alone, which it treats with great fullness of detail. The opening verses of the Code of Manu narrate how Manu, the descendant of Brahmā, gave the great sages an account of the creation, and afterwards transferred the task of expounding the Institutes of the Sacred Law, which he had learned from Brahmā,

to Bhṛgu, one of his ten mind-born sons. There is an ancient proverb that 'all Manu said is medicine,' and another maxim stating that 'a *smṛti* or rule of law that is opposed to the sense of Manu's Institutes is not approved.' The great number of learned Commentaries composed on the Code of Manu, from the 8th or 9th cent. downwards, also testifies to the very particular authority early assigned to this codification of the religious and secular law, which may have originated in the first centuries A.D., if not earlier. There are also many *Smṛtis* which have not been preserved in a separate and complete form, and are known to us only from the passages of law cited in the Sanskrit Commentaries and Digests; but the authenticity of these texts is somewhat doubtful. The mythological poems called *Purāṇas* are also cited a great deal, particularly on the subject of vows, gifts, and other parts of the religious law, though they are said to be inferior in authority to the *Smṛtis*. The Commentaries and systematic works on law, being posterior in time to the *Smṛtis* and *Purāṇas*, have gradually come to supersede them in authority, especially the celebrated *Mitākṣarā*, a Commentary on the *Smṛti* of Yājñavalkya composed by the ascetic Vijñāneśvara, *c.* A.D. 1100, at Kalyāṇapura, in the Deccan. The *Smṛtichandrikā* of Devanna-bhaṭṭa, the *Saraswativilāsa* of king Rudradeva, the *Viramitrodaya* of Mitramiśra, the *Mayūkhas* of Nilakaṇṭha, and other learned compositions are used concurrently with the *Mitākṣarā* in the several provinces; in Bengal alone the *Dāyabhāga* of Jīmūtavāhana has superseded the *Mitākṣarā* as far as the law of inheritance is concerned. Customs which are, like written codes, considered a source of law have to a certain extent been embodied in the codes. Recent collections of customs were instituted by the British Government—*e.g.*, A. Steele, *The Law and Customs of Hindu Castes*, London, 1868; C. L. Tupper, *Punjab Customary Law*, Calcutta, 1881; C. Boulnois and W. H. Rattigan, *Notes on Customary Law as administered in the Courts of the Punjab*, Lahore, 1876.

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J. JOLLY.

LAW (Iranian).—The term *daēna*, the later *dīn*, which is commonly and conveniently translated 'law,' is perhaps the most characteristic and best known term in the Avestic system. It also indicates the religion itself; in fact, in accord with the entire mentality of the ancient Iranians, as of so many other Eastern peoples, there was no distinction between religious and civil law. Another term which may be translated 'law' is *dāta*, and in the Pahlavi treatise, the *Dīnkart*, we read the assertion, *Airāno dāṭo dino Māzdayasno* (*Dīnkart*, ed. Peshotan B. Sanjana, Bombay, 1874ff., ch. 28), which we may render, 'the Mazdean religion is the law of Irān.' As Geiger remarks, it is highly probable that with the ancient Iranians, as with other Indo-European peoples, the early form of judicial process was the simple one of a village council of elders. His surmise, that in the word *vīcira* (the origin of the modern Persian *vazīr*, or, as we say, 'vizier') we have a Gāthic term for 'judge,' does not seem to be tenable, although *vīcira* certainly bears the meaning of 'deciding.' In the later Avesta the term *ṭkaēsha*, sometimes with the qualificative *dātōrāza*, 'giving or administrating law' (*Ys.* ix. 10), certainly indicates the judge. In the passage just quoted it is especially applied to Urvākhshaya, the son of Thrita, who is considered apparently as a kind of Iranian Numa. According to Geiger's view, the priestly code, which we know as the *Vendīdād*, represents only that portion of legislation 'in which the priesthood reserved for themselves jurisdiction, or else added ecclesiastical penalties to those of the secular tribunal.' There are distinct traces in the Avesta of blood *vendetta*, and, still more, of *wergild*; indeed, the prescriptions for the latter are fairly full (see *Vend.* iv. 44). Such usages were no doubt pre-Zoroastrian. The legislation contained in the *Vendīdād*, agreeably with the underlying principles of the system, does not make any real distinction between what we should call civil jurisprudence and religious or ritual law. If we accept J. H. Moulton's theory of the Magian element in later Zoroastrianism (*Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, lectures vi., vii.), then the whole ritual legislation must be attributed to this, as he maintains, non-Aryan race. In the code, however, moral, ritual, and civic, even hygienic, crimes and their respective punishments are mingled together. As we should expect from the fundamental and traditional love of truth and hatred of falsehood which, even by the testimony of their Greek foes, always characterized the ancient Iranian people, the highest value is attached to the observance of contracts (*mithra*), and breach of contract is severely condemned, even when towards unbelievers. Contracts are said to be confirmed in six ways—by word of mouth, by handgrasp, or by the pledging of a sheep, an ox, a man, or a piece of land, respectively (*Vend.* iv. 2ff.). Crimes of personal violence are carefully graduated according to the seriousness of the injuries done and the number of times committed, the penalties being fixed on a sliding scale of (apparently) scourgings. Capital punishment, curiously enough, is prescribed, not for taking life, but for performing irregularly and without sufficient knowledge certain priestly functions. The ordinary unit, so to speak, of corporal chastisement for all kinds of crimes is *upāzana*, which is generally translated 'stroke' or 'blow' with a horsewhip or scourge. A difficulty arises from the enormous number of these units which are prescribed for certain crimes, rising to hundreds and even thousands, which it would be quite impossible for any human being to bear. As, however, there was apparently a scale of monetary equivalents for corporal chastisements, it may be that these impossible numbers are simply meant as a guide to fix the amount of such wergild. As a matter of fact, far more serious punishments are assigned to what we should consider slight ritual or ceremonial transgression than to crimes of violence. In the opinion of Spiegel and Geiger, these *upāzana* may possibly mean simply blows with an instrument for the slaying of noxious insects and other creatures of the Evil Spirit, whose destruction was supposed to atone for a certain degree of crime.

As the *Vendīdād* was exclusively a priestly code of the Magians, 'it is self-evident why transgressions of religious precepts are most severely punished. If the penalty consisted only in the delivery of slain *khrafstras*, it might of course reach very high sums. It is probable that, quite early, persons could be relieved of their obligation by the payment of money compensation to the priest. The scourge could never have assumed such dimensions without provoking opposition' (Geiger, *Ostīrān. Kultur*, p. 459).

Be this as it may, the system of an equivalent fine in money for successive degrees of corporal punishment seems to have subsisted down to Sasanian times, inasmuch as in the Pahlavi treatise, *Shāyast lā-Shāyast* (lit. 'licet non-licet'), which is the standard text of later Mazdean casuistry, in its comment on the above-quoted 4th Fargard of the *Vendīdād*, the scale of lashes for various degrees of violence, rising from five to two hundred, is given with equivalents in *dirhams*

and *stīrs* (Gr. δραχμή, στατήρ), which originally were said mythically to represent the weights in the golden scales of Rashnū, the Spirit who weighed the deeds of the dead, but which later on were translated into real monetary values (see E. W. West, *SBE* v. [1880] 239–242; C. de Harlez, *Introduction à l'Avesta*, Paris, 1881, pp. ccxxviii, ccxxix). In the case of one crime mentioned in the vision of Arṭā-ī Vīrāf, the penalty would appear to amount to about £2000.

The fact that in the Avesta and the subsequent Pahlavi literature practically no distinction is made between moral sins and legal crimes, between ecclesiastical and civil jurisprudence, accounts for the fact that we have really no civil code in the Sacred Book, and in spite of its name the Pahlavi *Dādistān-ī Dīnīk* ('law-code of religion') is purely a treatise of moral theology. Fragments of what may be called civil legal codes exist in one or two Pahlavi treatises mentioned by West. Thus what he styles 'the Social Code of the Parsis in Sāsānian times' contains information about slaves, partners, and joint proprietors, 'decisions of the leaders of professions and agreement and disagreement with their decisions,' the laws of property, the income of wives, annuities, mortgage, care and adoption of children, 'infallibility of officials,' etc. One provision regarding a man with two wives may be quoted:

'Each wife separately is joint proprietor with the husband, but the wives are separate proprietors as regards one another; and it is not allowable for a wife to alter that joint proprietorship, but it is for the husband' (*GIrP* ii. [1904] 117).

There can be no doubt whatever that civil codes, tribunals, and judges must have existed under all the successive Iranian dynasties, under the supreme authority of the king. It will be remembered that twice in the OT the 'laws of the Medes and Persians' are specially referred to in identical terms. In Dn 6^{15} it is said to be 'the law of the Medes and Persians' that no decree made by the king may be altered; and in Est 1^{19} there is mention of 'the law of the Medes and Persians,' which may not be altered, apparently even by the king himself. As regards the punishment of crime, it is well known that throughout history, and even to the present day, penalties of gruesome cruelty have been characteristic of Persian rulers and magistrates. It has been remarked by more than one writer that the horrible punishments detailed in the *Inferno* of Arṭā-ī Vīrāf are almost certainly reproductions of the dreadful tortures inflicted in the Sasanian courts and tribunals, and a further suggestion has been ventured that some echo of the same may not improbably be found in the grim punishments of Dante's *Inferno*.

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L. C. CASARTELLI.

LAW (Japanese).—**1.** The laws of ancient Japan, as of all ancient peoples, were those of custom. Though their details have been lost, it is evident that the two fundamental principles—of Imperial sovereignty, and of the family system—were firmly established even in early days. The Imperial House considered itself the head of the whole race, and governed accordingly, while each clan, under its own head, called *omi* or *muraji*, was represented at the court, holding its office by inheritance from generation to generation. Within each clan the law of custom was followed, the clansmen seeming to have rendered unquestioning obedience to their chief. This period of authority derived from custom extended from pre-historic times to about A.D. 600, and may be regarded as a time uninfluenced by foreign ideas, in which were laid the foundations of those later laws most uniquely Japanese.

2. The oldest code mentioned in Japanese history is the constitution formed by the regent, Prince Umayado (Shotoku Taishi), in the 12th year of Empress Suiko (A.D. 604). This consisted of seventeen articles, and is commonly known as *The Seventeen Article Constitution*. Whether, however, this constitution should be called a positive law or merely a political principle is a question discussed but not settled by Japanese historians, since it was issued in the name of the Prince and not of the Empress.

In the tenth year of Emperor Tenchi (A.D. 671) a code of laws, said to have consisted of twenty-two volumes, was formed; but the entire code was lost, and its contents are unknown. In the fourth year of Emperor Mommu, Prince Osakabe and Fujiwara Fuhito were charged with the duty of codification; and in the following year, the first of Taiho (701), the work was completed. This entire code, consisting of eleven volumes of general law concerning government organization, administration, and private relations, and six volumes of criminal laws, was promulgated and enforced the same year, and is known as the *Taiho Code*. It also has been lost.

In the second year of Yoro, in the reign of Emperor Gensho (718), Fujiwara Fuhito and others were again ordered to revise the statutes. The revision consisted of ten volumes of general law and an equal number devoted to criminal law. Though called by the name 'Yoro,' this was nothing more than a revision and supplement of the Taiho Code, and is, therefore, commonly known by the latter name. The part of this code on general law has been perfectly preserved, but the part on criminal laws has been lost, with the exception of four chapters. This is the oldest law-book in Japan.

These laws were marked by Chinese influence—not that Chinese law was adopted as a whole, but the best Chinese principles were added to Japanese laws already existing. The Taiho laws, with many revisions and supplements, governed the nation for about five hundred years, until 1190. There are many commentaries, chief among them being *Ryo-no-Gige*, *Ryo-no-Shuge*, and *Ryo-Sho*. The first of these was officially edited in the tenth year of Tencho in the reign of Emperor Ninna (833), and is recognized as of the highest authority.

3. With the establishment of the feudal system, the individual Shoguns issued laws for the government of their vassals; and, as the authority of the Shoguns increased, the territory within which the Taiho laws were enforced decreased until, with the establishment of the Shogunate government at Kamakura under Minamoto Yoritomo (middle of 12th cent.), it was limited to places directly under the control of the court. A remarkably simple code of feudal laws consisting of only fifty-one articles was formed by Hojo, the executive head of the Shogunate, on the 8th of August, in the first year of Teiei, in the reign of Emperor Gohorikawa. It is known as the *Teiei-Shikimoku*, and accorded so well with the spirit of feudalism that it remained effective until the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1867).

The characteristic of this code is its rejection of Chinese influence and its adaptation to the maintenance and development of a unique Japanese feudalism. In the days of the Taiho laws, the whole country was under direct government supervision; but during the feudal period only a little territory remained under such control, by far the larger part being held as arrière-fiefs. In the earlier period, the children of a family shared equally in the inheritance of property, but under feudalism the eldest son took precedence.

4. With the fall of the Kamakura Shogunate

(1334) its successor, the Ashikaga, continued to enforce the principles of the Teiei-Shikimoku; but the laws were revised from time to time until the articles numbered two hundred and ten. The *Kenbu-Shikimoku*, of seventeen articles, was issued during the time of the Ashikaga Shogunate; but the affairs of the country became disorderly, and neither the law of the court nor the will of the Shogunate was executed. Many feudal lords declared their independence; and some among them issued their own regulations or family laws, of which those of the Shingen, Ouchi, Chosokabe, Hojo, and Asakura families remain intact. For two hundred years, until the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603), the country passed through what is known as the dark ages, and no new laws of permanent value were enacted.

5. In the eighth year of Keicho in the reign of Emperor Goyozei (1603), Tokugawa Iyeyasu pacified the whole country and established his government as Shogun in Yedo (now Tokyo). Two hundred and sixty-five years of peace followed. The Tokugawa family tried to govern the country according to already existing customs, and, as far as possible, avoided the making of written laws. But, as time passed, the number of simple statutes increased, and they were codified in what is known as the *Kwajo-Ruiten*. This code was divided into two parts, the first dealing with laws of ceremony, of administration, and of personal relations, while the second contained the criminal laws. As the criminal law comprised a hundred articles, the people of the time termed it *Tokugawa's Code of the Hundred*. Secrecy was a governing principle of the Tokugawa Shogunate; these articles, therefore, were not published, but privately distributed among feudal officers for information and guidance. As a result, these laws, though of comparatively recent date, are not in all points clearly understood.

6. The uncertainty concerning these laws of the Shogunate is increased by the fact that at the time of the Restoration in 1867, when the authority which had been exercised by the Shogunate was restored to the Imperial House, they were entirely inapplicable, being in reality family and not national in their nature, and they were, accordingly, completely set aside. During a period of some seven hundred years the Imperial House had had no real voice in the government, and possessed no laws which could at once be enforced. As a temporary measure, certain Chinese laws were revived and articles from the Taiho Code were revised. Contact with Western nations and a study of their civilization showed the necessity of laws in harmony with the modern world; and in the fifteenth year of Meiji (1882) the criminal code was promulgated. This was followed, in the twenty-second year (1889), by the proclamation of the Constitution, and, in the thirty-third year, (1900), by the civil code. Auxiliary laws of procedure have been issued on the models of Western nations; but all these, together with the standard codes, recognize and enforce the two fundamental principles which from the first have characterized Japanese law: the sovereignty of the Imperial House and the family system.

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TAMAKICHI NAKAJIMA.

LAW (Jewish). — The important signification which Judaism from earliest times has attached to the law is outwardly indicated by the fact that the religious vocabulary of the Jews presents no fewer than seven synonyms for this conception: *hôq* (also *huqqāh*), the most comprehensive expression for law, the laws of nature being also indicated by it, *mishpāt*, *'êdûth*, *miṣvāh*, *piqqûd*, *tôrāh*, and the term *dāth*, which is borrowed from Persian.

The legal portions of the Pentateuch are: Ex 12 f., 20-23, 25-31, 34 f.; Lv 1-8, 11-25, 27; Nu 5-10, 18 f., 27 11, 28-30, 35 f.; Dt 4-27.

The usual division of the laws into legal, ritual, and moral is not supported by the sources; such a distinction is nowhere expressed, nor can such a division be made with regard to their contents. On the contrary, one and the same law is often both legal and moral—*e.g.*, the numerous social laws; and just as often the basis adduced for the legal and ritual laws elevates them to moral laws.

An outward distinction is impossible because all laws without distinction are regarded as divine commands. All commands are of divine origin, since God represents law and morality in idea. This conception is the constant element in Jewish religion at all stages of its evolution, which we can still partly trace in the original documents. However much law may have varied in its connotation at different times, it was always regarded as an expression of the divine will; and he who professed to belong to the Jewish community must not only acknowledge the one God, but also conform to all His laws unconditionally. Disobedience to the commands of God was equal to heresy, just like idolatry and superstition, and was described as 'profanation of the divine name.' Judaism was from the beginning more a religion of doing than of believing, and, therefore, it has laid the main emphasis on the legal rather than on the mystical element. The constitution of Judaism, accordingly, is not a number of articles of belief, but ten commandments; and the revelation at Sinai is represented not as a communication of secret doctrines, but as a proclamation of the divine will; Moses is not a metaphysician, but a lawgiver.

The Pentateuch, as we have it to-day, does not present one uniform system of legislation, but a composite body of laws from several sources of very different times; and, in spite of all their work, critics have not entirely succeeded in assigning the single laws to a particular source or even to a particular time. The oldest laws (esp. Ex 21-23) exhibit a considerable degree of harmony with the old Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, but a dependence of the one on the other must not be assumed. In comparing the two systems of law, apart from the great progress in single laws, we are struck by a difference in principle, viz. the intimate union of law and morality which characterizes Jewish legislation (cf. *e.g.* Ex $22^{20\text{-}26}$ $23^{9.\ 12}$ and esp. Dt, *e.g.* 5^{15} $10^{17\text{-}19}$ $15^{9\text{-}11}$ 24^{18}).

The discourses of the prophets from the middle of the 8th cent. onwards already presuppose a law, which they recognize as binding and whose nonfulfilment they censure. Frequently, however, they polemize against the law; they declare the whole system of worship worthless and even hated of God, when the nation does not practise justice and morality. But the elevated moral exhortation of the prophets was little understood and still less followed. It was too abstract to exercise a decisive influence on the life of the people. It had first to be made practicable in a social legislation, adapted to different cases and circumstances, and transformed into a rule of conduct for the individual. In this way Deuteronomy took its rise; it is a product of the prophetic teaching, and places social justice at the heart of religion, while it restricts the sphere of worship to a great extent, and, in particular, recognizes only one place of worship. After the return from the Exile and the building of the second Temple, the order of worship in all its details was appointed in the 'Priests' Code,' although its constituent parts are, it is true, of an

earlier date. The different law-books were now combined into one book along with the traditions of primeval history and the history of the nation which also originated at different periods (up to the death of Moses). Moses was regarded as the author of this book, every word of which was supposed to be inspired, and was designated by the name *tôrāh*, 'teaching.' Belief in its divine origin and recognition of its whole contents became the basis of Judaism under Ezra. This book was by no means a law-book; half of its contents were of the nature of narrative, so that it appealed to the understanding and imagination as much as to the will; and it was those narrative portions that had the greatest influence on the religious education of the people. The LXX made a great and most momentous error when, for want of an exactly corresponding Greek expression, they translated *tôrāh* by *νόμος* ('law'), giving rise to an utterly false conception of the nature of Judaism, and making possible, at a later date, the historically important attack of the Pauline letters upon the Law. The fact that the Jews regarded the book as 'teaching' is indicated by the Aramaic translation *'oraithā*, which can mean only 'teaching' and never 'law.' This is especially shown by the wide-spread demand of learning and teaching of the Torah, and by the fact that the occupation of the intellect with it was regarded as the loftiest and most delightful of tasks. A classical proof of this is afforded in Ps 119, which, following the succession of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, presents in 22 times 8 verses an endless variation on the same theme: the Torah is the chief good, chief happiness, pleasure, entertainment, and comfort. The law was only the framework upon which the pure monotheism, which forms the substance of the Jewish teaching, could establish itself, work itself up, and become the religion of the people.

Simultaneously with the elevation of the Torah to be the religious book of the community, the synagogue was established with the reading, translation, and explanation of the Torah as its first object. As soon as it was introduced, the Torah, like every other law-book, required explanation by experts, and the *sôfᵉrîm*, 'scribes' (from *sēfer*, 'book'), became the religious authorities in Judaism from that time onwards. The expositions of the Torah laid down in their lectures soon became quite as binding as the written teaching; and thus there was developed an oral teaching, which did not, however, interfere with the validity of the Torah, being at first only an application of it. But it soon went beyond the written teaching, and, in particular, it was supposed to create a 'hedge round the teaching,' on the one hand to preserve the essentials of the religion from corruption and evaporation, and on the other hand to secure the observance of the religious laws by means of provisions, sometimes lightening, sometimes increasing, their burden. The oral teaching varied with the custom and common law of each period, adapted the written word to the changed outward circumstances and new views, and even directly created new provisions, which could not possibly have been foreseen in the Torah. Thus, for instance, the whole synagogue service with its order of prayer was gradually introduced by the scribes, and at a later date, in the Hellenistic period, feasts like Pūrîm and Hănukkā were introduced and made religiously binding. The collision of Judaism with Greek civilization raised a very difficult problem for the scribes; and, if the victorious elevation of the Hasmonæans saved Judaism from the danger of the moment, the newly founded Jewish State nevertheless had, from the necessity of the case, to come forward in opposition to the scribes, who wished to regard Judaism as merely a religious community. Thus arose the parties of the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The former, led by the scribes, were the representatives of the religious principle and emphasized the value and necessity of the oral teaching in addition to the Torah. The latter, worldly-minded throughout, wished to recognize the Torah alone. The Sadducees, accordingly, lukewarm in their attitude towards religious matters, exerted their influence towards petrifying religion, while the pious Pharisees sought its progress and development. Under the compulsion of this contest, the Pharisees extended the oral teaching more and more and had to find a basis for it, and, in particular, to prove its agreement with the Torah. About the last century before Christ an attempt was made by Hillel and Shammai to fix the oral teaching in writing; this had previously been avoided, partly to preserve intact the authority of the Torah as the only valid religious document, and partly to leave the tradition free and flowing. Here, too, it is incorrect and one-sided to speak of an oral 'law.' For from the very beginning the oral no less than the written teaching contained narrative, instructive, and edifying portions as well as the legal elements; the legal portion was designated Hălākhā, the narrative Haggādā. Jewish thought, feelings, and hopes were laid down in the proverbs, parables, and stories of the Haggādā, which for this reason is just as important a source for the customs and religious views of the Jews as the Hălākhā. The Hălākhā, *i.e.* the religious norm, was in the different schools subjected to great differences of opinion, which the scribes sought to clear up in public discussions. A definite system of logical and exegetical principles gradually formed, according to which the Hălākhā was derived from the written text. The wider the circle within which the life of the Jews moved, and the wider their circle of knowledge and opinions became, the more the sphere of the Hălākhā had to be extended. It embraces temple rites and synagogue worship, land laws, civil and criminal law, poor laws, laws regarding marriage, laws about foods, and laws of health.

The oral law, which now gradually became written law, also recognized the existence and necessity of an unwritten law, controlling matters left to the moral feeling of the individual—the finer demands of morality which did not admit of formulation and classification. The unwritten law was designated *dābhār ham-māsūr lal-lēbh*, 'something which is left to the heart.' This conception was a healthy counterpoise to the ever-increasing tendency to determine beforehand the proper course of action in all circumstances by means of a law. On the other hand, it filled up the deficiencies and gaps that are a necessary feature of every written law. It is thus entirely misleading to speak of the Jewish religion as purely legal in character. The designation *dîn*, 'law,' for the individual provisions applies exclusively to those religious duties which deal with definite actions that can be judicially formulated—what is prohibited or allowed. The *dîn* demands nothing but obedience; the *dābhār ham-māsūr lal-lēbh*, on the other hand, appeals to the moral feeling, and thus recognizes morality as a necessary supplement to the law. The Hălākhā gives numerous instances in which the individual cannot be punished according to law, but is guilty in the eyes of the law of God.

In the midst of the work of recording the oral law there took place the great catastrophe which in A.D. 70 destroyed the State and the Temple of the Jews. The result of the dispersion of the Jews was that, since its external unity had ceased, Judaism anxiously sought to preserve its inner unity in law and custom. While up to this time

the object of all additions to and burdens on the law was to preserve the teaching of Judaism intact, the law now had the further task of preserving the very existence of the Jews as a people at all. The study of the law was now regarded as the highest religious duty and an equally valuable, in fact a more valuable, substitute for the earlier sacrifice. If the traditions of the Haggādā played an important part in the consciousness of the people, the Hălākhā was the chief occupation of the high schools in Palestine. They carefully sought not only to fix all the single provisions, but in particular to preserve all those laws and customs which by force of circumstances had for a time—they hoped only for a time—fallen into disuse. 'Ăḳîbā ben Joseph (*q.v.*), who died as a martyr after the fatal issue of the rising of Bar Kokhba (A.D. 134), brought the recording of the oral teaching to a temporary end. He sought to arrange the immense amount of material from two points of view: according to the matter in the form of a book of law (*Mishnā*) and according to Bible verses in the form of a running commentary to the legal books of the Torah (*Midrāsh*). After his death his pupils tried with all possible speed to close the record finally, so that the tradition might not be lost by the violent death of other scholars. 'Ăḳîbā's Mishnā formed the basis on which his pupil R. Mē'ir further improved, and after his death R. Yehûdā, the patriarch (†*c.* 200), closed, the record, and created the Mishnā as a generally received book of law. Soon after, the Midrāshîm, which in their main contents went back to 'Ăḳîbā and his contemporaries, were completed.

Their names (with the exception of a few which are preserved only in fragments) are *Mᵉkhîltā* (on Exodus), *Sifrā* (on Leviticus), and *Sifrē* (on Numbers and Deuteronomy). These Midrāshîm have not, however, been any more officially recognized than the collection of traditions which has been preserved to us under the name of *Tôsefta*. In attitude and aim the Tôseftā is similar to the Mishnā, but it originated in other schools and had accepted many traditions which are wanting or rejected in the latter. It is, therefore, a priceless source for the scientific investigation of the Hălākhā. The Mishnā and the Tôseftā are divided into six portions: (1) synagogue worship and agriculture; (2) sabbath and feast days; (3) law of marriage; (4) civil and criminal law; (5) temple rites; and (6) laws of purity.

The completed Mishnā, which was composed in the Hebrew language, was taken by Rābh and Samuel to Babylon, and taught and explained in the institutions of learning founded by them there. The Palestinian schools also sought to explain the Mishnā, which, owing to its condensed method of expression, was often difficult to understand. These explanations in the Aramaic tongue, which are called *Gᵉmārā*, and which have been written down and collected, furnish more than a bare commentary to the Mishnā. In their outward form they are records of the discussions which took place in the schools during three centuries, and they preserve these in all their original vividness. In their contents, particularly in the Haggādic portions, they are a repertory of everything that the most distinguished representatives of Judaism during the period spoke, thought, felt, experienced, and knew. While the explanation of the Mishnā was not finished in Palestine, the Babylonian Gᵉmārā was completed about A.D. 500. The Mishnā and the Gᵉmārā together were called the *Talmud*. Of the two Talmuds, the Babylonian became in practice the only authoritative one; the Palestinian (incorrectly called the Jerusalem Talmud) was not recognized, and was always much less studied.

The Talmud as a whole is not, strictly speaking, a law-book like the Mishnā; it places the opposite opinions with their reasons beside each other and often leaves the debated question undecided. In spite of that, it brought Jewish law to a fixed system, and thus lent to Judaism the necessary inner unity. By means of it Judaism was remoulded into the homogeneous mass which it presented during the whole of the Middle Ages. The Talmud allows a sphere of action to the freedom of thought altogether out of proportion to that which is granted to the freedom of will or action. It does not demand blind obedience to the law, but would recognize as valid only what is rationally deduced from the word of Scripture, and asks time and again in regard even to Biblical commands: Why has the Torah so ordered? It then adduces a logical or moral reason. Only in the case of very few laws, for which a rational explanation could not be found (*e.g.*, the red heifer [Nu 19]), is the authoritative command of God adduced as the ground of obligation.

The Jewish law, as it found its final expression in the Talmud, has often been represented as an unbearable yoke. This designation, however, which is played upon as early as Sirach, indicates only the impression which the law made on non-Jews, and not the emotions with which the people themselves regarded it. The Jew ever found joy and satisfaction in the fulfilment of it, and coined for it the special expression *śimḥāh śel miṣvāh*, 'joy in the commandment.'

The recognized benediction on occasions of fulfilling all the more important religious provisions ran as follows: 'Praised be thou, O God, who hast sanctified us by thy commandments'; and in the daily evening prayer they said: 'We rejoice in the words of thy teaching and the words of thy commandments now and evermore, for they are our life and the length of our days.'

It was not freedom from the law, but freedom in the law, that was the religious ideal of the Jews. They felt themselves morally free simply through the fact that they subjected themselves joyfully to the law, and recognized that it must be obeyed even when it was not there. The patriarchs they regarded as especially virtuous because they had kept the law even before it was given. It was not Kant, therefore, who was the first to teach the autonomy of morality. In one place we are told that he who keeps the commandments stands as high in God's sight as if he had produced them out of himself (cf. F. Perles, 'Die Autonomie der Sittlichkeit im jüd. Schrifttum,' in *Festschrift für Hermann Cohen*, Berlin, 1912, pp. 103-108).

It is true that the frequent use of petty casuistry, and especially the forced exegesis of the Talmud, repels us, but the Talmud ought not to be judged in this light alone. Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the morality of the Jews did not degenerate under its control, but rather became more rigorous. For the casuistry had almost always the tendency to make the law more exacting, and did not, as a rule, deal with moral so much as with legal and ritual questions, while morality was often appealed to as a supplement to the law. On the other hand, it was important that certain moral requirements, such as care for the poor, the sick, and unburied dead, and even kindness to animals, were made laws in the Talmud. It is often alleged that all the laws aim at the well-being of the individual and of society, but it is quite as frequently emphasized that only the unselfish fulfilment of the law has moral value, and that the ennobling of humanity is the highest aim. Specially peculiar to the Judaism of the Talmud is the conception of the *qiddûsh hash-shêm*, 'hallowing of the divine name,' according to which every Jew ought to witness for God by an exemplary life, and contribute towards His recognition among men.

In spite of the fact that the divine legislation as a whole was regarded as eternal and unchangeable, in individual cases the temporary suspension and even the annulling of a law was recognized as justifiable and necessary. Sufficient ground for putting aside even Biblical commands was found

by the lawyers not only in danger to life or impossibility of carrying out the law owing to a *vis major*, but also in intolerable inconvenience to the community, danger to the existence or repute of the religion, and collision with the laws of the State. The 'dignity of man' is also repeatedly given as a reason for temporary suspension of a law.

When it was completed, the Talmud was adopted as the only authority in matters of religious law, and became, like the Mishnā 300 years previously, the subject of study and exposition. Since it was not, of course, a law-book in the strict sense of the term, definite rules had to be laid down for judging in cases where the Talmud presented undissolved differences of opinion. The need of codifying the extensive contents of the Talmud came more and more to the front. When the Karaites (*q.v.*) rejected the whole Talmud, and, in fact, the oral teaching altogether, and recognized the Torah alone as binding in matters of religious law, a code had to be formed which set forth plainly what was to be regarded as law in the Talmud and what only as individual opinion. Hence arose, from the 8th to the 9th cent., the so-called *Halākhōth Gᵉdōlōth*, compendium of the Talmud, which in outward form follows the Mishnā, but attempts to make a better arrangement of the material according to subjects. This work, which originated from the Gᵉōnīm, the heads of the Babylonian schools of the time, did not obtain such an extensive circulation as the *Halākhōth* of Isaac al-Fāsī, which was composed two centuries later. Al-Fāsī makes use of the Palestinian Talmud also to decide questions of religious law, and is much more independent than the Gᵉōnīm in laying down general rules, as well as in using them to obtain concrete results from the discussions of the Talmud. The most original and important code of Rabbinic Judaism is the *Mishneh Tōrāh* of Moses Maimonides. Absolutely abandoning the dialectics and the order of the materials of the Talmud, he gives a strictly systematic exposition of the laws and the teaching of Judaism in fourteen books. In opposition to all his predecessors, he specifies neither his sources nor opposed opinions, and gives no reasons for his own decisions. On this account his work was very sharply attacked from many sides, although his opponents could not free themselves from his influence. After him the first work to obtain far-reaching influence was the *Ṭūr* of Jacob ben Asher of the 14th cent., who, in fact, used Maimonides as his model, but produced a new and unique book of law, stating and discussing the contradictory opinions of the authorities after the Talmud. This work remained the undisputed authority for more than two centuries. It was only after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal that the need for a new code more suited to the changed conditions made itself felt. To meet this need Joseph Qaro produced the *Shulḥān 'Ārūkh*, basing his work on the *Ṭūr*, but also consulting the rest of its predecessors. Joseph Qaro often proceeds very independently in his code, and his work on this account met with energetic opposition before it was generally accepted. The Polish Talmudists especially opposed it, one of whom, Moses Isserles, provided it with continuous glosses, which were then printed along with the work. A century later, however, the *Shulḥān 'Ārūkh* was the only authoritative code of Rabbinic Judaism, and it has remained so among the orthodox Jews to the present day. It had, in fact, contributed largely to the consolidation of Judaism, and was at the time of its production, when the Jewish communion threatened to break up, a historical necessity. Gradually, however, it became more and more a hindrance to free religious development, and, on the whole, its influence upon the culture, particularly of the Jews of eastern Europe, has been unfavourable. The efforts of the last century, therefore, towards the culture and reform of Judaism have aimed at destroying the unrivalled authority of this work.

LITERATURE.—*JE*, artt. 'Abrogation of Laws,' i. 131; 'Accommodation of the Law,' i. 161; 'Authority, Rabbinical,' ii. 337; 'Conflict of Laws,' iv. 224; 'Law, Civil,' vii. 633; 'Law, Codification of,' vii. 635; 'Oral Law,' ix. 423; 'Talmudic Law,' xii. 33; E. Schürer, *GJV*⁴ ii. 545–579, 'Life under the Law,' and against him I. Abrahams, in *JQR* xi. [1898–99] 626–642; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im NT Zeitalter*², Berlin, 1906, pp. 136–163, and against him F. Perles, *Bousset's Religion des Judentums . . . kritisch untersucht*, do. 1903, *passim*; R. T. Herford, *Pharisaism, its Aim and its Method*, London, 1912, *passim*; S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology*, do. 1909, p. 116 ff.

FELIX PERLES.

LAW (Muhammadan).—I. *INTRODUCTION.*—**1. Muslim canon law (sharī'ah or shar') and the sacred texts: Qur'ān and tradition.**—A Muslim is bound by religious regulations not only in the performance of his daily ritual prayers, the fast, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and other religious acts, but also in the contraction and dissolution of his marriage, in commercial contracts, and, indeed, in all events of any importance in his domestic and social life. All these religious regulations form together a code of law which in Arabic is called the *sharī'ah* or *shar'*, lit. 'the way' (viz. that which faithful Muslims must follow according to Allāh's will). Muslims believe that the regulations of this code depend not on human judgment, but entirely on Allāh's inscrutable will. Originally the only sources from which the knowledge of Allāh's law could be gained were the Qur'ān and the *sunnah*.

The Qur'ān contains few regulations of a legislative character. It is true that in certain verses instructions are given as to how a Muslim must generally distinguish himself from an unbeliever, as to his chief duties, and some sins which he must especially avoid; but these regulations do not form a complete system. From the beginning Muhammad's *sunnah*[1] was an indispensable supplement to the regulations of the Qur'ān. In the Qur'ān, *e.g.*, it is enjoined that a Muslim must perform his *ṣalāt* (*i.e.* the daily ritual prayer, which consists principally of praise of Allāh, prostration, etc.), but not how he must fulfil this religious duty. In such a case Muhammad's *sunnah* gave an explanation of the Qur'ān. All Muslims have always performed the *ṣalāt* in the same way as the Prophet had done before them, for Muhammad's position as a preacher of the new religion and as the head of the Muslim community entailed that his followers should observe not only the regulations which he gave as Allāh's will in the form of the Qur'ān, but also his personal commands and example.

After the death of Muhammad the traditions concerning the deeds and sayings of the Prophet and his companions, as well as the Qur'ān, were held in great respect; and the *sunnah* of these was an example worthy of following for the later Muslims, at least in so far as the Prophet had approved either implicitly or expressly of their acts or sayings. A tradition is called in Arabic *ḥadīth*, which commonly means 'story,' 'communication'; in a special sense 'the *ḥadīth*' means the whole sacred tradition.

[1] The word *sunnah* is often wrongly taken to mean 'tradition' (viz. regarding the deeds and sayings of the Prophet), but it really means the method of behaviour which is generally followed: the *sunnah* of a person means the ordinary line of conduct of the person, and the *sunnah* of a people means the manners and customs of the people. Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Le Droit musulman,' in *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 6 ff.; I. Goldziher, *Muham. Studien*, Halle, 1889–90, ii. 1 ff., 11 ff.

Originally the oral traditions were handed on from one generation to another. Many undertook long journeys in order to visit celebrated teachers of tradition in different lands and places, and to hear them relate their traditions. Besides the text (*matn*) of a tradition, the names of the persons who had handed it on, from the latest narrator to the Prophet, were accurately learned by heart. The trustworthiness of these teachers was the guarantee for the correctness of their narrative, and therefore the portion of the tradition containing the names of the teachers was called the *isnād* or *sanad*, *i.e.* 'the support' (viz. for the credibility of the traditions). Still, many of the Muslim traditions concerning Muhammad's *sunnah* are deliberately invented; on this point a historical and critical examination leaves no possibility of doubt. Decisions were ascribed to the Prophet on questions of all kinds which did not become important to Muslims till long after his death. Moreover, there are in currency numerous contradictory traditions. Apparently each party attributed to the Prophet just what they held to be the true conception. In the first century of Islām there was serious controversy as to the trustworthiness of many traditions. Every one knew that there were many true and untrue traditions as to the *sunnah* of the Prophet, and the opposing teachers of tradition accused each other of lying. But, when the ritual, the doctrine, and the most important social and political institutions had become definitely fixed, agreement was reached in wide-spread circles as to the trustworthiness of most traditions. When a tradition could not be brought into harmony with the generally current conceptions, it was regarded as false. Moreover, many successful attempts were made to harmonize contradictory traditions with the prevailing conceptions, by means of ingeniously discovered explanations.

Although there is no official and exclusively authoritative collection of Muslim traditions, there are six collections commonly recognized in the orthodox world, viz. the 'six books' or the 'six *ṣaḥīḥs*,' *i.e.* the six 'sound' or 'authentic' collections. Two of these—the collection of traditions of al-Bukhārī († A.H. 256 = A.D. 870) and that of Muslim († A.H. 261 = A.D. 875)—are held in great honour by orthodox Muslims. The other four are those of Abū Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhī, al-Nasā'ī, and Ibn Mājah.

The Shī'ites do not reject the authority of Muhammad's *sunnah*, but differ in opinion from the orthodox Muslims as to the trustworthiness of many traditions relating to it. They have their own collections of traditions.[1]

2. The fiqh and the fiqh-schools.—By the *'ilm al-fiqh* ('science of the *fiqh*') is meant the science of the regulations contained in the sacred texts. It was not enough to know only the literal contents of the Qur'ān and the traditions; it was also necessary to know in what sense these texts were to be understood, and how the commands and prohibitions which they contained were to be applied in different circumstances. The scholars who occupied themselves with this study of the *fiqh* (the *faqīhs*) have given an extraordinary extension to the original meaning of the regulations of the Qur'ān and of the traditions. They could find answers in the sacred texts to all possible questions of the law, and in this way the study of the *fiqh* has produced a vast system of legal casuistry worked out in every detail.

Since the opinions of scholars as regards the rules to be deduced from the Qur'ān and the traditions disagreed in many respects, there grew up in a short time different *fiqh*-schools, each having its own views as to questions of detail. Such a school was called *madhhab* ('party'). There were at first a great many of these schools; each *faqīh* of any importance had his own *madhhab*.

The rise, development, and ultimate fate of the different *madhhabs* were dependent to a great extent on accidental circumstances; and the favour of the Government often had a special influence on their reputation. If the judges and magistrates in a Muslim land were chosen by preference from among the followers of a particular *madhhab*, many people joined that *fiqh*-school, until change in the Government exercised fresh influence in an opposite direction. In the course of time most of the old schools lost their significance, until they finally had no followers at all. Only the four schools of Abū Ḥanīfah († A.H. 150 = A.D. 767), Mālik ibn Anas († A.H. 179 = A.D. 795), al-Shāfi'ī († A.H. 204 = A.D. 820), and Ibn Ḥanbal († A.H. 241 = A.D. 855) have retained adherents in the orthodox Muslim world down to the present day.

One of the extinct schools is that of Dāwūd ibn 'Alī († A.H. 270 A.D. 883), the *Ẓāhiriyah*, *i.e.* the party which prided itself on holding to the 'outward sense' (*ẓāhir*) of the text.[1] Nawawi, an Arabic writer of the 7th cent. A.H., mentions six *fiqh*-schools held in repute in his time,[2] two of which were the *Ẓāhiriyah* and the school of Sufyān al-Thawri († A.H. 161 = A.D. 777); but the formerly famous school of al-Awzā'ī († A.H. 157 = A.D. 773) in Syria was by that time extinct. It is true that the value of the system of al-Awzā'ī was not less than that of other *madhhabs*, but, since its adherents lived in more or less remote places, far from the great caravan roads and from the route of the pilgrims going to Mecca, their opinions on the *fiqh* gradually passed out of consideration.[3] The *madhhab* of Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (the *Jarīriyah*), more famous as a chronicler († A.H. 310 = A.D. 922), had at that time also disappeared.

As to the *fiqh*-schools which still exist the following points may be noted.

(1) The school of Abū Ḥanīfah owed its great influence in later centuries especially to the Turkish Osman Sultans, who in the 16th cent. obtained authority over so important a part of the orthodox Muslims. From the beginning this dynasty showed exceptional preference for the Ḥanafitic system, and this *madhhab* is still dominant in Turkey and in all lands in which Turkish influence is felt. It has also spread in Central Asia (Turkestan, Bukhara, Samarkand) and in Hindustan, so far as the population there has accepted Islām as the result of the former Muslim invasions.

(2) The school of al-Shāfi'ī was based specially on the authority and influence of the 'Abbāsid Khalifs. The Shāfi'ites had obtained a considerable supremacy in the centre of the Muslim lands in the Middle Ages, and their reputation still continued to increase until, in the 16th cent., the Ḥanafitic school came to the front under Turkish influence. Even after this time the Shāfi'itic school continued to possess many adherents, even in Syria, Egypt, and West Arabia, in which lands the Ḥanafitic school only was accepted as the official one in public matters; *e.g.*, the judges and ruling personages who were sent from Turkey to these lands were all Ḥanafitic, but the original population still continued to order its religious and domestic life according to the regulations of the Shafi'itic school, and the study of the Shāfi'itic *fiqh*-books continued to flourish. The Shāfi'itic school is also dominant in the Straits Settlements, the Malay border districts of Siam, and the whole Indian Archipelago, as well as in the coast districts of Hindustan (Malabar and Coromandel), on the Persian Gulf, and in South Arabia (especially in Ḥaḍramaut). In German East Africa it is the most important; only a minority of the Muslim population there belong to the heretical Ibāḍites. Followers of the Shāfi'itic school are also to be found in Daghestan, and in some parts of Central Asia.[4]

(3) The school of Mālik ibn Anas flourished originally at Medina. Later on, it spread over the whole of the west of Islām, not only in the north-west of Africa (Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, formerly also in Spain), but over the whole of Africa, so far as it gradually accepted Islām. Even in Egypt the Mālikitic school has many adherents. It has the same position in Upper Egypt as the Shāfi'itic has in Lower Egypt.

(4) The school of Ibn Ḥanbal has always been the least important; it has never had many adherents, and will probably completely disappear in time, like so many other *fiqh*-schools. At present Ḥanbalites are found in Central Arabia, in the interior of Oman, and on the Persian Gulf. Besides this, the followers of this school are found sporadically in Baghdād, in some towns of Central Asia, and in some districts (among others, in Syria) which do not lie on the great trade-routes. It is worthy of notice that the Wahhābites, who are generally considered heretics, prefer to be taken for Ḥanbalites; they often appeal to Ibn Taimiyah in order to defend their particular conceptions, which are in conflict with the requirements of modern life generally obtaining in the orthodox Muslim world. This scholar, though in many respects quite independent, belonged to the Ḥanbalite school.[5]

The differences of opinion between the *fiqh*-schools did not turn on fundamental points. It has been alleged, indeed, that Abū Ḥanīfah tried by preference to establish the rules of the *fiqh* in agreement with his own opinions on morality and justice, while other *faqīhs* (especially Dāwūd ibn 'Alī and Ibn Ḥanbal) kept strictly to the letter of the sacred texts. An unprejudiced comparison of

[1] See further I. Goldziher, 'Über die Entwicklung des Ḥadīth,' in *Muham. Stud.* ii. 1–274, also 'Neue Materialen zur Litteratur des Überlieferungswesens bei den Muhammedanern,' in *ZDMG* l. [1896] 465–506, and 'Beiträge zur Litteraturgesch. der Shī'a und der sunnitischen Polemik,' in *SWAW*, phil.-hist. Kl., 1874; W. Marçais, *Le Taqrîb de En-Nawawi traduit et annoté*, Paris, 1901; E. Salisbury, 'Contributions from Original Sources to the Knowledge of Muslim Traditions,' in *JAOS*, 1862, pp. 60–142; A. Sprenger, 'Über das Traditionswesen bei den Arabern,' in *ZDMG* x. [1856] 1–17; art. 'Ḥadīth' in *EI* ii.

[1] For this school cf. I. Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten, ihr Lehrsystem und ihre Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1884.

[2] Cf. *Biographical Dictionary of Illustrious Men, by el-Nawawi*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Gottingen, 1842–47, p. 288.

[3] Cf. *Muqaddasi*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1876, p. 144.

[4] As to Shāfi'itic Muslims in South Africa see, among others, C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, The Hague, 1888–89, ii. 296 ff.

[5] Cf. I. Goldziher, in *ZDMG* lii. [1898] 155–160; and D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurieprudence, and Constitutional Theory*, London, 1903, p. 273 ff.

the various systems of *fiqh* shows, however, that this view is exaggerated, and that in general all Muslim scholars followed very much the same methods of establishing the *fiqh*-rules. Difference of opinion existed only on questions of detail.

Even the controversy between the earlier scholars on the question whether the *qiyās* was permissible raised no serious deep-seated difference of opinion. *Qiyās* means literally 'measuring off.' What was intended was reasoning by analogy—the application to similar cases of regulations which in the Qur'ān or in the tradition were given only with reference to special circumstances.

An example of *qiyās* is the following. A Muslim is forbidden in the Qur'ān (ii. 276–279, iii. 125, iv. 159, xxx. 38), as well as in tradition, to make himself indebted for *ribā*, *i.e.* not only usury, but every demand of interest. In the traditions in which the prohibition of the Qur'ān is explained in more detail, *ribā* is forbidden only if a Muslim carries on a business with gold, silver, and some kinds of merchandise which were formerly the usual objects of trade in Arabia. Some *faqīhs* thought that it was right to hold strictly to the letter of these traditions: '*ribā*,' they said, 'is forbidden only to any one engaged in the trades expressly mentioned in these sacred texts; for, if the demanding of interest was not permitted in other cases as well, this would have been clearly expressed.' Others thought that here the *qiyās* (analogy) must be applied, and that *ribā* must be regarded as equally forbidden in other cases of the same nature.[1]

Those who rejected the *qiyās* accused their opponents of misrepresenting and derogating from the laws of Allāh by following their own fallible human 'insight' (*ra'y*). The enemies of Abū Ḥanīfah, *e.g.*, charged him and his followers with establishing the *fiqh*-rules solely on the basis of *ra'y* and *qiyās*, and with neglecting the study of the tradition. 'Iblīs' (Satan), they said, 'was the first who had been guilty of such arbitrary arguments.' An appeal was made even to the Prophet, and it was maintained that he himself had already expressly forbidden the *qiyās* and all such kinds of reasoning. Still, the *qiyās* was in the end generally recognized by all orthodox *faqīhs* as permissible. As a matter of fact, it had never been possible to exclude analogy, and even those who had most prided themselves on keeping exclusively to the literal sense of the texts, such as the Ẓāhirites, had been themselves compelled in many cases to draw conclusions from the holy texts by means of argument (they then used to maintain that their conclusion was already 'included' [*mafhūm*] in the text, and, therefore, had not to be deduced from it by means of argument).[2]

There are some special methods of argument which have not found general favour among orthodox *faqīhs*, viz. the *istiḥsān* (*i.e.* to reckon something *ḥasan*, 'good'), which was used by Abū Ḥanīfah and his school, and a similar method of reasoning of Mālik ibn Anas, the *istiṣlāḥ* (*i.e.* judgment that something is for general good). Both methods had apparently as their object the establishment of *fiqh*-rules by the abandonment of analogy, thus departing from the regulations of the holy texts. Both Abū Ḥanīfah and Malik thought this sometimes necessary, if holding fast to the letter of the law gave rise in exceptional cases to injustice, or was even quite impossible. But most *faqīhs* rejected these *istiḥsān* and *istiṣlāḥ*, and thought none qualified to depart in so arbitrary a manner from the usual rules, even though it might appear to be for the general good. Another method which was not generally favoured was the *istiṣḥāb* (lit. 'seek connexion with'), which was especially practised by al-Shāfi'ī, and with certain restrictions also by Abū Ḥanīfah. This *istiṣḥāb* meant that a doubtful situation was connected with a previous position of circumstances, and that the regulations which held good in the latter case were regarded as applicable in the former also. Such a position of doubt may arise if any one remains absent so long that his existence becomes uncertain. The Ḥanafites apply the *istiṣḥāb* only when the question arises of the retention of rights which have been already obtained. The Shāfi'ites do so even with regard to the acquirement of new rights. If, *e.g.*, any one dies after the existence of his blood-relation has become uncertain, then, according to the Ḥanafites, the latter has no right to his estate; but the Shāfi'ites do not recognize this limitation, and, according to them, the usual rules of inheritance obtain in such a case, just as if the existence of the absent party was certain.[3]

[1] Cf. I. Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten*, p. 41 f.

[2] Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje's review of Goldziher's *Die Ẓāhiriten* in *LOPA* i. [1884] 421–425.

[3] For *istiḥsān*, *istiṣlāḥ*, and *istiṣḥāb* cf. I. Goldziher, 'Das Prinzip des istiṣḥāb in der muham. Gesetzwissenschaft,' in *WZKM* i. [1887] 228–236.

Fundamental departures from the doctrine of the four *fiqh*-schools are not found even among the Shī'ites and other heretical sects. Although each of these sects has its own doctrine in matters of *fiqh*, and this differs in many points from the opinions of the orthodox schools, the points of difference are generally limited to the same kind of details as those on which even the four orthodox *fiqh*-schools differ. The controversy which produced the heretical parties in Islām was not concerned with the *fiqh*, but rather with questions of the faith (*kalām* [*q.v.*]) and with the political question who should be the head of the Muslim community as the direct successor of the Prophet.

Orginally each *faqīh* of any importance could consider himself qualified to deduce the *fiqh* from the Qur'ān and tradition, but after the rise of the *fiqh*-schools independent criticism of the sacred texts gradually ceased, and it became more and more usual to join the *madhhab* which was locally recognized as authoritative.

Nevertheless, for a long time some very learned *faqīhs* maintained their own judgment on matters of *fiqh*. In the 3rd cent. there arose some more or less independent *madhhabs*; and several scholars, though they associated themselves in general with the opinions of an already established school, still considered themselves qualified to depart in some points of secondary importance from the views of its founder. Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan al-Shaibānī, *e.g.*, who belonged to the followers of Abū Ḥanīfah, had in many cases different conceptions from those of their master. Even al-Ṭabarī and Dāwūd ibn 'Alī might be regarded as followers of the Shāfi'itic school, though they had generally a wholly independent conception of the *fiqh*.

Later it became the general conviction in the orthodox Muslim world that scholars as well as laymen were bound to *taqlīd* (lit. 'to invest with authority,' *i.e.* to acknowledge that the rules of the *fiqh* had already been established in an authoritative manner). Such a person, for whom the rules of a *fiqh*-school had binding authority, was called *muqallid* (*i.e.* one who held others in authority). The earlier scholars, on the contrary, who had themselves deduced the *fiqh* from the holy texts, were afterwards called *mujtahids* (lit. 'people who had toiled strenuously'), and the search for the true sense of the sources to which they had applied themselves was called *ijtihād* (*i.e.* lit. 'to be zealous and take trouble,' here in the special sense of 'exerting themselves in order to determine the rules of the *fiqh*').

Muslim writers generally distinguish three kinds of *mujtahids*, because they think that not every one has been equally capable of independent judgment on matters of the *fiqh*: (1) 'Till the third century after the *hijrah*,' they say, 'there were general or unlimited *mujtahids*, who were so learned and acute that they could deduce the *fiqh* from the sources quite independently. To these belong the founders of the *fiqh*-schools, and some of their contemporaries. (2) After this time there were still *mujtahids*, but these were independent only within certain limits. Though they established new rules for *fiqh*-questions, which were not yet sufficiently settled, they apparently considered themselves bound by the principles of their school, and thus only built on the foundations laid by the master.' This second class of *mujtahids* were called '*mujtahids* of *madhhab*s'. (3) Later, when no more new rules were established, the necessity still remained, for some time, for a certain kind of *ijtihād*, for in each *fiqh*-school there was much diversity of opinion on questions of subordinate importance between the scholars of the *madhhab*, and contradictory traditions concerning the opinions of the founder of the school had often been brought into circulation. Scholars, such as Nawawī, who had settled which of these different opinions in the *madhhab* deserved the preference, were thus regarded by later Muslims as also in a certain sense *mujtahids*; they had 'weighed up' the contradictory decisions, and settled which of them must be regarded as the 'heaviest' (*al-rājiḥ*), *i.e.* the best. They were *mujtahids* of the third class.[1]

All later *faqīhs* are, according to the general conviction of orthodox Muslims, only *muqallids*, who are in all respects bound by the utterances of the former *mujtahids*. Those who hold a different opinion on this point, such as the Wahhābites, are regarded as heretics. The Wahhābites condemn the *taqlīd*; their scholars

[1] Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje's review of Sachau's *Muham. Recht*, in *ZDMG* liii. [1899] 140 ff.

consider themselves still constantly bound by the duty of independent study of the sacred texts. Among the Shī'ites also *mujtahids* are still found who are qualified to judge in matters of religion on their own authority.

Every orthodox Muslim is, therefore, bound by the regulations of his *fiqh*-school, and the *fiqh*-books have become the law-books for later generations. The Qur'ān and the collections of tradition are, it is true, always held in high honour as holy texts, but it is not possible to know what doctrine may be deduced from these sacred sources except by means of the *fiqh*-books. The *fiqh*-books are still studied in all Muslim lands. In later times Mecca has, in a special degree, become the centre of the study of the *fiqh*, and in the great mosque of Mecca instruction in the *fiqh*, according to the method of the Middle Ages, is given almost uninterruptedly by various scholars.[1]

The great majority of Muslims cannot consult the *fiqh*-books for themselves, and must, therefore, use the explanation of a *faqih*, who is qualified to give a *fatwā*, when they wish to know what the law prescribes in cases which are not of daily occurrence. A *fatwā* is a professional opinion on *fiqh*-matters, generally couched in the form of question and answer. A scholar who gives such *fatwās* is in consequence called *muftī*, and any one who is recognized as a competent *faqīh*, so that his legal advice is asked when occasion arises, may be regarded as a *muftī*. Besides this, there are in Muslim lands official *muftīs* paid by the Government to advise the public, and, when necessary, also the Government itself, as to the law. In some places, where adherents of different *fiqh*-schools are constantly found, the Government even appoints a separate *muftī* for each *madhhab*. The contents of the *fatwās* are obtained from the *fiqh*-books, since the *muftīs*, like all other scholars, are only *muqallids*. Sometimes, among the questions submitted to a *muftī*, are found situations which are new in Muslim society, and subjects which have become important for the Muslims only under the later influence of Western civilization; in such cases the *muftīs* must decide how the old rules are to be applied in the changed circumstances. In the *fiqh*-books of later date consideration is given, so far as is necessary, to the *fatwās* which relate to new situations.[2]

The general conviction of orthodox Muslims nowadays is that the doctrine of each of the four *fiqh*-schools represents a correct view of the canon law. At first the scholars disputed hotly on the *fiqh*, and their adherents often showed signs of great intolerance. For a long time bitter animosity existed between the teachers in the holy towns in Arabia and the *faqīhs* in the conquered territory (especially in 'Irāq). Those who lived at Mecca and Medīna would have liked to keep the monopoly of the sacred science in their own hands. They tried in every possible way to throw ridicule and suspicion on their rivals, who were frequently not even of pure Arabian descent (Abū Ḥanīfah, *e.g.*, was of Persian blood). Both parties deluged each other with a flood of abusive names. Although the majority of the people were not entirely acquainted with the details of the problems of scholarship, nevertheless, in places where the followers of different schools came into contact with each other, collisions often took place which gave rise to street fights and mutual persecution.

In spite of this, the controversial questions concerning the *fiqh* did not cause permanent divisions in Islām. On the contrary, the conviction gradually arose in orthodox circles that the difference of opinion between the *fiqh*-schools must be regarded not as a misfortune, but rather as a situation willed by God Himself. It is, they thought, apparently possible and permissible to hold different opinions as to various *fiqh*-rules of secondary importance. Thus, if one school cherished a less rigorous opinion concerning a command or prohibition than the other schools, it was proper for the faithful to regard this as in some degree a blessing, since the less rigorous opinion could apparently also be defended with good reason. A tradition says that the Prophet himself declared: 'The difference of opinion in my community is a proof of God's mercy.'

Each Muslim has to give the preference to the observance of the regulations of his own *fiqh*-school, and only under exceptional circumstances is an appeal made to the divergent doctrine of another *madhhab*. This appeal is also called *taqlīd* (in this case the recognition that the rules of another school are authoritative on a special point), and is held permissible under certain conditions for laymen.

The following is an example. According to the Shāfi'ites, children under age can be given in marriage only by their father or grandfather. In Acheh, where the Shāfi'itic *madhhab* is usually followed, it was the ancient national custom not to allow children to remain unmarried until their majority. Now, if it happens that the father and the grandfather of children under age are dead, the difficulty is solved by means of *taqlīd*, appealing to the Ḥanifites, who declare that even distant blood-relations are also competent to give children in marriage during their minority.[1]

Passing from one *madhhab* to another is not always approved of. There are Turkish scholars who permit those who follow the Shafi'itic or another *madhhab* to become Ḥanifites, but forbid Ḥanifites to go over to another *fiqh*-school. Such transference to another *madhhab* is scarcely ever found except when there is some exceptional reason for it—*e.g.*, when any one leaves his native country and goes to live in a land where the majority of the inhabitants belong to another *fiqh*-school. In places such as Mecca, where the adherents of the different *fiqh*-schools constantly come in contact with each other, transference to another *madhhab* is found, if, *e.g.*, a man and woman who belong to different *fiqh*-schools wish to marry.

3. The 'uṣūl al-fiqh' (i.e., the sources or foundations of the fiqh).—The *fiqh* is based on four infallible foundations: (1) Allāh's word—the Qur'ān; (2) the words and deeds of the Prophet—*sunnat al-nabī*; (3) the general agreement of feeling among orthodox scholars—*ijmā'*; and (4) the analogy—*qiyās*. Each of these foundations supplies a guarantee that the doctrine of the *fiqh*-schools is really in agreement with the will of Allāh. They are called the *uṣūl al-fiqh* (lit. 'roots of the *fiqh*'). The name *furū'* ('branches') is used to designate the rules of the *fiqh* based on these *uṣūl*.

(1) *The Qur'ān.*—As has been stated above, the *qiyās* originally was not generally recognized as a permissible method of establishing the *fiqh*, nor has the infallibility of *sunnah* and *ijmā'* been recognized from the beginning. But none could contest the authority of the Qur'ān, which, accord-

[1] Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, ii. 232 ff., and *The Achehnese*, Eng. tr., Leyden, 1906, ii. 1 ff.; P. Arminjon, *L'Enseignement, la doctrine et la vie dans les universités musulmanes d'Égypte*, Paris, 1907.

[2] For the *fatwās* and their contents, which are often important, see C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, ii. 238, 240, also 'Ein arab. Beleg zum heutigen Sklavenhandel in Singapore,' in *ZDMG* xlv. [1891] 895–902, 'Iets over verjaring in het Moshamm. recht,' in *Tijdschr. Bataviaasch Genootsch.* xxxix. [1897] 431–457, and 'Islām und Phonograph,' *ib.* xlii. [1900] 393–427; I. Goldziher, 'Über eine Formel in der jüd. Responsenlitteratur und in den muham. Fetwās,' in *ZDMG* liii. [1899] 645–652.

[1] For further particulars cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, i. 341 ff., and see also § 5 (*a*), below.

ing to Muslim opinion, contained Allāh's own words, nor was there later any doubt that Muhammad had accurately delivered God's word.

According to tradition, the Prophet had, with the help of the angel Gabriel, repeatedly collated the sacred text with the original preserved in heaven, and the Qur'ān must thus be regarded as a completely trustworthy source of Allāh's will. It is true that some of the verses contradict each other, but it generally appeared possible to give an interpretation of the contradictory texts which brought them into harmony; and, if this was not possible, it was assumed that the one verse of the Qur'ān was cancelled by the other.

(2) *The sunnah.*—From the very beginning the *sunnah* of the Prophet passed in general as a guide for all Muslims. But Muhammad was not regarded by his contemporaries as infallible. He was often subjected to severe opposition, even from his most loyal adherents, and, indeed, did not himself make any claim to infallibility. On the contrary, he often took pains to declare expressly that he was only a fallible man like every one else; he could achieve only one miracle which none else could accomplish—the communication of Allāh's revelation.

After the death of the Prophet, also, it occasionally happened that customs which he had expressly permitted to his followers, or of which he had himself given the example, were rejected and regarded as contrary to the true spirit of Islām.

The *mut'ah*-marriage is an example. According to several traditions, the Prophet had permitted some Muslims to contract temporary marriages—*e.g.*, on the occasion of expeditions. For this purpose a sum of money or other goods was given to a woman, and a marriage was contracted with her for a definite period, after the expiration of which the marriage was again dissolved. This kind of marriage is known as *mut'ah* ('to make use of'). The second Khalīf, 'Umar, forbade these temporary marriages; he apparently regarded them as practically fornication: 'Let no one be brought to me who has married a wife for a limited period,' he said, 'for, if so, I will have him stoned.' According to a later tradition, the Prophet himself withdrew his permission. Orthodox Muslims regard *mut'ah*-marriages as forbidden; the Shī'ites still continue to regard them as permissible.[1]

But later Muslims began to idealize the Prophet. They could not admit that he had been subject to mistakes and weaknesses just like other men, and they could not allow that any doubt existed on this point. It was necessary to have full security that men were not following an erroneous line when they accepted the *sunnah* of the Prophet. An attempt was made to find proofs for the infallibility (*'iṣmah*) of the Prophet, and it was thought that this could be discovered in many verses of the Qur'ān—*e.g.*, in those in which God enjoins obedience not only to Himself, but also to Muhammad, His representative. There was also a tradition which made the Prophet declare expressly: 'My community shall not err when they hold fast in everything to Allāh's book and to my *sunnah*.'

According to Muslim theory, the *sunnah* of the Prophet consists of three elements: (1) his *qawl* (decisions); (2) his *fi'l* (manner of conduct); and (3) his *sukūt* or *taqrīr* (tacit approbation of the deeds and words of others).

Generally behaviour according to the *sunnah* of the Prophet is as indispensable a duty for a Muslim as obedience to the regulations of the Qur'ān. The only exception to the general rule is formed by those cases in which God had permitted exceptional freedom to His messenger; *e.g.*, Muhammad had more than the number of wives permitted by the law, and in such special cases it is naturally regarded as forbidden to follow the example of the Prophet. Some European writers have erroneously imagined that what the *sunnah* prescribes has not a binding power in the same degree as a command in the Qur'ān. On the contrary, Muslim scholars even assume that some regulations of the Qur'ān are altered or cancelled by later decisions or acts of the Prophet which contradict them. In Qur'ān, ii. 176, *e.g.*, it is ordained that legacies may always be left to parents and near blood-relations; but this rule is regarded as cancelled, because, later on, according to tradition, after the regulation of inheritance *ab intestato*, Muhammad said: 'No will may be made for the benefit of heirs whose share in the estate is fixed.' Although the Qur'ān, xxiv. 2, prescribes only scourging as the punishment for fornication, adulterers must, according to the canon law, be in some cases stoned to death. This last punishment is based exclusively on the *sunnah* of the Prophet, which in this case has altered the regulation of the Qur'ān.

(3) *The ijmā'*.—By the time that a firm conviction had been formed in the schools as to the main rules of the *fiqh*, this general feeling began to be regarded as a new argument for the validity of the doctrine. It was declared to be impossible that rules as to which all *fuqāhs* had the same opinion could be based on error, and thus the *ijmā'* ('general agreement of opinion') of the scholars must be an incontrovertible proof of the correctness of their views. There could, so men thought, no longer be any doubt, even as to subjects on which there was originally a difference of opinion, so soon as all scholars were agreed on them. Their unanimous opinion must for the future be reverenced by every one as the truth.

The doctrine of the infallibility of the *ijmā'* at first met with much opposition. Many refused to concede binding authority in religious matters to the opinions of fallible men, even when they were agreed in their judgment. Nevertheless a tradition arose later, according to which the Prophet himself had declared: 'My people shall never be unanimous in error.' It was also thought possible to find arguments for this opinion in some verses of the Qur'ān. In iv. 115, *e.g.*, punishment is threatened on those 'who separate themselves from the Prophet' and 'do not follow the way of the faithful,' and this 'way of the faithful,' it was said, was obviously nothing else than that for which unanimity had been already obtained in Islām.

The earlier Muslims had already attached great importance to the *ijmā'* of 'the companions of the Prophet' (*ṣaḥabah*). It was thought that those who belonged to the generation which had been so extraordinarily favoured by the blessing of personal acquaintance with Muhammad must have been completely permeated by the true spirit of Islām, and it was thus impossible that they could have been unanimous in error. Later on, Mālik ibn Anas laid special emphasis on the general agreement of opinion of the scholars of Medina. In that holy city, he thought, the *sunnah* of Islām must have undoubtedly been preserved in its purest form. Thus, when all the scholars in the city of the Prophet were agreed in their opinion, this could not be erroneous. Others applied the same reasoning to the *ijmā'* of the scholars in both the holy towns—Medina and Mecca. In the end, however, consideration had to be given also to the *faqihs* in other places. There was no sufficient reason for limiting the authority of the *ijmā'* exclusively to the opinion of the *ṣaḥabah* and the scholars in the holy cities. Thus the *ijmā'* came to mean in Islām the agreement of all scholars who could be regarded as competent to judge in matters of religion.

The *ijmā'* must be regarded as the most important of the *uṣūl*. It became in the end the infallible basis for the whole doctrine of Islam.[1] It gave Muslims security also that the *fiqh* was correctly deduced from the sacred texts. It is true that, with regard to many details of the canon law, there remained a difference of opinion between the four *fiqh*-schools; but, as has already been noticed, all orthodox Muslims came later to recognize that as to these questions different opinions were possible. It was agreed that the doctrine of each of the four *madhhabs* gave a correct view of the canon law, and, in consequence, it was possible to say that the *ijmā'* itself had sanctioned even those regulations as to which the four *fiqh*-schools cherished different opinions. Moreover, everything which afterwards, under changed circumstances, became a rule was held to be justified when all were agreed about it. Customs and doctrines cannot be heresies for the true Muslim, provided that all orthodox *faqihs* sanction them, even if they are not based on the Qur'ān or the *sunnah*. Those who do not honour customs sanctioned by the *ijmā'*, such as the Wahhābites, are regarded by the orthodox Muslim as heretics.

(4) *The qiyās.*—Of the different methods of argument according to which some rules of the *fiqh* were established only the *qiyās* was recognized as a fourth infallible foundation for the *fiqh*. The other methods, such as *istiḥsān*, *istiṣlāḥ*, and *istiṣḥāb*, were not approved by the majority of Muslim scholars.

[1] On the so-called *mut'ah* see G. A. Wilken, *Das Matriarchat (das Mutterrecht) bei den alten Arabern*, Leipzig, 1884, pp. 9–16; and J. Wellhausen, 'Die Ehe bei den Arabern,' in *GGN*, 1893, p. 464 ff.

[1] See especially C. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Le Droit musulman,' in *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 15 ff.; I. Goldziher, 'Die Religion des Islams,' in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, Leipzig, 1906, I. iii., 1st half-vol., pp. 105–107.

To prove that the *fiqh* might really be based on analogy, an appeal was made to various texts of the Qur'ān and tradition. According to some traditions, the Prophet had instructed Mu'ādh, his governor of Yaman, to keep in general to the Qur'an and the *sunnah*, but, in cases in which this was not possible, to behave according to the analogy of these sacred texts. Since, later on, all orthodox scholars were agreed that the *qiyās* was permissible, no further doubt on the point was possible. Thus, for later generations in the orthodox Muslim world, the doctrine that the *qiyas* is a fourth infallible foundation of the *fiqh* is based on *ijmā'*.

Some orthodox scholars were of opinion that the general custom (*'urf*) should also be regarded as a basis for the *fiqh*. As a matter of fact, many *faqīhs*, from ancient times, had been careful, in establishing the regulations of the *fiqh*, to take into consideration the general customs of Muslims; but it has never become a rule to regard the *'urf* as a fifth infallible foundation of the *fiqh*.[1]

Muslim writers have written extensive works about the *uṣūl al-fiqh*, which treat of the different methods by means of which the rules of the *fiqh* may be established. Most *faqīhs* make no special study of this science, but content themselves with the condensed statements as to the *uṣūl* which may be found in the *fiqh*-books.

4. Summary of the contents of Muslim canon law.—The chief regulations of Muslim canon law may be divided into two classes: (1) those regarding religious worship and ritual duties; and (2) those regarding civil, penal, and public law.

The regulations belonging to the first class deal in the first place with the five *'ibādāt*, *i.e.* the ritual actions by which Allāh is to be worshipped. They are (i.) the *ṣalāt* (the ritual prayer, mainly consisting of prostration, praises of the Creator, etc.); (ii.) the *ṭahārah* (the ritual purification, which must be specially gone through before the *ṣalāt* is performed, but which is also required in other cases in which a believer must be in a ritually pure condition); (iii.) the *zakāt* (originally alms-giving, which was afterwards fixed by definite rules and became a kind of religious tax); (iv.) the *ṣawm* (fasting, especially in the month of Ramaḍān); and (v.) the *ḥajj* (the annual pilgrimage to Mecca).

These five *'ibādāt* are always treated in the first five chapters of the *fiqh*-books, according to the usual division of these works which has obtained since ancient times. They belong at the same time to the 'pillars' of Islam, *i.e.* to the principal duties of a Muslim. Originally also the *jihād* (the 'sacred war' against unbelievers) was regarded by many Muslims as a 'pillar' of Islām. This opinion is still held by the Khārijites, who are, however, regarded as heretics. According to orthodox Muslims there are only five 'pillars' of Islām. One of these is the *ṣalāt*, including the *ṭahārah* connected with it. The *zakāt*, the *ḥajj*, and fasting belong also to them, and the fifth 'pillar' is the confession (*shahādah*), consisting of the well-known 'two words': 'I confess that there is no God but Allāh, and that Muhammad is the messenger of Allāh.' For it is reported in tradition that the Prophet said: 'Islām is built on five [*sc.* foundations]: on the *shahādah*, the *ṣalāt*, the *zakāt*, the *ḥajj*, and fasting in the month of Ramaḍān.'

The subjects connected with the belief in Allāh were so numerous, and the controverting of manifold heresies on this point came in time to extend so far, that the doctrine regarding the first 'pillar' (the *shahādah*) developed into a separate branch of science, the *'ilm al-tawḥīd* or *'ilm al-kalām* ('knowledge of the unity of God' or 'doctrine of faith'). In the *fiqh*-books only the four other pillars are discussed. In connexion with the daily *ṣalāt*, the *fiqh*-books also deal with the whole worship in the mosque, the service on Friday and on the two *'īds* (*i.e.* feasts: the 'great' feast on the tenth of the last month, *Dhū'l-ḥijja*, and the 'small' feast on the first of the 10th month, *Shawwāl*); further, they deal with various special *ṣalāts*—*e.g.*, the *ṣalāt al-istisqā'* (the *ṣalāt* by which Allāh is asked for rain in times of great drought), and the *ṣalāt* at the eclipses of the sun and moon.

Besides these chief duties, a Muslim must observe numerous other religious prescriptions, and abstain from many actions which are regarded by canon law as blameworthy, or even strictly forbidden. These prescriptions may be found in nearly all the chapters of the *fiqh*-books. They treat chiefly of: (i.) the religious ceremonies on various occasions in Muslim domestic life—*e.g.*, child-birth, circumcision, marriage, and death; (ii.) the ritual purity of persons and objects, the ritual slaughter, the lawful food and drink, etc. These regulations are followed by various others—*e.g.*, concerning the prohibition of images of living beings, of superfluous luxury (the use of gold and silver dishes, the wearing of silk clothes by men, etc.), of various games and pleasures, and concerning permissible and forbidden music. The *fiqh*-books specially deal with some of those regulations in the chapter on the *walīmah* (the religious meal at the marriage-feast and on other occasions); for, if any of the rules mentioned in the *fiqh*-books are infringed, the religious character of this meal is lost.

The regulations of the second division chiefly concern marriage, divorce, relationship and the rights and duties connected with it, guardianship, inheritance, and slaves and freedmen; also contracts (sale, hire, partnership, commission, etc.), warrants, the obtaining of property and other rights, the prohibition of taking interest (Muslim law regards this as 'usury'); oaths and vows and all connected with them; testamentary dispositions and the *waqfs* (dispositions by which certain goods are withdrawn from trade in order to be reserved for definite religious aims or for a special number of persons); furthermore, the right of retaliation and the redemption of it by payment of a ransom; legal procedure, and the law of evidence; finally, the duty of believers to take part in the *jihād*, the rights and duties of unbelievers living in Muslim lands, and the appointment of an *imām* (chief of the Muslim community), his rights and his duties.

It is not the aim of all the regulations of the law to give absolute commands or prohibitions; in many cases it is only suggested that it is advisable from a religious point of view to perform or to omit some action. Five classes of regulations may be distinguished; they are called *al-aḥkām al-khamsah*, *i.e.* 'the five legal categories.' (i.) A deed may be obligatory (*wājib*, 'necessary,' or *farḍ*, 'prescribed'). Only the Ḥanifites recognize a difference between *wājib* and *farḍ*. They apply the term *farḍ* to all that is prescribed by the Qu'rān or by the tradition, if the meaning is beyond doubt; and *wājib* to that which, in case of doubt, is obligatory only according to the most probable view. Duties to be observed by every Muslim individually are called *farḍ al-'ain* (or *farḍ 'ala 'l-'ain*); duties to be observed only by a certain number of Muslims collectively are called *farḍ al-kifāyah* (or *farḍ 'ala' l-kifāyah*) *e.g.*, the daily *ṣalāt* in the mosque and the sacred war against 'unbelievers.' (ii.) A deed may be commendable or meritorious (*sunnah*). A Muslim will be rewarded if he observes these regulations, but he will not be punished if he neglects them.

It has been supposed by some scholars that the actions belonging to this class were called *sunnah* as being derived from the *sunnah* of the Prophet. But this is incorrect. It is indifferent for what reason an action is recommended in canon law. Muslim jurists of one *fiqh*-school sometimes call a deed *sunnah*, in order not to disagree wholly with the doctrine of another *madhhab*, which calls the same deed obligatory. A deed may also be *sunnah* because it was recommended in a verse of the Qur'ān; on the other hand, the imitation of a deed of the Prophet is often 'obligatory.' Other words that are used in the same sense as *sunnah* are *mustaḥabb* ('desirable'), and *mandūb* ('recommended').

(iii.) A deed may be permissible (*mubāḥ* or *jā'iz*) or (iv.) objectionable (*makrūh*); the latter actions are better avoided, but a Muslim is not punished if he commits them. (v.) A deed may be forbidden (*ḥaram*); the committing of this action is punished. The action which is forbidden may at the same time be 'valid' (*ṣaḥīḥ*)—*e.g.*, if one steals water and with it fulfils the ritual purification; this action is 'valid,' although stealing is forbidden. An 'invalid' action is called *bāṭil*.

Notwithstanding the great lack of knowledge and the negligence of most Muslims, in all Muhammadan lands that part of the canon law which deals with religious duties and ritual is more or less faithfully observed. According to the popular conscience, some actions are even regarded as

[1] Cf. I. Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten*, p. 204.

obligatory which have not so important a place in canon law. On the other hand, most Muslims neglect without scruple many duties that are really prescribed as 'obligatory.'[1] In general, the whole Muslim world is especially faithful to certain food-laws (*e.g.*, abstinence from pork), to circumcision, and to other religious customs by which a Muslim is externally distinguished from the followers of other religions. In the canon law these are not regarded as 'chief duties,' but in practice they play the part, to a certain extent, of the real 'pillars' of Islām. Other duties are neglected by most people, particularly those which are to be daily observed—*e.g.*, the *ṣalāt*. One country, however, is stricter than another.

The regulations regarding civil, penal, and public law generally proved to be only ideals that were practically unattainable. It is true that, according to the theory of the law-books, these regulations are in all respects of equal value with the prescriptions concerning religious duties, and every Muslim is bound to regard them as obligatory, but in practice it is impossible to observe them, particularly those which concern commercial and other contracts. Everywhere the demands and customs of the commercial intercourse and local manners and customs prevent even the most pious Muslim from observing these regulations; very often the observance of them is hindered by the arbitrary behaviour and tyranny of the local authorities. Pious Muslims often ask the advice of able lawyers as to the religious rules concerning matters of commerce, but in practice they find themselves compelled to act contrary to this advice.[2] Only the regulations concerning marriage and family life are faithfully observed by most Muslims as far as it is made possible by the different circumstances in each land.[3] Hence a twofold law usually obtains in Muslim countries. Alongside of canon law the local customary law (*'ādah*), and regulations of the local government, have in practice very great influence. Consequently there are usually two kinds of procedure. Besides the *qāḍī*, *i.e.* the judge, who judges according to the regulations of the *sharī'ah*, we find everywhere other magistrates, who inflict punishment and give decisions according to local manner and customs and local regulations. The influence of these magistrates is generally the more important. The *qāḍī* decides only those questions which are generally admitted to be immediately connected with religion, and which for this reason have to be decided according to the *sharī'ah*. These questions are specially matters concerning family life, marriage, inheritance, and donations and endowments for religious purposes.

In the following pages the regulations of Muslim canon law regarding civil and public law are dealt with only so far as they are really of practical importance for the Muslim (cf. also the 'Muhammadan' sections of artt. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, ADULTERY, APOSTASY, etc., to which reference is made below).

The doctrine of the Shāfi'itic *madhhab* will form the general basis of our description of the religious regulations of the Muslim canon law; only in dealing with matters of particular importance we shall refer also to the divergent opinions of other *fiqh*-schools (esp. those of the Ḥanifites and the Mālikites).[4]

[1] Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, ii. 273 ff., 308 ff.
[2] *Ib.* ii. 270–277.
[3] Cf. *ib.* ii. 269 ff., 303 ff.; I. Goldziher, 'Muham. Recht in Theorie und Wirklichkeit,' in *ZVRW* viii. [1889] 406–423.
[4] See, further, for the development of the *fiqh* and *uṣūl al-fiqh* and for the practical importance of Muslim canon law, C. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Le Droit musulman,' in *RHR* xxxvii. [1898] 2 ff., 174 ff., *Mekka*, ii. 200 ff., *The Achehnese*, ii. 269 ff., and 'L'Arabie et les Indes néerlandaises,' in *RHR* lx. [1909] 60–80; I. Goldziher, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg, 1910, pp. 35–39, *Die Ẓāhiriten*, and the art. 'Fiḳh' in *EI* ii.; D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory*.

II. *MARRIAGE, KINSHIP, LAW OF INHERITANCE, SLAVES.*—**5. Marriage.**—(*a*) *The marriage contract.*—In ancient times in Arabia the husband used to buy his wife from her nearest kinsman (*walī*, 'nearest'). He could give her in marriage to whom he liked, and he received the dowry, which was regarded as a sale price. By paying this sale price the bridegroom became the owner of the bride. In some Arabic Bedawīn tribes we find these customs even at the present time, with very little modification.[1]

In some parts of Arabia, however, the original form of marriage by sale and the patriarchal family customs connected with it were already so far modified in the time of Muhammad that it was customary to pay the dowry to the bride herself; and it was regarded as objectionable if her *walī* desired to keep this gift wholly or partly for himself. So, according to the Qu'rān (*e.g.* iv. 28), the Muslims had to regard the dowry as a 'reward for the wife,' and no one was allowed to withhold it. It seems, however, that the nearest kinsman in Muhammad's days was entitled to give a girl in marriage to whom he liked, even against her will. As several women complained of this to the Prophet, he is said to have issued a command that in future in ordinary cases every *walī* must ask the agreement of the bride to her marriage.

No marriage is valid without being preceded by the making of a proper marriage contract (*'aqd al-nikāḥ*). Even at the present day, the *walī* usually is the only person entitled to make this marriage contract with the bridegroom.

The Ḥanifites allow a woman to make the marriage contract herself, or to appoint a proper person to do so in her name, if she is of age and is not under guardianship. The Shāfi'ites, on the other hand, hold that neither a minor woman nor even a woman of full age is entitled to do this; only her *walī* has the right to marry her to any one; but he is at the same time generally bound to give his co-operation if she desires it of him. Mālikites, like the Ḥanifites, consider that the woman who is of age is entitled to make her own marriage contract, unless she belongs to a distinguished family, or, in consequence of her beauty or other qualities, is an exceptionally desirable match; in the latter case she may be united in marriage only through her *walī*. The only case in which the *walī* has the right to oppose a marriage is when the woman desires to marry a man who is not her 'equal' (Abū Ḥanīfah also allowed him this right if the bridegroom was unable or unwilling to pay a suitable dowry, but this opinion was rejected by his two pupils, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad); for the *walī* has to protect the honour of the family. The 'equal' of a woman is called her *kuf'*.

The theories of the various *fiqh*-schools about the equality (*kafā'ah*) disagree. The Shāfi'ites and Ḥanifites pay special attention to (1) *birth*: an Arab is considered of greater distinction than any non-Arab, and among the Arabs the tribesmen of Muḥammad—the Qurayshites—rank highest, the relatives of the Prophet being the most distinguished; (2) *profession*: the *fiqh*-books contain numerous regulations on this subject. The profession of *faqīh* is regarded as specially distinguished; if the profession of the bridegroom is inferior to that of the father of the bride, the former is no *kuf'* of the bride. No emancipated slave can be considered as the *kuf'* of a freewoman, any more than a *fāsiq* is that of a woman who is *'adl*.[2] On the other hand, it is

[1] J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys*, London, 1831, i. 263, 272; A. Musil, *Arabia Petræa*, Vienna, 1908, iii. 180, 184.
[2] Everybody that is not *'adl* is called *fāsiq*. When a person is *'adl*, it means that no great sin has been committed by him, and that he does not usually infringe the less important regulations of canon law. Even although he has infringed these less important regulations, a person still may be *'adl* if he fulfils the greater part of his other religious duties devoutly. This atones

wholly indifferent for this purpose whether the bridegroom is equal in wealth to the father of the bride or not. In matters of *kafā'aḥ* the Mālikites do not judge according to the origin or profession of the bridegroom, but exclusively by his conduct and faith. As a rule, the various regulations of canon law concerning the *kafā'aḥ* are of no practical importance for the present-day Muslims. Marriages which would be considered *mésalliances* according to the theory of the law very often are considered by the wife and her *walī* as honourable. An exception to this rule is made by the *sayyids* or *sharīfs*, the descendants of the Prophet. In some countries (*e.g.*, the Dutch Indies) they refuse to marry their daughters to men who are not related to them, because of their distinguished origin.

The various *fiqh*-schools differ as to the cases in which the *walī* has still in Islām the right of making a marriage contract without the permission of the bride.

The Shāfi'ites hold that the *walī* as a rule has no right to give the bride in marriage without her permission. A minor girl, therefore, cannot be given in marriage by her *walī*, for she is not able to give a valid permission. According to the Shāfi'ites, only the father or, failing him, the paternal grandfather is entitled to compel his daughter (or granddaughter) to a marriage, if she is still a virgin, whether she be a minor or of age. For this reason they call the father and the grandfather *walī mujbir* (*i.e.* 'compelling' *walī*). Nevertheless the doctrine even of the Shāfi'ites always regarded it as commendable (*sunnaḥ*) that the *walī mujbir* should ask the permission of the bride before giving her in marriage. Further, he is not entitled to compel her to marry if she declares that she is not a virgin—this declaration is accepted as true without further proof—or if there is enmity either between himself and the girl or between the girl and the man with whom he wishes her to join in marriage. The *walī mujbir* is not entitled to give the bride in marriage to anybody who is not her 'equal' (*kuf'*), or who is not able to pay a 'sufficient' dowry (*mahr al-mithl*).

According to the Ḥanafites and Mālikites, women under age may be given in marriage without their permission; this may be done by their father or, failing him, by a more distant kinsman on the paternal side. In the latter case the Ḥanafites permit them to demand dissolution (*faskh*) of their marriage when they come of age.

According to the Ḥanafites, women of full age cannot be compelled to a marriage by any one; and, according to the Mālikites, they may be compelled only by their father (not by the grandfather) so long as they are still virgin. Only the father is thus, according to the Mālikite system, *walī mujbir*.

The *walī* must be not only the 'nearest' kinsman,[1] but also an adult and a free Muslim in full possession of his intellectual powers and (at least according to the Shāfi'itic school) not a *fāsiq*. If he does not satisfy these conditions, his right passes to the next kinsman. If none of the persons just mentioned is qualified to become *walī*, or if there is no kinsman, or the kinsman unlawfully refuses to be *walī*, the magistrate (*ḥākim*) is regarded as the *walī* of the bride. According to tradition, the Prophet said: 'The magistrate is *walī* of her who has no *walī*.' The *fiqh*-books do not indicate which of the magistrates is then the competent *walī*; in many Muslim countries in this case the marriage contract is made by the *qāḍī*. If there is no magistrate living in the place where the marriage is to be contracted, the bride and bridegroom are allowed to hand over this function to some proper person. Such a man is called *ḥakam* (which is also the title of an arbiter in a lawsuit). Parties are entitled to choose another person as *ḥakam* even if a competent magistrate is living in the place, but in this case the *ḥakam* who is chosen is allowed to act as a substitute for the real magistrate only if he satisfies the conditions of a *qāḍī* in every respect.

The bridegroom is not generally represented by a *walī* in the making of a marriage contract—he does it himself. The contract is made by his *walī* only if he lives under guardianship as a minor. According to the Shāfi'ites, boys under age can be married only by their *walī mujbir* (their father or paternal grandfather), for they are supposed to be unfit to give their permission for the marriage. The Ḥanafites and Mālikites, however, allow other relatives also to do this.

for his small sins. But, if he confesses heretic opinions, he ceases to be *'adl*.

[1] The opinions of the different *fiqh*-schools disagree as to the order in which the kinsmen of the bride are entitled to be regarded as her nearest kinsman (cf. § 7 (*b*)).

If the bridegroom lives under guardianship for other reasons (*e.g.*, bankruptcy), he can be married only by the mediation of his guardian.

By the marriage contract the *walī* or other representative of the bride declares her to be given in marriage to the bridegroom (this declaration is called *ījāb*, 'the offer'); and the bridegroom declares that he takes her as his wife (this declaration is called *qabūl*, 'acceptance'), and that he will pay her a certain sum as dowry. *Ījāb* and *qabūl* must follow each other immediately, as in all other contracts.

According to the Shāfi'ites, in the making of the contract parties are not allowed to modify the legal rights and duties of married couples. Either husband or wife, indeed, is allowed to renounce later on the rights to which they are entitled by the law, but it is not permitted to bind oneself to this beforehand; *e.g.*, if the man bound himself beforehand not to marry a second wife, or if the wife renounced her right of being supported by her husband, then these conditions would be null and void. In this case the marriage contract remains valid, unless conditions were made which would be contrary to the aim of a marriage (*i.e.* not to have children); in that case both the condition and the marriage are considered void. In other *fiqh*-schools these questions are partly decided in another way.

For the *walī* of the bride it is *sunnaḥ* to make a speech (*khuṭbaḥ*) when the marriage contract takes place. If possible, this speech is made in Arabic, and must glorify God, bless His Prophet, give pious admonition, and recommend marriage. According to the Shāfi'ites and the Ḥanafites, the contract must be made in the presence of trustworthy witnesses, who must satisfy certain demands of the law. The Mālikites, however, only demand that the marriage shall not be kept secret.

Assistance of a clergyman is not required in Islām for the making of a marriage contract, but usually the aid of a person who has a special knowledge of the regulations concerning marriage is invoked. Only in this way do Muslims feel that the marriage is guaranteed not to be null and void. Thus we find in nearly all Muslim countries persons who make a profession of assisting at the marriage contracts. In different countries these men are called by various names (*e.g.*, *mumlik* in Mecca).[1] Sometimes such a person dictates to the parties the words that are to be pronounced by them, but in most cases he appears exclusively as a representative (*wakīl*) of the *walī* of the bride. Then he need only dictate to the bridegroom the required formulæ. If the bridegroom and the *walī* of the bride possess a sufficient knowledge of the regulations of the canon law, they may make the marriage contract themselves without the assistance of a professional officiator.

In the art. Worship (Muslim) the religious ceremonies connected with marriage will be dealt with, such as the *walīmat al-'urs* (*i.e.* the marriage feast, which originally was probably a sacrificial meal).

It remains to mention only that bride and bridegroom are not allowed to contract a marriage if they are in the state of *iḥrām*, *i.e.* the state of religious consecration and abstinence which the law makes obligatory for those joining in the yearly pilgrimage (*ḥajj*).

(*b*) *The dowry.*—The dowry given by the bridegroom to the bride has still its old Arabic name *mahr* (cf. Heb. *móhar*). By this word was originally meant the price which was paid to the *walī* of the bride. Another name for the dowry is *ṣadāq*. Because of the general meaning of the Arab. verb *ṣadaqa* and its derivatives, we may assume that the *ṣadāq* was originally the amount deposited by the bridegroom as a guarantee of his trustworthiness, and held by the *walī* of the bride if the bridegroom broke his promise. Later on no distinction was made between *mahr* and *ṣadaq*, and Muslim scholars generally regard these words as synonymous in every respect.

The amount to be paid by the bridegroom as dowry depends on the conditions upon which parties agree when the marriage contract is made. There are three possible cases. (1) There is no condition between parties as to the amount of the *mahr*. (2) It is expressly stated that the fixing of the amount of the present to the bride is left to the

[1] Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka*, ii. 161. *Mumlik* is literally the person who 'makes' the bridegroom 'owner' of the bride.

pleasure of the bridegroom. (3) A fixed sum is mentioned. In the first case a bridegroom is obliged to give his bride a *mahr al-mithl*, *i.e.* a dowry suitable to her position and also dependent on the social position, descent, age, intelligence, beauty, and other qualities of the bride, for which she may be reckoned as a more or less desirable match. The agreement by which the *mahr* is expressly left to the pleasure of the bridegroom is called *tafwīḍ* ('to leave over to somebody'). The *walī* of the bride can leave the fixing of the amount of the dowry to the bridegroom only if the bride has expressly empowered him to do so, and she may do this only if she is of age and has the free disposal of her fortune. In the third case the amount of the dowry is precisely stated in the contract. Then the dowry is called *mahr musammā*.

According to the Shāfi'ites, it is *sunnah* to fix the amount of the dowry in this way, the parties not being bound by legal regulations concerning the amount, except that it is necessary that the amount of dowry desired by the *walī mujbir* of the bride be at least equal to a *mahr al-mithl*. The Ḥanifites and Mālikites hold that the dowry must always represent a certain minimum value. They disagree, however, as to the exact amount of this minimum. The Ḥanifites say that it is not allowed to give less than a golden *dīnār* or 10 silver *dirhāms*. The Mālikites hold that the minimum is one quarter of a golden *dīnār* or 3 silver *dirhāms* (cf. the same difference between these two *fiqh*-schools where the minimum value of stolen property is concerned, as discussed in art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Muhammadan], § 5 (3)).

It is not necessary to pay the dowry at the time when the marriage contract is made. Usually only a portion (*e.g.*, the half) of the *mahr* is paid before the marriage; but the customs vary in different lands. The remainder is paid later in case of divorce or of the death of one of the couple. According to the Shāfi'ites, it is usual to pay to the bride before the marriage two-thirds or at least half of the dowry.

This custom of paying only a part of the dowry before the marriage probably dates back to the pre-Islāmic period. We may assume that the original purpose was to prevent the loss of all connexion between the wife and her family. In many countries in which the custom of buying a wife exists, if she is ill-treated by her husband, the relatives of the wife do not lose the right to protect her until the full dowry is paid.[1]

The bridegroom has to pay half the dowry to the bride as damages if he breaks the marriage contract by afterwards refusing to take her as his wife. If the amount of the dowry was expressly left to the pleasure of the bridegroom by means of *tafwīḍ*, he is obliged, according to the Shāfi'ites and the Ḥanifites, to give a 'present' as compensation to the rejected bride. This present is called *mut'ah* because of the name given to this compensation in Qur'ān, ii. 237–238. The Mālikites also hold that this 'present' of the bridegroom is not obligatory, but they regard it as *sunnah* for the bridegroom.

(c) *The lawful obstacles to marriage.*—The principal circumstances which can prevent the contraction of a marriage are the following five.

(1) An already existing marriage. A free Muslim may not contract a new marriage so long as he has already four wives; a woman may be married to only one man at once. Polygamy is permitted in Islām only within these limits; it existed in Arabia from antiquity and was not done away with by the Prophet. In Qur'ān, iv. 3, in which believers who had embezzled the property of orphans entrusted to them were enjoined to live in a simple manner, the following words are found:

'If ye fear that ye will be unable to give the orphans what is theirs, marry so many wives as is good for you—two, three, or four; and if ye still fear (in spite of this) that ye will be unable to act suitably, marry only one wife or take slaves: that is better, that ye be not inclined to evil.'

These words were interpreted by the later Muslim *faqīhs* in the sense that no Muslim may possess more than four wives at once. And there was a tradition that the Prophet had expressly authorized this interpretation. It was, indeed, known from tradition that Muhammad himself had more than four wives at once, but men explained this later as one of the special privileges which God had given only to His messenger.

(2) Too close relationship. A Muslim is forbidden to marry his female relatives in the direct line (ascending and descending), his sisters and the female descendants of his brothers and sisters, and his aunts and great-aunts on both the paternal and maternal sides. A relative (man or woman) whom it is forbidden to marry is called *maḥram*; *e.g.*, a man is his daughter's *maḥram*. Relationship-in-law (the relation between a married person and the relatives of his or her consort in consequence of marriage) is an obstacle to marriage. A Muslim may not marry his female relations-in-law in the direct (ascending and descending) line—*e.g.*, his mother-in-law, daughter-in-law, step-daughter, etc. —nor can he have two sisters or an aunt and niece as wives at the same time. In the fourth place, foster-relationship is also a hindrance to marriage, on the ground of Qur'ān, iv. 27.

No one may marry either a woman who has suckled him or his foster sisters (*i.e.* women who have been suckled by the same woman as suckled him). Foster-relationship is held to exist between a man and all his descendants on the one side and the woman who has suckled him, all her relations (either blood-kin or foster-kin), her husband, and all his relations (both blood-kin and foster-kin) on the other side. This foster-relationship, on the ground of a decision of the Prophet, is an obstacle to marriage within the same degree of relationship as with blood-relations. On the other hand, there is no foster-relationship (*a*) between the woman who suckled the child and the ancestors or side-relations of that child; or (*b*) between the child and the ancestors or side-relations of children who were suckled by the same woman.

These regulations concerning the obstacles to marriage caused by kinship are in general deduced from Qur'ān, iv. 26–27 (cf. also xxxiii. 49 and xxiv. 30–31). The ordinances made in these two verses of the Qur'ān were at least partly new to the Muslims, as may be seen from the words found at the end of Qur'ān, iv. 27, in which permission is expressly given to regard as lawful the marriages which had been previously contracted contrary to these restrictions.

(3) Difference of religion. In Qur'ān, ii. 220–221, it is forbidden for Muslims to contract a marriage with unbelievers. To that prohibition there were originally no exceptions:

'Marry no heathen women before they have become believers; a believing slave is better than an unbelieving free woman, even though she please you. Give also your female relations in marriage to no unbelievers before they have become believers; a believing slave is better than an unbelieving free man, even though he please you. They (the unbelievers) take you to hell, but God takes you to paradise and forgiveness.'

Later on, one exception was admitted, and Muslim men were allowed to marry women who belonged to a so-called people 'of the book' (*ahl al-kitāb*). By the *ahl al-kitāb* must be understood people, such as Jews and Christians, to whom, according to Muhammad's view, the same religion had previously been announced as he made known to his own people, the Arabians.

See Qur'ān, v. 7: 'Now are all free women permitted to you, both among the Muslims and among those who have received sacred books before you.'

In distinction from the other *fiqh*-schools, the Shāfi'ites regard marriage of women of the *ahl al-kitāb* as permitted only if these *ahl al-kitāb* had accepted their religion before the Qur'ān was revealed, and also had not corrupted it. So, according to the Shāfi'ites, a Muslim may not marry an English woman, because the English, though they belong to the *ahl al-kitāb*, accepted Christianity after Muhammad's time.

(4) A man and woman who are separated from each other cannot as a rule contract a new marriage with each other if the former marriage was dissolved either because the man had three times repudiated his wife, or because he had accused her of adultery by means of the *li'ān* (the swearing of a solemn oath). As to these two cases see § 6 (*a*) and (*b*), in which the exceptions to the general rule are also discussed.

(5) Women may not contract a new marriage

[1] The following example shows that this view was not entirely unknown even to the Muslim scholars: if a man leaves his native town and goes elsewhere, according to Abū Ḥanīfah he may take his wife with him only if he has paid her the whole of the *mahr*.

within a certain period after the dissolution of a former one. This period is called *'iddah*, *i.e.* properly 'the number' (viz. the number of days). If the marriage was dissolved by the decease of the husband, according to Qur'ān, ii. 234, the wife must wait four months and ten days. A similar period of mourning after the death of the husband existed among the Arabians in the heathen period; but it was then customary, at least in some Arabian tribes, for the widow to seclude herself in a small tent for a full year after the death of her husband; during this time she might not purify herself.[1] The *'iddah* after divorce was, on the other hand, probably first introduced by Muhammad. According to Qur'ān, lxv. 4, the wife may not marry again within the limit of three *qurū'*, if her marriage was dissolved by divorce. According to Abū Ḥanīfah, *qurū'* must be taken to mean menstruation; according to the Shāfi'ites, Mālikites, and others, it is the period of a woman's cleanness between the periods of menstruation. If the woman has no menstruation, the *'iddah* is reckoned at three months. When a woman is pregnant at the dissolution of her marriage, she may in no case marry again before her confinement.

Difference in position is, as a rule, no obstacle to the contraction of a marriage, since it is in no case regarded as scandalous for the bridegroom to marry a woman of lower rank; and even a woman may contract a valid marriage with a man who is not her *kuf'*, if neither her *walī* nor she herself has any objection.

Youth is usually no hindrance according to Muslim law. Child-marriages were not forbidden in Muhammad's day, and even the Prophet married 'A'ishah, the daughter of Abū Bakr, when she was only six years old. But, according to the Shāfi'ites, only the *walī mujbir* (the father, or, failing him, the paternal grandfather) is qualified to give his children (or grandchildren) in marriage before their majority. According to the other *fiqh*-schools, more distant relations have the same right if the ancestors of the children under age are deceased. Children under age, therefore, cannot marry, according to the Shāfi'ites, if they have no father or grandfather. See, however, § 2 (at the end) as to the *taqlīd* which is applied in such a case.

(*d*) *Mutual rights and duties of married people during marriage; īlā' and ẓihār.*—No community of goods between the married couple is brought into existence by marriage. Each keeps the ownership of that which was possessed at marriage, and of that obtained during marriage by labour, endowment, inheritance, or in any other way. The wife keeps the right, during her married life, of disposing of her possessions and of making contracts. She does not in that respect come under the guardianship of her husband. The husband is obliged to support his wife according to her position, and to give her food as well as clothing, residence, and service consistently with the appropriate customs. This legal and obligatory support is called *nafaqah*. If the husband is not able to give the legal support to his wife, she is entitled to demand divorce (*faskh*), but in that case she has to prove that her husband is really not able to give her *nafaqah*. If the husband is able to support her, but refuses to do so, the judge must try to induce the husband to fulfil his duty, if the wife requires him to do so.

A husband who is married to more than one wife must not spend more time in the rooms of one wife than in those of another. The husband is also particularly forbidden in the law-books to swear an oath to abstain from sexual intercourse. The taking of such a vow of abstinence was called *īlā'* ('to swear'). In the pre-Islāmic period the Arabs regarded this *īlā'* as a kind of divorce, by which, however, the marriage was not fully dissolved. Although the woman was thus neglected, she could not contract a new marriage before her husband had definitely repudiated her, and this he generally refused to do before he had been paid a certain sum as ransom.

This *īlā'* was forbidden in Qur'ān, ii. 226 f. Any one who had taken such a vow of abstinence was for the future obliged to repudiate his wife after the expiration of four months, if he was then still unreconciled to her. According to the Ḥanafites, after the expiration of four months the marriage is *ipso facto* legally dissolved if no reconciliation has taken place; but, according to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, it must in this case be dissolved by the *ḥākim* if the man refuses to repudiate his wife of his own accord. If the husband desires to be reconciled again with his wife, he is, according to the unanimous opinion of Muslim scholars, obliged to make a 'guilt-offering' (*kaffārah*, lit. 'that which covers the sin') because he has broken his vow. The legal regulations concerning the *īlā'* are applicable only if the husband has vowed to abstain from conjugal relations with his wife for longer than four months.

Another vow of abstinence was the *ẓihār* (from *ẓahr*, 'back'). In this case the husband declared that 'his wife should be to him even (untouched) as the back of his mother.' This was apparently a customary vow of abstinence by the heathen Arabs, which, according to tradition, was also taken by some Muslims in the month of fasting, when they proposed to abstain from conjugal relations with their wives. This vow was expressly condemned in Qur'ān, lviii. 1–5.

Apparently the original meaning of this revelation was that every Muslim who 'turned again' to this heathen custom should have to pay a heavy penalty (*kaffārah*), consisting of the emancipation of a Muslim slave, fasting for two successive months, or the feeding of sixty poor persons, before he was again permitted to have intercourse with his wife. The Muslim *fuqahā*, however, have explained these verses of the Qur'ān in another sense.[1] According to the Shāfi'ites, the husband is legally bound to this *kaffārah* unless he repudiates his wife immediately after pronouncing the *ẓihār*. 'If he does not do this at once,' they say, 'then he "turns back,"' *i.e.* breaks his vow of abstinence, and must thus give the *kaffārah*. According to the other *fiqh*-schools, he breaks his promise only if he actually behaves contrary to his vow, and is only then obliged to give the *kaffārah*. Thus these also explain 'turn back' in the sense of changing opinion and breaking the vow of abstinence.

Both the *īlā'* and the *ẓihār* soon became obsolete in Islām.

If the husband fulfils his duties, he has the right to demand obedience from his wife, and is even entitled to chastise her if she is unwilling (*nāshiz*); in this case she loses her right to *nafaqah*.

Husband and wife, according to the Shāfi'ites, can make no change in their mutual rights and duties as established in canon law. Any agreement of that nature which they may make in the marriage contract has no binding power. Nevertheless, it is usual, in some Muslim lands, even among the Shāfi'ites, for the husband to undertake certain exceptional obligations with regard to his wife, to which he is not bound by the law. He promises, *e.g.*, not to take a second wife, though he has the right to do so. In order to give a binding force to such promises the bridegroom, immediately after the conclusion of the marriage contract, pronounces a repudiation of his wife conditional on the non-fulfilment of his vows. He declares, after making the marriage contract: 'If I take a second wife [or 'if I neglect my wife and give her no *nafaqah*,' etc.], then is she repudiated by me.' This custom is called *ta'līq* (lit. 'to hang up' the divorce to a condition).

By this *ta'līq* various rights may be guaranteed to the wife which the law does not give her, and she may gain in this way a much better position. If she is ill-treated or neglected by her husband, or if he acts in other respects contrary to his promises, the marriage is *ipso facto* dissolved, and the wife may, if she wishes, marry another husband. This *ta'līq* is customary especially in the Dutch Indies. Only when the bridegroom is of high distinction or a pious man, so that it is im-

[1] Cf. J. Wellhausen, 'Die Ehe bei den Arabern,' in *GGN*, 1893, pp. 454–456.

[1] Cf. I. Goldziher, *Die Ẓāhiriten*, pp. 52–54.

possible to imagine that he will treat his wife otherwise than well, is the *ta'līq* not applied.[1]

6. Divorce.—(*a*) *Repudiation* (*ṭalāq*).—According to Muslim canon law, marriage may be dissolved by divorce in four ways, besides by the death of one of the parties or their apostasy from Islām. The common form of divorce is the repudiation (*ṭalāq*) pronounced by the husband. Among the old Arabians the husband thus renounced his rights over his wife, who could return to her relatives and contract a new marriage with another husband. Her marriage was immediately dissolved by the *ṭalāq*, the effect of which was the same as that of the *'atāq*, or emancipation of slaves. But, according to the new law of Islām, the wife might not marry again during a certain period (*'iddah*; cf. § 5 (*c*) (5)) after the repudiation. During the *'iddah* it had to be seen whether she was pregnant, in which case her former husband would have the right of claiming the child. Further, the husband gained the right of reconciling himself with his wife during the *'iddah*, and of revoking the *ṭalāq*. The revocation of the repudiation is called *rujū'* (also *rij'ah* or *raj'ah*).

According to Muslim tradition, this new right of the revocation of the *ṭalāq* was at first abused. It was evidently given to the husband in order to put him in a position to retrieve his fault if he had repudiated his wife in a fit of passion; but a wife complained to the Prophet of her husband, who repeatedly repudiated her and as often revoked his repudiation before the expiration of the *'iddah*. By this means the woman was practically repudiated, but could not contract a new marriage with another husband. Obviously her husband was trying in this way to compel her to ransom herself by paying back the dowry that she had formerly received from him. The Prophet forbade this practice in Qur'ān, ii. 231:

'When you have repudiated your wife and she has waited her time, keep her with you and treat her well, otherwise let her go free, but do not take her back with evil intent. He who does that sins. Yet do not mock the words of Allāh.'

Moreover, the right of revoking the *ṭalāq* was now limited in Qur'an, ii. 229 f.:

'If the *ṭalāq* has twice (taken place, then it may only) be revoked with good intentions, or you must let go (your wife) with kindness, (for) it is not permissible to take back from her that which you have (formerly) given her . . . but if the husband repudiates his wife (once more), then she is no longer lawful for him.'

On the ground of these verses of the Qur'ān, a husband may repudiate his wife only three times. After each *ṭalāq* an *'iddah*-period begins, during which the wife may not marry again. During the *'iddah* after the first and second repudiations the marriage is not yet dissolved. If, *e.g.*, the husband is married to four wives and repudiates one of them, he may not during the period of *'iddah* marry another woman; but, if either the husband or wife dies during this period, the survivor shares in the inheritance. Moreover, the husband is entitled to revoke his repudiation during this period. If he allows the term to expire, the marriage is then dissolved. The divorced parties may contract a new marriage with each other if they both wish it; but in this case a new marriage contract must be made and a dowry again paid by the husband.

After the third *ṭalāq*, however, the marriage is immediately dissolved. An *'iddah*-period also follows the third repudiation, during which the wife may not marry again; but the man has no further right to revoke his repudiation, and the divorced pair cannot ever contract a new marriage with each other.

To the last rule there is one exception based on the Qur'ān itself. A woman at Medina who was three times repudiated by her husband and afterwards married to another man wished afterwards to marry her first husband again. When she explained her wish to the Prophet, he declared that this was impossible, even if she were repudiated by her second husband; later on, however, he took pity on her, and altered the regulation quoted above from Qur'ān, ii. 229 f. After the words 'after the third *ṭalāq* the woman is no longer permitted to him,' the following regulation was added: 'Unless the woman afterwards married another husband and was also repudiated by him; in such a case it is no sin for them both (*sc.* the wife and her first husband) to return to each other, if they think that they will in future be able to observe the commandments of Allāh.'

On the ground of this regulation, the law allows married people to contract a new marriage with each other even after the third *ṭalāq*, if the wife has in the meantime married another husband and been repudiated by him. In Muslim countries repudiation is very often pronounced three times for insignificant reasons, and the divorced persons often desire to be joined together again. In order to make this possible, the wife contrives to contract a mock-marriage with another husband, who is ready to repudiate her immediately after the marriage. He who declares himself willing to do this is called *muḥallil* (because he makes the wife by this mock-marriage once more *halāl*, *i.e.* permissible for her first husband). Such a mock-marriage may be employed only twice, for, if the husband has three times pronounced the thrice-repeated *ṭalāq*, he cannot again contract a new marriage with his repudiated wife.

(*b*) *Other forms of divorce.*—Besides *ṭalāq* there are three other ways in which marriage may be dissolved: *khul'*, *faskh*, and *li'ān*. After each of these, a period of *'iddah* begins for the woman in which she may not marry again. During this time she is entitled to *nafaqah*, if she has not neglected her duties towards her husband.

(1) *Khul'* was customary in ancient times among the Arabs. Generally speaking, it consisted in the ransom of the wife by her relatives, usually for a sum of money proportionate to that which they had received from the bridegroom as *mahr* at the time of the marriage. In consideration of this sum, the husband was induced to renounce his wife and leave her free to marry another husband. *Khul'* means literally 'to put off.' The use of *khul'* in this context is derived from the symbolic act (the throwing away of a cloak, a shoe, or a similar piece of clothing) by which the husband shows that he renounced his claim on his wife.[1]

As has already been mentioned, the Prophet originally forbade the husband to receive back his wife's dowry at the dissolution of marriage, as this custom often gave rise to the deliberate neglect and otherwise vexatious treatment of the wife (see the words of Qur'ān, ii. 229, quoted above; cf. also iv. 24–25). But later on the ancient custom of *khul'* was again permitted.

The reason of this was the request of a woman at Medina, who declared that she had such an aversion to her husband that she no longer wished to stay with him. She asked permission to buy her freedom in order to be released from her husband, and the following addition was then made to the words of Qur'ān, ii. 229: 'It is not lawful for you to take back anything which you have given to your wives, except if you are afraid that you will transgress the laws of Allāh; when you are afraid of this, then is (the ransom) with which the wife redeems herself no sin for either (of the married couple), that is the law of Allāh,' etc.

On the authority of these words the *khul'* remained even in Islām a legal method of divorce. The wife by this means buys her repudiation; her husband can never revoke it. If the husband and wife both wish it, they may again join in marriage.

(2) *Faskh* is the annulment of marriage with the co-operation of the magistrates. According to the Ḥanifites, a minor who has been given in marriage, not by her father or grandfather, but by a more distant relative, may demand dissolution of this

[1] Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, i. 348 ff.

[1] Cf. Ru 47f., and J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys*, i. 113.

marriage on the attainment of her majority (see § 5 (*a*)). Other reasons for the *faskh* may be found in certain diseases or bodily infirmities mentioned in the *fiqh*-books. This method of divorce is possible also when, after the completion of the marriage, it appears that the bride or bridegroom does not fulfil certain qualifications (*e.g.*, with regard to birth, position, virginity, etc.) which had been expressly insisted on as conditions at the making of the marriage contract. According to the Shāfi'ites, a wife may also demand *faskh* if she proves that her husband is not able to give her lawful maintenance (*nafaqah*). In these cases the sentence of dissolution of marriage is pronounced by the magistrate at the request of the parties.

(3) The dissolution of marriage by means of *li'ān* ('imprecation') is based on Qur'ān, xxiv. 6–9. As a rule, any one who accuses a free Muslim woman of fornication, without being able to prove his accusation, is punished by scourging. If, however, a husband suspects his own wife of infidelity, the law allows him to accuse her of adultery without any further proof, and to contest the legitimacy of her child, but he must do so by means of the *li'ān*, invoking Allāh in the manner prescribed in Qur'ān, xxiv. 6–9:

'Those who accuse their wives of infidelity and have no other witnesses than themselves must invoke Allāh four times as a witness that they have spoken the truth, and a fifth time, calling down His curse on themselves if they have lied. The wife may avert the punishment (for adultery) if she swears by Allāh four times that her husband has lied, and a fifth time, declaring that God's wrath may fall upon her if her husband has spoken the truth.'

If a husband, after accusing his wife of adultery, refuses to pronounce the *li'an*, he must be scourged for slander if he cannot produce witnesses; but the Ḥanafites consider that the husband ought to be imprisoned until he pronounces the *li'ān* or admits that he has lied. According to the Shāfi'ites and the Mālikites, not only is the marriage legally dissolved by the *li'ān*, but the married couple may never marry each other again. According to the Ḥanafites, even after the *li'ān* the marriage must still be dissolved by a decision of the magistrate, and the reunion of the parties is permitted if the husband has afterwards revoked his accusation and been scourged for his slanderous imputation.

7. **Relationship, and the rights and duties based on it.**—(*a*) *The relation between a child and his parents.*—In ancient Arabia, on account of the nature of the marriage by sale, the husband (*ba'al*, lit. 'master,' of the woman) was regarded as the father of all children borne by his wife during the marriage, even if he did not beget them. Thus he was also regarded as the father of the children borne by his wife if he had married a pregnant woman, or if he had given up his wife for a certain time to another man in order to raise up noble children from her.[1]

In Islām this rule was altered. According to Muslim canon law, only the man who has begotten the children in a legal marriage is regarded as their father; a woman must wait for the expiration of the *'iddah*-period, if she wishes to marry another husband after the dissolution of her marriage, in order that it may be seen whether she is pregnant. If she is, she may marry again only after her confinement, and the first husband is regarded as the father of the children born during the *'iddah*. Thus in Islām the first and second husbands cannot quarrel about the children born after the dissolution of the marriage; such quarrels were very common in the pre-Islāmic period.[2]

Muslim canon law generally recognizes a child born in wedlock as begotten by the husband and thus as legitimate when the birth takes place not earlier than six months after the consummation of marriage. A child born within a certain period after the dissolution of marriage (whether by divorce or through the death of the husband) is also regarded as legitimate. According to the Ḥanafites, it must be assumed that pregnancy may last two years if it appears that the mother had no menstruation during that time. According to the Shāfi'ites and the Mālikites, pregnancy may even last much longer (four or seven years), and thus a child born so long after the dissolution of the marriage may still pass as legitimate. Further, the children which the master begets from his slaves are regarded as legitimate offspring, and are placed on a complete equality with those begotten in lawful marriage (see § 9 (*a*)). When it appears that a marriage is invalid, or that any one has been wrong in thinking that he was the owner of a slave, the children are, nevertheless, regarded as legitimate, provided the parents acted mistakenly in good faith, so that there can be no question of *zinā'* ('fornication').

All other children are illegitimate (*walad zinā'*, 'begotten in fornication'). There is no relationship between such illegitimate children and their father, even though the father expressly recognizes that they were begotten by him. From such an acknowledgment no claim to relationship can follow either for the child or for the father (neither right of inheritance, nor guardianship, nor duty of maintenance). The Shāfi'ites even allow a father to marry the daughter whom he begets in fornication, though they regard it as blameworthy (*makrūh*). The Ḥanafites forbid this. On the other hand, the relationship between the mother and her illegitimate children is legally precisely the same as that between her and her legitimate children. She is not allowed to marry her illegitimate son, and she inherits from him, etc. A child is also illegitimate if the husband by means of *li'ān* accuses his wife of adultery (see § 6 (*b*) (3)), and declares that the child borne by her is not his. If, on the other hand, it is uncertain whether a child was really begotten by the husband during wedlock (or by the master, during the time that he was the owner of the slave), it is then regarded as legitimate without further proof, if the father recognizes it as his. Such an acknowledgment is called *iqrār*.

Adoption is forbidden, and has no legal force (see ADOPTION [Muhammadan]).

Blood-relations in the direct line are obliged to support each other (by means of *nafaqah*) in case of necessity; according to the Ḥanafites, this duty rests on all blood-relations that are not allowed to marry each other (thus on all *muḥarams*; see § 5 (*c*) (2)).

(*b*) *Other kinds of relationship.*—Another result of marriage by sale among the ancient Arabians was that after marriage the wife ceased to belong to her family, so that there was family-relationship only between the child and the family of its father, and not between it and the family of the mother. It is true that for philological reasons it may be assumed that even in Arabia the patriarchal family-system was preceded by the matriarchal, but in historical times no clear traces of the latter system can be found.[1]

[1] For further particulars about this so-called *nikāḥ al-istibḍā'* cf. W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, London, 1885, p. 110 [2 do. 1903, p. 132].

[2] *Ib.*

[1] On this subject see the works of the following writers, whose views differ as to many details: I. Goldziher, 'Endogamy and Polygamy among the Arabs,' in *The Academy*, xviii. [1880] 26; G. A. Wilken, *Das Matriarchat (das Mutterrecht) bei den alten Arabern*, Leipzig, 1884; J. W. Redhouse, 'Notes on Prof. E. B. Tylor's Arabian Matriarchate,' in *JRAS* xvii. [1885] 275–292; W. R. Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (new ed. with additional notes by the author and by I. Goldziher, London, 1903); cf. Th. Nöldeke, in *ZDMG* xl. [1886] 148 ff.; J. Wellhausen, 'Die Ehe bei den Arabern,' in *GGN*, 1893, p. 460 ff.; and Th. W. Juynboll, *Over het verband tusschen de Moham. bruidsgave en het rechtskarakter van het oud-Arabische huwelijk*, Leyden, 1894.

As already pointed out, even before Muhammad marriage ceased to be generally regarded as a purchase. So also it was customary in Arabia before Islām not to limit relationship entirely to the family or tribe of the father, but in many cases to take into consideration the relatives on the mother's side, although the maternal relatives are never placed on an equality with the paternal by the Muslim scholars. It is also true that maternal relationship is an obstacle to marriage according to Qur'ān, iv. 26 f. (the maternal aunt is a *maḥram*, just as is the paternal aunt, and the *ḥaḍānah* [*i.e.* the care of children] is in certain cases equally a right of maternal relatives), but, in general, attention is paid only to the rights and duties of the *'aṣabāt*, *i.e.* the male relatives on the paternal side.

Rights which are based on relationship (*nasab*) and which are usually conceded to the *'aṣabāt* are: (1) the right of giving female relatives in marriage or of opposing the marriage of female relatives who wish to marry below their rank; (2) the right of inheritance; (3) the right of managing the property of blood-relations who are under age or insane; (4) the right of retaliation or of demanding the price of blood if a blood-relation has been killed; and (5) the right to succeed a blood-relation who has set free a slave in his rights and duties with regard to the freedman. According to the majority of Muslim *faqihs*, if a blood-relation has unintentionally killed any one, the duty of paying the satisfaction money also falls entirely on the *'aṣabāt*.

In order to indicate the nearest relative among any one's *'aṣabāt*, Muslim scholars divide the male relatives on the paternal side into classes. The first class consists of the descendants, the second of the ancestors; the third class is formed by the descendants of the father, and the fourth class by the descendants of the paternal grandfather. Among the descendants the son is the next of kin, then the son's son, etc.; among the ancestors the father is the next of kin, next to him his father, etc.; the next of kin in the third class is the brother, then follows his son, etc.; the next of kin in the fourth class is the paternal uncle, then follows his son, afterwards his son's son, etc. He who is related to any one both on the paternal and on the maternal side precedes a blood-relation of the same rank who is related to him only on the paternal side; so, *e.g.*, in the third class the full brother takes precedence of the half-brother on the paternal side, the son of the full brother precedes the son of the paternal half-brother, etc.

Thus, as a rule, not only the son but also the grandson, etc., has precedence over the father, and the grandfather on the paternal side ranks above the brother. There are, however, exceptions to this rule. (1) The nearest *'aṣabāt* of a woman who have the right to give her in marriage are, according to the Shāfi'ites, not her descendants but her ancestors, and after them her relatives in the lateral line; but, according to the Ḥanifites and Mālikites, the ordinary rules obtain in this case also, and the descendants have the right in the first place to be *walī al-nikāḥ*. (2) The brothers of a deceased man inherit equally with his paternal grandfather, and are thus not excluded by him; but the grandfather has always the right to at least a third of their common share, so that, if he inherits together with one or two brothers, each obtains an equal part; but, if he inherits with three or more brothers, the latter divide two-thirds of the whole among themselves in equal parts, while the grandfather has one-third. (3) The rights which can be exercised over a freed slave pass by the death of his emancipator to the nearest of the *'aṣabāt* of the emancipator, but in this case the brothers take precedence of the grandfather. (4) According to the Shāfi'ites, the obligation of the nearest *'aṣabāt* to pay the *'aql* (the atonement money), when one of their blood-relations has committed unintentional manslaughter, falls only on the lateral relations and not on the *'aṣabāt* in the direct (ascending and descending) line (cf. art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Muhammadan], vol. iv. p. 292).

The blood-relations on the maternal side and those on the father's side, so far as they do not belong to the *'aṣabāt*, are called *dhawi'l-arḥām*. They have in general no rights and duties based on relationship. According to the Ḥanifites, however, they take the place of the *'aṣabāt*, if these do not exist. In such a case the right to be *walī* and to give the bride in marriage passes to the mother and to her next of kin; and the inheritance also passes to the next relatives among the *dhawi'l-arḥām*. According to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, on the other hand, the *'aṣabāt* in such a case are not succeeded by the *dhawi'l-arḥām* but by the Muslim community; thus, if there are no *'aṣabāt*, the treasury (*bait al-māl*) inherits; and the *ḥākim*, *i.e.* the magistrate, must take the place of the *walī* of the bride.

(c) *Guardianship.*—Minors are legally under the guardianship of their parents or nearest blood-relations. They are not qualified to make independent contracts, or to undertake other legal transactions. Minority ceases generally, according to Muslim law, when the children are really adult and the signs of puberty can be observed. According to the Shāfi'ites, minority ends in any case after the completion of the fifteenth year; according to the Ḥanifites, only after the eighteenth year. Besides the so-called *wilāyat al-nikāḥ* (*i.e.* the guardianship which gives the guardian the right to give a female relative in marriage, or to prevent her marrying below her rank), which has already been discussed in § 5 (*a*), Muslim lawyers distinguish two other kinds of guardianship, namely, the *ḥaḍānah* and the *wilāyat al-māl*.

(1) The purpose of the *ḥaḍānah* is to care for the physical well-being of the minors and also for their education and training for a profession. During the married life of the parents the children are subjected to the parental authority; in case of separation of the parents, the mother has the right to retain the children so long as they have need of her help, *i.e.*, according to the Shāfi'ites, until they are about seven years old; after this, the child may entrust itself to the care of the father, if it prefers to do so; according to the Ḥanifites, a boy always comes at that age under the guardianship of the father, but a girl remains under the guardianship of her mother, while, according to the Mālikites, both boys and girls remain under the guardianship of the mother until they are of full age (girls even until they marry).

If the mother contracts a fresh marriage, she loses the *ḥaḍānah*, unless her new husband is at the same time one of the blood-relations of the children. In this case she keeps the guardianship, according to the Shāfi'ites, if the husband belongs to the *'aṣabāt* of the children; according to the Ḥanifites, if he is a *maḥram* of them; and, according to the Mālikites, if he is either a *maḥram* of them or a relative who would himself have the right to be guardian over the children if he were not excluded by nearer relatives.

If, after the divorce, one of the parents removes to another place, the child remains as a rule with the parent who does not leave the former dwelling-place, in order to avoid the dangers of travel. If, however, the father establishes himself permanently in another place, he has the right to take his children there with him; but the rules of the

different *fiqh*-schools with regard to this subject vary in details.

If the mother is dead, Muslim lawyers generally consider the female relatives the most suitable for the *ḥaḍānah*. According to the Ḥanifites, the father and the other *aṣabāt* of minors have a right to the *ḥaḍānah* only when there are no female relatives.

The rules which the *fiqh*-schools follow with regard to the order in which the male and female relatives enjoy a right to the *ḥaḍānah* differ from each other in many details; *e.g.*, according to the Mālikites, the maternal aunt has a preference above all other female relations. They base this opinion on the tradition that, when Ḥamzah and his wife were dead, three of his *'aṣabāt* quarrelled over the question which of them had the best right to look after Ḥamzah's young daughter. One of them said to the Prophet: 'She is not only the daughter of my uncle, but my wife is, moreover, her maternal aunt.' On this Muhammad decided that the child must be entrusted to this man and his wife, saying, 'The maternal aunt is as good as the mother.'

According to the Shāfi'ites, if the mother dies or is not qualified for the *ḥaḍānah*, she is succeeded by her mother, or, if necessary, by the mother of her mother. Only after them the father, and, after him, his mother, or, if necessary, his maternal grandmother, has a claim to the *ḥaḍānah*. If the father and his female ancestors (and, after them, the grandfather and his female ancestors) are dead or disqualified, the nearest of the male or female relatives in the collateral line has the right to the *ḥaḍānah*. In this case by the female relatives are meant all, both on the maternal and on the paternal side, but by the male relatives only the *'aṣabāt*. If several male and female relatives are equally related to the child, the female ones have the preference. If the child has reached the age of about seven years, it may choose for itself whether it will be entrusted to the next of kin of its male or of its female relatives.

(2) The *wilāyat al-māl* is the guardianship which has for its purpose the management of the property of minors. According to the Shāfi'ites, only the father (and, failing him, the paternal grandfather) can be legally *walī al-māl*. The father (or, if necessary, the grandfather) has, however, the right to appoint by testamentary disposition a guardian over his children (or grandchildren) who are under age. A guardian thus appointed is called *waṣī*. Even women can in this way be entrusted with the care of the property of a child under age, and the mother is in the first place taken into consideration for this purpose, although she has no legal claim to the position. Failing both the father and grandfather, or a guardian appointed by them, the magistrate (*ḥākim*), or a person appointed by the magistrate, must take the place of guardian. The Mālikites recognize the qualification of the father only (not that of the paternal grandfather) to set up a legal claim to be guardian and to appoint a *waṣī*.

The guardian manages the property of the minor, and makes any necessary agreements for him, etc. When it is near the child's coming of age, the guardian has to inquire whether his ward is *rashīd*, *i.e.* able to manage his property for himself. This regulation is based on Qur'ān, iv. 5:

'Examine the minors, and put them in possession of their property, when you find that they are *rashīd*.'

If it appears that the ward, though of age, is not yet capable of managing his own property, the guardianship continues. The opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah, that the guardianship in any case ceased as soon as the ward was twenty-five years old,[1] has found no favour with other Muslim scholars.

The *ḥaḍānah* of the insane, and the care of their property, must be entrusted as a rule to the same blood-relations as guardianship over minors. The wife of an insane person has, however, the first claim to the *ḥaḍānah*, and his daughter has in this respect the preference above all other female relatives with the exception of the mother.

8. Law of inheritance.—(*a*) *Introduction.*—Muslim canon law distinguishes various groups of heirs. The first group consists of persons to whom the Qur'ān allots a definite share ($\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, or $\frac{1}{6}$) in the estate. Such a share is called *farīḍah*, and the heirs belonging to this group are therefore called the *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ*, *i.e.* those who have a right to such definite shares.

When the heirs of this first group have received their share, the residue of the estate falls to the share of the male relatives of the deceased in the male line (the so-called *'aṣabāt*). These *'aṣabāt*, who in Islām thus form a second group of heirs, were in Arabia in pre-Islāmic times the only relatives who had a right to the estate. When, however, in the battles at Badr and Uḥud and on other occasions, many Muslims had perished, quarrels arose among the members of their families as to the division of the estates which they left. Some examples of this are reported in Muslim tradition. The widow of 'Aws ibn Thābit seems to have complained to the Prophet that the male relatives of her dead husband had taken possession of his estate, while she and her children had obtained nothing of it. Other women came with similar complaints to Muhammad. This gave him occasion to decide that for the future the widow and some of the nearest female relatives of the deceased should have a right to a certain share in his estate. These regulations are to be found in Qur'ān, iv. 8, 12–15, and 175. It is not quite clear on what principles Muhammad based his regulations. It is, however, certain that he did not mean to abolish the right of inheritance of the *'aṣabāt*. This continued to form the foundation also of the Muslim law of inheritance; and the new regulations, according to which some of the nearest relatives of the deceased obtained a right to a fixed share (*farīḍah*) of his estate, were, therefore, only supplementary to the old Arabian law of inheritance.

If there are no *'aṣabāt*, and there still remains something over from the estate after the *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ* have received their shares, then, according to the Ḥanifites, the residue must also be shared among the *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ* proportionately to their shares. According to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, this residue falls to the lot of the treasury (*bait al-māl*), and it is handed over to the *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ* only if the treasury is not managed according to the rules of the law.

The blood-relations of the deceased who do not belong to the *'aṣabāt* and to whom no *farīḍah* is assigned in the Qur'ān—the so-called *dhawu'l-arḥām*—form, as has already been noted in § 7 (*b*), according to the Ḥanifites, a third group of heirs who have a claim to the estate in the case of the failure of the *'aṣabāt* and the *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ*. According to the Shāfi'ites and the Mālikites, the *dhawu'l-arḥām* are not heirs unless the *'aṣabāt* and *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ* fail and the treasury is not managed according to the rules of the law. In the opposite case the whole estate falls, according to them, on the failure of heirs of the first and second group, to the share of the treasury.[1]

(*b*) *The law of inheritance of the 'aṣabāt.*—As has been stated above (in § 7 (*b*)), the *'aṣabāt* are divided into classes, and the descendants of the deceased take precedence over his ancestors, the latter over the descendants of his father, these again over the descendants of his grandfather, and in each class only the next of kin inherits. But, as has already been noted, the grandfather does not exclude the brothers of the deceased; he inherits together with them, and has a right to at least $\frac{1}{3}$ of their common share. If there are at the same time *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ* among the heirs, the grandfather has, moreover, a claim to at least $\frac{1}{3}$ of the estate. He may then choose which is most advantageous for him: $\frac{1}{3}$ of the estate, $\frac{1}{3}$ of the residue of the estate after the *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ*

[1] See, among others, A. von Kremer, *Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen*, Vienna, 1875–76, i. 517, 532.

[1] Cf. E. Quatremère, *Histoire des sultans mamlouks de l'Egypte*, Paris, 1837–41, II. i. 132.

have received their share, or a share equal to that inherited by a brother of the deceased.

If the deceased is a freed slave and dies without leaving *'aṣabāt*, the person (man or woman) who has given him his freedom (the so-called *mawlā*) takes the place of the *'aṣabāt*, and this person is succeeded by the nearest of his *'aṣabāt* if he has predeceased the freed man.

In consequence of the regulation in Qur'ān, iv. 12–15 and 175, that women have a right to the half of what men in the same grade of blood-relationship inherit, some female blood-relations on the father's side are regarded in the Muslim law of inheritance as *'aṣabāt* in addition to the male relations. If, *e.g.*, the deceased has left both sons and daughters, they inherit together, and the daughters also count as *'aṣabāt*; but a daughter receives only half the share of a son. In such a case the daughter is called *'aṣabāt bi'l-ghairi*, i.e. *'aṣabāt* through another—she is *'aṣabāt* because the son (her brother) inherits. In this case the son himself is described as *'aṣabāt bi-nafsihi* (i.e. *'aṣabāt* by himself). The same rule and nomenclature also obtain for the daughter of a son of the deceased who inherits together with the son of a son of the deceased; also for the full sister of the deceased who inherits together with his full brother; and for the half-sister on the paternal side who inherits together with a half-brother on the paternal side. The grandfather on the paternal side also makes *'aṣabāt bi'l-ghairi* of both the full sister and the half-sister on the paternal side.

The full sister and the half-sister on the paternal side are called *'aṣabāt* when they inherit together with a daughter of the deceased or of his son; *i.e.*, they have in that case, like the male *'aṣabāt*, a claim to the residue of the inheritance after the *dhawu'l-farā'iḍ* have received their share. In such a case, therefore, they are called *'aṣabāt ma'a'l-ghairi*, i.e. *'aṣabāt* because they inherited 'together with' another.

(*c*) *The law of inheritance of the dhawu'l-farā'iḍ.*—The regulations concerning the shares to which the heirs belonging to this group have a claim are based upon a literal explanation of the so-called 'inheritance verses' in Qur'ān, iv. 12–15:

'Allāh commands you to give to your children: to a male child as much as to two female; if there are only female children (two or) more than two, then these receive two-thirds of the estate, and, if there is only one female child, then she receives the half. The parents (of the deceased) each receive one-sixth, if he leaves a child; if, however, there are no children and the parents inherit, the mother receives a third, except when there are surviving brothers of the deceased, for then the mother receives only a sixth. You (men) receive the half of the estate of your wives if they leave no children, otherwise you receive only a fourth. They (the widows) receive a fourth of your estate if you leave no children, otherwise (they receive only) an eighth. If a person dies without leaving blood-relations in the direct line, and there is a brother or sister of him, then these each receive a sixth; if there are more, then they receive together one-third.'

A supplement to these 'inheritance verses' is given in Qur'ān, iv. 175:

'They ask you for a decision,—say: "Allāh decides for you concerning the case in which a man dies without leaving blood-relations in the direct line as follows: If a man die without leaving children and there is a sister of him, then she receives the half of his estate . . . if there are two sisters, then they receive two-thirds between them; if, however, they inherit together with their brothers, one brother receives as much as two sisters."'

Thus in these verses fixed shares are assigned to the daughter, the two parents, the husband (and wife), and the brothers and sisters of the deceased. But, according to the Muslim lawyers, Qur'ān, iv. 15, refers only to half-brothers and half-sisters on the maternal side; iv. 175, on the other hand, to full sisters or half-sisters on the paternal side. Moreover, according to their explanation of the text, the rules for the daughter of the deceased equally apply to the daughter of his son; and the rules for his parents also apply to his grandparents. The heirs who have a claim to a fixed share of the inheritance can thus be reduced to the following twelve classes: (*a*) *in the descending line*: the daughter of the deceased, and the daughter of his son; (*β*) *in the rising line*: the father, the mother, the grandfather, and the grandmother; (*γ*) *in the side line*: the full sister, the half-sister on the father's side, and the half-sister and half-brother on the mother's side; (*δ*) the widow and the widower.

The shares to which these twelve classes of heirs have a claim are the following:

(1) The daughter receives ½, two or more daughters together ⅔ of the estate; if sons also inherit, the daughter does not receive a fixed share, but then becomes *'aṣabāt bi'l-ghairi*, and receives ⅓ of the share of a son.

(2) The same rules obtain for the daughter of a son. She receives ½, two or more daughters of a son together ⅔ of the estate; if the daughter of a son inherits together with the son of a son, she receives ⅓ of his share. She is excluded by the son of the deceased if he inherits, but not by the daughter of the deceased. If, *e.g.*, there is one daughter of the deceased, she receives ½, and the son's daughters receive ½, since ⅔ of the estate is allotted to the daughters and son's daughters together. But, if there are two or more daughters, there then remains no further residue of the *farīḍah* for the son's daughters; they may, however, still inherit if there is a son's son, for he makes them *'aṣabāt bi'l-ghairi*, and in this case he is, therefore, called the 'blessed' son's son.

(3) The father has a claim to ⅙ of the estate; besides this, he inherits as an *'aṣabāt* if there are no offspring of the deceased.

(4) The paternal grandfather has also a claim to ⅙ of the estate, if the father of the deceased is no longer alive; besides this, he inherits as an *'aṣabāt* if the deceased has left neither father nor offspring. If there are surviving brothers of the deceased, the grandfather inherits together with them (see § 8 (*b*)).

(5) The mother inherits ⅓ of the estate; if, however, there survive either, in the first place, children or son's children or, in the second, two or more brothers or sisters of the deceased, she inherits only ⅙.

(6) The grandmother inherits ⅙ of the estate. According to the Mālikites, the maternal grandmother has this right as well as the paternal grandmother of the deceased, together with her female ancestors in the female line. According to the Shāfi'ites and Ḥanafites, the same applies also to the mother of the paternal grandfather of the deceased; *i.e.*, by grandmother they understand every female ancestor of the deceased with the exception of those who are related to him by means of a grandfather who does not belong to his *'aṣabat*.

(7) A full sister receives ½; two or more full sisters inherit ⅔ of the estate; they have, however, this right only when the deceased has not survived descendants or ancestors. If, however, a daughter of the deceased or of his son survives, the full sister becomes *'aṣabāt ma'a'l-ghairi* (see § 8 (*b*)); and, if the grandfather on the paternal side shares the inheritance, then she becomes *'aṣabāt bi'l-ghairi*; similarly, if a full brother of the deceased shares the inheritance.

(8) Practically the same rules obtain for a half-sister on the father's side. If there is one half-sister, she receives ½; if there are two or more, they receive ⅔ of the estate; if there is a half-brother on the father's side, the half-sister on the father's side becomes *'aṣabah bi'l-ghairi* and receives ⅓ of her brother's share. Like the full sister, she loses her claim to a *farīḍah* if there are offspring or male ancestors of the deceased, or if his full brother survives. Inheriting together with the grandfather, she becomes *'aṣabāt bi'l-ghairi*; if, on the other hand, she inherits with the daughter or son's daughter, she becomes *'aṣabāt ma'a'l-ghairi*. If there are two or more full sisters of the deceased, they receive together ⅔ of the estate, and there remains no residue of the *farīḍah* for the half-sister on the father's side; if, however, the latter inherits together with one full sister of the deceased, the two have together a claim on ⅔ of the estate; the full sister then receives ½, and the half-sister ⅙. This is the same rule as in the case of the inheritance of daughters together with son's daughters; the ⅔ is in both cases called by Muslim lawyers *takmilah*, *i.e.* the 'filling up' (*sc.* of the ½ which the daughter or a full sister receives).

(9) The half-brother on the mother's side follows the rules of the next case.

(10) The half-sister on the mother's side has a claim to ⅙ of the estate. Two or more half-brothers or half-sisters receive together ⅓. They have, however, a claim to a *farīḍah* only if the deceased died without surviving offspring or male ancestors.

(11) The widower receives ½ of the estate of his wife. If, however, she has left children or son's children, he receives only ¼, whether the children are his own offspring or those of another husband.

(12) The widow receives ¼ of the estate of her husband; if, however, he has left children or son's children, she receives only ⅛, both when they are her offspring and when they are those of another wife of the deceased. If there are several widows, they must divide their *farīḍah* equally.

It may happen that, when the various *dhawu'l-*

farā'iḍ inherit together, the sum of the fixed shares to which they have a claim is more than the whole estate. In such a case the share of each must be proportionately diminished.

For example, if there are no sons, two daughters have a claim to ⅔ of the estate, the father and mother to ⅙ each. If the deceased has also left a widow, she has in this case a claim to ¼ and the sum of the *farā'iḍ* is ¼+⅔+⅙+⅙=¾+⅔+⅙+⅙=13/12. In this case the estate must be divided into twenty-seven equal shares instead of twenty-four; of these the daughters receive sixteen, the parents four each, and the widow three. This diminution of the amount of the shares of the inheritance is called *'awl*. The case here indicated is known as the *minbariyah*, because this problem was proposed for decision to the Khalīf 'Alī while he stood in the pulpit (*minbar*).

(*d*) *Special cases.*—There are still some special cases—the so-called *masā'il mulaqqabah* (*i.e.* cases which are known under special names)—in which, owing to the simultaneous inheritance of various blood-relations, a departure from the general rules is regarded as necessary in order to prevent relatives who usually receive more than others from receiving in a special instance less than them. It is impossible here to enumerate all these cases; the following are examples of them.

If a woman is deceased and her estate has to be shared between her two parents and her husband, the latter has a claim to ½ and the mother to ⅓ of the estate, so that there would remain over for the father only ⅙—exactly ½ of the mother's share. To prevent this, after the widower has received the half, the residue is so divided between the two parents that the father receives ¾ of it and the mother ¼. The same rule obtains when a husband is deceased and his estate has to be divided between his two parents and his widow. The widow receives ¼, and of the remaining ¾ the father receives ⅔ and the mother ⅓. These two cases are called the two 'brilliant,' or the 'decided by Umar,' cases.

Another case is the *akdariyah*. The origin of this name is not certain. According to some Muslim writers, Akdar was the name of a *faqīh* whom Khalīf 'Abd-al-Malik consulted about the following problem. When a woman is deceased and her heirs consist of (1) her husband, (2) her mother, (3) her paternal grandfather, (4) her sister (whether her full sister or her paternal half-sister), then these have together a claim to ½ of the estate (the widower to ½, the mother to ⅓, the sister to ½, and the grandfather to ⅙). According to the rule mentioned above (the so-called *'awl*), the estate must, therefore, be divided into nine shares, so that the widower would receive three shares, the mother two, the grandfather one, and the sister three. To prevent the sister from inheriting three times as much as the grandfather, the ½ share of the inheritance must in this case be so divided that the grandfather receives ⅓ of it and the sister ⅔. Thus the grandfather inherits 2/9 and the sister 4/9. According to the Ḥanafites, however, the widower inherits ½, the mother ⅓, and the grandfather ⅙, while the sister is excluded by the grandfather.

As to the division of the estate among the *dhawu'l-arḥām*, if they inherit, there are two theories.

According to some lawyers, the right of these persons to inherit depends on the principle that only he who is next of kin to the deceased inherits, and that he excludes the more distant relatives. Others think that the *dhawu'l-arḥām* take the place of those blood-relations of the first and second group through whose intermediacy they are related to the deceased. Thus, if the estate must be divided between two persons A and B, of whom A is the daughter of the daughter of the deceased, and B the daughter of the daughter of his son, then, according to the first theory, B would be excluded by A, who is more closely related to the deceased; but, according to the second theory, A would take the place of the daughter of the deceased and thus inherit ½, and B would take the place of the daughter of the son and thus inherit ½ (see § 8 (*c*)). Moreover, according to the second theory, the residue of the estate also must be divided in the same proportion between the *dhawu'l-arḥām*, so that in this case A inherits ⅔, and B only ⅓. The latter theory is preferred by the Shāfi'ites, the former by the Ḥanafites.

He who deliberately and illegally has compassed the death of the deceased is unworthy to inherit, like the *murtadd* (*i.e.* he who is an apostate from Islām). The estate of the *murtadd* passes, according to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, to the treasury; according to the Ḥanafite scholars Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan, on the other hand, the heirs of the *murtadd* have a right to his estate. Otherwise, according to the unanimous opinion of the *fiqh*-schools, there is no difference in general between believers and unbelievers in the law of inheritance.

No one can be regarded as an heir if it is not certain that he was still alive at the moment when the deceased died. If, therefore, various persons lose their lives by flood, conflagration, or other disasters without its appearing which perished first, there can be no inheritance between those persons. With regard to the case in which an heir is so long absent that his existence is doubtful, see § 2, p. 860[a]. An exception to the general rule is found in the case of a child who was not born at the moment of the death of his father; as soon as such a child comes into the world alive, it is regarded as an heir of its deceased father.[1]

9. **Slaves and freedmen.**—(*a*) *The rights and duties of slaves.*—In Muḥammad's time there were many slaves in Arabia. It would have been impossible for him to abolish slavery. Islām, however, so far changed the position of affairs that for the future no Muslim might make a slave of a fellow-believer. According to Muslim canon law, slavery can arise only (1) through captivity, if a non-Muslim prisoner be taken by a Muslim; or (2) by birth, if the mother is a married slave.

Slaves are the property of their master (*saiyid*). He can dispose of them as of the rest of his possessions. He can, for instance, part with them by sale, gift, or testamentary disposition, hire them out, lend them, mortgage them, etc. A child, however, may not be separated from the mother so long as it is still in need of a mother's care (*i.e.* till about seven years old). The master may not make his slave work beyond his power, and must give him the necessary rest after his work. Slaves have also a right to *nafaqah* (maintenance, *i.e.* food, clothing, housing). The legal punishments for the misdemeanours of slaves are, generally speaking, less severe than for those of free persons.

Slaves have no right of property, nor can they, as a rule, make contracts or bind themselves by them. All that they acquire becomes the property of their master. When, however, he wishes to use the service of his slave for commercial purposes, the master may give him authority to carry out the necessary legal transactions (sale and purchase, etc.). The contracts which the slave then makes are binding and valid, so far as he remains within the limits of the power given him, and the goods which the master has entrusted to him to carry on the business serve as guarantee for the engagements made by the slave. If, on the other hand, the slave goes beyond his powers, he is himself alone responsible; and the creditors can obtain satisfaction from him after he has been set free. If slaves injure any one by a punishable act, the *saiyid* is liable to make good the damage, but he can free himself from this liability by giving up the guilty slave to the injured person.

The master has the right to live in concubinage with all his unmarried female slaves, if they confess Islām or belong to the so-called 'people of the book'—in the last case, however, according to the Shāfi'ites, only if the slaves belong to the true *ahl al-kitāb* (see § 5 (*c*) (3)). If any one has become an owner of the female slave of another person by means of sale, donation, or otherwise, he is not permitted immediately to live with her in concubinage, but must wait a definite period to see if she is not already pregnant.

Children born from the concubinage of the owner with his female slave are free (see § 7 (*a*)), and are

[1] See, further, W. Jones, *Al-Sirājiyyah, with a Commentary*, Calcutta, 1792; A. Rumsey, *Al Serajiyyah or the Mohammedan Law of Inheritance, with Notes and Appendix*, London, 1880, [2]1890; N. B. E. Baillie, *The Moohummudan Law of Inheritance according to Aboo Huneefa and his Followers*, do. 1874; J. D. Luciani, *Traité des successions musulmanes (ab intestat)*, Paris, 1890; L. Hirsch, *Abdul Kadir Muhammed: der überfliessende Strom in der Wissenschaft des Erbrechts der Hanefiten und Schafeiten übersetzt und erläutert*, Leipzig, 1891; E. Sachau, 'Muham. Erbrecht nach der Lehre der ibaditischen Araber von Zanzibar und Ostafrika,' in *SBAW*, 1894, pp. 159–210.

in all respects equal with children born from marriage with a free wife. Among the Old Arabians a different rule obtained in this case: no children of female slaves were regarded as free. The female slave who has given her master a child is called *umm walad* (lit. 'mother of children,' viz. mother of one or more children of her master). After the death of her master she becomes legally free, and, therefore, after her confinement, may no longer be alienated or mortgaged.

Slaves male and female may contract a legal marriage with both free and unfree persons, so long as the former are not at the same time their owners; for, according to Muslim law, the master may marry only a female slave of another owner and not one of his own; and the same rule applies also to mistresses.

According to the Mālikites, slaves may even have four wives (free or not free); but, according to the other *fiqh*-schools, only two. A female slave is given in marriage by her master, who then acts as owner, not as *walī*, and need not ask her consent for the marriage. He also has the right to refuse to give her in marriage, though she ask him to do so. But, according to the Shāfi'ites, the master has not the right of forcing his male slave to a marriage; he is empowered only to refuse consent to a marriage; whereas, according to the Ḥanifites and Malikites, the master has the right of giving even his male slaves in marriage against their will.

Just like a free man, the slave is obliged to give his wife a dowry, and must work for this purpose if his master does not pay the *mahr* for him. The dowry which a female slave receives becomes the property of her *saiyid*. A slave has the right of rejecting his wife twice, and the second *ṭalāq* has the same consequence in law for the slave as the third *ṭalāq* for a free man (cf. p. 868). The *'iddah* after the dissolution of marriage by death or divorce is also prescribed for female slaves, and lasts a shorter time than the *iddah* of a free woman. Instead of the *'iddah* of four months and ten days, the female slave has one of two months and five days; the *'iddah* of three *qurū'* is replaced by one of two *qurū'*, and that of three months by one of a month and a half; in case of pregnancy the *'iddah* of a female slave does not end before her confinement.

Children born of marriages in which one or both of the parents are not free take the rank of the mother. Children of a married female slave are thus always slaves, and become the property of the master of their mother, independently of the question whether their father is a free man or a slave. Since it is regarded as undesirable for the children of a free man to become the slaves of another, the law condemns marriage between a free man and a female slave of another, except under the four following conditions: (1) that he has not sufficient means to pay the dowry of a free woman, (2) that he is not in a position to have conjugal intercourse with a free woman, (3) that the female slave whom he desires is a believer in Islām, and (4) that there is a risk that he will fall into immorality, so that the proposed marriage with a slave is, as it were, the last means of preserving him from that sin (cf. Qur'ān, iv. 29-30). The Ḥanifites, however, regard it as permissible for a free man to marry a female slave of another, without the first three conditions, provided she belongs to the *ahl al-kitāb* (cf. § 5 (*c*)).

(*b*) *Emancipation* (*'itq*) *of slaves.*—The setting free of slaves is regarded as a highly meritorious act for Muslims and well-pleasing to God. Muhammad said, according to a tradition: 'The setting free of a believing slave shall preserve the liberator from hell at the day of resurrection.' It is also one of the means by which a believer who has transgressed Allah's law can in some cases make a reparation for his fault.

Every one who has the right of disposing of his property has also the right to set free his slaves, unless, *e.g.*, he has mortgaged them. If a slave belongs to various owners, and his freedom is given him by one of them, he becomes free if the liberator has at the same time made good to his partners the value of their share; otherwise, the liberation is valid only for the share of the liberator, and the slave becomes a *muba"aḍ* (*i.e.* partly free and partly not free).

The *umm walad* is legally free after the death of her master; if she has been formerly married and has children of that marriage, these children follow the rank of their mother, and become equally free at the death of the owner of their mother. A male or female slave who becomes the property of a blood-relation obtains a legal freedom *ipso facto*. According to the Shāfi'ites, this rule obtains only when the owner is one of those in the direct line of ascent or descent of the slave; but, according to the Mālikites, also if the slave becomes the property of his own brother or sister; and, according to the Ḥanifites, even if the owner is a *maḥram* of the slave, *i.e.* one who is related to him within the limits of kin which form an obstacle to marriage.

The master may also limit the liberation by certain conditions—*e.g.*, by the *tadbīr* and the *kitābah*.

(1) The *tadbīr* is a liberation by which the master declares that at his death his slave shall be free. So long as the *saiyid* lives, such a slave (*mudabbar*) is not different from others. According to the Shāfi'ites, the master even retains the right of parting with him and thus revoking his liberation; according to the Mālikites and Ḥanifites, such a slave may not be parted with, and the master may not revoke his *tadbīr*. The *tadbīr*, according to the unanimous opinion of Muslim lawyers, must be classed with a testamentary disposition. Since the heirs of one who dies intestate have a claim to at least ⅓ of his estate, the *tadbīr* is valid only if the value of a *mudabbar* is not more than ⅓ of the estate. If the value of the slave is greater, he becomes only partially free, unless the heirs sanction the disposition of the deceased.

(2) The *kitābah* (or *mukātabah*) is a liberation by virtue of an agreement with a slave. The name seems to be derived from the document (*kitāb*) in which the conditions of the contract were originally set out. This kind of liberation was customary among the Arabs before Muhammad. At that time slaves who were not ransomed by their relations sometimes obtained the permission of their master to earn their ransom by work. In Qur'ān, xxiv. 33, Muslims were recommended, if their slaves asked to redeem themselves in this way, to grant their request and to help them in its furtherance—*e.g.*, by giving them money or omitting part of the ransom. Some of the earlier *faqīhs* even regarded the master as obliged to do this.

The *mukātab* (*i.e.* the slave who makes this contract of liberation with his master) must bind himself to pay a definite sum of money to his master (the *mukātib*) as ransom (according to the Shāfi'ites, in at least two or more instalments). By the *kitābah* he obtains the right for the future of acquiring property for himself and of making contracts even without the express permission of his master. In other respects the *mukātab* remains in the same position as other slaves; his master, however, may no longer mortgage him or part with him, and, when he has paid his ransom, he is free.

The master may make another contract of liberation with his slave (the *'aqd al-'atāqah*, *i.e.* the liberation contract). This consists of the purchase of the slave by himself; he becomes free immediately, but is obliged to pay the ransom to the liberator as quickly as possible, or within a period agreed upon.

Between the liberator and his freed slave there continues to exist a certain relationship (*walā'*, *i.e.* patronage). The liberator becomes the *mawlā* (i.e. *patronus*) of the freed slave, and, if the latter has no *'aṣabāt*, the *mawlā* takes their place. The liberator then obtains the rights which usually depend on blood-relationship, such as the right of inheritance, the right to give in marriage his liberated female slaves, the right of retaliation, and others.

The *walā'* exists not only between the liberator and his freed slave personally, but also between the liberator and the descendants (and even the freed slaves) of the freed slave. After the death of the liberator the patronage passes to the next of kin of his *'aṣabāt* (cf. § 7 (*b*)). The same rules are also applied to a woman who has liberated a slave (*mawlāt*, *i.e.* liberatrix).[1]

III. *CONTRACTS, WILLS, 'WAQFS.'*—**10. General rules.**—The *fiqh*-books contain many special regulations for various contracts, but scarcely any general principles as to the responsibility of the parties, the establishment and annulment of rights and obligations, etc. They expressly forbid only agreements which are not precise or which depend upon accidental chances (*e.g.*, all assurance contracts), and these they declare invalid because of the possibility that one of the parties thereby binds himself to something which he cannot see in advance. The Muslim jurists call such an undesirable chance *gharar*.

No definite form for the making of a contract (*'aqd*) is prescribed. In consequence of Qur'ān, ii. 282, many of the earlier *faqīhs* thought that, when an agreement has not to be immediately fulfilled on either side, since the parties have agreed on certain terms of delay, the contract must be in writing, and concluded in the presence of witnesses. This was considered necessary, *e.g.*, for the so-called *salam* or *salaf*; this contract meant that a future harvest was bought and the price paid in advance. But this did not become the general opinion. The law-books insist only that the parties who make an agreement must make their intentions plain to each other. The legal form of an agreement is called its *ṣīghah*. The mutual declarations of the parties are called *ījāb* (offer) and *qabūl* (acceptance). Only exceptionally is it permitted to make contracts without such an *ījāb* and *qabūl* in matters of very little importance.

When two parties transfer to each other rights or claims, these must refer to matters which, according to the *sharī'ah*, have a real value for Muslims. Thus, regarded from a legal standpoint, all contracts are invalid which refer to forbidden musical instruments, to books which treat of philosophy, astrology, and other forbidden sciences, to grapes, which must serve for the preparation of wine, to dogs, pigs, and other ritually unclean things, etc. If such affairs are treated, it is not strictly a change of real ownership (*tamlīk*), according to the Muslim law-books, but rather a method of obtaining a *de facto* possession (*istilā'*).

The *fiqh*-books contain numerous precise regulations concerning the most common contracts and transactions, such as purchase, sale, hire, mortgage, gift, deposit, partnership, security and loan, etc. These transactions have the general name of *mu'āmalāt*. But this part of the law has only a theoretical and no practical value for the Muslim (see above, § 4). Principles different from those of the *sharī'ah* generally obtain in commercial life; and it is usually impossible even for the most pious Muslims to regulate their lives in this matter precisely according to the law-books. Therefore no further discussion in detail need be given here.

[1] See, further, Syed Ameer Ali, *The Personal Law of the Mohammedans according to all the Schools, together with a comparative Sketch of the Law of Inheritance among the Sunnis and the Shiahs*, London, 1880; E. Clavel, *Droit musulman; du statut personnel et des successions d'après les différentes rites et plus particulièrement d'après le rite hanafite*, Paris, 1895; F. de Nauphal, *Études orientales: système législatif musulman*, St. Petersburg, 1893; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, i. 295–371; R. Roberts, 'Das Familien-, Sklaven- und Erbrecht im Qorân,' *LSSt* ii. 6 [1908]; Sidi Khalil, *Mariage et répudiation*, tr. E. Fagnan, Algiers, 1909; Mahmoud Fathy, *La Doctrine musulmane de l'abus des droits* (with introduction by E. Lambert), Lyons, 1913; art. 'Abd,' in *EI* i.

The remarkable regulation of the Muslim law which forbids the charging of interest in trade must, however, not remain unnoticed. Not only usury in the strict sense, but the charging of interest at all is regarded as a great sin (*kabīrah*); and, although this prohibition has always been transgressed by numbers of Muslims, the pious try as far as possible to avoid direct offence against it.[1]

11. The prohibition against charging interest (ribā).—(*a*) *Introduction.*—In Muhammad's surroundings the practice of usury seems to have taken the form especially of a contract of exchange. The money-lender gave money or articles of commerce (*e.g.*, dates or barley) on condition that after a certain period a larger sum of money or a greater quantity of the articles received should be returned. If the debtor could not fulfil his obligation on the day when it fell due, the creditor gave him a postponement of payment, but doubled the amount of his debt. Such contracts of exchange were regarded as a sort of sale and purchase (*bai'*), and the postponement of payment was called *nasī'ah*. This usurious trade is strictly forbidden in various verses of the Qur'ān; see, *e.g.*, ii. 276:

'They say that there is no difference between *bai'* and *ribā*, but Allāh permits *bai'* and forbids *ribā*! . . . They who in future are guilty of *ribā* are destined for hell; they shall remain there for ever.' Cf. also ii. 276-279, iv. 159, and xxx. 38.

Thus no Muslim could doubt that usury was strictly forbidden in Islām, but in the earliest times there were many, and among them well-known companions of the Prophet, such as Ibn 'Abbās, who maintained that Islām prohibited only the abuse of the poverty of the debtor by constantly doubling his debt and ruining him. They regarded usury as forbidden only in a restricted sense; the *nasī'ah* was particularly deprecated. Others thought that by *ribā* (lit. 'multiplication') the Prophet had meant not only usury, but all charging of interest. Later on this opinion became general. Thus, if a Muslim wishes to lend money or articles of commerce to any one, he can do so only on condition that the debtor, after the expiration of a certain period, shall pay him back the same sum of money or the same quantity of articles lent him. No profit may be made out of him; the value which the creditor receives must be the same as that which he has given. If the purpose is not to give a temporary convenience to the other party, but only to exchange goods, this is permitted only if both parties receive goods of the same value and at the same time. One who does not observe these rules is guilty of *ribā*. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish two kinds of *ribā*: (1) *ribā* by contract of exchange, (2) *ribā* by loan (*mutuum*).

(*b*) *Ribā by contract of exchange.*—The regulations of the law-books concerning the first kind of *ribā* are based on traditions, according to which the Prophet had expressly declared that it was prohibited to a Muslim to exchange gold for gold, silver for silver, dates for dates, etc., unless both parties simultaneously made the same payment to each other. These words of the Prophet are handed down in various recensions, in which gold, silver, barley, wheat, and dates (sometimes also raisins

[1] See, further, for contracts in general, R. Grasshoff, *Die allgemeinen Lehren des Obligationenrechts sowie die Lehre von den Realkontrakten nach der Rechtsschule des Imâm Esch-Schâfi'i: ein Abschnitt aus dem Kitâb el-bujû des Abû Ishâk Esch-Schîrâzî übers. und comm.*, Königsberg, 1895; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, ii. 319–321; S. Grove Grady, *A Manual of the Mohammedan Law of Inheritance and Contract: comprising the Doctrine of the Soonee and Sheea Schools*, London, 1869; L. W. C. van den Berg, *de Contractu 'do ut des' jure Mohammedano*, Leyden, 1868; F. Peltier, *Le Livre des ventes du Cahîh d'El-Bokhâri, trad. avec éclaire. et comm.*, Paris, 1910, and *Le Livre des ventes du Mouwatta de Malik ben Anas trad. avec éclaire.*, Algiers, 1911; D. Gatteschi, *Real Property, Mortgage, and Waqf according to Ottoman Law* (tr. A. van Dyck), London, 1884.

and salt) are specially mentioned as the objects of the forbidden contracts of exchange.

Some scholars, and especially the Ẓāhirites, thought that they must keep strictly to the words of these traditions; they regarded the *qiyās* as forbidden only in these cases (see § 2), and considered that the regulations concerning *ribā* could refer only to the exchange of articles expressly named in these traditions. The majority of jurists, however, could not agree to such a limitation of the *ribā*. They thought that gold, silver, and other articles were mentioned in the tradition only as examples. The Ḥanifites considered that the rule which in the tradition was expressly given for dates, barley, etc., could be applied to all other articles of sale which were measured by weight; the Mālikites thought that dates, barley, and wheat ought to be regarded as examples of articles which were kept in shops to be used as food; the Shāfi'ites regarded the prohibition of *ribā* as applicable to the exchange of all articles of value (*athmān*) and all forms of food.

Articles which are regarded as subject to the prohibition of *ribā* are called *māl ribawī*. If it is desired to exchange such articles, two courses are possible. (1) When two articles not of the same kind are concerned (*e.g.*, gold and silver, or dates and barley), delivery must take place on both sides at once, but the parties are not bound to give each other the same quantity. (2) If, on the other hand, two articles of the same kind are exchanged (*e.g.*, gold for gold, and silver for silver), the parties must immediately hand over to each other the same quantity. It is, therefore, possible by the exchange to be guilty of *ribā* in three ways: (α) if one of the parties receives more than the other, this is *ribā'l-faḍl* (*i.e.* usury because of the greater payment); (β) if the two parties do not receive the payment due to them at the same time, they are guilty of *ribā'l-yad* (*i.e.* usury with regard to the possession); (γ) if they expressly make a condition of postponement, this must be regarded as *ribā'l-nasā'* (*i.e.* usury with regard to the conditional postponement). The purpose of these regulations of Muslim law was apparently to prevent men from making themselves guilty of usury by means of the exchanges customary in Muhammad's time, by which the debtor, after the expiration of the period agreed upon, had to pay back a greater amount of money or of articles of sale than he had received.

(*c*) *Ribā by loan.*—When it is not a matter of contract of exchange but of loan (*mutuum*), Muslim law forbids the creditor to make a condition of interest or of other advantage on any pretence whatever. The prohibition of *ribā* is in this case not limited to gold, silver, food, etc., but is applicable to everything that can be lent.

When a Muslim lends money to a co-religionist, this may be merely a kindness exclusively for the benefit of the debtor, and is recommended for this reason. If the debtor wishes to show his gratitude to his creditor for the support he has received, and to return more than he received, this is permissible, but the creditor may not make it a condition beforehand.

As may easily be understood, Muslims have from the beginning endeavoured to escape this prohibition. Means were often found of demanding high interest without openly coming into conflict with the words of the law.

One of these means was the following. Two fictitious contracts of sale were made; the creditor sold an article to the debtor, on condition that he would later on pay the sale price agreed upon; hereupon the creditor bought the same article back again from the debtor, but for a lower price, which he paid at once. By this means the debtor actually obtained a certain sum of money, and was obliged after a fixed time to pay back a much greater sum as purchase money. This double contract of sale was well known in Europe in the Middle Ages. It was called *mohatra*, apparently a corrupted pronunciation of the Arab. word *mukhāṭarah*.[1] This Arabic name proves that the custom did not arise in Europe, but was taken over from the Muslims.[2]

[1] Cf. R. Dozy and W. H. Engelmann, *Glossaire des mots espagnols et portugais dérivés de l'arabe*, Leyden, 1869, p. 316; du Cange, *Glossar. ad Scrip. med. et inf. Latinitatis*, *s.v.* 'Mohatra'; for the *mohatra*-contract see also J. Kohler, *Moderne Rechtsfragen bei islam. Juristen*, Würzburg, 1885, p. 5 ff.

[2] See, further, E. Cohn, *Der Wucher (Ribâ) in Qor'ân, Chadîth*

12. Obligations arising from oaths and vows.—Oaths and vows have always played a great part in the various Muslim lands. The obligations which spring from them have a religious character in the eyes of Muslims. The ancient Arabians were accustomed to enforce by oaths not only their alliances and other important agreements, but even every sort of promise and statement in ordinary life;[1] and vows of abstinence were made as a preparation for the holding of religious ceremonies, the prosecution of blood-feuds, and other important acts. No one lightly decided to break the oath or vow which he had once made, for he feared to be punished for such a sin by the wrath of God.

The Prophet himself often strengthened his words, according to the custom of the time, by oaths and vows. He did not, however, consider himself as unconditionally bound by them, but thought that it was in some cases better to appease God's wrath for the breaking of an oath by means of an atoning sacrifice (*kaffārah*) than to hold obstinately to the oath. 'When I have sworn an oath that I will do something, but later on perceive that it is better to act differently, I offer an atoning sacrifice and break my oath,' was Muhammad's customary statement, according to tradition.

In Qur'ān, v. 91, the regulations are given as to the religious acts by which a Muslim who acts contrary to his oath can turn aside God's wrath. The penance (*kaffārah*) must then consist in feeding or clothing ten poor persons, in manumitting a slave, or, in the case of a person who has no means, in fasting for three days (cf. also lxvi. 2). The jurists have worked out these rules in still fuller details—*e.g.*, fixing the minimum of food or clothing which must be given; they differ in their opinions as to the particulars; according to the Shāfi'ites, the manumitting of a slave can serve for *kaffārah* only if the slave is a believer.

An oath is called *yamīn* and a vow *nadhr*. The rules concerning oaths and vows differ in various points. A vow is binding only when a Muslim who is qualified according to the legal regulations to make an independent agreement has voluntarily taken upon himself to carry out an act which is meritorious, regarded from a religious standpoint, and to which he was not bound apart from his vow. In this way it is possible to be bound by a vow to set free slaves, to give alms to the poor, to make a pilgrimage, and so on. He who has bound himself by a vow remains permanently obliged to fulfil it, and cannot free himself from it by a *kaffārah*. If, however, the vow has been made dependent on a condition (*e.g.*, 'If I recover from my illness, I will fast for a certain number of days'), he is bound to fulfil his oath only when the condition has really been fulfilled. A vow to do something which is forbidden or to omit something which is obligatory may not be regarded as binding. Muslim jurists also consider that no one can bind himself by a vow to do or to omit what is merely permitted but not meritorious (or forbidden)—*e.g.*, to drink water. In such cases there is no obligation to a *kaffārah* even if the vow be not fulfilled.

Oaths, on the other hand, are subjected to another rule; for he who has sworn by an oath to do or not to do anything is always bound to a

und Fiqh, Heidelberg, 1908; F. Arin, *Recherches historiques sur les opérations usuraires et aléatoires en droit musulman*, Paris, 1909; Benali Fékar, *L'Usure en droit musulman et ses conséquences pratiques*, Lyons, 1908.

[1] There are two kinds of oaths: (1) the oath by which it is sworn that a statement or testimony contains the truth; this oath refers to that which has already happened (see below, § 16 (*b*)); (2) the oath by which one swears to act or not to act in a certain way; this oath refers to a future event, and is discussed here.

kaffārah if he breaks his oath, even though he had pledged himself to do something which is forbidden, or to omit something which is obligatory.

Moreover, Muslim jurists deal at length with various special oaths and vows and the questions connected with them; even in very short *fiqh*-books there are usually full details as to this subject. The following cases, *e.g.*, are mentioned in particular. When a man has declared, 'If such and such is done, I will apostatize from Islām,' if the conditions are fulfilled, he may not, it is true, give up his faith, but must nevertheless, according to the Ḥanifites, offer a *kaffārah*. On the other hand, if a man has declared, 'If I do such and such, or if such and such happens, my wife is repudiated, or my slave is set free,' he is actually bound by his words, and, on the fulfilling of the conditions, his wife must be regarded as repudiated and his slave as free.

An oath is valid only when it has been taken either in the name of Allāh (or in that of one of His attributes) or by the Qur'ān. Other oaths, *e.g.*, by calling on the Prophet, are not binding.

13. **Wills.**—Muslim law only partially recognizes the right to make a will. When the debts of the deceased have been paid, his legal heirs (see § 8) have a claim to ⅔ of the residue of the estate. The testator may dispose by will (*waṣīyah*) of only the remaining ⅓ of the estate. If he has disposed of more than ⅓, his arrangements and legacies are valid only if, and so far as, they are sanctioned by his heirs.

As to this rule, there is no difference of opinion among the *fiqh*-schools. It is based on the following tradition.

Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ, one of the contemporaries of the Prophet, had decided to devote the whole of his property after his death to pious purposes. Once, when he lay dangerously ill, he explained his plan to the Prophet, who, he thought, would value his pious deed. This was, however, not the case; on the contrary, Muhammad forbade him to disinherit his heirs. 'It is better to leave them rich,' said he, 'than to force them to beg after your death.' Finally, the Prophet consented to Sa'd's petition to dispose of ⅓ of his estate.

From this tradition the Muslim jurists have deduced another principle. Every Muslim may dispose of his property as he wishes during his life, and thus may even give everything away if he wishes; but this right ceases if he is seriously ill. In that case only ⅓ of the property may be disposed of by gift, the manumitting of slaves, etc. The property of a seriously sick person is thus treated as in some degree similar to an estate to which the heirs have a claim.

This rule is also applicable to persons who in other ways are in danger of their lives—*e.g.*, to any one who is taking part in a battle, to a woman during childbirth, to the inhabitants of a district which is suffering severely from plague, etc. If, during a serious illness, or while he was in other respects in danger of his life, a person has given away more than ⅓ of his property, his arrangements are valid only if his heirs offer no opposition to them, or if he has recovered from his illness or escaped the danger in which he was.

Further, the legality of a *waṣīyah* depends principally on (1) the right of the person who makes the will (*al-mūṣī*), (2) the right of the one who benefits by the will (*al-mūṣā-lahu*), (3) the property which is disposed of (*al-mūṣā-bihi*), and (4) the form of the will. The law-books contain the following regulations as to these four subjects. (1) Only those who have the power of independent disposition over their property have the right to make a will; minors are not qualified. Moreover, the *waṣīyah* is valid only if the testator had the right to dispose of what he left, and if he acted without compulsion. The testator remains qualified to revoke his will up to the time of his death. (2) The beneficiary under a will must at the moment at which the will is made be qualified and in a position to become the owner of what is left him. A will made in favour of an unborn child is valid, however, if the child be born within the next six months. Those who already inherit by the enactment of the law have no right to receive further legacies by will. According to tradition, the Prophet forbade the alteration, by means of testamentary disposition, of the shares fixed for them by law (see above, p. 862[a]); if the will is not made in favour of a definite person, but for a hospital, a mosque, or similar institution, then the purpose must be one which is permitted by law; *e.g.*, a will in favour of a Christian church or a Jewish synagogue is invalid. (3) The objects which are left to any one in the will must be accurately described, and of such a nature that it is possible to take possession of them. The testator may not, for instance, leave any forbidden musical instruments or dogs to any one; or a copy of the Qur'ān, or a Muslim slave, to a Christian or other unbeliever. (4) No special form of will is prescribed; the law directs only that the testator should make his will clearly known in the presence of persons who can bear witness that he has really made such a testament. It need not be reduced to writing. Besides the allotment of property, the will may contain certain other dispositions—*e.g.*, the appointment of an executor who is charged with the care of the payment of debts, and of the division of the estate; further, the nomination of a guardian for the children of the testator who are under age, etc.

The beneficiary of the will first receives possession of the property left him when he has accepted the arrangements of the testator (by means of *qabūl*; see § 10). If he should predecease the testator, his heirs are qualified to accept the will in his favour.[1]

14. **Regulations concerning the waqfs.**—By a *waqf* Muslim law means something which is withdrawn from commerce, in order to reserve it for religious purposes or for the benefit of definite persons. To the question whether such a disposition is lawful in Islām Muslim scholars originally gave various answers. Some considered that the rights of the heir were injured by such dispositions. Others declared that the heirs had no claims on any man's property so long as he still lived, and, therefore, a man might withdraw his goods from commerce, just as he had the right to contract debts, to set free slaves, and to give away property, to the injury of his heirs. According to Abū Ḥanīfah, a *waqf* was not irrevocably binding; 'he who has made a *waqf* of anything,' said he, 'remains the owner of it, and can always revoke his disposition if he will.' The majority of Muslim lawyers, however—and among them Abū Yūsuf and Muhammad, the two pupils of Abū Ḥanīfah—considered that the disposition by which anything was made a *waqf* was irrevocably binding. By making such a disposition, they said, the owner loses his right of ownership; only Allāh remains the owner of that which is *waqf*. Others held that the ownership of a *waqf* passed to those who benefited by it.

Those who regarded the *waqfs* as allowable appealed for support to the traditions according to which various comrades of the Prophet had made such dispositions with his approbation. The best-known tradition is the following. 'Umar, the second Khalīf (or, according to others, his son 'Abd-Allāh), had a piece of land at Khaibar which he valued greatly. He decided to devote it to religious purposes. With the approbation of the Prophet, he made a *waqf* of it, and enacted that it might for the future be neither sold nor given away, and that the income should be devoted exclusively to the poor and to religious purposes.

Waqf properly means the transaction itself, *i.e.* the devotion of property to religious purposes; other words used in the same sense are *tasbīl*, *i.e.* devote to the 'way of God' (*sabīl Allāh*); *taḥrīm*, *i.e.* the declaration that something is *ḥarām* ('forbidden,' 'inalienable'); and *ḥabs*, *i.e.* to make fast (in other words, to make inalienable). Both *waqf* and *ḥabs* are also used to indicate that which is

[1] See, further, F. Peltier, *Le Livre des testaments du Çaḥîḥ d'El-Bokhâri*, Algiers, 1909.

withdrawn from commerce; in the latter sense the plurals of *waqf* and *habs* are *wuqūf* and *ḥubūs*.

The Muslim law-books contain the following regulations concerning *waqf*. (1) *The wāqif*, i.e. *the person who makes a waqf of anything*.—No one is qualified to make such a disposition unless he has the independent right of alienating his property. He who withdraws anything from commerce must at the same time be the owner of it; otherwise his disposition is invalid. Unbelievers have the right of making their property a *waqf* if the purpose of it is not contrary to Islām; *e.g.*, a Christian in a Muslim land is forbidden to make his dwelling a *waqf* in order to have it turned into a church.

(2) *The mawqūf, or waqf*, i.e. *that which is made a waqf*.—According to the Shāfi'ites, it is permissible to make a *waqf* of moveable as well as of immoveable property, at least so far as the moveables are not immediately destroyed by use (*e.g.*, food, or wax candles which are designed for the illumination of a mosque). Forbidden instruments, books whose contents give signs of unbelief, and similar articles cannot in any case be made *waqf*. Many other Muslim scholars regard the regulations concerning *waqf* as applicable only to immoveable property, and recognize only a few exceptions to this rule. According to the Ḥanifites, beasts of burden and weapons may be designated *waqf*. Books are also often withdrawn from commerce in all Muslim lands, and especially devoted to an appointed library or mosque.

(3) *The mawqūf 'alaihi*, i.e. *he who receives benefit from the waqf*.—This person must be qualified to make use of the property; *e.g.*, it would not be permissible to make a copy of the Qur'ān *waqf*, and a believing slave could not make a *waqf* in favour of unbelievers. As to the question whether the person who derived benefit from a *waqf* must be so indicated that the institution may remain for ever, a difference of opinion exists. Some think that it is necessary for the *waqif* to indicate an unending series of persons for whom the *waqf* is destined; others hold that a *waqf* has a permanently valid continuation even if this is not specially indicated by the founder; 'if there are no surviving persons who, according to the disposition of the *wāqif*, have a claim to the income of a *waqf*,' they say, 'then the income is intended for the poor.'

Waqfs need not be exclusively intended for religious or philanthropic purposes; according to the majority of Muslim lawyers, it is sufficient if the purpose of a *waqf* is merely permissible. In the Shāfi'itic law-books it is expressly stated that a *waqf* may even extend to the advantage of the rich. Many *waqfs*, such as mosques, cemeteries, and water supplies, are intended for the rich as well as for the poor. The law-books especially recognize the validity of a *waqf* in favour of some one's family. In this case, if any one has decided that property belonging to him shall be a *waqf* for his children and further descendants, and these become extinct, then, according to the majority of Muslim lawyers, his further relatives have a right to the income of the *waqf*, and after them the poor.

(4) The *ṣīghah*, *i.e.* the form in which the *wāqif* makes his will known, is not generally subjected to special regulations. It is sufficient if the founder makes his meaning plain by pointing out what property shall be *waqf*, and to what purpose it must be given. It is, however, not permissible to make the existence of a *waqf* dependent on a condition or a period of time. Therefore a *waqf* is invalid if the *wāqif*, for instance, declared, 'If I get a son, then is my house a *waqf*,' or if he made his property a *waqf* 'for ten years.' According to many Muslim writers, one may, however, distinguish between *waqfs* which have a general purpose (*e.g.*, for philanthropic purposes) and those which are intended only for definite persons (*e.g.*, for the descendants of the founder). In the first case the disposition of the *wāqif* must be preserved as far as possible, and thus only the conditions or designation of a period must be declared invalid, and not the institution itself; in the latter case there is no opening for this, and the *waqf* itself is invalid.

An exception to this rule is that the *wāqif* may make the existence of a *waqf* dependent on his own death. He may decide that property shall become a *waqf* after his death. Such a disposition is, however, subject to the general regulations concerning wills, and may be withdrawn by the owner up to his death; moreover, only ⅓ of the estate may thus be made a *waqf*, since the heirs have a right to the other ⅔.[1]

IV. *PUBLIC LAW.*—15. **The imām.**—(*a*) *The election of an imām.*—According to the legal theory, the Muslim community must be guided by an *imām*, who is to be regarded as the *khalīfah* (*i.e.* substitute) of the Prophet.[2] The quarrels as to the *imāmat* in the first centuries after Muhammad divided the Muslims into various religious-political parties, which partially continue to the present day. To them belong especially the Shī'ites and Khārijites, who are regarded as heretics by orthodox Muslims. The opinions of these parties differ in many respects—as to political questions, as to who must be regarded as the legitimate *imām*, and as to the requirements which he must fulfil.[3] We must at present limit ourselves to a sketch of the regulations which obtain in this matter among the orthodox.

All questions regarding the *imām* must be decided according to the position of affairs during the first thirty years after Muhammad. That period, in which the Muslim community was led by Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān, and 'Alī—the so-called 'rightly guided khalīfahs' (*al-khulafā' al-rāshidūn*)—with the help and co-operation of the most faithful comrades of the Prophet, is regarded among orthodox Muslims as the 'Golden Age' of Islām; and, according to them, the principles followed at that time must be regarded as the only correct ones.

The *imām*, therefore, like the four immediate successors of the Prophet, must belong to his tribe, and thus be a Quraishite. The Shī'ite doctrine that the *imām* must be also a descendant of the Prophet is rejected by the orthodox. Moreover, (1) the *imām* must be a free, male Muslim of full age, recognized as '*adl* (see p. 864[b]); (2) he must be competent to manage the business of the State, and, above all, have the spirit and courage to fight against the unbelievers and to protect Muslim territory. (3) The *imām* ought also, properly speaking, to be a *mujtahid* (see p. 860[b]), competent, if necessary, to settle difficult religious

[1] See, further, J. Krcsmárik, 'Das Wakfrecht vom Standpunkte des Šarī'atrechtes nach der ḥanefitischen Schule,' in *ZDMG* xlv. [1891] 511–576; E. Clavel, *Droit musulman: le waqf, ou habous, d'après la doctrine et la jurisprudence* (*Rites ḥanafite et malékite*), Cairo, 1896.

[2] In most Muslim countries the popular view was that the *imām* was the substitute of Allāh Himself. Accordingly, many *imāms* were called *khalīfat Allāh* (*i.e.* substitute of God), but many Muslim scholars disapprove of this title. See I. Goldziher, 'Du Sens propre des expressions "Ombre de Dieu, Khalife de Dieu" pour désigner les chefs dans l'Islam,' in *RHR* xxxv. [1897] 331–338.

[3] See D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology*, pp. 7–63; J. Wellhausen, 'Die religiös-politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam,' in *AGG*, phil.-hist. Kl., new ser., no. 2 [1903]; I. Friedländer, 'The Heterodoxies of the Shiites in the Presentation of Ibn Ḥazm,' in *JAOS* xxviii. [1907] 1–80, xxix. [1909] 1–183; I. Goldziher, 'Beiträge zur Litteraturgesch. der Shi'a und der sunnit. Polemik,' in *SWAW* lxxviii. [1874] 439–524; R. E. Brünnow, *Die Charidschiten unter den ersten Omayyaden*, Leyden, 1884.

situations on his own authority, just as the immediate successors of Muhammad were held to have been perfect scholars. Since, however, such *ijtihād* was regarded as beyond the reach of later generations, such learning can no longer be demanded even of an *imām*. (4) An *imām* may have no physical infirmity, or defect of intellect; serious defects, such as blindness, deafness, or insanity, disqualify a candidate for the *imāmat*. Consequently, a *khalīf* was often made blind after his deposition, in order to prevent him from attempting to recover his position.

At the election of an *imām* it is necessary to follow the principles which obtained in the 'Golden Age.' Inheritance, according to the law, gives no claim to the *imāmat*. Each *khalīf* must be elected, and his election is valid only if (1) he, like the first *khalīf* Abū Bakr, receives the homage of a certain number of Muslims of high rank ('those who are qualified to bind and loose'); or if, (2) like the second *khalīf* 'Umar, he is appointed by the former *imām* as his successor. 'Those who are qualified to bind and loose' and have the right of electing an *imām* consist of Muslims of full age, of the male sex, free men who are recognized as *'adl*, and can judge what persons have the necessary qualifications to be elected as *imām*, and which among those who come under consideration is the most suitable for the position under existing circumstances.

The election of an *imām* is a *farḍ al-kifāyah*; *i.e.*, as soon as this task is fulfilled by some qualified person, all others are relieved from the duty (see p. 863[b]). 'The election of an *imām*,' say the Muslim scholars, 'it is true, is usually carried out by the leading circles in the capital, and is acquiesced in in the other parts of the land (as at the election of Abū Bakr), but the electors in the capital have no right of preference above those in other places.' If different persons are elected as *imām* in different places, a new election must be held between these candidates. The *faqīhs* are not agreed as to the number of electors which must be demanded for a valid election. Some of them require at least five electors, and in support of this opinion appeal to the election of the third *khalīf* 'Uthmān, but others regard the election by even one elector as valid if he is a universally respected and influential man.

If the *imām* himself nominates his successor, the choice is binding on all Muslims, if the chosen person has the qualities necessary for an *imām* and expressly accepts his nomination. In appointing his successor the *imām* need not consult the electors; he may also indicate several persons to succeed him in a definite order one after the other. But Muslim lawyers consider that a father has no right to appoint his son as his successor, since they regard no one as capable of forming an unprejudiced judgment as to whether his son is fitted for this high dignity.

(*b*) *The rights and duties of the imām.*—The *imām* is not only the spiritual head of the Muslims, as has been often incorrectly assumed in Europe; he is at the same time the highest secular authority in Islām. There is no idea among Muslims of a separation between spiritual and temporal power. In this respect the position of the first thirty years after Muhammad is copied. The *imām* must, like the four 'rightly led' *khalīfs*, wage war against unbelievers, see to the contribution of the *zakāh*, resolve differences of opinion in the community, take care that the regulations of the *sharī'ah* are respected and that transgressions against it are punished, take action against heresies, try to bring the erring back to the right way, etc. If it appears that the *imām* is incompetent to fulfil his office, or that he abuses his power, then 'those who can bind and loose' must depose him and choose a new *imām*.

Every Muslim is bound in loyalty and obedience not only to the legitimate *imām*, but also to any one who has made himself *de facto* master of the highest authority, even though he has not the requisite qualities (*e.g.*, a woman, a person who is under age, ignorant, not an Arabian, or a sinner), and even if he has not been appointed as *imām* in a legal manner. Such a potentate, who in the *fiqh*-books is usually called 'the holder of power' (*dhū'l-shawkah*), is not a legitimate *imām*, but orthodox Muslims nevertheless regard it as necessary for believers to recognize his authority, at least when he does not force them to sin against the law.

This opinion apparently arose as early as the first century after Muhammad. During the incessant strife of the Umayyads against the religious rebels, who would not recognize their authority, the opinion became established, among the majority of the people and among the leading scholars, that it was better, for the prevention of greater disasters, not to resist the tyrant even though he did not fulfil the theoretical ideals. Traditions arose that the Prophet himself had foretold this state of affairs, and had enunciated the doctrine that it was a duty for all Muslims to submit to the ruling princes. 'Thirty years long,' the Prophet is reported to have said, 'shall you be happy under the government of my successors, but after this the dominion shall pass to tyrannous princes.' The companions of Muhammad asked, 'Must we not contend against such godless potentates?' 'No,' he answered, 'so long as they do not interfere with the *ṣalāt*.' According to another saying of the Prophet, 'a Muslim must be obedient both in matters which he approves and in those of which he disapproves, so long as no acts are enjoined on him by which he would transgress the laws of God. In the latter case he need neither listen nor obey.'

On the ground of this theory the later Muslim princes and *khalīfs* had a claim on the obedience of their subjects, even though they were not appointed according to the regulations of the *sharī'ah* and did not possess the legally required qualities. Opposition to princes who are not of Qurayshite (or even of Arabian) origin, such as the Turkish Sulṭāns, and who have, therefore, theoretically no right to the Khalifate, is from a religious standpoint not permitted for Muslims, unless the prince has to be deposed because of his bad government.

16. Legal procedure.—(*a*) *Regulations concerning the qāḍī and trials.*—A very important duty of the *imām* is to appoint a sufficient number of judges. Acting as judge is regarded by Muslim scholars as a *farḍ al-kifāyah* (see p. 863[b]). Thus no one is obliged to accept the office of judge when the duty can be fulfilled satisfactorily by others; when this, however, is not the case, to act as judge becomes a personal duty (*farḍ al-'ain*); under such circumstances every one who is able to give a decision according to the regulations of the law is obliged to be a judge.

A *qāḍī* (judge) generally must be a free male Muslim of full age, who is recognized as *'adl* (see p. 864[b]), and is fully acquainted with the regulations of the canon law. In theory the judge must even be a *mujtahid* (see p. 860[b]), and be able, in passing a sentence, to deduce independently from the sacred sources the rules to be applied. But, as has already been stated, among the later Muslims no one was any longer regarded as qualified to give an independent judgment in *fiqh*-matters; therefore even a judge can at present be only a *muqallid*, and must keep in every respect to what is prescribed in the authoritative *fiqh*-books of his *madhhab*.

In order to secure the independence of the judge, the law forbids the *qāḍī* to accept presents, except from his relatives in the direct line (because, according to the law, he can never give a decision in their favour). For the same reason, according to all except the Ḥanifites, judges are forbidden to engage in commerce, because it would be possible to give them exceptional advantages in trade, in order to obtain their favour.

The judge controls the trial, and is not generally bound by legal regulations for this purpose. He is obliged only to give sufficient opportunity both

to plaintiff and to defendant (*al-mudda'ī* and *al-mudda'ā 'alaihi*) to present their declaration and arguments. He must treat both parties equally, provided they are both believers; he must also refrain from exercising influence on the witnesses. He is permitted to endeavour to bring about friendly relations between the parties, and to recommend the cause of one party to the good will of the other.

If the defendant admits that the plaintiff is right, the latter is not obliged to prove his contention. Such an *iqrār* ('acknowledgment') may, however, be regarded as valid only if it has been made before the judge by a defendant of full age, in full possession of his intellectual faculties, without any compulsion. If the contention concerns the payment of a debt or other questions concerning property, he who makes the acknowledgment must also be *rashīd* (see p. 871[a]).

If, on the other hand, the defendant contests the contention of the plaintiff, he cannot lose his case until the plaintiff has proved his claim by evidence. If, however, the matter in hand is so accurately known to the judge that he can himself give evidence, he may, according to the Shāfi'ites and Ḥanifites, give sentence without further proof on the sole ground of his personal knowledge; according to the Mālikites, he has not this right. All Muslim schools are agreed that the judge is never obliged to give sentence on the ground of formally valid proof, against his better knowledge.

(*b*) *Legal theory regarding evidence.*—Written documents cannot be regarded as valid evidence, unless their contents are confirmed by trustworthy witnesses; the force of the proof, however, is then no longer in the document, but in the oral evidence. An exception is formed to this rule by documents sent from one judge to another. In practice it is frequently necessary to recognize exceptions to this rule.

Legally recognized evidence consists principally in (1) proof borne by witnesses, and (2) the sworn testimony of the parties before the judge.

(1) Testimony (*shahādah*) has the force of proof only if it is borne by a Muslim of full age, who is not under guardianship, and is recognized as *'adl* (see p. 864[b]). If the judge knows a witness personally, he need not inquire whether he is *'adl*; otherwise, according to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, he may give no credence to the testimony till two trustworthy male witnesses have assured him that the witness is *'adl*, even though the other party in the case make no objection to his credibility; according to the Ḥanifites, such an inquiry is called for only in the case of *ḥadd* and *qiṣāṣ* (see art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS [Muhammadan], §§ 2, 5), and if the other party throws doubt on the credibility of the witness.

Inquiry into the credibility of the witnesses is usually handed over by the judge to two of his officers who bear the title of *muzakkī*, *i.e.* one who declares the witness to be *zakī* ('without sin,' 'pure'). In many Muslim lands there are also persons with the title of *'adl* or *shahīd*, who fill much the same rôle as a notary. They are appointed by the *qādī*. If two parties wish to make an important contract or sale, or to set on foot other transactions, they may go to such an *'adl* that he may witness the contract. If, later on, there is litigation between the parties with reference to this transaction, the *'adl* may be heard by the judge as a trustworthy witness.

When it is established that a witness is *'adl*, his evidence is held to be worthy of belief, without his having to swear on oath that he will speak the truth. Only in a few cases may the judge attach to the evidence of an *'adl* no value as proof—*e.g.*, when the witness is related in the direct line to one of the parties and testifies in his favour, or if he is an enemy of one of the parties and testifies against him. According to the Ḥanifites and Mālikites, husband and wife cannot give valid evidence against each other, though the Shāfi'ites allow this.

Since only a few Muslims live so strictly according to the regulations of the canon law that they may really be regarded as *'adl*, the judges in Muslim lands must very often content themselves with the declarations of witnesses who do not fulfil the legal requirements. In such cases their declarations are not legal testimony in the strict sense.

The testimony of Christians, Jews, and other unbelievers must be regarded as worthless; the judge may attach no credence to the declarations of persons who deny the most important truths in the sphere of Muhammadanism.

The number of witnesses by whom either of the parties can prove a declaration depends on the subject in hand. If the parties are disputing as to debt or property, then, according to Qur'ān, ii. 282, the evidence of at least two men, or of one man and two women, is required; according to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, one male witness is in such a case sufficient, if the party who calls him takes an oath that he (himself) has spoken the truth (and, according to the Mālikites, even two women in this case may take the place of the male witness).

If the case is not concerned with money, the law demands (α) the witness of two men, if they must testify as to subjects which are generally known only to men—*e.g.*, retaliation and the price of blood; (β) the testimony of a definite number of women, if points have to be proved which are usually known only to women—*e.g.*, the physical infirmities of women, foster-relationship, childbirth, etc. As to the number of female witnesses required in the latter case, the opinions of the *fiqh*-schools differ; the Shāfi'ites demand four women or two women and one man, the Mālikites two women, and the Ḥanifites one only. If the case concerns a *ḥadd*, the witness of women must be regarded as worthless; in this case proof can usually be given only by two male witnesses, and in cases of adultery only by four male witnesses.

(2) The oath (*yamīn*), according to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, may be administered by the judge to one of the parties in order to make the evidence of one male witness or of two female witnesses a sufficient proof. The defendant is obliged to take an oath that the plaintiff is in the wrong, if the latter cannot prove his claims legally. If the defendant refuses to take this oath, the plaintiff, according to the Shāfi'ites, must be given the verdict if he is ready to swear to the truth of his contention; according to the Ḥanifites, this oath of the plaintiff is not necessary, and the judge must immediately condemn the defendant if he refuses to swear that the plaintiff was in the wrong; according to the Mālikites, the oath of the plaintiff is required only in some special cases.

The expiration of a long time is not properly recognized in Muslim law as a means of acquiring property or gaining freedom from debt, but, when it appears that a plaintiff has neglected to institute a suit for an exceptionally long time without good reason, this must be regarded as a proof that he knew himself that he had no case. As to the length of this term of limitation the opinions of Muslim scholars differ. In practice an ordinance of the Turkish Sulṭāns is usually followed, who decreed (towards the end of the 16th cent.) that the judges might not grant a suit if it appeared that the plaintiff had without good reason neglected to bring forward his case for fifteen years (see C. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Iets over verjaring in het Moeham. recht,' in *Tijdschrift Bataviaasch Genootschap*, xlii. [1900] 393-427).

17. The holy war (jihād).—(*a*) *The duty of believers to take part in the holy war* (*jihād*).—

Another important religious duty of the *imām* and the Muslim community is the holy war against unbelievers—the *jihād* (*i.e.* 'to take trouble,' 'exert oneself,' striving 'on the way of Allāh' [*fī sabīl Allāh*])—in order violently to convert the heathen to the true faith, or at least to subject them to the yoke of Islām.

In the earliest period of Islām, Muslims were forbidden to take measures against the unbelieving inhabitants of Mecca who persecuted and ill-treated them, but after the *Hijrah* the position was altered. In Qur'ān, xxii. 39–42, Allāh declared that in future Muslims should be permitted to defend themselves if they were attacked, and that in so doing they could count on God's support.

'When they strive against their persecutors,' it is stated in these verses of the Qur'ān, 'it is permissible: Allah is powerful enough to help those who are driven out of their homes unrighteously, merely because they said, "Allāh is our Lord." If God did not help men against each other, hermitages, churches, synagogues, and all places of prayer where God's name is often glorified would be rendered desolate,' etc.

This permission to offer defence against attacks was soon afterwards changed into a command actually to attack the unbelievers, and, since the various expeditions for robbery and pillage on both sides brought about a state of perpetual war between the inhabitants of Mecca and the Muslims at Medīna, the *jihād* gradually became one of the most important religious duties of Muhammad's adherents.

Cf. Qur'ān, ii. 212–213: 'The strife is prescribed for you; you have, it is true, an antipathy to it, but it is possible that you have an antipathy to that which nevertheless is good for you.'

Those who could not personally take part in the campaign must at least assist in the *jihād* by payments of money according to their means.

Even after Mecca was taken, and the inhabitants had been converted to Islām, the *jihād* against unbelievers remained a religious duty. Though the Prophet at that time did not persecute the heathen for their unbelief alone, the *jihād* against many tribes of the heathen Arabs was necessary because they frequently broke their treaty and otherwise showed signs of their untrustworthy and dangerous disposition. The doctrine that all heathen must be subjected to Islām 'because of their unbelief' first arose in the time of the Great Conquests, after the death of the Prophet, when the Muslim armies succeeded in conquering an extensive territory outside Arabia, and in making tributaries of many unbelievers. At that time the Prophet is said to have declared: 'I am commanded to fight against men until they bear witness that there is no God but Allāh, and that Muhammad is God's messenger; only by pronouncing these words can they make their property and blood secure from me.'

The *jihād* is a duty for every male Muslim who is free, of full age, and not only in the full possession of his intellectual powers, but also physically fit for service and able to obtain the necessary weapons. A son, however, may not go to war without the permission of his parents (if they are Muslims), or a debtor without the permission of his creditors. According to the Shāfi'ites and Ḥanifites, no one is bound to the *jihād* unless he has a mount to cover the distance between his dwelling and the scene of war, and also the necessary sustenance for himself and for those for whose sustenance he is responsible; according to the Mālikites, the duty of taking part in the war is independent of these conditions.

The *jihād* is generally a *farḍ al-kifāyah*, and, when a sufficient number of Muslims take part in the war, the others are permitted to give themselves up to the study of the law and to the practice of the various callings by which the sustenance of believers must be maintained. Only in case of an attack by unbelievers and the invasion of a Muslim land is participation in the *jihād* an individual duty (*farḍ al-'ain*) both for the inhabitants of the threatened districts and for all believers living in the neighbourhood. If the land is conquered by unbelievers, according to the *fatwās* of the later scholars, every Muslim who is in a position to leave the land is then obliged to do so as quickly as possible, at least if he is hindered in the practice of his religious duties.

All lands not belonging to 'the territory of Islām' (*dār al-islām*) must gradually be conquered by the Muslims, and are therefore called 'territory of the war' (*dār al-ḥarb*). The *imām* has to settle when the attack shall be begun. According to theory, one campaign at least must be undertaken against the unbelievers every year; but this became impossible in the later periods, and, according to several Muslim scholars, at present it may be regarded as sufficient if the *imām* keeps the army in good condition and trains it for carrying on the *jihād*.

The many regulations concerning the ways in which Muslims must wage the *jihād* cannot be treated in detail here; they have no practical importance for the later generations. Generally speaking, the war must be carried on as humanely as possible, the helpless must not be killed, and the property of the enemy must not be needlessly destroyed. Before the *imām* invades territory inhabited by unbelievers, he must urge the inhabitants to be converted to Islām. If he neglects this, according to the Shāfi'ites (but not the other *fiqh*-schools), the *diyah* must be paid for every believer who is killed.

(*b*) *Regulations concerning booty.*—The sharing of booty (*ghanīmah*) among those who have a claim to it is carefully regulated in the *fiqh*-books. The regulations on this subject depend on Qur'ān, viii. 42. This verse was revealed when the Muslims had obtained great booty in the battle of Badr, and it was necessary to establish rules for its division. Among the ancient Arabians the head of the tribe usually received a fixed proportion (*e.g.*, a quarter) of the booty, while the rest was divided among the fighting men of the tribe. The head of the tribe received the largest share, but was bound to heavy expenditure in the interests of the tribe. He had, above all, to uphold the honour of the tribe, by hospitality and kindness not only to his relations but to all who had need of help, such as the old, widows, orphans, the poor, and the guests of the tribe. In agreement with this old Arabian custom, Qur'ān, viii. 42, regulated the division of the *ghanīmah* in the following words: 'Know that of that which you make booty a fifth part belongs to Allāh—to His messenger, his family, the orphans, the poor, and travellers—if you believe in Allāh,' etc. Thus the head of the Muslim community, *i.e.* Allāh or His messenger, for the future took the place of the former head of the tribe, and had to use the fifth part of the booty for the same purposes as the Arabian heads of the tribes had formerly been accustomed to use it.

According to Muslim law, ⅘ of the booty of war must be divided among the troops which have taken part in the battle. If a Muslim kills an unbeliever in battle, according to the Shāfi'ites, he has a right to his weapons (*salab*); but, according to the Ḥanifites and Mālikites, only if he had expressly made this condition with the *imām* beforehand. The remaining fifth part (*khums*), according to the Shāfi'itic system, based on the words of Qur'ān, viii. 42, must be divided into five equal parts. One of these parts (namely, that which was formerly designed for the Prophet) must after his

death be used for the common good of the general Muslim community, and the four remaining parts are to be given respectively to (1) the relatives of the Prophet, (2) the orphans, (3) the poor, and (4) travellers, at least so far as they have need of help. According to the Ḥanifites, the share of the Prophet has lapsed since his death, and so also has that of his family, so that the *khums* must be divided into three equal parts and paid out to the three remaining parties. According to the Mālikites, the *imām* has the right to decide according to his own judgment how the *khums* shall be used in the general interest of Muslims.

To the booty belong not only the weapons and mounts which have been captured in battle, but all moveable property of the enemy; on the other hand, the land and all immoveable property in conquered territory is not divided as booty (see below, § 18 (*a*)). Prisoners are also part of the booty. If unbelievers are converted to Islām before they fall into the hands of the conquerors, they and their children must be regarded by the Muslims as fellow-believers, and they also keep their property. In the opposite case they become slaves (the men as well as the women and children) and are divided among the persons who have a right to a share in the booty. The *imām* is entitled to put prisoners of war to death; according to the Shāfi'ites and Mālikites, he may spare them and set them free, either in exchange for ransom or for Muslim prisoners of war, or even without compensation.

18. Rights and duties of unbelievers in Muslim lands.—(*a*) *Tribute.*—The population of the lands conquered by Muslims after Muhammad's death originally retained their old faith. They were allowed to remain in their old dwellings, both in the towns and in the country; but they had to pay tribute to their conquerors. The tribute consisted chiefly of payment of part of the harvest. Villages and sometimes whole districts were commanded by the magistrates to deliver definite quantities of crops, which were afterwards converted into money by the Muslim officials. The forms of government existing in the ancient times in the different districts were preserved in many respects.[1]

The tribute is called both *jizyah* and *kharāj*; both names have originally the same meaning. The word *jizyah* is taken from Qur'ān, ix. 29: 'Strive against the "people of the Book" who do not believe in Allāh and the Last Day, and do not regard as forbidden what Allāh and His messenger forbid, until they pay you *jizyah* in abasement.' Muslim writers are accustomed to explain *jizyah* as that which is paid 'as compensation' by the 'people of the Book' because the Muslims allow them to keep both their faith and their life and give them protection. *Kharāj*, on the other hand, is borrowed from the language of the conquered, especially in Irāq, where the word is used in the general sense of taxation.[2] Later on, however, a difference was made between the two words, *kharāj* being taken to mean—probably because it was originally understood in the sense of produce of the field—taxation connected with the occupation of land, in distinction from *jizyah*, which came to be used exclusively in the sense of poll-tax.

The land in the conquered territories was declared by Muhammad's successors to be a national domain, in agreement with the opinions of the companions of the Prophet. They would not divide the land among the troops, but kept it as a permanent source of income for all future generations of Muslims. The conquered population were allowed to cultivate the land as they had formerly done, but they had to pay part of the produce as tribute (*kharāj*).

The Prophet himself had acted in some respects in the same way at the conquest of certain districts inhabited by Jews to the north of Medina. When these places fell into the hands of Muslims without much fighting, the Prophet commanded that the captured land should not be divided among the Muslim troops, but, like the *khums* of the *ghanīmah*, should be left to his personal disposition. See Qur'ān, lix. 7: 'What God allows to fall to His messenger as *fai'*[1] belongs to God—to His messenger, his family, the orphans, the poor, and travellers; accept what God's messenger gives you, but refrain from that which he forbids you; fear God, for His punishments are fearful.' Apparently the intention was that property which could not be regarded as booty should be managed by the Prophet, in order that the income might be used in the same way as the fifth part of the booty.

The land which was declared to belong to the State dominion in conquered countries was also called *fai'*, and to secure the use of the income of the *fai'*-land to the Muslim community it was arranged that *kharāj* should be for ever attached to the possession of that land. Even if the population which cultivated the land went over to Islām, they must continue to pay the *kharāj*. This rule has proved unworkable in practice, since the payment of the *kharāj* was regarded as an act of subjection to which only unbelievers could submit.[2] The new converts rejected this obligation, in spite of all measures taken by the magistrate. After their conversion they refused to pay more than the tithe which the Arabian Muslims were also obliged to pay from the product of their harvests.

In the second century after the *Hijrah* several separate works were written by Muslim scholars about the *kharāj*. Among these is the well-known book written by Abū Yūsuf at the instance of the 'Abbāsid Khalīf Al-Manṣūr.[3] In these works it is accurately established which lands belonged to the *fai'*-territory and were thus the State's dominion, and how much their inhabitants must pay as tribute. But, after the whole population had gradually accepted the faith of the Arabian conquerors, and the sharp distinction between them and the latter was becoming less and less marked, the payment of the *kharāj* passed completely out of use. Both the Arabs who had settled on the State domain and the new converts refused to submit to such a tribute, and in the end the land was no longer regarded as *fai'*-land.

(*b*) *Poll-tax, and other obligations of the dhimmīs.*—In the later law-books there is usually no longer an exhaustive discussion of the *kharāj*, but only of the *jizyah*. By this was understood in later times, as has already been noted, a fixed sum of money which was to be paid per head by unbelievers as tribute (on the ground of Qur'ān, ix. 29). According to the Shāfi'ites, only the *ahl al-kitāb*, *i.e.* possessors of a revelation (esp. Christians and Jews who already confessed their faith before Muhammad had preached Islām [see above, p. 866[b]]), are allowed to submit to the Muslims on condition that they shall pay the *jizyah*. Other believers must, ac-

[1] See C. H. Becker, *Papyri Schott-Reinhardt*, i. (Heidelberg, 1906) 37 ff.

[2] Cf. T. Nöldeke, *Gesch. der Perser und Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden*, Leyden, 1879, p. 241; M. von Berchem, *La Propriété territoriale et l'impôt foncier*, Geneva, 1886, p. 20; C. H. Becker, p. 39. Another name, originally a Byzantine term, was *tasq* (Gr. τάξις); cf. Nöldeke, *ZA* xxiii. [1909-10] 145-148.

[1] Lit. 'what God *makes return* (Arab. *afā'a*) to His messenger.' All the possessions of the unbelievers must 'return' to the Muslims. From this peculiar expression of Qur'an, lix. 7, the name *fai'* originated. By this name Muslim law understands all goods returning to the Muslims, without being booty in the proper sense of the word. The tribute paid by unbelievers also belongs to the *fai'*.

[2] Hence the earlier Muslim *faqīhs* used to forbid Arab conquerors to own land, at least in countries in which the land belonged to the State domain (*fai'*). There was no objection, however, to Arabs possessing land in countries in which the land did not belong to the *fai'*, and where, therefore, no *kharāj* was to be paid.

[3] On the Arabic books about the *kharāj* see I. Goldziher, *Deutsche Lit.-Zeitung*, xvii. [1896] 1514 f.

cording to them, be fought against until they have accepted Islām. According to the other *fiqh*-schools, the regulations concerning the *jizyah* are applicable also to all other unbelievers, and the latter may be permitted to submit to the Muslims and at the same time to retain their faith. According to the Ḥanifites, the heathen Arabians were the only exception to this rule; and, according to the Mālikites, the heathen Quraishites, so that only these had to choose between death and conversion to Islām.

The submission of unbelievers must take the form of a statement by which the rights and duties of both parties are accurately described. The unbelievers must bind themselves to pay the *jizyah*, and to fulfil the other duties that Islām enjoins on them. The Muslims in exchange for this must bind themselves for the future not only to leave them in peace, but also to protect them. The subjugated unbelievers who are thus under the protection (*dhimmah*, *i.e.* responsibility) of the Muslims are therefore called *dhimmīs* in the law-books.

Only those *dhimmīs* who are of full age, free, male, and in full possession of their intellectual faculties are obliged to pay *jizyah*. According to the Shāfi'ites, the amount of this payment depends on the agreement made at the drawing-up of the act of submission; the *imām* or his deputy must demand at least one *dīnār* per head, but, if it is possible, preferably more; according to the Mālikites, the *imām* has the right to act in the interests of the Muslims according to his own judgment; according to the Ḥanifites, he has no choice, but must demand from every poor *dhimmī* one *dīnār*, from each who is well-to-do two *dīnārs*, and from each who is rich four *dīnārs*. According to the conviction of Muslims, however, at the 'end of the days' Jesus will once more come back to the earth and show to Christians as well as to Jews that Islām is the only true religion. In the ideal period, which will begin at His coming, all unbelievers must be converted, and the *jizyah* can no longer be accepted from any one.

Like other taxes which unbelievers have to pay (*e.g.*, the customs which they must pay for their goods if they trade in Muslim lands), the *jizyah* belongs to the *fai'*. As to the question how the *imām* must use the money belonging to the *fai'* there is a difference of opinion among the *fiqh*-schools.

According to the Shāfi'ites, the rules concerning the division of the *khums* of the booty (see above, p. 881 f.) are also applicable to the *fai'*; thus ⅕ of the *fai'* must be divided between the same five categories of persons who have also a right to the *khums* of the booty, while the remaining ⅘ are destined for the general interests of Muslims. According to the Ḥanifites and Mālikites, the rules concerning the distribution of the booty are not applicable to the *fai'*, but the whole *fai'* must be used in the interests of all Muslims (*e.g.*, for the payment of judges, troops, and officials, for the building of forts, roads, bridges, mosques, etc.).

Unbelievers in Muslim lands not only have to pay tribute, but are also subjected to other regulations which involve indignities; *e.g.*, they have to fasten a coloured piece of cloth (*ghiyār*) on their clothes, and wear a special kind of girdle (*zunnār*), in order that they may readily be distinguishable from Muslims. Christians must preferably wear a blue, Jews a yellow *ghiyār*. They may not ride on horseback, their houses may not be as high as, or higher than, those of their Muhammadan neighbours, and they may carry no weapons. They must not give offence to Muslims—*e.g.*, by ringing their church-bells, or by openly slighting Islām, the Prophet, or the Qur'ān, by drinking wine, or eating pork, etc. On the other hand, they may practise their own religious observances. In the towns in which at the conquest of the land there were no churches or synagogues, they may not be built later; Christians and Jews may restore these buildings only if they are in danger of ruin; according to Abū Ḥanīfah, even this was permitted only in those lands which had not been conquered but had voluntarily submitted at the approach of the Muslim army. As a matter of fact, however, in the first centuries of Islām the Muslims conceded to Christians much greater freedom as to the building of churches (cf. I. Goldziher, in *ZDMG* xxxviii. [1884] 674). Otherwise the *dhimmīs* are in many respects on an equality with their Muslim fellow-citizens: they may acquire property in the lands of Islām and carry on trade; this last is under certain conditions permitted even to unbelievers who have not submitted.

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LAW (Roman).—**1. Fas and ius.**—Law, according to Roman ideas, had a double foundation, being based partly upon divine revelation and partly upon human ordinance. Here we have the root of the distinction between *fas* and *ius*, and this again corresponds to the division of law into *ius divinum* and *ius humanum*:

'Fas et iura sinunt id est divina humanaque iura permittunt; nam ad religionem fas, ad homines iura pertinent' (Serv. *Georg.* i. 269; the explanatory clause, however, fails to hit the mark, as the distinctive character of the *fas* lay, not in its relation to religious things—there were also secular laws 'de religione'—but in its divine origin [cf. Isid. *Orig.* v. ii. 2, 'fas lex divina est, ius lex humana']); Cic. *de Harusp. Resp.* 34, 'oratores contra ius fasque interfectos . . . ius legatorum cum hominum praesidio munitum sit, tum etiam divino iure esse vallatum'; Livy, xxvii. xvii. 13, 'ubi ius ac fas crederent coli . . .'; *ib.* 16, 'ubi nec divini quicquam nec humani sanctum esset.'

On the other hand, the later threefold division of the law into *ius sacrum*, *ius publicum*, and *ius privatum*[1]—a division unknown in professional jurisprudence[2]—does not rest upon diversity of origin, but is based upon the division of affairs into *res sacræ*, *res publicæ*, and *res privatæ*, of which groups the *res sacræ* (and *res religiosæ*) come under *ius divinum*, and the other two under *ius humanum*.[3] The fact that the term *fas* is neuter and indeclinable shows that the corresponding concept was a pure abstraction; the attempts to personify it were of relatively late date, and never quite

[1] Quintil. *Inst. Or.* II. iv. 33; Auson. *Griph. tern. num.* 61.
[2] Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*[3], ii. 52.
[3] Gaius, *Inst.* ii. 2, 'Summa itaque rerum divisio in duos articulos diducitur; nam aliae sunt divini iuris, aliae humani. Divini iuris sunt veluti res sacrae et religiosae . . .'; 10, 'hae autem quae humani iuris sunt, aut publicae sunt aut privatae' (cf. Mommsen, *loc. cit.*).

succeeded, for the prayer which Livy (I. xxxii. 6) puts into the mouth of the *Pater patratus* of the *Fetiales* at the *Clarigatio*, and which begins with the invocation, 'audi Juppiter, audite Fines, audiat Fas' (cf. VIII. v. 8, 'audite Ius Fasque'), shows traces of extensive adulteration by annalistic tradition, while the deity whom later poets designate Fas (Seneca, *Herc. Fur.* 658; Valer. Flacc. i. 796) is in reality the Greek Themis.[1] This view of *fas* never found admission into the cultus, while, on the other hand, the divine personification of *ius*—i.e. Iustitia—was in the Augustan Age not merely represented by the poets as the counterpart of the Greek Dike,[2] but even honoured by the erection of a special temple.[3]

To the Romans *fas* was by no means simply an eternal and universal law, a justice equally valid for all peoples and for all times, natural and therefore traceable to a divine source—a *ius naturæ* or *κατὰ φύσιν δίκαιον*—although in the later period and under the influence of Greek philosophy it was certainly attenuated to an indefinite abstraction of this kind,[4] for, in the sense of a natural or customary law,[5] even without written formulation, *fas* was conjoined with the *mos maiorum*,[6] or with *fides*,[7] and the classical jurists sometimes criticized current law by an appeal to *fas* as of higher authority;[8] it was from this point of view, in fact, that the phrase 'contra fas' was often simply a rather severe characterization of the illegality of an action,[9] and the frequent expression 'fas est' came to signify nothing more than 'par est,' 'licet,' 'fieri potest.'[10] Originally, however, the scope of the *fas* did not extend beyond the Roman people. Nor had the *fas* existed from eternity: it was believed that the founders of the Roman State had made a compact with certain deities, who thereupon became the national gods, and, while this compact secured for the Roman people the protection and favour of these gods, and therefore also all good fortune and prosperity, it likewise required from them the strict fulfilment of certain clearly defined duties and commandments.[11]

These divine laws were all included under the one term *fas*, which, accordingly, was not confined to the demands of natural justice, as, *e.g.*, those referring to the relation of children to parents, etc., but comprehended also the extensive and intricate ritual law in its entirety. We have the clearest evidence for this in the earliest extant document which makes mention of *fas* and its opposite *nefas*, viz. the Roman Calendar of festivals. That the abbreviations Q·R·C·F and Q·ST·D·F found there are to read as 'quando rex comitiavit fas' and 'quando stercus delatum fas' respectively is proved on adequate grounds; moreover, the symbols F and N attached to the majority of the days in the calendar meant originally, not *fastus* and *nefastus*, as was supposed at a later period, but *fas* and *nefas*, as is shown by the symbol N·F·P, subsequently contracted to ℕP, and signifying 'nefas feriae publicae.'[1] In these phrases *fas* can be construed grammatically only as the predicative noun of a clause which in full would run: 'hoc die lege agere fas est';[2] 'fas est' signifies 'is in accordance with *fas*,' just as 'ius est' was employed in an analogous sense.[3] Thus the distinctively Roman practice of dividing the days of the year into the two classes of 'holy days' and 'working days,' belonging respectively to the gods and to men, comes under the *fas*.[4] As bearing a like sense, and with express reference to the ordinances of sacred law, the word *fas* is frequently used not only in the technical phraseology of sacred things,[5] but also in the literature generally, as, *e.g.*, with reference to dedication (Cic. *de Domo sua*, 138), the legal position of 'loca sacra' (Paul. *Dig.* XXXIX. iii. 17. 3), questions of marriage law (Ulpian, *Dig.* III. ii. 13. 4), and adoption (Cic. *de Domo sua*, 35); similarly, in Cic. *Verr.* v. 34 ('contra fas, contra auspicia, contra omnes divinas et humanas religiones') and Marcian, *Dig.* XLVIII. xviii. 5 ('incestum, quia cognatam violavit contra fas'), the phrase 'contra fas' still bears the pregnant sense of a violation of divine law, and passages of like tenor are of frequent occurrence down to the later literary period.

It is a widely prevalent view that the *ius* was disengaged from the *fas* in relatively late times, and was indeed developed from it, and that in a broad sense the whole public and private law of the Romans rested upon the basis of the religious law.[6] This theory, however, requires considerable qualification, as has recently been most efficiently shown by L. Mitteis (*op. cit.* p. 22 f.). Mitteis (p. 26) rightly emphasizes the circumstance that there is hardly a single significant trace of the influence of the *fas* in the law of property as relating to living persons, while the occasional occurrence of *fas* and *ius* in family law and the law of inheritance is explained by the fact that marriage was regarded as a 'divini humanique iuris communicatio' (Modestinus, *Dig.* XXIII. ii. 1), and all the questions relating to the *sacra* of family and clan came as decisively within the province of the *fas* as questions relating purely to property within that of the *ius*. In criminal jurisprudence a religious penal law of earlier origin maintained a place beside a later secular one, and the provisions of each are clearly distinguished by the form of the punishment imposed (*sanctio*); thus, while the secular law relegates the execution of the penalty to the authorities, and attaches definite penalties in person or property to particular crimes, the religious law knows nothing whatever of penalties inflicted by human means, but either declares that the trespass against a sacred ordinance can be made good by the proper expiatory offerings (*piacula*) or else, by pro-

[1] Auson. *Technop. de dis*, 44, 'sunt et caelicolum monosyllaba: prima deum Fas, quae Themis est Graiis'; G. Goetz, *Thesaur. gloss. emendat.*, Leipzig, 1899–1903, i. 436; cf. K. Lehrs, *Populäre Aufsätze aus dem Altertum*[2], Leipzig, 1875, p. 98.

[2] Verg. *Georg.* ii. 474; Ov. *Fast.* i. 249, both with reference to Arat. *Phæn.* 133.

[3] Ov. *Epist. ex Ponto*, III. vi. 23 ff.; cf. H. L. Axtell, *The Deification of Abstract Ideas in Roman Literature and Inscriptions*, Chicago, 1907, p. 36 f.; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*[2], Munich, 1912, p. 333.

[4] Cic. *pro Milone*, 43, 'quod aut per naturam fas esset aut per leges liceret'; Pers. v. 98, 'publica lex hominum naturaque; continet hoc fas.'

[5] On both of these conceptions cf. R. Hirzel, "Ἄγραφος Νόμος," in *ASG*, phil.-histor. Klasse, xx. 1 [1900].

[6] Flor. i. xxxv. 7, 'contra fas deum moresque maiorum'; *Cod. Justin.* ix. 38, 'praeter fas praeterque morem antiquitatis.'

[7] Livy I. ix. 13, 'per fas ac fidem'; Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 15, 'neque fas neque fidem pensi habere'; cf. also *Hist.* iii. 5, 'ius fasque exuere,' with *Ann.* i. 35, 'fidem exuere,' and *Hist.* iv. 67, 'fasque ac foedera respicere.'

[8] Instances in L. Mitteis, *Römisches Privatrecht*, i. 23 f., note 3.

[9] *e.g. CIL* viii. 10570, ii. 3, '(praevaricationem) . . . contra fas atq[ue] in perniciem rationum tuarum sine modo exercuit.'

[10] Cf. R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 51.

[11] As is distinctly expressed in Cic. *pro Sest.* 91, 'tum res ad communem utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula hominum, quae postea civitates nominatae sunt, tum domicilia coniuncta, quas urbes dicimus, invento et divino iure et humano, moenibus saepserunt'; similarly it is said, *e.g.* in *CIL* vi. 1302, 'is preimus ius fetiale paravit,' although the Fetial Law was undoubtedly regarded as a part of the *fas*.

[1] Cf. W. Soltau, in A. Fleckeisen's *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie*, cxxxvii. [1888] 836; Wissowa, *op. cit.* p. 438.

[2] The present writer is at a loss to understand the view of W. W. Fowler (*The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, p. 487 f.), viz. that *fas* is here an adverb.

[3] *e.g.* Plaut. *Persa*, 105, 'pernam quidem ius est adponi frigidam postridie.'

[4] Hence Verg. *Georg.* i. 268 f., 'quippe etiam festis quaedam exercere diebus fas et iura sinunt.'

[5] *e.g. CIL* vi. 576, 'extra hoc limen aliquid de sacro Silvani efferre fas non est'; Fest. p. 318, 'neque fas est eum immolari.'

[6] Of recent writers cf. especially E. Lambert, *La Fonction du droit civil comparé*, i. (Paris, 1903) 632 ff.

nouncing the formula 'sacer esto,' devotes the offender to the deity for such punishment as the latter may decree. The *leges sacratæ* with which the inviolability of the plebeian magistracy was guaranteed at its institution were simply laws which pronounced the sentence (*sanctio*) 'sacer esto,'[1] just as, in fact, the penalty imposed upon one who violated the privileges of the *plebs* was, according to the literary tradition, 'ut . . . eius caput Iovi sacrum esset, familia ad ædem Cereris, Liberi, Liberaeque venum iret.'[2] What we have here, accordingly, is not a secular ordinance in the forms of public law, but a contract under the protection of the *fas*. The person declared to be *sacer* was a proscribed outlaw, and any one had the right to execute the divine sentence under which he lay, and might kill him with impunity.[3] The same consequences were incurred by one who committed an act of violence upon a tribune of the people,[4] though at a later period the State itself saw to the due infliction of the penalty by secular law, viz. by bringing the crime before the magistrates in the form of a process of perduellion.[5] A similar reinforcement of the sentence 'sacer esto' by a secular penalty is authorized also by the Law of the XII Tables as given by Pliny, *HN* xviii. 12:

'Frugem . . . aratro quaesitam noctu pavisse ac seculsse puberi XII tabulis capital erat suspensumque Cereri necari iubebant, . . . impubem praetoris arbitratu verberari noxiamve duplionemve decerni,'

where the reference to Ceres indicates that the original formula of the *sanctio* was 'Cereri sacer esto,' and that the penalty of crucifixion (or, in the case of those under age, scourging) was a later addition. It is possible that in other cases as well the sanction of secular law was added to or substituted for that of sacred law, and, as the former was naturally more certain in its operation than the latter, *fas* gradually lost its practical significance, and came to be regarded more as an ideal ratification and reinforcement of a secular law that was in itself perfectly competent to administer the penalty. Only so can we explain the circumstance that the often[6] purely conventional phrase, 'ius et fas' or 'ius fasque,'[7] is found, almost without exception, with its terms in that order,[8] even in passages where the reverse order might seem the more natural, as, *e.g.*, Livy, XXXIII. xxxiii. 7, 'ius fas lex,' and Cic. *de Harusp. Resp.* 43, 'deos hominesque, pudorem, pudicitiam, senatus auctoritatem, ius, fas, leges, iudicia violavit' (where 'deos hominesque' would lead us to expect 'fas iusque'). The same sequence occurs also in the technical language of religion, as in the Lex aræ Narbonensis, *CIL* xii. 4333, ii. 14, 'Si quis tergere ornare reficere volet, quod beneficii causa fiat, ius fasque esto,' in accordance with which the corresponding passage in the law of the temple at Furfo (*CIL* ix. 3513. 7) should probably be restored thus: 'utei tangere sarcire tegere . . . [ius] fasque esto.' This also explains why the *fas* should be specially appealed to in matters which the arm of the civil law did not reach, as, *e.g.*, affairs of international law, which regulated the relations of war and peace among the nations; thus Tacitus speaks of the 'fas gentium'[1] and the 'fas armorum et ius hostium.'[2]

2. Codification.—It is only natural to expect that there could be no complete or public codification of the ordinances of the *ius divinum*, as, although the latter was traced back to a definite compact with the gods, it was in reality the result of a gradual development. The duty of preserving this sacred law was committed to the State priests, who had, as required, to give their professional opinions for the enlightenment and instruction both of the authorities and of private individuals. There was, however—apart from the penal authority of the Pontifex Maximus in relation to his subordinate priests—no official administration of sacred law, and no official infliction of its penalties. In general, offences against the *fas* were regarded as falling under the maxim 'deorum iniuriae dis curae' (Tac. *Ann.* i. 73), and the *piacula* assigned to particular ritual misdeeds were not penalties, but were designed simply to show the delinquent how he might propitiate the offended deity. A person who did not avail himself of this opportunity, and who refused to offer the required *piaculum*, or one who violated the *fas* in so gross a fashion that expiation was deemed impossible, was *impius*, was excluded from the *pax deorum*, even if neither the sacred nor the secular authorities took proceedings against him;[3] the only thing that could affect such an offender, indeed, was the reprimand of the Censor. Those who violated the ordinance regarding holy days, or did not fulfil a vow that they had made, or broke an oath made by appealing to the gods, did not thereby become liable to human retribution at all, whether of priests or of magistrates; and even with regard to those provisions of the sacred law which, by means of the formula 'sacer esto,' committed the defender to the divine retribution, the intervention of the State in the infliction of punishment was, as noted above, a later development. Likewise, in cases which did not relate to penal offences at all, but involved civil matters falling within the scope of the *fas*, as, *e.g.*, the mode and extent of the required fulfilment of a vow, the inheritance of the *sacra familiaria*, etc., the priests did not deliver a judgment that could be enforced by law, but merely gave an opinion regarding the legal position, though it is true that this opinion was almost always accepted by the parties concerned.

Corresponding to the respective spheres of the several colleges of priests, the codification of the *ius divinum* is found in three distinct forms, viz. the *ius pontificium*, the *ius augurale*, and the *ius fetiale*. The *ius fetiale* contained the articles relating to matters of international law which could not be consummated without religious ceremonies, and also the form of such ritual; the vital element in the *ius augurale* was the widely ramified and imposing doctrine of the *auspicia*; the *ius pontificium* embraced not only the ritual ordinances designed for the guidance of the priests, *i.e.* the ceremonial law in the proper sense, but also all the essential principles of the legal and other relations between the Roman citizen or the Roman nation and the State gods; and in a State whose citizens, alike as individuals and as a people, attached the utmost significance to the maintenance of the *pax deum*, and as 'religiosissimi mortales' (Sallust, *Cat.* xii. 3) applied themselves to their religious

[1] Hence the term 'sacrosanctus,' the implications of which A. Rosenberg (*Hermes*, xlviii. [1913] 359 ff.), whose arguments so frequently carry conviction, has failed to grasp with sufficient clearness.

[2] Livy, III. lv. 7; cf. Dion. Hal. vi. lxxxix. 3, x. xlii. 3 f.

[3] Fest. p. 318; Macr. *Sat.* III. vii. 5; Dion. Hal. II. x. 3; cf. also W. W. Fowler, *Journal of Roman Studies*, i. [1911] 57 ff.

[4] Cic. *pro Tullio*, 47, 'legem antiquam de legibus sacratis, quae iubent impune occidi eum, qui tribunum plebis pulsaverit'; cf. Livy, III. lvi. 5; Dion. Hal. vi. lxxxix. 3.

[5] Mommsen, *Röm. Strafrecht*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 581.

[6] First in Plautus, *Cist.* 20; Terence, *Heeyra*, 387.

[7] Cf. R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes*, p. 161.

[8] The sequence in Verg. *Georg.* i. 269 ('fas et iura sinunt') and Amm. Marc. XIV. i. 5 ('velut fas iusque perpensum') is due no doubt to the writers' conscious purpose; in Livy, VII. xxxi. 3 ('sicut fas iusque est') E. Wölfflin, in view of his author's regular usage, has substituted 'ius fasque' for the traditional reading.

[1] *Ann.* i. 42, 'hostium quoque ius et sacra legationum et fas gentium rupistis.'

[2] *Hist.* iv. 58; cf. *Ann.* i. 10, 'contra fas disciplinae'; Justin, XXXIX. iii. 8, 'praeter commune bellantium fas.'

[3] Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, p. 36 f.

concerns with the most painful conscientiousness, this pontifical law bore upon every phase of private and public life, so that the Pontifex Maximus was actually designated as 'iudex atque arbiter rerum divinarum humanarumque' (Festus, p. 185). This certainly does not in the slightest alter the fact that the jurisdiction of the Pontifices, as of all other priests, was wholly confined to the province of the *ius divinum*;[1] nevertheless those invested with the priestly office, just because they expounded and administered the *fas*, had, on the one hand, the opportunity of acquiring great experience in the application and interpretation of law, and thus also great acuteness in juridical thinking and reasoning; while, on the other hand, in view of the numerous points at which the *fas* came into touch with questions of secular life and secular law, they required to have a thorough knowledge of the *ius civile* also,[2] so that the Pontifices were the earliest jurists of Rome, and in virtue of their *responsa* exercised no small influence upon the development of the civil law as well. It should be noted, however, that these *responsa*, so far as they transcended the proper sphere of the *ius divinum*, were not official deliverances, and thus were never given by the *collegium* as a whole, but were pronounced by individual Pontifices, who in such things had no higher authority than a private person learned in the law. From the circumstance that the body of consulting lawyers was largely recruited from among the Pontifices the ancient reading of the history, to which modern scholars have attached too much importance, wrongly assumed that the Pontifical College as such was officially concerned in the preservation and application of the civil law, and asserted that the form of words necessary to the institution of a suit (the *legis actiones*) was officially communicated to the parties by a member of the Pontifical College annually appointed for the purpose,[3] and even that the knowledge of the civil law as a whole was confined to the Pontifices.[4] As a matter of fact, the official function of the Pontifical College was restricted to the administration of the sacred law, and a similar limitation must be assigned to the juristic writings *de iure pontificio*, which drew their materials from the pontifical archives, the *libri* (or *commentarii*) *pontificum*, and of which, with an older work by Q. Fabius Pictor, the comprehensive treatises of M. Antistius Labeo and C. Ateius Capito may be singled out for special mention.

An important step in the publication of the sacred law was taken when the register of court-days and holy days, the *Fasti*, was made accessible to the public—an event brought about, as Mommsen[5] rightly infers from Cic. *ad Att.* VI. i. 8, by the promulgation of the Code of the XII Tables; while the well-known disclosure of Cn. Flavius, the protégé of the revolutionary Appius Claudius, Censor in 312 B.C., marks the earliest issue of the calendar in a codified form. Another extensive collection of articles from the sacred law, the publication of which cannot be precisely dated, was current among the jurists of the later period under the title of *Ius Papirianum*,[1] and was annotated by Granius Flaccus, a contemporary of Cæsar.[2] The meaning of the name 'Papirianum' had been forgotten by the ancients themselves, but was believed to go back to an editor called Papirius (the *prænomen* is variously given), said to have been the first Pontifex Maximus after the expulsion of the kings,[3] while a rather unconvincing modern theory[4] would assign the compilation to Sextus Papirius, a jurist of Cicero's time, who is mentioned as a pupil of Q. Mucius Scævola.[5] While the collection as a whole may be of fairly late date,[6] there can be no doubt that its individual statutes go back to a very remote period and were drawn from the writings of the Pontifices. They are called *Leges Regiæ*,[7] and were arranged in the order of the kings to whom—somewhat arbitrarily, it is clear—they were ascribed.[8] As regards their matter, they lie wholly within the range of the *ius divinum*, and, in cases where they prohibit something, the penalties imposed are exclusively of a religious kind—the offering of a *piaculum* for less serious offences,[9] and, for more serious, condemnation by the formula 'sacer esto.'[10] Moreover, many of the provisions bear directly upon the ceremonial of sacrifice,[11] and of other proceedings regulated by religious law, as, *e.g.*, the interment of the dead,[12] so that we can quite easily understand the reference of Servius (*Æn.* xii. 836) to the 'lex Papiria *de ritu sacrorum*' (cf. also Macr. *Sat.* III. xi. 5). In all cases where the code seems to encroach upon the sphere of secular law, it deals with matters which originally were regulated by the *fas* alone, but were subsequently brought within the scope of the ordinary criminal law, as appears to have been the case even with *parricidium*.[13] The ordinances of the *fas* formulated in the *Leges Regiæ* bore with special frequency upon matters in which private law was palpably defective,[14] as, *e.g.*, the unintentional slaying of a human being,[15] and many questions of family law: thus we find ordinances concerning the punishment of children who ill-treat their parents,[16] the exposure of children,[17] the repudiation and selling of wives,[18] the period of a widow's mourning and her re-marriage,[19] etc.; the protection of clients[20] and landmarks[21] also fell within the scope of the sacred law. When the extreme penalty of 'sacer esto' is imposed, the deities to whom the criminal is delivered are always those of the earliest Roman cultus, and above all Juppiter,[22] Vediovis,[23] and the *divi parentum* or

[1] Cic. *de Leg.* ii. 47, 'quid enim ad pontificem de iure parietum et aquarum aut ullo omnino nisi eo quod cum religione coniunctum est?'

[2] *Ib.* 'pontificem bonum neminem esse nisi qui ius civile bene nosset.'

[3] Pompon. *Dig.* I. ii. 2. 6, 'omnium tamen harum interpretandi scientia et actiones apud collegium pontificum erant, ex quibus constituebatur quis quoquo anno praesset privatis'—a statement which Mommsen (*Staatsrecht*[3], ii. 46) justly characterizes as confused and incredible, while R. Maschke (in *Festschrift zum 50-jähr. Doktorjubil. L. Friedländers*, Leipzig, 1895, p. 322 ff.) makes it the basis of far-reaching inferences.

[4] Livy, IX. xlvi. 6, 'civile ius repositum in penetralibus pontificum evulgavit,' and, following this statement, Valer. Max. II. v. 2, 'ius civile per multa saecula inter sacra caerimoniasque deorum immortalium abditum solisque pontificibus notum Cn. Flavius . . . vulgavit.'

[5] *Römische Chronologie*[2], Berlin, 1859, p. 31, note 35*a*.

[1] Macr. *Sat.* III. xi. 5; Paul. *Dig.* L. xvi. 144; in Pompon. *Dig.* I. ii. 2. 2, it is wrongly designated 'ius civile Papirianum'; in Serv. *Æn.* xii. 836, it is called 'lex Papiria.'

[2] Paul. *Dig.*, *loc. cit.*

[3] Dion. Hal. III. xxxvi. 4; cf. further A. Schwegler, *Römische Geschichte*, Halle, 1870, i. 24.

[4] F. P. Bremer, *Jurisprudentiæ antehadrianæ quæ supersunt*, Leipzig, 1896-1901, i. 132 f.

[5] Pompon. *Dig.* I. ii. 2. 42.

[6] Cf. esp. O. Hirschfeld, *Kleine Schriften*, Berlin, 1913, p. 239 ff.

[7] Pompon. *Dig.* I. ii. 2. 36; Livy, VI. i. 10.

[8] This appears from Fest. p. 230, 'in regis Romuli et Tatii legibus . . . in Servii Tullii haec est . . .'

[9] *e.g.* 'Paelex aram Iunonis ne tangito; si tangit, Iunoni crinibus demissis agnam feminam caedito' (Paul. p. 222; cf. Aul. Gell. IV. iii. 3).

[10] *e.g.* 'si quisquam aliuta faxit, ipsos Iovi sacer esto' (Paul. p. 6).

[11] As, *e.g.*, in the presentation of the *spolia opima* (Fest. p. 180).

[12] Cf. Pliny, *HN* xiv. 88, 'vino rogum ne respargito.'

[13] 'Si qui hominem liberum dolo sciens morti duit, parricidas esto' (Paul. p. 221).

[14] Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*[3], ii. 42.

[15] 'Ut si quis imprudens occidisset hominem, pro capite occisi agnatis eius in contione offerret arietem' (Serv. *Ecl.* iv. 43; cf. *Georg.* iii. 387).

[16] 'Si parentem puer verberit, ast ille plorassit, puer divis parentum sacer esto' (Fest. p. 230).

[17] Dion. Hal. II. xv. 2.

[18] Plut. *Romulus*, 22.

[19] Plut. *Numa*, 12.

[20] Dion. Hal. II. x. 3.

[21] *Ib.* II. lxxiv. 3.

[22] Paul. p. 6; Dion. Hal. II. lxxiv. 3.

[23] Ζεὺς καταχθόνιος (Dion. Hal. II. x. 3).

ancestral spirits.[1] The Δημήτηρ to whom one half of the husband's property was assigned when he unjustly repudiated his wife[2] must undoubtedly have been the ancient Roman goddess Tellus, of whom we read as the goddess of marriage;[3] and to her also belonged the oblation of a cow in calf ('forda bos'), which, according to Plut. *Numa*, 12, was demanded from a widow who married again during her period of mourning. The Ceres to whom the spoiler of crops was delivered was without doubt the ancient Roman goddess of vegetation,[4] and not the Greek Demeter; it was the latter, however, to whom, as Ceres Liber and Ceres Libera, the statutes of the *Leges Sacratæ* (a reproduction of the *Leges Regiæ*) assigned the property of one who infringed the privileges of the *plebs*.[5]

As the sentence of 'sacer esto' was attached only to the statutes derived from the sphere of the ancient *fas*, we must not, with Mommsen (*Strafrecht*, p. 900 ff.), regard the formula as equivalent to the capital penalty of the secular law; in reality it simply handed the offender over to divine retribution, nor did it ever signify more than this except in so far as the State supplemented the religious penalty by a civil one. The youth who beat his father, and thereby became 'divis parentum sacer' was not called to account by the civil magistrates, though in legislating for certain other offences the State fixed definite penalties and so undertook to enforce them. As we saw above (p. 885[a]), the peculiar form of the penalty imposed by the XII Tables upon the injurer of crops ('suspensum Cereri necari' [Pliny, *HN* xviii. 12]) clearly implies that the secular penalty of crucifixion was an addition to the older religious penalty of 'Cereri sacer esto.' The like holds good with regard to another offence: if a patron wilfully injured his client, he was, by a *lex regia* ascribed to Romulus, delivered, as *sacer*, to Vediovis (Dion. Hal. II. x. 3), and the XII Tables formulated this ordinance as 'patronus si clienti fraudem fecerit, sacer esto' (Serv. *Æn.* vi. 609); the fact that the deity's name is omitted in the latter formulation shows that the phrase 'sacer esto' had lost its original meaning, for it was necessary that the sentence of *sacratio* should always specify a particular deity.[6] That the whole procedure of *consecratio capitis et bonorum*[7] lay outside the sphere of secular justice, and belonged exclusively to that of religious law,[8] to which all formal judicial procedure was alien, appears from the fact that the *consecratio bonorum*, which was still inflicted in historical times, and manifestly on the grounds of the *Leges Sacratæ*, by the tribunes of the people upon those who resisted them,[9] was carried out in purely religious forms, and neither required a forensic process nor permitted of an appeal.

As the *ius divinum* was believed to have come into being at the foundation of the city, it could of course be developed indirectly by the expositions of the priests, but could not be added to by the creation of fresh laws. From the institution of the Republic, accordingly, there was no specific sacred legislation, and the *ius sacrum* was a division of the *ius publicum*,[10] as finds clear expression in the formula with which the magistrate rejected private claims to property, 'aut sacrum aut publicum esse,'[1] *i.e.* 'the property of the gods and that of the State are one in relation to private property.' In the so-called *Lex de imperio Vespasiani*[2] the two great divisions of *divinæ humanæ res* and *publicæ privatæque res* (the *publicæ res* embracing also the *sacræ res*) are not conjoined in such a way as to imply that the latter pair is a subdivision of the *humanæ res*; and Ulpian's definition of (secular) jurisprudence as 'divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia' (*Dig.* I. i. 10. 2) no longer recognizes any distinction between sacred and secular law.

1 Fest. p. 230; Plut. *Romulus*, 22.
2 *Ib.* 3 Serv. *Æn.* iv. 166.
4 Pliny, *HN* xviii. 12; see below.
5 Livy, III. lv.–lvi.; cf. Dion. Hal. VI. lxxxix. 3, X. xlii. 4.
6 Fest. p. 318, 'sacratae leges sunt, quibus sanctum est, qui quid adversus eas fecerit, sacer alicui deorum sit sicut familia pecuniaque'; cf. Dion. Hal. II. x. 3.
7 The abundant literature on this subject is given in J. Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverwaltung*, iii.[2], Leipzig, 1885, p. 276.
8 Cf. Macr. *Sat.* III. vii. 4, 'sacrationis vocabulo observantiam divini iuris implevit.'
9 Instances in Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, p. 49.
10 Ulpian, *Dig.* I. i. 1. 2, 'publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem . . . publicum ius in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus.'

LITERATURE.—M. Voigt, 'Die römische Klassification von ius divinum und humanum,' in *Berichte der sächs. Gesellsch. der Wissenschaften*, liv. [1902] 185 ff.; T. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*[3], Leipzig, 1887, ii. 36 ff.; W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, pp. 109 ff., 270 ff., 486 ff.; L. Mitteis, *Röm. Privatrecht*, Leipzig, 1912, i. 22 ff. For the *Leges Regiæ*: M. Voigt, 'Über die leges regiae,' *ASG*, phil.-hist. Klasse, vii. [1876]; P. Krüger, *Gesch. der Quellen und Litteratur des röm. Rechts*[2], Munich and Leipzig, 1912, p. 3 ff.; fragments in C. G. Bruns and O. Gradenwitz, *Fontes iuris rom. antiqui*[7], Tübingen, 1909, i. 1 ff.

G. WISSOWA.

LAW (Teutonic and Slavic).—1. Terms denoting 'law.'—As the conceptions of justice and law are everywhere of higher antiquity than the knowledge and use of writing, we may assume that among the Teutons and the Slavs there were at one time only ἄγραφοι νόμοι, 'unwritten laws.' The nature of such unwritten laws can be discovered only by an analysis of the general terms used to designate them. Among the Slavs one of the most typical terms for the idea of law is *zakonŭ*, a word found in all the Slavic tongues, and the word *pokonŭ* was employed in the same sense. As both of these words are etymologically akin to the O. Slav. *za-čina*, Czech *po-čnu*, 'I begin,' they must originally have meant something like 'beginning,' *i.e.* that which existed or was in force from the first. This is the fundamental sense also of the O. Russ. *poślina*, 'law,' lit. 'the past,' and *starina*, 'law,' lit. 'antiquity'; cf. such phrases as *po staroj pośline Novgorodčkoj*, 'by ancient Novgorod law,' *dirzati vŭ starine*, 'to observe the laws,' *na vsej starine*, 'in retention of all previous law.' An essentially similar idea lies at the root of the term for 'law' common to the West Teutonic dialects, O.H.G. *ēwa*, O.S. *ēo*, A.S. *æ*, *æw*. It is true that some philologists regard this Teutonic word as cognate with the Lat. *æquum*, so that it would mean originally 'fairness,' 'equity,' and this is certainly possible by phonetic laws (O.H.G. *ēwa* from * *aihwa* = Lat. *æquum* from * *aiquo*); but the Slavic data just noted seem to make it much more probable that O.H.G. *ēwa* is related to Lat. *ævum*, 'eternity,' Gr. *αἰών*, 'long space of time,' *aiel*, 'ever,' and thus, like the Slavic *zakonŭ*, *poślina*, *starina*, will mean 'the law which has been in force from eternity, from the beginning, from of old.'

A second concept connoting 'law' and 'equity,' and common to both Teutons and Slavs—though found also in other branches of the Indogermanic stock—is that of 'straightness' as contrasted with 'crookedness.' Thus Goth. *raihts*, O. Norse *réttr*, A.S. *riht*, O. Sax. *reht* (cf. also O. Irish *recht*, 'law,' 'justice'), are philologically equivalent to Lat. *rectus*, 'straight,' 'right,' Avest. *rāšta*, 'straight,' 'right,' 'correct'; and similarly the Slav. *pravidu*, *pravo*, 'law,' 'justice,' is derived from *pravŭ*, 'straight.' We cannot doubt that this 'straight' signifies 'running in the same line with something else,' *i.e.* 'in accordance with it.' This, however, raises the question as to what that 'something else' was. According to R. Löning (*Über Wurzel und*

1 *CIL* ix. 439, 440; cf. Plaut. *Trin.* 1044; Livy, xxv. i. 12, xl. ii. 8.
2 *CIL* vi. 930, line 17, 'quaecunque ex usu reipublicae mataestateque divinarum humanarum, publicarum privatarumque rerum esse censebit.'

Wesen des Rechts, Jena, 1907, *passim*), the norm was a sense of justice inherent in man. In view of the above interpretations of Slav. *zakonŭ*, *poslina*, *starina*, and O.H.G. *ēwa* (Lat. *ǣvum*), however, the present writer thinks it more natural and more in keeping with primitive thought to explain Germ. *Recht*, Slav. *pravo*, as signifying that which agrees with the usages of the earliest times.

Other two Teutonic groups of terms denoting 'law' are derivatives of roots originally signifying 'statute,' 'something fixed.' One of these is Eastern Teutonic, the O. Norse *lög* (from which A.S. *lagu* and hence 'law' itself are derived), Goth. (as in Jordanes, 11) *bel(l)agines*, 'laws' = * *bi-lagineis*, connected with *lagjan*, 'to lay,' and, if cognate with Lat. *lex*, going back to the primitive Indogermanic language. The other group, which is represented in all the Teutonic dialects, and tends rather to assume the sense of 'judgment on grounds of law,' includes the Goth. *dōms*, in *dōmjan*, O. Norse *dómr*, A.S. *dōm* (the regular term for 'law,' as in *dómbók*, 'law-book'), O. Fris. *dōm*, O. Sax. *dōm*, O.H.G. *tuom*—all cognate with Gr. *τίθημι*, 'set,' 'place,' 'lay,' and Skr. *dhāman*, 'seat,' 'law,' 'order.' As we can hardly suppose that the reference here is to statutes of the primitive gods, whose sphere of authority lay as yet 'beyond good and evil' (cf. art. ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 50[b]), any more than to the statutes of kings, who in primitive times had no independent authority to make laws (cf. art. KING [Teut. and Litu-Slav.], above, p. 728), we must regard O. Norse *lög* and Goth. *dōms* as denoting the statutes of those tribal assemblies, presided over by kings, which can be traced back to the Indogermanic epoch, such statutes being then carried in the memory of the people and so handed down from one generation to another (cf. O. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, *s.v.* 'Volksversammlung').

Reference must be made, finally, to a very peculiar term for 'law' found in all the Teutonic languages, viz. Goth. *witōp* ('*νόμος*'), O. Norse *vitað*, O.H.G. *wizzōd*, etc. It is formed from the Goth. *witan*, 'to know,' and is manifestly to be understood in the sense of the late M.H.G. *wîstuom* (Eng. 'wisdom'), 'legal precedent,' 'instruction in law,' but lit. 'learning,' *i.e.* the learning that consists in the knowledge and application of legal views and usages.

2. Law as oral tradition.—If we want a concise characterization of the legal side of primitive life among the Teutons and Slavs, we cannot do better than take the words of Nestor's *Chronicle*, ch. x.: 'they had the customs and the law of their fathers and traditions; each [tribe] its own usage.' As writing was not yet in use, this ancient law of custom (Slav. *zakonŭ*, O.H.G. *ēwa*) could, of course, be preserved from age to age only by oral tradition. How this was done in remote antiquity we have no direct or definite means of knowing, but we may gain some idea of the method by observing the corresponding state of matters found among peoples who still remained without legal documents till far on in historical times. Among Teutonic peoples this was the case with the Scandinavians.

'The highest civic position was that of "the man of law" (*lögmaðr*, *logsogumaðr*). He was the living code and the custodian of the law for the province and the diet; he was the director of the Thing, he announced its decisions to the public, and in cases of doubt expounded the law. It was his duty to keep a knowledge of law alive among the people, and, as is prescribed by the Icelandic *graugans* and recommended by the Scandinavian statutes, he had every three years to stand upon the "cliff of the law" and recite intelligibly to all the whole civil law, and once a year the procedure of the law-courts (*þingskōp*)' (K. Weinhold, *Altnordisches Leben*, Berlin, 1856, p. 400).

Such 'men of law,' as official guardians and preservers of primitive legal tradition, who in Scandinavia were preferably resorted to even when at length movements were made towards reducing the laws to writing, must have played a part also among the other Teutonic peoples from remote times. In references to the documentary formulation of ancient popular laws, we often hear of *sapientes*, *i.e.* 'the learned' (cf. Goth. *witōp*, 'law,' 'legal decision'), as those to whom the work was committed. Thus Charlemagne (*Capit.* ann. 789, cap. 62) says: 'lex a sapientibus populo composita.' From a prologue to a collection of ancient popular laws we learn that Theodoric, king of the Franks, when at Chalons, selected a number of men learned in the laws ('viros sapientes qui in regno suo legibus antiquis eruditi erant') with a view to recording the usages of the Franks, Alamans, and Bavarians. The law of the Frisians contains supplements by the *sapientes* Wlemarus and Saxomundus, and that of the Thuringians by the former. With reference to the ordinance of the *Lex Salica*, a prologue dating from the 6th cent. states that in the days when the people were still heathens four men selected by the 'rectores' of the people had expounded the Salic law in three assemblies (cf. O. Stobbe, *Gesch. der deutschen Rechtsquellen*, Brunswick, 1860–64, i. 16 f.; H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgesch.* i.[2], Leipzig, 1906, p. 298). These *sapientes*, whose legal formulæ are referred to in the sources as *iudicia* ('decisions,' 'opinions'), may be compared to the Scandinavian 'men of law,' and we may safely assume that among the Teutons there had existed from time immemorial a class of 'erudite men' who carried in their minds the ancient law of custom in fixed formulæ, and publicly recited it on given occasions. From traces still found in Scandinavia (cf. K. von Amira, *Grundriss des germ. Rechts*[2], Strassburg, 1901, p. 50 ff.), it may be inferred that these fixed forms were at first metrical; and with this we may compare what Aristotle says of the Agathyrsians, a Transylvanian people, viz. that before they had a knowledge of writing they expressed their laws in song, so that they might not forget them.[1]

3. The beginnings of codification.—Whether, like the Teutons, the Slavs had among them in pre-historic times a special class of learned men who carried in their memories the ancient law of use and wont, and on given occasions communicated it to the people, we have no definite means of knowing. The two races, however, are certainly so far alike that their first attempts to reduce their laws to writing (and it is only with such beginnings that the present article can deal) were due to their contact with the civilized peoples of the South, and to the need of having their relations with these regulated by law, the movement, in the case of the Teutons, being a result of their coming into touch with the Romans, while the Slavs (Russians) were similarly influenced by their intercourse with Byzantium. In the Romanic area arose the *Lex Salica* and the *Lex Ribuaria*; the two West Gothic law-books and the Edict of Theodoric, king of the Eastern Goths; the two Burgundian codes and the Edicts of the Longobards. These, as well as the *Lex Alamannorum*, the *Lex Baiwariorum*, and the three sets of popular laws (Thuringian, Frisian, Saxon) reduced to writing at the instance of Charlemagne, were all in Latin, while the Anglo-Saxon code, which is closely connected with the *Lex Saxonum*, was the only one of the West Teutonic law-books which used the native language.[2]

[1] ἢ ὅτι πρὶν ἐπίστασθαι γράμματα, ᾖδον τοὺς νόμους, ὅπως μὴ ἐπιλάθωνται, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἀγαθύρσοις ἔτι εἰώθασι (*Problem.* xix. 28).

[2] Further details are given fully in O. Stobbe, *op. cit.*; H. Brunner, *op. cit.*; R. Schröder, *Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgesch.*[5], i., Leipzig, 1907; R. Schmid, *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*[2], Leipzig, 1858; F. Liebermann, *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, Halle, 1903.

On Slavic soil, again, it was the relations between the Russians and the Greeks that gave occasion to the earliest written formulations of legal enactments. These were the treaties of peace (*dogovory*) between Prince Oleg and the Greeks (A.D. 912), and between Prince Igor and the same people (A.D. 945).[1] The investigations of Ewers[2] seem to show that Oleg's document is the main treaty, and that Igor's contains later supplements. The purpose of each was to bring the relations between Russians and Greeks under legal regulations; cf., *e.g.*, § 3 of Oleg's treaty, referring to homicide:

'If a Russian kills a Christian, or a Christian a Russian, he shall die at the place where he committed the homicide. If, however, he who committed the homicide flees, then, if he possesses property, the nearest kinsman of the slain man shall take his portion *according to the law* (*po zakonŭ*), but the wife of the slayer shall take as much as falls to her *according to the law*,' etc.

As may be inferred from this extract, the treaty makes frequent reference to the Russian law (*zakonŭ*), which, in view of what has already been said, would be no more than an unwritten law of custom, and of which we have the earliest written deposit in the treaties of Oleg and Igor designed to regulate the intercourse of Greeks and Russians. As was shown above, similar considerations, *mutatis mutandis*, underlie the various *leges Barbarorum*. The earliest codification of the Russian law of custom, or of part of it, for the Russians themselves, will then be found in the first form of the *Russkaja Pravda*,[3] which, according to tradition, Jaroslav (A.D. 1019-54) presented as a gift to his allies, the Novgorodians, '. . . and gave them a law (*pravdu*), and caused a statute to be written, saying, "Walk according to this document."' As Ewers remarks, 'So arose the earliest legal document of the Russians, intended primarily for Novgorod, but it must soon have become operative throughout Russia, as there was no other written law in its way.'

It ought to be noted, however, that L. K. Goetz[4] takes quite a different view from the foregoing. He is of opinion (p. 238) that the references to 'Russian law' found in the treaties of Oleg and Igor really presuppose the existence of a *document*—the *Pravda* in its original form (as in Goetz, pp. 6–11; Jireček, iii. 1–17; Ewers, pp. 264–270)—since, as he believes, that earliest formulation of the Russian law of custom was free from all extraneous (Greek or Teutonic) influence, and dates from a time anterior to Vladimir—from the first half of the 9th, if not indeed from the 8th century. He certainly admits that it was in no sense an official document, and supposes that it was written for purely private purposes by, say, a judge of the local law-court (see KING [Teut. and Litu-Slav.]), who 'made these notes to serve as a guide in cases where he might have to pronounce a legal decision regarding the amount of compensation' (p. 230). It is hardly possible to arrive at certain conclusions regarding these matters, although the theory that the *Russkaja Pravda* had a private origin such as Goetz conjectures does not appear to the present writer to be very probable.

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated in the course of the article. O. SCHRADER.

LEAVEN.—Leaven is that which produces fermentation in a mass of dough. The Hebrew word *s'ôr* was the designation of the piece of dough already infected by the leaven which was put into the flour to communicate the leaven to the entire mass before it was baked. Dough that had risen through the influence of this leaven was called *ḥāmēṣ*. Leaven might either be communicated by contagion, by mixing yeast with water, or spring up spontaneously, especially in a warm climate like Palestine. Bread that was entirely free from leaven was called *maṣṣāh*, 'unleavened bread.' Ordinarily in the warm climate of Syria twenty-four hours was sufficient for a mass of dough to become thoroughly leavened. Pliny (*HN* xviii. 26) states that the best yeast was made among the Romans by kneading millet or a fine brand of wheat with must at vintage time. The early Hebrews, however, appear to have depended entirely upon the *s'ôr*, or leavened piece of dough, to preserve and transmit the leaven. The later Jews probably used the lees of wine as yeast.

Leaven, like all striking forms of germ growth, made a profound impression upon the thought and institutions of the Hebrews. Ignorant as they were of its real nature, they interpreted it as it appealed to their senses. The fact that it soured the dough in which it was placed led them to classify it as a type of corruption. Therefore everything infected with leaven was in time regarded as unfit for use in certain parts of the sacrificial ritual. Plutarch has most clearly voiced this widely held belief:

'Now leaven is itself the offspring of corruption and corrupts the mass of dough with which it has been mixed' (*Quæst. Rom.* 109).

Am 4[5] indicates, however, that leaven offerings, either in principle or in practice, were not wholly forbidden in the ritual of northern Israel. Lv 7[13] and 23[17] also provide that the bread eaten by the priest might contain leaven, and indicate that leavened cakes were presented in connexion with the Feast of Weeks. Here the early use of wine (Lv 23[13]; cf. also Ex 29[40], Nu 15[5] 28[7-14]), which must in many cases have been fermented, in connexion with sacrifices presents a suggestive analogy and indicates that the provision against that which contained evidence of corruption was not primitive or absolute. W. Robertson Smith (*Rel. Sem.*[2], London, 1894, p. 221) has suggested that in its earliest form the legal prohibition of leaven applied only to the Passover, and in the oldest code (*J*) of Ex 34[25] and 23[18] the prohibition is thus limited. The extension of the prohibition to the shewbread and then to all cereal offerings (Lv 2[4, 11] 7[12] 8[2], Nu 6[15]) evidently represents a later stage of development, under the influence of the popular idea that leaven represented corruption, and from the desire (so manifest in the Holiness Code and Ezekiel) absolutely to exclude from the ritual everything inconsistent with the idea of Jahweh's perfect holiness. The original reason for the use of unleavened bread in connexion with the Passover meal appears to have been simpler. In primitive times, and still among the Arabs on a low stage of civilization, bread was made and cooked at once. The Passover, in its latest Jewish form, evidently represented a blending of the older nomadic spring festival and the first of the three great Canaanite harvest festivals. After the Hebrews passed over to the agricultural stage, it marked the time when the sickle was first put in the standing grain and the people brought to the Deity the first sheaves gathered from their fields (cf. C. F. Kent, *Israel's Laws and Leg. Precedents*, London, 1907, p. 258 f.). During this busy first week of harvest the people had no time to wait for the slow working of the leaven, but gladly ate the bread made hastily from the unleavened dough. Thus the custom grew into an institution confirmed by the earliest Hebrew laws. In later times it presented such a marked contrast to existing usage that the Passover itself was frequently designated as the Feast of Unleavened Bread. The tendency to regard leaven as a type of putrefaction doubtless

[1] Texts in H. Jireček, *Svod Zákonuv Slovanskych*, Prague, 1880, p. 1 ff., tr. in J. P. G. Ewers, *Das älteste Recht der Russen*, Dorpat, 1826, p. 132 ff.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 123.
[3] Text in Jireček, nos. iii. and iv.; tr. in Ewers, p. 264 ff.
[4] *Das russische Recht* (*Russkaja Pravda*), i., 'Die älteste Redaction des russischen Rechts,' Stuttgart, 1910.

fortified this earlier custom and explains the tendency, already noted, to extend the prohibition to all cereal offerings. It is paralleled by the extension of a similar prohibition so as to include all fermented liquors.

Because of its peculiar characteristics leaven was used figuratively in early literature in two very different senses. In Mt 13^{33} and its parallel, Lk $13^{20f.}$, it is used by Jesus as a symbol of the quiet, pervasive, and rapid extension of the principles of the rule or kingdom of God in human society. Its more common use is illustrated by Mt 16^{6-12} (cf. Mk 8^{15}, Lk 12^{1}), where Jesus warns His disciples against the leaven of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Herodians. It is a pregnant, concrete figure, which well describes the secret, persistent, corrupting influence of Jesus' foes, who were seeking in an underhand way to pervert the loyalty even of His immediate followers. The Rabbinical writers also used leaven as a symbol of sin and corruption. St. Paul, in 1 Co 5^{6} and Gal 5^{9}, evidently quotes a familiar proverb which graphically reflects this current idea: 'A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump.' In 1 Co $5^{6f.}$ he goes on to develop a figure based on the well-known Jewish custom of thoroughly cleansing their houses of all leaven in preparation for the joyous Passover feast: 'Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out the old leaven, that ye may be a new lump, even as ye are unleavened. For our passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ: wherefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.'

The Roman Flamen Dialis was forbidden to touch 'farinam fermento imbutam' (Aul. Gell. x. xv. 19). In other ethnic religions leaven plays little part.

LITERATURE.—There is no literature beyond what is cited in the article.

C. F. KENT.

LEGALISM.—See NOMISM.

LEIBNIZ.—1. **Life.**—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, or Leibnitz, was born at Leipzig on 1st July 1646. His father, a professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of the same town, died in 1652, leaving his son under the care of his young widow (his third wife), who appears to have discharged her duties with admirable skill. The family was well-connected, of the official class, with considerable means, and the mother, a religious woman, impressed on her children the importance of maintaining the good name of their ancestors. Leibniz became in great measure his own teacher, and even in his earliest days his love of study was extraordinary. He learned Latin by himself at the age of eight, and at ten, by the advice of a neighbour, his father's library was to his great joy opened to him, with the words, 'Tolle, lege.' One study succeeded another in the case of this extraordinary boy, who, after mastering Latin and Greek, devoted himself to the learning of the Schools. At the age of fifteen, in 1661, he became a student at the University of Leipzig. But the teaching there was not such as to satisfy him, and it was through his private study that he became acquainted with the philosophy of Descartes. He also read Francis Bacon, Cardan, Campanella, Kepler, and Galileo, and he soon realized the distinction between the new and the old methods of science. The summer of 1663 was spent at Jena under Weigel, a mathematician as well as a philosopher, and his interest in mathematics developed from this time, though it was not until later in life that he reached the deeper study of the science. The years 1663-66 were occupied in legal studies, and in the last of those years he obtained his doctorate of law at Altdorf (not having already received it at his own University of Leipzig), and the brilliancy of his dissertation procured him the offer of a professorial chair. This, however, he declined, having, as he said, different ends in view. His mother died in 1664, and he never visited his native town again except in passing. Although not yet twenty-one, he had already written several remarkable essays, which showed the trend of his later work. One of them dealt with the importance of the historical method in law. Nüremberg was Leibniz's next place of abode, and there he became (like his great predecessor, Descartes) acquainted with the Order of the Rosicrucians, of which he became, indeed, a member. What was more important, he also became acquainted there with J. C. von Boineburg, who had been first minister to the Elector of Mainz, and by whose advice he both printed his *Nova Methodus* in 1667 and dedicated and presented it to the Elector. This act determined the young man's future life, for he entered the Elector's service in consequence of the acquaintance then made. Leibniz now took to political writing; he defended (unsuccessfully) the claims of the German candidate to the crown of Poland in 1669, and in 1670, in his *Thoughts on Public Safety*, he advocated a new league ('Rheinbund') for the protection of Germany. He also brought forward the proposal that the French king, Louis XIV., instead of marching on Holland (a step then imminent), should make an expedition to Egypt. Letters referring to this scheme were sent to Louis by Boineburg, and in 1672 Leibniz, as the author of the memorial, was requested to go to Paris. This he did, but he was never granted the interview which he desired. The history of the scheme was hidden in the archives of the Hanoverian Library until Napoleon learnt of it on taking possession of Hanover in 1803.

In Paris Leibniz became acquainted with Descartes's successors Arnauld and Malebranche, and also with physicists such as Christian Huygens, and he was soon immersed in the study of the philosophical and scientific questions on which he proceeded to write. As early as 1671 he had written *Hypothesis physica nova*, an essay on physics, and more especially on the subject of gravitation, so that he was already known in the scientific world. His tour was extended to London, where he became acquainted with Boyle, Oldenburg, and Newton. A calculating machine (an improvement on that of Pascal), which was one of his many scientific inventions, was exhibited at the Royal Society of London, and he was elected a Fellow in 1673. It is from this period that his studies in higher mathematics date, and he now entered upon the series of investigations which culminated in his discovery of the differential and integral calculus. This gave rise to a long controversy with Newton as to which of them first invented the mathematical method of the calculus. This famous controversy resulted in the conclusion that, though Newton was in possession of a similar method as early as 1665, in all probability it was not known to Leibniz. Each discovered the method independently. Leibniz published his account of the method in 1684; Newton's was first published in 1693.

In 1673 Leibniz entered the employment of Duke Frederick of Brunswick-Lüneburg as librarian and private councillor, and in 1676 he removed to Hanover, visiting Spinoza in Holland on his way. At Hanover he passed the rest of his life. He supported by his pen the claims of the dukedom in various ways, and also wrote a history of the Brunswick-Lüneburg family, for which work he had to travel in Germany, Austria, and Italy. At Rome he was offered the custodianship of the

Vatican Library by the pope, but one of the conditions was that he should become a Roman Catholic, and to this Leibniz would not consent. He was, however, interested in a scheme which was then being mooted for the reunion of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, and it was in connexion with this discussion that he wrote, in 1686, *Systema theologicum*, in which he tried to find some common standing-ground between the two religions. The letters to Leibniz from Bossuet and others show that the writers hoped to convert him to Roman Catholicism; and, when it was clear that they would not succeed, the letters ceased. He later attempted to reconcile the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, also without success. In addition to his literary pursuits, Leibniz interested himself in the mining operations carried on in the Harz Mountains and in the coining of silver found there.

In 1690 Leibniz was appointed librarian at Wolfenbüttel, and some years later he formed a friendship with the Electress Sophia Charlotte of Brandenburg and her mother Princess Sophia of Hanover. It was through this friendship that his connexion with Berlin arose, and he was invited thither in 1700. In this year the Academy which he planned was founded by Frederick I. of Prussia with Leibniz as President for life. He proceeded to suggest the establishment of similar societies in St. Petersburg, Dresden, and Vienna, with various degrees of success. In recognition of this work Leibniz was made privy councillor of justice by the Elector of Brandenburg; the same honour was given him by the Elector of Hanover and by Peter the Great of Russia. He likewise had the distinction of being granted an imperial privy councillorship when on a visit to Vienna in 1712, while he was also made a baron of the Empire (Reichsfreiherr). While in Berlin he had much pleasant intercourse at Charlottenburg with his royal pupil the Electress Sophia Charlotte, and her death in 1705 was a severe blow to him. Indeed subsequently to that event his visits to Berlin became less frequent, and that which took place in 1711 was the last. After the visit to Vienna in 1712 he returned to Hanover in 1714, but the Elector George had by that time gone to England to assume the crown, and Leibniz was disappointed at not being asked to accompany him, since he had supported his father's claims to the Elector's hat. He was directed instead to remain in Hanover and finish his history of Brunswick. This was the last work of his life. He died on November 14th, 1716, and his last years were far from happy. He was ill, neglected after his royal friend's death by those who should have helped him, and embittered by many controversies; and, when the end came, hardly any notice was taken of it either in Berlin or in London, whither his sovereign had gone. His only mourner in Hanover was Eckhart, his secretary, and not till 1787 was a monument erected to his memory. To the last he showed a marvellous power of work in very many directions; indeed his attainments were those of an almost universal kind, and such as have seldom been equalled. As he was naturally ambitious, the neglect from which he suffered pained him greatly.

It is matter for regret that Leibniz's teaching has to be derived in great measure from isolated papers, sketches, and letters. In 1703–04 he worked out his criticisms on Locke's *Essay*, but the author's death prevented their publication. In 1710 appeared his most important philosophical work, the *Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme, et l'origine du mal.* In 1714 he wrote *La Monadologie*, and in that year there also appeared the *Principes de la nature et de la grâce.* During his latter years he corresponded (by the desire of the Queen of England) with Samuel Clarke 'sur Dieu, l'âme, l'espace, la durée.'

2. Philosophy.—Leibniz's philosophical doctrines are mainly concerned with the mode in which substance is to be conceived. They represent a distinct advance on the Cartesian view, which took for granted that there were *two* substances, connected only, if indeed they were connected at all, by the power of God. Thus Cartesianism showed itself to be a dualism which successive philosophers have in different ways done their best to solve. Spinoza, of course, endeavoured to absorb them into one Divine Substance. For him 'determination is negation,' and so far did he carry this doctrine that in his case unity is preserved only at the expense of the reality of the parts; the Substance, that is to say, is self-existent and unconditional, requiring no other thing from which it is formed, or part which may determine it. This development of the Cartesian doctrine is, no doubt, a consistent one, and one which carried the principle to its logical conclusion, but it ends in something which much resembles the Oriental theory of absolute self-identity. Leibniz, on the other hand, accepts the multiplicity of substance (the ultimate reality), which he terms monads (an expression originally perhaps adopted from the Pythagoreans, but more directly from Giordano Bruno), and these monads he proceeds to determine. Assuming that substance can be conceived only as force, he states that the metaphysical view of monads is that they are simple substances without parts, and, as there are no parts, there can be 'neither extension, form, nor divisibility.' No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is no conceivable way in which they can be destroyed by natural means. Nor can they by these means come into being. Thus a monad can become existent or come to an end only all at once, *i.e.* by creation in the one instance or annihilation in the other.

These monads are therefore, so to speak, centres of force, as distinguished from manifestations of world-force. They are not to be confused with the atoms of Democritus or the materialists, inasmuch as they have within them the power of action; indeed it is their nature to act, and they also have what might be called a spiritual nature. In his *Monadology*, Leibniz states that the monad likewise has 'perception and appetition.' The perception is, however, not necessarily conscious perception, since conscious perception represents another stage, which he calls 'apperception.' In perception we have a unity which has a multiplicity of relations, and is thus variously modified. Likewise the appetition is not necessarily conscious desire or will; it represents change within the identity of a simple substance. Hence we must conceive the monad as possessed of spontaneity and as capable of evolving its nature and experience from itself. It is not inert and passive, but is a microcosm, 'the universe in little'; indeed Leibniz goes so far as to make use of the Aristotelian term, and say that the monads are entelechies because they have a

> 'certain perfection which makes them the sources of their internal activities, so to speak, incorporeal automata' (§ 18).

They are not, however, pure entelechies, as is shown by the differences among themselves.

> 'Each monad must be different from every other. For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike' (§ 9).

He considers that the Cartesian view of perception is wrong, because it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not commonly aware, and he believes that this causes a failure to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and death; this error has even 'confirmed ill-

balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal' (§ 14).

Leibniz does not give the name 'soul' to everything that has perception and desires; for such, he says, the general name monads or entelechies should suffice.

The name of 'souls,' he considers, should be reserved for those 'in whom perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory' (§ 19). 'Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness which copies [*imite*] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it' (§ 26). 'It is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from the mere animal and gives us Reason and the Sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind [*esprit*]' (§ 29).

This knowledge makes us conscious of ourselves, of substance, and of God; it teaches us that what is limited in us is in Him without limits.

Reasoning is founded by Leibniz on two great principles: (1) that of Contradiction, by which we judge that to be false which involves a contradiction and that true which is contradictory to the false; and (2) that of Sufficient Reason, whereby we hold that there can be no fact, real or existent, 'unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise, even although these reasons usually cannot be known to us.' There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and fact.

'Truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible; truths of fact are contingent, and their opposite is possible' (§ 33).

Then, again, the organic body of each living thing is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton,

'which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. . . . For a machine made by the skill of man is not a machine in each of its parts. . . . But the machines of nature, namely living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts *ad infinitum*' (§ 64).

Each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible but also actually subdivided without end. The smallest particle of matter has in it a world of creatures—living beings, animals, entelechies, souls—and nothing is sterile, or fallow, or dead, or confused save in appearance. Each living body has a dominant entelechy (in the animal the soul), but the members of this body are full of other living beings, plants, and animals, each of which has its dominant entelechy or soul.

There is never absolute birth (*génération*) nor complete death consisting in the separation of soul from body.

'What we call *births* are developments, growths, while what we call *deaths* are envelopments and diminutions' (§ 73).

Organic bodies do not really proceed from chaos, but always from seeds in which there was some pre-formation.

'The organic body was already there before conception, but also a soul in this body, and in short the animal itself' (§ 74).

The animal is merely prepared for the great transformation of becoming another kind of animal.

The fact that the soul and the animal itself are alike indestructible makes it easier for Leibniz to explain his theory of the union of or material agreement between soul and organic body. Both soul and body follow their own laws, and

'they agree with each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representatives of one and the same universe' (§ 78).

Souls and bodies, the two realms of efficient causes and final causes, are in harmony with one another. This is the famous doctrine of pre-established harmony, which is often misrepresented, since it is said to be arbitrarily dependent on the will of God, whereas in reality it proceeds from the very nature of the monads themselves as percipient, spontaneous beings. Leibniz believes that Descartes was not far off from his doctrine, and that he would have arrived at it had he known that there was a

'law of nature affirming the conservation of the same total direction in matters' (§ 80).

The Leibnizian and Cartesian theories of mechanical physics were the subject of much controversy. For Descartes's theory of the constancy of the quantity of motion in the world, Leibniz substitutes the principle of the conservation of *vis viva*, but the long controversy was probably due in great measure to the ambiguity of the terms employed. It really concerns the conservation of momentum as compared with the conservation of energy, which is what Leibniz maintains. For Leibniz, motion is simply a change of position. It is not a positive quality belonging to the moving of a body, but a relative one, and rest itself is merely an infinitely small degree of motion.

Leibniz illustrates his theory of pre-established harmony by the well-known example of the two clocks. There are three alternative methods by which they may be made to keep perfect time with one another: (1) the machinery of the one may actually move the other, being connected, *e.g.*, by a piece of wood, which represents Locke's theory of mutual influence; (2) whenever one moves the mechanism, a similar alteration may be made in the other by a skilled workman, which is the doctrine of the Occasionalists; or (3) the clocks may have been so perfectly constructed at the first as to continue to correspond at every instant without any further influence or assistance, which is Leibniz's view of a pre-established harmony. Another simile that he uses is, however, a more adequate one: he compares the monads to two independent bands of musicians playing in perfect harmony.

As regards our knowledge, it is all developed by the soul's own activity, and sensuous perception is but a confused sort of knowledge. Locke had denied that there were any innate ideas, and held that all our knowledge must reach us from outside, and through the senses. Descartes believed that it came from pure thought and independently of the senses. Leibniz held that his theory harmonized the two. The soul of man as monad is an active spontaneous force, and its ideas are innate, but they are not clear and distinct, as Descartes would have us believe. To begin with, they are confused and imperfect, and it is only by means of a developing force that they reach clearness and self-evidence. Locke's sensation is really confused perception, and it is made clear only by the result of an internal experience. Human knowledge is both *a priori* and *a posteriori*.

'As there is a perfect harmony between the two realms in nature, one of efficient and the other of final causes, there is another harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, *i.e.* between God, as Architect of the mechanism [*machine*] of the universe, and God considered as Monarch of the Divine City of spirits [*esprits*]' (§ 87).

Thus Leibniz justifies the ways of God to man, the punishment of some, and the reward of others, as being in accordance with the divine harmony. Could we sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we should find that it is impossible to make it better than it is. Leibniz therefore makes God the necessary postulate of morality, and in his *Théodicée* he works out his theology and defends his view of the universe as the best possible world, and shows how faith and reason may be found to coincide and harmonize. God must either exist as a self-existent Being or be impossible. The will is an effort towards that which one finds good, and is free only in the sense of being exempt from external control, and, as it has a sufficient reason for its action, determined by what seems good to it. Freedom consists in following reason, while servitude comes from following the passions which proceed from confused perceptions.

Probably few philosophers have suffered more

than Leibniz from misrepresentation of their systems. We have Voltaire's stinging satire of the doctrine of the 'best possible world' in his *Candide*, but that was a satire more than a misrepresentation. The doctrine of the pre-established harmony, however, lent itself to easy caricature, as did that of the living monads. Few of Leibniz's writings were published during his lifetime, and he left masses of MSS in detached papers and little treatises, difficult to sort out. His two principles of contradiction and sufficient reason were never clearly related to one another, and existed, so to speak, side by side in independence. Newton's physics did not altogether accord with Leibniz's metaphysics, and Newton's triumph meant corresponding discredit to Leibniz. His successor, Christian Wolf, though he systematized his philosophy, was not a true follower, or at least he followed him in a pedantic way. Perhaps Kant understood his position better, although he advanced far beyond it. Hegel terms it an 'artificial system,' but he appreciates its worth as showing forth the principle of individuality. Goethe adopted the Leibnizian conception of monads and souls. Later on Lotze re-constructed the philosophy of Leibniz on his revolt as a man of science against the idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, though he was influenced by Kantian doctrines and rejected much of Leibniz's teaching.

[3. **Mathematics.**—Leibniz was a pioneer in the science of comparative philology, and compared and collected various remote languages; this was but one of his very numerous studies outside philosophy. It was to mathematics, however, that he specially devoted his attention. Leibniz's mathematical studies were carried beyond what was usual at the time under Weigel at Jena in 1663. The *de Arte Combinatoria*, which he wrote in 1666, is of logical rather than mathematical interest. In 1673, when in London, he told Pell that he had obtained the summation of infinite series by differences, but in this he had been anticipated. After this he studied under Huygens in Paris. Among other results at this period, he obtained the important series $\frac{\pi}{4} = 1 - \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{5} - \frac{1}{7} + \frac{1}{9} - \ldots$.

He now began his great work on the infinitesimal calculus. He started with the conception, previously employed by Barrow, Newton's teacher, of a 'triangulum characteristicum' at any point on the curve. This consists of the chord joining two adjacent points, together with parallels to the axes of co-ordinates drawn through these points. In the limit when these points come to coincide with the given point, the chord becomes the tangent at it. With the aid of this conception he attacked problems of tangency, showing that the so-called 'inverse problems of tangents' could be reduced to quadratures, or, in modern terminology, integrations. He regarded integration as a summation of infinitesimals. His original notation for $\int y dx$ was '*omn.y*,' *omn.* standing for *omnia*. Later he introduced the symbols $\int$, standing for *S*, or *Summa*, and *d*, for *differentia*, which are still used in the calculus. By 1676 he had applied the new methods to the 'direct problems of tangents' and to solid geometry, and in the following year he gave correct rules for the differentiation of sums, products, powers, and other functions.

In 1684 he published his first paper on the differential calculus in the Leipzig *Acta Eruditorum*. Besides tangency, maxima and minima and refraction are treated; *dy* and *dx* are still apparently taken as finite, though small.

Two years later he gave a sketch of the integral calculus in the same journal. Here *dy* and *dx* are regarded as quantities, though infinitely small. His final position appears to have been that they are 'quantitates assignabiles' which spring from quantitates inassignabiles' by the law of continuity, but on the whole question he showed considerable vacillation. His view of the calculus, though more general, and perhaps more fruitful, than Newton's, was on the whole less consistent and logical. Thus he always seems to have regarded a curve as a polygon with infinitesimal sides, whilst Newton usually considered it as generated by the continuous motion of a point. In the minds of both, however, there was probably enough confusion to justify Berkeley's attack in *The Analyst*.

Some idea of the variety and magnitude of Leibniz's mathematical achievements can be gathered from the fact that, besides the notation of the calculus, we owe to him the words 'co-ordinate' and 'axis of co-ordinates' in analytical geometry, the beginnings of the theories of determinants, osculation, and envelopes, and the method of partial fractions. 'Leibniz's theorem' deals with the repeated differentiation of a product. In mechanics his work, though fruitful, contains many errors. He regarded *vis viva*, which varies as the square of the velocity, as the proper measure of the force in a moving body, whilst Descartes had used momentum, varying directly as the velocity, for this purpose. Though the attack on Descartes was unjustified, yet this view ultimately led to the fundamental modern conception of energy.—J. B. S. HALDANE.]

LITERATURE.—None of the many editions of Leibniz's works is complete. There is, first of all, the *Opera Omnia*, by L. Dutens, Geneva, 1768, which was held to be complete when published. In 1843 G. H. Pertz began an edition of his works (1st ser. 'History,' 4 vols., Hanover, 1843-47, 2nd ser. 'Philosophical,' 1 vol., incomplete, Berlin, 1846). The only complete edition of his mathematical works is the third of the same series, 'Leibnizens mathematische Schriften,' ed. C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols. and supplementary vol., Halle and Berlin, 1850-63. The most important edition of his philosophical works is by C. J. Gerhardt, *Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875-90. There are also Leibniz's *Deutsche Schriften*, ed. G. E. Guhrauer, 2 vols., Berlin, 1838-40; A. Foucher de Careil, *Œuvres de Leibnitz*, 7 vols. (planned in 20 vols.), Paris, 1859-75; Onno Klopp, *Die Werke von Leibnitz*, 10 vols., Hanover, London, and Paris, 1864-77, containing the historical and political works; and A. Jacques, *Œuvres de Leibnitz*, 2 vols., Paris, 1847. There is an edition (not complete) of his philosophical works by J. E. Erdmann, Berlin, 1839-40, and one by P. Janet, 2 vols., Paris, 1866.

For the life and teaching of Leibniz we have Robert Latta, *The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings*, Oxford, 1898 (gives a translation of the *Monadology* and other philosophical works); J. T. Merz, *Leibnitz*, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, Edinburgh, 1884; W. R. Sorley, art. 'Leibnitz,' in *EBr*[11]; E. Boutroux, *La Monadologie: accompagnée d'éclaircissements*, Paris, 1881; cf. also Le Bovier de Fontenelle, *Éloge* (=vol. i. of the *Opera Omnia*, Geneva, 1768 [see above]), in the *Acta Eruditorum*, and L. Grote, *Leibniz und seine Zeit*, Hanover, 1869; E. Pfleiderer, *Leibnitz als Patriot, Staatsmann und Bildungsträger*, Leipzig, 1870; F. Kirchner, *G. W. Leibniz: sein Leben und Denken*, Kothen, 1876. There are countless monographs on Leibniz, besides good accounts of him by Kuno Fischer, 'G. W. Leibniz, Leben, Werke, und Lehre' in *Gesch. der neueren Philosophie*, Heidelberg, 1902; E. Zeller, *Gesch. der deutschen Philosophie*, Munich, 1873. Among the critical works may be mentioned Bertrand Russell, *Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibnitz*, Cambridge, 1900. Further literature is cited in *DPhP* iii. [1905] 330-338.

E. S. HALDANE.

LEPROSY.—See DISEASE AND MEDICINE.

LESSING.—1. Life and times.—It is easy for us to see in retrospect that the achievement of Lessing lay in preparing the way for the complex creative movement associated with the names of Goethe and Schiller; Lessing himself, however, looked forward to a future only dimly illumined by rays of hope, and he went out perforce 'not knowing whither he went.' The century following the close of the Hundred Years' War had seen a very slow and partial recovery of the German national life from the utter barbarism, the degeneration of morals, of manners, and of educational and political institutions which resulted from that devastating war. But at the middle of the 18th cent., when Lessing's literary career began, a new life was stirring; universities were

being founded, and the latent national genius was re-asserting itself in the varied interests that we should comprise under the term 'culture.'

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was born at Kamenz, in the Saxon province of Upper Lusatia, on 22nd Jan. 1729, the second child and eldest son of a family of twelve born to a Lutheran clergyman, afterwards head-pastor of the town, and his worthy but not remarkable wife. The boy was brought up in simple circumstances and in a very orthodox family circle. In 1741 he was sent to the Klosterschule of St. Afra at Meissen, in which the monastic spirit was associated with a thorough classical education, a strict discipline, and a healthy intermixture of boys from different social strata. In his spare hours he supplemented his vigorously pursued studies by extensive reading in his favourite authors—Theophrastus, Plautus, and Terence—and, when he left in June 1746, in consequence of the disturbed condition of the town after the battle of Kesselsdorf, it was with a thorough mastery of Latin and Greek, some knowledge of modern languages, and well-developed mathematical powers. His farewell oration was on 'Mathematics among the Ancients.' He next entered Leipzig University, where he came under the influence of J. A. Ernesti and J. F. Christ in classics and of A. G. Kästner in mathematics. Fearful lest keen study should make him a dry pedant, he entered society and acquired the accomplishments suited to a man of the world. Introduced into dramatic circles, he completed his first play, which he had commenced at school, and it was performed at Frau Neuber's theatre. His new interests gave his good father much anxiety, for the young student had been destined for the Church; and he had to promise to study medicine before his parents' confidence was restored.

Leaving Leipzig in consequence of debts which he had contracted by standing security for some actor-friends, he went for a time to Wittenberg, but in 1749 he found himself in Berlin, earning a living by translating, and at the same time making a literary venture with his friend Christlob Mylius, in the shape of a *Quarterly Review* intended to form a history of dramatic poetry and to contain translations of classical and foreign dramatic works. The *Review* ceased to appear in the following year, since Mylius had made a statement in it with which Lessing refused to be associated. Another periodical appearing in parts from 1754 to 1758 showed Lessing's determination to devote himself to the reform of the stage.

He published at this time in the *Vossische Zeitung* a series of criticisms which attracted much attention. On returning to Wittenberg for a few months, he was engaged in theological studies, and wrote the well-known *Rettungen* (the defence of certain little-known and much-maligned authors of the past). At the same time he made a special study of Horace and Martial, and entered into a controversy with a certain pastor, S. G. Lange, utterly destroying the latter's claims to be 'the German Horace,' and securing a respectful hearing for any critiques which he might care to publish. Once again in Berlin, Lessing became the friend of the learned Moses Mendelssohn and the publisher C. F. Nicolai.

His literary activity was now great, and, apart from his translations of important foreign books, he published from 1753 to 1755 six volumes of collected works, containing songs, odes, epigrams, letters, critiques, fables, and his tragedy, *Miss Sara Sampson*. For a second period he resided in Leipzig, and then started an abortive grand tour as travelling companion to a rich young man. Back again in Leipzig, he developed an intimate friendship with the soldier-poet E. C. von Kleist (destined to be cut short after two years by von Kleist's untimely death), and then, disappointed by his failure to obtain an official post in Prussia, he returned to Berlin (1758).

Lessing's next production was the *Letters upon Current Literature*; these were epoch-making in German literature. Saddened by the loss of his friend von Kleist, and lonely in his conscious superiority to the literary circles of Berlin, he went for a time to Breslau, acting as secretary to the governor, General Tauentzien, developing a strange love of the gaming-table, collecting a large and valuable library, working at his *Laocoon*, and sketching out his play *Minna von Barnhelm*. After an illness due to overwork, he gave up his post in 1765, and, refusing a professorship which involved certain duties uncongenial to an independent man, returned to Berlin. He was unable to obtain the post of librarian to Frederick the Great, and turned to finish the *Literaturbriefe*, the *Laocoon*, and *Minna von Barnhelm*. We next find Lessing at Hamburg, acting as 'critic of the plays and actors' in connexion with a newly founded National Theatre, issuing the criticisms which are preserved under the title *Hamburgische Dramaturgie* ('Hamburg Dramatic Writings'), and engaging in violent single-handed controversy with C. A. Klotz (professor of rhetoric at Halle), whom he ultimately laid low by his *Antiquarische Briefe* ('Letters upon Archæology'). In 1770 he accepted the post of librarian of the Wolfenbüttel Library under a Brunswick prince, but his life at Wolfenbüttel was dull in the extreme. He was importuned by his family for financial help, and cut off from intercourse with congenial companions. He was betrothed in 1771 to Eva König, but was unable to marry her till five years later. In the meantime he published his *Emilia Galotti* and afterwards some 'fragments' by his friend H. S. Reimarus, which aroused another controversy. He then went to Austria, and, when just about to marry, felt compelled to accept an invitation to accompany Prince Leopold of Brunswick on a journey to Italy. The journey lasted nine months, but involved Lessing in uncongenial ceremonies, and left him few opportunities of studying Italian works of art. In 1776 he was married, and he had a happy life with his cultured and refined wife; but their joy was short-lived, for in 1778 a son died after only a few hours of life, and his wife died a fortnight later. *Nathan the Wise*, *The Education of the Human Race*, and *Dialogues for Freemasons* mark the remaining years of his life, which ended at Brunswick suddenly after a brief illness on 15th Feb. 1781, when he was only fifty-two years of age.

Perhaps the greatest service which Lessing rendered to his age lay in his devotion to truth even more than in his influence in changing the direction of creative literary work, in revolutionizing the principles of criticism, and in stimulating theological study. 'In his person,' said D. F. Strauss, 'allegiance to truth and love of truth personified guard the portals of our literature' (*Lessing's Nathan der Weise*[2], Berlin, 1866). It was righteous indignation rather than cynical irony that gave point to his most acute criticisms. Sham and the worship of mere appearances were hateful in his eyes.

'Not the truth which a man possesses or believes himself to possess, but the sincere attempt which he has made to reach the truth, constitutes his worth. For not through the possession of truth, but through inquiry after truth, are developed those powers in which his ever-increasing perfection consists. Possession makes the mind stagnant, inactive, proud. If God held in His right hand all truth, and in His left only the ever-active impulse to search for truth, even with the condition that I must for ever err, and said to me, "Choose!" I should humbly bow before His left hand and say, "Father, give! Pure truth belongs to Thee alone!"' (*Sämmtliche Schriften*, ed. Lachmann and Maltzahn, xi. (2) 401).

Though Lessing's mind sought creative expression, its bent was in the long run predominantly critical. While he could not create without stimulating his own critical faculty, and could not arrive at critical conclusions without desiring to apply them, we owe more to his insight as a critic than to his genius as a creative artist. And our debt has found striking expression in words which give an illuminating estimate of the critic as well as a testimony to his influence on subsequent authors.

Macaulay once said that the reading of Lessing's *Laocoon* formed an epoch in his mental history, and that he had learned more from it than he had ever learned elsewhere (G. H. Lewes, *Life of Goethe*[2], London, 1864, p. 57). Carlyle said in his 'Essay on the State of German Literature' (*Works of T. Carlyle*, London, 1857, ii. 30): 'It is to Lessing that an Englishman would turn with readiest affection. . . . As a poet, as a critic, philosopher, or controversialist, his style will be found precisely such as we of England are accustomed to admire most; brief, nervous, vivid; yet quiet, without glitter or antithesis; idiomatic, pure without purism, transparent yet full of character and reflex hues of meaning.'

2. Contributions to æsthetics.—Æsthetics has always occupied an important place in modern German philosophy, but it is questionable whether Kant or Schelling, Hegel or Schopenhauer, exercised so potent or so far-reaching an influence as Lessing, whose *Laocoon* (written between 1760 and 1765 and published in 1766) gathered together in a suggestive form the results of previous critical theory and handed them on to a dawning new age along with an arresting presentation of several new problems. The book deals only by way of illustration with the sculptured group which gives it its title. Its theme is the dissimilarity of poetry on the one hand and painting and plastic art on the other; it attacks the current but uncritically held view summed up in Plutarch's quotation from Simonides referring to poetry as a speaking picture and painting as a dumb poem. Lessing shows that peculiar laws govern these different arts, and, in particular, that the choice of a 'pregnant moment,' essential to the artist, is not the task of the poet. The artist must select a moment at which the object of his art is so acting that the representation of it shall be most suggestive to the imagination—suggestive both of past and of prospective action; the poet, however, is able to prepare the imagination of his hearer or reader beforehand and even to influence it subsequently;

in other words, he is able to lead up to his critical moment and to tone down the effects of his treatment of it. Virgil could for this reason represent Laocoon as screaming with anguish; but the sculptor shows him to us as emitting deep sighs.

'That choice which allows free play to the imagination is alone a happy one. The more we gaze, the more must our imagination add; and the more our imagination adds, the more we must believe that we see. Now in the whole course of an emotion there is no moment which offers this to so little advantage as its climax. There is nothing higher beyond this, and to present the extreme to the eye is to clip the wings of fancy and to compel her, since she cannot get beyond the impression of the senses, to seek lower and weaker images wherewith to occupy herself, shunning, as her limit, the visible fulness of expression. Thus, if the Laocoon sighs, the imagination can hear him shriek. But if he shrieks, it can neither rise a step above, nor descend a step below this representation, without beholding him in a more endurable and consequently less interesting condition. It either hears him merely moaning or sees him already dead' (*Laocoon*, ch. iii.).

With some of the exaggeration of an advocate, Lessing inveighs against descriptive poetry; action in the widest sense of the word, we might say 'the dramatic,' that which changes, moves, and progresses (including feeling), is to him the primary object of poetry. So far as poetry represents things co-existing in time, it must do so by representation of things in succession. A fruitful illustration of this, as of so many of his theses, is drawn from Homer.

'Now a shield, at any rate, it will be said, is a single material object, and consequently a description of it, according to its parts in juxtaposition, would not form a suitable subject for poetic representation. And yet this very shield [that of Achilles] has been described by Homer, in over a hundred magnificent lines, with such minuteness and exactitude as regards its material, its form, and all the figures which filled its vast surface, that modern artists have experienced little difficulty in producing a drawing corresponding with it in every detail. My reply to this particular objection is that I have already replied to it. What Homer does is not to describe the shield as it is when finished and complete, but as it is being wrought. Here again, therefore, he has availed himself of that admirable device of transforming what is co-existent in his subject into what is consecutive, thus giving us a vivid picture of an action instead of a tedious painting of a material object. We do not see the shield, but the divine craftsman in the act of making it. He steps, with hammer and tongs, before his anvil, and, after the plates have been forged out of the raw material, the figures destined by him to adorn the shield rise from the bronze one by one before our eyes, beneath the finer strokes of his hammer. We do not lose sight of *him* until *the work* is completed. At length it is finished, and we marvel at it with the confident astonishment of an eye-witness who has beheld the actual operation' (*ib.* ch. xviii.).

Incidentally Lessing discusses a number of special topics of interest to the student of art from the comparative point of view. The book, as we have it, is but a fragment of Lessing's projected work, but its charm lies in the skill with which the main themes are relieved, and at the same time illustrated, by digressions which stimulate the imagination instead of wearying the critical faculties.

'We are plunged at once into the midst of his argument; then he draws back, alternately approaches and recedes from his goal, taking occasionally a side-glance at objects he meets on his way. We see him in the very act of conquering the truths he intends to expound, witness his hesitancy while they are still uncertain, share his pleasure as they burst upon him in their full significance. . . . If we except the best of Plato's dialogues, it would be difficult to name any book which gives opportunity for so much of the most valuable kind of mental gymnastic' (J. Sime, *Lessing*, i. 251 f.).

3. Dramatic writings.—Lessing's dramatic works interest us here only in so far as they reflect his social and religious ideals. *Miss Sara Sampson*, the scene of which is laid in England, is a tragedy of middle-class life, interesting as a hint of the new day about to dawn on the German drama. *Minna von Barnhelm* is a charming study in human character, full of local colour and contemporary feeling, and presents its characters before a background of political significance.

The Seven Years' War ended for political reasons, and harmony of national sentiment did not immediately take the place of the bitterness which accompanied the conflict. *Minna von Barnhelm* made for true peace, whether Goethe was right or wrong in saying that it was the design of the play to effect by art a result which could not be achieved by diplomacy. 'The Saxon felt most painfully the wounds inflicted upon him by the proud Prussian.' In this play 'the grace and amiability of the Saxon ladies subdue the stolid character, the dignity, the obstinacy of the Prussians' (*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1837, pt. ii. bk. 7). The play was of great importance, since its originality, and the breach which it made with contemporary imitation of French and English drama, stimulated the national consciousness and genius.

Nathan the Wise, a dramatic poem rather than a drama, secured Lessing's European fame. It saw the light first in 1779, but had long been planned. While Lessing declined to admit that his play contained allusions to the controversies in which he had been engaged with a Hamburg pastor, J. M. Götze, he declared that he would have nothing to say against the surmise that his purpose was to show how in olden time and in many lands, as among modern peoples, there have lived individuals who, though holding aloof from the religious systems of their age, were yet respectable and good; or against the conclusion that he intended to present such persons in a less repulsive light than that in which they had hitherto been regarded in Christian communities.

We cannot here detail the plot, but the idea of the play—and there is more idea than action—centres in the story of three rings in the possession of three sons of a dead man, one of them being the true heirloom, the others fraudulent imitations. The central characters of the play are a Christian, a Jew, and a Muslim. Nathan, the Jew, teaches what Lessing admitted was his own conviction, not, as some have supposed, that of the three religions one is true and the others false, the true to be discovered by observation of the results of each in the lives of its adherents, but rather the deep truth that, so long as Christians, Muslims, and Jews quarrel about their systems, the truth of religion (present in each) can never be discovered. When the power of the true ring has shown itself acting from within its owner, there will be nothing left to quarrel about. Creeds are accidents of birth and circumstances, but true religion is seen in character and action and must be the achievement of those who profess it.

Nathan the Wise was played in Berlin in 1783, but by indifferent actors. Only when Goethe and Schiller produced it at Weimar in 1801 did it take the place that it holds to-day in the repertory of the best German theatres. In it Lessing still teaches his lessons of toleration and broad-minded sympathy.

4. Literary and dramatic criticism.—In literary and dramatic criticism Lessing occupied an original standpoint and maintained it with brilliance and learning. His various contributions to periodicals and his *Literaturbriefe* ('Letters upon Current Literature') carried him into the arena already occupied, on the one side, by J. C. Gottsched, who blindly imitated the stilted masterpieces of the French, and therefore gave supremacy to formal standards, and, on the other, by the Swiss writers J. J. Bodmer and J. J. Breitinger, who insisted on the supreme importance of creative imagination. Lessing took up an independent position, criticizing both schools, though championing the main thesis of the anti-French school. From the frankest criticism of Gottsched, a renowned Leipzig professor, the young critic proceeded to the still more daring venture of criticizing Rousseau and Voltaire. In his *Hamburgische Dramaturgie* (published while he was 'critic' at the Hamburg Theatre and collected in 1769) he urged that the Greek dramatists and Shakespeare should be regarded as models, and he succeeded in severing the tie between German literature and the classic French school. In a brief but striking essay on 'How the Ancients represented Death' (*Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet*, 1769), Lessing maintained in reply to Klotz, who had criticized a remark in *Laocoon*, that the ancients represented the god of Death, not by the symbol of a skeleton, but by that of a boy, twin-brother of Sleep. He argued that skeletons represented the departed souls of evil men.

'It must presumably be our religion which has banished the ancient cheerful image of Death out of the realm of art. Since, however, this religion did not wish to reveal this terrible truth [that even natural death is the wages and fruit of sin] to drive us to despair, since it too assures us that the death of the righteous cannot be other than gentle and restoring, I do not see what should prevent our artists from banishing the terrible skeletons, and again taking possession of that other better image. . . . Only misunderstood religion can estrange us from beauty, and it is a token that religion is true and rightly understood, if it everywhere leads us back to the beautiful' (*Lessing's Prose Works*, Bohn's Library, 1879, p. 225 *f.*).

5. Theological opinions.—Lessing was always most powerful in the expression of his opinions when he was compelled to defend them against the traditionalist, whether of the literary or of the theological world. In addition to early Essays, 'The Origin of Revealed Religion' and 'Contributions to History and Literature' (containing essays on the theories of Leibniz), controversies in which he was engaged led to the publication of the following tracts: 'The Demonstration of the Spirit and of Power,' 'The Testament of John,' 'A Rejoinder' (*Ein Duplik*), and 'The Religion of Christ.' His chief theological controversy arose over papers that he published anonymously which were the work of H. S. Reimarus, who died at Hamburg while Lessing was there. Those papers, which were transcripts from an essay left by Reimarus entitled 'An Apology for Rational Worshippers of God,' dealt with the questions of revelation, immortality in the OT, and the inconsistencies in the accounts of Christ's Resurrection. That they did not reflect adequately his personal views may be judged by his own words:

'What has the Christian to do with the hypotheses, the explanations, the proofs, of the theologian? The letter is not the spirit, and the Bible is not religion' (*Sämmtliche Schriften*, x. 14).

The foremost critic of these papers was Götze, head-pastor of Hamburg, whose utterances were the occasion of some of Lessing's most brilliant controversial writings. Lessing strenuously upheld the right of the intellect to discuss with perfect freedom all subjects, whatever their nature, which are of deep concern to mankind.

'If you could bring it about that our Lutheran pastors should become our popes; that they should have power to prescribe to us where we must cease to investigate Scripture, to put limits to our investigation and to our right of publishing the results; I should be the first to exchange the popelings for the pope' (*ib.* p. 161).

Lessing insisted on the distinction between Christianity and the religion of Christ:

'that which He Himself as a man recognised and practised, which every man may have in common with Him, which every man must wish to have in common with Him in proportion as the character ascribed to Christ simply as a man is sublime and lovely' (*ib.* xi. (2) 243).

In the dialogue entitled 'The Testament of John,' Lessing asks, 'Are not Christian love and the Christian religion the same thing?' (*ib.* x. 46). In his treatment of Biblical questions Lessing was very frank. He left it to others to write appreciations of the Bible, taking their results for granted. He himself set out to show that the Bible is not the only sustenance for man's spiritual life, and the suggestions which he threw out in the course of these controversial writings (which belong chiefly to the year 1778) led to those inquiries and researches which were only much later recognized as the legitimate studies of NT Canon and Early Christian History. Indeed, it was Lessing who first among the Moderns drew attention to the essential difference between the first three and the fourth Gospels (see the fragment, 'New Hypothesis concerning the Evangelists,' *Sämmtliche Schriften*, xi.).

Lessing's contributions to theological study were vividly summarized in a work consisting of a hundred propositions and entitled 'The Education of the Human Race' (*Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, 1780). Humanity is represented as passing through three stages of education. The first is that reflected in its school-book, the OT. We see there the gradual development from the worship of a patriarchal and local deity to that of one God, and the transition from the ethics of a virtue which is dependent on rewards and punishments in this life to the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, to learn which the Hebrew people had been 'sent abroad' to Babylon. The second is that in which Christ taught the eternal sanctions of righteousness in place of immediate retribution, and the NT is the school-book of this stage. Before the third stage is reached, revealed truths are to be transformed into truths of reason.

'It will come, the time of consummation, when man, however firmly his mind is convinced of an ever better future, will yet have no need to borrow motives for his conduct from that future. For he will do what is right because it is right, and not because arbitrary rewards are attached to it, which were merely intended to attract and strengthen his wandering attention, so that he might recognise its inward and better rewards. It will certainly come, the time of this *new eternal Gospel*, which is promised us already in the elementary books of the New Covenant' (Proposition 85 *f.*).

After remarking that each individual human being must first traverse the ground along which the race advances towards its perfection, he meets the objection that in one and the same lifetime a man cannot pass through all the stages, making the interesting, and at that time novel, suggestion of pre-existence (see Propositions 93–100). This little treatise is closely related to *Nathan the Wise* in its teaching of the relative worth of different religions, and in its insistence that each is fitted for a particular race and epoch and that none can claim supremacy over all the others.

6. Political opinions.—In *Ernst and Falk, Dialogues for Freemasons* (*Gespräche für Freymäurer*), published without his permission in 1780, Lessing expresses his views of society, devoting but little space to freemasonry, which should, he says, overcome all distinctions of caste and fortune, of nationality and religion. He admits a preference for natural life as opposed to the social state.

Speaking of ants, he says: 'What activity and yet what order! Everyone carries, drags, and pushes, and not one is a hindrance to the rest. See, they even help one another; . . . they have no member that holds them together and rules them; . . . each individual is able to govern himself' (*Sämmtliche Schriften*, x. 257).

But at the same time he recognizes that the good of individuals depends at present on a certain degree of organization. With no uncertain courage, considering the circumstances of the age, Lessing insists on the basis of social life in the needs and satisfactions of individual life.

'States unite men that through and in this union every individual man may the better and more surely enjoy his share of welfare. The total of the welfare of all its members is the welfare of the state; besides this there is none. Every other kind of welfare of the state, whereby individuals suffer and must suffer, is a cloak for tyranny. . . . As if nature could have intended the welfare of an abstract idea, State, Fatherland, and the like rather than that of each individual' (*ib.* x. 258).

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ii. Translations.—*Selected Prose Works of G. E. Lessing* (*Laocoon, How the Ancients represented Death*, and *Dramatic Notes*), tr. E. C. Beasley and H. Zimmern, London, 1879; *Lessing's Laocoon*, tr. E. C. Beasley, do. 1887; *Laocoon and Other Prose Writings*, tr. and ed. W. B. Rönnfeldt, do. 1895; *Laocoon*, tr. with introd. R. Phillimore, do. 1905; *Lessing's Dramatic Works*, ed. E. Bell, 2 vols., do. 1879; *Plays of Lessing* (*Nathan the Wise, Minna von Barnhelm*), tr. R. D. Boylan, ed. E. Bell, do. 1888; *Nathan the Wise*, tr. with introd. R. Willis, do. 1867; *Nathan the Wise*, tr. E. Frothingham, New York, 1868; *Cambridge Free Thoughts and Letters on Bibliolatry*, tr. from German of G. E. Lessing by H. H. Bernard, London, 1862; *The Education of the Human Race*[4], tr. F. W. Robertson, do. 1896.

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do. 1878; T. W. Rolleston, *Lessing*, do. 1889; K. Fischer, *Lessing als Reformator der deutschen Literatur dargestellt*[2], 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1888; H. W. C. Schwarz, *Lessing als Theologe*, Halle, 1854; T. Carlyle, 'Essay on the State of German Literature,' in *Works*, ed. London, 1857; D. F. Strauss, *Lessings Nathan der Weise*, Berlin, 1864, new ed. Frankfort, 1908; K. Fischer, *Lessings Nathan der Weise, Ideе und Charactere der Dichtung*, Stuttgart, 1864 (condensed in E. Frothingham's tr.; see above); H. Düntzer, *Lessings Nathan der Weise erläutert*[3], Leipzig, 1873.

HAROLD E. B. SPEIGHT.

LETTERS CELESTIAL AND INFERNAL.—With the development of writing the belief arose that the gods themselves kept records of their proceedings, and thus among the Egyptians Thoth was the scribe of the gods (A. Wiedemann, *Religion of the anc. Egyptians*, London, 1897, pp. 227 f., 248), while the Indians believed Brahmā to be a writer god (cf. *Vāsavadattā*, tr. L. H. Gray, New York, 1913, p. 115), particularly the deity who writes the fate of each mortal on the individual's forehead (*brahmarekhā*).

As a natural corollary it was thought that the gods could communicate their will to man by written as well as by spoken words.

In the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, the rubric of ch. xxx. b. states that 'this chapter was found in the city of Khemennu [Hermopolis Magna] under the feet of [the statue of] this god. [It was inscribed] upon a slab of iron of the south, in the writing of the god himself, in the time of . . . Men-kau-Rā [of the IVth dynasty] . . . by the royal son Heru-ṭā-ṭā-f' [son of Cheops, the builder of the Great Pyramid] (*Book of the Dead*, tr. E. A. W. Budge, London, 1901, p. 151; cf. 221 f., 418).

In some forms of revelation the document is written in heaven by the deity. This is notably the case with the Decalogue (Ex 24^{12} 31^{18} $32^{15f.}$ $34^{1.\ 28}$, Dt 5^{22} 9^{10} $10^{2.\ 4}$), and the archetype of the Qur'ān is written 'on the preserved table' (*fī lauḥin maḥfūẓ*[in], lxxxv. 22; cf. also xiii. 39, xcvii. 1), the word for 'table' (*lauḥ*) being the one employed also in reference to the tables of the Ten Commandments (vii. 142, 149, 153; cf. the equivalent Heb. לוּחַ, Ex 24^{12} etc.). Mention is likewise made in the Bible of books sent down from heaven and eaten by Ezekiel and St. John the Divine, who then prophesied the contents of the volumes (Ezk $2^{9ff.}$, Rev $10^{8ff.}$). Similarly, in the Book of Mormon an angel gives Lehi a book foretelling the Babylonian Captivity (1 Nephi $1^{11ff.}$). According to the *Zôhar*, Adam, while yet in Eden, received from God a book containing, in 670 writings, the 72 sorts of wisdom, and giving the 1500 keys of knowledge—matters which were unknown even to the angels. Adam consulted this book daily till he was driven from the Garden, when it flew away from him. In pity for his grief, God caused it to be restored to him, and it was in the possession of his descendants until Abraham (J. E. Eisenmenger, *Entdecktes Judenthum*, Königsberg, 1711, i. 375 f., ii. 675).

The sacred book of the Elkesaites was believed to have fallen from heaven (Eus. *HE* vi. 38), or, according to another version, to have been brought from heaven to Elkesai by a gigantic angel (Hippol. *Refut.* ix. 8; see *ERE* v. 263[a]).

The belief may, however, be traced much farther back. Towards the end of the 3rd or during the 2nd cent. B.C. Menippus, a Syrian from Gadara, inaugurated the *genre* of the 'Menippean satire.' Among his productions were *ἐπιστολαὶ κεκομψευμέναι ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν θεῶν προσώπου* (Diog. Laert. VI. viii. 101), and Dieterich (*Kleine Schriften*, p. 244) suggests that the non-Greek phrase *ἀπὸ τοῦ τῶν θεῶν προσώπου* may be a reminiscence of a Heb. מִפְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים. It may have been these compositions that gave another Semite, Lucian of Samosata, the inspiration for his 'Letters of the Gods.' Servius (*ad Æn.* vi. 532) mentions a certain Tiberianus who 'inducit epistolam vento allatam ab antipodibus, quae habet superi inferis salutem,' and Pausanias (X. xxxviii. 7) records that Æsculapius sent the poetess Anyte to Naupactus, bearing a sealed tablet given her by the god, to heal Phalysius, who was well-nigh blind, but who, obeying the divine command to read the tablet, received full vision again. Other instances of more doubtful interpretation might be cited, as, *e.g.*, Juvenal's phrase (xi. 27), 'e caelo descendit *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*,' although here the most obvious meaning is that Chilon was divinely inspired with the maxim, not that a missive inscribed '*γνῶθι σεαυτόν*' was wafted to him from the sky.

Within Christianity one of the earliest mentions of a celestial letter occurs in the 23rd Ode of Solomon (tr. J. H. Bernard, *TS* VIII. iii. [1912] 97 f.; probably second half of the 2nd cent. A.D.), in which the decree of the Most High descends in a letter 'like an arrow which is violently shot from the bow.' It was 'a great Tablet, which was wholly written by the Finger of God.' The contents of this letter were apparently Mt 28^{19}. In the Ethiopic Acts of Peter the apostle receives from Christ books 'written with His own hand . . . wherein were written the mysteries which the tongues of the children of men are neither able to utter nor to understand with their hearts, except those whose hearts are arrayed in the strength of the gracious gift of baptism' (tr. E. A. W. Budge, *Contendings of the Apostles*, London, 1899–1901, ii. 469–471). In the 4th cent. Georgian Life of St. Nino (tr. M. and J. O. Wardrop, *Stud. Bib. et Eccles.* v. 1 [1900]) the saint receives, in vision, a book from a divine visitor, its contents being Mt 26^{13}, Gal 3^{28}, Mt 28^{19}, Lk 2^{32}, Mk 16^{15}, Mt $10^{40.\ 28}$, Jn 20^{17}, and two other sentences—all apparently being selected to promote Montanistic teachings.

To the category of celestial letters belongs the very interesting 'letter for hallowing Sunday,' whose history may be traced at least to the 6th cent., and which has spread, despite many efforts to check it, throughout both Western and Eastern Christendom. Although much study has already been devoted to this letter, its history is by no means clear. Its general character is thus summarized by Delehaye (*op. cit. infra*, p. 174):

'La lettre est écrite par le Christ lui-même, en lettres d'or ou avec son sang. Elle est portée sur la terre par l'archange Michel, ou bien elle tombe du ciel, à Rome sur le tombeau de saint Pierre, à Jérusalem, à Bethléem ou en d'autres lieux célèbres, suivant l'occurrence. Son objet principal est d'enculquer l'observation du dimanche. Subsidiairement, d'autres préceptes y sont recommandés. Vient ensuite une série de menaces terribles contre ceux qui mépriseront ces ordres, et assez souvent une vive protestation destinée à rassurer les chrétiens qui concevraient des doutes sur l'authenticité du document. Ordinairement, le texte du message divin est encadré d'un prologue racontant les circonstances de la promulgation, et d'un court épilogue.'

The principal specimens of this letter are as follows:

(*a*) Latin: J. A. Fabricius, *Codex apocr. Novi Testamenti*[3], Hamburg, 1719, i. 308–314; J. P. Migne, *Dict. des apocryphes*, Paris, 1856–58, ii. 367–369; Delehaye, 179–185.

(*b*) Anglo-Saxon: Four homilies are edited by A. S. Napier in *Wulfstan*, Berlin, 1883, a fifth by him in *Eng. Miscellany presented to Dr. Furnivall*, Oxford, 1901, pp. 355–362, and a sixth has been published by R. Priebsch in *Otia Merseiana*, i. (Liverpool, 1899) 129 ff.

(*c*) Middle English: John Audelay's poem is edited by R. Priebsch in *Eng. Miscellany*, 397–407.

(*d*) German: Delehaye, 191–193; Dieterich, 234–237, 248 f.; A. Wuttke, *Deut. Volksaberglaube*[3], Berlin, 1900, p. 178 f.; L. Strackerjan, *Aberglaube und Sagen aus dem Herzogtum Oldenburg*, Oldenburg, 1868, i. 59 ff.; K. Bartsch, *Sagen, Märchen und Gebräuche aus Mecklenburg*, Vienna, 1879–80, ii. 341 ff.; U. Jahn, *Hexenwesen und Zauberei in Pommern*, Breslau, 1887, p. 40 ff.; F. Closener, *Strassburgische Chronik*, Stuttgart, 1842, pp. 89–96; *Chroniken der oberrhein. Städte*, Strassburg, i. (Leipzig, 1870) 111–116; M. Haupt, *Altdeut. Blätter*, ii. (do. 1840) 241–264.

(*e*) Icelandic: J. Arnason, *Íslenzkar þjóðsögur og æfintýri*, Leipzig, 1861–64, ii. 53–55.

(*f*) French: Delehaye, 194–196; an unedited O. Fr. text is mentioned by Priebsch, *Eng. Miscellany*, 397.

(*g*) Celtic: E. O'Curry, *Lectures on the MS Material of anc. Irish Hist.*, Dublin, 1861, p. 603 (referring to *Leabhar Leacain*, do. 1896, col. 217); P. W. Joyce, *Soc. Hist. of anc. Ireland*,

London, 1903, i. 386 f. (referring to *Leabhar Breac*, Dublin, 1876, pp. 202–204); Welsh 'Ebostul y Sul,' in *Y Cymmrodr*, viii. [1887] 162 f.

(*h*) Slavic: Vesselovsky, *Journ. Ministry of Public Instruction*, clxxxiv. [1876] 50–116 (Russ.).

(*i*) Greek: A. Vassiliev, *Analecta Græco-Byzantina*, Moscow, 1893, pp. 23–32, xiv–xx.

(*j*) Ethiopic: F. Praetorius, *Mazhafa Tomar, das äthiop. Briefbuch*, Leipzig, 1869; R. Basset, *Apocryphes éthiop. tr. en français*, ii., Paris, 1893.

(*k*) Oriental in general (Greek, Armenian, Syriac, Karshuni, Arabic, Ethiopic, and Hebrew): M. Bittner, 'Der vom Himmel gefallene Brief Christi in seinen morgenl. Versionen und Rezensionen,' *DWAW*, 1905.

The earliest known mention of the 'Sunday letter' is its condemnation, as a diabolical forgery (*diaboli figmentum*), by Licinianus, bishop of Carthage, towards the end of the 6th cent.[1] (*Ep. ad Vincentium* [*PL* lxxii. 699 f.])—a condemnation which was repeated at the Lateran Council of 745 (J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum . . . Collectio*, xii. [Florence, 1766] 384 *p*). Originally the letter emphasized the keeping of Sunday, but later it came to insist on other duties as well. It often concluded with maledictions on the disobedient and unbelieving, but some specimens also contain a benediction on those who do its bidding (Delehaye, 185; *Eng. Miscellany*, 362, 404, 406 f.). Peter the Hermit carried with him a 'chartulam de caelo lapsam,' and the Flagellants of the 14th cent. also claimed to possess 'letters from heaven' (Delehaye, 187, 189), some of these alleging that 'the Lord God deprived the Roman Pope, all bishops, prelates, and priests of all authorities.

With the addition of a blessing for obeying the commands of the heavenly letter the way was opened for what is to-day the most important function of the epistle—its use as an amulet to ward off all harm. The origin of the apotropæic aspect of the 'heaven letter' is obvious, but cannot be supported at present by documentary evidence. A Swiss letter of, at latest, the early 16th cent. (Dieterich, 248 f.), purporting to be that which 'bapst leo kunig karolo von himmel sant,' promises to gain honour and prosperity for its bearer and to protect him against enemies, death by water or fire, and false witnesses, to bring a travailing woman to happy delivery, and to keep the whole house from injury. This particular text does not mention the Sunday law, but in another, of 1604 (Delehaye, 191 f.), the mandatory and apotropæic functions are combined. The letter is still a favourite amulet among the German soldiery, and is also used for general protection of person and house (Dieterich, 240, 249 f.). It is also found among the Slavs (E. Kozac, *JPTh* xviii. [1892] 155).

The origin of the wide-spread 'Sunday letter' is, as Delehaye has conclusively shown (207 ff.), the West, not the East, and, in all probability, Africa or Spain (the latter country being the more likely, since Vincentius, to whom Licinianus wrote, was bishop of Iviza, in the Balearic Islands).

The counterpart to the 'heaven letter' is the 'hell letter.' Apart from a cursory mention by T. Trede (*Wunderglaube im Heidentum und in der alten Kirche*, Gotha, 1901, p. 257) of a letter written by Satan and preserved in Girgenti, however, no instance of an infernal epistle seems to be recorded. On the other hand, letters to the infernal gods are known from classic times (Dieterich, 251). In the 14th and 15th centuries a number of epistles were ascribed to Satan, but these were solely satirical in purpose (see W. Wattenbach, 'Über erfundene Briefe in Handschriften des Mittelalters,' *SBAW*, 1892, pp. 91–123, and for an admirable specimen *ib.* 104–122).

Literatur.—In addition to the works mentioned in the art. see I. F. Knorrn, *Diss. . . . de libris et epistolis cœlo et inferno delatis*, Helmstedt, 1725; H. Delehaye, *Bull. de la classe des lettres . . . acadêm. roy. de Belgique*, III. xxxvii. [1899] 171–213; A. Dieterich, *Kleine Schriften*, Leipzig, 1911, pp. 234–251; K. Abt, 'Von den Himmelsbriefen,' *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde*, viii. [1909]; T. O. Radlach, 'Zur Lit. und Gesch. der Himmelsbriefe,' *Zeitschr. des Vereins für Kirchengesch. in der Provinz Sachsen*, v. [1908] 238–248; R. Priebsch, *Din vröve botschaft ze der christenheit*, Graz, 1895; V. G. Kirchner, *Wider die Himmelsbriefe*, Leipzig, 1908; W. Köhler, 'Himmels- und Teufelsbriefe,' *Religion in Gesch. und Gegenwart*, iii. (Tübingen, 1912) 29–35. Many German specimens are given in such periodicals as *Schweiz. Archiv für Volkskunde*, *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde*, etc.; see also above, p. 761[a].

Louis H. Gray.

LETTS.—See Lithuanians and Letts.

LEUCIPPUS.—See Democritus.

LEVI BEN GERSHON.—1. Life and influence.—Levi ben Gershon, familiarly known in Hebrew literature as Ralbag, from the initials of his name, called also Gersonides, Leon de Bagnols, Magister Leo de Bannolis, and Magister Leo Hebræus, Jewish philosopher, exegete, mathematician, and astronomer, was born in Bagnols (S. France) in 1288, and died on April 20th, 1344. Levi lived at Orange and at Avignon, where it is supposed that he practised as a physician. His life fell in a period when discussion raged furiously between the followers of tradition and those who read their philosophical conceptions into the text of Scripture. Levi belonged to the latter class, and, though under the influence of the great Stagyrite and his Arabic interpreter, Averroes, he was not afraid to criticize them—just as he was sufficiently open-minded to differ from Ptolemy in matters of astronomy.

He was, like most of the great scholars in the Middle Ages, a polyhistor; but his interest in Jewish theology, as well as his studies in metaphysics, accentuated his occupation with many of the exact sciences. Just as Aristotelian theories regarding the spheres and the stars as the virtual intermedium between the Deity and man made a study of astronomy necessary, so did occupation with questions concerning the Jewish calendar necessitate a knowledge of both mathematics and astronomy. Of Levi's life we know very little; but its end must have been darkened by the clouds that hung over his people and led him to compute the Year of Redemption to be 1358, and to write horoscopes for the years 1343 and 1344.

In Hebrew literature Levi's chief influence was as a philosopher and Bible commentator. He was the first after Maimonides to present to his fellow Jews a complete system of philosophy; and, while he found many followers, his comparative freedom from the fetters of tradition evoked strong opposition. Ḥasdai b. Abraham Crescas († 1410) severely criticized his philosophical deductions; and he was decried as unorthodox by such writers as Isaac b. Sheshet († 1408), Abravanel (1450), Shem Ṭob b. Shem Ṭob (1461), Messer Leon (1475), Elias Delmedigo († 1497), and Manasseh b. Israel (1627). Indeed, in 1546 it was dangerous to print his chief work on philosophy. But the opposition which he aroused is proof that he was widely read. His influence extended outside his own circle. Spinoza adopted his theories regarding miracles; Pico de Mirandola praised his astronomical treatise,

[1] This date may be carried back to the early 4th cent., and to the East, if the Coptic exhortation to Sunday-hallowing by Peter of Alexandria († 311) be genuine. Even so, however, the origin of the 'Sunday letter' seems, from internal evidence, to be Occidental, not Oriental. On this letter of Peter see C. Schmidt, 'Fragmente einer Schrift des Märtyrerbischofs Petrus von Alexandrien,' *TU* II. v. 4b [1901]), and Delehaye's review in *Analecta Bollandiana*, xx. [1900] 101–103. It may be remarked, moreover, that the association with Peter the Apostle, as in the letter of Licinianus, would naturally be the oldest, and that from him the transfer to Peter of Gaza, Antioch, or Nimes was made later.

part of which Pope Clement VI. (1342) ordered to be translated into Latin; and he is mentioned by Reuchlin and Keppler. Further, he was the real discoverer of the *baculus*, or 'Jacob's Staff,' an instrument for measuring angles and distances on the earth and in the spheres—a discovery which has been attributed to Regiomontanus. He also invented the *camera obscura*, in order to be able to find out the relation of the radii of the sun and the moon to the radius of a circle, to measure the size of the eclipse of these two bodies, and to ascertain the relation of the diameter of the whole body to that of the part obscured. He laid down these results in his *Luḥôth ha-t'kunnāh* ('Astronomical Tables'), incorporated in the fifth part of the *Milḥâmôth*. This was 200 years before Leonardo da Vinci and Porta.

2. Philosophy.—Levi's philosophical system is contained in his *Milḥâmôth Adhônai* ('Wars of the Lord,' Riva di Trenta, 1560, Leipzig, 1856). His controversy with Maimonides centred about the creation of matter and the immortality of the soul. In order to posit God's interference in natural phenomena and to form a basis for the existence of miracles, Maimonides had denied the eternity of matter, while he had not proved the possibility of individual immortality. Levi held opposite views; but, in order to justify his standpoint, he found it necessary to explain the physical and metaphysical theories upon which his idea of the co-eternity of matter with God was based. The *Milḥâmôth*, which is in six parts, covers the whole ground of natural philosophy, metaphysics, and theology in the following order: theory of the soul; prophecy; God's omniscience; providence; astronomy, physics, and metaphysics; Creation and miracles.

According to Levi, the basis of human intellect is in reality the imaginative soul, something akin to the animal soul. This human intellect is moved to action by the universal intellect; when joined to the acquired ideas and conceptions, it becomes the acquired intellect. This acquired intellect is made up of universals; and Levi holds, with the realists, that such universals have a real existence. It is therefore possible that the acquired intellect may continue to exist after death, thus affording us a philosophical basis for the theological doctrine of the immortality of man. In a similar manner he lays the foundation for the belief in prophecy by connecting the rational faculty in man, which then comes into play, with the universal intellect. Prophecy is thus differentiated from divination, in which the imaginative power in man is, so to speak, the receiving instrument, and to whose workings no certainty can be attached. Maimonides had based his theory upon the imaginative side of the human mind and upon the will of God, without attempting to explain the psychological process. Levi, on the other hand, demands moral as well as intellectual perfection in the prophet.

There are three grades of superhuman forces—the planetary intelligences, the active intellect, and the primary cause of all, God. God's existence is proved by the phenomena of creation; and His oneness is deducible from the evident hierarchy in the forces that move the universe. The planetary intelligences are made up of the spirits of the stars, which are to be thought of as immaterial bodies swinging in recurring periods in the world harmony. There are forty-eight such sphere intelligences and eight astral ones, corresponding to the forty-eight spheres and the eight planets. No one of the sphere intelligences can be—as Averroes supposed—the primary cause, since they affect a part of the universe and not the whole. In contradistinction to Aristotle, Levi holds that the world had a beginning, since neither matter nor motion is infinite; but, like the heavenly bodies, it has no end. At creation, matter was inert and undetermined. Form and various attributes were given to it by God, but the diverse separate intelligences proceeded directly from the Divine Being. Miracles do not proceed from the Deity, but from the active intellect. Natural laws are of two kinds: those governing the heavens, upon which sublunary phenomena are dependent, and those governing the active intellect. Miracles are natural events, and are meant to act as a counterpoise to the inflexibility of the celestial bodies. According to Levi, there is a definite analogy between the knowledge of God and that of man; but there is a clear distinction to be made between them. God's knowledge extends over all the cosmic laws of the universe, and over the influence exercised upon sublunary things by the celestial bodies; but He does not know the details of what happens in the sublunary world. This explains the possibility of the freedom of the will, which does not in any way derogate from God's omniscience or imply any imperfection in Him, as He knows all that is essential.

God's providence does not extend to every individual, as Maimonides had supposed; nor does it deal only with mankind as a whole—the theory of Aristotle. Levi strikes a middle course, and holds that some human beings are under a general providence, others under a special, and that the quantity of special providence meted out to any individual is in direct relation to the scale in creation which he has reached—*i.e.*, to the degree of nearness to the active intellect attained by him. The solicitude of this special providence, appreciated only by beings of the highest perfection, manifests itself in a warning to avoid evil influences emanating from the celestial bodies, all of which are regulated by eternal laws known to the Deity.

These philosophical and metaphysical doctrines are found again in Levi's commentaries on various books of the Bible, written between the years 1326 and 1338—notably in those on the Pentateuch and the Former Prophets—and they have even been excerpted and published in separate form under the title of *Tô'alîyôth* (Riva di Trenta, 1550-64). In addition to these he wrote comments on Job, Daniel, Proverbs, Canticles, Esther, Ecclesiastes, and Ruth. Levi's explanations are quite consciously two-faced. He is perfectly well aware of the literal meaning of the text, which he explains with lucidity and clearness, following in many cases Ibn Ezra; even miracles, *e.g.*, he explains in a natural sense. But behind this literal meaning he sees a philosophical and historic sense, which he deduces out of the text with great skill. He also finds his scientific principles rooted in the Bible—on the theory that all knowledge is one, the separate parts of which cannot contradict each other.

This philosophic bent of mind is likewise seen in his works on pure science. He believed himself to be an absolute rationalist, and held that no problem was insoluble to man. He even dared to explain geometric axioms. His work on arithmetic (*Ma'ăsēh Ḥôshĕbh*) differs from that of Ibn Ezra, which may be said to be dogmatic and mechanical, in that it attempts to build up a theoretic system founded upon an algebraic basis taken from the elements of Euclid. The same spirit is shown in his tract *de Numeris harmonicis*, dealing with a question in algebra put to him by Philip of Vitry, Bishop of Meaux. Levi was also one of the first writers in Europe to study trigonometry, and he worked out a commentary on the first five books of Euclid.

His views on astronomy are, of course, the integral part of his general system of philosophy, and are largely contained in the fifth section of his *Milḥāmôth*. Here again he shows his freedom of judgment. He is not afraid to criticize both Alpetragius (al-Bitruji) and Ptolemy. He takes into consideration a system akin to that of Copernicus, but only to reject it as quite impossible. According to Levi, the various movements of a star depend upon more than one sphere, so that the number of the heaven-circles equals the number of all these movements. Each planet also belongs to several spheres—which accounts for the complicated courses of the stars. Yet he is not satisfied with so simple a statement, the current mysticism of his day leading him to seek a deeper meaning in these movements. The object of the stars, he says, is to exercise an influence here on earth in order to make good the evident incompleteness of earthly things. This influence, however, is not plenary; man's freedom of will can break through the causal nexus of the dominance of stars, and the higher a man ascends in the scale of humanity the greater is his power to overcome this influence. Levi is thus a firm believer in astrology, the existence of which, he says, 'no one can doubt.' The light of the sun warms the earth because there is some secret connexion between the sun and the element of fire which is not possessed by the other heavenly lights.

3. **Appreciation.**—Levi's method is, in all cases, first to state the opinions of his predecessors, to criticize these opinions, and then to state his own view. It is significant that the first work that he wrote was one on logic, in which he reviews Averroes' interpretation of the *Analytics* of Aristotle. His general position can be stated best in his own words:

'If thought carried us to a conclusion which does not seem to result from the simple wording of Holy Writ, we would still have no scruple to speak the truth; for to do this would not run counter to Biblical ethics, which cannot ask us to believe that which is false.'

He must not in any way be considered as a sceptic; he found means to harmonize the truth, as he saw it, with received tradition. Nor did he in any way care for the applause of the multitude, though he did believe that some subjects were not fit for discussion. Indeed, he says on one occasion:

'By God, it is the intention of the author to hide his words from the crowd, in order to be understood only of the few, and to do no harm to others.'

In view of this, it seems impossible to hold, as some have done, including Curtze, Cantor, and Günther, that, very late in life, Levi became a convert to Christianity. The basis for this view is found in some expressions in the dedication (in 1342 to Pope Clement VI.) of the Latin translation of a part of the chapters on astronomy contained in his *Milḥāmôth*. But there was no need to adopt such a course in Avignon, where the Jews were treated by the popes with conspicuous kindness. All Levi's writings exhibit a strong Jewish feeling, and none of his literary and philosophic opponents mentions the charge. Carlebach suggests rightly that this dedication must have been composed for him by some one else, who wrote what he pleased, as Levi was unacquainted with Latin.

LITERATURE.—M. Seligsohn and I. Broydé in *JE* viii. 26 ff.; M. Joël, *Levi ben Gerson als Religionsphilosoph*, Breslau, 1862; Joseph Carlebach, *Lewi ben Gerson als Mathematiker*, Berlin, 1910; I. Weil, *Philosophie religieuse de Lévi-Ben-Gerson*, Paris, 1868; M. Steinschneider, *Hebräische Übersetzungen*, Berlin, 1893, p. 27; A. Neubauer, *Les Écrivains juifs français*, ed. E. Renan, Paris, 1893, p. 240; S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, do. 1857–59, p. 498; Gerson Lange, *Sefer Maassei Choscheb: die Praxis des Rechners. . . . des Levi ben Gerschom*, Frankfort, 1909.

RICHARD GOTTHEIL.

LIBERAL JUDAISM.—The changes in thought which marked the close of the 18th cent. and so powerfully affected the course of the 19th did not pass without influencing Judaism. Moreover, the external barriers between the Jews and the rest of the world were broken down by the changes which preceded and followed the French Revolution, and the problem arose as to the harmonization of the new social life with the old religious institutions. These two causes, the intellectual and the social, have not always had the same relative importance; sometimes the one, sometimes the other, has predominated. But they have not been isolated, because the two are essentially related. The social changes in the position of the Jews were bound up with the modification of the European intellectual outlook. Those who have led the liberal Jewish cause have mostly been the intellectually and socially 'emancipated'—those, in short, who have most deeply felt the consequences of the altered attitude of men in general towards the problems of thought and of intercourse.

There has been nothing in the nature of schism, because, on the one hand, there has been no established synagogue (see HERESY [Jewish]), and, on the other, the leaders of the new movements have invariably been animated with a strong loyalty to the common cause of Judaism. But from time to time these new movements have been distinctly marked off from the older Judaism by less reliance on tradition. The earlier Reform in Judaism was an attempt to re-state Judaism in the light of the new Jewish learning, which did so much to promote the 'higher criticism' of the Talmud. It was seen that the Rabbinic Codes were the result of growth, that they had a history which, while it made them more interesting as expressions of the progressive life of Jewry, necessarily undermined their authority as unalterable norms. The older Rabbinic Judaism had made far fewer claims to the permanent validity of traditional forms than did the conservative Judaism of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. In the Jewish life of the 18th cent. there were many customs—ritualistic and social—which, in the light of historical criticism, were seen to be of very various date and significance. Reform, accepting this criticism, busied itself with the valuation of traditions, establishing or accepting the validity of some and not of all. More and more, too, the conception became firmly formed—though there are at the present day some 'liberals' who are also 'Zionists'—that the Jews were not a nation but a religious community, and that, while the maintenance of the synagogue as an independent organization was absolutely essential for the vitality and continued existence of Judaism, yet it was imperative to find as a basis for the maintenance of independence other means than the retention of separative customs.

The course of Reform in Judaism thus became in part a matter of detail. Some of these details were of small significance, such as the question whether to pray with covered or uncovered heads. But others were of greater importance. One of these was the position of women. Woman always occupied a high position in Jewish esteem (see I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896, ch. v.). But the Reform movement tended to express this esteem of woman by admitting her more fully to congregational equality with men. Another detail was the question of language. The first effective Reform movement occurred in Germany; Moses Mendelssohn—who, however, belongs to the history of Reform only in a special sense—wrote three sermons in German in 1757 on the occasion of the victories of Frederick the Great. Vernacular sermons had been in regular vogue much earlier (L. Zunz, *Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der*

*Juden*², Berlin, 1892, pp. 424–496). But, in the centuries preceding the age of Reform, sermons were rare in synagogues, being usual only twice a year, and then the language employed by the preacher was either some form of Hebrew or a dialect, such as Yiddish. The establishment of regular sermons in the pure vernacular and the fuller organization of religious education for the young, especially as regards girls, are among the most important changes which the modern conservative synagogue owes to the liberals. Again, the introduction of the organ and the employment of vernacular prayers and hymns were further stages in the Reform movement (1810), which, on the whole, sought to 'æstheticize,' or, as some have ineptly expressed it, to 'de-orientalize,' the synagogue services.

But there was a deeper principle at work, and, as time went on, the Reform movement, attaching itself to such views as that of Maimonides that the Pentateuchal sacrificial system was a concession to the weakness of early Israel, sought to remove the liturgical prayers for the restoration of the sacrifices and also for the physical resurrection and return to Palestine, without, however, surrendering the belief in immortality and in the Messianic Age. Liberal Judaism has always tended to a firm grasp of Messianism, in the form of a belief in the perfectibility of human nature, of a steady advance towards that end, and of the ultimate conversion of the world to monotheism, and the establishment of the universal Kingdom of God.

Much anxiety was presented by the Saturday Sabbath, and since the beginnings of Reform the problem has grown in difficulty. Economic pressure among the working and professional classes, as well as laxity and assimilation among the more wealthy and leisured circles, has led to a weakening of the seventh day sabbatical rule among conservatives as well as among liberals. No real solution has been found, for, while Sunday services have been established in some liberal Jewish congregations of Germany and America, there has been very little desire or attempt to transfer the Sabbath from Saturday to Sunday.

Reform in Judaism entered on a new and more fertile phase under the inspiration of Abraham Geiger (1810-74). He was one of the leading representatives of the new learning—of the 'science' of Judaism, to use the phrase often applied to it. His writings were of great significance; indeed, his *Urschrift* (Breslau, 1857) is a work which is becoming more and more appreciated as a contribution to Biblical and historical criticism. But, though Geiger was possessed of a 'historical temper'—to use E. G. Hirsch's phrase—he did not, as the 'Breslau' school of Jewish thought tended to do, separate his criticism from his creed. Just because he conceived of Judaism not as a given quantity but as a process (*JE* v. 586), Geiger recognized the necessity of making that process harmonious. His whole struggle for Reform was based on his sense that thought and religion must be syncretized, not put into separate compartments. Some very sincere and very great Jews of the Breslau School were able to discriminate between intellectual and practical freedom, but Geiger could not arrive at critical results in his study and go on with religious conformity as though nothing had happened to compromise the sanctions on which conformity was based. The same attitude towards sanctions and their influence on life is at the root of the liberal Judaism of our own time.

Parallel with this was the conviction among certain Reformers that it was necessary to return to the Bible in order to purge Judaism from Rabbinism. This tendency was shown in the discussions of the French Sanhedrin, summoned by Napoleon in 1806. So, too, when the first Reform synagogue was opened in England (1842), the authority of the 'Oral Law' was repudiated, while, as D. W. Marks, the minister of the new congregation, put it, in his sermon published on the occasion, 'for Israelites there is but one immutable law, the sacred volume of the scriptures, commanded by God to be written down for the unerring guidance of his people until the end of time.' Similarly, Isaac M. Wise (1819–1900), the great organizer of Jewish Reform in the United States of America, and the founder of the famous Hebrew Union College of Cincinnati, strenuously maintained the older view of Biblical inspiration; to the end of his life he upheld the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, as in his *Pronaos to Holy Writ* (Cincinnati, 1891). But this easy discrimination between 'Mosaism' and 'Rabbinism' was not tenable when the newer Biblical criticism affected the synagogue. Geiger had been a 'higher critic' not only of Rabbinism but also of Mosaism. Similarly, Zunz (1794–1886) was not only a pioneer in the criticism of the Midrash; he was also a leader in the criticism of the Biblical text which the Midrash expounded. For some time, however, a half-way house was built by those who, while firmly holding by the authority of the Bible, denied the authority of tradition. But the house constructed with so much care proved an ephemeral lodging for the new Judaism. And this for two reasons. Whereas the older confident view as to Biblical authority was undermined, the newer repudiation of tradition was equally felt to be ill-founded. Mystical theories, not always consciously recognized as mystical, have invaded all forms of religion, and Judaism at present is much infected by mystical conceptions. Liberal Judaism, feeling itself bound to assert that not all the Bible is of God, became equally assured that not all the tradition is of man. It believes in a spiritual continuity of the ages, and regards the whole of the Jewish revelation as a spiritual experience, which links together all generations of Jews, including the present generation. It is not, however, necessary to insist on this way of describing what has happened. It can be expressed rationally by the assertion that criticism has tended to prove that, just as documents grew up from traditions, so traditions may have the validity of documents. Hence it is becoming usual now to speak of 'liberal Judaism,' whereas in former generations the favoured term was 'Reform Judaism.' Liberal Judaism in a real sense bases itself on the Scriptures. It may be described in general terms as a direct resumption of the prophetical Judaism. But it regards the Talmud as often a real advance in religious and ethical teaching, and therefore has the warmest affection for the Talmud as the expression of certain important aspects of the Jewish genius. Thus liberal Judaism, though necessarily denying the validity of any book whatever as a final authority in religion, is strongly placed by its very power of eclecticism. It has not yet formulated a precise theory as to its relation to the idea of Law. But it is coming to accept the theory of progressive revelation in a manner which must eventually become interpretable in objective, communal, and therefore more or less legalistic, terms.

It is unnecessary to discuss more fully the tenets of liberal Judaism, because in most fundamental principles it is at one with conservative opinion. Liberal Judaism shares the belief in the absolute unity of God, in the revelation of God to man, in human responsibility, in immortality, in the call of Israel to teach the universal Fatherhood of God, in the pragmatic sufficiency of righteousness for salvation to all men despite differences of creed,

and in the ultimate triumph of right throughout the world. Liberal Judaism, however, more consciously upholds the universalistic character of the religion, and lays more stress on the fundamental principles than on their expression in ceremony and institution. It allies itself specifically to the teaching, or rather to the spirit, of the Hebrew prophets, who made their appeal to the great truths of religion and morality, and who held that these truths can be brought to bear directly on the life of humanity. But liberal Judaism maintains, as strongly as does the older Judaism, that spirit and letter, prophet and priest, are not antithetic. Hence, although some individual liberal Jews are now expressing appreciation of parts of the NT, liberal Judaism does not acquiesce in any general condemnation of Pharisaism apart from the abuses to which every organized system is liable. On its part, while reducing considerably the number and details of ceremonial observances, and while leaving even such important ritual as the dietary laws a matter for individual choice, liberal Judaism accepts and maintains the idea of ceremony as valuable for enforcing the religious life in the synagogue and for sanctifying the home. Hence the Sabbath, and great festivals, and a number of other public and family rites are lovingly retained. The very fact that this can be done without the ritual precision marking the observance of the same rites in the older Judaism is tending to revive many beautiful customs, full of significance for the historical continuity of religious experience, and possessed of spiritual value, which modern conditions of life were weakening or destroying. It may be said, in conclusion, that liberal Judaism applies to ceremonies the test of present values. It believes in the retention of whatever of the past has vital value in the present or promises a renewal of value in the future.

LITERATURE.—D. Philipson, *The Reform Movement in Judaism*, New York, 1907 (a complete history of the movement with many quotations, and full references to the earlier literature on the subject); C. G. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism*, London, 1903, *Outlines of Liberal Judaism*, do. 1912; *Richtlinien zu einem Programm für das liberale Judentum*, Frankfort, 1912 (an important series of declarations which are the basis of the liberal revival in Germany now in progress); volumes of the annual *Year Books* of the Central Conference of American Rabbis (the meeting in Detroit in 1914 was the 25th of the series); *Jewish Addresses*, London, 1904, and other publications of the Jewish Religious Union, London.

I. ABRAHAMS.

LIBERTARIANISM AND NECESSITARIANISM.—I. *THE CONTROVERSY AND ITS METHODOLOGY.*

—Libertarianism[1] is misrepresented by necessitarians; necessitarianism is misunderstood by libertarians. So we find it urged by writers on either side of this discussion, and even a moderate acquaintance with the relevant literature substantiates both these charges. This is not due to wilfulness, but arises partly from the ambiguity of language which is unequal to the subtlety of nature, though mainly, as we shall see, from the intrinsic difficulty of the problem itself.

'Both parties commit themselves to a confusion which arises from language, and which is due to the fact that language is not meant to convey all the delicate shades of inner states' (Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, p. 160). 'Facts must be described in some way and therefore words must be used,' as B. Jowett reminds us (*Interpretation of Scripture and other Essays*, London Library Series, n.d., p. 526), but 'always in philosophy with a latent consciousness of their inadequacy and imperfection.'

It is therefore necessary to analyze terms like 'cause,' 'motive,' 'character,' which play such an important rôle in this discussion; for we must make sure that the question is not a logomachy, but a real one.

Thus the term 'causality' is allowed by custom, 'the arbiter of language,' to embrace many meanings. The scientist means by it uniformity of sequence, and objects to any other meaning. Now it is clear that, if this is a full account of causation, libertarianism in any sense is meaningless. For to seek the cause of a moral action in the past is to desert the moral standpoint, and is vetoed by the moral consciousness. Moreover, causality as uniform sequence seems to be full of contradictions. There are uniform sequences which are not causally connected, as the conjunction of night and day. Again, uniform sequence lands us in an infinite regress. The intellect which meant to satisfy itself by going one step back is urged to go back for ever. When we come to man, however, we find, or seem to find, a 'cause' which is intelligible in itself. We know *why* we act in some cases; it is because we have purposes which we wish to realize, ideals by which we guide our actions. It may not be possible to explain *how* we act, because activity is an ultimate element in our experience, just as we cannot say how we think, but *cogito ergo sum*. Man, then, appears to himself the principle of his own movements; here the cause is immanent and efficient. And he guides himself by ideas; here the cause is final. At first men applied 'cause' in this full sense to the world of nature, as we still do in ordinary speech.

'Savages wherever they see motion which they cannot account for there they suppose a soul' (G. T. F. Raynal, quoted by T. Reid, *Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind*, 3 vols., London, 1822, iii. 269).

As time went on, this rich view of causality as applied to nature became eviscerated. Final causes were fruitless, efficient cause was useless, the regularity of sequences sufficed. No one can deny that this was a gain, that superstition and magic thus received a death-blow, and that nature was examined with greater impartiality and rewarded the patient student. It is, however, questionable whether this view is rightly termed causality at all, for what is it but an attempt to understand a change without beginning or end, an attempt which succeeds only because it has the instinct to stop somewhere and to take just as much of the change as it pleases? A change, however, can never explain itself, and it certainly cannot explain the subject who is conscious of it or the moral agent who thinks—rightly or wrongly—that he can direct it in accordance with his aims. In discussing freedom we must ask which view of causation is the most satisfactory. It will not do to foreclose the question off-hand by a bigoted adherence to uniformity of sequence as alone possible or exhaustive. If we remember this looseness in the use of the term 'cause,' we are saved from initial confusion and from the arrogance of gratuitous assumptions. To say that a human action is 'caused' does not in any way inform us as to the kind of causation implied. The rashest libertarian may use the term without committing himself to determinism.

'The circulation of the blood is not the cause of life in the same sense that a blow with the hammer may be the cause of death, nor is virtue the cause of happiness in precisely the same sense that the circulation of the blood is the cause of life. Everywhere as we ascend in the scale of creation from mechanics to chemistry, from chemistry to physiology and human action, the relative notion is more difficult and subtle, the cause becoming inextricably involved with the effect and the effect with the cause, every means being an end and every end a means. Hence no one who examines our ideas of cause and effect will believe that they impose any limit on the will. They are an imperfect mode in which the mind imagines the sequence of natural or moral actions; being no generalization from experience but a play of words only. The chain which we are weaving is loose, and when shaken will drop off. External circumstances are not the cause of which the will is the effect, neither is the will the cause of which circumstances are the effect. But the phenomenon intended to be described by the words "cause and effect" is itself the will whose motions are analysed in language borrowed from physical nature' (Jowett, *op. cit.* p. 526).

Occam's razor[1] is no doubt a useful instrument

[1] The term, according to Thomas Reid, was introduced into philosophy by Alexander Crombie (1760–1842).

[1] 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.'

for certain purposes, but it can be abused, and it is abused when causality is shorn till nothing is left but uniform sequence.

Further, in our use of the term 'motive,' we ought to remember that motives do not act on a person as forces act on a body. While it is true that in deliberation, which is mainly intellectual, we have something metaphorically similar to the placing of weights in a balance, yet this is a metaphorical resemblance only, and in real action the decisive elements are preference and value, and these emerge from the living person himself. Motives are movements of the subject as well as movements on the subject. The subject acts on its own affections.

'We must reject also the idea that our motives are fixed and given quantities which operate within the soul like weights on a pair of scales, thus effecting a decision. Must all conduct result from given motives—cannot new motives arise from inner transformations of life? And, moreover, must not the soul continually assign fresh values to the motives?' (Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, p. 439, footnote).

If moral activity is real, then we cannot speak as if a decision was a resultant compounded of many different forces acting on one centre; we find rather that one course of action is preferred by a person and acted on. The rejected proposals do not enter into the action as in the case of mechanical resultants. In fact they may even strengthen the preferred activity—by rousing the subject to greater effort. It is often said that the strongest motive always prevails, but, if this means that the motive which prevails is always strongest, we have an identical, and so a useless, proposition. If it means, as most ordinary people take it to mean, that our reason always obeys our passions, that, in Bentham's phrase, 'nature has placed man under the empire of pleasure and pain' (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, London, 1789, ch. i.), then it is not true. While men act largely from passion, they need not do so; and, indeed, to most people, as Lecky points out, 'the reality of all moral freedom ultimately depends' on the distinction between our will and our desires, on what Reid in his able discussion on this point calls our animal and our rational natures (W. E. H. Lecky, *Eur. Morals*[8], London, 1888, ii. 123; Reid, *Essays*, iv. ch. 4). It is just because a mechanical view of motives is tacitly assumed as true that so much confusion arises. J. S. Mill failed to distinguish properly between desire and will for this reason (see A. C. Pigou, *The Problem of Theism*, London, 1908, p. 79); and, when T. H. Green says: 'but he being what he is, and the circumstances being what they are at any particular conjuncture, the determination of the will is already given, just as an effect is given in the sum of its conditions' (*Works*, London, 1906, ii. 318; cf. *Prolegomena*, Oxford, 1883, p. 126), we feel that in the last clause he has given up his own standpoint and descended into another genus of thought. No one has done more to explain the real nature of motives than Green, and perhaps this is an unfortunate lapsus. Libertarians have probably fastened on this and the corresponding sentence in the *Prolegomena* with too great avidity. Green not only recognized, but enforced and carried through all his moral reasonings, the difference between motives and the solicitations of desire. While we admit, then, that moral action depends on motives, we do not by this admission decide the question of freedom either one way or another. We have still to ask what the nature of this relation is.

Again, no term is more abused in this discussion than 'character' (see Eucken, *op. cit.* p. 422 ff., and art. CHARACTER, vol. iii. p. 364 f., for the various meanings of this term). While the determinist tends to look on 'character' as fixed at each stage, its growth depending on the interaction between it and circumstances also fixed, the indeterminist sometimes speaks of the will as acting independently of the character; and so in the former case we have character explained as mechanical, and actions looked on without regard to any real activity of the subject, while in the latter case we have a subject with no content. But, in reality, what we have is a subject possessing a character which has to be conserved or bettered in the midst of circumstances. We have a subject conditioned by its object but relatively independent of it. This 'character' is not fixed at any point, nor are these circumstances unalterable. Circumstances and character are not indifferent to the subject, nor does the subject act otherwise than through them. But, if the subject could not act teleologically on them and through them, there would be no moral life at all. There is a seeming paradox in all self-control or self-denial, as Plato saw, but it is a paradox explicable only on the ground that personality is a potential infinite under self-imposed moral government.

If 'character' be used in a sense which gives no future to man, which forgets that man does not grow simply as a plant grows, but that he draws on the future also for his spiritual sustenance, then Martineau and others are justified in drawing some distinction between the 'self' and the 'character.' In fact, some such distinction is used in every philosophical system which recognizes that man can obey ideals and an 'ought' which is higher than 'is.'

With regard to moral laws, experience is (unfortunately) the mother of pretence, and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to allow laws relating to what I ought to do to be determined or limited by what is done' (Kant, *Works*, ed. G. Hartenstein, Leipzig, 1867–68, iii. 26).

In regard even to the past there is a very true sense in which a spiritual being like man can be said to create it. He selects from it, and reacts upon it. If the self is treated as fixed, *i.e.* if its future determinations are calculable, if any dubiety on this head is held to be owing to our imperfect knowledge, then we are unconsciously falling back on a biological view of the self. This may be done in the interests of our ideal freedom, as by certain Hegelians; but there is the danger that by so doing we are destroying the very possibility of this ideal freedom itself. In discussing the question of freedom, the phrase 'self-determination' or 'determination by character' may be used in a way that ignores the very possibility of freedom. We do not solve the question by the phrase 'self-determination' or 'self-realization.' We need to examine what this self is, and what is the nature of the determination.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the misunderstanding between the two parties is deeper than language, that it is inherent in the problem itself. The question of freedom is but a specific way in which different theories of life conflict. The controversy is like a combat between two representative champions, on the issue of which the fate of armies depends. That is what gives the problem its perennial interest and importance, and makes it so difficult of solution. It is true, as Eucken points out, that in recent times more than in the past the solution of the problem is attempted through an analysis of experience (*op. cit.* p. 433), but the problem cannot be solved on that arena alone; it is mainly a philosophical and theological question. The wider issues emerge sooner or later on whatever plane we attempt a solution. Freedom may be taken as the touchstone of every philosophical system. To explicate a theory from this standpoint is to come face to face with its real implications.

'If there be anything obscure and difficult in philosophy we are sure to find it in that part which treats of Elections and

Liberty' (W. King, *Origin of Evil*[4], Cambridge, 1758, ch. v. sect. i.).

This is the reason why in actual discussions we find the battle raging, not round a single point, but over a wide area of consequences, and herein is the danger that we may attribute to thinkers consequences which they repudiate, because we think these consequences follow from admitted premisses. We can accuse men of bad logic; we must not falsely report them.

For example, necessitarianism is often identified with fatalism.

'It is supposed to imply the existence of a Fate which forces people, whether they like it or not, to commit so many murders in proportion to their population, or forces a sober person to take to drink because his grandfather was a drunkard' (Leslie Stephen, *Hobbes*, London, 1904, p. 157 f.).

J. S. Mill protested against this identification, and distinguished between his own view and such a view as that of Robert Owen, according to whom our characters were made for us and not in any sense by us. We must allow the distinction. It is not necessary to start with the conviction that determinism in every form destroys morality and paralyzes conduct. Many determinists, even of what William James calls the 'hard' school, endeavour to show that morality is impossible save on their theory. Probably the ordinary man will always associate determinism with fatalism; probably his instinctive logic is right in so doing; in discussion, however, it is necessary to distinguish them, unless the force of argument compels us to identify them.

Again, the libertarian view is identified with caprice, with a liberty of equilibrium according to which the power of the will is not influenced in any way by education, experience, or training. The objections to this view, however, are so many and so obvious, and have been so often pointed out by libertarians themselves, that it is surely frivolous on the part of determinists to attack this view of liberty. What A. S. Pringle-Pattison says of J. M. E. McTaggart is true of many more.

'He attacks a "freedom of indetermination" for which I do not think any champion would enter the lists. What upholder of freedom, for example, would accept the statement that "according to the indeterminist theory our choice between motives is not determined by anything at all"?' (*Phil. Radicals*, London, 1907, p. 205 f.).

The problem will not be solved, but rather shelved, if libertarianism is identified with an exploded myth, or determinism answered by the story of Buridan's ass dying between two equally attractive bundles of hay. Conforming, then, to the proper method of carrying on this discussion, it is necessary for us to examine the various types of necessitarian doctrine, leaving out the theological aspects of the problem, which more properly fall under the title PREDESTINATION.

II. *DIFFERENT TYPES.*—When we try to classify various theories of necessity and freedom, we are tempted to neglect the historical elements, to eliminate epochal and personal peculiarities, and so to identify views that differ widely in their ultimate assumptions and aims. To do this is to do violence to facts and to confuse the problem itself. No one can justly treat Augustine and Hobbes as if they spoke in unison on this matter. Yet it is possible and desirable to examine certain typical ways in which this problem has been discussed.

1. **The common man's position.**—Perhaps the most prevalent view is to regard freedom and necessity as both true although apparently contradictory. We do not refer to the high-idealistic way of identifying opposites, but to what may be called the common man's position. W. Hamilton, *e.g.*, accepts both as facts of consciousness: to use either exclusively is to land oneself in confusion; but, while each alone is false, both together are true. Hamilton's position, however, is so dependent on his peculiar theory of knowledge and ignorance that it has now only an historical interest. It is clear that he and Mill held practically the same views on freedom when their admissions and cautions are taken into account. The fundamental assumptions of their systems are, however, very different.

Theologians often take up this position. They speak of predestination and free will as concentric circles; to us they appear inconsistent, but in reality they are compatible with each other. It may be the case that for practical purposes it is best to regard the problem as on a par with Zeno's famous paradoxes and to say: 'Solvitur ambulando.' The value of this view seems to lie in its recognition of facts and its faithfulness to experience. Its weakness consists in its theoretic helplessness. For we find too often that freedom is confined to a realm which is swiftly being conquered by necessity, or else that it is raised to a pro-temporal or supra-temporal region while experience as we know it is rigidly determined. Or, again, freedom is viewed simply as a datum of consciousness which is not in any way brought into line with the rest of experience. Human life is thus divided into two spheres which contradict each other—on one side freedom, on the other necessity.

It is very doubtful, however, if the problem can be thus solved. There are distinctions in experience, but they are not meant to be contradictories, nor are the limitations of our knowledge to be used to discredit knowledge itself. It is a gain to recognize that both freedom and necessity have a meaning, and that both are implicitly taken for granted in all systems. The most rigid determinists surreptitiously admit freedom.

'Moreover, determinism has never been completely and logically carried out at any period. When the Stoic philosophers converted the whole cosmos into a causal structure and placed the destinies of men entirely within its framework, man's power of personal decision still remained; . . . The possibility of such decision (the very core of Stoic morality) is obviously in direct opposition to the determinist doctrine. . . . And in Spinoza's case, although he so strongly maintained that man is situated entirely within a flawless network of cosmic connections, the fact remains that man has to be won over to a recognition of his position, and this recognition imparts quite a new complexion to the whole of life' (Eucken, *op. cit.* p. 435). 'Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret' (Horace, *Ep.* i. x. 24).

So also theologians like Augustine, Calvin, and Chalmers, in the interests of morality, appeal to the conscience and the power of choice. The Stoic admitted the possibility of sudden conversion. Can, then, determinism alone or freedom alone be taken as true or must both be recognized? Attempts have been made to carry necessity all through reality—with some show of plausibility.

2. **Physical determinism.**—Huxley, for instance, revived the view of Descartes that animals were simply automata, and man was explained in a similar fashion. Consciousness had no more efficient relation to the movements of a creature than the steam-whistle has to the movements of a railway train. Few, if any, biologists would agree with this theory in detail, but Huxley's assumptions and aims are still widely accepted and implicitly acted on by scientific philosophers (not necessarily scientists). His purpose was to guard physics and biology from the moralist, who worked with teleological concepts whose introduction into physics produced chaos and confusion. The scientist feels at home in dealing with the movements of matter. He can describe, predict, and to some extent control, them. He has thus enriched society, discovered new media of communication and means of comfort. The results here are so great and beneficial that one can appreciate the desire to apply the same methods to all reality. Hence the theory of the conservation of energy is

held to explain everything, and the scientific categories of cause and effect are, it is taken for granted, operative everywhere just as in physics. All apparent differences are levelled down under this theory. So consciousness arises, it is said, out of molecular motions, and accompanies them like the phosphorescent line which results from the rubbing of a match. No efficiency can originate in consciousness; otherwise there would be the intolerable fact that something came from nothing. The amount of the existing energy is so fixed that we could accurately predict the future if we knew the state of things at any moment. We do not, of course, have accurate knowledge at any time; but, if we had, then the future would be open and naked to us. This is not the divine foreknowledge of which theologians speak, for many of them admit the greatest freedom (as King in his famous sermon on Predestination, published with notes by R. Whately in his *Use and Abuse of Party Feeling in Religion*, London, 1822) as consistent with the divine foreknowledge. It is really our ordinary physical knowledge infinitely enlarged. Now this view, conveniently known as naturalism, has no place for freedom in any shape. It has no place for anything ultimately but matter and motion. This determinism is totally different from theological determinism, and should not be identified with it, as it so often is.

The libertarian can leave to the biologist the refutation of this view. He can leave it even to the physicist himself. It may be pointed out that the advance of science does not depend on extending these assumptions to cover all reality. Indeed, to do so is to make science itself chaotic and indeterminate, for the value of the principle of the conservation of energy depends on its limitation to those fields where the amount of energy is calculable. It does not in the least show how the energy whose working is calculable is related to all the energy in existence. If it tried to do so, it would be useless. Its strict delimitation is the very condition of its success. Nor does it allow for different kinds of energy; it must confine itself to quantitative relations. Hence the pretence of foretelling the future is simply a logical conclusion from the principle itself.

The fact is that biology needs new categories. The lowliest organism possessing spontaneity must not be factorized into general conditions, far less reduced to a single principle. It is doubtful if anything that can be called a 'thing' can be so explained. One golf-ball is not another, and a living being has an even more obtrusive individuality. Was this the reason why even Epicurus attributed to each atom an 'exiguum clinamen' peculiar to itself? In the higher animals at least, consciousness is a real factor whose presence helps towards preservation and propagation; it would otherwise be unintelligible. When, again, we come to explain man, we must recognize the existence of a new problem. Are we to regard history and civilization, ideals and achievements, as shadows of matter? The unsatisfactoriness of this theory is perhaps best shown by its own advocates. For they forget their own assumptions in dealing with knowledge, morality, and social life. They make morality to consist in warfare with the cosmic process (as Huxley). They regard consciousness as flowing alongside of neurotic processes, but related to them in no way: they are both manifestations of an unknown energy. Some of them (Clifford, Haeckel, etc.) make matter conscious. Further, they seem to make all reality to be somehow in consciousness, and so in the realm of shadows. The prevalence of naturalism is due to two causes. In the first place, every theory must recognize the enormous influence which the physical organism has on the inner life, the intimate relationship between the higher phases of spiritual existence and material conditions. This naturalism does, and it is therefore valuable. Again, there is a close connexion between this view and the results of science. No theory that scorns scientific results can nowadays prevail, but these results are not dependent on naturalistic assumptions. The weakness of this view is revealed when it tries to explain itself; then it either forgets itself or contradicts itself, or, as is almost always the case, it admits consciousness as a reality and tries to explain it on deterministic grounds. It leads thus to psychological determinism.

3. Psychological determinism.—The basis of this determinism is the theory of association. Consciousness is recognized as 'sui generis,' but any existing phase of it is said to be caused by the preceding. Great stress is laid also on physiological processes, often in such a way as to suggest that these are the ultimate causes. Now there is always a relation between states of consciousness even when these are qualitatively different, but to explain this relation is just the problem. The cause of this relation is not always evident to the subject experiencing it. Even the simplest case of memory is tinged with personal qualities that raise it above a mere association of ideas, and, as Bergson points out (*op. cit.* p. 156), many of our so-called associations are *ex post facto* attempts to unify experience. The main objection to this theory is its defective view of the 'self.' What we find is a bundle of impressions not one of which or all of them together make the self. A. Bain, following Hume, says: 'I cannot light upon anything of the sort [*i.e.* a self]' (*The Emotions and the Will*[3], London, 1875, p. 492). But the fact is that the self thus banished is tacitly assumed in every statement, although sensation, knowledge, and volition are all explained as if there were no subject to which they belonged. The personal equation is forgotten in each case. We are dealing all through with given quantities which arrange and rearrange themselves evidently *in vacuo*, or, rather, as Bergson insists, in space. Consciousness is a stream, or a display in a theatre at which no one is looking. What we have here pictured for us is a conflict of motives acting nowhere—a fight without fighters. When the self is recognized, it is only as a desire or aversion or a point in which motives meet, but it has neither position nor magnitude.

'To talk of motives conflicting of themselves is as absurd as to talk of commodities competing in the absence of traders' (Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 290). 'The associationist reduces the self to an aggregate of conscious states: sensations, feelings, and ideas. But if he sees in these various states no more than is expressed in their name, if he retains only their impersonal aspect, he may set them side by side for ever without getting anything but a phantom self, the shadow of the ego projecting itself into space' (Bergson, p. 165).

No one in Great Britain has done more than Green to discredit the associationist view of experience. He saw clearly that states of consciousness could never account for consciousness of states. It is true that he explicated this truth mainly in regard to the cognitive element, but it is equally true in regard to feeling, and even more in regard to volition. Sensations are determined by interest; attention depends on the subject as well as on the object. Experience is always seen from the inside, and in the nature of the case can never be seen directly from the outside. It is personal and individual. To deny this is to deny the very possibility of freedom, in fact, to make freedom meaningless; to admit it is to get a platform on which the question of necessity and freedom can be intelligently discussed.

4. Self-determination.—Can we then regard the reality of freedom as a common platform for every system that admits an activity of the subject

which issues from itself, and which cannot be reduced wholly to the influence of conditions? There is a sense in which this is true of all things —of chemical reaction, of biological growth, and of human activity. Everything—man included—has its own nature, and freedom is simply the acting out of this nature according to its own laws. Is this a sufficient account of freedom? If it is, freedom means freedom from compulsion, and it could be applied, metaphorically at least, to everything. The planets are thus free as the immortal gods; the flower that grows without being trampled on, the lion in the jungle, the man out of fetters, are all free in this negative sense. Or it might mean that man was able to fulfil the distinctive laws of his being without internal interruption, *i.e.* interruption arising from the man himself as distinct from external compulsion.

Schopenhauer understood Kant's view of freedom in this sense as the working out of the 'esse' according to its own character, conditions giving the occasions to this nature to reveal itself in time and space. Freedom here means the evolution in acts of the inner nature of the subject. The subject is free, but the acts are rigidly determined. Whether this be a true representation of Kant we do not need to inquire. At any rate freedom here seems to be the bare knowledge that we act as we act. Curiously enough, Schopenhauer admitted conversion as Kant and the Stoics did, but only as a mystery. It is now generally acknowledged that this is determinism of a very 'hard' type.

But, leaving aside Schopenhauer's clumsy apparatus of a noumenal ego and phenomenal acts, it may still be held that freedom is simply determination by oneself.

'To be free means that one is determined by nothing but oneself' (J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*[4], London, 1900, p. 94).

Every one holding the activity of the self as a fact agrees with what this statement excludes, viz. mechanical causation or compulsion. In this respect the statement is immaculate, but what does it include? We may see this from the context.

'A vicious man in a sense can, and in a sense cannot, do a good action. He cannot, in the sense that a good action does not issue from such a character as his. A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit. But he can do the action, in the sense that there is nothing to prevent him *except his character*—i.e. except himself. Now a man cannot stand outside of himself, and regard a defect in his own character as something by which his action is hindered. If he can, *but for himself*, he *can* in the only sense that is required for morality' (*ib.* p. 98 *f.*).

This view, it is held, combines the truth of necessity and freedom because it gives uniformity and spontaneity a place; but since it was set forth in 1900 a very influential school has maintained the opposite. Surely the real question is: Can the tree itself be made good? not Can grapes grow on thorns? If any libertarian holds that good fruit can come from a bad tree without changing the tree itself first, then libertarianism is indeed a lingering chimera. But, if libertarianism holds to the possibility of changing the bad character itself, then it seems worth contending for, and recent investigation into changes of character seems to substantiate its truth. The authority who tells us that a bad tree cannot bear good fruit also exhorts us to make the tree itself good, and, on the Kantian dictum that every 'ought' implies a 'can,' which Mackenzie accepts, this is possible. Is the difficulty here not due to the fact that a static and spatial view of 'character' is unconsciously adopted? The living self is as it were photographed, and this snapshot is taken as fixed and true. Yet the same writer goes on to speak of at least three different selves, one of which he places above the 'character,' and he makes real freedom obedience to this self. We are grateful to the Hegelians for emphasizing the value of this real freedom which the theologians always recognized, the freedom of a *non posse peccare* such as we imagine in a perfect being. There need be no dispute about such freedom and its desirability. But how can we attain to this freedom itself if the 'character,' the man himself, prevents its ever being sought after? It seems absurd to talk of progress here, or of degrees of freedom, if the very road towards it is barred. Fortunately, however, those holding such views are so much alive to the interests of morality that they forget their own theories, as the rigid predestinarian also does. It is sought sometimes to explain this view of freedom by the analogy of knowledge. In logical reasoning we have necessity and free activity also; that we cannot think otherwise is no restraint on thought. But does knowledge itself not advance through experiment and error? This theory, then, would do very well for a perfect world, and consciously or unconsciously it is this idea that reality is perfect that animates it, but the freedom we need is not first the freedom of absolute perfection, but one that can open a door of hope to men who err in thought and practice. We need a freedom that will help us to get the perfect freedom which none of us has as yet. When we start with a theoretic bias in favour of a perfect reality, either of two things happens.

'This system of exclusively immanent reason, with its pantheism, suffers shipwreck more particularly upon the fact of the manifold unreason in human and natural life. For, from this point of view, there are two alternatives only; either the unreason must be minimised, removed as far as possible from sight or explained away, or it must be recognised as a basic element in reality and hence held to be unassailable. Thus we have either a tendency towards optimism, which involves shallowness, or towards pessimism, which means negation and finally despair' (Eucken, p. 468 f.).

It will not do to project the activity of the subject either into a perfect absolute or into social customs. For, while a perfect absolute would explain perfect freedom, it does not explain sin and error, which are the roots of all our difficulties, nor does society give us any relief, because we find all the perplexing difficulties of our life repeated in it.

Conclusion.—The freedom which we desiderate is a moral power that can make the world better. While knowledge may be content to unfold its object and works, as Bergson says, 'in the circle of the given,' in morality we make the object. 'Action breaks the circle' (*Creative Evolution*, London, 1912, p. 203). But, if we admit this freedom to make things better and indeed to create, then we must admit also with it, as its correlative, freedom to make things worse and to destroy. Is not this what we actually find in experience? We have in man a spiritual being rising above nature to the heights of ideals, but also falling into nature, disobeying ideals, and refusing to realize them. We find new individuals appearing who were never there before, a fact which no bare singularism can ever explain. If reality were suddenly frozen into a static whole, then absolute thought would have the happy task of quiet contemplation; but reality is always active, and so living thought and living action are never satisfied with the past, nor is morality ever satisfied with the present. Bergson tries to show that it is the neglect of this dynamic nature of life that makes the whole difficulty of freedom; and for philosophy and theology the greatest task at present is to outline a theory of reality and of God that, starting from this fact, can give us some reasonable view of nature below us and God above us. Our freedom is conditioned by both of these, though in different ways; the one supplies the media, the other the norm, for the activity of spiritual beings. We are not mere cogs in the

machine of nature, nor mere points through which God irresistibly acts. May it not be the case that nature itself is more friendly to us than we imagine, that its stability is a training-ground for growing men to learn their powers, and carry out their purposes, and God Himself our very life whose unchangeable nature gives independence to our dependence, and whose perfect freedom and moral relations to us alone supply the transition by offering us the power by which we can be freed from our self-delusion and our moral thraldom? The great objection to this view is that we get something 'de novo.' But is that not just the whole claim of morality, that the present be not simply projected into the future, but that a new and a better world be created? For Christianity, at any rate, the possibility of new creatures and of a new world is basal. What a moral law, an 'ought' above the 'is' of character, implies is that this requirement is morally more reasonable than a mere re-arrangement of the existent. We need not be afraid of those who cry 'chance.' For there is so much unreason and absurdity, so much cruelty and evil, in the world that we welcome even 'chance' if it opens a door to their abolition. That this could be possible without the dangerous gift of free power we cannot conceive. But so imperative is the need of betterment that even this dangerous method is welcome. Nor need we be concerned that thus the peace of the absolute is destroyed. The only Absolute for which Christian men care has, if certain tales be true, sacrificed His own peace and more to make it possible for men to obey their conscience and be fellow-workers with God.

LITERATURE.—The literature on this subject is well-nigh unlimited; see the selection given in *DPhP*. Recent discussions are found in J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, Cambridge, 1911; H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, Eng. tr., London, 1912; R. Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, Eng. tr., do. 1912; F. C. S. Schiller, 'Freedom and Responsibility,' in *Oxford and Cambridge Review*, 1907, p. 41 ff.; Andrew Seth, *Two Lectures on Theism*, Edinburgh, 1897; Norman Pearson, *Some Problems of Existence*, London, 1907; Bertrand Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, do. 1910; Borden P. Bowne, *Personalism*, do. 1908; C. B. Upton, *The Bases of Religious Belief (HL* 1899), do. 1894, *Dr. Martineau's Philosophy* (with Introductory Essay), do. 1905; Oliver Lodge, *Man and the Universe*, do. 1910; James Lindsay, *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion*, do. 1897, ch. xiii.; G. F. Barbour, *A Philosophical Study of Christian Ethics*, do. 1911, ch. x.; see also art. FREE WILL.

DONALD MACKENZIE.

LIBERTY (Christian).—In this article no attempt is made to deal with the philosophical problems of free will and determinism, nor with the relation of free will to predestination or causality; the reader is referred to the artt. specifically treating of free will under its metaphysical and speculative aspects (see artt. FREE WILL, LIBERTARIANISM AND NECESSITARIANISM, PREDESTINATION). Of recent writers on Christian ethics Haering, *Ethics of the Christian Life* (see pp. 76–95), may be consulted for a discussion of the free will as a presupposition of Christian morality, and in particular in its relation to conscience as viewed from the Christian standpoint.

By the Biblical writers the fact of human free will is assumed, like the existence of God. Free will in its absolute sense belongs alone to the unconditioned being of the Deity, but on the moral side man is at once free and responsible. In Ezk 18[1-4] the idea of irresponsibility as a deduction from heredity is vigorously combated: 'the soul that sinneth it shall die.' Man, who is created in the Divine image, is a partaker of the Divine nature, and his freedom is the reflex of God's. When we pass into the atmosphere of the NT, we discover that personal free will is an axiom in the teaching of our Lord and His apostles. We may therefore fitly consider the following aspects of the subject.

1. **Christian liberty as a religious experience.**—The religious life in our Lord's interpretation is a filial relationship with a Heavenly Father, and therefore a life of liberty. It consists in love to God and to man. When hatred, rancour, and resentment, on the one side (Mt 5[44f.]), and needless anxiety in relation to material things, on the other (Mt 6[31-34]), have been expelled from the soul, we are then truly the sons of our Father. The submission of children to the Father above is not a surrender of liberty, but its noblest prerogative; in fact, freedom in the Christian sense is simply obedience to that which we most truly and deeply love and venerate. Freedom is attained by self-conquest, by victory over unrighteousness, of which the penalty is self-contempt and unrest. 'Come unto me . . . and ye shall find rest unto your souls' (Mt 11[28-30]) is a promise of freedom. Self-denial, therefore, to Jesus is a privilege, not a loss; the taking up of the cross (Mt 10[38] 16[24], Mk 8[34], Lk 14[27]), which looks like the loss of liberty, issues in moral emancipation.

This general view of religion explains our Lord's attitude towards the Mosaic Law, which is a conspicuous feature of His teaching alike in the Synoptic and Johannine narratives. He does not, of course, countenance an antinomian contempt of moral restriction, nor does He proclaim exemption from the Moral Law. In so far as the Mosaic Law enshrines the eternal principles of morality, it is worthy of all reverence; it is not superseded, but only consummated, by the 'New Commandment' of our Lord's teaching. On the other hand, in the course of time the Law had been marred by accretions of interpretation which tended to lay the emphasis on vexatious minutiæ of custom and usage, and elevated practices of cleanliness and health to an unnecessary prominence, with the result that trivial and secondary regulations were deemed as sacred as the original enactments. The letter of the Law was punctiliously observed by the pious Jew in the hope of propitiating God. Obedience to the outward regulation tended to cloud the finer powers of the inner life and to produce a distorted sense of the relative value of given acts. Hence our Lord's pronouncements on the unwashen hands of the disciples (Mt 15[20], Mk 7[2]) and on the proper view of the Sabbath as 'made for man' (Mk 2[27]) are to be regarded as examples of His method of interpreting the nature of Christian freedom. He substituted great principles of action for minute and arbitrary regulations supposed to be binding at all times and under all circumstances. He superseded definitions of duty—*e.g.*, our duty to our neighbour in the parable of the good Samaritan—by a commandment 'exceeding broad,' namely, the law of love.

It is obvious that this view of liberty receives its crowning illustration and its binding force from His own manhood. If we take such statements as Jn 4[34] 5[30] 6[38] as summing up the character of His own religious experience, we discover that self-will in His judgment is no freedom; the true freedom for Him was 'to do the will' of His Father. Moreover, His sinlessness is the supreme argument for His conception of freedom and the reality of His power to liberate humanity from the power of sin. These ideas are clearly expressed in His discourse to 'those Jews which had believed Him' (see Jn 8[31-36]). Professing, as 'the seed of Abraham,' that they had never suffered the extreme penalty of domination by their conquerors—a proud boast and substantially true in so far as the preservation of their racial identity was concerned—they had overlooked the true principle of freedom, which was in effect freedom from the bondage of sin. Moral emancipation was the *real* freedom (free 'essentially,' ὄντως [8[36]]) in our Lord's view. 'The

truth' which is to set men free is 'perfect conformity to the absolute, that which is' (see B. F. Westcott, *Gospel according to St. John*, London, 1908, on Jn 8^{32}, and the relation of this conception to Socratic, Stoic, and Jewish ethics). Again, in Jn $15^{14f.}$ our Lord speaks as the true imparter of freedom; He communicates to others what is His own (παρὰ τοῦ πατρός μου); and this self-communication is the basis of a friendship between Himself and His disciples in which the doing of His will is not a service but a joy.

These conceptions of Christian liberty as a religious experience find further illustration in the writings of St. Paul, to whom ἐλευθερία is a vivid and real characteristic of the Christian life; this word, with its connected epithet and verb, 'free' and 'set free,' occurs 11 times in Gal., 7 in Rom., 8 in the Corinthian Epistles, and twice in other letters (see W. M. Ramsay, *Cities of St. Paul*, London, 1907, p. 36 ff., who argues that this is one of the ideas which became familiar to St. Paul from his Hellenic environment in Tarsus and elsewhere). In the Galatian Epistle in particular he enunciates with great emphasis the freedom which the gospel confers 'in Christ Jesus' (see Gal 2^4). The Christian ἐλευθερία destroys distinctions of sex, social status, and race (3^{28}; cf. also Col 3^{11}, Eph 6^8). By an allegory which recalls our Lord's words in Jn 8^{35} he differentiates (4^{22-30}) between the children 'of a handmaid' and those 'of a free woman,' indicating that the real freedom is that of the spirit imparted to us by Christ (5^1), which involves a complete abrogation of the outward enactments of the law as a means of personal and universal salvation. He protests against submission to the rite of circumcision, which, while it had a religious significance to the Jew, had none to the Gentile, ending with 'the impatient, perhaps half-humorous wish that the Judaizers who want to circumcise the Galatians might be subjected to a severer operation themselves' (W. R. Inge, 'St. Paul,' *Quarterly Review*, no. 438 [1914], p. 53). But, while glorying in the liberty to which the Christian has been called, he is careful to avoid any misunderstanding as to its nature: liberty is not licence (5^{13}).

But to St. Paul Christian liberty has an even deeper religious significance: it involves a real emancipation from sin (Ro 6^{18-22} 8^{2-21}, 2 Co 3^{17}); and herein he carries on the teaching of our Lord. His own personal experience is: 'the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and of death' (Ro 8^2). This constitutes the true Christian sonship (Gal 4^7), 'the liberty of the glory of the children of God' (Ro 8^{21}); and we note that 'glory' here is an aspect of our present earthly existence. Sin, which is a bondage and carries with it a sense of guilt and condemnation, has been defeated by Christ, who is thus qualified to be the liberator of the soul (Gal 5^1). To early Christian writers the promise of freedom (2 P 2^{19}) from any other source is an illusion. It is from this experience of inward liberty that the fruits of the spirit—joy, peace, and hope—are developed. 'To be spiritually-minded is *life and peace*' (Ro 8^6) is a saying which recalls the serene and gentle teaching of the author of the Sermon on the Mount, and may be illustrated by the testimony of Christian experience in all ages.

St. Paul is indeed the great apostle of liberty. He regards the Christian life as one of unrestricted access to God, and lays much emphasis on the Christian duty of παρρησία, or boldness of utterance, in proclaiming the principles of the gospel (see art. 'Boldness of Speech,' *ExpT* xxi. [1909–10] 236 ff., for an elucidation of this duty). His opposition to the narrower ideal of St. Peter saved Christianity (Gal 2^{11}) and made it a world-faith. He was the advocate of liberty of thought, action, and judgment. His pronounced views on original sin and the eternal, supreme power and grace of God never weakened his sense of human accountability (Ro 1^{18} 2^6).

As J. Weiss (*Paul and Jesus*, Eng. tr., London, 1909, p. 113) remarks, 'the ethical sense of responsibility, the energy for struggle and the discipline of will was not paralysed or absorbed in Paul's case by his consciousness of redemption and his profound spiritual experiences.'

He believed in Divine election, pre-knowledge, and predestination, and, without attempting to resolve the antithesis, places human determination side by side with these. Man co-operates with Divine grace, which is a power 'appropriated by man's moral nature and conditioned by his free action' (Alexander, *The Ethics of St. Paul*, p. 144, who quotes Ph 1^6 2^{12}, 2 Co 1^{12}, 1 Th 5^{23}, and the statement of Weiss just cited).

It may also be noted that St. James's royal 'law of freedom' ($2^{8.\ 12}$) is practically identical with St. Paul's 'law of the Spirit,' consisting, as Haering (*op. cit.* p. 162) remarks, in 'freedom from the multiplicity of single precepts,' while the epithet 'royal' appears to imply that 'Christ's law is not addressed to slaves, who must obey whether they will or not, but to the heirs of the kingdom (2^5) who voluntarily embrace the law as their guide; cf. the Stoic paradox in Hor. *Ep.* I. i. 106' (see note in J. B. Mayor's commentary *ad loc.*).

2. Christian liberty in relation to the problems of ethical and social life.—It is clear from what has already been said that Christian liberty as an experience of the inner life has a direct relationship with outward practice, and has created ethical problems in the conduct of life. This is seen in the conflict of duties arising within the early Christian Church as the result of the accession of converts from paganism to its ranks. For example, St. Paul was faced at Corinth with a difference of opinion regarding the practice of eating 'things offered to idols.' Evidently the peril lay in a one-sided and over-emphasized interpretation of Christian liberty, which offended the conscience of the more cautious and self-restrained Christians. There were, in fact, two opposing tendencies represented by those who strained their new-found Christian liberty to the breaking-point—'the strong' of 1 Cor. (see ch. 8, *passim*) and Christians of a narrower type, who were more concerned about preserving personal sanctity than about exercising their Christian privileges. The claim that 'all things are lawful to me' (1 Co 6^{12} 10^{23})—the watchword of 'the strong,' quoted out of their mouth by the Apostle—had been abused not only to the extent of participation in heathen sacrificial feasts, but to the extent of advocating grave licence and immorality in sexual relationships. As E. von Dobschütz points out, such Christians were self-deceived, mistaking outward freedom for the inner freedom proclaimed by the gospel.

'The slave, instead of joying in the freedom which Christ gave him, hankered after outward liberty. The Jew, instead of gratefully recognising his freedom from the constraint of law, exerted himself to secure release from circumcision: others sought also and found the freedom only in things which were unbecoming Christianity and morally impermissible' (*Christian Life in the Primitive Church*, Eng. tr., London, 1904, p. 66).

The strong must therefore take on their shoulders the infirmities of the weak (Ro 15^1); they must spare sensitive minds the pain of witnessing practices which appear to them to be wrong; as Christians, they are to refrain where the exercise of liberty is a stumblingblock to the weak (1 Co 8^9). Finally, the strong might lead others into sin by encouraging them to eat against conscience for mere self-gratification, and thus sin not only against their brethren but against Christ (8^{12a}). Such was the ruling of the Apostle. On the other hand, the moral revulsion from paganism produced

an exaggerated asceticism which in some sections of the Church resulted in the advocacy of celibacy, in aversion to mixed marriages (1 Co $7^{12f.}$), and even in hostility to such spiritual manifestations as 'speaking with tongues,' which recalled the excitements of pagan cults. In holding the balance between such opposing tendencies, neither of which did justice to the gospel as a whole, St. Paul had a difficult task. He sympathized with the moral vigour of the one and the moral earnestness of the other, and resolved the antinomy by the proclamation of Christian love as the supreme law of conduct and the sovereign *charisma* (1 Co 13). Christian liberty is always to be humanized, corrected in its exercise even where legitimate, and modified in the doing of what is morally indifferent by the spirit of love, which teaches the Christian not so much to stand upon his rights as to consider the interest of others. Such ἐπιείκεια (Ph 4^5), or 'sweet reasonableness,' is not a weak concession to human infirmity, but a virile demonstration of tenderness and charity. It was in this sense that the Apostle himself 'became all things to all men' (1 Co 9^{22}) that he might save some. He was ready to sacrifice liberty to the claims of brotherhood; and this was the new contribution which Christianity made to the ethics of the ancient world: it superseded or (perhaps it would be more correct to say) consummated the ethics of self-realization by the ethics of self-sacrifice.

Christianity therefore condemned libertinism as an offence against the common life of humanity. The 'liberty of indifference'—of doing what one likes—is rejected by the Christian ethic as an illustration of that ἀνομία which is sin (1 Jn 3^4). Undoubtedly the interpretation of liberty against which St. Paul and later teachers protested (cf. Irenæus, *adv. Hær.* I. vi. 3, quoted by von Dobschütz, p. 270, for an account of the practices of Valentinians, curiously parallel to those of the Corinthian Church) was a mark of immaturity in the early Christian communities, due to an exultant sense of a new unrestricted life; but the influence of Gnosticism, with its dualistic separation of spirit and matter, must also be taken into account as explanatory of the repeated appearances of libertinism in the primitive Church. On the other hand, the antagonism between flesh and spirit is inherent in human nature; even when sublimated into the convenient distinction of Hebraism and Hellenism, the one standing for righteousness, the other for freedom, the two tendencies represent a fixed duality in the moral and intellectual evolution of the race. Now one element and now the other holds the sway in the life of the individual and of the community; and no one who reads the history of the Church can be blind to the fact that in given periods one of the two has exercised the greater influence and created the type of religious witness which is associated with particular epochs. After the dark ages the Renaissance represents the revival of Hellenism; and to mediæval laxity in religious and social life succeeds the Reformation, which is the triumph of Hebraism. The swing of the pendulum from Puritanism to the excesses of the Restoration in England illustrates the fact that there are recurring reactions in national life which inevitably affect the ethical standard alike of Church and society. It is clear also that the conception of Christian liberty, always subject to the expansions of a virile intellectual or rationalistic consciousness, is bound to suffer restriction and limitation during a reaction to Puritanism of life and morals; and, when the Puritan wave has spent itself, human nature re-asserts itself in a desire to regain its lost or curtailed liberty of action. Thus in all ages of the Church the question of accommodation to the habits, customs, and recreations of secular society has to be faced by the individual Christian, and in the solution of the difficulty two opposite tendencies, parallel with those in the Corinthian Church, have always made themselves felt: we should now call them the broad and the narrow view. In the present age, when we have reached a pitch of civilization in which the resources of the natural universe are placed at the disposal of mankind to an extraordinary extent and the facilities of intercommunication, luxury, and amusement are multiplied for all sections of society, Christianity is still represented by the double ideal—the one proclaiming the width of the Christian freedom, the other its self-restraint and self-limitation. Take, *e.g.*, the attitude of the modern Christian to the theatre. This is but a repetition, under another set of conditions, of the problem which the early teacher of Christianity had to face. With all our advance in moral insight, our larger views of life and destiny, we have not yet superseded the ethical principles which served as a guide to St. Paul. The individual conscience still has to weigh over against the undoubted fact of Christian liberty the influence of the personal support of certain customs or institutions not wholly moralized, and, under certain circumstances, actually immoral, still has to take into account the effect of the exercise of liberty, in matters morally indifferent, upon others not so clear in their moral vision nor sufficiently strong to meet the demands of a new temptation, as well as upon those belonging to the same community whose conscience is sensitive. At the same time, it is clear that a policy of self-isolation on the part of the Christian in regard to the defective and degrading tendencies of given recreations leaves the latter as they are; and to many Christians who interpret liberty in the wider sense consideration of the public good is paramount in determining their attitude in the matter of supporting the drama or otherwise. The law of love is not less binding to-day than in the earlier ages of the Church. It may even be argued that the developed sense of human solidarity and brotherhood, in itself the offspring of Christianity, is educating the Christian conscience to solve all such questions of conscience by a reference to the good of the community as a whole. Yet even the love of humanity, which is but another aspect of the love of God, is determined in practice by our ethical conception of the *summum bonum* for humanity; and here the Christian ideal, more especially in relation to art, differs *toto orbe* from the cult of realism popular in many quarters to-day, which is based on the theory of 'art for art's sake,' regardless of the effect on public morality. Art enriches the common life only when regarded as 'a revelation of a deeper truth in things.'

'If it is taken merely *as* art, merely as a beautiful dream, it sinks into play, becomes a mere refined amusement, and loses all its real power over the human spirit. There could hardly be any worse sign of an age than that it regards art as a mere amusement, as a mere escape from the graver problems of life' (J. S. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*[4], London, 1900, p. 443).

'All things are yours' (1 Co 3^{21}) is indeed the noblest charter of Christian freedom, but only when interpreted in the light of the succeeding words, 'ye are Christ's.' The possession of worldly treasure—literary, scientific, commercial, territorial—involves for the Christian in personal union with a Divine life a clear perception of the eternal amid the transitory, the unseen amid the temporal: his citizenship is in heaven; his real life lies in that ideal world which gives meaning, beauty, and power to the world of phenomena. Hence 'liberty' in the Christian sense is always limited by the sanctions of 'the mind of Christ'; in other words, by a reference to the ethical ideal for which Christ stands.

Less need be said as to the relation of Christian freedom to the institutions of the State, the laws of the State, and the established regulations and customs of organized communities, as this has been treated in the art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Christian), vol. v. p. 474. It is well known that neither Christ nor the apostles encouraged revolt against the State, even when, as in the case of slavery, a national institution contradicted the essential teaching of the gospel, being content to lay down universal principles rather than directions for particular nations and phases of social evolution (cf. Mt 22^{21}, Mk 12^{17}, Lk 20^{25}, Ro 13^{1-7}, 1 P 2^{17}). St. Paul, in dealing with the mutual obligations of masters and servants, bases their relationship on the fact that both are slaves of a heavenly Master (Eph 6^{5-9}, Col 3^{22-4^1}). But the Christian ideas of human equality and brotherhood carried with them a revolutionary force which inevitably tended in the course of ages to modify social custom, legislation, and practice. As an ideal, brotherhood has yet to be realized, and the process of realization involves a perpetual conflict of interests. The rights of conscience are imperative, 'are inherent in Christian faith, and cannot be ignored in the interests either of despotism or of democracy' (see art. ETHICS AND MORALITY [Christian], *loc. cit.*). The pages of Christian history are crowded with the records of attempts to assert these rights in the face of persecution, State-edicts, and repressive measures, and the annals of religious liberty are glorious with heroisms and martyrdoms cheerfully endured for conscience' sake. How far passive resistance to State legislation, when the latter conflicts with conscience, may be justified is a subtle ethical problem which is settled variously according as the casuist exalts the sacredness of a particular issue above regard to the general well-being of society as a whole, or *vice versa*. On the other hand, the Church exists to moralize State legislation and to enlighten national institutions; it guards the great ideal of human brotherhood, which involves an equal opportunity for all, and it advocates and supports all effort to alleviate human misery and to remedy imperfect social conditions, and to defeat social injustices. In the ideal of liberty, equality, and fraternity the last stands first in the order of Christian thought (cf. Murray, *Handbook of Christian Ethics*, p. 31 f.). Equality flows from brotherhood—the Christian conception of a common family and one eternal Father.

> 'And this equality can have no meaning except as an equal right for all; nor can there be an equal right for all, which does not allow every individual liberty to act as he pleases. But every individual can enjoy this freedom in reality only when each is restricted from interfering with the freedom of the rest' (*ib.* p. 32).

Co-operation in industrial struggles such as those which the present generation is witnessing between capital and labour imposes restrictions upon liberty. Trade unions break down when the principle of Christian liberty is ignored and the will of the individual is not subordinated to a common purpose. And, as legislative restrictions tend more and more to curtail the liberty of the individual, in other words, as the laws of the State become more socialized, the obligations of Christian liberty 'to seek not its own, but the things of others' are proportionately more binding.

3. Christian liberty in relation to the intellect.—Over against the authority of the State, with which the individual conscience has often found itself in opposition, there is the authority of the Church, to which the individual member is supposed to subordinate his will and judgment. Limits of space prevent a full treatment of the subject of authority in relation to the individual judgment in matters of faith. Suffice it to say that the opponents of Christianity are in the habit of urging from a review of Church history that Christian freedom of thought has never been received with anything but stern measures of repression, that the heretic has frequently been treated as an immoral person, and that on the whole Catholicism has been the foe of human enlightenment and progress (see J. B. Bury, *History of Freedom of Thought*, London, 1914, for a clear, if prejudiced, statement of this point of view). No fair-minded person can deny the general reasonableness of this charge. The necessity of exercising rigid discipline within the system of the Church in the interests of internal order and unity, the exaction of obedience on the part of the hierarchy from each unit as an exercise in self-renunciation not without real spiritual benefit, and the safeguarding of the deposit of faith amid a worldly and corrupt society may be adduced as grounds of self-defence against the common charge; but the fact remains that the Church has often transgressed the spirit and example of its founder in its hostility to new thought and in the repression of rationalism, forgetting that orthodoxy and Christianity are not synonymous terms. Christ's general attitude towards heterodoxy was that of tolerance; this is shown by His reproof of Jewish exclusiveness more by implication than by actual condemnation in such references as we find to the Samaritans in St. Luke's Gospel (10^{33} 17^{16} 9^{51-56}; the reading 'Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of' in the last passage is without strong critical authority, but the fact of His rebuke is recorded in v.^{55}), by His outspoken rejection of narrowness in the passage Lk 9^{50}, 'Forbid him not: for he that is not against you is for you,' and by His emphasis on the ethical rather than the intellectual side of the Christian witness in Jn 7^{17}. To Him 'faith' was not assent to an intellectual proposition or formula, but the spirit of receptiveness in relation to Himself and His teaching.

The convenient distinction between a religion of authority and a religion of the spirit tends to break down in practice. The Society of Friends, without a ministry and without sacraments, yet becomes an organized fellowship with recognized principles ethical and spiritual, which are binding on its members. Authority runs into every sphere of thought as well as into religion. The infallible church of Catholicism is superseded by the infallible book of Protestantism; but, when both forms of authority are discredited, it does not follow that pure subjectivity is the only possible issue. In Christianity there must be a synthesis of the principle of inspiration with that of authority. The day of inspiration, so long as we believe in a Spirit that guides into all truth, is never at an end, while at the same time the corporate witness of the Christian Church in all epochs of its history cannot be ignored. The progress of Christianity depends, therefore, on an adequate recognition of both these factors—the *consensus sanctorum* and the openness of the reason to the light that lighteth every man. In a striking essay on 'The Principle of Authority' by A. E. J. Rawlinson (*Foundations*, London, 1912) it is stated that there are three stages in the life of the educated Christian: (*a*) bondage to authority—the stage proper to childhood; (*b*) the stage of 'abstract freedom,' *i.e.* the assertion of the right to criticize and, if necessary, to deny; leading on to (*c*) the stage of 'concrete freedom,' which is defined as voluntary assent on grounds of reason to what was formerly believed on authority. Many Christians never pass beyond the first stage; intellectually they remain unenlightened, but their religious experience is unaffected. The second stage is that in which Christian liberty comes into play as a factor in our moral and intellectual development. To repress the spirit of inquiry is to

let 'that capability and godlike reason fust in us unused' (Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, IV. iv. 38 f.), to imperil our moral and spiritual health, and to foreclose the possibility of a larger equipment for Christian influence. If the issue on the intellectual side is rejection of the doctrines hitherto accepted on authority, there still remain the witness of life and the experience of the saints. It is no doubt true that Christian experience is bound up with a conviction of the truth of certain doctrines, such as the existence of God, immortality, the divinity of our Lord, and the persistent activity of His spirit; but its moral earnestness and beauty remain as a perpetual challenge to those who reject doctrinal Christianity and thereupon feel justified in belittling its contribution to the ethical progress of humanity. On the one hand, it is possible to combine intellectual suspense and even scepticism with a high-minded allegiance to the moral teaching of Christ, and such inquirers after truth are not to be excluded from the fellowship either of individual Christians or of the organized Christian community in its various forms. On the other hand, the Church may legitimately demand from those to whom it does not refuse the right of private judgment that such judgment shall be exercised with becoming humility.

'He who would teach a new truth or reject an old (and to do so is a vocation to which in every generation some men are called) must both expect to meet in practice with the persecutions by which true prophets are assailed, and must also face the *prima facie* likelihood that his own prophecy may turn out false' (*ib.* p. 380).

Hence in actual practice within the limits of the Christian fellowship liberty of thought is restricted by the collective witness of the saints, by consideration of human fallibility, by the avoidance of arrogance, intolerance, and impatience, and by respect for simple faith which moves on traditional lines. If one may adapt a saying of T. H. Green (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1884, p. 292), the Church is 'a society of which the members owe reciprocal services to each other,' simply as Christian to Christian. There must be no attempt to frown on the mind that is open to the newer light when ethically and intellectually equipped for the re-interpretation of ancient doctrine, nor is it to be forgotten that those who have been affected in spiritual outlook by the critical spirit which has modified the value of time-honoured creeds and formularies may yet be qualified to bring out of the treasury of their wisdom and devotion 'things both new and old.' It is a function of Christian liberty to harmonize *nova et vetera*, as giving their respective witness to the realization in humanity of the ever-developing Christian ideal. But, if the modernist as a reverent seeker after truth is tolerated, he in turn must exercise the grace of patience towards the traditionalist. Christian liberty is a great gift, but Christian charity is a greater.

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